RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, JAIPUR

NARAIN SHANKER & ANR. ETC. ETC.

January 30, 1980

(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]

Motor Vehiclts Act 1939, S. llOA and Constitution of India 1950, Article- 41-Accident claim-State Transport Corpor"tion-Duty of. 14

The respondents lost their limbs in a road accident while travelling in a bus belonging to the petitioner, a nationalised transport system. The plea by the operator to escape the liability for compensation '\\'as that the lights of thebus accidemtl.lly f"iled, which resulted in tlae accide11.t.

The Accidents Claims Tribunal ne.catived the plea and awarded compensation in sums far lowerthan were claiBled by the respondents.

In the special leave petitions to this Court, the petitioner contested the.. application. of the principle of res ipsa loquitur and the quantum of the claim.

Dismisiing the petitions,

HELD : I. (i) It was improper of the Corporation to have tenaciously resisted the claim. [868 Al

(ii) It was ri:ht on the part of the Tribunal to have raised a rebuttable presumption on the strength of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. [868 B]

2. The heads of claim have been correctly appreciated by the Tribunal' and the awards have been moderate. [868 CJ

3. Instead of indulging in wasteful litigation, it would have been more

humane and just, if the Corporation had hastened compassionately to settle the claims so that goodwill and public credibility could be improved. [867 HJ

4. The St0te has a paramount duty, apart from liability foc tort, to make effective provision for disablement in cases of undeserved want-Article 41 of the Constitution states so. r868 A]

5. Nationalisation of road transport should have produced a better sense of social responsibility on the part of the management and drivers.

One of the major purposes of socialisation of transport is to inject a sense of safety, accountability and operational responsibility which may be absent in the 00.se of private undertakings whose motivation is profit n1aking regardless of risk to life. (867 E Fl

6. Common experience on Indian high-ways diclose callousness and blunt~ eel consciousness on the part of public corporations which acquire a monopoly under the Motor Vehicles Act in plying buses.

It is a pity that State Road Transport vehicles should become mobile menaces. [867 G]

CrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION' : Special Leave Petition (Civil} Nos. 6698-6700 of 1979.

R.S.R. TPT. CORPN. v. NARAIN SHANKER (Krishna Iyer, !.) 867

From the Judgment and Order dated 25-10-1978 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 195, 196 and 197 of 1978.

Soli J. Sorabjee Soli. Genl. and Sobhagmal Jain for the Petitioner.

M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.

The Order of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J.-These th}:ee petitions for special leave relate to a road tragedy where many Jost their limbs while travellin~ in a bus belonging to the nationalised transport system of Rajasthan.

A flimsy plea was put forward by the' operator to escape liability for compensac. ti on that the lights of the bus accidentally failed and' thus the unfortunate episode occurred.

Other embellishments were also set up for, the purpose of exoneration.

The Accidents Tribunal was not taken in and, having disbelieved the evidence, awarded compensation in sums far lower than were claimed by the victims.

Two contentions were raised and rightly over-ruled and they have been repeated in the Petition: for special leave and we similarly reject them.

The nature of the accident and the surrounding circumstances are such that the doctrine res ipsa loquitur was rightly invoked by the court.

Indeed, the terrible accidents attributable to reckless driving • and escalating year after year make'oirr high-ways great hazards.

One should have thought that nationalisation of road transport would liavei

produ1:ed a better sense of social responsibility on the part of the, management and the drivers.

In fact, one of the major purposes of socialisation of transport is to inject a sense of safety, accountability and operational responsibility which may be absent in the case of private undertakings, whose motivation is prOfit making reagrdless' of risk to

~ _ life; but co=on experience on Indian high-ways discloses callousness and blunted consciousness on the part of public corporations which acquire a monopoly under the Motor Vehicles Act in plying buses. r It is a thousand pities that our State Road Transport vehicles should become mobile menaces, and we should impress upon them the need to have greater reverence for humai:t life representing, as they do, the valu(}-set of the State itself.

In the present case, the State Corporation put fqrward a false plea and contested the application of the principle of res ipsa /oquitur to avoid liability. It would have been more human~ and just if, instead of indulging in wasteful litigation, the Corporation had hastened compassionately to settle the claims so that goodwill and public credibility could be improved.

After all, the State has a paramount duty, apart

' 868

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1980] 2 S.C.R.

A from liability for tort, to make effective provision for disablemen~ in cases of undeserved want-Aritcle 41 of the Constitution states so. - It was improper of the Corporation to have tenaciously resisted tihe

claim. It was right on the part of the Tribunal to 11ave raised a rebuttable presumption on the strength of the doctrine of res ipsd

B loquitur.

The State Corporation has contested even the quantum of the claim.

Indian life and limb cannot be treated as cheap, at least by State instrumentalities.

The heads of claim hav{l been correctly appreciated by the Tribunal and the awards have been moderate. Here again, the State Corporation should have sympathised with the victims of the C tragic accident and generously adjusted the claims within a short period.

What is needed is not callous litigation but greater attention to th(! efficiency of service, including insistence on competent, cautious and responsible driving.

We have had the advantage of Sihri Soli J. Sorabjee, who repre- D sented the Corporation \vith a characteristic sense of fairness, but we are unable to desist from making_ the above observations which are induced by the hope that nationalised transport se.rvice will eventually establish their superiority over the private system and sensitively respond to the comforts of and avoid injury to the travelling public and the pedestrian users of our highways. ,

We dismiss the Special Leave Petitions.

N.V.K.

- Petitio11S dismissed. -"'

NARAIN SHANKER & ANR. ETC. ETC

January 30, 1980

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

R. S. PATHAK, JJ.

Motor Vehiclts Act 1939

Constitution of India

Article 41

Nationalisation of road transport

Motor Vehicles Act

Soli J. Sorabjee Soli

Sobhagmal Jain

M. N. Shroff

KRISHNA IYER

nationalisation of road transport

Motor Vehicles Act

Sihri Soli J. Sorabjee

N.V.K.


PABITRA N. RANA A v.

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

January 30, 1980

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.] B

Preventive Detention under stk:tion 3(1) of the (7onservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Sniugg/ing Activities Act, 1974-Inordinate and u1W!xplai11cd delay in deciding the representation filed by thei, detenu violateS' _ Article 22(5) of the Constitution and hence vitiates detention. ,

Allowing the Writ Petition, the Court

HELD : Under clauses 4 and 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution tho detenu has a dual right viz.

(i) to have the representation, irrespective of the length of detention, considered by the appropriate Government; and

(ii) to have the representation considered by the Board duly constituted D under the concuned Act. [870 E-F]

Further, the constitutional right to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that the representation must be disposed of as quickly as possible and any unexplained delay would amount to a violt'ltion of constitutional guarantee contained in Article 22(5). [870 F-G]

The obligation of the appropriate detaining authority to take 0. decision on the representation filed by the detenu is quite apart and distinct from its obligation to constitute. a Board and to send the representation to it. The detaining

~- uthdort~ is n?th entitlhed t 1 o wait fbrl Ihde

1 opinio[n 87 o 0 ! 0 theHBo 8 a 7 r 1 d Abu] t has to take ' ds ecmon wit out t e east pOSSI e e ay.

- ,

' ..

Pankaj Kumar Chakraborty & Ors. v. State of West Bengal [1970] I SCR F 543 and Narendra Purushotam Umrao ietc. v. B. B. Gujral and Ors., [1979] 2 SCR 715; relied on.

CRIMINAL ORJGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1376 of 1979.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution).

A. K. Sen and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner.

U. R. Lalit and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAZAL Au, J.-This Writ Petition has been filed with a pljyer that an order of detention passed against the petitioner on the 7th

September, 1979, under s. 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 be quashed.

After the order was served on the detoou he made a representation on the 27th September, 1979 to the Govt. who received it on the 28th September, 1979.

In support of the Rule Mr. A. K. Sen has raised a number of points, but in view of one of them which is to the effect that there has been an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the detaining authority in deciding the representation and that !he detention is therefore vitiated, we need not go into the other points.

On the question of delay the petitioner had expressly taken a plea in para 11 of the petition but in their reply the respondents have not at all explained or detailed any reason why there was inorrlinate delay in disposing of the representation submitted by the detenu to the detaining authority.

The admitted position is that the representation was received by the Government on the 28th September, 1979 and it was rejected on 3rd November, 1979, that is to say, after about one month and five days of the receipt. It is now well settled that any unexplained delay in peciding the representation filed by the detenu amounts to a clear violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and is sufficient to vitiate the detention.

Our attention was drawn by the counsel for the petitioner to a recent decision of this Court in Narendra Purushotam Umrao etc .. v. B. B.

Gujral & Ors.(') where this Court while relying on an earlier decision of this Court in Pankaj Kumar ChakrabortY, & Ors. v. State

of West Bengal(') pointed out that under Clauses 4 and 5 of Art. 22 of the Constitution the detcnu has a dual right, viz.,

1. to have the representation, irrespective of the length of detention, considered by the appropriate Government, and

2. to have the representation considered by the Board duly constituted under the concerned Act.

We might further mention that the constitutional right to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that the representation must be disposed of as quickly as possible and ilny unexplained delay would amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee contained in Art. 22<5).

This Court has also pointed out that the obligation of the appropriate detaining authority to take a decision on the representation filed by the detenu is quite apart

(l) [1979] 2 S.C.R. 315.

-'---·,=~

PAillTRA N. RANA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 8 71

and distinct from its obligation to constitute a Board and to send the representation to it.

The detaining authority is not entitled to wait for the opinion of the Board but has to take its decision without the least possible delay. In Writ Petition No. 246 of 1969 decided -0n September 10, 1969 this Court observed as follows :

"lt is iniplicit in the language of Art. 22 that the appropriate Government, while discharging its puty to consider the representation, cannot depend upon the views of the Board on such representation. It has to consider the representation on its own without being influenced by any such view of the Board. There was, therefore, no reason for the Government to wait for considering the petitioner's representation until it had received tl1e report of the Advisory Board. As laid down in Sk. Abdul Karim & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (supra) the obligation of the appropriate Government under Art. 22(5) is to consider the representation made by the detenu as expeditiously as possible. The consideration by the Government of such representation has to be, as aforesaid i'ndependent of any opinion which may be expressed by the Advisory Board.

The fact that Art. 22 ( 5) enjoins upon the detaining authority to affond to tl1e detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation must implicitly mean that such representation must, when made, considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, otherwise, it is obvious that th~ obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make a representation loses both its purpose and meaning."

The observations extracted above clearly show that the representation must be consiPered by the Government as expeditiously as

possible. Mr. Lalit submitted that the delay in deciding the representation was due to tlle fact tlmt the representation had to pass through various channels and departments before the Government was in a position to decide it. In the first place no such facts have been pleaded in the reply filed by the respondents and, therefore, we cannot entertain the grounds now urged by the e-0uru; el for the Union for the first time in the arguments before us.

Even so it ilppears that at the most the detaiiiliig authority had forwaooed the representation to the Revenue Intelligence whose comments were

received on 16-10-79. Thereafter there was absolutely no justification for any delay in taking a decision on the merit of thi:l representation. Even if we assume that there was some reasonable explanation for the delay from 28th September, 1979 to 16th Octo-

A ber, 1979, there appears to be no good explanation whatsoever for the delay from 16th October, 1979 !O 2nd November, 1979 when the representation was rejected by tlj.e Government. It is manifest that th_e Government was not obliged to waif for the decision of the Board because it had to consider the representation independently of what the Board might say.

In this view of th0 matter, we are B satisfied that there has been unreasonable delay in deciding the representation filed by the detenu and that by itself is sufficient to

render the detention void. For tliese reasons we allow this petition, .) set aside the order of detention and direct that the detcnu be released .... fortliwith.

V.D.K.

Petition allowed.

MGJPF-91 SCI/80-2,500-24-10-80

PABITRA N. RANA

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

January 30, 1980

S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI

P. s. KAILASAM

A. D. KosHAL, JJ.

Activities Act, 1974

Article 22(5)

Article 22

Article 22(5)

[1979] 2 SCR 715

Article 32

A. K. Sen

Harjinder Singh

U. R. Lalit

M. N. Shroff

FAZAL Au

s. 3

A. K. Sen

28th September, 1979

3rd November, 1979

Art. 22(5)

Constitution of India

Art. 22

Art. 22

[1979] 2 S.C.R. 315

September 10, 1969

Art. 22

Art. 22(5)

Art. 22

Lalit


P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM v.

ARUNACHALAM & Ai'IR.

February 1, 1980

[V. R KRISHNA h1m, s. MURTAZA E\ZAL Au, D. A. DESAI,

R. S. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]

Constitution of India 1950, Article 136- Scope of jurisdiction-High Court in appeal setting aside conviction and sentence by trial court for murder- No appeal preferred by government-Private party if could invoke jurisdiction

under Article 136.

Words & Phrases-'Crime'-Definition of.

The petitioner was acquitted by the High Court in appeal, of charges under sections 302 and 148 I.P.C., but the brother of the deceased-not the State nor even the first informant, petitioned this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against acquittal, got leave, had his appeal heard, which was ultimately allowed the court setting aside the judgment of the High Court, and restoring the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under section 302 I.P.C. (Arunachalam v. S. R. Sadhananthan [1979]

3 S.C.R. 482).

The petitioner filed the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, contending :

(1) that Article 136 did not empower the grant of special leave to the brother of the deceased and the grant of special leave by the Court and its entertaining the appeal violated Article 21 of the Constitution, and (2) be fore the Court may grant special leave under Article 136 there must be an antecedent right of appeal absent which the question of leave by the Court does not arise.

Dismissing the petition,

HELD: (per Krishna Iyer, .Murtaza Fazal Ali and Desai, JJ).

1. Justice is functionally outraged not only when an innocent person is punished but also when a gtrilty criminal gets away with it stultifying the legal system.

[877H, 878A]

2. An insightful understanding of the sweep, scope and character of Art. 136

will easily dispel the dichotomy between an antecedent right of appeal and a G subsequent grant of leave.

[878D] ·

3. The jural reach and plural range of the judicial process to remove injustice in a ven society is a sure index of the versatile genius of law-in-action as a delivery system of social justice. Our constitutional order vests in the summit court a jurisdiction to do justice, at once omnipresent and omnipotent but controlled and guided by that refined yet flexible censor called judicial discretion.

B This nidus of power and process, which master-minds the broad observance throughout the Republic of justice according to law, is Art. 136.

[878E-F]

--·---~-----......- -----·

4. In express terms, Art. 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to inter"' fere in suitable cases. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction.

It is residuary power; it is extra-ordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Art. 136. [878G-H, 879A]

5. There is a procedure necessarily implicit in the po\ver vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Art. 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding. fathers unarguabl)' intended in the very terms of Art. 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well-established by precedents in bur jurispru dence.

Judicial discretion is canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity.

[879A-C]

6. It is manifest that Art. 136 is of composite structure, is power-cumprocedure-power in that it vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and proce dure in that it spella a mode of hearing. It obligates the exercise of judicial discretion and the mode of hearing so characteristic of the c-0urt process.

In short, there is an in-built prescription of power and procedure in terms of Art. 136 which meets the demand of A."1. 21. [879E-F]

7. If Art. 21 is telescoped into Art. 136, it follows that fair procedure is imprinted on the special leave that the court may grant or refuse.

With a motion is made for leave to appeal against an acquittal, this Court appreciates the gravity of the peril to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. While conSidering the petition under Art. 136 the courtwill pay attention to the question of liberty, the person who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and his locus standi.and the weighty factors which persuade the court to grant special leave.

[879FG]

8. 'The wider the discretionary power the more sparing its exercise.

The court may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who is not eo

nomine a party on the record.

[880CD]

9. Sometimes indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other times politicisa- F tion of higher functionaries may result in refusal to take a case to this Court under Art. 136 even though the justice of the /is may well justify it.

In the absence of an independent prosecution authority easily accessible to every citizen, a wider connotation of the expression 'standiiig' is necessary for Art. 136 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in which private individualsnot the State alone-may institute criminal proceedings.

[880G-H, 881A]

10. The narrow limits set, into the concept of 'person aggrieved' and 'stand ing' needs liberalisation.

[88 IE]

Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, Attorney-General of the Gambia v.

Pierra Sarr N'Jie, [1961] A.C. 617, Bar Council of Maharashtra v.

M. v.

Dabholkar, [1975] 2 SCC 702 referred to.

(Per Pathak and Koshal, JJ concurring).

1. Article 136 seeks to confer on the Supren1e Court the widest conceivable range of judicial power, making it perhaps among the most powerful courts in the wor]d. 'fhe judicial power reaches out to every judgment, decree, determi-

 .. ,'../ . '

;'ll j

'"i > \< -, : •

~.:f. ·] . ·.·• ·~

SADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Krishna Iyer,!.) 87 5

nation, sentence or order affecting the rights and obligations of persons in civil A matters, of life and liberty in criminal matters as well as matters touching the Revenues of the State. It is an attempt to ensure that the foundations of the Indian Republic, which have been laid on the bed-rock of justice, are not undermined by justice anywhere in the land. , l884CE]

Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. !1950] S.C.R. 459, 474, Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others, [1955] 1 S.f:.R. 267, 2 72, referred to.

2. Article 136 vests in the Supreme Court, a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by grant of special leave. However, a limitation is inbuilt into the jurisdiction of the Court and it flows from the nature and character of the case intended to be brought before the Court, and it requires compliance despite the apparent plenitude of power vested in the Court. When a petition is presented to the Court under Article 136, the Court will have due regard to the nature and character of the cause sought to be brou8ht before it when entertaining and disposing of the petition. [884E-G]

3. A crime. is' an act deemed by Iaw to be harmful to society in general, even though its immediate victim is an individual.

Murder injures primarily the particular victim, but its blatant disregard of human life puts it beyond a matter of mere compensation between. the murderer and the victim's family.

Those who commit such acts are proceeded against by the State in order that, if convicted, they may be punished. No private person has a direct interest in a criminaJ proceeding although exception may be Jnade by the Statute in certain cases.

[885C-FJ

Kenny's Outlines of Crilninal Law, 16th Edn., p. 2 para 3 Blackstos Commentaries, 111 p. 2, Mogul Steamship Co. v. Mc Greger Gew & Co. [1889] 23 QBD 598; referred to.

4. The notion of crime e.s a threat to the whole community is the material counter-part of the formal rule that the State alone is master of a. criminal prosecution.

In a criminal proceeding, the State stands forward as prosecutor on public grounds. No private person has a direct interest in a criminal proceeding, although exception may be made by the statute in ce11ain cases. A criminal prosecution is not intended for the private satisfaction of a personal vendetta or revenge.

In India, the criminal law envisages the State as the prosecutor. !885E-F]

Salmond on.Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. p. 92 para 14 and Current Legal Prob /ems, 1955; Glanville Williams, "The Definition'of Crime", p. 107 at p. 122; referred to.

5. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s. 378, the right of appeal vested in the State has now been made subject to leave being granted to the State by the High Court. The complainant continues to be subject to the prerequisite condition that he must obtain special leave to appeal. The fetters so imposed on the right to appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent 1:::ourt of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of t11e case, even though it is held by a superior court. [886B-C]

A Law Commission of India 48th Report 1972 pp. 17-21 referred to.

6. What follows from the grant of speci6l leave is an appeal, a, nd the jurisdiction must, therefore, be invoked by a petitioner possessing a locus standi re cognised in law. [887F-G] ·

7. Access to the jurisdiction under A.rticle 13 6 cannot be permitted to a private party who seeks to employ the judicial process for the satisfaction of private revenge or personal vendetta. Nor can it be permitted as an instru ment of coercion where a. civil action would lie.

In every case, the Court is bound to consider what is the interest which brings the petitioner to court and whether the interest of the public community will benefit by the grant of special leave. . [887B-C]

8. The Court should entertain a special leave petition filed by a private party, other than the complainant, in those cases only where it is convinced that the public interest justifies an appeal against the acquittal and that the State has refrained from petitioning for special leave for reasons which do not bear on the public interest but are prompted by private influence, want of bona fide and other extraneous considerations. [887E-Fl

9. Tue procedure followed by this Court in disposing of a petition under Article 136 is oonsistent with the procedure contemplated by Article 21 for the Court in exercising its jurisdiction will do so as a court of law following the well-known norms of procedure which have been recognised for long as governing and informing !he proceedings of all courts. Article 21 is, therefore, not violated. [887G-H, 888A]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 355 of 1979.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution) P. R. Mridul, K. Jayaram, K. Ram Kumar and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Petitioner.

Soli l. Sorabjee, Solicitor General, R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, and D. A Desa~ JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. and concurring opinion of R. S. Pathak and A D. Kosha1 JJ. was delivered by Pathak, J.

G KRISHNA IYER, J. Is it constitutionally valid or desirable on principle to permit a private citizen, who has but loO'Se nexus with the victim of a crime, to invoke the special power under Art. 136 of the Constitution for leave to appeal against an acquittal of the alleged criminal thereby p1.1tting in peril his life or liberty in the absence of aµy legislative provision arming such officious outsider with the right to B appeal ? This issue, profound on its face but unsound on reflection, falls fp'r decision in this writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The facts, compressed into a single sentence, are that the pcti-

-- - I

• SADHANANTHAM; v. ARUNACHALAM (Krishna Iyer, l.) 877

tioner was acquitted of a murder charge by the High Court in appeal A but the brother of the deceased-not the State nor even the first inforniant-moved this Court under Art. 136, got leave and had his appeal heard which resulted in the petitioner (accused) being convicted and sentenced to the life term under s. 302 I.P.C. The present contention urged to upset that conviction, is that the leave to appeal and the subsequent proceedings were unconstitutional as violative of Art. 21 B the procedl\Ial 1nagna carta protective of life and liberty-and, therefore, the sentence must fail. This plea, faintly presented before this Court when the appeal was heard, was briefly considered and rightly rejected. This second battle, doomed to fail like the first, demands of

us a condensed ratiocination in negation of the contentioa hopefully urged by Sri Mridul, counsel for the petitioner. . ~

Two inter-laced issues arise and they turn on (a) the content and <:haracter of Art. 136 vis-a-vis Art. 21, and (b) the locus standi of a Good Samaritan, if we may use that expression to refer to a publicspirited citizen seeking to trigger the legal process to see that justice is done to his neighbour.

Article 21, in its sublime brevity, guardians human liberty by insisting on the prescription of procedure established by law, n, ot fiat as sine qua IWn for deprivation of personal freedom. And those procedures so

established must be fair, not fanciful, nor formal nor flimsy, as laid down in Maneka Gandhi's case.(1) So, it is axiomatic that our constitutional jurisprudence mandates the State not to deprive a person of his personal liberty without adherence W fair procedure laid down by . )aw. The question is whether there is any procedure, fair or otherwise, which enables a kindly neighbour who is not a complainant or first informant, to appeal to the Supreme Court against an allegedly erroneous acquittal by the High Court. The corpus juris contains no black-letter law arming any such purely compassionate soul to approach this Court, argues Sri Mridul; and so, his client's liberty has been deprived by a proceeding initiated by someone without any procedure established by law.

We see the dexterity in the advocacy but reject its efficacy. Nor are we impressed with the submission that the brother of

the deceased in the case, or any other high-minded citizen, is an offi cious meddler who has no business nor grievance when the commission of grievous crime is going unpunished. There is a spiritual sensitivity for our criminal justice system which approves of the view that a wrong done to anyone is a wrong done to oneself, although for pragmatic .cun

siderations the law leashes the right to initiate proceedings in sp'me situations. Again, 'justice is functionally outraged not only when an

(1) Maneka Gandhi v. Union oflndia [1978] I SCC 248.

 A innocent person is punished but also when a guilty criminal gets away with it stultifying the legal system. The deep concern cf the law is to track down, try and punish the culprit, and if found not guilty, to acquit the accused.

It is imperative under Art. 21 that there should be some civilised procedure for holding a man guilty and depriving him of his liberty.

Undoubtedly, this Court, if it grants leave under Art. 136 and eventually finds him guilty, deprives him of his liberty; and so the crucial question that falls for decision is as to whether there is any procedure as predicated by Art. 21 independent of or implicit in Art. 136. It is appa- 1 rent that there is no statutory provision which creates a right of appeal in favour of a stranger enabling him to challenge an acquittal by the / High Court. The Criminal Procedure Code does not create such a right pf appeal and, speaking generally, a right of appeal is the creature of statute. So it is submitted that before the court may grant special leave under Art. 136 there must be an antecedent right of appeal, absent which the question of leave by the court does not arise. The argument is ingenious but inference is fallacious.

An insightful understanding of the sweep, scope and character of Art. 136 will easily dispel the dichotpm.y between an antecedent right pf appeal and a subsequent grant of leave, which is the corner-stone of the contention of the petitioner.

The jural reach and plural range of the judicial process to remove injustice in a given society is a sure index of the versatile genius .of law-in-action as a delivery system of social justice. By this standard, our constitutional order vests in the summit court a jurisdiction to do justice, at once omnipresent and omniPiOtent but controlled and guided by that refined yet flexible censor called judicial discretion. This nidus "' (' of power and process, which master-minds the broad observance throughout the Republic of justice according to law, is Art. 136.

Specificity being essential to legality, let us see if the broad spec trum spread-out of Art. 136 fills the bill from the point of view of "procedure established by law". In express tenns, Art. 136 does no~ confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases.

The discretionary dimension is considerable but that relates to the power of the court. The question is whether it spells by implication, a fair proced11re as contemplated by Art. 21. In our view, it does.

Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its liinit, when it chases injustice, in the sky itself. This Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice

SADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Krishna lyer, !.) 8 79

wherever i~ is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Art. 136. Is it merely a power in the Court to be exercised in any manner it fancies'? Is there no procedural limitat¥in in the man ner of exercise and the occasion for exercise ? Is there no duty to Act fairly while hearing a case under Art. 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or, after such gi:ant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly any doubt that there is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Art. 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding fathers unarguably iii.tended in the very terms of Art. 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well-established by precedents in our jurisprudence.

Judicial discretion is canalised authority not arbitrary eccentricity.

Cardozo, with elegant accuracy, has observed(') :

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.

He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant roaming at will in pursuit of his pwn ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion i:1formed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life. Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains."

It is manifest that Art. 136 is of composite structure, is power-cumprecedure--power in that it vests jurisdiction in. the Supreme Court, and procedure in that it spells a mode of hearing. It Obligates the exercise of judicial discretion and the mode of hearing so characteristic of the court process. In short, there is an in-built prescription of power and pmcedure in terms of Art. 13 6 which meets the demand of Art. 21.

We may eye the issue slightly differently. If Art. 21 is telescoped into Art. 136, the conclusion follows that fair procedure is imprinted on

tile special leave that the court may grant or refuse. When a motion is made for leave to appeal against an acquittal, this Court appreciates G the gravity of the peril to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. It is fair to assume that while considering the petition under Art. 136 the court will pay attention to the question of liberty,

the person who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and his locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade the court to grant special leave. When this conspectus of proceS'Sual circumstances and , H

(1) Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of tbe Judicial Process, Yale lrnivcrsity

Press (1921).

\,.

2-138SCI/80

._..,.,,,,....., __ ~--~ --- .. -·-- .•. .....-..-

' c

criteria ply upon the jurisdiction of the court under Art. 136, it is reasonable to conclude that the desideratum of fair procedure implied in Art. 21 is adequately answered.

Once we hold that Art 136 is a comp, osite provision whic1t Veils a wide jurisdiction and, by the very fact of entrusting this unique jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, postulates, inarticulately though, the methodology of exercising that power, nothing nw're remains in tjie objection of the petitioner. It is open to the court to grant special leave :µid the subsequent process of hearing) are well-established. Thus. there is an integral provision of power-cum-procedure which answers with the desideratum of Art. 21 justifying deprivation of life and liberty.

The wider the discretionary power the more sparing its exercise.

Times out of number this Court has stressed that though parties promiscuously 'provoke' this jurisdiction, the Court parsimoniously invokes the power. Moreover, the Qourt may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who is not eo nomine a party on the record. Thns, procedural limitations exist and are governed by well-worn rules of guidance.

Sri Mridul urged that every inquisitive benefactor or offensive adventurer cannot 'rush in' and upset a verdict of acquittal by resort to Art. 136. This is really a matter for exercise of judicial discretion and the Court can be trusted to bear in mind time-honoured practices and the values of Art. 21. But no dogmatic proscription of leave under Art. 136 to a non-party applicant can be laid down inflexibly. For access to justice is not a cloistered virtue.

It is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the pess of the court, especially at the expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maint!)ined and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should uot be granted 'visa'. It is also true that in the criminal jiirisdic- ' lion this strictness applies a fortiori since an adverse verdict from this Court may result in irretrievable injury IP life or liberty.

Having said this, we mnst emphasise that we are living in times when many societal pollutants create new problems of unredre6Sed grievance when the State becomes the sole repository for initiation of criminal action. Sometimes, pachydermic indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other times politicisation of higher functionaries may result in refusal to take a case to this Court under Art. 13 6 even though the justice of the /i$ may well justify it. While "the criminal law should not be used as a weapon in personal vendettas between private indiYiduals", as Lord Sl1awcr01s(') once wrote, in the absence of an indepen-

(1) The Times, 26May1977, 20.

'"' \

. ' .

SADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Knshna Iyer,!.)

88 I

dent prosecution authority easily accessible to every citizen, a wider connotation of the expression 'standing' is necessary for Art. 136 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in which private individuals--not the State alone-may institute criminal proceedings. The Law Reform Commission (Australia) in its Discu8sion Paper No. 4 on "Access to Courts-I Standing: PuWic Interest Suits" wrote: The general rule, at the present time, is that anyone may commence proceedings and prosecute in the magistrate's court. The argument for retention , of that right arises at either end of the spectrum-the great cases al!.d the frequent petty cases. The great cases are those touching government itself-a Watergate or a Poulson. However independent they may legally be any ublic official, police or prosecuting authority, must be subject tp some government supervision and be dependent on government funds; its officers will inevitably have personal !inks with government. They will be part of the "establishment". There may be cases where a decision not to prosecute a case having political ramifications will be seen. rightly or wrongly, as ' politically lllj(l'tivated.

Accepting the possibility of occasional abuse the Commission sees merit in retaining some right of a citizen to ventilate such a matt.er in the courts.

Even the English System, as pointed by the Discussion paper, permits a private citizen to file an indictment. In our view, the narrow limits set, in vintage English law, into the concept of 'person aggrieved' and 'standing' needs liberalisation in our democratic situation., In Dabholkar's case('!. this court imparted such a wider meaning. The American Supreme Court relaxed the restrictive attitude towards 'standing' in the famous case of Baker v. Carr.(') Lord Denning, in the notable case of the Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N lie,(') spoke thus : .... the words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do n, ot concern him;

'Prof.· S. A. de Smith takes the same view(•) : All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public

(I) Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar [1975] 2 SCC 702.

(2) [1962] 369 us 186. q

(3) 1961AC617. {4) Quoted in 'Standing and Justiciability' by V. S. Deshpande Journal of the Indian Law Institute April-June, 1971, Vol.13, No. 2, p.174.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.ll.

 'i\ interest-the desirability pf encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not cpncem him,

B Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note:(')

In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi. It contains an element of the actio popu/aris. This is because it looks beyond the personal rights of the applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by preventing inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their ppwers.

In Dabholkar's case, one of us wrote. in his separate opinion(2)

The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system.

This view is echoed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission.

The crucial significance pf access jurisprudence has been best E expressed by Cappelletti : (3)

The right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rlghts. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection. Such protection, moreover, is best assured by a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement-the most ba\ic

'human right'-of a system which purports to guarantll!! legal rights.

G We are thus satisfied that the bogey of busybodies blackmailing adversaries through frivolous invocation of Art.136 is chimerical.

Access to J W>tice to every bona fide seeker is a democratic dimension of remedial jurisprudence even as public interest litigation, class action.

(1) ibid p. 175.

(2) Krishna Iyer, J. in Bar Counfil of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabho/kar [1'751

2 sec 102 at 120.

(3) Access to Courts-I Satnding : Public Interest Suits p. 3.

SADHANANTHAM V. ARUNACHALAM (Pathak, J.) 883

pro bono proceedings, are. We cannot dwell in the home of processua! obsolscence when our Constitntion highlights social justice as a goal. We hold that there is no merit in the contentions of the Writ petitioner and dismiss the petition.

PATHAK, J : The High Court of Madras in its appellate jurisdiction acquitted the petitioner, Sadhanantham, of charges under s. 302 and s. 148, I.P.C. Arunachalam, a brother of the deceased, petitioned to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the acquittal.

The court granted special leave, and ultimately allowed the appeal, Arunachalam

v. .P.

S. .R.

Sadhanantham(I), and setting aside the judgment of the High Court restored the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under s. 302, I.P.C. The petitioner has filed this writ petition contendihg that the judgment and order of this Court is a nullity and should be set aside.

The principal contention is that Article 136 did not empower this Court to grant special leave to Arunachalam (the third respondent) and the grant of special !"ave by the Court and its entertaining the appeal violates Article 21 of the Constitution.

The maintainability of the appeal on the ground that Arunachalam was not entitled to petition under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave was challenged before the Bench hearing the appeal, but the Bench over-ruled the objection holding that it had ample power under Article 136 to entertain the special leave petition. The learned Judges laid down that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instanoe of private parties.

We have read the judgment of our learned brother V. R. Krishna Iyer, but because of the importance of the question we consider it necessary to set clown our own view.

The expense of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court flows from an entire code of rovisions contained in the Constitution.

It mcludes an appeal on certificate by the High Court under Article 131 that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution in a civil, criminal or other proceeding disposed of by a judgment, decree or final order of a High Court, and an appeal on certificate under Article 133 that the case involves a substantial questioh of law of general importance which calls for decision by the Supreme Court. In a criminal proceeding, disposed of by a judgment or final order or sentence of a High Court, besides cases where the High Court has convicted the accused and sentenced him to death either on reversing in appeal an order of acquittal by

(I) [1979] 3 SC.R. 482.

E ,

tne trial court or on the case bei'ng withdrawn from the snbordiaate court to itself for trial, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court where the High Court "certifies that the case is fit olle' for appeal to the Supl'eme I Court". Article 135 confers jurisdiction and power on the Supreme Court with respect to any matter to which Article 133 or Article 134 does not apply if such jurisdiction and power were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the cQllSti-· tution. Article 13 6 declares :

"136. (1) Notwithstanding anythng in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its disretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India."

j Then follow other provisio'ns to which we need not refer.

Plainly, the jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 seeks to coafer o• this Court the widest conceivable range of judicial power, malcing it perhaps among the most powerful courts in the world. The judicial power reaches out to every judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order effecting the rights and obligatiol:!s of persons in civil matters, ef life and liberty in criminal matters as , well as matters touching the Revenues of the State. It is . an attempt to ensure that the foundations ef the Indian Republic, which have been laid on the bed-rock of justice, are not undermined liy i'njustice anywhere in the land; Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.(I) As the Courtl observed in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh , •Till Others(2).

Article 136 vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by grant of special leave.

Nonetheless, there is a limitation which, in our opinion, is of immediate relevance.

It is a limitation inbuilt into the jurisdiction of the Court and flows from the 'nature and character of the case intended to be brought before the Court. It is a limitation which requires compliance despite the apparent plenitude of power vested in the Court.

When a petition is presented to the Court under Article 136, the Court will have due regard to the nature and chaNcter of the cause sought to be brought before it when entertaiuing a'nd disposing of the petition.

The question is : Does the brother of a deceased person, who llas been murdered, possess the right to petition under Article 136 of tile

(1) [19501S.C.R.459, 474.

(2) (1955) l S.C.R. 267, 272.

~ADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Pathak,!.) 885

Constitution for special leave to appeal against an acquittal of the A accused ? It is a question which touches directly on the na.ture of a crime and of a criminal proceeding.

Several diffurent definitions of a crime have beeh attempted (and there are some jurists who say that it is impossible of definition), but there is broad agreement on one attribute of its nature, that it is an B illegal act which amounts to a wron~ against the public welfare. Mogul Steamship Co. v. Cm Greger Gew & Co.( 1). As a concept, crime has been defined as "any conduct which a sufficiently powerful section of any given community feels to be destructive of its own interests, as endangering its safety, stability or comfort," which "it usually regards as especially heinous and seeks to repress with corresponding severity; C if possible it secured that the forces which the severeign' power in the State can command shall be utilised to prevent the mischief or to punish anyone who is guilty of it."(') Crimes were defined by Blackstone(8) as "the breach and violation of public rights and duties which affect \he whole community." A crime, therefore, is an act deemed by la" to be harmful to society in general even though its D immediate victim is an individual. Murder injures primarily the parti C\llar victim, but its blatant disregard of human file puts it beyond a matter of mere compensation between the murderer and the victim's family.

Those who commit such acts are proceeded against by the State in order that, if convicted, they may be punished. (4) The notion of crime as a threat. to the whole community, is the material E cQlllnterpart of the formal rule that the State alone is master of a criminal prosecution.(') In a criminal proceeding the State

stands forward as prosecutor on public grounds.

No private person has a direct interest in a criminal proceeding, although exception may be made by the statute in certain cases. It is common knowledge that F a criminal prosecution is not intended for the private satisfaction of a personal vendetta or revenge. (6)

In India also, the criminal law envisages the State as the prosecutor.

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the machinery of the

(1) [1889] 23 Q. B. D. 598, 606perLord Eslier M. R.

(2) Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 16th Edn., p. 2 para 3.

(3) Commentaries, III. 2.

(4) Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. p. 92 para 14.

(5) Current Legal Problems, 1955 : Glanville Williams, "1he Defmition of

Crime", p, 107 at p.122. (6} Since the matter is being treated broadly, it is unnecessary to deal here with the distinction between "public" and uprivate" crimes, and the classification of crimes. which the law permits to be compounded.

SUPREMF. COURT REPORTS

[1980] 3 S.C.R.

State is set in motio'n on information received by the police or on a complaint filed by a private person before a Magistrate. If the case proceeds to trial and the accused is acquitted, the right to appeal against the acquittal is closely circumscribed. Under the Code of Criminal Procdure, 1895(') the State was entitled to appeal to the High Court, and the complai'nant could do so only if granted special leave to appeal by the High Court.

The right of appeal was not given to other intrested persons. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure

1973,(2) the right of appeal vesred in the State bas now been made subject to leave being granted to the State by the High Court. The complainant continues to be subject to the pre-requisite condition that he must obtain spocial leave to appeal.

The retters so imposed on the right to appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who h<Js been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court.

The Law Commission of India(3) gave anxious thought to this matter, and while. noting that the Code recognised a few ·xceptions by way of permitting a person aggrieved to initiate proceedings in certain cases and permitting the complainant to appeal against an acquittal with special leave of the High Court, expressed itself against the general desirability to encourng.o cippeals against acquittal. It referred to the common law jurisprudence obtaining in England and other countries where a limited right of appeal against acquittal was vested in the State and where the emphcsis rested on the need to decide a point of iaw of general importance in the intersts of the general administration and proper development of the criminal law.

But simultaneously the Law Commission also noted that if the right to appeal against acquittal was retained and extended to a complainant the law should logically cover F also cases not instituted on complaint. It observed :

"Extreme cases of manifest injustice, where the Government fails to act, and the party aggrieved has a strong foeling

that Che ma'.ter requires further consideration, should not, in our view, be left to. the mercy of the Govcrmnent. To G inspire and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, that limited right of appeal with leave given to a private party should be retained, and should embrace cases initiated on private complaint or otherwise at the instance of an aggrieved person."

(I) S.417.

(?) s. 378.

(3) Forty.eighth Report, 1972, pp. 17~21, paras 43-58.

.,_ - \

. i

SADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Pathak, !.) 887

However, when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was enacted the A

tatute, as we have seen, confined the right to appeal, in the case -Of private parties to a complainant. This is, as it were, a material indication of the policy of the law.

Having regard to the fundamental nature of a criminal proceeding to which rererence has been made, it is now appropriate to examine the consideratio'ns which the Court should keep in mind when entertaining a petition for special leave to appeal by a private party against an order of acquittal.

From what has been said, it is plain that 'access to the jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be pennitted to a

private party who seeks to employ the judicial process for the satisfaction of private revenge or personal vendetta. Nor can it be permitted as an instrument of coercion where a civil action would lie. In every case, the Court is bound to consider what is the interest which brings the petitioner to court and whether the interest of the public community will benefit by the grant of special leaV'e. 'In a jurisprudence which elevates the right to life and liberty to a fundamental priority, it is incumbent upon the court to closely scrutinise the motives and urges of those who seek to employ its process against the life or liberty of another.' In this enquiry, the Court would perhaps prefer to be satisfied whether or not the State has good reason for not coming forward itself to petition for .special leave.

We think that the Court should entertain a special leave petition filed by , a private party, other than the complainant, i'n those cases only where it is convinced that the public interest justifi.cs an appeal against the acquittal and that the State has refrained from petitioning for special leave for reasons which do not bear on the public interest but are . prompted by private influence want of bona fide and other extraneous

considerations.

We would restrict accordingly the right of a private party, other than the complainant, to petition for special leave against an order of acquittal. It is perhaps desirable to keep in mind that what follows from the grant of special leave is an appeal, and the jurisdiction must, therefore, be iJ; ivoked by a petitioner possessing a locus standi recognised in law.

In 'regard to the question whether the proodure followed by this Court in disposing of a petition for special leave under Article 136 is consistent with the procedure contemplated by Article 21, we have

no hesitation in holding that the principle is inbuilt within the terms of Article 136 itself that the Court in exercising its jurisdiction will do H

'.SO as a court of law following the well-known norms of procedure which hav0 been recognised for long as governing and informing the

......... - --

I A proceedings of all courts.

We have no hesitation in holding that Article 21 is not violated.

The petitioner has failed to establish that there is a case for interfering with the judgment of this Court allowing the appeal.

The writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is. no order as to costs.

N.V.K.

Petition dismissed.

P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM

ARUNACHALAM & Ai'IR

February 1, 1980

D. A. DESAI

R. S. PATHAK

A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.

Constitution of India

Article 136

Article 136

sections 302 and 148

I.P.C

Article 136

section 302

I.P.C

[1979]

3 S.C.R. 482

Article 32

Article 136

Article 21

Article 136

Krishna Iyer

.Murtaza Fazal Ali

Desai

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Supreme Court

Article 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 21

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

S. 186

Per Pathak

Koshal

Article 136

Article 136

Article 136

Iaw

India

Salmond

Glanville Williams

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

s. 378

Article 136

Article 21

Article 21

Article 32

P. R. Mridul

K. Jayaram

K. Ram Kumar

Aruneshwar Gupta

Soli l. Sorabjee

R. N. Sachthey

E. C. Agarwala

A. Subhashini

V. R. Krishna Iyer

S. Murtaza Fazal Ali

D. A Desa~

R. S. Pathak

A D. Kosha1

Pathak

G KRISHNA IYER

Art. 136

Art. 32

Art. 136

s. 302

I.P.C

Art. 21

Mridul

Art. 136

Art. 21

Article 21

Maneka Gandhi

Mridul

Art. 21

Art. 136

Art. 21

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 21

Article 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Art. 136

Cardozo

Art. 136

Art. 13

Art. 21

Art. 21

Art. 136

Art. 136

Benjamin Cardozo

Art. 136

Art. 21

Art 136

Art. 21

Art. 136

Art. 21

Art. 136

Art. 13

Art. 136

Law Reform Commission (Australia)

Dabholkar

S. A. de Smith

V. S. Deshpande

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.ll

H.W.R. Wade

Australian Law Reforms Commission

Cappelletti

sec 102

SADHANANTHAM V. ARUNACHALAM

PATHAK

High Court of Madras

Sadhanantham

s. 302

s. 148

I.P.C

Article 136

Arunachalam

s. 302

I.P.C

Article 136

Arunachalam

Article 21

Article 136

Article 136

V. R. Krishna Iyer

Article 131

Article 133

[1979] 3 SC.R. 482

Article 135

Article 133

Article 134

Article 13

Article 136

Article 136

Article 136

Article 136

Code of Criminal Procedure

Salmond

State

Code of Criminal Procdure, 1895

Code of Criminal Procedure

Law Commission of India(3

England

s. 378

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Article 136

Article 136

Article 21

Article 136

Article 21