{"document_id": "1980_2_1005_1014_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SHAH GUMMAN MAL v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 6, l 98U\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosH,\\L, JJ.]\n\nCustoins Act I 962, Section 135 ( 1) (b) & Erh'ence Act, 1872, Sections 106 and 114-Preniises searched-Gold 'biscuits with /oreign niarkings recovered- Accused not disclosing identity of person who gu ve the gold-Whether court can presume that the gold was smuggled and in1ported without permit.\n\nAn offence under section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 is punishable if the offender, acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing or in any other manner deaJ.ing \\vith any goods which he kno\\vs or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111.\n\nSection 111 enumerates the categories. of goods which are imported into India and are liable to confiscation.\n\nThe Central Excise officials searched the house of the appellant and found in a secret chamber of an iron safe, \\vhich was opened by him \\'i'ith the keys in his possession, a. bundle containing 28 gold biscuits and a half biscuit, all of which bore foreign markings. In another secret chamber were found gold earnings in plnstic boxes and a bundle of currency notes.\n\nWhen questioned in the presence of the witnesses he stated that he had been receiving gold biscuits from some unkno\\vn person from Bombay and that the other artides belonged to him and his mother.\n\nHe admitted that be had no general or special permit from either the Reserve Bank of India or the Gold Control Administrator to import or keep foreign gold. The statement of the appellant was recorded.\n\nThereafter the appellant was prosecuted for offences under Section 135(1)(b)(ii) of the Customs Act. 1962 and Section 85(ii) read with Section 8(i) of the Gold Control Act, 1968.\n\nThe Magistrate convicted and sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprison~ ment for nine months under each count. On appeal, the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and sentence under the Gold Control Act as the requisite sanction for prosecution was not accorded, but maintained the conviction and sentence nnder Section 135(i)(b){ii) of the Customs Act, which order was confirmed by the High Court in revision.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant :· G ( 1) that if the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act is not available to the prosecution, then there is no legal evidence to show that the appellant bad any knowledge or had any reason to believe that the goods were imported or were smuggled without a lawful permit and (2) as the case had been going on for eight years, a lenient view on the question of sentence may be taken; while on behalf of the respondent-State it was submitted that the fact that the gold bore foreign markings and was recovered H from the possession of the appellant who had admitted in his statement before the Customs Officers that some unknown person had given it to him,\n\n1006 SUPR1i\\1E C01JR r RLPOR r~ [i 980] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA \\Vould itself raise a suflicient presumption to attribute knov.ll:dge to the a.ppel11.nt that the gold i.vris snuggled wilhvut any permit.\n\n_Dismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: (1) The prosecuti.Jn has clearly proved the charge under Section 135(1) (b)(ii) of the Customs Act. [1014Dl B\n\n(2) The sentence being one only of rigorous imprisonment for nine\n\nmonth~. there i~ no room for any reduction thereof.\n\n[1014E-1\n\n(3) The fact as to ho\\v the appellant came into possession of the gold and whether it was import, d or not being v,, ithin the special knowledge of the appellant, if he frriled to disclose the identity of the person who gave him the gold, it Vias open to the Court to presume under sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act that the appellant kncv..· that the gold in his possession \\vas srnnggled and in1po1te<l without a permit. [lOliJE-_F]\n\n( 4) The broad e!Icct of the application of the basic principles underlying section 106 of the Evidence A.ct would be that the onus is disch:trged if the prosecution ndduces only so. much evidence, circumstantial or direct, as is sufficient to raise a. presumption in its f:ivour \\0vith regard to the existence of facts sought to be proved. [1012F: 0 l.rsarda.r DauTat Rani &: Ors. v. Th~ [h1io11 of India & Or.r. [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 358: Co1111r:i.uiuuer ,)f lncon1t' Tax. , i.Jadras v. lvle.urs Best & Co. [1966] 2 S.C.R. 480: Collector of Cnito1ns, 1'It1dras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormul [1974] 3 S.C.R. 833: Labchand Dl1a11p(lf Si11gh Jain v. -The State of Maharashtra [1975] 2 S.C.R. 907; Bnl:11n(d Ja11111ados Batra v. State o_f ,\\faherashtra [1976] 1 S.C.R. 539 reftrrcd to; Bl'rluun Khurslied Pt'sikaka v. State of Bor11bay rt955] 1 S.C.R. 613; Stat(' of Punjeb v. Uian Ch,,.nd & 01hcrs Ct!. A.\n\nE 195/62 dispocd of on April 2, 1968 di<1tinguishcd.\n\nIn the instant case 1_hough the seizure v.-as not n1adc nnl\"kr Section 111 of the Cu'itoms Act and the prosecution could not press into service the presumption arising from cction 123 of the Customs Act.\n\nIt is proved that the appellant \\V<1~ in th~ possession of gold bicuits with foreign nuukings which were kept in <l •.ccret chambr of the safe. a11d he admitted that the gold was brought from outside the country and given to him by son1ebody, whoe identity be was not prerared to disclose.\n\nThese circumstances are sufficient to raise a presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act so as to attribute knov1edge to the appellant that the gold was smuggled.\n\n[1014B-D]\n\nCRIMINAL -APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 1974.\n\nG Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 10-8-1973 of the Andhrn Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 648/72 and Criminal Revision Petition No. 992/72.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant.\n\nM. A. Khader and Venkatarao & G. N. Rao for the Respondent.\n\nH The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated August 18. 1973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n\nThe facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary to repeat them all over again.\n\nThe appellant was tried by the Magistrate for offences under s. 135 (1) (b )(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962 and s.85(ii) read withs. 8(i) of the Gold Control Act, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for nine months under each count. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently .\n\nSentences of fine were also imposed. The Sessions Judge, on appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence under the Gold Control Act and acquitted the appellant of that charge for the reason that the requisite sanction for his prosecution was not accorded, but maintained the conviction and sentence of the appellant under s. 135 (1) ( b) (ii) of the Customs Act.\n\nThereafter, the appellant went up in revision to the High Court which confirmed the conviction and sentence upheld by the Sessions Judge.\n\nThen the appellant moved this Court and this appeal is by special leave.\n\nThe allegations made against the appellant may be briefly stated.\n\nOn 16-4-1971 P.W. 4, Superintendent of Central Excise issued a warrant (Ext. P-3) authorising P.W. 3 and another Inspectono proceed to the house of the appellant at 6.30 a.m. P. W. 3 calied P.W. 1 and one Nihalchand as mediators and informed them that the accused had concealed gold biscuits of foreign origin in his house and hence it was decided to search his house.\n\nWhen the search was conducted, the accused was directed to produce the gold biscuits of foreign origin\n\nin his possession.\n\nThe accused denied that he possessed any but the E Excise ofticials searched the house and found in a secret chamber of an iiron safe, which was opened by the accused with the keys in his possession, a bundle containing 28 gold biscuits and a half biscuit marked as M. Os. 1-29.\n\nAll these biscuits bore foreign markings.\n\nIn another secret chamber were found gold earrings in plastic boxes and a bundle of currency notes.\n\nThe accused was then questioned in the presence of the witnesses and he stated that he had been recei>-\n\nving gold biscuits from some unknown person from Bombay and that the other articles belonged to him and his mother.\n\nOn being questioned further, the accused admitted that he had no general or special permit from the Reserve Bank of India or the Gold Control Administrator to import or keep foreign gold.\n\nThe statement of the accused was recorded and is marked Ext. P4.\n\nBefore launching a prosecution, the Collector of Central Excise issued a notice calling upon the appellant to show cause why M. Os. 1 to 51 be not confiscated and penalty levied.\n\nThe accused gave his explanation, Ext. P-7.\n\nThereafter, the Collector passed orders of adjudication confiscating the articles and imposed a penalty of Rs. 5,000/.\n\nOn appeal,\n\n10-138 SCI/80\n\n1008 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe confiscation of jewellery and cash was set aside.\n\nSubsequently, PW 5, the Assistant Collector of Customs filed a complaint for the prosecution of the appellant under the Customs Act.\n\nWe have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act was set aside for lack of proper sanction. It is also admitted by the prosecution in the instant case that as no seizure was made in accordance with the provisions of the Customs Act, the presumption under s. 123 thereof was not available to the prosecution.\n\nSection 135(1) (b), under which the appellant has been convicted, runs thus:-\n\n\"135 (1) Without prejudice to any action that may be taken under this Act, if any person-\n\n(b) acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under section 111.\"\n\nAnalysing the essential ingredients of clause (b), it is manifest that before a conviction can be recorded under it, the prosecution must prove that the accused has acquired possession of or is in any way concerned in depositing, keeping, etc., any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under s. 111. Thus in the instant case, as no presumption under s. 123 was available, it was for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the appellant was in possession of smuggled gold knowing full well that it was imported from outside the country so as to fall within the ambit of s. 111.\n\nDr. Chitale, appearing for the , appellant, contended that if the presumption under s. 123 is not available to the prosecution, then there is no legal evidence to show that the appellant had any knowledge or had any reason to believe that the gocds were imported or were smuggled without a lawful permit.\n\nThe counsel appearing for the State, however, submitted that the fact that the gold bore fore; gn markings and was recovered from the possession of the appellant who had admitted in his statement before the Customs officers that some unknown person had given it to him, would itself raise a sufficient presumption to attribute knowledge to the appellant that the gold was smuggled without any permit.\n\nAlthough the question raised by the counsel for the parties is not free from difficulty, an overall consideration of the special facts of the present case would show that there could no difficulty in holding that having regard to the admissions\n\n~.\n\nmade by the appellant and his subsequent conduct, the onus would shift to the appellant to show that the gold found (ram him with foreign markings was imported without any permit to his knowledge.\n\nThis will be the combined effect of the provisions of ss. 106 and 114 of '!he Evidence Act. The matter was considered at great length in the case of Berham Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay(!) where this Court holding that s. 106 could not be construed to place the 'Onus on the accused to prove the prosecution case, observed as follows:-- '\n\n\"Section I 06 of the Evidence Act cannot be construed to mean that the accused has by reason of the circumstance that the facts are especially within his own knowledge to prove that he has not committed the offence. (See Atiygalle v. The King-A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 169, also In re :\n\nKanakasabai Pillai-A. I. R. 1940 Madras 1). It is for the prosecution to prove that he has committed the offence and that burden is not in any manner whatsoever displaced by section 106 of the Evidence Act.\"\n\nThese observations were made wHh respect to the peculiar facts of that case.\n\nIt appears that what had happened in that case was tha~ the appellant was found to be guilty of an offence under the Prohibition Act and the only evidence to prove his guilt was that he was smelling of alcohol.\n\nThis Court held that it was for the prosecution to prove the. contravention of the provisions of the Prohibitpn Act and to prove further that a particular intoxicant which was a liquor under the Act, was consumed by the accused and merely because the accused knew what he had taken (which was a matter within his know- 1edge) could not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving that the liquor consumed was an intoxicant as defined under the Act.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the observations made by this Court regarding the interpretation of s. 106 of the Evidence Act would not apply to the facts of the present case. In the case of lssardas Dau/at\n\nRam & Ors. v. The Union of.India & Ors.(') this Court, after discussing the admitted circumstances of the case, found that the rele- 'Vant pieces of evidence would prove the guilty knowledge of the ac- <CUsed.\n\nThat was a case which arose under s. 178(A) of the Sea -customs ;\\cJ and this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"If the gold now in question had been imported earlier it would be extremely improbable that the gold would remain in the same shape of bars and with the same fineness\n\n\n(2) [1962) Supp. (l) S.C.R. 358.\n\nF •\n\n' c\n\n. F\n\n1 010\n\nSUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1980J 2 s.c.R.\n\nas when imported after the passage of this length of time.\n\nIt was precisely for this reason that at the stage of the enquiry before the Collector the principal point which was urged on behalf of the appellants was to deny that the seized gold was of foreign origin and it is the nature of the defence that accounts for the order of the Collector dealing almost wholly with the consideration of that question. In order to reach his finding about the gold being smuggled, the Collector has referred to the conduct of the appellants . . . . . . These were undoubtedly relevant pieces of evidence which bore on the question regard:ng the character of the gold, whether it was licit or illicit.\n\nLearned counsel is, therefore, not right in his submission regarding the absence of material before the Collector to justify the finding recorded in paragraph 6 we have set out earlier.\"\n\nThe facts of the present case appear to us to be almost on a!I fours with the facts of the case mentioned above.\n\nHere, also, the facts are that gold with foreign marking in the shape of biscuits without indicating any change was recovered from the possession of the appellant.\n\nSecondly, the appellant admitted that the gold was brought from outside the country.\n\nThe appellant further admitted that he did not hold any permit for importing the gold and the plea iaken by him was that some unknown person had delivered the gold to him. In view of these circumstances and the fact as to how the accused came into possession of the gold and whether it was imported or not being within the special knowledge of the accused, if he failed to disclose the identity of the person who gave him the gold, then it was open to the Court to presume under ss. 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act that the appel~ !ant knew that the gold in his possession was smuggled and imported without permit.\n\nIn The State of Punjab v. Gian Chand & Ors. (Criminal Appear No. 195 of 1962 disposed of on 2-4-1968), while examining thtl validity of conviction and sentence under s. 167 ( 81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, this Court held that as the accused did not claim any ownership over the gold and was a bullion merchant, the mere fact that the gold had foreign markings would not be sufficient to prove that the accused had knowledge that the gold was smuggled. In this connection, this Court observed as follows :- •\n\n\"In our view, the High Court was right in its conclusion because the fact that none of the respondents claimed ownership over the said gold could not necessarily mean either that the gold was smuggled gold or that the respondents were\n\n... ;--\n\nin possession thereof with the knowledge that it was so. The fact that the gold has foreign marks stamped on it can only mean that the gold was foreign.\n\nBut since such foreign gold used to be imported before the present restrictions were imposed on its importation, it could have been imported without any violation of law. Consequently, that fact alone would not establish either of the two ingredients of s. 167(81).\"\n\nThe facts of this case are, however, clearly distinguishable from -those of the present case. In the first place, in the case mentioned above, the accused was a bullion merchant and it was in the very nature of circumstances and as a part of his profession, natural for him to be in possession of gold. Secondly, the Court clearly held that during those days foreign gold used to be freely imported in our country and therefore the mere presence of foreign markings would not be snfficient to raise a presumption under s. 106 of the Evidence Act so as to attribute 'knowledge to the accused that the gold was smuggled. In the instant case,\n\nthe facts are quite different and so is the nature of the admission made by the appellant.\n\nIn a later decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Messrs Best & Co.(') this Court observed as •. t , follows :-\n\n\"When sufficient evidence, either direct .or circumstantial, in respect of its contention was disclosed by the Revenue, adverse inference could be drawn against the assessee if he failed to put before the Department material which was in his exclusive posession. The process is described in tl1e law of evidence as shifting of the onus in the course of a proceeding from one party to the other.\"\n\n(It is true that case arose under the provisions of the income Tax Act 1mt the principles laid down by this Court would apply equally to the :facts of the present case. In the case of Collector of Customs, Madras &\n\n-Ors. v. 'D. Bhoormull(') a case under the Customs Act, while dwelling on the nature and purport of the onus which lay on the prosecutfon, cthis Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It cannot be disputed that in poceeding for imposing •penalties under clause (8) of s. 167 to which s. 178-A does not apply; the burden of proving that the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Department. This is a fundamental\n\n\n' c\n\n. D\n\n1012 SUPREME COURf REPORTS\n\n(1980) 2 S.C.R>.\n\nrule relating to proof in all criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, where there is no statutory provision to the contrarary. But in appreciating its scope and the nature of the onus cost by it, we must pay due regard to other kindred principles, no less fundamental, of universal application. One of them is that the prosecution or the Department is not required to prove its case with mathematical precision to a demonstrable degree ............ -All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis, believe in the existence of the fact in issue, Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof, often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case.\"\n\nSimilarly, while dealing with the merits of the case, this Court made the following observations :-\n\n' \"In the case before us, the circumstantial evidence suggesting the inference that the goods were illicitly imported into India, was similar and reasonably pointed towards the conclusion drawn by the Collector .......... The Collector had given the fullest opportunity to Bhoormull to establish the alleged acquisition of the goods in the normal course of business. In doing so, he was not throwing the burden of proving what the Department had to establish,_ on Bhoormull. He was simply giving him a fair opportunity of rebutting the first and the foremost presumption that arose out of the tell-tale circumstances in which the goods were found, regarding 'their being smuggled goods by disclosing facts within his special knowledge.\"\n\nIt was also pointed out that the broad effect of the application of the basic principles underlying s. 106 of the Evidence Act would be that onus is discharged if the prosecution adduces only so much evidence, circumstantial or direct, as is sufficient to raise a presumption in its favour with regard to the existence of the facts sought to be proved.\n\nIn the case of Labchand Dhanpat Singh Jain v. The State of Maharashtra, while this Court was again considering the extent and application of ss. 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act and in this connection, pbserved as follows :-\n\n\"Even if we were to apply the ratio deddendi of Gian\n\n, H Chand's case (supra) in the case before us, we find that the\n\n\n(2) [19751 2 S.C.R. 907.\n\n• t\n\n1.._.\n\nresult would only be that no presumption uruder section 123 of the Act could be used against t4e appellant. We do not think that the High Court or the Magistrate had used this presumption. We fin<rthat they had relied upcn circumstantial evidence in the case to infer the character of the gold re.. covered and the accused's guilty knowledge .......... A reference to lssardas Dau/at Ram & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. ((1962) Supp. (1) S.C.R. 358] is enough to show that the GOnduct of the accused and the incredible version set up by him were enough to saddle the accused with the necessary knowledge of the character of the goods found in his possession. ........................................\n\nAtleast, the burden of proving an innocent receipt of gold lay upcn the appellant under section 106 Evidence Act. The totality of facts poved was enough, in our opinion, to raise a presumption under section 114 Evidence Act t!Jat the gold had been illegally imported into the country so as to (be) covered by section 111 ( d) of the Act. The appellant had not offered any other reasonable exp1anation of the manner in which it was being carried.\"\n\nThe facts in this case appar to be very similar to the facts in the present case. Furthermore, the case of Balumal Jamnadas Batra v. State of Maharashtra(') was also a case under the Customs Act and there also the presumption m1dcr section 123 was not applicable. It was held therein that having regard to the conduct of the accused and nature of the articles me11s rea was established.\n\nIn this connection, this Court observed as follows :--\n\n\"The very appearance of the goods and the manner in which they were packed indicated that they were newly manufactured and brought into this country very recently from another country.\n\nThe il\\scriptions i:>n them and writing on the boxes were par\\s of the state in which the goods in unopened boxes were found from which inferences about their origin and recent import qiuld arise.\n\nThe appellant's conduct, including his untruthful denial of their possession, indicated consciousness of their smuggled character or mens rea.\"\n\nFrom the af0l'esaid case also it would apl\"'ar that this Court was H prepared to draw a presumption against the accused from the fac~ that\n\n(!) [ 1976] 1S.C.R.539.\n\nSUPREME C0URT REPORTS\n\n\nA the articles concerned were concealed and had particular markings and special features and from the nature of the unsatisfactory explanation given by the accused.\n\nWhile it is, therefore, true that in the instant case the seizure was not made under s. 111 of the C\\Jstoms Act and the prosecution could not press into service the presumption arising from s. 123 of the Customs Act, that does not clinch the issue. It is proved that the appellant was in possession of gold with foreign markings which was found to be in the shape of biscuits or bars kept in a secret chamber of the safe, and that the accused admitted that the gold was brought from outside the country and was given to him by somebody whose identity he was not prepared to disclose. Thus, the appellant knew as to who was the person who had given him the gold and if he also knew, as he says, that the gold was smuggled, he must have known whether the person who delivered the gold to him brought it under a permit or without any permit because at the time of the occurrence the import of gold was banned excepting nnder special circumstances.\n\nHaving regard to the totality of the situation, there is no reason why the prosecution would not be entitled to call into aid the combined effect of the presumptions under ss. 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that the prosecution has clearly proved the charge under s. 135 ( 1)\n\n(b) (ii) of the Customs Act.\n\nE It was also contended by Dr. Chitale that as the case had been\n\ngoing on for eight years, a lenient view on the question of sentence may be taken. The sentence being one only of rigorous imprisonment for nine months, we think there is no room for any reduction thereof.\n\nFor the reasons given above, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n\\~--.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "SHAH GUMMAN MAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAH GUMMAN MAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 6, l 98U", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHAH GUMMAN MAL v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 6, l 98U\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosH,\\L, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MuRTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 106 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 135(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429, "end_char": 446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 764, "end_char": 775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 778, "end_char": 789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 850, "end_char": 855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of goods which are imported into India and are liable to confiscation."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1388, "end_char": 1394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When questioned in the presence of the witnesses he stated that he had been receiving gold biscuits from some unkno\\vn person from Bombay and that the other artides belonged to him and his mother."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1524, "end_char": 1545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He admitted that be had no general or special permit from either the Reserve Bank of India or the Gold Control Administrator to import or keep foreign gold."}}, {"text": "Section 135(1)(b)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1717, "end_char": 1738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1746, "end_char": 1757, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 85(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1768, "end_char": 1782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1793, "end_char": 1805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gold Control Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1813, "end_char": 1835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 135(i)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2156, "end_char": 2173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gold Control Act, 1968", "statute": "the Gold Control Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2185, "end_char": 2196, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gold Control Act, 1968", "statute": "the Gold Control Act, 1968"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2383, "end_char": 2394, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 135(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3273, "end_char": 3287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3314, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 106 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3739, "end_char": 3759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 S.C.R. 480", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 S.C.R. 833", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 S.C.R. 907", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4568, "end_char": 4587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 1 S.C.R. 539", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4644, "end_char": 4663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4916, "end_char": 4927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5044, "end_char": 5055, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5787, "end_char": 5800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5805, "end_char": 5817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. A. Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5838, "end_char": 5850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. A. Khader and Venkatarao & G. N. Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Venkatarao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5855, "end_char": 5865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. A. Khader and Venkatarao & G. N. Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5868, "end_char": 5877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. A. Khader and Venkatarao & G. N. Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAzAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5945, "end_char": 5953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated August 18."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6047, "end_char": 6072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6267, "end_char": 6273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.85(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6316, "end_char": 6324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6819, "end_char": 6825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "16-4-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7144, "end_char": 7153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16-4-1971 P.W. 4, Superintendent of Central Excise issued a warrant (Ext."}}, {"text": "Nihalchand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7346, "end_char": 7356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-3) authorising P.W. 3 and another Inspectono proceed to the house of the appellant at 6.30 a.m. P. W. 3 calied P.W. 1 and one Nihalchand as mediators and informed them that the accused had concealed gold biscuits of foreign origin in his house and hence it was decided to search his house."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9128, "end_char": 9139, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9145, "end_char": 9230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9402, "end_char": 9413, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9437, "end_char": 9443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act", "statute": "We have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act"}}, {"text": "Section 135(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9491, "end_char": 9505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act", "statute": "We have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act"}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9924, "end_char": 9935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act", "statute": "We have already mentioned that the prosecution and conviction under the Gold Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10267, "end_char": 10273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10325, "end_char": 10331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10549, "end_char": 10555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10562, "end_char": 10569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chitale, appearing for the , appellant, contended that if the presumption under s. 123 is not available to the prosecution, then there is no legal evidence to show that the appellant had any knowledge or had any reason to believe that the gocds were imported or were smuggled without a lawful permit."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10642, "end_char": 10648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 106 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11768, "end_char": 11783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11944, "end_char": 11950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12518, "end_char": 12529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13395, "end_char": 13401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13749, "end_char": 13758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 106 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15812, "end_char": 15827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2-4-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16041, "end_char": 16049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195 of 1962 disposed of on 2-4-1968), while examining thtl validity of conviction and sentence under s. 167 ( 81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, this Court held that as the accused did not claim any ownership over the gold and was a bullion merchant, the mere fact that the gold had foreign markings would not be sufficient to prove that the accused had knowledge that the gold was smuggled."}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16115, "end_char": 16121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16135, "end_char": 16156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 167(81)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17115, "end_char": 17125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17648, "end_char": 17654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18668, "end_char": 18679, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18885, "end_char": 18891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18901, "end_char": 18907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhoormull", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20214, "end_char": 20223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, while dealing with the merits of the case, this Court made the following observations :-\n\n' \"In the case before us, the circumstantial evidence suggesting the inference that the goods were illicitly imported into India, was similar and reasonably pointed towards the conclusion drawn by the Collector .......... The Collector had given the fullest opportunity to Bhoormull to establish the alleged acquisition of the goods in the normal course of business."}}, {"text": "s. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20779, "end_char": 20785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 106 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21174, "end_char": 21189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21314, "end_char": 21321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "106 and 114 of the Evidence Act and in this connection, pbserved as follows :-\n\n\"Even if we were to apply the ratio deddendi of Gian\n\n, H Chand's case (supra) in the case before us, we find that the\n\n(2) [19751 2 S.C.R. 907."}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21465, "end_char": 21476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22206, "end_char": 22217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22317, "end_char": 22328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22427, "end_char": 22438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22749, "end_char": 22760, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22798, "end_char": 22809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23979, "end_char": 23985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24084, "end_char": 24090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24098, "end_char": 24109, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 106 and 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25012, "end_char": 25027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25135, "end_char": 25141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25164, "end_char": 25175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1015_1023_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES, U.P. AND ORS.\n\nDEEP CHAND AGGARWAL February 6, 1980\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nPublic Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965 (U.P. Act No. XXV of B\n\n1965) Section 3-Whether offends Article -14 of tl:e Constitution.\n\nA sum of Rs. 15000 /- \\Vas advanced to the Re~:pon<lent by the a.ppellant for the purpose of setting up a panel pins and wire nails industry in Hardoi .on the former hyPothecating under the mortgage deed his house by way of security for the loan.\n\nThe respondent committed default in repayment of the loan.\n\nThe State Government was compelled to take coercive measures to :oecover the ha.lance of the amount due and payable under the <leed as if it were an arrear of land revenue by resorting to section 3 of the Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965 read with sections 279/281 of the\n\nU.P.\n\nZamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.\n\nThe respondent, therefore, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the file of the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) questioning the competence of the revenue authorities to recover the balance of the amount due under the , deed as if it were an arrear of land revenue on the ground of violation of Article- 14 of the Constitution.\n\nFollowing the decision of this Court in Northern India Calere.rs P. Ltd. and Anr. v. Stute of Punjab and Anr., [1967] 3 SCR 399 (which held the field at that time and since overruled) the High Court declared that Section 3 of the Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution and quashed the recovery proceedings initiated by the revenue authorities.\n\nAllowing the appeal by certificate, the Court\n\nHELD : Section 3 of the Public Moneys (Recove1y of Dues) Act 1965 which enables the State Government to recover the sums advanced under the circumstances mentioned therein, as if these were arrears of land revenue cannot be held to be discriminatory and viblative of Article 14 of the Consti- F tution. [10230-El\n\n(a) Section 3 ( 1) ( c) of the Act provides that \\vhere any person is a party to a.ny agreement providing that any money payable thereunder to the State Government shall be recoverable as arrear of land revenue and such person makes any default in repayn1ent of the Joan. or advance or any instalment thereof then the arrear due and payable by hin.1 may be recovered as if it G were an arrear of land revenue by issuing a certificate to the Collector. 1 The remedy of the State Government to recover the amount by instituting a <Uit also remains unaffected by the Act. [l019G-Hl\n\n(b) There is reasonable basis for the classification made by the statute and that the classification does haVe a reasonable relation to the object of the statute. The Act is passed with the object of providing a speedier remedy to the State Government to realize the loans advanced by it ' or by the ff\n\n~Jttar Pradesh Financial Corporation.\n\nThe State Government while advancing loans does not act as an ordinary banker with a view to earning interest.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1980] 2 S.C.R\n\nOrdinarily it advances Joans in order to assist the people financially in establishing an industry in the State or for the development of agriculture,. anima1 husbandry and for such oth;:r purposes which would, advance the economic well-being of the people.\n\nThe amounts so advanced are repayable in easy instalments with interest which would ordinarily be lower than the rate of interest payable on loans .advanced by banking institutions which are run on commercial lines.\n\nThe loans are advanced from out of the funds of the State in \\Vhich all the people of the State are vitally interested.\n\nMoneys advanced by the Statt: 'Government have got to be recovered expeditiously so that' fresh advances may be made to others who ha.ve not~ yet received finar.cial assistance from the State Government.\n\nIf the State Government should resort to a remedy by way of a suit on the mortgage deeds or\n\nonds executed in its favour, the realization of the amounts due to the Government is bound to be dela.yed resulting in nonavailability of sufficient funds in the. hands of the State Government for advancing fresh loans. It is with the object of avoiding the usual delay involved in the disposal of suits in civil Courts and providing for an expeditious remedy, th€ Act has been enacted. In the instant case, the mortgage deed provided that the amount due thereunder could be realised as if it were an arrear of land revenue; and [1020B-G]\n\n(c) The 1nere fact that there is no express provision in the Act containing guidelines to the authorities concerned regarding the (,,:ircumstances under which the amounts couhl be realized by resorting to the procedure piescribed for recovering arrears of land revenue, however, in the circumstance of the case is not sufficient to hold that section 3 of the impugned Act confers\n\nrbitrary power on the Sta.te Government and makes a hostile discrimination.\n\nThe A.ct which is passed with the object of providing a speedier ren1edy itself provides sufficient guidance to the officer concerned as to when he should resort to the re1nedy provided for.\n\n[1021A-C]\n\nShri Mannalal and Anr. v. Collector of Jhalwar and Ors, [1961] 2 SCR 962; Lachhn1an Das on behalf of Firn1 Tilak Ram Bux v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1963] 2 SCR 353 and Magan/a/ Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bo1nbay and Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 1 followed.\n\nF CIVIL APPELLATE JUR!SDJCTJON; Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 18-8-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 334 of 1963.\n\nG. N. Dixit and 0. P. Rana for the Appellants.\n\nH. K. Puri for the Respondent.\n\nG The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMJAH, J.-This appeal by certificate involves the question whether section 3 of the Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965 (U.P. Act No. XXV of 1965) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') offends Article 14 of the Constitution and it arises in the H following circumstances.\n\nThe respondent is a resident of Railwayganj, Hardoi in the State of Ultar Pradesh.\n\nHe applied to the Government of Uttar Pradesh\n\n_, I\n\nfor a loan of Rs. 15,000/ for the purpose of setting up a panel pins and wire nails industry in Hardoi.\n\nThe State Government which was interested in the industrial development of the State accordingly advanced the loan of Rs. 15,000 to t)1e respandent under a mortgage deed dated March 10, 1960.\n\nThe respondent was permitted to repay the loan in ten half-yearly instalments commencing from May 1, 1962 together with interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum calculated from March 25, 1960.\n\nTc:: mortgage deed provided that the respondent should spend Rs. 7 ,000 out of the loan advanced on the purchase of machineries for manufacturing panel pins and wire nails and the balance of Rs. 8,000 on the construction of a building for the purpose of the said industry and for no other purpose.\n\nThe respondent also agreed to observe truly the Uttar Pradesh Rules for the Advance of Loan for Developing Cottage Industries in the Rural Area promulgated by the State Gove=ent and also to permit the Direc!or of Industries, U.P. or any official deputed by him to inspect his accounts for the purpose of verifying whether the amount borrowed had been utilised for the specified purpose.\n\nThe respondent hypothecated under the deed his house by way of security for the loan.\n\nClause ( 8) of the mortgage deed, however, inter alia provided that if any of the instalments payable by the respondent as mentioned in the deed was not paid .on the stipulated date then the entire amount due llllder the deed could be recovered by the State Government as arrears of la11d revenue. The 111ortgage deed was signed by the Director of Industries, U.P. on !Jehalf of and acting llllder t_he !!Uthority of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh and the respondent.\n\nThe respondent committed default in repayment of the loan.\n\nThe State Gove=ent was, therefore, compelled to take coercive measures to recover the balance of the amount due l!nd payable under the deed as if it were an arr?ar of land revenue, by resorting to section 3 of the Act read with sections 279 I 281 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.\n\nAt the request of the Director of Industries, U.P., the Collector of Hardoi initiated steps to recover the balance of the amount due under the deed as an arrear of land revenue.\n\nPursuant to the order of the Collector, the Tahsi!dar of Hardoi issued an order of attachment dated March 12, 1968 of the house of the respondent and also issued a warrant of arrest of the respondent to recover the amount llllder the provisions governing the procedure prescribed for realising land revenue.\n\nImmediately thereafter, the respandent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the file of the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) in writ petition No. 334 of 1968 questioning the competence of the revenue authorities to recover the\n\nff,\n\n1018 SUPREME COlrRT iEPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA the balance of the amount due under the deed as if h were an arrear of land revenue.\n\nJn that petition, the respondent contended that the Act was discriminatory and was, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that the State Government had two remedies available to it in law-one by way of a suit for recovery of the mortgage money and another under the Act which authorised it to recover the amounts due as if they were arrears of land revenue, that the remedy under the Act was more onerous than a suit so far as the respondent was concerned and that there were no guidelines in law as to the circumstances in which the State Government could\n\nC resort to the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe Director of Industries, U.P. ]!nd the revenue authorities who were impleaded as respoadents in the writ petition contended that the provisions of the Act did not offend Article 14 of the Constituti.on.\n\nFollowing the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd., & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr.(') the High ourt dec- 'f) Jared that section 3 of the Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution by providing an additional remedy to the State Government over and above the remedy by way of a suit, leaving it to the unguided discretion of the State Government to resort to one or the other and that the remedy available under the Act was more drastic or prejudicial to the party concerned thrin the suit.\n\nAccordingly the High Court quashed the recovery proceedings initiated by the revenue authorities. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the Director of Industries, U.P. and the revenue authorities have come up in appeal to this Court.\n\nThe impugned Act was passed in the year 1965 to provide for speedy recowry of certain classes of dues. payable to the State or to the Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation.\n\nThe Act CQntains three sections.\n\nThe first section deals with the title of the Act and extent of its operation.\n\nT11e second section is the definition clause Section 2 (b) of the Act defines the expression 'financial assistance' asi\n\nany financial assistance (i) for establishing. expanding or running any industrial undertaking; or (ii) for purposes of vocational training; or (iii) for the development of animal husbandry; or (iv) for purposes of any other kind of planned development; or ( v) for relief against distress. Section 3 of the Act with which we are now concerned reads as follows :-\n\n\"3. Recovery of certain dues as arrears of land revenue-\n\n\nDIRECTOR 'oF INDUSTRIES v. DEEP CHAND (Venkataramia/1, J.)\n\nI 0 J 9\n\n(1) Where any person is party- A\n\n(a) to any agreement relating to a loan, advance or grant given to him by the State Government or the Corporation by way of financial assistance, or\n\n(b) to any agreement r\"lating to a guarantee given by the State Government or the Corporation in respe.ct of a loan raised by an industrial concern, or\n\n(c) to any agreement providing that any 111_oney payable thereunder to the State Government shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue, and such person-\n\n(i) makes any default in repayment of the loan or advance or any instalmen~ thereof, or\n\n(ii) having become liable under the conditions of the grant to refund the grant or any portion thereof, makes any default in repayment of such grant or portion or instalment thereof, or\n\n(iii) otherwise fails to comply with the terms of the agreement,-\n\nthen, in the case of the State Government, such officer as may be authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette and in the case of the Corporation, the Managing Director thereof, may, without prejudice 10 any other mode of recovery under any other law for !he time being in force, send a certificate to the Collector, mentioning the sum due from such person and requesting that such sum together with costs of the pro• ceedings be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue.\n\n(2) The Collector on receiving the certificate shall proceed to recover the amount stated therein as an arrear of land revenue.\"\n\nIt may be seen that section 3 (1) ( c) of the Act provides that where any person is a party to any agreement providing that any money payable thereunder to the State Government shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue and such person lllllkes any default in repayment of the loan or a<lvance or 'any instalment thereof then the arrears due and payable by him may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land reve11ue by issuing a certificate to the Collector.\n\nThe remedy of the State Government to recover the amount by instituting a suit also remains unaffectc{I by the Act.\n\n1020 SUPREME COURT RfPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C .. R.\n\nAt the outset, it has to be stated that the decision of this 'Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd., & Anr. (supra) is overruled by this Court in Magan/al Chhaggan/al (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors.(') The question for determinatiO!ll in this case is whether section 3 of the impugned Act violates Article 14 of the Constitution. In order to decide this question, it is necessary to determine the object of the Act and whether the classification made between the State on the one hand and others who have also advanced moneys under mortgage deeds bears any reasonable relation to the object of the statute.\n\nT11e Act is passed with the object of providing a speedier remedy to che State Government to realize the loans advanced by it or by the Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation.\n\nThe State Government while advancing loans does not act as an ordinary banker with a view to earning interest.\n\nOrdinarily it advances l.oans in order to assist the people financially in establishing an industry in the State or for the development of agriculture, animal husbandry and for such other purposes which would advance the economic well-being of the people.\n\nThe amounts so advanced are repayable in easy instalments with interest which would ordinarily be lower than the rate of interest payable on loans advanced by banking institutions which are run on commercial lines. The loans are adYanced from out of the funds of the State in which :ill the people of the State are vitally interested.\n\nMoneys advanced by the State Government have got to be recovered expeditiously so that fresh advanc.es may be made. to others who have not yet received financial assistance from the State Government. If the State Government should resort to a remedy by way of a suit on the mortgage deeds or bonds executed in its favour, the realization of the amounts due to the Government is bound to be delayed resulting in non-availability of sufficient funds in the hands of the State Government for advancing fresh loans. It is with the object of avoiding the\n\nusual delay involved in the disposal of suits in civil courts and providing for an expeditious remedy, the Act has been enacted. In the instant case, the mortgage deed provided that the amount due there.- under could be realised as if it were an arrear of la,1d revenue. It cannot, therefore, be said that there is no reasonable basis for the classification made by the statute and that the classification does not have a reasonable relation to the object of the statute.\n\nIt is also argued that the impugned Act does not provide any H guidelines to the authorities concerned regarding the circumstances under which the amouJJ1'1. could be realized by resorting to the pro-\n\n(l) [ 1975] 1 S.C.R.\n\n' i\n\ncedure prescribed for recovering arrears of land revenue. It is no doubt true that there is no express provision in the Act containing such guidelines.\n\nThat, however, in the circumstances of the case is not sufflcient to hold that section 3 of the impugned Act confers arbitrary power on the State Government and makes a hostile discrimination.\n\nUnder section 3 of the Act, the Collector can proceed to realize the amount due as arrears of land revenue only on the basis of a certificate issued by an officer as may be authorised in that behalf by the State Gove=ent mentioning the sum due from any person referred to therein.\n\nSuch officer is expected ordinarily to avail himself of the speedier remedy provided under the statute. We are of the view that the Act which is passed with the object of providiug a speedier remedy itself provides sufficient guidance to the officer concerned as to when he should resort to the remedy provided by it. As observed by this Court in Magan/al Chhgganlal (P) Ltd.'s case (supra), one expects the officer concerned to avail himself of the procedure prescribed by the Act and not to resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary civil court. In that case, the legality of the provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 and the provisions contained in Chapter VA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 which provided a speedier remedy to recover possession of premises belonging to the State Government and the Bombay Municipal Corporation which were in unauthorised occupation of any person was questioned on the ground that the remedies under the said provisions were more onerous than the remedy by way of a suit which was also available to the State Government and the Corporation.\n\nWhile upholding the above provisions, Alagiriswami, J. who spoke for the majority observed thus :\n\n\"The statute itself in the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of eviicting un' authorized persons occupying them.\n\nThis is a sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the power has been conferred.\n\nWith such an indication clearly given in the statutes one expects the officers concerned to avail themselves of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court.\n\nEven normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to gtet possession of the property quickly and the other which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter. Administrative officers, no\n\n1022 SUPREME CCuRl' REJ>OR15 [1980] 2 s.c.R.\n\nless than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal to hold that an administrative officer would in laking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Government proporty or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts in one case and to tbc ordinary Civil Courts in the other. The provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion.\n\nIn considering whether the officers would be discriminating between one set of persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human behaviour and not behaviour which is abnormal.\n\nIt is not every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account. This is not one orf those cases where discrimination i~ writ large on the face of the statute.\n\nDiscrimination may be possible but is very improbable. And if there is discrimination in actual practice this Court is not powerless.\n\nFurthermore, the fact that the Legislature considered that the ordinary procedure is insufficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorised occupants of Government and Corporation property and provided a special speedy procedure therefor is a clear guidance for the authorities charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised occupants. We therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the majority in the Northern India Caterers' case.\n\nCertain provisions similar to the Act impugned in this case enabling a State Government to recover the amounts due to it by resorting to a speedier remedy have been upheld by this Court in two cases--Shri Manna Lal & Anr. v. Collector of Jhalawar & Ors.(') aT'd Lachhman Das 011 behalf of firm Tilak Ram Ram Bux v. State of Punjab & Ors.(2). Jn the case of Shri Ma11na Lal & Anr. (supra) the facts, were these : The Jhalawar State Bank was originally a Bauk belonging to the princely State o[ Jhalawar. Its assets, including moneys due to it, became vested in the United State of Rajasthan under the convenant executed by the Ruler -Of Jhalawar along wih other Rulers by which the United State of Rajasthan was formed.\n\nOn the promulgation of the Constitution of India, the United State of Rajasthan became the State of Rajasthan in the Indian Union and all its assets including the Jhalawar State Bank and its dues vested in the State of Rajas'.han.\n\nIn that case the question which arose for consideration was whether\n\n(I) [1961] 2S.C.R.962.\n\n\n' •-.:\n\nmoneys which had been advanced by the Jhalawar State Bank could be recovered by taking pr9ceedings under the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act.\n\nThis Court held that the amounts could be recovered by the State of Rajasthan after the Bank had become vested in it as a public demand under the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act and that the said Act did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution even though it provided a special facility to the Government as a banker for the recovery of the bank's dues for the Government could legitimately be put in a separate class for this purpose.\n\nIn the latter case i.e. the case of Lachhman Das on behalf of Firm\n\nTilnk Ram Ram Bux (supra), the right of Patiala State Bank to recover the amounts due to it under the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act was questioned.\n\nThis Court hdd that the Bank established by a State had distinctive features which differ entiated it from other Banks and formed a category in itself and the Act in setting up separate authorities for determination of disputes and in prescribing a special procedure to be followed by them for the recovery of the dues by summary process could not be considered to be discriminatory.\n\n• We are, therefore, of the \\'tiew that section 3 of the Act which\n\n~.·\n\nenables the State Government to recover the sums advanced under the circumstances mentioned therein as if they were arrears of land revenue cannot be held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition. Since the High Court disposed of the case on the basis of the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. & Anr. (supra) which has since been overruled, We make no order as to co,.sts.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n11-138 SCI/80\n\nA I\n\nF I", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES, U.P. AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES, U.P. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DEEP CHAND AGGARWAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEEP CHAND AGGARWAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 6, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DEEP CHAND AGGARWAL February 6, 1980\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D. A. 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Act No."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5789, "end_char": 5798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hardoi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent is a resident of Railwayganj, Hardoi in the State of Ultar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Ultar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6071, "end_char": 6084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent is a resident of Railwayganj, Hardoi in the State of Ultar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6105, "end_char": 6132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He applied to the Government of Uttar Pradesh\n\n_, I\n\nfor a loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "March 10, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 to t)1e respandent under a mortgage deed dated March 10, 1960."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6619, "end_char": 6633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was permitted to repay the loan in ten half-yearly instalments commencing from May 1, 1962 together with interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum calculated from March 25, 1960."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7843, "end_char": 7856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uthority of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh and the respondent."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8135, "end_char": 8144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 279", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8166, "end_char": 8178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": 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"Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10143, "end_char": 10153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10655, "end_char": 10659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the Director of Industries, U.P. and the revenue authorities have come up in appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10861, "end_char": 10896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "payable to the State or to the Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11058, "end_char": 11067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11425, "end_char": 11434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13143, "end_char": 13152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14050, "end_char": 14059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14089, "end_char": 14099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16763, "end_char": 16772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16884, "end_char": 16893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Magan/al Chhgganlal (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17507, "end_char": 17535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by this Court in Magan/al Chhgganlal (P) Ltd.'s case (supra), one expects the officer concerned to avail himself of the procedure prescribed by the Act and not to resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary civil court."}}, {"text": "Chapter VA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17847, "end_char": 17903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Alagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18327, "end_char": 18339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While upholding the above provisions, Alagiriswami, J. who spoke for the majority observed thus :\n\n\"The statute itself in the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of eviicting un' authorized persons occupying them."}}, {"text": "Ma11na Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21088, "end_char": 21098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the case of Shri Ma11na Lal & Anr. ("}}, {"text": "Jhalawar State Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21142, "end_char": 21161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra) the facts, were these : The Jhalawar State Bank was originally a Bauk belonging to the princely State o[ Jhalawar."}}, {"text": "United State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21290, "end_char": 21315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its assets, including moneys due to it, became vested in the United State of Rajasthan under the convenant executed by the Ruler -Of Jhalawar along wih other Rulers by which the United State of Rajasthan was formed."}}, {"text": "Jhalawar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21362, "end_char": 21370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its assets, including moneys due to it, became vested in the United State of Rajasthan under the convenant executed by the Ruler -Of Jhalawar along wih other Rulers by which the United State of Rajasthan was formed."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21473, "end_char": 21494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21988, "end_char": 22006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court held that the amounts could be recovered by the State of Rajasthan after the Bank had become vested in it as a public demand under the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act and that the said Act did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution even though it provided a special facility to the Government as a banker for the recovery of the bank's dues for the Government could legitimately be put in a separate class for this purpose."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22150, "end_char": 22160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lachhman Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22410, "end_char": 22422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the latter case i.e. the case of Lachhman Das on behalf of Firm\n\nTilnk Ram Ram Bux (supra), the right of Patiala State Bank to recover the amounts due to it under the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act was questioned.", "canonical_name": "Lachhn1an Das"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23039, "end_char": 23048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Patiala State Bank to recover the amounts due to it under the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act", "statute": "Patiala State Bank to recover the amounts due to it under the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23265, "end_char": 23275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Patiala State Bank to recover the amounts due to it under the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act", "statute": "Patiala State Bank to recover the amounts due to it under the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act"}}, {"text": "Northern India Caterers Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23510, "end_char": 23546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the High Court disposed of the case on the basis of the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. & Anr. ("}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1024_1027_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "102.J\n\nSUBHASH CHANDRA A.\"lD ORS.\n\nSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 12, 1980\n\n[V. R KRISHNA !YER AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.J\n\nMotor Vhicles Act, 1939, Section 51(2)-Wlzether Regional Transport Authority in1posing a condition that no permit shall be renelved in respect of vehicles wlticli are 7 years old is ultra-vires Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution-Con1peterzcy of the R.T.A. to inzpose such a condition.\n\nDismissing the special leave petition, the Court\n\nHELD : 1.\n\nJ\\lere lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism writ large on s. 51(2) (x). If Indian life is not ultra vires Indian law every condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision.\n\n[1025G]\n\n2. Section 51(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public safety, not piivate profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure except the pressure of social justice to Indian lives moving in D buses, \\Valking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killerroad nccident-is to be awarded death sentence, s. 51 and like provisions must receive severe enforcement. In this spirit-although backtracking from 4-year-old models to 7-year-old models-the state imposed condition. 18.\n\nSection 51(2)(x) authorises the imp6st of \"any condition\" of course having a nexus with the statutory purpose.\n\nHuman safety is one such purpose.\n\n(10250-F, H]\n\n3. From the point of view of the human rights of road users, the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdic~ tion and not to prescribed such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty.\n\nThere is no conflict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition as an additional requirement a.nd safety factor in the shape of the year and the model.\n\nThis i<; an extra measure, a further insurance against machine failure and cannot contradict the 'fitness' provision.\n\n[11260, 1027A-B]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition No. 1262 of 1980.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 19-2-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 184 of 1975.\n\nG S. N. Kaicker, Mrs. S. Markendeya and S.\n\nMarkendeya for the Petitioners.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-An order draped in relative brevity is sufficient since we are refusing leave to appeal although the issue raised is the vires of a provision.\n\nAfter due fulfilment of the obligation for oral hearing, we have considered the impact of two earlier decisions cited by Shri Kaicker sup-\n\n-~ ~-\n\n• .. ._._\n\nI .\n\nSUBHllSH CHANDER v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1025\n\n1Posedly striking a nate conlrary to the judgment un<ler attack but feel\n\nI\\. free-why, bound-to dismiss th' petition for special leave not merely ''1 because the High Court is right but because justice to the travelling public-a lost cause 011 our made roads-conscientises to that course.\n\nTersely put, the petitioner is the grantee of permits to ply minibuses as contract carriages and in the grant a condition has . been fastened that the vehicle shall not be more than seven years old.\n\nCondition No. 18, relating to Mini-Buses Contract Carriage permits, .and the source of power, s. 51 (2 )(x) read thus : That the vehicle covered by the permit shall be not more than fO'ur years old counted from the date of registration at any time during \\he validity of the permit. 51 (2) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a contract carriage permit, may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely :- •\n\n(x) any other conditions which may be prnscribed.\n\nSection 51 (2) (x) any other.\n\n\"Four years' have been relaxed to seven years since September 23, 1978, the beneficiaries being the bus owners and the potential victims being the unknown casualties who have no 'poor lobby' power.\n\nThe State must remember that it has responsibilities not merely to mini-bus owners, but also to avoid the daily tragedies on the Indian high ways under the lethal wheels of these whirling carriages. Section 51 (2)\n\nof the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public safety, not private profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure except the pressure of social justice to India'n lives moving in buses, walking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer-road .accident-is to be awarded death sentence, s. 51 and like provisions\n\nmnst receive severe enforcement. In this spirit--although backtracking from 4-yearold models to 7-year-old models-the state imposed -condition 18.\n\nThis was challenged artfully but unsuccessfully before. the High Court and is attacked before us as ultra vires s. 51 (2) of the Act. We will examine briefly the submission to reach the conclusion that mere lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism writ large on s. 51 (2) (x). If Indian life is not ultra vires Indian Jaw every condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision.\n\nThis perspective of social justice simplifies the problem and upholds the High Court.\n\nSection 51 (2)'(x) anthorises the impost of any condition, of course, H having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human\n\nsafety is Olle sucli purpose. The State's neglect in this area of policing\n\n1026 i<UPREME COURT REPORT; i [1980] 2 s.c.R;\n\npublic transport is deplorable but when it does act by prescribing a condition the court cannot be persuaded into little legalism and harmful' negativism. The short question is whether the prescription that the bus shall be at a seven-year old model one is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and i\\s passengers' comparative safety and comfort on our chaotic highways. Obviously, it is. The older the model, the less the chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote comfort. Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and strong, less likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less susceptible to wear and tear and moral fatigue leading to unexpected collapse.\n\nWhen we buy a car or any other machine why do we look for the latest model ? Vintage vehicles are good for centenarian display of curios and cannot but be mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected highways. We have no hesitation to hold, from the point of view of the human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe s11ch safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty.\n\nTwo decisions-Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate(') and In re: Ramesh Chandra Tewari etc.(') were cited as striking a con-· trary note. The first deals withs. 48(3) of the Act and prescription of the model or year of the make was held ultra vires because, lexically read, it was held that the expression specified description in s. 48(3) did not cover, according to dictionaries, the year of manufacture of the vehicle.\n\nWe extract Black's Law Dictionary on 'description' to show how the model of a vehicle is obviously a facet of its description .. 'Description' means : (\")\n\nA delineation or account of a particular subject by the recital of its characteristic accidents and qualities.\n\nSo, dictionary versus dictionary leaves the matter at large, apart from the plain function of the court to gather the meaning, not nnder the dictatorship of dictionaries but guided by the statutory purpose with- . out being deflected by logamachic exercises, the mischief to be countered and the public interest to be advanced. We are clear that a later model is a better safeguard and, more relevantly to the point, the year of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the description. ------\n\n(1) AIR 1967 All. 129.\n\n(2) Civil Misc. Writ No. 7317 of 1975 of Allahabd High eourt (unreported).\n\n(3) p, 532.\n\n• -\n\nSUBHASH CHANDER v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1027\n\nThe unreported ruling in Civil Writ No. 7317 of 1975 interprets\n\n'l!. 38 of the Act and the non-issuance of the fitness certificate because the model was not recent enough. May be the vehicle, regardless of the year of its make, may be fit and the refusal to certify fithess merely because it is old may not always be right. But we see no conflict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition, as an additional requirement and safety factor, in the shape of the year of the model. This is an extra measure, a further insurance against machine failure and cannot contradict the 'fitness' provision.\n\nMore reasons are, superogatory, less discussion will leave the Jaw -0bscure. We hold the ratio df the impugned ruling to be right and refuse leave to appeal.\n\n:S.R.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "J\n\nSUBHASH CHANDRA A.\"lD ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUBHASH CHANDRA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 12, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 12, 1980\n\n[V. R KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 51(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 314, "end_char": 327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 51(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 547, "end_char": 555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 51(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 701, "end_char": 714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Motor Vhicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1038, "end_char": 1043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 51(2)(x)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1212, "end_char": 1228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "G S. N. Kaicker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2065, "end_char": 2080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. N. Kaicker, Mrs. S. Markendeya and S.\n\nMarkendeya for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. Markendeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. N. Kaicker, Mrs. S. Markendeya and S.\n\nMarkendeya for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nMarkendeya"}}, {"text": "S.\n\nMarkendeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G S. N. Kaicker, Mrs. S. Markendeya and S.\n\nMarkendeya for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "S.\n\nMarkendeya"}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2183, "end_char": 2195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-An order draped in relative brevity is sufficient since we are refusing leave to appeal although the issue raised is the vires of a provision.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Kaicker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After due fulfilment of the obligation for oral hearing, we have considered the impact of two earlier decisions cited by Shri Kaicker sup-\n~ ~-\n\n• .. ..\n\nI ."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2539, "end_char": 2551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUBHllSH CHANDER v. U.P. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1025\n\n1Posedly striking a nate conlrary to the judgment un<ler attack but feel\n\nI\\. free-why, bound-to dismiss th' petition for special leave not merely ''1 because the High Court is right but because justice to the travelling public-a lost cause 011 our made roads-conscientises to that course.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3148, "end_char": 3153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3618, "end_char": 3628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 23, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3701, "end_char": 3719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Four years' have been relaxed to seven years since September 23, 1978, the beneficiaries being the bus owners and the potential victims being the unknown casualties who have no 'poor lobby' power."}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4047, "end_char": 4057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4070, "end_char": 4094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4673, "end_char": 4678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5068, "end_char": 5078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6512, "end_char": 6515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramesh Chandra Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two decisions-Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate(') and In re: Ramesh Chandra Tewari etc.(')"}}, {"text": "s. 48(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6900, "end_char": 6908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1028_1036_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RALLIS lNDIA LTD: v.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 12, 1980\n\n[R. S. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSIIAL, JJ.]\n\nCentral Sales Tax Act 1956-Section 15(b )-Scope of.\n\nOn the ground that the dealers have not charged and collected Central' Sales Tax during the period !st April, 1969 to 9th June, 1969 tho Commercill<l Tax Officer, allowed exemption under section 10 of the Central Sales Tax Act in respect of certain turn-over of the appellant which included the price realised on account of inter-state sales. In respect of a second set of transactions which involved the purchase value of cotton sold during the: yer through inter-state sales the Commercial Tax Officer held that the appellant 'vas entitled to exemption under the proviso to section 6 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act.\n\nIn 1972 section 15(h) of the Central Act \\\\'as amended with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1958 and in 1974 section 6 of the State Act was amended with retrospective effect from the same date.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner of commercial Taxes revised the assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer passed under the State Act on the ground that in view of the provisions of section 6 as amended in 1974 the appellant was not entitled to any exemption during the above period. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the pellant'S appeal on the view that section 6 of the State Act did not talk of any exemption either before or after its amendment in 1974. The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal holding that the exemption granted by the C.T.O. was p<itcntly \\vrong.\n\nDismissing the Appeal,\n\nHELD: 1. Section 10 of the Central Act Vlhich inakcs no reference to any tax leviable under a State Act can be of no assistance to the appellant.\n\nGranting that the appellant did not collect any tax under the Central Act during the period in question on the ground\" that no, such tax could have been levied or collected so that it becomes fully entitled to the benefit of the exemption enacted by the1 section, that \\Vould only niean that central sales tax cannot be charged from it in respect of sales covered by the section. No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act in respect of such sales and the appellant couid not derive any benefit from section 10 of the Central Act in the matter of its assessment under the State Act.\n\n[I033G-H]\n\n2. In so far as the a-ssessment under the State Ac.:t is concerned all that the C, T.O. could have meant by granting exemption \\Vas that the appellant H became liable to pay a tax under the opening para. of the section; but that since the appellant wa-s also entitled to a refund of sucll tax the same was taken to have been paid by and refundedto it. The assessment order made- I\n\nRALLIS INDIA LTD. v. ANDHRA PRADESH (Kasha!, ], ) 1029\n\nunder the proviso to section 6 of the State Act and section 15 (b) of the A Central Act as they stood then was unexceptionable.\n\n[1034E-F]\n\n3. Under section 6 as amended the. liability to tax rcn1ained uncht.nged but thci entitlen1ent to refund v1as abolished and was substituted by a right to reimbur.sen1ent of the tax \\\\'hich arose only if the concerned goods \\Vere later on sold in the course of inter-state trade under the Central Act and tax under that A.ct was paid in respect thereof.\n\nSuch reiniburs.ement would not be available merely because the goods in question had been sold in the course of inter-state ttade or commerce when they \\Ve1e not subjected to tax under the Central Act. No such tax was paid. The proviso to section 6 as amended in 1974 can be of no assistance to the appellant. [1035A-B]\n\n4. The language of claue (b) of section 15 of , the Central Act is the same as that of the amended proviso to secti6n 6 of the State Act.\n\nIt clearly means that the tax under the State Act wouJd be rei1nhursible only to at dealer who has paid tax under the Central Act in respect of the sale\n\nof the goods in question in the course of inter-state trade or commerce.\n\n[1035C-D]\n\n5. The argun1ent that the Deputy Commissioner had no power to cancel the order of refund is fallacious.\n\nHe has done nothing rnore than to revise an order of the C.T.O. which has been varied only in so far as it was not in conformity with the law deemed to have been prevailing on the date of the assessment by virtue of the retrospective amendment of section 6 of the State Act. The Deputy Commissioner had not only the power but was duty bound to strike down the order of refund as being illegal. [1035F-Gl\n\n6. Rule 27 A can be of little help to the appellant inasmuch as even if it can be constn1ed as laying down something in its favour, the rule ca-nnot\n\noverride the. provisions of the Act.\n\n[1036A]\n\nDaita Suryanarayana and Con1pany v. State of Andlzra Pradesli 39 S.T.C, 500 approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1897 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 19-9-1977 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision Pe'.iti011 No. 66/76.\n\nS. T. Desai, T. A. Ra111achandra11, Mrs. J.\n\nRamachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant.\n\nT. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThe question which falls for determination in the G appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh against its judgment dated the 19th September, 1977 is whether the appellant which is a limited company is not liable to make good to the State Sales Tax authorities the amount of sales tax leviable under sectio'n 6 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the A. P. Act) in respect of the turn-over cover- H ing the purchase by th3 petitioner of cotton during the period 1-4-1969 to 8c6-1969, which turn-over had been exempted from sales tax by\n\n' F\n\nJ H\n\nthe Commercial Tax Offic-cr, No. II, Guntur (C.T.O. for short) in his assessment order dated the 30th of April, 1971.\n\n2. Two assessment orders were passed by the C.T.O. on the date last mentioned. One of them covered the turn-over of the appellant liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act (heminafter referred to as the Ce:Jtral Act). That turn-over included a sum of Rs. 2(J.61,166 which represented the price realised on account of inter-state sale during the period 1-4-1969 to 9-6-1969.\n\nIn respect of this amount the order made by the C.T.O. was :\n\n\"The dealers have not charged and collected Cen'ral saks Tax for the period from 1-4-69 to 9-6-69.\n\nThe twnover of Rs. 26,61,166.33 upto 9-6-')9 is allowed excmpc1on in view of section 10 of Central Sales Tax Amendment Act.\"\n\nThe second assessment order was passed under the A.P. Ac'. and therein the C.T.O., while considering a sum of Rs. 51,87,879/- being the purchase value of cotton sold during the year through inter-state sale, remarked that the appellant was entitled to 'exemption' nnder the proviso to section 6 of the A. P. Act in respect thereof. He linalisecl the assessment accordingly.\n\n3. In the year 1972, clause (b) of section 15 of the Central Act was amended retrospectively so as to be effective from 1st October, 1958.\n\nTwo years later, section 6 of the A.P. Act was also amonded and made effective from the same date.\n\nOn the 21st of August, 1974, the Deputy Commissio'ner (Commercial Taxes) hereinafter called the D.C.C.T.) issued a notice to the appellant calling upon it to show cause why the 'exemption' granted to it by the C.T.O. should not bo cancelled.\n\nAfter !€ceiving the appellanfs reply, the D.C.C.T. revised the assessment order dated 30th of April, 1971, passed under the A.P. Act and held that in view of the provisions of section 6 thereof as amended in 1974 the appella'nt was not entitled to any 'exemption' in respect of the purchase price (amounting to Rs. 23,00,057/-) of cotton sold by it in the course of interstate trade for Rs. 26,61,166/- during the period 1-4-1969 to 8-6-1969. The order of the D.C.C.T. was challenged by the appeallant in an appeal which was diSmissed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribu'nal, Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter called the Tribunal) on the 30th of August, 1976, mainly on the ground that section 6 of the AP. Act did not talk of any 'exemption' either before or after its amendment in 1974.\n\nThe appellant sought a revision of the Tribunal's order by the High Court nnder section 22 (I) of the A.P. Act but remained unsuccessful as the High Court was of the opinion (for\n\n' 411\n\nwhich it relied upon Vadivelu Chetty v. Commercial Tax Officer,\n\nTirupathi(') and Daita Suryanarayana and Company v.\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh( 2 ) that the exempt>on granted by the C.T.O. was 'patently wrong'.\n\nThe High Court however granted a certificate declaring the case to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 133(1)(c) of the constitution of India read with section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\n4. In ord•\"r to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the\n\n~I\" appellant it is necessary to examill'e the various relevant legislative i( : provisions which are set out below :\n\nSection JO of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the 1969 Act).\n\n\"10.\n\nExemption from liability to pay tax in certain . cases.\n\n(1) Where any sale of goods in the course of interstate trade or commerce has been effected during the period between the 10th day of November, 1961, and the 9th day of June, 1969, and the dealer effecting such sale has not collected any tax under the principal Act on the ground that no such tax could have been levied or collected in respect of such sale or any portion of the turn-over pelating\n\nto such sale ahd no such tax could have been J.cvied or collected if the amendments made in the principal Act by this Act had not bc•cn made, then, notwithstandi'ng anything contained in section 9 on the said amendments, the dealer shall not be liable to pay any tax under the principal Act, as ame'nded by this Act, in f'spect of such sale or -such part of the turnover velating to such sale.\n\n(2) For the purposes of sub-scction(l), the burden of proving that no tax was collected under the principal Act in respect of any sale referred to in sub-section (I) or in respect of any portion of tho turn-over relating to such sale shall be o'.n the dealer effecting such sale.\"\n\nSection 6 of the A. P. Act as on 30-4-1971\n\n\"6. Tax in respect of declared goods-Notwithstanding anything contained in 5ection 5, the sale or purchase of declared goods by a dealer shall be liable to tax at the rate, and only at th~ point of sale or purchase, specified against\n\n(I) 50 S.T.C. 176.\n\n(2) 39 S.T.C. 500.\n\nA each in the Third Scheduk, on his tur\"n-over of such sales or purchases for each year irrespective of the quantum of his turn-over in such gocic:!s; !lnd the tax shall be assessed, levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed :\n\nProvided that where any such goods on which tax has been so levied are 5old in the course of inter-state trade or commerce, the tax so levied shall be refunded to such, person, in such manher and subject to such conditions as. may be prescribed.\"\n\nThe proviso to section 6 o/ the A. P. Act as amended in 1974 retrospectively with effect from 1-l0-1958.\n\n\"Provided that whene any such goods on which a tax has been so levied are sold in the course of inter-state trade or commerce and tax has been paid under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. in respect of the sale of such goos in the course of inter-stat•e trade or commerce the tax so levied shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce, in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.\"\n\nSub-rule (I) of rule 27-A of the Rules framed under the A.P. Act as on 30-4-1971\n\n\"Where any tax has been levied and collected under section 6 in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are subsequently sold in the course of int•er.,; tate trade or commerce, the tax so levied and collected shall be refunded to the person in the manner and subject to the conditions specified in sub-rules (2) to (4).\"\n\nSub-rule (I) of the said rule 27 A after its amendment 1-8-1974\n\n\"Whef'e any lax has been levied ahd collected under G section 6 in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are subsequently sold in the ccurse of inter-state trade or commerce,. the tax so levied and collected shall be reimbursed to the person in the manner and subject to the cohditions specified iu sub-rules (2) to ( 4) : H Provided that the refund shall not IJ.o made unless the tax payable under !hoc Central Sales Tax Act 1s paid.\"\n\nClauses (a) and (b) of section 15 of the Central Act av in force on 30-4-1971\n\n\"15. Restrictions and conditions in regard to tax 011 sale or purchase of declared goods within a State-Every sales tax law art' a State shall, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely :-\n\n(a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such goods inside the Slate shall be levied only i\"n respect of the last sa1c or purchase inside the State and shall not exceed two per cent of the sale or purchase price.\n\n(b) where a tax has be•cn levied under that law in respect of the sal•c or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter-state trade or commerce, the tax so kvied\n\n10 33\n\nshall be refunded to such person in such manner D• and subject to such conditions as may be provided in any law in force in that State.\" Clause (b) of section 15 of the Ce11tral Act as amended in 1972 retrospectively with effect from 1-10-1958\n\n\"(b) where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchas•c inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade or commorce, and tax has been paid under this Act in respect of tho sale of such goods in the course of inter-satc trade or con1metce, the tax levied under such law shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be provided\n\nin any law in force i\"n that State.\"\n\n5. Section 10 of the 1969 Act makes no reference at all to any G, tax leviable under the State Act. It concerns itself only with the tax payable under the Central Act which it calls the 'Principal Act' and sayc, that a dealer shall not be liable to pay any such tax for the period between 10-11-1964 and 9-6-1969 if certaih conditions arc satisfied.\n\nMuch reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant on this section which, in our opinion, however, is of no aSJSistance to H him. It may be taken for granted that the appellant did not collect any tax uhder the Central Act on the sale of goods effected by it in\n\nthe course of inter-state trade during the period 1-4-1969 to 9-6-1969 on the ground that no such tax could have been levied or collected in respect of such sale, so that it becomes fully entitled to the benefit of the exemption enacted by the section; but that would only mean that Central sales tax cannot be charged from it in respect of such sale.\n\nAs it is, no demand has been made from it for any tax leviable under the Central Act in respect of such sale and we do not see how the appel; ant could benefit from the said section 10 in the matter of its assessment for the period in question under the A.P. Act.\n\n\"' All tha:t we are concerned with is the liability of the appellant to pay tax on the purchase of cotton which it sold during that period in the course of into::r-state trade and that is a matter which has to be decided with reference to section 6 of the A.P. Act, rule 27-A extracted above and section 15 of the Central Act.\n\n6. As on 30-4-1971 the provisions of section 6 of the A.P. Act laid down that if goods were sold in the course of inter-state trade or c01mnerce and tax had been levied on the sale or purchase thereof uuder that Act, the dealer concerned would be entitled to refund of such tax.\n\nAs on the date of assessment therefore the appellant was within its rights to claim refund of any tax that it was liable to pay on the purchase of cotton later sold by it in the course of i\"nter-state trade; and although the section did not talk of any 'exemption', all that the C.T.O. could have meant by granting the appellant 'exemption from the tax was that it became liable to pay a tax under the opening para of the section but as it was also e\"ntitled to a refund of such tax, the same was tak•cn to have been paid by and refunded to it.\n\nAs the section then stood therefore the assessment order was unexceptionable.\n\nThis was also the position Ul)Cfor clause (b) of ./ section 15 of the Central Act the language of which is practically the same as of the proviso to section 6 of the A.P. Act.\n\n7. The matter however docs not end there as the amendment of section 15 of the Central Act in 1972 and that of section 6 of the' A.P.\n\nAct in 1974 made a real difference which appears to ns to be an insur- G mountable hurdle in the way of the •appellant's stand being accepted. As already stated, both the amendments were retrospective so as ta be effective from the 1st of October, 1958. That means that the law to be applied to the assessment finalised through the two orders dated 30th of April, 1971, by the C.T.O. was that as modified by the two amendments. Of course we are here concerned only with the order of assess- :n ment made under the A.P. Act. That order would be good if it is in conformity with the provisions of the amended section 6 of the A.P.\n\nAct but not otherwise. Under the amended section the liability tb tax\n\n., •\n\nremained unchanged but the entitlement to refund was abolished and A was substituted by a right to reimbursement of the tax which arose only if the concerned goods were later on sold in the course of inter-state trade or commerce under the Central Act and tax under that Act was paid in respect thereof. Such reimbursement would not be avaia!able merely because the goods in question had been sold in the course of inter-state trade or commerce when they were not subjected to tax under the Central Act. Admittedly no such tax was paid by the appellant in the course of inter-trade on goods regarding the purchase of which , reimbnrsement of the tax leviable under the A.P. Act is claimed. The '.'1\" proviso to section 6 as amended in 1974 therefore is of no assistance _.ill.. to it.\n\n~-J\n\n8. Nor does the amended clause (b) of section 15 of the Central\n\n--: 1\n\nAct come to the appellant's aid, as the language used therein, for all practical purposes, is the same as that of the amended proviso to section 6 of the A.P. Act and clearly means that the tax under the A.P.\n\nAct would be reimbursibk only to a dealer who has paid tax under the Central Act in respect of the sale of the goods in question m the course of inter-state trade or commerce .\n\n9. Faced with the above situation, Mr. Desai, Learned counsel for the appellant, pressed into service a novel contention to the effect that the appellant was not asking for any reimbursement or refund, that it was the D.C.C.T. who had cancelled the order 0! refund (inherent in the 'exemption' granted by the C.T.0.) and that there was no provision authorising the D.C.C.T. to force the appellant to return any amount paid to it as a refund. The argument is obviously fallack>us.\n\nThe D.C.C.T. has done nothing more than to revise an order of the C.T.O. which has been varied only in so far as it was not in conformity with the law deemed to have been prevailing on the date of the assessment by virtue of the retrospective amendment of section 6 of the A.P.\n\nAct. It is conceded by Mr. Desai that the 'exemption' has to be regarded as a composite order of levy plus refund. That part of it which granted a refund was illegal under the amended proviso to section 6 of the A.P. Act inasmuch as no reimbursement was due in respect of goods on which tax under the Central Act had not been paid.\n\nThe D.C.C.T. therefore had not only the power but was duty-hound to strike down the order of refund as being illegal. The order of the C.T.0. as revised by the D.C.C.T. thus is reduced to an order merely of levy of the tax due under the opening paragraph of section 6 of the A.P. Act so that the appellant becomes liable to pay such tax.\n\n10. The only other argument put forward by Mr. Desai in support •f the appeal rested on the provisions of rule 27-A above extracted in\n\n\\ its un-amended form.\n\nThe rule can obviously be of no help to him inasmuch as even if it can be construed as laying down something in kvour of the appellant it cannot override the provisions of the Act under which it is framed. No amount of argument would make a rule override or control the legislative enactment under the authority of which it comes into being and that is why the rule was amended in 1974 so as to conform to the parent statute.\n\n11. It may be stated that at one stage of the argument Mr. Dai drew our attention to the fact that by reason of the amendments made in the statute law and the consequent demand by the D.C.C.T. for the refunded amount the appellant had been placed under a burden which did not fall on those who collected the Central sales tax from the purchasers and paid it to the Government because they were held entitled to refund of the tax under tke A.P. Act even though they had not paid anything out of their own pocket as tax under the Central Act. However, as he did not challenge the constitutional validity of any of the amended sections he did not pursue the matter further and we need take no further notice of it.\n\n12. We mighl.. mention here that Daito Suryanarayana <1nd Company's case (supra) on which the High Court rclied i11 support of the impugned judgment takes a v.iew of the law which is in conformity with the opinion expressed above by us and we unreservedly approve of the same.\n\n13. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "RALLIS lNDIA LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RALLIS lNDIA LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 12, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RALLIS lNDIA LTD: v.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\nFebruary 12, 1980\n\n[R. S. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSIIAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 15(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 345, "end_char": 355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 363, "end_char": 384, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 756, "end_char": 777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 15(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 788, "end_char": 801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "1st October, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1972 section 15(h) of the Central Act \\\\'as amended with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1958 and in 1974 section 6 of the State Act was amended with retrospective effect from the same date."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 896, "end_char": 905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1343, "end_char": 1352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1599, "end_char": 1609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Granting that the appellant did not collect any tax under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1737, "end_char": 1810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2117, "end_char": 2191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2269, "end_char": 2279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act", "statute": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2823, "end_char": 2832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act", "statute": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2854, "end_char": 2864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act", "statute": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2951, "end_char": 2960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act", "statute": "No demand had been made from it for any tax Jeviable under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Vere later on sold in the course of inter-state trade under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3166, "end_char": 3241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3535, "end_char": 3544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vere later on sold in the course of inter-state trade under the Central Act", "statute": "Vere later on sold in the course of inter-state trade under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3649, "end_char": 3659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vere later on sold in the course of inter-state trade under the Central Act", "statute": "Vere later on sold in the course of inter-state trade under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4347, "end_char": 4356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4971, "end_char": 4979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, T. A. Ra111achandra11, Mrs. J.\n\nRamachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ra111achandra11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 5002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, T. A. Ra111achandra11, Mrs. J.\n\nRamachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J.\n\nRamachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, T. A. Ra111achandra11, Mrs. J.\n\nRamachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Tandon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5030, "end_char": 5042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, T. A. Ra111achandra11, Mrs. J.\n\nRamachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5063, "end_char": 5088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5094, "end_char": 5109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5175, "end_char": 5181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J.\n\nThe question which falls for determination in the G appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh against its judgment dated the 19th September, 1977 is whether the appellant which is a limited company is not liable to make good to the State Sales Tax authorities the amount of sales tax leviable under sectio'n 6 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the A. P. Act) in respect of the turn-over cover- H ing the purchase by th3 petitioner of cotton during the period 1-4-1969 to 8c6-1969, which turn-over had been exempted from sales tax by\n\n' F\n\nJ H\n\nthe Commercial Tax Offic-cr, No."}}, {"text": "30th of April, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5890, "end_char": 5909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II, Guntur (C.T.O. for short) in his assessment order dated the 30th of April, 1971."}}, {"text": "One of them covered the turn-over of the appellant liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 6087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1-4-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6268, "end_char": 6276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(J.61,166 which represented the price realised on account of inter-state sale during the period 1-4-1969 to 9-6-1969."}}, {"text": "9-6-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6280, "end_char": 6288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(J.61,166 which represented the price realised on account of inter-state sale during the period 1-4-1969 to 9-6-1969."}}, {"text": "1-4-69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6434, "end_char": 6440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of this amount the order made by the C.T.O. was :\n\n\"The dealers have not charged and collected Cen'ral saks Tax for the period from 1-4-69 to 9-6-69."}}, {"text": "9-6-69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of this amount the order made by the C.T.O. was :\n\n\"The dealers have not charged and collected Cen'ral saks Tax for the period from 1-4-69 to 9-6-69."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of them covered the turn-over of the appellant liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "One of them covered the turn-over of the appellant liable to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6544, "end_char": 6575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6864, "end_char": 6873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Amendment Act", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6989, "end_char": 6999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Amendment Act", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7111, "end_char": 7120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Amendment Act", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "21st of August, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 21st of August, 1974, the Deputy Commissio'ner (Commercial Taxes) hereinafter called the D.C.C.T.) issued a notice to the appellant calling upon it to show cause why the 'exemption' granted to it by the C.T.O. should not bo cancelled."}}, {"text": "D.C.C.T.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7479, "end_char": 7487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "€ceiving the appellanfs reply, the D.C.C.T. revised the assessment order dated 30th of April, 1971, passed under the A.P. Act and held that in view of the provisions of section 6 thereof as amended in 1974 the appella'nt was not entitled to any 'exemption' in respect of the purchase price (amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7613, "end_char": 7622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Appellate Tribu'nal, Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7979, "end_char": 8024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the D.C.C.T. was challenged by the appeallant in an appeal which was diSmissed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribu'nal, Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter called the Tribunal) on the 30th of August, 1976, mainly on the ground that section 6 of the AP."}}, {"text": "30th of August, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8066, "end_char": 8086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the D.C.C.T. was challenged by the appeallant in an appeal which was diSmissed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribu'nal, Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter called the Tribunal) on the 30th of August, 1976, mainly on the ground that section 6 of the AP."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8114, "end_char": 8123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8298, "end_char": 8308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8714, "end_char": 8727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court however granted a certificate declaring the case to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 133(1)(c) of the constitution of India read with section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "article 133(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8734, "end_char": 8751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8791, "end_char": 8802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8806, "end_char": 8833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "10th day of November, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Where any sale of goods in the course of interstate trade or commerce has been effected during the period between the 10th day of November, 1961, and the 9th day of June, 1969, and the dealer effecting such sale has not collected any tax under the principal Act on the ground that no such tax could have been levied or collected in respect of such sale or any portion of the turn-over pelating\n\nto such sale ahd no such tax could have been J.cvied or collected if the amendments made in the principal Act by this Act had not bc•cn made, then, notwithstandi'ng anything contained in section 9 on the said amendments, the dealer shall not be liable to pay any tax under the principal Act, as ame'nded by this Act, in f'spect of such sale or -such part of the turnover velating to such sale."}}, {"text": "9th day of June, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9346, "end_char": 9367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Where any sale of goods in the course of interstate trade or commerce has been effected during the period between the 10th day of November, 1961, and the 9th day of June, 1969, and the dealer effecting such sale has not collected any tax under the principal Act on the ground that no such tax could have been levied or collected in respect of such sale or any portion of the turn-over pelating\n\nto such sale ahd no such tax could have been J.cvied or collected if the amendments made in the principal Act by this Act had not bc•cn made, then, notwithstandi'ng anything contained in section 9 on the said amendments, the dealer shall not be liable to pay any tax under the principal Act, as ame'nded by this Act, in f'spect of such sale or -such part of the turnover velating to such sale."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9774, "end_char": 9783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10264, "end_char": 10273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30-4-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10297, "end_char": 10306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 6 of the A. P. Act as on 30-4-1971\n\n\"6."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11089, "end_char": 11098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-l0-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11168, "end_char": 11177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proviso to section 6 o/ the A. P. Act as amended in 1974 retrospectively with effect from 1-l0-1958."}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11338, "end_char": 11365, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11771, "end_char": 11780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-8-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12143, "end_char": 12151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-rule (I) of the said rule 27 A after its amendment 1-8-1974\n\n\"Whef'e any lax has been levied ahd collected under G section 6 in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are subsequently sold in the ccurse of inter-state trade or commerce,."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12207, "end_char": 12216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12605, "end_char": 12626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12661, "end_char": 12671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13651, "end_char": 13661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-10-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13734, "end_char": 13743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (b) of section 15 of the Ce11tral Act as amended in 1972 retrospectively with effect from 1-10-1958\n\n\"(b) where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchas•c inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter-State trade or commorce, and tax has been paid under this Act in respect of tho sale of such goods in the course of inter-satc trade or con1metce, the tax levied under such law shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be provided\n\nin any law in force i\"n that State.\""}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14297, "end_char": 14307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10-11-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14583, "end_char": 14593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It concerns itself only with the tax payable under the Central Act which it calls the 'Principal Act' and sayc, that a dealer shall not be liable to pay any such tax for the period between 10-11-1964 and 9-6-1969 if certaih conditions arc satisfied."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15451, "end_char": 15461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15781, "end_char": 15790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15838, "end_char": 15848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15907, "end_char": 15916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16827, "end_char": 16837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16924, "end_char": 16933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17013, "end_char": 17023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17063, "end_char": 17072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of October, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17319, "end_char": 17339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated, both the amendments were retrospective so as ta be effective from the 1st of October, 1958."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17694, "end_char": 17703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18505, "end_char": 18514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18623, "end_char": 18633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18794, "end_char": 18803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act would be reimbursibk only to a dealer who has paid tax under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18867, "end_char": 18947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19084, "end_char": 19089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faced with the above situation, Mr. Desai, Learned counsel for the appellant, pressed into service a novel contention to the effect that the appellant was not asking for any reimbursement or refund, that it was the D.C.C.T. who had cancelled the order 0!"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19782, "end_char": 19791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act would be reimbursibk only to a dealer who has paid tax under the Central Act", "statute": "Act would be reimbursibk only to a dealer who has paid tax under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20000, "end_char": 20009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act inasmuch as no reimbursement was due in respect of goods on which tax under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20022, "end_char": 20117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D.C.C.T.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20142, "end_char": 20150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The D.C.C.T. therefore had not only the power but was duty-hound to strike down the order of refund as being illegal."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20396, "end_char": 20405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act inasmuch as no reimbursement was due in respect of goods on which tax under the Central Act", "statute": "Act inasmuch as no reimbursement was due in respect of goods on which tax under the Central Act"}}, {"text": "Dai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21123, "end_char": 21126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated that at one stage of the argument Mr. Dai drew our attention to the fact that by reason of the amendments made in the statute law and the consequent demand by the D.C.C.T. for the refunded amount the appellant had been placed under a burden which did not fall on those who collected the Central sales tax from the purchasers and paid it to the Government because they were held entitled to refund of the tax under tke A.P. Act even though they had not paid anything out of their own pocket as tax under the Central Act."}}, {"text": "Act even though they had not paid anything out of their own pocket as tax under the Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21508, "end_char": 21603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Daito Suryanarayana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21810, "end_char": 21829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We mighl.. mention here that Daito Suryanarayana <1nd Company's case (supra) on which the High Court rclied i11 support of the impugned judgment takes a v.iew of the law which is in conformity with the opinion expressed above by us and we unreservedly approve of the same."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1037_1042_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "....\n\n' -\\\n\nl0'.l7\n\nKASAMBHAI ARDUL REHMANBHAI SHAIKH v.\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.\n\nFebruary 13, 1980\n\n(P. N. BHAGWATI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nPrevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954, Sertioru. 7 and 16-Plea-bargaining-Magistrate if co1npetent to record conviction if ar.cused pleads guilty.\n\nCri1ninal Trial-Judgn1ent-Cyclostyled fonn in which nzerely blanks filled by Magistrate-Such Disposal-Reprehensible Policy.\n\nSentencing-Offences of food adulteration-Deterrent and punitive sentences-Necessity for.\n\nThe appellants were prosecuted for con1mitting offences under section 16(l)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,\n\n1954. After some evidence \\vas led on behalf of the prosecution, ple:l.- bargaining took place between the prosecution, the accused and the :r..1agistrate.\n\nThe accused pleaded guilty which plea Vi1as accepted by the Magistrate. The D accused were accordingly convicted a, nd sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a sn1all fine.\n\nThe High Court initiated suo n1otu proceeding in revision. The accused appeared and challenged the convictions recorded against them, but the High Court did not go into the circumstances in which the plea of guilty was entered, enhanced the sentences in1poscd on them to three months' simple E imprisonment a.nd fine.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHELD : 1. A conviction based on the plea of guilty entered by the accused as a result of plea-bargaining cannot be sustained. [1041EJ\n\n2. The I-Iigh Court was clearly in error in not setting aside the conviction and sending the case back to the Magistrate for trial in , accordance. with Jaw, ignoring the plea of guilty entered by the appellants.\n\n[1041F]\n\n3. The Magistrate trying an accused for a serious offence like adulteration must apply his mind to the evidence recorded before him and, on the facts .as they emerge from the evidence, decide \\\\-'hether the accused is guilty or not.\n\n[1040B]\n\nIn the instant case the 1fagistrate had got a cyclostyled form of judgment in which merely blanks were filled in by him. This clearly indicates that the Magistrate \\Vas in the habit of encouraging pleabargaining and letting off the accused lightly if there was a plea. of guilty, enabling quick disposal without any effort. This Was a highly reprehensible practice.\n\nThe High Court had expressed strong disapproval of it.\n\n[1039H-1040A]\n\n4. (i) It is highly regrettable that the prosecution as well as the 1fagistrate 0 should have been a. party to any plea-bargaining in a prosecution for adulteration iiivolVing the health and well-being of the comn1unity. Adulteration has\n\nassumed alarming proportions and it is essential to \\vipe it out ruthlessly and completely by bringing to book offenders responsible for adulteration resulting in ruination of the health of the people. The investigating agencies must .intensify their effo1ts and catch hold of those who for private economic gain are prepared to jeopardize the health of the community.\n\nWhen such persons are arraigned before the Court and found guilty a deterrent and punitive sentence must be imposed upon thctn.\n\n[1039E-CJ]\n\n(ii) If it is possible to get a\\vay with a light sentence in respect of an offence of adnltera.tion the anti-adultcratio11 hl\\v will cease to have any meaning and validity.\n\n[1039H]\n\n5. Administration of justice is a sacred t~L'k and partakes of the divine function.\n\nJt is with the greatest sense of responsibility and anxiety that the judicial officer must discharge his judicial function, pa.rticularly when it con- cc:Tis the liberty of a person.\n\n[1040C]\n\n6. It would be contrary to public policy to allo\\v a conviction to be recorded against an accused by inducing hlln to confess to a plea of guilty on an allurement being held out to him that if he enters a plea of guilty, he will be let off very lightly. Such .a. procedure would be clearly unreasonable, unfair and unjust and would be violative of Art. 21 of the D Constitution.\n\nIt \\VOtil<l have the effect of polluting the pure fount of justice, because it might induce an innocent accused to plead guilty to suffer a light and inconsequential punishn1cnt rather than go through a long and ardous criminal trial. The judge also might be likely to be deflected from the path of duty to do justice and he n1ight either convict an innocent accused by hccepting the plea of guilty or let off a guilty accused with a light sentence,\n\nthus, subverting the process of hw and fru-; trating the social objective and purpose of the anti-adulteration statute. This practice would also tend to encourage corruption and collusion and as a direct consequence, contribute to the lowering of the standard of justice.\n\n[1041B-EJ\n\nCRIMINAT- APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos .. 93-94 of 1980.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and order dated 30\" 1-1979 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 306/78 and 305/78.\n\nT. U. Mehta and Vimal Dave for the Appellant.\n\nH. R. Khanna and M. N. Shro[j for the Respondent.\n\nG The following Judgments were delivered :\n\n.. __ ,....\n\nBHAGWATJ. J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a .Al judgment of the Gujarat High Court in suo motu revision against an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Balasinor convicting the appdlant of the offence under s. 16(1) (a) (i) read withs. 7 of H the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sc!iltencing him to suffer simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. l 25 /- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment forr\n\n' I\n\nK. ADDUL REHMAN BHAI v. GU.JARAT (Bhagwati, J.) 1039\n\na further period of 30 dnys. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court A of the learned Magistrate for an offence of adulteration of turmeric powder punishable under s. 16(1)(a)(l) read withs. 7 of the Preven-. !ion of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.\n\nIt appears fro'm the record that after some evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution, plea bargaining took place between the prosecution, the defence and the learned Magistrate and on the basis of an understanding arrived at between these three parties, the appellant pleaded guilty and the learned Magistrate accepting this pica of guilty,· recoroed a finding oJ conviction against the appellant and let off the\n\nappellant with a nominal sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Couit and a small fine. It is, of course true that there is no specific evidence to show that the plea for guilty was entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining, but two circumstances, viz., (1) that the appellant pleaded guilty, even though the sample was treated as can-. celled by the public Analyst on account of its being broken and leaking and there was no evidence of the report of the public Analyst showing the sample as adulterated and (2) that the judgment of the learned Magistrate was given in a cyclostyled form, clearly lead to the inference that-the pka of guilty was entered by the appellant in consequenc<' of an assurance held out by the prosecution and acquiesced in by the learned Magistrate that he would be let off with a very light sentence.\n\nIt ishighly regrettable that the prosecution as well as the learned Magistrate should have been a party to any such plea bargaining in a prosecution for adulteration involving the health and well-being of the community. Unfortunately, in our country aJu!teration has assumed alarming proportions and it is absolutely essential to wipe it out ruthlessly . and completely by bringing to book offenders responsible for adulteration resulting in ruination of the health of the people. The investigating agencies must intensify th.eir efforts and catch hold of those who for some private economic gain are prepared to jeopardize the health of the community and indulge in mass murder and when such persons are arraigned before the Court and found guilty a really deterrent and punitive sentence must be imposed upon them. If it comes to be known that even in respect of an offence of adulteration, it is possible to get away v.ith a light sentence, the anti-adulteration law will cease to have any meaning and validity. It will be mocked at by the people as a futile legislative exercise. Moreover, we find that here the learned Magistrate had got a cyclostyled form of judgment in which merely blanks were filled in by him and this is the clearest possible evidence that he was in\n\nthe habit of encouraging plea bargaining and letting off the accused S, . lightly if there was a plea of guilty, so that he may get quick disposal\n\n1~138 SCI/80\n\nwithout any effort. This was a high! y reprehensible practice and we are glad to note that the High Court has expressed strong disapproval of it.\n\nThe Magistrate trying an accused for a serious offence like adulteration must apply h's mind to the evidence recorded before him and, on the facts as they emerge from the evidence, decide whether the accused is guilty or not. It must always be remembered by every judicial officer that administration of justice is a sacred task and according to our hoary Indian traditipn, it partakes of the divine function and it is with the greatest sence of responsibility and anxiety that the judicial, officer must discharge his judicial function, particularly when it concerns the liberty of a person. The course followed by !he learned Magistrate in the present case clearly showed that there was no application of mind by him to the case laid on behalf of the prosecution and he was a consenting party to the appellant being persuaded to enter the plea of guilty and, acting mechanically on the plea of guilty as extracted from the appellant, be appeased bis insensitive conscience by recOl'ding a finding conviction against the appellant and let him off with a mere sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a nominal fine.\n\nThe High Court on its attention being drawn to the Order passed by the learned Magistrate initiated suo motu proceeding in revision by issuing notice to the appellant to show cause why the sentence impOsed on him should not be enhanced. The appellant appeared in answer to the notice and challenged the conviction recorded against him, but Ute High Court did not go into the circumstances in which the plea of guHty was entered by the appellant and relying on the plea-of guilty prcx:eeded on the basis that the appellant was rightly convicted and since the offence said to be established against the appellant, was with respect to an article of 'primary food' punishable under s. 16(1)(a,)\n\n(i) of the Prevention of Food Adnlteration Act, 1954, the High Court held that the appellant was liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum term of 3 mpntbs and a fine of not less than Rs. 500. The High Court accordingly enhanced the sentenced. imposed on the appellant to 3 months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500 or in default, further simple imprisonment for 30 days. This order made by the High Court is challenged in the present. appeal preferred by the appellant after obtaining special leave of this Court.\n\nNow, it does npt appear from the record whether the entire prosecution evidence was completed before the learned Magistrate before the plea of gnilty was entered on bel]alf of the appellant, but one thing' is clear that the finding conviction recorded by the learned MagiStrate\n\n' '\n\nK. ABDUL REHMAN BHAI V. GUJARAT (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nI 041\n\nagainst the appellant was not based on the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution. The conviction of the appellant based solely on the plea of guilty entered by him and thi&. confession of guilt was the result of plea of bargaining between the prosecution, the defence and the learned Magistrate. It is obvious that such conviction based on the plea of guilty entered by the appellant as a result of plea bargaining cannot be sustained. It is to our. mind contrary to public policy to allow a conviction to be recorded against an accused by inducing him f ,..- to confess to a plea of guilty on an allurement being held out to him 1hat if he enters a plea of guilty, he will be let off very lightly. Such a procedure would be clearly unreasonable, unfair and unjust and would be violative of the new activist dimension of Art. 21 of the Constitution unfolded in Maneka Gandhi s case. It would have the effect of polluting the pure fount of justice, because it might induce an innocent accused to plead guilty to suffer a light and inconsequential punishment rather than go through a long and ardous criminal trial which, having regard to our combrous and unsatisfactory system of administration of justice, is not only long drawn out and ruinous in terms of time and money, but also uncertain and unpredictable in its result and the judge also might be likely to be deflected from the path of duty to do justice and he might eitl1er convict an innocent accused by accepting the plea of guilty or let off a guilty accused with a light sentence, thus, subverting the process of law and frustrating the social objective and purpose of the anti-adulteration statute.\n\nThis practice would also tend to encourage corruption and collusion and as a direct consequence, contribute to the lowering of the standard of justice.\n\nThere is no doubt in our mind that the conviction of an accused based on a plea of guilty en!ered by him as a result of plea-bargaining with the prosecution and the Magistrate must be held to be unconstitutional and illegal.\n\nThe High Coun should have therefore, set aside the conviction of the appellants and sent the case back to the learned Magistrate for trial in accordal)ce with law, ignoring the plea of guilty entered by the appellant.\n\nThe High Coun was clearly in error in not doing so.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal,· set aside the judgments of the High Court as also the Order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant by the learned Magistrate and remand the case to the \\earned Magistrate so that he may proceed with the case from the stage at which the appellant confessed to a plea of guilty.\n\nThe learned trial Magistrate will ignore the plea of guilty entered by ilie\n\nappellant and proceed further with the case after giving an opportunity to the prosecution to lead such additional evidence as it thinks fit and\n\nt A then allowing the appellant to enter upon his defence and lead sncb e'1dence in defence as he thinks proper and then dispose of the case in accordance with law. The appellant will continue on the same bail on which he has been released by this Court by its Order dated 30th March, 1979.\n\nBHAGWA TI, J.\n\nThe facts giving arise to this appeal by special leave are almost identical with those of Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1980 save and except that the appellant is different and for the same reasons as are given by us in our Judgment disposing of Criminal-._,_ Appeal No. 93 of 1980, we allow the present appeal, set aside the. judgment of the High Coort as also the Order of Conviction and , sentence recorded against the appellant by the learned Magistrate and remand the case to the learned Magistrate so that he may proceed with the case from the stage at which the appellant confessed to a plea of\n\nguilty. The learned trial Magistrate will iguore the plea of guilty entered by the appellant and proceed further with the case after giving an opportunity to the prosecution to lead such additional evidence as it thinks fit and then allowing the appellant to enter upon his defence and lead such evidence in defence as he thinks proper and then dispose of the case in accordance with law. The appellant will continue on the same bil on which he has been released by this Court by its Order dated 30th March, 1979.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n.. ,-,", "total_entities": 27, "entities": [{"text": "l7\n\nKASAMBHAI ARDUL REHMANBHAI SHAIKH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KASAMBHAI ARDUL REHMANBHAI SHAIKH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16(l)(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 567, "end_char": 586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 597, "end_char": 606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 614, "end_char": 649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3958, "end_char": 3965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. U. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4952, "end_char": 4963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta and Vimal Dave for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Vimal Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4968, "end_char": 4978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta and Vimal Dave for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4999, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shro[j for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shro[j", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5016, "end_char": 5028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shro[j for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5107, "end_char": 5115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The following Judgments were delivered :\n\n..  ,....\n\nBHAGWATJ.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA TI"}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5352, "end_char": 5360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5392, "end_char": 5433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)(a)(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)(a,)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10578, "end_char": 10590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adnlteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. ABDUL REHMAN BHAI V. GUJARAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11411, "end_char": 11442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it does npt appear from the record whether the entire prosecution evidence was completed before the learned Magistrate before the plea of gnilty was entered on bel]alf of the appellant, but one thing' is clear that the finding conviction recorded by the learned MagiStrate\n\n' '\n\nK. ABDUL REHMAN BHAI V. GUJARAT (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nI 041\n\nagainst the appellant was not based on the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11444, "end_char": 11452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it does npt appear from the record whether the entire prosecution evidence was completed before the learned Magistrate before the plea of gnilty was entered on bel]alf of the appellant, but one thing' is clear that the finding conviction recorded by the learned MagiStrate\n\n' '\n\nK. ABDUL REHMAN BHAI V. GUJARAT (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nI 041\n\nagainst the appellant was not based on the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA TI"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12291, "end_char": 12298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12331, "end_char": 12344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 of the Constitution unfolded in Maneka Gandhi s case."}}, {"text": "30th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14611, "end_char": 14627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant will continue on the same bail on which he has been released by this Court by its Order dated 30th March, 1979."}}, {"text": "BHAGWA TI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14630, "end_char": 14639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWA TI, J.\n\nThe facts giving arise to this appeal by special leave are almost identical with those of Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA TI"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15759, "end_char": 15765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1043_1047_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "NIROD BARAN BANERJEE v.\n\nDY. COMMISSIONER OF HAZARI BAGH February 14, 1980 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nNew Plea-A point not taken either before the trial court or before the !High Court when the appeal was not taken,, cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time either in the Supren1e Court or in the application given he/ore the lligh Court for granting a certificate of fitness-Civil Procedure ., Code Order VI Rule 8 and Order Vlll Rule 2.\n\nIn respect of the lands acquired by the State of Bihar, the appellant w315 awarded a sum of Rs. 9665-35 which along with sola.tium and other <:barges totalled to a sum of Rs. 20,23 Hi7. The appellant claimed a sum\n\nof Rs. 2,80,000/- as the market value of the land acquired. Before the Distr, ict Magistrate could take up the hearing on a reference made under\n\n1. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the matter was agreed by the parties to be referred to a Board of Arbitration consisting of three persons of whom one wa5 appointed by the appellant. The Board so constituted gave an award confirming the con1pensa.tion given by the Collector. The appellant moved the District Court for setting aside the award. The said application was diS!missed by the Court and an appeal to the High Court thereon was also dismissed. Thereafter, the appellant approached the High Court for -granting a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court and it was .at that stage that for the first time the appellant raised the point tha.t the arbitration agreement was not in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution and that there being no arbitration agreement in the eye of la.w, the a\\Vard was invalid and liable to be set aside. The High Court accepted the contention and granted leave as prayed for.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The question \\Vhether or not there was an agreement which fulfilled the requirements of Art. 299 is not a pure question of law but is a <iuestion which depends on investigation of facts.\n\n[1046C]\n\n2. ln view of the provision of Order VI Rule 8 and Order VIII Rule ' (If the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant would be debarred from $ising a point for the first time before this Court or even before the High Court. It is well settled that no evidence can be looked into by the Court for which there is no foundation in the pleadings.\n\n[1047BJ\n\nIn the instant case, the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the plea for the first time in the Supreme Court, in as much as :\n\n(a) the appellant contented himself by relying on the resolution by the Government, treated it as a -valid arbitration agreement and never raised the .question that the said resolution was hit by Art. 299 ot the Constitution of India. [I047C]\n\n(b) he fully participated in the arbitration proceedings aad having taken the benefit of a decision by the Board in his favour made a complete somer- B sault only when the decision went against him, by taking the plea now under <ixrunination, which doublless required investigation of facts. [1047D]\n\n A\n\n(c) Even that plea he took neither before the Additional Sub-Judge nor in the High Court when the appeal was heard on merits but only for the-- first time in the application which he gave for gr3nting leave to appeal to- ..(\" this Court. Had he raised the plea before the Trial Court that the arbitration agreement was not in consonance with Art. 299 of the Constit11tion of India, the rrespondent may have been in a position to rebut the plea by producing evidence a.nd circumstances to sho\\v that an agreement for arbitration was g authenticated in the form required by Art. 299 of the Cons.titution. [1047El ,\n\nKa/yanpur Lime Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Anr.; [1954] S.C.R. 958 @ 969; followed.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JlTRISDICTION 1970.\n\nCivil A ppcal No. 1105 of\\., \\\n\nAppeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order datea 13-5-1968 of the Patna High Court in Misc. Appeal No. 178 of 1963.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, K. N. Choubey and B. P. Singh for the Appelial!t.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Attorney General and S. N. !ha for the Respondent.\n\n1 he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Patna High Court dated 13-5-1968 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court.\n\nThe case arose out of land acquisition proceedings taken by the Government in respect of the land in dispute which comprised 84.31 acres.\n\nOn 21-9-1980, the Collector by his award allowed a compensation of Rs. 9666.35 which along with solatium and other charges totalled to a sum of Rs. 20,231.67.\n\nThe appellant claimed Rs. 2,80,000/- as the market value of the land acquired.\n\nOn 11-10-1960, a reference was made to the District Judge under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nBefore the District Judge couldtake up the proceedings for hearing, the matter was agreed by the parties, to be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three\n\npersons of whom ane was appointed by the appellant Accordingly, a joint petition for referring the case to the arbitrator was made on 19-12-1961 and on the next day, dated 20-12-1961 the case was referred for arbitration to the Board. On 22-5-1962. the Board gave an award confirming the compensation given by the Collector.\n\nHaving thus lost his case before the Board, the appellant moved the District Court for setting aside the award.\n\nHis application was dismissed by the Additional Sub-Judge to whom\n\n' '\n\nN. B. BANERJEE V. DY. COMMISSIONER (Fawl Ali, J.)\n\nI 045\n\nthe case was transferred in the meantime and hence an appeal was tiled by him before the High Court which was also dismissed.\n\nThereaftet; the appellant approached the High Court for granting a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court and it was at that stage that for the first time he raised the point that the arbitration agreement was not in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution and that thus there being no arbitration agreement in the eye of law, the award was invalid and liable to be set aside.\n\nThe High Court appears to have been impressed by the point raised before it and granted leave as prayed for.\n\nHence this appeal before us.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that on the admitted facts there was no separate arbitration agreement, that the resolution of the Government incorporating the agreement of both the parties that the matter be referred to the Board ot Arbitrators would be deemed to be the arbitration agreement, that the resolution not having been authenticated in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India was invalid and that therefore the award which followed it would also be invalid. . In support of his argument the learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Mulamchand v. State o.1 Madhya Pradesh(') where this Court while considering the scope and the ambit of Article 299 observed as follows :-\n\n\"It was held by this Court that the provisions of s. 175(3) were mandatory and the contracts were therefore void and not binding on the Union of India which were not liable for damages for breach of the contracts.\n\nThe same principle was reiterated by this Court in a later case- State of West Bengal v. M/s. B. K. Monda/ and Sons [19621 1 Supp. SCR 876. The principle is that 1he provision of s. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or the corresponding provisions of Art. 299 (1) of the Constitution of India are mandatory in character and the contra. verition of these provisions nullifies the contracts and makes them void.\n\nThere is no question of estoppel or ratification of such a case.\" It was argued by Dr. Chitale that in view of the constitutional provisions of Art. 299, this Court held that the agreement was void, and that there could be no estoppel against a statute or constitutional rrovisions.\n\nTo the same effect are the decisions in Laliteshwarl\n\n(ll [t96SJ 3 s.c.R.. 214, 22t.\n\nG ,\n\n.I c\n\nPrasad Sa hi Y. Baseshwar Prasad & Ors.(') and Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fisherman Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and Ors.('). Great reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of this Court in The Marine Cooled (Bengal) P. Ltd. v. Union of India(') which was also a case of an arbitration\n\nagreemnt.\n\nThe Attorney General while Pcpelling the arguments of the appellant submitted that there can be no dispute with the propositions laid down by this Court regarding the interpretation of Art. 299 of the Constitution of India but that the question whether or not there was an agreement which fulfilled the requircmcn ts of Art. 299 is not a pure question of law but is a question which depends on investigation of facts.\n\nHe added that as the appellant did not plead this point either before the Trial Court or before the High Court when the appeal was heard on merits the appellant cannot be allowed to raise it for the first time either in this Court or in his\n\napplication given before the High Court for granting a certificate of fitness.\n\nIt was argued by the Attorney General that if the point had been pleaded at the initial stage, the respondent might have been in a position to show that an agreement conforming to the provisions of Art. 299 of the Constitution of India existed.\n\nWe am of the opinion that the contention raised by the Attorney General is sound and must prevail.\n\nIn the case of Kalyanpur Lime Works Ltd. v.\n\nState of B1har and Another(') a similar situation arose and this Court refused to entertain the point relating to the applicability of s. 30 of tho Government of India Act 1915 which corresponds to Art. 299 of the Constitution ors. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, on the ground that the party concerned did not raise the same in their pleadings. In this connection this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"The first question which arises in this connection is whether the contract was to be executed by a formal document or whether it could be spelt out from the correspondence in which the negotiations were carried on by the parties.\n\nWe do not think it necessary to go into this question, for assuming that a. formal document was necessary, the plea of secti0n 30, it is to be noted, was not raised in the pleadings.\n\nObjection is taken on behalf of the ::ippellant that\n\n(1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 63, 70.\n\n(2) [1978] I S.C.R. 375, 381.\n\n(3) [1964) 2 S.C.R. 859.\n\n(4) [1954] S.C.R.\n\n958. @ 969.\n\nN. B. BANERJEE v. DY. COMMISSIONER (FazaJ Ali,!.)\n\nthe point not having been raised in the written statement it was not incumbent npon the plaintiff to show that the , contract was executed according to the provisions of section 30, before it could be specifically enforced and reliance was placed upon the provisions of order VI, rule 8, and Order VIII, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.\"\n\nThis Court pointed out that in view of the provisions of Order VI Rule 8 and Order VIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant would be debarred from raising the point for the first time before this Court or even before the High Court.\n\nThe facts of the present case appear to be on all fours with facts of the case in the decision cited above. In the instant case also, the appe11ant contented himself by relying on the resolution by the Government, treated it as a valid arbitration agreement and never raised the question that the said resolution was hit by Art. 299 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, the appellant fully participated in the arbitration proceedings and having taken the benefit of a decision by the Board in his favour made a complete somarsault only when the decision went against him, by taking the plea now under examination, which doubtless required investigation of facts.\n\nEven that plea too he took neither before the Additional Sub-Jrndge nor in the High Court when the appeal was heard on merits but only fer the first time in the application which he gave for granting leave to appeal to this Court.\n\nIn. these circumstances it is manifest that if the appellant had raised the plea before the Trial Court that the arbitration agreement was not in consonance with Art. 299 of the Constitution of India, the\n\nespondent may have been in a position to rebut the plea by producing , evidence and circumstances to show that an agreement for arbitration was authenticated in the form required by Art. 299 of the Contitution. It is well settled that no evidence can be looked into by the Court for which there is no foundation in the pleadings.\n\nWe <:annot therefore allow the appellant to raise the plea for the first time in this Court a'nd the High Court also ought not to have entertained it at the stage of the application for a certificate of fitness to be granted for leave to appeal to this Court.\n\nNo other point was pleaded before us.\n\nThe appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of this case however, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "NIROD BARAN BANERJEE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIROD BARAN BANERJEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DY. COMMISSIONER OF HAZARI BAGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DY. COMMISSIONER OF HAZARI BAGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 14, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF HAZARI BAGH February 14, 1980 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Order Vlll Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 508, "end_char": 522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of the lands acquired by the State of Bihar, the appellant w315 awarded a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1393, "end_char": 1406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the appellant approached the High Court for -granting a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court and it was .at that stage that for the first time the appellant raised the point tha.t the arbitration agreement was not in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution and that there being no arbitration agreement in the eye of la.w, the a\\Vard was invalid and liable to be set aside."}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Order VI Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2060, "end_char": 2073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order VIII Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2080, "end_char": 2095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2129, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2705, "end_char": 2713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order VIII Rule", "statute": "Order VIII Rule"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2721, "end_char": 2742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3400, "end_char": 3408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3630, "end_char": 3638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K. N. Choubey and B. P. Singh for the Appelial!t.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "K. N. Choubey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3975, "end_char": 3988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K. N. Choubey and B. P. Singh for the Appelial!t."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 4004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K. N. Choubey and B. P. Singh for the Appelial!t."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4026, "end_char": 4042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Attorney General and S. N. !"}}, {"text": "S. N. !", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4064, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Attorney General and S. N. !"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4140, "end_char": 4149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Patna High Court dated 13-5-1968 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court."}}, {"text": "21-9-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21-9-1980, the Collector by his award allowed a compensation of Rs."}}, {"text": "11-10-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4703, "end_char": 4713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 11-10-1960, a reference was made to the District Judge under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act."}}, {"text": "S. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19-12-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5102, "end_char": 5112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the District Judge couldtake up the proceedings for hearing, the matter was agreed by the parties, to be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three\n\npersons of whom ane was appointed by the appellant Accordingly, a joint petition for referring the case to the arbitrator was made on 19-12-1961 and on the next day, dated 20-12-1961 the case was referred for arbitration to the Board."}}, {"text": "20-12-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5140, "end_char": 5150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the District Judge couldtake up the proceedings for hearing, the matter was agreed by the parties, to be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three\n\npersons of whom ane was appointed by the appellant Accordingly, a joint petition for referring the case to the arbitrator was made on 19-12-1961 and on the next day, dated 20-12-1961 the case was referred for arbitration to the Board."}}, {"text": "22-5-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5206, "end_char": 5215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-5-1962."}}, {"text": "N. B. BANERJEE V. DY. COMMISSIONER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5479, "end_char": 5513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His application was dismissed by the Additional Sub-Judge to whom\n\n' '\n\nN. B. BANERJEE V. DY."}}, {"text": "Fawl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5515, "end_char": 5523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER (Fawl Ali, J.)\n\nI 045\n\nthe case was transferred in the meantime and hence an appeal was tiled by him before the High Court which was also dismissed."}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5924, "end_char": 5935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that on the admitted facts there was no separate arbitration agreement, that the resolution of the Government incorporating the agreement of both the parties that the matter be referred to the Board ot Arbitrators would be deemed to be the arbitration agreement, that the resolution not having been authenticated in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India was invalid and that therefore the award which followed it would also be invalid. .", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6659, "end_char": 6680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6966, "end_char": 6977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7052, "end_char": 7061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7138, "end_char": 7152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his argument the learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Mulamchand v. State o.1 Madhya Pradesh(') where this Court while considering the scope and the ambit of Article 299 observed as follows :-\n\n\"It was held by this Court that the provisions of s. 175(3) were mandatory and the contracts were therefore void and not binding on the Union of India which were not liable for damages for breach of the contracts."}}, {"text": "s. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7396, "end_char": 7402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7414, "end_char": 7443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7479, "end_char": 7487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7499, "end_char": 7520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7726, "end_char": 7733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Dr. Chitale that in view of the constitutional provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7783, "end_char": 7791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Laliteshwarl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7963, "end_char": 7975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect are the decisions in Laliteshwarl\n\n(ll [t96SJ 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8548, "end_char": 8556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8683, "end_char": 8691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9302, "end_char": 9310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9318, "end_char": 9339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9630, "end_char": 9635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9693, "end_char": 9701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act 1915", "statute": "Government of India Act 1915"}}, {"text": "[1966] 2 S.C.R. 63", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10376, "end_char": 10394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964) 2 S.C.R. 859", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10436, "end_char": 10455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10711, "end_char": 10721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order VIII Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10960, "end_char": 10975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10981, "end_char": 11008, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11458, "end_char": 11466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order VIII Rule", "statute": "Order VIII Rule"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11474, "end_char": 11495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12204, "end_char": 12212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12220, "end_char": 12241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12430, "end_char": 12438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1048_1052_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "UTTAM CHAND v.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.\n\nFebruary 14, 1980\n\n[S. Mu!l.TAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nMaharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling of Holdings) Act 1961, Seclions; 2(11), 2(22), 8, 10 and 12-Scope-Only those transfers nlade at any tifne on or after 4-8-1959 would be hit by the Act.\n\nThe appellant in his return filed before the Deputy Collector had shoWD the total lands in his possession to be 370 a.cres and 34 gunthas.\n\nProceedings under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 were taken against him in order to determine whether the return filed was correct or not. It was alleged by the appellant that some time in the year 1956 there was a partition between the appellant and his nephews a.s a. result of which his family got 202 acres of land. The appellant had scrld\n\n51 acres of land to other persons before the Act came into force and that he ga.ve some land to his adopted son in lieu of the latter's share and that the adopted son thereafter gave 93.25 acres of land to his mother under Civil Court decree. All these transactions took place some time in the year 1956. The Collector aflcr examining the return found that the total land o\\vned by the appellant was 118 a.cres 36 gunthas and the excess was only 4 acres 36 gunthas which could be taken over under the Act. The Commissioner calle<l for the records and interfered suo moto. After making some enquiry, he held that the land declared by the appellant in his return fa.r exceeded the ceiling limit and in computing the total lands owned by the appellant he took into account even the lands which had been giv.en by the adopted son to his mother, the wife of the appellant.\n\nThe appellant filed a writ petition against the order of the Commissioner in the High Court which refused to interfere on the ground that the transfer of the land in favour of the adopted sons was held to be collusive as also the decree.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that under the provisions of the Act, land whicl1 was received by his wife from the adopted son was her personal property and could not be included in the ceiling of the appell<nt and that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to add that land and treat the same as the land of the appellant and to set aside the order of the Deputy Collector.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it was contended that the word 'person' defined in section 2(22) of the Act includes family a.nd that 'family' as defined in section 2 ( 11) includes, a: Hindu Undivided family, and in the case of other persons, a group or unit, the members of which by custom or usage are joint in an estate or possession or residence.\n\nAllowjng the appeal.\n\nH HELD : I. The judgment of the High Court is set aside as also that of the Comn1issioner and that the judgment of the Deputy Collector restored.\n\n[1052B]\n\n--\"\"' .)\n\nUTTAM CHAND v. MAHARASHTRA (Faw! Ali,!.) 1049\n\n2. The Act clearly exempts the land which may have been acquired or A. tramferred prior to 4-8-1959.\n\nSection 8, 10 and 12 whirh deal with the subject clearly enjoin that only those transfers would be hit by the Act which are made at any time on or after 4-8-1959.\n\n[105\\A]\n\n3. There was neither nny pleading nor any case made out either before the Deputy Collector or even before the Commissioner to indica.te that the transfer of the land in favour of the adopted son and the transfer by the B adOpted son in favour of his mother were collusive or tainted by fraud.\n\nBoth these transactions took place as far back as 1956 th3ot is to say 5 years before the Act came into force.\n\n[1050G-H]\n\n4. The High Court was not justified in presuming that the transfer made by the appellant in favour of his adopted son towards his sha.re and the transfer by the adopted son to his mother was either collusive or fraudulent.\n\nC There v:as neither any foundation in the pleadings nor any evidence to support this conjecture of the High Court.\n\n[1051A-C]\n\n5. Sections 2(11), 2(12) are of no assistance a.s Section 6 takes within its fold lands belonging to the owner, or his family as a single unit and is not meant to cover the separate or individual property of a member of the family which is self-acquired property and cannot be clubbed together D with 'the lMid of the owner or his family.\n\nTo begin \\\\1ith, the Act merely intended to include the land within the ceiling limits of a person or his family \\Vhich belonged to such a person or persons having different shares in that property. That is v.hy all transfers made prior to 1959 were expressly exempted from the operation of the Act.\n\n[105\\E-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil App., a! No. 1415 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 30-9-69 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 1512 of 1967.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C. A garwala for the Appellant.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and M. N. Shrof] for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au. J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 30-9-1969 dismissing the G writ petition filed by the appellant against an order of the Commissioner.\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may be stated as follows :\n\nProceedings under Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of R Holdings) Maharashtra Act No. XXVII 1961 and (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) which received the assent of the President on\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R. -·- 16-6-1961 were taken against the appellant in order to determine whether the return filed by the appellant under the provisions of the Act was correct or not. In his return filed before the Depuiy Collecfor, the appellant had shown the total lands to be 370 acres and 34 gunthas.\n\nIt was however alleged by the appellant that some time in the year 1956, there was a partition between the appellant and bis nephews as a result of which his family got 202 acres of land.\n\nThe appellant bad sold 51 acres of land to other persons before the Act came into force.\n\nThe appellant further alleged that he gave some lauds to his adopted son in lieu of the latter's share. Th~ adopted son Nemichand thereafter gave 93.25 acres of land to his mother under a civil Court decree.\n\nAll these transactions took . place some time in the year 1956.\n\nThe Collector after exainining the return found that the total land owned by the appellant was 118 acres 36 gunthas and the excess was only 4 acres 36 gunthas which could be taken over under the Act.\n\nAgainst ihe order of the Deputy Collector, the Commissioner appears to have called for the records and interfered suo moto and after making some enquiry, he held that the land declared by the appel\" !ant in his return far-exceeded the ceiling limit. In computing the total lands owned by ihe appellant, the Commissioner appears to have taken into account even that land which had been given by Nem.ichand to his mother, ihe wife of the appellant.\n\nAgainst this order of Commissioner, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed as a result of which an application was filed for frant of certificate for appeal to this Court which was granted. Hence this Appeal.\n\nThe short point taken by Mr. V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the appellant is that under the provisions of the Act, land which was received by his wife from the adopted son Was her personal property and could not !J.~ included in the ceiling of the appellant and that the Commissioner iherefore had no jurisdiction to add that land and treat the same as the land of the appellant and proceed to set said the order of the Depnty Collector. The High Court in a short judgment refused to interfere mainly on lhc ground that the transfer of the land in favour of Nemichand, the adopted son, was held to be collusive as also the decree.\n\nThere was neither any pleading nor any case made out either before the Deputy Collector or even before ihe\n\nCommissioner to indicate that the transfer of the lands in favour of the adopted son and ihe transfer of N em.ichand in favour of his mother were collusive or tainted by fraud.\n\nIn fact both these transactions took place as far back as 1956, ihat is to say, five years before the Act came into force.\n\nEven ihe Act clearly exempts lands which may\n\n• y\n\n\nUTTAM CHAND v. MAHARASHTRA (Fazai Ali, J.) 1051\n\nhave been acquired or transferred prior to 4-8-1959.\n\nSs. 8, 10 and 12 which deal with the subject clearly enjoin that only those trallsfers wouW be hit by the Act which are made at any time on or after 4-8-1959. As both the transfers mentioned above were prior to 4-8-1959, it is obvious that they fell completely outside the ambit of the provisions of the Act. The High Court was thus not justilied in pr\\:Suming that the transfer made by the appetlant in favour of his ad0pted son towards his share and the transfer by the adopted son Nemichand to his mother were either collusive or fraudulent.\n\nThere was neither any foundation in the pleadings nor any evidence to support this conjecture of the High Court.\n\nMr. Bhandare, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the. word 'person' defined in Sec. 2(22) of the Act includes family and that 'family' as defined in Sec. 2(11) of the Act includes, a Hindu undivided family, and in the case of other persons, a group or unit the members of which by custom or usage are joint in estate or possession or residence. Reliance was also placed on Section 6 of the Act which runs thus :\n\n\"Where a family unit consists of members which exceed five in number, the family unit shall be entitled to bold land exceeding the ceiling area !o the extent of one-fifth of t.he ceiling area for each member in excess of five, 50 however that the total holding shall not exceed twice the ceiling area, and in such cas~, in relation to the holding of such family unit, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area.\"\n\nThese sections are of no assistance to the Respondent because Section 6 takes within its fold lands belonging to the owner, or his family as a single unit and is not meant to cover the seperate or individual property of a member of the family which is self-acquired property and cannot be clubbed together with land of owner or his family.\n\nTo begin with the Act merely intended to include land within the ceiling limit of a person or his family which belonged lo such a person or persons having different shares in that property.\n\nThat is why all transfers made prior to 1959 were expressly exempted from the operation of the Act.\n\nThe arguments advanced by the rspondent appear to have found favour with the Commissioner, but it was legally erroneous as indicated above. In these circumstances, therefore, the most important fct to be determined was whether or not any transfer that has been made by the person concerned was prior to or after 4-8-1959. If the transfer was prior to 4-8-1959 then the provisions of the Act would not apply at all. In the instant case, both the\n\n\n.A transfers being three years prior to the date mentioned above, the Act would not apply to the appellant, and the Commissioner and the High Court therefore erred in holding that the lands transferred by Nemichand to his mother should be included in the total area of the land owned by the appellant.\n\nB We, therefore, allow this Appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and also that of the Commissioner and restore the judgment of the Deputy Collector. In the special circumstances, there shall be no on:Jers as to costs.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 29, "entities": [{"text": "UTTAM CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UTTAM CHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 14, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 14, 1980\n\n[S. Mu!l."}}, {"text": "S. Mu!l.TAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "4-8-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 269, "end_char": 277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling of Holdings) Act 1961, Seclions; 2(11), 2(22), 8, 10 and 12-Scope-Only those transfers nlade at any tifne on or after 4-8-1959 would be hit by the Act."}}, {"text": "section 2(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2429, "end_char": 2442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2503, "end_char": 2512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8, 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3036, "end_char": 3056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 2(11), 2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 4002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4028, "end_char": 4037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4790, "end_char": 4804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C. A garwala for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "R. Salish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C. A garwala for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. K. Pandita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C. A garwala for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "E. C. A garwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4835, "end_char": 4850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C. A garwala for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4871, "end_char": 4885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and M. N. Shrof] for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "C. K. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4887, "end_char": 4904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and M. N. Shrof] for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shrof", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4909, "end_char": 4920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, C. K. Ratnaparkhi and M. N. Shrof] for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAzAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4987, "end_char": 4995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au."}}, {"text": "Nemichand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6196, "end_char": 6205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ adopted son Nemichand thereafter gave 93.25 acres of land to his mother under a civil Court decree.", "canonical_name": "Nem.ichand"}}, {"text": "Nem.ichand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In computing the total lands owned by ihe appellant, the Commissioner appears to have taken into account even that land which had been given by Nem.ichand to his mother, ihe wife of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Nem.ichand"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7277, "end_char": 7291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The short point taken by Mr. V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the appellant is that under the provisions of the Act, land which was received by his wife from the adopted son Was her personal property and could not !", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Ss. 8, 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8450, "end_char": 8466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9114, "end_char": 9122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhandare, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the."}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(22)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9214, "end_char": 9224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(11)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9284, "end_char": 9294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9508, "end_char": 9517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.K.A.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11618, "end_char": 11624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1053_1062_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "> >\n\nHAZARI LAL\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\nFebruary 15, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nPrevention of CorruptiQn_ Act, 1947-Section 4(1)-Scope of-Accused .charged with den?anding and taking illegal gratification-Many prosecution witnesses turned hostile-Staten1ents 1nade by witnesses in the course of investiga- .Jion-Jf could be used as substantive evidence-Evidence of police. inspector- 1/ needs corroboraition.\n\nPanch l-Vitncsses-Clerks-lf could not be called independent lvUncs!.eS.\n\nThe accused (appella.nt) who \\Vas charged with offences under section 5(1) {<!) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161 of the Perutl Code was convicted and sentenced by the Specit1l Judge. The convictions and .. entences were confirmed by the High Cuurt.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that the &eooter rickshaw of the complainant driven '.by his driver was one day involved in a traffic accid'ent and the vehicle ; vas ttarken to the police station by the accused1 who was a police oonstablC.\n\nThe .cooiplainant obtained orders of the Magistrate for its releese but the accused detlined to release the vehicle unless he w.as paid a sum of Rs. 60. fhe complainant was not prepared to pay the sum demanded. He then went to an inspector of the Anti-Corruption Department and lodged a complaint th at the .accused was demanding illegal gratification from him for the release oI his ·.scooter rickshaw which \\\\'tls ordered by the Magistrate to be r'eleased'.\n\nThe prosecution further alleged that the lnspector called two panch v:itnesses and after noting down the numbers of six ten rupee currency notes given\n\ny the complainant, treated them with phenol phthalene powder and gave them to the complai1u1nt.\n\nIt was arranged that the complainant should hand over th'e currency notes to the accused and should thereafter make ai signal at whicb ·-the Inspector and panth witnesses would enter the room.\n\nThe complainant carried out the plan as arranged and gave the call on which the Inspector and panch witnesses enter'ed the room of the accused.\n\nOn seeing the lnsptct<Jr, the accused 1-cn10\\'ed the currency notes from his pocket aind flung then1 across the wall into the adjoining room.\n\nThe notes were coll'etted and when compared with the numbers noted earlier, they tallied.\n\nThe hands of the accused were th'en dipped in sodium bicarbonate solution which, colourless earlier, turned pink.\n\nSimilarly the oondkerchief in the right side pocket of the trousers of the accused was removed and also dipped in sodium bicarbonate , solution. Th>! too turned pink.\n\nBefore the trial court many of the \\Vi1.nesses turned hostile and one of the , panch witnesses became mentally deranged.\n\nJn appeal it was contended before this Court that ( 1) the courts below had made free use of the statements made by the witnesses in the course of 'investigation as if they were substantive evidence and, if they were excluded, the .rest of the evidence would not be sufficient to draw the presumption under\n\nA soctioo 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, (2) the fact that the lmp<C\n\nt.or wa<> the very police officer 'vho laid the trap, should be sufficient to insist on corroboration of his evidence.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD: l(a) The courts below were clearly wrong in tive evidence statements made by witnesses in the course\n\n[1059El\n\nusing as substanof investigation.\n\n(b) Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a bar on µte use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course . of. investigaition at nny enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under invetiga tion at the tirne wh'en such statement was made, except for the purpose of contradicting the witnesses in the manner provided by section 145 of the Evidence Act W'here any part of such statement is so used any part thereof may also he used in the re-examination of the witness for the limited purpose of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. The only other exception to this emb&rgo on the use of statements made in the course of an\n\ninvestigation relates to the statements falling within the provisions of section 32 ( 1) of the Evidence Act or permitted to be proved under s. 27 of the Evidence Act. [1059A-(\\, l\n\n(c) The contention of the prosecution that the earlier statements with whk:h witnesses were confronted for the purpose of contradiction could be takeil into consideration by the Court in view of the definition of \"proved\" in section 3 of the Evidence Act has no substance.\n\nThe definition of the term ''proved\" dOes not enable a Court to take into consideration matters, including tililte-·\n\nments. whose use is statutorily barred.\n\n[1059G]\n\n2(ai) The evidence of the Inspector is entirely trustworthy and there is no need to seek any corroboration.\n\n[1059H]\n\n(b) Ther'e is no rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule: of law, nor any rule of prudence which requires that the evidence of such t'.lolice\n\nofficers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and there should be insistence on corroboration.\n\nIn the facts and circunlStanceS of a particular c21>e a court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence' ot: such an officer without corroboration, but, equally in the facts and circum- 1tances of another case the court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence 0f such an officer. It is aJJ a matter of appreciation of evidence and on i; uch mattc; rs.\n\nthere can be no hard and fast rule nor can there be any prccedential guidance ..\n\n[1060A-Bl\n\nIn the instant case the proved facts were that the complainant mad~ a report to the Inspector, and currency notes whose numbers were noted nd which were treated with phenol phthaJene powder were handed ovr t..1 the complainant.\n\nTh'e complainant went into the accused's room and came out after a short while giving the agreed signal.\n\nWhen the Inspector rushed in,. the accused thre\\v the currency notes acros~ the wall into the adjoining roon1.\n\nHis hands and the handkerchief when dipped in sodium bicarbonate , ofutilln turned pink and lastly instead of giving a plausible explanation as lo how thii phenol phthalene powder came to his hands and the handkerchief in bis .poc::ket all that he could say was that he \"knew nothing about it\".\n\nFrom all thcsefacts the only inference that follows is that currency notes were obtaine!f.- br\n\nthe accused from the cotnplainant. It is not necessary that the passing .of\n\n• •\n\n> )\n\n' 1 ) . <\n\nr-··\n\n• J\n\nmoney should be proved by direct evidence, it may also be proved by circum A stantial evidence. The events which followed in quick sucoession in the present\n\ncase led to the only inference that the money was obtained by the accused from the complainant.\n\n3. Under section 114 of the Evidence Act the Court may presume tt.e existence of any !'act which is likely to have happened regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private B business, in their relation to facts of the particular case.\n\nOne of the illustrations to this section is that the Court may pr'csume that a person Who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless h'e can account for his possession.\n\nSo too in .the facts and circumstances of the present case the Court may presume that the accused who tcok out the currency notes from his po.;::ket and flung then1 across the wall had' Obtained them from the complainant \\l.ho, a C few ntinutes earlier, was shown, to have been in possession of th'e notes. Once it is found that the accused had obtained the money from the complai11a11t the presumption under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately attracted.\n\nThe presumption is rebuttable, but in the present case there is no material to rebut the presumption.\n\nThe accused was, therefore, rightly convicted by the courts below.\n\n[1061D-FJ\n\nSita Ram v. The State of Rniasthan AIR 1975 SC 1432; Sura; Mal v.\n\nD The Sitate (Delhi Administration) AIR 1979 SC 1408 held inapplicable.\n\n4. There is no force in the contention that persons holding clerical posts could not be called independent witnesses on the ground that they would be under fear of disciplinary action if they did not support th'e prosecution case.\n\nThe respectability and verasity of a witness is not necessarily dependent upon his status in Jife and it cannot be S<'1id that clerks are less tn1thful and amen- E able than superior officers.\n\n[1060E]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 211 of 1974.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-4-1974 of the Delhi High Court in Crl. A. No. 186172.\n\nFrank Anthony, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the Appellant.\n\nH. S. Marwah and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The appellant Hazari Lal was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Delhi, of offences under section 5(2) read with section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. On the first count he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500. On the second connt he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years.\n\nThe two sentences were directed to nm concnrrently.\n\nThe convictions and sentences were confirmed by the High Conrt of Delhi.\n\nl3-138SCI/80\n\n1056 SUPREME COURT REPORr; ' [1980] 2 s.c.R.\n\nThe case which the prosecution set out to prove before the Trial Judge was briefly as follows : •\n\n\\. )\n\n1 >\n\nThe scooter rickshaw belonging to Sri Ram (P.W.3) and driven by his driver Ram Lubhaya (P.W. 6) was involved in an accident on July 12, 1969. The scooter rickshaw and a tonga which were involved in the accident were taken to the Police Station, Kashmere Gate by the accused, a Police constable attached to that station. P.W. 3 obtained orders from the Magistrate for the release of his vehicle and went to the Police Station to obtain delivery of tile vehicle.\n\nThe accused, who was present took him outside and told him that the vehicle would be given to him only if he paid a bribe of Rs. 60.\n\nP.W. 3 then went away.\n\nHe went to the Anti Corruption Department and made statement to Inspector Paras Nath, P.W. 8.\n\nAfter recording the statement of P.W. 3, P.W. 8 sent for two persons Davinder Kumar (P.W. 4) and Kewal Krishan.\n\nThe statement of P. W. 3 was read out to P. W. 3 in the presence of the two Panch witnesses Davinder Kumar and Kewal Krishan. P. W. 3 then produced six currency notes of the valne of Rs. 10 each. The numbers of the notes were noted and they were treated with phenol phthelene powder.\n\nAfter the usual instructions were given to P .W. 3 and the panch witnesses, the raiding party proceeded towards Kashmere Gate. P.W. 3, P.W. 6 and Kewal Krishan went into the Police Station, while P.W. 8 and others stayed outside.\n\nThe money was handed over to the accused who took it and put it inside the right hand pocket of his trousers. P.W. 6 and Kewal Krishan then came out and signalled to 'P.W. 8 whereupon P.W. 8 and the Panch witnesses went inside the Police Station. The accused was present inside. As soon as he saw the party led by P.W. 8 he took out the currency notes from the right side pocket of his trousers and threw them across the wall into the adjoining room. P. W. 8. instructed some of the police officers accompanying him to rush to the adjoining room and to keep a watch over the notes which must have fallep. there. He then introduced himself to the accused and took him to the adjoining room. Some of the notes were lying on the table of the Duty Officer in that room while others had fallen on the ground near the chair of the Duty Officer.\n\nThe six notes were collected in the presence of the witnesses and their numbers were compared with the numbers noted before they proceeded on the raid. The numbers tallied. The accused was questioned by the Jllspector and he denied that he had demanded any bribe and kept silent about the acceptance of the bribe. Both the hands of the accused were dipped in sodium carbonate solution and the solution which was previously colourless turned pink. The same test was repeated\n\n,,.-\"\"'i.\n\n• y\n\n' }\n\n; .\n\nwith the handkerchief which was taken out of the right hand side pocket of the accused and also with the trousers of the accused. Each test resulted in the bicarbonate solution turning pink. After completion of the investigation a charge-sheet was laid against the accused being for offences under s. 5 (2) read with s. 5 (1 )( d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nAll that has been mentioned in the previous paragraph was what the prosecution set out to prove before the Trial Court. But many of the witnesses turned volte face. P.W. 3 stated in his evidence that on the first occasion when he went to the Police Station to obtain delivery of his scooter rickshaw it was not the accused that was present but one Hawaldar. It was the Hawaldar and not the accused that demanded the bribe of Rs. 60 from him. According to him at the time of the raid, when he, P.W. 6 and Kewal Krishan went inside the Police Station they found the accused there and asked him to take the sum of Rs. 60 and return the scooter rickshaw. P.W. 3 stretched his hand with the money towards the pocket of the accused's trousers but the accused said the money might be paid to the person for whom it was meant. He refused to receive the money and jerked P.W. 3's hand with his hand as a result of which the notes came to be flung across the wall into the neighbouring room.\n\nHe told the Inspector that the notes had been flung across the wall and that the accused had neither demanded the amount from him nor accepted the money from him. On the other hand the accused had refused to take the money from him. The Inspector recovered the notes from the neighbouring room, placed them on the table and thereafter subjected the handkerchief and the pocket of the accused's trousers to the phenol phthelene test. The implication of this part of the evidence was that it was as a result of the handling of these articles by the Inspector that they came to have phenol phthelene powder and that was the reason why the solution turned pink.\n\nP. W. 3 was treated as hostile and crossexamined by the prosroution with reference to the earlier statements made by him. P.W. 6 followed suit and he too was declared hostile and cross-examinied by the prosecution with reference to bis earlier statements.\n\nOf the two panch witnesses Kewal Krishan was not examined as he had become mentally deranged before the trial of the case.\n\nDavinder Kumar was examined as P.W. 4. This witness supported the prosecution case i'n some particulars but in regard to other particulars he made statements contrary to his earlier statements. He was also treated as hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. In substance bis chief-examination was to the affect that P.W.3, P.W.6 and\n\nKewal Krishan went inside the Police Station, while he stayed outside with the Inspector P.W. 8. P.W.3, P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan came out after sometime and stated that the accused had accepted the bribe.\n\nThe raiding party then went inside.\n\nOn seeing the Inspector the accused got suspicious and threw away the currency notes across the wall into the neighbouring room.\n\nIn examinatio\\1-in-chief he also stated that before they proceeded to the Police Station for the raid, statement of both P.W.3 and P.W.6 had been recorded. He stated that after the bribe was given P.W.3 also came out and signalled to P.W.8 that the bribe had. b; ien given.\n\nAnother statement made by him in chief-examinatio'n was that he was unable to remember if the Inspector questioned the accused at the time of the raid.\n\nAs these statements were contrary to his earlier statements he was crossexamined by the prosecution.\n\nParas Nath, (P.W.8) spoke to the complaint made to him by P.W.3., the action that he took, the raid etc.\n\nRegarding the actual raid he stated that P.W.3, P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan first went in side the Police Station.\n\nAfter sometime, P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan came out and signalled that P.W.3 had passed the bribe money and that P.W.3 and the accused were in the room.\n\nWhen he went i'n, the a\"ccused took out the notes from the right side pocket of his trousers and threw them across the wall into the adjoining room. He theii spoke to the test made by him etc.\n\nOn this evidence both the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court found the accused gnilty of the two offences with which he was charged.\n\nShri Frank Anthony, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Courts below had made free use of the statements made by the witnesses in the course of the investigation .as if such statements were substantive evidence. If those statements were exclnded from consideration there would be no evidence of any demand or acceptance of bribe by the accused.\n\nAll that the prosecution would be left with would be the evidence of the Inspector and P.W.4 to the effect that the accused took out the currency notes from the right side pocket of his trousers and flung them across the wall into the adjoining room.\n\nThat evidence accordi'ng to the learned counsel would not be sufficient, even if accepted, to draw the presumption under s. 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in Sita Ram v. The State of Rajasthan,(') and Suraj Mal v. The State (Delhi Administration(') .\n\n(l) AIR 1975 SC 1432 •.\n\n(2) AIR 1979 SC 1408.\n\n1 '\n\n• •\n\nHAZARI LAL v. DELm ADMN. (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 1059\n\nThe learned counsel was right in his submission about the free use made by the Courts below of statements of witnesses recorded during the course of investigation. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a bar on the use of any statement made by any person to a Police Officer in the course of investigation at any enqniry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made, except for the purpose of contradicting the witness in the manner provided by s.145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Where any part of such statement is so used any part t.hereof may also be used in the re-examination of the witness for the limited purpose of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. The only other exceptions to this embargo on the use of statements made in the counse of an investigation, relates to the statements falling within the provisions of s. 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act or permitted to be proved under s. 27 of the l'ndian Evidence Act. S.145 of the Evidence Act provides that a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing and reduced into writing and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him or being proved but, that if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The Courts below were clearly wrong in using as substantive evidence statements made by witnesses in the courne of investigation. Shri H. S. Marwah, learned counsel for the Delhi Administration amazed us by advancing the argument that the earlier statements with which witnesses were confronted for the purpose of contradiction could be taken into consideration by the Court in view of the definition of \"proved\" in section 3 of the Evidence Act which is, \"a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man, ought, in the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists.\" We need say no more on the submission of Shri Marwah except that the definition of proved does not enable a Court to take into consideration matters, including statements, whose use is statutorily barred .\n\n. After excluding irrelevant material we are left with the evidence of P.W.8 and that of P.W.4 whose evidence corroborates that of P.W.8 in several material particulars. We, however, wish to say that the evidence of P.W.8 is entirely trustworthy and there is no need to\n\neek any corroboration. We are not prepred to accept the sub B mission of Shri Frank A'nthony that the fact that he is the very Police Officer who laid the trap should be sufficient for us to insist upon\n\n• 1 . '\n\ncorroboration.\n\nWe do wish to say that there is no rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices and there should be insistence on corroboration. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case a Court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration, but, equally, in the facts and circumstances of another case the Court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of such an officer. It is all a matter of appreciation of evidence and on such matters there can be no hard and fast rule, nor can there be any precedential guidance.\n\nWe are forced to say this because of late we have come across several judgments of Courts of Session and sometimes even of High Courts where reference is made to decisions of this Court on matters of appreciation of evidence and decisions of pure question of fact. \\Vhile on this subject of appreciation of evidence we may also refer to an argument of Shri Frank Anthony based on the observations of a learned single judge in Kharaiti Lal v. The State,(') that peons holding clerical posts and the like should not be called as panch witnesses, as such witnesses could not really be called independent witnesses as they would always be under fear of disciplinary action if they did not support the prosecution case. We do not think we can accept the submission of Shri Frank Anthony. The respectability and the veracity of a . witness is not necessarily dependent upon his status in life and we are not prepared to say that Clerks are less truthful and more amenable than their superior officers.\n\nFrom the evidence of P.W.8 and that of P.W.4 we may take the following facts as established : P.W.3 made a report to P.W.8. He produced six currency notes of the denomination of ten rupees whose numbers were noted and which were treated with phenol phthelene powder.\n\nThereafter the notes were handed over to P.W.3. P.W.3, P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan went inside the Police Station.\n\nAfter sometime P.W.6 and Kewal Krishan came out and gave a sigbal.\n\nP.W.8 then went inside the Police Station.\n\nOn seeing him the accused who was inside the Police Station with P.W.3 took out some cnrrency notes from the right side pocket of his trousers and threw them across the partition wall into the adjoining room. The notes which were so thrown out by the accused, were found to be the same notes which had been treated with phenol phthelene and handed over to P.W.3 before the raid.\n\nThe handkerchief which was taken out of tl1e right side pocket of the trouser of the accused as well as the\n\n(I) 1965(1)DelhiLawTimes362.\n\nright side pocket itself were subjected to a test which showed that they too had come into contact with phenol phthelene powder. It may be rioted that the circulll\\Stance that the handkerchief (Ex.P-4) recovered from the right side pocket of the pant on the person of the accused was subjected to the colour test which indicated the presence of phenol phthelene powder on that handkerchief was put to the appellant in his examination under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code. Instead of giving any explanation as to how this phenol phthelene powder came on the handkerchief lying in his pocket, the apP\"llant replied : \"I k\"now nothing about it.\" From these facts the irresistable inference must follow, in the absence of any explanation from the accused, that currency notes were obtained by the accused. from P.W.3.\n\nIt is not necessary that the passing of money should be proved by direct evidence.\n\nIt may also be proved by circumstantial evidence.\n\nThe events which followed ih quick succession in the present case lead to the only inference that the money was obtained by the accused from P.W.3.\n\nUnder s.114 of the Evidnce Act the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, huma'n conduct and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case.\n\nOne of the illustrations to s.114 of the Evidence Act is that the Court may presume that a person who is in possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or bas received the goods knowing them to be stolen; unless he can account for his possession.\n\nSo too, in the facts ahd circumstances of the present case the Court may presume that the accused who took out the currency notes from his pocket and flung them across the wall had obtained them from P.W.3, who a few minutes earlier was shown to have been in possession of the notes.\n\nOnce we arrive at the finding that the accused had obtained the money from P.W.3, the presumption under s.4(1) of the Prevention of C9rruption Act is immediately attracted.\n\nThe presumption is of course rebuttable but in the present case there is no material to rebut the presumption. The accused was, therefore, rightly convicted by the Courts below.\n\nWe will now refer to the two decisions of this Court on which.\n\nShri Frank Anthony relied.\n\nIn Sita Ram v. The State of Rajasthan,\n\n(supra) the evidence of the complainant was rejected and it was held that there was no evidence to establish that the accused had received ahy gratification from any person.\n\nOn that finding the presumption\n\nunder s.4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was not drawn.\n\nH The question whether the rest of the evidence was sufficient to establish that the accused had obtained the money from the complainant\n\nI 062\n\nSUPREME CC(JRT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R:\n\nwas not considered.\n\nAll that was taken as established was the recovery of cert_a_in money from the person of the accused and it was held that mere recovery of money was not enough to entitle the drawing of the presumption under s.4 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nThe Court did not co\"nsider the further question whether recovery of the money alongwith other circumstances could establish that the accused had obtained gratification from any person. Jn the present case we have found that the circnmstances established by the prosecution entitled the Court to hold that the accused received the gratification from P.W.3. In Suraj Mal v. The State (Delhi Administration) (supra) also it was said mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it was paid was not sufficient when the substantive evidence in the case was not reliable to prove payment of briln or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. There can be no quarrel with that proposition but where the recovery of the money coupled with other circumstances leads to the conclusion that the acc11sed received gratification from some person the Court would certainly be entitled to draw the presumption under s.4( 1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In our view both the decisions are of no avail to the appellant and as already observed by us conclusions of fact must be drawn on the facts of each case and not on the facts of other cases. In other words there can be no precedents on questions of facts. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "LAL\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 15, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">\n\nHAZARI LAL\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\nFebruary 15, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 593, "end_char": 621, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 626, "end_char": 637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3026, "end_char": 3054, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3385, "end_char": 3396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3404, "end_char": 3430, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3741, "end_char": 3752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4141, "end_char": 4151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4209, "end_char": 4214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4475, "end_char": 4484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6748, "end_char": 6759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7691, "end_char": 7703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7711, "end_char": 7739, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "AIR 1975 SC 1432", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7984, "end_char": 8000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1979 SC 1408", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8052, "end_char": 8068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8708, "end_char": 8721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "Frank A'nthony"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dholakia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8723, "end_char": 8737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. C. Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8742, "end_char": 8754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H. S. Marwah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8775, "end_char": 8787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. S. Marwah and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "H. S. Marwah"}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8792, "end_char": 8806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. S. Marwah and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Hazari Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8906, "end_char": 8916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The appellant Hazari Lal was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Delhi, of offences under section 5(2) read with section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "HAZARI LAL"}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8986, "end_char": 8998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9009, "end_char": 9021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9033, "end_char": 9067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9073, "end_char": 9084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9092, "end_char": 9109, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Conrt of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9437, "end_char": 9456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The convictions and sentences were confirmed by the High Conrt of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9667, "end_char": 9670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe case which the prosecution set out to prove before the Trial Judge was briefly as follows : •\n\n\\. )\n\n1 >\n\nThe scooter rickshaw belonging to Sri Ram (P.W.3) and driven by his driver Ram Lubhaya (P.W. 6) was involved in an accident on July 12, 1969."}}, {"text": "Ram Lubhaya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9704, "end_char": 9715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe case which the prosecution set out to prove before the Trial Judge was briefly as follows : •\n\n\\. )\n\n1 >\n\nThe scooter rickshaw belonging to Sri Ram (P.W.3) and driven by his driver Ram Lubhaya (P.W. 6) was involved in an accident on July 12, 1969."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9756, "end_char": 9769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nThe case which the prosecution set out to prove before the Trial Judge was briefly as follows : •\n\n\\. )\n\n1 >\n\nThe scooter rickshaw belonging to Sri Ram (P.W.3) and driven by his driver Ram Lubhaya (P.W. 6) was involved in an accident on July 12, 1969."}}, {"text": "Police Station, Kashmere Gate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9858, "end_char": 9887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scooter rickshaw and a tonga which were involved in the accident were taken to the Police Station, Kashmere Gate by the accused, a Police constable attached to that station."}}, {"text": "Paras Nath", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10323, "end_char": 10333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He went to the Anti Corruption Department and made statement to Inspector Paras Nath, P.W. 8."}}, {"text": "Davinder Kumar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10413, "end_char": 10427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording the statement of P.W. 3, P.W. 8 sent for two persons Davinder Kumar (P.W. 4) and Kewal Krishan."}}, {"text": "Kewal Krishan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10441, "end_char": 10454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording the statement of P.W. 3, P.W. 8 sent for two persons Davinder Kumar (P.W. 4) and Kewal Krishan."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12612, "end_char": 12616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12631, "end_char": 12635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12652, "end_char": 12680, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12685, "end_char": 12691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12699, "end_char": 12716, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hawaldar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13067, "end_char": 13075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 3 stated in his evidence that on the first occasion when he went to the Police Station to obtain delivery of his scooter rickshaw it was not the accused that was present but one Hawaldar."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16693, "end_char": 16706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Frank Anthony, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Courts below had made free use of the statements made by the witnesses in the course of the investigation .as if such statements were substantive evidence.", "canonical_name": "Frank A'nthony"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17424, "end_char": 17431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17439, "end_char": 17467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "AIR 1975 SC 1432", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17622, "end_char": 17638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1979 SC 1408", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17647, "end_char": 17663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17892, "end_char": 17903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17911, "end_char": 17937, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18240, "end_char": 18245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18253, "end_char": 18272, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18643, "end_char": 18651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18659, "end_char": 18678, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18711, "end_char": 18716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18746, "end_char": 18751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. S. Marwah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19326, "end_char": 19338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri H. S. Marwah, learned counsel for the Delhi Administration amazed us by advancing the argument that the earlier statements with which witnesses were confronted for the purpose of contradiction could be taken into consideration by the Court in view of the definition of \"proved\" in section 3 of the Evidence Act which is, \"a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man, ought, in the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists.\"", "canonical_name": "H. S. Marwah"}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19364, "end_char": 19384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri H. S. Marwah, learned counsel for the Delhi Administration amazed us by advancing the argument that the earlier statements with which witnesses were confronted for the purpose of contradiction could be taken into consideration by the Court in view of the definition of \"proved\" in section 3 of the Evidence Act which is, \"a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man, ought, in the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists.\""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19607, "end_char": 19616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Marwah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19962, "end_char": 19968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We need say no more on the submission of Shri Marwah except that the definition of proved does not enable a Court to take into consideration matters, including statements, whose use is statutorily barred ."}}, {"text": "Frank A'nthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20472, "end_char": 20486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not prepred to accept the sub B mission of Shri Frank A'nthony that the fact that he is the very Police Officer who laid the trap should be sufficient for us to insist upon\n\n• 1 . '", "canonical_name": "Frank A'nthony"}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22107, "end_char": 22120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think we can accept the submission of Shri Frank Anthony."}}, {"text": "section 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23787, "end_char": 23798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23800, "end_char": 23823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24458, "end_char": 24463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24757, "end_char": 24762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25395, "end_char": 25401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25990, "end_char": 25996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26004, "end_char": 26032, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26463, "end_char": 26466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26478, "end_char": 26506, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27448, "end_char": 27455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27463, "end_char": 27491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1063_1066_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "• . \\\n\n' I\n\nRAGHUNANDAN SINGH & ORS.\n\nBRIJ MOHAN SINGH & ORS.\n\nFebruary 15, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\n[J. P. Zan1i11dari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 o1\n\n1950) Section 12-Scope of.\n\nTerms of Thcka empowering lease-holders to remain in possession of agrl .. .c; ultural land--Appoint te1nporary tenants and recover Govern1nent Revenue- Thekadar whether a hereditary tenant.\n\nThe appellants who were originally the Zamindars of the land in dispute granted Thekas to the respondents first on the 10th July, 1933 and then on the 24th May, 1943.\n\nWhile the first Theka provided that the tease-holders were to remain in pos.4ession of the entire agricultural land either through them~ 1elves or by euanging with temporary tenants and by recovering government revenue, the second Theka though in the same terms, provided that the leasehold'ers would remain in possession of the agricultural land as lease-holders themselves and may appoint temporary tenants by receiving the government\n\n, revenue.\n\n' i\n\nThe appellants succeeded before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but the Deputy Director of Consolidation held in revision, that the appellants were Bhoomidars and the respondents could not get any status under Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Zam.indari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants in limine.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it v,.-as submitted on behalf of the appellants that as the Theka granted by the Zamindars was not made with the les<ees <>nly for the purposes of personal cultivation of the lands the respondents 'Nould not fall within the ambit of section 12 of the Act, while on behalf of th~ respondents it wa<I contended that oo they were in cultivating possession of the lands in question, they had acquired the status of her'editary tenants conferred p on them by section 12 of the Act and they were not Assamis as contemplated by section 13 of the Act.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. Before a person can be held to be a hereditary tenant under Section 12 of the Act, three conditions must be fulfilled: (1) He must be in\n\npossession of the land in dispute on the !st May 1950, (2) His possession mlist G be under a Tbeka and (3) The Th'eka must be for the purpose of personal cuttivlltion of the lands in dispute by that person and not for other purposes.\n\n!1065C-DJ\n\n2. The dominant intention of the statute, as of other land reforms legisla tion, is to secure land for the tiller of the soil who alone would be clothed with the special rights of a hereditary tenant.\n\n[1065-DJ H\n\n3. The terms of the Tbeka do not spell out the facts that the respondents llad taken the lease for purposes of personal cultivation only, because other\n\n' A purpoSes also are indicated as part of the Theka namely to sublet the land or to appoint tcmpora.ry tenants and the like.\n\nThe conditions required by section 12 are therefore not fulfilled in the case of the respondents.\n\n[1066C]\n\nBalu Noorul Hassan Khan (Dead) by LRs v. Ram Prasad Singh and oilier! [1980] 1 S.C.C. 367 followed and relied upon; Rani Dullaiya & Anr. v. Ganga Prarad 1968 ALJ 518 over-ruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1197 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 9-4-19.69 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petitiou No. 1005 of 1969.\n\nS. P. Singh and R. A. Gupta for the Appellant.\n\nC Yogeswar Prasad, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, S. K. Bagga and Mrs.\n\nS. K. Bagga for Respondent No. 4.\n\nS. N. Singh for Respondents 1-3 and 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants in limine. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length.\n\nThe only point for detennination in the present appeal is whether the case of the parties is governed by section 12 or section 13 of the U .P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 (Act I of 1950) (hereinafter called the Act).\n\nThe facts in dispute are that so far as the appellants are concerned, they were orginally the zamindars of the lands in dispute and they granted Thckas to the respondents first on the 10th of July, 1933 and then on the 24th May, 1943. The interpretation of the tenns of the Theka wonld determine the question of the status of the appellants.\n\nShri Shiv Pujan Singh, appearing for the appellants, submitted that as the Thcka granted by the Zamindars was not made with the lessees only for the purposes of personal cnltivation of the lands the respondents would not fall within the ambit of Section 12 of the Act.\n\nOn the other hand, it was argued or the respondents that as they were in cultivating possession of the lands in question, they had acquired the status of hereditary tenants conferred on them by section 12 of the Act and they are not Assamis contemplated by section 13 of the Act.\n\nAlthough the appellants succeeded before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) the Deputy Director of Consolidation held in revision that the appellants were Bhoomidars and the respondents could not get any status under section 12 of the Act.\n\nIn order to decide this question, we have to determine the scope and ambit of Section 12 of the Act.\n\n. t •\n\nJl.; ..\n\nRAGHUNANDAN v. BRIJMOHAN (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nI 065\n\n. \"12. Thekedars to be hereditary tenants in certain circumstances- A ( 1) Where any land was in the personal culliivation of a person on the 1st day of May, 1950, as a thekedar thereof and the theka was made with a view to the cultivation of the land by such thekedar personally, then notwithstanding anything in any law, document or order of court, he shall be deemed to be a hereditary tenant thereof entited to hold, and when he has been ejected from the land after the said date, to B regain possession as a heredifary tenant thereof liable to pay rent at hereditary rates.\" ·\n\nAn analysis of this section would show that before a person can be held to be a hereditary tenant under the section, the following conditions must be fulfilled :- C\n\nl. He must be in possession of the land in dispute-on the 1st of May, 1950.\n\n2. His possession must be under a Theka.\n\n3. The Theka must be for the purpose of personal cultivation of the lands in dispute by that person (emphasis supplied) D and not for other purposes. The dominant intention of the statute, as of other land reforms legislation, is to secure land for the tiller of the soil who alone would be clothed with the special rights of a hereditary tenant.\n\nIt is, therefore, manifest that only if the above three conditions are E fulfilled, would the Thekedars get the status of hereditary tenants and not otherwise. This section was interpreted by a decision of this Court in Babu Noorul Hasan Khan (Dead) by Lrs. v. Ram Prasad Singh and Others(') where this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"If such a land was in .the personal cultivation of a person on the p 1st of May, 1950 as a Thekedar thereof and if the Theka was made with a view to the cultivation of the land by such Thekedar personally then because of the non-obstante clause occurring in sub-section ( 1) of section 12 of the Act the Thekedar would be deemed to be a hereditary tenant of the land entitled to hold as such and liable to pay rent on hereditary rates.\n\nIf, however, the land was in personal cultivation G of the Thekedar merely as a Thekedar appointed to collect rent from other tenants and incidentally allowed to cultivate the Sir or Khudkasht land of the lessor then he will be a mere assami in accordance with section 13(2) (a) of the Act.\"\n\nThe facts of the case before us are similar to the facts of the H' present case' and the decision of the courr is therefore directly in point.\n\n\nA perusal of para 1 of the Theka executed on the 10th of July 1933 in favour of the Thekedars clearly shows that the lease-holders were to remain in possession of the entire agricultural land eiliier through themselves or by arran!jing with temporary tenants and by recovering government revenue. The other Theka which was executed on 24-5-43 was almost in the same terms and clause(!) provide that the lease-holders will remain in possession of the agricultural land as lease-holders themselves and may appoint temporary tenants by receiving the govermnent revenue.\n\nThus, the terms of the Theka, do not spell out the fact that the respondents had taken the lease for the purpose of personal cultivation only because other purposes also are inddcated as part of the Theka viz. to sublet the land or to appoint temporary tenants and the like.\n\nIn these circumstances, the condition required by section 12 are\n\nclerly not fulfilled in the case of the respondents.\n\nMr. Singh appearing for the respondents relied on a decision of D the Allahabad High Court in Rani Dullaiya & Anr. v. Ganga Prasad(') where it was held that although the Theka may be for some other purpose also, but if it was also for personal cultivation section 12 of the Act would apply to the Thekedars. With due respect, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court is in direct conflict with the decision of this Court referred to above and E it must, therefore, be held to be incorrect.\n\nFor the above reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as also that of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and restore the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 24-1-1968.\n\nF In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as lo costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(l) (1968) A. L. J. 518.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "I\n\nRAGHUNANDAN SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUNANDAN SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BRIJ MOHAN SINGH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BRIJ MOHAN SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 15, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 80, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 15, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1260, "end_char": 1270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1303, "end_char": 1339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1682, "end_char": 1692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1903, "end_char": 1913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1970, "end_char": 1980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2086, "end_char": 2096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2931, "end_char": 2941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balu Noorul Hassan Khan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3012, "end_char": 3035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1066C]\n\nBalu Noorul Hassan Khan (Dead) by LRs v. Ram Prasad Singh and oilier! ["}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3305, "end_char": 3325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 9-4-19.69 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc."}}, {"text": "S. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3374, "end_char": 3385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Singh and R. A. Gupta for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "S. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "R. A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3390, "end_char": 3401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Singh and R. A. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C Yogeswar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Yogeswar Prasad, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, S. K. Bagga and Mrs.\n\nS. K. Bagga for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3446, "end_char": 3458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Yogeswar Prasad, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, S. K. Bagga and Mrs.\n\nS. K. Bagga for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C Yogeswar Prasad, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, S. K. Bagga and Mrs.\n\nS. K. Bagga for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Singh for Respondents 1-3 and 5.", "canonical_name": "S. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "FAzAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3601, "end_char": 3609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL Au, J.-This appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants in limine."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3939, "end_char": 3949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3977, "end_char": 4022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10th of July, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in dispute are that so far as the appellants are concerned, they were orginally the zamindars of the lands in dispute and they granted Thckas to the respondents first on the 10th of July, 1933 and then on the 24th May, 1943."}}, {"text": "Shiv Pujan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4418, "end_char": 4434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Shiv Pujan Singh, appearing for the appellants, submitted that as the Thcka granted by the Zamindars was not made with the lessees only for the purposes of personal cnltivation of the lands the respondents would not fall within the ambit of Section 12 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4659, "end_char": 4669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4877, "end_char": 4887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4940, "end_char": 4950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5185, "end_char": 5195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5287, "end_char": 5297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of May, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An analysis of this section would show that before a person can be held to be a hereditary tenant under the section, the following conditions must be fulfilled :- C\n\nl. He must be in possession of the land in dispute-on the 1st of May, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7204, "end_char": 7214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7624, "end_char": 7637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10th of July 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal of para 1 of the Theka executed on the 10th of July 1933 in favour of the Thekedars clearly shows that the lease-holders were to remain in possession of the entire agricultural land eiliier through themselves or by arran!jing with temporary tenants and by recovering government revenue."}}, {"text": "24-5-43", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other Theka which was executed on 24-5-43 was almost in the same terms and clause(!)"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8695, "end_char": 8705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8769, "end_char": 8774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Singh appearing for the respondents relied on a decision of D the Allahabad High Court in Rani Dullaiya & Anr."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9021, "end_char": 9031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "-1-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9493, "end_char": 9500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the above reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as also that of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and restore the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 24-1-1968."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9577, "end_char": 9583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1067_1071_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nRAM BABU MISRA\n\nFebruary 19, 1980\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nl 067\n\nEvidence Act, 1872, Section 73-Scope of-Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others adn1itted or proved-Competency of the Magistrates to gtve directio1l to the accused to give specimen signature when the case is sti!J under investigation.\n\nDismissing the appeal by special Jea\\e, the Court :\n\nHELD : Though a direction by the Magistrate to the accused to give his specimen writing when the case is still under investigation would urely be in the interests of the administration of justic'e, Section 73 of the E\\rideace Act does not ena.ble the Magistrate to give such a direction when the case is still under investigation.\n\n[1068G-H]\n\nThe second paragraph of Section 73 'enables the Court to direct any person present in Court to give specimen writings \"for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare\" such writings with writings alleged to have been written by such p'erson.\n\nThe clear implication of the words \"for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare\" is that there is some proceeding before the Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary for the Court to compare such writings.\n\nThe direction is to be given for the purpose of 'enabling the Court to compare' and not for the purpose of enabling the investigating or other agency 'to compare'.\n\nIf the case is still under investigation there is no present proceeding before the Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary to compare the writings.\n\nThe language of Section 73 does not permit a Court to give a direction to the accused to give\n\npecimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be' instituted in the Court.\n\n[1069D-F]\n\n(ii) Section 73 of the Evidence Act m•akes no distinction between a Civil Court and a Criminal Court. It would not be open to a person to seek tlre assistance of the Civil Court for a direction to some other p'erson to give sample writing under section 73 of the Evidence Act on the pl'ea that it would help him to decide whether to institute a civil suit in Which the question would be whether certain alleged writing5 are those' of the other person or not. That being the position, it should not make any difference if the investigating a.gency seeks the assistance of the court under section 73 of the Evidence Act ori the plea that a case might be instituted before the Court where it would be necessary to compare the writings.\n\n[1069G-H]\n\nState (Del/ii Admn.) v. Pali Ram, [1979] 1 SCR 931 and State of Bombay\n\nv. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808; distinguished,\n\nState of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808; T. Subbaiah v.\n\nS. K. D. Ramaswamy Nadar, AIR 1970 Mad. 85; Farid Ahmed v. The State, AIR 1960 Cal. 32; Priti Ran; an Ghosh and others v. The State, 77 C.W.N.\n\nI!'\n\nA 865; Dharamvir Singh v.\n\nState, 1975 Crl.\n\nL.J. 884 (Pb. & Haryana); Brii •\n\nBhusha11 Raghunandan Pd. v. The State, AIR 1957 M.P. 106; and Srikant Rout\n\nv. State of Orissa, 1972 (2) CUttack Weekly Reporter 1332; appr<'\\''d.\n\nGuizar Khan and Ors. v. State, AIR 1962 Patna 255 and B. Rami Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P., 1971 Crl. L.J. 1591 (AP); over-ruled.\n\n[The Court suggested that suitable legislation may be made on the analogy of s. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, to provide for the investiture of Magistrates \\Vith the power to issue directions tO :1ny peron, i:r:icluding an accused person, to give specimen signatures and \\Vritings.]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 811 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Orde~ dated 18-12-1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Cr!. Revision No. 170 of 1975.\n\n0. P. Rana and M. Ramachandran for the Appellant.\n\nNemo for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The Officer who was investigating into offences under Section 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 Indian Penal Code alleged against the respondent, Ram Babu Misra, moved the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, to direct the accused to give his specimen writing for the purpose of comparison with certain disputed writings.\n\nThe leruved Magistrate held that he had no power to do so when the case was still under investigation.\n\nHis view has been upheld by the High Court. \"'he State has preferred this appeal by Special Leave of this Court.\n\nShri 0. P. Rana, learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that Section 73 of the Evidence Act conferred ample power on the Magistrate to direct the accused to give his speciruen writing even during the course of investigation. He also urged that it would be generally in the interests of the administration of justice for the Magistrate to direct the accused to give his speciruen writing when the case was still under investigation, since that would enable the investigating agency not to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial or enquiry, if the disputed writing, as a result of comparison with the specimen writing, was found not to have been made by the accused. While we agree with Mr. Rana that a direction by the Magistrate to the accused to give his specimen writing when the case is still under investigation would surely be in the interests of the administration of justice, we find ourselves unable to agree with his submission that s. 73 of the Evidence Act enables the Magistrate to give. such a direction even when the case is still under investigation.\n\nf \"'\n\n' l\n\nU.P. STATE v. RAMDABU (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1069\n\nSection 73 of the Evidence Act is as follows :\n\n\"73. In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose.\n\nThe Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.\n\nThis sectton applies also, with any necessary modifications to finger-impressions\".\n\nTe second paragraph of section 73 enables the Court to direct any D person present in Conrt to give specimen writings \"for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare\" such writings with writings alleged to have been written by such person.\n\nThe clear implication of the words \"for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare\" is that there is some proceeding before the.Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary for the Court to compare such writings.\n\nE The direction is to be given for the purpose of 'enabling the Conrt to compare' and not for the purpose of enabling the investigating or other agency 'to compare'. If the case is still under investigation there is no present proceeding before the Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary to compare the writings. The language of section 73 does not permit a Court to give a direction to the accused\n\n~ F to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be institnted in the Court.\n\nFurther section 73 of the Evidence Act makes no distinction between a Civil Conrt and a Criminal Court. Would it be open to a person to seek the assistance of the Civil Conrt for a direction to some other person G to give sample writing under section 73 of the Evidence Act on the plea that it would help him to decide whether to institute a civil suit in which the question would. be whether certain alleged writings are those of the other person or not ? Obviously not. If not, why should it make any difference if .the investigating agency seeks the assistance of the Court under s. 73 of the Evidence Act on the plea that a case H might be instituted before the Court where it would be necessary to compare the writings . ?\n\nWe may also refer here to Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, which provides :\n\n\"5. If a Magistrate is satisfied that, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeiling under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, it is expedient to direct any person to allow his measurements or photograph to be taken, he may make an order to that effect, and in that case the person to whom the order relates shall be produced or shall attend at the time and place specified in the order and shall allow his measure- • ments or photograph to be taken, as the case may be, by a police officer :\n\nProvided that no order shall be made directing any person to be photographed except by a Magistrate of the first class : Provided further, that no order shall be made under this section unless the person has at some time been arrested in connection with such investigatiou or proceeding\".\n\nSection 2(a) of the Act defines \"measurements\" as 'including \"finger impressions and foot print impressions\".\n\nThere are two things to be noticed here.\n\nFirst, signature and writing are excluded from the range of s. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act and, second, 'finger impression' are included in both s. 73 of the Evidence Act and s. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act.\n\nA possible view is that it was thought that s. 73 of the Evidence Act would not take in the stage of investigation and so s. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act made special provision for that stage and even while making such provision, signature and writings were deliberately excluded. As we said, this is a possible, view but not one on which we desire to rest our conclusion. Our conclusion rests on the languageof s. 73 of the Evidence Act.\n\nSection 73 of the Evidence Act was considered by us in State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram('), where we held that a Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code was entitled under s. 73 of the Evidence Act to direct an accused person appearing before it to give his specimen handwriting to enable the Court by which he may be tried to compare it with disputed writings.\n\nThe present question whether such a direction, under s. 73 of the Evidence Act, can be given when the matter is still under investigation and there is no proceeding before the Court was expressly left open. The question was also not considered in State of Bombay v. Kathi Ka/11 Oghad,(')\n\n(!) [1979] 1 S.C.R. 931.\n\n(2) AIR 1961 SC 1808.\n\n• . )\n\nU.P. STATE v. RAMBABU (Chinnappa Reddy,!.)\n\nI 071\n\nwhere the question which was actually decided was that no testimonial t\\ compulsion uhder Art. 20(3) of th; o Constitution was involved in a direction to give specimen signature and hand-writing for the purpose of comparison.\n\nThe view expressed by us in the earlier paragraphs, on the construction of s. 73, Evidence Act was the view taken by the Madras High 8 Court in T. Subbiah v. S. K. D. Ramaswamy Nadar('), the Calcutta High Court in Farid Ahmed v. the State(') (Mitter J., at page 32). and Prill Ranjan Ghosh & Ors. v. The State('), the High Court of Punjab\n\nand Haryana in Dharamvir Singh v. State('), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Brij Bhushan Raghunandan Prasad v.\n\nThe State(•), the Orissa High Court in Srikant Rout v. State of Orissa(6 ) C and the Allahabad High Court in the judgment nnder appeal. A contrary view was taken by the Patna High Court in Guizar Khan & Ors. v. State(') and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in B. Rami Reddy & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh. (8 ) We do not agree with the latter view. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. and while doing so We would suggest the suitable legislation may be made on the ana- D logy of s. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, to provide for the investiture of Magistrates with the power to issue directions to any person, including an accused person, to give specimen signatures and writings.\n\ns. R.\n\n(I) AIR 1978 Mad. 85.\n\n(2) AIR 1960 cal. 32.\n\n(3) 77 C.W.N. 865.\n\n(4) 1975 Crl. L. J. 884 (Pb. & Haryana).\n\n(5) AIR 1957 M. P.106.\n\n(6) 1972(2) Cuttack Weekly Reporter 1332.\n\n(7) AIR 1962 Patna 255.\n\n(8) 1971 Crl. L. J. 1591 (A.P.).\n\nJ4-138SCI/80\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM BABU MISRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM BABU MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 19, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF U.P.\n\nRAM BABU MISRA\n\nFebruary 19, 1980\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 603, "end_char": 613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 772, "end_char": 782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1585, "end_char": 1595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1800, "end_char": 1810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2040, "end_char": 2050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2382, "end_char": 2392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1979] 1 SCR 931", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2574, "end_char": 2590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1961 SC 1808", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1961 SC 1808", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3325, "end_char": 3329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Identification of Prisoners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3337, "end_char": 3368, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "18-12-1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3664, "end_char": 3674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Orde~ dated 18-12-1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3682, "end_char": 3702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Orde~ dated 18-12-1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Cr!."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3741, "end_char": 3748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and M. Ramachandran for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Ramachandran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3753, "end_char": 3768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and M. Ramachandran for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3933, "end_char": 3944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3965, "end_char": 3982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ram Babu Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The Officer who was investigating into offences under Section 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 Indian Penal Code alleged against the respondent, Ram Babu Misra, moved the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, to direct the accused to give his specimen writing for the purpose of comparison with certain disputed writings.", "canonical_name": "RAM BABU MISRA"}}, {"text": "Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4041, "end_char": 4075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The Officer who was investigating into offences under Section 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 Indian Penal Code alleged against the respondent, Ram Babu Misra, moved the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, to direct the accused to give his specimen writing for the purpose of comparison with certain disputed writings."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri 0."}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4476, "end_char": 4486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5115, "end_char": 5119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While we agree with Mr. Rana that a direction by the Magistrate to the accused to give his specimen writing when the case is still under investigation would surely be in the interests of the administration of justice, we find ourselves unable to agree with his submission that s. 73 of the Evidence Act enables the Magistrate to give."}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5368, "end_char": 5373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5554, "end_char": 5564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6354, "end_char": 6364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7378, "end_char": 7388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7613, "end_char": 7623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7953, "end_char": 7958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8142, "end_char": 8179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8301, "end_char": 8333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8992, "end_char": 9004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9205, "end_char": 9209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Identification of Prisoners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9248, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9303, "end_char": 9308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9333, "end_char": 9337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Identification of Prisoners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9345, "end_char": 9376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9423, "end_char": 9428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9501, "end_char": 9505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Identification of Prisoners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9513, "end_char": 9544, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9803, "end_char": 9808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9831, "end_char": 9841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9952, "end_char": 10010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10274, "end_char": 10279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "[1979] 1 S.C.R. 931", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10514, "end_char": 10533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1961 SC 1808", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10540, "end_char": 10556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10707, "end_char": 10717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10919, "end_char": 10924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Madras High 8 Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10965, "end_char": 10984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view expressed by us in the earlier paragraphs, on the construction of s. 73, Evidence Act was the view taken by the Madras High 8 Court in T. Subbiah v. S. K. D. Ramaswamy Nadar('), the Calcutta High Court in Farid Ahmed v. the State(') (Mitter J., at page 32)."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11035, "end_char": 11054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view expressed by us in the earlier paragraphs, on the construction of s. 73, Evidence Act was the view taken by the Madras High 8 Court in T. Subbiah v. S. K. D. Ramaswamy Nadar('), the Calcutta High Court in Farid Ahmed v. the State(') (Mitter J., at page 32)."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11162, "end_char": 11182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State('), the High Court of Punjab\n\nand Haryana in Dharamvir Singh v. State('), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Brij Bhushan Raghunandan Prasad v.\n\nThe State(•), the Orissa High Court in Srikant Rout v. State of Orissa(6 ) C and the Allahabad High Court in the judgment nnder appeal."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11232, "end_char": 11260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State('), the High Court of Punjab\n\nand Haryana in Dharamvir Singh v. State('), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Brij Bhushan Raghunandan Prasad v.\n\nThe State(•), the Orissa High Court in Srikant Rout v. State of Orissa(6 ) C and the Allahabad High Court in the judgment nnder appeal."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11318, "end_char": 11335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State('), the High Court of Punjab\n\nand Haryana in Dharamvir Singh v. State('), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Brij Bhushan Raghunandan Prasad v.\n\nThe State(•), the Orissa High Court in Srikant Rout v. State of Orissa(6 ) C and the Allahabad High Court in the judgment nnder appeal."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11469, "end_char": 11485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A contrary view was taken by the Patna High Court in Guizar Khan & Ors."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11528, "end_char": 11556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State(') and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in B. Rami Reddy & Ors."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11782, "end_char": 11786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Identification of Prisoners Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11794, "end_char": 11825, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1971 Crl. L. J. 1591 (A.P.)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12206, "end_char": 12233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(8) 1971 Crl."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1072_1077_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAMCHANDRA A. KAMAT v ..\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 20, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.] Conservation of Foreign Exahange and Prevention of Smuggling Activittes Act 1974, Section 3-Delay by detaining authority in furnishing copies of statements and documents referred to in the order of deten(ofV-Detention whether viJiared.\n\nThe petitioner was directed to be detained by an order dated1 August 31 1 1979 under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange :ind Prevention of. Smuggling A.ctivities Act, 1974 and in pursuance thereof was arrested on September 5, 1979.\n\nHe was served with the grounds of detention on the same day. The petitioner's advocate wrote a letter dated September 7, 1979 to the detaining authority-second respondent stating that it was not possible to 1nake an effective representation without the copies of statements and documents referr'ed to in detention order. The detaining authority did not take any action on the letter but forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary tv the Government of India who by a oommunication dated September 10, 1979 acknowledged its receipt , arut requested the advocate to contact the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bombay regarding the supply of copies of statements and documents.\n\nAs no further communication was received, the advocate addressed a letter da.ted September 14, 1979 to the Deputy Direct.or to supply him copies of the statements and documents.\n\nThe Deputy Director in his communication dated September 22, 1979 requested the advocate to see him on September 24, 1979 to take inspection of the documents.\n\nOn inspcting the docun1ents the advocate was not satisfied and insisted on supply of copies of docun1rnts, Which were supplied on three days, September 26, 1979, September 28. 1979 and September 29, 1979.\n\nOn October 5. 1979 the petitioner made his representation a.gainst the detention.\n\nIn the writ petition, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that as there was unrcas.onab1e delay in furnishing of the statements and documt:nts referred to in the grounds of detention and the right to make an effective J P representation \\WlS denied, the detention could not be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law.\n\nOn behalf of the detaining authority it wc:s contended rhat the constitutional right of the p'etitioner to make an effective representation had not been infringed and that it was not incumbent upon the detaining authority to supply copies of all documents relied up0n in he grounds of detention and that the grounds of detention were sufficiently det.aileJ Si) as to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation against the deten- G lion.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : 1. The detaining authority failed to act with reasonable expedi~ tton in furnishing the statements and documents referred to in the gr')unds of detention.\n\nThe detention is therefore not in accordance with the procl;!ctu1e contemplated under law, and the continued detention is not warranted.\n\nH [1077Gl\n\n2. It is r.ettled law that the 34>PJYJpriate authority is bound to give s.n opnortunity to the cletenu to make representation and to consider the representation\n\nof the detenu as early as possible.\n\nThere should not be any delay in .the A matter of consideration.\n\n[ 107 4G] Jayanarayan Sukut v. Shue of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 225, referred to.\n\n3. (i) The right to make a representation is a fundamental right.\n\nThe representation thus made should be considered expeditiously by the Government.\n\nIn order to make an effective representation, the detenu is entitled to obtain information reating to the grounds nf detention. When the grounds uf detention are served on the detenue he is entitl'ed to ask for copies of the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention to enable him to make - an effective representation. When the detenu makes a request for such documents, they should be supplied to him expeditiously.\n\n[!075E]\n\n(ii) When the Act contemplates the furnishing of grounds of detention within five days of the order of detention, the intention is clear that the state ments and dncurr1ents which are referred to in the grounds of deteution and \\vhich are required by the d'etenu should be furnished with reasonable expedi .. tion.\n\n[1076B]\n\n4. If chere is undue delay in furnishing the statements and documw.t& referred to in the grounds. of detention the right to make an effe\\:tive representation is denied. It is the duty of the detaining authority to satisfactorily explain the delay, if any, in furnishing of the documents.\n\n[1076A, 1075G]\n\n5. It m<1oy not be n'ecessary for the. detaining authority to supply copies of the documents relied upon in the grounds of detention at the time when the ground are furnished to the detenu but once the detenu states that for effective represe.ntation it is necessary that he should have copies of the t>tate-- ments and documents referred to in the grounds of det'ention it iS the duty of the detaining £Juthority to furnish them with reasonable expedition.\n\nThe detaining authority cannot decline to furnish copies of the documents on the ground tha.t the grounds were sufficiently d'etailed to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation.\n\n[1077D-E]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1323 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.) Ram Jethama/ani and Harjinder Singh and M. M. Lodha for the Petitioner.\n\nU. R. LaUt, A. V. Rallgam and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-Th~ Petitioner Ramchandra A. Kamat has preferred this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of writ of Habeas Corpus directing his release by quasting the order of his detention da'ed 31-8-1979 passed by second respondent, Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance.\n\nThe petitianer was directed to be detained by an order dated 31st August, 1979 under S. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Ac'.ivities Act, 1974. In pursuance of the order, the petitioner was arres'.ed on 5-9-1979. He was served with the grounds of detention on the same day.\n\nThe Petitioner through his advocate by a letter dated 7-9-1979 wrote to the scond\n\n' respondent stating that it was found that the detaining authonty rclkd upon a number of statements of various persons including the dctenu\n\nas well as documents referred to in the grounds, but the detenu was not furnished with the copies of the same. The Advocate stated that detenu desires to make a representation against the order of detention but found that without the copies of documents referred to in the grounds of detention order it is not possible to make an efbctive representation.\n\nA reply to his letter was sent to the Advocate by Mr.\n\nThawani, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, wherein he acknowledged the receipt of the Jetter of the Advocate dated 7-9-1979. '._ By this Jetter the Deputy Secretary requested the Advocate to contact ' the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bombay, who it was stated, had been suitably advised regarding supply of copies of statements and documents, relied upon in the detention order dated 31-8-1979. It may be noted that the detaining authority, the second respondent did not acknowledge the Jetter from the detenu's advocate or take any action by himself but directed the Deputy Secretary to address the communication dated 10-9-1979 referred to above. Though the letter states that the Deputy Director, Bombay has been suitably advised regarding the request for supply of copies of statemen's and documents relied on in the detention order nothing further was done by the Deputy Director of Enforcement, Bombay.\n\nOn the 14th September, 1979, the advocate not having received any communication, addressed a letcr to the Deputy Director enclosing a copy of the :etter which he received from the Deputy Secretary and requested the Deputy Director to supply him on behalf of his clien: copies of the relevant statements and documents referred to and relied upon in the order of detention at an early date.\n\nIn reply to the letter of 14·9-i9 by the Advocate, the Deputy Director in his communication dated 22-9-1979 -~ requested the advocate to see the Deputy Director on 24-9-1979 at 1430 hours to take inspection of the documents.\n\nOn inspeting the documents the advocate was not satisfied and insisted on supply of copies of documents and ultimately copies were supplied on 3 days, namely, on 26-9-79, 28-9-79 and 29-9-79.\n\nThe representation was made by the detenu on 5-10-79.\n\nIt is settled law that the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make representation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. There should not be any delay in the matter of consideration.\n\nThe Constitutional Bench of this Court in Jayanarayan Sukul v.\n\nState of West Bengal(') has held that the fundamental right of the detenu to have representation considered by the appropriate Govern-\n\n(!) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 225.\n\ngo~ - '13. Trv1\n\nRAMCHANDRA A. KAMAT v. UNION (Kailasam, J.)\n\nI 075\n\nme'nt will render meaningless if the Government will not deal with the A matter expeditiously. The Court observed :\n\n\"It is established beyond any measure of doubt that the appropriate authority is bound to consider the represemation of the dctenu as early as possible. The appropriate Government itself is bound to consider the representation as expeditiously as possib:e. The reason for immediate consideration of the representation is too obvious to be stressed.\n\nThe personal liberty of a person is at stake.\n\nAny delay would not only be an irresponsible act on the part of the appropriate authority but also unconstitutional because the Constitntion enshrines the fundamental right of a detenu to have his representation considered and it is imperative that when the liberty of a person is in peril immediate action should be taken by the relevant authorities.\n\nThe same view has been expressed by this Court in a 'number of cases vide See_rvai's Constitutional Law of India, Vol. I, page 542. paragraph 12.82.\n\nThe right to make a representation is a fundamental right.\n\nThe representation thus made should be considered expeditiously by the Government. In order to make an effective representation, the detenu is entitled to obtain information relating to the grounds of detention.\n\nWhen the grounds of detention are served on the detenu, he is entitled to ask for copie\" of the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention to enable him to make an effective representation.\n\nWhen the detenu makes a request for .such documents, they should be supplied to him expeditiously. The detaining anthority in preparing the grounds would have referred to the statements and documents relied on in the grounds of detention and would be ordinarily available with him-when copies of such documents are asked for by the detenu the detaining authority should be in a position to supply them with reasonable expedition. What is reasonable expedition will depend on the facts of each case.\n\nIt is alleged by the detenu that there had been unreasonable dela) in furnishing of the statel)lents and documents referred to in the grounds of detention.\n\nIt is the duty of the detaining authority to satisfactorily explain the delay, if any, in furnishing of these docu ments.\n\nWe arc in this context not referring to the statements and documents not referred to in the grounds of detention for it may be that they are no: in the possession of the detaining authority and that reasonable time may be required for furnishing copies of the relevnnt documents, which may not be in his possession.\n\nIf there is undue delay in furnishing the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention the right to make effective representation is denied. The detention cannot be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law. When the Act contemplates the furnishing of grounds of detention ordinarily withi'n five days of the order to de~\"ntion, the intention is clear that the statements and documents which are referred to in the grounds of detention and which are required by the detenu and arc cX]l\"'Cted to ln in possession of the detaining authority should be furnished with reasonable expedition. . ~- It will have to be considepod on the facts of the case whether there \"· was any unexplained delay in furnishing the statements and documents relied on in the grounds of detention.\n\nThe detenu was arrested on 5-9-1979 and his advocate by a letter dated 7-9-1979 Annexure 'C' to tJix writ petition wrote to the detaining authority stating that for making an effective represe'ntation, he must have copies of statements and documen'.s referred to in the detention order.\n\nHe prayed that the copies of the statements and documents may be furnished to him.\n\nThis letter was received by the detaining authority on the 10th of S\"ptember, 1979 and a communication was addressed 'not by the detaining authority but by Mr. Thawani, Deputy Secretary on the same date. It is not clear whether the detaining authority applied his mind and realised the necessity for furnishing of the docurll'\"nts to the detenu expeditiously. The communication was addressed by the Deputy Secretary to the Advocate of the detenu informing him that the Deputy Director of Enforcement at Bombay had been suitably advised regarding the request for supply of copies of statem\"nts and documents relied on in the detention order. One would have expected that the detaining authority or the Deputy Secretary acting on his . , behalf, to hav::o directed the Deputy Director of Enforcement, Bombay to furnish the necessary documents expeditiously to the Advocate as requested or to the detenu himself. The direc'.ion in the communication from the Deputy Secretary was not immediately complied with.\n\nThe Advocate for the detenu wrote again on the 14th September, 1979 reminding the Deputy Director of the communications, he had received from the Deputy Secretary. The Advocate requested that the copies of the relevant statements and documents referred to and relied upon in the detention order may be supplied to him. This letter was replied by the Deputy Director on the 22nd September, 1979 in which the Advocate was asked to have inspection of the documents i'n his premises between 1430 hours on 24-9-1979. The copies of the sPatements\n\nand documents requested by the Advocate for the detenu and directed by the Deputy Secretary to be furnished to the Advocate were not furnished to him instead the Deputy Director asked tho Advocate to\n\nhave inspection at the Deputy Director's office.\n\nAfter inspecting the documents on 22/24/25-9-1979, he insisted of having copies which were supplied on the 26th, 27th and 28th of September, 1979.\n\nThe explanation given by the detaining authority regarding tte delay in furnishing copies as seen in his counter affidavit is that the constitutional right of the petitioner to make effective representation had not been infringed.\n\nAccording to the detaining authority \"it was not incumbent upon the detaining authority to supply copies of all the documents relied upon in the grounds of detention to the petitioner alongwith the grounds within 5 days of detention as petitioner has contended. In this context it would be relevant to state that the grounds were sufficiently detailed so as to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation against the detention.\" He further stated that all steps were taken to comply as expeditiously as possible. It may not be necessary for the detarning authority to supply copies of all the docum.ents relied upon in the grounds of detention at the time when the grounds are furnished to the detenu but once the detenu states that for effective representation it is necessary that he should have copies of the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention, it is the duty of the detaining authority to furnish them with reasonable exp\"'-dition. The detaining authority cannot decline to furnish copies of the documents on the ground that the grounds were sufficiently detailed to enable the petitioner to make an effective represen'ation. In this case, the detaining authority should have taken reasonable steps !o provide the detenu or his advocate with the. statements and documents as early as possible. The reply to the detenu was not sent by the detaining authority and it is not clear whether be appreciated the necessity to act expeditiously. As noted already, a communication was sent by the Deputy S'cretary to the Deputy Director, who did not comply with the direction and furnish copies otl the statements and documents.\n\nAfter a lapse of 12 days i.e. on 22-9-1979, the Deputy Director offered inspection.\n\nTaking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and explanation furnished by the detaining authority, we are of the view that the detaining authority failed to act with reasonable expedifon in furn; shing the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention.\n\nOn the facts of the case, therefore, we are satisfied that the detention is not in accordance with the procedure contemplated under law. The continued detention is not warranted. The order of liis release has already been issued by this Court.\n\nN.VK.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "RAMCHANDRA A. KAMAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA A. KAMAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 20, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. s. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exahange and Prevention of Smuggling Activittes Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conservation of Foreign Exahange and Prevention of Smuggling Activittes Act 1974", "statute": "Conservation of Foreign Exahange and Prevention of Smuggling Activittes Act 1974"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 453, "end_char": 465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conservation of Foreign Exahange and Prevention of Smuggling Activittes Act 1974", "statute": "Conservation of Foreign Exahange and Prevention of Smuggling Activittes Act 1974"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1050, "end_char": 1069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detaining authority did not take any action on the letter but forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary tv the Government of India who by a oommunication dated September 10, 1979 acknowledged its receipt , arut requested the advocate to contact the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bombay regarding the supply of copies of statements and documents."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1382, "end_char": 1400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As no further communication was received, the advocate addressed a letter da.ted September 14, 1979 to the Deputy Direct.or to supply him copies of the statements and documents."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1527, "end_char": 1545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Director in his communication dated September 22, 1979 requested the advocate to see him on September 24, 1979 to take inspection of the documents."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Deputy Director in his communication dated September 22, 1979 requested the advocate to see him on September 24, 1979 to take inspection of the documents."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1979,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1782, "end_char": 1801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On inspcting the docun1ents the advocate was not satisfied and insisted on supply of copies of docun1rnts, Which were supplied on three days, September 26, 1979, September 28."}}, {"text": "September 28. 1979 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1802, "end_char": 1824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On inspcting the docun1ents the advocate was not satisfied and insisted on supply of copies of docun1rnts, Which were supplied on three days, September 26, 1979, September 28."}}, {"text": "September 29, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1825, "end_char": 1843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1979 and September 29, 1979."}}, {"text": "October 5. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1849, "end_char": 1864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 5."}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5380, "end_char": 5390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5413, "end_char": 5424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethama/ani and Harjinder Singh and M. M. Lodha for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethama/ani and Harjinder Singh and M. M. Lodha for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. M. Lodha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethama/ani and Harjinder Singh and M. M. Lodha for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "U. R. LaUt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5486, "end_char": 5496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. LaUt, A. V. Rallgam and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rallgam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5498, "end_char": 5511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. LaUt, A. V. Rallgam and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5516, "end_char": 5528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. LaUt, A. V. Rallgam and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-Th~ Petitioner Ramchandra A. Kamat has preferred this petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Ramchandra A. Kamat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5622, "end_char": 5641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-Th~ Petitioner Ramchandra A. Kamat has preferred this petition under Art.", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA A. KAMAT"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5676, "end_char": 5683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6022, "end_char": 6029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Thawani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reply to his letter was sent to the Advocate by Mr.\n\nThawani, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, wherein he acknowledged the receipt of the Jetter of the Advocate dated 7-9-1979. '._", "canonical_name": "Thawani"}}, {"text": "7-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7014, "end_char": 7022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reply to his letter was sent to the Advocate by Mr.\n\nThawani, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, wherein he acknowledged the receipt of the Jetter of the Advocate dated 7-9-1979. '._"}}, {"text": "31-8-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7299, "end_char": 7308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this Jetter the Deputy Secretary requested the Advocate to contact ' the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bombay, who it was stated, had been suitably advised regarding supply of copies of statements and documents, relied upon in the detention order dated 31-8-1979."}}, {"text": "10-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted that the detaining authority, the second respondent did not acknowledge the Jetter from the detenu's advocate or take any action by himself but directed the Deputy Secretary to address the communication dated 10-9-1979 referred to above."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7615, "end_char": 7621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the letter states that the Deputy Director, Bombay has been suitably advised regarding the request for supply of copies of statemen's and documents relied on in the detention order nothing further was done by the Deputy Director of Enforcement, Bombay."}}, {"text": "14th September, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7832, "end_char": 7852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 14th September, 1979, the advocate not having received any communication, addressed a letcr to the Deputy Director enclosing a copy of the :etter which he received from the Deputy Secretary and requested the Deputy Director to supply him on behalf of his clien: copies of the relevant statements and documents referred to and relied upon in the order of detention at an early date."}}, {"text": "22-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8313, "end_char": 8322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to the letter of 14·9-i9 by the Advocate, the Deputy Director in his communication dated 22-9-1979 -~ requested the advocate to see the Deputy Director on 24-9-1979 at 1430 hours to take inspection of the documents."}}, {"text": "24-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8379, "end_char": 8388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply to the letter of 14·9-i9 by the Advocate, the Deputy Director in his communication dated 22-9-1979 -~ requested the advocate to see the Deputy Director on 24-9-1979 at 1430 hours to take inspection of the documents."}}, {"text": "26-9-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On inspeting the documents the advocate was not satisfied and insisted on supply of copies of documents and ultimately copies were supplied on 3 days, namely, on 26-9-79, 28-9-79 and 29-9-79."}}, {"text": "28-9-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8612, "end_char": 8619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On inspeting the documents the advocate was not satisfied and insisted on supply of copies of documents and ultimately copies were supplied on 3 days, namely, on 26-9-79, 28-9-79 and 29-9-79."}}, {"text": "29-9-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8624, "end_char": 8631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On inspeting the documents the advocate was not satisfied and insisted on supply of copies of documents and ultimately copies were supplied on 3 days, namely, on 26-9-79, 28-9-79 and 29-9-79."}}, {"text": "5-10-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8679, "end_char": 8686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation was made by the detenu on 5-10-79."}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.C.R. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9145, "end_char": 9164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12670, "end_char": 12678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu was arrested on 5-9-1979 and his advocate by a letter dated 7-9-1979 Annexure 'C' to tJix writ petition wrote to the detaining authority stating that for making an effective represe'ntation, he must have copies of statements and documen'.s referred to in the detention order."}}, {"text": "10th of S\"ptember, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13074, "end_char": 13097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was received by the detaining authority on the 10th of S\"ptember, 1979 and a communication was addressed 'not by the detaining authority but by Mr. Thawani, Deputy Secretary on the same date."}}, {"text": "Thawani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13175, "end_char": 13182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was received by the detaining authority on the 10th of S\"ptember, 1979 and a communication was addressed 'not by the detaining authority but by Mr. Thawani, Deputy Secretary on the same date.", "canonical_name": "Thawani"}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14396, "end_char": 14416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was replied by the Deputy Director on the 22nd September, 1979 in which the Advocate was asked to have inspection of the documents i'n his premises between 1430 hours on 24-9-1979."}}, {"text": "26th, 27th and 28th of September, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14923, "end_char": 14961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After inspecting the documents on 22/24/25-9-1979, he insisted of having copies which were supplied on the 26th, 27th and 28th of September, 1979."}}, {"text": "N.VK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17482, "end_char": 17486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.VK."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1078_1081_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SHYAM AMBALAL SIROYA\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nFebruary 20, 1980\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of S1nuggling Activities A.ct. 1974--Sectton 11-Detenu's representation for revocation of dete1Jtion order not considered by Government-Non-consideration, if vitiates the order.\n\nThe petitioner's brother was detained by an order of detention dated 31st August, 1979 under s. 3 (I) of the Comervation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and the grounds of detention were served on him on 5th September, 1979.\n\nAn -application was made on 17th September, 1979 for supply of documents and statements recorded and relied on in the grounds of detention.\n\nOn 22nd September, 1979 he made an mcomplete representation.\n\nThe dcx:uments were supplied on 25th September, 27th September and 3rd October, 1979. The detenu made a second repr06entation on 5th October, 1979 requesting that the order of detention be revoked by the Central Government but no action was taken on them till the date of hearing.\n\nIn the writ petition it was alleged that the first representation as well as the second representation requesting for the revocation of the order under e. 11 of the Act were not considered by the Central Government and that nonconsideration of .the representation vitiated the detention order. The detaining S authority on the other hand contended that th'e mere f1act that the representation was not considered by the Central Government did not vitiate the order of detention.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHEID : The continued detention of the detenu cannot be held to be according to procedure.\n\n[1081FJ\n\nIf a properly addressed petition is left unattended for a long period of time the detention order cannot be justified as being accordir-g to procedure.\n\n[1081 El\n\nThe power conferred on the Central Government by section 11 of the Act is wide enough to 'enable that Government to revoke the detention order at any stage for the words used are a detention order may at any tlme be revoked or nlodified.\n\nAny petition for revoca.tion of an order of detention should be dealt with with reasonable expedition. It may be permissible for the (entra1 Government to take reasonable time for disposing of a petition for revocation of an order of detention but it would not be justified in ignoring the representation because a statutory duty is cast upon the Central Govern~ ment.\n\nIt is necessary that the Government should apply its mind and either revoke the order of detention or dismiss the petition.\n\n[1080G HJ\n\nIn the instant case the representation which was properly addressed by the detenu to the Central Government was not forwarded to that Government and\n\nas such no action had be'en taken till the date of hearing. There is no justifica~ A tion in sending the representa.tion to the Central Govemm'ent at this very late stage.\n\n[IOSIC&E]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 1414 of 1979.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution. • Ram Jethamalani and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner.\n\nU. R. Lalit, E. C. Agarwala and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\n fhe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J. The petitioner is brother of Virendra Ambalal Siroya who was detained by an order of detention dated 31-8-1979 issued by Additional Secretary to the Government of India under S. 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The detenu was served with the grounds of detention on 5-9-1979.\n\nThe counsel for the detenu made an application on 17-9-1979 for supply of documents, and statements recorded and relied on in the grounds of detention.\n\nBefore the documents were supplied, an incomplete representation was made by the detenu on 22-9-1979.\n\nThe documents were supplied on 25-9-1979, 27-9-1979 lllld 3-10-1979.\n\nThe detenu again made a second representation on 5-10-1979 and requested that the order of detention may be revoked by the Central Government.\n\nMr. A. K. Sen, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the representation requesting the Central Government to order the revocation under S. 11 of the Act was not forwarded by the_ detaining authority to the Central Government and as such the detention is illegal, In the memorandum of grounds in his writ petition at paragraph XIV the detenu submitted that he made representation to the Central Government and that the Central Government had not considered the representation at all.\n\nIn paragraph XV the detenu contended that the second representation was an application for revocation under S. 11 of the Act wherein he specifically requested that the Central Government should revoke the order.\n\nThe said representation was not considered by the Central Government. It was submitted that non-consideration of the representation by the Central Government vitiated the detention -0rder.\n\nIn reply the detaining authority stated in paragraph 15 as follows:-\n\n\"It is submitted that the consideration of representation of the detenu by the detaining authority is perfectly valid and\n\nlegal and in accordance with the law. It is, however, denied H that merely because it was not considered by the Central Government, the detention order is vitiated in any way.\"\n\nSUPREME COURT NEPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\n.\\ It is clear from the statement that the representation was not forn\n\nwarded to the Central Government.\n\nThe plea on behalf of the detaining authority is 'that merely because the representation was not considered by the Central Government, the detention order would not be vitiated.\n\nThe representation of the detenu dated 5-10-1979 is marked as Annexure 'E'. It states that it is a further representation in the matter of his detention.\n\nAfter setting out the various grounds, the relief asked for in paragraph 5 runs as follows :-\n\n\"The petitioner prays that :\n\n(a) That the order of detention be revoked by the Central Government. ( b) This further representation be placed before COFEPOSA Advisory Board alongwith the earlier representation. ( c) That the Adisory Board be pleased to repqrt to the Central Government to revoke the impugned order of detention.\"\n\nThe request of the detenu is clear : He prayed for the revocation 0f the order of detention by the Central Government. It is not the case of the detaining authority that he did not understand the representation as being intended fur the Central Government. On the other hand, his plea is that the mere fact that the Central Government has not considered the representation would not vitiate the order of detention.\n\nThe detaining authority is the Additional Secretary, Government of\n\nIndia, Ministry of Finance and it is not d; sputed that a communication lo the Central Government can be properly addressed by sending it to the Additional Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Finance.\n\nIt is admitted that th\" representation was properly addressed to the Central Government.\n\nThe Central Government is empowered to revoke the order of detention at any stage. It was submitted that the order of revocation by the Central Government can only be passed G after the order of detention in confirmed by the detaining authority and the Advisory Board.\n\nThe power conferred on the Central Government by S. 11 is wide enough to enable the Central Governnwnt to revoke the detention order at any stage for the words used are a detention order may at any time be revoked or modified. The power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention imp1ies II that the detenu can make a representation for exercise of that power.\n\nAny petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expedition.\n\nIn this case it is the main ground urged\n\n~ ,. __l\n\n~.\n\non behalf of the detenu that the petition of the 5th of October, 1979 was not forwarded to the Central Government and consequently no order has been passed on that petition up to date.\n\nIn the course of arguments, Mr. A. K. Sen on behalf of the detenu submitted that even the earlier representation was addressed to the Central Government which was also not forwarded.\n\nWe do not think that we should entertain this plea as it was not pleaded in the memorandum of grounds that the first representation was to the Central Government but made for the first time in the Court before us.\n\nIn any event, it is clear that a representation properly addressed by the detenu to the Central Government was not forwarded to the Central Government und as such no action had been taken up to date. It may be permissible for the Central Government to take reasonable time for disposing any revocation petition. But it would not be justified in ignoring th_e representation for revocntion of the detention as a statutory duty is cast upon the\n\nCentral Government. It is necessary that the Government should apply its mind and either revoke the order of detention or dismiss the petition, declining to order for revocation.\n\nThe question that arises for consideration is, as to what will be the consequence if a properly addressed petitioU\" is not forwarded to the Central Government and as such left unattended for a period of nearly four months.\n\nWe feel that in such circumstances the detention cannot be justified as being according to the procedure. In the circumstances we do not feel that we will be justified in sending the representation to the Central Government for disposal at this stage.\n\n/ Taking all the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that the continued detention of the detenu cannot be held to be according to procedure.\n\nHis release has already been ordered.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "SHYAM AMBALAL SIROYA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHYAM AMBALAL SIROYA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 20, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHYAM AMBALAL SIROYA\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nFebruary 20, 1980\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 450, "end_char": 454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Comervation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 466, "end_char": 546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17th September, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 648, "end_char": 668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An -application was made on 17th September, 1979 for supply of documents and statements recorded and relied on in the grounds of detention."}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 764, "end_char": 784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd September, 1979 he made an mcomplete representation."}}, {"text": "25th September, 27th September and 3rd October, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 855, "end_char": 907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dcx:uments were supplied on 25th September, 27th September and 3rd October, 1979."}}, {"text": "5th October, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 952, "end_char": 969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu made a second repr06entation on 5th October, 1979 requesting that the order of detention be revoked by the Central Government but no action was taken on them till the date of hearing."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu made a second repr06entation on 5th October, 1979 requesting that the order of detention be revoked by the Central Government but no action was taken on them till the date of hearing."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3020, "end_char": 3030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Jethamalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3054, "end_char": 3069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethamalani and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3074, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethamalani and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "U. R. Lalit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3111, "end_char": 3122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, E. C. Agarwala and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3124, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, E. C. Agarwala and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3143, "end_char": 3155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit, E. C. Agarwala and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3222, "end_char": 3230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J. The petitioner is brother of Virendra Ambalal Siroya who was detained by an order of detention dated 31-8-1979 issued by Additional Secretary to the Government of India under S. 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974."}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3410, "end_char": 3414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3426, "end_char": 3507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "22-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3819, "end_char": 3828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the documents were supplied, an incomplete representation was made by the detenu on 22-9-1979."}}, {"text": "25-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3862, "end_char": 3871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The documents were supplied on 25-9-1979, 27-9-1979 lllld 3-10-1979."}}, {"text": "27-9-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The documents were supplied on 25-9-1979, 27-9-1979 lllld 3-10-1979."}}, {"text": "5-10-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu again made a second representation on 5-10-1979 and requested that the order of detention may be revoked by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4049, "end_char": 4058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. K. Sen, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the representation requesting the Central Government to order the revocation under S. 11 of the Act was not forwarded by the_ detaining authority to the Central Government and as such the detention is illegal, In the memorandum of grounds in his writ petition at paragraph XIV the detenu submitted that he made representation to the Central Government and that the Central Government had not considered the representation at all."}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4198, "end_char": 4203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "COFEPOSA Advisory Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6046, "end_char": 6069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b) This further representation be placed before COFEPOSA Advisory Board alongwith the earlier representation. ("}}, {"text": "Government of\n\nIndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6697, "end_char": 6717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detaining authority is the Additional Secretary, Government of\n\nIndia, Ministry of Finance and it is not d; sputed that a communication lo the Central Government can be properly addressed by sending it to the Additional Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Finance."}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7331, "end_char": 7336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1082_1086_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "...\n\nBABU RAO PATEL v.\n\nSTATE OF DELHI\n\nFebruary 21, 1978\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nPenal Code, Seorion 153A(1), Scope of-Whether political thesis or hi.slorical truth so presented be said to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ilfwill between different religious groups or communities so as to attract the provisions of Section 153A of the Code.\n\nDismissing the appeals, by special leave th'e Court,\n\nHEID : Section 153A(l) is not confined to the promotion of feelings of enmity etc. on grounds o~ religion only, but takes in promotion of such feelings on other grounds ns well such .as race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community.\n\n[1083G]\n\nIn the instance case : Both the articles do promote feelings of erun:ty, hat1ed and ill-will between the Hindu and Muslim communities. (J()S6C]\n\n(i} The first article \"A tale of two Communalisms\" is not even thinly veiled as a political thesis; it is an undisguised attempt to promote feelings of enmity, hatr'ed and ill-will between the Hindu and the Muslim communities-.\n\nIt is designed to fain the sparks of ill-will and hatred on ground of contmuni.ty.\n\nThe reference to the alleged Muslim tradition of rape, loot, violence and murder and the al1eged terror struck into the hearts of Hindu minority in a neighbouring country by . periodical killings, in the context of his thesis that communalism is the instrument of ::i militant minority can lead to no other\n\ninferenoe.\n\n[1084E-F]\n\n(iij The second article 'Lingering disgraice of history' go'es further and i.s calculated to rouse feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between Muslims and Hindus. It was \\vrong to present the :f\\.Ioghuls as , the ancestors of today's Muslim'!\n\nF and to willify the l\\fuslims as the proud discendants of the \"foul\" Moghuls.\n\n[1084G, 1086A, B, CJ\n\nFeelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups or coipmunities cannot be promoted in the guise of political thesis of historical truth.\n\n[!086C]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal \"fos. 237- 238 of 1974.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 14-8-1973 of thei Delhi High Court in Cr!. Revision Nos. 146 and 153 of 1971.\n\nA. K. Sen, Gobind Das, A. N. Karkhanis, Sridharan and Mrs. S.\n\nBhandare for the Appellant.\n\nTl. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\n~'.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by A\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Can political thesis or historical truth be so presented as to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will betwen different religious groups or communities, is the question wh:ch we are called upon to answer in these two crim; nal appeals. The appellant in the two criminal appeals is the editor, publisher and printer of a monthly magazine going by the name 'Mother India'. He wrote two articles under the captions \"A tale of two communalisms' and \"Lingering disgrace of history\". On complaints filed by the Superintendent of Police, Delhi, under section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code, he was convicted in respect of each of these articles in separate cases and sentenced in each case to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of four months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi.\n\nOn appeal the learned Sessions Judge, Delhi, confirmed the conviction in both the cases bnt reduced the sentence of fine to Rs. 500/- in each case.\n\nThis was confirmed by the High Court. The appellant has preferred chese appeals by Special Leave of this Court.\n\nShri A. K. Sen, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if the articles were read as a whole it would be patent that the article \"A tale of two communalisms\" was no more than a political thesis and the second article \"Lingering disgrace of history\" was no more thallj\n\na protest based on historical truths against the naming of roads in Delhi after Moghul emperors.\n\nHe contended that neither article contained any attack on any religion and, therefore, there was no question of promoting and attempting to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-w11! between different religious groups on grounds or religion.\n\nThe convictions under section 153-A were, therefore, wrong, he suBmitted.\n\nSection 153-A(l)(a) provides, \"whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visibk representations or otherwise, promotes, or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place ot birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other )!Tound whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different religious, racial language or regional groups or castes, or communities shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both\". It is seen thats. 153A(l).\n\n(a) is not confined to the promotion of feelings of enmity etc. on grounds of religion only as argued by Shri Sen but takes in promotion of such feelings on other grounds as well such as race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. In the present case we have to consider the question whether the two articles promote on grounds of religion or community, feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups or communities .\n\n' •\n\n1084 SUPREME COURT REl'OR rs\n\n[1980) 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe first of the articles \"A tale of two communalisms\" does begin as a sort of political thesis.\n\nAccordmg to the author, \"communalism is an instrument of political minorities\".\n\nHis thesis is that militant minorities thrive on communalism. If he wanted to develop his thesis on those lines no-one could object.\n\nBut, he referred to Muslims generally as \"a basically violent race\" and went on to say \"communa- Iism is, therefore, an instrument of a minority with a racial tradition of rape, loot, violence and murder as is found in India with a Muslim population of 12.7%. In Pakistan the Hindn minority is 6.6% but because its racial tradition is different it does not indulge in commun~\n\nriots . . . . Three essentials are necessary for violent communalism. The community must be a minority, the minority must be sizable and the minority must have a tradition of murder and violence ....... We find these three essentials in the Muslim community of India\". He then stated in the article that in Pakistan and particularly in East Bengal peace loving and terror struck Hindu minority was being eliminated by periodical killing and conversions on a mass scale. \"Young Hindu males were compelled to undergo vasectomy operations, young and pretty Hindu girls became the victims of Is'amic beds of lust\". It is then said \"It is not in the nature and religion of the H:ndu of India to be intolerant and blood-thirsty like the followers of Islam\".\n\nAccording to him the only answer to the problem of communalism was to declare India a Hindu State.\n\nIn our opinion there cannot be the slightest doubt that the article is not even thinly veiled as a political thesis; it is an undisguised attempt to promote feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between the Hindu and the Muslim communities.\n\nIt is designed to fan the sparks of ill-will and hatred on ground of community.\n\nThe reference to the alleged Muslim tradition of rape, loot, violence and murder and the alleged terror struck into the hearts of Hindu minority in a neighbouring country by periodical killings, in the context of his thesis that communalism is the instrument of a militant ininority can lead to no other mference.\n\nThe second article 'Lingering disgrace of history' is said to be a protest against the naming of Delhi roads after the Moghul emperors who according to the author were lustful perverts, rapists and murderers.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel the attack was directed against the Moghul rulers and not against the. Muslims of India. It was also said that all the statements in the article about the lusts and perversions of the Moghul rulers were plain historical truths.\n\nOn a full reading of the article it reveals much more than a protest against naming Delhi roads after Moghul rapists and perverts.\n\nAt one place it is said \"From Mohammed Ibn Qasim, who landed in India in June\n\n' .\n\n. -\n\n.. A_\n\n. \\\n\n- '\n\n712 A.D. with, 6000 Muslim cut-throats, to Mohomed Ali Jinnah, who cut this ancient cradle of a peace-loving human race into three bleed ing bits in August, 1947, we have had 1235 years of bloodstained history in which our life has been constantly punctuated by endless raids, rapes, loot, arson and slaughter. In all these years Hindus have given millions of men, women and children as hostages to Islam to buy some peace and preserve their own religion. They are still doing so.\n\nGod alone knows how long this process of paying and appeasing Muslims will go on but it cannot go on for long if the family planning designs of the present secular government succeed. Because then pretty soon there would be no Hindu left to pay.\n\n\"It is difficult to predict the future of the ancient Hindu race. It , has no future at all in Pakistan where a subtle and systematic genocide of the 10 million Hindus there has now been undertaken at State level by enforcing vasectomy operations on Hindu males and tubectomies on Hindu females, and by raping women and converting young children to Islam.\n\n\"But as long as the Hindu race lasts and survives in India its only cradle and grave in the whole world, it will be worthwhile setting before its children the ideals of its numerous Hindu heroes and nation builders rather than reminding them constantly of these Moghul brntes and tyrants who burnt Hindu home~, ravished Hindu mothers and sisters, slaughtered Hindu men and harassed and kidnapped and converted Hindu children\".\n\nAfter referring to various perversities and tyrannies of the Moghul rulers ending with Aurangzeb, he said : \"To have a street named after this Mughal bastard in New Delhi, the capital of India, is not only a disgrace to the Hindus but a crying insult to the brave community of Sikhs.\n\nHad the Muslims been insulted thus, they would not only have burnt every house on the road named after the tyrant but also set fire to the whole damned city. The Muslims know how to guard their\n\ntraditions\". He expressed the opinion that some of the ancient relics that reminded Hindus of their sh-ame and disgrace made Muslims proud of the foul deeds of their ancestors.\n\nHe made an appeal that a beginning should be made to wipe out 'our thousand year old shame' by changing the \"Muslim names of roads\" which 'remind us of the inhuman\n\natrocities committed on onr men, women and children'. If the Moghnls raped, looted, killed and sinned, the author's view appears to be that they did so as \"Muslim sadists\".\n\nThe author goes so far as to say that today's MusVms are proud of the foul deeds of \"their ancestors\", the Moghuls being considered by the author as the progenitors\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\nof the present day Indian Muslims.\n\nThere is no question that the article is calculated to rouse feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between Muslims and Hindus.\n\nWhether communalism is the weapon of an aggressive and militant minority as suggested by the accused or the \"shield of a nervous and fearful minority\", the problem of communalism is not solved by casiigating the members of the minority community as intolerant and blood thirsty and a community with a tradition of rape, loot, violence and murder.\n\nWhether the Moghuls were rapists and murderers or not and whether the Delhi roads should be named after them or not it was wrong to present the Moghuls as the ancestors of today's Muslims and to villify the Muslims as the proud descendants of the \"foul\" Mogl:tuls.\n\nWe are convinced that both the articles do promote feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between the Hindu and Muslim communities on grounds of community and this cannot be done in the guise of political thesis or historical truth. The appeals are dismissed.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\ni •\n\n• ; l '\n\n• . -", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "BABU RAO PATEL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BABU RAO PATEL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 21, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nBABU RAO PATEL v.\n\nSTATE OF DELHI\n\nFebruary 21, 1978\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 115, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 153A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 344, "end_char": 356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S6C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 823, "end_char": 826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2208, "end_char": 2217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Gobind Das, A. N. Karkhanis, Sridharan and Mrs. S.\n\nBhandare for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Gobind Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2219, "end_char": 2229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Gobind Das, A. N. Karkhanis, Sridharan and Mrs. S.\n\nBhandare for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2231, "end_char": 2246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Gobind Das, A. N. Karkhanis, Sridharan and Mrs. S.\n\nBhandare for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sridharan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2248, "end_char": 2257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Gobind Das, A. N. Karkhanis, Sridharan and Mrs. S.\n\nBhandare for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nBhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2267, "end_char": 2279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Gobind Das, A. N. Karkhanis, Sridharan and Mrs. S.\n\nBhandare for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Marwah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2304, "end_char": 2313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2400, "end_char": 2418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Can political thesis or historical truth be so presented as to promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will betwen different religious groups or communities, is the question wh:ch we are called upon to answer in these two crim; nal appeals."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2961, "end_char": 2966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On complaints filed by the Superintendent of Police, Delhi, under section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code, he was convicted in respect of each of these articles in separate cases and sentenced in each case to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of four months and to pay a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2995, "end_char": 3012, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3210, "end_char": 3253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1000/- by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3278, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the learned Sessions Judge, Delhi, confirmed the conviction in both the cases bnt reduced the sentence of fine to Rs."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3523, "end_char": 3532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri A. K. Sen, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if the articles were read as a whole it would be patent that the article \"A tale of two communalisms\" was no more than a political thesis and the second article \"Lingering disgrace of history\" was no more thallj\n\na protest based on historical truths against the naming of roads in Delhi after Moghul emperors.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4163, "end_char": 4174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4879, "end_char": 4882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on grounds of religion only as argued by Shri Sen but takes in promotion of such feelings on other grounds as well such as race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REl'OR rs\n\n[1980) 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5244, "end_char": 5284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' •\n\n1084 SUPREME COURT REl'OR rs\n\n[1980) 2 S.C.R.\n\nThe first of the articles \"A tale of two communalisms\" does begin as a sort of political thesis."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5818, "end_char": 5823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, he referred to Muslims generally as \"a basically violent race\" and went on to say \"communa- Iism is, therefore, an instrument of a minority with a racial tradition of rape, loot, violence and murder as is found in India with a Muslim population of 12.7%."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pakistan the Hindn minority is 6.6% but because its racial tradition is different it does not indulge in commun~\n\nriots . . . ."}}, {"text": "East Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6312, "end_char": 6323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then stated in the article that in Pakistan and particularly in East Bengal peace loving and terror struck Hindu minority was being eliminated by periodical killing and conversions on a mass scale. \""}}, {"text": "Islam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6720, "end_char": 6725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is then said \"It is not in the nature and religion of the H:ndu of India to be intolerant and blood-thirsty like the followers of Islam\"."}}, {"text": "Mohammed Ibn Qasim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8103, "end_char": 8121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At one place it is said \"From Mohammed Ibn Qasim, who landed in India in June\n\n' ."}}, {"text": "Mohomed Ali Jinnah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8222, "end_char": 8240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'\n\n712 A.D. with, 6000 Muslim cut-throats, to Mohomed Ali Jinnah, who cut this ancient cradle of a peace-loving human race into three bleed ing bits in August, 1947, we have had 1235 years of bloodstained history in which our life has been constantly punctuated by endless raids, rapes, loot, arson and slaughter."}}, {"text": "Islam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8578, "end_char": 8583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In all these years Hindus have given millions of men, women and children as hostages to Islam to buy some peace and preserve their own religion."}}, {"text": "Moghul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9754, "end_char": 9760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to various perversities and tyrannies of the Moghul rulers ending with Aurangzeb, he said : \"To have a street named after this Mughal bastard in New Delhi, the capital of India, is not only a disgrace to the Hindus but a crying insult to the brave community of Sikhs."}}, {"text": "Aurangzeb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9780, "end_char": 9789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to various perversities and tyrannies of the Moghul rulers ending with Aurangzeb, he said : \"To have a street named after this Mughal bastard in New Delhi, the capital of India, is not only a disgrace to the Hindus but a crying insult to the brave community of Sikhs."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9854, "end_char": 9863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to various perversities and tyrannies of the Moghul rulers ending with Aurangzeb, he said : \"To have a street named after this Mughal bastard in New Delhi, the capital of India, is not only a disgrace to the Hindus but a crying insult to the brave community of Sikhs."}}, {"text": "V.D.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11938, "end_char": 11944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.D.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1087_1091_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "Ii'-\n\n108'7\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT A v.\n\nPATEL BAVA KARSAN & ORS.\n\nFebruary 22, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P, S, KAILASAM AND AD. KosHAL, JJ.] B\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Artich'.~ 14 and 19 & Gujarat Ji, funicipality Act Sections 233 llltd 236-Statute empowering eviction from municipal pre1nises-\n\nAn appeal to go1ernment against the order of eviction provided-Constitutional validity of prorisfons.\n\nSection 233 of the Gujarat Municipality Act 'empowered the Chief Officer of the iunicip[l.fity to evict persons from municipal premises.\n\nRespondent No. 1 in the appeals was required by a notice in pur8uance uf the provisions of section 233(1) of the Act to hand OVer possession of a piece of land to the J\\iunicipality on the ground that he was in unauthorised occupa~ tion thereof\\ The respondent assailed the notice in proceedings under Ar_tic.l'e 226 of the Constitution, and the only point in controversy was '\\vhether or not section 233 of ihe Act under which the proceedings for eviction were taken wa~\n\noonstitutional!y v&lid.\n\nThe High Court in view of a previous decision of that court held th<1t section 233 being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution wa~ ultra vires.\n\nIn th~ appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of th'e respondents :\n\n(1) that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case was not correctly decided because though in Chhaganlal Maganlal's case there was a right to appe::il t0 a Civi1 Court and the right to take evidence was given by the Statute concerned, in the former. the relevant statute contained no such provisions, and (2) that the provisions of the Gujarat Act were violative of Article 19 of the Constitution.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHEtD: (l)(i) The judgment of the High Court is set aside a.nd the order F of the Chief Officer dated 9-3-66 affirmed, [l090G]\n\n(ii) Jn the case of Northern Indian Catererl Private Limited v.\n\nState of Punjab and others. [1967] 3 SCR, 399, this Court while considering a statute \\vhos'e provisions \\Vere almost similar to those of section 233 of the Gujarat Act took the same vie\\V .as the High Court and struck down the Statute. This decision\n\nheld the field until it \\\\'as ultimately overruled in the case of ChhaRanlal Magan- G la/, [1975] 1 SCR l. In a later decision in Ahmedabad Municipal (,'orporatiun\n\nand others v. Ra1nan Lal Govi11d Ram am! others, [1975] 3 SCR 935, this Court while fo11owing the case of Chhaganlal Magan/al upheld a provision of the\n\nBomb&y Provincial Municipal Corporation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1963 \\Vhich was in pari mnteria \\Vith section 233 of the Gujnraf Act.\n\n[1090A-C]\n\n(iii) Once the property belonging to the Govrnment or semi-Government bodies is held to fall within a particular class and therefore a reasonable classification, \\Vhether a civil rem'edy is given or not would not be violative of Article\n\n14 of the Constitution, [10900-F]\n\n15-138SCI/80\n\n1088 SUPREME COURT IiEPORTS\n\n[1980) 2 S.C.R ..\n\n(iv) Under St:ction 236, the respondents have a right to file an appeal to the Government against the impugned order of eviction. rhis section also contains a specific p:-ovision under v.hich the delay can be condoned if sufficient cau1e is shown to the sutisfaction of the appellate authority nan1ely th'e Governnt:!nt.\n\nIt will be open to the respondents to file an appeal which \\v'ill be di.;; posed ot by the Government in accordance v1ith lrnv.\n\n[10900-H, 1091A]\n\n(2) The contention that the provisions of the Gujarat Act v.rere violative of .Article 19 of the Constitution was expressly considered and negatived in Af1111edabad .\\1unicipa/ Corpnro!ion & ors. v. Rl1111anlal Govindara1n & Ors.\n\n[1090E-FJ\n\nCIVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTJON : Civil Appeal Nos. 1596 and 1224 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 31-1-1970 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 438/66.\n\nT. U. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and K. J. John for the appellant\n\nCA 1224/70 & RR. 1596/70. .\n\nS. C. Patel and M. N. Shrvfj for the Appellant CA No. 1596/70.\n\nD M. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar for Respondent No. 1 CA\n\nl'lo. 1224/70.\n\nS. C. Patel and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 2 CA No. 1224/ 70.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 31-1-1970 issuing a writ of mandamus to the Rajkot Municipality directing it to desist from enforcing a notice dated 9-3-1966 served on respondent No. 1 and requiring him in pursuance of the provisions of s. 233 (1) of t11e Gujarat Municipality Act (hereinafter referred to as the Gujarat Act') to hand over possession of a piece of land to the Municipality on the ground that he was in unauthorised occupation thereof.\n\nThe only point in controversy before the High Court was as to whether or not s. 233 of the Gu_jarat Act, under which the proceedings for eviction of the respondent No. 1 were taken, was constitutionally valid. The High Court in view of a previous decision of that Court held that s. 233 being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India was ultra vires.\n\nThe appellants applied for certificate for leave to appeal under Art. 133(1)- ( c) which was granted; hence this appeal. Section 233 of the Gujarat ct runs thus :-\n\n\"233. Power to evict certain persons from mzmicipal H premises.\n\n(1) If the Chief Officer is satisfied-\n\n( a) that the person authorised to occupy any premises belonging to the municipality (hereinafter referred to\n\nI ,\n\nas \"the municipal premises\") as a tenant or otherwise has-\n\n(i) not .paid rent lawfully due from in respect of such premises for a period of more than two months, or\n\n(ii) sub-let, without the perm1ss1on of the mumc1pality, the whole or any part of such premises, or\n\n(iii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy such premises, or\n\n(b) that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any municipal premises,\n\nthe Chief Officer may, notwithstandig anything contained in any law for the time being in force, by notice ervcd (i) by post or (ii) by affixing a copy of it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of such premises, or (iii) in such other manner as may be provided in the rules made by the State Government order that the person as well as any at.her person who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises, shall vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the notice.\n\n(2) Before an order under sub-section (1) is made against any person the Chief Officer shall inform the person by notice in writing of the grounds on which the proposed order is to he made and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation and producing evidence, if any, and to show cause why such order should not be made, within a period to be specified in such notice. If such person makes an application to the chief officer for extension of the period specified in the notice the chief officer may grant the . same on such terms as to payment and recovery of the amount claimed in the notice as it deems fit.\n\nAny written statement put in by such person and documents produced in pursuance of such notice shall be filed with the record of the case und such person shall be entitled to appear before the authority proceeding in this connection by advocate, attorney or\n\nl'l\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1930] 2 s.c.a.\n\npleader.\n\nSuch notice in writing shall be served in the manner provided for service of notice under sub-section (1).\n\nIt appears that in the case of Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Pun; ab & Anr.(1) this Court while construina a statutG\n\n~ whose provisions were almost similar to those of s. 233 of the Gujarat Act took the same view as the High Court and struck down the statute.\n\nThis decision held the field until it was ultimately overruled in the case of Chhagan!al Maganlal( 2 ).\n\nIn a later decision in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. v_ - Ramanlal Govindram & Ors. (3 ) this Court while following the case of Chhaganlal Maganlal upheld a provision of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1963 which was in pari materia with s. 233 of the Gujarat Act.\n\nMr. M. K. Ramamurthi appearing for the respondents submitted that Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case (supra) was not correctly decided because though in Chhaganlal Magan/al's case (supra) there was a right to appeal tc a Civil Court and the right to take evidence was given by the statute concerned, in the former, the relevant statute contained no such provision. This contention does not appear to be well-founded because once property belonging to the Government or semi-Government bodies is held to fall within a particular class and therefore a reasonable classification, whether a civil remedy is given or not would not be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution on the broad principle laid down in Chhaganlal Maganlal's case.\n\nIt was also argued that the provisions of the Gujarat Act were violative of Art. 19 of the Constitution of India. This contention was expressly considered and negatived by this Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. v.\n\nRaman/al Govindram & Ors.\n\n(supra) with which we find ourselves in complete agreement. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and affirm the order of the Chief Officer dated 9-3-1966.\n\nWe might, however, observe that under section 236 of the Gujarat, Act, the respondents have a right to file an appeal to the Government against the impugned order of eviction. This section lso\n\ncontains a specific provision under which delay can be condoned if sufficient cause is shown to the satisfaction of the appellate autho-\n\n(1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 399.\n\n\n(3) [1975] 3. S.C.R. 935.\n\n. -\n\nrity namely the Government. In these circumstances, it will be open A to the respondents to file an appeal to the Government against the order of eviction passed by the Chief Officer which will be disposed of by the Government in accordance with the law.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs .\n\nN.KA.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "7\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PATEL BAVA KARSAN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PATEL BAVA KARSAN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AD. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 222, "end_char": 234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 233(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 632, "end_char": 646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 934, "end_char": 945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1110, "end_char": 1121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1141, "end_char": 1151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1282, "end_char": 1313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In th~ appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of th'e respondents :\n\n(1) that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case was not correctly decided because though in Chhaganlal Maganlal's case there was a right to appe::il t0 a Civi1 Court and the right to take evidence was given by the Statute concerned, in the former."}}, {"text": "Chhaganlal Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1365, "end_char": 1384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In th~ appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of th'e respondents :\n\n(1) that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case was not correctly decided because though in Chhaganlal Maganlal's case there was a right to appe::il t0 a Civi1 Court and the right to take evidence was given by the Statute concerned, in the former.", "canonical_name": "Chhaganlal Maganlal"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1637, "end_char": 1647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "9-3-66", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1794, "end_char": 1800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeals,\n\nHEtD: (l)(i) The judgment of the High Court is set aside a.nd the order F of the Chief Officer dated 9-3-66 affirmed, [l090G]\n\n(ii) Jn the case of Northern Indian Catererl Private Limited v.\n\nState of Punjab and others. ["}}, {"text": "section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2023, "end_char": 2034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 935", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chhaganlal Magan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "others, [1975] 3 SCR 935, this Court while fo11owing the case of Chhaganlal Magan/al upheld a provision of the\n\nBomb&y Provincial Municipal Corporation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1963 \\Vhich was in pari mnteria \\Vith section 233 of the Gujnraf Act.", "canonical_name": "Chhaganlal Maganlal"}}, {"text": "section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2558, "end_char": 2569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2831, "end_char": 2842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3485, "end_char": 3495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "T. U. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3811, "end_char": 3822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and K. J. John for the appellant\n\nCA 1224/70 & RR."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3824, "end_char": 3836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and K. J. John for the appellant\n\nCA 1224/70 & RR."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3841, "end_char": 3851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. U. Mehta, D. N. Mishra and K. J. John for the appellant\n\nCA 1224/70 & RR."}}, {"text": "S. C. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Patel and M. N. Shrvfj for the Appellant CA No."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shrvfj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3916, "end_char": 3928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Patel and M. N. Shrvfj for the Appellant CA No.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Shrvfj"}}, {"text": "D M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3964, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D M. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "D M. K. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3987, "end_char": 3999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D M. K. Ramamurthi and Vineet Kumar for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4057, "end_char": 4069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Patel and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Shrvfj"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4153, "end_char": 4162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 31-1-1970 issuing a writ of mandamus to the Rajkot Municipality directing it to desist from enforcing a notice dated 9-3-1966 served on respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rajkot Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4302, "end_char": 4321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate is directed against a judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 31-1-1970 issuing a writ of mandamus to the Rajkot Municipality directing it to desist from enforcing a notice dated 9-3-1966 served on respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat Municipality Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gujarat Municipality Act", "statute": "Gujarat Municipality Act"}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4959, "end_char": 4965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gujarat Municipality Act", "statute": "Gujarat Municipality Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4985, "end_char": 4992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gujarat Municipality Act", "statute": "Gujarat Municipality Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5105, "end_char": 5116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5161, "end_char": 5172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7666, "end_char": 7672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chhagan!al Maganlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7837, "end_char": 7856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision held the field until it was ultimately overruled in the case of Chhagan!al Maganlal( 2 ).", "canonical_name": "Chhaganlal Maganlal"}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8148, "end_char": 8154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8180, "end_char": 8196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. M. K. Ramamurthi appearing for the respondents submitted that Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's case (supra) was not correctly decided because though in Chhaganlal Magan/al's case (supra) there was a right to appeal tc a Civil Court and the right to take evidence was given by the statute concerned, in the former, the relevant statute contained no such provision.", "canonical_name": "D M. K. Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8822, "end_char": 8829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8991, "end_char": 8998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9006, "end_char": 9027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "9-3-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9356, "end_char": 9364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and affirm the order of the Chief Officer dated 9-3-1966."}}, {"text": "section 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9405, "end_char": 9416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1967] 3 S.C.R. 399", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9703, "end_char": 9722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1092_1094_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ". A\n\nUNION OF INDIA ETC . v.\n\nK. R. TAHILIANI & ANR.\n\nFebruary 26, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. D. KDSIIAL, JJ.J\n\nFundatnental Rflfcs-Rule 56(i) (i)-Scopc of--Governn1cnt servant of]i~ elating in a class I or class Tl post-If could be con1pulsorily retired.\n\nOn the question whether a GovErnment servnnt olTiciating in a class 1 or class JI service or post tould be retired compulsorily by exercising pow'er under r. 56(j) (l) of the Fonda.mental Rules after he. has attained! the agC' of 50 years.\n\nJlELD: 1. Rule 56(j) (i) is mea.nt to cov'er only those who are in a post on a regular basis, that is, in a substantive capacity and not on an officiating basis only. [1094El\n\n2. A government servant ordinarily holds service at the pleasure of the State which means pleasure canalised by rules.\n\n[1093H]\n\n3. An officiating hand bas no right to the post and cannot be strictly said to be in tha.t service or post as a member of that servic'e. Jn short an officiating go\\:ernment servant does not really b'e1ong to class I or class II service until he acquires a. right thereon. The stn1cture of the clause \"if he is in class I or class II service or post\" emphasises the natur'e of the service or post vis-a-vis the Govern1nent servant concerned. When a government servant belonging ttJ class I or class II service or post on a regular basis has to b'e retired compulsorily rule 56(j) (i) comes to the rescue of the Governn1ent. But if he is only a temporary hand ¥/ho has no right to the post he can alw2.ys be reYerted to lhc post,\n\nif any, on which he has a lien. Sin1ilar is the poition of an officiating hand.\n\n[1094B-DJ\n\n4: Although the rule vests an absolute right in the appropriate authority to retire a government servant in public interest absolutis1n and arbitranness are F ccntrar:v to the scheme of the rules of this kind. Even while exercising lh.e po\\ver under this rule the Stare should take care not to act arbitrarily, misguided by the absolute expression in the nde.\n\n[1094F-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 850 of 1978\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 22-7-1977 of the Delhi High Court in LP.A. No. 97 of 1977.\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2008 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and Order dated 19-5-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.\n\nWrit No. 1592/76.\n\nG. L. Sanghi, R. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant in both the appeals.\n\nUNION v. K. R. TAlllLIANI (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 093\n\n• '< M. K. Ramamurthy, G. D. Gupta and Miss Anita for the Respon- A\n\ndent in CA No. 850/78.\n\nShanti Bhushan and P. K. Pillai for the Respondent in CA No. 2008/78 .\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Two government servants have been retired from service in exercise of the powers vested in the Central Government by Rule 56 (j) (i) of the Fundamental Rules.\n\nThey have successfully challenged compulsory retirement by petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Union of India has come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.\n\nThe sole question to be decided is whether a government servant officiating in a Class I or Class II service or post can be retired compulsorily by exercising the power under Rule 56 (j) (i) after he has attained the age of 50 years.\n\nThe biographical details of these two officials in government scr- D vice need not detain us because the facts arc admitted and the only point at issue is whether Rule 56(j) (i) will apply to a government servant who is only officiating in a Class I or qss II post or service.\n\nWe agree with the High Court that on a correct interpretation of that Rule, an officiating hand will not be caught in the claws of the compulsory retirement provision.\n\nThe reasons may briefly be stated by E us now although these have been elaborately set out by the High Court (in the Delhi case).\n\nWe may extract the relevant part of the Ruic at this stage:\n\n\"56. (j) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion F that it is in public inters! to do so have the absclute\n\nright to retire any Government servant by giving him notice Of not less than three months in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice.\n\n(i) If he is in Class I or Class II service or pest and had G entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty live years after he has attained the nge of fifty years.\" ·\n\nA Government servant ordinarily holds service at the pleasure of the State but in our Republic where the rule of law prevails even H pkasure is canalised by rules.\n\nViewed from this perspective security of tenure is a value in itself.\n\nIn Government jurisprudence it is,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [J 98()j 2 S.C.R.\n\nhowever, open to the State to make rules under the proviso to Article 309; and Rule 56 (j) is one such rule.\n\nAssuming as we do, the validity of the said Rule, the question of construction causes little difficulty once the scheme of the provision is understood correctly.\n\nAn officiating hand has no righJ to the post and is perhaps a fleeting bird who may have to go back to the substantive post from which he has been IJromoted on an officiating basis.\n\nWhat is more to the point, a person who has been appointed de novo may begin his service on an officiating basis or on l! temporary basis aJ!d it is obvious that he has no right to the post and cannot be strictly said to be in that service or pq_st as a member of that service. In short, an ofijciating Government servant does not really belong to Class l or Class II service until he acquires a right thereon. Even viewed closely and meticulously, the structure of the clause, namely, \"if he is in Class I or Class II services or post\", emphasises the nature of the service or post vis-a:-v.is the Government servant concerned.\n\nWe need not go into the sel\\lantic shapes, lexical 11iceties or linguistic nuances but only go through the mf_aning and purpose of the provision.\n\nWhen a Governm.ent servant belo.llging to a Class I or Class II service or post on a regular basis bas to !Je retired compulsorily, Rule 56 (j) (i) comes to the rescue of the Government. But if he is only a temporary hand, he has no right to the post and can always be reverted to the post, if any, on which he has a lien.\n\nSimilar is the position of an officiating hand.\n\nThus, we have reached an inevitable conclusion that Rule 56 (j) (i) is meant to cover only those who are in a post on a regular basis, i.e., in a substantive capacity, and not on an officiating basis only.\n\nIn passing, we may make it clear that although the Rule vests an absolute right in the appropriate authority to retire a Gove!lllllent servant in public interest, Y, et absolutism arid arbitrariness are contrary to the scheme of the ruls we are concerned with. We, therefore emphasise the fact that even while exercising power under Rule 56 (j) (i) the State will take care not to act arbitrarily, misguided by the a_bsolute expression in the Rule.\n\nWe dismiss the two Appeals and vacate the stay in Civil Appeal No. 850 of 1978.\n\nIn each case, costs quantified in a sum of Rs. 2,500/- (Two Thousand and Five Hundred) will be paid. The counsel for the respondents in both the cases have generously agreed that Rs. 1,000/- (One Thousand), out of the said sum be p_aid over to the Free Legal Aid Society in each case.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 19, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nUNION OF INDIA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. R. TAHILIANI & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. R. TAHILIANI & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 26, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 26, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. D. KDSIIAL, JJ.J\n\nFundatnental Rflfcs-Rule 56(i) (i)-Scopc of--Governn1cnt servant of]i~ elating in a class I or class Tl post-If could be con1pulsorily retired."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, R. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, R. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2384, "end_char": 2397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, R. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "K. R. TAlllLIANI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2447, "end_char": 2463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION v. K. R. TAlllLIANI (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 093\n\n• '< M. K. Ramamurthy, G. D. Gupta and Miss Anita for the Respon- A\n\ndent in CA No."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2465, "end_char": 2477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION v. K. R. TAlllLIANI (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 093\n\n• '< M. K. Ramamurthy, G. D. Gupta and Miss Anita for the Respon- A\n\ndent in CA No.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2496, "end_char": 2512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION v. K. R. TAlllLIANI (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 093\n\n• '< M. K. Ramamurthy, G. D. Gupta and Miss Anita for the Respon- A\n\ndent in CA No."}}, {"text": "G. D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION v. K. R. TAlllLIANI (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 093\n\n• '< M. K. Ramamurthy, G. D. Gupta and Miss Anita for the Respon- A\n\ndent in CA No."}}, {"text": "Anita for the Respon- A\n\ndent in CA No. 850/78.\n\nShanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2535, "end_char": 2598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION v. K. R. TAlllLIANI (Krishna Iyer, J.)\n\nI 093\n\n• '< M. K. Ramamurthy, G. D. Gupta and Miss Anita for the Respon- A\n\ndent in CA No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2603, "end_char": 2615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan and P. K. Pillai for the Respondent in CA No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2700, "end_char": 2712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Two government servants have been retired from service in exercise of the powers vested in the Central Government by Rule 56 (j) (i) of the Fundamental Rules.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2952, "end_char": 2963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Two government servants have been retired from service in exercise of the powers vested in the Central Government by Rule", "statute": "Two government servants have been retired from service in exercise of the powers vested in the Central Government by Rule"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 3006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have successfully challenged compulsory retirement by petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Union of India has come up in appeal to this Court by special leave."}}, {"text": "agree with the High Court that on a correct interpretation of that Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3578, "end_char": 3649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3861, "end_char": 3866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons may briefly be stated by E us now although these have been elaborately set out by the High Court (in the Delhi case)."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4831, "end_char": 4842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1095_1104_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "\\ ' 1 I\n\nFRANCES CORALIE MULLIN\n\nW. C. KHAMBRA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 27, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nCon.titution of India 1950, Art 22(5) & Conserration of Foreign Exchange and Prevenfi911 of S1nuggli11g Activities Act 1974, Section 3-Detenu's representation against order of dete11tio11-Disposal of such representation by detaining nuthority-Necessity for slightest departure froni ti111e ilnperative-Detaining\n\nauthority-To explain.\n\nPleadings-Affidavits in cases involving personal freedoni-Precision, perspecuity and clarity-Necessiry for.\n\nThe petitioner was s'erved on November 23, 1979 with an order of detention under the Conserva.tion of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974, and the grounds of detention \\Vere also served on th'e detcnu on the same day.\n\nOn December 1st, 1979, the advocate of the detcnu I';!questcd for copies of the state1nents and documents upon which reliance was placed in th'e grounds of detention and at the instance of the detaining authority (Adminisw 1rator, Union Territory of Delhi), the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence turw\n\nnished the copies sought on December 7, 1979, On Det'ember 22, 1979, the .d'etenu made a representation to the detaining authority which was actually received by the latter on December 26, 1979. A copy of the representation was forwarded to the Customs authorities for their remarks which were received en\n\nJ~1mary 4, 1980. The representation was th'ereafter considered and rejected by\n\n:the detnining authority on January 15, 1980. The rejection of the representation B was communicated to the detenu on January 17, 1980.\n\nJn the m'eanwhile, the Advisory Board to whom the detention had been referred met on January 4, 1980, and considered the matter. The detenu was produced before the Advisory Board and the conc'emed departmental offict:ils were also present. On January 10, 1980, the Advisory Board recorded its opinion .and forwarded the same to the detaining authority, which recomm'endation \\\\'-as placed before the Administrator on January 19, 1980, when the detaining authority confirmed the order of detention.\n\nJn the writ petition under Article 32 it was contended on behalf of the petitioner ( 1) that the representation of the detenu made on December 22, 1979, was not communicated to the Advisory Board as it ought to have been when the board met on January 4, 1980, (2) that the detaining authority should have disposed of the representation before forwarding it to the Advisory Board ar..d .even ff the detaining authority did forward it to the Advisory Board, the detain~\n\ning authority should not have awaited the h'earing before the Advisory Board and should not have allowed itself to be influenced by such hearing, and (3) thal there \\Vas inexcusable delay in enabling the det'enu to n1ake a representation and in disposing of such representation.\n\nDisn1issing the writ petition, Il\n\nHELD : I. The representation of the detenu was forwarded to the Ad1i, o; y lloard and it was also considered by the latter. [1098HJ\n\n2. On ~1n examination of the records it is found that though the Ad1ninistrator considered the representation of the detenu aft'er the hearing by the Board,\n\nthe Administrator \\Vas entirely uninfluenced by the hearing before the Board. [l 104B]\n\n3. If there appear'ed to be any delay in disposing of the representation ol the detcnu it -..vas not due to any want of care but bec2.i.1se the representation required thorough examination in consultntion with investigators of facts a'.ld advisers on Jaw.\n\n[1104A]\n\nJn the instant case, the petitioner's request for copies of statements and docu~ rnents was received by thl.! detaining authority on December 3, 1979 and at the instance of the detaining authority, the Director of Revenue Intelligence furnished the copies sought 011 December 7, 1979.\n\nThe detenu's repr.:sentation was received by the detaining authority on December 26, 1979.\n\nWithout any losS of tim'e, copy of the representation \\Vas sent to the Customs authorities for their remarks.\n\nThis was necessary bec•:iuse the information leOOing to the order of detention was laid by the Custo1ns authorities and the facts \\\\'ere complex si1:ce th'e allegations against the detenu revealed an involvement with an international gall£ of dope smugglers. The comments of the Customs authorities were received\n\non January 4, 1980.\n\nThe Advisory Board was meeting on the same day and there could be no question of the detaining authority considl\"ring the representation of the detenu before the Board met.\n\nAfter obtaining conlffie-nts of the Custo111s authorities it \\Vas found necessary to take legal advice as the rprsen taticn posed many legal and constitutional questions.\n\nThe same \\Yas obtained and the representation was finally rejected by the J\\d1ninistrator on January 15.\n\n1980. [llOlD-H]\n\n4. The role of the COlHi in c:nses of preventiYe detention has to be one ot t:!crnal vigilance.\n\nNo freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty high•.:r than to maintain it unimpaired. The Court\"s \\Vrit is the ultim::i.te in5;!Jranccs ag<iinst illegal detention.\n\nThe Constitution enjoins conformance with the provisions of Arti..:le 22 and the Court exacts compliance.\n\nArticle 22.(5) vests in the dctenu the right to be provided with an opportunity to n1ake a rpr~.en\n\ntation. [l !OOF]\n\n5. The La\\v Reports tell a sfLlfY and t'cach a lesson that the principai cnen1y of the detcnu and his right to n1nke a represcntntion is neither high-handcdne.>s nor mean-n1indedne-s but the casual indifference. the mindless in-sensibility the routine and the red-tape of the bureaucratic_ machine. [l 100G1\n\n6. The four principles to be followed in regard to representation of detenu enunciated by the Court in Jaya11a1yan Suk11l v. State of West Benr; a!, [1970]\n\n3 S.C., R. 225 <1\"l well as other principles enunci::ited in other cases. an analysis \\\\'ill sho\\.v, are aimed at shielding personal freedom against indiffernce, insensibility. routine Elnd redtape and thus to secure to th'e detenu the right lo make an effective representation. [l lOOH}\n\nl\\111rtndra I'11rshota111 ll111rao etc. v. B. B. Gujra! & Ors., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 315; Ran1cfuuufra A. Karna! v. Unio11 of India & Ors. [1980]\n\n2 . S.C.R. 1072 Nagendra Nath J..1011({(;/ v. 7'/1c St{lfe of We.'it Bengal, [19721 1 S.C.C. 498 @ 504; Prahlrcd.ar Shankar D!i11ri v. S. S. Pradhan, [1971) 1 S.C.C. 896; Kantilaf\n\nBo5c v. State of W.':'sf Be111.?af, AIR 1972 S.C. 1623, referred tl}.\n\n' .\n\n7. The time-in1perative can never be absolute or obsessive. There has to be A lee-v.1ay, depending on the necessities of the case.\n\n8. Several situation<; may arise compelling the departure fro1n the timeimperative.\n\nBut no allov.1ance can be made for lethargic indifference.\n\nNo allowance can be made for needless procrastiQ2.tion.\n\nBut, allo\\vance n1ust sur...:ly be made for necessary consultation \"''here legal intricasies and factual ramifications are involved.\n\nThe burd'en of explaining the necessity for the slightest B, departurr fron1 the time imper8•tive is on the detaining authority.\n\n9. There should be greater precision and persp'.ecuity in affidavits filed into Court.\n\nCare and clearity are particularly important \\Vhen the court is• concerned with questions of personal freedom.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1524 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution).\n\nRam Jethmalani, Harjinder Singh, Sunil Mehta and Mu/\"tl M11dgal for the Petitioner.\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nMrs. Frances Coralie Mullin. a British National was serevd on November 23, 1979, with an order of detention under the Cons-\"vation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act.\n\nThe grounds of detention were also served on her on the same day.\n\nOn December 1, 1979, her Advocate sent a telegram to the detaining authority, namely, the Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, asking for copies of statements a\"nd docu ments upon which reliance was placed in the grounds of detention.\n\nThe telegram was received by the detaining authority on December 3, 1979.\n\nThe Director of Rewnue Intelligence who was directed by the Administra:or, Unioh Territory of Delhi, to supply copies of statements and documents to the detenu, so supplied them on Decem·\n\nber 7, 1979.\n\nSevcnt•een documents were mentioned in the accompanying letter.\n\nAlleging that one of the documen:s (item No. 14) was not sc'nt, the Advocat•c wrote a letter by Registered post on December 17, 1979, asking for a copy of that document also.\n\nA reply was sent on January 1, 1980, to he effect that document No. 14 had also been supplied earlier but nonetheless another copy of the same document was being s•ent again.\n\nOn December 22, 1979. the detenu made a representation to the detai'ning authority and it was actually received by the latter on Deceml:Y.er 26, 1979.\n\nThe Home Department of the Delhi Administrafain forwarded a copy of\n\nthe representation to the Customs authorities for their f'marks. The remarks were received on January 4, 1980.\n\nThereafter the representation was considred and rejec:ed by the Administrator on January 15, 1980.\n\nThe rejection of the representation was communicated to the detcnu on January 17, 1980. In the meanwhile the Advisory Board to whom the detention of the petitioner had beel} referred met B\n\non January 4, 1980 and considered the matter.\n\nThe detcnu was produced before the Advisory Board and various concerned Depart- • mental officials >Wre also present.\n\nOn January 10, 1980, the Advi-... i sory Board recorded its opinion and forwarded the same to the detain- ~. ing authority. It was received by the Home Department of the . \\....._ Delhi Administration on January 11, 1980 but was actually placed before the Administrator on Jannary 19, 1980 when th~ detaining authority confirmed the order of detention.\n\nIn this aplication for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus three submissions were made by Shri Ram J ethmalani, learned counsel for D the petitioner :\n\n1. The representation of the detenu, made on December 22, 1979, was not communicated to the Advisory Board as it ought to have been, when the Board met on January 4, 1980.\n\n2. The dctai'ning authority shoud have disposed of the represenr\n\nE talion before forwarding it to the Advisory Board. Even if the detaining au!hority did forward it to the Advisory Board, the detaining authority should not have awaited the hearing before the Advisory Board and should not have allowed itself to be influenced by such hearing. . ·.<'\n\n3. There was inexcusable. delay in enabling the detenu to make a\n\nrepresentation and ind.isposing of the representation.\n\nNotwithstanding the clear assertion in the additional grounds raised by the petitioner, which she was allowed to do by an order of the Court, that her representation dated December 22, 1979, was not placed before the Advisory Board when the Board met on January 4, 1980, there was no specific denial of the assertion in the counter filed by the Delhi Administration to the aditional grounds.\n\nHowever, we were informed by Shri Abdul Khader, learned Counsel for the Delhi Administration, 1hat the representation was in fact forwarded to the Advisory Board and also considered by the latter.\n\nHe produced the relevant files before us which we also permitted Shri Je1hmalahi to inspect.\n\nWe are satisfied that the representation was forwarded to the Advisory Board and it was also considered by the\n\n,.....,\n\nlatter.\n\nThere is, therefore, no force in the first submission made on behalf of the petitioner.\n\nWe wish to repeat here, what we have said on earlier occasions, that there should be greaor p1t:cision and pers\n\npecuity in affidavits filed into Court.\n\nCare and clarity are particularly important when the Court is concerned with questions of personal freedom.\n\nIn support of the second a'nd third submissions, reliano;, was plaood\n\n.by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the four principles laid down by this Court in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal,(') and on the observations of the Court in Narcndra Purslwtam Umrao etc. v. B. B. Gujaral & Ors.(') and Ramchandra A. Kamat v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors.(\").\n\nIn the first case a Constitution bench of the Court laid down four broad principles to be followed in regard to representation of detenus :\n\n\"First, the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible.\n\nSecondly, the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board i'ncluding the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board.\n\nThirdly, there should not be any delay in the\n\nmattr of consideration.\n\nIt is true that no hard and fast\n\ni ule can be laid down as to the measure of time taken by the appropriate authority for consideration but it has to be\n\nremmbered that the Government has to be vigilant in the governance of the citizens. A citizen's right raises a correlative duty of the State.\n\nFourthly, the appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before sending tire case along with the detenu's re presentation to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government will release the detenu the Government will not\n\nend the matter to the Advisory Board.\n\nIf, however, the Government will not release the detenu the Government will swd the case alongwith the detenus representation to the Advisory Board. If thereafter the Advisory Board v.ill express an opinion in favour of release of the detenu the Government will release the det•cnu. If the Advisory\n\n(I) 119701 3 S.C.R. 225 @ 232.\n\n\nBoord will express any opinion against the release of the detenu the Govemment may still exercise the power to release the detcnu.\"\n\nIn the second case, to the facts of which we will refer later, thc observations upon which re!iance was plac•cd were : .. It is urged that the Government was under a constitutional obligation to co1Eidcr\n\nthe representations before the hearing before the Advisory Beard.\n\nThere is no quarrel with the principle but the difficulty is about the application of the principle o nthe facts an circums!'Jnces of !ti~\n\npresent case.\n\nIn fact, the Government has to reach its decision ., uninfluenced by the opinion of the Advisory Board.\" In the third case, offer of inspection of documents twdve days after request for copies was considered fatal to the detention and it was observed :\n\n\"If there is undue delay in furnishing the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detention the right to make effective representation is denied. The detention cannot be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law.\n\nWhen the Act concmplates the furnishing of grounds of detention ordinarily within fo>c days of the order of detention the intention is clear that the statements and documents which arc referred to in the grounds of det•cntion and which are required by the detenu and are expected to be in possession of the detaining authority should be furnished with reasonable expedition.\"\n\nWe have no doubt in our minds about the role of the Court in. cases of preventive detention : it has to be one of eternal vigilance.\n\nNo freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty higher than tp maintain it unimpaired.\n\nThe Court's writ is the ultimate insurance against illegal detention.\n\nThe Constitution enjoins conformance with the provisions of Article 22 and the Court exacts compliance.\n\nArt. 22(5) vests in the detenu the right to \\J.c provided with an opportunity to make a representation.\n\nHere the Law Reports tell a story and teach a lesson. It is that the principal enemy of the detenu\n\nand his right to make a representation is neither high-handedness nor mean-mindedness but !hoe casual indifference, the mindless jnsensibility, the routine and the red-tape of the bureaucratic machine.\n\nThe four principles enunciated by the Court in Jayanarayan Sukul\n\nv. State of West Bengal (supra) as well as other principles enunciated in other cases, an analysis wiit show, are aimed at shielding personal freedom against indifference, insensibility, routine and red-tape and thus to secure to the detenu the right to make an effective representation.\n\nWe agree: (I) the ddaining authority must provide the\n\n• 1\n\n' 1\n\ndetenu a very early opportllllity to make a representation, (2) the detaining authority must consider the representation as soon as possible, and this, preferably, must be before the representation is forwarded to the Advisory Board, (3) the representation must be forwarded to the Advisory Board before :he Board malccs its report, and ( 4) the consideration by the dtaining authority of the rcprcs_!!ntation must be entirely independent of the hearing by the Board or its rcpcrt, expedition being essential at every stage.\n\nWe, however, hasten to add that th•c time-imperative can never be absolute or obsessive.\n\nThe Court\\ observations are not to be so understood.\n\nTh•cre has to be Ice-way, depending on the necessities (we refrain from using the word 'circumstances') of the case.\n\nOhc may well imagine, a case wher\" a detenu docs not make a Pcpresentation before the Board makes its Pcport making it impossible for the detaining authority either to consider it or to forward it to the Board in time or a case where a detcnu makes a representation to the detaining authority w shortly before tho\" Advisory Board takes up the reference that the dctainihg authority cannot consider the representation before then but may merely forward it to the Boord w:thout himself considering it.\n\nSeveral such situations may arise compelling departure from the time-imperative.\n\nBut no allowance can be made for lethargic indi!Icrence. No allowance can be made for needless procrastination.\n\nBut, allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies ahd factual ramifications are involved.\n\nThe burden of explaining the necessity for the slightest departure from the time-\n\n- jmpcrative is on the detaining authority.\n\nWe notice that in Narendra Purshotam Umarao etc. v. B. B. Gujral & Ors., (supra) the detenu made his representation on 4th and 6th of March 1978, the Advisory Bonni gave a hearing on 13th March and the detaining authority rejected the representation on 18th March.\n\nThe Court perused the records of the GoV'crnment and the Advisory Board and concluded that there was no infraction of the Constitutional safeguard in Art. 22(5).\n\nIt was held, with reference to the records, that the Government had taken a decision unihfluenced by what transpired at the hearing before the Board.\n\nThe matter was found to have been dealt with by the government at all levels and the detaining authority had come to an independeht conclusion of his own by applying his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case.\n\nWe have already expressed our agreement with the four principles', enunciated in !ayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal (supra). ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~ [1980] 2 S.C.tL\n\nWe would make one observation.\n\nWh•\"n it was said there that the Government should come to its decision on the representation before the Government forwarded the representation to the Advisory Board, the emphasis was not on the point of time but on the requirement that the Government should consider the representation independently of the Board.\n\nThis was explained in Nagendra Nath Monda!\n\nv. the State of West Bengal('). In Sukul's case\n\n(supra) the Court also made certain P'crtinent observations (at pages 231-232) :\n\n\"No definite time can be laid down within which a representation of a detenu should be dealt with save and except that it is a constitutional right of a detenu to have his represntation considered as expeditiously as possible.\n\nIt will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether the appropriate Government has disposed of the case as expeditiously as possible ......... \"\n\nIn Prabhakar Shankar Dhuri v. S. S.\n\nPradhan(') and Kantilal Bose v. _State of West Bengal(') deJoay of 16 days and 28 days respectively in disposing of the representation of the dctenu was considered sufficient to vitiate the detention.\n\nOn the other hand, in Nagendra Nath Monda/ v. The State of West Bengal,(') a delay of 34 days was held not to affect the validity of the detention as part of the delay was explained by the circumstance that the records of the case had been sent to the Advisory Board and part of the delay w\"s explained by the enquiries which the Government had to make.\n\nThe Court observed : .'\n\n'That fact is not disputed before us and so also the fact that those records showed that on June 7, 1971, Government had sent the files in connection with the . petitioner's case and his representation to the Advisory Board.\n\nAs soon as the representation was returned to it, Government considered it and rejected it but that was before the Board made its report and sent it tp Government.\n\nBut counsel urged that this fact may explain the lapse of time from the date that the records w.ere sent and the date when they were returned, but not the delay between May 27, 1971 and June 7, 1971, during which Government could have arrived at its decision.\n\nThat argument has not much force, because in a given case Government may not be able to\n\n0) [19711 t S.C.C.498at 504.\n\n(2) [19711 3 s.c.c. 896.\n\n(3) AIR 1972 S.C. 1623.\n\n( .\n\n> \\\n\nFRANCllS CORALIE v. w. c. KHAMBRA (Chinnappa Reddy, !.)\n\nI I 03\n\nreach a proper conclusion within a short time especially, in a case where another authority, in this case the District Magistrate, has passed the questioned order. It might have\n\nto make inquiries as to the situation in the locality, the nature of and the circumstances in which detention was found necessary, the previous history of the person detained etc.\n\nTherefore, it is difficult to agree with counsel that Govermnent should have reached its conclusion during the said period ............ There can be no hard and fast rule with regard to the time which Government can or should take, and that each case must be decid•cd on its own facts.\"\n\nWe may now consider whether the facts here disclose a disregard to the petitioner's cohstitutional right as claimed by his counsel in his second and third submissions.\n\nThe petitioner's request for copies of statements and documents was received by the detaining authority on December 3, 1979, and at the instance of the detaining authority, the Diiector of Revenue Intelligence furnished the copies sought on December 7, 1979.\n\nThe authorities who laid the information before the detaining authority and who were primarily concerned in the matter were the Customs authorities via the Director of Revenue\n\nIntelligence'.\n\nSo the detaining authority directed the Director of Revenue Intellige\\10~ to furnish copies of the documents and it was so done. There was no delay in furnishing of documents and no legitimate complaint could be made on that score.\n\nThe detenu's representation was received by the detaining authority on December 26,\n\n1979. Without any loos of time copy of the representation was sent to tlie Customs authorities for their remarks.\n\nThat was obviously necessary because the information leading to the order of detention was laid by the Customs authorities. The facts were undoubtedly complex since tho allegations against th; o detenu revealed an involvement with an international gang of dope smugglers.\n\nThe comments of the Customs authorities were received on January 4, 1980.\n\nThe Advisory Board was meeting on January 4, 1980 and so there could be no qnestion of the detaining authority considering the representation of the detenu before the Board met, unless it was done in great and undue haste.\n\nAfter obtaining the comments of the Customs autho ritics, it was found necessary to take legal advice as the representation posed many legal and constitutional questions. So, after consul talion with the Secretary (Law and Judicial) Delhi Admihistration, the representation was finally rejected by the Administrator on J anuary 15, 1980.\n\nThese facts are stated in the counter affidavit filed 16-138 SCl/80\n\non behalf of the Delhi Administration and are substantiated by the records prodnced before us. If there appeared to be any delay, it was not due to any want of care but because the representation required a thorough examination in consultation with investigators of fact and advisers on law.\n\nWe have ourselves examined the records and we find that though the Administrator considered the representation of the dete'.nu after the hearing by the Board, the Administrator was entirely uninfiuenced by the hearing before the Board. The application for the issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus is therefore dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "I\n\nFRANCES CORALIE MULLIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "I\n\nFRANCES CORALIE MULLIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "W. C. KHAMBRA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "W. C. KHAMBRA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 27, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Activities Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 224, "end_char": 243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Activities Act 1974", "statute": "Activities Act 1974"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 667, "end_char": 731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 4, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1726, "end_char": 1741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the m'eanwhile, the Advisory Board to whom the detention had been referred met on January 4, 1980, and considered the matter."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1884, "end_char": 1900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 10, 1980, the Advisory Board recorded its opinion .and forwarded the same to the detaining authority, which recomm'endation \\\\'-as placed before the Administrator on January 19, 1980, when the detaining authority confirmed the order of detention."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2167, "end_char": 2177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 22, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2274, "end_char": 2291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the writ petition under Article 32 it was contended on behalf of the petitioner ( 1) that the representation of the detenu made on December 22, 1979, was not communicated to the Advisory Board as it ought to have been when the board met on January 4, 1980, (2) that the detaining authority should have disposed of the representation before forwarding it to the Advisory Board ar..d .even ff the detaining authority did forward it to the Advisory Board, the detain~\n\ning authority should not have awaited the h'earing before the Advisory Board and should not have allowed itself to be influenced by such hearing, and (3) thal there \\Vas inexcusable delay in enabling the det'enu to n1ake a representation and in disposing of such representation."}}, {"text": "December 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3702, "end_char": 3718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "detaining authority on December 3, 1979 and at the instance of the detaining authority, the Director of Revenue Intelligence furnished the copies sought 011 December 7, 1979."}}, {"text": "January 15.\n\n1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same \\Yas obtained and the representation was finally rejected by the J\\d1ninistrator on January 15."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 S.C.R. 315", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6178, "end_char": 6197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R. 1072 Nagendra Nath J..1011({(;/ v. 7'/1c St{lfe of We."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7374, "end_char": 7384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7408, "end_char": 7422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Harjinder Singh, Sunil Mehta and Mu/\"tl M11dgal for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Ram J ethmalani"}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7424, "end_char": 7439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Harjinder Singh, Sunil Mehta and Mu/\"tl M11dgal for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Sunil Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7441, "end_char": 7452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Harjinder Singh, Sunil Mehta and Mu/\"tl M11dgal for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Mu/\"tl M11dgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7457, "end_char": 7471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Harjinder Singh, Sunil Mehta and Mu/\"tl M11dgal for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7493, "end_char": 7511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7516, "end_char": 7528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7595, "end_char": 7610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nMrs. Frances Coralie Mullin."}}, {"text": "Frances Coralie Mullin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7621, "end_char": 7643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nMrs. Frances Coralie Mullin.", "canonical_name": "I\n\nFRANCES CORALIE MULLIN"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7750, "end_char": 7809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Decem·\n\nber 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8375, "end_char": 8394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Director of Rewnue Intelligence who was directed by the Administra:or, Unioh Territory of Delhi, to supply copies of statements and documents to the detenu, so supplied them on Decem·\n\nber 7, 1979."}}, {"text": "December 17, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8577, "end_char": 8594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14) was not sc'nt, the Advocat•c wrote a letter by Registered post on December 17, 1979, asking for a copy of that document also."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8658, "end_char": 8673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A reply was sent on January 1, 1980, to he effect that document No."}}, {"text": "Deceml:Y.er 26, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8943, "end_char": 8963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the detenu made a representation to the detai'ning authority and it was actually received by the latter on Deceml:Y.er 26, 1979."}}, {"text": "Ram J ethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10053, "end_char": 10068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this aplication for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus three submissions were made by Shri Ram J ethmalani, learned counsel for D the petitioner :\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Ram J ethmalani"}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11102, "end_char": 11122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notwithstanding the clear assertion in the additional grounds raised by the petitioner, which she was allowed to do by an order of the Court, that her representation dated December 22, 1979, was not placed before the Advisory Board when the Board met on January 4, 1980, there was no specific denial of the assertion in the counter filed by the Delhi Administration to the aditional grounds."}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11184, "end_char": 11196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, we were informed by Shri Abdul Khader, learned Counsel for the Delhi Administration, 1hat the representation was in fact forwarded to the Advisory Board and also considered by the latter."}}, {"text": "Je1hmalahi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11418, "end_char": 11428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He produced the relevant files before us which we also permitted Shri Je1hmalahi to inspect."}}, {"text": "Boord", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13853, "end_char": 13858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Boord will express any opinion against the release of the detenu the Govemment may still exercise the power to release the detcnu.\""}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15648, "end_char": 15658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15693, "end_char": 15703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18676, "end_char": 18686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19662, "end_char": 19667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sukul's case\n\n(supra) the Court also made certain P'crtinent observations (at pages 231-232) :\n\n\"No definite time can be laid down within which a representation of a detenu should be dealt with save and except that it is a constitutional right of a detenu to have his represntation considered as expeditiously as possible."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20860, "end_char": 20872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'That fact is not disputed before us and so also the fact that those records showed that on June 7, 1971, Government had sent the files in connection with the ."}}, {"text": "May 27, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21328, "end_char": 21340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But counsel urged that this fact may explain the lapse of time from the date that the records w.ere sent and the date when they were returned, but not the delay between May 27, 1971 and June 7, 1971, during which Government could have arrived at its decision."}}, {"text": "December 26,\n\n1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23239, "end_char": 23257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detenu's representation was received by the detaining authority on December 26,\n\n1979."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24173, "end_char": 24178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So, after consul talion with the Secretary (Law and Judicial) Delhi Admihistration, the representation was finally rejected by the Administrator on J anuary 15, 1980."}}, {"text": "J anuary 15, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24259, "end_char": 24276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So, after consul talion with the Secretary (Law and Judicial) Delhi Admihistration, the representation was finally rejected by the Administrator on J anuary 15, 1980."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24959, "end_char": 24965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1105_1110_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "-• I\n\nMANTOO MAJUMDAR & BASDEV SINGH\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nFebruary 27, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, A. C. GUPTA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nCod• of Criminal Procedure 1914--&ction 161(2)-Accused persons detained in prison for over six years without investigation or fra1ni11g: of charges- Legality of.\n\nThe two petitioners have been imprisoned for seven years in various prisoas on the basis that they were implicated in several cases of 1971 and 1972. In their habeas corpus petition they impugned their continued detention in prison without trial.\n\nAllowing the petition,\n\nHELD : The petitioners should be released forthwith.\n\n[1109E]\n\n(1) Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the\n\nmagistrate to authorise the detention of an accused in such custody as he D thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. The section also provides that no magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person exceeding 90 days in grave cases and 60 days in lesser cases, and that on the expiry of the said period the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail.\n\n[1108H]\n\n(2) Apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code by way of \" passport into the prison house, there is no mention of any investigation of the E cases, nor was a charge sheet laid beifore the court against either accused. Even the magistracy have bidden farewell to their primary obligation.\n\n[!108E]\n\n(3) Although in these cases many years have passed the magistrates have been mechanically authorising repeated detentions unconscious of the provi sions of law.\n\n[1109B]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1149 of 1979.\n\nF (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.) V. N. Ganpu/e for the Petitioners.\n\nU. P. Singh for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-No Constitution nor Code nor Court call ink:rdict illegal incarceration where couscientized agencies of the law at the\n\ngrass-roots level are absent. Such is the only explanation for the lawless lot of the two prisoners who are petitioners before us. These two humans sojourning for long years in some jail or other in Bihar since 1972 found their personal liberty subverted by the police, prison officials and the magis'racy that they wrote letters to the Hon. Chief J nstice in desperation.\n\nThe above habeas corpus petition is a legal\n\nincarnation of those letters. Sensitired by the prima jacie hideous facts disclosed the court directed a rule to issue.\n\nSomehow, despite several adjournments the State did not ewn furnish the basic facts abont the imprisonment of the petitioners, the offences for which they were kept in judicial custody, for how long and at what stage were the proceeding.; and the like. This gross indifference of the Bihar State in regard to citizens depriYed of their liberty for indefinite and prolonged spells is an unconscionable aspect of that State's unconcern for human rights. Indeed, counsel for the State did his level best to get relevant information. Being at the end of our patience and finding a helpless counsel, we had to pass an onder in the following terms : -\n\nIt is noticed that an order dated 17-12-1979 directed jail authorities and District Magistrates under whose jurisdiction the petitioners are kept in confinement to explain -· b.efore 14 .. 1-80 the nautre of the charges against the petitioners, the stage of trial of each of these cases and the reason for the delay in proceeding with the trial. It is surprising that despite communication having been made to them thr011gh the State, counsel for the State represents that telex message to the concerned District Magistrate and jail authorities had been sent, but ho information has yet been furnished in compliance with this Court's order. We are constrained therefore to issue notice to the jail authorities ltnd the District Magistrates to show cause why action for violation of this Court's direction should not be taken against them.\n\nThe Court will issue notice to be personally served on these authorities with a direction that they shall appear in Court in person on 25-2-1980. Counsel for the State undertakes to furnish the names of the District Magistrate concerned and jail authorities by 12-2-1980.\n\nPost the matter on 13-2-1980 with office report whether the counsel has submitted names and addresses of the authorities concerned as directed abow.\n\nWhen (he directive of the court went beyond mere censorious ob\n\nI +\n\nservations into bint at action against the defaulting officers, the sceire ' began to change and at the hearing on February 25, 1980, the Superintendent of the Jail and the District Magistrate who were in a sense vicariously responsible for the custodial condition of the petitioners H appeared in person and prayed to be excused for the default or delay in furnishing vital informatio\\1 about these unfree individuals.\n\nFuller facts have been furnished by t11e Superintndent, cmitral Jail, suffi-\n\nMANTOO MAJUMDAR v. BIHAR (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1107\n\ncient to enable us to discover the incoiltestable illegality of the deten- A tion and to direct the release on bail of the petitioners.\n\nLaw is what Jaw d<l'Cs and not what Jaw writes in the books beyond the reach of those behind bars. In this perspective, Art. 21 of the Constitutioil and s. 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, are dead letter for each petitioner.\n\nArticle 21 guaran~es personal liberty in these terms :-\n\nNo person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.\n\nSection 167 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code contains the following mandate:\n\nThe Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in mch custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or comrnil it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction :\n\nProvided that- E\n\n(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the polioe, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody F under this paragraph for a total period exceeding-\n\n(i) ninety days, where the inve1.>tigation !dates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;\n\n(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to, any other offence,\n\nand, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released an bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chaprer XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;\n\n(b) no Magistrate slrnll authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him;\n\n( c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall . authorise B detention in the custody of the police.\n\nIn Maneka Gandhi's case(') and a crop of cases thereafter this Court has emphasised the need for fair procedure to justify detention of persons. To put a man in prison and forget his personhood thereafter, to deprive a man of his personal liberty for an arbitrary c riod without monitoring by the law, to keep a man in continued custody unmindful of just, fair and reasonable procedure-these shake the faith in the rule of law and militate against the mandates of Part III of the Constitution. And yet, that is precisely what has happened in the present case.\n\nThe frightful facts fraokly furnished iu the return filed are that the twopetitioners have been enduring incarceration for over seven years in various prisons in Bihar on the basis that they are implicated in several cases of 1971 and 1972. A long list has been annexed to the counter-affidavit. But what scandalises us is that apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code by way of a passport into the prison house, there is, no mention of any investigation of the case, nor a single charge-sheet laid before the court against either accused. What flabbergasts us is that even the magistracy have bidden farewell to their primary obligation, perhaps, fatigued by over-work and uninterested in the freedom of others. If we see the chart produced by the Superintendent of the Jail we find that a large number of dates are given on which the prisoners have been produced before the magis trates concerned from 1973 to 1980 without so much as the court checking up whether the investigations hve been completed, chargesheets have ben laid and there is justification for keeping the petitioners in custody.\n\nSection 167(2) which we have extracted above, empowers the magistrate to authorie the detention of an accused in such custody as he thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole.\n\nMore importantly, there is a precious interdict protective of personal freedom which states that no magistrate shall authorise the detention of the_ accused person exceeding 90 days in grave cases and 60 days in\n\n(1) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] l S.C.C. 248.\n\n~[197812 S.C.R. 621.\n\n~·.\n\nMANTOO MAJUMDAR v. BIHAR (Krishna lyer, !.) 1109\n\nlesser cases. \"On the expiry of the said period .... the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. ... \" Not 60 days but six years have passed in the present case; not 90 days but 1900 days or more have passed; and yet, the magistrates concerned have been mechanically authorising repeated detentions unconscious of the provisicms which obligated them to monitor the proceedings which warrant such detention. In short, the police have abdicated their function of prompt investigation. The prison staff have not bothered to k'now how long these internees should be continued in their custody and, most grievous of all, the judicial officers concerned have routinely signed away orders of detention for years by periodically appending their incarceratory authorisations. We know nat how many others are languishing in prison like the petitioners before us. 'If the salt hath lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted ?' If the law officers charged with the obligation to protect the liberty of persons are mindless of constitutional mandates and the code's dictates, how can freedom survive for the ordinary citizen ?\n\nWe must record our deep appreciatiollj of Shri Ganpule who has appeared amicus curiae and proceed further to register our profound satisfaction at the fair and frank statement made by Shri U. P. Singh for the State who rightly pointed out that the ccmtinued detentions \\n\n\nthe face of s. 167(2) were indefensible.\n\nWe direct the release forthwith of the two petitioners on their own bond without sureties. This Court has held in earlier cases that bail does not involve a necessary component of sureties.\n\nWe, therefore, direct that on taking the personal recoguizance from the petitioners, both of them will be set free subject to such other legal proccdings F that the State may take if so warranted.\n\nWe have stated earlier that in the populatioo of prisoners there may be many other whose legal illiteracy and pecuniary indigence may have forbidden their moving this Court or the High Court by way G of habeas corpus petition. It is a bad state of affairs when we see the Bihar State being oblivious or callous to the prisoners whom it is warehousing.\n\nFor what purpose, one knows: not. It may be an act of penitence on the part of the authorities of the state and also of cleansing of conscience if only a special officet with judicial experience or other law officer familiar with criminal justice were appointed to B make an extensive survey and study all the cases of prisoners to find out whether illegal custody has become a large scale phenomenon. After\n\nA all, the State is also the guardian of the p:!Ople's freedom and must, activist fashion set in motion measures to enlarge those prisoners who are held in custody without the warrant of fair procedure.\n\nWith these directions we direct the release of the petitioner• on their ow'n bonds in a sum of Rs. 1,000/- each.\n\nl'.13. R.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\n• ,", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "I\n\nMANTOO MAJUMDAR & BASDEV SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANTOO MAJUMDAR & BASDEV SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 71, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• I\n\nMANTOO MAJUMDAR & BASDEV SINGH\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\nFebruary 27, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, A. C. GUPTA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 632, "end_char": 646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 680, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1667, "end_char": 1677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code", "statute": "Apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code"}}, {"text": "V. N. Ganpu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1700, "end_char": 1711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Ganpu/e for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Singh for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1813, "end_char": 1825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-No Constitution nor Code nor Court call ink:rdict illegal incarceration where couscientized agencies of the law at the\n\ngrass-roots level are absent."}}, {"text": "No Constitution nor Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1830, "end_char": 1854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2149, "end_char": 2154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These two humans sojourning for long years in some jail or other in Bihar since 1972 found their personal liberty subverted by the police, prison officials and the magis'racy that they wrote letters to the Hon."}}, {"text": "17-12-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being at the end of our patience and finding a helpless counsel, we had to pass an onder in the following terms : -\n\nIt is noticed that an order dated 17-12-1979 directed jail authorities and District Magistrates under whose jurisdiction the petitioners are kept in confinement to explain -· b.efore 14 .. 1-80 the nautre of the charges against the petitioners, the stage of trial of each of these cases and the reason for the delay in proceeding with the trial."}}, {"text": "25-2-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court will issue notice to be personally served on these authorities with a direction that they shall appear in Court in person on 25-2-1980."}}, {"text": "12-2-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4238, "end_char": 4247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the State undertakes to furnish the names of the District Magistrate concerned and jail authorities by 12-2-1980."}}, {"text": "13-2-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4269, "end_char": 4278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Post the matter on 13-2-1980 with office report whether the counsel has submitted names and addresses of the authorities concerned as directed abow."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5275, "end_char": 5282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5308, "end_char": 5317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5388, "end_char": 5398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7357, "end_char": 7370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Maneka Gandhi's case(') and a crop of cases thereafter this Court has emphasised the need for fair procedure to justify detention of persons."}}, {"text": "what scandalises us is that apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But what scandalises us is that apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code", "statute": "But what scandalises us is that apart from mentioning the sections in the Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ganpule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10777, "end_char": 10784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must record our deep appreciatiollj of Shri Ganpule who has appeared amicus curiae and proceed further to register our profound satisfaction at the fair and frank statement made by Shri U. P. Singh for the State who rightly pointed out that the ccmtinued detentions \\n\n\nthe face of s. 167(2) were indefensible."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10919, "end_char": 10930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must record our deep appreciatiollj of Shri Ganpule who has appeared amicus curiae and proceed further to register our profound satisfaction at the fair and frank statement made by Shri U. P. Singh for the State who rightly pointed out that the ccmtinued detentions \\n\n\nthe face of s. 167(2) were indefensible.", "canonical_name": "U. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 167(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11015, "end_char": 11024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11706, "end_char": 11717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a bad state of affairs when we see the Bihar State being oblivious or callous to the prisoners whom it is warehousing."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1111_1129_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "THE TULSIPUR SUGAR CO. LTD. v.\n\nTIIE NOTIFJED AREA COMMITTEE, TULSIPUR\n\nFebmary 27, 1980\n\n(D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nAd1ninistrative law-Conditional legislmion-Subordinate /egislatio1i-Power to extend the area of Municipal Co111111ittee whether' subordinate legislation- Audi alteram partefn-When necessary.\n\nThe plaintiff (appellant) was a sugar n1anufa<:turr with its factory in a suburb of Tulsipur Town. By a notification issued on August 22, 1955 under section 3 of the U.P. Town Area Act, 1914 the limits of the Tulsipur Town \\\\'ere extended bringing the factory area within the jurisdiction of the Town Area Committee. In October, 1959 a draft notification was issued by which objections and representa-tions to the levy of octroi on goods brought into the limits of the Town Arca Comn1ittee 1 for: the purposes of sale, use or consumption were invited.\n\nLater a final -notification dated Decetnber 15, l 959 v.1as issued under section 39, In both the notifications however though reference \\Vas\n\nrnade to two schedules to the notifications in neither \\Vas the second schedule which referred to the lin1its of the Town Area, added.\n\nThis defect was cured by notification dated A.pril 14, 1960 inc9rpor.ating Schedule II in the Notification dated December 15, 1959.\n\nThe plaintiff was then cailed upon to pay octroi on some of the inatcrials and stores brought into the factory.\n\nThe plaintiff thereupon questioned the vslidity of the Notification dated August 22, 1955 extending the limits of the Town Area Com1uittee bringing its\n\nfactory within the limits of the Town Area Committee and the subsequent notifications on the grounds that (i) the first of them dated August 22, 1955 did not give an opportunity to all concerned to n1ake representa1ions regarding the advisability of extending the limits of the Town Area Committee (ii) that the notification dated December 15, 1959 \\\\'as inchoate because neither the draiit notification nor the final notificMion contained the second .schedule and (iii)\n\nthat this defect could not oe cured by issue of the Notification dated April 14, 1960 in that it was issued without follo\\ving the procedure prescribed by section 39 of the Act.\n\nThe Trial Court held that the notification of August 22, 1955 was not open to question, that there was no valid levy because the draft notification the final notification and the amending notifica.tion were invalid and ineffective for the reason that the omission of the second Schedule \\\\'as a 1uaterial illegality and the subsequent notification could not validate an irregular notification.\n\nOn appeal by the defendoo.t the civil judge, and on furlhel' appeal the High Court, disn1issed the plaintiff's suit.\n\nIn appeal to this court it \\.vas contended that since the declaration of any erea as a town area involved civil consequences, exercise of power by the State\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\nGovernment under section 3 by necessary implication imposed a duty on the State Government to give publicity to its proposals and failure to comply with !uch procedure invalidated a declaration made under section 3.\n\nDismiMing the appeal,\n\nHELD: 1. Where a function performed by the, State Governn1ent is judicial or quasi-judicial involving adjudication of the rights of any person resulting in\n\nchil consequences it becomes necessary to follow the maxim audi alteram partem (hear the other side) before taking a decision.\n\n[1118E]\n\n2. In order to establish that a duty to act judicially applies to the performance of a pa!rl:icular function it is no longer neessa ry to show that the function is analytically of a judicial character or involves the determination of a lis inter partes, though the presumption that natural justice must be observed will arise more readily \\Vhere there is an express duty to decide only after conducting a hearing or inquiry or \\Vhere the decision is. one entailing the determination of disputed questions of la\\v and fact.\n\nPrima-facie a duty io act judicially will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where the statuS is not merely terminable at pleasure or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or other legitimate interest or expect'ation or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indicative of the absence of an obligation to act judicially. \\V'here a discretionaory power to encroach upon individual rights is exercised, the factors pointing to whether it must be exercised judicially include the nature of the interests to be effected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the. nature of the sanctions if any inYolved.\n\nExceptionally a duty to act judicially may a.rise in the course of exercising a function not culn1inating in: a binding decision if the \\\\'Ording of the grant of power or the context indicate that a fair hearing ought to be extended to persons llkelv to be prejudicially affected by an investigation or recommendation. [ll 18F-H, 1119A-C]\n\nHalbury's La\\YS of England Vol. I, 4th Edition page 77 refe1Ted to.\n\n3. Where an administrative decision affects the rights of persons, it beco1nes the duty of the authority concerned to give' notice of the proposed action to the persons to be affected and to take a decision after giving a fair opportunity to the person concerned to make his representation in that regard. [l 119C-\n\n\n4. Where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle. is tho.t it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf. [ll 19E]\n\nH S(a) The power of the Sta-te Government to make a declaration under section 3 of the Act is legislative in character becnnse1 the application of the rest of the provisions of the Act tn the geographical area, which is declared as\n\nTULSIPUR SUGAR CO. V. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE 1113 (Venkataramiah, !.) a town area, is dependent upon such declaration.\n\nSection 3 of the Act is in A ' the nature of a conditional legislation.\n\n[1119H, 1120A]\n\nIn the instant case the rnaxint audi alteram parte1n does not become applicable by necessary implication.\n\n[I 121G]\n\n(b) The contention that the declaration to be made undeir section 3 of the ACt is in the nature of subordinate legislation is not tena-ble. It is not possible to equate a declaration to be made under section 3 of the Act with rules made under section 39. [1122A, Bl\n\nSub-section 3 of section 39 does not in terms apply to a declaration to be made under se<:tion 3 of the Act. [1122B1\n\n( c) The contention of the plaintiff that the declaration made by the Sta.te Government under section 3 of the Act declaring the area in \\vhich the sugar factory of the plaintiff is situated as a part of the Tulsipur Town Area is invalid is not tenable.\n\nA notification il'.sued under section 3 of the. Act which ha6 the effect of making the _A.ct applicable to a geographical area( is in the nature of conditional legislation. It cannot be characterised as a piece of subordinate legislation. [l 126B-C]\n\nB-.\n\n(d) The notification dated December 15, 1959 by which octroi was sought D to be levied \"'as valid.\n\nIn the instant case the omission to men~ tion the boundaries of Tulsipur Town in the draft notification and in the final notification did not make the final notification ineffective as there cculd be no roon1 for doubt about the local area within whose limits the said irnpost would be effective. The procedure prescribed for the imposition of octroi was valid because representations a-nd objections to the proposed levy were invited and a valid notificaition was issued. A notification so published is E. conclusive proof that the tax had been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. [l 128G-H, 1129A-C]\n\nCIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 577 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 17-1-1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Civil Appeal No. 462 of 1964.\n\nMr. Anil B. Diwan,!. S. Sinha and K. !. John for the Appellant.\n\nMr. J.P. Goyal, S. K. Jain and S. M. Jain for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-This appeal by certificate arises ont of Suit No. 416 of 1960 on the file of the Munsif, Utraula at Gonda instituted by the Tulsipur Sugar Company (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff') against the Town Area Committee, Tulsipur (hereinafter referred lo as 'the defendant') for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from levying octroi on goods brought into the premises of th<J\n\nsugar factory belonging to the plaintiff pursuant to the Notification bearing No. 540/XXIII-102 (58-59)-7 dated December 15 1959 . , issued by the Commissioner of Faizabad Division in exercise of the\n\npowers conferred on him by sub-section (2) of section 39 of the U.P. Town Area Act, 1914 (U.P.\n\nNo. II of 1914) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with the Notification bearing No. 1375(1)/XXIII-102(58-59)-24 dated April 14, 1960.\n\nThe name of the defendant was altered into tbe Notified Area Committee of Tulsipur by virtue of an order made by the Munsif on August 18, 1962 since the defendant which was originally a Town Area Committee had been re-constituted as a Notified Arca Committee with effect from March 15, 1962. The plaintiff is a company carrying on the business of manufacturing sugar in its factory which was cstablisl1ed in the year 1936 in Shitlapur village which was situated in the suburb of Tulsipur Town.\n\nBy the Notification bearing No. 1853- IX-86 T-51 dated December 22, 1955 issued by the Govrnor of Uttar Pradesh under section 3 of the Act, the limits of the Tulsipur Town Area were extended so as to bring within its limits the village of Shitlapur.\n\nThus the sugar factory of the plaint'ff was brought within the jurisdiction of the Tulsipur Town Area Committee. In the year 1959, it was proposed to levy octroi on certain goods which were brought into the limits of the Tuls.ipur Town Area Committee for purposes of sale, use or consumption and for that purpose a draft notification was publi.shed on October 28, 1959 notifying the proposed rules which would govern the levy of octroi and inviting cbjections and representations thereto.\n\nThe final Notification was published by the Commissioner on December 15, 1959 under section 39 of the Act notifying the rules governing the levy of octroi in the Town Area of Tulsipur. In both these notifications, there was a reference to two Schedules-Schedule No. 1 and Schedule No. 2 but in fact neither of the two notifications contained the second schedule.\n\nThe first schedule referred to the rates of octroi leviable on the good:; specified therein and the second schedule referred to the limits of the Town Area.\n\nWhen the Commissioner noticed that the Notification dated December 15, 1959 by which the octroi rules were promulgated dia not contain the second schedule, he published a notification dated April 14, 1960 in the U.P. Gazette dated April 23, 1960 setting out the octroi limits of the Town Area of Tulsipur by way of amendment to the Notification dated December 15, 1959 incorporating the second schedule containing the limits of the Town Area of Tulsipur in the latter notification. By the said notification dated April 14. 1960, item\n\nNo. 29 in the first schedule of the Notification dated December 15, 1959 was also directed to be omitted.\n\nAfter the publication of the Notification dated December 15, 1959, the plaintiff was called upon to pay octroi on some of the materials, articles and stores brought into its sugar factory which was situated within the limits of the Tulsipur\n\n...\n\nTULSIPUR SUGAR CO. V. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE j j j 5 (Venkataramiah, J.) Town Area for being used in the manufacture and sale of sngar.\n\nAggrieved by the said levy, the plaintiff instituted the above suit 011 November 18, 1960 for permanent injunction as stated above questioning the validity of the Notification dated August 22, 1955 issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh extending the limits of the Tulsipur Town Area so as to include the area in which the factory of the plaintiff was situated and also the Notification dated December 15, 1959 and the amendment of the said Notification by Notification dated April 14, 1960 issued by the Commissioner of Faizabad.\n\nThe contention of the plaintiff with. regard to the Notification dated August 22, 1955 was that since it had been promulgated without giving a prior opportunity to all those concerned to make representation regarding the advisability of extending the limits of the Tulsipur Town Area Committee so as to include the village of Shitlapur within whose limits the factory of the plaintiff was situated, it was liable to be decfared as void.\n\nIn so far as the Notification dated December 15, 1959 w:.s concerned, it was urged by the plaintiff that it was liable to be struck down on the ground that it was inchoate as the second schedule defining the limits of the Tulsipur Town, Area had not been incorporated either in the draft notification dated October 28, 1959 or in the final Notification dated December 15, 1959. It was also urged that the above defect could not be cured by the issue of the Notification dated April 14, 1960 by which the Notification dated December 15, 1959 was amended without following all the pm; edure prescribed for promulgating rules under section 39 of the Act. The defendaat pleaded that neither of the two contentions urged by the plaintiff was tenable.\n\nThe defendant pleaded that since all the legal formalities required for the extension of its limits and for the imposition of the ociroi had been followed, it was not open to the plaintiff to question any of the above notifications.\n\nThe trial court held that the validity of the Notification dated August 22, 1955 was not open to question before the civil coilft but it however declared the draft Notification issued on October 28, 1959, the final Notification issued on December lS, 1959 and the amending Notification dated April 14, 1960 \"'invalid and ineffective on the ground that the omission tp include the second\n\nschedule containing the octroi limits in the draft Notificulio:; and the Notification dated December 15, 1959 ws a material illegality and the Notification dated April 14, 1960 which had been issued without following all the formalities could not have the effect of validatina the e Notification dated December 15, 1959. In view of the above .findim the :rial court held that there was no valid levy of octroi by the defe;'. da:\"tt.\n\nAccordingly, the trial court passed a decree restraining the\n\ndeftndant from levying octroi on goods brought by the plaintiff into its factory.\n\nThe defendant filed an appl against the S(!id decree before the District Judge, Gonda in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1963.\n\nThe plaintiff filed cross objections in that appeal.\n\nThat appeal was heard , by Civil Judge, Gonda who allowed the same and dismissed the cross\n\nobjections.\n\nThe suit instituted by the plaintiff was consequently dismissed.\n\nThe plaintiff thereafter filed a second appeal before the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) in Second Civil Appeal No. 462 of 1964 questioning the decree passed by the first appellate court.\n\nBy its judgment dated !anuary 17, 1968, t!J.e High Court diimissed the second appeal.\n\nOn the asis of a certificate issued by the High Court under Article 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution, the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court.\n\nWe shall first examine the correctness of the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff relating to the validity of the Notification dated August 22, 1955 declaring the ar~ in which the sug3r factory of the plaintiff is situated as a town area. The said Notification reads iD as follows :-\n\n\" 22nd August, 1955\n\nNo. 1853A-IX 86 T-51-In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of tae U.P. Town Area Act, 1914 (U.P. Act No. II of 1914), the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to declare the town of Tulsipur in Gonda district to be a town area for the purpose of the said Act and under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act to define the limits of the said town\n\narea as shown in the schedule hereto.\n\nSCHEDULE BOUNDARIES OF TULSIPUR TOWN AREA\n\nDISTRICT GONDA\n\nNorth: Jaoakpur forest road crossing at Nakti Nala to station road upto Public Works Department inspection house railway crossing.\n\nWest: From the terminating point of Northern Jloundary of Public Works Department Inspection House railway crossing towards south upto plot No. 223 of village Tulsipur on Tulsipur Chaudhari Dih Road.\n\nSouth: From plot No. 2418 of village Tulsipur to the 3rd furlong pillar of 18th mile on Balrampur Road and\n\nterefrom upto plot No. 359 on Tulsipur Chaudharidih p•1cca Road aod from there to plot No. 223, of village Tulsipur.\n\nTULSIPUR SUGAR CO. v. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE 1117 (Venkataramiah, J.) East: From the terminating point of southem Boundary at plot No. 2418 tow.ards north parallel to Nakti Nala upto the point where Pachperwa Road meets and therefrom upto Sugar Factory railway crossing, Sugar Factory railway line to the eastem side of the Sugar Factory upto the terminating po_int of the Northem Boundary at Nakti Nala.\"\n\nSection 3 of the Act reads: \"3. Declaratiou and definition of town areas:-\n\n(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette--\n\n(a) declare any town, village, snburb, bazar or iilhabited\n\nplaced to be a town area for the purpose of this Act, and may unite, for the purpose of declaring the area constituted by such union to be a town area, the whole or a portion of town, village, suburb, bazar or inhabited place with the whole or a portion of any other town, village, suburb, bazar or inhabited place;\n\n(b) define the limits of any town area for the like purposes;\n\n( c) include or exclude any area in or from any town\n\narea so declared or defined; and\n\n(d) at any time cancel any notification under this section;\n\nProvided that an agricultural village shall not be declar- 'ed, or included within the limits of a town area.\n\n~2) The decision of the State Government that any inhabited area is not an agricultural village within the meaning of the proviso to sub-section (1) of this section shall be final and conclusive and the publication in the Official Gazette of a notification declaring such area to be a town area or within the limits of •a town area shall be conclnsive proof of such decision.\"\n\nThe Act does not provide that the State Government should give previous publicity to its proposal to declare any area as a town\n\narea and should make such declaration after taking into consider- H ation any representation or objection filed in that behalf by the members of the public. It is not in dispute that no such previons\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~ fl980] 2 S.C.tl.\n\npublication was made in the instant case.\n\nThe contention o.f the plaintiff is that even though the statute does not expressly require such previous publication and consideration of rcpre§entations and objections made to the proposal to declare any area as a town area since a declaration of any area as a town area involves certain civil consequences such as the obligations arising from the implementation of the provisions of the Act in that area, we ; hculd hold that the exercise of the power of the State Government under section 3 of the Act by necessary implication imposes a duly on the State Government to follow the principles of natural justice i.e. to give publicity to its proposal to declare any area as a town area and to decide the question whether any declaration under section 3 of the Act should be made or not after taking into consideration the representations or objections submitted by the members of the public in that regard and failure to comply with such procedure would invalidate any declaration made under section 3. The above contention is based on the assumption that the duty imposed on the State Government is in the nature of an administrative power in the exercise of which the State Government should follow the principles of natural justice.\n\n The solution to the qu\"-stion raised before us principally depends upon the nature of the function that is performed by the State Government under section 3 of the Act. If that function is judicial or quasi-judicial involving adjudication of the rights of any person resulting in cvil consequences, it no doubt becomes necessary to follow the maxim audi alteram partem (hear the other side) before\n\ntaking. a decision. It is also true that in order to establish that a duty to act judicially applies to the performance of a particular function, it is no longer necessary to show that the function is analytically of a judicial character or involves the determination of a /is inter partes; thongh a presumption that natural justice must be observed will arise more readily where there is an express duty to decide only after conducting a hearing or inquiry or where the decision is one entailing the determination of disputed questions of law and fact.\n\nPrima facie, moreover, a duty to act judicially will arise in the exercise of a power to deprive a person of his livelihood or of his legal status where the status is not merdy terminable at pleasure, or to deprive a person of liberty or property rights or another legitimate interest or expectation, or to impose a penalty on him; though the conferment of a wide discretionary power exercisable in the public interest may be indicative of the absence of an obligation to act judicially.\n\nWhere a discretionary power to encroach upon individual rights is\n\nTULSIPUR SUGAR CO. v. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE 1119 ( Venkataramiah, J.) exercised, the factors pointing to whether it must be exercised judi'\n\nciaUy include the nature o~ the interests to be affected, the circumstances in which the power falls to be exercised and the nature of the sanctions, if any, involved.\n\nExceptionally, a duty to act jud'- cially may arise in the course of exercising a; function not culminating in a binding decision, if the wording of the grant of powers or the context indicates that a fair hearing ought to be extended to persons likely to be prejudicially affected by an investigation or reconur.enda- \\ tion'. (Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. I, Fourth Edition, Para ~· 65 at p. 77).\n\nJ A. K. Kraipak & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors.,(') Mo/tinder Si11g/1 Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commis.1ioner, New Delhi & Ors.(') and Maneka Gandhi v.\n\nUnion of India(') which were de<eidt:d in the light of the ever widening and exp::.nding horizons of natural justice also lay down that it is only where an administrative\n\ndecision affects the rights of persons, it becomes the duty of the au!hority concerned to give notice of the proposed action to the\n\npenon to be affected and to take a decision after gIVing a fair opportllllity to the person concerned to make his representation in tbat regard. Ttc decision in Schmidt v. Secretary of ~·:ate for Home Affairs(') which was followed by this Cour~ in Maneka Gandfu's case\n\n(supra) summarises the above principle as follows: 'Where a public oilie<:r !; as power to deprive a person Of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be donG without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf'.\n\nIn all these cases one significant common factor is t the administrative action is directed against a p.:rson.\n\nNone of them. however, is a case whre the question whether in th.: absence of an expres§ provision requiring it lo do so, an authority\n\nwhich has to exercise a legislative function should fol'ow the priuciples CJ( natural justice before discharging such fuioction arose for consideration.\n\nWe are concerned in the present case with the power oi the State\n\nGovernment to make a declaration constituting a geographical area G into a town .area under section 3 of the Act whicl1 does not require the State Government to make snch declaration after giving notice of ks mtention so to do to the members of the public and invitin~\n\ntheir rep1esentations regarding such action.\n\nThe power of the Stat~\n\n(I) 119101 1 s.c.R.457.\n\n(2) [l978) 2 S.C.R. 272.\n\n(3) (1978] 2 S.C.R.62!.\n\n(4) [1969) 2 Chancery Division 149.\n\n17-138 SC!/80\n\nSUPREME COURT RS!'I •RTS\n\n[J 980] 2 S C.R.\n\nGovernmeiit to make a declaration under section 3 of the Act is legislative in character because the application of the rest of the proviio!l5 o[ the Act to the geographical area which is dcclred as a town area is dependent upon such declaration.\n\nSection 3 of the Act is in the nature of a conditional legislation.\n\nDealing with the nature of functions of a non-judicial authority, Prof. S. A. De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Third Edition) observes at page 163 :--\n\n\"However, the analytical classification of a function may be a conclusive factor in excluding the operation of the audi alteram partem rule.\n\nIt is generally assumed that in English law the making of a subordinate legislative instrument need not be preceded by notic0 or hearing unless the parent Act so provides\".\n\nIn Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone & Ors.(') the facts were these : In 1964, the British Legal Association was formed.\n\nOut\n\nC•f about 2.6,000 practising solicitors some 2,900 were members of the association.\n\nThe Lord Chancellor anonnced Oil May 1, 1972, that the scale of fees under Schedule I to the SoEcitcrs' Remuneration Order, 1883 were proposed to be abolished and that for all conve:J.!ncing transactions the system of quantum meruit was to be\n\naµplicd.\n\nOn June 6, pursuant to section 56 (3) of the Solicitors Act 1957, the Law Society was sent by the commtttee. set up under section 56 (1) a draft of the order propo, sed to be made under\n\n<ection St (2). The draft order was published m 1bc Law S-Ociety's Uaz.::-.c 011 June 21.\n\nThe association set out two circulars about the proposed order, the first at the end of May, to all solicitors, and the second on July 17, making a series of accusations against the Lord Chancellor and the Law Society. On July 11, the association sent printed submissions to the statutory committee, requesting that the order should not be approved at this juncture and that the Lord Chancellor should seek further consultations with the profession and professional organisations. On July 14, the association wrote to each member of the committee asking for further time and a deferment . of the decision for two months.\n\nThe Lord Chancellor's reply dated July 18, was that he saw no reason for postponing the meeting or for refraining from making the order in such terms as the committee approved.\n\nOn July 18, the plaintiff as a member Of the nat; onal executive committee of the association, took out a writ a2ainst Ail members of the statutory committee, see\\cing a declaration and an iujnnction, and on July 19, at 2 P.M. hav:ng previously\n\n(1) (1972] 1 W.LR.1373.\n\nTULSIPUR SUGAR CO. v. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTP.!\\ 1121 (Venkataramiah, J.) notified the Treasury Solicitor of the intention, he moved the court A -ex parte, seeking to restrain the committee from holding the meeting\n\nwJ, ich wa. to be held at 4.30 P.M. on that day.\n\nThe motion was dismissul by Megarry, J. and we feel rightly with the following (lbS<'rvations:\n\n\"In the present case, the committee in que~•ion has an entirely different function : It is legislative rather than adminisfrotivc or executive.\n\nThe function of the comwjttee ; s to make or refuse to make a legislative instrument under\n\ndlegated powers.\n\nThe order, when made, will lay d<iwn the remuneration for s_cilicitors generally; <tn<I the terms of the order will have to be considered and construed and appiied in numberless cases in the future.\n\nLet me accept that in the sphere of the so-called quasi-judicial the rules of natural justice run, and that in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness.\n\nNevertheless, these considerations do not seem to me to affect the process of legislation, whether primary or delegated.\n\nMany of those affected by delegated legislation, and effected\n\nvery substantially, are never consulted in the process cf enacting that legislation, and yet they have no remedy. or course the informal consultation of reprcscr, tative bodies by tne legislative authority is a commonQ)ace, but ~]though\n\n& few statutes have specifically provided for a general process of publishing draft delegated legislation and considering objections (see for example, the Factories Act 1961, Schedule 4 ), I do not know of any implied right to 'be consulted or make objections, or any principle upon which the courts may enjoin the legislative pruccss at the suit of those who contend that insufficient lime for consul- . talion and consideration has been given. I accept that the\n\nfa.:~ that the order will take the form of a statatory instrument does not per se make it immune from attact, whether by injunction or otherwise; but what is important is not its form but its nature, whlch is plainly legislahVe\".\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that the maxim 'audi a/leram partem' does not become applicable to the case by necessary impli- _cation.\n\nThe second limb of the argument in support of the above .:ou1cn- H tion is that the declaration made under section 3 of the l\\ct being in :the \\Jature of subordinate legislation, it was the duty of the State\n\nGovernmrnt to follow the same procedure whih was pplicable to; the promulgation of rules under section 39 of the Act. Our, attention was drawn in this connection to sub-section (3) of section 39 of lbe Act which provided that the power to mal:e rules under the said secuon was subject to the condition of the rules being made after previous publication. We are of the view that it is not possible to equate a declaration to be made under sectlc'n 3 of the Act with rules made under section 39.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 39 of the Act C:oes nut in terms apply to a declaration to be made under section~ 3 of th•o Act.\n\nThe contention that the declaration to be made under section 3 of the Act is in the nature of a subordinate legislation is also not tenable.\n\nWe may refer at this stage to the decision of the , Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in The Queen v. Burah.(') ' Section 9 of Act No. XXII of 1869 of the Indian Legislature which came up for consideration in that case conferred upon the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal the power to determine whether that Act or any part of it should be applied to a certain area within his jurisdiction. It read as under:--\n\n\"9. The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend mutatis nwtandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\n\nEvery such notification shall specify the boundaries of the territories to which it applies.\"\n\nRepelling the contention urged against the validity of the aforesaid section 9, Lord Selborne observed at page 193 thu.s:\n\n\"Legislation which does not directly fix the period for its own commencement, but leaves that to be done by au external authority, may with quite as much reason be called incomplete, as that which does not itself immediately determine the whole area to which it is to be applied, but leaves this to be done by the same external authority. If it is an act of legislation OJ! the part of the external authority so trusted to enalrge the area within which a law acty in operation is to be applied, it would' seem a fortiori to be an act of legislation to bring the law originally into operation by fixing the time for its commencement\".\n\n(1) 5 !. A. 178.\n\n.TULSIPUR SUGAR CO. l'. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE 112 3 ( V enkataramiah, J.) .Proceeding further, the learned Lord observed at page 195: Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak oi the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would -be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council. Their whole operation is, directly and immediately, under and by virtne of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself.\n\nThe proper Legislature bas exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things.\n\nThe oonditions having been .fulfilled, the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an imperial or in a provincial legislature, they may (in their Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally.\n\nLegislation, oonditional on the use . of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient.\n\nThe British Statute Book abounds with examples of it; and it cannot be supposed that the Imperial Parliament did not, when constituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation as within the scope of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred\".\n\nFollowing the decision in The Queen v. Burak (supra) the High '\"):_ Court of Australia held in Haxter v. Ah Way(') that sub-section (g) of section 52 of the Customs Act, 1901 which provided that all goods the importation of which was prohibited by a proclamation should be considered as prohibited imports was not a delegation of legislative power but conditional legislation and was within the power conferred\n\n-On Parliament by sub-sections (i) and (ii) of section 51 of the Australian Constitution. ..\n\nJ; he essential distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation was considered for the first time by this Court in In re The Delhi laws Act, 1912.(2) After considering the decision in The Queen v. Burah (supra), Mukherjea, J. observe<l at page 980:\n\n'The same principle was applied by the Judicial Committee in King v. Benoari Lal Sharma (72 I.A. 57). In\n\n(I) 8 C. L. R. 626.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 747.\n\n1124 SUPREME COllRT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R~\n\nI / )\n\nthat case, the validity of an emergency ordinance by the Governor-General of India was Challenged inter alia on the ground that it provided for setting up of special criminal courts for particular kinds of offences, but the actual setting up of the courts was left to the Provincial Governments which were authorised to set them up at such time and place as they considered proper. The Judicial Committee held that \"this is not delegated legislation at all.\n\nIt is merely an example of the not uncommon legislative power by which the local application of the provisions of a statute is determined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity. • Thus, conditional legislation has all along been treated in judicial pronouncements not to be a species of delegated legislation at all. It comes under a separate category, and, if in a particular case all the elements of a conditional legislation exist, the question does not arise as to whether in leaving the task of determining the condition to an outside authority, the legislature acted beyond the scope of its powers.\"\n\nIn Basant Kumar Sarkar & Ors. v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. & Ors.(') this Court was required to consider the question whether section 1 ( 3) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 was valid.\n\nOne of the conditions urged by the appellants rn that cas~ was that the said provision suffered from the vice of excessive delegation on the ground that the power given to the Central Government to apply the provisions of that Act by notificatiop, conferred on the Central _.f Government absolute discretion, the exercise of which was not guided by any legislative provision and was, therefore, invalid.\n\nGajendragadkar, C.J. rejected the above contention with the following observations:-\n\n\"We are not impressed by this argument.\n\nSection 1 (3) is really not an ilJustration of delegated legislation at all; it is what can be properly described as conditional legislation. The Act has prescribed a self-contained code in regard to the insurance of the employees covered by it; several remedial measures which the Legislature thought it necessary to enforce in regard to snch workmen_ have been specifically dealt with and appropriate provisions have been made to carry out the policy of the Act as laid down\n\n\n...\n\n. .\n\nTULS!PUR SUGAR CO. V. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE 112 5 (Venkataramiah, J.) in its relevant sections.\n\nSeeton 3 (1) of the Act A purports to authorise the Central Government to establish a Corpmation for the administration of the scheme of\n\nUmployees' State J; nsurance by a notification.\n\nIn other words, when the notification should be issued and in respect of what factories it should be issued, has been left to B the discretion of the Central Government and that is precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation.\n\nWhat Lord Selborne said about \\he powers c<inferred on the Lieutenant-Governor by virtue of the relevant provisions of Act 22 of 1869 in Queen v. Burah (5 I.A. 178 at p. 195), can be said with equal justification about the C powers conferred on the Central Government by s. 1 ( 3).\"\n\nFollowing the decision in Baxter v. Ah Way (supra) this Court in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd., Bangalore v. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore by its Commissioner, Bangalore City(') upheld the validity of section 97(e) of the City of Bangalore D Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 by which the Bangalore Municipality had been authorised by the State Legislature to levy certain taxes.\n\nIn tire course of the said decision, Kapur, J. observed thus:\n\n\"In the present case, the Legislature has laid down the powers of the Municipality to tax various goods. It has enumerated certain articles and animals and Clause VIII\n\nread with s, 97(e) of the Act has authorised the Municipality to impose tax on other articles and goods.\n\nThis power is more in the nature of conditional delegation as was held in Baxter v. Ah Way [1909] 8 C.L.R. 626 where it was held that under s. 52(g) of the (Australian) Customs Act, 1901, a power given to prohibit by proclamation the importation of cert_ain articles was not a delegation of legislative power but coni:jitional legislation because the prohibition of importation was a legislative act of Parlian1ent itself and the effect of sub-s. (g) of s. 52 was only to confer upon the Governor-General in Council the discretion to determine to which class of goods other than those specified in the section and under what conditions the prohibition should apply.\n\nAll that the legislature has done in the present case is that it has specified certain , articles on which octroi duty can be imposed and it has also\n\n(I) [1961] 3 S.CR. 698.\n\n• E\n\n' F\n\ngiven to the Municipal Corporation the discretion to determine on what other goods and under what conditions tlie tax should be levied.''\n\nWe arc, therefore, of the view that a notification issued under sccfon 3 of the Act which has the effect of making the Act appJicable to a geographical area is in the nature of a conditional legislatioa and that it cannot he characterised as a piece of subordinate legislation. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the contention of the plaintiff that tk declaration made by the State Government m1dcr sectivu 3 of the Act declaring the area in which the sugar factory of the plaintiff is situated as a part of the Tulsipur town area is iiwalid js not tenable.\n\nThe other submission made in this connection that the area in which the factory of the plaintiff was situated was a part of an agricnltnral village which could not be included within the limits of a town area committee has also got to be rejected in view of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act which provides that the decision of the State Government that any inhabited area is not an agricultural village within the meaning of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3 shall be final and conclusive and the publication in the Official Gazette of a notification declaring such area to be a town area or within the limits of a town area shall be conclusive proof of such decision, since it is not disputed that the notification had been duly published in the Official Gazette.\n\nTh,, next question relates to the validity of the notification dated December 15, 1959 by which octroi was sought to be levied by the Town Arca Committee of Tulsipur.\n\nThere is no dispute that the procedure prescribed for the imposition of octroi was followed in the instant case.\n\nA draft of the octroi rules containing the. schedule of octroi rates which were proposed to be levied on different kinds of goods was published inviting representations and objectionr lo the proposed levy and that a final notification dated December 15, 1959 was published in the Official Gazette as required by the Act.\n\nSubsection ( 4) of section 15B of the Act provides that the notification so published shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nWhat is, however, argued before us is tbat the Notification dated December 15, 1959 which did not contain the second schedule specifying the octroi limits could not be read as levying octroi as the omission to specify the octroi limits was not curable in the circumstances of the case and that the suhscquent notification issued on April 14, 1960 could not cure\n\nTULSIPUR SUGAR CO. V. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE\n\nI 12 7 (Venkataramiah, J.) 'lhe said defect.\n\nIn order .to appreciate the contention, it is necessary A ·•o set out the relevant par:ts of the Notification dated December 15, 1959:\n\n\" December 15, 1959\n\nNo. 540/XXIII-102 (58-59)-7-In continuation of notification No.\n\n190/XXIII-102 (58-59)-5 dated October 28, 1959, and in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 39 of the U.P. Town Area Act, 1914 (U.P. Act No. II of 1914), the Commissioner, Faizabad Division, is pleased to make the following rules for the assessment and collection of octroi in the Town Area, Tulsipur, District Gonda, after their previous publication in the aforesaid notification as required by subsection (3) of section 39 of the said Act.\n\nRules\n\n1. Octroi shall be levied according to the rates and description given in Schedule I on goods and animals bronght within the octroi limits of Town Area Tulsipur (hereinafter called the town area) as specified in Schedule II for consnmption, use or sale therein.\n\n2. No person shall bring within the limits of tbe Town Area any laden vehicles or laden animal in respect of which octroi is lcviable under these rules until the octroi due in respect of the commodities has been paid to snch persons {bereinafter called tbe Moharrirs) and at such barriers as the Town Area Committee (hereinafter called the Committee) may appaint from time to time.\n\n3. No laden coolie from whom octroi is leviable in respect of commodities under his charge, shall enter the limits of the Town Area m1til he has paid the octroi for such commodities in the manner aforesaid.\n\nSchedule of Oetroi rates in Town Arca, Tulsipur\n\n\"S. No.\n\nName of goods Rates Remarks\n\nThe opening part of the above notification dated December 15, 1959 clearly states that the rules mentioned therein haJ been made H for the assessment and collection of octroi in the Town Area, Tulsi- ; pur, District Gonda after their previous publication.\n\nThe rates at\n\nwhich the octroi was leviable on ilifferent commodities are stated iru the schedule.\n\nAfter inviting our attention to Rule 1 of the Rules which provides that octroi shall be levied according to the rates and description given in the first schedule on goods and animals brought within the octroi limits of the Town Area, Tulsipur (hereinafter called. the tov.n area) as specified in the second schedule for consumption, use or sale therein, learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that Rule 1 postulates the incorporatio11 in the notification of the second: schedule containing octroi limits of the Town Area of Tulsipur and by the omission of the second schedule, the levy of octroi has become ineffective.\n\nIt is argued that the expression 'octroi limits of the town area' should be construed as different from the expression 'town area' aRpearing in the opening of the Notification dated Decem ber 15, 1959 and hence the omission to set out the octroi limits in the second schedule was fatal to the Notification. It is further contended that the amendment of the above notification made by the notificatioll' dated April 14, 1960 also could not validate the levy of octroi by the notification dated December 15, 1959 as the said amending notification had not been made after previous publication. It is true that Rule 1 refers to the second schedule in which the octroi limits of town area were proposed to be set out but we are of opinion that such omission is not fatal to the notification dated Decelllber 15, 1959.\n\nIt is not disputed that the opening part of the notification dated October 28, 1959 containing the draft of the octroi rules also stated that it was proposed to make provision for the assessment and collec-· tion of octroL in the Town Area, Tulsipur.\n\nIri that notification also, there was no specific reference to the octroi limits as such. The octroi being a tax on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein, it cannot be said that the members of the public who were interested in opposing the levy of octroi by way of making any representation in that behalf were misled as to the local area in which octroi would be levied. On a fair reading of Rule 1 we feel that the authority which promulgated the rules only intended to set out in the second schedule the limits of the Town Area which had already been published it1 the notification dated August 22, 1955 under section 3 of the Act declaring the geographical area situated' within the boundaries set out therein as the Town Area of Tulsipur.\n\nBy the notification dated April 14, 1960, the notification dated December 15, 1959 was amended by incorporation of the second schedule with the very same boundaries of the Town Area found in the notification dated Auust 22. 1955.\n\nSince the intention of the authority imposing octroi in the Town Arca of Tulsipur is made explicit in the opening: part of the notifiction dated December 15,,\n\n' -'\\\n\n< '\n\nTULSlPUR SUGAR CO. V. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE 1129 ( Venkataramiah, J.) 1959, we do not think that the omission to set out the boundaries of Tu!sipur Town in that notification can make the levy of octroi ineffective as there could be no room for any doubt about the local area within whose limits the said impost would be effective.\n\nThe declaration made on August 22, 1955 under section 3 of the Act specifies the said limits. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the notification dated December 15, 1959 was neit.her incomplete nor ineffective. The omission to incorporate the second schedule\n\nwas only an inconsequential mistake which was rectified by the subsequent notification dated April 14, 1960.\n\nWe do not, therefore, !ind an:y substance in this contention also.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we do not find any error in the judg- C ment of the High Court.\n\nJn the result, the appeal fails and is hereb;,< dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.\n\nN.K.A Appeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 127, "entities": [{"text": "THE TULSIPUR SUGAR CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE TULSIPUR SUGAR CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TIIE NOTIFJED AREA COMMITTEE, TULSIPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TIIE NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE, TULSIPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 475, "end_char": 484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 497, "end_char": 516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Decetnber 15, l 959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 913, "end_char": 932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later a final -notification dated Decetnber 15, l 959 v.1as issued under section 39, In both the notifications however though reference \\Vas\n\nrnade to two schedules to the notifications in neither \\Vas the second schedule which referred to the lin1its of the Town Area, added."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 952, "end_char": 962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1232, "end_char": 1243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2183, "end_char": 2193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 22, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2253, "end_char": 2268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Trial Court held that the notification of August 22, 1955 was not open to question, that there was no valid levy because the draft notification the final notification and the amending notifica.tion were invalid and ineffective for the reason that the omission of the second Schedule \\\\'as a 1uaterial illegality and the subsequent notification could not validate an irregular notification."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2934, "end_char": 2943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3122, "end_char": 3131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Halbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5096, "end_char": 5103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll 18F-H, 1119A-C]\n\nHalbury's La\\YS of England Vol."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6091, "end_char": 6100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6497, "end_char": 6506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6568, "end_char": 6577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6581, "end_char": 6591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6776, "end_char": 6785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 17-1-1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Anil B. Diwan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Anil B. Diwan,!."}}, {"text": "S. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8108, "end_char": 8116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Sinha and K. !."}}, {"text": "K. !. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8121, "end_char": 8131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Sinha and K. !."}}, {"text": "J.P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8156, "end_char": 8166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. J.P. Goyal, S. K. Jain and S. M. Jain for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8168, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. J.P. Goyal, S. K. Jain and S. M. Jain for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "S. M. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8183, "end_char": 8193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. J.P. Goyal, S. K. Jain and S. M. Jain for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8259, "end_char": 8272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-This appeal by certificate arises ont of Suit No.", "canonical_name": "V enkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Town Area Committee, Tulsipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8481, "end_char": 8510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "416 of 1960 on the file of the Munsif, Utraula at Gonda instituted by the Tulsipur Sugar Company (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff') against the Town Area Committee, Tulsipur (hereinafter referred lo as 'the defendant') for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from levying octroi on goods brought into the premises of th<J\n\nsugar factory belonging to the plaintiff pursuant to the Notification bearing No."}}, {"text": "Faizabad Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8836, "end_char": 8853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "issued by the Commissioner of Faizabad Division in exercise of the\n\npowers conferred on him by sub-section (2) of section 39 of the U.P. Town Area Act, 1914 (U.P.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8920, "end_char": 8930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8943, "end_char": 8962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shitlapur village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9540, "end_char": 9557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff is a company carrying on the business of manufacturing sugar in its factory which was cstablisl1ed in the year 1936 in Shitlapur village which was situated in the suburb of Tulsipur Town."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9728, "end_char": 9737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Shitlapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9849, "end_char": 9858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1853- IX-86 T-51 dated December 22, 1955 issued by the Govrnor of Uttar Pradesh under section 3 of the Act, the limits of the Tulsipur Town Area were extended so as to bring within its limits the village of Shitlapur."}}, {"text": "October 28, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10213, "end_char": 10229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1959, it was proposed to levy octroi on certain goods which were brought into the limits of the Tuls.ipur Town Area Committee for purposes of sale, use or consumption and for that purpose a draft notification was publi.shed on October 28, 1959 notifying the proposed rules which would govern the levy of octroi and inviting cbjections and representations thereto."}}, {"text": "December 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10411, "end_char": 10428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The final Notification was published by the Commissioner on December 15, 1959 under section 39 of the Act notifying the rules governing the levy of octroi in the Town Area of Tulsipur."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10435, "end_char": 10445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulsipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10526, "end_char": 10534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The final Notification was published by the Commissioner on December 15, 1959 under section 39 of the Act notifying the rules governing the levy of octroi in the Town Area of Tulsipur."}}, {"text": "TULSIPUR SUGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11762, "end_char": 11776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the publication of the Notification dated December 15, 1959, the plaintiff was called upon to pay octroi on some of the materials, articles and stores brought into its sugar factory which was situated within the limits of the Tulsipur\n\n...\n\nTULSIPUR SUGAR CO.", "canonical_name": ".TULSIPUR SUGAR"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11817, "end_char": 11830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE j j j 5 (Venkataramiah, J.) Town Area for being used in the manufacture and sale of sngar.", "canonical_name": "V enkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Faizabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12422, "end_char": 12430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by the said levy, the plaintiff instituted the above suit 011 November 18, 1960 for permanent injunction as stated above questioning the validity of the Notification dated August 22, 1955 issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh extending the limits of the Tulsipur Town Area so as to include the area in which the factory of the plaintiff was situated and also the Notification dated December 15, 1959 and the amendment of the said Notification by Notification dated April 14, 1960 issued by the Commissioner of Faizabad."}}, {"text": "April 14, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13347, "end_char": 13361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also urged that the above defect could not be cured by the issue of the Notification dated April 14, 1960 by which the Notification dated December 15, 1959 was amended without following all the pm; edure prescribed for promulgating rules under section 39 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13500, "end_char": 13510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Judge, Gonda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14883, "end_char": 14904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant filed an appl against the S(!id decree before the District Judge, Gonda in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15220, "end_char": 15259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff thereafter filed a second appeal before the High Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) in Second Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15507, "end_char": 15518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16010, "end_char": 16019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16032, "end_char": 16051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16095, "end_char": 16108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II of 1914), the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to declare the town of Tulsipur in Gonda district to be a town area for the purpose of the said Act and under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act to define the limits of the said town\n\narea as shown in the schedule hereto."}}, {"text": "Gonda district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16155, "end_char": 16169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II of 1914), the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to declare the town of Tulsipur in Gonda district to be a town area for the purpose of the said Act and under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act to define the limits of the said town\n\narea as shown in the schedule hereto."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16263, "end_char": 16272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "SCHEDULE BOUNDARIES OF TULSIPUR TOWN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16367, "end_char": 16403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SCHEDULE BOUNDARIES OF TULSIPUR TOWN AREA\n\nDISTRICT GONDA\n\nNorth: Jaoakpur forest road crossing at Nakti Nala to station road upto Public Works Department inspection house railway crossing."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17393, "end_char": 17402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19518, "end_char": 19527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19778, "end_char": 19787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20027, "end_char": 20036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20420, "end_char": 20429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandfu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23218, "end_char": 23231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ttc decision in Schmidt v. Secretary of ~·:ate for Home Affairs(') which was followed by this Cour~ in Maneka Gandfu's case\n\n(supra) summarises the above principle as follows: 'Where a public oilie<:r !;"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24097, "end_char": 24106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24557, "end_char": 24566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24765, "end_char": 24774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24912, "end_char": 24961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British Legal Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25413, "end_char": 25438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the facts were these : In 1964, the British Legal Association was formed."}}, {"text": "May 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25575, "end_char": 25586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lord Chancellor anonnced Oil May 1, 1972, that the scale of fees under Schedule I to the SoEcitcrs' Remuneration Order, 1883 were proposed to be abolished and that for all conve:J.!ncing transactions the system of quantum meruit was to be\n\naµplicd."}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25617, "end_char": 25627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "statute": "De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Act"}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25819, "end_char": 25829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "statute": "De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Act"}}, {"text": "Solicitors Act 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25841, "end_char": 25860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25918, "end_char": 25928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Solicitors Act 1957", "statute": "the Solicitors Act 1957"}}, {"text": "Megarry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27438, "end_char": 27445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The motion was dismissul by Megarry, J. and we feel rightly with the following (lbS<'rvations:\n\n\"In the present case, the committee in que~•ion has an entirely different function : It is legislative rather than adminisfrotivc or executive."}}, {"text": "Factories Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28726, "end_char": 28744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Schedule 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28746, "end_char": 28756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Factories Act 1961", "statute": "the Factories Act 1961"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29511, "end_char": 29520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Factories Act 1961", "statute": "the Factories Act 1961"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29708, "end_char": 29718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Factories Act 1961", "statute": "the Factories Act 1961"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29797, "end_char": 29807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30095, "end_char": 30105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30127, "end_char": 30137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30286, "end_char": 30295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30495, "end_char": 30504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30643, "end_char": 30649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXII of 1869 of the Indian Legislature which came up for consideration in that case conferred upon the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal the power to determine whether that Act or any part of it should be applied to a certain area within his jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Jaintia Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30991, "end_char": 31004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend mutatis nwtandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India."}}, {"text": "Khasi Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31049, "end_char": 31060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette, extend mutatis nwtandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31277, "end_char": 31286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Selborne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31293, "end_char": 31301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Repelling the contention urged against the validity of the aforesaid section 9, Lord Selborne observed at page 193 thu.s:\n\n\"Legislation which does not directly fix the period for its own commencement, but leaves that to be done by au external authority, may with quite as much reason be called incomplete, as that which does not itself immediately determine the whole area to which it is to be applied, but leaves this to be done by the same external authority."}}, {"text": ".TULSIPUR SUGAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31984, "end_char": 31999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".TULSIPUR SUGAR CO.", "canonical_name": ".TULSIPUR SUGAR"}}, {"text": "V enkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32040, "end_char": 32054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE 112 3 ( V enkataramiah, J.) .Proceeding further, the learned Lord observed at page 195: Their Lordships think that it is a fallacy to speak oi the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would -be due to any other legislative authority than that of the Governor-General in Council.", "canonical_name": "V enkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Imperial Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33352, "end_char": 33371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The British Statute Book abounds with examples of it; and it cannot be supposed that the Imperial Parliament did not, when constituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation as within the scope of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred\"."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33697, "end_char": 33707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33715, "end_char": 33732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33974, "end_char": 33984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the decision in The Queen v. Burak (supra) the High '\"):_ Court of Australia held in Haxter v. Ah Way(') that sub-section (g) of section 52 of the Customs Act, 1901 which provided that all goods the importation of which was prohibited by a proclamation should be considered as prohibited imports was not a delegation of legislative power but conditional legislation and was within the power conferred\nOn Parliament by sub-sections (i) and (ii) of section 51 of the Australian Constitution. .."}}, {"text": "section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34017, "end_char": 34027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1901", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "Court in In re The Delhi laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34192, "end_char": 34231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34298, "end_char": 34307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J; he essential distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation was considered for the first time by this Court in In re The Delhi laws Act, 1912.(2) After considering the decision in The Queen v. Burah (supra), Mukherjea, J. observe<l at page 980:\n\n'The same principle was applied by the Judicial Committee in King v. Benoari Lal Sharma (72 I.A. 57)."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35759, "end_char": 35768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35792, "end_char": 35817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36006, "end_char": 36024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the conditions urged by the appellants rn that cas~ was that the said provision suffered from the vice of excessive delegation on the ground that the power given to the Central Government to apply the provisions of that Act by notificatiop, conferred on the Central _.f Government absolute discretion, the exercise of which was not guided by any legislative provision and was, therefore, invalid."}}, {"text": "Central _.f Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36095, "end_char": 36117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the conditions urged by the appellants rn that cas~ was that the said provision suffered from the vice of excessive delegation on the ground that the power given to the Central Government to apply the provisions of that Act by notificatiop, conferred on the Central _.f Government absolute discretion, the exercise of which was not guided by any legislative provision and was, therefore, invalid."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36235, "end_char": 36249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar, C.J. rejected the above contention with the following observations:-\n\n\"We are not impressed by this argument."}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36362, "end_char": 36371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Insurance Act, 1948", "statute": "State Insurance Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37649, "end_char": 37653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bangalore City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37853, "end_char": 37867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the decision in Baxter v. Ah Way (supra) this Court in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd., Bangalore v. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore by its Commissioner, Bangalore City(') upheld the validity of section 97(e) of the City of Bangalore D Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 by which the Bangalore Municipality had been authorised by the State Legislature to levy certain taxes."}}, {"text": "section 97(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37894, "end_char": 37907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City of Bangalore D Municipal Corporation Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37915, "end_char": 37966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bangalore Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37980, "end_char": 38002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following the decision in Baxter v. Ah Way (supra) this Court in Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd., Bangalore v. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore by its Commissioner, Bangalore City(') upheld the validity of section 97(e) of the City of Bangalore D Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 by which the Bangalore Municipality had been authorised by the State Legislature to levy certain taxes."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38109, "end_char": 38114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tire course of the said decision, Kapur, J. observed thus:\n\n\"In the present case, the Legislature has laid down the powers of the Municipality to tax various goods."}}, {"text": "s. 52(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38550, "end_char": 38558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the City of Bangalore D Municipal Corporation Act, 1949", "statute": "the City of Bangalore D Municipal Corporation Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38579, "end_char": 38596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38864, "end_char": 38869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Customs Act, 1901", "statute": "Customs Act, 1901"}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.CR. 698", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 39232, "end_char": 39250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40243, "end_char": 40252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40432, "end_char": 40441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Arca Committee of Tulsipur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40883, "end_char": 40914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th,, next question relates to the validity of the notification dated December 15, 1959 by which octroi was sought to be levied by the Town Arca Committee of Tulsipur."}}, {"text": "section 15B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41372, "end_char": 41383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42330, "end_char": 42340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42353, "end_char": 42372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gonda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42557, "end_char": 42562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II of 1914), the Commissioner, Faizabad Division, is pleased to make the following rules for the assessment and collection of octroi in the Town Area, Tulsipur, District Gonda, after their previous publication in the aforesaid notification as required by subsection (3) of section 39 of the said Act."}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42660, "end_char": 42670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42770, "end_char": 42780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42908, "end_char": 42919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Decem ber 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44801, "end_char": 44819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is argued that the expression 'octroi limits of the town area' should be construed as different from the expression 'town area' aRpearing in the opening of the Notification dated Decem ber 15, 1959 and hence the omission to set out the octroi limits in the second schedule was fatal to the Notification."}}, {"text": "Decelllber 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45411, "end_char": 45430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that Rule 1 refers to the second schedule in which the octroi limits of town area were proposed to be set out but we are of opinion that such omission is not fatal to the notification dated Decelllber 15, 1959."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46334, "end_char": 46343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "TULSlPUR SUGAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46869, "end_char": 46883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the intention of the authority imposing octroi in the Town Arca of Tulsipur is made explicit in the opening: part of the notifiction dated December 15,,\n\n' -'\\\n\n< '\n\nTULSlPUR SUGAR CO.", "canonical_name": ".TULSIPUR SUGAR"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47249, "end_char": 47258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1130_1151_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "KALLYANI v.\n\nNARAYANAN AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 27, 1980\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nMaru111akkatayan1 Law-Property ancestral and of joint ftanilv-Will executed by a testator would be ineffective as he had no power or uthority to dispose of by will ancestral properties in Ids hand.\n\nPartition n1eaning of-Hindu Law-Effect of partition under Hindu AJitakshara Law-A Hindu father has the po1ver to partition the joint fan1ily property which includes the di.\\Tuption of joint fa1nily status.\n\nOne Karappan son of Chulliparambil Krishnan had two wives Naini tm.d 1'onni.\n\nThrough bis first 'vife Naini he had four sons-Kric; hnan (D1), Shankaran (D2), Raman and the husband of plaintiff appellant Kallyani who died after him at1d Madhavan \\Vho• predeceased him and husband of D3 and father of D4, D5 and D6-and four daughters.\n\nIle had one son by name Kesavan and two drlughters, through his second wife Ponni.\n\nOne \\'aHi! \\\\'as the second wife of his father and she had three daughters.\n\nKarappan and' his family are Ezhavas and in the matter of inheritance, succession and oo the question of personal !a\\V they \\Vere governed essentially by customary law and in the a-bsence of any specific custom, they are governed by the Hindu, Mitakshara law. Karappan executed. a registered deed variously described as a will or a deed of partition or evidencing family arrangement, Ex. Pl dated January 25, 1910. In this deed after na.rrating his near relations including his two wives male and fema1e children born to each and his father's second \\1.-ife and her children, he described the manner in which the A, B and C scheduled properties should be taken by them. after his death.\n\nIn February 1910 Karappan died.\n\nRaman, the husbnd of the plaintiff appellant, the third son of the first wife died on February 20, 1936. Plaintiff widow of Raman sued for partition and separate possession of her undivided !t11 share in properties set out in A, B and C schedules to the plaint.\n\nThe Trial Court held tlrnt Ext. Pl had the effect of constituting a coparcenary of four brothers, sons of first wife of Karappan and that it was their joint family property and they did not hold as tenants-in-common but as joint tenants and were governed by survivorship in the matter of succCssion. The contention that even in such a situation the widow wou1d be entitled to her husband's share. becau'ie' of a customary right was negatived. In respect of B & C schedule properties, it was held that they belonged exclusively to defendant 1 and his wife a11d plaintiff c<lnnot claim a share in them.\n\nThe High Court affirmed the Trial . Court':s judg1nent and decree treating Ex. Pl as family arrangement and hence the plaintiff's appeal by certificate.\n\nAllo\\ving the appeal, the Court 'B HELD: 1. Ext. PL siyled as a will by the deceased Karappan is not effective as a wi11.\n\nIf by Ext. P-1 deceased Karappan atten1pted tc make a \\Vill of the ancestral property in his hand in \\vhich his sons had ncquired\n\n.. ~\n\nKALLYANI v. NARAYANAN\n\n1 I 3 I\n\ninterest by birth, obviously he had no power to make a will in respect of such property. Ex. Pl does not purport to devise by will the undivided share\n\nof btator Karappan in the jo_int family property, but he attempts to dispose of by a will all the properties in which his sons had interest by birth. He had not claimed any share in the property but claimed a right to deal with ancestral property as he desired.\n\nJn Ex. Pl itself he describes properties set eut in schedules A and B annexed to Ex. Pl as his tarvad properties. [1139B- C]\n\n2. Expression \"tarvad\" in Marumakkattayam law is. the narne given to the joint family consisting of 1nales and females, a.II dcsca1dants in the female line from a .common ancestress.\n\nA tarvad may consist of two or more branches kncw.n as 'Thavazhies', each tavazhi or brooch consisting of one of the female members of the tarvad and her descendant~ in the. female line.\n\nThus when property is described as tarvacl p1operty in a broad sense it is admitted to be joint family.\n\nThis also becomes. clear from the recital in Ex. P.1 that properties seL out in A and B schedules \\Vere tarvad pr0pertics and property in C schedule were claimed by him as his selfacquired properties and they were to be kept joint and were not sought to be dealt with by Ex. Pl. Therefore, to the extent Ex. Pl purports to dispose of an ancestral properties by will it would be ineffective as a will as Kara-ppan had no power or authority to dispose of by will ancestral properties in his hand.\n\n[1139C-GJ 3; Partition is a word of technical import in Ifindu lw. Partition in one sense is a severance of joint family status and coparcener of a copa-rcenary is entitled to claim it as a matter of his individual volition.\n\nIn this narro\\V sense all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivoca-l\n\nindication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the. family and enjoy his share in severalty, Such an unequivocal intention to sep&rate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in fe6PCCt of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenary with right of survivorship and such separated n1cmber holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant-in-conimon. Such partition bas an impact on devolution of shares of such members. It goes to his heirs displacing survivorship. Such partition irrespective of y,:hether it is accompanied\n\nor followed by division of properties by metes and bounds covers both a division of right and division of property.\n\nA disruption of joint fan1ily status by definite and unequivocal indication to separate implies separation in interest and in right, although not immediately followed by a de facto octual division of .the subject-1natter. This may at any time, be claimed by virtue of the separate right.\n\nA physical and actual division of property by metes and bounds follows frOl; Il disruption of status and \\vould be termed partition in a broader sense.\n\n[1140A-EJ\n\n4. A Hindu father joint with his sons governed by Mitakshara. la\\v has the pov; er to partition lhe joint family property at any moment during his life time. The consent of the sons is not necessary for the exercise of that power.\n\nThis power comprehends the power to disrupt joint family status. [l 141H,\n\n1142A]\n\nKa11daswan1y v. Doraiswamy Iyer, [1880] ILR 2 ~Iad. 317; approved .\n\n.5 •. Even though the f .. ther has a right to make a partition of the joint family property in his hand, he has no right to make a partition by will of joint family property amongst various members of the fa...1).i.ly except, of course, with\n\ntheir consent. Jn the instant case, if by Ex .. Pl Karappan attempted to make\n\n1132 SUPREME COURT REl'ORT'i\n\n(1980] 2 8.C.R.\n\nA a partition of the property by his \\vill, Ex. Pl would he ineiffective as a\n\npartition. ~Y Ex. Pl Karappan does not divide his properly by metes and bounds vesting the shue of each in present in each of his sons. [1142-.B-CJ\n\nEx. Pl would not be eIIcctive as a partition in broader sense, namely, dividing property by metes and bounds fron1 the dnte on which it was executed as it was to be effective from a future date and that future uncertain event \\Vas the death of Karappan and that during the tiinc he ~'ould remain alive he \\vould deal \\Vith the properties at his S\\Veet_will.\n\nFurther, there wn-3 no effective partition by metes and bounds by E.x. Pl thLlugh the shares of sons were specified aS also the provision for female members \\Vas made.\n\nIf intention of the testator is to be gathered from the language of Ex. Pl Ka.mppan intended it to be a will not a partition in presenti.\n\nTherefore, Ex. Pl cannot be effective as a deed of partition in the broader sense i.e., partition by metes\n\nand bounds. [l 142E-G]\n\nBrijraj Singh v. Sheoda11 Singh, 40 I.A. 161; referred.\n\n6. An ineffective will sometimes though not ahvays, if otherv:ise consented by all adult members, may be effective as a family arra-ngement but as the father of a joint Hindu family has no power to impose' a family arrangement under the guise of exercising the po\\ver of partition, the power which undoubtedly he had but \\h.'hich he has, failed to effectively exercise, it cannot in the absence\n\nof consent of all male members bind them as a family arrangement. [l 143D-FJ\n\n7. A family management must be nn agreement amongst the various members of the family intended to be generally a.n<l reasonably for the benefit of the family and secondly the agreement should be with the object either of con1promising doubtful or disputed rights or for preserving the family property or the place and security of the fan1i1y.\n\nJn this case, both these ingredtents are absent. [ll43FG]\n\nH. N. Aryornurthy &_ Anr. v. Jl.l. D. Subbaraya Setty (dead) through l.r5 and Ors., [1972] 4 S.C.C. !; applied.\n\nBrijraj Singh v. Shcodan Singh, 40 I.A. 161; Laksl11nichand v. AnanJi, 53 I.A. 123; discussed.\n\n8. To be effective ns a family arrangement the deed n1ust be one intended to operate from the date of the execution, and it must be assented to and\n\nacquiesced in and acted upon by all. affecte-d party. In the instant case, Ex. Pl in term reserves to Karappan his right to <leal with the property at his sweet will and was to be operative after his death. Moreover, at the time of the execution of Ex. P.1 there is no evidence as to who were the adult members of the family other than Karappan who consented to the alleged family arrangement Assuming that Ex. Pl was to be treated as family arrangement after the death of Karappan, the absence of any c, idence of agreement amongst\n\nfamily members entitled to share, to the tenns of Ex. P.1 when it was executed, the absence of any dispute at or about the time Ex. P .1 was executed amongst the members of the family sought to be settled by Ex. P.1 and the absence\n\nof evidence that arrangement V.'as necessary for the security of the family or property would wholly negative the contention that Ex. P. I would furnish evidence of family arrnngement. Jt is doubtful whether ai Hindu father -can\n\nKALLYANI V. NARAYANAN 1133\n\ntirnpose family arrangement sans direct evidence of consent of each of his sons, to be effective after his death.\n\nTherefore Ex. P-1 does not furnish evidence <>f family arrangement.\n\n[!444E-H, 1145A-CJ\n\n9. In Hindu Law c111a joint family and joint fnmily property th!'.' word \"'partition' is understood in aspecial sense.\n\nJf scverence of joint family statu~ is br0ught about by a deed, a writing or an. unequivocal declaration (, f intention -to bring about such disn1ption, qua the joint fnmily, it constitutes partition.\n\n1 'fo constitute a partition all that is hecessary is a definite and unequivocal indication of intention by a member of a joint :fi1mily to sepamte himself from the family Wt.at form such intimation, indication or representation of members should take . -v.rould depend upon the circumstances of each case.\n\nA further requirement is\n\n....-: that the unequivocal indication of intention to separate must be to the know- ~-- ledge of the persons affected by such declaration : This intention to separate may be manifest in diverse ways. Undoubtedly, indication or intimation must be to members of the joint family likely to be affected by such a declaration.\n\n!ll45E-H, 1146A] c\n\n\\ •\n\nRaghavan v. Chenchanuna, A.LR. 1964 S.C. 136; referred to.\n\n10. Partition can be partial qua person and property but a partition which 'folio'WS disruption of joint family status will be a-mongst those who are entitled to a share on partition. Till disruption of joint family status takes place no D -coparcener can claim wh.it is his exact share in coparcenary property. lt is 1iable to increase aod decrease depending upon the addition to the number or\n\ndeparture of a male memer and inheritance by survivorship.\n\nBut once a .disruption of joint fantily status takes place, coparceners cease to hold the\n\npleperty as joint tenants but they hold as tenants-in-common.\n\n[1146E-G]\n\nIn the instant case, on death of Karappan~ Kesavan the son of the second E -wife obtained a physical partition of the property took his O\\\\n share and Jeft 1he family, there was first a disruption of the joint family status. Looking to the terms of Ex. P-1 there \\Vas a disruption of joint family status a, the share -0f each son was specified and vested, liabilities and obligations to\\vards the family members were defined and imbalance out of unequal division v.ras cor- -rccted. This certainly has the effeet of bringing nbout disruption of joint family sta.tus and even if there was no partition by metes and bounds and F the coparceners continued tOI remain under the same roof or enjoye.d the property without division by metes and bounds, they did not bold as joint tenants un1cas re-union is pleaded and proved.\n\n[1146G-H, 1147A]\n\n11. There is no presumption when one coparcener separates from othe\" Lhat the latter remMned united.\n\nAn agreement amongst them must be proved -either to remain united or to re-unite. A Hindu family is presumed to be G joint unless the contrary is proved but where it is admitted that one of the -coparceners did separate himself from the other members of the joint family\n\n11nd had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him, there is no 'presupiption that the rest of the coparceners continued to be joint. There is no presumption on the other side too that because one n1cmbcr of the family separated himself there has been separation with regard to all. It would be a\n\nquestiQ-n of fact to be dermined in each case upon the evidence relating to D the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other <:oparceners or they remained united. Except that four sons by N aini remained\n\nSU!'REM:J COURT REPORTS\n\n(!980] 2 S.C.R •.\n\nunder one roof and were joint in food laboured together there is no. evidence that they agreed to constitute a coparcenary assun1ing th<M. a coparcenary a creature of law could be: created by agreement.\n\nA.nd if Karappan specified· even the <;, hare of ea1.; h of his son<; by Naini in Ex.. P-1, this evidence of remaining together is hardly sufficient 1o v.arrant a conclusion that the&Se four sons constituted a coparcenary.\n\nE.x.' P-1, could not support -such a conclusion and the lligh Court \\Vas in error in spelling out such conclusion from Ex. P-1 overlook~.\n\ning its specific direction of a specified share of each of his sons and liability to pay owelty.\n\n[1148B-F]\n\nPalani Anunal v. Muthuvenkatachala Mariagon, 52 I.A. 83; Bhagwan Dayal\n\nv. Mrs. Reoti Devi, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 440; Bulabax v. Rukhmabai, !LR 3G IA.\n\n130; Sengoda v. Muthu, I.LR. 47 Mad. 567; referred to.\n\nBhagwati Prasad Shah and Ors.' v. Pulhin Ra1neshwari Jucr and Anr., {1951J S.C.R. 603, followed.\n\n12. Partition branch\\vise is, unknown to Mitakshara Law. Jn the instant case, if five sons of Karappan each constituted a branch obviously aJtcr one son as a branch sepM\"ated unless a reunion is pleaded, other four cannot constitute\n\na corporate bcxly like a coparcenary by agreement or even by subsequent conduct ot remaining together enjoying the property together.\n\n[1148F, 11\"9E1\n\n\n13. Once disruption of joint fa1nily status takes place, it covers both a :I division of right and division of prQperty.\n\nIf a document clearly sholft. the division of rights and status il'\\ legal construction and effect cannot be altered' by evidence of subsequent conduct of parties. [1150C]\n\n14. There is no concept known to Hindu Law that there would be a branch of a family wife-wise. [ll 50D]\n\np In this case Ex. P-1 itself specifies the share of each men1ber separatrly. 1herefore, tavazbi wife-wise stated in Ex. P-1 has to be ignored.\n\nEx P-t d.id• bring about a spifi.cation of shares and once such shares were defined. by the father \"\"ho had the power to define and vesting the same there was a disruption of joint family.\n\nThere was thus a division of rights and division of property by allotment of shares. The mode of enjoyment immediately clwlged and members cf such family ceased to be coparceners holding as joint ten.aats but G they held as tenants-in-common. The plaintiff would be entitled to the share .to which her deceased bus.band Raman was entitled.\n\nR.an1an had 1th tlaa.re. in 'A' schedule properties which the plaintiff would be entitled.\n\n[11501>~ £.:.F,\n\n1151C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2544 of 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 21-12-1965 of the Kerafac High Court in A.S. No. 403 of 1961.\n\n/· '\n\nP. Govindan Nair, C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, S. Balakrishnan A and Mrs. Baby Krishnan, for the Appellant.\n\nT. S. Krishnamurthy Iyer and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Respondents.\n\nE. M. S. Anam and P. N. Pura for Respondent No. 9. :; I'he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.--On a certificate granted by the Full Bench of the High Court of Kerala, original plaintiff, a Hindu widow who was seeking + partition of a share to which her deceased husband was entitled, having '\"\"\n\nlost ia both the Courts, has filed this appeal. The High Court granted the certificate under Article 133(l)(c) of the Constitution as in its opinion the following substantfal questions of law arise from the judgment rendered by it : c\n\n1. Whether under the Mitakshara Law the parties are governed by customary law, and, in the -absence of any rule of custoniary law on the point in question, by Mitakshara Law property can be divided, albeit )) by a family settlement, between two artificial units of\n\na joint family, one comprising the sons of a father by his first wife, the first wife and his step mother, and the other comprising his son by his second wife and the second wife so as to constitute each unit into a coparcenary with rights of survivorship between its E. members; and\n\n2. Whether the use of the word 'tavazhi' (in any case a misnomer) in describing the two units in the will, Ext.\n\nP-1 left by the father and held to be the basis of the family settlement, is sufficient in the circumstances, to F establish an intention that the membern of each unit were to take the property as coparceners and not as tenants-in-common, the grouping into units being only for convenient enjoyment?\n\nThe factual background from which, according to the High Court the aforementioned two questions emerge for consideration of thi~ G Court may be stated.\n\nOne Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni.\n\nHe had six daughters, four by the first wife and 18-138 SCl/80\n\ntwo by the second wife.\n\nOne Valli was the second wife of his father and she had three daughters. Karappan and his family are Ezhavas and in the matter of inheritance, succession and on the question of personal law they were governed essentially by customary law and in the absence of any specific custom they are governed by the Hindu Mitakshara Law. Karappan executed a registered deed variously described as a will or a deed of partition or evidencing family arrangement, Ext. P-1 dated January 25, 1910, the salient features of which may be reproduced.\n\nAfter narrating his near relations including his two wives, male and female children born to each and his father's second wife and her children, the following recitals are worthy of C note:\n\n\"There are as belonging to me now properties to the! value of Rs. 8000 /- mentioned in the sub-joined schedules A and B as my tarwad properties and also my self-acquired properties and properties to the value of Rs. 200/- of the C schedule which is set apart as common properties\".\n\nD \"Since I am seriously ill and in order that there may not\n\narise any dispute in future in respect of properties belonging to me, I have resolved today the following with regard to the course of enjoyment of the said properties after my death\".\n\n\"I myself shall have the full powers of disposition over all th\"' properties described in A, B and C schedules during my life time and after my death, out of the properties to the value of Rs. 8000/-, Rs. 1300/- worth of properties shall vest in each of my male issues, Rs. 300/- in my first wife, Rs. 1000/- in my second wife since she is sick and Rs. 200/- in my father's second wife''.\n\n\"On the above basis I have set apart to be vested in them after my death Rs. 5200/- worth of properties to the first tavazhi male issues, Rs. 300/- to my first wife and Rs. 200/- to my father's wife, altogether properties worth Rs. 5700/- scheduled to A schedule; Rs. 1300/- worth of properties comprising items 1 to 4 and 6 to 12 of B schedule to the second tavazhi, inclusive of an owelty of Rs. 22 7 as. 8 ps. 5 decided to be paid by the first tavazhi to the second tavazhi, and item 5 of B schedule worth Rs. 1000/- to my second wife\".\n\nH \"And that 1/5th share of assessment of C schedule property shall be paid annually by Kesavan in the Amsom and receipt obtained\".\n\n•rt is also resolved that each tavazhi shall meet the travel- A ling expenses of female issues and maintain properly the women who return on the death of their husbands, that both tavazhis shall equally maintain the dhildren of my aunt and my sister and that since C schedule properties are partitioned now, all my male issues shall have equal rights over the property after my death\".\n\nThis is a registered deed.\n\nSoon thereafter, in February 1910, Karappan died.\n\nRaman, the husband of the plaintiff, the third son, of the first wife, died on February 20, 1936.\n\nPlaintiff widow of Raman sued for partition and separate possession of her undivided 1/4 share in properties set out in A, B and C schedules to the plaint. It is necessary to clarify here that there were A, B and C schedules annexed to Ext. P-1 which, for clarity of understanding, would be referred to as the Will of the deceased though it would be presently pointed out that it is ineffective as a Will.\n\nSchedules A and B to Ext. P-1 specify certain properties.\n\nProperties set out in schedule B to Ext. P-1 except item No. 5 were awarded to Kesavan, the son by the second wife, and item No. 5 to the second wife. Properties in schedule A to Ext.\n\nP-1 subject to adjustment pointed out in Ext. P-1 wera given to the first wife and her sons. Properties set out in schedule C to Ext. P-1 were kept undivided and were the subject-matter of another suit filed by the present plaintiff which has ended in a decree in her favour and which decree has become final.\n\nOn the other hand, properties set out in schedule A to the plaint are the very properties which are shown in schedule A to Ext. P-1.\n\nIn respect of properties set out in the schedule B to the plaint it is alleged that they were acquired by tl1e;\n\njoint labour of defendants 1 and 2, deceased Raman and Madhavan, l!lld it is equally true of properties set out in schedule C to the plaint bnt they were separately set out because they stood in the name o~ ilie wife of defendant 1.\n\nPlaintiff, however, claimed 1/4 of her share in all the properties set out in schedules A, B and C to the plaint.\n\n0 1\n\nThe suit was principally resisted by defendant 1 as per his written G statement dated July 12, 1958. It was in terms contended that the\n\nproperties dealt with by Ext. P-1 were the joint family properties of Karappan and his' sons and that Karappan was not entitled to and had no authority in law to execute a Will in respect of the properties.\n\nTh.ere is an averrnent which may be extracted. It reads :\n\n\"Even though Karappan has no right to execute the Will accordingly, what Karappan actually did was that he partie\n\nI B\n\n' E\n\ntioned the properties between the two tavazhies in order to avoid future quarrel between the two wives and their children. ' As a father he has got the right to partition his properties according to the custom of the community and according to the Mitakshara law, that Will would be valid asl a deed of partition and accordingly accepting the same later, properties had been taken possession by the two tavazhies separately.\n\nEven though the execution Qf such a deed was against procedure, it was in order to honour the wishes of deceased Karappan that the same was acted upon\".\n\nIn respect of plaint B schedule properties, the contention was Iha~ it was acquired by the private income of the first defendant and that schedule 'C' properties belonged to the wife of defendant 1 and that plaintiff has no share in it. It was also contended that as the four sons by the first wife of Karappan constituted a tavazhi, it has all the incidents of a coparcenary and, therefore, succession was governed by survivorship and hence the plaintiff has no share in schedule A properties.\n\nThe trial Court framed as many as 12 issues.\n\nThe important findings of the Trial Court are that Ext. P-1 is neither effective as a Will nor as a deed of partition. Without specifically so saying that Ext. P-1 would be effective as a family arrangement, it was held that Ext. P-1 had the effect of constituting a coparcenary of four brothers, sons of first wife of Karappan and that it was their joint family property and they did not hold as tenants-in-common but as joint tenants and were governed by survivorship in the matter of succession.\n\nThe contention that even in such a situation the widow would be entitl ed to her share because of a customary right was negatived. In rest ' of B and C schedule properties it was held that they belonged exclBsively to defendant 1 and his wife and plaintiff cannot claim a share\n\nin them.\n\nConsistent with these findings, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court heard the first appeal preferred by the plaintiff.\n\nThe High Court substantially agreed with the findings of the trial Court and specifically held that Ext. P-1 furnished important evidence of a family arrangement accepted and acted upon by all the parties affected thereby. It was held that as family arrangement it is binding and it indicated that the division was per branches, therefore, the four sons by the first wife of Karappan divided as one branch and one son alone by the second wife separated as a different branch and as four sons by the first wife constituted a joint family, succession would be governed by survivorship and the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any share in schedule A properties.\n\nOn the question of acquisition of schedule B and C properties, the A finding of the trial Court was confirmed.\n\nIt may be mentioned that plaintiff had filed another suit for partitkm of properties set out in C Schedule to Ext. P-1 and that suit was decreed in plaintiff's favour and that decree has become final .\n\nTwo questions of general importance framed by the High Court are rather involved and confusing and do not pinpoint the attention on questions of law emerging from the judgment of the High Court.\n\nThe first question that needs to be answered is whether Ext. P-1 styled as a Will by the deceased Karappan would be effective as a.\n\nWill. If by Ext. P-1 deceased Karappan attempted to make a Will of the ancestral property in his hand in which his sons had acquired interest by birth, obviously he had no power to make a Will in respect of such property. Ext. P-1 does not purport to devise by Will the individual share of testator Karappan in the joint family property but he attempts to make a will of all the properties, ancestral and selfaoquired and even to dispose of property in which his sons had interest by birth, by will. He has, not claimed any share in the property but claimed a right to deal with ancestral property as he desired. In Ext.\n\nP-r itself he describes properties set out in schedules A and B annexed to Ext. P-1 as his tarvad properties.\n\nExpression 'tarvad' in Marumakkattayam Law is the name given to the joint family consisting of males and females, all descended in the female line from a common ancestress.\n\nA tarvad may consist of two or more branches known as thavazhies; each tavazhi or branch consisting of one of the female members of the tarvad and her decendents in the female line (see Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn., pp. 792-93.) Thus when property is described as tarvad property in a broad sense it is admitted to be joint family property. This also becomes clear from the recital in Ext. P-1 that properties in A and B schedules were tarvad properties and property in C schedule were claimed by him as his self-acquired properties and they were to be kept joint and were not sought to be dealt with by Ext. P-1. Therefore, to the extent Ext. P-1 purports to dispose of ancestral properties by will it would be ineffective as a will as testator Karappan had no power or authority to dispose of by will ancestral properties in his hand.\n\nAnd as he has not attempted to dispose of his undivided share in the ancestral properties by Ext. P-1 it is not necessary here to examine the question whether Mitakshara law as administered in Tamfil Nadn and Kerala enables an undivided coparcener to dispose of his share in joint family property by will.\n\nTherefore, Ext. P-1 is not effective as a will and\n\nthe respondents did not invite ns to affinn their rights nnder Ext. P-1 as if it is a binding will.\n\nThe next stage in the unfolding of the case is whether Ext. P-1 is effective as a partition.\n\nPartition is a word of technical import in Hindu law.\n\nPartition in one sense is a severance of joint status and coparcener of a coparcenary is entitled to claim it as a matter of bis individual volition. In this narrow sense all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty.\n\nSuch an unequivocal intention to separate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in respect of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenary with right of survivorship and such separated member holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant-incommon. Such partition bas an impact on devolution of shares of such members. It goes to his heirs displacing survivorship. Such partition irrespective of whether it is accompanied or followed by division of properties by metes and bounds covers both a division of right and division of property (see Approviar v. Rama Subha Aiyar(') quoted with approval in Smt. Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh v.\n\nAppasaheb Tuljaramarao Nimbalkar & Ors.(') A disruption of joint family status by a definite and unequivocal indication to separate implies separation in interest and in right, although not immediately followed by a de facto actual division of the subject-matter. This may at any time, be claimed by virtue of the separate right <see Girja Bai v. Sadashiv('). A physical and actual division of property by metes and bounds follows from disruption of status and would be termed partition in a broader sense.\n\nThere was some controversy whether a Hindu father governed by Mitaksbara Jaw bas a right to partition ancestral properties without the consent of bis sons.\n\nAfter referring to Mitakshara, I, ii, 2, Mayne in 'Hindu Law & Usage', 1 ltb Edn. p. 547, states that a Hindu father under the Mitaksbara Law can effect a partition between himself and his sons as also between bis sons inter se without their consent and that not only can he partition the property acquired by himself but also the ancestral property. The relevant text may be extracted:\n\n''The father has power to effect a division not only between himself and his sons but also between the sons\n\n(1) (1886) 11 M. T. A. 75.\n\n\n(3) 41 I. A. 151.\n\ninter se. The power extends not only to effecting a division by metes and bounds but also to a division of status\".\n\nSimilarlY, in Mulla's Hindu caw, 14th Edn., p. 410 (para 323), it is stated that the father of a joint family has the power to divide the family property at any moment during his life time provided he gives his sons equal shares with himself, and if he does so, the effect in law is not only a separation of the father from the sons, but a separation of the sons inter se.\n\nThe consent of the sons is not necessary for the exercise of that power. It, therefore, undoubtedly appears that Hindu father joint with his sons governed by Mitaksbara law has the power to partition the joint family property at any moment during his life time.\n\nMr. Krishnamoorty Iyer urged that even though undoubtedly a Hindu father joint with his sons and governed by Mitakshara law has the power to partition the joint family property, this power enables him to partition the property by metes and bounds but he has no power merely to disrupt the joint family status unaccompanied by division of property by metes and bounds. The limited question that needs answer in this case is whether a Hindu father joint with his sons governed by Mitakshara law has the power to disrupt the joint family status being a first step in the stage of dividing the property by metes and bonnds.\n\nThe wider question whether a coparcener of a coparcenary governed by Mitakshara law brings about a disruption of joint famil} tatus by definite and unequivocal indication of his intention to sepaate himself from the family would constitute disruption of statuj qua the non-separating members need not be examined. A Hindu father joint with his sons and governed by Mitakshara law in contradistinction to other manager of a Hindu undivided family or an ordinary coparcener enjoys the larger power to impose a partition on bis sons with himself as well as amongst his sons inter se without their consent and this larger power to divide the property by metes and bounds and to allocate the shares to each of his sons and to himself would certainly comprehend within its sweep the initial step, viz., to disrupt the joint family status which must either precede or be simultaneously taken with partition of property by metes and bounds. This view taken in Kandaswami v. Doraiswami Ayyar, (') does not appear to have been departed from. Further, the text from Mayne's book extracted in the preceding paragraph shows that the weight of authority is against the proposition canvassed for by Mr.\n\nIyer.\n\nIt does, therefore, appear that a Hindu father governed by\n\n(I) [1880] 1.L.R.2Mad/317.\n\nMitakshara law has power to partition the joint family property belonging to the joint family consisting of himself and his sons and that this power comprehends the power to 4isrupt joint family status.\n\nThe question is, has Karappan as father exercised his power to partition the joint family property by Ext. P-1 ? Even though the father has a right to make a partition of the joint family property in his hand, he has no right to make a partition by will of joint family property amongst various members of the family except, of course, if it could be made with thdr consent (see Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Slngh(').\n\nWhether it is effective as family arrangement will be presently examined.\n\nTherefore, if by Ext. P-1 Karappan attempted to make a partition of the property by his will, Ext. P-1 would be ineffective as a partition.\n\nBy Ext. P-1 Karappan does not divide his property by metes and bounds vesting the share of eacb in presenti in each of his sons.\n\nOne thi'ng that is not in dispute is that Karappan did not intend Ext. P-1 to be effective from the date on which it was execu.ted.\n\nIn his own words he states that he was seriously ill and as he would like to avoid a dispute in future in respect of his properties and, therefore, he resolved that his property shall be enjoyed after his death in the manner stated in Ext. P-1. He reserved to himself the full powers of disposition over all the properties more particularly described in the various schedules annexed to Ext. P-1 during his life time and whatever directions were given in Ext. P-1 were to be effective only after his death.\n\nAt two places in terms he stated that the dispositions made by Ext. P-1 were to be effective after his death.\n\nIt is, therefore, inescapable that Ext. P-1 was not to be effective as a partition in broader sense, namely, dividing property by metes and bounds from the date on which it was execnted. It was to be effective from a future date and that future uncertain event was the death of Karappan and that during the time he would remain alive he would deal with the properties at his sweet will.\n\nFurther, there was no effective partition by metes and bounds by Ext. P-1 though the shares of sons were specified as also the provision for female members was made. If intention of the testator is to be gathered from the language of Ext. P-1 Karappan intended it to be a will to be effective after his death.\n\nHe never intended it to be a partition in presenti. Therefore, Ext.P-1 cannot be effective as a deed of partition in the broader sense, i.e. partition by metes and bounds.\n\nWhat then is the effective of Ext. P-1 on the joint family of which Karappan was father-cum-manager ? The respondents contend that\n\n(I) 40 J. A.161.\n\nit is a family arrangement providing for carving out branchwise (shakha per wire) separation of interest in the joint family properties and as it was unreservedly accepted by all affected thereby after the death of Karappan, it is binding on all.\n\nAppellant contends that Ext.P-1 had the effect of disrupting the joint family status and from that dale members of the joint family entitled to their shares in the joint family property, held as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenant with the result that inheritance by survivorship, a special feature of a Hindu coparcenary, would be displaced by Hindu law of succession, the property going to the heirs recognised by Jaw.\n\nDefendant 1 who contested the suit in terms stated that Ext.P-1 was not effective as a will.\n\nHe than stated that Ext.P-1 purports to partition the property between the two tavazhies represented by Kara pp an' s two wives and their respective male offspring. It may, however, be stated that nowhere in the written statement he has put forth the contention that Ext.P-1 evidences a family arrangement assented to by all affected thereby.\n\nThat case appears to have been made out by the High Court for the first time and since the plaintiff has been non-suited on the finding that Ext.P-1 was a family arrangement which provided for a coparce'nary of four sons of the first wife of Karappan, retaining inheritance by survivorship amongst the four members it is necessary to examine the contention whether Ext.P-1 provides for a family arrangement assented to by all concerned. An ineffective will sometimes though not always, if otherwise consented by all adult members, may be effective as a family arrangement but as the father of a. joint Hindu family has no power to impose a family arrangement under the guise of exercising tbe power of partition, the power which undoubtedly he has but which he has failed to effectively exercise, cannot in the absence of consent of all male members bind them as a family arrangement.\n\nWhat constitutes family arrangement bas been fully examined by this Court in M. N. Aryamurthy & Am.\n\nv. M. D. Subbaraya Setty (dead) through l.r. & Ors.('). Broadly stated, it is that there must be an agreement amongst the various members of the family intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family and secondly the agreement should be with the object either of compromising doubtful or disputed rights or for preserving the family proprty or the place a'nd security of the family.\n\nBoth these ingredients appea rto be absent in this case.\n\nJn Briira; Singh's case (supra) a father purported to make a will in which he recorded a partition of the joint family property amongst his three sons.\n\nHe did not take a share for himself and simultan-\n\n(1) [/972] 4 s.c.c. l.\n\neously gave double share to his eldest son.\n\nThere were usual recitals of partition and allotment of shares and it was further stated that in anticipation of execution of the deed various sharers were put in possession of property allotted to each of them.\n\nThis was done two months prior to the execution of the so-called will. The document was held ineffective as a will but on evidence it was found that all concerned had acquiesced in the arrangement evidenced by the deed and the deed was intended to operate from the date of its execution and, therefore, it evidenced a family arrangement contemporaneously made and acted upon by all the partie'.l and hence binding.\n\nSimilarly in Lakshmi Chand v. Anandi,(') two brothers having no male issue and constituting a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara, signed a document, described therein as an agreement by way of will.\n\nThe document provided in effect that if either party died without male issue, his widow should take a life interest in a moiety of the whole estate and that if both the parties died without male issue, the daughters of each, or their male issue, should divide the father's share.\n\nThe document was registered. A few days after its execution one brother died, and his widow was entered as owner of a moiety of the estate.\n\nSubsequently the other brother sued for a declaration that the document was null and void.\n\nPrivy Council held that the docmnent could not operate as will but that as a co-sharer in a Mitakshara joi'nt family with the consent of all his co-sharers he could deal with the share to which he would be entitled on a partition and was binding as family arrangement.\n\nTo be effective as a family arrangement the deed must be one intended to operate from the date of its execution, a feature wanting in Ext.P-1. and it must be assented to and acquiesced in and acted upon by all affected thereby.\n\nAt the time of execution of Ext.P-1 there is no evidence as to who were the adult members of the family other than Karappan who consented to the alleged family arrangement.\n\nOne thing, however, may be pointed out that defendant 1 gave his age as 87 years on December 29, 1959, when his evidence commenced.\n\nPresumably he must have been born in 18 72.\n\nBut there is no evidence about the age of other children of Karappan. The only evidence as to the consent of the male members is that after the death of Karappan all male members acted according to the wishes of Karappan as disclosed and ordained in Ext.P-1.\n\nAssuming it to be so, Ext.P-1 was to operate after the death of Karappan and not from the date of execution.\n\nThe High Court after referring to Brijra; Singh's case\n\n(supra) overlooked the fact that in accepting the deed before it, the Judicial Committee was impressed by the fact that it was intended to lipeak from the date on which it was written and not future date, viz.,\n\n(!) 53 I. A. 123.\n\ndeath of the writer.\n\nExt.P-1 in terms reserves to Karappan his right to deal with the property at his sweet will and was to be operative after his death.\n\nThe High Court completely overlo.o'ked this material differe'llce.\n\nAssuming that Ext.P-1 was to be treated as family arrangement after the death of Karappan, the absence of any evidence of agreement amongst family members entitled to a share, to the terms of Ext.P-1 when it was e~;, cuted, the absence of any dispute at or about the time Ext.P-1 was executed amongst the members of the family sought to be settled by Ext.P-1; and the absence of evi dence that arrangement was necessary for the security of the family or property would wholly negative the contention that Ext. P-1 would furnish evidence of family arrangement.\n\nWe have grave doubt whether a Hindu father can impose family arrangement sans direct evidence of consent of each of his sons, to be effective after his death.\n\nTherefore, Ext.P-1 does not furnish evidence of family arrangement.\n\nNow, if Ext.P-1 cannot be effective as a deed of partition inasmuch as it did not result in division of property by mete6 and bounds, its effect on continued joint family status may be examined. If it disrupted joint family status by its very execution, there was thereafter no question of directing any family arrangement to be effective from a futnre date as per its terms and even though it may spell ont a family arrangement what effect the disruption of joint family status would have on the mode of succession has to be ascertained.\n\nOne thing is crystal clear that Ext. P-1 is not a deed of partition in the sense it does not purport to divide the property amongst various coparceners by metes and bounds.\n\nHowever, in Hindu law qua joint family and joint family property the word 'partition' is understood in a special sense. If severance of joint status is brought about by a deed, a writing or an unequivocal declaration of intention to bring about such disruption, qua the joint family, it constitutes partition. (see Raghavamma v.\n\nChenchamma)('). To constitute a partition all that is necessary is a definite and unequivocal indication of intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family.\n\nWhat form such intimation, indication or representation of such interest should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case.\n\nA further requirement is that this unequivocal indication of intention to separate must be to the knowledge of the persons affected by such declaration.\n\nA review of the decisions shows that this intention to separate may be manifested in diverse ways.\n\nIt may be by notice or by filing a suit.\n\nUndoubtedly, indication or\n\n(I) A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 136.\n\nintimation must be to members of the joint family likely to be affected by such a declaration.\n\nHas not Ext.P-1 the effect of bringing about a disruption of joint family headed by Karappan and consisting of himself and his sons ?\n\nB The fact situation is that in Ext. P-1 Karappan specified the share of each of his sons, the property allotted on share being valued at Rs. 1300/- each of the four by the first wife and one by the second wife, and vesting the share so specified in each of his sons. He also spe- \\' cified value of the property allotted to his first wife, to his second wife and to the second wife of his father. In the process he found that some- C thing more was given to the sons of his first wife and in order to restore the equilibrium of treating his sons equally, he directed that owelty to the tune of Rs. 227 /- and odd be paid by the sons of the first wife to the sons of his second wife. This was with a view to correcting the inequality in division of shares. He also states that there will be two branches. He refers to them as tavazhies and himself and his family as D tarvad. Tarvad is akin to joint family and tavazhi is a branch of the family. The High Court, however, treated the use of the words 'tarvad' and 'tavazhi' and 'Karnavaran' to be inappropriate and hence inconsequential. Similarly, the High Court found specification of share of each of the male child as not indicative of a partition in the sense of disruption of joint family status.\n\nPartition can be partial qua person and property but a partition which follows disruption of a joint family status will be amongst those who are entitled to a share on partition. On death of Karappan, Kesavan, the son of the second wife obtained a physical partition of the property, took his own share and left the family.\n\nThere was first a disruption of the joint family by specifying the shares in Ext.P-1. Till disruption of joint family status takes place no coparcener can claim what is his exact share in coparcenary property. It is liable to increase and decrease depending upon the addition to the number or departure of a male memlx:r and inheritance by survivorship.\n\nBut once a disruption of joint family status takes place, coparceners cease to hold the property as joint tenants but they hold as tenants-in-common.\n\nLooking to the terms of Ext.P-1 there was a disruption of joint family status, the shares were specified and vested, liabilities and obligations towards the family members were defined and imbalance out of unequal division was corrected. This certainly has effect of bringing about disruption of joint family status and even if there was no partition by metes and bounds and the coparceners continued to remain under the same roof or enjoyed the\n\nproperty without division by metes and bounds, they did not hold\n\nas joint tenants unless re-union is pleaded and proved.\n\nIt was, however, contended and the contention has found favour with the High Court that when Kesavan, the second wife's son of Karappan took the properties allotted to his share and left the (amily, as per terms of Ext. P-1 four sons of Nani were constituted joint tenants or members of a coparcebary. In reaching this conclusion reliance was placed by the High Court on Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar('). In that case, after referring to Appo- ' viers case, (supra) it was observed as under:\n\n\"But the mere fact that the shares of the coparcc11ers have been asoortained does not by itself necessarily lead to an inferncc that the family had separated.\n\nThere may be reasobs other than a contemplated immediate separation for ascertaining what the shares of the coparceners on a separation would be. It is also now beyond doubt that a member of such a joint family can separate himself from other members of the jojnt family and is on separation entitled to have bis share in the property ascertained and partitioned off for hinl and that the remaining coparceners without any special agreement amongst themselves may continue (o be coparceners and td enjoy as members of a, joint family, what remained after such a partition of the family property. That the remaining members continued to be joint may, if disputed, be inferred from the way in which their family business was carried on after their previous coparcener had separated from them.\"\n\nIn Bhagwan Dayal v. Smt. Reoti Devi, (2) this Court examined the effect of a separation of om' member of a joint family on the joint family status and on the remaining members in the light of the Privy Council decision in Pa/an; Ammal's case: (supra) The relevant observation is as under :\n\n\"The general principle is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved : but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course of conduct. It is also settled that there is no presumption that when one memlnr separates from others that the latter remained united; whether the latter remain united or 'not must be decided on the facts of each case.\"\n\n(l) 52 IA 83.\n\n\nIn fact, Judicial Committee in Balabux v. Rukhmabai(') unequivocally held that there is no presumption when one coparcener separates from others that the latter remained united.\n\nAn agreement amongst them must be proved either to remain united or to re-unite.\n\nIn Sengoda v. Muthu,( 2) the High Court interpreted Palani Ammars case to lay down that if a partition takes place with respect to one coparcener, the decree or the deed bringing about partition would provide a pointer as to the effect of the decree or the deed on the remaining coparceners.\n\nIn Bhagwati Prasad Shah & Ors.\n\nDulhin Rameshwari Juer & Anr.,(8 ) this Court pointed out that the general principle undoubtedly is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved but where it is admitted that one of the coparceners did separate himself from the other members of the joint family and had his share in the joiqt property partitioned off for him, there is no presuinption that the rest of the coparceners continued to be joint.\n\nThere is ho presumption on the other side too thav because one member of the family separated himself there has been separation with regard to all.\n\nIt would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or they remained united. Except that four sons by Nani remained under one roof and were joint in food and laboured together there is no evidence that they agreed to constitute a coparcenary assuming that a coparcenary a creature of law could be created by agreement. And if Karappan specified even the share of each of bis sons by Nani in Ext. P-1, this evidence of remaining together is hardly sufficient to warrant a conclusion that these four sons constituted a coparcenary. Ext. P.1 could not support such a conclusion and' IDgh Court was in error in spelling out such conclusion from Ext. P-1 overlooking its specific direction of a specified share of each of his sous and liability to pay owelty.\n\nA further submission that there was partition branchwise is uhknown to Mitakshara law and is wholly untenable. In Mayne's Hinda Law, 11th Bin., p. 347, law as thus stated :\n\n\"So long as a family remains an undivided family, two or more members of it, whether they be members of different branches or of one 'and the same brahch of the family, can have no legal eXistence as a separate indepndent unit; but all the members of a branch, or of a sub-branch, R\n\n(I) !LR 30 IA 130.\n\n(2) I.LR. 47 Madras 567.\n\n(3) [1951] S.C.R. 603.\n\neoL-'31. TM\n\ncan form a distinct and sepaiate corporate unit within the A larger corporate family and hold property as such. Such property will be joint family property of the members of the branch inter se, but will be separate property of that branch in relation to the larger family.\n\nThe principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of the joint property of an undivided Hipdu family governed by the Mitakshara law.\"\n\nIn Bhagwan Dayal's case (supra) legal pooition after referring to earlier decisions has been culled out as under :\n\n\"Coparcenary is a g-eature of Hindu law and cannot be C created by agreement of parties except in the case of reunion. It is a corporate body or a family unit. The law\n\nalso recog'.nires a branch of the family as a subordinate cooperate body.\n\nThe said family unit, whether the larger one or the subordinate one, can acquire, hold and dispose of family property subject to the limitations laid down by D law ...... Hindu law does not recognise some of the members of a joint family belonging to different branches, or even to a single branah, as a corporate unit.\"\n\nNow, if five sons of Kara pp an each constituted a branch, obviously after one son as a branch separated unless a reunion is pleaded, other four caunot constitute a corporate body like a coparcenary by agreement or even by subsequent conduct of remaining together enjoying the property together.\n\nIn Balkishen Das & Ors. v. Ram Narain Sahu & Ors.,(') an ikrarnama was produced which showed that defined shares in the whole estate had been allotted to the several coparceners.\n\nThere was a passage which gave liberty to any of the paities either to live together as a member of the joint family or to sepaiate his own business.\n\nMahabir was given four a:anas , share and others defined shi\\feS in the remainder.\n\nContention raised was that Mahabir alone separated and others remained joint. Subsequent conduct was relied upon to substantiate the contention that they remained together.\n\nNegativing this contention it was held that the ikramama effected a sepaiation of estate even if the paities elect- , ed either to have a partition of their shares by metes and bounds, or to continue to live together and enjoy their property in co=on as before. Whether they did one or the other would affect the mode of enjoyment, but not the tenure of the property or their interest in it.\n\nThe ikrarnama effected a separation in estate, its legal\n\n(l) 30 I. A. 139.\n\nI!'\n\nconstruction and effect could not be controlled or altered by the subsequent conduct. Once the shares were determined and allotted, it was held consistently with Appovier's case (supra) that this converted them from joiut holders into tenants-in-common.\n\nIn Boddu Venkatakrishna Rao & Ors. v. Boddu Satyavathi & Ors.,(') the following passage ih Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (Fifth Edn.), was approved :\n\n\"The principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu law, except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family.\"\n\nOnce disruption of joint family status takes place as Lord Westbury puts it in Appovier's case, (supra) it covers both a division of right and division of property. If a document clearly shows the division of rights and status its legal construction and effect cannot be altered by evidence of subsequent conduct of parties.\n\nNow, in this case Ext. P-1 itself specifies the share of each member separately. There is no concept 1.'1lown to Hindu law that there could be a branch of a family wife-wise.\n\nTo illustrate, if a Hindu father has two wives and he has three male children by the first wife and two by the second, each wife constituting a branch with her children of the family is a concept foreign to Hindu law. Therefore, tavazhi wife-wise stated in Ext. P-1 has to be ignored and the contention that there was a partition amongst wife-wise branches as represented by each wife is equally untenable. Ext. P-1 did bring about a specification of shares and once such shares were defined by the father who had the power to define and vesting the same there was a disruption of joint family.\n\nThere was thus a division of rights and division of property by allotment of shares.\n\nThe mode of enjoyment immediately changed and members of such family ceased to be coparoeners holding as joint tenants but they held as tenant11-incommon. Subsequent conduct of some of them to stay together in the absence of any evidence of re-union as understood in law is of no consequence. In any event when Kesavan, the son of the second wife, sought and obtained physical partition of the properties allotted to him and left the family there being no evidence whether others agreed to remain united except the socalled evidence of subsequent conduct, which is irrelevant or of no consequence, disruption of status was complete. Therefore, the four sons of the first wife held the property as tenants in common.\n\nB There is evidence in the form of some documents showing that defendant 1 was described as Karnavaran of a coparcenary of the\n\n(!) [1968]28.C.R.395.\n\nT ·~\n\n\"\".\n\nfour sons of the first wife of Karappan and that the property was enjoyed as a joint family property.\n\nIn view of our conclusion that such subsequent conduct is not conclusive of any agreement to reunite, it is not necessary to examine the evidence.\n\nIn view of our conclusion that since the execution of Ext. P-1 on January 25, 1910, or after the death of Karappan in February 1910, when Kesavan, the son of the second wife took his share of the property left the family there was a disruption of the joint family and the sons of Karappan by his first wife hdd the property, which remained for them after Kesavan obtained his share, not as joint tenants but as tenants-in-common, the plaintiff would be entitled to the share to which her deceased husband Raman was entitled.\n\nRaman had 1/ 4 share in A schedule properties which the plaintiff would be entitled and therefore, there would be a preliminary decree in her favour to that effect.\n\nPlaintiff's . claim to a share in properties set out in schedules B and C annexed to the plaint has been concurrently negatived by both the courts on :he finding that they are. the properties of defendant 1 and his wife and are not accretions to the property which devolved from Karappan.\n\nThis concurrent finding of fact arrived at on appreciation of evidence appears to be correct and need not be disturbed.\n\nTherefore, plaintiff's suit with regard to a share\n\n!~- B and C scheduk properties has been rightly dismissed.\n\nAt the commencement of hearing of the appeal it was pointed out that original plaintiff Kallyani is dead and there is some dispute between her two daugh'.ers Yashoda and J anaki about sucossion to the estate of Kallyani.\n\nBoth bad applied to the exclusion of each other for being substituted as legal representatives of \\he deceased.\n\nFor purposes of this appeal both were subs'.ituted for the deceased appellant.\n\nIt is not necessary to decide this question in this appeal because who'ever of the two establishes her right to inherit the property of Kallyani would be entitled to the same but the dispute would be between Yashoda and J anaki and the other defendants have no right to be heard in that mater.\n\nAccordingly this appeal succeeds and it is partly allowed.\n\nThe _judgment and decree of the trial Court a\"nd the High Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit in regard to A schedule property are set aside.\n\nPlaintiff's suit is decreed and it is declared that she has 1/4 share in properties set out in schedule A annexed to the plaint.\n\nA preliminary decree to that effect shall be drawn.\n\nDefendant 1 shall pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\n19-138 SCIISG", "total_entities": 65, "entities": [{"text": "KALLYANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALLYANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NARAYANAN AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARAYANAN AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 27, 1980\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Through bis first 'vife Naini he had four sons-Kric; hnan (D1), Shankaran (D2), Raman and the husband of plaintiff appellant Kallyani who died after him at1d Madhavan \\Vho• predeceased him and husband of D3 and father of D4, D5 and D6-and four daughters.", "canonical_name": "Raman"}}, {"text": "Karappan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1266, "end_char": 1274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karappan executed.", "canonical_name": "Kara-ppan"}}, {"text": "January 25, 1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1403, "end_char": 1419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pl dated January 25, 1910."}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1727, "end_char": 1732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raman, the husbnd of the plaintiff appellant, the third son of the first wife died on February 20, 1936.", "canonical_name": "Raman"}}, {"text": "February 20, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1813, "end_char": 1830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raman, the husbnd of the plaintiff appellant, the third son of the first wife died on February 20, 1936."}}, {"text": "Marumakkattayam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Expression \"tarvad\" in Marumakkattayam law is."}}, {"text": "Kara-ppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4459, "end_char": 4468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pl purports to dispose of an ancestral properties by will it would be ineffective as a will as Kara-ppan had no power or authority to dispose of by will ancestral properties in his hand.", "canonical_name": "Kara-ppan"}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Hindu father joint with his sons governed by Mitakshara."}}, {"text": "Ka.mppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7655, "end_char": 7663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pl Ka.mppan intended it to be a will not a partition in presenti."}}, {"text": "KALLYANI V. NARAYANAN", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10140, "end_char": 10161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jt is doubtful whether ai Hindu father -can\n\nKALLYANI V. NARAYANAN 1133\n\ntirnpose family arrangement sans direct evidence of consent of each of his sons, to be effective after his death."}}, {"text": "Karappan~ Kesavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12091, "end_char": 12108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1146E-G]\n\nIn the instant case, on death of Karappan~ Kesavan the son of the second E -wife obtained a physical partition of the property took his O\\\\n share and Jeft 1he family, there was first a disruption of the joint family status."}}, {"text": "aini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13805, "end_char": 13809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Except that four sons by N aini remained\n\nSU!'REM:J COURT REPORTS\n\n(!", "canonical_name": "Naini"}}, {"text": "Naini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14141, "end_char": 14146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h of his son<; by Naini in Ex.. P-1, this evidence of remaining together is hardly sufficient 1o v.arrant a conclusion that the&Se four sons constituted a coparcenary.", "canonical_name": "Naini"}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S.C.R. 440", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14632, "end_char": 14651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R.an1an", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16303, "end_char": 16310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.an1an had 1th tlaa.re."}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16587, "end_char": 16603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/· '\n\nP. Govindan Nair, C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, S. Balakrishnan A and Mrs. Baby Krishnan, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16605, "end_char": 16630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/· '\n\nP. Govindan Nair, C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, S. Balakrishnan A and Mrs. Baby Krishnan, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan A", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16632, "end_char": 16649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/· '\n\nP. Govindan Nair, C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, S. Balakrishnan A and Mrs. Baby Krishnan, for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "S. Balakrishnan A"}}, {"text": "Baby Krishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16659, "end_char": 16672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/· '\n\nP. Govindan Nair, C. S. Ananthakrishna Iyer, S. Balakrishnan A and Mrs. Baby Krishnan, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. S. Krishnamurthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16694, "end_char": 16718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamurthy Iyer and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16728, "end_char": 16745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamurthy Iyer and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Respondents.", "canonical_name": "S. Balakrishnan A"}}, {"text": "E. M. S. Anam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16768, "end_char": 16781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. M. S. Anam and P. N. Pura for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. N. Pura", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16786, "end_char": 16796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. M. S. Anam and P. N. Pura for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16867, "end_char": 16872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I'he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.--On a certificate granted by the Full Bench of the High Court of Kerala, original plaintiff, a Hindu widow who was seeking + partition of a share to which her deceased husband was entitled, having '\"\"\n\nlost ia both the Courts, has filed this appeal."}}, {"text": "Article 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17172, "end_char": 17189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karappan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18437, "end_char": 18445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni."}}, {"text": "Chulliparambil Krishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18454, "end_char": 18477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni."}}, {"text": "Nani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18493, "end_char": 18497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni."}}, {"text": "Ponni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18502, "end_char": 18507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni."}}, {"text": "Shankaran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18543, "end_char": 18552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni."}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18558, "end_char": 18563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni.", "canonical_name": "Raman"}}, {"text": "Madhavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18609, "end_char": 18617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni."}}, {"text": "Kesavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18724, "end_char": 18731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Karappan, son of Chulliparambil Krishnan, had two wives Nani and Ponni- Defendant 1 Krishnan, defendant 2 Shankaran, one Raman, husband of plaintiff Kallyani, and deceased Madhavan, husband of defendant 3 and father of defendants 4, 5 and 6, were H his sons by first \\vife Nani, and one Kesavan was his son by , the second wife Ponni."}}, {"text": "Valli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18866, "end_char": 18871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Valli was the second wife of his father and she had three daughters."}}, {"text": "July 12, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23393, "end_char": 23406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0 1\n\nThe suit was principally resisted by defendant 1 as per his written G statement dated July 12, 1958."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25835, "end_char": 25852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court heard the first appeal preferred by the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Mayne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28305, "end_char": 28310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A tarvad may consist of two or more branches known as thavazhies; each tavazhi or branch consisting of one of the female members of the tarvad and her decendents in the female line (see Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29176, "end_char": 29182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-1 it is not necessary here to examine the question whether Mitakshara law as administered in Tamfil Nadn and Kerala enables an undivided coparcener to dispose of his share in joint family property by will."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32004, "end_char": 32009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SimilarlY, in Mulla's Hindu caw, 14th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "Krishnamoorty Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32631, "end_char": 32649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Krishnamoorty Iyer urged that even though undoubtedly a Hindu father joint with his sons and governed by Mitakshara law has the power to partition the joint family property, this power enables him to partition the property by metes and bounds but he has no power merely to disrupt the joint family status unaccompanied by division of property by metes and bounds."}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34437, "end_char": 34441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the text from Mayne's book extracted in the preceding paragraph shows that the weight of authority is against the proposition canvassed for by Mr.\n\nIyer."}}, {"text": "Kara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38145, "end_char": 38149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-1 purports to partition the property between the two tavazhies represented by Kara pp an' s two wives and their respective male offspring.", "canonical_name": "Kara-ppan"}}, {"text": "Singh's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39847, "end_char": 39854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn Briira; Singh's case (supra) a father purported to make a will in which he recorded a partition of the joint family property amongst his three sons.", "canonical_name": "Singh's"}}, {"text": "December 29, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42216, "end_char": 42233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One thing, however, may be pointed out that defendant 1 gave his age as 87 years on December 29, 1959, when his evidence commenced."}}, {"text": "Brijra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42714, "end_char": 42720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court after referring to Brijra; Singh's case\n\n(supra) overlooked the fact that in accepting the deed before it, the Judicial Committee was impressed by the fact that it was intended to lipeak from the date on which it was written and not future date, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42722, "end_char": 42727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court after referring to Brijra; Singh's case\n\n(supra) overlooked the fact that in accepting the deed before it, the Judicial Committee was impressed by the fact that it was intended to lipeak from the date on which it was written and not future date, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Singh's"}}, {"text": "Ammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50271, "end_char": 50276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reoti Devi, (2) this Court examined the effect of a separation of om' member of a joint family on the joint family status and on the remaining members in the light of the Privy Council decision in Pa/an; Ammal's case: (supra) The relevant observation is as under :\n\n\"The general principle is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved : but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course of conduct."}}, {"text": "Palani Ammars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51059, "end_char": 51072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sengoda v. Muthu,( 2) the High Court interpreted Palani Ammars case to lay down that if a partition takes place with respect to one coparcener, the decree or the deed bringing about partition would provide a pointer as to the effect of the decree or the deed on the remaining coparceners."}}, {"text": "LR 30 IA 130", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 53267, "end_char": 53279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53782, "end_char": 53795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhagwan Dayal's case (supra) legal pooition after referring to earlier decisions has been culled out as under :\n\n\"Coparcenary is a g-eature of Hindu law and cannot be C created by agreement of parties except in the case of reunion."}}, {"text": "Mahabir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55089, "end_char": 55096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir was given four a:anas , share and others defined shi\\feS in the remainder."}}, {"text": "Appovier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55984, "end_char": 55992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once the shares were determined and allotted, it was held consistently with Appovier's case (supra) that this converted them from joiut holders into tenants-in-common."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56176, "end_char": 56200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Westbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56438, "end_char": 56446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Once disruption of joint family status takes place as Lord Westbury puts it in Appovier's case, (supra) it covers both a division of right and division of property."}}, {"text": "Kallyani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 59996, "end_char": 60004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the commencement of hearing of the appeal it was pointed out that original plaintiff Kallyani is dead and there is some dispute between her two daugh'.ers Yashoda and J anaki about sucossion to the estate of Kallyani.", "canonical_name": "KALLYANI"}}, {"text": "Yashoda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60066, "end_char": 60073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the commencement of hearing of the appeal it was pointed out that original plaintiff Kallyani is dead and there is some dispute between her two daugh'.ers Yashoda and J anaki about sucossion to the estate of Kallyani.", "canonical_name": "Yashoda"}}, {"text": "J anaki", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60078, "end_char": 60085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the commencement of hearing of the appeal it was pointed out that original plaintiff Kallyani is dead and there is some dispute between her two daugh'.ers Yashoda and J anaki about sucossion to the estate of Kallyani.", "canonical_name": "J anaki"}}, {"text": "Yashoda", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60531, "end_char": 60538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary to decide this question in this appeal because who'ever of the two establishes her right to inherit the property of Kallyani would be entitled to the same but the dispute would be between Yashoda and J anaki and the other defendants have no right to be heard in that mater.", "canonical_name": "Yashoda"}}, {"text": "J anaki", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60543, "end_char": 60550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary to decide this question in this appeal because who'ever of the two establishes her right to inherit the property of Kallyani would be entitled to the same but the dispute would be between Yashoda and J anaki and the other defendants have no right to be heard in that mater.", "canonical_name": "J anaki"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1152_1157_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "MEET SINGH v.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nFebruary 27, 1980\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KOSIIAL, JJ.]\n\n\"Special Reasons\" in ordinaiy and in the context of sentencing process-- Meaning of-Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 5(2) and proviso thereto scope of-Duty of the Court while exercising its discretion under the proviso,\n\nexplained.\n\nSection 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 prescribes a minimum sentence of one year, in all.cases of conviction under the Act, with a proviso that the Court may for any special reasons rorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year.\n\nTho petitioner was convicted for having committed offences under section 161 l.P. C. and Section 5 (2) of POCA and was sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year on each count and on the second count, also to pa.y a fine of Rs. 400/- D or in default to suffer further R.J. for three months by the learned Special Judge. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to n1n concurrently.\n\nJn appeal the High Court, while maintaining the conviction, reduced the substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year to\n\n1 the sentence undergone till the date of the' Judgment of the High Court and increased the E fine to Rs. 4,000 /- (Rupees four thousand) or in default to suffer further R.I. for one year. The I-ligh Court, while so altering the sentence, took into consideration two facts, namely, (i) that the petitioner was dismissed from service and (ii) that be is a family man.\n\nDismissing the special leave petition of the convict against his conviction, there being no appeal by St.re, the Court\n\nHELD: 1. The language of the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act makes it abundantly clear that court is under an obligation to impose a minimum punishment once the conviction is recorded under Section 5 (2) and the minimum punishment of imprisonri1ent is for a term not less than one year. Undoubtedly the proviso confers power on the Court to a'vard less than the minimum punishment if the Court convicting ood sentencing the accused, (; is of the opinion that for any special reasons which the Court is under an obligation to record in writing, sentence of imprisonment for a term less than the minimum is called for. Conceding that the quantum of sentence is\n\nin the discretion of the trial Court, where the Legislature stepped in and Circumscribed and fettered the discretion by directing in1posing of a minimum sentence, the court can exercise its discretion within the limited spheres left open by legislature. The Legis};)ture circumscribed the discretion by reqriiring the 0 Court to impose minimum sentence but left it open to award less than the minimum statutorily prescribed for special reasons. The reasons have to be special reasons. The words 'special reasons' in the context in which they are\n\n<Used could only mean special to the accused on whom sentence is being imposed.\n\nThe Court has to weigh reasons advanced in respect of each individual accused\n\nwhose C'lSe is taken up for awarding sentence. [1155CGl\n\nIn the instant case, there was no justification much less special reasons -matutorily required, for awarding less than the minimum sentence. Stricto sensu <:ourt exceeded its jurisdictjon while interlering with the quantum of sentence. f!l57EJ\n\n'' Jagdish Prasad v. West Bengal, [1972] 2 S.C.R. p. 845 @ 851, relied on.\n\nI ~\n\n2. The word \"special\" has to be understood in contradistinction to word ·\"general\" or \"ordinary\". \"Special\" means distinguished by some unusual quality, out of the ordinary. Again \"special\" means 'particular'; peculiar; different from -Others; designed for a particular purpose, occasion, or person;· limited in range;\n\n.con.fined to a definite field of action. 'fhus, anything which is common to a\n\nlarge class gove.med by the same statute cannot be said to be: special to each <>f them. And, \"special reasons\" in the context of sentencing process must be special to the accused in tile case or special to the focts and circumstances\n\n<>f the case in which the sentence is being awarded. [1155GH, 1156Al\n\n3. In the instant .case, the only two reasons special according to the High <:ourt for awarding less than the minimum sentence are (i) appellant before it has lost his job and (ii) and he is a married mau with children. These two reasons would be common to ninety nine percent of cases tried under Prevention -0-f Corruption Act and if they can1 be Styled as \"special reasons\" for awarding less than the minimum sentence the proviso would be rendered' wholly nugatory.\n\n(1156G-H, 1157AJ\n\nObservation :\n\nThe Court should not be oblivious ta the fact that while conferring discrtion in the matter of awarding adequa.te sentence within limits prescribed by the -statute, the Legislature finding cases of misplaced sympathy in sentencing process fettered the Court's discretion by prescribing a minimum sentence and making it obligatory to record special reasons for awarding Jess than the minimum. ff still the notice of encroachments on court's discretion is not ta.ken, time may not be far when the Legislature out of exasperation may resort to what it has done in Section 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act where minimum -sentence i~ prescribed and Court's discretion to award less in any case is who1Iy taken away. [1157A-Cj\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 405 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and Order dated 31-10-1979 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl. Appeal No . 986/77.\n\nN. C. Talukdar, Shrinath Singh and M. S. Dhillon for the Petitionar.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.-While we decline to grant special leave in this case, an unsavoury feature of the judgment which rather stares into our\n\nA face, and surfac~ at regular intervals, makes it obligatory to make a few observations.\n\nPetitioner was \"convicted for having committed offences under Section 161 of the I.P.C. and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and was sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year on each B count and on the second count, also to pay a fine of Rs. 400/- or in default to suffer further R.I. for three months by the learned Special Judge.\n\nBoth the substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently .\n\nPetitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 1977 against his c conviction and sentence to the High Court .of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.\n\nThis appeal came up for final hearing before a learned single judge of the High Court on 31st October, 1979. When the appeal was taken up for hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in the High Court did not question either the correctness or the legality of the conviction. This is unquestionable as the High Court has observed while disposing of the appea'I that \"no arguments on merits are advanced\". The High Court then proceeded to cons.der adequacy or otherwise of sentence imposed on the appellant before it The High Court then proceeded to reduce the substantive sentence of the appellant of rigorous imprisonment for one year to the sentence 11ndergone till the date of the judgment of the High Court.\n\nWhile so reducing the substantive sentence the High Court noticed the following circumstances which in the opinion of the High Court were\n\nsufficient to enable it to interfere with the sentences imposed upon the present petitioner.\n\nIt would be advantageous to extract the relevant observations :-\n\n\"The learned counsel for the appellant has only submitted that the appellant has already been dismissed from service; that he is a family man, and that his sentence may be reduced to that already undergone.\n\nIn my view no useful purpose will be served by sending him again to jail to serve his unexpired period of sentence.\n\nHe has already lost his job.\n\nThe ends of justice will be amply met if his sentence of imprisonment is reduce(! to that already undergone and instead sentence of fine is enhanced from Rs. 400 to Rs. 4000 (four thousand) or in default to suffer further R.I. for one year.\n\nI order accordingly.\"\n\nThe judgment of the High Court throws no light on the qucstion as to how much sentence the appellant had undergone by the time the\n\n':>·.\n\nHigh Coun released him on bail while admitting his appeal.\n\nBut A it cannot be more than a few days only.\n\nPetitioner as pointed out earlier is convic'ed for committing offences under Section 161 IPC and 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nSection 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act reads as under:- B\n\n\"P.any pubEc ser~;:int who commits criminal miscond•aci shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine :\n\nProvided that the court may, for any special reasons c recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year.\" (underlining ours)\n\nThe language of the proviso makes it abundantly clear that court is under an obligation to impose a minimum punishment once the conviction is recorded under Section 5 (2) and the minimum punishment of imprisonment is for a term not less than one year.\n\nUndoubtedly the proviso confers power on the Court to award less than the minimum punishment, if the Court convicting and sentencing the accused, is of the opinion that for any special reasons which the court is under an obligation to record in writing, sentence of imprisonment for a term less than the minimum is called for.\n\nConceding that. the quantum of sentence is in the discretion of the trial court, where the. Legislature stepped in and circumscribed .and fettered the discretion by directing imposition of a minimum sentence, the court can exercise its discretion within the limited sphere left open by legislature.\n\nThe ugislature circumscribed the discretion by requiring the coun to impose minimum sentence but left it open to award less than the minimum statutorily prescribed for special reasons.\n\nThe reasons have to be special reasons.\n\nThe words 'special reasons' in the context in which they are used could only mean special to the accused on whom sentence is being imposed.\n\nThe cO'Jrt has to wci gh reasons advanced in respect of each individual accused whose cctsc is taken up for awarding sentence. The word 'special' has to he\n\nunderstood in contradistinction to word 'general' or 'ordinary'.\n\nNow what docs term 'special' connote? \"Speciru\" means distinguished by some .unusual quality; out of the ordinary. (See Words and l'hrasos, Permanent Edition, Volume 39A p. 82.) Webster defines \"special\" as particular; peculiar; different from others; designed for a particular purpose, occasion. or person; limited in range; confined to a definite field of action.\n\nThus anything which is common to a large class\n\nA governed by the same statute cannot be said to be special to each of them. It would thus unquestionably appear that \"special reasons\" in the context of sentencing process must be special to the accused in the case or special to the facts and the circumstances of the case in which the sentence is being awarded.\n\nThe High Court then was under an obligation to award minimum sentence unless the accused advanced special reasons, i.e. special to him in the facts and circumstances of the; case and successfully.invoked the discretion vested in the Court to award !es~ than the minimum sentence prescribed by law. The Court observes that this appellantcorrupt officer whose corruption was proved to its satisfaction because the High Court declined to interfere with the conviction of the appellant for corruption and who must consequently or of necessity be dismissed from service, considered his dismissal from service as a special reason.\n\nFrankly speaking the High Court honestly did not expect any corrupt officer !o be retained in service.\n\nOrdinarily a corrupt official whose corruption is proved to the hilt is foble to be dismissed, and therefore, this aspect is not special to the appellant.\n\nAccordingly if an officer proved to be corrupt to the satisfaction of the court is liable to be dismissed it cannot influence the question of sentence.\n\nAlso because it would be true of all public servants dealt . with under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.\n\nAnother special reason that appealed to the High Court is that appellant is a 'family man'.\n\nPossibly the High Court considered marriage and children of the appellant as special to him.\n\nAn unsually large\n\nnumbr of the Government officers from amongst those charged with cormption and convicted for the same would be married men with family, unless they joined service before marriage and became corrupt very soon at the inception of the career.\n\nAnd ordinarily speaking a family of corrupt officer in some cases if not all benefits by the corrupt activity unless shown to the contrary which is not the case.\n\nIf large number of public servants from those convict<(_d under section 5 {2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are married men with children it passes comprehension how this fact can be styled as special to the appellant influencing his sentence. It may be mentioned without fear of contradiction that the only two reasons, special according to the High Court for awarding less than the minimum sentence are (i) appellant has lost his job and (ii) he is a married man with children.\n\nThese two reasons would be common to ninety nine per cent of cases tried under Prevention of Corruption Act and if they can be styled as special reasons for awarding less than the\n\n, l\n\nminimum sentence the proviso would be rendered wholly nugatory.\n\nA The Court should not be oblivious to the fact that while conferring discretion in the matter of awarding adequate sentence within limits prescribed by the statute, the Legislature finding cases of misplaced sympathy in sentencing process fettered the Court's discretion by prescribing a minimum sentence and making it obligatory to record . special reasons for awarding less .. than the minimum. If still the B notice of encroachments on court's discretion is not taken, time may not be far when the Legislature out of exasperation may resort to what it has done in Section 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act where minimum sentence is prescribed and Courts' discretion to award less in any case is wholly taken away.\n\nIn this context it would be timely to recall the warning uttered by this Court in Jagdish Prasad v. West Bengal(') This Court said :\n\n\"Offences under the Act being anti-social crimes affecting the health and well-being of our people, the Legislature having regard to the trend of courts to impose in most cases only fines or where a sentence of imprisonment was passed a light sentence was awarded even in cases where a severe sentence was called for, & more drastic step wa§ taken by it in prescribing a minimum sentence and a minimum fin~ to be imposed even for a first offence.\"\n\nIn this case, there was no justification, much less special reasons statutorily required, for awarding less than the minimum sentence. stricto sensu Court exceeded its jurisdiction while interfering with the quantum of sentence.\n\nAnd with this observation we dismiss the special leave petition.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(!) [1972]2 S.C.R. p. 845 rt 851.", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "MEET SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEET SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 49, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEET SINGH v.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nFebruary 27, 1980\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KOSIIAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 666, "end_char": 677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "St.re", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the special leave petition of the convict against his conviction, there being no appeal by St.re, the Court\n\nHELD: 1."}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1662, "end_char": 1674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1682, "end_char": 1710, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1840, "end_char": 1849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5170, "end_char": 5180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. C. Talukdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5555, "end_char": 5569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Talukdar, Shrinath Singh and M. S. Dhillon for the Petitionar."}}, {"text": "Shrinath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5571, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Talukdar, Shrinath Singh and M. S. Dhillon for the Petitionar."}}, {"text": "M. S. Dhillon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5590, "end_char": 5603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Talukdar, Shrinath Singh and M. S. Dhillon for the Petitionar."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5668, "end_char": 5673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.-While we decline to grant special leave in this case, an unsavoury feature of the judgment which rather stares into our\n\nA face, and surfac~ at regular intervals, makes it obligatory to make a few observations."}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5952, "end_char": 5963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "statute": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5971, "end_char": 5976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5982, "end_char": 5994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6030, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court .of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6417, "end_char": 6464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "989 of 1977 against his c conviction and sentence to the High Court .of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "31st October, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal came up for final hearing before a learned single judge of the High Court on 31st October, 1979."}}, {"text": "Section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8435, "end_char": 8446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8447, "end_char": 8450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8468, "end_char": 8496, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8499, "end_char": 8508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8520, "end_char": 8548, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9095, "end_char": 9104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12251, "end_char": 12263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12271, "end_char": 12299, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12976, "end_char": 12985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12997, "end_char": 13025, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13478, "end_char": 13506, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14218, "end_char": 14228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These two reasons would be common to ninety nine per cent of cases tried under Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "These two reasons would be common to ninety nine per cent of cases tried under Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14232, "end_char": 14267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1158_1171_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nMOHD. Y AKUB S/0 ABDUL HAMID & ORS.\n\nMarch 4, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nPenal' Code--Atte1npt to con1mit an offence-What constitutes-\"I'reparation\" and \"attenipt\" distinction.\n\nThe respondents were charged with th'e offence of attempting to smuggle out cf India 43 silver ingots in violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,\n\n1947, Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and the Customs Act, l 962.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that on the night of the occurrence the res.pondents carried in a truck and a jeep silver ingots some of which were concealed in a shawl, and some others hidden in saw-dust bags from Bombay to a lon-ely creek nearby and that when the ingots were unloaded n'ear the creek the sound of the engine of a mechanised sea-craft from the side of the creek was heard by the Customs officials and that therefore they were guilty of attempting to muggle silver out of India.\n\nThe respondents pleaded that they w'ere not aware of the presence of silver ingots in the vehicles, that they were only employed for driving the jeep and the truck to another destination and that the police stopped them en route and had driven them to the creek.\n\nE The Trial Court convicted and sent.enced them to vaI_:ious terms of imprio; onment and fine.\n\nOn appeal, the Sessions Judge acquitted all the respondents taking the view that the facts proved showed no more than that the accused had only marle _/ \"preparations\" for bringing the silver to the creek and \"had not con1mittcd any -...___ act amounting to a direct mov'ement towards the commission of the offence\" and F that until the silver was put in the boat with intent to export, it would merely be in the stage of preparation 'falling short of an \"attempt\" to export in contravention of the law.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the State's appeal.\n\nAllowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : Per Sarkaria, J. : (Chtnnappa Reddy, J. concurring)\n\n1. The High Court was in error in holding that the circumstances established by the prosecution fell short of constituting the offence of an \"attempt\" to export\n\nunlawfully silver out of Jndia.\n\n[1165F]\n\n2. The expression \"attempt\" within the .meaning of the penal provision\" is wide enough to take in its fold any one or series of acts committed beyond the stage of preparation in movingcontraband goods deliberately to the place of embarkation, such act or acts 1'eing reasonably proximate to the completior. of the unlawful export. [ll65E].\n\n( t\n\n, Y ,\n\nMAHARASHTRA V. MOHD. YAKUB 1159\n\n3. The definition of 'proved' contained in section 3 of the Evidence Act does not draw any distinction between cir.::umstantial 2.n<l other evidence.\n\nIf the circumslances establish such a high degree of probability that a prudent n1~1n ought to act on the supposition that the accused was attempting to export silver from Jndia in contravention of the law, that woukl be ufficicnt proof rJf tbc.t fact in issue.\n\n[1164AB]\n\n4(a.) What constitutes an \"attempt\" is a mixed question of law and fact, depending largely on the circumstances of the particular case. \"Attempt\" defie~\n\na precise and exr.::t definition.\n\nBro•adly speaking, all crimes which cons1\"-t of the commission of affirmative acts are preceded by some covert or ovrt conduct which may be divided into three stages : the first stage exists when the c;.ilplit first entertains the idea or intention to commit an offen•;;; e; in the s'econd stage he makes preparations to commit it; and the third stage is reac_hed when the culprit takes. delib'rate overt steps to commit the offence. Such overt act 01 step, in order to be criminal, need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of the offence. It is sufficient if such act or acts were deliberately done and manifest a clear intention to commit the offence aimed, being reasonably proxi~\n\nma(e to the consu1nmation of lhe offence.\n\n[1164C-E]\n\nAbhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 241, followed.\n\n(b) There is a distinC:tion between \"preparation\" and \"attempt\".\n\nAttempt begins where preparation ends. In sum, a p'erson commits the offence of 'at -tempt to commit a particular offence' when (i) he intends to commit that part?·\n\ncul.ar offence c.nd (ii) he, having made preparations and with the int'euti,)n to commit the offence, does an act towards its commission; such an ac.t need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of that offence but must be an act during the course of co1nmiting that offence.\n\n[1164E-F]\n\nIn the instant case the respondents carried silver ingots in the two vchicle3 to the sea-shore and started unloading them near a creek from which the sound of the engin'e of a sea-craft was heard. In short they did all that was necc<; sary\n\nto expert the silver ingots by sea and the only step that remain1::d was to l•J1d then1 on the soo-craift for moving out of the territorial waters of the counlry.\n\nBut for the intervention of the Customs officials, the unlawful export would have been consummated. The disappearance of the sea-craft reinforces the inference that the accused had delib'i!rately attempted to export silver by sea in con:ruven~\n\ntion of law.\n\n[1164G-H]\n\nChinnappa Reddy, J (concurring),\n\nJn order to constitute rut \".attempt\" first there must be an intention tv commit a particular offence, second, some act must have been done which wcu!d n'ecessarily have to be done towards the commission of the offence and third suih act must be 'proximate' to the intended result.\n\nThe measure of prciximity is not in relation to time and action but in relation to intention.\n\nIn other words, the act must reveal with reasonGble c'erta.inty, in conjunction with other facts and circumstances and not necessarily in isolation, an intention as d; stinguished from a mere desire or object to commit the particular offence, though the act by itself may be merely suggestive or indicative of such intention.\n\n[1170E-F]\n\nJn the instant case had the truck been stopped and searched at the very commencement of the journey \"or even on the way much before its destination the discovery of silver ingots in the truck might at the worst Jead to the inference\n\ntbat the accus'ed had prepare.J or were preparing for the commission of the offence. It could be said that the accused were transporting or attempting to tninsport the silver somewhere but it would not necessarily suggest or inJicate that the inrention was to export silver.\n\nThe fact that the truck was dri\\'.en up tu a lonely creek from where the silver rould be transferred into a sea-faring vessel was suggestive or indicative, though not conclusive, that the accus'ed want~ ed to export the silver. It might have been open to the accused to plead thr.t the silver was not to be exported but only to be transported in the course of inter-coastal trade.\n\nBut the circumstMlce that all this was done in a clandtstine fashion, at dead of night revealed, with reasonable certainty,_ th'e intention of the accused that the silver was to be exported. [ll 70GH]\n\nReg v. Eagleton [1854] Dears C.C. 515; Gardner v. Akerayd [1953[ 2 All ER 306; Davey v. Lee [!968] 1 Q.B. 366; Haughten v. SmiJh [1975] A.C. 476, 492; Director of Puhlic Prosecutions v. Stonehouse [1977] 2 All E.R. 909, referred to.\n\nA.bhavanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar [19621 2 SCR 241 @ 253, applied.\n\nMalkiat Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab [1969] 2 SCR 663 @ 667, distin guished. ~\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 335 D of 1974.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1-11-1973 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 113 of 1972.\n\n0. P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.\n\nV. N. Ganpule and V. B. Joshi for the Respondents.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSARKARIA, J.--This appeal by special leave preferred by the State ~' of Maharashtra, is directed against a judgment <4_ted November 1, F 1973, of the Bombay High Court.\n\nMohd. Yakub respondent 1, Shaikh Jamadar Mithnbhai respondent 2, and Issak Hasanali Shaikh respondent 3, were tried in the court of the Jndicial Magistrate First Class, Bassein, 13-0mbay, in respect of three sets of offences punishable under section 135 read G with section 135 (2) of the Customs Act, 1962. The first charge was the violation of sections 12(1), 23(1) and 23 (d) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, the second was violation of Exports (Contrcl) Order No. 1 of 1968 E.T.C. dated March 8, 1.968: rnd the third was the contravention of the provisions of Sections 7, 8, 33 and 34 of the Customs Act, 1962.\n\nThey were also charged for H violation of the Exports (Control) Order No. 1/68 E.T.C. dated March 8, 1968 issued under sections 3 and 4 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 punishable under section 5 of the said\n\n\\ -.\n\nI MAHARASHTRA v. MOHD. YAKUB (Sarkaria, !.)\n\nI J 61\n\nAct.\n\nThe gist of the charges was that the respondents attempted to A smuggle out of India 43 silver ingots\", weighing 1312.410 kgs., worth about Rs. 8 lakhs, in violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and the Customs Act.\n\nThe facts of the case were as follows :\n\nOn receiving some secret information that silver would be transported in Jeep No. MRC-9930 and Truck No. BMS-796 from Bombay to a coastal place near Bassein, Shri Wagh, Superintendent of Central Excise along with Inspector Dharap and the staff proceeded in two vehicles to keep a watch on the night of September 14, 1968 at Shirsat Naka on the National Highway No. 8, Bombay City. At about mid-night, the aforesaid jeep was seen coming from Bombay followed by a truck. These two vehicles were proceeding towards Bassein. The officers followed the truck and the jeep which, after travelling some distance from Shirsat Naka, came to a fork in the road and thereafter,\n\ninsteac\\ of taking the road leading to Bassein, proceeded on the new National Highway leading to Kaman village and Ghodbunder Creek.\n\nUltimately, the jeep and truck halted near a bridge at Kaman creek whereafter the ~CCJ!Sed removed some small and heavy bundles from the truck and placed them aside on the ground.\n\nThe Customs Officers rushed to the spot and accosted the persons present there.\n\nAt the same time, the sound of the engine of a mechanised sea-craft . from the side of the creek was heard by the officers.\n\nThe officers surrounded the vehicles and found four silver ingots near the footpath leading to the creek.\n\nRespondent 1 was the driver and the sole occupant of the jeep, while the other two respondents were the driver and cleaner of the truck.\n\nThe officers sent for Kana and Sathe, both residents of Bassein. In their presence, respondent 1 was questioned about his identity.\n\nHe falsely gave his name and address as Mohamad Yusuf s/o Say.yad Ibrahim residing at Kamathipura.\n\nFrom the personal search of respondent 1, a pistol, knife and currency notes of Rs. 2,133/- were found.\n\nFifteen silver ingots concealed in a shawl were found in the rear side of the jeep and twenty-four silver ingots were found lying under saw-dust bags in the truck.\n\nThe truck and the jeep together with the accused-respondents and the silver ingots were taken to Shirsat Naka where a detailed panchanama was drawn up. Respondent 1 had no licence for keeping a pistol.\n\nConsequently the matter was reported to Police Station Bassein, for prosecuting the respondent under the Arms Act.\n\n1162 SUPREM!l° COURT REPORTS\n\n\nThe respondents and the vehicles and the silver ingots were taken to Bombay on September 15, 1-968.\n\nThe statements of Um respondents under section 108 of the Customs Act were recorded by Shri Wagh, Superintendent of Central Excise.\n\nThe Collector, Central Excise, by his order elated May 28, !969, confiscated the silver ingots.\n\nAfter obtaining the requisite sanction, \"the Assistant Collector, Central Excise made a complaint against all the three accused in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, Basscin for trial in respect of the aforesaid offences.\n\nThe plea of the accused was of plain denial of the prosecution case. They stated that they were not aware of the alleged silver and\n\nthat they had just been employed for carrying the jeep and the truck to another destination.\n\nThey alleged that they were driven to the creek by the police.\n\nThe trial Magistrate convicted the accused of the aforesaid offences and sentenced accused I to two years' rigorous imprisonment ai1d a fine of Rs. 2,000 and, in default, to suffer further six months' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nAccused 2 and 3 were to suffer six montl1s' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 and, in default, to suffer two months' rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe accused preferred three appeals in the court of the Additiom1l Sessions Judge, Thana, who, ]Jy his common judgment dated September 30, 1973, allowed the appeals and acquitted them on the ground that the facts proved by the prosecution fell short of establishing that the accused had 'attempted' to export silver in contravention of the law, because the facts proved showed no more than that the accused had only made 'preparations' for bringing this silver to the creek and\n\n\"had not yet committed any act amounting to a direct movement towards the commission of the offence\".\n\nJn his view, until silver was pnt in the boat for the purpose of taking out of the country with intent to export it, the matter would be merely in the s.tage of 'preparation' falling short of an 'attempt' to export it.\n\nSince 'preparation' to commit the offence of exporting silver was not punishable under the Customs Act, he acquitted the accused.\n\nAgainst this acquitt:il, the State of Maharashtra carried an app<:al H to the High Court, wh:ch, by its judgment dated November I, 1973, dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal of the accused-respondents.\n\nHence, this appeal.\n\n.. ~\n\n~--\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. MOHD. YAKUB (Sarkaria, J.)\n\n116 J\n\nIn the instant case, the trial court and' the Sessions Judge con- A cmrently held that the following circumstances had been established by the prosecution:\n\n(a) The officers (Shri Wagh and party) had received definite information that silver would be carried in a truck and a jeep from Bombay to Bassein for exporting from the country and for this purpose they kept a watch at Shirsat\n\nNaka and then followed the jeep an_d the truck at some distance.\n\n(b) Accused 1 was driv:ng the jeep, while accused 2 was driving the truck and accused 3 was cleaner on it.\n\n( c) Fifteen silver ingots were found concealed in the jeep and 24 silver ingots were found hidden in the truck.\n\n( d) The jeep and the truck were parked near the Kaman creek from where they could be easily loaded in some\n\nsea craft.\n\n(e) Four silver ingots from the vehicle had been actually unloaded and were found lying by the side of the road near the foot-path leading to the sea.\n\n(f) On being questioned accused 1 gave his false name and address.\n\n(g) The accused were not dealers in silver.\n\nThe trial Magistrate further held that just when the officers surrounded these vehicles and caught the accused, the sound of the engine of a mechanised vessel was heard from the creek.\n\nThe first appellate court did not d!scount this fact, but held that this circum- F stance did not have any probative value.\n\nThe question, therefore, is whether from the facts and circumstances, enumerated above, it could be inferred beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had attempted to export the silver in contravention of law from India ?\n\nAt the outset, it may be noted that the Evidence Act does not insist on absolute proof for the simple reason that perfect proof in this imperfect world is seldom to be found.\n\nThat is why under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, a fact is said to be 'proved' when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition\n\nA that it exists.\n\nThis definition of 'proved' does no~ draw any distinction between circumstantial and other evidence.\n\nThus, if the circumstances listed above establish such a high decree <if probability that a prudent man ought to act on the supposition that the appellant was attmpting. to exp2rt silver from India in contravention of the\n\nlaw, that will be sufficient proof of that fact in issue.\n\nWell then, what is an \"attempt\" ? Kenny in his 'Outlines of Criminal Law' defined \"attempt\" to commit a crime as the \"last proximate act which a person does towards the commission of an offence, the consummation of the offence being hindered by circumstances beyond his control.\" This definition is too narrow.\n\nWhat constitutes an \"attempt\" is a mixed question of law and fact, depending largely on the circumstances of the particular case. \"Attempt\" defies a precise and exact definition.\n\nBroadly speaking, all crimes which consist of the commission of affirmative acts are preceded by some covert or overt conduct which may be divided into three stages.\n\nD The first stage exists when the culprit first entertains the idea or intention to commit an offence.\n\nIn the second stage, he makes preparations to commit it.\n\nThe third stage is reached when the culprit\n\ntakes deliberate overt steps to commit the offence.\n\nSuch overt act or step in order to be 'criminal' need not be the pennltimate act towards the commission of the offence.\n\nIt is sufficient if such act or acts were deliberately done, and manifest a clear intention to commit the offence aimed, being reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence. As pointed out in Abhayanand Mishra v.\n\nState of Bihar(') there is a distinction between 'preparation' and 'attempt'.\n\nAttempt begins where preparation ends. In sum, a person commits the offence of 'attempt to commit a particular offence' when (i) he intends to commit that particular offence; and (ii) he, having made preparations and with the intention to commit the offence, does an act towards its commission; snch an act need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of that offence but must be an act during the course of committing that offence.\n\nNow, let us apply the above principles to the facts of the case in hand.\n\nThe intention of the accused to export the silver from India by sea was clear from the circnmstances enumerated above.\n\nThey were taking the silver ingots concealed in the two vehicles under cover of darkness.\n\nThey had reached close to the sea-shore and had started unloading the silver there near a creek from which the sound of the engine of a sea-craft was also heard. Beyond the stage of preparation, most of the steps necessary in the course of export by\n\n(I) [1962) 2 S.C.R. 241.\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. MOHD. YAKUB (Sarkaria, !.) 1165\n\nsea, had been taken.\n\nThe only s!ep that remained to be taken towards the export of the silver was to load it on a sea-craft for moving out of the territorial waters of India. But for the intervention of the officers of law, the unlawful export of silver would haVle been consummated.\n\nThe calendestine disappearance of the sea-craft when the officers intercepted and rounded up the vehicles and the accused at the creek, reinforces the inference that the accused had deliberately attempted to export silver by sea in contravention of law.\n\nIt is important to bear in mind that the penal provisions with which we are concerned have been enacted to suppress the evil of smuggling precious metal out of India.\n\nSmuggling is an antisocial activity which adversly affects the public revenues, the earn' ing of foreign exchange, the financial stability and the economy of the country.\n\nA narrow interpretation of the word \"attempt\" therefore, in these penal provisions which will impair their efficacy as instruments for combating this baneful activity has to be eschewed.\n\nThese provisions should be construed in a mannr which wonld suppress the mischief, promote their object, prevent their subtle evasion and foil their artful circumvention. Thus, construed, the expression \"attempt\" within the meaning of these penal provisions is wide enough to take in its fold any one or series of acts committed, beyond the stage of preparation in moving the contr1,1band goods deliberately to the place of embarkation, such act or acts being reasonably proximate to the completion of the unlawful export. The inference arising out of the facts and circumstances established by the prosecution, unerringly pointed to the conclusion, that the accused had committed the offence of attempting to export silver out of India by sea, in contravention of law.\n\nFor reasons aforesaid, we are of opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that the circumstances established by the prosecution fell short of constituting the offence of an 'attempt' to export unlawfully, silver out of India.\n\nWe, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the acquittal of the accused-respondents and convict them under\n\nSection 135(a) of the Costoms Act, 1962 read with Section 5 of the G Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 and the Order issued thereunder, and sentence them as under :\n\nAccused-respondent 1, Mohd. Yakub is sentenced to suffer one year's rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,000 and, in default, to suffer six months' further rigorous imprisonment. Accused respon- H dents 2 and 3, namely, Sheikh Jamadar Mithubhai and Issak Hasanali Shaikh are each sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nA with a fine of Rs. 500 and, in default to suffer two months' further rigorous imprisonment.\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nI concur in the conclusion of my brother Sarkaria, J. in whose Judgment the relevant facts have been set out with clarity and particularity.\n\nI wish to add a few paragraphs on\n\n8 the nature of the actus reus to be proved on a charge of an attempt to commit an offence.\n\nThe question is what is the difference between preparation &nd perpetration?\n\nAn attempt to define 'attempt' has to be a frustrating exercise.\n\nC Nonetheless a search to discover the characteristics of an attempt, if not an apt definition of attempt, has to be made.\n\nIn England Parke B described the characteristics of an 'attempt' in Reg. v. Eagleton,(') as follows :-\n\n\"the mere intention to commit a misdemeanour is not criminal. Some act is required, and we do not think that all acts towards committing a misdemeanour indictable. Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be considered as attempts to commit but acts immediately conuected with it arc .... \"\n\nThe dictum of Parke B is considered as the locus classicus on the subject and the test of 'proximity' suggested by it has been accepted and applied by English Courts, though with occasional bnt audible murmur ab, out the difficulty in determining whether an act is immediate or remote. Vide Lord Goddard C.J. in Gardner v. Akeroyed.(')\n\nI' \" .... it is sometimes difficult to determine whether an act is \" immediately or remotely connected with the crime of which it is alleged -,,\n\nto be an attempt\". Parke B. himself appeared to have thought that the last possible act before the achievement of the end constituted the attempt.\n\nThis was indicated by him in the very case of Reg. v.\n\nEagleton (supra) where he further observed :\n\n\". . . . . . . . . . . . and if, in this case . . . . . . . . any further step on the part of the defendent had been necessary to obtain payment .............. we should have thought that the obtaining credit ................ would not have been sufficiently proximate to the obtaining the money, But, on the statement in this case, no other act on the part of the\n\n(1) [18541 Dears C. C. 515.\n\n(2) [1952] 2 All E. R. 306.\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. MOHD. YAKUB (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 1167\n\ndefendant would have been required. It was the last act, depending on himself towards the payment of the money, and therefore it ought to be considered as an attempt\".\n\nAs a general principle th!'; test of 'the last possible act before the achievement of the end' would be entirely unacceptable. If that principle be correct, a person who has cocked his gun at another and is about to pull the trigger but is prevented from doing so by the intervention of someone or something cannot be convicted of attempt to murder.\n\nAnother popular formulation of what constitutes 'attempt' is that of Stephen in his Digest of the Criminal Law where he said :\n\n\"An attempt to commit a crime is an ac~ done' with intent to commit that crime and forming part of a series of acts, which would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted. The point at which such a series of acts begins cannot be defined; but depends upon the circumstances of each particular case\".\n\nWhile the first sentence is an attempt at defiuing 'attempt', the second sentence is a confession of inability to define. The attempt at definition fails precisely at the point where it shonld be helpful. See the observations of Parker C.J. in Davey v. Lee(') and of Prof. Glanville Williams in his essay on 'Police Control of intending criminals' in 1955 Criminal Lmv Review.\n\nAnother attempt at definition was made by PtQfessor Turner in [1934] 5 Cambridge Law Journal' 230, and this was substnntially reproduced in 'Archbald's Crimlnal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (36th &Jn.). Archbald's reproduction was quoted with approval in Davey\n\nv. Lee(\") and was as follows :\n\n, ' .......... '. . the actus reus necessary to constitute an attempt is complete if the prisoner does an act which is a step towards the commission of a specific crime, which is immediately and not merely remotely connected with the commission of it, and the doing of which cannot reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose• than the commission of the specific crime\".\n\nWe must at once say that it was not noticed in Archbald's (36th Edn.) nor was it brought to the notice of the DivisiQrla] Court which\n\n decided Davey v. Lee (supra) that Prof. Turner was himself not satis- H fied with the definition propounded by him and felt c; o'mpelled to\n\n(l) [1968]! Q. B. 366. 2&--138 SCl/80\n\nA modify it, as he thought that to require that the act could not reasonably be regarded as having any other purpose then the commission of the specific crime went too far and it shold be sufficient \"to show prima facie' the offender's intention to commit the crime which he is charged with attempting\".\n\nB Editing 12th edition of Russell on Crime and 18th edition of Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, Professor Turner explained his modified definition as follows:\n\n\"It is therefore suggested that a practical test for the actus reus in attempt is that the prosecution must prove that c the steps taken by the accused must have reached the point when they themselves clearly indicate that was the end towards which they were directed.\n\nIn other words the steps taken must themselves be sufficient to show, prima facie, the offender's intention t, o commit the crime which he is charged with attempting. That there may be abundant other evidence D to establish his mens rea (such as a confession) is irrelevant to the question of whether he had done enough to constitute the actus reus\".(I)\n\nWe must say here that we are unable to see any justification for e!!:cluding evidence aliunde on the question of mens rea in considering what E constitutes the actus reus.\n\nThat would be placing the actus reus in too narrow a pigeon-hole.\n\nIn Haughten v. Smith,(') Hai/sham L. C. quoted Parke B from the Eagleton case (supra) and Lord Parker, C.J. from Davey v.\n\nLee (supra) and proceeded to mention three propositions as emerg- F ing from the two definitions :\n\n\"(1) There is a distinction between the intention to commit a crime and an attempt to commit it. .......... .\n\n(2) In addition to the intention, or mens rea, there must be an overt act of such a kind tha~ it is intended, to form and does form part of a series of acts which would constitute the actual commission of the offence if it were not interrupted. . . . . . . . . . ( 3) The act relied on as constituting the attempt must not be an act merely preparatory to commit the completed offence, but must bear a relationship to the completion of the offence referred to in Reg. v. Eagleton, as being 'proximate' tci the completion of the offence in\n\n(l) Russell on Crimes (12th Elin.) edited by Prof. Tarner, P. 184.\n\n(2) [1975] A. C. 476 at 492.\n\n1- -< \\\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. MOHD. YAKUB (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 1169\n\nDavey v. Lee [1968) 1 Q.B. 366, 370, as being 'imme- A diately and not merely remotely connected' with the completed offence ........... \"\n\nI In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Stonehouse, (1) Lord Diplock a'nd Viscount Dilhome, appeared to accept the 'proximity' test of Parke B, while Lord Edmund-Davies accepted the statement of Lord Hailsham as to what were the true ingredients of a criminal attempt.\n\nWhatever test was applied, it was held that the facts clearly dis-· closed an attempt in that case.\n\nIll India, while attempts to commit certain specified offences have themselves been made specific olfonces (e.g. 307, 308 Indian Penal Code etc.), an attempt to commit an offence punishable under the Penal Code; generally, is dealt with under section 511 Indian Penal\n\nCode.\n\nBut the expression 'attempt' has not bee'n defined anywhere.\n\nIn Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar,(') Raghubar Dayal and Subba Rao, JJ., disapproved of the test of 'last act which if uninterrupted and successful would constitute a criminal offence' and summarised their views as follows :\n\n\"A person commits the offence of 'attempt to commit a particular offence' when (i) he intends to commit that particular offence; and (ii) he, having made preparations and with the intention to commit the offence, does an act towards its commission; such an act need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of that offence but must be an act during the course of committing that offence\".\n\nIn Malkiat Singh & Anr v. State of Punjab,(3) a truck which was carrying paddy, was stopped at Samalkha 32 miles from Delhi and about 15 miles from the Delhi-Punjab boundary. The question was whether the accused were attemJ?ting to export paddy from Punjab to Delhi.\n\nIt was held that on the facts of the case, the offence of attempt had not been committed. Ramaswamy. J., observed :\n\n\"The test for determining whether the act of the appellants constituted an attempt or preparation is whether the overt acts already done are such that if the offender changes his mind and does not proceed further in its progress, the acts already done would be completely harmless. In the present case it is quit~ possible that the appellants may have\n\n(1) (1977] 2 All E. R. 909.\n\n(2) (1962] 2 S.C.R. 241at253,\n\n(3) (1969] 2 S.C.R. 663 at 667.\n\nIi been warned that they had no licence to carry the paddy and they may have changed their mind at any place bet- \\'leen Samalkha barrier and the Delhi-Punjab boundary and not have proceeded further in their journey\".\n\nWe think that the test propounded by the first, sentence should be understood with reference to the facts of the case.\n\nThe offence alleged to be coutemplated was so far removed from completion in that case that the offender had yet ample time and opportunity to change his mind and proceed no further, his earlier acts being com pletely harmless. That was what the Court meant, and the reference to 'the appellants' in the sentence where the test is propounded makes it clear that the test is propounded with reference to the partieular\n\nfacts of the case and not a~ a general rule.\n\nOtherwise, in every case where an accused is interrupted at the last minute from completing the offence, he may always say that when he was interrupted he was about to change his mind.\n\nLet me now state the result of the search and research : In order to constitute 'an attempt', first, there must be an intention to commit a particular offence, second, some act must have been done which would necessarily have to be done towards the commission of the offence, and, third, such act must be 'proximate' to the intended result.\n\nThe measure of proximity is nOt in relation to time and action but in relation to intention. In other words, the act must reveal, with reasonable certainty, in conjunction with other !acts and circumsta'nces and not necessarily in isolation, an intention, as distinguished from a mere desire or object, to commit the particular offence, th9ugh the act by itself may be merely suggestive or indicative of such intention; but, that it must be, that is, it must be indicative. or suggestive of the intention.\n\nFor instance, in the instant case, had the truck been stopped and searched at the very commencement of the journey or even at Shirsad Naka, the discovery of silver ingots m the truck might at the worst lead to the inference that the accused had prepared or were preparing for the commission of the offence. It could be said that the accused were transporting or attempting to transport the silver somewhere hut it would not necessarily suggest or indicate that the intention was to export silver.\n\nThe fact that the truck was driven upto a lonely creek from where the silver could be transferred into a sea-faring vessel was suggestive or indicative though not conclusive, that the accused wanted to export the silver.\n\nIt might have been open to the accused to plead that the silver was\n\n? r\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. MOHD. YAKUB (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1171\n\nnot to be exported but only !o be transported in the. course of inter- A coastal trade. But, the circumstance that all this was done in a clandestine fashiob, at dead of night, revealed, with reasonable certainty, the intention of the accused that the silver was to be exported.\n\nIn the result I agree with the order proposed by Sarkaria, J .\n\nP.B.R.' Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHD. Y AKUB S/0 ABDUL HAMID & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. Y AKUB S/0 ABDUL HAMID & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 4, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 4, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange Regulation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 435, "end_char": 446, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution alleged that on the night of the occurrence the res.pondents carried in a truck and a jeep silver ingots some of which were concealed in a shawl, and some others hidden in saw-dust bags from Bombay to a lon-ely creek nearby and that when the ingots were unloaded n'ear the creek the sound of the engine of a mechanised sea-craft from the side of the creek was heard by the Customs officials and that therefore they were guilty of attempting to muggle silver out of India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 937, "end_char": 942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution alleged that on the night of the occurrence the res.pondents carried in a truck and a jeep silver ingots some of which were concealed in a shawl, and some others hidden in saw-dust bags from Bombay to a lon-ely creek nearby and that when the ingots were unloaded n'ear the creek the sound of the engine of a mechanised sea-craft from the side of the creek was heard by the Customs officials and that therefore they were guilty of attempting to muggle silver out of India."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1903, "end_char": 1911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : Per Sarkaria, J. : (Chtnnappa Reddy, J. concurring)\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Sarkaria"}}, {"text": "Chtnnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1919, "end_char": 1934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : Per Sarkaria, J. : (Chtnnappa Reddy, J. concurring)\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Chtnnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2585, "end_char": 2594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jndia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the circumslances establish such a high degree of probability that a prudent n1~1n ought to act on the supposition that the accused was attempting to export silver from Jndia in contravention of the law, that woukl be ufficicnt proof rJf tbc.t fact in issue."}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 241", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5183, "end_char": 5198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1164G-H]\n\nChinnappa Reddy, J (concurring),\n\nJn order to constitute rut \".attempt\" first there must be an intention tv commit a particular offence, second, some act must have been done which wcu!d n'ecessarily have to be done towards the commission of the offence and third suih act must be 'proximate' to the intended result.", "canonical_name": "Chtnnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 663", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7376, "end_char": 7392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. 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Joshi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7761, "end_char": 7769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered :\n\nSARKARIA, J.--This appeal by special leave preferred by the State ~' of Maharashtra, is directed against a judgment <4_ted November 1, F 1973, of the Bombay High Court.", "canonical_name": "Sarkaria"}}, {"text": "Mohd. 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"end_char": 10629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The officers sent for Kana and Sathe, both residents of Bassein."}}, {"text": "Mohamad Yusuf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10766, "end_char": 10779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He falsely gave his name and address as Mohamad Yusuf s/o Say.yad Ibrahim residing at Kamathipura."}}, {"text": "Kamathipura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10812, "end_char": 10823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He falsely gave his name and address as Mohamad Yusuf s/o Say.yad Ibrahim residing at Kamathipura."}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11404, "end_char": 11412, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September 15, 1-968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11525, "end_char": 11544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1162 SUPREM!l° COURT REPORTS\n\nThe respondents and the vehicles and the silver ingots were taken to Bombay on September 15, 1-968."}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11586, "end_char": 11597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11605, "end_char": 11616, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Judicial Magistrate, Basscin", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11925, "end_char": 11953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After obtaining the requisite sanction, \"the Assistant Collector, Central Excise made a complaint against all the three accused in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, Basscin for trial in respect of the aforesaid offences."}}, {"text": "Additiom1l Sessions Judge, Thana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12733, "end_char": 12765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused preferred three appeals in the court of the Additiom1l Sessions Judge, Thana, who, ]Jy his common judgment dated September 30, 1973, allowed the appeals and acquitted them on the ground that the facts proved by the prosecution fell short of establishing that the accused had 'attempted' to export silver in contravention of the law, because the facts proved showed no more than that the accused had only made 'preparations' for bringing this silver to the creek and\n\n\"had not yet committed any act amounting to a direct movement towards the commission of the offence\"."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12802, "end_char": 12820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused preferred three appeals in the court of the Additiom1l Sessions Judge, Thana, who, ]Jy his common judgment dated September 30, 1973, allowed the appeals and acquitted them on the ground that the facts proved by the prosecution fell short of establishing that the accused had 'attempted' to export silver in contravention of the law, because the facts proved showed no more than that the accused had only made 'preparations' for bringing this silver to the creek and\n\n\"had not yet committed any act amounting to a direct movement towards the commission of the offence\"."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13570, "end_char": 13581, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13639, "end_char": 13659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this acquitt:il, the State of Maharashtra carried an app<:al H to the High Court, wh:ch, by its judgment dated November I, 1973, dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal of the accused-respondents."}}, {"text": "Shirsat\n\nNaka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14281, "end_char": 14294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "YAKUB (Sarkaria, J.)\n\n116 J\n\nIn the instant case, the trial court and' the Sessions Judge con- A cmrently held that the following circumstances had been established by the prosecution:\n\n(a) The officers (Shri Wagh and party) had received definite information that silver would be carried in a truck and a jeep from Bombay to Bassein for exporting from the country and for this purpose they kept a watch at Shirsat\n\nNaka and then followed the jeep an_d the truck at some distance."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15696, "end_char": 15705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kenny", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16422, "end_char": 16427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kenny in his 'Outlines of Criminal Law' defined \"attempt\" to commit a crime as the \"last proximate act which a person does towards the commission of an offence, the consummation of the offence being hindered by circumstances beyond his control.\""}}, {"text": "[1962) 2 S.C.R. 241", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18715, "end_char": 18734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 135(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20972, "end_char": 20986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Costoms Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20994, "end_char": 21011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21022, "end_char": 21031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Costoms Act, 1962", "statute": "the Costoms Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21041, "end_char": 21078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jamadar Mithubhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21375, "end_char": 21392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accused respon- H dents 2 and 3, namely, Sheikh Jamadar Mithubhai and Issak Hasanali Shaikh are each sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nA with a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Issak Hasanali Shaikh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21397, "end_char": 21418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accused respon- H dents 2 and 3, namely, Sheikh Jamadar Mithubhai and Issak Hasanali Shaikh are each sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment\n\nA with a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Issak Hasanali Shaikh"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22133, "end_char": 22140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England Parke B described the characteristics of an 'attempt' in Reg."}}, {"text": "Parke B", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22141, "end_char": 22148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England Parke B described the characteristics of an 'attempt' in Reg.", "canonical_name": "Parke B."}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22852, "end_char": 22859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Lord Goddard C.J. in Gardner v. Akeroyed.(')"}}, {"text": "Parke B.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23058, "end_char": 23066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parke B. himself appeared to have thought that the last possible act before the achievement of the end constituted the attempt.", "canonical_name": "Parke B."}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24355, "end_char": 24362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another popular formulation of what constitutes 'attempt' is that of Stephen in his Digest of the Criminal Law where he said :\n\n\"An attempt to commit a crime is an ac~ done' with intent to commit that crime and forming part of a series of acts, which would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted."}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24962, "end_char": 24968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the observations of Parker C.J. in Davey v. Lee(') and of Prof. Glanville Williams in his essay on 'Police Control of intending criminals' in 1955 Criminal Lmv Review.", "canonical_name": "Parke B."}}, {"text": "Glanville Williams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25006, "end_char": 25024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the observations of Parker C.J. in Davey v. Lee(') and of Prof. Glanville Williams in his essay on 'Police Control of intending criminals' in 1955 Criminal Lmv Review."}}, {"text": "Archbald", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25252, "end_char": 25260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another attempt at definition was made by PtQfessor Turner in [1934] 5 Cambridge Law Journal' 230, and this was substnntially reproduced in 'Archbald's Crimlnal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (36th &Jn.)."}}, {"text": "Turner", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25963, "end_char": 25969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nor was it brought to the notice of the DivisiQrla] Court which\n\n decided Davey v. Lee (supra) that Prof. Turner was himself not satis- H fied with the definition propounded by him and felt c; o'mpelled to\n\n(l) [1968]!", "canonical_name": "Turner"}}, {"text": "Hai/sham L. C.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27459, "end_char": 27473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Haughten v. Smith,(') Hai/sham L. C. quoted Parke B from the Eagleton case (supra) and Lord Parker, C.J. from Davey v.\n\nLee (supra) and proceeded to mention three propositions as emerg- F ing from the two definitions :\n\n\"(1) There is a distinction between the intention to commit a crime and an attempt to commit it. .......... ."}}, {"text": "Tarner", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28358, "end_char": 28364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "edited by Prof. Tarner, P. 184.", "canonical_name": "Turner"}}, {"text": "Diplock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28670, "end_char": 28677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1169\n\nDavey v. Lee [1968) 1 Q.B. 366, 370, as being 'imme- A diately and not merely remotely connected' with the completed offence ........... \"\n\nI In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Stonehouse, (1) Lord Diplock a'nd Viscount Dilhome, appeared to accept the 'proximity' test of Parke B, while Lord Edmund-Davies accepted the statement of Lord Hailsham as to what were the true ingredients of a criminal attempt."}}, {"text": "Viscount Dilhome", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28683, "end_char": 28699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1169\n\nDavey v. Lee [1968) 1 Q.B. 366, 370, as being 'imme- A diately and not merely remotely connected' with the completed offence ........... \"\n\nI In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Stonehouse, (1) Lord Diplock a'nd Viscount Dilhome, appeared to accept the 'proximity' test of Parke B, while Lord Edmund-Davies accepted the statement of Lord Hailsham as to what were the true ingredients of a criminal attempt."}}, {"text": "Edmund-Davies", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28764, "end_char": 28777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1169\n\nDavey v. Lee [1968) 1 Q.B. 366, 370, as being 'imme- A diately and not merely remotely connected' with the completed offence ........... \"\n\nI In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Stonehouse, (1) Lord Diplock a'nd Viscount Dilhome, appeared to accept the 'proximity' test of Parke B, while Lord Edmund-Davies accepted the statement of Lord Hailsham as to what were the true ingredients of a criminal attempt."}}, {"text": "Hailsham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28809, "end_char": 28817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1169\n\nDavey v. Lee [1968) 1 Q.B. 366, 370, as being 'imme- A diately and not merely remotely connected' with the completed offence ........... \"\n\nI In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Stonehouse, (1) Lord Diplock a'nd Viscount Dilhome, appeared to accept the 'proximity' test of Parke B, while Lord Edmund-Davies accepted the statement of Lord Hailsham as to what were the true ingredients of a criminal attempt."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29102, "end_char": 29119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29180, "end_char": 29190, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 511", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29223, "end_char": 29234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29249, "end_char": 29253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raghubar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29365, "end_char": 29379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar,(') Raghubar Dayal and Subba Rao, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29384, "end_char": 29393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar,(') Raghubar Dayal and Subba Rao, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29987, "end_char": 29993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Malkiat Singh & Anr v. State of Punjab,(3) a truck which was carrying paddy, was stopped at Samalkha 32 miles from Delhi and about 15 miles from the Delhi-Punjab boundary."}}, {"text": "Samalkha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30047, "end_char": 30055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Malkiat Singh & Anr v. State of Punjab,(3) a truck which was carrying paddy, was stopped at Samalkha 32 miles from Delhi and about 15 miles from the Delhi-Punjab boundary."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30070, "end_char": 30075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Malkiat Singh & Anr v. State of Punjab,(3) a truck which was carrying paddy, was stopped at Samalkha 32 miles from Delhi and about 15 miles from the Delhi-Punjab boundary."}}, {"text": "Ramaswamy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30310, "end_char": 30319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswamy."}}, {"text": "(1962] 2 S.C.R. 241", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30723, "end_char": 30742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1969] 2 S.C.R. 663", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30754, "end_char": 30773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1172_1181_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "ADVOCAIB GENERAL, STAIB OF BIHAR v.\n\nMADHYA PRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES LTD.\n\nMarch 5, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. C!IlNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nCriminal Contempt-Section 2(C) of the Contempts of Courts Act, 1971, Seope of-Statutory Limitation under Section 20 of the Act; computation of.\n\nThe respondents were the successful bidd'ers at an auction of forest coupesin the State of Bihar. As they defaulted in making the security deposit in 1espect of three coupes, the agreements With them were determined by the Conservator of Forests.\n\nThe respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court instead of in the Patna High Court and followed it up with several applications one after another both in tlie Calcutta and Pain\" High Courts towards the forest department from preventing unauthorised removal of forest produce by the respondents.\n\nVexed by the manner in which the respondent was filing repeated applitationsand procuring orders of a learned single judge of the High Court necessitating the filing of as many appeals to the Division Bench, the State of Bihar moved an application for committing the respondents for contempt of court, alleging that, by their conduct the respondents Wt:re obstructing the administration of justice-· and interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings. The Patna High Court held that the tespondent's conduct was most unscrupulous and that !here was gross abuse of the process of the Court, which could in certain circumstances\n\namount to contempt of Court. However, the High Court dismissed the appli cation on the ground that it was b•rred by limitation as it was filed beyond the p'eriod of one year prescribed by section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The- High Court held, on a reading of the contempt application that the material allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that re la ting to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971 before the single judge of the Ca.lcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29,\n\n1971 of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. As the contempt appli cation dated 18-7-73 in OCM 7 /73 was filed more than a year later, it WM tin1'• barred. In regard to the allegation relating to the filing of the petftion dated December 14, 1972, the High Court observed that there was no specific all'8'>\" lion th-at any contempt of court was committed by the filing of this application.\n\nThough the r.espondents tendered an unconditional apology, its acceptance was, not considered as the application was found to b'e beyond time. Hence the appeal under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.\n\nAllowing the State appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. Every abuse of process of the court may not necessarily amount lo contempt of Court. Abuse of proc'ess of the Court calculated to hamper thedue course of a judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justie is a.\n\ncontempt of Court.\n\n[1178A-B]\n\n2. It may be that c.ertain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties by striking out pleadings under the\n\n.())VOCATE GENL., BIHAR v. M. P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES 1173\n\nprovisions of Order 6, Rule 16 C.P.C. or in some other manner. But on the A other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct Which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of Justice. [ll 78B-CJ\n\n3. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest and a vital istakc, in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the administraition of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression \"Contempt of Court\" may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that administration of justice shall not be pre~ vented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. [ll 78C-E]\n\nOffutt v. U.S., 348, U.S. p. 11, quoted with approval.\n\n4. It is not necessary that every allegation made should be followed then and there by the statement that the allegation established a contempt of CourL Paragraph 29 of the application to commit th'e respondents for Contempt express~ ly referred to the application dated December 14, 1972 an~ paragraph 31 state\n\nthat all the facts and circumstances enumerated in the petition established tba.t D the respondents were obstructing and interfering with the due course of adminis tration of justice.\n\n[1180F-H]\n\nIn the instant ooe :\n\n(a) the respondents began the \"game\" by filing an application under o\\rt. 226 of the Constitution of India in the Calcutta High Court, whereas in the normal course one would expect such an application to be filed in the Patna High Court within whose jurisdiction the subfect matter of dispute was situate.\n\nA justifiable prim.a facie inference from this circumstance may be that the application was not bonafide but intended to harass and oppress the opposite party.\n\n[1179C-EJ\n\n(b) Thereafter application after application was filed before the learned single Judge, everyone of them, designed to circumvent, cfefect or nullify the effect of the orders of the Division Benches of the Calcutta High Court and Patna High Court. The order of !lie Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court directing the respondents to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 1,55,000/- \\Vas never complied with, The order of the Division Bench of the Pa.tna High Court directing the respondents to furnish security of immovable property in a sum of Rs. 75,000/- and to deposit in cash or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rq, 50,000/- was also never complied with. Instead, an order was obtained from\n\nthe single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restraining the State of Biha.r from continuing the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau. When this order was set aside by the Division Bench, an attempt was m.ade to circum vent all earlier orders by obtaining an order of the single Judge that they ma.y be allowed to deposit a sum of Rs. 60,000/. in cash and permitted to remove the •tock from the forest Coupes. When the State of Bihar moved the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau for a direction to auction the attached stock, the respond'ents moved ao application on December 14, 1972, aod obtained an order from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the\n\nmoney suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamaiu. In considerina the question whether the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972, amounts to a Contempt of Court, the Cou1t must take into account the whole course of the continuing contumacious conduct of the respondents from the beginning of 1he 'game'. Clearly, not a single application mad'e to the Single Judge was bona fide. Every application was a daring 'raid' on the Court and each was an abuse of the process of the Court. The applica.tion dated December 14, 1972 praying that the proc'eedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judze should be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, on January 10, 1972 the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had expressly permitted the proceedings in the money suit to go on. The application of the respondents clearly showed that they were intent upon obstructing the due course of the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, PaJamau and to obstruct\n\nthe administration of justice by abusing the process of the Court. [11790 H,\n\nllSOA-E]\n\n(c) The application dated December 14, 1972 was an abuse of process of the Court, calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding and the\n\nadministration of justice end was therefore, a criminal contempt of Court; [llSOH, l!81A]\n\n(d) though the respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the Patna High Court, the conduct of the respondents is so reprehensible as to\n\n\\Varrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence.\n\n[1181A}\n\nCRIMINAL AIPELI, ATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 1974: From the Judgment and Order dated 24-4-1974 of the Patna High Court in Original Cr!. Misc. No. 7 /73.\n\nLal Narayan Sinha, Attorney General, U. P. Singh, B. P. Singh and S. N. !ha for the Appellant.\n\nSukumar Ghosh for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe Advocate-General of Bihar is the appellant in this appeal under Section 19 of the Contempts of Comts Act, 1971. Respondent No. 1, M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, represented by respondent No. 2, Om Prakash Agrawal, were the highest bidde.rs at an auction held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Garhwa South, of four forest coupes iu the State of Bihar.\n\nUnder the terms of the agreements the respondents were required to deposit 25% of each of the four bids as security.\n\nThe respondents were, however, able to make the deposit in respect of one coupe only and not in respect of the other three coupes.\n\nThe responde.nts requested for time. Thereafter, there was a long course of correspondence with which we are not now concerned.\n\nFinally, on January 28, 1970, th~ Conservator of Forests determined the agreements.\n\nOn February 28, 1970, respondent No. 1 served a notice on the Divisional FQl'est Offieer\n\n..~\n\nADVOCATE GENL., BIHAR V. M. P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES 1175 (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) Garhwa South, intimating him that they had filed au application under\n\nArticle 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court and that S. C. Deb, J., had been pleased to issue a rule nisi aud also an injunction restraining the Govt. of Bihar and the officials of the Forest Department of the Govt. of Bihar from giving effect to the proceedings by which the leases were. determined and further directing them to all9w M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries to carry on the work of cutting and felling of trees and removing the material in the, said forest coupes.\n\nAlleging that the Officers of the Forest Department of the Govt. of 13ihar had violated the order of injunction granted against them, the respondents filed an application to commit the Officers for Contempt of Court and in that application they prayed for and obtained an interim order directing the Officers not to interfere in any way with the activities of the respondents in removing the produce of the Khair trees. The, State ofBihar preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court aud on September 29, 1970, the Division, Bench passed arr order allowing the appeal and directing the respondents to furnish;\n\nsecurity in a sum of Rs. 1,55,000 if they desired to remove the forest produce.\n\nOtherwise, they were restrained from selling the trees aud extracting the produce.\n\nThe respondents offered certain property as security but that was rejected by the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court as the title was found to be defective.\n\nAt this stage on J auuary 8, 1971, the State of Bihar filed money suit No. 3 of 1971 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Palam.au to recover a sum of Rs. 1,93,225 as damages.\n\nThe State of Bihar also filed au application under Order 38, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure and obtained an order of attachment of the 'Kath' manufactured by the respondents alongwith. utensils, equipment, etc.\n\nThe espondents were directed to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs and asked to show cause why the interim attachment should not be made absolute.\n\nThe attachment was effected on January 10, 1971. The respondents appeared before the learned Subordinate Judge and requested that the reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 75,000. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the ayer of the respondents and reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 75, ooo. The State od' Bihar preferred an appeal to the Patna High Court and ail,\n\ninterim order was made by the High Court, stayi.ng the operation of the order of the learned Subordinate Judge but continuing the attachment.\n\nOn March 29, 1971, after hearing both the parties, the Patna High Court made an order directing the respondents, to furnish security of immovable property in a sum of Rs. 75,000 and to deposit cash or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs. 50,000. It was directed that\n\nJ!'\n\non such security being furnished the interim attachment would cease and the respondents would be allowed to remove the stock, utensils and equipment.\n\nWithout complying with the orde.r of the Patna High Conrt, Respondent No. 1 then moved the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on April 21, 1971, and obtained an order restraining the\n\nState of Bihar from continuing the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and further directing the State to take steps to get the attachment vacated if security was furnished by the respondents as directed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The State of Bihar filed an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge and the operation of the order was stayed by an order of January 10, 1972 of the Divisio!\\ Bench. It was directed that the proceedings in the money suit in the Conrt of the learned Subordinate Judge of Palrunau should proceed.\n\nIn the meanwhile on July 30, 1971, Respondent No. 1 moved another application before the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta; High Court offering to deposit Rs. 60,000 in cash and requesting that on such deposit being made, they might be allowed to remove the stock. This application was allowed on July 30, 1971, by the learned Single Judge and the amount was directed to be deposited with the counsel for th~\n\nState of Bihar.\n\nThe order was later on modified on December 16, 1972, and the amount was directed to be deposited with the Registrar of the High Court.\n\nOn November 20, 1972, the State of Bihar filed an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau complaining that the respondents had not furnished secnrity as di.reeled by the Patna High Court and as the attached stock was deteriorating it might be sold by auction.\n\nBefore anything further could be done Respondent. No. I filed a petition on 14th December, 1972, and obtained an order from the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on December 18, 1972, staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau until the attached goods we.re released in compliance with the orders dated July 30, 1971 and February 16, 1972.\n\nThe State of Bihar preferred an appeal against the order of tbe learned\n\nSingle Judge and on January 22, 1973, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and directed the proceedings in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau, to go on.\n\nVexed by the manner in which the 1st Respondent was filing repeated applications and procuring orders from a learned Single Judge\n\n•'I\n\nADVOCATE GENL. B!llAR V, M P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES 1177 ( Chlnnappa Reddy, J.) of the High Court, necessitating the filing of as, many appeals to the Division Bench, the State of Bihar filed an application for committing the Respondents for Contempt of Court alleging that, by their conduct the respondents were obstructing the administration of justice and interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings. The Patna High Court held that the respondents' conduct was most unscrupulous one that there wa5 gross abuse of the process of the Court, which could in certain circumstances amount to contempt of Court. The High Court, however, dismissed the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by section 20 of the Contempt of Comts Act.\n\nThe High Court held, on a: reading of the Contempt application, that the material allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that relating to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971, before tbe Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29, 1971 of the Division Bench of tile Patna High Court.\n\nAs the contempt application was filed more than a year later it was time-barred. In regard to the allegation relating to the filing of the petition dated December 14, 1972, the High Court observed that there was no specific allegation that any Contempt oe Court was ccmmittcd by the filing of this application. We may also mentioi; i. that the respondents tendered an unconditional apology to the High Court of Bihar.\n\nThe question of accepting the apology was Mt considered as the application was found to be bey®d time.\n\nThe A<lvocate General of Bihar has filed this appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court.\n\nI\"-- Before we consider the merits of the appeal we may mention here - that the learned Single Judge who made the several orders in favour\n\nof the respondents was himself compelled in a later order dated AugusG F 13, 1973 to state that the respondents had suppressed material facts and misled him on various occasions and obtained orders from him.\n\nSection 2 ( c) of the Contempt of- Courts Act defines Criminal contempt as follows :\n\n\"(c) 'Criminal Contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or any signs, or by visible rcprn\n\nsentations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-\n\n(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or\n\n(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or\n\n(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with,· or obstructs\n\nor tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner\".\n\nWhile we are conscious that every abuse of the process of the Court may not necessarily amount to Contempt of Court, abuse of the process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of ai judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice, we must say, is a contempt of Court. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the Court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner.\n\nBut, on tlie other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious infiueoce beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice.\n\nThe public have an interest, an abiding and a real i!lterest, and a vital stake in the effective; and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the pe.ril of all rights and liberties perishing.\n\nThe Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the, Court against insult or injury as the expression \"Contempt of Court\" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. \"It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage\".(!) \"The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope''.(')\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn-Vol. 9, paragraph 38), there is a brief discussion of when abuse of the process of the Court may be a punishable contempt. It is said :\n\n\"38. Abuse of process in general.\n\nThe Court has power to punish as contempt any misuse of the court's process.\n\nThus the forging er altering of court documents and other deceits of like kind are punishable as serious contempts. Similarly, deceiving the court or the court's officers by deliberately S1'ppressing a fact, or giving false facts, may be1 a punishable contempt.\n\n(I) Por Frank Further Jin Offutt v. U.S. -34: U.S. p. II.\n\n(2) Per Judge Curtis-Raleigh quoted in Je11nisq11 v. Baker- [1972] I All E. R.\n\n997@ 1006.\n\n, ,\n\nADVOCATE GENL. B!HAR V. M P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES: 1179 (Chlnnappa Reddy, !.) Certain acts of a lesser nature may also constitute an abuse of process as, for instance, initiating or carrying on proceedings which are wanting in bona {ides or which are frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive.\n\nIn such cases the court has extensive alternative powers to prevent an abuse of its process by striking ant or staying procee<lings or by prohibiting the taking of further proceedings without leave.\n\nWhere the court, by exercising its statutory powers, its powers under rules of court, or its inherent jurisdiction, can give an adequate remedy, it will not in general punish the abuse as a contempt of court.\n\nOn the other hand, where an irregularity or misuse of process amounts to an offence against justice, extending its influence beyond the parties to the action, it may be punished as a contempt\".\n\nIn the present case, the respondents began 'the game' by filing an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court, whereas in the normal course one would expect such as application to be filed in the Patna High Court within whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the dispute was situate.\n\nFor some mysteriou~ reasons which nobody has been able to explain to us, the writ application was filed in the Calcutta High Court. A justifiable prima facie inference from this circumstance may be that the application was not bona fide but intended to harass and oppress the opposite parties. We do not want to say anything more about this aspect of the case as we are told that this is a failing of the respondents which they shared with several others. Perhaps, as we had occasion to remark during the course of the hearing, some parties are unable to reconcile themselves to the fact that the Calcutta High Court has long since ceased to have jurisdiction over the area comprising the State of Bihar which it had several decades ago.\n\nThe 'game' proceeded further.\n\nApplication after application was filed before the learned Single Judge, everyone of them designed to circumvent, defeat o.r nullify the effect of the orders of the Division Benches of the Calcutta High Court an.ct the Patna High Court. . The order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court directing the respondents to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 1,55 ,000 was never complied with.\n\nThe order of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court directing the respondents to furnish security of immovable property in a sum of Rs. 75,000 and to deposit cash or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs. 50,000 was also never complied with.\n\nInstead, an order was obtained from the; Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restraining the State of : Bihar from CO'Jltinning the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau., When this order was set aside by the Division Bench, an attempn was made to circumvent all earlier orders by obtaining an order from the Single.\n\nJudge that they may be allowed to deposit Rs. 60,000 in cash and permitted to remo'le the stock from the forest coupes. When the State o[ Bihar moved the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau for a direction to auction the attached stock, the respondents moved an application: on December 14, 1972, and obtained an order from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau.\n\nIn considering the question whether the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972, amount to a Contempt of Court, the Court inust take into accoont the whole course of the continuing contumacious conduct of the respondents from the beginning of the \"game\". Clearly, not a single appliciition made to the Single Judge was bona fide. Every application was a daring 'raid' on the Court and each was an abuse of the process of the Court.\n\nThe application dated December 14, 1972 praying that the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge shonld be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, ori January 10, 1972, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had expressly permitted the proceedings in the money suit to go on. The application of the respondents clearly showed that they were inten~ upon obstructing the due course of the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and to obstruct th~\n\nadministration of justice by abusing the process of the Court.\n\nThe High Court expressed the view that there was no specific allegation that any contempt of Court had been committed by the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972. We are unable to agree with the view .of the High Court. Paragraph 29 of the application to commit the responqents for Contempt expressly refers to the application dated December 14, 1972 and paragraph 31 states that all the facts and circumstances enumerated in the petition; estabiished that the respondents were obstructing and interfering with the due course and administration of justice. It was not necessary that every allegation made should be followed then and there by the statement that the allegation established a Contempt of Court.\n\nWe are satisfied that the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972, was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct\n\n{ '• I\n\nADVOCATE GENL. BIHAR V. M P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES. 1181 (Chlnnappa Reddy, !.) the due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice and was, therefore, a Criminal Contempt of Court. The respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the Patna High Court, but we are convinced that the conduct of the respondents is so reprehensible as to warrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence. We accordingly allow the appeal and sentence each of the respondents to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks. ·\n\nV.D.K. 11ppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "MADHYA PRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MADHYA PRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 5, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 88, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 5, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. C!IlNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 2(C)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempts of Courts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempts of Courts Act, 1971", "statute": "the Contempts of Courts Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 585, "end_char": 604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court instead of in the Patna High Court and followed it up with several applications one after another both in tlie Calcutta and Pain\" High Courts towards the forest department from preventing unauthorised removal of forest produce by the respondents."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 623, "end_char": 639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court instead of in the Patna High Court and followed it up with several applications one after another both in tlie Calcutta and Pain\" High Courts towards the forest department from preventing unauthorised removal of forest produce by the respondents."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1065, "end_char": 1079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vexed by the manner in which the respondent was filing repeated applitationsand procuring orders of a learned single judge of the High Court necessitating the filing of as many appeals to the Division Bench, the State of Bihar moved an application for committing the respondents for contempt of court, alleging that, by their conduct the respondents Wt:re obstructing the administration of justice-· and interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1678, "end_char": 1688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1696, "end_char": 1718, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ca.lcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1971, "end_char": 1991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The- High Court held, on a reading of the contempt application that the material allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that re la ting to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971 before the single judge of the Ca.lcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29,\n\n1971 of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "March 29,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2034, "end_char": 2049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The- High Court held, on a reading of the contempt application that the material allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that re la ting to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971 before the single judge of the Ca.lcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29,\n\n1971 of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "18-7-73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2132, "end_char": 2139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the contempt appli cation dated 18-7-73 in OCM 7 /73 was filed more than a year later, it WM tin1'• barred."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2281, "end_char": 2298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the allegation relating to the filing of the petftion dated December 14, 1972, the High Court observed that there was no specific all'8'>\" lion th-at any contempt of court was committed by the filing of this application."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2609, "end_char": 2619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2627, "end_char": 2655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Order 6, Rule 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3185, "end_char": 3201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "statute": "the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4932, "end_char": 4953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Biha.r", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instead, an order was obtained from\n\nthe single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restraining the State of Biha.r from continuing the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6137, "end_char": 6176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instead, an order was obtained from\n\nthe single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restraining the State of Biha.r from continuing the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau."}}, {"text": "Palamau", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the State of Bihar moved the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau for a direction to auction the attached stock, the respond'ents moved ao application on December 14, 1972, aod obtained an order from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the\n\nmoney suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamaiu."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamaiu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6750, "end_char": 6790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the State of Bihar moved the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau for a direction to auction the attached stock, the respond'ents moved ao application on December 14, 1972, aod obtained an order from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the\n\nmoney suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamaiu."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7421, "end_char": 7437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applica.tion dated December 14, 1972 praying that the proc'eedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judze should be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, on January 10, 1972 the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had expressly permitted the proceedings in the money suit to go on."}}, {"text": "Lal Narayan Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8476, "end_char": 8493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Sinha, Attorney General, U. P. Singh, B. P. Singh and S. N. !"}}, {"text": "P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8516, "end_char": 8524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Sinha, Attorney General, U. P. Singh, B. P. Singh and S. N. !"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8526, "end_char": 8537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Sinha, Attorney General, U. P. Singh, B. P. Singh and S. N. !"}}, {"text": "S. N. !", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8542, "end_char": 8549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narayan Sinha, Attorney General, U. P. Singh, B. P. Singh and S. N. !"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8572, "end_char": 8585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukumar Ghosh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8651, "end_char": 8666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe Advocate-General of Bihar is the appellant in this appeal under Section 19 of the Contempts of Comts Act, 1971."}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8740, "end_char": 8750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempts of Comts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8758, "end_char": 8786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8811, "end_char": 8842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, represented by respondent No.", "canonical_name": "MADHYA PRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES LTD"}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Agrawal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8877, "end_char": 8895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Om Prakash Agrawal, were the highest bidde.rs at an auction held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Garhwa South, of four forest coupes iu the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Garhwa South", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8976, "end_char": 8988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Om Prakash Agrawal, were the highest bidde.rs at an auction held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Garhwa South, of four forest coupes iu the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9019, "end_char": 9033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Om Prakash Agrawal, were the highest bidde.rs at an auction held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Garhwa South, of four forest coupes iu the State of Bihar."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, on January 28, 1970, th~ Conservator of Forests determined the agreements."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9503, "end_char": 9520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 28, 1970, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9741, "end_char": 9752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contempts of Comts Act, 1971", "statute": "the Contempts of Comts Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "S. C. Deb", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9809, "end_char": 9818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIHAR V. M. P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES 1175 (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) Garhwa South, intimating him that they had filed au application under\n\nArticle 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court and that S. C. Deb, J., had been pleased to issue a rule nisi aud also an injunction restraining the Govt."}}, {"text": "Govt. of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9901, "end_char": 9915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BIHAR V. M. P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES 1175 (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) Garhwa South, intimating him that they had filed au application under\n\nArticle 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court and that S. C. Deb, J., had been pleased to issue a rule nisi aud also an injunction restraining the Govt."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10097, "end_char": 10128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "determined and further directing them to all9w M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries to carry on the work of cutting and felling of trees and removing the material in the, said forest coupes."}}, {"text": "State ofBihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10662, "end_char": 10675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The, State ofBihar preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court aud on September 29, 1970, the Division, Bench passed arr order allowing the appeal and directing the respondents to furnish;\n\nsecurity in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 29, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10750, "end_char": 10768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The, State ofBihar preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court aud on September 29, 1970, the Division, Bench passed arr order allowing the appeal and directing the respondents to furnish;\n\nsecurity in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "J auuary 8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At this stage on J auuary 8, 1971, the State of Bihar filed money suit No."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subordinate Judge of Palam.au", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11287, "end_char": 11329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of 1971 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Palam.au to recover a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Order 38, Rule 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11427, "end_char": 11443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11468, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 10, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11774, "end_char": 11790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The attachment was effected on January 10, 1971."}}, {"text": "State od' Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12078, "end_char": 12093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State od' Bihar preferred an appeal to the Patna High Court and ail,\n\ninterim order was made by the High Court, stayi.ng the operation of the order of the learned Subordinate Judge but continuing the attachment."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12294, "end_char": 12308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 29, 1971, after hearing both the parties, the Patna High Court made an order directing the respondents, to furnish security of immovable property in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 21, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12859, "end_char": 12873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 then moved the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on April 21, 1971, and obtained an order restraining the\n\nState of Bihar from continuing the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and further directing the State to take steps to get the attachment vacated if security was furnished by the respondents as directed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Palrunau", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13452, "end_char": 13481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was directed that the proceedings in the money suit in the Conrt of the learned Subordinate Judge of Palrunau should proceed."}}, {"text": "July 30, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13519, "end_char": 13532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile on July 30, 1971, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Calcutta; High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13616, "end_char": 13636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 moved another application before the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta; High Court offering to deposit Rs."}}, {"text": "December 16, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13964, "end_char": 13981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order was later on modified on December 16, 1972, and the amount was directed to be deposited with the Registrar of the High Court."}}, {"text": "November 20, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14069, "end_char": 14086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 20, 1972, the State of Bihar filed an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau complaining that the respondents had not furnished secnrity as di.reeled by the Patna High Court and as the attached stock was deteriorating it might be sold by auction."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Palamau", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14148, "end_char": 14174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 20, 1972, the State of Bihar filed an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau complaining that the respondents had not furnished secnrity as di.reeled by the Patna High Court and as the attached stock was deteriorating it might be sold by auction."}}, {"text": "14th December, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14422, "end_char": 14441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I filed a petition on 14th December, 1972, and obtained an order from the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on December 18, 1972, staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau until the attached goods we.re released in compliance with the orders dated July 30, 1971 and February 16, 1972."}}, {"text": "December 18, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14525, "end_char": 14542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I filed a petition on 14th December, 1972, and obtained an order from the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on December 18, 1972, staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau until the attached goods we.re released in compliance with the orders dated July 30, 1971 and February 16, 1972."}}, {"text": "February 16, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14727, "end_char": 14744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I filed a petition on 14th December, 1972, and obtained an order from the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on December 18, 1972, staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau until the attached goods we.re released in compliance with the orders dated July 30, 1971 and February 16, 1972."}}, {"text": "January 22, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14840, "end_char": 14856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar preferred an appeal against the order of tbe learned\n\nSingle Judge and on January 22, 1973, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and directed the proceedings in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau, to go on."}}, {"text": "Court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14986, "end_char": 15021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar preferred an appeal against the order of tbe learned\n\nSingle Judge and on January 22, 1973, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and directed the proceedings in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau, to go on."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15943, "end_char": 15953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 7, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16190, "end_char": 16203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court held, on a: reading of the Contempt application, that the material allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that relating to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971, before tbe Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29, 1971 of the Division Bench of tile Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bihar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16759, "end_char": 16778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also mentioi; i. that the respondents tendered an unconditional apology to the High Court of Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16910, "end_char": 16915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The A<lvocate General of Bihar has filed this appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court."}}, {"text": "AugusG F 13, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17189, "end_char": 17206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I\"-- Before we consider the merits of the appeal we may mention here - that the learned Single Judge who made the several orders in favour\n\nof the respondents was himself compelled in a later order dated AugusG F 13, 1973 to state that the respondents had suppressed material facts and misled him on various occasions and obtained orders from him."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17334, "end_char": 17343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 6, Rule 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18427, "end_char": 18443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19746, "end_char": 19753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn-Vol."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20200, "end_char": 20202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21407, "end_char": 21415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of : Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23150, "end_char": 23166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instead, an order was obtained from the; Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restraining the State of : Bihar from CO'Jltinning the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau.,"}}, {"text": "Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24504, "end_char": 24545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application dated December 14, 1972 praying that the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge shonld be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, ori January 10, 1972, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had expressly permitted the proceedings in the money suit to go on."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_1182_1199_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.\n\nVAGHELA DAYABHAI CHATURBHAI & ORS.\n\nMarch 5, 1980\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950; Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 & Bombay Land Rerenue Rules 1921-Allotment and grant of cultivation rights Ol'tr 'Bluuha lands'-State Governnient Resolution providing for preference to ltari.\n\njans, adivasis and backward class people-Constitutional guarantee of equality\n\n,.; I under Article 14--Whether violated. , c JVords & Phrases-'Bhatha lands'-Meaning of\n\nThe expression \"bhatha land\" means land which forms part of the bed of a river on \\Vhich vegetables, rn'elon, cucumber etc. can be grown during the lean period after the rainy season is over, when the level of the water in the river\n\nis quite ]ow. The cultivation of such land is possible only till the next rainy season a,; the land gets submerged under the river water. The occupancy rights.\n\nD over such land cannot ordinarily be granted on a permanent basis as in the case of cultivabl'e lands, in view of the fact that the land gets submerged under the river water every year for 4-5 months.\n\nTill the year 1951 the cultivation rights over 'bhatha lands' were disposed of by public a1,1ction and the successful bidders were treated as l'essors of the lands for short periods. In the year~ 19 51 the State Government ordered that E the leasehold rights over 'bhatha lands' should be disposed of by selection, the crder of priority being (1) bona fide agriculturists who h2.d cultivated the land personally for five years or more, (2) adjacent land holders who had insufficient land for maintenance of their families, (3) coop'erative farming societies and ( 4) priority holders under the Waste Land Rules.\n\nThis order was however cancelled and superseded by the Government Reso~ lution dated September 19, 1962 which provid'ed that on the expiry of the then _ -1 existing leases, not held by cooperative farming societies, bhatha land should be disposed of on the basis of five years' lease by public auction.\n\nExprience showed that only the moneyed people were able to purchas'e the leasehold rights at the public auction and persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the oth'er wea.ker sections of society were not even able to participate in such auctions. Consequently, in the year 1964 leasehold rights over bhatha lands were disposed of on ekasal basis by public auctions.\n\nThe question relating to the disposal of leasehold rights ov'er bbatha lands was discussed' &t the meeting of the District-Collectors held in 1965-1966 and in pursuance to the suggestions made at the meeting and after considering all rde~ ,.ant matters the State Government by a Resolution dated 28th December, 1966 7 directed that the 'existing procedure for dispos.al of bhatha lands by aucticn be disoontinued with effect from fanuary 1, 1967 and the disposal of such lands were ordered to be in the following priority : ( 1) bona fide agriculturists ef the village who were holding land less than 5 acr'es, preference being given to harijans, adivasi and backward class people (2) holders of the land adjoining the\n\nGUJARAT V. V. D. CHATURBHA! 1183\n\nbhatha la.nd holding less than 16 acres and having genuine need of additional A land for maintenance of their families; (3) cooperative farming societies of harija:..s, adivasi and backward classes people, ( 4) coopera.tive farming societies consisting of la.ndless labourers or small holders and (5) any of the priority holders under the Waste Land Rules.\n\nIn pursuance to the aforesaid Resolution, the Collector by his Order dated July 18, 1967, granted 22 members belonging to Waghari Harijan Community B leasehold rights in resp'ect of bhatba lands for a period of 10 years.\n\nThe respondents questioned the validity of the Government Resolution dated December 28, 1966 and the Order of th:e Collector dated July 18, 1967 granting the lease, in their writ petitions.\n\nThey alleged that some of them were in possession of portions of the land of which th'ey had been dispossessed by the Order of the Collector by virtue of the eksal tenures created in their favour in the C auctions held in or about the year 1964 and that they could not be dispo81iC['ised without following the procedure prescribed by section 79(A) reOO with section 202 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. Tirey also contended that the Government Resolution dated December 28, 1966 and the grants made by the CoJlector on the basis of the said Resolution w'ere liable to be struck down en\n\nthe ground that they were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and that they had been arbitrarily deprived of an opportunity to offer bids at public auc- D tions and to a'Cquire Ieas'chold rights.\n\nThe State Government contested the petitions on the ground that none of the respondents was in possession of the lands in question on the d.afe of the writ petitions and that some of them who continued to remain in possession of certain portions of the land after the expiry of the eksal lease. were dispossessed in accordance with law and that the lands have been handed over to the grantees I: as per the Kabza receipts. The Resolution dated December 28, 1966, was pas,, ed in order to grant lease in respect of bhatha lands in flavour of the landless persons or persons having small extent of lands or persons belonging to Sche<lu1~\n\ned Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward classes and members of cooperative societies at reasonable rent without being put to the necessity of offering bids at\n\npublic auctions, where only moneyed persons could become successful bidders.\n\nThe High Court quashed the Resolution on two grounds : (I) That the act of the State Government in passing the Resolution amounfed to a fraud on the Statute as the power of the State under the Code which was a taxation nwasure had been utilized for a collateral purpose of achieving a welfare scheme and (2) that the Resolution was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as there was no rational nexus between the object to be achieved by th'e Code viz. realisation of land revenue and the classification of persons eligible for the grant of leasehold rights in r'espect of bhatha lands into several groups. It further directed the Sta.te Government qot to take into consideration the Government's circular issued pursuant to the impugned Resolution while considering the question of renewal of leases or disposal of bhatha lands and not to dispossess the writ petitioners except in due course of law.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHEID : 1 ( i) The Preamble of the Olde provides that it had been passed a• it was found exdient to consolidate and amend the law relating to Revenue\n\n21-138 SCI/80\n\n1184 S\\Jl'iH.MB COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.a.\n\nA Officers and to the assessment and recovery of Land Revenue and to other matters connected with Land Revenue Administration. [1193B].\n\n(ii) The other provisions of th'e Code and the Rules made thereunder show that it is open to the Collector to dispose of unoccupied lands belonging to the Government either for cultivation or for any other purpose in favour of indivi .. duals or aggregate of individuals either fr'ee of charge or at an upset price to be fixed by him or by public auction.\n\nA review of the several Government orders passed under the Code shows that lands belonging to Government had been oct apart free of charge for several public purposes such as free pasturage, burial grounds, roads, religious institutions, dhobies' ghats, potters' grounds, threshing floors 'etc.\n\nLand revenue was remitted when therewere drought conditions.\n\nForfeited holdings were often given back to defaulters who had not paid land revenue once again, on payment of arrears out of compassion.\n\nTagavi loana were given by Government to occupants to improve lands. The dominant purpose of the Code, therefore appears to be public welfare, even though land revenu'e which was recoverable under the Code constituted an important source of revenue of the State Government.\n\n[1196A-E]\n\n(iii) After India became independent, land reform measures had to be intro-- duc'ed by the States in India to prevent concentration of land in a few hands and to impose ceiling on the extent of land that could be held by an individual or a family, to take possession of land from individuals or families which w\"' in excess of the ceiling so imposed and to distribute such excess land amongst persons ltelonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker •ections of society. All these laws were made in order to implement the Directive\n\nPrinciples of State Policy contained in Articles 38, 39 and 46 of the comtitution by strengthening agrarian economy. Never before was there a greater need as during the post-Constitution period for administering land revenue laws in an equitable manner so that the economic interests of the_ weaker sections of the society and in particular of members belonging to Scheduled Castes and Schedul. ed Tribes are protected and promoted. [1196F-Hl\n\n(iv) There is no provision in the Code or the Rules made thereunder which prohibits disposal of 'occupancy rights or leMehold rights in respect Of unoccupied lands in any manner other than public auction. [1197 Al\n\n( v) The conclusion reached by the High Court that the basic scheme of the Code was the realization of land revenue by disposing Of unoccupied lands by public auction alone appears to be baseless.\n\n[1197B]\n\n(vi) The finding of the High Court that the impugned Resolution which provides for the disposal of bbabha lands amongst bona fide agriculturists, harijans, adivasis and backward class people and other persons mentioned therein without resorting to public auction but by having recou= to the procedure oct\n\nout in it is contrary to the latter and the spirit of the Code is set aside.\n\n[1197CJ\n\n2(i) The Resolution is designed to bring about distribution of agricltural lands as best to sub<'erve the common gOOd thus eliminating concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. It helps persons, who are in need of lands for their bare maintenance and who have otherwise no chance of getting them, to acquire lands at a low rate of rent. [11990]\n\nGUJARAT v. v. D. CHATURBHA! (Venkataramiah, !.) 1185\n\n(ii) The classification made in the impugned Resolution of persons or cooperative societies who are eligible to secure grants of leasehold rights, bears a reasonable relation to the object with which the Code is enacted. It cannot be characterised as arbitrary. There is no infirmity in the above classification. The Resolution aims at bringing about social and economic justice and assists people who are not strong enough to secure leasehold rights at a public auction for purpos'es of cultivation.\n\nThe leases to be granted oce not for any unlimited period.\n\n[1199E]\n\n(iii) The High Court was in error in holdng that the Resolution was vrolative of Article 14 of the Constitution. [1199F]\n\n3. The High Court did not record any firm finding on the question of possession of any part of the land by any of the writ petitioners. The direction issued by the High Court to the State Government and the Revenue authorities not to dispossess the writ petitions except in due course of law therefore becomes unsustainable. [1191HJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 281-285 of 1970.\n\nB \"\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25/28-4-1969 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA Nos. 1520, 850, 1079, and 1117 of 1967 and D 201 of 1968.\n\nS. T. Desai, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants.\n\nMrs. E. Udayarathnam for respondent No. 1 in CA 284/70.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-These five appeals by certificate are preferred by the State of Gujarat against the conunon judgment dated April 25/28, 1969 delivered in five petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution on the file of the High Court of Gujarat in which the constitutional validity of the Resolution of the Government of Gujarat bearing No. L, B.B. 3964/101585-C dated December 28, 1966 issuing directions regarding the procedure to be followed in the disposal of 'bhatha lands' with effect from January L 1967 inter alia providing for showing preference to Harijans, adivasis, backward class persons and co-operative farming societies c0nsisting of landless labourers or small holders in the matter of cultivation rights over bhatha land was challenged.\n\nThe expression 'bhatha land' means land which forms part of the bed of a river on which vegetables, melon, cucumber etc. can be grown during the lean period after the rainy season is over when the level of the water in the river is quite low.\n\nThe cultivation of this land is possible only till the next rainy season and when the river swells during the rainy season, the said land again gets sub- 1 merged under the river water. The occupancy rights over such land\n\nG ,\n\ncannot ordinarily be granted on a permanent basis as in the case of other cultivable lands in view of the land getting submerged under river water every year for 4-5 months.\n\nThe lands in question are situated in the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat. Till the year 1951, the cultivation rights over bhatha lands in the area in question were being disposed of by public auction and the successful bidders were being treated as lessees of the lands for short periods. In the year 1951, the State Govel\"!lfilent ordered that the leasehold rights over bhatha lands should be disposed of by selection in the following oFder of priority:-\n\n1. Bona fide agriculturists who had cultivated the land personally for five years or more.\n\n2. Adjacent land holders who, in the Collector's opinion, had insufficient land for maintenance of their families.\n\n3. Co-operative farming societies and\n\n4. Priority holders under the Waste Land Rules.\n\nThe above order was cancelled and superseded by the Government Resolution dated September 19, 1962 which provided that on the expiry of the then existing leases, not held by co-operative farming societies, bhatha lands should be disposed of on the basis of five years' lease by public auction. Experience showed that only the moneyed people were abl.e to purchase the lease-hold rights at the public auction and p_ersons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weajcer sections of society were not even able to participate in such auctions. In the year 1964 however, lease-hold rights over bhatha lands were disposed of on eksal basis by public auctiO!l.\n\nThe question relating to the procedure to be followed in the disposal of the lease-hold rights over bhatha lands was discussed at the meeting of the Collectors held in 1965-66 and after taking into consideration all relevant matters and the suggestions made at the above said meeting, the State Government passed the following Resolution in supersession of all existing orders:-\n\n\"Government of Gujarat Revenue Department No. L.B.B. 3964/101585-C\n\nSachivalaya, Ahmedabad-15 Date: 28-.12-1966\n\nRESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT In cancellation of all existing orders in regard to disposal of Bet and Bhatha land by auction, Government is pleased to direct that\n\nexisting procedure of disposal of Bhatha land by auction should discontinued from 1st January, 1967 and such land should be dis\n\nposed of according to instructions detailed below:-\n\n1. The existing lease held by co-operative society should be renewed on their expiry only to the members of cooperative society. Individually held land less than 16 acres excluding the bet-bhathi! land and the total holding of the number including the land to be granted is not more than the member or members 16 acres.\n\n2. If condition ( 1) is fulfilled the lease in favour of the co-operative societies should be renewed for a further period of 10 years on payment of revised rent which should be fixed on the basis of the factor~ enumerated hereinafter instruction number ( 6) below.\n\n3. As regards Bhatha lands which have been leased in favour of individuals such lease should not be renewed but on the expiry of such lease the lands should be disposed of to priority holders as enumerated in instruction No: 5 on payment of rent to be determined on the basis of factors \"-numerated in instruction No. 6.\n\nThere will be no objection to renew the lease in favour of such individual if he is otherwise eligible as per principles fixed in this G .R.\n\n4. As regards new Bet Bhatha lands which are to be disposed of for the first time they should also be granted to p_riority holders as mentioned in instruction No. 5, on the basis of rent charged for similar lands which have been disposed of as per instructions contained in the G .R. or which have been disposed of in the past by auction. ·\n\n5. The priority fQI disposal of Bet Bhatha land should be as under:-\n\n1. Bona fide agriculturists of the village who are holding lartd less than 5 acres. Preference in this case will be given to Harijan adivasi and backward class people.\n\n2. Holders of the land adjoining the Bet Bhatha land holding land Jess than 16 acres and who in the opinion of Collector have a genuine need of additional lands for maintenance of their families.\n\nInter se preference in this case also will be as per (1) above.\n\n3. Co-operative farming societies of Harijans, adivasi and backward class persons.\n\n A\n\n4. Co-operative farming societies consisting of landless\n\n. E\n\nlabourers or small holders.\n\n5. Any of the priority holders under the waste land rules.\n\nThe individuals as well as co-operatives of the village in which the Bet Bhatha lands are ituated wiJl have their first priority while the individuals and co-operative societies of neighbouring villages within a radius of miles shall be given priority i!). the order of nearness from village where the Bet Bhatha Lands are situated.\n\nIf there are claims of two equal priority holders for the same land the disposal wiJl be by lots.\"\n\nThereafter twenty-two members belonging to Waghari Harijan community were granted lease-hold rights in respect of a J, hatha land for a period of ten years pursuant to the above Government Resolution by the Collector of Ahmedabad on July 18, 1967. The relevant part of the aforesaid order of the Collector dated July 18, 1967 rea~ as follows:-....\n\nORDER\n\nNo. C.B.A.R.E.V. 165 District Collector's Office Ahmedabad 18-7-67\n\nIt is hereby ordered that under mentioned twenty-two members of Waghari Harijan Ganotia Samuha Kheti Mandali (unlimited) Santhal, .have been granted lands for cultivation, out of the Govern- ,-( F men! BHATHA-LANDS, for the period of ten years each member not to have more than four acres of land, on the conditions hereinafter mentioned.\n\nNames of members of the Waghari Harijan Ganotia Samuha Kheti G Mandali (unlimited)\n\nTERMS\n\n1. These lands are granted on the condition that Waghari Harijan Ganotia Samuha Kbeti Mandali (unlimited) must e get itself registered within one year.\n\n2. Either the individual or a co-operative society shall not be\n\ngranted BET-BHATHA LANDS at more than one place.\n\n3. Within the period of fifteen days from the date of the A harvest of the crop from BET BHA THA lands shall be paid np. Rules regarding snspension or remission of land revenne shall not be applica_ble to the realization of this rent.\n\n4. The land shall be cultivated peronally by the grantee, unless under exceptional circninStances.\n\nThe decision of the B Collector regarding the xistence of such exceptional circumstances shall be final on this condition.\n\nLease shall be terminated, withont granting any compensation.\n\n5. Rent shall be fixed d payable according to sections 6 and 7 of Government Resolution Revenue Department No.\n\nC L.B.B. 3964-101585-G dated 28-12-1966.\n\n6. All conditions mentioned in PATTA shall be complied with.\n\n7. The Collector shall be authorised to revoke the lease deed before the expiration of the period of the lease. 0\n\n8. Unless lease deeds are executd, the occupation of the land shall be treated as unauthorised one.\n\nBesides conditions mentioned above, all conditions mentioned in Government Resolution Revenue Department No. L.B.B. 3964- 101585-G dated 28-12-1966 shall be applicable to this grant.\n\nE This grant shall be valid for the period of ten years from the year 1967-68. This grant expires on 31-5-1977.\n\nLease deed to be executed and k.ept in record.\n\nSd/- Niranjan Singh, Collector, F Ahmedabad.\"\n\nAggrieved by the above grant, the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 1079. of 1967 which was one of the writ petitions out of which these appeals arise questioned the validity of the Government Resolution dated December 28, 1966 and the order of the G Collector granting the.lease dated July 18, 1967 in favour of the said tweaty-two persons. lI1 the oti\\er four petitions also, the said Resolution and certain grants made by the Collector were questioned.\n\nThe petitioners in all the petitions alleged that some of them were in posession of portions of the lands which had been disposed of by the order of the Collector by virtue of the eksal tenures created in their e\n\nfavour under auctions held in or about the year 1964 and they could not be dispossessed without following the procedure prescribed by\n\nsection 79-A read with section 202 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). One of them alleged that he was a permanent tenant of a portion of the land. They contended that the Govsirnment Resolution dated December 28, 1966 and the grants made by the Collector on the basis of the said Resolution were liable to be struck down on the ground that they were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Their main grievance was that they had been arbitrarily deprived of an opportunity to offer bids at public auctions and to acquire lease-hold rights. They prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Stat~ Government and the Revenue authorities not to disposss them on the b_asis of the impugned Resolution of the Goverrup.ent and the orders of the Collector. The State Gove=ent and the other respondents in the writ petitions resisted the petitions.\n\nAfter hearing the parties, the High Court quashed the Government Resolution and the grants made by the Collector holding that they were ultra vires the scheme of the Code and were also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nD The State Government was directed not to take into consideration the Government circular issued pursuant to the impugned Resolution while\n\nconidering the question of renewal of leases or disposal of bhatha lands in question andnot to dispossess the writ petitioners except in due course of law.\n\nThe Siate Government has questioned the order made by the High Court in these appeals.\n\nBefore going into the question relating to the validity of the impugned Resolution and the grants made by the Collector, it is necessary to deal with the question whether any of the writ petitioners were in possession of the lands in question. The allegation made by them in this regard was denied by the State Government. In the course of the counter affidavits filed before the High Court, it was pleaded on behalf of the State Government that none of the writ petitioners was in possession of any portion of the lands in question on the date of the petition that some of them who continued to remain in possession of cerw, in portions of the land after the expiry of the eksal leases were dispossessed in accordance with law and that the land had been handed over to the grantees as per kabza receipts. Dealing with the question of possession, the High Court observed in the course of its order as follows:-\n\n\"The petitioners claim in these petitions that they were cultivating these lands as tenants, except the petitioner in ll Sp. C.A. No. 1079/11967 who claims to be a permanent tenant. The case of the petitioners was that at the relevant time they had been given Eksali (of one year) leases on the\n\nGUJARAT v. v. D. CHATURBHAJ (Venkataramiah, J.) 1191\n\nexpiry of which their right of renewal was completely A taken away by the aforesaid circular.\n\nThe circular had completely fettered the discretion of the competent authorities under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' and had created an absolute rule excluding the petitioners so much so that they could not even now give a bid at any public auction for these lands. Even though in Sp.\n\nC.A. No. 1079/67 the case of the petitioner was of a lease in perpetuity the State had controverted this allegation and no such grant was produced. The case of the State was that the pe_titioner was in illegal possession after the Eksali lease in 1964. Therefore, even that case also stands on the same footing.\n\nIn view of the said disputed questions of facts which cannot be resolved by us, the petitioner, therefore, challenged the impugned circular on the grounds ( 1) that it is ultra vires the Code, especially as it creates an absolute rule excluding Jhe petitioners who would have been entitled under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code to get these le.ases by bidding at the public auction as per the relevant rules. The impugned order in this connection violates the policy of th~ Code which is to augment the Government revenue and which does not contain any policy of excluding any person from the disposal of these unalienated GovernJl!ent lan_ds, (2) the petitioners, further challenge the impugned order on the ground that it is discriminatory and violates Article 14 and the inequality is writ large on the face of the entire order especially the so called reservations in favour of Harijans, adivasis and backward class people are so excessive tt all the 1 GO per cent lands would get reserved for them under this policy of priority and the petitioners would be completely exclnded.\"\n\nThere is no reference to the question of possession of the land by\n\nthe respondents in any other part of the judgment of the High Court.\n\nG From the portion of \\he judgment extracted above, it is seen that the High Court did not record any firm finding on the question of posses\n\nsion of any part of the land by any of the . writ petitioners. It, therefore, follows that the direction issued by the High Court to the State Government and the. Revenue authorities not to dispossess the writ petitioners except in due course of law beromes unsustainable.\n\nH What remains to be considered in these appeals is whether the impugned Resolution and the orders of the Collector are valid or not.\n\nThere. is no dispute that the writ petitioners were not eligible under the impugned Resolntion for any grant being made in preference to, the grantees in these cases and if the impugned Resolution is valid, the grants made by the Collector becOl]).e unassailable. It is on ' account of the above position the writ petitioner challenged the validity of the Resolution passed by the Government on December 28,\n\n1966. The High court quashed the said Resolutiou on two grounds:\n\n(1) that the act of the State Government in passing the Resolution amounted to a fraud on the statute as the power of the State under the Code which was a taxation measure had bee.Jl utilized for a collateral purpose of achieving a welfare scheme and (2) that the Resolution was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as there was no rational nexus between the object to be achieved by the Code viz. realization of land revenue and the classificatiop. of persons eligible for the grant of lease-hold rights in respect of bhatha lands into several group§..\n\nOn the first groun~, the H; igh Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"The Code in terms directs the statutory authority, the Collector to make disposal exercising his judicial discretion, of course, subject to the statutory rules or even subject to the orders of the Government which ha'!'.:e statutory force.\n\nThe whole purpose and object of the Land Revenue Code is never to exclude any citizen, and such exclusion by way of an absolute rules leaving no discretion even to the statutory authority would be completely beyond the scope of a regulatory measure.\n\nThis would be pJescribing the end and not prescribing means to an end.\n\nThe end has been laid down by the Legislature in this case and it is one of augmenting the land revenue, and for the purpose of revenue administration under this Code, if any dispos_!!l is made, the disposal would be ordinarily to augment land revenue. It may be that in exceptional cases, the authority may give remissio'n as in famine years or on other grounds which are specified under the scheme of the Code or the Rules.\n\nThe end which is envisaged to be achieved by the Code is one of getting revenue augmented which is the obvious end of any taxation measure.\n\nThe end which the impugned regulation seeks to achieve is totally a different end.\"\n\nFrom a reading of the above observations of the High Court, it becomes obvious that the High Court felt that the Resolution which B had been passed with a view to showing preference to memberi belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward classes, landless persons who belonged to the weaker sections of\n\nsociety and members of co-operative fanning societies did not subserve the object of the Code i.e. realization of maximum revenue.\n\nThe High Court also felt that there was no scope for the passing of any order or resolution in the nature of a welfare measure while admi\\llsteiing the provisions of the code. In order to examine the correctness of the above view of the High Court, it is necessary to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Code. The Preamble of the Code provides that it had been passed as it was found expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to Revenue officers and to the assessment and recovery of Land Revenue and to other matters connected with the Land Revenue Administration. Chapters II and Ill o: the Code deal with constitution powers of!icers provision relating to the security to be furnished by certain Revenue officers and the\n\nlia!>ility of principals and sureties.\n\nChapter V of the Code is entitled 'Of Lands and Land Revenue' and contains sections 37 to 59.\n\nSection 3 7 of the Code declares that 'all public roads, loans and paths, the bridges, ditches, dikes, and fences, on, or beside, the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below high watermark, and of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes, and tanks, and 8ll canals, and water-courses, and all standing and flowing water, and all lands wherever situated, which are not the property of individuals, or of aggregates of persons legally capable of holding property, and except in so far as any right of such persons may be established, in or over the same, and except as may be otherwie provided in any law for the time being in force are and are hereby declared to be, with all rights, in or over the same, or appertaining thereto, the property of the Government and it shall b.e lawful for the Collector subject to the order of the State Government, to dispose of them in such manner as he may deem fit, or as may be authorised by general rules sanctioned by the Government concerned, subject always to the rights of way, and all other rights of the public or of individual legally subsisting.' The aforesaid section 37 of the Code vests the rights in all properties referred to therein the State Government and provides that it is !awful for the Collector subject to the orders of the State Government to dispose of them in such manner as he may deem fit or as may be authorised by the general rules sanctioned by the Government. The State Government is thus .constituted the proprietor of the several items referred to therein.\n\nWhile the Collector has been given the power of disposal of the land belonging to the Government, he can do so only in accordance with the other provisions of the Code and the Rules made thereunder and subject to any order or resolution passed by the State Government. The power of the State Government to make r•ders under section 37 (I) of the Code is not in tbe\n\npature of appellate or revisional powers which are dealt with separately under sections 203 and 211 of the Code but is iu the nature of an admiuistrative power enabliug the State Govergment to regulate the power of the Collector. Section 38 of the Code authorises the survey officers whilst survey operations are proctl_eding under Chapter VIII of the Code and at any other time the Collector to set apart lands which belonged to the State Government and not iu the lawful occupation of any person or aggregate of persons, in unalienated villages or unalienated portions of villages, for free pasturage for the village c, i_ttle, for forest reserves, or for any other pu{Jlic or municipal purpose; and lands assigned specially for any such purpose shall not be otherwise used without the sanction of the Collector.\n\nSection. 39 of the Code restricts the right of grazzing on free pasturage-lands to the cattle of the village or villages to which such lands belong or have been assigned.\n\nSection 44 of the Code recognizes the existence of certain privileges of villagers or of certaiu classes of persol1s to cut fire-wood or timber for domestic or other purposes even in the case of villages or lands in which the rights of the Government to the trees have been reserved under section 40 of the Code.\n\nSection 48 of the Code sets out the manner of assessment and alteration of assessment of any land. It provides that the land .revenue leviable on any land shall be assess, d with reference to the use of the land-(a) for the purpose of agriculture, (b) for the purpose of building and ( c) for a purpose other than agriculture or building.\n\nSub-section (3) of section 48 of the Code empowers the Collector or a survey officer, subject to any rules rnaqe in this behalf, to prohibit the use for certain purposes of any land liable to the payment of land revenue and to summarily evict any holder who uses or attempts to use the same for any such prohibited purpose.\n\nChapter VIII lays down the procedure to be followed in the course of survey and settlement proceedings thus ensuring that there is an equitable classification of lands for purposes of levy . of just assessment in the light of the relevant economic factors.\n\nThe principles underlying the said procedure prohibit the levy of oppressive or excessive revenue.\n\nThere is no scope for levy of extortfonate revenue which may be termed as rackrent.\n\nChapter VI of the Code deals with tl; ie provisions relating to the grant, use and reliuquishment of land.\n\nSection 62 of the Code which Jays down the conditions subject to which unoccupied land may be granted provides th_at the Collector may, subject to such ~Jes as may from time to time be made by the State Government, reqmre the payment of a price for uilalienated land or to sell the same by auction or to annex such conditions as he may deem fit. Rule 37 of the\n\nBombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') which are promulgated by the State Government in exercise of its powers under sections 213 and 214 of the Code provides that any unoccupied survey number not assigned for any special purpose may, at the Collector's discretion, be granted for agricultural purposes to such person as the Collector deems fit, either upon payment of a price fixed by the Collector, or without charge, or may be put up to public auction.\n\nWhen land is granted under section 62 read with Rule 37, the grantee acquires a heritable and transferable occpancy right over the land granted, subject to the lawful conditions imposed under the grant.\n\nThe proviso to section 68 of the Code, however, provides that notwithstanding any provision in the Code, it shall not be unlawful f9r the Collector at any time to grant permission to any person to occupy any unalienated unoccupied land for such period and on such conditions as he may, subject to rules made by the State Government in that behalf prescribe and in any such cas~ the occupancy shall be held only for the period and subject to the condition~ so prescribed. Rule 32 of the Rules provides that land may be given free of price and free of revenue, whether in perpetuity or for a term, for any of the purposes specified in column 1 referred to in the table given below that rule viz. for sites for the construction at the cost of a municipality, a panchayat or other local bodies of schools or colleges etc., for sites used or to be used in connection with any scheme under the Community Develop\n\nment Programme, for sites used or to be used as market yards under the management of market committees established under the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 etc. Rule 35 of the Rules empowers the Collector to exempt from payment of land revenue\n\nwithout any limit lands used for sites of hospitals, dispensaries, schools etc.\n\nUnder Rule 41 of the Rules, land situated in the bed of a river !J.nd not included in a survey number can, save as otherwise provided in sections 46 and 64, ordinarily be leased annually by auction to the highest bidder for the term of one year or such further period as the Co_!lector may think fit and the accepted bid should be deemed to be the land revenue chargeable on such land. The language of this rule also enables the State Government to dispose of snch lands in any other equitable way.\n\nThis Rule, however, does not apply to a land which is situated in the bed of a river and which is included in a survey number. Rule 42 of the Rules empowers the Collector to dispose of unoccupied land required or suitable for building sites or other non-agricultural purpose either by public auction or in his discretian by private arrangement either upon payment of a price fixed by him, or without charge, as he deems fit.\n\nA These and the other provisions of the Code and the Rules made thereunder show that it is open to the Collector to dispose of unoccupied lands belonging to the Government either for cnltivation or for any other purpose in favour of individuals or aggregate of individuals either free of charge or at an upset price to be fixed by him or by public auction.\n\nA historical review of the several GoverllII1ent orders passed under the Code shows that lands belonging to Government had been set apart free of charge for several public purposes such as free pasturage, burial grounds, roads, religious institutions, village sites, cattle stands, dhobies' ghats, potters'. grounds, threshing floors etc. Land revenue was remitted when there were drought conditions.\n\nForfeited holdings were often given back to defaulters who had !J.Ot paid land revenue once again on payment of arrears out of compassion.\n\nTagavi loans were given by Govefl!illent to occupants to improve lands. Some of the Government orders relating to grants of lands to private individuals may be stated here by way of illustration.\n\nAn order passed by the Government of Bombay in the year 1931 authorised grant of laods to kolis and other wild tribes in jungle tracts without payment of any occupancy price.\n\nAnother order passed in 1924 directed that grants of waste lands to members belonging deprsed classes should be liberally made. An order of the year 1925 for grants of lands to co-operative societies free of charge. Liberal grants of lands were made to military pensioners at concessional rates.\n\nAll these orders were passed during the British rule by the State Government in exercise of its powers under the Code.\n\nThe dominant purpose of the Code, therefore, appears to be public welfare, even though land revenue which was recoverable under the Code constituted an important source of revenue of the State Govemmenl\n\nAfter India became independent, land reforms measures had to be introduced by the States in India to prevent concentration of land in a few hands and to impose ceiling on the extent of land that could be held by an individual or a familY, to take possession of land from individuals or families which was in excess of the ceiling so imposed and to distribute such excess land amongst persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheuled Tribes and other weaker sections of society.\n\nAll these laws were made in order to implement the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Articles 38, 39 and 46 of the Constitution by strengthening agrarian economy. Never before was there a greater need as during the post-Constitution period for administering land revenue laws in an equitable manner so that the ecnnomic interests of the weaker sections of the society and in particular of members belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are protected\n\naud promoted. It has to, be mentioned here that there is no provision in the Code or the Rules made thereunder which prohibits disposal -0f occupancy rights or lease-hold rights in respect of unoccupied lands in any manner other than public auction. When it is felt that it is necessary to acquire excessive lands in the hands of private individuals for distribution amongst the landless and other deserving persons, it is equally necessary to observe the same rule while distributing the land which belongs to the State Government. In view of the foregoing, we are of the view that the conclusion reached by the High Conrt that the basic scheme of the Code was the realization of land revenue by disposing of unoccupied lands by public anction alone appears to be baseless. We, therefore, find it difficult to agree that the impugned Resolution which provides for the disposal of bhatha lands amongst bonafide agriculturists, harijans, adivasis and backward elass people and other persons mentioned therein without resorting to public auction but by having recourse to the procednre set out in it is contrary to the letter a'nd the spirit of the code. We, therefore, set aside the finding of the High Court on the above question.\n\nWe shall now proceed to examine the question whether the impugned Resolution is violative of Article 14 of the Con3titution. The grievance of the writ petitioners was that they were denied the opportunity to acquire the lease-hold rights at the public auction as a consequence of the policy of disposal of bhatha lands contained in the Resolution.\n\nThe finding of the High Court on the above question appears to have been influenced by its view on the object with which the Code was enacted and this becomes obvious from the following observation of the High Court :-\n\n\"As we have already pointed out, the object sought to be achieved is completely a. collateral object and the criteria which are adopted for the alleged classification viz. the membership of the co-operative society and the persons being Harijans, Adivasis or backward class people have no rational nexus whatever to the object of augmenting land revenue, which would be the implicit object underlying the entire Code, including this statutory power of disposal of the said lands for the benefit of the public. The C-Ode never contemplated any exclusion of persons when such statutory power was sought to be exercised by the State by any statutory order.\n\nTherefore, this statutory order clearly violates Article 14 of the Constitution and even on that ground it must be struck\n\ndown.\"\n\nFor the purpose of determining the question whether the impugned Resolution is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or not, it is\n\nnecessary to examine whether the classification adopted by the State Government is based upon some intelligible differentia which distinguishes individuals and co-operative societies in whose favour grants of lease-hold rights in bhatha lands are required to be made by the Collector from others and whether the said classification bears any reasonable relation to the object underlying the Code. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that the classification made by the Resolution does not have any rational relation to the object of the Code which according to it was realization of revenue and nothing more than that.\n\nWe have explained earlier that the object of the Code is to make provision for an equitable distribution of available land amongst persons C who are in need of it. As mentioned earlier, the State Government is under an obligation to ensure that the ownership and the control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the co=on good and the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to\n\nthe co=on detriment. In India which is predominantly an agricultural country, land forms the most important means of production. It is well known that unemployment among the masses is on the increase because employment opportnnities are not increasing at the same rate at which the population is increasing. Consequently we find in India to day a large number of landless persons and persons with uneconomic holdings in villages who are either unemployed or under-employed.\n\nIt is also equally well-known that persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes form the bulk of such landless persons or owners of uneconomic holdings who are in need of special care.\n\nIt is also the settled policy of the State Governments to encourage co-operative movement, which is embarked upon with a view to preventing exploitation of ecbnomically weaker sections of society by others. The State Government in the instant case appears to have passed the impugned Resolution in order to grant leases in respect of bhatha lands in favour of landless persons or persons having very small extents of land or persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes. and backward classes and members of co-operative societies at a reasonable rent without being put to the necessity of offering bids at a public auction where it is well known that only moneyed persons can become successful bidders. The impugned Resolution lays down the procedure to be followed in the disposal of lease-hold rights in respect of bhatha lands. It does not relate to all unoccupied lands available in the State of Gujarat. The total extent of bhatha lands available in the State of Gujarat when compared with other available unoccupied lands may be a very small extent. The writ petitioners on whom the burden of proving that the impugned\n\nResolution is discriminatory have not furnished any information about the extent of Bhatha lands available for disposal Clauses ( 1) and\n\n(2) of the Resolution provide that the existing leases held by cooperative societies should be renewed on their expiry only in favour of the members of such co-operative societies subject to certain conditions for a further period of ten years on payment of revised rent which should be fixed on the basis of the factors referred to therein. Clause\n\n(3) of the Resolution, provides that leases of bhatha lands granted in favour of individuals should not be renewed on their expiry but they should be disposed of in favour of bonafide agriculturists who belong to the weaker sections of society and co-operative farming societies on the basis of priority set out in clause (5) thereof. The rent payable by them should again be determined in accordance with the instructions given in the Resolution.\n\nThe Resolution is designed to bring about distribution of agricultural lands as best to subserve the common good thus eliminating concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. It helps persons, who are -in need of lands for their bare maintenance and who have otherwise no chance of getting them, to acquire lands at a low rate of rent. -\n\nThe classification made in the impugned Resolution of persons or co-operative societies who are eligible to secure grants of lease hold rights, according to us, bears a reasonable relation to the object with which the Code is enacted. It cannot be characterised as arbitrary.\n\nWe do not find that there is any infirmity in the above classification.\n\nThe Resolution aims at bringing about social and economic justice and assists people who are not strong enough to secure lease-hold rights of a public auction for purposes of cultivation. The leases to be granted are not for any unlimited period. At the end of the period prescribed in the leases, it will be open to the Collector to dispose them of afresh.\n\nIn the above circumstances, we hold that the High Court was in error in holding that the Resolution was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we allow these appeals, set aside the\n\ncommon judgment and order passed by the High Court and dismiss G the writ petitions.\n\nWe feel that in the circumstances of the case, the State Government should pay the costs of respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 284 of 1970.\n\nWe order accordingly.\n\nThe other parties shall bear their own costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n22-138 SCI/80", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VAGHELA DAYABHAI CHATURBHAI & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VAGHELA DAYABHAI CHATURBHAI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 5, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 5, 1980\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Rerenue Rules 1921", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 433, "end_char": 443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Land Rerenue Rules 1921", "statute": "Bombay Land Rerenue Rules 1921"}}, {"text": "September 19, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1807, "end_char": 1825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was however cancelled and superseded by the Government Reso~ lution dated September 19, 1962 which provid'ed that on the expiry of the then _ -1 existing leases, not held by cooperative farming societies, bhatha land should be disposed of on the basis of five years' lease by public auction."}}, {"text": "28th December, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2712, "end_char": 2731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question relating to the disposal of leasehold rights ov'er bbatha lands was discussed' &t the meeting of the District-Collectors held in 1965-1966 and in pursuance to the suggestions made at the meeting and after considering all rde~ ,.ant matters the State Government by a Resolution dated 28th December, 1966 7 directed that the 'existing procedure for dispos.al of bhatha lands by aucticn be disoontinued with effect from fanuary 1, 1967 and the disposal of such lands were ordered to be in the following priority : ( 1) bona fide agriculturists ef the village who were holding land less than 5 acr'es, preference being given to harijans, adivasi and backward class people (2) holders of the land adjoining the\n\nGUJARAT V. V. D. CHATURBHA!"}}, {"text": "fanuary 1, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2846, "end_char": 2861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question relating to the disposal of leasehold rights ov'er bbatha lands was discussed' &t the meeting of the District-Collectors held in 1965-1966 and in pursuance to the suggestions made at the meeting and after considering all rde~ ,.ant matters the State Government by a Resolution dated 28th December, 1966 7 directed that the 'existing procedure for dispos.al of bhatha lands by aucticn be disoontinued with effect from fanuary 1, 1967 and the disposal of such lands were ordered to be in the following priority : ( 1) bona fide agriculturists ef the village who were holding land less than 5 acr'es, preference being given to harijans, adivasi and backward class people (2) holders of the land adjoining the\n\nGUJARAT V. V. D. CHATURBHA!"}}, {"text": "July 18, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3603, "end_char": 3616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance to the aforesaid Resolution, the Collector by his Order dated July 18, 1967, granted 22 members belonging to Waghari Harijan Community B leasehold rights in resp'ect of bhatba lands for a period of 10 years."}}, {"text": "section 79(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4275, "end_char": 4288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4299, "end_char": 4310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tirey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tirey also contended that the Government Resolution dated December 28, 1966 and the grants made by the CoJlector on the basis of the said Resolution w'ere liable to be struck down en\n\nthe ground that they were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and that they had been arbitrarily deprived of an opportunity to offer bids at public auc- D tions and to a'Cquire Ieas'chold rights."}}, {"text": "December 28, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4408, "end_char": 4425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tirey also contended that the Government Resolution dated December 28, 1966 and the grants made by the CoJlector on the basis of the said Resolution w'ere liable to be struck down en\n\nthe ground that they were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and that they had been arbitrarily deprived of an opportunity to offer bids at public auc- D tions and to a'Cquire Ieas'chold rights."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5960, "end_char": 5970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8047, "end_char": 8052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1196A-E]\n\n(iii) After India became independent, land reform measures had to be intro-- duc'ed by the States in India to prevent concentration of land in a few hands and to impose ceiling on the extent of land that could be held by an individual or a family, to take possession of land from individuals or families which w\"' in excess of the ceiling so imposed and to distribute such excess land amongst persons ltelonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker •ections of society."}}, {"text": "Articles 38, 39 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8625, "end_char": 8647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10927, "end_char": 10937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11513, "end_char": 11524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "C. B. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11540, "end_char": 11551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11556, "end_char": 11568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "E. Udayarathnam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11595, "end_char": 11610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. E. Udayarathnam for respondent No."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11691, "end_char": 11704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.-These five appeals by certificate are preferred by the State of Gujarat against the conunon judgment dated April 25/28, 1969 delivered in five petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution on the file of the High Court of Gujarat in which the constitutional validity of the Resolution of the Government of Gujarat bearing No."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11868, "end_char": 11879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13141, "end_char": 13147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands in question are situated in the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13169, "end_char": 13176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lands in question are situated in the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Priority holders under the Waste Land Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13811, "end_char": 13854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Gujarat Revenue Department No. L.B.B. 3964/101585-C\n\nSachivalaya, Ahmedabad-15", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14912, "end_char": 15004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question relating to the procedure to be followed in the disposal of the lease-hold rights over bhatha lands was discussed at the meeting of the Collectors held in 1965-66 and after taking into consideration all relevant matters and the suggestions made at the above said meeting, the State Government passed the following Resolution in supersession of all existing orders:-\n\n\"Government of Gujarat Revenue Department No."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15265, "end_char": 15282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.B.B. 3964/101585-C\n\nSachivalaya, Ahmedabad-15 Date: 28-.12-1966\n\nRESOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT In cancellation of all existing orders in regard to disposal of Bet and Bhatha land by auction, Government is pleased to direct that\n\nexisting procedure of disposal of Bhatha land by auction should discontinued from 1st January, 1967 and such land should be dis\n\nposed of according to instructions detailed below:-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Harijan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16954, "end_char": 16961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Preference in this case will be given to Harijan adivasi and backward class people."}}, {"text": "Co-operative farming societies of Harijans", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17263, "end_char": 17305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co-operative farming societies of Harijans, adivasi and backward class persons.", "canonical_name": "Co-operative farming societies of Harijans"}}, {"text": "Co-operative farming societies", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17351, "end_char": 17381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co-operative farming societies consisting of landless\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Co-operative farming societies of Harijans"}}, {"text": "Waghari Harijan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17977, "end_char": 17992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter twenty-two members belonging to Waghari Harijan community were granted lease-hold rights in respect of a J, hatha land for a period of ten years pursuant to the above Government Resolution by the Collector of Ahmedabad on July 18, 1967."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18154, "end_char": 18163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter twenty-two members belonging to Waghari Harijan community were granted lease-hold rights in respect of a J, hatha land for a period of ten years pursuant to the above Government Resolution by the Collector of Ahmedabad on July 18, 1967."}}, {"text": "18-7-67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18349, "end_char": 18356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.B.A.R.E.V. 165 District Collector's Office Ahmedabad 18-7-67\n\nIt is hereby ordered that under mentioned twenty-two members of Waghari Harijan Ganotia Samuha Kheti Mandali (unlimited) Santhal, .have been granted lands for cultivation, out of the Govern- ,-( F men!"}}, {"text": "sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19626, "end_char": 19642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28-12-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19721, "end_char": 19731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C L.B.B. 3964-101585-G dated 28-12-1966."}}, {"text": "PATTA", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19765, "end_char": 19770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All conditions mentioned in PATTA shall be complied with."}}, {"text": "31-5-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20297, "end_char": 20306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This grant expires on 31-5-1977."}}, {"text": "Niranjan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20362, "end_char": 20376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- Niranjan Singh, Collector, F Ahmedabad.\""}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21221, "end_char": 21231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21244, "end_char": 21255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21263, "end_char": 21293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21628, "end_char": 21638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22336, "end_char": 22346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jhe petitioners who would have been entitled under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25000, "end_char": 25090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25518, "end_char": 25528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jhe petitioners who would have been entitled under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Jhe petitioners who would have been entitled under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "December 28,\n\n1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26932, "end_char": 26950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is on ' account of the above position the writ petitioner challenged the validity of the Resolution passed by the Government on December 28,\n\n1966."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27304, "end_char": 27314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chapter V of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30092, "end_char": 30113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 37 to 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30167, "end_char": 30184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Code", "statute": "Chapter V of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30187, "end_char": 30196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Code", "statute": "Chapter V of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31302, "end_char": 31312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32048, "end_char": 32058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 203 and 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32169, "end_char": 32189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32320, "end_char": 32330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter VIII of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32422, "end_char": 32446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33078, "end_char": 33088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33367, "end_char": 33377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33392, "end_char": 33402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VIII of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VIII of the Code"}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33751, "end_char": 33761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter VI of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34500, "end_char": 34522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34608, "end_char": 34618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Code", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Code"}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34970, "end_char": 35001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 213 and 214", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35121, "end_char": 35141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nBombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921", "statute": "the\n\nBombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921"}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35488, "end_char": 35498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nBombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921", "statute": "the\n\nBombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921"}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35680, "end_char": 35690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the\n\nBombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921", "statute": "the\n\nBombay Land Revenue Rules, 1921"}}, {"text": "Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36697, "end_char": 36743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 46 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37051, "end_char": 37069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963", "statute": "the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38960, "end_char": 38980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order passed by the Government of Bombay in the year 1931 authorised grant of laods to kolis and other wild tribes in jungle tracts without payment of any occupancy price."}}, {"text": "Articles 38, 39 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40313, "end_char": 40335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All these orders were passed during the British rule by the State Government in exercise of its powers under the Code", "statute": "All these orders were passed during the British rule by the State Government in exercise of its powers under the Code"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42020, "end_char": 42030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43200, "end_char": 43210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43374, "end_char": 43384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48472, "end_char": 48482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_746_757_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "A VlNOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY\n\n\\I.\n\nNARAIN DEVI TANEJA\n\nJanuary 11, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nDelhi Rent Control Act, 1970-Sccfions 25A and 25B(8)--Scope of.\n\nClause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act provides that a landlord can evict a tenant of premises let for residential purposes on the ground thot the same were required by him bona fide for occupation as a residence for himself and thnt he bas no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.\n\nAn appeal from the order of the Controller lies to the tribunal and a further appeal to the High Court.\n\nIn September, 1975, the Government of India took a decision that Govern .. ment employees owning houses in Delhi shall be required to vacate accommodation allotted to jhem by the Government within a period of three montlos from !st October. 1975. To avoid pro:edural delays in the matter of eviction of tenants from houses let out by (Jovernment servants who were required to shift to their own houses, Chapter ill A was introduced by an Amending Act. Section I4A which was added in Chapter III provided a right to a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government to recover immediate possession of the premises' let out by him in case he was required by the Government to vacate the residential premises allotted to him. The non-obstante clause contained in section 25A provides that .ithe provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything. inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or any other law ; for the time being in force.\" Section 25B(B) pre>· vides that \\Vhen \"an order for the recovery of possession of any premises\" has been made by the Controller on an application covered by section 25B no appeal or second appeal shall lie ther<:from.\n\nThe respondent's application under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act was rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground that it was not legally permissible for her to CJbtain possession of the premises under the section because she had sought evic; tion only in respect of a part of the premises.\n\nIn the respondent's rev1s1on petition before the High Court the tenant contended that the petition 'vas incompetent because in view of the provisions of section 25B(B) the cnly remedy available to the respondent was by way of appeal under section 38. Rejecting this contention the High Court held that :ii petition for revision as envisaged by section 25B(8) lay against the order accept~ ing or rejecting an eviction application and against such an order alone.\n\nDismissing the tenant's appeal.\n\nHELD : The remedy of the !aad la.dy against the order of the Controller in the present case was by way of revision (and revision only) of that order by the High Court under the proviso to section 25B(B), even though it -\n\nV. K. CHOWDHRY V, N. D. TANEJA 747\n\nan order not directing but by refusing rocovery of possession of the premises A in dispute. [756 G-Hl\n\nThe non-obstante clause in section 25A provides that whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of Chapter IIIA and those of the rest of the Act or of any other law in force the former shall prevail. If an application is made under cluse ( e) of the proviso to section 14 (I) it has to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in section 25B and not under B the provision.:; contained in Chapters other than Chapter IIIA. Therefore, the procedure laid down in section 25A read with section 25B(1) envisages a shortcut to the conclusion of the proceedings before the Controller. Section 25B(8) further provides that when an order for the recovery of possession\n\nof any premises has b'een made no appeal under section 38 or second appeal under section 39 shall lie. The combined effect of section 25A and section 25B(l) and (10) is that in wh>tever respect section 25B makes a departure C from the procedure prescribed in other chapters of the Act, the provisions of Chapter IUA shall prevail. [753 B-D; 754 DJ\n\nThe expresion \"order for the recovery of possession of any premises\" has to be construed, in the context in which it appears, as an order deciding an application for the recovery of possession of any premises; because, firstly, if an order in favour of the landlord alone was meant to be covered by sub-sec D tion (8) an order refusing such relief would be liable to be called in question by way of an appeal or second appeal under section 38 so that there would be two procedures for the end product of the Controller's proceedings being called in question, one when the same is in favour of the landlord and another when it goes against hi~ which would obviously entail discrimination B!Ild make the sub-section invalid. But if a provision can be construed in a manner which upholds its legal or constitutional validity it should, if possible, be so construed E rather than the other way round. [755 B-E)\n\nAll that sub-section (10) of section 25B states is that the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction covered by subsection ( 1 ) shall be the same as the procedure for disposal of other applications by ControIIers except as provided in Chapter IUA. Sub-section (8) expressly takes away the right of nppeal or second appeal \\Vhile providing the remedy of revision F instead. [747 E-F]\n\nSection 14(7) does not require that an order for the recovery of possession of any pren1ises should contain a direction that the landlord would not be) entitled to obtain possession of the premises in dispute before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the order. The sub-section itself declares\n\nthat such an order \\\\'ould not be executable before a certaiq perio4 has expired.\n\nG The declaration is part of the law of the land and would be operative as such so that the landlady would not be entitled to execute the order before the expiry\n\nof six months from the date thereof notwithstanding the fact that the terms of sub-section (7) have not been made part of the order. [757 C-DJ\n\nDevi Singh v. Chaman Lal (1977) Rajdhani La.w Reporter 566; R. K. Parikh v. Uma Verma I.L.R. (1978) JI Delhi 78; Blwgwati Perslwd v. Om Perkhaslz (1979) Rajdhani Law Reporter 26; Mahavir Singh v. Kamal Narain (1979) Rajdhani Law Reporter 159 approved.\n\nA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2691 of 1979.\n\nAppeal bY Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 7-8-1979 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 49/1979.\n\nY ogesh Kumar 1 ain and Mukul Rohtagi for the Appeal.\n\nB. P. Bhandari, R. C. Bhatia and P. C. Kapoor for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated August 7, 1979, of a Single !udge of the High Court c of Delhi accepting a petition made by the landlady for revision of the order of an Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter called the Controller) of Delhi refusing to direct eviction of the tenant.\n\n2. The landlady had sought eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on the ground covered by clause ( e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), namely, that she required them bona fide for occupation as a residence for herself. Her application being triable in. accordance with the procedure laid down in section 25B of the Act, the tenant sought the Controller's leave to contest it on grounds which were stated in his affidavit. The leave was granted and thereafter the tenant filed a written statement contesting his eviction which was ultimate!Y disallowed. The learned Controller held that although the landlady had proved that s.he required the premises bona fide for her own occupation, she was diseJ!titled to the relief claimed by her for two reaso~ which were (1) that she\n\nhad not proved service on the tenant of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and, (2) that her application claimed eviction only in respect of a part of the premises Jet out which was riot legally permissible.\n\nThe landlady went up in revision to the High Court and the learned Single Judge reversed both the findings which had been decided by the Controller against her.\n\nTwo other points were raised before the High Court on behalf of the tenant. It was contended, firstly, that the petition for revision was incompetent in view of the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 2SB of the Act and that only an appeal as contemplated by section 38 thereof should have been instituted before the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal).\n\nThe contention was negatived with the observation that a petition for revision as envisaged hy sub-section (8) above-mentioned lay against an order accepting or rejecting ari eviction application, and against such an order alone, as laid down in Devi Singh\n\nv. Chaman Lal('), R. K. Parikh v.\n\nUma Verma( 2), Bhagwati Pershad v. Om Perkash( 3 ) and Mahavir Singh v. Kanwla Narain(').\n\nThe second contention was that the lease deed on which the landlady relied in support of the alleged tenancy was unstamped and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This contention was repelled for the reason that although the said deed was taken on the file subject to the objection made on behalf of the tenant, the objection was never pressed at the time of argument before the Controller. It was also observed by the learned Single Judge that the contention was practically meaningless as the tenant had never denied the tenancy in question.\n\nIn the result the learned Single Judge passed the i!!]pugned order directing the eviction of the tenant and, as already stated, that is th(l\n\ncrder impugned before us.\n\n3. It has been vehemently contended before us on behalf of the tenant-appellant that the opinion of the High Court about the maintainability of the petition for revision of the order of the Controller is erroneous and that the only remedy open to the Iitndlady against that order was by way of appeal to the Tribunal under section 38 of the Act. In order to determine the acceptability of the contention it is necessary to undertake a somewhat dtailed exami11a.tion of some of the provisions of the Act, especiaJ!y those which were introduced by a 1976 amendment with effect from 1st of December, 1975.\n\n4. The Act as originally framed provided for the control of rent' and of eviction of tenants.\n\nVarious safeguards were created by it to ensure security of tenure to tenants residing in the urban area of Delhi and the right of the landlord to evict his tenant was restricted in ambit so as to be available only if the existence of certain specified grounds was proved. Those grounds are enumerated in cliluses\n\n(a) to (l) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act.\n\nThe ground contained in clause ( e) runs thus:\n\n\" ( e) that the premises let for residential purposes are G required bona fide l)y the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person\n\n(1) (1977) Rajdhani Law Reporter 566.\n\n(2) I.LR. (1978) II Delhi 786.\n\n(3) (1979) Rajdhani Law Reporter 26.\n\n(4) (1979) Rajdbani Law Reporter 159.\n\nA for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential acco11111lodation;\"\n\nThe jurisdiction to decide disputes arising under the Act was vested in Controllers and civil courts were divested thereof. Chapter VI of the Act made provision for appointment of Controllers, their powers and functions and appeals from their orders.\n\nOut of the sections appearing in that Chapter there are three with which w~ are here concerned. They are sections 37, 38 and 39. Section 37 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Controller and sub-section ( 2) thereof states:\n\nC \"Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in any proceeding before him, follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence.\"\n\nD Section 38 lays down that from e¥ery order of the Controller made under the Act an appeal shall lie to the Tribunal who shall hJLve a.ll the powers of a court under the Code of Civil Procedure when hearing an appeal.\n\nSection 39 provides for an appeal to the High Court against an appellate order passed by the Tribunal bu~ makes it clear that such a second appeal shall lie only if it in¥ol.ves E some substantial question of law.\n\nOn the 9th of September, 1975, the Central Government took a decision that Government employees owning houses within the Union Territory of Delhi shall be required to vacate accommodation aUotted\n\nto them by the Government within a period of three months beginning with the Jst of October, 1975, and that in case they failed to vacate such acco11111lodation before the 1st of January 1976, they would have to pay therefor licence-fee equivalent to rent at the market .rate.\n\nIn view of that decision it became necessary to mak~ special provision for enabling such Government employees to evict their respective tenants and to shift to their own houses. It was also felt that procedural delays required to be cut down in the case of disputes between the landlord and the tenant when the landlord bona fide required the demised premises for his own occupation.\n\nThe Act was therefore amended by Ordinance No. 24 of 1975 which was eventuaJly replaced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act (being Act No. 18 of 1976 and hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act). The Amending Act introduced in Chapter III of the Act section 14A which provided for a right to a person in occupation of any residential premises aUotted to him by the Central Government\n\nor any local authority to recover immediate possession of premises let out by him in case he was required by the Government or the authority to vacate the residential premises allotted to him.\n\nThe only other change effected by the Amending Act was to add a new chapter, viz., Chapter IIIA, to the Act.\n\nThe chapter is headed \"Summary Trial Of Certain Applications\" and consists of three sections, viz., sections 25A, 25B and 25C, the first two of which may be reproduced in extenso:\n\n\"25A. The provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or in\n\nany other law for the time being in force.\" C\n\n\"25B. (1) Every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premis-\"s on the ground specified in clause ( e) of the proviso to sub-section ( 1) of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be de; ilt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section.\n\n\"(2) The Controller shall issue summons, in r:eiation to every application referred to in sub-section (1), in the form specified in the Third Schedule.\n\n\"(3) (a) the Controller shall, in addition to, aiid simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service on\n\nth~ tenant, also direct the summons to be served ]Jy registered post, acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to• accept the service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works_ for gain and may, if the circumstances 'lL!_he case so require, also direct the publication of the snmmons in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which th~ tenant is last knowri to have resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain. ·\n\n(b) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the tenant or his agent is received by the Controller or the registered article containing the summons is received back with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee tq the effect that the tenant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the registered article, t}le Con!roller may declare that there has been a valid service of summons.\n\n\"( 4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files au affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his appearance in pnrsuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to aJ! order for eviction on the ground aforesaid.\n\n\"(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause ( e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under section\n\n14A.\n\n\" ( 6) Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable.\n\n\"(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in a proceeding to which this Chapter applies,\n\nfollow the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recordirig of evidence.\n\n\"(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section:\n\nProvided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.\n\n\"(9) Where no application has been made to the High Court on revision, the Controller may exercise, the powers of review in accordance with the provisions oi Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\n\n' . :..--\n\n\" '\n\n• ,\n\n\" ( 1 O) Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction on the ground specified in clause ( e) of the proviso to subsection ( 1) of section 14, or under section 14A, 11hall be the same as the procedure for the disposal of applications by Controllers.\"\n\n5. The non obstante clause occurring in section 25A makes it quite clear that whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of Chapter IHA on the one hand and those of the rest of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force on the other, the former shall prevail. Section 25B provides a special procedure for the determination of an application by a landlord claiming recovery of\n\npossession from his tenant of the premises let out to the latter on either of two grounds, viz., those specified in clause ( e) of the proviso to sub-s'ection ( 1) of section 14 and in section 14A. Thus if such an application is based on the ground that the landlord requires the demised premises bona fide for his own occupation as a residential accommodation it has to be dealt with in accordance\\\n\nwith the procedure specified in section 25B and not under the provisions contained in chapters other than Chapter IIIA, in so far as the latter are inconsistent with the for!I\\er.\n\nThis follows directly from the provisions of section 25A read with those of sub-section\n\n(1) of section 25B. That procedure envisages a short-cut to the. conclusion of the proceedings before the Controller and for that purpose makes the right of the tenant to contest the application of the landlord subject to the Controller's leave obtained on grounds specified in an affidavit. If no such affidavit is filed, the question Of leave does not arise nor that of a contest by the tenant. Furthermore, if the affidavit is filed but leave is refused, a contest by the defendant is again barred. In either case the proceedings immediately come to a termination by the passage of an order of eviction of the tenant. In case, however, the required affidavit is filed and leave to contest is granted, the Controller has ID embark on the usual inquiry but the .same has again to be conducted in conformity with the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence.\n\nThis is the mandate of sub-section\n\n(7) of section 25B, which makes a slight departure in the matter of practice and procedure from. that to be followed in other applications under the Act as laid down in sub-section (2) of section 37.\n\nSub-section (8) of section 25B makes another variation in the H procedure and states that when an order for the recovery of possession of any premises has been made by the •controller on an applier-;-,.;-~-\n\n-~ '.\n\ncation covered by sub-section (I) no appeal or second appeal shall lie therefrom. In the case of such an order therefore the provisions of sections 38 and 39 are specifically made inapplicable. The subsection further provides however for the remedy of revision by the fligh Court of any order made by the Controller under section 25B, a remedy which is not available to a party in a dispute not covered by Chapter IHA.\n\nReference may also be made here to sub-section (10) of section 25B pointedly.\n\nThat sub-section makes it clear that even in the case of applications falling under sub-section (1) of that section the procedure for their disposal by Controllers shall be the same as in the case of other applications, except as is provided in Chapter Ill A. The combined effect of section 25A and sub-section (1) and\n\n(10) of section 25B is that in whatever respect section 25B makes a departure from the procedure prescribed in other chapters of the Act, the provisions of Chap.ter IHA shall prevail but that where that Chapter does not provide for a variation, applications covered by sub- D ' section (I) of section 25B shall be treated at par with all other applications for the purposes of procedure.\n\n6. It is in the above background that the question as to whether an appeal to the Tribunal or a revision to the High Court was competent against the order passed in the instant case by the Controller has to be decided, and that brings us directly to the meaning of subsection (8) of section 25B.\n\nThe proviso to that sub-section gives power to the High Co.urt to revise \"an order made by the Controller\n\nunder this section\" which expreion is no doubt Ci\\pable of being cogstrued as any order o~ whatsoever, nature passed by the Controller .-if\n\nwhile acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in seetion , 25B. The proviso, however, has to be read as a legislative measure carved out of the sub-section to which it is appended and the order mentioned therein has to be regarded as an order of the type which\n\nthe snb-section speaks of, i.e. \"an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section.\" Thus, the order covered by §uh-section (8) (and therefore, by the proviso also) would be a final order disposing of an application on conclusion of the proceedings under sub-section ( 4) or sub-section (7) of secti.on 25B.\n\nThis line of reasoning does not present any difficulty.\n\n7. Learned counsel for the tenant however argued that for an H order to be covered by sub-section ( 8) of section 25B it must be an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by tl1e Controller.\n\nAccording.to him, if an order does. not direct recovery\n\nv. K. CHOWDHRY v. N. D. TANEJA (Kasha!, !. ) 7 5 5\n\nof pos.session by the landlord from the tenant, it is not an order which sub-section ( 8) would embrace.\n\nThis contention, though not wholly implausible, runs counter to the decision in Devi Singh v. Chaman Lal (supra) which was followed in Bhagwati Prasad v. Om Prakash\n\n(supra) and Mahavir Singh v. Kama! Narain (supra) and does not find favour with us. Sub-section(S) no doubt in terms speaks only of an order \"for the recovery of possession of any premises\" and does not mention one which refuses the relief of eviction to the landlord; but then it appears to us that the expression \"order for the recovery of possession of any premises\" has to be construed, in the context in which\n\nit appears, as an order deciding an application for the recovery of the possession of any premises.\n\nOur reasons in this behalf are twofold.\n\nFirstly, if an order in favour of the landlord alone was meant to be covered by sub-section (8), an order refusing such relief would be liable to be called in question by way of an appeal or second appeal under section 38 so that there would be two procedures for the end-product of the Controller's proceedings being called in question; one when the same is in favour of the landlord, and another when it goes against him, which would obviously entail discrimination and make the sub-sectk>n suffer from a constitutional invalidity.\n\nIt is an accepted rule of interpretation that if a provision can lle\n\ncoristrued in a manner which upholds its lei:al or constitutional validity it should if possible be so construed rather thaQ the other way round.\n\nWe do feel that the language used is not happy but tllen it would not be doing violence to it if it is construed as just above stated.\n\nSecondly, the scheme of the Act and the object of the introduction of section 14A and Chapter IHA into it by, the Amending Act make us form the opinion that sub-section (8) of section 25B is exhaustive of the rights of appeal and revision in relation to the proceedings held under that Chapter. Before the enforcement of the A.mending Act, all disputes between a landlord and his tenant were liable to be dealt with according to a uniform. procedure before the Controlle.r as also in appeal and second appeal.\n\nNo distinction was made between one kind of dispute and another.\n\nWhen it was felt that the procedure prescribed in the Act defeated, by reason of the delay involved, the very purpose of an application made under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, especially in the case of landlords who themselves held accommodation allotted by the Government or a local authority whlch they were required to vacate, section 14A and Chapter IIIA were introduced by the Amending Act so as to cut down the time-factor drastically, so much\n\nso that a tenant was required to o)Jtain leave from the Controller for contesting an application for his eviction before he could put up his defence, and the Controller was given th_c power to refuse leave and straightway pass an order of eviction if he found that the grounds disclosed by the tenant in support of his right to dispute the landlord's claim were not such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction.\n\nSub-section (7) further simpiilled the procedure on contest being allowed, even though sub-section (2) of section 37 itself provided for a procedure far simpler than ordic narily obtains in proceedings before a civil court.\n\nThen there is sub-section (8) which provides for the abolition of the right of appeal and second appe>tl and replaces it by a power in the High Court to revise an order passed by the Controller.\n\nThat provision, as a part of the overall picture painted, must necessarily be construed as laying down procedure exclusive of that provided in sections 38 and 39, and we hold that the four cases relied upon by the High Court in rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the tenant were correctly decided.\n\n8. In the way of the above interpretation of sub-section ( 8) of section 25B, the provisions of .sub-section (10) thereof do not pose a hurdle.\n\nAll that sub-section (10) states is that the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction covered by sub-ection ( 1) shall be the same as the procedure for disposal of oilier applications by Controllers, except as. provided in Chapter llIA. Sub section (8) as interpreted by us governs an application covered by sub-section (1) of section 25B and expressly takes away the right of! appeal or second appeal, while providing tlie. remedy of revision instead.\n\nAs we have held the provisions of sub-section ( 8) to be exhaustive\n\nof the remedies available to a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controli.('r in applications triable under Chapter IHA, such applications fall outside the category of those which can be disposed of like other applications under sub-section (10) read with the pro visions contained in other chapters of the Act.\n\n9. As a result of the above discussion we hold that the remedy of the landlady against the order of the Controller in the present case was by way of revision (and revision only) of that order by the High Court as laid do\"!n in the proviso to s.llb-section ( 8) of sectlon 25B, even though it was an order not directing, but refusing recovery of pqssession of the premises in dispute.\n\n10. Another contention raised on behalf of the tenant was that the order passed by the High Court while revising that of the Controller was illegal inasmuch as it did not specifically contain a direc•\n\nv. K. CHO\\VDHRY v. N. !J. TANE.JA (Koshal, J.) 757\n\ntion that the landlady would not be entitled to obtain possession of A the premises in dispute before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.\n\nThe contention seeks support from the provisions of sub-section (7) of s(!ction 14 of the Act which states:\n\n\"Where an order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in clause ( e) of the proviso to sub-section {I), the landlord shall not ge entitled to obtain possession there-0f before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.\"\n\nNow this sub-section does not at all require that an order for the recovery of possession of any premises should contain a direction of\n\nthe type above mentioned.\n\nOn the other hand, the sub-section itselt declares that such an order wonk[ not be executable before a certain period has expired.\n\nThe declaration is part of the law of the land and would be operative as such so that the lndlady would not be entitled to execute the order made by the f!igh Court in her favour before the expiry of six months from the date thereof notwithstandfog the fact that the terms of sub-section (7) have not been made a part of that order.\n\n11. The only other ground urged in support of the appeal was that the landlady had prayed for the te.nant's eviction from only a part of the premises and that such eviction could not legally be granted to her.\n\nThe contmtion embraces a question of fact which has been decided against the tenant by the High Court and for reconsidering which we do not find any reason.\n\n12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed but with no order as to costs. p\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed .", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "A VlNOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VINOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NARAIN DEVI TANEJA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARAIN DEVI TANEJA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A VlNOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY\n\n\\I.\n\nNARAIN DEVI TANEJA\n\nJanuary 11, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. 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K. CHOWDHRY V, N. D. TANEJA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aad la.dy against the order of the Controller in the present case was by way of revision (and revision only) of that order by the High Court under the proviso to section 25B(B), even though it -\n\nV. K. CHOWDHRY V, N. D. TANEJA 747\n\nan order not directing but by refusing rocovery of possession of the premises A in dispute. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Act"}}, {"text": "9th of September, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12648, "end_char": 12670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th of September, 1975, the Central Government took a decision that Government employees owning houses within the Union Territory of Delhi shall be required to vacate accommodation aUotted\n\nto them by the Government within a period of three months beginning with the Jst of October, 1975, and that in case they failed to vacate such acco11111lodation before the 1st of January 1976, they would have to pay therefor licence-fee equivalent to rent at the market .rate."}}, {"text": "1st of January 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13010, "end_char": 13029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 9th of September, 1975, the Central Government took a decision that Government employees owning houses within the Union 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TANE.JA (Koshal, J.) 757\n\ntion that the landlady would not be entitled to obtain possession of A the premises in dispute before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.", "canonical_name": "KosHAL"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_758_764_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL-IT,\n\nCALCUTTA v.\n\nKALYANJI MAVJI & COMPANY\n\nJanuary 14,. 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nIndian Income 1ax Act 1922 (11 of 1922), Ss. 10(2)(v) & 10(2)(xv)- Assessee d1Jing business in coal-Working various collieries--One colliery requi~ sitioned for n1ilitary use-Later cferequisitioned-Expenditure incurrred far re~ suniing operation of Colliery-Whether capital or revenue expenditur~.\n\nThe respondentasses.&ee carried on business in coal as the owner of various collieries. One of the collieries, was' occupied by the niilitary from 1942 until it was derequisitioned in 1955. During that per)od the assessee did not work the said colliery : M.though the business in coal and working of the other collieries were carried on. While the colliery remained under military occupation the assessee incurred expenditure in respect of the colliery on account of payment of surlaco rent, minimum royalty and; sala•ry for the watch and ward staff, which expenditure was claimed and allo\\ved as business expenditure\\ of the assessee.\n\nAfter the colliery was handed over to the assessce upon dorequisiticn the assessee incurred an expenditure of about Rs. 1.6 lakhs in renovating the build~ ing, reconditioning tha machinery and. clearing the land of all debris accumulated over a number of years.\n\nIn the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1959-60 th~ a8Se, s.iee claimed deduction of the aforesaid amount under section 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act.\n\nThe deduction was disallowed by the Income! Tax Officer on the ground that the expenditure was capital in nature~\n\nThe appeals by the assesseei to the Appellate AssistMlt' Comn1issioner and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were dismissed.\n\nIn the reference to the 1-Iigh Court at the instance of the assessee 'the High Court observed that the business of the assessee had to be considered as a wholei and not on the basis1 of its different sources of supply or units of production, and held thM: on the facts admitted and found it could not be said that any fresh asset had been acquired by the assessee by spending Rs. 1.6 lakhs and that the expenditure: was incurred by the assessee for the purpose of carrying on an existing concern. The expenditure was, therefore, in the nature of a revenue expenditure.\n\nIn the appeal by the Revenue to this Court, it wao contended : (a) where repairs are effected to buildings and machinery a deduction under section 10(2) is permissible only in respect of \"current rpairsl' and, repairs which are not\n\n' 1current repa-irs\" are not intended to be the subject of relief, (b) the repairs made by the assessee cannot be described as \"current repairs\", and (c) if section 10(2) (v) is the relevant clause, being the specific provision in respect of expendi-\n\n/ /\n\n\\ ,'..-\n\nC.!.T. V. KALYANJI MAVJI 759\n\nture on \"current repairs\" to buildings and machinery, there is nu justifiration for relying on section 10(2)(xv) a residuary clause.\n\nDismisoing the appeal,\n\nHEI.D: I. The High Court Wa.9 right in holding that the expenditure was eot of a carital nature. [764 EJ\n\n2. The expenditure of Rs. 1.6 Jak.hs was expenditure laid out. as part of the B process of profit earning. The nature of tho expenditurr. was clearly revenue in characfer. (764 DJ\n\n3. There can be little doubt that the expenditure incurred was incidental to the business of the assessee. It was involved in renovating the buildings, recondi\n\ntioning the m&.<::hinefy and clearing the debris~ fron1 the land, for the purpose of resuming the operation of the co1liery. The expenditure \\Vas laid out wholly for the pUrpQSe of the business. [763 DJ\n\n4. There must be stroug evidence that in, the case of repairs which arc not \"current repairs'' the Legisl<c1ture intended a depc:rturc from the principle that an expenditure iaid out or expended wholJy and exclusively for the purposes of the business, and which expenditure is not capital in n<:.•ture, should not be allo'ved in computing the incon1e from business.\n\nThere is nothing in the language of section 10(2)(v) \\vhich declares or necessarily implies that repairs, other than, \"current repairs\", will not qualify for the benefit of that principle.\n\nOn accepted commercial practice anJ trading principles an item of business expenditure must be deducted in order to arrive at the true figure of profits and gains for tax\n\npurposes. [762 G-763 AJ\n\nC.l.T. v. Chitnis 50 I.A. 292; Mo'tipur Sugar Facto1y Ltd .. v. C./.T. Bihar and Orissa, 28 I.T.R. 120; Devi Fibns Ltd. v. C.l.T. /rrfadras, 75 I.T.R. 301; Badrldas Daga v. C.1.T. 34 I.T.R. 10, 15; Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. C.l.T. rvcsl\n\nBengal, 37 I.T.R. 1, 9; Ihe Law Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Con1111issioners of Inland Revenue 12 Tax Cases 621, 625 referred to.\n\nThe scope of Sectien !0(2)(xv) should be construed liberally. [763 BJ\n\nJn the instant case even if the expenditure n1ade by the assessee cannot b~\n\ndcribed as \"current repairs\" he is entitled to invoke' the benefit of s. 10(2) (xv).\n\n[763 CJ\n\n5. \\Vhether an expenditure can be described as capital or revenue falls to be decided by several ti?'sts, each one of which approaches the question from oae perspective or another, conditioned by the particular facts of each case.\n\n[763 FJ\n\nAssam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. C.l.T. West Btngal (1955) 27 I.T.R. 34 G referred to.\n\nIn the instant case the business of the as.Sessee was coal mining and it was carried on by th~ Operation of a networ~ of collieries. Each colliery was a unit of production. \\\\'hile the several units of production continued to be employed and the business continued to be carried on, one alone of all the units, was compelled to suspend production. The suspension was due to the property be.ing H requisitioned for military use.\n\nAs soon as it was derequisitioncd the a'8CS\"See I l-9ISCil80\n\nA took measures to resume production of coal. The buildings were renovated, the machinery reconditioned and the accumulated debris removed from the la.nd No new asct was brought into existence, no advantage for the enduring benefit of the business 'vas acquired. The activity which was continuously in operation but had been te1upora1y suspended was resumed. [763 G-764 CJ\n\nOyIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2098 of 1972\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 5-8-1971 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Rderence No. 109 /65.\n\nD. V. Patel, ]. Ramamurthy and Miss A Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nS. R. Banerjee, Mrs. lndu Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. : This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court at Calcutta under s. 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 is directed against the judgment dated August 5, 1971 of that High Court disposing of an income-tax reference.\n\nThe respondent asscssee is a registered firm and owns several collieries in West Bengal and Bihar. One of the collieries is known as the South Samia Colliery. The South Samia colliery was under military occupation from 1942 and was released in 1955. During the period of military occupation the assessee incurred expenditure on account of minimum royalty payable in respect of the coJ:iery, the sur face rent and salaries for the watch and ward employees.\n\nThe expenditure was allowed in income-tax proceedings as a business expenditure. After the colliery was released by the military, the assessee incurred n further expenditure amounting to Rs. 1,61, 7 42 on the colliery with a view to resuming mining OJX'rations.\n\nThe expenditure was incurred during the previous year beginning October 24, 1957 and ending November 11, 1958 relevant to the assessment year 1959-60.\n\nIn the assessment proceedings for that assessment year the assessee claimed a deduc'ion of the amount of Rs. 1,61,742 under s. 10(2)\n\n(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, but the deduction was disal1owed by the Income-tax Officer on the ground that the expenditure was capital in 'nature.\n\nOn apJX'al, the Appe:late Assistant Commissioner affirmed that the expenditure was in the nature of capital expenditure.\n\nThe assessee proceeded in second appeal, but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, without giving any reasons of its own, merely recorded itE agreement with the income-tax authorities. The assessee obtained\n\n' '\n\n.1 \"\n\n--'. .\n\nC.I.T. v. KALYANJ! MAVJ! (Pathak, !.) 7 Gi\n\na reference to the High Court at Calcutta for its opinion ob the follow\n\ning question :\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income-tax appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the expenditure claimed on the South Samla Colliery at Rs. 1,61,742 was capital in nature.\"\n\nTh~ High Court noted the following facts :\n\nThe assessee carried on busihess in coal as the owner of various collieries. The South Samia Colliery, which was one of them, was occupied by the military from 1942 until it was derequisitioncd in\n\n1955. During that period the assessee did not, because hei could not, work the colliery.\n\nHe continued, however, carrying on hie business in coal and working other collieries during that period. While the South Samia Colliery remained under military occupation the assessee incurred expenditure on payment of surface rent and minimum royalty in respect of that colliery and also on account of salary for the watch and ward staff. The expenditure had been claimed and allowed as business expenditure of the assessee.\n\nAfter the colliery was handed over to the assessee upon derequisition, the assessee incurred, during the relevant period, an expendi'.ure of Rs. 1,61,742 in renovating the bnil\\ling, reconditioning the machinery and clearing the land of debris accumulated over a numrer of years.\n\nThe expenditure of Rs. 1,61,742 consisted of Rs. 66,937 spent on the staff and labour force by way of salaries, wages and other benefits and an amount of Rs. 94,805 spent on the purchase of various stores, machinery repairs, dhowrah repairs etc. This expenditure had to be . incurred by the assessee for the purpose of putting the machinery in working order and bringihg the colliery to a state where the mining operations could be resumed.\n\nThe colliery had not started working and mining operations had not been resumed . during the relevant year.\n\nThe High Court observed that the assessee was carrying on its business throughout and the circumstance that one of the collieries was not being worked did not affect the carrying on of that business. The business of the assessee, the High Court said, had to be considered as a whole and not on the basis of its different sources of snpr~Y or uuits of production. The High Court held that on the facts admitted and fon:nd it could not be said that any fresh asset had been acquired by the assessee by spending Rs. 1,61,742. The expenditure, it observed, was incurred by the assessee for the purpose of carrying on an existing concern and not for acquiring any concern not in existence. Accordi'ngly, it held that the expenditure was in the n&ture of revenue expenditure and, therefore, answered the question in favour of the assessee.\n\nIn this appeal the first con:ention raised by the Revenue is that the High Court had no jurisdiction to re-appraise the facts and therefore its finding on th~ nature of the expenditure is vitiated. The contention is without substance. The facts on which the High Court has relied are admitted between the parties or are facts found by the income-tax authorities.\n\nWe have no hesitation in rejecting the first contention.\n\nThe second contention is that the claim of the assessee must be considered with reference to s.10(2) (v) and not s.10(2)(xv) of tho Act. It is urged that if s.10(2) (v) is the relevant clause, being the specific provision in respect of expenditure on current repairs to buildings nnd machinery, there is no justification for relying on s.10(2)(xv).\n\nS. 10(2) (xv) is a residuary clause, and deals with expenditure not being an allowance of the 'nature described in any of the preceding clauses of s.10 (2). The submission is that where repairs are effected to buildings and machinery a deduction under s.10(2) is permissible only in respect of curont repairs, and repairs which are not \"current repairs\" are not intended to be the subject of relief. The Act, it is conte'nded, limits the repairs to \"current\" repairs.\n\nTh~ repairs made by the assessee, it is said, cannot be described as \"current repairs\".\n\nNow, this contention rests on the principle; that if a special rrovision covers the case, resort cannot be had to a general provision. It seems to us that if the renovation of the building. the reconditioni'ng of machinery and the removal of debris cannot be described as \"current repairs\"-and we assume that to be so--the case would be entitled to consideration under s.10(2)(xv). Section 10(2) (v) deals with current repairs only. The subject matter of s.10(2) (v) is \"current repairs\" a'nd it appears difficult to agree that repairs which are not \"current repairs\" should not be considered for deduction on general princiQles or under s.10(2) (xv). There must be very strong evidence that in the case of such repairs, the Legislature intended a departure from the principle that an expenditure, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business, a'nd which expenditure is not capital in nature, shoud not be allowed in computing the\n\nincome from business. There is nothing in the language of s.10(2)\n\n(v) which declares or necessarily implies that repairs, other than, current repairs, will not qualify for the benefit of that principle. We must remember that o'n accepted commercial practice and trading principles an item of business expenditure must be deducted in order\n\n...\n\n.~ ! \"\n\nC.I.T. v. KALYANJI MAVJI (Pathak, J.) 763\n\nto arrive at the true figure of profits and gains for tax purposes. The rule was held by the Privy Council in C.l.T. v. Chitnis(') to be applicable in the case of losses, and it bas been applied by the courts in India to business expenditure incurred by an assessee. Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd. v. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa(') and Devi Films Ltd . . v.\n\nC.I.T. Madras(').\n\nThe principle found favour with this Court in Badridas Daga v. C.I.T.( 4 ) and Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. West Benzal(5). If the contents of that rule be true on general principle, there is good reason why the scope of s.10(2) (xv) should be construed liberally. In our opinion, even if the expenditure made by the asseswe in the present case cannot be described as \"current repairs\", he is entitled to invoke the benefit of s. 10(2) (xv). We may mention that in The Law Shipping ca. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') it has been held that accumulated arrears for repairs are none the less repairs necessary to earn profits, although they have been allowed to accumulate.\n\nThe question then is whether s.10(2)(xv) is attracted. There can be little doubt that the expenditure incurred is incidental to the business of the assessee. It was involved in renovating the buildings, reconditioning the machinery and clearing the debris, from the land. All the work done was for the purpose of resuming the operation of the colliery. The expenditure was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business. We do not think there can be any dispute as to that.\n\nBut the more serious question is whether the expenditure can be regarded as capital in '.nature, for if that be so the benefit of s.10(2) (xv), o.-i its plain ternis, must be denied.\n\nNow, whether an expendi\" ture can be described as capital or revenue falls to be decided by several osts, each one of which approaches the queGtion from one perspective or another, conditioned by the particular facts of each case.\n\nWe need not refer to all of them. On the facts of the present case, it seems sufficient to mention the tests laid down by this Court in Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. West Bengal('). The business of the assessee in the present case was coal-mining, and it was carried on by the operation of a network of collieries.\n\nEach colliery was a unit o~ production.\n\nWhile the several units of production continued to be\n\n(!) 59 I.A 297.\n\n(2) 28 l.T.R. 120.\n\n(3) 75 l.T.R. 301.\n\n(4) 34 l.T.R. 10, 15.\n\n(5) 37 l.T.R. 1, 9.\n\n<(G) 12 Tax Cases 621, 625 .\n\n17) [1955] 271.T.R. 34.\n\nemployed and the business continued to be carried on, one alone of the units, the South Samla Colliery was compelled to suspend production. The suspension was expected to be of temporary duration, b~ cause the property was merely requisitioned for military use, it was not acquired. As soon as the property was de-requisitioned, the assessee took measures to resume production of coal. It was necessary to remove the impediments which had come in the way by reason of the temporary suspension of work. The buildings were renovated, the machinery reconditioned and the accumulated debris removed from the land. The colliery was, in a word, reinstated to the condition necessary for ensuring production.\n\nNo new asset was brought into existence; no advantage for the enduring benefit. of the business was acquired. Ail activity which was continuously in operation but had been temporarily suspended was to be resumed. It is imm:rterial that during the year under consideration there was no m!ning activity. That the colliery was regarded as an asset of a continuing business all along, even during the period of military occupation, is evidenced by the fact that expenditure incurred by the assessee during that period in respect of the colliery was allowed as a permissible deduction ih its income tax assessments. The expenditure of Rs. 1,61,742 under consideration in the present case was also expenditure laid out as part of the process of profit earning.\n\nThe nature of the expenditure is clearly revenue in character. The High Court is right in holding that the expenditure is not of a capital nature.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal disJ01i.1•rcl .", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL-IT,\n\nCALCUTTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL-II, CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KALYANJI MAVJI & COMPANY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALYANJI MAVJI & COMPANY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 14,. 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL-IT,\n\nCALCUTTA v.\n\nKALYANJI MAVJI & COMPANY\n\nJanuary 14,."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ss. 10(2)(v) & 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1468, "end_char": 1481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1712, "end_char": 1741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tax Officer on the ground that the expenditure was capital in nature~\n\nThe appeals by the assesseei to the Appellate AssistMlt' Comn1issioner and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were dismissed."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2468, "end_char": 2481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2719, "end_char": 2732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(v)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4071, "end_char": 4087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6383, "end_char": 6394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, ]."}}, {"text": "Ramamurthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6399, "end_char": 6409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramamurthy and Miss A Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramamurthy and Miss A Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. R. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6452, "end_char": 6466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. Banerjee, Mrs. lndu Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "lndu Goswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6473, "end_char": 6485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. Banerjee, Mrs. lndu Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Arvind Minocha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. Banerjee, Mrs. lndu Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. : This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court at Calcutta under s. 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 is directed against the judgment dated August 5, 1971 of that High Court disposing of an income-tax reference."}}, {"text": "s. 66A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6654, "end_char": 6663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6671, "end_char": 6698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "asscssee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6826, "end_char": 6834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent asscssee is a registered firm and owns several collieries in West Bengal and Bihar."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent asscssee is a registered firm and owns several collieries in West Bengal and Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent asscssee is a registered firm and owns several collieries in West Bengal and Bihar."}}, {"text": "November 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7623, "end_char": 7640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expenditure was incurred during the previous year beginning October 24, 1957 and ending November 11, 1958 relevant to the assessment year 1959-60."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7807, "end_char": 7815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8380, "end_char": 8402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 Gi\n\na reference to the High Court at Calcutta for its opinion ob the follow\n\ning question :\n\n\"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Income-tax appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the expenditure claimed on the South Samla Colliery at Rs."}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11601, "end_char": 11608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11621, "end_char": 11632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11665, "end_char": 11672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11844, "end_char": 11855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11858, "end_char": 11866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12005, "end_char": 12009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12110, "end_char": 12117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12785, "end_char": 12796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12798, "end_char": 12811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12871, "end_char": 12878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13054, "end_char": 13061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13438, "end_char": 13445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13989, "end_char": 13994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v. Chitnis(') to be applicable in the case of losses, and it bas been applied by the courts in India to business expenditure incurred by an assessee."}}, {"text": "Devi Films Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14106, "end_char": 14120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd. v. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa(') and Devi Films Ltd . ."}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14368, "end_char": 14375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14574, "end_char": 14582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14860, "end_char": 14871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15454, "end_char": 15461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17961, "end_char": 17967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal disJ01i.1•rcl ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_765_772_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "GRINDLA YS BANK LIMITED\n\nTHE INCOME TAX OFFICER, 'H' WARD COMPANIES,\n\nDISTRICT-IV, CALCUTTA AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 15, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. s. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nBar of linlitation under section 153(1)(a)(iii) of the lnco111e Tax Act, 1961··- When the asssment proceeding remained during the entire per!od by successive orders of the Court, the fresh assessn1ent order cannot be faulted 011 grounds of limitation.\n\nPowers of High Court to make the order a ftehll a, sessnient und,::r certiorari ; urisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appellant, a banking compooy incorporated in the United Kingdom, carries on banking business in India and is assessed under the Income Ta-x Art,\n\n1961. The appellant filed a return of it~ income for the assessment year 1972-73.\n\nDuring the assessment proceedings the1 Income Tax Officer issued a notice under •cction 142 (I) of the Income Ta, x Act requiring the appellant to produce certain account books and documents. The appellant applied against the notice to thei\n\nHigh Court of Calcutta under Article 226 'of tho Constitution. The High Court construing the notice in specifically limited terms. directed the appellant to comply with it. The appellant preferred an appeal in the High Court. Meanwhile,\n\npursuant to the direction by the learned single judge~ the Income Tax Officer made an assessment order on March 31, 1977. Thereafter the appeal was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgn1ent dated May 8 and 12, 1978, and the impugned notice under section 142(1) aruf the consequent assessment order were quashed. But while' doing so;· 'the Division Bench also directed the Incon1e Tax Officer to make a freshiissessn1ent. 1\\ggrieved by that direction, the appellant applied for, and o1:¢ajned special lea\\'e to appeal to this Court. ,,,.·\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The Hight Court was competent to make the order dircctiilg a\\ fresh assessment since the limitation for making the assessment had not expired and no valuable right to be assessed had thereby accrued to the appellant. [769\n\nD-EJ\n\nThe facts of the case ma..ke it clear that the assessment proceedings ren1ained pending during the entire period from March 17, 1975 to March 31, 1977 by virtue of successive stay orders of the Court. If regard be had to clause (ii) of Explanation 1 to section 153 which provides that in computing 1he period of limitation for rhe purposes of section 153 the period during which the assessment is st&•yed by an order or injunction of any court shall be excluded, it is abundantly clear that the assessment order dated March 31, 1977 is not\n\nbarred by limitation. In computing the period for 111aking the assessn1ent, the Income 1ax Officr would be entitled to exclude the entire period from March 17, 1975, on which date there were fourteen: days still left \\Vithin the norm:i, l\n\noperation of the rule of limitation.\n\nTheJ assessment order wa:! made on the very first day after the period of stay expired; it could not be faulted on the ground of li1nitation. [769 B-D]\n\n2. The character of an assessment proceeding of which the impugned notice a; id the assessment order formed part, being quasi-judicial, the \"certiorari'' jurisdiction of the I-Iigh Court under Article 226 was attracted. Ordinarily, where the High Court exercises such jurisdiction it merely quashes the offending order, and the consequential legal effect is that but for the offending order the remaining part of the proceeding stands automatically reviewed before the inferior court or tribunal \\vith the need for fresh consideration and disposal by a fresh order.\n\nOrdinarily the High Court does not substitute its own ordr for the order quoohed by it. It is, of course, a different case where' the adjudication by the High Court establfahes a comPiete \\Vant of jurisdiction in the inferior court or tribunal to entertain or to take the proceeding a.t all.\n\nJn that event on the quashing of the proceeding by the High Court there is no revival at all.\n\nBut although in the former kind of case the High Court, after quashing tht offending order, does not substitute its own order it has pD\\Ver nonetheless to pass such further orders as the ju!:itice of the case requires. [769 F-H, 770 A]\n\n3. When passing such orders the High Court draws on its inherent power to make all such orders as a\"rc necessary for doing con1plete justice between the parties. The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the cou1t, by the mere circumstance that it has initiated a proceeding in the court, must be neutralised.\n\nThe simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. [770 A-C]\n\nIn the present case, the appellant would not have enjoyed the advantage of the bar of limitation if, notwithstanding his immediate grievance against the notice under s. 142(1) of the Income-Tax Act, he had pern1itted the assessment proceeding to go on after registering his protest before the Income-Tax Officer, and allowed an assessment order to be made in the normal course. In an application under s. 146 against the assesSment order, it would have been open to him to urge that the notice was un_reasonable and invalid and he was prevented by gufficient cause from complying \\.vith it and therefore the assessment order should be cancelled. In that event, the fresh assessment made under s. 146 would not be fettered by the bar of limitation. Section 153(3)(i) removes the bar. But the appellant preferred the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. If no order was 1nade by the High Court directing a fresh ftSSCiin1ent, he could contend that a fresh assessment proceeding is barred by limitation. That is an advantage which the appellant seeks to derive by the mere circumstamce of his filing a writ petition. It will b'e noted that the defect comp1ained of by the appe1Iant in the notice was a procedural lapse at best and one that could be readily corrected by serving an appropria!e notice. It v,:as not a defect affecting the fundamental jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer to make the assessment. The Jiigh Court \\Vas plainly right' in making the directioa. which it did. [770 CG]\n\nDircllC•r of Inspection of Inco1ne Tax (Investigation) /\\lew Delhi and Anr.\n\nv. Poora11 Mall and Sons anJ Anr. (1974) 96 !TR 390@ 395; followed.\n\n...- • I\n\n,£_\n\n__.,,;( \"--\n\n{ Cachar PlywoCld Ltd. v. Income Tax OfficPr, 'A' Ward, Karin1ganj Dist.\n\n..,,\n\n-Cachar and Anr:, (1978) !14 !TR (Cal.); approved.\n\nRajindr 1Vath etc. v. The Co1nn1issio11er of Inco1ne Tax, Delhi, [1980]1 SCR 272; distinguished.\n\nPickles v. Fa/sham, 9 Tax Cases, 261, 288; Anisminic Ltd. v. The Foreign Co1npe1Uation Co1nni~.tion & Anr. [1969] 1 All E.L.R. 208; Bath and West B Countries Property Trust Ltd. v. Thomas (Inspector of Taxes) [1978] All. E.R. 305; distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2009 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8/12th C May, 1978 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 884/76.\n\nDevi Pal. P. K. Pal, J. B. Dadachanji and K. J.\n\nJohn for the Appelfant.\n\nS. T. Desai, B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respon- D 4lents 1-2.\n\nThe Judgment of theCourt was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J : This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court at ca:cutta dated May 8 and 12, 1978 in\n\no far as it direc'.s the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment E i\"n respect of the appellant.\n\nThe appellant is a banking company incorporated in the United Kingdom with its registered office at London. It carries on banking business in India, and is assessed under the Income-tax Act, 1961.\n\nThe appellant filed a return of its income for the assessment year 1972-73.\n\nDuring the assessme1>; proceeding, the Income-tax Officer issued a 11otice undr s. 142(1) cl the Income-tax Act requiring the \"appellant to produce certain account books and documents. The appellant applied against the notice to the High Court at Calcutta under Articles 226 of the Constitution. A learned Single Jud~ of the High Court did not accept the wide construction which the appellant -1; ought to put upon the impugned notice, and construing it in specific 'limited terms he directed the appellant to comply with it. The appellant preferred an appeal in the High Court. Meanwhile, pursuant to the >direction by the learned Single Judge, the Income-tax Officer made an\n\na:oi; ei; sment order on March 31, 1977.\n\nThereafter, the appeal was :allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated May 8 and 12, 1978, and the impugned notice under s. 142(1) and the\n\nA consequent assessment order were quashed. But while doing so, the- Division Bench also directed the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh. assessment.\n\nAggrieved by that direction, the appellant applied for,. and obtained, special leave to appeal, to this COurt.\n\nThe sole question before us is whether the High Court erred in directing a fresh assessment.\n\nThe appellant contends that the High Court was In error in making the direction because the assessment had already become barred by limitation and thereby a valuable right not to he assessed had accrued to the appellant, and the High Court was -\"\"\" not competent to deprive the appellant of that accrued right. '1\n\nIt is necessary first to examine whether the bar of limitation had_ come into play at any time before the High Court passed the impugned order.\n\nThe assessment year under consideration is the year 1972-73. By virtue of s.153(1) (a) (iii) of the Income-tax Act, no assessment orderin respect of that assessment year could be made after two years from the end of that assessment year. The end of the assessment year i<l March 31, 1975. However, the appellant filed the writ petition on March 17, 1975, fourteen days before the end of the period for making_ the assessment order. On the same date. March 17, 1975, the learned Single Judge granted an interim injunction restraining the lncomt>-tax Officer from proceeding with the assessment, and on March 25, 1975 the injunction was made operative for the pendency of the writ petition. The writ petition was disposed of by the learned single judge by his judgment dated August 31, 1976. It is apparent that the assessment proceedings remained s'.ayed throughout the period from March 17, 1975 to August 31, 1976 by vi.rtue of the orders of the court. As. has been mentioned, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition on August 31, 1976.\n\nIn his judgment, besides directing the appellant to comply with the notice under s. 142(1) as construed by him, he also included a direction to the Income-tax Officer to complete the assessment by March 31, 1977.\n\nOi1 Seprember 22, 1976, he amended his judgment inasmuch as it now required that \"the assess-- men! for the relevant year must be completed on the 31st of March,. 1977 but must not be completed before 31st March 1977.\" In other words, while the Income-tax Ofticer could continue with the assessment proceedings he was restrained by the Court from making 1he assessment order before, and i'n fact could mak2 it only on, March 31,\n\n1977. Now it is important to note that when the amendment was: made by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, it was an amendment made by him to a judgment disposing of the writ petition and having regard especially to the nature and the terms of the amend--\n\nGRJNDLAYS BANK v. I.T.0. (Pathak, !.) 769\n\nment, it must be deemed '.o have taken effect as from August 31, 1976, the date of the original judgment. In the appeal filed thereafter by the appeJant, no interim order was made suspending the operation of the direction that the assessment order be made on. March 31, 1977 only.\n\nA stay order was made against the enforcement of the notice of demand alone.\n\nAdhering to the directions of the learned Single Judge, the Income-tax Officer made an assessment order o'n March 31, 1977.\n\nIn the result, the assessment proceeding remained pending during the entire period from March 17, 1975 to March 31, 1977 by successive orders of the Court. If regard be had to clause (ii) of Explanation 1 to s. 153, which provides that in computing the period of limitation for the purposes of s. 153, the period during which the assessment is stayed by an order or injunction of any court shall be excluded, it is abundantly clear that the assessment order dared March 31, 1977 is not barred by limitation. In computing the period for making the assessment, the Income-tax Officer would be entitled to exclude the entire period from March 17, 1975, on which date t11ern were fourteen days still left wirhin the normal operation of the rule of limitation. The assessment order was made on the very first day after the _period of stay expired; it could not be faulted on the\n\nound of limitation. There is, therefore, no force in the submission of the appellant that the limitation for making the assessment had expired and a valuable right not to be assessed had thereby accrued to it, and that consequently the High Court was not competent to make tJ-.e order direc\"ing a fresh assessment.\n\nThe next point is whether the High court possessed any power to make the m<ler directing a fresh assessment. The principal relief sougl1t in the writ petition was the quashi11g of the notice under s. 142( 1) of the. Income-tax Act, and inasmuch as the assessment order dated March 31, 1977 was made during the pendency of the proceeding consequent upon a purported non-compliance with that notice, it became necessary to obtain the quashing of the assessment order also. The character of an assessment proeeeding, of which the impugned notice and the assessment order formed part, being quasijudicial, the \"certiorari\" jurisdiction of the High court under Article 226 was attracted. Ordinarily, where the High court exercises such jurisdic'ion it merely quashes the offending order and the consequential legal effect is that hut for the offending order the remainfog part of the proceeding stands automatically revived before the inferior court or tribunal with the need for fresh consideration and disposal by a fresh order. Ordinarily, the High Court does not substitute its own order for the order quashed by it. It is, of course, a different case -where the adjudication by the High Court establishes a: complete want of jurisdic-\n\n7 70 SUPREME COURT ftEPORTS\n\n(1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\ntion in the inferior court or tribunal to entertain or to take the proceeding at all. In that event on the quashing of the proceeding by tho High Court there is no revival at all. But although in the former kind of case the High court, after quashing the offending order, does not substitute its own order it has power nonetheless to pass such further orders as the justice of the case requires. When passing such orders the High court draws on its inherent power to make all such onlers as are necessary for doing complete justice between the parties. The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair ad1anbgc ga; ned by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, by the mere circumstance that it has initiated a proceeding in the court, must be neutralised. The simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should n<lt be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. The present case goes further. The appellant would not have enjoyed the advantage of the bar of limitation if, notwithstanding his immediate grievance against the notice under s. 142 (1) of the Inco; nc-tax Act, he had permitted the assessment proceeding to go 011 after registering his protest before the Income-tax Officer, and allowed an assessment order to be made in the normal course. In an application under s. 146 against the assessment order, it would have been open to him to urge that the notice was unreasonable and invalid and he was prevented by sufficient cause from complying with it and therefore the assessment order shoulrl be cancelled. In that event, the fresh assessment made under s. 146 would not be fettered by the bar of limitation. Section 153 ( 3) (i) removes the bar. But the appellant preferred the constituti, onal jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. If 110 order was made by the High Court directing a fresh assessment, he could contend as is the contention now before us, that a fresh assessment proceeding is barred by limitation. That is an advantage which the appellant seeks to derive by the mere circumstance of his filing a writ petition. It will be noted that the defect complained of by the appellant in the notice was a procedural lapse at best and one that could be readily corrected by serving an appropriate notice. It was not a defect effecting the fnndamen!al jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to make the assessment.\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court was plainly right in making the dire<:- tion which it did. The observations of this court in Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation), New Delhi and Another v. Pooran Mall & Sons and another(') are relevant. It said :\n\n\"The court in exercising its powers under article 226 has io mould the remedy to suit the facts of a case. If in a particular case a court takes the view that the Income-tax\n\n(I) [1974] 96 l.T.R. 390 at 395.\n\n' •\n\nOfficer, while passing an order under section 132(5), did not give an adequate opportunity to the party concerned it should not be left with the only option of quashing it and putting the party at an advantage even tl10ugh it may be satisfied that on the material before him the conclusion arrived at by the Income-tax Officer was c<>rrect or dismissing the petition because otherwise the party would get an unfair advantage. The power to quash an order under Article 226 can be exercised not merely wheu lhc order sought to be quasl1ed is one made without jurisdiction in which case there can be no room for the same authority lo be directed to deal with it. But, in the circumstances of a case, the court might take the view that another authority has the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and may direct that authority to deal with it or where the order of the authority which has the jurisdiction fs vitiated by circumstances like failure to observe the principles of natural justice, the court may quash the order and direct the authority to dispose of the matter afresh after giving the aggrieved party a reasonable opportunity of putting forward its case. Otherwise, it would mean that where a court quashes an order because the principles of natural justice have not been complied with, it should not while passing that order permit the tribunal or the authority to deal with it again irrespective of the merits of tl1e case.\"\n\nThe point was considered by the Calcutta High court in Cachar pl)'- wood Ltd. v. Income-Tax Officer, \"A\" Ward, Karimganj, Dist., Cachar\n\n& Ano!her(') and the High court, after considering the provisions of s. 153 of the fncome-Tax Act, considered it appropriate, while disposing of the writ petition, to issue a direction to the Income-tax Officer to complete the assessment which, but for the direction of the High court, would have been barred by limitation .\n\n..., Our attention I1as been drawn to a recent decision of this Court in\n\nRajinder Nath etc. v. The Commissioner of lncome-tax, Delhi(') (by a Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member).\n\nIn that case, the Court considered the provisions of s. 153(3) (ii) of the Income-tax Act and laid down that the word \"direction\" in that subsection refers to a direction necessary for the disposal of the case and which the court has power to make while deciding the case. Jn the view taken by us that the order made by the High Court directing a fresh assessment is necessary for properly and completely disposing of\n\n(1) [1978) 114 l.T.R. 379.\n\n(2) [1980) 1 S.C.R. 272.\n\nll'\n\nIJ;\n\nSUPREME COURT RHORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\n--A the writ petition, the appellant can obtain no assistance from Rajinder Nath (supra).\n\nMr. A. P. Mohanti, who appeared for the intervener, supported the contention that the High Conrt was not entitled to make an order directing a fresh assessment, and has referred us to three cases, Pickles v.\n\nFalsham, C), Anisminic Ltd. v. The Foreign Compensation Commission and Another('), and Bath and West Countries Property Trust Ltd. v. Thomas (Inspector of Taxes)('). We are of the opinion that the cases are distinguishable. In Pickles (supra), Cave L.C. declined to remand the case to the Special Commissioners because. the time for making the requisite assessment had expired. In Anisminic Ltd.\n\n(supra) the decision of the Commissioner considered by the House of Lords was a nullity. The present case is one of a mere procedural lapse, an imperfect notice which is replaceable by a. proper notice. The third case, Bath and West Countries Property Trust Ltd. (supra) was again a case where it was too late for the Inspector to make a fresh assessment. In the case before us a direction by the High court is sufficient to raise the bar of limitation, a power absent in the aforesaid cases.\n\nIn our Judgment, the order made by the High Court directing the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment was necessary in order to do complete justice between the parties. The High Court had juris- , E diction to make the order, and it acted in the sound exercise of its judicial discretion in making it.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed with cost1.\n\nV.D.K.\n\n11) 9TaxCases261.288 . . 2\\ [1969) I All Eng. Law Reports 208\n\n(3) [1978] I All Eng. I.aw Reports 305.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n' ' •", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "GRINDLA YS BANK LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GRINDLAYS BANK LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, 'H' WARD COMPANIES,\n\nDISTRICT-IV, CALCUTTA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, H WARD COMPANIES, DISTRICT-IV, CALCUTTA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. 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"end_char": 12195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, the assessment proceeding remained pending during the entire period from March 17, 1975 to March 31, 1977 by successive orders of the Court."}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12283, "end_char": 12289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12369, "end_char": 12375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 142( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13463, "end_char": 13473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13482, "end_char": 13496, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13922, "end_char": 13933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 142", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15643, "end_char": 15649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15882, "end_char": 15888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16171, "end_char": 16177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16226, "end_char": 16237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16350, "end_char": 16361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17256, "end_char": 17267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 132(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17466, "end_char": 17480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17888, "end_char": 17899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18899, "end_char": 18918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point was considered by the Calcutta High court in Cachar pl)'- wood Ltd. v. Income-Tax Officer, \"A\" Ward, Karimganj, Dist.,"}}, {"text": "s. 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19073, "end_char": 19079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 153(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19581, "end_char": 19590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19603, "end_char": 19617, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1980) 1 S.C.R. 272", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19979, "end_char": 19998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajinder Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20117, "end_char": 20130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll'\n\nIJ;\n\nSUPREME COURT RHORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\nA the writ petition, the appellant can obtain no assistance from Rajinder Nath (supra)."}}, {"text": "A. P. Mohanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20145, "end_char": 20158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. P. Mohanti, who appeared for the intervener, supported the contention that the High Conrt was not entitled to make an order directing a fresh assessment, and has referred us to three cases, Pickles v.\n\nFalsham, C), Anisminic Ltd. v. The Foreign Compensation Commission and Another('), and Bath and West Countries Property Trust Ltd. v. Thomas (Inspector of Taxes)(')."}}, {"text": "Pickles", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20577, "end_char": 20584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pickles (supra), Cave L.C. declined to remand the case to the Special Commissioners because."}}, {"text": "Cave L.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20594, "end_char": 20603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Pickles (supra), Cave L.C. declined to remand the case to the Special Commissioners because."}}, {"text": "Anisminic Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20731, "end_char": 20745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Anisminic Ltd.\n\n(supra) the decision of the Commissioner considered by the House of Lords was a nullity."}}, {"text": "Bath and West Countries Property Trust Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20966, "end_char": 21009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third case, Bath and West Countries Property Trust Ltd. (supra) was again a case where it was too late for the Inspector to make a fresh assessment."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_773_785_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "I -I\n\nl-1ANAGING DIRECTOR, UTTAR PRADESH WAREHOUSING\n\nCORPORATION & ANR.\n\nl' .\n\nVINAY NARAYAN VAJPAYEE\n\nJanuary 16, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nLJ1hour dispute-Employer-A Statutory Corporation-Disnzissed an e1npToyee 'lV-ithout giving an c-pporJunity of being_ heard-Validity of.\n\nStatutory bodies-Rights of employees under.\n\nConstitu1ion of India-Article 226-Scope of-High Court issued Writ of -Certiorari qutJshing order of di.unissal and ordered reinstatement of en1ployee\n\nwith full back l'l-'oges--Il con1petent to order reinstaten1ent.\n\nThe respondent was an employee of o statutory body. On allegations of theft, misappropriation of stocks and certain other irregularities a preliminary Cnquiry was conducted by the I\\fanaging Director (the appellant) and charge~ were framed against the employee. In the explanation submitted by him he expressly demanded that he wished to cross-examine certain witnesses whose names were given by him, and wanted to examine certain other persons a! witnesses. A few months thereafter, the appellant passed the impugned order of dismissal and required him to pay Rs. 549 jon account of certain com modities allegedly misappropriated by him.\n\nThe employee's petition under Article 226 for tQa issue of a writ of certiorari was rejected by a single Judge. The Division Bench allowed the writ on the ground that the Corporation which was required to act in a quasi-judicial manner failed to give an opportunity of being heard to the dismissed employee and that therefore the order of dismissal was bad.\n\nOn appeal, the appellant contended that Regulation 16 providing for an enquiry and giving an opportunity to an employee against whom an enquiry ·\"'tls to be held for misconduct had not come into force when the respondent was dismissed and, therefore, he had no statutory status and no locus-standi to maintain the writ which in substance was for specific performance of a ..contract of service.\n\nDsmissing the appeal,\n\nHEID : (Per Sarkaria, J.)\n\n1. The impugned order of dismissal was bad in law and had been rightly l!et aside by the High Court [781 F]\n\n(a) Regulations defining duties, conduct and conditions of its employees framed by statutory bodies have the force of law.\n\nThe form and content of contract with a particular employee being preScriptive and statutory, the statutory bodies have no free hand in framing the terms and conditions of tervice to their employees, but are bound to apply them as laid down in the\n\nregulations.\n\nThe regulations give the employees a statutory stntus oind impose obligations on the statutory authorities, and that they cannot deviate frorn the conditions of service laid down therein.\n\nThere is no personal element in public employment and service.\n\nWhenever employees rights are affected by a decision taken under statutory powers the court would presume the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance by the statutory body with rules and regulations in1posed by the statute. [779 EG}\n\nSukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Rani [1975] 3 SCR 619 referred to\n\nIn the instant C•Jse the appellant v,.ns a statutory body and, therefore, even if at the time of dismissal the statutory regulations had not been framed or had not come into force, employment being public employment, the employer could not terminate the employee's services without due enquiry in accordance with the regulations in force or in the absence of any regulations, in accordance with the rules of natural justice.\n\nSuch on enquiry into the conduct of a public employee is of a quasi-judicial character. The respondent was employed by the Corporation in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the statute and, threfore, the Corporation's pO\\Ver to dismiss the respondent from service was derived from this statute.\n\nThe court would presume the existence of a duty on the part of the dismissing authority to observe rules of natural justice and to act in accordance with the spirit of the regulation which was: then on the anvil and came into force shortly' after the dismissal.\n\nSecondly, in the instant case no regular departmental enquiry \\Vas hekl.\n\nThe order of dismissal was passed summarily after perusing the employee's explanation. The rules of natural justice require that the dismissed e1nployee shoulJ be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to est\"'blish his innocence which means an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the Corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also the show-cause notice for the proposed punishment. Such an opportunity w:\\s der.itd to the respondent. [780 G-H; 781 A-D]\n\nExecutive Con1n1itee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v.\n\nChandra Kiran Tyagi [1970] 2 S.C.R. 250; Ra111ana Dayara111 Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 referred to.\n\n2. The High Court \\Vas in error in directing payment of full back wages to the dismissed 'employee. [783 EJ\n\n3(a) In exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in. a supervisory capacity and not as an. appellate tribunal.\n\nIt does not review the evidence upon which the inferior Tribunal proposed to base its conclusion; it simply demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or n1anifestly erroneou<; but does not substitute its own view for the vievv of the inferior tribunal.\n\nTn m•Jtters of employment while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution over the orders and quasi-judicial proceedings of an admini~ trative authority culminating in dismissal of an employee, the High Court should ordinarily, in the event of the dismissal being found illegal, imply quash the same and should not further give a positive direction for payment to the employees full back wages (although as a consequence of the annulment of the dimissal the position as it obtained imn1ediatdy before the dismisl!al is restored). [782 F-H]\n\n• •\n\n(b) Whether an employee of a statutory authority should be reinstated in A public employment with or without full back wages, is a question of fact depending on evidence to be produced before the triburial.\n\nOne of the important factors to be considered in determining whether reinstatement should be with full back wages and with continuity of employment is to see if after the termination of his employment the employee was gainfully employed elsewhere. [783 D-EJ\n\nIn the instant case the employee did not raise an industrial dispute nor did he invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal but moved the High Court under Article 226 primarily on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice'.\n\n[783B-C]\n\nChinnapp~ Reddy, J. (concurring).\n\nThere is hardly any distinction, on principle, between a person directly C under the employment of the Government and a person under the employment of an agency or instrumentality of the Governn1ent or a corporation set up under a statute or incorporated but wholly owned by the Government.\n\nThe desire to achieve the objectives enumerated in the preamble to the Constitution has resulted in intense governmental activity in iuanifol& v,:ays.\n\nToday, the Government either directly or through corporations set up by it or O\\\\Tied by it, owns or manages a large number of industries and institutions. These D agencies and instrumentalities, corporations or companies have become the biggest employers in the country. There is no good reason why if the Government is bound to observe the equality ck1uses of the Constitution in the matter of employment and in its dealing vtith its employees, the Corporations set up or owned by the Government should not be equally bound and why instead, such Corporations shouldbecome citadels of patronage and arbitrary .action. To confine the applicability of the equality clauses, in relation to E matters of employment, strictly to direct employment under the Governments, in a country like ours is perhaps to mock at the Constitution and the people.\n\nSome element of public employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access to a court so as to enforce a contract of employment and denies him the protection of ) Articles 14 and 16. Employees in public sector often discharge the onerous duties as civil servants and participate in activities vital to the country's F economy.\n\nMany enactments have declared persons in the ervice of local authorities, government companies 0.nd statutory corporations, as public servants and extended to them the protection which is extended to civil servants from suits and prosecutions. It is, therefore, but right that the independence and integrity of those employed in the public sector should be secured as much as the independence and integrity of civil servants. (784 D- 785 G\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 274 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated e 6-8-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 4/67.\n\nM _ N. Phadke and Naunit Lal for the appellants.\n\n12-91SCI/80\n\nA. K. Sen, E. C. Agarwala, R. Sathish and V. K. Pandita for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation (for short, the Corporation), has preferred this appeal by special/ leavei\n\nagainst an appellate judgment, dated August 6, 1969, of a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad.\n\nIt arises out of these facts :\n\nV. N. Vajpayee, respondent herein, was employed as a Warehouseman with the Corporation and at the relevant time was posted at the Kanpur Warehouse.\n\nThere was a complaint of theft, misappro- C priation of stocks and various other irregularities against the respondent.\n\nA preliminary inquiry was held by the Managing Director of the Corporation and charges were framed against him and served upan him on November 28, 1960, requiring him to submit his explanation and to indicate the evidence, if any. On receiving the charge-sheet, the respondent addressed a communication, requesting the Managing Director D to furnish him with certain papers, which were accordingly furnished.\n\nThereafter, the respondent submitted his explanation on January 19,\n\n1961. In this explanation, he specifically demanded that he v.anted to cross-examine certain witnesses, the particulars of which were mentioned by him. He further gave the names and particulars of certain E other witnesses, stating that he wanted to examine them, in defence.\n\nNothing happened thereafter till April 18, 1961, on which date the Managing Director passed an order dismissing the respondent from service with effect from the date of his suspension.\n\nLater on, a demand was made from the respondent, requiring him to remit a sum of (Rs. 549 .61 due to the Corporation on account of certain commodities F said to have been misappropriated by the respondent on account of short realisation of storage charges by him.\n\nThe respondent then filed a Writ Petition (No. 87 of 1962) under Article 226 of the Constitution, in the High Court praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of his dismissal on the ground that it was violative of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as he had G not been given an opportnnity to cross-examine the witnesses and to establish his innocence. He further prayed for a direction that the Corporation be restrained from recovering the sum of Rs. 549.61 from him.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit, the appellants stated that the respondent H had also cross-examined the witnesses.\n\nIt was further urged that there had also cross-examined the witnesses. It was further urged that there was no regulation provided for conducting an inquiry in a particular\n\n\\ \"I\n\n. ,,., .,. .\n\nmanner, and, therefore, the remedy of the respondent was by way of a suit aud he had no locus standi to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further pleaded that the writ petition was delayed and should have been thrown out on that score, also.\n\nThe writ petition was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, who dismissed it, holding that t.he Corporation was not required to act in a quasi-judicial manner and that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution were not applicable to the facts of the case .\n\nAggrieved, the respondent carried a special appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court, which has reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and has held that the Corporation was required to act in a quasi-judicial manner and, therefore, the writ petition was maintainable.\n\nThe Division Bench remanded the case for a decision on merits.\n\nAfter the remand, the lea!\"Ded Single Judge by his judgment, dated December 7, 1966, allowed the writ petition, holding that the principles of natural justice had been violated.\n\nHe, therefore, quashed the order of the respondent's dismissal, but refused to grant an injunction restraining the appellant for realising Rs. 549.61 from the respondent.\n\nThe Corporation again preferred a Special Appeal No. 4 of 1967 to a Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed that appeal by a judgment, dated August 6, 1969.\n\nHence this appeal by the Corporation.\n\nThe main contention of th~. learned counsel for the appellants is that at the relevant time, Regulation I 6 providing for an enquiry and, giving an opportunity to the employee had not come into force; consequently, the respondent had no statutory status and had. theretorn no\n\nlor:us standi to maintain the writ petition.\n\nIt is submitted that the only remedy of the respondent was to file a suit for damages on account of his alleged wrongful dismissal.\n\nSupport for this contention has been sought from a decision of this Court in Executive Committee of U.P.\n\nState Warehousing Corporation Ltd. v.\n\nChandra Kiran Tyagi(').\n\nReference has also been made to Sirsi Municipality v.\n\nCecelia Kam Francis Tellis.(')\n\nOn the other hand, Shri A. K. Sen, appearing for the respondent, submits that since the decision of this Court in U.P. State Ware/wusing Corporation (ibid), the laW' has undergone a change. It is pointe<J out that the appellant is a Corporation constituted under a statute and is owned and controlled by the State Government and its employees.\n\n\nL B\n\ntherefore, have a statutory status. It is argued that even in the absence of Regulation 16 providing for a departmental enquiry, the appellant was bound to hold an enquiry and to give, in compliance with the rules of natural justice, lull :ind fair opportunity to the respondent to defend himself and repel the charges levelled against him. It is maintained that such an opportunity was denied to him because he was not al!cwed to examine witnesses cited by him in defence. Reference in cMnection with the proposition propounded has been made to SukiLiev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr.(')\n\nWe will first notice Chandra Kiran Tyagi's case, which is the sheetar, chor of the appellants' arguments.\n\nThe facts of that case were somewhat similar.\n\nTyagi was a Warehouseman in the employment of the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Limited.\n\nAfter recei\\ing Tyagi's explanation, the Enquiry Officer did not take any evidence in respect of any charge. Instead, he met various persons and collected information, and gave his findings on the various charges on the basis of the enquiries made by him and the records.\n\nEven the information so collected was not put to Tyagi.\n\nOn the basis of those findings of the Enquiry Officer, Tyagi was dismissed from service.\n\nTyagi filed a suit challenging his dismissal.\n\nHe prayed for a declaration for rninstatement on the ground that the relationship was one of personal service.\n\nSpeaking through Vaidialingam, J. this Court held that a declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will not normally be granted. It was noted that there are three exceptions to this ruk :\n\n(i) appropriate cases of public srvants who have been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311, (ii) dismissed workers under industrial and labour law; and (iii) when a statutory body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. It was fur. ther held that though the impugned order was made in breach of the regulation contrary to the terms and conditions of the relationship between the appellant (employer) and the respondent (employee), but, it would not be in breach of any statutory obligation, because, the Act does not guarantee any statutory status to the respondent; nor does it impose any obligation on the appellant in such matters.\n\nTherefore, the violation of regulation 16(3) as alleged and established in that case, could only result in the order of dismissal being held to be wrongful, and in consequence, making the appellant liable for damages, but could not have the effect of treating the respondent as still in service or entitling him to reinstatement.\n\nH The authority of the rule in Tyagi's case, to the effect, that an employee of such a statutory body even if it be owned and managed by\n\n\nr. )\n\nthe Government does not enjoy a statutory status, appears to have been eroded by the later decisions of this Court, particularly the proncuncement in Sukhdev Singh's case (ibid). The statutory bodies in that case were : Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Industrial Finance Corporation and Life Insurance Corporation. All the three bodies wer,(' created under separate stututes enacted by the Central Legislature. It was clear from the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1954, that the Commission created by it, acts as an agency of the Central Government.\n\nSimilarly, by virtue of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948, the Finance Corporation is under the control a.nd management of the Central Government.\n\nThe Life Insurance Corporation is similarly owned and managed by the. Government and call be dissolved only by the Government in view of the provisi011s of the Life Insurance Act, 1956. All the three statutes constituting the three statutory corporations enabled them to make regulations which provide, inter alia, for the terms and conditions of employment and services of their employees.\n\nQuestions arose : (i) whether the regulations have the force of law, and (ii) whether the statutory corporations are 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.\n\nRay, C.J., speaking for himself and Chandrachud and Gupta JJ., held that the regulations framed by these stututory bodies for the purpose of defining the duties, conduct and conditions of its employees have the force of Jaw.\n\nThe form and content of the contract with a particular employee is prescriptive and statutory.\n\nThe notable feature is that these statutory bodies have no free hand in framing the conditions and terms of service of their employees.\n\nThey are bound to apply the terms and conditions as laid down in the regulations.\n\nThese regula-- tio•s are not only binding on the authority but also on the public.\n\nThey give the employees a statutory status and impose obligations on the statutory authorities, who cannot deviate from the conditions of • serlice.\n\n-\\ ; It was further made clear that an ordinary individual, in the case of master and servant contractual relationship, enforces breach of con-\n\n' tract, the remedy being damages because personal service is not G capable of enforcement.\n\nIn the case of statutory bodies, huwever, there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of the bodies.\n\nIn their case, the element of public employment and service and the support of statute require observance of rules and regulations.\n\nAt page 634 of the Report, the learned Chief Justice significantly reiterated that \"whenever a man's rights are affected H by decision taken under stututory powers, the Court would presume\n\n>, the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and com-\n\nA pliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute...\n\nThe Court then referred to U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation cases and held that these decisions were rn direct conflict with an earlie.r decision of this Court in Naraindas Barot v. Divisional Controller, S.T.C.,(') and were wrongly decided.\n\nThe Court followed the decision in Sirsi Municipality (ibid).\n\nMathew J. in his separate but concurring judgmnt, pointed out how the concept of the State has undergone draetic changes in recent years.\n\nA State is an abstract entity and can act oniy through the instrumentality or agency of natural or juridical persons.\n\nWith the advent of a welfare State the framework of civil service administration becarne increasingly insufficient for handling the new tasks which were often of a specialised and highly technical character For this reason, a policy of public administration through separate Corporations which would operate largely according to business principles and be separately accountable, was evolved.\n\nSuch public corporations constituted under enactments, became a third arm of the Government.\n\nThe employees of public corporation are not civil servants. In so far as public corporations fulfil public tasks on behalf of the Government, they are public authorities and, as such, subiect to control by Government.\n\nThe public corporation being a creation of the State is subject to the constitutional limitation as the State itself.\n\nThe Court thus with a majority of 4-1 held tilat the statutory bouies then under consideration were 'authonties' within tr' meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and though their empl\"yees were not sen ants of the Union or of a State, yet they had a statutory status.\n\nThe appellant is a Corporation constituted under the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation (Act 28) of 1956, which was subsequently replaced by the Central Act 58 of 1962. It is a statutory body wholly controlled and managed by the Government.\n\nIts status 1s analogous to that of the Corporalions which were under consideration in Sukhdev Singh's case (ibid).\n\nThe ratio of Sukhdev Singh's case, therefore, squarely applies to the present case.\n\nEven if at the time of the dismissal, the statutory regulations had not been framed or had not come into force, then also the employment of the respondent was public employment and the statutory body, the employer, could not terminate the services of its employee without due enquiry in accordance with the statutory Regulations, if any in force, or in tl1c absence of such Regulations, ir. <teccrdoucc with the rules of natural\n\njustice.\n\nSuch an nquiry into ti1e c<.)T]duct o[ a public employee is of\n\n\n' .\n\na quasi-judicial character.\n\nThe respondent wa; employed by the appellant-Corporation in exercise o! tile powers conferred . on it by the statute which created it. The appellants' power to dismiss the respondent from service was also derived from the statute. The Court would therefore, presume the existence of a duty on the part of the dismissing authority to observe the rules of natural justice, and to act in accordance with the spirit of Regulation 16, which was then on the anvil and came into force shortly after the impugned dismissal.\n\nThe rules of natural justice in the circumstances of the case, required that the respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt, to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to cros~-cJcamiee the witnesses relied upon by the appellant-Corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment.\n\nSuch an opportunity was denied to the respondent in the instant case.\n\nAdmittedly, the respondent was not allowed to kad evidence in defence.\n\nFurther, he was not allowed to crossexamine certain persons whose statements were not recorded by the Enquiry Officer (Opposite Party No. 1) in the pre>ence of the resndent. There was controversy on this point. But it was clear to the High Court from the report of enquiry by the Opposite Party No. 1 that he relied upon the reports of some persons and the statements of some other persons who were not examined by him.\n\nA regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge-sheet is drawn np and served upon the delinquent and the latter's explanation is obtained.\n\nIn the present case, no such enquiry was held and the order of dismissal was passed summarily after perusing the respondent's explanation.\n\nThe rules of natural justice in this case, were honoured in total breach.\n\nThe impugned order of dismissal was thus bad in law and had been rightly set aside by the High Court.\n\nBefore passing on to the next question we may in fairness mention, that Mr. Asok Sen had cited two more decisions, also.\n\nThe first was a recent judgment of the House of Lords in Melloch.v. Aberdeen Corporation('), wherein Lord Wilberforce in his speech (at pages 1595- 1596 of the Report) observed that in cases in which there is an element of public employment or service, or support by statute or something in the nature of an office or a status, which is capable of protection, then irrespective of the terminology used, and even though in some inter parties aspects the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there may be essential procedural requirement to be observed on grounds of natural justice.\n\nThe second decision is Ramana\n\n(l) [1971] I W.L.R.1578.\n\nDayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors.(')\n\nIn Ramana Dayaram Shelly's case (ibid) Bhagwati, J. after making an exhaustive survey of t, he decisions of this Court and of American Courts, summarised some of the factors which are considered to determine whether a Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of Government.\n\nWe do not think it necessary to burden this judgment by a detailed discussion of these cases because in the instant case, -all the material factors exist which show beyond doubt that the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation constituted under the Central Act 28 of 1956, is an agency or instrumentality of the Government, and the relationship between the Corporation and its employees is not purely that of m-aster and servant, founded only on contract.\n\nIndeed, it was not seriously disputed that the respondent was in public employment, and the Corporation is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.\n\nFurther contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that even if the dismissal of the respondent was wrongful, the High Court could only quash the same, bnt it could not in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution give the further direction that the employee should be reinstated in service with full back wages.\n\nIt is maintained that in giving this further direction, the High Court had overleaped the bounds of its jurisdiction.\n\nThere appears to be force in this contention. It must be remembered that in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in a supervisorY capacity and not as an appellate tribunal.\n\nIt does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed to base its conclusion; it simply demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal.\n\nIn other words, the offending order or the impugned illegal proceeding is quashed and put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of the writ petitioner.\n\nThus in matters of employment, while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, over the order and quasi-judicial proceeding of an administrative authority-not being a proceeding under the industrial law /labour law before an industrial/labour tribunal--<:ulminating in dismissal of the employee, the High Court should ordinarilv. in\n\n11) A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628.\n\nU. P. WAREHOUSING CORPN. V. V. N. VAJPAYEE 783 (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) the event of the dismissal being found illegal, simply qnash the same and should not further give a positive direction for payment to the employee full back wages (although as a consequence of the annulment of the dismissal, the position as it obtained immediately before the dismissal is restored), such peculiar powers can pr6£erly be exercised in a case where the impugned adjudication or award has been given by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court.\n\nThe instant case is not one under Industrial/Labour Law.\n\nThe respondentemployee never raised any industrial dispute, nor invoked the jurisdictiop. of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. He directly moved the High Court for the exercise of its special jtJlisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the order of dismissal primarily on the ground that it was violative of the principles of natural justice which required that his public employment should not be terminated without giving him a due opportunity to defend himself and to rebut the charges against him.\n\nFurthermore, whether a worm_an or employee of a statutorY authority should be reinstated in public employment with or without full back wages, is a question of fact depending on evidence to be produced before the !ribunal. If after the termination of his employment the workman/ employee was gainfully employed elsewhere, thl)J is one of the important factors to be considered in determining whether or not the reinstatement should be with full back wages and with contiuity of employment.\n\nFor these two fold reasons, we are of opinion that the High Court was in error in directing payment to the employee full back WG)?fS.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons wh\\le upholding the judgment of the High Court with regard to the quashing of the order of dismiss~! of the respondent on the ground of its being invalid, we delete the direction for payment to the respondent full back wages. Excepting this modification, the appeal is dismissed.\n\nHowever. in the circumstan-\n\nCe!', the appellant-Corporation shall pay the costs of the responden4\n\nin this Court.\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The respondent-employee was dismissed from service.\n\nThe employer dismissed him, without observing the principles of natural justice. This has been found by the High Court who quashed the order of dismissal in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe employer has appealed.\n\nThe employer claims that a declaration to enforce a contract of personal service cannot be granted by the Court.\n\nThe only remedy of the employee, he pleads, is to file a suit for damages for wrongful dis'missal.\n\nThe answer of the employee is that the employer is a statutory Corporation whose employees have statutory status, and that the employer is bound by the regulations made under the statute as also to observe the principles of natural justice.\n\nBreach of the regulations or failure to observe the principles of natural justice entitles the employee to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe question whether breach of statutory regulations or failures to observe the principles of natural justice by a statutory Corporation w:ll entitle an employee of such Corporation to claim a declaration of continuance in service and the question whether the employee is entitled to the protection of Arts. 14 and 16 against the Corporation were considered at great length in Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanslzi & Anr.(1) The question as to who may be considered to be agencies or instrumentalities of the Government was also considered, again at some length, by this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shelly v.\n\nThe International Airport Authority of India & Ors.(')\n\nI find it very hard indeed to discover any distinction, on principle, between a person directly under the employment of the Goverrnnent and a person under the employment of an agency or instrumentality of the Government or a Corporation, set up under a statqte or incorporated but wholly owned by the Government.\n\nIt is self evident and trite to say that the function of the State has long since ceased to be confined to 'the preservation of the public peace. the exaction of taxes and the defence of its frontiers.\n\nIt is now the function of the State to secure 'social, economic and political justice. to preserve 'liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship', and to ensure 'equality of status and of opportunity'. That is the proclamation of the people in the preamble to the Constitution.\n\nThe desire to attain these objectives has necessarily resulted in intense Governmental activity in manifold ways.\n\nLegislative and executive activity have reached very far and have touched very many aspects of a Gitizen's life.\n\nThe Government, directly or through the Corporations, set up by it or owned by it, now owns or manages, a large number of industries and institutions. It is the biggest builder in the country.\n\nMammoth and minor irrigation projects, heavy and light engineering projects, projects of various kinds are undertaken by the Government.\n\nThe Government is also the biggest trader in the country. The State and the multitudinous agencies and Corporations set up by it are the principal purchasers of the produce and\n\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628.\n\n...\n\n_,/''\"\n\nU. P. WAREHOUSING CORPN. V. V. N. VAJPAYEE 785 (Channappa Reddy, !.) the products of our country and they control a vast and complex machinery of distril; JUtion.\n\nThe Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, Corporations set up by the Government under statutes and Corporations incorporated under the Companies Act but owned by the Government have thus become the biggest employers in the country. There is no good reason why, if Government is bound to observe the equality clauses of the c0nstitution in the matter of employment and in its dealings with the employees, the Corparations set up or owned by the Government should not be equally bound and why, instead, such Corporations could become citadels of patronage and arbitrary action.\n\nIn a country like ours which teems with population, where the State, its agencies, its instrumentalities and its Corporations are the biggest employers and where millions seek employment and security, to confirm the applicability of the equality clauses of the constitution, in relation to matters of employment, strictly to direct employment under the Government is perhaps to mock at the Constitution and th~ people.\n\nSome element of public, employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access to a Court so enforce a contract of employment and denies him the protection o1' Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nAfter all employment in the public; sector has grown to vast dimensions and employees in the public sector often discharge as onerous duties as civil servants and participate in activities vital to our country's economy.\n\nIn growing realization of the importance of employment in the public sector, Parliament and the Legislatures of the States have declared persons in the\n\nservice of local authoritie8, Government companies and statutory corporations as public servants and, extended to them by express enactment the protection usually extended to civil servants from suits and prosecution.\n\nIt is, therefore, but right that the independence and integrity of those employed in the public sector should be secured as much as the independence and integrity of civil servants.\n\nI agree with what has been said by my brother Sarkaria .r.\n\nI have added a few lines to emphasise some aspects of the problem.\n\nPB.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "1ANAGING DIRECTOR, UTTAR PRADESH WAREHOUSING\n\nCORPORATION & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGING DIRECTOR, UTTAR PRADESH WAREHOUSING CORPORATION & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VINAY NARAYAN VAJPAYEE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VINAY NARAYAN VAJPAYEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 165, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1237, "end_char": 1248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Per Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1993, "end_char": 2005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dsmissing the appeal,\n\nHEID : (Per Sarkaria, J.)\n\n1."}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 SCR 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3059, "end_char": 3075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R. 250", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4787, "end_char": 4806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5088, "end_char": 5099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6715, "end_char": 6726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnapp~ Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6814, "end_char": 6829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[783B-C]\n\nChinnapp~ Reddy, J. (concurring).", "canonical_name": "Chinnapp~ Reddy"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8359, "end_char": 8377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9158, "end_char": 9167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M _ N. Phadke and Naunit Lal for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9172, "end_char": 9182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M _ N. Phadke and Naunit Lal for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12-91SCI/80\n\nA. K. Sen, E. C. Agarwala, R. Sathish and V. K. Pandita for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9228, "end_char": 9242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12-91SCI/80\n\nA. K. Sen, E. C. Agarwala, R. Sathish and V. K. Pandita for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Sathish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9244, "end_char": 9254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12-91SCI/80\n\nA. K. Sen, E. C. Agarwala, R. Sathish and V. K. Pandita for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V. K. Pandita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9259, "end_char": 9272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12-91SCI/80\n\nA. K. Sen, E. C. Agarwala, R. Sathish and V. K. Pandita for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9337, "end_char": 9345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation (for short, the Corporation), has preferred this appeal by special/ leavei\n\nagainst an appellate judgment, dated August 6, 1969, of a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad.", "canonical_name": "SARKARIA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9550, "end_char": 9573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation (for short, the Corporation), has preferred this appeal by special/ leavei\n\nagainst an appellate judgment, dated August 6, 1969, of a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "V. N. Vajpayee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9608, "end_char": 9622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It arises out of these facts :\n\nV. N. Vajpayee, respondent herein, was employed as a Warehouseman with the Corporation and at the relevant time was posted at the Kanpur Warehouse."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10012, "end_char": 10029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A preliminary inquiry was held by the Managing Director of the Corporation and charges were framed against him and served upan him on November 28, 1960, requiring him to submit his explanation and to indicate the evidence, if any."}}, {"text": "January 19,\n\n1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10344, "end_char": 10361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the respondent submitted his explanation on January 19,\n\n1961."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11150, "end_char": 11161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12041, "end_char": 12052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12385, "end_char": 12396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 7, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12881, "end_char": 12897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the remand, the lea!\"Ded Single Judge by his judgment, dated December 7, 1966, allowed the writ petition, holding that the principles of natural justice had been violated."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13316, "end_char": 13330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1967 to a Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed that appeal by a judgment, dated August 6, 1969."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Ware/wusing Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14199, "end_char": 14233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Shri A. K. Sen, appearing for the respondent, submits that since the decision of this Court in U.P. State Ware/wusing Corporation (ibid), the laW' has undergone a change."}}, {"text": "Chandra Kiran Tyagi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15074, "end_char": 15093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We will first notice Chandra Kiran Tyagi's case, which is the sheetar, chor of the appellants' arguments."}}, {"text": "Tyagi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tyagi was a Warehouseman in the employment of the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Limited.", "canonical_name": "Tyagi"}}, {"text": "U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15257, "end_char": 15299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tyagi was a Warehouseman in the employment of the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Limited."}}, {"text": "Tyagi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15318, "end_char": 15323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recei\\ing Tyagi's explanation, the Enquiry Officer did not take any evidence in respect of any charge.", "canonical_name": "Tyagi"}}, {"text": "Vaidialingam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15898, "end_char": 15910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking through Vaidialingam, J. this Court held that a declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will not normally be granted."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16179, "end_char": 16190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17390, "end_char": 17405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The authority of the rule in Tyagi's case, to the effect, that an employee of such a statutory body even if it be owned and managed by\n\nr. )\n\nthe Government does not enjoy a statutory status, appears to have been eroded by the later decisions of this Court, particularly the proncuncement in Sukhdev Singh's case (ibid).", "canonical_name": "Sukhdev Singh's"}}, {"text": "Oil and Natural Gas Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17460, "end_char": 17490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statutory bodies in that case were : Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Industrial Finance Corporation and Life Insurance Corporation."}}, {"text": "Industrial Finance Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17492, "end_char": 17522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statutory bodies in that case were : Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Industrial Finance Corporation and Life Insurance Corporation."}}, {"text": "was clear from the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17654, "end_char": 17713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17775, "end_char": 17793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was clear from the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1954, that the Commission created by it, acts as an agency of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17824, "end_char": 17864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17959, "end_char": 17985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Life Insurance Corporation is similarly owned and managed by the."}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18115, "end_char": 18139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18494, "end_char": 18504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Life Insurance Act, 1956", "statute": "the Life Insurance Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18527, "end_char": 18530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, C.J., speaking for himself and Chandrachud and Gupta JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18563, "end_char": 18574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, C.J., speaking for himself and Chandrachud and Gupta JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18579, "end_char": 18584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, C.J., speaking for himself and Chandrachud and Gupta JJ.,"}}, {"text": "U.P. Warehousing Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20162, "end_char": 20190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 634 of the Report, the learned Chief Justice significantly reiterated that \"whenever a man's rights are affected H by decision taken under stututory powers, the Court would presume\n, the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and com-\n\nA pliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute...\n\nThe Court then referred to U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation cases and held that these decisions were rn direct conflict with an earlie.r decision of this Court in Naraindas Barot v. Divisional Controller, S.T.C.,(') and were wrongly decided."}}, {"text": "Indian Airlines Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20195, "end_char": 20222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 634 of the Report, the learned Chief Justice significantly reiterated that \"whenever a man's rights are affected H by decision taken under stututory powers, the Court would presume\n, the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and com-\n\nA pliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute...\n\nThe Court then referred to U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation cases and held that these decisions were rn direct conflict with an earlie.r decision of this Court in Naraindas Barot v. Divisional Controller, S.T.C.,(') and were wrongly decided."}}, {"text": "Sirsi Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20441, "end_char": 20459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court followed the decision in Sirsi Municipality (ibid)."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20469, "end_char": 20475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew J. in his separate but concurring judgmnt, pointed out how the concept of the State has undergone draetic changes in recent years."}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21688, "end_char": 21698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22163, "end_char": 22176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its status 1s analogous to that of the Corporalions which were under consideration in Sukhdev Singh's case (ibid).", "canonical_name": "Sukhdev Singh's"}}, {"text": "Asok Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24882, "end_char": 24890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before passing on to the next question we may in fairness mention, that Mr. Asok Sen had cited two more decisions, also."}}, {"text": "Wilberforce", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25034, "end_char": 25045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aberdeen Corporation('), wherein Lord Wilberforce in his speech (at pages 1595- 1596 of the Report) observed that in cases in which there is an element of public employment or service, or support by statute or something in the nature of an office or a status, which is capable of protection, then irrespective of the terminology used, and even though in some inter parties aspects the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there may be essential procedural requirement to be observed on grounds of natural justice."}}, {"text": "Ramana Dayaram Shelly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25663, "end_char": 25684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramana Dayaram Shelly's case (ibid) Bhagwati, J. after making an exhaustive survey of t, he decisions of this Court and of American Courts, summarised some of the factors which are considered to determine whether a Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of Government."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25699, "end_char": 25707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramana Dayaram Shelly's case (ibid) Bhagwati, J. after making an exhaustive survey of t, he decisions of this Court and of American Courts, summarised some of the factors which are considered to determine whether a Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of Government."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26125, "end_char": 26168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment by a detailed discussion of these cases because in the instant case, -all the material factors exist which show beyond doubt that the Uttar Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation constituted under the Central Act 28 of 1956, is an agency or instrumentality of the Government, and the relationship between the Corporation and its employees is not purely that of m-aster and servant, founded only on contract."}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26541, "end_char": 26551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26809, "end_char": 26820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27186, "end_char": 27197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27853, "end_char": 27864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28217, "end_char": 28232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. V. N. VAJPAYEE 783 (Chinnappa Reddy,!.)", "canonical_name": "Chinnapp~ Reddy"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28975, "end_char": 28986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30339, "end_char": 30354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-The respondent-employee was dismissed from service.", "canonical_name": "Chinnapp~ Reddy"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30588, "end_char": 30596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31258, "end_char": 31269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31594, "end_char": 31609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Channappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33614, "end_char": 33629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. V. N. VAJPAYEE 785 (Channappa Reddy, !.)", "canonical_name": "Chinnapp~ Reddy"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33875, "end_char": 33888, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34952, "end_char": 34967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35289, "end_char": 35299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In growing realization of the importance of employment in the public sector, Parliament and the Legislatures of the States have declared persons in the\n\nservice of local authoritie8, Government companies and statutory corporations as public servants and, extended to them by express enactment the protection usually extended to civil servants from suits and prosecution."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35813, "end_char": 35821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree with what has been said by my brother Sarkaria .r.", "canonical_name": "SARKARIA"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_786_789_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "ST A TE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nSHANKER LAL & ORS.\n\nJanuary 16, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0. CHJN,; APPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\n}., fadhya Pradesh .Municipalities Act, 1961, Section 94(7)-Scope of-State Governrnent transferred teachers en1ployed by Municipal Coucils-Competency of.\n\nThe respondents were employed as lecturers and teachers in the various C Municipal Higher Secondary Schools run and managed by a Municipal Council in the State.\n\nThe State Government transferred certain lecturers and teachers serving under a particular Municipal Council to the Schools run and managed by another Municipal Council.\n\nThe respondents writ petition challenging the order of their transfers was allowed by the High Court on the ground that no officer other than those mentioned in s. 94(7) namely Revenue Officer,.\n\nAccounts Officer etc. could be transferred.\n\nIn the State's appeal the respondents contended that they were employees of schools run and managed by Municipal Councils but not of the Councils.\n\nHELD : I. The High Court was not right in putting a retricted interpretation on s. 94(7) of the Act. The other officers and servants who can be appointed by the Municipal Councils under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 97 ar'e also officers and servants mentioned in these sub-sections for the purposes of sub-section (7). Theoretically, therefore, the power does exist in the State Government to transfer them. [788 B-C]\n\n2. The argument that the respondents arc the employees of schools run and managed by the Municipal Councils but not of the councils themselves has no substance.\n\nEducation department is one of the departments of a\n\nfunicipal Council.\n\nSection 124 envisages the establishment and running of Higher Secondary Schools by Municipal Councils and therefore the lecturers and teachers appointed in the various <>chools are officers and servants of the Municipal Councils. [788 G-H, 789 A]\n\n3. In case of employees getting small emoluments the power to transfer should be sparingly exercised under some compelling exigencies of a particular situation and not as a matter of routine. [788 C-D]\n\nClv1r. APPELLATE JuR1smcnoN : Civil Appeal Nos. 537-539 of\n\n./ r\n\n1970. ;_..-\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20-8-1968 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc, Petition Nos. 282, 283 and 293 of J 968.\n\nS K. Gambhir for the Appellant.\n\nS. S. Khanduja for the Respondents.\n\n.,,.\n\nM. P. STATE y. SHANKER LAL ( Ulltwalia, !. )\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-These three appeals by special leave are from the common judgment of the Madh\\\"l Pradesh High Court allowing the Writ Petitions filed by the six respondents and quashing the orders of their transfer made by the State Government in exercise of their power under s. 94(7) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1\\161, hereinafter called the Act.\n\nThe respondents were employees of the Municipal Council, Sagar.\n\nThey were employed as lecturers and teachers in the various Municipal Higher Secondary Schools run and managed by the said Municipal Council.\n\nThree orders were issued by the State Government on various dates in June, 1968 transferring certain lecturers and teachers serving under a particular Municipal Council tci the schools run and managed by another Municipal Council.\n\nThe six respondents were transferred by the said orders to various places. They challenged the order of transfer in the High Court on the ground that the State Government had no power to transfer them under s. 94(7) of the Act. The High Court has c cepted their contention and hence these appeals.\n\nWe shall quote the relevant provisions of s. 94 of the Act as they stood at the relevant time from the judgment of the High Court. There have been some amendments in the year 1973 with which we are not concerned.\n\nThey read as follows :-\n\n\"94. Appointment of staff :-\n\n( 1) Every Council having an annual income of five lakhs of rupees or more shall, subject to rules framed under section 95, appoint a Revenue Officer and an Accounts Officer and may appoint such other officers and servants as may be necessary and proper for the efficient discharge of its duties.\n\n(2) Every Council not falling under sub-section (1) shall, subject to rules framed under section 95, appoint a Sanitary Inspector, an Overseer, a Revenue ·\n\nInspector, and an Accountant and may appoint such other officers and servants as may be necessary and proper for the efficient dis\"charge of its duties : .......................................\n\n(7) The State Government may transfer any officer or\n\nservant of a council mentioned in sub-sections (1) & ff\n\n(2) and in receipt of total emoluments exceeding one hundred rupees to any other Council.\"\n\n788 SUPRE~1E COURT l{El'ORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA The High Court has taken the view that the words \"any officer or servant of a Council mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2)\" occurring in sub-s. (7) mean \"any officer or servant as enumerated or specified in s\\ib-ss. (1) and (2); that is to say, the officers who can be transferred under sub-s. (7) are only Revenue Officer, Accounts Officer, Sanitary lnspector and an Overseer, a. Revenue Inspector or an Acconntant.\n\nNo other officer or servant can be transferred. We do not think that the High Court is right in putting this restricted interpretation to sub-s. (7) of s. 94.\n\nOther officers and servants who can be appointed by jhe Municipal Councils either under sub-s. (1) or under sub-s. (2) are also the officers and servants mentioned in these sub-sections for the purposes of sub-s. (7). Theoretically, therefore, the power does exist in the State Government to transfer them.\n\nWe must, however. hasten to add that in case of employees getting small emoluments the power seems to be meant to be sparing .. ly exercised under some compelling exigencies of a particular situation and not as a matter of routine. If it were to be liberally exercised, it will create tremendous problems and difficulties in the way of Municipal employees getting small salaries.\n\nThere may be hardly :in employee serving under any Municipal Council who cannot be theoretically and literally covered by sub-ss. (1) and (2) and subjected to the exercise of power of transfer under sub-s. (7).\n\nE The High Court in support of its view has referred to snb-s. ( 4) of s. 94 wherein only the officers enumerated in sub-ss. (1) and (2) are specified. Obviously the said sub-section does not cover the cases of other officers and servants as mentioned in sub-ss. (I) and (2). The language of sub-sec. (7) is in contrast to that of sub-s. (4) and, instead of lending support to the view of the High Court, goes against it.\n\nIt was argued for the respondents that they are employees of the Schools run and managed by the Municipal Councils but not of the Councils themselves. We do not think that this argument has got G any snbstance.\n\nEducation department is one of the departments ef a Municipal Council.\n\nDuties of the Conncil are enumerated in subs. (1) of s. 123, clause (v) which provides for \"establishing and maintaining primary schools\". Under s. 124 \"a Council may, at its discretion, provide, either wholly or partly out of the Municipal property and fund, for all or any of the following matters, namely ( c) H furthering educational objects.\" Thus establishment and running of Higher Secondary Schools by Municipal Councils are envisaged under the Act and the lecturers and teachers appointed in the various schools\n\nM. P. STATE v. SHANKERLAL (Untwalia, J.) 789\n\nare undoubtedly the officers and servants of the Municipal Coun- A '! ells.\n\nFor the reasons stated above we hold that the State Government had the power to transfer the respondents. But it is not clear why the power was exercised in the case of the respondents.\n\nIn any event, learned counsel for the appellant assured ns that the State is more anxious for the correct interpretation of the law engrafted in section 94(7) of the Act than to enforce the order of transfer against the respondents.\n\nIn the result while clarifying the position of law, we dismiss the appeals but make no order as to costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 24, "entities": [{"text": "A TE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\nSHANKER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STTE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 16, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 16, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "APPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 94(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1961", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 94(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 762, "end_char": 770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1961", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 94(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act, 1961", "statute": "Municipalities Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1214, "end_char": 1224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1661, "end_char": 1672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2344, "end_char": 2356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S K. Gambhir for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2377, "end_char": 2391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Khanduja for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M. P. STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2420, "end_char": 2431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. P. STATE y. SHANKER LAL ( Ulltwalia, !. )"}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2510, "end_char": 2518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-These three appeals by special leave are from the common judgment of the Madh\\\"l Pradesh High Court allowing the Writ Petitions filed by the six respondents and quashing the orders of their transfer made by the State Government in exercise of their power under s. 94(7) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1\\161, hereinafter called the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 94(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2784, "end_char": 2792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3518, "end_char": 3526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3652, "end_char": 3657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3991, "end_char": 4001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5352, "end_char": 5357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6332, "end_char": 6337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7021, "end_char": 7027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 94(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7945, "end_char": 7958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Thus establishment and running of Higher Secondary Schools by Municipal Councils are envisaged under the Act", "statute": "Thus establishment and running of Higher Secondary Schools by Municipal Councils are envisaged under the Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_790_800_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "MEHARBANSINGH\n\nBHAGW ANTSINGH AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 17, 1980\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nMadhya Bharat Zan1indari Abolition Act, 1951-S. 4(2)-Scope of.\n\nBy virtue of section 3 ( 1) of the Madhya Bharat Zan1indari Abolition Act, 1951, rights of proprietors in villages, Muhalas and Chaks or blocks settled on the zamindari system vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In so far as the mortgages \\Vere concerned a mortgage \\vith possession \\vhich existed on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting of the property was deemed to have been substituted by a simple mortgage.\n\nThe mortgagee who was in possession of lands under a deed of mortgage, for example a usufrnctuary mortgage, lost possession of the lauds bi operation of la\\v and bis mortgage became e. simple mortgage from the date of vesting of the lands in the State.\n\nOn the other hand a mortgagor \\vho was once the proprietor of the lands, though lost his proprietary right in the lands becaue of their vesting in the State, had to fulfil his obligation as a mortgagor to the extent of the amount secured under the mortgage. To alleviate the lot of such proprietors section 4(2) of the Act provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section ( 1) a proprietor shall continue to remain in possession of his khud-kasht land so recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting. The expression khud-kasht is defined to 111ean \"land cultivated by the Zamindar himself or through employees or hired labourers\".\n\nIf a person was a zamindar and cultivated the land himself or through employees or hired labourers that would be his khud-kasht cu1ti\\.ation within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act, that is, in a given case if it v; as shown that a proprietor had khud-kasht land \\vhich was so recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting of the lands in the State, he was entitled to continue to remain in possession of those lands.\n\nSection 37(1) provides that every proprietor who is divested of his proprietary rights shall be a pacoo. tenant of the khud-kasht land in his possession and the land revenue payable by him shall be determined at the rates fixed by the current settlement for the same kind of land.\n\nIn the present case, the plaintiff's suit for redemption of the mortgage \\Yhich was an usufructuary mortgage, was decreed by the trial court in respect of G the relief of redemption but the claim in regard to the mesne profits \\Yas disallowed. Against that decree three appeals were filedbefore the District Court, one of them being the appeal by the plaintiffs challenging the refusal by the trial court to grant mesne profits. The plaintiff's appeal was partly allowed granting mesne profits from the date of deposit of the mortgage money in court. The other two appeals were dismissed. The matter v:as taken in appeal to the High Court by the defendants in second appeal. The plaintiffs ff also preferred a second appeal claiming full relief in so far as mesne profits were concerned. The High Court partly allowed the defendants' appeal holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the mortgage by paying the\n\nI ..\n\n- ( '\n\n' ...\n\n' • •\n\n\nMEHARBAN SINGH V. BHAGWANT SINGH 791\n\nmortgage money but were not entitled to get possession of the mortgaged ,.\\ land, since according to the High Court, the proprietary rights including the right to get possession bad become vested in the State -under the aforesaid Act. It further held that the plaintiffs were only entitled to claim cornpensa tion from the Government in lieu of their proprietary rights after redeeming the mortgage by making payment of the n1ortgege money.\n\nAgainst the decree of the High Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal before this Court in Meharban Singh & Ors. v. Naresfz Singfz & Ors. [1970] 3 SCR 18.\n\nThis Court set aside 8 the decree of the High Court and remitted the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision on the question whether the lands in dispute were khud-kasht larxls and to p.:1ss a decree for possession if they were found to be so in view of sections 4(1)(f) and 4(2) of the Act. After the case went back to the High Court, the State Government was impleaded as a party to the suit and was· permitted to file a written statement. Certain additional issues were raised by the Higb. Court on the basis of the ne\"v pleadings. The High Court C sent the case to the trial court for recording its finding on the issue 'whether the land in dispute was recorded as khud-ka.sht land immediately before the date of vesting?' after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce further evidence on the said additional issue and to resubmit the record to it.\n\nThe trial court held that the suit land was khud-kasht land in possession of the plaintiffs before the date of vesting of the estate and submitted the said find\n\ning to the High Court. The said finding was not in fact disputed before the D High Court. Aii that the High Court was to decide was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Act but the High Court once again took the view that the plaintiffs were not entitled to get possession of the suit lands although they were entitled to a decree for redemption. It is against the judgment of the High Court, the above appeal has been filed.\n\nAllowing the appeal and restoring the decree of the Court of first appeal, E\n\nHELD : When the case went back to the High Court all that the High Court was to decide was whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of section 4(2) of the Act in terms of the directions given by this Court. Since the plaintiffs were the proprietors of the suit lands there can be no dispute that till the time of mortgage the suit lands were in their possession.\n\nSecondly since the ]ands were recorded as khud-kas/lt lands of the mortgagors in the F annual vilJage papers before the date of vesting, they were clearly entitled to a decree for possession in terms of section 4(2) and there was no occasion for the High Court to examine the consequences of their losing the possession of the lands after the mortgage. When section 4(1) (f) read with s. 4(2) gave the mortgagor the benefit of the right to remain in possession of his khud-kasht, which we.s in his possession upto the date of mortgage, there could be no reason why it should bo denied to t:he plaintiffs. It was found •n G evidence by the first court of appeal that the mortgagors were themselves cultivating the lands and thereafter the mortgagee got them cultivated through his relatives.\n\nAssuming that the mortgagee really inducted tenants in the lands, during the period of mortgage their tenure was bound to end on the redemption of the mortgage according to the ordinarylaw of redemption unless they could lay claim to protection under any other law. [797 E-H]\n\nIt is well settled that the normal law of mortgage would apply and tenants 8 inducted by the mortgagee would go out of the lands on redemption of the\n\n13-91SCI/8~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 SC.II.\n\nA mortgage if in the n1eanwhile the law has not been shown to intervene for their protection.\n\nIn the instant case 1he law expressly gave the benefit 11! section 4t2) to a proprietor like the plaintiffs.\n\nThe tenants inducted by the mortgagee would have no statutory right to possession .. 1800 A-B}\n\nMahabir Gopc and others v. Jlarbans l\\7arain Singh and others [1952]'5.C.R. 775; Narihar Prasad Singh and Another v. Mst. of Munshi Nath Prasad and B others [1956) SCR 1; Asa Ran1 and anotl1er v. Mst. Rani Klili 1111d £1no1/icr [1958] SCR 986; Prabhu v. Ramdev and othm [1966] 3 S.C.R. 676. referred to.\n\nSection 41 which deals with protection of tenancy rights of the n1ortgagees\n\nannot be invoked by the mortgagees in the case of section 4(2). [800 BC]\n\n'\\ c C'rv!L APPELLATE JURls.IJICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2113 of ... 1972.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 10-2-1972 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 310 of 1960.\n\nD Shiv Dayal and J. S. Sinha for the Appellant.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Shobha Dixit for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J.\n\nThis appeal of one of the plaintiffs, by special leave, is directed against the jndgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated February 10, 1972, by which the suit for possession of the lands, which the plaintiffs had mortgaged, has been dismissed even though the trial court's decree for redemption has been maintained.\n\nAs the matter has come up to this Court for the second time, at the instance of the plaintiffs it is not necessary to state all the facts for they have been mentioned in this Court's earlier decision is Meharbansingh and others v. Nareshsingh and others.(') It will be sufficient to refer to those facts which bear on the present controversy.\n\nThe suit lands belonged to Samle Singh, father of appellant Meharban Singh, and Jomdar Singh who executed a registered deed of mortgage in favour of Munshi Singh on May 20, 1939, for Rs. 2242/14/-. It is not disputed before us that it was a usufructuary mortgage of land within the area of the former Gwalior State. The mortgagors gave a notice to the mortgagee on May 15, 1943, for redemption of the lands but he. refused to accept. The mortgagors filed the suit for redemption on June 15, 1943.\n\nAs some other persons were alleged to be in possession of the suit lands, they were also impleaded\n\n\n...\n\n.._\n\n1 •..\n\n' ..\n\n'l!s defendants.\n\nThe Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 •(Samvat 2008), hereinafter referred to as the Act, came into force on October 2, 1951, and leave was granted to the plaintiffs to amend the -plaint suitably. The trial court decreed the suit on October 10,\n\n1958, but disallowed the relief for the grant of mesne profits. Three appeals were preferred against that judgment and decree of the trial court. The appellate court dismissed the appeals of the defendants . .It held that the suit lands were the khud-kasht lands of the, mortgagors,\n\nnd allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs for mesne profits from the -date of the deposit of the mortgage-money.\n\nThe defendants went in second appeal to the High Court; and the plaintiffs also preferred an appeal for refusal of mesne profits from the date of the cause of action.\n\nThe High Court partly allowed the defendants' appeal by its judgment dated September 27, 1962. It relied on this Court's decision in Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao(') and held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession.\n\nIt dismissed the appeal of plaintiff Meharbansingh.\n\nHe applied to this Court for special leave, and that led to this Court's decision in Meherbansingh's case (Supra) mentioned above.\n\nThis' Court allowed the appeal and, after considering the relevant provisions of the Act, remitted the case to the High Court for fresh decision after notice to the state on the point whether the suit land were Khud-kasht of the plaintiffs and they were entitled to remain in possession under 1>ection 4 of the Act. The State was therefore allowed to be impleaded as a party and to file a written statement. Certain additional issues were framed by the High Court and the case was remitted to the trial court for its findings.\n\nWhen it came to the High Court again, with those findings it once again took the view that the plaintiffs were not\n\nentitled to possession of the suit lands although they were entitled to a decree for redemption. It is against that judgment of the High Court dated February 10, 1973, that plaintiffs Meherbansingh has come up to this Court by way of the present appeal.\n\nThe facts of this case are thus quite simple, and its fate depends upon the answer to thz question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the suit lands under sub-section (2) of section 4 of the\n\nB '\n\nAct.\n\nThe Act made provision for the abolition and acquisition of the rights of proprietors in villages, \"muhals\", \"chaks\" or blocks settled on the zamindari system.\n\nIf therefore a person was a \"proprietor\" within the meaning of clause (a) of section 2, all his proprietary rights vested in the State free of all encumbrances by virtue of subn section (l) of section 3 of the Act from the date specified for the\n\n(I) {1962] Supp. I S.C.R. 123.\n\n794 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l S\n\n\nA purpose in the notification issued by the State Government. It is not disputed that the sp2cified date for purposes of the present case was October 2, 1951.\n\nThe consequences of the vesting of an estate under section 3 have been stated in section 4.\n\nWe are not concerned with sub section (3) of that section, and it will be sufficient to refer to clauses\n\n(a) and (f) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 4. Clause\n\n(a) of sub-section (1) of section 4 provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act, the following consequences shall ensue notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or document or in any other law for the time being in force,-\n\n\"(a) all rights, title and interest of the proprietor in such area, including land (cultivable, barren or Bir), forest, trees, fishe1ies, wells (other than private wells), tanks. ponds, water channels, ferries, pathways, village-sites, hats, and bazars and mela-grounds and in all sub-soil, including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not, shall cease a'nd be vested in the Stat>o free from all encumbrances;\"\n\nThis provision therefore had the effect of terminating the propriel'ary rights of a proprietor in his estate and in vesting them in the State> free from all encumbrances. The legislature has taken care to deal with the fate of mortgages, in clause (f) of sub-section ( 1) of section 4, which reads as follows.-\n\n\"(f) every mortgage wit!h possession existing on the property so vesting or part thereof on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of the F amount s•2cured on such property or part thereof be deemed without prejudice to the rights of the State under ection 3, to have been substituted by a simple mortgage.\"'\n\nSo a mortgage with possession, which ex.isled on th-: date immediately preceding the date of vesting of the property, was deemed to have G been substitued by a simple mqrtgage.\n\nThat was to be so without prejudice to the rights of the State under section 3.\n\nA mortgagee who was i'n possession of lands under a deed of mortgage, e.g. a usufructuary mortgagee, this lost possession of the lands by operation of the law, and his mortgage became nothing more than a simple mortgage from the date of the vesting of the lands in the State. In H other words, he lost possession of the lands which were once mortgaged with him with possession, and was left only with the normal right of a simple mortgagee to realise the mortgage money.\n\n. '\n\n' MEHARBAN SINGH v. BHAGWANT SINGH (Shinglzal, !.) 795\n\nWhile that was the fate of the mortgagee under the Act, the fate -of the mortgagor, who was once the proprietor of the lands, was even worse, for he lost his proprietary rights in the lands because of their vesting in the State under section 3 as aforesaid and had, nonetheless, to fulfil his obligation as a mortgagor to the extent of the amount secured under the mortgag~. It appears that the legislature therefore thought of alleviating the lot of those of such proprietors whose cases fell under subsection (2) of section 4 of the Act.\n\nThe sub- :section reads as follows,-\n\n\" (2) No:withstanding anything contained in sub-<>ection •(I), the proprietor shall continue to remain in possession oI his khud-kasht land, so recarded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting.\"\n\n\"So only those proprietors were permitted to continue to remain in possession of their lands who had khud-kasht lands and the lands were recorded as khud-kasht in the annual village papers before the date of vesting.\n\nThe expression khud-kasht bas been defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Act to mean, inter alia, land cultivated by the zamindar himself or through employees or hired labourers. Clause ( c) of section 2 of the Act states that words and expressions, used in the Act, but not defined in it, shall have the same me.aning as assigned to them in Qanoon Mal, Gwalior State, Samvat 1983.\n\nThe expression \"zamindar\" has been defined in clause ( 13) of section 2 of the Qanoon Mal to mean a person who has the rights mentioned in it. It is not disputed before us that the plaintiffs were zamindars under that definition, and were proprietors of their la'nds.\n\nIt is also not disputed before us that if a person was a zamindar and <:ultivated the land himself or through employees or hired labourers, that would be his khud-kasht cultivation within the meaning of clause ( c) of section 2 of the Act. It would follow that if, in a given case, it was shown that a proprietor had khud-kasht land which was so recorded i'n the annual village papers bdore the date of vesting of the lands in the State, he was entitled to continue to remain in possession of those lands.\n\nThis concession to the proprio>tor was by way of a rider to the rigorous provisions of section 3 of the Act regarding the vesting of his estate in the State, and if a proprietor was able to establish that ho was entitled to its benefit, there could be 'no reason why it should not be .allowed to him. It may be that the provision for the vesting of the estate in the State under section 3 and, in particular, that relating to the loss of possession of the mort- :gagee under clause ( f) of section 4, operated harshly on a mortgagee with possession, and he had to conte'nt himself with the other provi- -sions in the Act for the satisfaction of the debt owed to him by the\n\nB ,\n\nproprietor, but the law allowed him nothing more after the date of the vesting of the estate in the State.\n\nThe lot of the mortgagor-proprietor was in fact far worse, for while the Act divested him of the proprietary interest in the lands held by him and vested those right& in the State, it held him liable as if his; mortgage was a simple mortgage and left him only with the remedy of claiming compe'nsation, which. was itself overridden with his liability to his creditors. In the plight in which he was placed by the land reforms legislation which was the. subject-matter of the Act, it was quite reasonable for the legislature. to allow him, notwithstandini anything contained in sub-section (l) of section 4 which e'numerates consequences of the vesting of the estate in the State, the benefit of what sub-sectiQn, (2) of that section;\n\nprovided, and that also on his satisfying the rigorous conditions of the sub-section mentioned above.\n\nReference in this connection may also be made to section 37 of the Act, sub-sectio'n ( 1) of which provi<fos that every proprietor who• is divested of his proprietary rights shall be \"a pacca tenant of the khud-kasht land in his possession and the land revenue payable by him shall be determin2d at the rates fixed by the current settlement for the same kind of land.\" In fact, when this Court examined the matter on the earlier occasion, it topk notice of the above provision&\n\nof the Act and observed as follows,-\n\n\"The proprietor however, notwithstanding other consequences of the vesting in a State, is entitled to continue to remain in possession of his khud-kasht land which is so recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vest-· ing.\n\nNow it was clearly open to the plaintiffs to show that the land in question was khud-kasht and, therefore, in accordance with s. 4 they were entit:ed to remain in possession thereof.\"\n\nIn other \\Vords, this Court took the view that while the mortgagor\"\n\n(appellants) fulfilled the other requirements of the law, their claim to possession of the khud-kasht lands under sub-section (2) of sectiorr\n\n4 of the Act had to be decided on the basis of the facts, and it was open to them to show that the lands were khud-kasht and they were entitled to remain in possession in terms of sub-section (2) of section 4.\n\nThat was the purpose why the case was remanded to the High Court and an opportunity was give'n to the State to appear and contest the claim of the plaintiffs on that basis.\n\nAs has been stated, the case went back to the High Court which, in its turn, impleaded the State as a party to the suit, permitted it to file a written statement, added certain issues and sent the case t<>\n\n/ /'\n\ni \"'\n\nthe trial court for submitting its findings after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce further evidence.\n\nAnd wh>n it went back to the High Court with the findings of the trial court, the High Court stated as follows in its judgment under appeal,-\n\n\"After imp!eading the State as a party, the following issue, inter alia was remitted to the lower court for recording a finding after giving both the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence :\n\n'\"Whether the land in suit was recorded as khud-kasht immediately before the date of vesting.\"\n\nThe parties fild certain documents bnt did 'not adduce any oral evidence on the point.\n\nThe trial court has answered the issue in the affirmative.\n\nIt was not disputed before me that lhe land was recorded as Khud-kasht in the names oE the plaintiffs at the time of vesting,. .... \"\n\nThere can be no doubt, therefore, that the trial court recorded the finding, on the basis of the 'vide'nce before it, that the suit lands were recorded as the khud-kasht lands of the plaintiffs before the date of the vesting of the \"-state. That was in fact not disputed in the, High Court.\n\nAll that the Hi; h Court had then to do was to decide whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Act, for that was the clear direction of this Conrt in the earlier judgment.\n\nIt is not disputed before us that the plaintiffs were the proprietors of the suit lands, and it cannot be disputed that as they mortgaged them with possession with defendant Munshi Singh, they were themselves in possession upto the date of the mortgage, and as it has been found as a fact that the lands were recorded as khudkasht lands of the mortgagors in the annual village papers before the date of vesting, they were clearly entitled to a decree for possession in terms of sub-section (2) of section 4 and there was no .occasion for the High Court to examine the consequence of their losing the possession of the lands after the mortgage.\n\nIt has to be appreciated that possession is always lost by the mortgagor in the case of a mortgage with possession.\n\nBut when clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 4 gave the mortgagor the benefit of sub-section (2) of that section to claim the right to remain in possession of his khudkasht land which was in his possession upto the date of mortgage, if the strict requirement of sub-s, ction (2) was shown to exist, there could be no reason why it should be' denied to the plaintiffs.\n\nIt may be mentioned In this connection that when the case came up in first appeal before the Second Additional District Jndge of Bhind,\n\nhe examined the statements of Himachal Singh DW 1, Ram Krishan DW 2 and Hanumant Singh DW 3. Himachal Singh was a cousin of mortgagee Munshi Singh, Ram Krishan DW 2 was a nephew of Munshi Singh and Hanumant Singh DW 3 was himself a defendant. On a consideration of their statemcn!s. the court of first appeal reached the conclusion that the mortgagors were themselves cultivating the land and thereafter the mortgagee got it cultivated through his relatives. But eve'n if it were assumed that the mortgagee really inducted tenants in the lands during the period of the mortgage, heir tenure was bound to end on the redemption of the mortgage according to the ordinary Jaw of pedemption unless, of course, they could Jay claim to protection under any other Jaw.\n\nReference in this connection may be made to the decision of this Court in Mahabir Cope and others v.\n\nHarbans Narain Singh and others(') where the Jaw has been laid down as follows,-\n\n\"The general rule is that a person cannot by transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has.\n\nA mortgagee cannot, therefore, create an interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee.\n\nFurther, the mortgagee, who takes p05session of the mortgaged property. must manage it as a persqn of ordinary prudence would manage it if it were his own; and he must not commit any act which is destructive or permanently injurious to the property; see section 76, sub-clauses (a) & (e) of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nIt follows that he may grant leases not extending beyond the period of the mortgage; any leases granted by him must come to an end at redemption.\"\n\nCare was taken to state further in that case that if during the permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management, any right sprang up in the tenant by conferral or creation by statute, that would be a \"different matter altogether\", for that would then be an \"exception to the general rule.\"\n\nThe decision in Mahabir Gope's case (Supra) was applied or was followed in Harihar Prasad Singh and another v. Mst. of Munshi Nath Prasad and others(') where it was held as follows,-\n\n\"As the mortgagees are neither proprietors nor tenureholders as defined in the Act, the tenants holding under\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R.'775.\n\n(2) [1956] S.C.R. I.\n\n\\ l\n\ni ..\n\n_ ..\n\nthem could not claim to be raiyats as defined in &Xtions 5(2) and 5(3), and no occupancy rights could therefore be acquired by them under section 21 of the Act.\"\n\nThat decision was again followed in Asa Ram and another v. Mst. Ram\n\nKpli and another(!) also, and was held as follows,-\n\n\"But where there is no such prohibition, the only consequence is that the parties will be thrown back on their rights under the Transfer of Property Act, and the lessees must still establish that the lease is blinding on the mortgagors under s.76(a) of that Act.\"\n\nReference may also be made to Prabhu v.\n\nRamdev and others(') C where again reference was made to the decision in Mahabir Gope\n\n(supra) and the legal position was reiterated as follows,-\n\n\"Having made these observations, however, this Court bas taken th2 precaution to point out that even in regard to tenants inducted into the land by a mortgagee cases may arise where the said tenahts may acquire. rights of special character by virtue of statutory provisions which may, in the meanwhile, come into operation.\n\nA permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tehant conferred or created by statute ba&od on the 11ature of the land and possession for the requisite period, it was observed, was a different matter altogether.\n\nSuch a case is clearly an exception to the general rule prescribed by the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nIt will thus be seen that while dealing with the normal position under the Transfer of Property Act, this Court specifically pointed out that the rights of the tenants inducted by the mortgagee may cohceivably be improved by virtue of statutory provisions which may meanwhile come into operation.\n\nThat is precisely what has happened in the present case.\n\nDuring the continuance of the mortgage s. 15 of the Act came into operation and that made the respondents Khatadars who are entitled to claim the benefit of s. 161 of the Act.\"\n\nIt is therefore well settled that the normal law of mortgage would apply and tenants inducted by the mortgagee would go out of the\n\nfonds on redemption of the mortgago, if, in the meanwhile, law has H\n\n(ll [19ssrs.c.R. 986.\n\n\nnot been shown to intervene for their protection.\n\nAs, i\"n the instant case, the law expressly gave the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 4 to a proprietor like the appellant, the tenants Inducted by the mortgagee will have no statutory right of possession.\n\nA vain a'.tempt was made to invoke section 41 of the Act for the protection of the tenancy rights of the mortgagees, but their learned Counsel was unable to show how they could claim th~ benefit of that section iu face of the dear provision of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Act.\n\nIn fact all that Mr. Bhandare was able to contend on behalf of the respondents was that their case was covered by this Court's decision in Haji Sk. Subhat!'J case (supra). That decision formed the basis of the ear; ier decision of the High Court dated September 27, 1962, but this Court clearly pointed out in its earlier decision that the High Court was \"in error in allowing the appeal before it and in dismissing the plaintiff-appellants' suit for possession on the authority of this Court's decision in the case of Haji Sk. Subhan\" (supra). It is therefore not necessary for us to say, once again, why that decision cannot govern the present dispute.\n\nIn the result, we, allow the appeal and restore the decree of the court of first appeal with costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowd.\n\n• ...", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "MEHARBANSINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Meharban Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGW ANTSINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWANTSINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 17, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MEHARBANSINGH\n\nBHAGW ANTSINGH AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 17, 1980\n\n[P. N. SHINGHAL AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "E. S. 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S. Sinha for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J. S. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Shiv Dayal and J. S. Sinha for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Shobha Dixit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8112, "end_char": 8125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Shobha Dixit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dixit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8130, "end_char": 8142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Shobha Dixit for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "SHINGHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8208, "end_char": 8216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J.\n\nThis appeal of one of the plaintiffs, by special leave, is directed against the jndgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated February 10, 1972, by which the suit for possession of the lands, which the plaintiffs had mortgaged, has been dismissed even though the trial court's decree for redemption has been maintained."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8318, "end_char": 8343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J.\n\nThis appeal of one of the plaintiffs, by special leave, is directed against the jndgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated February 10, 1972, by which the suit for possession of the lands, which the plaintiffs had mortgaged, has been dismissed even though the trial court's decree for redemption has been maintained."}}, {"text": "February 10, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8350, "end_char": 8367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHINGHAL, J.\n\nThis appeal of one of the plaintiffs, by special leave, is directed against the jndgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated February 10, 1972, by which the suit for possession of the lands, which the plaintiffs had mortgaged, has been dismissed even though the trial court's decree for redemption has been maintained."}}, {"text": "Samle Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8916, "end_char": 8927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit lands belonged to Samle Singh, father of appellant Meharban Singh, and Jomdar Singh who executed a registered deed of mortgage in favour of Munshi Singh on May 20, 1939, for Rs."}}, {"text": "Meharban Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8949, "end_char": 8963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit lands belonged to Samle Singh, father of appellant Meharban Singh, and Jomdar Singh who executed a registered deed of mortgage in favour of Munshi Singh on May 20, 1939, for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Meharban Singh"}}, {"text": "Jomdar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8969, "end_char": 8981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit lands belonged to Samle Singh, father of appellant Meharban Singh, and Jomdar Singh who executed a registered deed of mortgage in favour of Munshi Singh on May 20, 1939, for Rs."}}, {"text": "Munshi Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit lands belonged to Samle Singh, father of appellant Meharban Singh, and Jomdar Singh who executed a registered deed of mortgage in favour of Munshi Singh on May 20, 1939, for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Munshi Singh"}}, {"text": "May 20, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9054, "end_char": 9066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit lands belonged to Samle Singh, father of appellant Meharban Singh, and Jomdar Singh who executed a registered deed of mortgage in favour of Munshi Singh on May 20, 1939, for Rs."}}, {"text": "Gwalior", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9190, "end_char": 9197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed before us that it was a usufructuary mortgage of land within the area of the former Gwalior State."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9254, "end_char": 9266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgagors gave a notice to the mortgagee on May 15, 1943, for redemption of the lands but he."}}, {"text": "June 15, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9371, "end_char": 9384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgagors filed the suit for redemption on June 15, 1943."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9533, "end_char": 9576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9648, "end_char": 9663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 •(Samvat 2008), hereinafter referred to as the Act, came into force on October 2, 1951, and leave was granted to the plaintiffs to amend the -plaint suitably."}}, {"text": "October 10,\n\n1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9772, "end_char": 9789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court decreed the suit on October 10,\n\n1958, but disallowed the relief for the grant of mesne profits."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10424, "end_char": 10442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court partly allowed the defendants' appeal by its judgment dated September 27, 1962."}}, {"text": "Meharbansingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10613, "end_char": 10626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It dismissed the appeal of plaintiff Meharbansingh.", "canonical_name": "Meharban Singh"}}, {"text": "Meherbansingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10714, "end_char": 10727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He applied to this Court for special leave, and that led to this Court's decision in Meherbansingh's case (Supra) mentioned above.", "canonical_name": "Meharban Singh"}}, {"text": "February 10, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11554, "end_char": 11571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is against that judgment of the High Court dated February 10, 1973, that plaintiffs Meherbansingh has come up to this Court by way of the present appeal."}}, {"text": "Meherbansingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11589, "end_char": 11602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is against that judgment of the High Court dated February 10, 1973, that plaintiffs Meherbansingh has come up to this Court by way of the present appeal.", "canonical_name": "Meharban Singh"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11853, "end_char": 11862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12120, "end_char": 12129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12236, "end_char": 12245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12563, "end_char": 12572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12593, "end_char": 12602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12765, "end_char": 12774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12810, "end_char": 12819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13748, "end_char": 13757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14375, "end_char": 14384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15154, "end_char": 15163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15438, "end_char": 15447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15989, "end_char": 15998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16127, "end_char": 16136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16378, "end_char": 16387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16803, "end_char": 16812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17179, "end_char": 17188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17471, "end_char": 17480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17582, "end_char": 17591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18475, "end_char": 18484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18766, "end_char": 18776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19600, "end_char": 19604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20070, "end_char": 20079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21723, "end_char": 21732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Munshi Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21992, "end_char": 22004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed before us that the plaintiffs were the proprietors of the suit lands, and it cannot be disputed that as they mortgaged them with possession with defendant Munshi Singh, they were themselves in possession upto the date of the mortgage, and as it has been found as a fact that the lands were recorded as khudkasht lands of the mortgagors in the annual village papers before the date of vesting, they were clearly entitled to a decree for possession in terms of sub-section (2) of section 4 and there was no .occasion for the High Court to examine the consequence of their losing the possession of the lands after the mortgage.", "canonical_name": "Munshi Singh"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22315, "end_char": 22324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22622, "end_char": 22631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Additional District Jndge of Bhind", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23047, "end_char": 23088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned In this connection that when the case came up in first appeal before the Second Additional District Jndge of Bhind,\n\nhe examined the statements of Himachal Singh DW 1, Ram Krishan DW 2 and Hanumant Singh DW 3."}}, {"text": "Himachal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23121, "end_char": 23135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned In this connection that when the case came up in first appeal before the Second Additional District Jndge of Bhind,\n\nhe examined the statements of Himachal Singh DW 1, Ram Krishan DW 2 and Hanumant Singh DW 3."}}, {"text": "Ram Krishan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23142, "end_char": 23153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned In this connection that when the case came up in first appeal before the Second Additional District Jndge of Bhind,\n\nhe examined the statements of Himachal Singh DW 1, Ram Krishan DW 2 and Hanumant Singh DW 3."}}, {"text": "Hanumant Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23163, "end_char": 23177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned In this connection that when the case came up in first appeal before the Second Additional District Jndge of Bhind,\n\nhe examined the statements of Himachal Singh DW 1, Ram Krishan DW 2 and Hanumant Singh DW 3."}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24560, "end_char": 24570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24601, "end_char": 24625, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mahabir Gope", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25137, "end_char": 25149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Mahabir Gope's case (Supra) was applied or was followed in Harihar Prasad Singh and another v. Mst."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25617, "end_char": 25627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25892, "end_char": 25916, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.76(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26006, "end_char": 26013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26924, "end_char": 26948, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27026, "end_char": 27050, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27346, "end_char": 27351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27464, "end_char": 27470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27845, "end_char": 27854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28009, "end_char": 28019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28237, "end_char": 28246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28281, "end_char": 28289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact all that Mr. Bhandare was able to contend on behalf of the respondents was that their case was covered by this Court's decision in Haji Sk."}}, {"text": "Haji Sk. Subhat!'J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28399, "end_char": 28417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact all that Mr. Bhandare was able to contend on behalf of the respondents was that their case was covered by this Court's decision in Haji Sk.", "canonical_name": "Haji Sk. Subhat!'J"}}, {"text": "Haji Sk. Subhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28779, "end_char": 28794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision formed the basis of the ear; ier decision of the High Court dated September 27, 1962, but this Court clearly pointed out in its earlier decision that the High Court was \"in error in allowing the appeal before it and in dismissing the plaintiff-appellants' suit for possession on the authority of this Court's decision in the case of Haji Sk.", "canonical_name": "Haji Sk. Subhat!'J"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_801_808_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "\\~.\n\n\\ ·~\n\nKUSA & ORS.\n\nST A TE OF ORISSA\n\nJanuary 17, 1980\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nSupretne Cofltt (Enlargc1nent of Criminal Appellate Juri.1dic!ion) Act 1970, S. 2(a)-Scope.\n\nIndian Evidence Act 1872, S. 32(1).\n\nJJyi111: declaration-Evidentiary value of-Eyewitnesses account ittco-11siste11t C 'tt.ith dying declaration-Dying declaration if could be relied upon.\n\nDying declaration-Evidence of doctor that deceased was in a state of shocklnability of deceased to answer the last question of doctor-Whether invalidates the dying declaration.\n\nDying declaration-Deceased naming some other persons than accused-Such persons not challaned-Validity of dying declaration.\n\nThe appellants along with other accused persons were tried undr section 302/149 l.P.C. for cauging murder of two persons. While one of the deceased died on the spot tlre other wOO was removed to hospital, gave a dying declaration to the doctor before dying. The Sessions Judg'e finding that none of the. eye-\\vitnesses examined was reliable and as the accused could not be convicted on the basis of their testimony acquitted all the accused. fle further held that the evidence of the eye-witnesses was rendered improbable and was in fact falsified by the dying declaration Ex. 9.\n\nOn appeal by the State, the High Court held that the dying declaration Ex. 9 was absolutely true and reliable and was sufficient to establish the prosecution case.\n\nIt accord- -- ingly convicted and sentenced the appellants to in1prisonment for life.\n\n( In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that ( 1) as the deceased was in a state of shock, it was unsafe to rely on the dying declaration, (2) as the dying declaration was incomplete it could not be acted upon, and ( 3) as the deceased had implicated some persons other than the accused, the dying declaration could not be said to be true.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\n11'\n\n...- HELD : I. The High Court was right in holding that even excluding: the evidence of the eyeMwitnesses the dying declaration is true and reliable and sufficient to found the conviction of the appellants. [808 FJ\n\n2. The Sessions Judge committed an error in law in rejecting the dying declaration because if the evidence of the eyeMwitnesses was to be rejected on the ground that it \\Vas inconsistent with the dying declaration, it would not necessarily follow that the dying declaration was also unreliable and unworthy of credence. [804 CJ\n\n3. (a) This Court has held that whenever a particular view taken by authors of Medical Jurisprudence, is adumbrated, the same must be put -to -1\n\nthe doctor to assess how far the view taken by the experts apply to the facts of the particular case.\n\n[805 G1\n\nIn the instant case though the doctor who had recorded the dying declaration had stated that the deceased was in a state of shock because he had received a serious injury in the abdomen w•hich had to be stitched, he woo however not crossed-examined as to the fact whether or not despite the ::.hock, the deceased had retained his mental faculties.\n\nOn the other hand, the last certificate given by the doctor towards the end of the dying declaration that the patient became semi-conscious clearly shows that the deceased was fully conscious wh'en he started making the dying declaration before the doctor. [804 H, 805 GJ\n\n(b) A perusal of the entire dying declaration clearly shows that the doctor had asked all the necessary questions that could be asked from the deceased and the last question \"what more you want to say\" V/as merely in the nature of a formality. I-laving narrated the full story, there was no:hing more that the deceased could add.\n\nThe dying declaration was therefore not incon1plete one. [806 BJ\n\nCyril Waugh v. The King, 54 CWN 503, distinguished.\n\n(c) Merely because some other persons named in the dying declaration were not challaned \\Vould not by itself prove the falsity of the dying declaration.\n\nIt may be that these, persons were left out from the category of a-cused in the >E F.I.R. or the challan due to ulterior motives. [806 E, 805 CJ\n\n4. A person on the verge of death is most unlikely to mn.ke an untrue statement unless prompted or tutored by his friends or relatives.\n\nThe shadow\n\nof immediate death is the best guarantee of the truth of the staten1ent by ra dying person regarding the causes or circumstances leading to his death /- which are absolutely fresh in his mind and is untainted or discoloured bY If any other consideration except speaking the truth. It is for these reasons that the Statute (The Evidence Act) attaches a special sanctity to a dying declaration. [808 B-C]\n\n5. It is well established that although a dying declaration should be carefully scrutinised if after perusal the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and is free from any effort to pro1npt the deceased to 1nake a •G statement and is coherent and consistent, there is no legal impeditnent in founding the conviction on such a dying declaration even if there is no corroboration. [808 D-EJ\n\nKhushal Rao v. The State of Bombay [1958] SCR 552,; Tarachand Dan1u Sutor v. The State of Maharashtra [1962] 2 SCR 775; Mannu Raja & Anr.\n\nv. State of M.P. [1976J 3 SCC 104 referred to.\n\nRom Nath Madhoprasad & Ors. v. State of M.P. AIR 1953 SC 420, over- 1111ed.\n\n• ' ..\n\n• XUSA v. ORISSA (Fazal Ali, !.) ~03\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 53 of A. 1974.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 2-11-1973 of the Orissa High Court in Govt. Appeal No. 10/1971.\n\nY. S. Chitale, and U. P. Singh for the Appellant.\n\nD. Mookherjee and B. P. Parthasarthi for the ResPondent.\n\nThe Judgthent of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au J.-This appeal under s. 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdicton) Act 1970 is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 2-11-1973 convicting the appellants u/s. 302/149 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe appellants along with other accused person were tried before the Sessions Judge under s. 302/149 for causing murder of two persons namely Ghansham and his brother Antarj>ami.\n\nThe Trial Court after considering the evidence acquitted all the accused of the charges framed against them.\n\nThereafter the State of Orissa filed an appeal before the High Court against the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge and in the said appeal the High Court reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge so far as the appellants were concerned and convicted and sentenced them as indicated above.\n\nHence this appeal before us.\n\nThe facts of the case are detailed in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat them. It appears that shortly before the date of occurrence, there was a partition suit between the parties in respect of certain properties enjoyed by accused Banshi and Ghana.\n\nOn 2-12-1968, according to the prosecution, the accused persons armed with lathis, Bhusas and valies came to the house of the deceased Ghansham and called him out.\n\nWhen Ghansharn opened the door, the accused Banshi stabbed Ghansham on the chest as a result of which Ghansham fell down and died.\n\nOn hearing the alarm, the other deceased Antarjami who was brother of G.hansham went to the spot and he was also assaulted by the accused persons. This occurrence had t>aken place nearabout 7 .00\n\na.m. F. I. R. was sent to Bramhagiri Police Station where it was lodged and a case was registered.\n\nAfter the usual investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against all the accused persons who were tried by the Sessions Judge with the result mentioned above.\n\nIt appears that the Trial Court after considering the evidence of the eye witness examined before it came to a clear finding that none\n\nof the eye witnesses were reliable and he!lce the accused could not be convicted on the basis of their testimony.\n\nOne of the main considerations which swayed with the trial Court in coming to this conclusion was that in view of the dying declaration-Ex. 9 made by Antarjami, the evidence of the eye witnesses becomes improbable, and is in fact falsified.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge also disbelieved the dying declaration as it was inconsistent with the oral evidence.\n\nWe might mention here that the Sessions Judge cqnun.ittcd an error of law in rejecting the dying declaration becaue if the evidence of the eye witnesses was to be rejected on the ground that it was inconsistent with the dying declaration then it would in the circumstances not necessarily follow that the dying declaration was also unreliable and unworthy of credence.\n\nThe High Court while endorsing the findings of the Trial Court that no reliance could be placed on the eye witnesses appears to have founded the conviction of the appellants mainly on the basis of the dying declaration-Ex. 9 recorded by Dr. Mohanty on 3-12-1968 at the hospital.\n\nThe High Court has given cogent reasons for holding that the dying declaration is absolutely true and reliable and was sufficient to establish the prosecution case against the appellants. We have also gone through the enjire dying declaration-x. 9 very carefully and we find that the statement mde by Antarjami is straight-forward, rational, consistent and absolutely coherent.\n\nThere appeoars to be a ring of truth in the statement made 1ty Antarjami.\n\nCoumel for the appellant has fairly conceded that there is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that there was any possibility of prompting the deceased to make a tainted statement.\n\nThe dying declaration was attacked by the counsel for the appellant on three grounds. In\n\nthe first place, it was submitted that as the deceased Antarjami was in a state of shock, it was unsafe to rely on the dying declaration; secondly it was contended that as the dying declaration was incomplete, it should not be acted upon and thirdly it was pointed out that Antarjami had implicated some persons other than the accused also in the assault on him and his brother, therefore the dying declaration could not be said to be true.\n\nSo far as the first contention is concerned; namely whether the deceased was in a state of shock, it is true that the doctor who had recorded the dying declaration had stated that the deceased was in a state of shock because he had received a serious. injury in the U abdomen which has to be stitched.\n\nThe doctor was however not cross-examined as to the fact whether or not despite the shock, the deceased had retained his mental faculties.\n\nOn the other hand; a\n\n• •\n\n\" ...\n\nKUSA v. QR!SSA (Fazal Ali, J.) 805\n\nbare perusal of the dying declaration and the coherent and consistent statement made by Antarjami clearly reveals the fact that the deceased was fully conscious and was not suffering from any confusion or hallucination.\n\nThe deceased has clearly stated the motive for the occurrence namely dispute about the partition.\n\nHe has also named the four appellants and stated that he aJld his brother were assaulted by valies and lathis and it is not disputed by the prosecution that the appellants were armed with these weapons. It is true that while naming the appellants, the deceased has also named some other persons but the mere fact tlrt those persons were not challaned does not detract from the value of the dying declaration because it may well be that what the deceased was saying was true and the persons who were left out from the category of accused in the F.I.R. or the challan may be due to ulterior motives.\n\nDr. Chitale however relied on a passage in Taylor's 'Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence'-Twelfth Edition particularly on the following passage :\n\nAssess very carefully the mental condition of the patient.\n\nWhen shock ensues upon violence, especially when severe loss of blood or some grievous head injury is leading to de_ath, the intellect of the dying person becomes confused.\n\nIf the doctor observes any wandering or want of clearness in the mind of the JJ'atient, he must mention it in connection with his evidence; but this does not absolve him from his duty, 'although it should make him particularly careful when interpreting his notes.\"\n\nWe are unable to place any reliance on these observations in absence of any question put to the doctor by the accused in his crossexamination regarding the view expressed by the author regarding the state of mind of the deceased. It has been held by this Court in several cases that whenever a particular view taken ]:>y authors of medical jurisprudence is adumbrated, the same must be put to the doctor to assess how far the view taken by the experts apply to the facts of the particular case.\n\nOn the other hand, the last certificate given by the doct.or towards the end of the dying declaration that the paiient. became semi-unconscious clearly shows that the .deceased\n\ns fully conscious when he started making the dying declaration before the doctor.\n\nFor these reasons therefore, the first ground taken by the appellant fails and is not tenable.\n\nAs to the second ground, namely that the dying declaration .was incomplete, we are unable to accept this contention q_ecause we find that the deceased\n\nAntarjan_ii could oot answer the last question which was \"what more you want to say\"' because he became semi-unconscious and was unable to answer any further question.\n\nA perusal of the enti-re dying declaration would clearly show that the doctor had asked all the necessary questio11s that could be asked from the deceased arid the last question was merely in the nature of a for.mality. It . is obvious that having narrated the full story there was nothing more\n\nthat the deceased could add.\n\nWe are therefor~ unable to hold that the prEsent dying declaration is an incomplete one.\n\nReliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Cyril Waugh v.\n\nThe King, C)whcrein it was held that no reliance could be placed where a dying dechµation was incomplete.\n\nReference to the facts of the case would show that the statement made by the deceased was really incomplete in as much as the deceased was unable to complete the main sentence where he was trying to describe the genesis and motive of the occurrence.\n\nThe deceased in that case stated as \"when he fired the short. he missed the other man.\n\nThe man has D an old grudge for me simply because .......... \". It is clear from the statement of the deceased in that case that the deceased wanted\n\no give the motive for the occurrence and other relevant facts which he could not say before the dying declaration was closed. This eoase therefore would have llD' application to the facts of the case.\n\nAs regards the last contention that the deceased had implicated some other persons also show that it was not true, we have already pointed out that merely because some other persons were named and not challaned would not by itself prove the falsity of the dying declartion. Finally on the question of law, it was argued that a dying declaration unless corroborated should not be acted upon.\n\nReliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Ram Nath Madhoprasad & Ors. v. State of M.P. ('). This decision, no doubt, supports the contention of the appellant but since then this Court has departed from the view taken in the case referred to above and has held that if the dying declaration is believed, it can be relied upo1'! for convicting the accused even if there is no corroboration.\n\nIn Khushal Rao v. The State of Bombay,(') it was pointed out that s. 32 (I) of the Evidence Act attaches special sanctity to a dying declaration and unless such a dying declaration can be sliown to be unreliable, it will not affect its admissibility. It was further\n\n(I) 54 c.w.c. 503.\n\n(2) A.T.R. 1953 S.C. 420, 423.\n\n(3) [1958] S.C.R. 552, 563-564.\n\nr .. /\n\nKUSA v. ORISSA (Fazal Ali, !.) 807\n\nheld that although a dying declaration has to be closely scrutinised, once the Court comes to the conclusion that it is true, no question of corroboration arises.\n\nIn this connection, the Court made the followiog observations:-\n\n\"The Legislature in its wisdom has enacted in s. 32 ( 1) of the Evidence Act that \"When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question\", such a statement written or verbal made by a person who is dead (omitting the unnecessary\n\nwods) it self a relevant fact.\n\nThis provision h_as been made by the Legislature, advisedly, as a matter of sheer necessity by way of an exception to the general rule that hearsay is no evidence and that evidence, which has not been tested by cross-examination, is not admissible.\n\nThe purpose of cross-examination is to test the veracity of the statements made by a witness.\n\nIn the view of the Legislature, that test is supplied by the solemn occasion when it was made, namely, at a time when the person making the statement was in d;.inger of losing his life.\n\nAt such a serious and solemn moment, that person is not expected to tell lies and secondly, the test of cross-examioation would not be available.\n\nIn such a case, the necessity of oath also has been dispensed with for the same reasons.\n\nThus, a statement made by a dying person asto the cause of death has been accorded by the Legislature a special sanctity which should, on first principles, b\":, respected.\n\n'• ...\n\nBut in our opinion, there is no absolute rule of law, or even a rule of prudence which has ripened into a rule of law, that a dying declllration unless corroborated by other independent evidence, is not fit to be acted upon, and made the basis of a conviction.\"\n\nIn this case this Court did not approve of the law laid down in the earlier decision which is reported in A.LR. 1953, p. 420.\n\nTo the same effect is a later decision of this Court in the case of Tarachand Damu Sutar v. The State of Maharashtra(') which is a decision rendered by five Judges of this Court which has also taken the view that once a dying declaration is found to be true, it can be\n\n(!) [1962] 2 S.CR. 775.\n\n14-91SCI/80\n\nacted upon without any corroboration.\n\nThus, the view taken by this Court by the three judges in A.LR. 1953, p. 420 stands overruled by this decision.\n\nSame view was taken by this Court in the case of Mannu Raja & Anr. v. State of M.P.(') which has been relied upon by Mr. D. Mookherjee, counsel for the State.\n\nThere are a number of later decision of this Court also to the same effect but it is unnecessary to multiply authorities. It is thus manifest that a person on the verge of death i;; most unlikely to make an untrue statement unless prompted or tutored by his friends or relatives.\n\nIn fact the shadow of immediate death is the best guarantee of the truth of the statement made by a dying person regarding the causes or circumstaJ!ces leading to. his death wliich are absolutely fresh in his mind and is untainted or discoloured by any other consideration except speaking the truth.\n\nI_t is for these reasons that the Statute (The Evidence Act) att:tches a special sanctity to a dying declaration.\n\nThus, if the statement of a dying person passes the test of careful scrutiny applied by the Courts, it becomes a most\n\nreliable piece of evidence which does not require any corroboration.\n\nSuffice it to say that it is now well established by a long course of decisions of this Court that although a dying declaration should be carefully scrutinised but if after perusal of the same, the Court is\n\natisfied that the dying declaration is true and is free from any effort to prompt the deceased to make a statement and is coherent and eonsistent, there is no legal impediment in founding the conviction on iuch a dying declaration even if there is no corroboration.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agree men! with the opinion of tlwHigh Court that even excluding the evidence of the eye witnesses, the dying declaration is true and reliable' Ii' and sufficient to found the conviction of the appellant.\n\nFor these reasons therefore the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(!) [1976] 3 s.c.c. 104.", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "KUSA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUSA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ST A TE OF ORISSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225, "end_char": 233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act 1872", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act 1872"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act 1872", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act 1872"}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 SCR 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1953 SC 420", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5495, "end_char": 5512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 2-11-1973 of the Orissa High Court in Govt."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5543, "end_char": 5556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, and U. P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5562, "end_char": 5573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, and U. P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Mookherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjee and B. P. Parthasarthi for the ResPondent.", "canonical_name": "D. Mookherjee"}}, {"text": "B. P. Parthasarthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5612, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Mookherjee and B. P. Parthasarthi for the ResPondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5697, "end_char": 5705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgthent of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au J.-This appeal under s. 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdicton) Act 1970 is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 2-11-1973 convicting the appellants u/s. 302/149 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to imprisonment for life."}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5727, "end_char": 5734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdicton) Act 1970", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5742, "end_char": 5812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgthent of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au J.-This appeal under s. 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdicton) Act 1970 is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 2-11-1973 convicting the appellants u/s. 302/149 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to imprisonment for life."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5853, "end_char": 5873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgthent of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au J.-This appeal under s. 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdicton) Act 1970 is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 2-11-1973 convicting the appellants u/s. 302/149 of Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to imprisonment for life."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5932, "end_char": 5949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6087, "end_char": 6093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ghansham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants along with other accused person were tried before the Sessions Judge under s. 302/149 for causing murder of two persons namely Ghansham and his brother Antarj>ami.", "canonical_name": "Ghansharn"}}, {"text": "Antarj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6164, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants along with other accused person were tried before the Sessions Judge under s. 302/149 for causing murder of two persons namely Ghansham and his brother Antarj>ami.", "canonical_name": "Antarjami"}}, {"text": "ami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6171, "end_char": 6174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants along with other accused person were tried before the Sessions Judge under s. 302/149 for causing murder of two persons namely Ghansham and his brother Antarj>ami."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6302, "end_char": 6317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the State of Orissa filed an appeal before the High Court against the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge and in the said appeal the High Court reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge so far as the appellants were concerned and convicted and sentenced them as indicated above."}}, {"text": "Banshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6892, "end_char": 6898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that shortly before the date of occurrence, there was a partition suit between the parties in respect of certain properties enjoyed by accused Banshi and Ghana."}}, {"text": "Ghana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that shortly before the date of occurrence, there was a partition suit between the parties in respect of certain properties enjoyed by accused Banshi and Ghana."}}, {"text": "2-12-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6914, "end_char": 6923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 2-12-1968, according to the prosecution, the accused persons armed with lathis, Bhusas and valies came to the house of the deceased Ghansham and called him out."}}, {"text": "Ghansharn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7081, "end_char": 7090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When Ghansharn opened the door, the accused Banshi stabbed Ghansham on the chest as a result of which Ghansham fell down and died.", "canonical_name": "Ghansharn"}}, {"text": "Antarjami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the alarm, the other deceased Antarjami who was brother of G.hansham went to the spot and he was also assaulted by the accused persons.", "canonical_name": "Antarjami"}}, {"text": "G.hansham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7278, "end_char": 7287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On hearing the alarm, the other deceased Antarjami who was brother of G.hansham went to the spot and he was also assaulted by the accused persons.", "canonical_name": "Ghansharn"}}, {"text": "Bramhagiri Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7431, "end_char": 7456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This occurrence had t>aken place nearabout 7 .00\n\na.m. F. I. R. was sent to Bramhagiri Police Station where it was lodged and a case was registered."}}, {"text": "Mohanty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8887, "end_char": 8894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 recorded by Dr. Mohanty on 3-12-1968 at the hospital."}}, {"text": "3-12-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 recorded by Dr. Mohanty on 3-12-1968 at the hospital."}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11529, "end_char": 11536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chitale however relied on a passage in Taylor's 'Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence'-Twelfth Edition particularly on the following passage :\n\nAssess very carefully the mental condition of the patient."}}, {"text": "Taylor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11568, "end_char": 11574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chitale however relied on a passage in Taylor's 'Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence'-Twelfth Edition particularly on the following passage :\n\nAssess very carefully the mental condition of the patient."}}, {"text": "Cyril Waugh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13843, "end_char": 13854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Cyril Waugh v.\n\nThe King, C)whcrein it was held that no reliance could be placed where a dying dechµation was incomplete."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15514, "end_char": 15519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16119, "end_char": 16124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarachand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17911, "end_char": 17920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect is a later decision of this Court in the case of Tarachand Damu Sutar v. The State of Maharashtra(') which is a decision rendered by five Judges of this Court which has also taken the view that once a dying declaration is found to be true, it can be\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.CR. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18117, "end_char": 18135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. Mookherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18424, "end_char": 18437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of M.P.(') which has been relied upon by Mr. D. Mookherjee, counsel for the State.", "canonical_name": "D. Mookherjee"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20166, "end_char": 20172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_809_815_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "HARISH CHANDRA NIGAM\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nJanuary 21, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nDefence of India Act, 1962, se!ctions 29 and 35(1) scope of-RequiSitioii , crders issued to the person actually in possession, but while issuing re'ijuisltion orders, possession ordered to be given to the State and not to the individuals .from whom taken-Propriety of the order.\n\nThe appellants in both the appeals were allotted a plot each \"provisionally subject to the final approval of Government\" and possession thereof was also given in 1956. Six years later by letter dated 31-10-62 they were informed that \"the State Government has not approved the allotment in your favour and the provisional allotment made in your favour stands cancelled\".\n\nSteps were to be taken for the eviction as per the said Jtter of cancellation. but before any action was taken, the District Magistrate requisitioned the said plots for defence purposes under section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1922. The letters of requisition were addressed to the apjiellants and poosession taken.\n\nNo steps were taken by the Department for taking formal -or symbolical possession of the plots in question after they were requisitioned 'by the Magistrate. Later on, while derequisitioning the said plots under section 35(1) of the Defence of India Act 1962, the Magistrate \"specified the Director of Industries, Kanpur as the person to whom the possession of tlte said plots shall be given\".\n\nPossession was given accordingly and the Director of Industries in CA 560/70 in turn allotted the-plot covered in it to one Mrs. B. K.\n\nAnand respondent 5 therein.\n\nThe writ Petitions filed by the appellants in the High Court challenging ...__ 1he said orders falled and hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing CA 559/70 and dismissing CA 560/70, the Court,\n\nHELD : Tb, e inquiry envisaged under sub section (I) of section 35 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, is necessitated only if facts and events taking place after' equition necessitate it.\n\nOtherwise not.\n\nAs for example, sup pose, possession Of a property is taken from X and after requisition be dies and dispute starts between his heirs as to who is. entitled to get back the :Property. A summary and prima facie inquiry may be made under sul>s. (1) and property may be released in favour of the person who may be entitled to the possession of it in the opinion of the Government.\n\nOf course such a decision would be subject to the adjudication of the rights of the parties in accordance with sub-s. (2). [814 C-BJ\n\nFacts. anterior to the requisition are not necessary to be investigated for release of the property because the property has to be released in favour of the person from whom possession was taken. If it were not so then it would l>e enlarging the scope of the inquiry envisaged under sub-s. (I) of s. 35 of\n\nB ~\n\nA the Act and the power of the Government to adjudicate upon anterior title of the various claimants to the property.\n\nThis is not the scope of the inquiry. [814 E-F]\n\n1\"ecbnically speaking on a correct interpretation of the law the property on derequisition; ought to have been released in favour of the two appellants in the two appeals from whom possession was taken at the time of requi B sition.\n\nThe requisition was effected by an order in writing addressed to the person in possession of the property in accordance with sub-s. (2) of s. 29.\n\nHe may not be the owner of the property.\n\nBut on requisition possession was taken from him. [814 C-D, F-G] ,.. [The Court, however, passed a qualified and conditional order in terms]. _ _ c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 559-560 of 1970.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 24-1-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 511 of 1968 connected with Special Appeal No. 512 of 1968.\n\nD R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis for the Appellant.\n\nMadan Bhatia for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-These two appeals by special leave have been heard together as common questioos of law and fact are involved in them. We shall state the facts of Civil Appeal No. 559 of 1970 in which the appellant is Shri Harish Chandra Nigam.\n\nThe facts of the other appeal viz.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 560 of 1970 in which the appellant is Shri Amar Singh are almost identical except ooe which shall be stated hereinafter.\n\nThe plot concerned in Nig:im's appeal is plot no. 60 aud in the other appe; ll it is plot no. 6.\n\nNigam made an application to the Director of Industrie~, Uttar Pradesh for allotment of the plot to him for industrial purposes. By an order dated November 22, 1956 the applimtion was \"provisionally accepted subject to the final approval of Government.\" Finally hewas inforined by the Manager of Industrial Estate, Kalpi Road, Kanpur in his letter dated 31-10-1962 \"that the State Government has not approved the allotment in your favour and the provisional allotment made in your favour stands cancelled.\" But it appears after the provision~] allotment Nigam was put in possession of the land.\n\nSteps were to be taken for his eviction after giving information as to the cancellatfon\n\nof the allotment in the letter aforesaid dated 31-10-1962. But before these steps were taken and possession was recovered from hinl the District Magistrate, Kanpur requisitioned the plot under section\n\n.......\n\n!< 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962; hereinafter called the Act. This A. -order is dated 7-12-1963. The order reads as follows :-\n\n~ )\n\n' '\n\n\"Whereas in my opinion it is necessary and expedient to requisition unit no. 60 in the GovJ Industrial Estate, Kanpur specified below, of which you are the person in possession for efficient conduct of Milijary operatiogs.\n\nAnd whereas the powers of requisitioning under Section 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (Ct:; ntral Act. No. 51 of 1962) have been conferred on me by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under Notification No. 5589/18-I- LA/63, dated January 14, 1963 issued by Revenue (B) Department-/18 Bhardwaj, District Magistrate, Kanpur hereby requisition the aforesaid Unit and or_der that possession thereof be delivered by 11-12-63 to the General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Kalpi Road, Kanpur, after removing therefrom any furniture or other articles.\n\nI further order that the Tahsildar, Kanpur shall arrange for the delivery of possession of the aforesaid unit to the General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Kalpi Road, Kanpur at the expiry of the period indicated above, if the possession is not delivered in compliance of\"the above order.\"\n\nPursuant to the above order possession was taken from appellant 'Nigam on January 2, 1964 and was handed over to the General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Kanpur.\n\nNo steps were taken by the Industries department for taking formal or symbolical possession of the plot in question after it was requisitioned by the District Magistrate.\n\nThen came the derequisitioned order pa_ssed by the District Magistrate under s. 35 of the Act on 20-1-1967. In passing it\n\nmay b_!' mentioned here that the appellant had kept his stores in two of the rooms standing in the land. But this fact is not very material for the purpose of_ deciding the matter in issue before us.\n\nThe de-requisition order reads as follows :-\n\n\"Regarding requisition of Unit No. 6 and 60 Industrial Estate for starting Artisan Training School by the 'Ordnance Factory, Kalpi Road, Kanpur.\n\nORDER\n\nD '\n\nWhereas the property specified in the schedule hereto B appended was requisitioned by the order of the District Magistrate, Kanpur dated 7-12-1963 until further order.\n\nAnd whereas it has now been decided that the said property shall be released from requisition with immediate effect.\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (Act No. 51 of 1962), I, S. S. Sidhu, District Magistrate, Kanpur being the competent authority do hereby declare that the said property is released fro!Il requisition, and hereby specify the Director of Industries, Kanpur as the person to whom the poss<:SSion of the said property shall be given.\n\nThereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court to issue a writ in the nature of mandal!lus against the respondent directing to deliver possession of the property in dispute !o the appellant and not to deliver possession to any other person.\n\nIt appears, however, thaJ possession of the property had been given D to the Industries departme11t.\n\nThe petitioner unsuccessfu!Jy prosecuted his writ petition before the learned single Judge of the High\n\nCourt.\n\nHe failed in appeal also.\n\nHence the prese11t appeal. '\n\nOne extra fact which need be mentioned in regard to the case of Amar Singh is that after de-requisition and after possession of the E plot was taken by the Industries department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh the plot was allotted to Mrs. B. K. Anand, respondent no. 5 in CTvil Appeal No. 560 of 1970.\n\nThe other facts of his case are identical.\n\nLearned Counsel for the appellants submitted before us that irrespective of the disputed question of fact whether there was final allotment in favour of the appellant or not, since requisition orde~ had l;>een served on him and possession had been taken from him, the property and its possession on de-requisition ought to have been released to him.\n\nIt could not be made in favour of the Industries department. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, submitted that since the appellant had not semblance of right, title or interest left in the plot after cancellation of the provisional allotment in his favour he had no locus standi to ask for a writ of mandamus for delivery of possession of the plot to him.\n\nDirection was given for releasing the plot in favour of the Industries department and if\n\n~ H the appellant is so advised he may recover possession of the plot on es.tabgshme.nt of his right, title or interest in the plot in a competent court in accordance with sub-s.(2) of section 35 of the Act.\n\nIt was\n\n\\ I\n\nfurther submitted in case of Amar Singh that the plot had been A allotted to -:Mrs. B. K. Anand and she c_annot be disposessed now.\n\nWe shall read the two provisions first and enunciate the law engrafted in them and .then proceed to pass the final orders in the two appeals as their respective facts and circumstances may warrant.\n\nSections 29 and 35 read as follows :--\n\n\"29. (l) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, if in the opinion of the Central Government or the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the defence of India, civil defence, public safety, maintenance of public order or efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, that Government may by order in writing requisition any immovable property and may make such further orders as appear to that Government to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning :\n\nProvided that no property or part thereof which is exclu sivdy used by the public for religious worship shall be requisitioned.\n\n(2) The requisition shall be effected by an order in writing addressed to the person deemed by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, to be the owner ur person in possessiop. of the property, and such order shall be served in the prescribed manner on the person to wl, om it is addressed.\n\n(3) Whencver any property is requisitioned under subsection ( 1), tl1e period of such requi§.ition shall not extend beyond the period for which such property is required for any of th~ purposes mentioned in that sub-section.\n\n35. (1) Where any property requisitioned under section 29 is to be released from such requisition, the Government by which or under whose authority the property was requisitioned or any person generally or specially authorised by it in this behalf may, after such inquiry, if any, as it or he may in any case, consider necessary to make or cause to be made, specify by order in writing the person to whom possession of the property shall be given and such possession shall, as far as practicable, be given to the person who\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS Ll98UJ 2 S.C.R.\n\nappears to the Government or, as the case may be, the person authorised as aforesaid, to be entitled to the possession of the property at the time such order is made.\n\n(2) The delivery of possession of the property to the person specified in the order under sub-section ( 1) shall be a full discharge of the Government from all liabilities in respect of the property, but shall not prejudice by any rights in respect of the property which any other person may be entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person to whom possession of the property is delivered.\"\n\nThe requisition was effected by an order in writing addressed to the person in possession of the property in accordance with sub-s.\n\n(2) of s. 29.\n\nHe may not be the owner of the property.\n\nBut on requisition possession was taken from him.\n\nThe inquiry envisaged under sub-s. (1) of s. 35 is necessitated only if facts and events taking place after requisition necessitate it.\n\nOtherwise not.\n\nAs for example, suppose, possession of a property is taken from x and after requisition he dies and dispute starts between his heirs as to who is entitled to get back the property. A summary and prima fade inquiry may be made under sub-s. (1) and property may be released in favour of the person who may be entitled to the possession of it in the opinion of the Government.\n\nOf course such a decision would be subject to the adjudication of the rights of the parties in accordance with sub-s. (2). Facts anterior to the requisition are not necessary to be investigated for release of the property because the property has to be released in favour of the person from whom possession was taken. If it were not so then it would be enlarging the scope of the inquiry envisaged under sub-s. (1) of s. 35 of the ;.ct and the power of the Government to adjudicate upon anterior title of the various claimants to the property.\n\nThis is not the scope of the inquiry.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear to us that technically speaking on a correct interpretation of the Jaw the property on de-reguisition ought to have been released in favour of the two appellants in the two appeals from whom possession was taken at the time of requisition. But on the special facts of these two appeals we do not feel persuaded to make our unqualified or unconditional order in these appeals filed on grant of special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution as justice requires only a qualified and conditional order.\n\nIt is plain on the facts placed before us that there was no final allotment of the plots in favour of the appellants.\n\nThe allotment was only provisional subject to the approval of the Government.\n\nPossession had been given to them and before requisition the Industries\n\nS~-Lf1.1M\n\n.department had not recovered back possesion of either of the two A plots. In such a situation we make the following orders in the two appeals separately.\n\nCivil Appe.al No. 559 of 1970.\n\nThe possession of plot no. 60 is directed to be delivered to appel- 11 fant Nigam within a period of six months from today. If during the\n\nsaid period of six months the Government takes adequate and legal -steps for takirig back fo; mal possession of the plot from him, then lJOSsession need not be delivered back to Nigam.\n\nBut on their failure to do so our girection will hold good and possession of plot no. 60 will have to be given to Nigam subject to its recovery back by C the Government even later. It will be open to the aggrieved party, if necessary, to initiate a proceeding in accordance with sub-s. (2) of s. 35.\n\nWe allow this appeal in part to the extent and in the manner indicated above.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 560 of 1970.\n\nSince in this case allotment of the plot was made in favour of Mrs. B. K. Anand, we do not consider it just and expedient to direct the Government to take steps for completing the formality of taking • possession and to dispossess Mrs. Anand.\n\nOn the special facts of '>this case we dismiss this 11ppeal in toto.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs in either of the appeals.\n\n'\\/.D.K.\n\nC.A. 559 /70 allowed.\n\nC.A. 560/70 dismissed.", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "HARISH CHANDRA NIGAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARISH CHANDRA NIGAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 53, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARISH CHANDRA NIGAM\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nJanuary 21, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31-10-62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Six years later by letter dated 31-10-62 they were informed that \"the State Government has not approved the allotment in your favour and the provisional allotment made in your favour stands cancelled\"."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Act, 1962", "statute": "Defence of India Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 962, "end_char": 988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 35(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1285, "end_char": 1298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1922", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1306, "end_char": 1331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1387, "end_char": 1393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, while derequisitioning the said plots under section 35(1) of the Defence of India Act 1962, the Magistrate \"specified the Director of Industries, Kanpur as the person to whom the possession of tlte said plots shall be given\"."}}, {"text": "B. K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1597, "end_char": 1602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Possession was given accordingly and the Director of Industries in CA 560/70 in turn allotted the-plot covered in it to one Mrs. B. K.\n\nAnand respondent 5 therein."}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1888, "end_char": 1898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act 1962", "statute": "the Defence of India Act 1962"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1906, "end_char": 1932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2847, "end_char": 2852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1962", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3403, "end_char": 3408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3744, "end_char": 3764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 24-1-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No."}}, {"text": "D R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3847, "end_char": 3859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Madan Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3898, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J.-These two appeals by special leave have been heard together as common questioos of law and fact are involved in them."}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra Nigam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4195, "end_char": 4215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "559 of 1970 in which the appellant is Shri Harish Chandra Nigam.", "canonical_name": "HARISH CHANDRA NIGAM"}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4314, "end_char": 4324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "560 of 1970 in which the appellant is Shri Amar Singh are almost identical except ooe which shall be stated hereinafter."}}, {"text": "Nig", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4415, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plot concerned in Nig:im's appeal is plot no.", "canonical_name": "Nigam"}}, {"text": "im", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4419, "end_char": 4421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plot concerned in Nig:im's appeal is plot no."}}, {"text": "Nigam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nigam made an application to the Director of Industrie~, Uttar Pradesh for allotment of the plot to him for industrial purposes.", "canonical_name": "Nigam"}}, {"text": "31-10-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4845, "end_char": 4855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally hewas inforined by the Manager of Industrial Estate, Kalpi Road, Kanpur in his letter dated 31-10-1962 \"that the State Government has not approved the allotment in your favour and the provisional allotment made in your favour stands cancelled.\""}}, {"text": "Nigam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it appears after the provision~] allotment Nigam was put in possession of the land.", "canonical_name": "Nigam"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Kanpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5312, "end_char": 5339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before these steps were taken and possession was recovered from hinl the District Magistrate, Kanpur requisitioned the plot under section\n\n.......\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5803, "end_char": 5813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1962", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5914, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51 of 1962) have been conferred on me by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under Notification No."}}, {"text": "January 2, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6661, "end_char": 6676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the above order possession was taken from appellant 'Nigam on January 2, 1964 and was handed over to the General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Kanpur."}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6997, "end_char": 7002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-1-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7017, "end_char": 7026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then came the derequisitioned order pa_ssed by the District Magistrate under s. 35 of the Act on 20-1-1967."}}, {"text": "7-12-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7585, "end_char": 7594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ORDER\n\nD '\n\nWhereas the property specified in the schedule hereto B appended was requisitioned by the order of the District Magistrate, Kanpur dated 7-12-1963 until further order."}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7827, "end_char": 7853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. S. Sidhu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7879, "end_char": 7890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51 of 1962), I, S. S. Sidhu, District Magistrate, Kanpur being the competent authority do hereby declare that the said property is released fro!Il requisition, and hereby specify the Director of Industries, Kanpur as the person to whom the poss<:SSion of the said property shall be given."}}, {"text": "B. K. Anand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8937, "end_char": 8948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One extra fact which need be mentioned in regard to the case of Amar Singh is that after de-requisition and after possession of the E plot was taken by the Industries department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh the plot was allotted to Mrs. B. K. Anand, respondent no.", "canonical_name": "B. K. Anand"}}, {"text": "section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10043, "end_char": 10053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. K. Anand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10164, "end_char": 10175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Anand and she c_annot be disposessed now.", "canonical_name": "B. K. Anand"}}, {"text": "Sections 29 and 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10412, "end_char": 10430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10567, "end_char": 10585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, if in the opinion of the Central Government or the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the defence of India, civil defence, public safety, maintenance of public order or efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, that Government may by order in writing requisition any immovable property and may make such further orders as appear to that Government to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning :\n\nProvided that no property or part thereof which is exclu sivdy used by the public for religious worship shall be requisitioned."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10676, "end_char": 10681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, if in the opinion of the Central Government or the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the defence of India, civil defence, public safety, maintenance of public order or efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, that Government may by order in writing requisition any immovable property and may make such further orders as appear to that Government to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning :\n\nProvided that no property or part thereof which is exclu sivdy used by the public for religious worship shall be requisitioned."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11795, "end_char": 11805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13027, "end_char": 13032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13170, "end_char": 13175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14074, "end_char": 14079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14677, "end_char": 14685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15855, "end_char": 15860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16047, "end_char": 16052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since in this case allotment of the plot was made in favour of Mrs. B. K. Anand, we do not consider it just and expedient to direct the Government to take steps for completing the formality of taking • possession and to dispossess Mrs. Anand."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_816_820_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "ARVIND @ ABASAHEB GANESH KULKARNI & ORS.\n\nANNA @ DHANPAL PARISA CHOUGULE & ORS.\n\nJanuary 22, 1980\n\n(N. L. UNTAWALIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nMortgage-Minor brothers alleged that mortgage was not for legtil necrssity and that the sale was for inadequate consideration-Elder brother discharged' family debts-Small part of consideration not accounted for-Sale-Validity of.\n\nA mortgagor executed twodeeds of n1ortgage in favour of the faU1er of the appellants for Rs. 1600 and Rs. 1000 in respect of certain lands.\n\nBoth the mortgages were possessory mortgages but the land was leased back to the mortgagor for a stipulated rent.\n\nThe mortgagor died leaving behind him three sons, one adult and two minors.\n\nThe adult son borrowed a further sum of Rs. 131 by executing a simple mortgage and purporting to act as the fanager of the joint family and the guardian of his minor brothers, executed a deed of sale in favour of the father of the appellants in respect of four out of ten items of land previously mortgaged.\n\nThe consideration for the sale was Rs. 3050 which was made up of Rs. 1600. Rs. 1000 and Rs. 131 due under three previous mortgages respectively and Rs. 200 received in cash on the date of sale.\n\nThe minor sons on becoming major filed a suii out of which this appeal arises. for a declaration that the sale deed e.xecuted was not for legal necessity, nor for the benefit of the estate and, therefore, not binding on them.\n\nThey also prayed for joint possession of their 2/3rd share.\n\nThe trial conrt found that there was legal necessity for the sale to the extent of Rs. 2600 only, the consideration of Rs. 3050 for the sale was inadequate as the lands were worth about Rs. 400 and that there was no compelling pressure on the estate to justify the sa.le and therefor'e the sale was not for the benefit of the family and hence not binding on the plaintiffs.\n\nA decree was granted in their favour for joint possession of 2 /3rd share of the lands subject to certain payment to the second defendant. On appeal by the second defendant, the Assistant Judge held the suit of the first plaintiff to be barred by time and therefore modified the decree in favour of the second plaintiff.\n\nOn appeal by the first plaintiff and second defendant, the High Court allowed the appent by the first plaintiff and dismissed the appeal filed by the second defendant. -\n\nAccepting the appeal of the legal representatives of the second defendant,\n\nHELD : Out of the sale consideralion of Rs. 3050 there was undoubted' legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 2600 the total amount due under the tv\"o deeds of mortgage executed by the father of the plaintiffs.\n\nOut of the ten items which were mortgaged, only four were sold and the remaining six items were released from the burden of the mortgages. The f.amily was also relievecf from one burden of paying rent to the mortgagee under the lease.\n\nAll this.\n\nwas for the benefit of the family, The value of the land svld under the deed of sale was found by the Courts below to be Rs. 4000.\n\nEven if that be so it cannot possibly be said that the price of Rs. 3000 was grossly inadequate.\n\nFurther there were continuous dealings between the family of the plaint~1s and the fan1ily of the second defendant over a long course of years.\n\nIn thi!SO circumstances it is impossible to say that the sale was not binding on the plaintiffs.\n\nThe Courts below appeared to think that notwithstanding the circumstanc'e that there was legal necessity to a large extent it was incumbent on the second defendant to establish that he made enquiry to satisfy himself that there was sufficient pressure on the estate which justified the sale. When the mortgagee was himself the purchaser and when the greater portion of the consideration went in discharge of the morgages no question of enquiry regarding pressure on the estate would arise at all. Where ancestral property is sold for the purpose of discharging debts incurred by the father and th& bulk of the proceeds of the sale is so accounted, the fact that a small part of the consideration it not accounted for will not invalidate the sale. [819 A-E]\n\nGauri Shankar & Ors. v. Jiwan Singh & Ors. A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 246 /Viamat Rai & Ors. v. Din Dayal & Ors. 1927 A.I.R. P.C. 121, Ram Sunder Lnl & another v. Lachhmi Narain and anothet' A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 143; HanoonJan Persaud Pondey v. Mt. Babooee Munrai Koonweree [1955] 6\n\nM.I.A. 393;\n\nRadhakrishendas and another v. Kaluram A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 574, referred to.\n\nD,...\n\nBa/mukand v. Kam/a Wati & Or!. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1385 held inapplicable.\n\nCIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 216-217 of 1970.\n\nAppeals by special )eave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-12-1968 of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal Nos. 1232 and 1214/1961.\n\nV. S. Desai, R. B. Datar and Lalit Bhardwaj and Naveen Sinha '- for the Appellants.\n\nS. V. Tambwaker for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by 11\n\nCH!NNAPPA REDDY, J.-On April 15, 1930 Parisa Chougule, executed Exhibit 93, a deed of mortgage in favour of Ganesh, Dattotraya Kulkarni (father of the appellants) for a sum of Rs. 1600 in respect of single item of land.\n\nOn August 25, 1933, Parisa Chougule executed Exhibit 92 another deed of mortgage in favour of Gthe same mortgagee for a sum of Rs. 1,000 in respect of ten ite<ns of land including the land previously mortgaged under Exhibit 93.\n\nBoth the mortgages were possesso1y mortgages but it appears from evidence that the land was leased back to the mortgagor for a 5tipulated rent.\n\nParisa Chougule died on June 15 1934 ieavino behind , b him three sons, Bhupal an adult and Anna and Dhanpal, minors. On fl July 11, 1934, Bhupal borrowed a further sum of Rs. 131 and executed a simple mortgage Exhibit 91 in respect of the very ten\n\nitems of land covered by Exhibit 92.\n\nOn May 1, 1935, Bhupal purporting to act as the Manager of the joint family and the guardian of his minor brother executed a deed of sale Exhibit 90 in favour of Ganesh Dattatraya Kulkarni in respect of four out of the ten items of land mortgaged under Exhibits 93, 92 and 91.\n\nThe consideration for the sale was Rs. 3050 and was made up of the amounts of Rs. 1600 Rs. 1000 and Rs. 131/- due under three mortgages Exhibits 93, 92 and 91 respectively and a sum of Rs. 200 received in cash by Bhu; ml on the date of sale.\n\nSix of the items which were mortgaged were released from the burden of the mortgage_s.\n\nOn September 23, 1946, Anna second son of Parisa became a major.\n\nOn August 31, 1951, Dhanpal third son of Parisa became a major. On August 27, 1953 Anna and Dhanpal filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for a declaration that the sale deed dated May 1, 1935 was not for legal necessity and not for the benefit of the estate and therefore, not binding on them.\n\nThey also prayed that joint possession of their two third share may be given to them. The Trial Court found that there was legal necessity for the sale to the extent of Rs. 2600 only, that the consideration of Rs. 3050 for the sale was inadequate as the lands were worth about Rs. 4000, that there was no such compelling pressure on the estate as to justify the sale and therefore, the sale was not for the benefit of the family a_nd hence not binding on the two plaintiffs.\n\nA decree was granted in favour of t_he two plaintiffs ., for joint possession of two third share of the lands ubject to their paying a sum of Rs. 133/5 ans/4 ps. to the second defendant. On appeal by the second defendant the Assistant Judge, Kolhapur affirmed the finding of the Trial Court that there was legal necessity to the > extent of Rs. 2600 only, that the value of the land was Rs. 4,006 and that there was no pressure on the estate justifying the sale. The Assistant Judge found that there was no evidence to show that the .defendant made any bonafide enquiry to satisfy himself that there. was sufficient pressure on the family justifying the sale.\n\nHe however, held that the suit of the first plaintiff was liable to be dismissed as it was barred by limitation.\n\nHe, therefore, modified the decree of the Trial Court by granting a decree in favour of the second plain-\n\n• tiff only for possession of a one third share in the lands subject to /\"\"- payment of a sum of Rs. 866.66 ps. to the second defendant.\n\nThe first plaintiff as well as the second defendant preferred second appeals to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court allowed the appeal filed by the first plaintiff and dismissed the appeal filed by the second defenilant.\n\nThe legal representatives of the second defendant have preferred these appeals after obtaining special leave from this Court under -f Arfclc J 36 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is clear that these appeals have to be allowed.\n\nThe facts narrated above show that out of the consideration of Rs. 30.50 for the sale there was undoubted legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 2600 the total amount due under the two deeds of mortgage executed by the father of the plaintiffs. Out of the ten items of land which were mortgaged, only four were sold and the remaining six items were released from the burden of the mortgages.\n\nThe family was also relieved from the burden of paying rent to the mortgagee under the lease deed.\n\nSurely all this was for the benefit of the family.\n\nThe. value of the land sold under the deed of sale was found by the Conrts below to be Rs. 4000.\n\nEven if that be so it cannot possibly be said that the price of Rs. 3000 was grossly inadequate. It has further to be remembered that there were continuous dealings between the family of the plaintiffs and the family of the second defendant, over a long course of years.\n\nIn those circumstances it is i, mpossible to agree with the conclusion of the courts below that the sale was not binding on the plaintiffs.\n\nThe conrts below appeared to think that notwithstanding the circumstance that there was legal necessity to a large extent it was incumbent on the second defendant to establish that he made enquiry to satisfy himself that there was sufficient pressure on the estate which justified the sale.\n\nWe are unable to see any substance in the view taken by the courts below.\n\nWhen the mortgagee is himself the purchaser and when the greater portion of the consideration went in discharge of the mortgagors, we do not see how any question of enquiry regarding pressure on the esta\\e would arise at all.\n\nWhere ancestral property is sold for !he purpose of discharging debts incurred by the father and the bulk of the proceeds of the s_aJe is so accounted, the fact that a small part o_f the consideration is\n\n- not accounted for will not invalidate the sale. In Gauri Shankar &\n\nOrs. v. liwan Singh Ors.(') it was found that Rs. 500 out of the price of Rs. 4000 was not fully accounted for and that there was legal DICessity for the balance of Rs. 3500. The Privy Council held that' if the purchaser had acted honestly, if the existence of a family necessity for a sale. was made out and the price was not unreasonably low, the purchaser was not bound to account for the application of the whole of the price.\n\nThe sale was upheld. In Niamat Rai and Ors. v. Din Dayal and Ors.(') the manager of a joint family sold family property for Rs. 34,500 to saisfy pre-existing debts of the extent of Rs. 38,000. It was held that it was sufficient to sustain the sale without showing how the balance had bn applied.\n\n(!) A.LR. 1227 P.C. 246.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 121.\n\nIn Ram Sunder Lal & Anr. v. Lachhmi Narain and Anr.(') ., the vendee the sale in whose favour was questioned fourteen years after the sale, was able to prove legal necessity to the extent of Rs. 7744 out of a total price of Rs. 10, 767. The Privy Council after quoting a passage from the well-known case of Hanoomanpersaud Pandey v.\n\nMt. Babooee Munrai Koonweree,(') upheld the sale.\n\nThe principle of these decisions has been approved by this Court in Radhak; ishandas and Anr. v. Kaluram. (').\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in Balmukand v. Kam/a Wati & Ors.(') That was a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale executed by the\n\nmanager of the family without even consulting the other adult members of the family.\n\nThe object of the sale was not to discharge any antecedent debts of the family nor was it for the purpose of securing any benefit to the family.\n\nThe only reason for the sale of the land was that the plaintiff wanted to consolidate bis own holding. The Court naturally found that there was neither legal necessity nor benefit to the estate by the proposed sale and the agreement therefore, could not be enforced.\n\nWe do not see what relevance this case has to the facts of the present case.\n\nWe aordingly allow the appeals and dismiss the suit with cost throughout.\n\nN.K.A.\n\n(1) A.I.R.1929 P.C.143\n\n(2) (1955) 6 M.I.A. 393.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 574.\n\n(4) A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1385.\n\nAppeals allawed.\n\n\\ . ~", "total_entities": 26, "entities": [{"text": "ARVIND @ ABASAHEB GANESH KULKARNI & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ARVIND @ ABASAHEB GANESH KULKARNI & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANNA @ DHANPAL PARISA CHOUGULE & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANNA @ DHANPAL PARISA CHOUGULE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 22, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 97, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 22, 1980\n\n(N. L. UNTAWALIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4773, "end_char": 4784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, R. B. Datar and Lalit Bhardwaj and Naveen Sinha '- for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4786, "end_char": 4797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, R. B. Datar and Lalit Bhardwaj and Naveen Sinha '- for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Lalit Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4802, "end_char": 4816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, R. B. Datar and Lalit Bhardwaj and Naveen Sinha '- for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Naveen Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4821, "end_char": 4833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, R. B. Datar and Lalit Bhardwaj and Naveen Sinha '- for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "S. V. Tambwaker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4858, "end_char": 4873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Tambwaker for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CH!NNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4942, "end_char": 4957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 11\n\nCH!NNAPPA REDDY, J.-On April 15, 1930 Parisa Chougule, executed Exhibit 93, a deed of mortgage in favour of Ganesh, Dattotraya Kulkarni (father of the appellants) for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Ganesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5050, "end_char": 5056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 11\n\nCH!NNAPPA REDDY, J.-On April 15, 1930 Parisa Chougule, executed Exhibit 93, a deed of mortgage in favour of Ganesh, Dattotraya Kulkarni (father of the appellants) for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Dattotraya Kulkarni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5058, "end_char": 5077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 11\n\nCH!NNAPPA REDDY, J.-On April 15, 1930 Parisa Chougule, executed Exhibit 93, a deed of mortgage in favour of Ganesh, Dattotraya Kulkarni (father of the appellants) for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Parisa Chougule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5183, "end_char": 5198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 25, 1933, Parisa Chougule executed Exhibit 92 another deed of mortgage in favour of Gthe same mortgagee for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bhupal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5609, "end_char": 5615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parisa Chougule died on June 15 1934 ieavino behind , b him three sons, Bhupal an adult and Anna and Dhanpal, minors."}}, {"text": "Anna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5629, "end_char": 5633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parisa Chougule died on June 15 1934 ieavino behind , b him three sons, Bhupal an adult and Anna and Dhanpal, minors.", "canonical_name": "Anna"}}, {"text": "Dhanpal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parisa Chougule died on June 15 1934 ieavino behind , b him three sons, Bhupal an adult and Anna and Dhanpal, minors."}}, {"text": "July 11, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5661, "end_char": 5674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On fl July 11, 1934, Bhupal borrowed a further sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "May 1, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5828, "end_char": 5839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 1, 1935, Bhupal purporting to act as the Manager of the joint family and the guardian of his minor brother executed a deed of sale Exhibit 90 in favour of Ganesh Dattatraya Kulkarni in respect of four out of the ten items of land mortgaged under Exhibits 93, 92 and 91."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Dattatraya Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5987, "end_char": 6013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 1, 1935, Bhupal purporting to act as the Manager of the joint family and the guardian of his minor brother executed a deed of sale Exhibit 90 in favour of Ganesh Dattatraya Kulkarni in respect of four out of the ten items of land mortgaged under Exhibits 93, 92 and 91."}}, {"text": "Bhu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6316, "end_char": 6319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 received in cash by Bhu; ml on the date of sale."}}, {"text": "September 23, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6437, "end_char": 6455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 23, 1946, Anna second son of Parisa became a major."}}, {"text": "Anna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6457, "end_char": 6461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 23, 1946, Anna second son of Parisa became a major.", "canonical_name": "Anna"}}, {"text": "August 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6503, "end_char": 6518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 31, 1951, Dhanpal third son of Parisa became a major."}}, {"text": "Parisa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6541, "end_char": 6547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 31, 1951, Dhanpal third son of Parisa became a major."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 27, 1953 Anna and Dhanpal filed the suit out of which this appeal arises for a declaration that the sale deed dated May 1, 1935 was not for legal necessity and not for the benefit of the estate and therefore, not binding on them."}}, {"text": "Kolhapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7523, "end_char": 7531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the second defendant the Assistant Judge, Kolhapur affirmed the finding of the Trial Court that there was legal necessity to the > extent of Rs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_821_828_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "NARENDRA BAHADUR TANDON\n\n~HANKERLAL (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRS. AND ANR.\n\nJanuary 25, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nLease-Land leased to a company--Company went into voluntary liquida- Jion-Land transferred to one of the Creditors, a Bank-Bank went into liqui- 4ation--Official liquidator of Bank found no deed of transfer executed- Voluntary liquidator executed deed of trans/er-If competent to do so-Property\n\nif passed to state by escheat-Lessor's interest transferred to plaintiffs-Official liquidator sold land to defendant-Defendant raised structures on land- C l'laintiffs never objected to raising of slructures-Plaintif!s, if estopped from contending that defendant had no right in land.\n\nThe original Owners of the land in dispute granted a permanent loose of the ]and to a company.\n\nThe lessee could use the land for any purpose and couJd also transfer the leasehold interest. Though a permanent lease the lessor could forfeit the lease if the lessee failed to pay rent for three conse- D .cutive years. The lessors interest changed hands twice and by virtue of a <lecreee in a suit for pre-emption filed by the respondents they became entitled to such interest.\n\nIn the meanwhile the company went into voluntary liquidation and the liquidator executed an agreement of sale of all its assets including the Ieaseht)ld interest in favour of a Bank which was the biggest creditor of the Com- pany. Immediately thereafter the Bank itself went into liquidation.\n\nSometime later the official liquidator of the Bank found that no deed of transfer was executed by the voluntary liquidator in favour of the Bank, the erstwhile voluntary liquidator therefore executed a deed of sale in favour of the Bank.\n\nThereafter the officiad liquidator of the Bank transferred the lease-hold interest \"'in the land to the defendant-appellant.\n\nBefore the company went into liquidation the first transferee of the land accepted rent from the voluntary liquidator. After the transfer of the leasehold interest to the Bank the second transferee demanded from the official liquidator arrears of rent for four years and claimed that the lease was forfeited by reason of the Bank's failure to pay rent for a continuous period of three years in terms of the lease. The official liquidator denied the right to forfeit the lease. He, however, paid rent which was accepted by the lesSors.\n\nEven subsequently rent was accepted by the lessors.\n\nThe respondent sued to recover possession of the suit land on the g'round that the lease-hold interest was not validly transferred by the voluntary liquidator and that therefore neither the Bank nor the defendant acquired any right in the land. The defendants contended that the voluntary liquidator had the authority in law to execute the deed of sale and formally complete a transaction which had already taken place, that the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff having accepted rent from the official liquidator were estopped\n\nA from contending that the transfer in favour of the Bank was not valid and' that the lease-hold interest in the 1'.ind had escheated to the Government 011 the dissolution of the company.\n\nThe suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. On s..::ccnd appeal, the High Court decreed the suit holding that the voluntary liquidator had no authority to exei.ute the deed of sale after the dissolution of B the company_ and that there was neither estopp.::l nor escheat.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. The High Court was right in holding that the liquidator had\n\n110 jurisdiction to execute the deed of sale after the company had been dissolved.\n\nOnce the company w2s dissolved in accordance with the procedur'e laid down in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 it ceased to exist and therefore the volnntary liquidator could not represent a non-existent company. If the liquidator was to discharge any duty or perform any function on behalf of the dissolved company he should have express statutory authority to do so, which he did not have under the Act. [826 D, 825 G]\n\n2. If the company had a subsisting interest in the lease on the date of dissolution, such interest must necessarily vest in the Government by escheat or bona vacantia. It is well settled that the property of an intestate dying without leaving lawful heirs and the property of a dissolved corporation passes to the Government by escbeat or bona vacantia.\n\nIf the lease-hold interest of company became vested in the Government on its dissolution, a suit at the instance of .the plaintiffs was not maintainable. [826 E, 827 G]\n\n3. The successors in interest of the original lessors accepted rent from the official liquidator indicating that they accepted the position that the Bank had succeeded to the rights of the company in the lease-hold interest. The official\n\nlioudator sold the land to the defendant with the permission of the Company Judge only when he failed to get the highest bid in public auction.\n\nAt no point of time did the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs raise an objection to the sale of the leasehold interest. When the defendant obtained permission cf the Municipal Board and raised constructions on the land, the plaintiffs who resided nearabout the lurid did not raise any objection to the construe~ tions. In the circumstances the plaintiffs were estopped from contending that the defendant had no right in the land. Their only right is to receive rent. [827 F-828 Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 575 Of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 17-2-1966 of the Allahabad G High Court in Special Appeal No. 92 of 1960.\n\nS.S. Javali and B. R. Aggarwal for the Appellant.\n\nR. K. Garg and V. J. Francis for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by u CmNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nHulas Chand and Bilas Chand, orii; nal owners of a certain plot of land in Saharanpur, granted a permanent lease of the land to Patel Mills Ltd., in May, 1930. The annual rent\n\n.'-.....\n\nwas Rs. 75 /-. The lease was empowered to use the land for any purpose whatsoever. The rights of the lessee were expressly made transferable. Though the lease was permanent, there was a condition that the lessor could forfeit the lease if the lessee failed to pay reht for three consecutive years.\n\nOn November 1, 1932 Hulas Chand and Bilas Chand transferred their interest to Budh Singh and Jialal.\n\nJugal Kishore, became entitled to the rights of Budh Singh and Jialal by purchase under sale deeds dated April 17, 1943 and May 11, 1943.\n\nBut, Shankerlal and Piareylal (present plaintiff) filed a suit for presumption agai'nst the vendors and Jugal Kishore and as a result of the decree passed in the suit, they became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit p:ot of land on August 13, 1945.\n\nMeanwhile the lessee Patel Mills went into liquidation and Mehra was appointed volun'.ary liquidator of the company on May 11, 1937 by a special resolution at a meeting of the creditors of the company.\n\nBenaras Bank Ltd., was the biggest creditor of the Company. So the liquidator negotiated the sale of all the assets of the Company to the Benaras Bank Ltd., for a sum of Rs. 70,000/- and on February 23, 1939 executed an agreement of sale after receiving the considerntion.\n\nTh~ lease-hold interest in the suit plot was also included as on~ of the assets in the agreement of sale. As a meeting held on May 4, 1939 the creditors accepted the final report of the voluntary liquidator. The report was sent to tho Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, and regis tered on Sep'.cmbcr 9, 1939. The company thus stood dissolved with effect from December 9, 1939. Subsequently on March 1, 1940 the Benaras Bank Ltd. itself went into liquidation. The Official Liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd. found that there was no duly executed deed of transfer execu'ed by the voluntary liquidator of the compahy in favour of the Benaras Bank Ltd. in respect of the lease-hold interest in the suit plot of land.\n\nAt the instance of the official liquidator of the bank, Shri Mehra the erstwhile voluntary liquidator of the company executed a deed of sale on January 28, 1941 and had it duly\n\nrqpstcrcd.\n\nOn March 9, 1943 the official liquidator transferred tho lease-hold ihterest in the suit plot of land to the defendant-appellant.\n\nWe have mcniioned that Patel Mills Ltd., stood dissolved with effect from December 9, 1939. Budh Singh and Jialal had earlier, i.e. on April 12, 1939, accepted rmt from the voluntary liquidator of the company.\n\nAfter the dissolution of the company and the transfer of the lease hold interest by the voluntary liquidator to the Benaras Bank!\n\nLtd. Budh Singh and Jialal sent a notice dated January 11, 1941 to the liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd. through their lawyer demanding payment of arrears of rent for four years and asserting that the\n\n15-91SCI/80\n\nlease was forfeited consequent on the lessee's failure to pay rent for a continuous period of three y2ars. The liquidator denied the claim of right of the lessor to forfeit the lease but admitted the claim for rent.\n\nRe'nt was accordingly paid and was accepted by Budh Singh and Jialal.\n\nLater, on March 21, 1946, Jugal Kishore who had purchased the rights of Budh Singh and Jialal also accepted rent from the official liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd.\n\nShankerlal and Piarey Lal who became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit plot of land as a result of the decree from pre-emption which they obtained against Jugal Kishore and his vendors, filed the suit out of which the appeal arises to recover possession of the land.\n\nTheir case was that the lease hold interest in the land was not validly transferred by the voluntary liquidator and therefore, the defendant acquired no right in the land.\n\nSeveral defences were raised. It was claimed that the voluntary liquidator had the authority in law to execute the deed of sale and formally complete a transaction which had already taken place.\n\nIt was also claimed that the predecessors in the interest of the plaintiffs having accepted re'nt from the official liquidator of the bank, the plaintiffs were estopped from contending that the transfer in ravour of the bank was not valid. Section 53A Transfer of Property Act was also invoked as a defence to the action of the plaintiffs.\n\nIt was lastly pleaded that the plaintiffs had no right to sue for possession as the lease-hold interest in the land had escheated to the Government on the dissolution of the Company. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court were affirmed by the 1st Appellate Court and a learned single Judge of the High Court in second appeal. The learned Single Judge found in favour of the defendant on the question of estoppel, escheat and authority of the voluntary liquidator to execute the sale deed but found against the defendant on the applicability of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nOn appeal by the plaintiffs under clause 10 of the Letters Patent a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Courts and decreed the suit. The Division Bench held that the voluntary liquidator had no authority to execute\n\nthe deed of sale after the dissolution of the company and that there was neither estoppel nor escheat. The Division Bench also held that s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act did not protect the defendant.\n\nThe defendant has preferred this appeal after obtaining a certificate from the High Court under Art. 133(1)(b) of the Constitution.\n\nThe submissions of Shri Javali learned counsel for the appellant on the question of applicability of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property\n\n' •\n\nAct and the authority of the voluntary liquidator after the dissolution of the company to execute the deed of sale may be easily disposed of.\n\nWe do not think that s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is attracted to the facts of the present case. The right under s. 53A is available against the transferor (effecting the incomplete transfer) and any person claiming under him. It is difficult to understand how the successorin-interest of a lessor can ever be said to a person claiming under a lessee making an incomplete transfer of the lease-hold interest.\n\nNor do we find force in the submission of the learned counsel that the voluntary liquidator had legal authority, after dissolution of the company to execute the deed of sale so as to formally complete the transaction which had already been entered into. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of Farwell, J., in Pulsford v. Demanish('). fn that case a liquidator was guilty of gross dereliction of duty.\n\nIn the words of Foarwell J., \"A more gross dereliction of duty by a liquidator I have seldom heard of\".\n\nThough in possession of sufficient assets of the liquidating company to pay all its debts in full the liquidator took no steps to ascertain the creditors of the liquidating compny or to see that they were paid. Instead he sold the business and assets of the company to a purchasing company wh6 covenanted to pay all the debts and liabilities of the liquidating company. The purchasing company did not pay the debts. The liquidating company was dissolved. The creditors had no remedy by which they could recover their debts. A creditor of the liquidating company sued the liquidator for recovery of damages. It was held that the liquidator was guilty of negligence i'n the discharge of his statutory duty and was liable in damages to the unpaid creditors of the liquidating company.\n\nWhat was decided in the case was not that a liquidator could represent the erstwhile company after it was dissolved but that a liquidator could be sued in damages for breach of a statutory duty which he had failed to perform while functioning as liquidator. We do not think that this\n\ncase is of any assistance to the appellant. We are ul:J.able to appreciate how after the company was dissolved the liquidator could still claim to represent the company and execute a registered de>d of sale. Once the company was dissolved it ceased to exist and the liquidator could not represent a non-existing company. If tl1e liquidator was to discharge any duty or perform any function on behalf of the dissolved company he should have express statutory authority. The Companies Act 1913 contained no provision enabling the liquidator to do any act on behalf of a dissolved company. S. 209 (H) of the Companies Act, 1913 enjoined the liquidator as soon as the affairs of the company were wound up to make up an account of the winding up and to call a gene-\n\n(!) [1903] 2 Ch. Divn. p. 625.\n\nral meeting of the company and a mreting of the creditors for the purpose of laying the accounts before the meetings. The liquidator was then required to send to the Registrar a copy of tho acconnt and to make a return to him of the holding of the meetings. The Registrar on receiving the accounts and the returns was required to register them an on the expiration of three months of registration the company was to be deemed as dissolved. The only duty cast upon the liquidator thereafter was that under s. 244(B). It was that the liquidator should on the dissolution of the company pay into the Reserve Bank of India, to the credit of the Central Government in an acconnt called the Companies Liquidation Account any money representing unclaimed dividend or any undistributed assets in his hands on the day of dissolution.\n\nNo other duty was stipulated to be performed by the liquidator under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1913, after the dissolution of the company. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel that the liquidator had the jurisdiction to execute the deed of sale dated January 28, 1941 after the company had been dissolved.\n\nThe next question which we must consider is what was the effect of the dissolution of the company on the lease-hold interest which the company had in the land. No term of the lease has been brought to our notice by which the lease would stand extinguished on the dissolutio'n of the company. If the company had a subsisting interest in the lease on the date of dissolution such interest must necessarily vest in the Government by escheat or as bona vacantia. In India the law is well settled that the property of an intestate dying without leaving lawful heirs and the property of a dissolved Corporation pas~2s to the Government by escheat or as bona vacant/a. Of course such property will be subject to trusts and charges, if any, previously effecting its vide M/s. rierce Leslie & Co. Ltd., v. Violat Ouchterlong Wapshare & Ors.('). It is also to be noticed here thats. 244(B) of the Companies Act 1913, as well ass. 555(2) of the Companies Act 1956 expressly enjoin a duty on the liquidator to deposit, on the dissolution of the company, into an account in the Reserve Bank of India known as the Companies Liquidation Acconnt any money representing nnpaid dividend or undisputed assets lying in his hands at the time of dissolution. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Tulshi Ram Sahu & Anr. v. Gur Dayal Si11gh & Anr.( 2) and Mussamat Ramman Bibi v. Mathura Prasad & Anr. (\"). Both were cases of fixed rate tenancies.\n\nAs pointed out\n\n(I) A.LR. 1969 pp. 843,\n\n(2) I.L.R. 33 Allahabad 111.\n\n(3) 75 Indian Cases 621.\n\n' •\n\nby the Full Bench in Tulsi Ram Sahu & Anr. v. Gur Dayal Singh\n\n& Anr.,(I) one of the incidentsi of a fixed rate tenancy was that ph\\vid ed bys. 18 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1901 which prescribed that a right of occupancy would stand extinguished when a fixed-rate tenant died leaving no heir entitled under the Act to inherit the right of occupancy.\n\nIt followed therefrom that the land had to revert to the landlord and could not go to the Government by escheat. On the other hand in Sonet Kooer v. Himmat Bahadur & Ors.(2).\n\nThe Privy Council held that on the failure of heirs to a tenant holding land under Mukerrori Tenure there was nothing in the nature of the tenure which prevented the Crown from taking the Mukerrori by escheat, subject to the payment of rent to the Zamindar. If the lease-hold interest of the company in the land became vested in the government on the dissolution of the company it must follow that the suit at the instance of the plaintiffs was not maintainable.\n\nThe next question for consideration is whether the plaintiffs were estopped from denying the validity of the sale in favour of the Benaras Bank Ltd., and the character of the possession of the Benaras Bank.\n\nLtd., and its successors in interest. As already mentioned by us Budhsingh and Jialal sent a notice dated January 11, 1941, through their lawyer demanding of the liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd., payment of arrears of rent for four years and asserting that the lease was forfeited consequent on the lessee's failure to pay rent for a conti nuous period of three years. The liquidator denied the claim of right of the lessor to forfeit the lease but admitted the claim for rent. The liquidator paid the rent and it was accepted by Budh Singh and Jialal.\n\nLater also the evidence shows that Jugal Kishore the purchaser froni Budh Singh and Jialal also accepted rent from the official liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd. This course of conduct of Budh Singh and Jialal and their successor Jugal Kishore clearly indicates the acceptance, by them, of the position that the Benaras Bank Ltd. had succeeded to the rights of the company in the lease-hold interest. Further, the offi cial liquidator of the Benaras, Bank Ltd. said first tried to sell tl_1e leaie hold interest by public auction. When that sale did not frustify because of the failure of the higll'ost bidder to deposit the sale price, the lease hold interest was sold to the defendant with the sanction of the Com parry Judge.\n\nAt no point of time did the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs raise the slightest objection to the sale of the lease-hold interest. It was thereafter that the defendant obtained the permission\n\n(1) I.L.R. 33 Allahabad 111.\n\n(2) I.LR. (I) Calcutta 391.\n\nof the Municipal Board, Saharanpur, and raised construction on the land. The plaintiffs themselves admittedly reside nearabout the land in dispute. They did not raise any objection to the raising of the constructions. The plaintiffs as well as the defendants appeared to proceed on the common understanding that the defendants had succeeded to the interest of Patel Mills Ltd., in the lease-hold interest. We are, therefore, of the view that the plaintiffs were estopped from contending that the defendant had no interest in land. The amount only right of the plaintiffs was to receive the rent. The result of our discussion is that the appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. It is, however, made clear that the plaintiffs have the right to\n\nreoive rent from the defendl!nts.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "NARENDRA BAHADUR TANDON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARENDRA BAHADUR TANDON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HANKERLAL (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRS. AND ANR.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHANKERLAL (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRS. AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 87, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 25, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND 0."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad G High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5574, "end_char": 5596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Decree dated 17-2-1966 of the Allahabad G High Court in Special Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S.S. Javali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5632, "end_char": 5643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Javali and B. R. Aggarwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5648, "end_char": 5662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Javali and B. R. Aggarwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5683, "end_char": 5693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and V. J. Francis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CmNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5778, "end_char": 5792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by u CmNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nHulas Chand and Bilas Chand, orii; nal owners of a certain plot of land in Saharanpur, granted a permanent lease of the land to Patel Mills Ltd., in May, 1930."}}, {"text": "Hulas Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5798, "end_char": 5809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by u CmNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nHulas Chand and Bilas Chand, orii; nal owners of a certain plot of land in Saharanpur, granted a permanent lease of the land to Patel Mills Ltd., in May, 1930.", "canonical_name": "Hulas Chand"}}, {"text": "Bilas Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5814, "end_char": 5825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by u CmNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nHulas Chand and Bilas Chand, orii; nal owners of a certain plot of land in Saharanpur, granted a permanent lease of the land to Patel Mills Ltd., in May, 1930.", "canonical_name": "Bilas Chand"}}, {"text": "Patel Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5926, "end_char": 5942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by u CmNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nHulas Chand and Bilas Chand, orii; nal owners of a certain plot of land in Saharanpur, granted a permanent lease of the land to Patel Mills Ltd., in May, 1930."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6287, "end_char": 6303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1932 Hulas Chand and Bilas Chand transferred their interest to Budh Singh and Jialal."}}, {"text": "Hulas Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6304, "end_char": 6315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1932 Hulas Chand and Bilas Chand transferred their interest to Budh Singh and Jialal.", "canonical_name": "Hulas Chand"}}, {"text": "Bilas Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6320, "end_char": 6331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1932 Hulas Chand and Bilas Chand transferred their interest to Budh Singh and Jialal.", "canonical_name": "Bilas Chand"}}, {"text": "Budh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6362, "end_char": 6372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1932 Hulas Chand and Bilas Chand transferred their interest to Budh Singh and Jialal.", "canonical_name": "Budh Singh"}}, {"text": "Jialal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6377, "end_char": 6383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1932 Hulas Chand and Bilas Chand transferred their interest to Budh Singh and Jialal."}}, {"text": "Jugal Kishore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6386, "end_char": 6399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugal Kishore, became entitled to the rights of Budh Singh and Jialal by purchase under sale deeds dated April 17, 1943 and May 11, 1943."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jugal Kishore, became entitled to the rights of Budh Singh and Jialal by purchase under sale deeds dated April 17, 1943 and May 11, 1943."}}, {"text": "Shankerlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, Shankerlal and Piareylal (present plaintiff) filed a suit for presumption agai'nst the vendors and Jugal Kishore and as a result of the decree passed in the suit, they became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit p:ot of land on August 13, 1945.", "canonical_name": "Shankerlal"}}, {"text": "Piareylal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6545, "end_char": 6554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, Shankerlal and Piareylal (present plaintiff) filed a suit for presumption agai'nst the vendors and Jugal Kishore and as a result of the decree passed in the suit, they became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit p:ot of land on August 13, 1945.", "canonical_name": "Piarey Lal"}}, {"text": "August 13, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6767, "end_char": 6782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, Shankerlal and Piareylal (present plaintiff) filed a suit for presumption agai'nst the vendors and Jugal Kishore and as a result of the decree passed in the suit, they became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit p:ot of land on August 13, 1945."}}, {"text": "Patel Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile the lessee Patel Mills went into liquidation and Mehra was appointed volun'.ary liquidator of the company on May 11, 1937 by a special resolution at a meeting of the creditors of the company."}}, {"text": "Mehra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6844, "end_char": 6849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile the lessee Patel Mills went into liquidation and Mehra was appointed volun'.ary liquidator of the company on May 11, 1937 by a special resolution at a meeting of the creditors of the company."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6904, "end_char": 6916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile the lessee Patel Mills went into liquidation and Mehra was appointed volun'.ary liquidator of the company on May 11, 1937 by a special resolution at a meeting of the creditors of the company."}}, {"text": "Benaras Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 7005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Benaras Bank Ltd., was the biggest creditor of the Company."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7178, "end_char": 7195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "70,000/- and on February 23, 1939 executed an agreement of sale after receiving the considerntion."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7389, "end_char": 7400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a meeting held on May 4, 1939 the creditors accepted the final report of the voluntary liquidator."}}, {"text": "Sep'.cmbcr 9, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7552, "end_char": 7570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report was sent to tho Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, and regis tered on Sep'.cmbcr 9, 1939."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company thus stood dissolved with effect from December 9, 1939."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7656, "end_char": 7669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently on March 1, 1940 the Benaras Bank Ltd. itself went into liquidation."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8122, "end_char": 8138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the official liquidator of the bank, Shri Mehra the erstwhile voluntary liquidator of the company executed a deed of sale on January 28, 1941 and had it duly\n\nrqpstcrcd."}}, {"text": "March 9, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8171, "end_char": 8184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 9, 1943 the official liquidator transferred tho lease-hold ihterest in the suit plot of land to the defendant-appellant."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8434, "end_char": 8448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Budh Singh and Jialal had earlier, i.e. on April 12, 1939, accepted rmt from the voluntary liquidator of the company."}}, {"text": "Benaras Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8626, "end_char": 8638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the dissolution of the company and the transfer of the lease hold interest by the voluntary liquidator to the Benaras Bank!"}}, {"text": "January 11, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8688, "end_char": 8704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. Budh Singh and Jialal sent a notice dated January 11, 1941 to the liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd. through their lawyer demanding payment of arrears of rent for four years and asserting that the\n\n15-91SCI/80\n\nlease was forfeited consequent on the lessee's failure to pay rent for a continuous period of three y2ars."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9156, "end_char": 9170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on March 21, 1946, Jugal Kishore who had purchased the rights of Budh Singh and Jialal also accepted rent from the official liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd.\n\nShankerlal and Piarey Lal who became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit plot of land as a result of the decree from pre-emption which they obtained against Jugal Kishore and his vendors, filed the suit out of which the appeal arises to recover possession of the land."}}, {"text": "Shankerlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9314, "end_char": 9324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on March 21, 1946, Jugal Kishore who had purchased the rights of Budh Singh and Jialal also accepted rent from the official liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd.\n\nShankerlal and Piarey Lal who became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit plot of land as a result of the decree from pre-emption which they obtained against Jugal Kishore and his vendors, filed the suit out of which the appeal arises to recover possession of the land.", "canonical_name": "Shankerlal"}}, {"text": "Piarey Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9329, "end_char": 9339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, on March 21, 1946, Jugal Kishore who had purchased the rights of Budh Singh and Jialal also accepted rent from the official liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd.\n\nShankerlal and Piarey Lal who became entitled to the lessor's interest in the suit plot of land as a result of the decree from pre-emption which they obtained against Jugal Kishore and his vendors, filed the suit out of which the appeal arises to recover possession of the land.", "canonical_name": "Piarey Lal"}}, {"text": "Section 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10203, "end_char": 10214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10215, "end_char": 10239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10895, "end_char": 10901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10909, "end_char": 10933, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10970, "end_char": 10979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11338, "end_char": 11344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11352, "end_char": 11376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Javali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11566, "end_char": 11572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submissions of Shri Javali learned counsel for the appellant on the question of applicability of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property\n\n' •\n\nAct and the authority of the voluntary liquidator after the dissolution of the company to execute the deed of sale may be easily disposed of."}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11643, "end_char": 11649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11848, "end_char": 11854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11862, "end_char": 11886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11950, "end_char": 11956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Farwell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12581, "end_char": 12588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of Farwell, J., in Pulsford v. Demanish(').", "canonical_name": "Foarwell"}}, {"text": "Foarwell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12706, "end_char": 12714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Foarwell J., \"A more gross dereliction of duty by a liquidator I have seldom heard of\".", "canonical_name": "Foarwell"}}, {"text": "Companies Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14336, "end_char": 14354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14450, "end_char": 14456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Companies Act 1913", "statute": "The Companies Act 1913"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14468, "end_char": 14487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 244(B)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15162, "end_char": 15171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15254, "end_char": 15275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was that the liquidator should on the dissolution of the company pay into the Reserve Bank of India, to the credit of the Central Government in an acconnt called the Companies Liquidation Account any money representing unclaimed dividend or any undistributed assets in his hands on the day of dissolution."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15298, "end_char": 15316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was that the liquidator should on the dissolution of the company pay into the Reserve Bank of India, to the credit of the Central Government in an acconnt called the Companies Liquidation Account any money representing unclaimed dividend or any undistributed assets in his hands on the day of dissolution."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15574, "end_char": 15587, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16304, "end_char": 16309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India the law is well settled that the property of an intestate dying without leaving lawful heirs and the property of a dissolved Corporation pas~2s to the Government by escheat or as bona vacant/a. Of course such property will be subject to trusts and charges, if any, previously effecting its vide M/s. rierce Leslie & Co. Ltd., v. Violat Ouchterlong Wapshare & Ors.(')."}}, {"text": "Companies Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16729, "end_char": 16747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Companies Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16776, "end_char": 16794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17150, "end_char": 17170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Tulshi Ram Sahu & Anr."}}, {"text": "Agra Tenancy Act 1901", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17581, "end_char": 17602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Benaras Bank.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18609, "end_char": 18628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next question for consideration is whether the plaintiffs were estopped from denying the validity of the sale in favour of the Benaras Bank Ltd., and the character of the possession of the Benaras Bank."}}, {"text": "Budhsingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18689, "end_char": 18698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already mentioned by us Budhsingh and Jialal sent a notice dated January 11, 1941, through their lawyer demanding of the liquidator of the Benaras Bank Ltd., payment of arrears of rent for four years and asserting that the lease was forfeited consequent on the lessee's failure to pay rent for a conti nuous period of three years.", "canonical_name": "Budh Singh"}}, {"text": "Benaras, Bank Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19625, "end_char": 19643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the offi cial liquidator of the Benaras, Bank Ltd. said first tried to sell tl_1e leaie hold interest by public auction."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_829_830_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "• •\n\nM. R. MINI (MINOR) REPRESENTED BY HER GUARDIAN\n\n& FATHER M. P. RAJAPPAN\n\nv .\n\nSTATE OF KERALA AND ANR .\n\nJanuary 28, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nUniversity-wise allocation of seats for M.B.B.S. course in Kerala, constitutional validity of.\n\nDismissing the Writ Petition, the Court\n\nHELD : The University-wise allocation of seats is valid.\n\nUnder the existing scheme, the c1'assification for purposes of quota is university-wise, not territory-wise. Belonging to backward Calicut District is not the same as being an alumnus of the Calicut University. May be, the State could hav'e classified candidaites University-wise, backward region-wise or otherwise, separately or in any constitutionally permissible combination.\n\nMystic maybes are beyond j'udicial conjecture.\n\nTh'e misfortune of the petitioner is damnum sine injuria.\n\nEvery adversity is not an injury. Judicial remedy cannot heal every wound or cure every sore since the discipline of the law keeps courts within its bounds. [830 A-DJ\n\nDr. /agdish Saran & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1980] 2 SCR 83! relied on.\n\nObservation : [Too long has the State been seeking ad hoc solutions and improvising reme~\n\ndies where comprehensive studies and enduring recipes are the desid'eratum.\n\nE To keep the education situation uncertain across the national and the fate of students of higher education tense or in suspense with annual challenges in court or agitationa1 exercises in the streets is dangerous procrastination fraught with negative resultc; where a creative undertaking of :r'esponsibility to find an endur~ ing answer to a chronic problem is the minimum that the t:Ountry exp'ects of the concerned State instrumentality.] [830 E-G]\n\nCrvIL ORIGINAL JuRismcnoN : Writ Petition No. 1220 of 1979.\n\nF (Under Article 32 of the Constitution) P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Petitioner.\n\nM. M. Khader and V. J. Francis for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-The petitioner, an aspirant for admission to G the M.B.B.S. course in one or other of the medical college in Kerala, has faile.d to qualify for selection from the Kerala University pool, not having ecured high enongh marks, and has failed to fall within the Calicut University pool, not having been a student of that University.\n\nWhat is urged, as a claim for inclusion, is that had she been treat- H ed as a Calicut University student her marks would have been sufficient to gain admission and since she belongs to the Malabar region, which\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ('\n\n(1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA is broadly served by the Calicut University, she should be given the\n\nbenefit of Calicut University students and consequential admission- \" a mixture of district-wise backwardness and university-wise preference to reach the desired advantage. '\n\nWe cannot agree. Under the existing scheme, the classification for purpose of quota is university-wise, not territory-wise. Belonging to backward Calicut District is not the same as being an alu1111rns of the Calicut University. Maybe, the State could have classified e&'ldidates university-wise, backward region-wise or otherwise, separately or in any constitutionally permissible combination. We are not here\n\nconcerned with the prospects of the petitioner under any different admission scheme or reservation project. Mystic maybes are beyond judicial conjecture.\n\nOnce we hold that the university-wise allocation of seats is valid the misfortune of the petitioner is damnum sine\n\ninjuria, if we may use that expression in this context. Every adversity is not an injury.\n\nJudicial remedy cannot heal every wound or cure every sore since the discipline of the law keeps courts within its bounds.\n\nWe do not preclude the State from taking any other pragmatic formula or evolving any selection calculus, constitutionally permissible, so as to promote equality against the backdrop of social justice. Indeed, we have by our Judgment in Dr. Jagadish Saran & Ors. v. U1iivn\n\nof India & Ors.('), explained the parameters, the criteria and the correct measures which must be initiated to marry equality to excellence, solemnised constitutionally.\n\nToo long has the state been seeking ad hoc solutions and in1pro- Vising remedies where comprehensive studies and enduring recipes are the desideratum.\n\nTo keep the education situation uncertain across the nation and the fate of students of higher education tense or in suspense with annual challenge in court or agitational exercises in the streets is dangerous procrastination fraught with negative results where a creative undertaking of responsibility to find an enduring answer to a chronic problem is the minimum that the country expects of the concerned State instrumentality.\n\nWe dismiss this petition subject to the observations we have made above, leaving it to the Kerala State and its Universities not to contribute to the litigative nursery of medical candidates but to face the task of shaping a firm policy governed by constitutional guidelines, not other pressures.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition dismfrsd.\n\n(1) [1980] 2 S.C.R. 831\n\n\" >", "total_entities": 16, "entities": [{"text": "M. R. MINI (MINOR) REPRESENTED BY HER GUARDIAN\n\n& FATHER M. P. RAJAPPAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. R. MINI (MINOR) REPRESENTED BY HER GUARDIAN & FATHER M. P. RAJAPPAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF KERALA AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 169, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SCR 83", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1794, "end_char": 1804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1826, "end_char": 1842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F (Under Article 32 of the Constitution) P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "N. Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F (Under Article 32 of the Constitution) P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. M. Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1882, "end_char": 1894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Khader and V. J. Francis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1899, "end_char": 1912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Khader and V. J. Francis for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1978, "end_char": 1990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-The petitioner, an aspirant for admission to G the M.B.B.S. course in one or other of the medical college in Kerala, has faile.d to qualify for selection from the Kerala University pool, not having ecured high enongh marks, and has failed to fall within the Calicut University pool, not having been a student of that University."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2104, "end_char": 2110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-The petitioner, an aspirant for admission to G the M.B.B.S. course in one or other of the medical college in Kerala, has faile.d to qualify for selection from the Kerala University pool, not having ecured high enongh marks, and has failed to fall within the Calicut University pool, not having been a student of that University."}}, {"text": "Calicut University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2608, "end_char": 2626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What is urged, as a claim for inclusion, is that had she been treat- H ed as a Calicut University student her marks would have been sufficient to gain admission and since she belongs to the Malabar region, which\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ('\n\n(1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA is broadly served by the Calicut University, she should be given the\n\nbenefit of Calicut University students and consequential admission- \" a mixture of district-wise backwardness and university-wise preference to reach the desired advantage. '"}}, {"text": "Calicut District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2975, "end_char": 2991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Belonging to backward Calicut District is not the same as being an alu1111rns of the Calicut University."}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We dismiss this petition subject to the observations we have made above, leaving it to the Kerala State and its Universities not to contribute to the litigative nursery of medical candidates but to face the task of shaping a firm policy governed by constitutional guidelines, not other pressures."}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 S.C.R. 831", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5083, "end_char": 5102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_831_862_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "JAGDISH SARAN & ORS.\n\nA v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS .\n\nJanuary 28, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA l¥ER, R. S. PATIIAK AND 0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] B\n\nCo11stitution of India 1950, Articles 15 and 16-Admission to post-graduate course in medicine-Rule of Delhi University-Reservation of 70 per cent of seats at post graduate level for its own university graduates-Validity of.\n\nPractice and Procedure-Litigatio11 on socio-legal issue-Brief to be well researched and factually detailed.\n\nThe University of Delhi has many post-gradua.te and diploma courses in the faculty of n1edicine but all of them put together provide 250 seats. 'fhe .three medioal colleges in Delhi turn out annually 400 medical graduates who get 'house' jobs in the local hospitals and qualify themselves for post-graduate courses. As the graduates from the Delhi University could not be accommodated fully or even in part for the post-graduate courses in medicine and as D these graduates were not considered for admission into other universities on account of various regional hurdles such as prescription of domicile, graduation in that very university, registration with the State Medicad Council, servic'e in the State Medical service etc., the Delhi University had earmarked some seats at the poet-graduate level in medicine for the m'edical graduates of Delhi University.\n\nUntil April 1978, the nlle for selection of candidates for admission into the post-graduate cla.sses in nledicine provided that s'election for 52% of the total number of seats was to be made on the basis of combined merit of Delhi University and other university medical graduates, and 48 per cent from the Delhi University graduates only, The rule was amended, reserving 70% of the seats at the post-graduate l'evel to Delhi gradua.tes and 30% being open to all,\n\nincluding graduates of Delhi.\n\nThe petitioner who was a medical graduate from the Madras University applied for the post-graduate degree in Dermatology in th'e University of Delhi.\n\nHe passed the common entrance test for admission, but his admission was turned down because of the rule of the University reserving 70% of the seats at th1J post-graduate level to Delhi University graduates.\n\nThe petitioner in his writ petition under Article 32 challenged th'e rule as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and sought the court's writ to direct the University to admit him to the M.D. Course in Dermatology.\n\nIt was contended that the University was sustained by Central Government finances, collected from the whole country and the benefits must likewise belong to all qualified students from ever}\"vhere. The University justified the reservation on the ground of exclusivism practised by every other University by forbidding Delhi University graduates from getting admission in th'eir colleges and also on\n\naccciunt of the reasonableness of institutional continuity in educational pursuits f0r students who enter a. un_iversity for higher studies.\n\nA Dismissing the writ petition.\n\nHELD : (per Krishna Iyer & Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.)\n\n1. Reservation of 70% is too high at the post-graduate level. But the rule is not invalidated because the facts are impcrlect, the course has already started and the court must act only on sure ground, especially when matters of policy, B socio-educational, investigation and expert evaluation of variables are involved.\n\nWhen fuller facts are placed, the court will go into this question more con fidently. [858 D-EJ -0\n\n2. If 70% reservation is on the high side and the petitioner is hop'efully near __...... 'admission' going by marks it is but just that be is given a chance to do his post-graduate course. His coming to Delhi itself was a compulsion beyond his C control. [858 FJ\n\n3. Petitioner directed to lie admitted to the degree course this year, If the rulesi>'of attendance etc., do not stand in the way and the Medical Council makes an exception by agreeing to addition of one scat as a special cas'e for this yeru.\n\n[858 G]\n\n4. (i) The University forthwith-not later than two months from today-to appoint a time-bound committee to investigate in depth the justification for and the qua.ntum of res'ervation at the post-graduate level from the angle of equality of opportunity for every Indian.\n\nThat comn1ittee will study facts and figures and the reservation realities of other universities and make recommendations on\n\nthe question of university-based reservations and allied aspects as well as modus operandi for implementation.\n\nThe Committee will benefit if it has a. constitutional expert and a representative of the Indian Medical Council on it.\n\nIts report shall be consid'ered by the University as soon as may be, so that, if possible, the \"..dmissions for the next year may be governed by the revised decisions of the concerned organs informed by the report. [858 H-859 C]\n\n(ii) The Union of India has a; special responsibility to ensure that in higher education provincialism does not erode the integrity of India. Anyone who lives in India can n'ever be considered an 'outsider' in Delhi. Blind and bigoted local patriotism in xenophobic exclusivism is destructive of freedom and only if compelling considerations of gross injustice, desperate back\\vardness and glaring inequality desiderate such a course can protective discrimination gain entrance into the pcrtals of college campuses. (859 D, 860 A, BJ\n\n5. The philosophy and pragmatism of universal excellence through universal G equal opportunity is part of our culture and constitutional creed. [843 A]\n\n6. The Indian Constitution is wedded to equal protection and non-discrimination. Arts. 14, 15 and 16 &re inviolable and Art. 29(2) strikes a similar note though it does not refer to regional restrictions or reservations.. Art. 15 save.OJ the State's pow'er to make special provisions for women and children or for advancement of socially and educationally backward classes. [842 BJ\n\n7. University-wise preferential treatment may still be consistent with the rule of equality of opportunity where it is calculated to correct and imbalance or handicap and permit equality in the larger sense. [849 FJ\n\n8. What is fundamental is equality, not classification. What is basic is equal opportunity, for each according to his ability, not artificial, compartmentalisation and institutional apartheidisation, using the mask of handicaps. A clanish ex .. clusivism based upon a particular university cannot be contemplated as consistent with Article 14. [852 Al\n\n9. A blanket ban which ls the indirect result of a wholesale reservation is\n\nconstitutional heresy.\n\nThere must be substantial soci2'1 justice as raison d'etre B for a high percentage of alumni reservation. [853 H]\n\n...,_\n\n10. If equality of opportunity for every person in the country is th'e consti ..\n\n~ tutional guarante'e, a candidate who gets more marks than another is entitled to •-\"-- -preference for admission.\n\nMerit must be the test when choosing the best, according to this rule of equal chance for equal marks. This proposition has greater importance \\Vhen we reach the higher levels of education like postgraduate courses.\n\nThe role of high grade skill or special talent may be less at the lesser levels of education jobs and disciplines of social incons'equence, but more at the higher levels of sophisticated skills and strategic employment.\n\nTo devalue merit at the summit is to tem_i:orise with the country's development in the vital areas of professional expertise. [854 E-G]\n\n11. The class which enjoys reservation must be educationally handicapped.\n\nThe reservation must be geared to getting oYcr the handicap. The rationale D of reservation must be in the case of medkal students, removzJ of regional or class inadequacy or like disadvantage. The quantum of reservation should not be 'excessive or societally injurious, measured by the over-all competency of the end-product, viz. degree-holders. A host of variables influence the quantification of the reservation. [855 B-C]\n\n12. The higher the level of the sp'eci:::Jity the lesser the role of reservation.\n\nM.B.B.S. is a basic medical degree and insistance on the highest talent may be relaxed by promotion of backward groups, institution-wise chosen, without injury to public w'elfare. It produces equal opportunity on a broader basis and gives hope to neglected geographical or human areas of getting a chance to rise.\n\n~Ioreover, the better chances of candidates from institutions in neglected regions\n\ngetting down for practice in these very regions also warrants institutional preference because that policy helps the supply of medical services to these backward areas. [855 D, } 1\n\n13. It is difficult to denounce or renounce the merit criterion where the selec tion is for post-graduate or post-doctoral courses in specialised subjects. There is no substitute for sheer flair, for creative talent, for fine-tuned performance at the difficult heights of some disciplines where the best alone is likely to blossom\n\nas the best. [856 F-G] G\n\n14. Neither Delhi nor the Delhi University medio:.::al colleges can be designated as categories \\Vhich \\varrant reservation. Reservation for Delhi graduates is not that invidlous, because the students are from families drawn from all over\n\nIndia~ Not sons of the soil• but sons 2dld daughters of persons who ar'e pulled into the capital city for reasons beyond their control.\n\nThis reservation, is, the)\"efore, qualitatively different. [857 D-F] H\n\n15. Institution-\\.vis'e reservation is constitutionally circumscribed and may become ultra vires if recklessly resorted to.\n\nBut even such rules, until revised\n\nby competent authority or stn1ck down judidally, will rule the roost. Until the signpost of 'no admission for outsiders' is removed from other uni\"Versities and some fair percentage of seats in other universities is left for open competition, the Delhi students cannot be made m, artyrs of the Constitution.\n\nR'eservation must be administered in moderatidn, if it is to be constitutional.\n\n[858 B-C]\n\n16. Litigation, on a socio-legal issue of critical constitutional moment, should\n\nB not end with general assertions, affida.vits of formal denials and minimal materials, but needs feeding the court with nutritive facts which build the flesh and blood of the administrative or legislative action under challenge and 111 other surrounding and comparative data v.'hich legitim<hte the 'reservation' or other -~ procedure under attack from the constitutional angle. Ingenious or im!lginative\n\norality in court can never be a substitute for \\Vell-rescarched down-to-ealfth factuality in the brief. In the adversary system, advoc2cy in the superior courst (l \\Vhich by their decisions, declare the law for all must broaden beyond the particular !is into a conspectus of sociological facts, economic factors and educational conditions so that other persons aggrieved ¥/ho will potentially be bound by the decision, do not suffer by not being eo 110111ine parties. [841 F-G, H 837 E]\n\n(Per Patltak. J.)\n\n1. Classification is a feature of the very core of equality.\n\nIt is a vital conc'ept in ensuring equality, for those who are similarly situa.ted form a class between themselves, and the classification is not vulnerable to chaJlenge if it.;; constituent basis is reasonably related to achieving the object of the concerned law.\n\nAn institutional preference as in the instant case does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equality.\n\n[861 D-E]\n\n2. The br:.sis of th'e reservation is that the candidate for admission to the ... post-graduate classes is a medical graduate of the same university. Th0 relationship is institutional.\n\nThere is sufficient validity in that criterion as a basis of classification under Article 14. [860 F, G]\n\nIt is not beyond reason that a student ¥/ho 'enters a medical college for bis_ --' graduate studies and pursues them for the requisite period of years should prefer on graduation to continue in the same institution for his post-graduate studies.\n\nThere is the strong argument of convenience, of stability and familiarity with an educational environment which in different parts of the country is subject to varying economic 2ud psychological pressures.\n\nBut much more J than convenience is involved. There are all th'e. advantages of a continuing frame of educational experience in the same educational institution.\n\nIn the post-graduate class, it is not an entirely different course of studies which is contemplated; it is a specialised and deeper experience in what bas gone before.\n\nThe student has becom'e familiar with the teaching techniques and standards of scholarship, aftd has adjusted his responses and reactions accordingly.\n\nThe continuity of studies ensures a higher degree of competence in the assimilation\n\n-OJf knowledge and experience. Not infrequently some of the same staff of Professors and Readers may lecture to the post-graduate <classes also.\n\nOver the under-graduate years the teacher has come to understand the particular n'eeds of the student, where he excels and where he ne'eds an especial encouragement\n\nin the ren1oval of deficiencies. There is good reason in an educational institution 'extending a certain degree of preference to it.;; graduates for admission to its post-graduate classes. [860 H-861 CJ\n\n3. htledical courses a.re not all necessiarily to be found only in New DeU1i.\n\nThey are located in other pa.rts of India and some are well-known centres of medical education.\n\nThe proposition that because New Delhi is the political, legislative and jU.dicial capital of India, an education of quality is not Lo be found • in other cities is not acceptable. Merely because New Delhi is the new Capital of Delhi does uot justify a disproportionate treatment of the claim to equality on a national level made by its medical graduates. [862 C-D]\n\n4. But too excessive a reservation could result in preference t.o graduate candidates of severely limited aptitude and competence over meritorious candi-· dates from other institutions whose exclusion could result in aborting a part of the national talent. [861 F]\n\n5. Whether or not a res'ervation of 70% was called for h2.s not been estab~ fished conclusively. There is hardly anything to show that th'e authorities applied their mind to a cool dispassionate judgment of the problem facing them. The judgment and decision of the authority must be evolved from strictly concrete and unemotional material relevant to the issue before it. [862 F]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 214 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Namboodiri for the Petitioners.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1.\n\nShanti Bhushan, Jitendra Sharma, V. P.\n\nChaudhry and R. L.\n\nGupta for the Respondents Nos. 3, 4 & 5.\n\nThe Judgment of Krishna Iyer, and 0. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ was delivered by Iyer, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate concurring Opinion\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Many a case in this Court is the dramatisation. on the forensic stage, of social stress or community conflict which seeks resolntion or release through the litigative process. This' Writ Petition turns the focns on one such tense issne and ventilates a widespread grievance which deserves constitutional examination.\n\nThe petitioner, Dr. Ramesh, is a medical graduate from the Madras University. His father, an officer under the Central Government, was transferred to Dell:ri and the son, desirous of taking a post-graduate degree in Dermatology, applied for admisison to the University of Delhi which offers that course. He took the common entrance test and secured enough marks to qualify for admission bnt was turned down becanse of a rule reserving 70% of the seats, at the post-graduate level, to Delhi graduates (if we may use that abbreviation for describing student-applicants who have taken their M.B.B.S. degree from the University of Delhi). The remaining 30% was open to all, including\n\ngraduates of Delhi.\n\nThis rule was made in April 1978 in modification of the earlier reservation of 48 % .\n\nHad this inflation (from 48% to 70% plus) not been made, the petitioner admittedly would have been granted admission.\n\nSo what blocked his right to post-graduate entry was this rule of institutional quota of 70% which accorded a disproportionate premium in favour of Delhi graduates. The other petitioners are no longer in the race having secured Iesser marks at the entrance test, and so the judicial lens must be fixed on the validity of such a considerable reservation or virtual monopoly for the Delhi graduates. The petitioner challenges its vires as violative of Arts. 14 to 16 and seeks the court's writ to direct the respondent University to admit him to the M.D. course (Dermatology).\n\nWhile litigating for his right to a seat in the postgraduate degree course in dermatology, he is now doing his diploma course in the same subject in the same University, which is inferior to his aspiration and entitlement if the right to equality is fatal to the quota policy.\n\nWe are not investigating the plea based on Art. 16 because it ls not clear whether the stipend paid to a post-graduate student makes the course an employment and, apart from that, the meat of the matter is whether there is discrimination. If there is, Arts. 14 and 15 are lethal enough, without resort to Art. 16.\n\nThe University of Delhi (we may use the shorthand form 'Delhi • University' hereafter) refutes this challenge and justifies the reservation\n\nin the concrete educational plight of Delhi graduates as an inevitable evil, if it be evil because of the exclusivism practised by every other > university.\n\nAn institutional quoa is not invariably a constitutional anathema and, in the present case, the Delhi University offers an explanation for this recourse to higher institutiona,1 reservation. Many universities now adopt the exclusionary or segregative device of de facto monopoly of seats for higher medical courses to its own alumni, Indians from other Indian Universities being treated as aliens. This xenophobic trend has forced the Delhi University to reciprocate with high reservation.\n\nIf reservation of seats, as a strategy of admission to techniclli colleges, is void there may be a wider impact on a number of the institutions and individuals than on the parties here.\n\nThe law laid down by this Court binds other institutions because Art. 141 is imperative.\n\nSri Shanti Bhushan, appearing for the University, assertively suggested to the contrary remembering only the rule of res judicata, but later realised the obvious error and recanted. He agreed that if\n\nJAGD!SH v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, J.) 837\n\nthis Court invalidated reservation, as such, many universities would be upset in their admission processes, although they were not party-a\n\nweakness of the adversary system which needs remedying.\n\nSo, we invited the learned Attorney General also to help the Court, which he did and we record our gratitude. Unfortunately, the petitioner has not been able to present, the social facts, the educational milieu, the statistical materials and other vital data bearing on the constitntional vice of\n\nthe rule of excessive reservation, and the respondent University, despite our repeated suggestions to its counsel, has not enriched its brief with sufficient facts which enlighten the court, although some additional information has been brought in. On the other hand, counsel's submissions were scary, if we may say so with respect, to the effect that when students went on a fast unto death, Government had to intervene and save the situation and provide larger reservation.\n\nAs the Attorney General agreed, hunger strikes cannot amend the Constitution, and Government, if impressed with the grievance which has led to the protest fast, mnst set in motion changes in the basic Jaw, as was done in the first constitntional amendment and later for States Reorganisation.\n\nWhen this flaw was pointed out to the respondent, some more materials were placed before the court in justification of the increase in the reservation quota from a constitutional angle, and we will deal with them. In the adversary system, advocacy in the superior courts, which, their decisions, declare the Jaw for all must broaden beyond the particular lis into a conspectus of sociological facts, economic fuctors and educational conditions so that other persons aggrieved who will potentially be bound by the decision, do not suffer by not being co-nominee\n\nparties. Surely, on the available material, counsel have done their best.\n\nThis preliminary narration leads upto the constitutional problem that\n\noonfronts the court in this petition under Art. 32 and stresses how it F deserves, for its solution, serious and sensitive judicial and administrative statesmanship enlivened by legal fundamentals, since the crucial issne springs from the pervasive and protective tendency for institutional reservation of post-graduate seats, which, if left uncanalised and indulged in excess, may well imperil the integrated status of higher national education and make a mockery of equal opportunity.\n\nBasically, great G constitutional issues cannot be divorced, even while being viewed from a legal perspective, from their national overtones oand individual impact, since passionate provincialisation and addiction to institutional xenophobia, even in higher education, have a suicidal fascination beyond myopic political perception.\n\nAnd, on the contrary, elitist exageration of 'national' considerations and personal merit, where local protection H is essential for the bumbler people's interests, bas a depressing reper- <:ussion if pushed beyond a point-an aspect which expert policy-makers\n\nsometimes overlook in unwitting promotion of their gronp interest.\n\nThe problem is complex and thorny, charged with practical difficnlties and fraught with explosive possibilies. A short cut, in such situations may well prove a wrong cut and so we are circumspect in our assessment and tentative in our conclusions, especially because counsel, in our adversary system, often do not travel beyond the narrow needs of the case and, despite our prodding, we have not received the social-statistic:oal wealth of material to help us take a comorehensive overview of the issue.\n\nLaw, constitutional law, is not an omnipotent abstraction or distant idealisation but a principled, yet pragmatic, value-laden and result-oriented, set of propositions applicable to and conditioned by a concrete stage of social development of the nation and aspirational imperatives of the people. India To-day-that is the inarticulate major premise of our constitutional law and life. We highlight these basics because Shri Shanti Bhushan, for the University, pleaded for a practical appreciation of the lot of the Delhi graduates excluded from everywhere else while Shri Balakrishnan for the petitioner, pressed for a national approach to high-grade talent vis-avis courses in specialities. A synthesis of both is, where the truth lies. The key to this case, if we may anticipate ourselves, .is in harmoniously blending developmental necessities of backward regions via institutional reservations-and national considerations of everybody's equal opportunity for higher education being ensured regardless of geographical, institutional or other inhibitions. We must never forget two values synthesised in our constitutional culture, as set out in the Preamble-unity and integrity of the nation and equality of, opportunity of weaker sections.\n\nWithout the latter becoming a sure reality the former may be mere rhetoric !\n\nAn epitome of the social background leading upto the controversy will give a hang of the case and elaboration may await a later stage.\n\nPost Independence India has many universities with facilities for higher learning. Most of them give institutional preferences in the allocation of seats for technical courses and this tendency sometimes reaches the morbid point of total cornering of seats at post-graduate level, especially in the coveted and competitive branches like medicine.\n\nThe Delhi University which has M.B.B.S. and post-graduate medical courses, exercises academic jurisdiction over the affiliated colleges in the capital of the conntry, enjoys great prestige for its schools of learning and excellence in teaching and is founded by the Central Government.\n\nIt has at once a territorial limitation and national complexion and it caters to a population, by and large, drawn from all over the country because of the vast official, political, parliamentary judicial, educational, commercial and other gravitational pulls which the capital of the\n\n' >\n\ncountry inevitably exerts. This population is fluid because of movements, transfers and a host of other factors.\n\nThe indigenous denizens. of Delhi are perhaps over-run by these super-imposed layers and the student community of the Delhi Universiy is not made up so much by the 'sons of the soil' as in universities in other places but is accounted for by the inflow of groups drawn from all over the country.\n\nIn a limited sense, it is a microcosm if India is a macrocosm. This national demographic composition is relevant to the eX'llminat'on of the 'reservation' problem.\n\nThe capital city is not just a part of India.\n\nIt is miniaturised India, a fact often forgotten by the administration in the field of culture and education, especially vis-a-vis regional minorities.\n\nIt is magapolitan and people from all parts flock to this outsized city. But we cannot exaggerate this factor, for the presence of the farther regions like the South and the North East, population-wise, is minimal and precarious. Shri Balakrishnan insisted that the University was sustained by Central Government finances, collected from the whole country, and the benefits must likewise belong to all qualified students from everywhere.\n\nThese are valuable aspects to shape policy but the court must test constitutionality and no more.\n\nTo that extent alone we will weigh these factors in moulding our verdict.\n\nWe will now identify the issues emerging from the matrix cf facts. Since Shri Shanti Bhushan laid stress on these factors, viz. the\n\n•Qf)lagraha crisis created by the students, the obdurate, may be, even obscurantist, exclusiveness of other Universities forbidding Delhi graduates from getting admission in their colleges and the reasonabler.cs:; of institutional continuity in educat:onal pursuits for students who enter a university for higher studies, we must dilate on the foundational facts more fully. Since Sri Balakrishnau emphasised the pathetic plight of meritorious students if 'apartheid' policies were practied by universitie8, contrary to the cultural unity and constitutional mandates of our nation, we must weave into the legal fabric of 'admission' regulations strands of national integration and equal opportun; ty for higher education.\n\nThese rival contentions justify, albeit a little repetitively, the recapitulation of recent events, parochial realitic~ and institutional behaviour, bearing on admissions to colleges in the Delhi University, with some comparative glance at others in the country.\n\nWe are concerned with three medical colleges, two being affiliated to, and one being maintained, by the Delhi University.\n\nTogether they turn out annually around 400 medical graduates. These graduales get house job~ in the local hospitals and qualify themselves for\n\n16-91 SCI/80\n\n~\" .,. \"\n\npost-graduate courses.\n\nThe University has mauy post-graduate degrees and diploma courses but all of them put together come to only 250 seats. Naturally, the graduates from the Delhi University cannot be accommodated fully or even in part for the post-graduate degree courses. If, out of the available seats for the post-graduate courses, a large slice is thrown up for open competition and students from all over the country swarm to take the entrance examination, the Delhi graduates' prospects become bleaker.\n\nThe further . cas.e of the University is that there is a harsh handicap for these graduates in that they are not considered for admission in other universities on account of various regional hmdles such as prescription of domicile, graduation in that very university, registration with the State Medical Council, service in the State Medical Service and the like.\n\nThe necessary consequence of these road-blocks in the way of getting into post-graduate courses is dissatisfaction frustration, fury and pressure for exclusive earmarking of all seats at the post-graduate level in the Delhi University for the Delhi graduates.\n\nReservation elsewhere breeds reservation here.\n\nGood and evil become contagious and indivisible and eventually over powering.\n\nThe chain reaction had led to the principle of reservation being accepted by the Delhi University, first in moderate measure and next immoderately, maybe, because the pressure of militant Delhi graduates forced the University's hands or because Government, which virtually forced this solution of 70% plus reservation, acted on the easy guidelines : Nothing succeeds like excess.\n\nReservation begins as a mild remedy but becomes, unless leashed, a Frankensteins monster.\n\nThe rule for selection of candidates until April 1978 was as follows:\n\n(a) For the first 52 % seats of the total number of seats available, the selection was to be made on the basis of combined merit of Delhi University and other Universities medical graduates.\n\n(b) The selection of the remaining 48 % seats was to be made from the Delhi University graduates only.\n\nBy this method, approximately half the number of seats were reserved for the Delhi graduates. But having regard to the figures of seats and turn-out of graduates earlier mentioned, this did not meet the requirements of the aspirants for post-graduate degrees from Delhi. If must be remembered that Delhi is the seat of the elite, of high officials, of prosperous professionals, of rich businessmen, of important politicians and echelons of consequence and other men of money-power.\n\nJAGDISII v. UNION (Krishna Iyer,];) 841\n\nTl.Jc.ir sons and daughters, already fed on superior facilities and coached in special schools beyond the reach of most other students in the rest of the country, have an appetite and opportunity for excellence in education ahead of others and wish to lap up all the post-graduate seats, if possible. The cream must belong to the cream, generation to generation, may be a cynical social scientists 'comment,'\n\nInevitably, a larger number of Delhi medical graduates, relatively speak; ng, must be ambitiously wanting to continue their studies in post-graduate medical courses which are prized for their career potential. It is significant that these courses are not easily available elsewhere and the standards and prestige of these degrees in the Delhi University are high.\n\nTaking a post-graduate medical degree thns opens up further vistas for stud:es abroad or employment at home. When we remember these factors and the reduced chance for bright Delhi graduates to gain admission into the Delhi post-graduate courses in the face of All-India competition, we can mildly appreciate the mood and demand of the student community for enlargement of their quota. But all grievances are not constitutional. Also, by remedy<ng one group's misfortune other groups may be hurt. The Court can only view rights and wrongs, through the constitutional prism.\n\nThe various universities show concmn for their backward regions and alumni in the name of equal opportunity. But the Indian Medical Council,. apprehensive of fall of standards lays stress on aca- demic merit. This dilemma of the law between equality of opportunity and excellence oi performance leads us to a demand for full facts, but, of course, we are left to speculate on many aspects of fhc\n\n- problem because even the Delhi University and the Union of India have left us in the lurch.\n\nLitigation, on a socio-legal issue of critical constitutional moment, should not end with general assertions, affidav:ts of formal denials and minimal materials but, as stated earlier, needs feeding the court with nutritive facts which build the flesh and blood of the administrative or legislative action under challenge and all other surrounding and comparative data which legitimate the 'reservation' or other procedure under attack from the constitutional angle. 'Reservation' jurisprudence is a tangled knot carefully to be developed and counsel cannot invite judges to make hunches as a cover-up for party's failure. And ingenious or imaginative ora!ity in court can never be a substitute for well-researched, down-to-earth factuality in the brief.\n\nMany a case is lost or won because counsel and court engage in the game of blind man's buff since investigative undertakings and presentation of constitutionally vital data do not find a place in the brief and our f01:ensic process inhibits travels beyond the\n\n A paper books in court ! Nevertheless, for the nonce, we have to make· do with the record.\n\nLet us go back to the basics. The Indian Constitution is wedded to equal protection and non-discrimination. Arts. 14, 15 and 16 are inviolable and Art. 29 (2) strikes a similar note though it does not refer to regional restrictions or reservations. Art. 15 saves the State's power to make special provisions for women and children or for advancement of socially and educationally backward classes.\n\nReservations under Art. 15 ( 4) exist and are applied.\n\nThere is no dispute about that and the whole debate has left that pattern and policy of 'reservation' out of controversy.\n\nWe zero-in only university-wise quotas, reservations and preferences from the constitutional stand-point. $. l\n\nThe primary imperative of Arts. 14 and 15 is equal opportunity for all across the nation to attain excellence--and this has burning relevance to our times when the country is gradually being 'broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls' in politics, economics and education, undoing the founding faith of an undivided integrated India by surrender to lesser appeals and grosser passions.\n\nWhat is fundamental, as an enduring value of our polity, is guarantee to each of equal opportunity to unfold the full potential of his personalities.\n\nAnyone anywhere, humble or high, agrestic or urban, man or woman, and whatever his religion or irreligion, shall be afforded equal chance for admission to any secular educational course or school for cultural growth, training facility, speciality or employment.\n\nEach according tohis ability, is of pervasive validity, and it is a latent, though radical, funckimental that, given propitious environments, talent is more or less evenly distributed and everyone has a prospect of rising te> the peak.\n\nEnvironmental inhibitions mostly 'freeze the geni_al current of the soul' of many a humble human whose failure is 'inflicted', not innate. Be it from the secular perspective of human equality or the spiritual insight of divinity in everyone, the inherent superiority cult with a herrenvolk tint, is contrary to our axiom of equality. That is why 'equal protection of the laws' for full growth is guaranteed, apart from 'equality before the law'.\n\nEven so, in our imperfect society, some objective standards like common admission tests are pr~\n\ncribed to measure merit, without subjective manipulation or university-wise invidiousness. In one sense, it is a false dilemma te> thlnk that there is rivalry between equality and excellence, although superficially they are competing values. In the long run, when every member of the society has equal opportunity, genetically and environmentally, to develop his potential, each will be able, in his own way,\n\nto manifest his faculty fully. The philosophy and pragmatism of uni-\n\nA versa! excellence through universal equal opportunity is part of our culture and constitutional creed .\n\nThis norm of non-discrimination, however, admits of just exceptions geared to equality and does not forbid those basic measures needed to abolish the gaping realities of current inequality afflicting socially and educationally backward classes' and 'the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes'. Such measures are rightly being . taken by the State and are perfectly constitutional as the State of\n\nKera/a v. N. M. Thomas(') has explained. Equality and steps towards equalisation are not idle incantation but actuality, not mere ideal but real, life. But can a university, acting within the constitutional parameters, create a new kind of discrimination viz., reservation for students of a particular university? The literal terms of Art. 14 do not tolerate it, the text of Art. 15 does not sanction it. Can we carve out a fresh ground of preference? Delhi University students, as such, are not an educationally backward class and, indeed, institution-wise segregation or reservation has no place in the scheme of Art. 15, although social and educational destitution may be endemic in some parts of the country where a college or university may. be started to remedy this glaring imbalance and reservation for those alumi for higher studies may be permissible. We will explain this further but, speaking generally, unless there is vital nexus with equal opportunity, broad validation of university-based reservation cannot be built on the vagu, ground that all other universities are practising it-a fact not fully proved before us either.\n\nUniversality of illega- -lity, even if the artists of discrimination are universities, cannot convert such praxis into constitutionality. Nor, indeed, can the painful circumstance that a batch of medical graduates demonstratively fasted in front of the Health Minister's house, ipsp facto, legalise reservation of seats in their favour.\n\nShri Shanti Bhushan vividly described his role as Law Minister in meeting the student satyagrahis who were honestly hungry for post-graduate seats and the crisis which stampeded government to intervene and make the University revise its reservation upward to save the lives of the 'fasters'. We have sympathy for students, especially for those who sacrifice their comforts to claim an opportunity to take post-graduate medical degrees.\n\nWe even feel that the student commumty often resorts to direct action of the satyagraha model when the pachydermic disposition of authorities drives them to such drastic heroics. But what if non-Delhi students\n\n(I) [1976] 1S.C.R.906.\n\nstart a rival starvation exercise? That will lead to testing the rule of law on the immolative or masochist capabiJ:ties of affected groups and not on the Articles of the Constitutional or provisions of the legislation.\n\nProtest fasting, a versatile weapon in our cultural armoury, is meant to sensitize or conscientize the soul of the Adm:nistration when it is too paper-logged or callous to look at human problems from the angle of human justice.\n\nBeyond that, this great Gandhian technique cannot be blunted by promiscuous use, so long as democratic mechanisms are alive and not impervious to legitimate gr:evances and can be sparked into action not merely by sensational, though sincere, tactics like fasting unto death.\n\nWhile recognisi11g. even reverencing, the role of soul force in quickening the callous conscience of authorities to grave injury and need for urgent remedv, we cannot . . uphold the Delhi University's 'reservation' strategy merely because Government was faced with student 'fasts' and ministers desired a compromise formula and the University bodies simply said 'Amen'.\n\nThe constitutionality of institutional reservation must be founded on facts of educational life and the social dynamics of equal opportunity Political panic does not ipso facto, make constitutional logic.\n\nPrima facie, equal marks must have equal chance for medical admissions, as urged by the practitioner.\n\nAnd. neither universitybased favoured treatment nor satyagraha-induced quota policy can survive the egalitarian attack.\n\nTo repulse the charge, equalityorientcd grounds must be made out.\n\nConstitutional equality itself is dynamic, flexible, and moulded by the variables of life.\n\nFor instance, if a region is educationally backward or woefully deficient in medical services, there occurs serious educational and health-service dispar:tyfor that human religion which must be redressed by an equality and service minded Welfare State.\n\nThe purpose of such a policy is to remove the existing inequality and to promote welfare-based equality for the denizens of the backward regions.\n\nThe specific strategy to ameliorate the unequal societul condition .is left to the State, provided it is geared to producing equality in the quality of life of that handicapped area subject, of course, to basic recognition of indivi-· dual quality and criteria of efficiency.\n\nIf the State, for example, seeks to remove the absence of opportunity for medical education of adivasis or islanders who have no inclination or wherewithal to go to far-off cities and join medical H colleges, by starting a regional university and medical college in the heart of such backward region and reserves a high percentage of seats there to 'locals' i.e. students from that university, it canno~ be\n\ncastigated as discriminatory.\n\nWhat is directly intended to aboltsh A existing disparity cannot be accused of discrimination.\n\nAgain, if the State finds that only students from the backward regions, when given medical graduation, will care to serve in that area, drawn towards it by a sense of belonging, and those from outside will, on graduation, leave for the cities or their own regions, it may evolve a policy of preference or reservation for students of that\n\nUniversity.\n\nThat strategy ensures the probability of their serving the backward people for whose benefit the medical courses were opened.\n\nSuch measures which make for equality of opportunity for medical education and medical service for backward human sectors may be constitutionalised even by Arts. 14 and 15.\n\nBut it must be remembered that exceptions cannot over-rule the rule itself by running riot or by making reservations as a matter of course, in every un:- versity and every course.\n\nFor instance. you cannot wholly cxclud\" meritorious candidates as that will promote sub-standard candidates and bring about a fall in medical competence, injurious, in the long run, to the very region.\n\nIt is no bless:ng to inflict quacks and medical midgets on people by wholesale sacrifice of talent at the threshold.\n\nNor can the very best be rejected from admission because tha~ will be a national loss and the interests of no region can be higher than those of the nation. So, within these limitations, without going into excesses, there is room for play of the State's policy choices.\n\nBefore moving to the next aspect we may touch upon a slightly different angle which opens up a new point of view.\n\nWhat is merit or excellence? If potent'al for rural service or aptitude for rendering medical attention among backward people is a criterion cf merit -and it, undoubtedly, is in a land of sickness and misery. neglect and penury, wails and tears'-then, surely, belonging to a university catering to a deprived region is a plus point of merit.\n\nExcellence is composite and the heart and its sensitivity arc as precious in the scale of educational values as the head and its creativity and social medicine for the common people is more relevant than peak performance in freak cases.\n\nMarks 011 this basis will take us to the same preference as reservations for in-university candidates.\n\nHere we are not preferring one with less marks, but adopting a holistic manner of marking linked up with backward settings, institution or:ented and like considerations has some meaning.\n\nA caveat or two may be sounded even in this approach lest ex-\n\nception should consume the rule.\n\nThe first caution is that reserva- R tion must be kept in check by the demands of competence. You cannot extend the shelter of reservation where minimum qualifications arc\n\nabsent.\n\nSimilarly, all the best talent cannot be completely excluded by wholesale reservation.\n\nSo, a certain percentage, which may be available, must be kept open for meritorious performance regardless of university, State and the like.\n\nComplete exclusion of the rest of the country for the sake of a province, wholesale banishment of proven ability to open up, hopefully, some dalit talent, total sacrifice of excellence at the altar of equalisation-when the Constitution mandates for every one equality before and equal protection of the lawmay be fatal folly, self-defeating educational technology and antinational if made a routine rule of Sta, te policy.\n\nA fair preference, a reasonable reservation, a just adjustment of the pr; or needs and real potential of the weak with the partial recognition of the presence of competitive merit-such as the dynamics of social justice which animates the three egalitarian articles of the Constitution .\n\nFlowing from the same stream of equalism is another limitation.\n\nThe basic medical needs of a region or the preferential push justified for a handicapped group cannot prevail in the same measure at the highest scale of speciality where the best skill or talent, mnst be handpicked by selecting according to capability. At the level of Ph.D., M.D., or levels of higher proficiency, where international measure of talent is made, where losing one great scientist or technologist in ll:e making Is a national loss the considerations we have expanded upon as -important Jose their potency. Here equality, measured by matching excellence, has more meaning and cannot be diluted much without gravo risk.\n\nThe Indian Medical Council has rightly emphasised that playing with merit for pampering local feeling will boomerang.\n\nMidgetry, where summitry is the desideratum, is a dangerous art. We may here extract the Indian Medical Council's recommendation, which may not be the last word in social wisdom but is worthy of consideration :\n\nStudent for post-graduate training should be selected strictly on merit judged on the basis of academic record in the undergraduate course. All selection for post-graduate studies should be conducted by the Universities.\n\nG Another casuistry needs to be exposed before we proceed. Backward regions and universities in consequence are miles away from forward cities with sophisticated institutions. The former, for a equalic\n\nsation, need crutches and extra facilities to overcome injustices. The latter already enjoy all the advantages of the elite and desen-e no fresh props. That will be double injury to claims of equality of the H capable candidates coming from less propitiously circumstanced universities and societies. Law is no absolute logic but the handmaid of current social facts of life.\n\n' •\n\nWe hasten to keep aloof from reservations for backward classes\n\nnd Scheduled Castes and Tribes because the Constitution has assigned a special place for that factor and they mirror problems of inherited injUilices demanding social surgery which if applied thoughtlessly in other situations may be a remedy which accentuates the malady.\n\nAt this stage it is appropriate to refer to one ruling of this Court which relates partly to university-wise reservation in the context of backward areas. Support from precedents for the propositions implicit in the above discussion can be derived, but we need not cover many rulings and may confine ourselves to one or two which have closer bearing than the rest. fa Chanchala's case(') university-wise reservation was challenged as unconstitutional. There wes reference to earlier .decisions, such as Rajendran v.\n\nMadras(') and Periakaruppan v.\n\nTamil Nadu(\") and their ratio was distinguished to reach the concluion that under certain circumsLnces university-wise classification and reservation was constitutionally permissible.\n\nIn Rajcndran's case\n\n(supra) district-wise quota for medical college admissions was struck down notwithstanding the argument that \"if selection was made districtwise, those selected from a district were likely to settle down as practitioners in that district, so that the districts were likely to benefit from their training\".(') The Court did not coffsidcr this to be intrinsically irrelevant but negatived the contention.\n\n\"On the ground that it was neither pleai:Ied in the counter-affidavit of the State, nor had the State placed any facts or figures justifying the plea that students selected district-wise would settle down as medical practitioners in the respective district where they resided.\"\n\nThe emphasis in both the cases (Rajendran and Periakaruppan) was -0n the reasonable nexus with the object of the rules of selection, namely, to get the most meritorious among the candidates for imparting medical education. In Chanchala' s case the basis of classification was different : \"in that it is neither district-wise nor unit-wise, but is university-wise.\"(') The justification for university-wise reservation was\n\nthci educational need and paucity of medical service in the area whero the: lllliversity was iet up. Certain regions poorly served with medical facilities and with few doctors needed to produce more medical men\n\n(!) D.N. Chanc/zala v. Mysore [t971] Supp. S.C.R. 608.\n\n(2) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 786.\n\n\n(4) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 608 at 618.\n\n(5) lbidat 619.\n\nwho would settle down there. Likewise, in those backward regions the absence of medical colleges effectively inhibited the needs of medical education of the local student community. The question was whether these grounds would suffice for providing reservation institution-wise.\n\nIn this setting, the Court observed :\n\n\"Since the universities are set up for satisfying--the educational needs of different areas where they are set up and medical colleges are established in those areas, it can safely be presumed that they also were so set up to safisiy the needs of medical training of those attached to those universities. In our view there is nothing undesirable in ensuring that those attached to such uni,•ersities have their ambitions to have training in specialised subjects, like medicine, satisfied through colleges affiliated to their own universities. Such\n\na basis for selection has not the disadvantage of district-wise or unit-wise selection as any student from any part of the state can pass the qualifying examination in any of the three universities irrespective of the place of his birth or residence, Further, the rules confer a discretion on the selection committee to admit outsiders upto 20% of the total available seats in any one of these colleges, ie. those who have passed the equivalent examination held by any other university not only in the State but also ebewhere m India.\"(')\n\nJn the course of the Judgment, Shelat, J. speaking for the Court, was inclined to broaden the principle of equalisation implied in Art. 15(4).(2 )\n\n\"Once the power to lay down classifications or cate-. gories of persons fron1 whom a, dn1i.ssion is to be given is granted, the only question which would remain for consideration would be whether such categorisation has an intelligible criteria and whether it has o reasonable relation with the object for which the Rules for admission are made. Rules for admission are inevitable so long as the demand of every candidate seeking admission cannot be complied with in view of the paucity of institutions imparting 1raining in such subjects as medicine. The definition of a 'political \"'fferer' being a detailed one and in certain terms, it would be easily possible to distinguish children of such political sufferers from the rest as possessing the criteria laid down by the definition. The object of the rules for admission can obviously\n\n(1) D.N. Chancliala v. Mysore, lbid p. 619M620.\n\n(2) Ibidp. 629.\n\nbe to secure a fair and equitable distribution ol seats amongst those seeking admission and who are eligible under the University Regulations. Such distribution can be on the principle that admission should be available to the best and the most meritorious. But an equally fair and equitable principle would also be that which secures admission in a just proportion to those who are handicapped and wbo, but for the preferential treatment gil'cn to them, would not stand a chance against those who are not so handicapped nd are, therefore, in a superior position. The principle underlying Art. 15(4) is that a preferential treatment can validly be given because the socially and educationally backward classes need it, so that in course of time they stand in equal position with the more advanced sections of the sccicty. It would not in any way be improper if that principle were also to be applied to those who are handicapped but do not fall under Art. 15(4) .\"\n\nAnother observation by Dua, J. in his separate opinion also bas preg- D nant meaning (') :\n\n\"The object of selection for admission to the Medical Colleges, considered in the background of the directive principles of State policy contained in our Constitution, appears to be to select the best material from amongst the E candidates in order not only to pmvide them with adequate means of livelihood, but also to provide the much needed medical aid to the people and to improve public health generally.\"\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nThe conclusion that we reach from this ruling which adverts to earlier procedents on the point is that university-wise preferential treatment may still be consistent with the rule of equality of opportunity where it is calculated to correct an imbalance or handicap and permit equality in the larger sense.\n\nThis extensive excursion is necessitated by the subtle tendency of ad\\':>ntagc groups to exploit propositions applicable to disabled categories to good account.\n\nNow. let us look at the raw realities of the Delhi University medical graduates and their claim for larger reservation for M.D. and M.S. Facts. and only facts, must be the guide, of course. within the framework of Part III, and this Court has to play the role not only of the sentinel on the qui vive but also\n\n(I) D.N. Chanrhola r. Jl, fysore (Supra) 632.\n\nof the 'hound of heaven', not merely watch but chase, to 3et things right if any constitutioml wrong has been committed.\n\nSo we must enquire whether 70% reservation for Delhi graduates which is prima\n\nfacie discriminatory can be extricated by any amelioratory constitutional logic or ethic implicit in Arts. 14 and 15.\n\nWe have set out the parameters within which alone reservation is permissible.\n\nWe must go to the roots of the creed of equality and here the case of State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas!') has critical relevance.\n\nThat decision dealt with the Scheduled Castes and Art. 16 and certain facilities other than reservation.\n\nBut the core reasoning has crucial significance in all cases of protective discrimination.\n\nThe process of equalisation and benign discrimination are integral, and not antagonistic, to the principle of equality. ln a hierarchical society with an indelible feudal stamp and inenrable actual inequality, it is sophistry to argue that progressive measures to eliminate group disabilities and promote collective equality are anathema on the score that every individual has entitlement on pure merit of marks.\n\nThis narrow 'unsocial' pedantrY subverts the seminal essene of equal opportunity even for those who are humble and handicapped. Meritocracy cannot displace equality when the utterly bachnrd masses labour under group disabilities.\n\nSo we may weave tho\"\" special facilities into the web of equality which, in an equitable setti1.g, provide for the weak and promote their levelling up so that, in the long run, the community at large may enjoy a general measure of real equal opportw1ity.\n\nSo we hold, even apart from Art. 15(3) and ( 4), that equality is not negated or neglected where special provisions are geared to the larger goal of the disabled getting over their Jig,. ablement consistently with the general good and individual merit.\n\nIndeed, Art. 14 implies all this, in its wider connotation, and has to inform the interpretation of Art. 15.\n\nMathew J. in Thomas's case (supra) quoted from the Moynihan Report and continued with some insightful comments which we may .c:; excerpt : (2)\n\n\"Here a point of semantics must be grasped.\n\nThe demand for equality of opportunity has been generally perceived by White Americans as a demand for liberty, a demand not to be excluded from the competition of lifo--- at the polling place, in the scholarship examinations, tt the\n\n(1) [1976] I S.C.R. 948.\n\n(2) Tbid955-56.\n\npersonnel office, on the housing market.\n\nLiberty does, of course, demand that everyone be free to try his luck, er t(ll!t his skill in such matters.\n\nBut these opportunities do not necessarily produce equality.\n\nOn the contrary, to the extent that winners imply losers, equality of opportunity almost insures inequality of results.\n\nThe point of semaQtics is that equality of opportunity now has a different meaning for Negroes than it has for Whites.\n\nIt is not (or at least no longer) a demand for liberty alone, but also for equality-in terms of group results.\n\nIn Barard Rustin's terms, 'It is now concerned not merely with removing the barriers to full opportunity but with achieving the fact of equality.' By equality Rustin means a distribution of achievements among Negroes roughly comparable to that among Whites.(')\n\nBeginning most notably with the Supreme Court''\n\ncondemnation of school segregation in 1954, the United D States has finally begun to correct the discrepancy between its ideals and its treatment of the black man.\n\nT'ne first steps, are reflected in the decisions of the courts and the civil rights laws of Congress, merely removed the legal and quasi-legal forms of racial discrimination.\n\nThese actions while not producing true equality, or even equality ot opportunity, logically dictated the next steps: positive use of government power to create the possibility of a real equality. In tha words of Professor Llpset: \"Perhaps the most important fact to recognise about the current situation of the American Negro is that (legal) equality is not enough to insure hh; moven1ent ; nto larger society.\"( 2 )\n\n(emphasis adJed)\n\nWe agree with this approach and feel quite clearly that the Slate's duty 1s to produce real equality, rather egalitarian ju, tice in actual life.\n\nIf university-wise classification for post-graduate medical education is shown to be relevant and reasonable and the differential has a nexus to the larger goal of equalisation of educational opportnnitits the vice of discrimination may not invalidate the rule.\n\n(1) The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy Eds. Lee Rai1- H water and William L. Pancey, p. 49.\n\n(2) 'The American Democracy' Magrath, Cornwell and Goodman P.1 S.\n\ns----\n\nEven so, what is fundamental is equality, not classification. What is basic is equal opportunity, for each according to his ability, not artificial compartmentalisation and institutional apartheidisation, using the mask of handicaps.\n\nWe cannot contemplate as oonsistent with Art. 14 a danish exclu.sivism based upon a particular university, without more.\n\nAlive to these major premises let us examine the merits of the charge of 'adm'ssion' discrimination in the present case.\n\nJustice Brennan, in a different social m; lieu, but wit!J a spiritualsecular meaning which may not be lost on us, stated:(')\n\n\"Lincon said this Nation was 'conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equaJ'.\n\nThe Founders' dre, am of a society where all men arc free and equal has not been easy to realize.\n\nThe degree of liberty and equality that exists today has been the product of unceasing struggle and sacrifice.\n\nMuch remains to be done-so much that the very institutions of our society have come under challenge.\n\nHence, today, as in Lincoln's time, a man may ask 'whether (this) nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can Jong endure'. It cannot endure if the Nation falls short on the guarantees of liberty, justice, and equality embodied in our founding documents.\n\nBut it also cannot endure if our precious heritage of ordered liberty be allowed to be ripped apart amid the sound and fury of our time. It cannot endure if in individual cases the claims of social peace and order on the one side and of personal liberty on the other cannot be mutually resolved in the forum designated by the Constitution. If that resolution cannot be reached by judicial trial in a court of law, it will be reached elsewhere and by other means, and there will be grave danger that liberty, equality, and ihe ordl'r essential to both will be lost.\"\n\nAnother national risk we run was sounded in words of caution in Khosa's case by Chandrachud, J. (as he then was): (2 )\n\nG \" ........ let us not evolve, through imperceptible extensions, a theory of classification which maY subvert, perhaps submerge, the precious guarantee of equality.\n\nT\\1e eminent spirit of an ideal society is eqnaity and so we must not be left to ask in wonderment: what after all is the operational residue of equality and eqnal opportunity?\" B (I) Mr. Justice Brennan concurring with the majority opinion in lllinious v.\n\nAllen, 197 U.S. 337 (1970).\n\n(2) State of I. and K. v. T. N. Khosa and Ors. [1974] I S.C.R. 771.\n\nJAGDISH v. UNION (Krishnu Iyer, J.) ~53\n\nThus t]fe constitutional principles and lim; tation~ are clear and the norms are belighted by the precedents but their application to the\n\nspecific situation is an exacting task.\n\nThe burden, when protective .discrimination promotional of equalisation is pleaded, is on the party\n\nwho seeks to justify the ex facie deviation from equality.\n\nWhat has the Delhi Un:versity stated here?\n\nThe learned AttorneY Genera] frankly admitted that student agitation, without more, could not validate 'reservation' and that excessive reservation was an obvious inequality.\n\nNor, indeed, is it a good plea that illegal reservation is being practised by other universities and the Delhi University is fore ed to act illegally in self-defence.\n\nLawlesness, under our system, is corrected by the law, not by counter-lawlessness.\n\nSo it is strange for the Delhi University to say our d:sorderly behaviour is orderly\n\nbecause other universities behave similarly.\n\nOnce these misguided defences of direct [!Ction by stude11ts or reprisals against other universities me brushed aside, we come to grips with the real issues.\n\nIs tbece circumstantial justification for constitutionalising the rservation strl!_tegy, especially of 70'.% plus?\n\nThe case for reservation ar, gues itself once we establish au operational relationship between the benign basis of such classified quota\n\nor like preference and the object to be achieved viz. promotion of better opportunities to the deprived categories of studen_ts or better supply of medical service to neglected regions of our land.\n\nBut the E Delhi University, city or students, do not fit into the criteria.\n\nWhen a university or other institution may usefully be made the instrument for promotion of facilities for equal educationai opportunity for a class or a region, the State may legitimately resort to institutionally classified reservation but Delhi fails to qualify. Again, the integral yoga of equality and excellence at the service of society as already stated, has another rider.\n\nIn the higher scales of specialised knowledge, be it art, science or technology, superior performance must be accorded recognition, for a variety of consideration.\n\nWho bnt humanity suffers if a rare genius, with a greater flair for or mastery of a key branch of natural or social science, is forced to wither away by a rule of total reservation for its own alumni and proscription of outsiders, by a house of higl1er learning ? Can 'unapproachability', a cultural anathema now in India, •attain respectability by beiog labelled as 'reservation ? No. Therefore, a blanket ban which is\n\nthe indirect result of a wholesale reservation is constitutional heresy.\n\nB There mnst be substantial social justice as raison d'etre for a high percentage of alumni reservation.\n\nA The argumeut urged in answer is that the doors for admission to post-graduate medical courses are almost completely closed for Delhi graduates by all other universities.\n\nSo, protective rervation becomes necessary as the1 'only hopq of Delhi students fol'. post- :raduate studies.\n\nThose real-life factors which show that Delhi p-aduates are denied de facto equ_ality on a national scale by the exclu- B sionism of other universities and that, therefore, they deserve sheltered equal opportunity in actuality by barriers of reservation of a high percentage of seat>-, uch being the University's defence-must be made out and not merely asserted.\n\nThis contention deserves close examination, not summ.ary rejection. c The mechanics of merit measurement is simple.\n\nAll applicants, whichever the University from where they have taken M.B.B.S. degree, must apply for a common entrance test.\n\nThe yard-stick or merit is the marks obtained.\n\nThereafter 70% of the seats is allotted to Delhi graduates and the balance 30% is selected from out of ~II\n\nthe remaining applicants, Delhi graduates included.\n\nSo much so, Delhi graduates get much more than 70% of the total seats. Although the stage of application of reservation may bear upon the effective quantum of advantage, the principal question is as to whether a minimum of 70% for the Delhi graduate alone is not far too excessive, based on extraneous agitational factors and essentially contradicting Arts. 14 and 15?\n\nIf equality of opportunity for every person in the. country is the constitutional guarantee, a candidate who gets more marks than\n\nanother is enttled to preference for admisscon.\n\nMerit must be tl1e\n\ntt when choosing the best, according to this rule of equal chance for e_qual marks.\n\nThis proposition has greater importance when we reach the higher levels of education like post-graduate courses. After all, top technological expertise in any vital field like medicine is e nation's human asset without which its advance and development will be stunted.\n\nThe role of high grade skill or special talent may be ltss at the lesser levels of education, jobs and disciplines of social inco.- sequence, but more at the higher levels of sophisticated skills alld strategic employment.\n\nTo devalue merit at the summit is to klltporise with the country's development in the vital areas of professional expertise. In science and technology and other specialised fields of developmental significance, to relax lazily or easily in rerd to exacting standards of performance may be running a grave national risk because in advanced medicine and other critical departments of higher knowledge, crucial to material progress, the peopl<t o! India should not be denied the best the nation's talent lying lateiat can produce. If the best potential in these fields is cold-shouldered\n\nJAODlSll v. UNION (Krishna Iyer, I.) 855\n\nfor populist considerations garbed as reservations, the victims, in\n\nI.he long run, may be the people themselves.\n\nOf course, this . unrelenting strictness in selecting the best may not be so imp.; rative at other !vets where a broad measur.e of efficincy may be good enough and what is needed is merely to weed out the worthless.\n\nComing to brasstacks, deviation from equal marks will meet with approval only if the essential conditions set out above are fulfilled. The class which enjoys reservation must be educationally handicapped.\n\nThe reservation must be geared to getting over the handicap.\n\nThe. rationale of reservation must be in the case of medical students, removal of regional or class inadequacy or like disadvantage. T.be quantum of reservation should not be excessive or societally injurious.\n\nmeasured by the over-all competency of the end-product, viz. degrecholders. A host of variables infiuece the quantification of the reservation. But one factor deserves great emphas1~. The higher the level of the .speciality the lesser the role of reservation. Such being the pragmatics and dynamics of social justice and equal rights, let us apply the tests to the case on hand.\n\nWe are aware that measurement of merit is difficult and the methods now in vogue leave so much to be desired, that swearing by marks as measure of merit may even be s-ark superstition. But for want of surer techniques, we have to make-do with entrance tests, and at any rate, save in clear cases of perversity or irrationality, this is ordinarily out of bounds for courts.\n\nM.B.B.S. is a basic medical degree and insistence on the lrighest talent may be relaxed by promotion of backward groups, institution wise chosen, without injury to public welfare. It produces equal opportunity on a broader basis and gives hope to neglected geograpb1cal or human areas of getting a chance to rise.\n\nMoreover, the better chances of candidates from institutions in neglected regions setting down for practice in these very regions also warrants institutional preference because that policy helps the supply of medical services to these backward areas. ·· After all, it is quite on the cards that\n\nsome out of these candidates with lesser marks may prove their real mettle and blossom into great dcx:tors. Again, merit is not measured by marks alone but by human sympathies.\n\nThe heart is as much a factor as the head in assessing the social value of a member of the profession. Dr. Samuel Johnson put this thought with telling effect when he said :\n\n\"Want of tenderness is want of parts, and is no less a proof of stupidity than of depravity\".\n\n17-91SCI/80\n\n' F\n\n856 \" SUPRhMJ!. COURT REPORTS [lY80j 2 S.C.R, ~\n\nA We have no <loubt that where the hulljan region from which the\n\nalunuu of an uistJ.rution an~ largely orawn JS D<t<.:K.warn, e1rn;:r uom the angle of opportunities for technical education or av~bility of medic_:ai services for tpe people, the provision of a high ratio ot reservaL1on hdly militates against the quality mandate-viewed in the perspective of social justice.\n\nWe have two weighty differentiating factors here.\n\nDeH1i is 41 no\n\nensi.: an educationauy or economically bad .warJ Jrnman n:g1011,\n\nm_easured against the rest of our count.ry.\n\nThe students vf Delhi, who are likely to seek admission to medical coll_eges, belong to classes higher in the scale than in most parts of India.\n\nAs explained rlier the presence qf huge central administrative estabshmcnts an<l higher echelons of the public services, members in numbers of the po!iucal aristocracy, thank~ to Delhi being the _ _§_eat of Parliament1 countless executives clustering around big business and industrial houses and offices and many educational, research ~, d other ipstitutionl>, professional organisations, the Supreme Court, the High Court, and thelr\n\nuaturl human conc<imitants in the upper soci<?-educational scale, make Delhi and the Delhi University the cynsure of q1e privileged species in a land of under-privilegd penury.\n\nOf l:Ourse, like in any megalopolis of a developing country, slums and other symptoms of\n\ndeprivation show up and the desperately poor denizen~ low the visibility line unbiquitously abound. But they are not the potential candidates for medicl admission or service nd cannot be used as\n\n'libi' for reservation. In what sense, regard l;>eing had to over-all Indian conditions, can it . be said that Delhi or the Delhi University,\n\ni~ backward or serves, through the medical colleges of its Univecsty,\n\nthe students who will settle down to alleviate suffering in that region,\n\nSecondly, and more importantly, it is <litlicult to denounce or renounce the merit criterion y; hen the selection is for post-graduate\n\nr post-doctoral courses in specialised subjects.\n\nThere is no substi _ tute for sheer flair, for creative talent, for finetuQ.ed performance at the difficult heights of some disciplines where the est alone i~ likely to blossom as the best.\n\nTo sympathise mawkishly with the weaker sections by selecting sub-standard candidates, is lo punish society as a whole by denying the prospeci of excellence say tn hospital service.\n\nEven the poorest, when strickn by critical illness, needs the attention of super-skilled specialists, not humdrum second-rates. So it is that relaxation on merit, by over-ruling equality and quality altogether, is a social risk where the stage is post-graduate or post-doctoral.\n\nOf course, we should not exaggerate. this factor.\n\nPost-graduate studiell are not all that great and demanding to invite only geniuses.\n\nWe cannot be scared by glorifying merit nor be hypnotised by the cult of talent, seeing as we do, crowds of M.Ds, M.Ss and their foreign analogues. Nor, indeed, are the entrance tests any but the feeblest yardsticks to measure innate capabilities. Is it not the wildest hostage to fortune to swear by lll'arks alone which are so freakish and determined by a chancy variety of variables? We find different modes of examining faculties in different universities, commissions and countries and may, on closer scrutiny, pick holes in the scientific basis of our entrance tests themselves. We repeat all this only to stress the !imitations on the current system of selection so that we may not be swept off our feet by the elitist feeling that something sacred or scientific is bemg jettisoned for the sake of accommodating nitwits of backward regions institutions or classes when marks are slightly slurred over. Even so, being realists, we go by existing methodology until better modes are devised.\n\nIn the light of thi.s discussion about the know-how a.nd know-why of reservations, what are the conclusions that emerge vis a vis the Delhi graduates? Neither Delhi nor the Delhi University medical colleges can be designated as categories which warrant reservation. But there is one weighty circumstance which must be in our rememberance. Reservation for Delhi graduates is not that invidious because, as stated in the beginning, the students are from families drawn from all over India, Not 'sons of the soil' but sons and daughters of persons who are willy nilly pulled into the capital city for reasons beyond their control.\n\nThis reservation is, therefore, qualitatively different.\n\nThere is another pathological condition affecting 'medical admissions' which is at the back of the; desparate 'satyagraha' of the students and this factor tilts the scale a great deal. Counsel for the University, supported by fragrne_ntary material pointing to a pan-Indian tendency, argued that all the country round every university bangs, bars and bolts the doors, of medical admission to outsiders and if Delhi alone were to keep its doors hospitably ajar where are the Delhi graduates to go for higher studies if squeezed out by All-India competition ? If reservation is evil, the embargo everywhere must b.e lifted, lest evil should beget evil. SO long as other universities are out of bounds for Delhi graduates, exposure to all-India competition becomes intense and prejudices their chances. This indirect, real yet heavy handicap creates an under-current of di8crimination and cannot be wished away and needs to be antidoted by some percentage of reservation or other legitimate device.\n\nAnother consideration which justifies some measure of reservation is the desire of students for institutional continuity in education.\n\nParerits, pupils and teachers will usually prefer such continuity and it has its own value.\n\nWe reco!Jlise that institution-wise reservation is constitutionally circumscribed and may become ultra vires if recklessly resorted to.\n\nBut even such rules unti1 revised by competent authority or struck down judicially, will rule the roost. That is why we have to concede that until the si111post of 'no admission for outsiders' is removed from other universities and some fair percentage of seats in ether universities is left for open competition the Delhi students cannot be made martyrs of the Constitution.\n\nEven so, 'reservation' must be administered in moderation, if it is to be constitutional. Some central technical institutions like the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi and Chandigarh and the Pondicherry Medical College have a much smaller fraction.\n\nTheir circumstances may be different and we do not have the full facts, neither side having furnished more than fragments. Judicial surmise is too weak to be of decisional certainty. For reasons we have assigned 70% plus is too high at th~ post-graduate level in the half-proved circumstances. But we stop short of invalidating the rule because the facts are imperfect, the course. has already started and the court must act only on ure ground, especially when matters of policy, socio-- educational in.vestigation and expert evaluation of variables are involved. Judges should not rush in where specialists fear to tread. We spare the impul!lled regulation even though we are, prima facie, sceptical about the vires thereof.\n\nTo doubt is not enough to demolish. \\\\'hen fuller facts are placed, the court will go into this question more confidently.\n\nWhile reluctantly repelli11: the challenge of the petitioner we think two directiMs must bei made in this case. If 70% reservation is on the hi2h side and the petitioner is hopefully near 'admission' going by marks andl reservation, it is bnt just that he is given a chance to do his post-!jCaduate course. Indeed, his coming to Delhi itself was a compulsion beyond his control, as we have noted earlier.\n\nThe petitioner, going by marks, deserves admission to the postgraduate degree course althongh he is now in the post-graduate diploma course. So we direct him to_ be admitted to the degree conrse thts year, if the rules of attendance etc., do not stand in the way and the Medical Council makes an exception by agreeing to addition of one seat as a special case for this year.\n\nMore importantly, we direct the University forthwith-not later than two months from to--day-to appoint a time-bound committee to\n\n) 1\n\n' ,\n\n. ' '\n\ninvestigate in depth the justification for and the quantum of reservation at the postgraduate level from the angle of equality of opportunity for every Indian but taking into consideration other constitutionally relevant criteria we have indicated in this judgment. That committeewill study facts and figures and the reservation realities of other universities and make recommendation$ on the question of university-based reservations and allied aspects as well as the modus operandi for implementation. The Committee will be ri, cher if it has a constitutional expert and a representative of the Indian Medical Council on it.\n\nIts report shall be considered by the University as i; oon as may be, so that, if possible, he admissions for next year may be governeq liy the revised decisions of the concerned organs informed by the report.\n\nWe are disturbed by the tendency to wall off each university as an insulated island of education, mindless of the integrated unity and equal opportunity which are an inalienable part of our constitutional value syst.em. There is good reason for reservation in many cases but the promiscuous, even profligate application of ari exception as a rule of educational life by forward cities and universities will boomerang on the nation in the long run. The Union of Indla has a special responsibility to ensure that in higher education provincialism does not erode the integrity of India. Who lives if India dies, is a poignant interrogation with cultural projections in many dimensions which our administrators are not, we hope, innocent off : Mutations in reservations in other' universities need not await litigation but can be undertaken before the court process is set in motion. The dialectic of constitutional protection in the dynamic context of equality in a developing country has been pre5ented by us at some repetitive length so that the voyage of re-thinking may not suffer from navigational errors.\n\nThe Indian Medical Council is the statutory body at the national F level whose functional obligations include setting standards for as well as regulation and coordination of medical education. What with a growing number of universities with divergent settings, standards iiii.d goals and a motley crowd of students with diverse academic and social backgrounds and ambitions, the prescription and invigilation of flexible yet principled norms regulating the entrance into medical courses and G training of medical graduates at various levels of specialization rire a\n\ndemanding and dynamic task. The I.M.A, cannot be a silent spectator or a static instrument but must initiate, activist fashion, steps to make Indian medical education a meaning asset to the nation's: healirig\n\nand hospital resources and a discipline with broad uniformity and assured standard. The Central Government, witness to a deteriorating H situation, cannot but act to negate the confusing trend of fall in quality and conflict among universities.\n\nWe may wind up by articulating the core thought that vitalises our approach. Anyone who lives inside India can never be considered an 'outsider' in Delhi. The people in the States are caught in a happy network of mutuality, woven into a lovely garment of hwnanlty, whose warp and woof is India.\n\nThis is the underlying fundamental of the preambular resolve registered in our National Parchment. So we insist that blind and bigoted local patriotism in xenophobic exclusivism is\n\ndestmctive of our Freedom and only if compelling considerations of gross injustice, desperate backwardness and glaring inequality desiderato such a purposeful course can protective discrimination gain entrance inJo the portals of college campuses. The Administration has a constitutional responsibility not to be a mere thermometer where mercury rises with populist pressure but to be a thermostat that transforms the mores of gi:0ups to stay in the conscience of the nation. viz. the Constitution.\n\nWe dispose of the petition with these twin directions leaving tbe parties to suffer their costs.\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nI have had the benefit of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother v. R. Krishna Iyer and while I agree\n\n, , A\n\nwith him that the writ petition should be dismissed, I propose to state • my own reasons.\n\nThe validity of a reservation of 70% of the seats in the post-graduate classes by the Delhi University in favour of its own medical graduates is assailed in this writ petition.\n\nThe basis of the reservation is thd consideration that the candidate for admission to the post-graduate classes is a medical graduate of the same University.\n\nNo question of backward classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, is involved.\n\nCriteria pertinent to reservation concerning them are, it seems to me, not relevant at all. Nor strictly is the test requiring a territorial nexus -the University doe~ not insist that the candidate should hail from any particular region or State for the purpose of the! 70% reservation. The relationship is entirely institutional-those who have graduated from the medical colleges run by the Delhi University are favoured for admission to the post-aduate classes.\n\nIn my opinion, there is sufficient validity in that consideration. It is not beyond reason that a student who enters a medical college for his graduate studies and pursues them for the requisite period of years should prefer on graduation to continue in the same institution for his post-graduate studies. There is the strong argument of convenience, of stability and familiarity with an educational environment which in different parts of the country i~ subject to varying economic and psychological pressures.\n\nButi much more\n\nJAGDISH V. UNION (Pathak, J.) 861\n\nthan convenience is involved. There are all the advantages of a: continuing frame of educational experience in the same educatiorfal in8titution. It must be remembered that it is not an entirely different course of studies which is contemplated; it is a specialised and deeper experience in what has gone before.\n\nThe student has become familiar .with the teaching techniques and standards of scholarship, and has adjusted his responses and reactions according.\n\nThe continuity of studies ensures a higher degree of competence in the assimilation of knowledge and experience. Not infrequently some of the same: staff of Professors and Readers may lecture to the post-graduate classes also.\n\nOver the under-graduate years the teacher has come to understand the particular needs of the student, where he excels and where he needs an especial encouragement in the removal of deficiencies.\n\nIn my judgment, them is good reason in an educational institution extending a certain degree of preference to its graduate for admission to its post-graduate classes.\n\nThe prefocence is based on a reasonable classification and bears] a just relationship to the object Qf the education provided in the postgraduate classes.\n\nThei concept of equality codified in our constitutional system is not violated. It has. been said sometimes that classification contradicts equality.\n\nTo my mind, classification is a feature of the very core of equality. It is a vital concept in ensuring equality, for those who are similarly situated alone form a class between themselves, and the classification is not vulnerable to challenge if its constituent basis is reasonably related to achieving the object of the concerned law.\n\nAn institutional preference of the kind considered here does not offend the constitutional guarantee of equality.\n\nBut the question really is : Is the degree of reservation excessive ?\n\nIs 70% too much? Too excessive a reservation! could result in prefer- ence to graduate candidates of severely limited aptitude and competence -0ver meritorious candidates from other institutions whose exclusion .could result in aborting a part of our national talent The determining factor, it appears to me, is the measure of reciprocity prevailing between the different educational institutions in India regarding the availability of admission to graduates of other institutions. It can hardly be supposed that if the medical graduates of the Delhi University are shut out from adequate consideration for admission to the post-graduate courses of other institutions merely because they did, not graduate from those institutions they should not think it unjust that thei hospitality of their own University to outside medical graduates leaves insufficient provision for them.\n\nNot to be able to take post-graduate tudies at all implies the termination of their medical studies.\n\nThis is a problem whic:h can be tackled only on a national level, with all Universities\n\nand other medical institutions coming together around a common table with the object of fashioning out a mutual reasonable qnota reservation.\n\nA wise and faN>ighted exercise, eschewing narrow parochial considerations, is called for.\n\nIV is only by a joining of hands across the entire nation that a suitable and enduring solution can be evo)ved and the tarbulence which disturbs the student body set at rest.\n\nMy learned brother has referred to the considerable attraction whlclr an educational institution in New Delhi exerts over student~ from other parts of the count.ry. I confess I do not share the view entirely. So much, I think, depends on the choice of a particular subject or course of studies by the candidate. And medical courses are not all necessarily to be found only in New Delhi.\n\nThey are located in other parts of India and some of those well-known centres of medical educationj have at least an equal reputation in certain fields of specialised study.\n\nI am reluctant to accept the prnpition that because. New Delhi is the political, legislative and judicial capital of India, an education: of quality is not to be found in other cities.\n\nMerely because New Delhi is the new Capital of Delhi does not justify a disproportionate treatment of tl1e claim to equality on a nati®al level made by its medical graduates.\n\nThe question remaius : Is a reservation of 70% excessive?\n\nWe have travelled through the record, and I agree with my learned brother that the material is so scanty, fragmentary and unsatisfactory that we are prevented from expressing any definite decision on !lie poiuf.\n\nAlthough we gave sufficient opportunity to the parties, the requisite material has not been forthcoming.\n\nWhether or not a reservation of 70% was called for has not been established conclusively.\n\nIndeed, there is hardly anything to show that the authorities applied their mind to a cool dispassionate judgment of th~ problem facing them. Popular agitation serves at best to arouse and provoke cqmplacent or slumbering authority; the judgment and decisio, n of the authority must be evolved. from strictly concrete and unemotional material re.Jevanf to the issue before it.\n\nUnfortunately, there is little evidence of that in this c;1se.\n\nFor that reason, I join my learned brothe.r in the directions proposed by him.\n\nThe petitioners have raised other contentions also, principally resting on the allegation that the University of Delhi is a, centrally admii:iisfered institution, but I see no force in those submissions.\n\nAccordingly, subject to the two directions proposed by my learned brother the writ petition is dismissed and the parties shall bear their own costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed;", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "JAGDISH SARAN & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDISH SARAN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 28, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 28, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA l¥ER, R. S. PATIIAK AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "University of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 475, "end_char": 494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The University of Delhi has many post-gradua.te and diploma courses in the faculty of n1edicine but all of them put together provide 250 seats. '"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe .three medioal colleges in Delhi turn out annually 400 medical graduates who get 'house' jobs in the local hospitals and qualify themselves for post-graduate courses."}}, {"text": "Delhi University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 813, "end_char": 829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the graduates from the Delhi University could not be accommodated fully or even in part for the post-graduate courses in medicine and as D these graduates were not considered for admission into other universities on account of various regional hurdles such as prescription of domicile, graduation in that very university, registration with the State Medicad Council, servic'e in the State Medical service etc.,"}}, {"text": "Madras University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1882, "end_char": 1899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner who was a medical graduate from the Madras University applied for the post-graduate degree in Dermatology in th'e University of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2233, "end_char": 2243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2281, "end_char": 2299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2476, "end_char": 2494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that the University was sustained by Central Government finances, collected from the whole country and the benefits must likewise belong to all qualified students from ever}\"vhere."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3009, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD : (per Krishna Iyer & Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3024, "end_char": 3039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD : (per Krishna Iyer & Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.)", "canonical_name": ". Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4584, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee will benefit if it has a. constitutional expert and a representative of the Indian Medical Council on it."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4854, "end_char": 4868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "858 H-859 C]\n\n(ii) The Union of India has a; special responsibility to ensure that in higher education provincialism does not erode the integrity of India."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi University", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9034, "end_char": 9050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither Delhi nor the Delhi University medio:.::al colleges can be designated as categories \\Vhich \\varrant reservation."}}, {"text": "Per Patltak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10997, "end_char": 11008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "841 F-G, H 837 E]\n\n(Per Patltak."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11732, "end_char": 11742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "New DeU1i", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13362, "end_char": 13371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "htledical courses a.re not all necessiarily to be found only in New DeU1i."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13500, "end_char": 13509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proposition that because New Delhi is the political, legislative and jU.dicial capital of India, an education of quality is not Lo be found • in other cities is not acceptable."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14547, "end_char": 14557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14580, "end_char": 14595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Namboodiri for the Petitioners.", "canonical_name": "S. Balakrishnan"}}, {"text": "M. K. D. Namboodiri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14600, "end_char": 14619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nS. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Namboodiri for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14642, "end_char": 14658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14685, "end_char": 14698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14722, "end_char": 14736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, Jitendra Sharma, V. P.\n\nChaudhry and R. L.\n\nGupta for the Respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "Jitendra Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14738, "end_char": 14753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, Jitendra Sharma, V. P.\n\nChaudhry and R. L.\n\nGupta for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "V. P.\n\nChaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14755, "end_char": 14770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, Jitendra Sharma, V. P.\n\nChaudhry and R. L.\n\nGupta for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. L.\n\nGupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14775, "end_char": 14787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, Jitendra Sharma, V. P.\n\nChaudhry and R. L.\n\nGupta for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": ". Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14859, "end_char": 14876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Krishna Iyer, and 0.", "canonical_name": ". Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14898, "end_char": 14902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chinnappa Reddy, JJ was delivered by Iyer, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate concurring Opinion\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Many a case in this Court is the dramatisation."}}, {"text": "R. S. Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14908, "end_char": 14920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chinnappa Reddy, JJ was delivered by Iyer, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate concurring Opinion\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Many a case in this Court is the dramatisation."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14961, "end_char": 14973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chinnappa Reddy, JJ was delivered by Iyer, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate concurring Opinion\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-Many a case in this Court is the dramatisation.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Ramesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15316, "end_char": 15322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, Dr. Ramesh, is a medical graduate from the Madras University."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 to 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16654, "end_char": 16668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17101, "end_char": 17108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17310, "end_char": 17325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17363, "end_char": 17370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18415, "end_char": 18423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18444, "end_char": 18458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Shanti Bhushan, appearing for the University, assertively suggested to the contrary remembering only the rule of res judicata, but later realised the obvious error and recanted.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20699, "end_char": 20706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22885, "end_char": 22897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We highlight these basics because Shri Shanti Bhushan, for the University, pleaded for a practical appreciation of the lot of the Delhi graduates excluded from everywhere else while Shri Balakrishnan for the petitioner, pressed for a national approach to high-grade talent vis-avis courses in specialities.", "canonical_name": "S. Balakrishnan"}}, {"text": "Delhi Universiy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24929, "end_char": 24944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Delhi are perhaps over-run by these super-imposed layers and the student community of the Delhi Universiy is not made up so much by the 'sons of the soil' as in universities in other places but is accounted for by the inflow of groups drawn from all over the country."}}, {"text": "Balakrishnau", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26604, "end_char": 26616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since Sri Balakrishnau emphasised the pathetic plight of meritorious students if 'apartheid' policies were practied by universitie8, contrary to the cultural unity and constitutional mandates of our nation, we must weave into the legal fabric of 'admission' regulations strands of national integration and equal opportun; ty for higher education.", "canonical_name": "S. Balakrishnan"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33186, "end_char": 33205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33225, "end_char": 33232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33327, "end_char": 33334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33496, "end_char": 33503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33794, "end_char": 33809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36681, "end_char": 36688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36721, "end_char": 36728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36961, "end_char": 36968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42032, "end_char": 42047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chanchala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47575, "end_char": 47584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fa Chanchala's case(') university-wise reservation was challenged as unconstitutional."}}, {"text": "Rajcndran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47944, "end_char": 47953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Rajcndran's case\n\n(supra) district-wise quota for medical college admissions was struck down notwithstanding the argument that \"if selection was made districtwise, those selected from a district were likely to settle down as practitioners in that district, so that the districts were likely to benefit from their training\".(')", "canonical_name": "Rajcndran"}}, {"text": "Rajendran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48677, "end_char": 48686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The emphasis in both the cases (Rajendran and Periakaruppan) was -0n the reasonable nexus with the object of the rules of selection, namely, to get the most meritorious among the candidates for imparting medical education.", "canonical_name": "Rajcndran"}}, {"text": "Periakaruppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48691, "end_char": 48704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The emphasis in both the cases (Rajendran and Periakaruppan) was -0n the reasonable nexus with the object of the rules of selection, namely, to get the most meritorious among the candidates for imparting medical education."}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 S.C.R. 786", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 49340, "end_char": 49359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shelat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50856, "end_char": 50862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the course of the Judgment, Shelat, J. speaking for the Court, was inclined to broaden the principle of equalisation implied in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50956, "end_char": 50966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52467, "end_char": 52477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52829, "end_char": 52839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52867, "end_char": 52870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another observation by Dua, J. in his separate opinion also bas preg- D nant meaning (') :\n\n\"The object of selection for admission to the Medical Colleges, considered in the background of the directive principles of State policy contained in our Constitution, appears to be to select the best material from amongst the E candidates in order not only to pmvide them with adequate means of livelihood, but also to provide the much needed medical aid to the people and to improve public health generally.\""}}, {"text": "D.N. Chanrhola", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54151, "end_char": 54165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "within the framework of Part III, and this Court has to play the role not only of the sentinel on the qui vive but also\n\n(I) D.N. Chanrhola r. Jl, fysore (Supra) 632."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54496, "end_char": 54511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54773, "end_char": 54780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55850, "end_char": 55860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56084, "end_char": 56091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56176, "end_char": 56183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56186, "end_char": 56192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew J. in Thomas's case (supra) quoted from the Moynihan Report and continued with some insightful comments which we may .c:; excerpt : (2)\n\n\"Here a point of semantics must be grasped."}}, {"text": "Thomas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56199, "end_char": 56205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew J. in Thomas's case (supra) quoted from the Moynihan Report and continued with some insightful comments which we may .c:; excerpt : (2)\n\n\"Here a point of semantics must be grasped."}}, {"text": "Moynihan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56237, "end_char": 56245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew J. in Thomas's case (supra) quoted from the Moynihan Report and continued with some insightful comments which we may .c:; excerpt : (2)\n\n\"Here a point of semantics must be grasped."}}, {"text": "Barard Rustin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57222, "end_char": 57235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Barard Rustin's terms, 'It is now concerned not merely with removing the barriers to full opportunity but with achieving the fact of equality.'"}}, {"text": "Rustin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57378, "end_char": 57384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By equality Rustin means a distribution of achievements among Negroes roughly comparable to that among Whites.(')"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 57513, "end_char": 57526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beginning most notably with the Supreme Court''\n\ncondemnation of school segregation in 1954, the United D States has finally begun to correct the discrepancy between its ideals and its treatment of the black man."}}, {"text": "United D States", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57578, "end_char": 57593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beginning most notably with the Supreme Court''\n\ncondemnation of school segregation in 1954, the United D States has finally begun to correct the discrepancy between its ideals and its treatment of the black man."}}, {"text": "Llpset", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58093, "end_char": 58099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tha words of Professor Llpset: \"Perhaps the most important fact to recognise about the current situation of the American Negro is that (legal) equality is not enough to insure hh; moven1ent ; nto larger society.\"("}}, {"text": "Cornwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58865, "end_char": 58873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) 'The American Democracy' Magrath, Cornwell and Goodman P.1 S.\n\ns----\n\nEven so, what is fundamental is equality, not classification."}}, {"text": "Goodman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58878, "end_char": 58885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) 'The American Democracy' Magrath, Cornwell and Goodman P.1 S.\n\ns----\n\nEven so, what is fundamental is equality, not classification."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59177, "end_char": 59184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brennan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59388, "end_char": 59395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Brennan, in a different social m; lieu, but wit!J a spiritualsecular meaning which may not be lost on us, stated:(')\n\n\"Lincon said this Nation was 'conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equaJ'."}}, {"text": "Lincon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59507, "end_char": 59513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Brennan, in a different social m; lieu, but wit!J a spiritualsecular meaning which may not be lost on us, stated:(')\n\n\"Lincon said this Nation was 'conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equaJ'.", "canonical_name": "Lincoln"}}, {"text": "Lincoln", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59957, "end_char": 59964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence, today, as in Lincoln's time, a man may ask 'whether (this) nation or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can Jong endure'.", "canonical_name": "Lincoln"}}, {"text": "Khosa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60835, "end_char": 60840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another national risk we run was sounded in words of caution in Khosa's case by Chandrachud, J. (as he then was): (2 )\n\nG \" ........ let us not evolve, through imperceptible extensions, a theory of classification which maY subvert, perhaps submerge, the precious guarantee of equality."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60851, "end_char": 60862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another national risk we run was sounded in words of caution in Khosa's case by Chandrachud, J. (as he then was): (2 )\n\nG \" ........ let us not evolve, through imperceptible extensions, a theory of classification which maY subvert, perhaps submerge, the precious guarantee of equality."}}, {"text": "S. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61329, "end_char": 61335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "E Delhi University", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63020, "end_char": 63038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the E Delhi University, city or students, do not fit into the criteria."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65689, "end_char": 65704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Samuel Johnson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69576, "end_char": 69590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Samuel Johnson put this thought with telling effect when he said :\n\n\"Want of tenderness is want of parts, and is no less a proof of stupidity than of depravity\"."}}, {"text": "All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76229, "end_char": 76275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some central technical institutions like the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi and Chandigarh and the Pondicherry Medical College have a much smaller fraction."}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76280, "end_char": 76290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some central technical institutions like the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi and Chandigarh and the Pondicherry Medical College have a much smaller fraction."}}, {"text": "Pondicherry Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76299, "end_char": 76326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some central technical institutions like the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Delhi and Chandigarh and the Pondicherry Medical College have a much smaller fraction."}}, {"text": "Union of Indla", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 79429, "end_char": 79443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of Indla has a special responsibility to ensure that in higher education provincialism does not erode the integrity of India."}}, {"text": "I.M.A", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 80685, "end_char": 80690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The I.M.A, cannot be a silent spectator or a static instrument but must initiate, activist fashion, steps to make Indian medical education a meaning asset to the nation's: healirig\n\nand hospital resources and a discipline with broad uniformity and assured standard."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82185, "end_char": 82191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J.\n\nI have had the benefit of reading the judgment prepared by my learned brother v. R. Krishna Iyer and while I agree\n\n, , A\n\nwith him that the writ petition should be dismissed, I propose to state • my own reasons."}}, {"text": "Jevanf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 88968, "end_char": 88974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jevanf to the issue before it."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 89499, "end_char": 89505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed;"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_863_865_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "ASHOK KUMAR\n\nSTATE (DELHI ADMJNISTRATION)\n\nlanuary 29, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nCriminat trials-Sentence-Offender in his teens at the time of committing the offence-Age, if a mitigating circumstance.\n\nThe appellant wtls co•victed and sentenced to two years' im.prisoE.ment and fine of Rs. 2,000 asd imprisoament for six months aad fiae of Rs. 500 for\n\ncar ]ifting and scooter poaching.\n\nOn the question of sentence.\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHELD : (a) The sentence of imprisonment is reduced to th.e extent of the period already undera; oae; but th0; se11.tences of fiae a11d tlle alternative period of imprisonment in case of default are maintained. [865 H]\n\n(b) The long protracted liticatioa fr•• 1971 oaward• is sodeterrent for a youag man in his 20s. The youthful age of the otfeader io a factor which deServe consideration.. A long period of in.carceration may brutalise a boy and blunt his finer sensibilities so th•t the elildwproduct may perhaps be aore criminal than the one at the point of entry. The ole•tler havi•g served a term of nearly six months must have realised that the gamo of crime does not pay. [864 D, 865 Cl\n\n( c) Payment of fine brings home the sense of respoll5ihility in a surer fashion than even shortwterms of imprisonment in some cases. [865 CJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JUJUSDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 66-67: of 19-80.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated F 30/8/1979 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 65-66 Of 1979.\n\nN. S. Das Bahl for the Appellant.\n\nM. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by G\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-The common appellant in both these appeals is a teen-aged student turned criminal adventurer in the elitist area of car-lifting and scooter-poaching current in our fashionable; cities, includ ing Delhi.\n\nWhile he was a college student and but 19 years old, the appellant tried his hand at stealing a scooter way back in 1971. He H was arrested but bailed out and while on bail was accused of committing a car theft.\n\nBoth these cases were tried and he was found guilty.\n\nThe\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R,\n\nA scooter offence resulted in a sentence of two years' imprisonment and, a fine of Rs. 2,000.\n\nThe car theft case got converted into an, offence under Section 411 I.P.C. and, consequently, a reduced sentence of imprisonment for six month~ and a fine of Rs. 500.\n\nThe convictions being concurrenf and no substantial infirmity being B present, we have confined leave to appeal to the questiqn of sentence only. But sentencing-the cutting edge of the judicial process is the crucial strategy of the criminal law in achieving social defence and delinquent rehabilitation.\n\nSd we have to consider tile totality of factors bearing on tile offence and the offender and fix a punishment which will promote effectively tile punitive objective of the Jaw--Oeterrence C and habilitation.\n\nWe do not deem it necessary to set out elaborately all the sociolegal facts which have been discussed at the bar.\n\nAll that ,'we need say is tllat tile offence took' place in 1971. and we are now in/\n\n1980. A long protracted litigation is some deterrent for 3'. young man in his twenties.\n\nThe accused was nineteen when the offences were committed and his youthful age is a factor which deserve& consideration.\n\nA long period of incarceration in tile present condition of prisons may brutalise tile boy and blunt his finer sensibilities so that the endproduct may perhaps be more criminal than the one at the point of entry. Not tllat all prison terms are not deterrent but some cases prove to be counter productive especially when the delinquent is young.\n\nIt may be interesting to recall Lord Soper's observations in the House of Lords in a debate on British Prisons, where he said :\n\n\"Now as to reform. I was a prison chaplain for 30 years.\n\nI cannot remember a single man who was reformed by being in prison-not one.\n\nI can remember tllose who, serving very short sentences, were for a time, perhaps, brought to recognise something of the gravity of what they had been doing; but I am completely convinced that the longer a man stays in: prison, :the longer' he stays in that kind\n\nof incarceration, the less is the prospect of reform and the more certain is the process< of decay. 111at is why I have consistently tried to say that any man wh0i is imprisoned in one particular set of circumstances for more than five years is probably dead for life. It is highly unlikely that tho5e who have endured that kind of monotonous' deadening will be able to recover in tile real world what they have lost in the artificial element and environment of prison life.\n\nThere has been, I think, in my time, a considerable increase\n\n---1 \\\n\n~ ' .\n\nASHOK KUMAR v. STATE (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 865\n\ni'n the amelioration of conditions in prison; but, to refer again for a moment to the artificiality of it, the longer, a man stays in prison the less capable ltd will be of recovering his place and establishing his positio, n back in the real world to which he is increasingly made alien by the very processes which he undergoes.\" Moreover, the appellant has already suffered nearly six months' imprisonment and it is a well-known fact for criminologists that the initial few months of jail life are the: most painfu1 and, therefore, the most deterrent.\n\nIn the present case, the offender having served a term of nearly six months must well have realised that the game of crime does not pay.\n\nThe fines of Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 500 imposed on the appellant should remain without interference. Payment of fine brings home thf1\n\nsense for responsibility in a surer fashion than even short terms of imprisonment in some; cases. We, therefore, decline to reduce the fine and reject counsel's plea in this, behalf.\n\nMore important than these circumstances is, the social urgency of making this student offender a non-offender.\n\nThere are two circumstances which weigh in our mind.\n\nThe young man has married and has three children. This is a measure of assurance that he will not play recklessly with his freedom.\n\nFamily life is ordinarily an insn.rance against a career of crime. We have also insisted on the uncle of the appellant undertaking to assure the good behaviour of the nephew who is the delinquent in question.\n\nThe uncle Shri Kohli has filed an affidavit dated 10-12-1979 in this Court making the neces• sary undertaking to guarantee the good behaviour of his nephew.\n\nThoughtless parents and guardians leaving a free hand for their wards\n\naccount for flippant criminality of the type we come across in middle class society. The undertakin~ given by the uncle has, therefore, considerable relevance.\n\nWe make a breach of th~ conditions in the affidavit actionable on the motion of the State.\n\nIt is a tragic reflection that afilnent criminality should become so pervasive among the student community. It is uncomplimentary to the character-building component of the system of education in tl1e presti gious institutions of onr cities.\n\nWe hope the State will take better care to instil a sense of values in the college campuses than it does now.\n\nWe allow the appeals to the extent of reducing the sentence of the\n\nappellant to the period undergone, but maintai'n the sentences of fine and the alternative period of imprisonment in case of default.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 13, "entities": [{"text": "ASHOK KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASHOK KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE (DELHI ADMJNISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE (DELHI ADMJNISTRATION)", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. Das Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1515, "end_char": 1526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Das Bahl for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1547, "end_char": 1559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "G\n\nKRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1624, "end_char": 1639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-The common appellant in both these appeals is a teen-aged student turned criminal adventurer in the elitist area of car-lifting and scooter-poaching current in our fashionable; cities, includ ing Delhi."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2120, "end_char": 2157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R,\n\nA scooter offence resulted in a sentence of two years' imprisonment and, a fine of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2323, "end_char": 2328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Soper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3733, "end_char": 3738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be interesting to recall Lord Soper's observations in the House of Lords in a debate on British Prisons, where he said :\n\n\"Now as to reform."}}, {"text": "Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6353, "end_char": 6358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The uncle Shri Kohli has filed an affidavit dated 10-12-1979 in this Court making the neces• sary undertaking to guarantee the good behaviour of his nephew."}}, {"text": "10-12-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6388, "end_char": 6398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The uncle Shri Kohli has filed an affidavit dated 10-12-1979 in this Court making the neces• sary undertaking to guarantee the good behaviour of his nephew."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_866_868_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION, JAIPUR\n\nNARAIN SHANKER & ANR. ETC. ETC.\n\nJanuary 30, 1980\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nMotor Vehiclts Act 1939, S. llOA and Constitution of India 1950, Article- 41-Accident claim-State Transport Corpor\"tion-Duty of. 14\n\nThe respondents lost their limbs in a road accident while travelling in a bus belonging to the petitioner, a nationalised transport system. The plea by the operator to escape the liability for compensation '\\\\'as that the lights of thebus accidemtl.lly f\"iled, which resulted in tlae accide11.t.\n\nThe Accidents Claims Tribunal ne.catived the plea and awarded compensation in sums far lowerthan were claiBled by the respondents.\n\nIn the special leave petitions to this Court, the petitioner contested the.. application. of the principle of res ipsa loquitur and the quantum of the claim.\n\nDismisiing the petitions,\n\nHELD : I. (i) It was improper of the Corporation to have tenaciously resisted the claim. [868 Al\n\n(ii) It was ri:ht on the part of the Tribunal to have raised a rebuttable presumption on the strength of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. [868 B]\n\n2. The heads of claim have been correctly appreciated by the Tribunal' and the awards have been moderate. [868 CJ\n\n3. Instead of indulging in wasteful litigation, it would have been more\n\nhumane and just, if the Corporation had hastened compassionately to settle the claims so that goodwill and public credibility could be improved. [867 HJ\n\n4. The St0te has a paramount duty, apart from liability foc tort, to make effective provision for disablement in cases of undeserved want-Article 41 of the Constitution states so. r868 A]\n\n5. Nationalisation of road transport should have produced a better sense of social responsibility on the part of the management and drivers.\n\nOne of the major purposes of socialisation of transport is to inject a sense of safety, accountability and operational responsibility which may be absent in the 00.se of private undertakings whose motivation is profit n1aking regardless of risk to life. (867 E Fl\n\n6. Common experience on Indian high-ways diclose callousness and blunt~ eel consciousness on the part of public corporations which acquire a monopoly under the Motor Vehicles Act in plying buses.\n\nIt is a pity that State Road Transport vehicles should become mobile menaces. [867 G]\n\nCrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION' : Special Leave Petition (Civil} Nos. 6698-6700 of 1979.\n\nR.S.R. TPT. CORPN. v. NARAIN SHANKER (Krishna Iyer, !.) 867\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25-10-1978 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Misc. Appeal Nos. 195, 196 and 197 of 1978.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee Soli. Genl. and Sobhagmal Jain for the Petitioner.\n\nM. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-These th}:ee petitions for special leave relate to a road tragedy where many Jost their limbs while travellin~ in a bus belonging to the nationalised transport system of Rajasthan.\n\nA flimsy plea was put forward by the' operator to escape liability for compensac. ti on that the lights of the bus accidentally failed and' thus the unfortunate episode occurred.\n\nOther embellishments were also set up for, the purpose of exoneration.\n\nThe Accidents Tribunal was not taken in and, having disbelieved the evidence, awarded compensation in sums far lower than were claimed by the victims.\n\nTwo contentions were raised and rightly over-ruled and they have been repeated in the Petition: for special leave and we similarly reject them.\n\nThe nature of the accident and the surrounding circumstances are such that the doctrine res ipsa loquitur was rightly invoked by the court.\n\nIndeed, the terrible accidents attributable to reckless driving • and escalating year after year make'oirr high-ways great hazards.\n\nOne should have thought that nationalisation of road transport would liavei\n\nprodu1:ed a better sense of social responsibility on the part of the, management and the drivers.\n\nIn fact, one of the major purposes of socialisation of transport is to inject a sense of safety, accountability and operational responsibility which may be absent in the case of private undertakings, whose motivation is prOfit making reagrdless' of risk to\n\n~ _ life; but co=on experience on Indian high-ways discloses callousness and blunted consciousness on the part of public corporations which acquire a monopoly under the Motor Vehicles Act in plying buses. r It is a thousand pities that our State Road Transport vehicles should become mobile menaces, and we should impress upon them the need to have greater reverence for humai:t life representing, as they do, the valu(}-set of the State itself.\n\nIn the present case, the State Corporation put fqrward a false plea and contested the application of the principle of res ipsa /oquitur to avoid liability. It would have been more human~ and just if, instead of indulging in wasteful litigation, the Corporation had hastened compassionately to settle the claims so that goodwill and public credibility could be improved.\n\nAfter all, the State has a paramount duty, apart\n\n' 868\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA from liability for tort, to make effective provision for disablemen~ in cases of undeserved want-Aritcle 41 of the Constitution states so. - It was improper of the Corporation to have tenaciously resisted tihe\n\nclaim. It was right on the part of the Tribunal to 11ave raised a rebuttable presumption on the strength of the doctrine of res ipsd\n\nB loquitur.\n\nThe State Corporation has contested even the quantum of the claim.\n\nIndian life and limb cannot be treated as cheap, at least by State instrumentalities.\n\nThe heads of claim hav{l been correctly appreciated by the Tribunal and the awards have been moderate. Here again, the State Corporation should have sympathised with the victims of the C tragic accident and generously adjusted the claims within a short period.\n\nWhat is needed is not callous litigation but greater attention to th(! efficiency of service, including insistence on competent, cautious and responsible driving.\n\nWe have had the advantage of Sihri Soli J. Sorabjee, who repre- D sented the Corporation \\vith a characteristic sense of fairness, but we are unable to desist from making_ the above observations which are induced by the hope that nationalised transport se.rvice will eventually establish their superiority over the private system and sensitively respond to the comforts of and avoid injury to the travelling public and the pedestrian users of our highways. ,\n\nWe dismiss the Special Leave Petitions.\n\nN.V.K.\n\n- Petitio11S dismissed. -\"'", "total_entities": 18, "entities": [{"text": "RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION, JAIPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, JAIPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NARAIN SHANKER & ANR. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARAIN SHANKER & ANR. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 30, 1980\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehiclts Act 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1623, "end_char": 1633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nationalisation of road transport", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1677, "end_char": 1710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nationalisation of road transport should have produced a better sense of social responsibility on the part of the management and drivers.", "canonical_name": "Nationalisation of road transport"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2241, "end_char": 2259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee Soli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2647, "end_char": 2668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee Soli."}}, {"text": "Sobhagmal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2680, "end_char": 2694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Sobhagmal Jain for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2716, "end_char": 2728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2791, "end_char": 2803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-These th}:ee petitions for special leave relate to a road tragedy where many Jost their limbs while travellin~ in a bus belonging to the nationalised transport system of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "nationalisation of road transport", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3842, "end_char": 3875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One should have thought that nationalisation of road transport would liavei\n\nprodu1:ed a better sense of social responsibility on the part of the, management and the drivers.", "canonical_name": "Nationalisation of road transport"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4416, "end_char": 4434, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sihri Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have had the advantage of Sihri Soli J. Sorabjee, who repre- D sented the Corporation \\vith a characteristic sense of fairness, but we are unable to desist from making_ the above observations which are induced by the hope that nationalised transport se.rvice will eventually establish their superiority over the private system and sensitively respond to the comforts of and avoid injury to the travelling public and the pedestrian users of our highways. ,"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\nPetitio11S dismissed. -\"'"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_869_872_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "PABITRA N. RANA A v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 30, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.] B\n\nPreventive Detention under stk:tion 3(1) of the (7onservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Sniugg/ing Activities Act, 1974-Inordinate and u1W!xplai11cd delay in deciding the representation filed by thei, detenu violateS' _ Article 22(5) of the Constitution and hence vitiates detention. ,\n\nAllowing the Writ Petition, the Court\n\nHELD : Under clauses 4 and 5 of Article 22 of the Constitution tho detenu has a dual right viz.\n\n(i) to have the representation, irrespective of the length of detention, considered by the appropriate Government; and\n\n(ii) to have the representation considered by the Board duly constituted D under the concuned Act. [870 E-F]\n\nFurther, the constitutional right to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that the representation must be disposed of as quickly as possible and any unexplained delay would amount to a violt'ltion of constitutional guarantee contained in Article 22(5). [870 F-G]\n\nThe obligation of the appropriate detaining authority to take 0. decision on the representation filed by the detenu is quite apart and distinct from its obligation to constitute. a Board and to send the representation to it. The detaining\n\n~- uthdort~ is n?th entitlhed t 1 o wait fbrl Ihde\n\n1 opinio[n 87 o 0 ! 0 theHBo 8 a 7 r 1 d Abu] t has to take ' ds ecmon wit out t e east pOSSI e e ay.\n\n- ,\n\n' ..\n\nPankaj Kumar Chakraborty & Ors. v. State of West Bengal [1970] I SCR F 543 and Narendra Purushotam Umrao ietc. v. B. B. Gujral and Ors., [1979] 2 SCR 715; relied on.\n\nCRIMINAL ORJGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1376 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution).\n\nA. K. Sen and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner.\n\nU. R. Lalit and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This Writ Petition has been filed with a pljyer that an order of detention passed against the petitioner on the 7th\n\nSeptember, 1979, under s. 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 be quashed.\n\nAfter the order was served on the detoou he made a representation on the 27th September, 1979 to the Govt. who received it on the 28th September, 1979.\n\nIn support of the Rule Mr. A. K. Sen has raised a number of points, but in view of one of them which is to the effect that there has been an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the detaining authority in deciding the representation and that !he detention is therefore vitiated, we need not go into the other points.\n\nOn the question of delay the petitioner had expressly taken a plea in para 11 of the petition but in their reply the respondents have not at all explained or detailed any reason why there was inorrlinate delay in disposing of the representation submitted by the detenu to the detaining authority.\n\nThe admitted position is that the representation was received by the Government on the 28th September, 1979 and it was rejected on 3rd November, 1979, that is to say, after about one month and five days of the receipt. It is now well settled that any unexplained delay in peciding the representation filed by the detenu amounts to a clear violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and is sufficient to vitiate the detention.\n\nOur attention was drawn by the counsel for the petitioner to a recent decision of this Court in Narendra Purushotam Umrao etc .. v. B. B.\n\nGujral & Ors.(') where this Court while relying on an earlier decision of this Court in Pankaj Kumar ChakrabortY, & Ors. v. State\n\nof West Bengal(') pointed out that under Clauses 4 and 5 of Art. 22 of the Constitution the detcnu has a dual right, viz.,\n\n1. to have the representation, irrespective of the length of detention, considered by the appropriate Government, and\n\n2. to have the representation considered by the Board duly constituted under the concerned Act.\n\nWe might further mention that the constitutional right to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that the representation must be disposed of as quickly as possible and ilny unexplained delay would amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee contained in Art. 22<5).\n\nThis Court has also pointed out that the obligation of the appropriate detaining authority to take a decision on the representation filed by the detenu is quite apart\n\n(l) [1979] 2 S.C.R. 315.\n\n\n-'---·,=~\n\nPAillTRA N. RANA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, J.) 8 71\n\nand distinct from its obligation to constitute a Board and to send the representation to it.\n\nThe detaining authority is not entitled to wait for the opinion of the Board but has to take its decision without the least possible delay. In Writ Petition No. 246 of 1969 decided -0n September 10, 1969 this Court observed as follows :\n\n\"lt is iniplicit in the language of Art. 22 that the appropriate Government, while discharging its puty to consider the representation, cannot depend upon the views of the Board on such representation. It has to consider the representation on its own without being influenced by any such view of the Board. There was, therefore, no reason for the Government to wait for considering the petitioner's representation until it had received tl1e report of the Advisory Board. As laid down in Sk. Abdul Karim & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (supra) the obligation of the appropriate Government under Art. 22(5) is to consider the representation made by the detenu as expeditiously as possible. The consideration by the Government of such representation has to be, as aforesaid i'ndependent of any opinion which may be expressed by the Advisory Board.\n\nThe fact that Art. 22 ( 5) enjoins upon the detaining authority to affond to tl1e detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation must implicitly mean that such representation must, when made, considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, otherwise, it is obvious that th~ obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make a representation loses both its purpose and meaning.\"\n\nThe observations extracted above clearly show that the representation must be consiPered by the Government as expeditiously as\n\npossible. Mr. Lalit submitted that the delay in deciding the representation was due to tlle fact tlmt the representation had to pass through various channels and departments before the Government was in a position to decide it. In the first place no such facts have been pleaded in the reply filed by the respondents and, therefore, we cannot entertain the grounds now urged by the e-0uru; el for the Union for the first time in the arguments before us.\n\nEven so it ilppears that at the most the detaiiiliig authority had forwaooed the representation to the Revenue Intelligence whose comments were\n\nreceived on 16-10-79. Thereafter there was absolutely no justification for any delay in taking a decision on the merit of thi:l representation. Even if we assume that there was some reasonable explanation for the delay from 28th September, 1979 to 16th Octo-\n\nA ber, 1979, there appears to be no good explanation whatsoever for the delay from 16th October, 1979 !O 2nd November, 1979 when the representation was rejected by tlj.e Government. It is manifest that th_e Government was not obliged to waif for the decision of the Board because it had to consider the representation independently of what the Board might say.\n\nIn this view of th0 matter, we are B satisfied that there has been unreasonable delay in deciding the representation filed by the detenu and that by itself is sufficient to\n\nrender the detention void. For tliese reasons we allow this petition, .) set aside the order of detention and direct that the detcnu be released .... fortliwith.\n\nV.D.K.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nMGJPF-91 SCI/80-2,500-24-10-80", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "PABITRA N. RANA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PABITRA N. RANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 30, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 30, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. s. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 240, "end_char": 260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 361, "end_char": 374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 499, "end_char": 509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1069, "end_char": 1082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 SCR 715", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1638, "end_char": 1654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1800, "end_char": 1815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "U. R. Lalit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1837, "end_char": 1848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. Lalit and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1931, "end_char": 1939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This Writ Petition has been filed with a pljyer that an order of detention passed against the petitioner on the 7th\n\nSeptember, 1979, under s. 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 be quashed."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2084, "end_char": 2088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2100, "end_char": 2181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the Rule Mr. A. K. Sen has raised a number of points, but in view of one of them which is to the effect that there has been an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the detaining authority in deciding the representation and that !", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "28th September, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The admitted position is that the representation was received by the Government on the 28th September, 1979 and it was rejected on 3rd November, 1979, that is to say, after about one month and five days of the receipt."}}, {"text": "3rd November, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3106, "end_char": 3124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The admitted position is that the representation was received by the Government on the 28th September, 1979 and it was rejected on 3rd November, 1979, that is to say, after about one month and five days of the receipt."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3327, "end_char": 3337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3345, "end_char": 3366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3742, "end_char": 3749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4321, "end_char": 4328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1979] 2 S.C.R. 315", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 10, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4867, "end_char": 4885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "246 of 1969 decided -0n September 10, 1969 this Court observed as follows :\n\n\"lt is iniplicit in the language of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4956, "end_char": 4963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lalit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6311, "end_char": 6316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lalit submitted that the delay in deciding the representation was due to tlle fact tlmt the representation had to pass through various channels and departments before the Government was in a position to decide it."}}, {"text": "16-10-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6909, "end_char": 6917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so it ilppears that at the most the detaiiiliig authority had forwaooed the representation to the Revenue Intelligence whose comments were\n\nreceived on 16-10-79."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_873_888_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM v.\n\nARUNACHALAM & Ai'IR.\n\nFebruary 1, 1980\n\n[V. R KRISHNA h1m, s. MURTAZA E\\ZAL Au, D. A. DESAI,\n\nR. S. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article 136- Scope of jurisdiction-High Court in appeal setting aside conviction and sentence by trial court for murder- No appeal preferred by government-Private party if could invoke jurisdiction\n\nunder Article 136.\n\nWords & Phrases-'Crime'-Definition of.\n\nThe petitioner was acquitted by the High Court in appeal, of charges under sections 302 and 148 I.P.C., but the brother of the deceased-not the State nor even the first informant, petitioned this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against acquittal, got leave, had his appeal heard, which was ultimately allowed the court setting aside the judgment of the High Court, and restoring the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under section 302 I.P.C. (Arunachalam v. S. R. Sadhananthan [1979]\n\n3 S.C.R. 482).\n\nThe petitioner filed the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, contending :\n\n(1) that Article 136 did not empower the grant of special leave to the brother of the deceased and the grant of special leave by the Court and its entertaining the appeal violated Article 21 of the Constitution, and (2) be fore the Court may grant special leave under Article 136 there must be an antecedent right of appeal absent which the question of leave by the Court does not arise.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD: (per Krishna Iyer, .Murtaza Fazal Ali and Desai, JJ).\n\n1. Justice is functionally outraged not only when an innocent person is punished but also when a gtrilty criminal gets away with it stultifying the legal system.\n\n[877H, 878A]\n\n2. An insightful understanding of the sweep, scope and character of Art. 136\n\nwill easily dispel the dichotomy between an antecedent right of appeal and a G subsequent grant of leave.\n\n[878D] ·\n\n3. The jural reach and plural range of the judicial process to remove injustice in a ven society is a sure index of the versatile genius of law-in-action as a delivery system of social justice. Our constitutional order vests in the summit court a jurisdiction to do justice, at once omnipresent and omnipotent but controlled and guided by that refined yet flexible censor called judicial discretion.\n\nB This nidus of power and process, which master-minds the broad observance throughout the Republic of justice according to law, is Art. 136.\n\n[878E-F]\n\n--·---~-----......- -----·\n\n4. In express terms, Art. 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to inter\"' fere in suitable cases. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction.\n\nIt is residuary power; it is extra-ordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice wherever it is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Art. 136. [878G-H, 879A]\n\n5. There is a procedure necessarily implicit in the po\\ver vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Art. 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding. fathers unarguabl)' intended in the very terms of Art. 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well-established by precedents in bur jurispru dence.\n\nJudicial discretion is canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity.\n\n[879A-C]\n\n6. It is manifest that Art. 136 is of composite structure, is power-cumprocedure-power in that it vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and proce dure in that it spella a mode of hearing. It obligates the exercise of judicial discretion and the mode of hearing so characteristic of the c-0urt process.\n\nIn short, there is an in-built prescription of power and procedure in terms of Art. 136 which meets the demand of A.\"1. 21. [879E-F]\n\n7. If Art. 21 is telescoped into Art. 136, it follows that fair procedure is imprinted on the special leave that the court may grant or refuse.\n\nWith a motion is made for leave to appeal against an acquittal, this Court appreciates the gravity of the peril to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. While conSidering the petition under Art. 136 the courtwill pay attention to the question of liberty, the person who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and his locus standi.and the weighty factors which persuade the court to grant special leave.\n\n[879FG]\n\n8. 'The wider the discretionary power the more sparing its exercise.\n\nThe court may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who is not eo\n\nnomine a party on the record.\n\n[880CD]\n\n9. Sometimes indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other times politicisa- F tion of higher functionaries may result in refusal to take a case to this Court under Art. 136 even though the justice of the /is may well justify it.\n\nIn the absence of an independent prosecution authority easily accessible to every citizen, a wider connotation of the expression 'standiiig' is necessary for Art. 136 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in which private individualsnot the State alone-may institute criminal proceedings.\n\n[880G-H, 881A]\n\n10. The narrow limits set, into the concept of 'person aggrieved' and 'stand ing' needs liberalisation.\n\n[88 IE]\n\nBaker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, Attorney-General of the Gambia v.\n\nPierra Sarr N'Jie, [1961] A.C. 617, Bar Council of Maharashtra v.\n\nM. v.\n\nDabholkar, [1975] 2 SCC 702 referred to.\n\n(Per Pathak and Koshal, JJ concurring).\n\n1. Article 136 seeks to confer on the Supren1e Court the widest conceivable range of judicial power, making it perhaps among the most powerful courts in the wor]d. 'fhe judicial power reaches out to every judgment, decree, determi-\n\n\n .. ,'../ . '\n\n;'ll j\n\n'\"i > \\< -, : •\n\n~.:f. ·] . ·.·• ·~\n\nSADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Krishna Iyer,!.) 87 5\n\nnation, sentence or order affecting the rights and obligations of persons in civil A matters, of life and liberty in criminal matters as well as matters touching the Revenues of the State. It is an attempt to ensure that the foundations of the Indian Republic, which have been laid on the bed-rock of justice, are not undermined by justice anywhere in the land. , l884CE]\n\nBharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. !1950] S.C.R. 459, 474, Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others, [1955] 1 S.f:.R. 267, 2 72, referred to.\n\n2. Article 136 vests in the Supreme Court, a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by grant of special leave. However, a limitation is inbuilt into the jurisdiction of the Court and it flows from the nature and character of the case intended to be brought before the Court, and it requires compliance despite the apparent plenitude of power vested in the Court. When a petition is presented to the Court under Article 136, the Court will have due regard to the nature and character of the cause sought to be brou8ht before it when entertaining and disposing of the petition. [884E-G]\n\n3. A crime. is' an act deemed by Iaw to be harmful to society in general, even though its immediate victim is an individual.\n\nMurder injures primarily the particular victim, but its blatant disregard of human life puts it beyond a matter of mere compensation between. the murderer and the victim's family.\n\nThose who commit such acts are proceeded against by the State in order that, if convicted, they may be punished. No private person has a direct interest in a criminaJ proceeding although exception may be Jnade by the Statute in certain cases.\n\n[885C-FJ\n\nKenny's Outlines of Crilninal Law, 16th Edn., p. 2 para 3 Blackstos Commentaries, 111 p. 2, Mogul Steamship Co. v. Mc Greger Gew & Co. [1889] 23 QBD 598; referred to.\n\n4. The notion of crime e.s a threat to the whole community is the material counter-part of the formal rule that the State alone is master of a. criminal prosecution.\n\nIn a criminal proceeding, the State stands forward as prosecutor on public grounds. No private person has a direct interest in a criminal proceeding, although exception may be made by the statute in ce11ain cases. A criminal prosecution is not intended for the private satisfaction of a personal vendetta or revenge.\n\nIn India, the criminal law envisages the State as the prosecutor. !885E-F]\n\nSalmond on.Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. p. 92 para 14 and Current Legal Prob /ems, 1955; Glanville Williams, \"The Definition'of Crime\", p. 107 at p. 122; referred to.\n\n5. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s. 378, the right of appeal vested in the State has now been made subject to leave being granted to the State by the High Court. The complainant continues to be subject to the prerequisite condition that he must obtain special leave to appeal. The fetters so imposed on the right to appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent 1:::ourt of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of t11e case, even though it is held by a superior court. [886B-C]\n\nA Law Commission of India 48th Report 1972 pp. 17-21 referred to.\n\n6. What follows from the grant of speci6l leave is an appeal, a, nd the jurisdiction must, therefore, be invoked by a petitioner possessing a locus standi re cognised in law. [887F-G] ·\n\n7. Access to the jurisdiction under A.rticle 13 6 cannot be permitted to a private party who seeks to employ the judicial process for the satisfaction of private revenge or personal vendetta. Nor can it be permitted as an instru ment of coercion where a. civil action would lie.\n\nIn every case, the Court is bound to consider what is the interest which brings the petitioner to court and whether the interest of the public community will benefit by the grant of special leave. . [887B-C]\n\n8. The Court should entertain a special leave petition filed by a private party, other than the complainant, in those cases only where it is convinced that the public interest justifies an appeal against the acquittal and that the State has refrained from petitioning for special leave for reasons which do not bear on the public interest but are prompted by private influence, want of bona fide and other extraneous considerations. [887E-Fl\n\n9. Tue procedure followed by this Court in disposing of a petition under Article 136 is oonsistent with the procedure contemplated by Article 21 for the Court in exercising its jurisdiction will do so as a court of law following the well-known norms of procedure which have been recognised for long as governing and informing !he proceedings of all courts. Article 21 is, therefore, not violated. [887G-H, 888A]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 355 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution) P. R. Mridul, K. Jayaram, K. Ram Kumar and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Petitioner.\n\nSoli l. Sorabjee, Solicitor General, R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, and D. A Desa~ JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. and concurring opinion of R. S. Pathak and A D. Kosha1 JJ. was delivered by Pathak, J.\n\nG KRISHNA IYER, J. Is it constitutionally valid or desirable on principle to permit a private citizen, who has but loO'Se nexus with the victim of a crime, to invoke the special power under Art. 136 of the Constitution for leave to appeal against an acquittal of the alleged criminal thereby p1.1tting in peril his life or liberty in the absence of aµy legislative provision arming such officious outsider with the right to B appeal ? This issue, profound on its face but unsound on reflection, falls fp'r decision in this writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The facts, compressed into a single sentence, are that the pcti-\n\n-- - I\n\n• SADHANANTHAM; v. ARUNACHALAM (Krishna Iyer, l.) 877\n\ntioner was acquitted of a murder charge by the High Court in appeal A but the brother of the deceased-not the State nor even the first inforniant-moved this Court under Art. 136, got leave and had his appeal heard which resulted in the petitioner (accused) being convicted and sentenced to the life term under s. 302 I.P.C. The present contention urged to upset that conviction, is that the leave to appeal and the subsequent proceedings were unconstitutional as violative of Art. 21 B the procedl\\Ial 1nagna carta protective of life and liberty-and, therefore, the sentence must fail. This plea, faintly presented before this Court when the appeal was heard, was briefly considered and rightly rejected. This second battle, doomed to fail like the first, demands of\n\nus a condensed ratiocination in negation of the contentioa hopefully urged by Sri Mridul, counsel for the petitioner. . ~\n\nTwo inter-laced issues arise and they turn on (a) the content and <:haracter of Art. 136 vis-a-vis Art. 21, and (b) the locus standi of a Good Samaritan, if we may use that expression to refer to a publicspirited citizen seeking to trigger the legal process to see that justice is done to his neighbour.\n\nArticle 21, in its sublime brevity, guardians human liberty by insisting on the prescription of procedure established by law, n, ot fiat as sine qua IWn for deprivation of personal freedom. And those procedures so\n\nestablished must be fair, not fanciful, nor formal nor flimsy, as laid down in Maneka Gandhi's case.(1) So, it is axiomatic that our constitutional jurisprudence mandates the State not to deprive a person of his personal liberty without adherence W fair procedure laid down by . )aw. The question is whether there is any procedure, fair or otherwise, which enables a kindly neighbour who is not a complainant or first informant, to appeal to the Supreme Court against an allegedly erroneous acquittal by the High Court. The corpus juris contains no black-letter law arming any such purely compassionate soul to approach this Court, argues Sri Mridul; and so, his client's liberty has been deprived by a proceeding initiated by someone without any procedure established by law.\n\nWe see the dexterity in the advocacy but reject its efficacy. Nor are we impressed with the submission that the brother of\n\nthe deceased in the case, or any other high-minded citizen, is an offi cious meddler who has no business nor grievance when the commission of grievous crime is going unpunished. There is a spiritual sensitivity for our criminal justice system which approves of the view that a wrong done to anyone is a wrong done to oneself, although for pragmatic .cun\n\nsiderations the law leashes the right to initiate proceedings in sp'me situations. Again, 'justice is functionally outraged not only when an\n\n(1) Maneka Gandhi v. Union oflndia [1978] I SCC 248.\n\n A innocent person is punished but also when a guilty criminal gets away with it stultifying the legal system. The deep concern cf the law is to track down, try and punish the culprit, and if found not guilty, to acquit the accused.\n\nIt is imperative under Art. 21 that there should be some civilised procedure for holding a man guilty and depriving him of his liberty.\n\nUndoubtedly, this Court, if it grants leave under Art. 136 and eventually finds him guilty, deprives him of his liberty; and so the crucial question that falls for decision is as to whether there is any procedure as predicated by Art. 21 independent of or implicit in Art. 136. It is appa- 1 rent that there is no statutory provision which creates a right of appeal in favour of a stranger enabling him to challenge an acquittal by the / High Court. The Criminal Procedure Code does not create such a right pf appeal and, speaking generally, a right of appeal is the creature of statute. So it is submitted that before the court may grant special leave under Art. 136 there must be an antecedent right of appeal, absent which the question of leave by the court does not arise. The argument is ingenious but inference is fallacious.\n\nAn insightful understanding of the sweep, scope and character of Art. 136 will easily dispel the dichotpm.y between an antecedent right pf appeal and a subsequent grant of leave, which is the corner-stone of the contention of the petitioner.\n\nThe jural reach and plural range of the judicial process to remove injustice in a given society is a sure index of the versatile genius .of law-in-action as a delivery system of social justice. By this standard, our constitutional order vests in the summit court a jurisdiction to do justice, at once omnipresent and omniPiOtent but controlled and guided by that refined yet flexible censor called judicial discretion. This nidus \"' (' of power and process, which master-minds the broad observance throughout the Republic of justice according to law, is Art. 136.\n\nSpecificity being essential to legality, let us see if the broad spec trum spread-out of Art. 136 fills the bill from the point of view of \"procedure established by law\". In express tenns, Art. 136 does no~ confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases.\n\nThe discretionary dimension is considerable but that relates to the power of the court. The question is whether it spells by implication, a fair proced11re as contemplated by Art. 21. In our view, it does.\n\nArticle 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its liinit, when it chases injustice, in the sky itself. This Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to injustice\n\nSADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Krishna lyer, !.) 8 79\n\nwherever i~ is and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Art. 136. Is it merely a power in the Court to be exercised in any manner it fancies'? Is there no procedural limitat¥in in the man ner of exercise and the occasion for exercise ? Is there no duty to Act fairly while hearing a case under Art. 136, either in the matter of grant of leave or, after such gi:ant, in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly any doubt that there is a procedure necessarily implicit in the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Art. 136 confers jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding fathers unarguably iii.tended in the very terms of Art. 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well-established by precedents in our jurisprudence.\n\nJudicial discretion is canalised authority not arbitrary eccentricity.\n\nCardozo, with elegant accuracy, has observed(') :\n\nThe judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.\n\nHe is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant roaming at will in pursuit of his pwn ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion i:1formed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life. Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.\"\n\nIt is manifest that Art. 136 is of composite structure, is power-cumprecedure--power in that it vests jurisdiction in. the Supreme Court, and procedure in that it spells a mode of hearing. It Obligates the exercise of judicial discretion and the mode of hearing so characteristic of the court process. In short, there is an in-built prescription of power and pmcedure in terms of Art. 13 6 which meets the demand of Art. 21.\n\nWe may eye the issue slightly differently. If Art. 21 is telescoped into Art. 136, the conclusion follows that fair procedure is imprinted on\n\ntile special leave that the court may grant or refuse. When a motion is made for leave to appeal against an acquittal, this Court appreciates G the gravity of the peril to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. It is fair to assume that while considering the petition under Art. 136 the court will pay attention to the question of liberty,\n\nthe person who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and his locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade the court to grant special leave. When this conspectus of proceS'Sual circumstances and , H\n\n(1) Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of tbe Judicial Process, Yale lrnivcrsity\n\nPress (1921).\n\n\\,.\n\n2-138SCI/80\n\n._..,.,,,,....., __ ~--~ --- .. -·-- .•. .....-..-\n\n' c\n\ncriteria ply upon the jurisdiction of the court under Art. 136, it is reasonable to conclude that the desideratum of fair procedure implied in Art. 21 is adequately answered.\n\nOnce we hold that Art 136 is a comp, osite provision whic1t Veils a wide jurisdiction and, by the very fact of entrusting this unique jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, postulates, inarticulately though, the methodology of exercising that power, nothing nw're remains in tjie objection of the petitioner. It is open to the court to grant special leave :µid the subsequent process of hearing) are well-established. Thus. there is an integral provision of power-cum-procedure which answers with the desideratum of Art. 21 justifying deprivation of life and liberty.\n\nThe wider the discretionary power the more sparing its exercise.\n\nTimes out of number this Court has stressed that though parties promiscuously 'provoke' this jurisdiction, the Court parsimoniously invokes the power. Moreover, the Qourt may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who is not eo nomine a party on the record. Thns, procedural limitations exist and are governed by well-worn rules of guidance.\n\nSri Mridul urged that every inquisitive benefactor or offensive adventurer cannot 'rush in' and upset a verdict of acquittal by resort to Art. 136. This is really a matter for exercise of judicial discretion and the Court can be trusted to bear in mind time-honoured practices and the values of Art. 21. But no dogmatic proscription of leave under Art. 136 to a non-party applicant can be laid down inflexibly. For access to justice is not a cloistered virtue.\n\nIt is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the pess of the court, especially at the expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maint!)ined and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should uot be granted 'visa'. It is also true that in the criminal jiirisdic- ' lion this strictness applies a fortiori since an adverse verdict from this Court may result in irretrievable injury IP life or liberty.\n\nHaving said this, we mnst emphasise that we are living in times when many societal pollutants create new problems of unredre6Sed grievance when the State becomes the sole repository for initiation of criminal action. Sometimes, pachydermic indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other times politicisation of higher functionaries may result in refusal to take a case to this Court under Art. 13 6 even though the justice of the /i$ may well justify it. While \"the criminal law should not be used as a weapon in personal vendettas between private indiYiduals\", as Lord Sl1awcr01s(') once wrote, in the absence of an indepen-\n\n(1) The Times, 26May1977, 20.\n\n'\"' \\\n\n. ' .\n\nSADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Knshna Iyer,!.)\n\n88 I\n\ndent prosecution authority easily accessible to every citizen, a wider connotation of the expression 'standing' is necessary for Art. 136 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in which private individuals--not the State alone-may institute criminal proceedings. The Law Reform Commission (Australia) in its Discu8sion Paper No. 4 on \"Access to Courts-I Standing: PuWic Interest Suits\" wrote: The general rule, at the present time, is that anyone may commence proceedings and prosecute in the magistrate's court. The argument for retention , of that right arises at either end of the spectrum-the great cases al!.d the frequent petty cases. The great cases are those touching government itself-a Watergate or a Poulson. However independent they may legally be any ublic official, police or prosecuting authority, must be subject tp some government supervision and be dependent on government funds; its officers will inevitably have personal !inks with government. They will be part of the \"establishment\". There may be cases where a decision not to prosecute a case having political ramifications will be seen. rightly or wrongly, as ' politically lllj(l'tivated.\n\nAccepting the possibility of occasional abuse the Commission sees merit in retaining some right of a citizen to ventilate such a matt.er in the courts.\n\nEven the English System, as pointed by the Discussion paper, permits a private citizen to file an indictment. In our view, the narrow limits set, in vintage English law, into the concept of 'person aggrieved' and 'standing' needs liberalisation in our democratic situation., In Dabholkar's case('!. this court imparted such a wider meaning. The American Supreme Court relaxed the restrictive attitude towards 'standing' in the famous case of Baker v. Carr.(') Lord Denning, in the notable case of the Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N lie,(') spoke thus : .... the words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do n, ot concern him;\n\n'Prof.· S. A. de Smith takes the same view(•) : All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public\n\n(I) Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar [1975] 2 SCC 702.\n\n(2) [1962] 369 us 186. q\n\n(3) 1961AC617. {4) Quoted in 'Standing and Justiciability' by V. S. Deshpande Journal of the Indian Law Institute April-June, 1971, Vol.13, No. 2, p.174.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.ll.\n\n 'i\\ interest-the desirability pf encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not cpncem him,\n\nB Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note:(')\n\nIn other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi. It contains an element of the actio popu/aris. This is because it looks beyond the personal rights of the applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by preventing inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their ppwers.\n\nIn Dabholkar's case, one of us wrote. in his separate opinion(2)\n\nThe possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system.\n\nThis view is echoed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission.\n\nThe crucial significance pf access jurisprudence has been best E expressed by Cappelletti : (3)\n\nThe right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rlghts. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection. Such protection, moreover, is best assured by a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement-the most ba\\ic\n\n'human right'-of a system which purports to guarantll!! legal rights.\n\nG We are thus satisfied that the bogey of busybodies blackmailing adversaries through frivolous invocation of Art.136 is chimerical.\n\nAccess to J W>tice to every bona fide seeker is a democratic dimension of remedial jurisprudence even as public interest litigation, class action.\n\n(1) ibid p. 175.\n\n(2) Krishna Iyer, J. in Bar Counfil of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabho/kar [1'751\n\n2 sec 102 at 120.\n\n(3) Access to Courts-I Satnding : Public Interest Suits p. 3.\n\nSADHANANTHAM V. ARUNACHALAM (Pathak, J.) 883\n\npro bono proceedings, are. We cannot dwell in the home of processua! obsolscence when our Constitntion highlights social justice as a goal. We hold that there is no merit in the contentions of the Writ petitioner and dismiss the petition.\n\nPATHAK, J : The High Court of Madras in its appellate jurisdiction acquitted the petitioner, Sadhanantham, of charges under s. 302 and s. 148, I.P.C. Arunachalam, a brother of the deceased, petitioned to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the acquittal.\n\nThe court granted special leave, and ultimately allowed the appeal, Arunachalam\n\nv. .P.\n\nS. .R.\n\nSadhanantham(I), and setting aside the judgment of the High Court restored the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under s. 302, I.P.C. The petitioner has filed this writ petition contendihg that the judgment and order of this Court is a nullity and should be set aside.\n\nThe principal contention is that Article 136 did not empower this Court to grant special leave to Arunachalam (the third respondent) and the grant of special !\"ave by the Court and its entertaining the appeal violates Article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nThe maintainability of the appeal on the ground that Arunachalam was not entitled to petition under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave was challenged before the Bench hearing the appeal, but the Bench over-ruled the objection holding that it had ample power under Article 136 to entertain the special leave petition. The learned Judges laid down that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instanoe of private parties.\n\nWe have read the judgment of our learned brother V. R. Krishna Iyer, but because of the importance of the question we consider it necessary to set clown our own view.\n\nThe expense of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court flows from an entire code of rovisions contained in the Constitution.\n\nIt mcludes an appeal on certificate by the High Court under Article 131 that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution in a civil, criminal or other proceeding disposed of by a judgment, decree or final order of a High Court, and an appeal on certificate under Article 133 that the case involves a substantial questioh of law of general importance which calls for decision by the Supreme Court. In a criminal proceeding, disposed of by a judgment or final order or sentence of a High Court, besides cases where the High Court has convicted the accused and sentenced him to death either on reversing in appeal an order of acquittal by\n\n(I) [1979] 3 SC.R. 482.\n\nE ,\n\ntne trial court or on the case bei'ng withdrawn from the snbordiaate court to itself for trial, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court where the High Court \"certifies that the case is fit olle' for appeal to the Supl'eme I Court\". Article 135 confers jurisdiction and power on the Supreme Court with respect to any matter to which Article 133 or Article 134 does not apply if such jurisdiction and power were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the cQllSti-· tution. Article 13 6 declares :\n\n\"136. (1) Notwithstanding anythng in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its disretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.\"\n\nj Then follow other provisio'ns to which we need not refer.\n\nPlainly, the jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 seeks to coafer o• this Court the widest conceivable range of judicial power, malcing it perhaps among the most powerful courts in the world. The judicial power reaches out to every judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order effecting the rights and obligatiol:!s of persons in civil matters, ef life and liberty in criminal matters as , well as matters touching the Revenues of the State. It is . an attempt to ensure that the foundations ef the Indian Republic, which have been laid on the bed-rock of justice, are not undermined liy i'njustice anywhere in the land; Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.(I) As the Courtl observed in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh , •Till Others(2).\n\nArticle 136 vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by grant of special leave.\n\nNonetheless, there is a limitation which, in our opinion, is of immediate relevance.\n\nIt is a limitation inbuilt into the jurisdiction of the Court and flows from the 'nature and character of the case intended to be brought before the Court. It is a limitation which requires compliance despite the apparent plenitude of power vested in the Court.\n\nWhen a petition is presented to the Court under Article 136, the Court will have due regard to the nature and chaNcter of the cause sought to be brought before it when entertaiuing a'nd disposing of the petition.\n\nThe question is : Does the brother of a deceased person, who llas been murdered, possess the right to petition under Article 136 of tile\n\n(1) [19501S.C.R.459, 474.\n\n(2) (1955) l S.C.R. 267, 272.\n\n~ADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Pathak,!.) 885\n\nConstitution for special leave to appeal against an acquittal of the A accused ? It is a question which touches directly on the na.ture of a crime and of a criminal proceeding.\n\nSeveral diffurent definitions of a crime have beeh attempted (and there are some jurists who say that it is impossible of definition), but there is broad agreement on one attribute of its nature, that it is an B illegal act which amounts to a wron~ against the public welfare. Mogul Steamship Co. v. Cm Greger Gew & Co.( 1). As a concept, crime has been defined as \"any conduct which a sufficiently powerful section of any given community feels to be destructive of its own interests, as endangering its safety, stability or comfort,\" which \"it usually regards as especially heinous and seeks to repress with corresponding severity; C if possible it secured that the forces which the severeign' power in the State can command shall be utilised to prevent the mischief or to punish anyone who is guilty of it.\"(') Crimes were defined by Blackstone(8) as \"the breach and violation of public rights and duties which affect \\he whole community.\" A crime, therefore, is an act deemed by la\" to be harmful to society in general even though its D immediate victim is an individual. Murder injures primarily the parti C\\llar victim, but its blatant disregard of human file puts it beyond a matter of mere compensation between the murderer and the victim's family.\n\nThose who commit such acts are proceeded against by the State in order that, if convicted, they may be punished. (4) The notion of crime as a threat. to the whole community, is the material E cQlllnterpart of the formal rule that the State alone is master of a criminal prosecution.(') In a criminal proceeding the State\n\nstands forward as prosecutor on public grounds.\n\nNo private person has a direct interest in a criminal proceeding, although exception may be made by the statute in certain cases. It is common knowledge that F a criminal prosecution is not intended for the private satisfaction of a personal vendetta or revenge. (6)\n\nIn India also, the criminal law envisages the State as the prosecutor.\n\nUnder the Code of Criminal Procedure, the machinery of the\n\n(1) [1889] 23 Q. B. D. 598, 606perLord Eslier M. R.\n\n(2) Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 16th Edn., p. 2 para 3.\n\n(3) Commentaries, III. 2.\n\n(4) Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. p. 92 para 14.\n\n(5) Current Legal Problems, 1955 : Glanville Williams, \"1he Defmition of\n\nCrime\", p, 107 at p.122. (6} Since the matter is being treated broadly, it is unnecessary to deal here with the distinction between \"public\" and uprivate\" crimes, and the classification of crimes. which the law permits to be compounded.\n\nSUPREMF. COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nState is set in motio'n on information received by the police or on a complaint filed by a private person before a Magistrate. If the case proceeds to trial and the accused is acquitted, the right to appeal against the acquittal is closely circumscribed. Under the Code of Criminal Procdure, 1895(') the State was entitled to appeal to the High Court, and the complai'nant could do so only if granted special leave to appeal by the High Court.\n\nThe right of appeal was not given to other intrested persons. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure\n\n1973,(2) the right of appeal vesred in the State bas now been made subject to leave being granted to the State by the High Court. The complainant continues to be subject to the pre-requisite condition that he must obtain spocial leave to appeal.\n\nThe retters so imposed on the right to appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who h<Js been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court.\n\nThe Law Commission of India(3) gave anxious thought to this matter, and while. noting that the Code recognised a few ·xceptions by way of permitting a person aggrieved to initiate proceedings in certain cases and permitting the complainant to appeal against an acquittal with special leave of the High Court, expressed itself against the general desirability to encourng.o cippeals against acquittal. It referred to the common law jurisprudence obtaining in England and other countries where a limited right of appeal against acquittal was vested in the State and where the emphcsis rested on the need to decide a point of iaw of general importance in the intersts of the general administration and proper development of the criminal law.\n\nBut simultaneously the Law Commission also noted that if the right to appeal against acquittal was retained and extended to a complainant the law should logically cover F also cases not instituted on complaint. It observed :\n\n\"Extreme cases of manifest injustice, where the Government fails to act, and the party aggrieved has a strong foeling\n\nthat Che ma'.ter requires further consideration, should not, in our view, be left to. the mercy of the Govcrmnent. To G inspire and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, that limited right of appeal with leave given to a private party should be retained, and should embrace cases initiated on private complaint or otherwise at the instance of an aggrieved person.\"\n\n(I) S.417.\n\n(?) s. 378.\n\n(3) Forty.eighth Report, 1972, pp. 17~21, paras 43-58.\n\n.,_ - \\\n\n. i\n\nSADHANANTHAM v. ARUNACHALAM (Pathak, !.) 887\n\nHowever, when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was enacted the A\n\ntatute, as we have seen, confined the right to appeal, in the case -Of private parties to a complainant. This is, as it were, a material indication of the policy of the law.\n\nHaving regard to the fundamental nature of a criminal proceeding to which rererence has been made, it is now appropriate to examine the consideratio'ns which the Court should keep in mind when entertaining a petition for special leave to appeal by a private party against an order of acquittal.\n\nFrom what has been said, it is plain that 'access to the jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be pennitted to a\n\nprivate party who seeks to employ the judicial process for the satisfaction of private revenge or personal vendetta. Nor can it be permitted as an instrument of coercion where a civil action would lie. In every case, the Court is bound to consider what is the interest which brings the petitioner to court and whether the interest of the public community will benefit by the grant of special leaV'e. 'In a jurisprudence which elevates the right to life and liberty to a fundamental priority, it is incumbent upon the court to closely scrutinise the motives and urges of those who seek to employ its process against the life or liberty of another.' In this enquiry, the Court would perhaps prefer to be satisfied whether or not the State has good reason for not coming forward itself to petition for .special leave.\n\nWe think that the Court should entertain a special leave petition filed by , a private party, other than the complainant, i'n those cases only where it is convinced that the public interest justifi.cs an appeal against the acquittal and that the State has refrained from petitioning for special leave for reasons which do not bear on the public interest but are . prompted by private influence want of bona fide and other extraneous\n\nconsiderations.\n\nWe would restrict accordingly the right of a private party, other than the complainant, to petition for special leave against an order of acquittal. It is perhaps desirable to keep in mind that what follows from the grant of special leave is an appeal, and the jurisdiction must, therefore, be iJ; ivoked by a petitioner possessing a locus standi recognised in law.\n\nIn 'regard to the question whether the proodure followed by this Court in disposing of a petition for special leave under Article 136 is consistent with the procedure contemplated by Article 21, we have\n\nno hesitation in holding that the principle is inbuilt within the terms of Article 136 itself that the Court in exercising its jurisdiction will do H\n\n'.SO as a court of law following the well-known norms of procedure which hav0 been recognised for long as governing and informing the\n\n......... - --\n\nI A proceedings of all courts.\n\nWe have no hesitation in holding that Article 21 is not violated.\n\nThe petitioner has failed to establish that there is a case for interfering with the judgment of this Court allowing the appeal.\n\nThe writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is. no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 165, "entities": [{"text": "P. 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Iaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7163, "end_char": 7166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is' an act deemed by Iaw to be harmful to society in general, even though its immediate victim is an individual."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8347, "end_char": 8352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In India, the criminal law envisages the State as the prosecutor. !"}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8420, "end_char": 8427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "885E-F]\n\nSalmond on.", "canonical_name": "Salmond"}}, {"text": "Glanville Williams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8505, "end_char": 8523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 92 para 14 and Current Legal Prob /ems, 1955; Glanville Williams, \"The Definition'of Crime\", p. 107 at p. 122; referred to."}}, {"text": "Code of 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Is it constitutionally valid or desirable on principle to permit a private citizen, who has but loO'Se nexus with the victim of a crime, to invoke the special power under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11438, "end_char": 11446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11791, "end_char": 11798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12118, "end_char": 12126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12259, "end_char": 12265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12266, "end_char": 12271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12425, "end_char": 12432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12799, "end_char": 12805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This second battle, doomed to fail like the first, demands of\n\nus a condensed ratiocination in negation of the contentioa hopefully urged by Sri Mridul, counsel for the petitioner. .", "canonical_name": "Mridul"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12920, "end_char": 12928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12939, "end_char": 12946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13145, "end_char": 13155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13439, "end_char": 13452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And those procedures so\n\nestablished must be fair, not fanciful, nor formal nor flimsy, as laid down in Maneka Gandhi's case.(1) So, it is axiomatic that our constitutional jurisprudence mandates the State not to deprive a person of his personal liberty without adherence W fair procedure laid down by . )"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14003, "end_char": 14009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The corpus juris contains no black-letter law arming any such purely compassionate soul to approach this Court, argues Sri Mridul; and so, his client's liberty has been deprived by a proceeding initiated by someone without any procedure established by law.", "canonical_name": "Mridul"}}, 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"Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cardozo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18587, "end_char": 18594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cardozo, with elegant accuracy, has observed(') :\n\nThe judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19237, "end_char": 19245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19597, "end_char": 19604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19633, "end_char": 19640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19689, "end_char": 19696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19716, "end_char": 19724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20067, "end_char": 20075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Benjamin Cardozo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20350, "end_char": 20366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When this conspectus of proceS'Sual circumstances and , H\n\n(1) Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of tbe Judicial Process, Yale lrnivcrsity\n\nPress (1921)."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20566, "end_char": 20574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20655, "end_char": 20662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20706, "end_char": 20713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21200, "end_char": 21207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21813, "end_char": 21821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21970, "end_char": 21977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22023, "end_char": 22031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22947, "end_char": 22954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23411, "end_char": 23419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Law Reform Commission (Australia)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23558, "end_char": 23591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Reform Commission (Australia) in its Discu8sion Paper No."}}, {"text": "Dabholkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24887, "end_char": 24896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Dabholkar's case('!."}}, {"text": "S. A. de Smith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25407, "end_char": 25421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do n, ot concern him;\n\n'Prof.· S. A. de Smith takes the same view(•) : All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public\n\n(I) Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar [1975] 2 SCC 702."}}, {"text": "V. S. Deshpande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25719, "end_char": 25734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4) Quoted in 'Standing and Justiciability' by V. S. Deshpande Journal of the Indian Law Institute April-June, 1971, Vol.13, No."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25812, "end_char": 25849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "H.W.R. Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26152, "end_char": 26163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'i\\ interest-the desirability pf encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not cpncem him,\n\nB Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note:(')\n\nIn other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi."}}, {"text": "Australian Law Reforms Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26896, "end_char": 26929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view is echoed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission."}}, {"text": "Cappelletti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27010, "end_char": 27021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The crucial significance pf access jurisprudence has been best E expressed by Cappelletti : (3)\n\nThe right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rlghts."}}, {"text": "Art.136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27681, "end_char": 27688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sec 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27951, "end_char": 27958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SADHANANTHAM V. ARUNACHALAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28031, "end_char": 28058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SADHANANTHAM V. ARUNACHALAM (Pathak, J.) 883\n\npro bono proceedings, are."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28317, "end_char": 28323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J : The High Court of Madras in its appellate jurisdiction acquitted the petitioner, Sadhanantham, of charges under s. 302 and s. 148, I.P.C. Arunachalam, a brother of the deceased, petitioned to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the acquittal.", "canonical_name": "Pathak"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28333, "end_char": 28353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J : The High Court of Madras in its appellate jurisdiction acquitted the petitioner, Sadhanantham, of charges under s. 302 and s. 148, I.P.C. Arunachalam, a brother of the deceased, petitioned to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the acquittal."}}, {"text": "Sadhanantham", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28410, "end_char": 28422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J : The High Court of Madras in its appellate jurisdiction acquitted the petitioner, Sadhanantham, of charges under s. 302 and s. 148, I.P.C. Arunachalam, a brother of the deceased, petitioned to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the acquittal."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28441, "end_char": 28447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28452, "end_char": 28458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28460, "end_char": 28465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28538, "end_char": 28549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Arunachalam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28690, "end_char": 28701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court granted special leave, and ultimately allowed the appeal, Arunachalam\n\nv. .P.\n\nS. .R.\n\nSadhanantham(I), and setting aside the judgment of the High Court restored the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under s. 302, I.P.C. The petitioner has filed this writ petition contendihg that the judgment and order of this Court is a nullity and should be set aside.", "canonical_name": "ARUNACHALAM & Ai'IR"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28855, "end_char": 28861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28863, "end_char": 28868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29039, "end_char": 29050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Arunachalam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29104, "end_char": 29115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal contention is that Article 136 did not empower this Court to grant special leave to Arunachalam (the third respondent) and the grant of special !\"", "canonical_name": "ARUNACHALAM & Ai'IR"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29224, "end_char": 29234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29357, "end_char": 29368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29536, "end_char": 29547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "V. R. Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29806, "end_char": 29824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have read the judgment of our learned brother V. R. Krishna Iyer, but because of the importance of the question we consider it necessary to set clown our own view.", "canonical_name": "V. R. Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Article 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30119, "end_char": 30130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30371, "end_char": 30382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 SC.R. 482", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30749, "end_char": 30767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31003, "end_char": 31014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31103, "end_char": 31114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31118, "end_char": 31129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31275, "end_char": 31285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31674, "end_char": 31685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32411, "end_char": 32422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32948, "end_char": 32959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33231, "end_char": 33242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35511, "end_char": 35537, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35708, "end_char": 35715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn.", "canonical_name": "Salmond"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36113, "end_char": 36118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nState is set in motio'n on information received by the police or on a complaint filed by a private person before a Magistrate."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procdure, 1895", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36378, "end_char": 36409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36630, "end_char": 36656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Law Commission of India(3", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37183, "end_char": 37208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Law Commission of India(3) gave anxious thought to this matter, and while."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37637, "end_char": 37644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It referred to the common law jurisprudence obtaining in England and other countries where a limited right of appeal against acquittal was vested in the State and where the emphcsis rested on the need to decide a point of iaw of general importance in the intersts of the general administration and proper development of the criminal law."}}, {"text": "S.417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38650, "end_char": 38655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 378", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38662, "end_char": 38668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38805, "end_char": 38834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39401, "end_char": 39412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41195, "end_char": 41206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41256, "end_char": 41266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41352, "end_char": 41363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41649, "end_char": 41659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_889_912_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "r , f\n\nP. N. ESW ARA IYER. v.\n\nTilE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 1, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, S .. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, D. A. DESAI, B\n\nR. S. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nSupreme Court Rules 1966-0.XL, rules 2 and 3 Scope of-Disposal of review 'etitions by circulation withDllt oral arguments-If violative of Art. 14.\n\nOrder XL, rule 2(1) of the Supreme Court Rules (as amended) provides that an application for review shall be by a petition and shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed. It shall set out clearly the grounds for review. Sub-rule (3) provides that \"unless otherwise ordered by the Court an application for review shall be disposed of by circulation without any oral a-rguments but the petitioner may supplement\n\nhis petition by additional written arguments\".\n\nIn a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioners contended D t:h.at scuttling of oral presentation Qnd open hearing is subversive of the basic creed that public justice shall be rendered from the public seat Ol1d that secrecy 8lld circulation are negation of judicial justice.\n\nDismissing the petitions,\n\nHELD : per Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and Desai, JJ (Pathak and Kosltal JJ concurring).\n\nUnchecked review has never been the rule. A review petition must be supported by proper grounds because otherwise every disappointed litigant' may ave.ge his defeat by a routine review petition. [895D]\n\nThe original rule required a certificate by the advocate to the effect that the petition was review-worthy. If it was so certified then a preliminary oral hear..\n\nF ing followed.\n\nAfter such oral argument the court issued notice to the other side or_ dismissed the petition. But as it turned out, laxity in certification and pro•iscuity in filing review applications crowded the court with unwanted review petitions and the very solemnity of finality would bo fruslralcd if such a garlle were to become popular. [895E-H]\n\nThe amended rule is designed to remove the evil of reckless reviews by the futroduction of preliminary judicial screening in circulation replacing counsel's certification. If the review petition and written submissions convinced the court prima facie that material error bad marred the justice or legality of the oarlier. judgment or order,. the case would be posted for oral hearing in court. Now 'certworthiness' is shifted from coU11Bel to court. [896H]\n\nCirculation in the judicial context merely means not in court through oral arguments but by discussion at judicial conference. Judges, even under the an1ended\n\nrule, must meet, collectively cere9rate and reach conclusions. In a review petition the same judges \\'i'hO have once heard oral arguments and are familiar with\n\n' j\n\nA the case direct a hearing in court if they find good grounds. It is not as if all oml advocacy is altogether shut out. Where oral presentation is not that essen tial its exclusion is not obnoxious. What is crucial is the guarantee of the • application of an impartial and open mind to the points presented. If withont much injury a certain class of cases can be disposed of without oral hearing, there is no good reason for not making such an experiment.\n\nIf on a close perusal of the jl<lper book the judges find that there is no merit or statable case, n there is no special virtue in sanctifying the dismissal by an oral ritual.\n\n[898E, 899E, 900CJ\n\nThe rule on its face affords a wider set of grounds for review for orders in civil proceedings but limits the grounds vis a vis criminal proceedings to errors apparent on the face of the record. fiere \"record\" means any material which is already on record or n1ay with the permission of the court be brought on record.\n\n[909C]\n\nThe substanti\\'e power is defived front l\\.rticle. J 37 and is as \\vide for crimi~ nal as for civil proceedings. Even the difference in phraseology in the rule (r. 2) must be reJd to encompass the same area and uot to engraft the artifi~ cial divergence prolluctive of anomaly.\n\nIf the expression record\" is read to moon any material cvt!n later brought on record, \\Vith the leave of the court. it will embrace subsequent events, ne\\V light and other grounds which are found in 0. 47, r. I, C.P.C. [909G-H]\n\nSow Chandra Kanta and Anr. v. Sheik Habib ::1975] 3 SCR 933; Lala Ram •\n\nv. Supreme Court of India & Ors [1967] 2 SCR 14 referred to.\n\nPer Pathak and Koshal JJ (concurring).\n\nOral hearing is not an essential requirment if on a preliminary examination a review application is found to be devoid of suCstance. .i\\. review application attempts nothing more than to obtain a reconsideration of the judgment of the court disposing of the substantive proceeding. The merits of the controversy having already been examined the re-examination :'ought c~.nnot proceed beyond the controversy already disposed of. [911C-D] If the. judges, on screening the review application, hold that there is no case whatever for review they will reject it. If on the other hand they find that a F good pririza jacie case for review has been made out, they will give an oral hearing in the presence of the parties.\n\nThere may also be cases where even after they are satisfied that no prinia facie case has been made out they consider it desirable to boor an applicant orally they will afford him an opportunity of oral hearing and in the event of a prima jacie case being made out they will issue notice to the respondent and oral hearing , Nill follow, in the presence of the parties. In short the denial of oral hearing is confined to the preliminary stage only. It is not possible to hold that at that preliminary stage also the applicant for review is entitled to be heard orally. The merit of the oral hear ing lies in the fact that Counsel addressing the court are able to discern what are the aspects of the controversy on which n1ore light is needed. The court can utilise an oral hearing in order to express its doubts on a point end seek clarification thereon from counsel. If there is no doubt whatever oral heariBg becomes a superfiuity and at best a mere formality. [911F-Hl ~Ir' A written submission is capable of careful drafting and explicit expression.\n\n/ \\md is amenable. to such arrangement in its written content that it pointedly brings to the notice of the reader the true scope and merit of the submission.\n\nf •\n\nIt is not correct to say that oral hearing is mandatory in all classes of cases and at every stage of every case. [912D]\n\n[The question under consideration being the need for an oral hefiling in relation to review applications only, there is no need to express any opinion on whether an oral hearing is an imperative requirement in the disposal of other kinds of cases brought before the Court.]\n\nORIGINAL JuR1sDICTJON : Writ Petition Nos. 151, 187, 238, 458, 1038, 1069 and 1277 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Nambpodiri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No. 151/79.\n\nSoll J. Sorabjee Sol. General, E. C. Agarwala, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent, in W.P. No. 151/1979.\n\nPetitioner in person-in W.P. No. 1038/79.\n\nP. R. Mridul and H. K. Puri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No. 187 /\n\n~ A. K. Gupta, Vivek Seth, Miss Madhu Moolchandani and 0. P.\n\nR11na for the Respondent No. Lin W.P. 187/79.\n\nSoli !. Sorabjee, Sol. Genl. E. C. Agarwala, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent No. 2 in W.P. No. 187 /79.\n\nA. K. Ganguli and D., P. Mukherjee for the Petitioner in W.P.\n\nE- 238/79.\n\nA. K. Ganguli and 0. P. Rana for the petitioner in W.P. No. 458/ 79.\n\nSoli J. Sorabjee, Sol. General, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Sub- . hashini for the Respondent in W.P. Nos. 458 & 238/79.\n\nG. L. Sang hi and Miss Lily Thomas for the Petitioners in \\V.P.\n\nNos. 1069 & 1277/79.\n\n) Dr. L. M. Singhvi and Sardar Bahadur Saharya for the intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D. A. Desai, JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave G a separate OpiniCJ:ll on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himself.\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Tersely expressed, this bunch of cases challenges the vires of a recent amendment made by the Supreme Court under Art. 145 in the matter of review petitions whereby the judges will decide in circulation, without the aid of oral submissions, whetl1e~ R there is merit in the motion and, in their discretion, choose to hear , farther arguments in court . .+\n\nIs orality in advocacy-that genius of Indo-Anglian Justice-an inalienable and ubiquitous presence in the court process, or does it admit of abbreviated appearance and-more pertinent to the point here--<liscretionary eclipse, at least when it has been preceded by a sufficient oral session ? Secondly is hearing on Bench in public, in contrast to considering the matter in conferential circulation, the only hall-mark of judicial justice, absent which the proceeding always violates the norms of equality implicit in Art. 14 the limits of \"reasonableness\" bedrocked in Art. 19, the proceduraJ. fairness rooted in Art. 21 ? And, finally, by resort to operational , secrecy, does rationing or barking of oral hearing travesty the values of our Justice S:ystem?\n\nThese basic problems of the forensic process,_ of pervasive impact and seminal import, fall for consideration in these writ petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The charge is that the novel expedi!mt\n\nof substitution of oral arguments by written submissions and orders in circulation dispensing with public sitting, save where-and that may be rare-the judges in their discretion choose to hear arguments in court, is a dangerous deviance from the fundamentals of the Judicial Process.\n\nApprehending maybe, the futuristic repercussions of a decision on these questions, even though now restricted to teview petitions, in other fields of 'hearing' at a later time, the Supreme Court Bar Association has intervened and argued to impugn the amended rule through , its President, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, in supplementation of parties' submissions.\n\nWe have allowed even other advocates to make brief contributions, because, when this Court considers issues of moment and pronounces thereon, the law so declared binds all : and it is ensouled in democratic propriety that the voice of reason and instruction be received from every permissible source in the nation, if processed according to cursus curiae.\n\nThis participative principle lends people's legitimation to the judicial process and strengthens the credentials of the rule of law.\n\nThe composite question, which settles the fate of these petitions, emerges this way.\n\nArt. 137 provides for review of judgments or orders of this Court, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rule made under Art. 145. We are here concerned with a rule made by this Court.\n\nThe rule-making power under Art. 145 is geared tQ 'regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court'. In particular, Art. 145(1) (bJ and (e) authorise such 'judicial' legislation in the shape of rules as to \"the procedure for hearing appeals and other matters pertaining to appeals\" and also \"as to the conditions subject to which any judgment pronounced or order made by the Court may be reviewed and the procedure for such review\".\n\nSuch rules, like any other law, are subject to the imperatives of Part III\n\ncand become non est if violative of the proscriptions and prescrip- A ' tions of the Constitution vide Premchand Garg's case(I). Even the Supt\"eme Court, in the scheme of our Republic, is no imperium in / , imperio.\n\n) •\n\nThe substantive power of review and the procedure for its exercise are essential for any judicial system if unwitting injustice is to be ob- B\n\nvial~ to the extent pragmatically possible, without being blinded b:11 any claim to impervious infallibility in the first judgment.! Even judges, more than other mortals, to correct injustice if the ei:ror is discovered within working limits. Thus, the root principle of judicial review is profoond.\n\nJudge Learned Hand co=ended to the judges the great rule of humility co_ntained in the oft-repeated words of Cromwell : C\n\n\"I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken\" said Oliver Cromwell just before the battle of Dunbar.\n\nThese words Judge Hand said he would like to have written \"over the portals of every church, every courthouse and at every cross-road in the nation.\"(') D\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nSuch is the high-minded tolerance with which this Court re-examine& its own orders to eliminate the happenstance of in justice unhampered by judicial hubris.\n\nThis Court had framed rules for review, right from the start, but a E certain amendment, recently made, has curtailed oral hearing in court as a matter of course and thi_s measure of discretionary truncation is attacked as fundamentally offensive to judicial justice of which this Court is the highest custodian. ''lf the salt hath lost hiS savour, wherewith shall it be salted?\" Surely, this Court's procedure should be the paradigm, nothing short of it.\n\nSo, the question is whether it is so F heathen to make oral hearing discretionary at the review stage and at the Supreme Court level that the rule can be condemned as constitutionally apoState ? Another faJal infirmity was also pointed out as the arguments proceeded, viz., that a hostile discrimination had been made by r. 2(1) against litigants who moved for review in criminal proceedings as against those in the civil jurisdiction., He will relegate G , jt for consideration to a later stage.\n\nThe relevant original rules ran thus :\n\n2. (1) An application for review shall be by a petition, and shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the\n\n(I) Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner U. P., Allahabad (1963] Suppl.\n\n(I) 885. .\n\n(2) The Spirit of Liberty by Learned Hand, p. >)<iv.\n\njudgment or order sought to be reviewed.\n\nIt shall set out clearly the grounds for review and shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, be accompanied by a certificate from the Advocate who appeared at the hearing of th!l case for the party seeking review, or where the party appeareu in person, from any advocate of this Court, that it is supported by proper grounds.\n\nThe certificate shall be in the form of a reasoned opinion.\n\n(2) No application for review in a civil proceeding shall be entertained unless the party seeking review furnishes to the Registrar of this Court at the time of filing the petition for review, cash security to the extent of two thousand rupees for the costs of the opposite party.\n\n3. An application for review shall be posted before the Court for preliminary hearing and order as to the issue of notice to the opposite party. Upon such hearing, the Court may either dismiss the petition or direct a notice to the opposite party and adjourn the hearing for such party to be heard. A petition for review shall as far as practicable be posted before. the same Judge or Bench of Judges that delivered the judgment or order sought to be reviewed.\n\n4. Where on application for review the Court reverses or modifies its former decision in the case on the ground of mistake of law or fact, the Court may, if it thinks fit in the interLsts of justice to _do so, direct the refund to the petitioner of the court-fee paid on the application in whole or in part, as it may think fit.\n\nThe corresponding amended rules read thus : I\n\n:2. (1) An application for review shall be by a petition, and shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed. It shall set out clearly the grounds for review. (1)\n\n(2) No change.\n\n3. [Unless otherwise ordered by the Court](') an application for review shall be disposed of by circulation without any oral arguments, but the petitioner may supplement his petition by additional written arguments.\n\nThe Court may either dismiss the petition or direct notice to the oppo-\n\n(1) Sub. by GSR 387 dated 13-3-1978 and came into force on 18-3-78.\n\n(2) Added by GSR 1024 dated 9-8-78 and came into force on 19-8-78.\n\nsite party. An application for review shall as far as prac- A ticable be circulated to the same Judge or Bench of Judges that delivered the judgment or order sought to be reviewed.\n\n4. No change.\n\n5. Where an application for review of any judgment or order has been made and disposed of, no further appli- B cation for review shall be entertained in the same matter.\n\n(newly inserted)\n\nThe vital difference, vis a vis the first point, is that now oral hearing is no longer a rigb• of the petitioner but facultative with the Bench and the 'circulatory' system replaces the public hearing method.\n\nA brief study of the anatomy of the rules will highlight the points urged.\n\nDissecting the rules and comparing their directives we find that unchecked review has never been the rule. It must be supported by proper grounds.\n\nOtherwise, every disappointed litigant may avenge bis defeat by a routine review adventure and thus obstruct the disposal of the 'virgin' dockets waiting in the long queue for preliminary screening or careful final hearing. It is perfectly reasonable to insist that the existence of proper grounds for review should be responsibly vouched for before the further time of the court is taken.\n\nSo, the original rule required a certificate to that effect by the advocate who earlier bad appeared in the case.\n\nHere, counsel functioned as an officer of the court and, under the mandate of the old r. 2(1) the Court granted or refused a certificate of review-worthiness. If it was so certified, then a preliminary oral hearing followed.\n\nAfter such oral argument, the court issued notice to the other side or dismissed the petition.\n\nThe system was fair enough if the certification process worked well and real errors and apparent mistakes marring the original judgment were the restricted grounds for review.\n\nBut as it turned out, laxity in certification and promiscuity in filing review applications crowded the court with 'unwanted review babies'.\n\nThe docket crisis which quaked the calendar deepened, to the detriment of faigative justice to the deserving who awaited their turn for hearing. Even otherwise, frivolous motions for review would ignite the\n\n'gallrbling' element in litigation with the finality of judgments even by the highest court, being left in suspense.\n\nIf, every vanquished party bas a fling at 'review' lncky dip and if, perchance, notice were issued in some cases to the opponent the latter-and, of course, the former, -would be put to great expense and anxiety.\n\nTue very solemnity of finality, so crucial to judicial justice, would be frustrated if such a game were to become popular.\n\nAnd it did become popular, as\n\n3-138SCI/80\n\nexperience showed. The inflow of meritless review petitions, which were heard and dismissed, interrupted the stream of public justice.\n\nThis Court in Sow Chandra Kanta and Anr. v. Sheikh Habib(') was faced with this problem and, while dismissing the review petition, observed how the opportunity for correction of grave errors was being perverted into the purchase of a fresh appeal to the same court against\n\nits own appellate or other judgment on the same grounds which were earlier rejected.\n\nThis Court said : (2 )\n\nA review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glari:lg omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallib:lity.\n\nA mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and over-ruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.\n\nThe very strict need for compliance with these factors is the rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge backlog of dockets waiting in the queue for dispooal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entert:llnment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and Jost. The Bench and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use.\n\nWe regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as pasport. Nothing which we did not hear them has been heard now except a couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. Maybe, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground b_ut review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.\n\nThese observations were symptomatic of the 'review syndrome' which, therefore, demanded remedying.\n\nAnd the amended rule purposefnlly incarnated under such auspices to remove the evil of reckless reviews by the introduction of preliminary judicial screening in circulation, replacing counsel's certification with court's scanning exercise--an added but necessitous judicial burden. If the review petition and written submissions (for which provision was made) convinced the Court,\n\n(!) [1975] 3 S.C.R. 933.\n\n(2) Ibid pp, 933-934.\n\nESWARA !YER v. THE REGISTRAR (Krishna Iyer, J.) 897\n\nprima fade, that material error had marred the justice or legality A of the earlier judgment or order the case would be posted for oral hearing in court. Otherwise, not. 'Certworthiness'--an American judicial shorthand for 'certi:ficate-worthiuess'-was, by this amendment, shifted from counsel to court. This, in pith and substance, is the rationale of the amended rule.\n\nCounsel, at one stage, asked whether there was' back-up empirical research to warrant the ; issumptions in the amendment, whether facts and figures about the number and nature of wasted 'review' time\n\nB .\n\nof court and a host of other related aspects were available. No such material is before us now. It is fair to confess that the scientific method of undertaking research and study into public problems as prelude to legislation is a 'consummation devoutly to be wished' and lamentably lacking in our country; and court management, with special reference to maximisation of judicial time-a matter of great national moment-is a problem the very existence of which is currently beyond the keen of juristic research. Where 'awareness' is absent, ad-hocism is inevitable. But here the experiential evidence of the judges who considered and decided on the amendment and the inference available from the decisions on review petitions make good the proposition or makes-do for empirical research.\n\nBe that as it may, we are satisfied that enough justification exists in the daily experience oI this Court to warrant the change the way it has been done.\n\nEven so, constitutional canons cannot be contravened even by pragmatic compulsions.\n\nParamountcy is pa.ramountcv and exigency must bow before it.\n\nWhat, then, are the paramount principles of constitutionality violated by the amended rule ? Absence of public hearing and oral presentation are the vices identified in counsel's arguments.\n\nTwo major submissions were made to invalidate r. 2(1). The scuttling of oral presentation and open hearing is snbversive of the basic creed that public justice shall be rendered from the pnblic seat, not in secret conclave, that hearing becomes 'deaf' if oral impressivec\n\nness is inhibited by the circulation process, more congenial to the G seclusion of bureaucratic cells, fed on files, than to the audio-visual argumentation heard in the halls of court, which is the insignia of judicial justice. Secrecy and circnlation are the negation of judicial procedure.\n\nA review is a judicial proceeding and its hearing, to fill the bill, must not run away from the essentials of processual jurisprudence, however allergic some judges may be to the 'sound system' H which is the heart of our forensics.\n\nWith allotropic modifications, counsel's arguments stressed this recurrent theme.\n\n A We must make it perfectly plain, right at the outset, that audi alterem partem is a basic value of our judicial system.\n\nHearing the party aiffected is too deeply embedded in the consciousness of our constitutional order. The question is about the quality, content and character of 'hearing' in the special 'review' situation.\n\nIncidentally, we may deal with oral hearing and its importance in the court pro- B cess, the possibilities of its miniaturisation and, in certain categories its substitution by written submissions.\n\nWe agree that public hearing is of paramount significance.\n\nJustice, in the Indian Republic, is public; and if judges shun the halls of court, read papers at home confer in private and issue final fiats without listening to the bar as the representative of the seekers of justice, the rule of law could well darken into an arcane trick and back door diktats issued from 'robed' -adjudicators strain the escutcheon of justice. We also agree that oral advocacy has a non-fungible importance in the forensic process which the most brilliant brief cannot match and the most alert judge cannot go without.\n\nThe intellectual jallywork of intricate 'legal reasoning and impassioned sculpture of delicate factual emphasis may often be teyond the craftsmanship of pen and paper.\n\nThere is no controversy that disposal by circulation, Secretariat fashion, cannot become a general judicial technique nor silent notings replace Bench-Bar dialogues.\n\nWe must clarify one point. 'Circulation', in the judicial context, merely means, not in court through oral arguments but by discussion at judicial conference.\n\nJudges, even under the amended rule, must meet, collectively cerebrate and reach conclusions. Movement of files with notings cannot make-do.\n\nOtherwise, mutual persuasion, reasoned dissent and joint judgment will be defeated and machinisation of opinion and assertions of views in absentia will deprive judicial notices of that mental cross-fertilisation essential for a Bench decision. The learned Solicitor General strongly urged that he was at one with counsel opposite on this point.\n\nWe agree.\n\nThe key question is different. Does it mean that by receiving written arguments as provided in the new rule, and reading and discussing at the conference table, as distinguished from the 'robed' appearance on the Bench and hearing oral submissions, what is perpetrated is so arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable a 'Pantomini' as to crescendo into unconstitutionality ? This phantasmagoric distortion must be dismissed as too morbid to be regarded seriously-in the matter of review petitions at the Supreme Court level.\n\nLet us look at the actuality without being scary. The rule under challenge does not implicate or attract an original hearing at all. It\n\nrelates to 'review' situations.\n\nEx hypothesi, an antecedent judicial hearing and judicial order exist.\n\nIndeed, if a full oral hearing on the Bench has already taken place the dangerousness of secret disposals dies out.\n\nWhat is asked for is a review or second look at the first order.\n\nShould this second consideration be plenary? Never.\n\nThe focus must be limited to obvious, serious errors in the first order.\n\nIndiscriminate second consideration cannot be purchased by more payment of courtfee.\n\nWe reject the strange plea one of the advocates put forward that since the petitioner h, td paid court-fee for review he had the right to the full panoply of oral hearing ad libitem covering the whole range.\n\nReview must be restricted if the hard-pressed judicial process is not to be a wasting disease.\n\nThere are many ways of limiting its scope, content and modality.\n\nThe confinement to certain special grounds, as in Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C., is one way.\n\nThe requirement of counsel's rea$oned certificate of fitness (Certworthiness) for review is another._ Judicial screening to discover the presence, prima fade, of good grounds to hear counsel in oral submission is a third.\n\nThe first is good and continues.\n\nThe second was tried and found ineffective and the third is being tried.\n\nLegislative policy is experimental as life itself is a trialand-error adventure.\n\nWhat is shocking about this third alternative ?\n\nJudges scrutinise-the same judges who have once heard oral arguments and are familiar with the case-and, if they do not play truant,\n\ndirct a hearing in court if they find good grounds. If there is ground, oral bearing follows.\n\nIt is not as if all oral advocacy is altogether shut out.\n\nOnly if preliminary judicial scrutiny is not able to discern any reason to review is oral exercise inhibited.\n\nThe court process is not a circus or opera where the audience can clamour for encore. When the system is under the severe stress of escalating case-load, management of Justice Business justifies forbiddance of frivolous reviews by scrutiny in limine on the written brief.\n\nJusticing too is in need of engineering.\n\nIn many jurisdictions oral submissions and public hearings are disallowed in like circumstances. In England and America where orality in advocacy has been apotheosised, certain extended stages of 'hearing' in the superior courts have been slimmed or removed.\n\nEven disposal of petitions for leave in judicial conference, without a Bench bearing, bs been in vogue.\n\nThis Court, as Sri Garg rightly emphasised, has assigned special value to public hearing, and courts are not caves nor cloisters but shrines of justice accessible for public prayer to all the people.\n\nRulings need not be cited for this basic proposition: But every judicial exercise need\n\nA f not be a public show. When judges meet in conference to discuss it\n\nc-c need not be televised on the nation's network.\n\nThe right to be heard is of the essence but hearing does not mean more than fair opportunity to present one's poiint on a dispute, followed by a fair consideration thereof by fair-minded judges.\n\nLet us not romanticise this process nor stretch it to snap it.\n\nPresentation can be written or oral, depending on .\n\nB the justice of the situation.\n\nWhere oral persuasiveness is necessary it is unfair to exclude it and therefore, arbitrary too. But where oral presentation is not that essential, its exclusion is not obnoxious. What is crucial in the guarantee of the application of an instructed, intelli-. '.l gent, impartial and open mind to the points presented.\n\nA blank judge C wearied by oral aggression is prone to slumber while an alert mind 1 probing the 'papered' argument may land on vital aspects.\n\nTo swear\n\nby orality or to swear at manuscript advocacy is as wrong as judicial allergy to arguments in court.\n\nOftentimes, it is the judge who will ask for oral argument as it aids him much.\n\nTo be left helpless among ponderous paper books without the oral highlights of counsel, is counterproductive.\n\nExtremism fails in law and life.\n\nWe agree that the normal rule of the judicial process is oral hearing and its elimination an unusual exception.\n\nWe are now on the vires of a rule relating to review in the highest court. A full-dress hearing, to the abundant accompaniment of public presence and oral submission, is over.\n\nIt is a second probe. Here written arguments are given. TI1e entire papers are with the judges.\n\nThe judges themselves are the same persons who have heard oral presentation earlier. Moreover, it is a plurality of judges, not only one. Above all, if prima facie grounds are made out a further oral hearing is directed.\n\nGranting basic bona (ides in the judges of the highest court it is impossible to argue that partial foreclosure of oral arguments in court is either unfair or unreasonable or so vicious an invasion of natural justice as to be ostracised from our constitutional jurisprudence. It must be remembered that review is not a second dose of the same arguments once considered and rejected. The rejection might have been wrong but that cannot be helped. Dissenting minorities regard the dominant majorities wrong in their judgments but there is no helping it.\n\nIt may not be inept to refer to the critical distinction, even where review of fundamental rights proceeding is sought, between an original or virgin hearing and a econd look at or review of the order already passed after a full hearing. In Lala Rmn's case(') this Court accented H on the essential distinction between an original application for the\n\n\nenforcement of fundamental rights and an application to review the A order made therein. It was there observed : (1)\n\nThe main purpose of a review petition is not to enforce a fundamental right, but to reopen an order vitiated by an error on the face of the record or for such other reasons.\n\nBut it is said that the effect of reopening of the earlier order would be to restore his application to enforce the fundamental right and, therefore, in effect and substance, an application to review such an 01 er is also an application to enforce the fu:idamental right. It may be that this is a consequence of reopening an order, but the application itself, as we have said, is not to enforce the fundamental right.\n\nIs there any nexus between the elimination of oral advocacy and the goal of dispensation of justice? Counsel urge there is none.\n\nWe cannot agree. The goal to be attained is maximisation of judicial time and celerity of disposal of review petitions.\n\nAnd, despite the heavier burden thrown on the judges during the hours outside court sittings by agreeing to read through and discuss the review papers for themselves, there is obvious acceleration of disposal of review petitions without intrusion into court time. Equally clearly, the benches are able to spare more time tor bearing cases.\n\nTo sum up, the advantages of the circulation system linked up with the objects of saving judge-time in court and prompter despatch of review petitions are obvious. To organize review Benches of the same judges who first heard the case only to last for a few minutes or a little longer, then to disperse and re-arrange: regular Benches, especially when most of the review petitions are repeat performances in futility, is a judicial circus the court •Can ill afford.\n\nThe rule is rational, the injury is marginal.\n\nThe magic of the spoken word, the power of the Socratic process end th~ instant clarity of the bar-bench dialogue are too precious to be parted with although a bad advocate can successfully spoil a good case i[ the judges rely only on oral arguments for weaving their decision.\n\nThe written brief, before careful judges, can be a surer process of deeper communication than the 'vanishing cream' of speaking submissions. And a new skill-preparation of an effective brief, truly brief, highly telling and tersely instructive-is an art of the pen worth the acquisition especially when, in practice, there are many gifted lawyers who go with Goldsmith who 'wrote like an angel and talked like poor Paul'. India is neither England nor America and our forensic technology must be fashioned by our needs and resources.\n\n(I) Ibid at 17.\n\nA Indeed, in this Court, counsel have begun to rely heavily, with good reason, on written submissions aud oral 'sweeteners'.\n\nThe Bench can never go it alone.\n\nThe bar must collaborate and catalyse.\n\nNor is there any attempt, in this circulation rule, to run away from the open.\n\nSecret sittings, exclusion of the public and cabals in conclave are bete noire for the judicial proces:.\n\nA review implies an earlier full hearing and, if warranted, a future further hearing.\n\nEvery measure has to be viewed in perspective, not out of focus.\n\nThe consternation that the court, by hidden procedures, may undo the 'open' heritage is a chimerical fear or a disingenuous dread.\n\nC St In other jurisdictions which our jurists hold in ang!ophilic esteem, this practice is current coin.\n\nThe balancing of oral advocacy and written presentation is as much a matter of principle as of pragmatism.\n\nThe compulsions of realities, without compromise on basics, offer the sound solution in a given situation.\n\nThere are no absolutes in a\n\nuniverse of relativity.\n\nThe pressure of the case-load on the judges' limited time, the serious responsibility to bestow the best thought on the great issues of the country projected on the court's agenda, the deep study and large research which must lend wisdom to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court which enjoy awesome finality and the unconscionable backlog of chronic litigation which converts the expensive end-product through sheer protraction into sour injustice-all these emphasise the urgency of rationalising and streamlining court mange ment with a view to saving court time for the most number of cases with the least sacrifice of quality and turnover. If, without much injury, a certain class of cases can be disposed of without oral hearing, there is no good reason for not making such an experiment. If, on a close perusal of the paper-book, the judges find that there is no merit or statable case, there is no special virtue in sanctifying the dismissal by an oral ritual.\n\nThe problem really is to find out which class of cases may, without risk of injustice, be disposed of without oral prese1tation.\n\nThis is the final court of provisional infallibility, the summit court, which not merely disposes of cases beyond challenge, but is also the G judicial institution entrusted with the constitutional responsibility of\n\n_ authoritatively declaring the law of the land.\n\nTherefore, if oral hearing will perfect the process it should not be dispensed with.\n\nEven so, where issues of national moment which the Supreme Court alone can adequately tackle are not involved, and if a considerable oral bearing and considered order have already been rendered, a review petition may not be so demanding upon the judge's 'Bench' attention, especially if, on the face of it, there is nothing new, nothing grave at stake.\n\nEven here, if there is some case calling for examination or suggestive\n\nI r :-\n\nof an ea1lkr error, the court may well post the case for an oral hearing. (Disposal by circulation is a calculated risk where no problem or peril is visible.)\n\nOral argument has been restricted at several stages in the judicial process in many countries. In the United States the problem of a large number of frivolous petitions for re-hearing (in our diction, review) filed by counsel provoked the court into framing restrictive rules of hearing.\n\nOne of the rules prescribes :\n\nA petition for rehearing is not subject to oral argument, and will not be granted, unless a justice who concurred in the judgment or decision desires it, and a majority of the\n\ncourt so determines. (') C\n\nIn England, leave to appeal to the House of Lords is a pattern of proceedings where obligatory oral hearing does not always exist. The\n\nrecent practice direction may be usefully referred to here :\n\nAs from October 1, 1976 Petitions for leave to appeal to the House of Lords will be referred to an Appeal Com- D mittee consisting of three Lords of Appeal, who will conside: whether the petition appears to be competent to be received by the House and, if so, whether it should be r.- ferred for an oral hearing.\n\nWhere a petition is not considered fit for an oral hearing, the Clerk of the Parliaments will notify the parties that the petition is dismissed.£')\n\nJustice John M. Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, while ex• plaining the need for controlling court work within manageable proportions, (8) ..... .it would be short sighted and unwise not to recognise that preserving the certiorari system in good health, and in proper balance with the other work of the Court, are matters that will increasingly demand thoughtful and imaginative attention.\n\nAs I have tried to show, the essence of the problem as things stand today is to guard against wasteful encroachments upon the Court's time by preventing an increase in, if not reducing, the volume of improvident applications for certiorari.\n\n (emphasis added)\n\n(1) Supreme Court Practice by Stern & Gressman 1950 Ec!n. p, 321.\n\n(2) (1979) 1 W.L.R. 497.\n\n(3) Hart and Wechsler, the Fedcrn\\ Courts and The Federal System, 2nd Edn. pp. 1605-1607.\n\nIt is significant that in the U. S. Supreme Court leave to appeal is decided in conference, not in court and even in regular hearing the maximum time for argument is often restricted in the highest court.\n\nUnder r. 28 it is one hour for each side. The mechanics of controlling argument time i6 interesting and instructive.(')\n\nCounsel arguing should keep track of his own time-- when he started and how much he has left. There is large clock in front of him.\n\nA note on the counsel table admonished counsel not tci ask the Chief Justice what time remains.\n\nWhen counsel has only five minntes left, a whi<te light on the lectern immediately in front of him goes on.\n\nWhen time has expired, a red light goes on. The Chief Justice is likely to stop counsel immediately, seldom allowing him to do more than to finish his sentence. The red light also marks the time to recess for lunch at two o'clock, and the end of the day's session at 4.30 p.m.\n\nD The rationale of redncing oral submissions without danger to efficacy or advocacy is explained by George Rossman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon : (')\n\n•/ Crowded dockets have forced appellate courts to curtail the time allotted for oral argument, with the result that some members of the profession wonder whether courts care for oral argument ...... The practice of today shows that advocacy can be effective even though the period of delivery is short.\n\nSome attorneys can be effective even though the period of delivery is short. Some attorneys can do wonders in thirty minutes when nothing more is available.\n\nThe English practice, of course, is different. Delmar Karlan has correctly set out the situation : (')\n\nIn the United States, oral arguments are secondary in importance to the briefs, and are rigidly limited in duration.\n\nIn the United States Supreme Court, one hour is allowed to each side, but in many appellate courts, less time that is permitted, frequently no more than fifteen minutes or a half. hour for each side.\n\nReading by counsel is frowned upon.\n\nThe judges do not wish to hear what they can read for themselves. They expect to get all the information they need\n\n(I) Supreme Court Practice (supra) p. 303.\n\n(2) American Bar Association Journal Jan. 1959, Vol. 45, No .. 1 p, 676.\n\n(3) 1962 Vol. 78 L. Q. R. 371 at 379-380.\n\n' >\n\nESWARA !YER v. THE REGISTRAR (Krishna Iyer, J.) • 905\n\nabout the judgment below, the evidence and the authorities relied upon from studying the briefs and record on appeal. 'They do not even encourage counsel to discuss in detail the precedents claimed to govern the decision, preferring to do that job by themselves in the relative privacy of their chambers, with or without the assistance of law clerks.\n\nIn England, where there are no written briefs, oral arguments are all important.\n\nThey are never arbitrarily limited in duration.\n\nWhile some last for only a few minutes, others go on for many days, even weeks.\n\nThe only control ordinarily exercised over the time of oral argument are informal, ad hoc suggestions from the judges.\n\nThe methods of the Marble Palace in Washington D.C. have some relevance though certainly not compulsiveness for us.\n\nJohn Frank writes : (')\n\nAs the docket of the Court became more crowded, necessarily the time allowed for argument had to shrink. Under today's system the time is either a half-hour or an hour for each side, depending on the complexities of the case.\n\nThis obviously precludes long introductions or eloquent perorations.\n\nTime is usually dgidly controlled; the legend is that Chief Justice Hughes once cut off an attorney in the middle of the word \"it\". If there are not too niany interruptions, the hour is sufficient; lawyers must learn to be brief.\n\nWe assume that judges will be up to the additional strain. We have stated enough to establish that judicial justice is not sabotaged by the eclipse of oral argument in a small sector of the forensic process. That\n\nis all that has been done by the amendment.\n\nA brief comparison bet- F ween the earlier and the current position will bring this out.\n\nIn the earlier rule a certificate by the lawyer was a condition precedent for entertainment of the review proceeding.\n\nIn the revised rule, no certificate by counsel but certification by the Bench that, prima facie an infirmity of the kind mentioned in the rule vitiates, the judgment G takes its place. Thereafter in both cases oral advocacy follows. Thus the only difference is not, as is some times assumed, that oral arguments are for the first time and finally cut out. Even now, oral hearing may be given and is given, not routinely but if ground is made out to the satisfaction of the judges who first heard the case (ignoring exceptional situations for the present). We have stated enough to repel II\n\n(I) John P. Krank, Marble Reh.ce-The Supreme Covn in Americrn Life 1958 Edn p, 92.\n\nA the attack on the vires of the rule.\n\nNothing arbitrary, nothing arcane, nothing obnoxious, given a sober appraisal.\n\nThe possible impression that we are debunking the value of oral advocacy in open court must be erased.\n\nExperience has shown that, at all levels, the bar, through the spoken word and the written brief, B has aided the process of judicial justice.\n\nJusticing is an art even as advocacy is an art.\n\nHappy interaction between the two makes for the functional fulfilment of the court system.\n\nNo judicial 'emergency' can jettison the vital breath of spoken advocacy in an open forum.\n\nIndeed, there is no judicial cry for extinguishment of oral argument altogether.\n\nBut the time has come for a proper evaluation of the role C of oral argument at the appellate level in the decisional process. Justice Harlan has insisted that oral argument should play a leading part. It is not \"a traditionally tolerated part of the appellate process\" but a decisively effective instrument of appellate advocacy.\n\nHe rightly stresses that there are many judges \"who are more receptive to the spoke1~ than\n\nthe written word\".\n\nHe hits the nail on the head when he states :\n\nFor my part, there is no substi1ute, even within the time limits afforded by the busy calendars of modern appellate courts, for the Socratic method of procedure in getting at the real heart of an issue and in finding out where the truth lies. (I)\n\nWe wholly endorse the conclusion of that experienced Judge of the United States Supreme Court when he concludes his thesis on oral arguments : (2 )\n\nOral argument is exciting and will return rich dividends if it is done well.\n\nAnd I think it will be a sorry day for the American bar if the place of the oral argument in our appellate courts is depreciated and oral advocacy becomes looked upon as a proforma exercise which, because of tradition or because of the insistence of his client, a lawyer has to go through.\n\nThe importance of oral advocacy has been the subject of many articles by learned writers. As Frederick Bernays Wiener writes in the Harvard Law Review : (')\n\nAppellate judges, virtually without exception, say that a case should never be submitted without oral argument. A good many are on record in print to the same effect, and\n\n(l) Cornell Law Qly. Vol. 41 1955-56, p. 7.\n\n(2) Ibid p, 11.\n\n(3) Vol. 62, 1948, p. 59,\n\nadd that they feel a sense of genuine regret whenever the clerk announces that a case is being submitted on briefs alone. These expressions reflect the fact the task of jucJg .. ment is infinitely harder when counsel is not present to be questioned regarding his exact position or the limits of a principle he has an;.ued in the brie!.\n\nWe concm with the view expressed by American Judges on oral advocacy(!)\n\nIn the Supreme Court, flexibility is especially essential.\n\nChief .Justice Hughes in 1928 characterised the argument ' before I.he Supreme Court as \"oral discussions·. The then Professor Frankfurter stated in 1933, \"The atmosphere of the Court is uncongenial to oratory and the res ..\n\ntrictions imposed on counsel tend to deflate rhetoric.\n\nBut true argument-the exploration of issues, particularly through sharp questioning from the bench-continues to be one of the liveliest traditions of the Court.\"\n\nThus, among the methods of persuasion, the pawer of the spoken word cannot be sacrificed without paying too high a price in the quality of justice especially in the Supreme Court litigation.\n\nMaybe, that the brief is valuable; indeed, a well prepared brief gives the detailed story of the case; the oral argument gives the hi!; i:t spots. The supreme success of oral argument and the grave risk of jettisoning it from the\n\nrepert-0ire of persuasive arts in the judicial process consists in George Rossmans observation : (2)\n\nThe oral argument can portray the case as a human experience which engulfed the parties but which they could not solve.\n\nThus, the oral argument can help to keep the law human and adapted to the needs of life. It typifies the Bar at its best.\n\nWe may sum up that the value of oral submissions need not be under-rated nor of written briefs over-rated. A blend of both is the. best. It is apt to repeat the words of Judge Brian Mckenna.\n\nThe fault is that the rules of our procedure which by their discourageinent of written argument make possible extensively protracted bearings in open court. Those responsible might think more of changing them. In civil cases a written argument supplemented by a short oral discussion, would sometimes save a great deal of time.\n\n(1) Supreme Court Practice (supra) p. 316.\n\n(2) American Bar Association Journal (supra) p. 676.\n\nThe judicial process is in crisis not because there is a flood of (,\"ases flowing into the courts. In a developing country with an awakened people and democratic rights, it is inevitable that the Jitigative Ganga may swell in its stream, but as justice Warren Burger wrote:\n\nIn the final third of the century we are still trying to operate the courts with fundamentally the same basic methods, the same procedures and the same machinery, Roscoe Pound said were not good enough in 1906.\n\nIn the super-market age we are trying to operate the courts with cracker-barrel corner grocer methods and equipment---vintage 1900.\n\nWe have to introduce management techniques and sensitive ski!Js in the administration of justice if its present pathological conditions are to receive therapeutic attention.\n\nThe Rule regarding the disposal of review petitions by circulatory conference, supplemented by oral hearing in appropriate cases, is one small step in the right direction. Indeed, by modernising our procedure we are furthering social justice for which the litigant community is waiting.\n\nWe have set out the parameters of judicial procedure vis-a-vis original hearings and review hearings having due regard to the realities of forensic life. In the dynamics of hearing orality does play a role at the first round, but at the second round in the same court is partly expendable.\n\nAfter all, romance with oral hearing must terminate at some point. Nor can it be made a \"sacred cow\" of the judicial process.\n\nComparative law lends confidence and from that angle we may refer to Halsbury (Vol. 10, para 761) where disposal, without oral hearing, of petitions to leave to appeal to the House of Lords is mentioned.\n\nLikewise, American Jurisprudence (Vol. 5 para 979 espe.- cially footnote 13) endorses a similar procedure.\n\nSri Mfidul pressed upon us that this judge-made legislation at the highest level was so plainly violative of Art. 14-an objection not spelt out in any writ petition before us that, without seeking refuge under the rule of practice that a paint not raised in the writ petition may not be allowed to be urged, the ju4ges must invalidate their own handiwork.\n\nSurely, Justice and Truth are never afraid of exposure nor bothered about prestige.\n\nCertainly, drafting legilation is not an easy art and judges are not artists beyond their orbit. Even otherwise, Homer nods.\n\nTherefore, if we find our rules void we must declare so and we will.\n\nThe omission of the ground of discrimination in the pleadings may often forbid the argument because the other side may be prejudiced or the necessary facts may not be on record. But here\n\nI \\\n\nno such disability exists.\n\nA technical objection shonld not throw out A a suitor from the plea for justice.\n\nAfter all, the courts belong to the people, as Jerome Frank once said.\n\nAnd Etigants are legal patients suffering from injustices seeking healing for their wounds.\n\nWould you tell a sufferer in hospital that because he disclosed a certain symptom very lat.; i therefore he would be discharged without treatment for the sin of delayed disclosure ? Humanism, which, at bottom sustains justice, cannot refuse relief unless, by entertaining the plea, another may sustam injury.\n\nWe have permitted the contention and proceed to consider it.\n\nThe rule, on its face, affords a wider set of grounds for review for orders in civil proceedings, but limits the ground vis-a-vis criminal proceedings to 'errors apparent on the face of the record'. If at all, the concern of the law to avoid judicial error should be heightened when life or liberty is in peril since civil penalties are often less traumatic.\n\nSo, it is reasonable to assume that the framers of the rules could not have intended a restrictive review over criminal orders or judgments.\n\nIt is likely to be the other way about.\n\nSupposing an accused is sentenced to death by the Supreme Court and the 'deceased' shows up in court and the court discovers the tragic treachery of the recorded testimony.\n\nIs the Court helpless to review and set aside the sentence -0f hanging? We think not.\n\nThe power to review is in Art. 137 and it is equally wide in all proceedings.\n\nThe rule merely canalises the flow from the reservoir of power. The stream cannot stifle the source.\n\nMoreover, the dynamics of interpretation depend on the demand of the context and the lexical limits of the text.\n\nHere 'record' means any material which is already on record or may, with the permission of the court, be brought on record. If justice summons the judges to allow a vital material in, it becomes part of the record, and if apparent error is there, correction becomes necessitous.\n\nThe purpose is plain; the language is elastic and interpretation of a necessary power must naturally be expansive.\n\nThe substantive power :is derived from Art. 13 7 and is as wide for criminal as for civil proceedings. Even the difference in phraseology in the rule (Order 40 Rule 2) must, therefore, be read to encompass the same area and not to engraft an artificial divergence productive of anomaly.\n\nIf the expression 'record' is read to mean, in its semantic sweep, any material even later brought on record, with the leave of the court, it will embrace subsequent events, new light and other grounds which we find in Order 47 Rule 1 C. P. C.\n\nWe see no insuperable difficulty in equating the area in civil and criminal proceedings when review power is invoked from the same source.\n\nTrue, the review power vis-a-vis criminal matters was raised only in the course of the debate at the Bar.\n\nBut when the whole case is before us we must surely deal comprehensively with every aspect argued and not piecemeal with truncated parts. That will be avoidance of our obligation.\n\nWe have, therefore, cleared the ground as the question is of moment, of frequent occurrence and was mooted in the course of the hearing.\n\nThis pronouncement on review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings sets at rest a possible controversy and is as much binding on this Court itself (unless over-ruled) as on litigants.\n\nThat is the discipline of the law of precedents m; d the import of Art. 141.\n\nAs we conclude, we wish to set the sights aright vis-a-vis oral hearings in judicial proceedings.\n\nTo put superstitious faith in oral submissions or unlimited argumentation as the sole means of presentation and persuasion and to debunk the potency of well drawn-up manuscript representations may be condemned as absurd.\n\nTrue, our judicial culture nourishes oral advocacy and public hearing since secret cerebrations and cabal deliberations are ordinarily anathema.\n\nSpeaking generally, oral advocacy is a decisive art in promoting justice.\n\nThe Bench cannot dispense with the Bar. In our system advocacy becomes func- ., tional when present viva voce and is enfeebled if presented in muted\n\nprint.\n\nWe do not claim that orality can be given a permanent holiday.\n\nSuch_ an attitude is an over-reaction to argun1entun1 ad nauseum. But we must importantly underscore that while lawyer's advocacy cannot be made to judicial measure especially if judges are impatient, there is a strong case for processing argumentation by rationalisation, streamlining, abbreviation and in, special situations, elimination. Review proceedings in the Supreme Court belongs to the last category.\n\nThere is no rigidity about forensic strategies and the court must retain a flexible powa in regard to limitin~ the time of oral arguments or, in exceptional cases, eliminating orality altogether, the paramount principle being fair justice. Therefore, it is quite on the cards that where no injury to justice will be all, orality may suffer partial eclipse in the shape of time-limitation or substi1ution by written submission even in categories other than review proceedings.\n\nAli that we mean to indicate is that the mode of 'hearing', whether it should be oral or written or both, whether it should be full-length or rationed, must depend on n.yriad factors and future developments.\n\nJudges of the Supreme Court must be trusted in thi~ regard and the Bar will ordinarily be associated when decisions affecting processual justice are taken.\n\nWe thus see nc disparity given flexibility in decoding the meaning of meanings.\n\nH ,\\!it' We see no. for?e in the chllenges an.d do h?pe that th~ Br will\n\n'::> make its contnbutwn to makmg expenments m modermzahon nd\n\nhumanization of the Justice System and court culture.\n\n' ) ' -,, l_\n\n' I\n\nESWARA 'YER v. THE REGISTRAR (Pathak, J.) 911\n\nPATHAK, J. We are in general agreement with our brother V. R. Krishna Iyer on the points directly in controversy in this writ petition, but we consider it desirable to say a few words on certain aspects concerning the scope of Rule 3 of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.\n\nAt the outset, we may state that as we are considering the question of the need for an oral hearing in relation to a review application only, we refrain from expressing any opinion on the point whether an oral hearing is an imperative requirement in the dispo.; al of other kinds of cases brought before the Court. That is a point to which, we think, we should address ourselves only when it directly arises.\n\nIn regard to a review application we are clear that an oral hearing is not an essential requirement if on a preliminary examination the review application is found to be devoid of substance. A review application is an attempt to obtain a reconsideration of the judgment of the court disposing of the substantive proceeding.\n\nIt attempt~ nothing more.\n\nThe merits of the controversy have already been examined by the Court and, in view of the ordinary scope of the power of review, the re-examination sought cannot proceed beyond the controversy already disposed of.\n\nIt is substantially the same ground traversed again, either entirely or in part. However, the Rule takes care to provide for oral arguments should the Court consider that '.necessary.\n\nThat necessity may arise in either of two cases.\n\nOn the review application being placed before the judges, they will consider it together with any additional written arguments filed by the petitioner in supplementation of the review application. If the judges hold on that screening of the review application that there is no case whatever for review, they will reject the review application.\n\nOn the contrary, they may find that a good prima facie case for review has been made out, and so they will direct notice to issue to the respondent, and upon that an oral hearing will take place in the presence of the parties. That is one occasion on which an oral hearing isl necessary.\n\nIf the judges are not convinced that a prima facie case has been made out by the review application, but are also 'not satisfied that there is no merit whatever in it, and are of opinion that in order to come to a definite opinion prima facie on the merits of the review application it is desirable to hear the applicant orally they will '.notify him accordingly and afford an opporiunity of oral hearing. On such oral hearing, the judges may dismiss the review application if finally satisfied that there is no prima facie case for review, but in the event of a prima facie case being made out they will isisue notice to the respondent and an oral hearing will follow in the presence of the parties. It is apparent that the denial of oral argument is confined to the preliminary stage\n\n4-138SCI/80\n\nonly. when the review application is placed before the judges and, as it were, they screen it for the purpose of determining whether there is reason to proceed further in the matter or whether it merits outright rejection. It is not possible to hold on principle that at that preliminary stage also, the applicant fQr review is entitled to be heard orally. The merit of an oral hearing lies in this that counsel addressing the court are able to discern what are the aspects of the contr<>- versy on which more light is needed.\n\nThe Court likewise can utilise an oral hearing in order to express its doubts on a point and seek clarification thereon from cowu; el. But if there is on doubt whatever that the review appication 1' totally without substance, an oral hearin! becomes a superfluity and, at best, a mere formality.\n\nA written submission is capable of careful drafting and explicit expression, and is amenable to such arrangement in its written content that it pointedly brings to the notice of the reader the true scope and merit of the submission.\n\nWe do not believe that a written submission in a review application cannot do adequate justiee in the matter of setting forth the case of the litigant. If there is need for an oral hearing it is for the reason mentioned earlier, that counsel come to know of the doubts in the mind of the Court and the court has an opportunity of having its doubts resolved.\n\nIt is this feature of an oral hearing which gives to it its primary value and relevance.\n\nBut that an oral hearing is mandatory in all classes of cases and at every stage of every case is a proposition to which we find ourselves unable to acc'ede.\n\nThe writ petition is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 112, "entities": [{"text": "f\n\nP. N. ESW ARA IYER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "f\n\nP. N. ESW ARA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TilE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 87, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTilE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 1, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, S .. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, D. A. DESAI, B\n\nR. S. PATHAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S .. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 187, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Rules 1966", "statute": "Supreme Court Rules 1966"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 362, "end_char": 381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Order XL, rule 2(1) of the Supreme Court Rules (as amended) provides that an application for review shall be by a petition and shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Rules 1966", "statute": "Supreme Court Rules 1966"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4249, "end_char": 4254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "1975] 3 SCR 933", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4310, "end_char": 4325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 14", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4371, "end_char": 4386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Per Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4401, "end_char": 4411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Pathak and Koshal JJ (concurring)."}}, {"text": "Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4416, "end_char": 4422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Pathak and Koshal JJ (concurring)."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6874, "end_char": 6884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Balakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6919, "end_char": 6934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Nambpodiri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "M. K. D. Nambpodiri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6939, "end_char": 6958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nR. K. Garg, S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D. Nambpodiri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "Soll J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7000, "end_char": 7016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soll J. Sorabjee Sol.", "canonical_name": "Soll J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7031, "end_char": 7045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, E. C. Agarwala, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent, in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7047, "end_char": 7061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, E. C. Agarwala, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent, in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7071, "end_char": 7084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, E. C. Agarwala, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent, in W.P. No.", "canonical_name": "A. Sub- . hashini"}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7171, "end_char": 7183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and H. K. Puri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7188, "end_char": 7198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and H. K. Puri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7240, "end_char": 7251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "187 /\n\n~ A. K. Gupta, Vivek Seth, Miss Madhu Moolchandani and 0."}}, {"text": "Vivek Seth", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7253, "end_char": 7263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "187 /\n\n~ A. K. Gupta, Vivek Seth, Miss Madhu Moolchandani and 0."}}, {"text": "Madhu Moolchandani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7270, "end_char": 7288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "187 /\n\n~ A. K. Gupta, Vivek Seth, Miss Madhu Moolchandani and 0."}}, {"text": "Soli !. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7347, "end_char": 7363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli !.", "canonical_name": "Soll J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "A. K. Ganguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7477, "end_char": 7490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Ganguli and D., P. Mukherjee for the Petitioner in W.P.\n\nE- 238/79."}}, {"text": "P. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7499, "end_char": 7511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Ganguli and D., P. Mukherjee for the Petitioner in W.P.\n\nE- 238/79."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Ganguli and 0."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Sol.", "canonical_name": "Soll J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "A. Sub- . hashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7678, "end_char": 7695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Sub- .", "canonical_name": "A. Sub- . hashini"}}, {"text": "G. L. Sang", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7743, "end_char": 7753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sang hi and Miss Lily Thomas for the Petitioners in \\V.P.\n\nNos."}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7766, "end_char": 7777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sang hi and Miss Lily Thomas for the Petitioners in \\V.P.\n\nNos."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7836, "end_char": 7849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ") Dr. L. M. Singhvi and Sardar Bahadur Saharya for the intervener.", "canonical_name": "L. M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7854, "end_char": 7876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ") Dr. L. M. Singhvi and Sardar Bahadur Saharya for the intervener."}}, {"text": "V. R. Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7914, "end_char": 7932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D. A. Desai, JJ.", "canonical_name": "V. R. Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "D. A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7959, "end_char": 7970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of V. R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D. A. Desai, JJ.", "canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "R. S. Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8011, "end_char": 8023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave G a separate OpiniCJ:ll on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himself.", "canonical_name": "R. S. PATHAK"}}, {"text": "A. D. Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8070, "end_char": 8082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave G a separate OpiniCJ:ll on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himself.", "canonical_name": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8101, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J. Tersely expressed, this bunch of cases challenges the vires of a recent amendment made by the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8212, "end_char": 8225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER, J. Tersely expressed, this bunch of cases challenges the vires of a recent amendment made by the Supreme Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8232, "end_char": 8240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8991, "end_char": 8998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9087, "end_char": 9094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9374, "end_char": 9381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Bar Association", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9909, "end_char": 9938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apprehending maybe, the futuristic repercussions of a decision on these questions, even though now restricted to teview petitions, in other fields of 'hearing' at a later time, the Supreme Court Bar Association has intervened and argued to impugn the amended rule through , its President, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, in supplementation of parties' submissions."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10021, "end_char": 10034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apprehending maybe, the futuristic repercussions of a decision on these questions, even though now restricted to teview petitions, in other fields of 'hearing' at a later time, the Supreme Court Bar Association has intervened and argued to impugn the amended rule through , its President, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, in supplementation of parties' submissions.", "canonical_name": "L. M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "Art. 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10658, "end_char": 10666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10770, "end_char": 10780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "137 provides for review of judgments or orders of this Court, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rule made under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10804, "end_char": 10812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10897, "end_char": 10905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 145(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10998, "end_char": 11009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Premchand Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11495, "end_char": 11509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such rules, like any other law, are subject to the imperatives of Part III\n\ncand become non est if violative of the proscriptions and prescrip- A ' tions of the Constitution vide Premchand Garg's case(I)."}}, {"text": "Cromwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12168, "end_char": 12176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judge Learned Hand co=ended to the judges the great rule of humility co_ntained in the oft-repeated words of Cromwell : C\n\n\"I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken\" said Oliver Cromwell just before the battle of Dunbar."}}, {"text": "Oliver Cromwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12257, "end_char": 12272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judge Learned Hand co=ended to the judges the great rule of humility co_ntained in the oft-repeated words of Cromwell : C\n\n\"I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken\" said Oliver Cromwell just before the battle of Dunbar."}}, {"text": "Dunbar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12299, "end_char": 12305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judge Learned Hand co=ended to the judges the great rule of humility co_ntained in the oft-repeated words of Cromwell : C\n\n\"I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken\" said Oliver Cromwell just before the battle of Dunbar."}}, {"text": "13-3-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15994, "end_char": 16003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by GSR 387 dated 13-3-1978 and came into force on 18-3-78."}}, {"text": "18-3-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16027, "end_char": 16034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by GSR 387 dated 13-3-1978 and came into force on 18-3-78."}}, {"text": "-8-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16066, "end_char": 16071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Added by GSR 1024 dated 9-8-78 and came into force on 19-8-78."}}, {"text": "19-8-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16095, "end_char": 16102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Added by GSR 1024 dated 9-8-78 and came into force on 19-8-78."}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 S.C.R. 933", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21257, "end_char": 21276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order 47 Rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27803, "end_char": 27818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27820, "end_char": 27825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29117, "end_char": 29124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England and America where orality in advocacy has been apotheosised, certain extended stages of 'hearing' in the superior courts have been slimmed or removed."}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29129, "end_char": 29136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England and America where orality in advocacy has been apotheosised, certain extended stages of 'hearing' in the superior courts have been slimmed or removed."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29401, "end_char": 29405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, as Sri Garg rightly emphasised, has assigned special value to public hearing, and courts are not caves nor cloisters but shrines of justice accessible for public prayer to all the people."}}, {"text": "Lala Rmn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32345, "end_char": 32353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Lala Rmn's case(') this Court accented H on the essential distinction between an original application for the\n\nenforcement of fundamental rights and an application to review the A order made therein."}}, {"text": "Goldsmith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34913, "end_char": 34922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And a new skill-preparation of an effective brief, truly brief, highly telling and tersely instructive-is an art of the pen worth the acquisition especially when, in practice, there are many gifted lawyers who go with Goldsmith who 'wrote like an angel and talked like poor Paul'."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34976, "end_char": 34981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India is neither England nor America and our forensic technology must be fashioned by our needs and resources."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38301, "end_char": 38314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States the problem of a large number of frivolous petitions for re-hearing (in our diction, review) filed by counsel provoked the court into framing restrictive rules of hearing."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38930, "end_char": 38945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nrecent practice direction may be usefully referred to here :\n\nAs from October 1, 1976 Petitions for leave to appeal to the House of Lords will be referred to an Appeal Com- D mittee consisting of three Lords of Appeal, who will conside: whether the petition appears to be competent to be received by the House and, if so, whether it should be r.- ferred for an oral hearing."}}, {"text": "John M. Harlan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39393, "end_char": 39407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a petition is not considered fit for an oral hearing, the Clerk of the Parliaments will notify the parties that the petition is dismissed.£')\n\nJustice John M. Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, while ex• plaining the need for controlling court work within manageable proportions, (8) ..... .it would be short sighted and unwise not to recognise that preserving the certiorari system in good health, and in proper balance with the other work of the Court, are matters that will increasingly demand thoughtful and imaginative attention."}}, {"text": "U.S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39415, "end_char": 39433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where a petition is not considered fit for an oral hearing, the Clerk of the Parliaments will notify the parties that the petition is dismissed.£')\n\nJustice John M. Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, while ex• plaining the need for controlling court work within manageable proportions, (8) ..... .it would be short sighted and unwise not to recognise that preserving the certiorari system in good health, and in proper balance with the other work of the Court, are matters that will increasingly demand thoughtful and imaginative attention."}}, {"text": "Stern", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40074, "end_char": 40079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(emphasis added)\n\n(1) Supreme Court Practice by Stern & Gressman 1950 Ec!n."}}, {"text": "Gressman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40082, "end_char": 40090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(emphasis added)\n\n(1) Supreme Court Practice by Stern & Gressman 1950 Ec!n."}}, {"text": "Hart", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40141, "end_char": 40145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Hart and Wechsler, the Fedcrn\\ Courts and The Federal System, 2nd Edn."}}, {"text": "Wechsler", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40150, "end_char": 40158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Hart and Wechsler, the Fedcrn\\ Courts and The Federal System, 2nd Edn."}}, {"text": "U. S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40258, "end_char": 40277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that in the U. S. Supreme Court leave to appeal is decided in conference, not in court and even in regular hearing the maximum time for argument is often restricted in the highest court."}}, {"text": "George Rossman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41272, "end_char": 41286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The red light also marks the time to recess for lunch at two o'clock, and the end of the day's session at 4.30 p.m.\n\nD The rationale of redncing oral submissions without danger to efficacy or advocacy is explained by George Rossman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon : (')\n\n•/ Crowded dockets have forced appellate courts to curtail the time allotted for oral argument, with the result that some members of the profession wonder whether courts care for oral argument ...... The practice of today shows that advocacy can be effective even though the period of delivery is short.", "canonical_name": "George Rossmans"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Oregon", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41313, "end_char": 41336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The red light also marks the time to recess for lunch at two o'clock, and the end of the day's session at 4.30 p.m.\n\nD The rationale of redncing oral submissions without danger to efficacy or advocacy is explained by George Rossman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon : (')\n\n•/ Crowded dockets have forced appellate courts to curtail the time allotted for oral argument, with the result that some members of the profession wonder whether courts care for oral argument ...... The practice of today shows that advocacy can be effective even though the period of delivery is short."}}, {"text": "Delmar Karlan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41854, "end_char": 41867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delmar Karlan has correctly set out the situation : (')\n\nIn the United States, oral arguments are secondary in importance to the briefs, and are rigidly limited in duration."}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42036, "end_char": 42063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the United States Supreme Court, one hour is allowed to each side, but in many appellate courts, less time that is permitted, frequently no more than fifteen minutes or a half."}}, {"text": "Washington D.C.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43324, "end_char": 43339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The methods of the Marble Palace in Washington D.C. have some relevance though certainly not compulsiveness for us."}}, {"text": "John Frank", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43405, "end_char": 43415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "John Frank writes : (')\n\nAs the docket of the Court became more crowded, necessarily the time allowed for argument had to shrink."}}, {"text": "Hughes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43795, "end_char": 43801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Time is usually dgidly controlled; the legend is that Chief Justice Hughes once cut off an attorney in the middle of the word \"it\"."}}, {"text": "John P. Krank", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45021, "end_char": 45034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have stated enough to repel II\n\n(I) John P. Krank, Marble Reh.ce-The Supreme Covn in Americrn Life 1958 Edn p, 92."}}, {"text": "Harlan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45919, "end_char": 45925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Harlan has insisted that oral argument should play a leading part."}}, {"text": "Frederick Bernays Wiener", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47134, "end_char": 47158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Frederick Bernays Wiener writes in the Harvard Law Review : (')\n\nAppellate judges, virtually without exception, say that a case should never be submitted without oral argument."}}, {"text": "Harvard Law Review", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47173, "end_char": 47191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Frederick Bernays Wiener writes in the Harvard Law Review : (')\n\nAppellate judges, virtually without exception, say that a case should never be submitted without oral argument."}}, {"text": "Frankfurter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48057, "end_char": 48068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The then Professor Frankfurter stated in 1933, \"The atmosphere of the Court is uncongenial to oratory and the res ..\n\ntrictions imposed on counsel tend to deflate rhetoric."}}, {"text": "George Rossmans", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48865, "end_char": 48880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The supreme success of oral argument and the grave risk of jettisoning it from the\n\nrepert-0ire of persuasive arts in the judicial process consists in George Rossmans observation : (2)\n\nThe oral argument can portray the case as a human experience which engulfed the parties but which they could not solve.", "canonical_name": "George Rossmans"}}, {"text": "Brian Mckenna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49320, "end_char": 49333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is apt to repeat the words of Judge Brian Mckenna."}}, {"text": "American Bar Association Journal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49713, "end_char": 49745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) American Bar Association Journal (supra) p. 676."}}, {"text": "Warren Burger", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50016, "end_char": 50029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a developing country with an awakened people and democratic rights, it is inevitable that the Jitigative Ganga may swell in its stream, but as justice Warren Burger wrote:\n\nIn the final third of the century we are still trying to operate the courts with fundamentally the same basic methods, the same procedures and the same machinery, Roscoe Pound said were not good enough in 1906."}}, {"text": "Roscoe Pound", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50201, "end_char": 50213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a developing country with an awakened people and democratic rights, it is inevitable that the Jitigative Ganga may swell in its stream, but as justice Warren Burger wrote:\n\nIn the final third of the century we are still trying to operate the courts with fundamentally the same basic methods, the same procedures and the same machinery, Roscoe Pound said were not good enough in 1906."}}, {"text": "Mfidul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51581, "end_char": 51587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Mfidul pressed upon us that this judge-made legislation at the highest level was so plainly violative of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51686, "end_char": 51693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Homer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52132, "end_char": 52137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even otherwise, Homer nods."}}, {"text": "Jerome Frank", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52565, "end_char": 52577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After all, the courts belong to the people, as Jerome Frank once said."}}, {"text": "Art. 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53885, "end_char": 53893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54589, "end_char": 54596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 40 Rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54701, "end_char": 54716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 47 Rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55057, "end_char": 55072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55900, "end_char": 55908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ESWARA 'YER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58222, "end_char": 58233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ) ' -,, l_\n\n' I\n\nESWARA 'YER v. THE REGISTRAR (Pathak, J.) 911\n\nPATHAK, J. We are in general agreement with our brother V. R. Krishna Iyer on the points directly in controversy in this writ petition, but we consider it desirable to say a few words on certain aspects concerning the scope of Rule 3 of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58269, "end_char": 58275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ) ' -,, l_\n\n' I\n\nESWARA 'YER v. THE REGISTRAR (Pathak, J.) 911\n\nPATHAK, J. We are in general agreement with our brother V. R. Krishna Iyer on the points directly in controversy in this writ petition, but we consider it desirable to say a few words on certain aspects concerning the scope of Rule 3 of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966."}}, {"text": "V. R. Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58325, "end_char": 58343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ) ' -,, l_\n\n' I\n\nESWARA 'YER v. THE REGISTRAR (Pathak, J.) 911\n\nPATHAK, J. We are in general agreement with our brother V. R. Krishna Iyer on the points directly in controversy in this writ petition, but we consider it desirable to say a few words on certain aspects concerning the scope of Rule 3 of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.", "canonical_name": "V. R. Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58506, "end_char": 58547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_913_923_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "JOLLY GEORGE VERGHESE & ANR. v.\n\nTHE BANK OF COCHIN\n\nFebruary 4, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nCode of Civil Procedure-Section 51, Ordet 21, rule 37-Scope of-' Debtor, if could be imprisoned for failure to pay his deb,/lmprisonment M•hen could be ordered.\n\nThe appellants were the judgment.debtors while the respondent-bank Wes the decreeholder. In eixecution of the decree a warrant for arrest and detention in civil prison was issued to the appellants under section 51 and order 21, rule 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On an earlier occa.sion there had been a simi Jar warrant for arrest in execution of the same decree. The decree-holders also proceeded against the properties of the judgment-debtors and in consequence all their immovable properties had been attached for the purpose of sale in dis charge of the decree-debts. A receiver was appointed by the cxecntion court to manage the properties under attachment. Even so, the court had issued a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtors became on an earlier occasion a similar warrant bad already been issued without any in.estigation as regards. the cnrrcnt ability of the judgment-debtors to clear off the debts or their mala-fide refusal, if any, to discharge the debts.\n\nOn the question whether under such circumstances personal freedom of the judgment-debtors can be held to ransom until repayment of the debt.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. The words in section 51 which hurt are \"or has had since the '} ,, date of the decree the means to pay the amount of the decree.\" Superficially \"\"'-- read this implies that if at any time after the passing of en old decree the judg\n\nment-debtor had come by some resources and had not discharged the decree he could be detained in prison even though at that later point of time he was found to be penniless. This is not a sound position, apart from being inhuman i.. going by the stendards of Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and ]J Political Rights and Article 21.\n\nA simple default to discharge is not enough.\n\nThere must be some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the past or alternatively current moons to -\\ pay the decree or a substantial part of it. The provision emphasises the need i to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal on demand\n\nverging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree. Considera tions of the debtor's other pressing needs Ond straitened circumstances will play\n\n~ prominently. [922E-GJ\n\n2. Unless there be some other vice or mens rea apart from failure to foot the decree, international law frowns on holding. the debtor's person in civil prison, as hostage by the court. India is now a signatory to this Covenant and ',- Article Sl(c) of the Constitution obligates the State to \"foster respect for\n\ninternational law am.d treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another\". Even so, until the Municipal Law is changed to accommodate the Covenant what binds the courts is the former not the latter. [918A-Bl '1\n\n3. Quondom affluence and current indigence without intervening dishonesty or bad faith in liquidating his liability can be consistent with Article 11 of th• Covenant because then no detention is permissible under section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [9210] •\n\n4. The high value of human dignity and the worth of the human person enshrined in Article 21, read with Articles 14 and 19, obligates the State not to incarcerate except under law which is fair, just and reasonable in its procedural essence. To cast a person in prison because, of his poverty and comequent inability to meet his contractual liability is appalling. To be poor is no crime and to \"recover\" debts by the procedure of putting one in prison is flagrantly violative of Article 21 unless there is proof of the minimal fairness of bis wilful failure to pay in spite of his sufficient means and absence of more terribly pressing claims on his means such as medical bills to treat cancer or other grave illness.\n\nUnreasonableness and unfairness in such a procedure is inferable from Article 11 of the Covenant But this is precisely the interpretation put on the proviso to section 51 C.P.C. and the lethal blow of Article 21 cannot strike down the provision as interpreted. [922A-Dl\n\nCrvlL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1991 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 9-7-1979 of the Kerala High Court in C.R.P. No. 1741 of 1979.\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader and K. M. K. Nair for the Appellants.\n\nK. M. Iyer and V. J. Franci~ for the) Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ,..\n\nKRISHNA IYER. J.-This litigation has secured special leave~)..·\n\nfrom us because it involves a profound issue of constitutional and international law and offers a challenge to the nascent champions of human rights in India whose politicised pre-occupation has forsaken the civil debtor whose personal liberty is imperilled by the judicial process it&elf, thann to 1. 51 (Proviso) and O. 21, r. 37, Civil Procedure Code.\n\nHere is an appeal by judgment-debtors-- the appellants-whose personal freedom is in peril because a court warrant for arrest and detention in the civil prison is chasing them for non-payment of an amount due to a bank-the respondent, which ha~ ripened into a decree and has not yet been discharged.\n\nIs such deprivation of liberty illegal?\n\nFrom the perspective of international Jaw the questiQn posed is whether it is right to enforce a contractual liability by imprisoning ./\n\n• •\n\n, J. G. VERGHESE v. BANK OF COClllN (Krishna Iyer,!.) 915\n\na debtor in the teeth of Art. 11 of the International Covenant on A Civil and Political Rights. The Article reads: No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. (Emphasis added)\n\nAn apercu of Art. 21 of the Conslitutiou suggests the question whether it is fair procedure to deprive a person of his personal liberty merely because he has not discharged tds contractual liability in the face of the constitutional protection of He and liberty as expounded and expanded by a chain of rulings o[ this Court beginning with Maneka Gandhi's case.(') Article 21 mads:\n\n21. Protection of life and personal liberty.-No person shall be deprived of his life or :personal lib<:rty except according to procedure established by law.\n\nA third, though humdrum, question is as to whether, in this case, s. 51 has been complied with in its enlightened signification.\n\nThls turns on the humane meaning of the provision .\n\nSome minimal facts may bear a brief J!arration sufficient to bring the two problems we have indicated, although we must candidly state that the Specal Leave Petition is innocent of these two issues\n\nand the arguments at the bar have avoided virgin adventures. Even E so, the points have been raised and counsel have helped with their submissions. We therefore, proceed to decide.\n\nThe facts. The judgment-del:Jtors (appellants) suffered a decree against them in O.S. No. 57 of 1972 in a sum of Rs. 2.5 lakhs, the respondent-bani:: being the decree-holder.\n\nThere are two other\n\n(I' money decrees against the appellants (in O.S. 92 of 1972 and 94 of 1974), the total sum payable by them being over Rs. 7 lakhs. In execution of the decree in question (O.S. 57 of 1972) a warrant for arrest and detention in the civil prison was issued to the appellants under s. 51 and 0.21, r. 37 of the Civil Procedure Code on 22-6-1979. Earlier, there had been a similar warrant for arrest in G execution of the same decree.\n\nBesides this process, the decreeholders had proceeded against the properties of the judgment.-debtors and in consequence, all these immo¥able properties had been at\\ached for the purpose of sale in discharge of the decree debts.\n\nIt is averred that the execution court has also appointed a Receiver for the management of the properties under attachment. In short, B\n\n(1) Maneka Gm1dh iv. Union of India, [1978] l S.C.C. 248.\n\nthe enjoyment or even the power to alienate the properties by the judgment-debtors has been forbidden by the court direction keeping them under attachment and appointing a Receiver to manage !hem.\n\nNevertheless, the court has issued a warrant for arrest because, on an earlier occasion, a similar warrant had been already issued. The High Court, in a short order, has summarily dismi; sed the revision filed by the judgment-debtors against the order oi arrest.\n\nWe see no investigation having been made by the executing court regarding the c1ment ability of the judgment-debtors to clear off the debts or their mala fide refusal, if any, to discharge the debts.\n\nThe question is whether under such circumstances the personal freedom of the judgment-debtors can be held in ransom until repayment of the debt, and if s. 51 read with 0. 21, r. 37, C.P.C. does warrant such a step, whether the provision of law is constitutional. tested on the touchstone of fair procedure under Art. 21 and in conformity with the inherent dignity of the human person in the light of Art. 11 of the International Covenant on avil and Political Rights.\n\nA modem Shylock is shackled by law's humane hand-cuffs.\n\nAt this stage, we may notice the two provisions .. Section 51 runs thus:\n\n51. Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, on the application of the decree-holder, order execution of the decree-\n\n( a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed;\n\n(b) by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property;\n\n(c) by arrest and detention in prison; ·) ( d) by appointing a receiver; or\n\n( e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require.\n\nProvided that, where the decree is for the payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless, after giving the judgment-debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to prison, the Court, for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied-\n\n( a) that the judgment-debtor, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree-\n\n(i) is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or\n\n(ii) has, after the in, stitution of the suit in which the A decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed, or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of , bad faith in relation to his property, or\n\n(b) that the judgment-debtor has, or has had since the date of the deem:, the means to pay the amount of the decree or some substantial part thereof and refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same, or\n\n( c) that the decree is for a sum for which !lie judgrnentdebtor was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account.\n\nExplanation.-In the calculation of the means of the judgmentdebtor for the purposes of clause (b), there shall be left out of account any property which, by or under any law or custom having the force of law for the time being in force, is exempt from attachment in execution of the decree.\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\nWe may here read also order 21 Rule 37 :\n\n37. (1) Notwithstanding anything in these rules, where an application is for the execution of a decree for the payment of money by the arrest and detention il'l the civil prison of a judgment-debtor who is liable to be arrested in pursuance of the application, the Court shall, instead of issuing a warrant for his arrest, issue a notice calling upon him to appear before the Court on a day to be specfiied in the notice and show cause why he should not be committed to the civil primi:\n\nProvided that such notice shall not be necessary if the Court is satisfied, by affidavit, or otherwise, that, with the object or effect of delaying the execution of the decree, the judgment-debtor is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court.\n\n(2) Where appearance is not made in obedience to the notice, the Court shall, if the decree-holder so requires, issue a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtor.\n\nRight at the beginning, we may take up the bearing of Art. 11 H on the law that is to be applied by an Indian Court whn there is a specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code, authorising detention\n\nfor non-payment of a decree debt.\n\nThe Covenant bans imprisonment merely for not discharging a decree debt.\n\nUnless there be iome other vice or mens rea apart from failure to foot the decree, nternational law frowns on holding the debtor's person in civil prison, as hostage by the court.\n\nIndia is now a signatory to this Covenant and Art. 51 ( c) of the Constitution obligates the State to \"foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another\".\n\nEven so, until the municipal law is changed to accommodate the Covenant what binds the court is the former, not the latter. A. H. Robertson in \"Human Rightsin National and International Law\" rightly points out that international conventional law must go through the process of transformation into the municipal law before the international treaty can become an internal law.(1)\n\nFrom the national point of view the national , rules alone count. ...... With regard to interpretation, however, it is a principle generally recognised in nationaj legal system that, in the event of doubt, the national rule is to be interpreted in accordance with the State's international obligations.\n\nThe position has been spelt out correctly in a Kerala ruling(') on the same point.\n\nIn that case, a judgment-debtor was sought to be detained under 0. 21, r. 37 C.P.C. although he was seventy and had E spent away on his illness the means he once had to pay off tl1e decree.\n\nThe observations there made are apposite and may bear excerption :\n\nThe last argument which consumed most of the time of the long arguments of. learned counsel for the appellant is that the International Covenants on Civil and Political :r Rights are part of the law of the land and have to be respe<*- ed by the Municipal Courts. Article 11, which I have extracted earlier, grants immunity from imprisonment to indigent but honest judgment-debtors.\n\nThe march of civilization has been a story of progressive subordination of property rights to personal freedom; and a by-product of this subordination finds noble expression in the declaration that \"No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.\" This revolutionary change in the regard for the human person is spanned by the possible shock that a resuscitated Shylock\n\nwould suffer if a modern Daniel were to come to judgment\n\n(I) p. 13.\n\n(2) Xavier v. Canara Bank Ltd., 1969 KLT 927 at 931, 933.\n\nwhen the former asks the pound of flesh from Antonio's bosom according to the tenor of the bond, by flatly refusing the mayhem on the debtor, because the inability of an impecunious obligee shall not imperil his liberty or person under the new dispensation proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Viewed in this progressive perspective we may examine whether there is any conflict between s. 51 CPC and Article 11 of the International Covenants quoted above. As already indicated by me, this latter provision only interdicts imprisonment if that is sought solely on the ground of inability to fulfil the obligation. Section 51 also declares that if the debtor has no means to pay he cannot be arrested and detained. If he has and still refuses or neglects to honour his obligation or if he commits actS of bad faith, he incurs the liability to imprisonment under s. 51 of the Code, but this does not violate the mandate of Article 11. However, if he once had the means but now has not or if he has money now on which there are other pressing claims, it is violative\\ of the spirit of Article 11 to arrest and confine him in jail so as to coerce him into payment. .....\n\nThe judgment dealt with the effect of international law and the enforceability of such Jaw at the instance of individuals within the State, arid <>bserved:\n\nThe remedy for breaches of International Law in general is not to be found in the law courts of the State because International Law per se or proprio vigore has not the force or authority of civil law, till under its inspirational impact actnal legislation is undertaken.\n\nI agree that the Declaration of Human Rights merely sets a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations but cannot create a binding set of rules. Member States may seek, through appropriate agencies, to initiate action when these basic rights are violated; but individual citizens cannot complain about their breach in the municipal courts even if the country concerned! has adopted the covenants and ratified the operational protocol. The individual cannot come to Court but may complain to the Human Rights Committee, which, in turn, will set in motion other procedures. In short, the basic human rights enshrined in the International Covenants above referred to, may at best inform judicial institutions and inspire legislative action within member-States; but apart from such deep reverence, remedial action\n\nat the instance of an aggrieved individual is beyond the area of judicial anthority.\n\nWhile considering the international impact of international covenants on municipal Jaw, the decision concluded :\n\nIndeed the construction I have adopted of s. 51, CPC has the flavour of Article 11 of the Human Rights Covenants.\n\nCounsel for the appellant insisted that law and justice must be on speaking terms-by justice he meant, in the present case1 that a debtor unable to pay must not be getained in civil prison.\n\nBut my interpretation does put law and justice on speaking terms. Ccunsel for the respondent did argue that International Law is the vanishing point of jurisprudence is itself vanishing in a world where humanity is moving steadily, though slowly, towards a world order, led by that intensely active, although yet ineffectual body, the United Nations Organisation.\n\nIts resolutions and covenants mirror the conscience of mank4id and insominate, within the member States, progressive legislation; but till this last step of actual enactment of law takes place, the citizen in a world of sovereign States, has only inchoate rights in the domestic Courts under these international covenants.\n\nWhile dealing with the impact of the Dicean rule of Jaw on pCJi; itive law, Hood Phillips wrote--and this is all that the Covenant means now for Indian courts administering mnnicipal Jaw Cl\n\nThe significance of this kind of doctrine for the English lawyer is that it finds expression in three ways. First. it influences legislators. The substantive law at any given time may approximate to the \"rule of Jaw'', but this oniy at the will of Parliament. Secondly, its principles provide canons of interpretation which express the individualistic attitude of English courts and of those courts which have followed the English tradition.\n\nThey give an indication of how the Jaw will be applied and legislation interpreted.\n\nEnglish courts lean in favour of the liberty of the citizen, especially of his person : they interpret strictly statutes which purport to diminish that liberty, and presume that Parliament does not intend to restrict private rights in the absence of dear words to the contrary.\n\n(1) O. Hood Phillips' Constitutional and Administrathc lc:'v 6th Edn.\n\np.40.\n\nThe positive commitment of the States Parties ignites legislative A action at home but does not automatically make the Covenant an enforceable part of the corpus juris of India.\n\nIndeed, the Central Law Commission, in its Fifty Fourth Report, did cognise the Covenant, while dealing with s. 51 C.P.C. : (1)\n\nThe question to be considered is, whether this mode of B execution should be retained on the statute book, particularly in view of the provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibiting imprisonment for a mere non-performance of contract.\n\nTue Law Commission, in its unanimous report, quoted the key passages C from the Kera/a ruling referred to above and endorsed its ratio. 'We\n\nagree with this view' said the Law Commission and adopting that meaning as the correct one did not recommend further change on this facet of the Section. It is important to notice that, interpretationally speaking, the Law Commission accepted the dynamics of the changed circumstances of the debtor : (') I>\n\nHowever, if he once had the means but now has not, -or if he has money now on which there are other pressing claims, it is violative of the spirit of Article 11 to arrest and confine him in jail so as to coerce him into payment.\n\nThis is reiterated by the Commission :\n\nImprisonment is not to be ordered merely because, like Shylock, the creditor says : (8)\n\n\"I crave the law, the penalty and forfeit of my bond.\"\n\nThe law does recognise the principle that \"Mercy is rea- F sonable in the time of affliction, as clouds of rain in the time of drought.\" ( 4 )\n\nWe concur with the Law Commission in its construction of s. 51 C.P.C. It follows that quondam afiluence and current indigence without intervening dishonesty or bad faith in liquidating his liability can be consistent with Art. 11 of the Covenant, because then no detention G is permissible under s. 51, C.P.C.\n\nEqually meaningful is the import of Art. 21 of the Constitution in ; ntext of imprisonment for non-payment of debts.\n\nThe high\n\n(l) p, 38.\n\n(2) ibid p, 41.\n\n(3) Merchant of Venice, Act, 4, Scene l.\n\n(4) Ecclesiasticus, 35 20.\n\nvalue of human dignity and the worth of the human person en.shrined in Art. 21, read with Arts. 14 and 19, obligates the State not to incarcerate except under law which is fair, just and reasonable in its procedural essence.\n\nManeka Gandhi's case(1) as developed further in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration('), Sita Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P.( 3) and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration(') lays down the proposition. It is too obvious to need elaboration that to cast a person in prison because of his poverty and con&equent inability to meet his contractual liability is appalling.\n\nTo be poor, in this land of daridra Narayana, is no crime and to 'recover' debts by the procedure of putting one in prison is too flagrantly violative of Art. 21 unless there is proof of the minimal fairness of his wilful failure to pay in spite of his sufficient means and absence of more terribly pressing claims on his means such as medical bills to treat cancer or other grave illness.\n\nUnreasonableness and unfairness in such a procedure is inferable from Art. 11 of the Covepant.\n\nBut this is precisely the interpretation we have put on the Proviso to s. 51 C.P.C. and the lethal blow of Art. 21 can'not strike down the provision, as now interpreted.\n\nThe words which hurt are \"or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay th~ amount of the decree\". This implies, superficially read, that if at any time after the passing of an old decree the judgment-debtor had come by some resources and had , not discharged the decree, he could be detained in prison even though at that later point of time he was found to be penniless.\n\nThis is not a sound position apart from being inhuman going by the standards of Art. 11 (of the Covenant) and Art. 21 (of the Constitution). The .simple default to discharge is not enough.\n\nThere must b~ some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the past or, alternatively, current means to pay the decree or a substantial part of it.\n\nThe provision emphasises the need to establish not mere omission to pay but an attitude of refusal on demand verging on dishonest disowning of the obligation under the decree.\n\nHere considerations of the debtor's other pressing needs and straitened circumstances will play prominently.\n\nWe would have, by this construction, sauced Jaw with justice, harmonised s. 51 with the Covenant and the Constitution.\n\nThe question may squarely arise some day as to whether the Proviso to s. 51 read with 0. 21, r. 37 is in excess of the Constitutional\n\n(I) [1978] I S.C.R. 248.\n\n(2) [1978] 4 s.c.c. 494.\n\n(3) [19791 2 S.C.R. 1085.\n\n(4) [1980] 2 S.C.R. 557.\n\nmandate in Art. 21 and bad in part.\n\nIn the present case since we A are remitting the matter for reconsideration, the stage has not yet arisen for us to go into the vires, that is why we are desisting from that essay.\n\nIn the present case the debtors are in distress because of the blanket distraint of their properties. Whatever might have been their means once, that finding has become obsolete in view of later happenings; Sri Krishnamurthi Iyer for the respondent fairly agreed that the law being what we have stated, it is necessary to direct the executing court to re-adjudicate on the present means of the debtors vis a vis the present pressures of their indebtedness, or alternatively whether they have had the ability to pay but have improperly evaded or postponed doing so or otherwise dishonestly committed acts of bad faith respecting their assets.\n\nThe court will take note of other honest and urgent pressures o'n their assets, since that is the exercise expected of the court under the proviso to s. 51. An earlier adjudication will bind if relevant circumstances have not materially changed.\n\nWe set aside the judgment under appeal and direct the executing court to deciile de novo the means of the judgment-debtors to discharge the decree in the light of the interpretation we have given.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "JOLLY GEORGE VERGHESE & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JOLLY GEORGE VERGHESE & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE BANK OF COCHIN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BANK OF COCHIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 4, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTHE BANK OF COCHIN\n\nFebruary 4, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. 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M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4558, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and K. M. K. Nair for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and K. M. K. Nair for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "K. M. Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. Iyer and V. J. Franci~ for the) Respondent."}}, {"text": "V. J. Franci~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4631, "end_char": 4644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. M. Iyer and V. J. Franci~ for the) Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4715, "end_char": 4727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ,..\n\nKRISHNA IYER.", "canonical_name": "Krishnamurthi Iyer"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5113, "end_char": 5133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5704, "end_char": 5711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5922, "end_char": 5929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6248, "end_char": 6261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 of the Conslitutiou suggests the question whether it is fair procedure to deprive a person of his personal liberty merely because he has not discharged tds contractual liability in the face of the constitutional protection of He and liberty as expounded and expanded by a chain of rulings o[ this Court beginning with Maneka Gandhi's case.(')"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6515, "end_char": 6520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7257, "end_char": 7262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7384, "end_char": 7389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 51 and 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7489, "end_char": 7500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22-6-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7542, "end_char": 7551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of the decree in question (O.S. 57 of 1972) a warrant for arrest and detention in the civil prison was issued to the appellants under s. 51 and 0.21, r. 37 of the Civil Procedure Code on 22-6-1979."}}, {"text": "Maneka Gm1dh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8013, "end_char": 8025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In short, B\n\n(1) Maneka Gm1dh iv."}}, {"text": "s. 51 read with 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8883, "end_char": 8900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8913, "end_char": 8918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9131, "end_char": 9138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "order 21 Rule 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11158, "end_char": 11174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12167, "end_char": 12174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Court whn there is a specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12216, "end_char": 12290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12651, "end_char": 12658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Court whn there is a specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Indian Court whn there is a specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "A. H. Robertson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12949, "end_char": 12964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. H. Robertson in \"Human Rightsin National and International Law\" rightly points out that international conventional law must go through the process of transformation into the municipal law before the international treaty can become an internal law.(1)\n\nFrom the national point of view the national , rules alone count. ......"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13555, "end_char": 13561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position has been spelt out correctly in a Kerala ruling(') on the same point."}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13669, "end_char": 13674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14114, "end_char": 14124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Shylock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14645, "end_char": 14652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This revolutionary change in the regard for the human person is spanned by the possible shock that a resuscitated Shylock\n\nwould suffer if a modern Daniel were to come to judgment\n\n(I) p. 13."}}, {"text": "Antonio", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14828, "end_char": 14835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when the former asks the pound of flesh from Antonio's bosom according to the tenor of the bond, by flatly refusing the mayhem on the debtor, because the inability of an impecunious obligee shall not imperil his liberty or person under the new dispensation proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15189, "end_char": 15194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15195, "end_char": 15198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15203, "end_char": 15213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15416, "end_char": 15426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15663, "end_char": 15668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15723, "end_char": 15733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15884, "end_char": 15894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17473, "end_char": 17478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17480, "end_char": 17483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17503, "end_char": 17513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "United Nations Organisation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18072, "end_char": 18099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ccunsel for the respondent did argue that International Law is the vanishing point of jurisprudence is itself vanishing in a world where humanity is moving steadily, though slowly, towards a world order, led by that intensely active, although yet ineffectual body, the United Nations Organisation."}}, {"text": "Hood Phillips", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18502, "end_char": 18515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While dealing with the impact of the Dicean rule of Jaw on pCJi; itive law, Hood Phillips wrote--and this is all that the Covenant means now for Indian courts administering mnnicipal Jaw Cl\n\nThe significance of this kind of doctrine for the English lawyer is that it finds expression in three ways."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18865, "end_char": 18875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substantive law at any given time may approximate to the \"rule of Jaw'', but this oniy at the will of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Central Law Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19693, "end_char": 19715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the Central Law Commission, in its Fifty Fourth Report, did cognise the Covenant, while dealing with s. 51 C.P.C. : (1)\n\nThe question to be considered is, whether this mode of B execution should be retained on the statute book, particularly in view of the provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibiting imprisonment for a mere non-performance of contract."}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19790, "end_char": 19795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19796, "end_char": 19801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20681, "end_char": 20691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21147, "end_char": 21152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21153, "end_char": 21158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21312, "end_char": 21319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21386, "end_char": 21391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21393, "end_char": 21398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21437, "end_char": 21444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Merchant of Venice", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21562, "end_char": 21580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Merchant of Venice, Act, 4, Scene l.\n\n(4) Ecclesiasticus, 35 20."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21699, "end_char": 21706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21718, "end_char": 21733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22370, "end_char": 22377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22677, "end_char": 22684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22774, "end_char": 22779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22780, "end_char": 22785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22810, "end_char": 22817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23340, "end_char": 23347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23370, "end_char": 23377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24016, "end_char": 24021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 51 read with 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24133, "end_char": 24150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 S.C.R. 557", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24281, "end_char": 24300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24314, "end_char": 24321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishnamurthi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24733, "end_char": 24751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever might have been their means once, that finding has become obsolete in view of later happenings; Sri Krishnamurthi Iyer for the respondent fairly agreed that the law being what we have stated, it is necessary to direct the executing court to re-adjudicate on the present means of the debtors vis a vis the present pressures of their indebtedness, or alternatively whether they have had the ability to pay but have improperly evaded or postponed doing so or otherwise dishonestly committed acts of bad faith respecting their assets.", "canonical_name": "Krishnamurthi Iyer"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25315, "end_char": 25320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_2_924_1004_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL, HYDERABAD ETC. ETC. v.\n\nGOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. ETC.\n\nFebruary 4, 1980 [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI AND\n\nP. s. KAlLASAM, JJ.]\n\nAndhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act 1975-Sections 3 to 1-Validity of-Provisions if violate constitutional guarantee in Art. 30(1).\n\nConstitution of India 1950-Article 30(1)-Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 1915-lf offends against Art. 30(1).\n\nThe purported object of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act 1975 was to regulate the service conditions of teachers in private educational institutions and for ensuring the security of service of the teachers. Section 3 (I) of the Act provides : \"Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher employed in any private educa tional institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority\". The proviso to this sub-section states that if any educational management etc. contravenes the provisions of this sub-section, the teacher affected shall be deemed to be in service. Where a proposal to dismiss etc. any teacher is communicated to the competent authority, according to sub-section\n\n(2) of this section, that authority shall, if satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of appointment. Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of this section states that no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be placed under suspension, except when an enquiry into the gross 'misconduct of such teacher is conten1plated.\n\nClause (b) provides that no such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher.\n\nThe proviso states that the competent authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months for a further period not exceeding two months, if in his opinion, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attnbutable to each teacher.\n\nSection 4 gives a right of appeal to teachers employed in private educational institutions against orders of punishment imposed on them.\n\nSection 5 deals with special provisions regarding appeal in certain past dis ciplinary cases.\n\nSection 6 which deals with retrenchment of teachers provides that where retrenchment of any teacher is rendered necessary consequent on any order of the Government relating to education or course of instructions or to any other matter, such retrenchment may be effeoted with the prior approval of the competent authority.\n\nSection 7 provides for payment of pay and allowances to teachers in the ¥-·-\n\n1 •\n\nALL SAINTS !IlGH SCHOOL V. GOVT. OF A.P. 92 5\n\nThe appellants who were minority educational institutions established by A members of the Christian commnnity filed writ petitions before the High Court impugning various provisions of the Act as being violative of the &'llarantee con 1ained in Article 30 (I) of the Constitution by permitting or compelling interference with the internal administration of their private educational institutiions.\n\nIn particular they challenged the provisions of sections 3 to 7 of the Act on the gronnd that they deprive them of their right to administer the affairs Of minority institutions by vesting the ultimate administrative control in an out B side authority. The contentions having been rejected by the High Court they filed appeals by special leave.\n\nHELD s Permajorily-(Chandrachud, CJ., and Fazal Ali, J.-Kailasam, J., dissenting.) :\n\nSub-sections (I) and (2) of section 3 are invalid and cannot be applied to minority institutions.\n\nPer majorily-(Chandrachnd, C.J., and Kailasam J.-Fazal Ali, J. dissent. mg).\n\nClauses (a) and (b) of section 3(3) do not offend against Art. 30(1) and are valid.\n\nBy the Court: Sections 4 &. 5 are unconstitutional as being Yiolative of Art. l'\n\nSO(IJ.\n\n• Per majority IChandrachnd, C.J., and Kailasam J-Fao:al Ali, J, dissenting) •\n\nSection 6 is valid.\n\nBy the Court : Section 7 is valid.\n\n) Per Chandrachud, C.J.\n\n_> ,\n\nSection 3 ( 1) and 3 (2) are unconstitutional in so far as they are made applicable to minority institutions since in practice these provisions are bound to interfere substantially With their right to administer institutions of their choice.\n\n[937E]\n\nI. (a) Section 3 (I) gives an unqualified mandate that no teache\" shall be dismissed etc. except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Under the proviso, contravention of the !ection results in a total invalidation of the proposed action. lf the section is contravened the teacher shall be deemed to be in service. Secondly, the sub-section applies not only to cases in which the teacher is punished by an order of dismissal etc. but to cases in which the appointment is otherwise terminated.\n\nAn order of termination simpliciter is also required to be submitted for the prior approval of the competent autbo~ rity.\n\nAll this shows that the true object of the sub-section is not that which one could liberally assume by reading down the section.\n\n[935H; 936ABJ\n\n(b) In the absence of any rules furnishing guidelines on the subject, it is difficult to predicate that in practice the operation of the section would be limited to a certain class of cases only.\n\nThe absence of rules on the subject makes the unguided discretion of the competent authority the sole arbiter of the question as to which cases would fall within the section and which would fall outside it.\n\n[936 B-F]\n\n(c) Section 3(2), nnder the guise on coaferring the power of approval, B confers upon the competent authority an appellate power of great magnitude.\n\nThat authority is made a judge both 'll facts and on law by the conferment upon\n\nit of a power to test the validity of the proposal on the vastly subjective touchstone of adequacy and reasonableness. The sub-section leaves no scope for\n\nreeding down the provision of section 3 ( 1). The two sub-sections together confer upon the competent authority, in. the absence of proper rules, a wide and untrammelled discretion to interfere with the proposed orde.r whenever in its opinion the order is based on grounds \\Vhich do not appear to it either adequate or reasonable. [936G-H; 937Al\n\n(d) Though the section provides that the competent authority \"shall\" approve. the proposed order if it is satisfied th11t it is based on adequate and reasonable grounds, its plain and necessary implication is that it shall not approve the proposal unless it is satisfied. The conferment of such a power on an outside authority, the exercise of which is ma.de to depend purely on subjective consideration 0rising out of twin formula of adequacy and reasonableness, cannot but constitute an infringement of the right guaranteed by article 30(1).\n\n[937C]\n\nState of Ker(lfu v. Very. Rev. Mothe1 Provincicil [197 lj 1 SCR 734, D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 688 and Alimedabad St. Xaviers College Society' v. State of Gujarat [1975] I S.C.R. 173; referred to.\n\n2. (a) Section 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the Act do not offond against the provisions of article 30(1) and are valid. [939B-Cl\n\n(b) Clause (a) contains but an elementary guarantee of freedom from arbitrariness to the teachers.\n\nThe provision is regulatory in character since it neither denies to the management the right to proceed against an erring teacher nor does it place an unreasonable restraint on its pov.'er to do so.\n\nIt aBsumes the right of the managenient to suspend a teacher but regulates that E right by directing that a teacher shall not be suspended unless an inquiry into his conduct is contemplated and unless the inquiry is in respect of a charge of gross misconduct. These restraints which bear a reasonable nexus irwith attainment of educational excellence cannot be considered to be/viola- } tive of the right given by article 30(1). The limitation of the period of suspension initially to two months, which can in appropriate cases be extended by another two months, as provided in clause (b) and its proviso, partakes of F the same character as the provisions contained in clause (a). A provision founded so patently on plain reason is difficult to construe as an invasion of the right to administer an institution unless that right carried with it the right to maladminister. [938G-H]\n\n3. Section 4 is unconstitutional as being violative of article 30(1) of the constitution.\n\nThe section confers upon the government the power to provide by mies that an appeal might lie to such authority or officer as it designates, regardless of the standing or status of that authority or officer. Secondly an appeal is provided for on all questions of fact and law, thereby throwing open the order passed by the management to the unguided scrutiny and unlimited review of the appellate authority, which would mean that, in the exercise of the appellate power, the prescribed authority or officer can substitute his own view for that of the management even in cases in which two views are reasonably possible.\n\nLastly, while a right of appenl i! given to the aggrieved teacher ainst the order passed by the management, no corresponding right is conferred on the management against the order passed by the competent authority under section 3(2) of the Act.\n\nIn the absence of a provision for appeal against the order of the competent autho-\n\n.. y\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL V. GOVT. OF A.P. 927\n\nrit.f{' refusing to approve the action proposed by the management, tbc Am-.agemcnt is pleased in a gravely dis-advantageous position vis-a-vis the teadier who is given the right of appeal by section 4.\n\n[939DH]\n\nSection 5 must fall with section 4.\n\n[940B]\n\n4. Section 6 is valid.\n\nThe section aims at affording a minimal guarantee of ie.Curity of tenure to teachers by eschewing the passing of 1nala-fide orders in the garb of retrenchment.\n\nIt is implicit in the provisions of this section B tkat the limited jurisdiction which it confers upon the con1petent authority is to examine whether, in cases \\vhere 1he retrenchment is stated to have become necessary by reason of an order passed by the Goven1ment, it has in fact so hecon1e necessary.\n\nThe conferment of a guided and limited pov.er on the competent authority for the purpose of finding out whether, in fact the retrenchment has bC:come necessary by reason of a Govemmentci1 order can 4 net constitute an interference with the right of administration conferred by c article 30(1 ).\n\n[940D-F]\n\nSection 7 is regulatory in its character and is valid.\n\n[940H]\n\nPer Fazal Ali, /.\n\nOn an exhaustive analysis of the authorities of this Court on the various aspects of the fundamental right enshrined in article 30(1) of the ConstitutiOB the following propositions of law emerge :- [)·\n\n(i) Article 30(1) enshrines th:e fundamental right of the miaority institutions to manage and administer their educational institutions.\n\n[967H]\n\n(ii) Although, the right conferred by this article is absolute, unfettered and unconditional, it does not mean that it gives a licence for maladministration so as to defeat the avowed object of the E article, namely to advance excellence and perfection in the field.\n\n(iii)\n\nof education.\n\n[968B]\n\n\\Vhile the State or any other statutory authority has no right to interfere with the internal administration of the 1ninority institution, it could take regulatory measures to pron1ote the efl:iciency and excellence of educational standards and issue guidelines for ensuring the security of the services of the tt:achers and other employees of the institution.\n\n[968C]\n\n(iv) Under the garb of adopting regulatory measures. the State or any other authority cannot destroy the administrative aulonomy of the institution or interfere with the management ..._)f the institution so as to render the right of adn1inistration of the management\n\nof the institution illnsory.\n\n[968E] G\n\n(v) By its very nature article 30 implies that where an affiliation is\n\nasked for, the university cannot refuse the same without sufficient reason or try to in1pose such conditions as \\Vou!d cornplctely destroy the autonomott>; administration of the educational institution.\n\n[968G]\n\n(vi) Induction of an outside authority in the governing body of the minority institution to conduct the affairs of the institution \\\\'ould. Il be completely destructive of the fundamental right under <lrticle 30(1), where a high authority like the ViceChancellor or his\n\n5-138SCI/80\n\nnominee is <1ppointed in the administration, such authorities should not be thn1st so as to have a controlling voice in tbe n1atter overshado\\Ying the pOV.'ers of the managing commitlee.\n\n[96BH]\n\n{vii) Jt is open to the Government or the University to fran1e rules\n\nand regulations , governing the conditions of 'iervice of teachers\n\nin order to secure their tenure of service and to appoint n high authority to see that the rules are not violated or the mctnbcrs of the staff are not victimised. Jn such .cases the purpose is not to interfere with the autonomy of the institution but n1erc:1y to improve the excellence and .efficiency of education.\n\nEven f\\O, an authority should not be given a blanket uncanalised .and arbitrary powers.\n\n[969E-F)\n\n(viii) \\\\'here a minority institution affiliated to a university is enjoUied\n\nto adopt courses of study of the syllabi or the nature of books prescn\"bed and the ho1ding of examination to test the ability of the students of the institution, it does not followthat the freedom contained in article 30(1) of the Constitution is Yiolated.\n\n[970AJ\n\n(ix) \\Vhere a high authority is appointed to exercise vigilance on tbp\n\nwork of the teachers and to ensure security of tenure for thCm the authority must be given proper guidelines.\n\nBefore cocting to any decision which may be binding on the n1anaging committee the head of the institution or the senior member. of the managing conunittee must be associated and they should be allowed to have a say in the matter. [970C] '\n\nKera/a Education Bj[[, 1957, [1957] SCR 995; Sidliaibhai Sablwi and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Anr. [1963] 3 SCR &37; Rev. Father W. Proost & Ors. v. State of Bihar [1969.l 2 SCR 73; State of Kera/a etc. v. Yem Rev. Mother Provincial etc. [1971] 1 SCR 734; D.A.V. College etc. v. State of Puniab & Ors. [1971] Suppl. SCR 688 and The Al1medabad St. Xoviers College Society & Anr. etc. v. State of Guiarat [1975] I SCR 173; referred to.\n\n1. (a) Section 3 in its entirety is ultra-vires as being violative of article\n\n30(1) and is wholly inapplicable to the appellants who are minority imtitutions.\n\n[97 5B]\n\n(b) The proviso enjoins that any contravention of the provisions would not affect the teachers who would be deemed to be in service.\n\nIt i~ manifest that in the absence of any rules the proviso would have no application and even if it applied it would amount to a serious inroad on the fundamental right of the minority institutions to administer or manage their own affairs.\n\n[971H]\n\n(c) Sub-section 2 of section 3 is unconstitutional as being vio1ative of article 30(1). It suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers and con~ fers undefined, absolute and arbitrary powers to grant or to refuse sanction to any action taken by the managing committee and almost reduces the H institution to a helpless position.\n\n[973B-C]\n\n( d) If the State wanted to regulate the conditions of service of the teachers, it should have taken care to make proper rules giving sufficient\n\nJ/i'\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. 929\n\nwowers to the n1anagement in the manner in which it \\Vas to act. fnduction , of an outside authority into the institution and making bis decision final was .a. blatant interference \\vith the autonomy of the institution.\n\nThe words\n\nadequate and reasonable\" are too vague and do not lay down any objective \"Standard to judge the discretion to be eixercised by the competent antho- Tity whose order would be binding on the institution. f972F-G]\n\n(e) While section 4 gives a right of appeal to the aggrieved teacher no such right has been given to the management to/ file an appeal against the order of t)le\n\n.competent authority if it refuses to grant sanction to the order of the ~.fana~ ging Committee of the institution. The competent authority is only the District Educational Officer who is not a very high authority such lL\"l a Director of Public instruction or Vice-Chancellor of a University.\n\nNo time limit has been fixed by the statute \\Vithin which the competent authority is to give its approval. The cumulative effect of clause (a) and (b) of section 3 (3) and the proviso is to interfere with the internal administration of the rrtinority institutions and curb the power of suspension. It deprives the institution of the right of taking any disciplinary action against a teacher.\n\nThe adjective \"gross'' before the term \"misconduct in clause (a) destroys the power of suspension which the minority institution possesses.\n\nThe provision contained in clause (b) of section 3 (3) providing that no suspension shall remain in force for a period of more than two months from the date of suspension and if no inquiry is completed within this period the teacher \\\\'oulct have to be reinstated. gives an unqualified right to a teacher in the matter of suspension which even a government servant does not enjoy.\n\n[973A, 974D-EJ\n\n2. Section 4 is ultra-vires and is violative of article 30 of the Constitution.\n\nIt does not contain any guidelines as to the manner in which the power could\n\ne exercised, nor does it contain any provision which may entitle the minority\n\nA '\n\ninstitution to be heard by the appellate authority.\n\nThe conferment of an E abSOlute and unguided power on the appellate authority \\VOuld amount to a direct interference with the right enshrinecl in article 30(1) and makes the\n\nminority institution a powerless body.\n\n[976B; 975GJ\n\n3. If section 4 is inapplicable to the minority institution Section 5 also\n\n~ follows the same fate.\n\n[976C] ; a.__•\n\n4. Section '6 which contains an un-canalised and unguided power suffers from the same vice as in the case of section 3. 'The words \"administer educational institutions of their choice'' in article 30 clearly indicate that the institution has an absolute right to select teachers, ret.1.in them or retrench them at its sweet will according to the norms prescribed by the institution or by the religious order \"'hich has founded the institution.\n\n[976HJ\n\n5. Sectiori 7 is an innocuous provision and is valid.\n\n[977C]\n\n6. Sections. 8, 9, 12 and 13 are inapplicable to the minority institutions.\n\n[977D, 978B]\n\n7. Section 16 suffers from a serious defect namely that the provision regarding appeal to the appellate authority v,; as valid then it completely bars\n\nthe right of the management to file a suit to challenge the validity of the order of the appellant. To this extent the section makes serious inroad 011 the fundamental right of the minority institutions and is inapplicable to ti. 'illinority institutions. [978G]\n\nSection 17 is inapplicable.\n\n[978F]\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.lt. •\n\n' A Per Kailasam, J.\n\n1. A reading of the various decisions rendered by this Court on the interpretation of article 30(1) of the Constitution makes it clear that while the right to establish and administer a minority institutiOn cannot be interfered, with, restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of maintaining the educational standards of the institution can be validly in1posed.\n\nFor maintaining the educational standards of the institution as a whole, it is necessary to ensure that it is properly staffed.\n\nConditions imposing the minimum quallfications of the staff, their pay and othar benefits, their service conditions, theimposition of punishment will all be covered and regulations of such a nature are valid.\n\nIn the case of institutions that receive aid it is the duty of the government who grants aid to see that the iunds are properly utilised.\n\nRegulations can be made by the government for ensuring the proper conditions of service of the teachers and for securing fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against them.\n\nPrescribing uniformity in the conditions of service and conduct of teachers in all non-governmental colleges would promote harmony, avoid frustration and, therefore, is permissible.\n\nRules prescribed by the university or other authority may require that no member Of the teaching or non-teaching stafi of a recognised or approved institution shall be dismissed etc., except after a proper cnquity.\n\nIf the regulations require thei approval of the competent authority for safeguarding the rights of the teachers and for securing the procedure there can be no objection.\n\nSuch authority can also interfere with the decision of tl•ie private institutions when , the punishment awarded is malafide or by way of victimisation or for similar causes.\n\n[989B; 993D-G[\n\nKera/a Education Bill [1959] SCR, 995, Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai & Ors, [1963] 3 SCR 837, Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 73, State of Kerala v. Very. Rev. Mother Provincial [19711 I SCR 734, D.A.V. College etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [1971] Suppl. &C.R. 688 and Ahniedabad St. Xaviers College Society and A.rir. etc. v.\n\nState af Guiarat [1975] 1 S.C.R. 173, referred to.\n\n2. It is not only reasonable but proper that a restricted meaning is given to the power of prior approval conferred on the competent aU:thority under sec tion 3 of the Act. It is a well established principle of interpretation that the statement of objects and reasons could\\ be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevalent at the time which actuated the sponsor <>f the Bill to introduce the same and Iha extent of urgency and the e\"11 songht to be remedied. Clearly the legislation was intended to regulate the service conditions of teachers employed in the private educational institutions and for the security of service of the teachers.\n\nTile power contained in section 3(t) and 3(2) is reStricted to regulating the service conditions of teachers and for ensuring their security of se-rvice.\n\n[1001C; 998A-B]\n\n3. While interpreting a provision of law the Court will presume that the legislation was intended to be intra vires and also reasonable. The section ought to be interpreted consiste-nt with the presumption which imputes to the legislature an intention of limiting the direct operation of its enactmerit to the extent that is permissible. A reading down of a provision of a statute puts into operation the principle that so far as it is reasonably possible to do so, the legislation should be construed as being within its power. It has the principle effect\n\n.. •\n\nI /\"·\n\n,, , r\n\n• 1\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL V. GOVT. OF A.P . 931\n\n<that where an Act is expressed in language of generality, which makes it capable, if read literally, of applying to matters beyond the relevant legislative\n\npowers, the Court will construe it in a more limited sense so as to keep it within power.\n\n[998E-F]\n\nThe State of West Bengal v. Sub/wdh Gopal Bose and Ors. (1954]\n\nSCR :i87, Att. Genl. v. HRH Prince Earnest Augstas of Hanover, [1957] AC. 436,\n\nKeshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. 1, 101, Towns v.\n\nB .Eigner 245 U.S. 413·62 Led. 372, 376 and Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar\n\n[1962] 2 Suppl. SCR 769; referred to.\n\nIn the instant case it must be presumed that the legislature was conscious of the limitations of the po\\ver which the competent authority can have in granting or withholding apprQ!Val in the c:ase of disciplinary proceedings con -ducted by private institutions. The object of the legislation in this case was very different from ether cases in which 1h~ legislation was aimed &t depriving the minority institutions' of all their powers. Its only aim is to provide security of service.\n\nThere are sufficient guidelines the objects and reasons as well as in the preamble.\n\n[I 00 I B-C]\n\n4. (a) The contention that section 3(1) and (2) lack guidelines and have conferred a blanket power cannot be accepted.\n\nSection 3(1) and (2) must be read together.\n\nThe wordsi \"adquate and reasonable\" should be given a retricted meaning so as to validate the provisions of the section.\n\nThe approval of an order contemplated by sub-section (2) will have to be read with subsection (1). Sub-section (2) required the competent authority to approve such a proposal if it is satisfied that there are adequate and J.easonable grounds for such proposal.\n\nThe words \"adequate and reasonable\" furnish sufficient guidelines.\n\nThe competent authority can interfere if there are no materials at all for sustaining the order of punishment or when on the materials found chc charge is completely baseless and preserve. The word \"ade~ quate\" will have to bC' understood as being confined to such examination of the proposal.\n\nThe y.; ord \"reasonable~ would indicate that the power of the competent authority is confined to the power of an authority to interfere with the enquiry and the conclusions arrived at by the domestic tribunal.\n\nIt cannot be understood as conferring nbsolute power to interfere '\\Vith the enquiry by the tribunal as a Court of appeal on merits.\n\n[1002E; 1001G-H]\n\n(b) The plea that the \"competent authority\" may be any petty officer cannot be upheld because it is defined in section 2(1) to mean \"any authority, officer or person authorised by notification perfomling the functions of competent authority\". The officers of the educational dtpartment who are incharge of the administration of educational institutions in the area cannot be called petly officers.\n\n[I002H]\n\n(c) Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (3) cannot be said to interfere with the right of administratio; n of the, private institutions. 1b.e two clauses are regulatory in nature and are intended to safeguard the teachers from being, suspended for unduly long periods without there being an enquiry into\n\n1'gross misconduct.\"\n\n[1003C]\n\n(d) Sub-section (4) of section 3 which states that every teacher pla<:ed ·.under suspension shall be paid subsistence allowance at such rates as may be\n\n----~~\n\n-1.\n\nA prescribed during the period of his suspension is purely regulatory in -nture\n\nand. therefore, un-objectionable.\n\n[1003D]\n\n5. Section 4 is invalid.\n\nThe vice contained in this section is that the riiht of appeal which is confined only to the teachers is not available to institutions.\n\n1003Fl\n\n6. Section 5 which! confers poWer on the competent authority to hear B appeals in certain, past disciplinary cases will have to fall' along with- •\n\nsection 4.\n\n[1003G]\n\n7. Section 6 is also regulatory in nature and its validity cannot be questioned.\n\n[ 1003H]\n\n8. Section 7 is :egulatory in nature and is intended for securing regular payment to the teachers.\n\n[1004A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1280, 1279, 1327-1330 of 1978 and 35 of 1979.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Jndgment and Order dateci' 2-8-1978 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 718, 5505. 3618, 5506, 5518, of 1975 and 604/78 and 4814/1975.\n\nL. N. Sinha, K. Srinivasa Murthy, Naunit Lal and M. Panduranga for the Appellants in CA Nos. 1279, 1280, 1327-1330/78.\n\nS. N. Kackar, Sol. Genl., Venkatarao and G. N. Rao for R. 1 in CA 1280, RR 1-3 in CAs. 1327 & 1329 and RR 1 & 2 in 1328 &\n\n1330.\n\nII. S. Gururaja Rao and S. Markendaya for RR 2-3 in CA 128() and R. 4 in CA 1279.\n\nK. M. K. Nair for R. 4 in CA 1329\n\nS. Balakrishnan for R. 8 in CA 1329\n\nG. Narasimhulu for R. 3 in CA 1330\n\nB. Parthasarthi for the Appellant in CA 35/79.\n\nB. Kanta Rao for the RR 4-5 in CA 35/79.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered\n\nG CHANDRACHUD, C.J.-Article 30(1) of the Constitution provides: All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.\n\nH The question which arises in these appeals is whether certain provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 11 of 1975, offend against the fundamental right\n\n~ ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Cha11draclmd, C.J.) 933\n\nconferred on mioorities by Art. 30 ( 1). The appellants are un- A , > questiOlll!bly minority educational institutions, having been established by members of .the Christian community .\n\n. My learned Brothers, Murtaza Fazal Ali and Kailasam, have examined the authorities bearing on the question before us.\n\nThe reilSons which impelled me to write a separa~ judgment are my inability to agree wholly with the various observations made by Justice Fazal Ali and with some of the prO]JOsitions which he has formulated as etlh,\"t\"ging from the decisions referred to by him, as also with the conclusion to which Justice Kailasam has come.\n\nI do not consider it necessary to examine all the decisions of this Court in which Art. 30(1) has received a full and careful consideration.\n\nThese decisions are reported in Re Kera/a Education Bill(!) 1957,, Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay(2) Rev. Father W. Proost v.\n\nThe State of Bihar(') State of Kera/av. Very Rev. Mother PrGvincial(4 ) D. A. V. College v. State of Pu'njab(') The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat(\") Gandhi Faizeam College Shahajalzanpur v. University of Agra(') and Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina(')\n\nAlmost each succeeding judgment has considered and analysed the previow judgment or judgments.\n\nI regard the matter arising before us as well-settled, especially after the 9-Judge Bench decision in Alunedabad St. Xaviers College Society (supra) and the recent judgment of the CQ!lstitution Bench in Lilly Kuria11,(') All that we have to do iil this case is to apply the law laid down in these decisions.\n\n0L- / Tiie.se decisions show that while the right of the religious and \"\" linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice cannot be interfered with, restrictions by way of regulations for the purpose of ensuring educational standards ond maintaining the excellence thereof can be validly prescribed.\n\nFor maintaining educational standards of an institution, it is necessary to ensure that it is competently staffed.\n\nConditions of service which prescrif:le minimum qualifications for the staff, their pay scales. their entillcment to other benefits of service and the laying down of safeguaids which must be observed before they are removed or dismisse([ from service or their services are terminated are all pcrmis>ib!e measures\n\n({j [1959] S.C.R. 995.\n\n(2) (1963] 3 S.C.R. 837.\n\n\n(4) [1971] l S.C.R. 734. (SJ [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 688.\n\n\n(8) (1979] l S.C.R. 820.\n\n. JI\n\n. F\n\nof a regulatory character.\n\nAs observed by Das C.J., in Re : Kera/a Education Bill, (supra) \"Right to administer cannot obviously include the right to mal-administer\", and in the words of Shah J., in Rev. Sidhajbhai, (supra) \"The right is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like\". Hidayatnllah C.J. said in Very Rev. Mother Provincial (supra) that \"Standards of education are not a part of management as such\", that the \"minority institutions cannot be permitted to fall below the standard of excellence expected of educational institutions\" and that \"the right of the State to regulate education, educational standards and the allied matters cannot be denied\".\n\nJustice Jaganmohan Reddy, in D. A. V.\n\nCollege (supra) reiterated while upholding clause 18 of the Guru Nanak University, Amritsar Act, 1961 that regulations governing recruitment and service conditions of teachers of minority institutions, which are made in order to ensure their efficiency and excellence do not offend against their right to administer educational institutions of their choice\n\nIn the case of institutions that receive State aid, it is the duty and obligation of the Government which grants aid to see that pablic funds are usefully and properly expended.\n\nIf the expenditure incurred for paying the emoluments of the staff is subsidised or financed from out of State funds, it becomes the duty of the State to se~ that no one who does not possess the minimum qualifications is zppointed on the staff, the pay and other emoluments of the staff are guaranteed and their service conditions secured.\n\nMinority institutions which receive State aid cannot complain of conditions subject to which the aid is granted, so long as such conditions do not amount to discrimination against them on the ground of language or religion nnd so long as the aid is not made to depend upon the performance or observance of conditions which amount to deprivation of the right guaranteed by article 30( l). There is also no doubt that minority institutions cannot be discriminated against in the matter of granting State\n\naid.\n\nNo institution, minority or majority, has a fundamental right to recognition by the State or affiliation to the University, but ince recognition and affiliation are indispensable for an effective and fruitful exercise Of the fundamental right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choic_e, they are entitled B to recognition and affiliation if they agree to accept and comply with regulatory measures which are relevant for granting recognition and affiliation, which are directed to ensuring educational excellence of\n\n• ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL I'. GOVT. OF A.P. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 935\n\nthe institution concerned and which, largely and substantially, leave uJlimpaired the right of administration in regard to internal affairs of the institution.\n\nThe impugned Act, by reason of section 1 (3), applies to all private educational institutions, whether or not they are established by minorities.\n\nThe appellants' contention is that several provisions of the Act violate the guarantee contained in Art. 30(1) by permitting or compelling interference with the internal administration of private edncational institutions established by minorities.\n\nThe 'appellants are particularly aggrieved by the provisions of sections 3\n\nt() 7 of the Act, the validity whereof in challenged on the ground that they deprive the appellants of their right to administer the affairs of minority institutions by vesting th.e ultimate administrative control in an outside authority.\n\nThese contentions having been rejected by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the appellants hav~ filed these appeals by special leave.\n\nSection 3 ( 1) of the Act provides that, subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated, except with the prior approval of the competent authority.\n\nThe proviso to the section says that if any educational institution contravenes the aforesaid provision, the teacher affected by the contravention shall be deemed to be in service.\n\nSection 3 (2) requires that where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher employed in any private educational institution is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall approve the proposal, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and . reasonable grounds for the proposal.\n\nFor appreciating their trne meaning and effect, sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) have to be read together.\n\nThe requirement of prior approval of the competent authority to an order of dismissal, removal, etc. may not by itself be violative of article 30 ( 1) because it may still\n\ne possible to say, on a reasonable construction of the provision laymg down that requirement, that its object is to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice or the elimination of malll fide; j\n\nor victimisation of teachers.\n\nBut I find it difficult to read down section 3 (I) so as to limit its operation tn these or similar considet'ations.\n\nIn the first place, the section does not itself limit its operation in that manner; on the contrary, it gives an unqualified mandate that no teacher shall be dismissed, removed, etc. excpt with\n\nthe prior approval of the competent authority.\n\nUnder the proviso,. contravention of the section results in a total invalidation of the pro-· posed action. If the section is contravened the teacher shall be; deemed to be in service.\n\nSecondly, section 3 ( 1) not only applies. to cases in which a teacher is, what is generally termed as 'punished', by an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, but it also applies to cases in which an appointment is otherwise terminated. An order of termination simpliciter which involves no stigma or aspersion and which does not result in any evil consequences is also required to be submitted for the prior approval of the competent authority. The argument that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with or the argument of ma/a fide~ andi victimisation has seldom any relevance if the services are terminated in accordance with the terms of a contract by which the tenure of the employment is limited to a specified period.\n\nThis shows that the true object of section 3 ( 1) is not that which one could liberally assume py reading down the section.\n\nSection 3 (1) is subject to any rules that may be made in behalf of the matter covered by it.\n\nIf the State Government were to frame rules governing the matter, there would have been some tangible. circumstances or situations in relation to which the practical opecation of section 3 (1) could have been limited. But in the abselll:e\n\nof any rules furnishing guidelines on the subject, it is difficult to predicate that, in practice, the operation of the section will be limited to a certain class of cases only.\n\nThe absence of rules on the subject makes the unguided discretion of the competent authority the sole. arbiter of the question as to which cases would fall within the section and which would fall outside it.\n\nAny doubt as to the width of the area in which section 3(1) operates and is intended to operate, is removed by the provision contained in section 3 (2), by virtue of which the competent authority \"shall\" approve the proposf!), \"if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds\" for the proposal.\n\nThis provision, under the guise of conferring the power of approval, confers upon the competent authority an appellate power of great magnitude. The competent authority is made by that provision the sole judge of the propriety of the proposed order since it is for that authority to see whether there are reasonable grounds for the proposal. The authority is indeed made a judge both of facts and law by the conferment upon it of a power to test the validity of the proposal on the vastly subjective touch-stone of adequacy and reasonableness.\n\nSection 3 (2), in my opinion, leaves no scope for reading down the provisions of sectioro\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 937\n\n3 ( ! ) . The two sub-sections together confer upon the competent authority, in the absence of proper rules, a wide and untrammelled\n\ndiscretion to interfere with the proposed order, whenever, in its opinion, the order, is based on grounds which do not appear to it either adequate or reasonable.\n\nThe form in which Section 3 (2) is couched is apt to mislead by creating an impression that its real object is to cast an obligation on the competent authority to approve a proposal under certain conditions. Though the section provides that the competent authority \"shall\" approve the proposed order if it is satisfied that it is based on adequate and reasonable grounds, its plain and necessary implication is that it shall not approve the proposal unless it is so satisfied. The confernment of such a power on 1lll outside authority, the exercise of which is made to depend on purely subjective considerations arising out of the twin formula of adequacy and reasonableness, cannot but constitute an infringement of !)le right guaranteed by Art. 30 (1).\n\nI find it difficult to save sections 3 ( 1) and 3 (2) by reading them down in the light of the objects and reasons of the impugned\n\nAct.\n\nThe object of the Act and the reasons that led to its passing are laudable but the Act, in its application to minority institutions, has to take care that it does not violate the fundamental right of the minorities under Art. 30(1). Sections 3(1) and 3(2) are in my opinion unconstitutional in so far as th~ made applicable to minority institutions since, in praetice) 1hese. provisions are bound to interfere substantially with their riglit to administer institutions of their choice.\n\nSimilar provisions were held to be void in V rry l?ev.\n\nMother Provincial, D. A. V. College and Lilly Kurian. (supra) There is no distinction in principle between those provisions and the ones contained in sections 3 (1) and 3 (2).\n\nFor these reasons, I am in agreement with Brother Fazal Ali that Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the impugned Act cannot be applied to minority institutions, since to do so will offend against Article 30\n\n(1 ).\n\nSection 3 (3) (a) provides that no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be placed under suspension except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct of such teaci1er is contemplated.\n\nSection 3 (3) (b) provides that no such suspension sball remain in force for more than a period of two months and if the inquiry is not completed within that period the teacher shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as\n\n-- -..---- . -- ----...-~·---=----=----=-· \"111:11:\" -~·~,.........._-y._...,,.... ...... - -~---\n\n.A a teacher.\n\nThe proviso to the sub-section confers upon the e-0mpetent authority the power, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to extend the period of two months for a further period not exceeding two months if, in its opinion, the inquiry could not be completed within the initial period of two months for reasons directly attributable to the teacher.\n\nWith respect, I find it difficult to agree with Brother Fazal Ali that these provisions are violative of article 30 (1). The question which one has to ask oneself is whether in the normal course of affairs, these provisions are likely to interfere with the freedom of minorities to administer and manage educ:, itional institutions of their choice. It is undoubtedly true that no educational institution can function efficiently and effectively unless the teachers observe at least the commonly accepted norms of good behaviour. Indisciplined teachers can hardly be expected to impress upon the students the value of discipline, which is a sine qua non of educational excellence.\n\nThey can cause incalculable; harm not only to the cause of education but to the society at large by generating a wrong sense of values in the minds of young and impressionable students.\n\nBut discipline is not to be equated with dictatorial methods in the treatment of teachers.\n\nThe institutional code of discipline must therefore conform to acceptable norms of fairness and cannot be arbitrary or fanciful.\n\nI do not think that in the name of discipline and in the purported exercise of the fundamental right of administration and management, any educational institution can be given the right to 'hire and fire' its teachers.\n\nAfter all, though the management may be left free to evolve administrative policies of an institution, educational instruction has to be imparted through the instrumentality of the teachers; and unless, they have a constant assurance of justice, security and fair play it will be impossible for them to give of their best which alone can enable the institution to attain the ideal of educational excellence.\n\nSection 3 (3) (a) contains but an elementary guarantee of freedom from arbitrariness to the teachers, The provision is regulatory in character since it neither denies to the management the right to proceed against an erring teacher nor indeed does it place an unreasonable restraint on its power to do so.\n\nIt assumes the right of the management to suspend a teacher but regulates that right by directing that a teacher shall not be suspended unless an inquiry into his conduct is contemplated and unless the inquiry is in respect of a charge of gross misconduct. Fortunately, suspension of teachers is not the order of the day, for which reason I do not think that these restraints which bear a reasonable nexus with the attainment of educational excellence can be C-Onsidered to be violative of the right given\n\n' ..\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Chandrachud, C.J.) 939\n\nby Art. 30 ( 1). The limitation of the period of suspension initially\n\nto two mo)lths, which can in appropriate cases be extended by another two months, partakes of the sa.!!le character as the provision contained in section 3 (3) (a). In the _generality of cases, a domestic inquiry against a teacher ought to be completed within a period of two months or say, within another two months. A provision founded so patently on plain reason is difficult to construe as an invasion of the right to [ldminister an institution, unless that right . carried with it the right to maladminister.\n\nI therefore agree with Brother Kai!asam that sections 3 (3) (a) and 3 (3) (b) of the Act do not offend against the provisions of Art. 30 (1) and are valid.\n\nSection 4 of the Act provides that any teacher . employed in a private educational institution (a) who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated; or\n\n(b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage, may prefer an appeal to such authority or officer as may be prescribed. This provision in my opinion is too broadly worded to be sustained on the touchstone of the right conferred upon the minorities by Art. 30 ( l). In the first place, the section confers upon the Government the power to provide by rules that an appeal may lie to such authority or officer as it designates, regardless of the standing or status of that authority or officer.\n\nSecondly, the appeal is evidently provided for on all questions of fact and law, thereby throwing open the order passed by the management to the unguided scrutiny and unlimited review of the appellate authority. It would be doing no violence to the language of the section to interpret it to mean that, in the exercise of the appellate power, the prescribed authority or officer can substitute his own view for that of the management, even in cases in which two views are reasonably possible.\n\nLastly, it is strange, and perhaps an oversight may account for the lapse, that whereas a right of appeal is given to the aggrieved teacher against an order passed by the management, no corresponding right is conferred on lhe management against an order passed by the competent authority under section 3 (2) of the Act. It may be recalled that by section 3 (1), no teacher can be dismissed, removed, etc. except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Section 3 (2) confers power on the competent authority to refuse to accord its approval if there are no adequate and reasonable ground for the proposal. In the absence of the µrovision for an appeal against the order of the competent authority refusing to approve the '¥'lion proposed by the management, the management is placed in a gravely disadvantageou§ position vis-a-vis\n\nSP~REME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R. ·\n\nA the teacher who is given the right of appeal by section 4.\n\nBy reason\n\nof these infirmities I agree with the conclusion of my learned Brothers ~,_._ that section 4 of the impugned Act is unconstitutionai, as being violative of article 30 (1).\n\nSection 5 is consequential upon section 4 and must fall witk it.\n\nSection 6 provides that where any retrenchment of a teacher is rendered necessary consequent on any order of the Government relating to education or course of instruction or to any other matter, such retrenchment may be effected with the prior approval of the competent authority.\n\nWith respect, I find myself unable to share the view of Brother Fazal Ali that retrenchment of teachers is a purely domestic affair of minority institutions and that the decisions of the management in the matter of retrenchment of teachers is beyond the scope of statutory interference by reason of Art. 30 (1). Section 6 aims at affording a minimal guarantee of security of tenure to teachers by eschewing the passing of mnla fide orders in the garb of retrenchment.\n\nAs I look at the section, I consider it to be implicit in its provisions that the limited jurisdiction which it confers upon the competent authority is to examine whether, in cases where the retrenchment it stated to have become necessary by reason of an order passed by the Government, it has in fact so become necessary.\n\nIt is a matter of common knowledge that Governmental orders relating to courses of instruction are usd as a pretence for terminating the services of teachers.\n\nThe conferment of a guided and limited power on the competent authority for the purpose of finding out whether, in fact, a retrenchment has become necessary by reason of a Government order, cannot constitute an interference with the right of administration conferred by Art. 30 (1). Section 6 is therefore valid.\n\nI would, however, like to add that in the interests of equal justice, the legislature ought to provide for an appeal against the orders passed by the competent authority under section 6. If and when the provision for an appeal is made, care must be taken to ensure that the appeal lies to an officer not below the prescribed rank.\n\nSection 7 provides that the pay and allowances of a teacher shall be paid on or before such day of a month, in such manner and by or through such authority, officer or person, as may be prescribed.\n\nI agree with my learned Brothers that this provision is regulatory In character and is, therefore, valid.\n\nThese are all the sections the validity of which was questioned in the Writ Petitions filed in the Hjgh Court. It is therefore not neces\"\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOYT, OF A, P, (Fazal Au, !,) 941\n\nosary to consider whether the ot]!er provisions of the Act are valid A\n\n,}< .or not.\n\nI concur in the final order proposed by Brother Kailasam that we -need not go into the merits of each of the Writ Petitions filed in the\n\nRigh Court, Learned counsel appearing for the schools sought the decision of the High Court on the constitutional issue only, He specifically asked the High Court not to decide each case on its merits, That may, accordingly, be left to the High Court to decide in the ligh~ of the majority opinion re!Jdered by us.\n\nWe have, by a majority, held that sections 3 (3) (a), 3 (3) (b), 6 and 7 are valid while sections 3 ( 1), 3 (2), 4 and 5 are invalid in their ; application to minority education institutions. It must follow that such institutions cannot be proceeded against for violation of provisions which are not applicable to them,\n\nin conclusion, all the Civil Appeals before us will go back to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for final disposal on merits in the 'light of our decision, There will be no order as to costs.\n\nFAZAL Au, J. : This batch of civil appeals by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court before whom the appellants filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of several sections 'of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 197 5, hereinafter referred to as the Act which contained 21 sections in five Chapters and was brought into force with effect from 5th October, 1974.\n\nThis Act was also applicable to 19 Edncational Institutions situated in the State of Andhra Pradesh and the appellants being admittedly minority educational institutions within 'the meaning of Article 30 of the Constitution of India have challenged the vires various sections of the Act which we shall indicate later.\n\nSome of the 'appeals have been filed by Christian Schools established by Roman Catholic Church and some by Christian Colleges established by the Christian community :\n\nThe main grounds of challenge are that the provisions of the Act directly interfere with the internal management of the institutions and has completely curbed the constitutional freedom which has been guaranteed to them by Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India 'and 'being violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution are ultra vires and therefore, wholly inapplicable to the appellants institutions.\n\n It is now well settled by a long course of decisions of this Court •that our Constitution which seeks to establish a secular State contains\n\n-·- --\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS\n\n[1980] 2 S.C.R •.\n\nA sufficient checks and balances, safeguards and guarantees to protect the rights of the minorities, the establishment of educational institutions being one of them.\n\nArticle 46 which contains the constitutional\n\nC'\\,\n\ndirective to promote educational and economic interests of the weaker sections runs thus :-\n\n\"46. Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections :\n\nThe State shall promote with special c•Jre the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.\n\nArticle 30(1) confors a fundamental rights on the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.\n\nArticle 30(2) enjoins on the State that in granting aid to the educational D institutions it shall not discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is nnder the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.\n\nThus, it would appear that Article 30(2) extends the guarantee contained in Article 30(1) even in the matter of receiving aid by the cdurntional institution established by the minority community. While adverting to this aspect of the E matter this Conrt in Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957(') observed as follows:-\n\n\"Nevertheless, in determining the scope and ambit of fundamental rights relied on by or on behalf of any person or body the court may not entirely ignore these directive principles of State policy laid down in Part IV of the Constitution but should udopt the principle of harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible''.\n\nAnother important factor which has to be noticed is that the terms in which Article 30 is couched are absolute and unconditional as compared to Article 19 which is hedged in by reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the State in public interest.\n\nThus, in a way the fundamental right contained in Article 30 is more effective and wider than the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThis, however, docs not mean that the State is completely deprived of even the right to regulate the working of the minority institutions and to make rules in order to improve the standards.\n\n(1) [1959] S.C.R. 995.\n\n...\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali,!.) 943\n\nof education imparted therein so as to achieve excellence and efficiency in the educational standards of these institutions. Regulatory measures cannot in any sense be regarded as placing restrictions or curbing the administrative autonomy of the institutions concerned.\n\nBut care must be taken by the State to see that in passing regulatory measures it does not transcend its limits so as to interfere with the internal administration of the management of the institutions concerned so as to violate the spirit and policy of Article 30. The question of the scope and ambit of Article 30 of the Constitution of India was very exhaustively considered as far back as in 1959 in Re : Kera/a Education Bill (Supra).\n\nThis case arose when the President of India called for the opinion of the Supreme Court on a Reference being made to it under Article 143 (1) of the Constitution of India.\n\nThe Reference was heard by 7 Judges of this Court out of which 6 of them excepting Venkatararna Aiyar, J. gave a unanimous opinion regarding various clauses of the Bill.\n\nThe provisions of the Kerala Education Bill are not pari materia with the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned in this case, bnt this Court while delivering its opinion has laid down a number of salutary principles which throw a flood of light on the scope and interpretation of Article 30 of the Constitution of India.\n\nT would, therefore, like to extract certain important passages from the opinion of the Court which dealt with the scope and application of Article 30. I would, however, like to mention that some of the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case may not apply to the present day conditions because there have been numerous changes in all aspects of life and even the concept of equality ha$\n\nundergone a revolutionary change.\n\nBut the observations made by this Court would afford a very valuable guideline to determine the question in controversy in the present case.\n\nWhile indicating the width of the right conferred on the minority institutions by Article 30(1) this Court pointed out that the right to administer does not envisage a right to indulge in mal-administration.\n\nIn this connection, Das, C.J. speaking for the majority observ\"ed as follows :-\n\n'The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minority cannot surely sk for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroi; ndings, without any competent teachers, possessing 11ny semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right to ad-\n\n6--138SCI/80\n\nminister an education-al institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided\".\n\nB Again, while sounding -a note of caution to the Government that no step should be taken by it which amounts to the institution surrendering its personality merely because the institution is receiving aid from the State, said the Chief Justice thus :-\n\n\"No educational institution can in actual practice be carried on without aid from the State and if they will not get it unless they surrender their rights they will, by compulsion of financial necessities, be compelled to give up their rights under Article 30(1) ........... .\n\nThe State Legislatures cannot, it is clear, disregard or override those provisions merely by employing indirect methods of achieving exactly the same result.\n\nEven the Legislature cannot do indirectly what it certainly cannot do directly\".\n\nConsidering the provisions of the Kera/a Education Bill particularly Clauses 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 the Court held that although these provisions constitute serious inroads on the right of administration of the institution and appear perilously near violating that right, yet in view of the peculiar facts of that case and having regard to the fact that clauses 9, 11 and 12 were designed to give protection and security to the ill paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes the Court as at present advised may treat these clauses -as permissible regulations.\n\nThese observations were based on the peculiar circumstances of the provisions of the Education Bill and the objects which they sought to sub-serve may not be applicable to the present case where the circumstances me quite different because admittedly most of the appellant institutions are not receiving any aid from the Government.\n\nEven so, this Court found it impossible to support clanses 14 and 15 which according to them were totally destructive of the rights guaranteed by Article 30 ( 1).\n\nIn this connection, the Court observed as follows :-\n\nB \"But considering that those provisions are applicable to all educational institutions and that the impugned parts of clauses 9, 11 and 12 are designed to give protection and\n\n' ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali,!.) 945\n\nsecurity to the ill paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes, we are prepared, as at present advised, to treat those clauses 9, 11(2) and 12(4) as permissible regulations which the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their educational institutions.\n\nWe, however, find it impossible to support els. 14 and 15 of the said Bill as mere regulations.\n\nThe provisions of those clause,;_ may be totally destructive of the rights under Article 30(1)\".\n\nThe Court had made it very clear that the observations extracted above applied to those categories of educational institutions which had sought not only recognition but also aid from the State. In the instant case. however, most of the appellant institutions have been established by mustering their own resources and have not been\n\nreceiving substantial aid from the Government.\n\nSimilarly, the Court made it clear that although the minority institutions had no fundamental right to recognition by the State yet to deny recognition on terms which may amount to complete surrender of the management of the institution to the Government would be violative of Article 30( 1)\n\nof the Constitution.\n\nIn this connection, Das, C.J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"There is, no doubt, no such thing as fundamental right to recognition by the State but to d$ny recognition to the educational institutions except. upon terms tantamount to the surrender of their constitutional right of administration of the educational institutions of their choice is in truth and in effect to deprive them of their rights under Article 30(1).\n\nWe repeat that the legislative power is subject to the fundamental rights and the legislature cannot indirectly take away or abridge the fundamental rights which it could not do directly and yet that will be the result if the said Bill conteining any offending clause becomes law\".\n\nAgain dwelling on the special character of the minority institutions Das, C.J. speaking for the Court observed thus :\n\n\"It is obvious that a minority community can effectively conserve its language, script or culture by and through educational institutions and, therefore, the right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice is a necessary concomitant to the right to conserve its distinctive language, script or culture and that is what is conferred on all minorities by Article 30(1) which has hereinbefore been quoted in full.\"\n\nDescribing the nature of the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 30 the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"There can be no manner of doubt that our Constitution has guaranteed certain cherished rights of the minorities con ceming their language, culture and religion.\n\nThese concessions must have been made to them for good and valid reasons.\n\nArticle 45, no doubt, requires the State to provide for free and compulsory education for all children, but there is notJ1ing to prevent the State from discharging that solemn obligation through Government a'nd aided schools and Article 45 does not require that obligation to be discharged at the expense of the minority comm uni ties.\n\nSo long as the Constitution stands as it is and is not altered, it is, we conceive, the duty of this Court to uphold the fundamental rights and thereby honour our sacred obligation to the minority communities who are of our own.\"\n\nSimilarly, Venkatarama Aiyer, J. who gave a dissenting opinion agreed however with the scope of Article 30 as expounded by the majority opinion.\n\nIn this connection, the learned Judge observed as follows:-\n\n\"Article 30(1) belongs to the same category as Arts. 25, 26 and 29, and confers on minorities, religious or linguistic, the right to establish and maintain their own educatiQnal institutions without any interference or hindrance from the State.\n\nThe true intention of that Article is to equip minorities with a shield whereby they could defend themselves against attacks by majorities, religious or linguistic, and not to arm them with a sword whereby they could compel the majorities to\n\ngrant concessions.\"\n\nVarious shades and aspects of the matter were again considered by this Court in the case of Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State of Bombay & Anr. (') In this case it appears that the Government of Bombay issued an order directing the concerned institution which was controlled by the United Church of Northern India to reserve 80% of the seats in the training colleges run by the institutiQn for teachers in non-Government training colleges.\n\nThese teachers, were to tJe nominated by the Government. Accordingly, the Educational Inspector ordered the Principal of the Training College not to admit without specific permissiQn of the Education Department private students in excess of 20% of the total strength in each class.\n\nThe institution took\n\n\n.. . ' /'\n\n:\" I.\n\nI l •\n\n• ALL SAINTS lllGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, J.) 947\n\nserious exception to this order of the Government as amounting to A direct interference in the management of the affairs of the institution.\n\nThe institution filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court which was heard by 6 Judges who after considering the facts of the case and the natnre of the order passed by the Govern ment obserYed as follows :-\n\n\"Unlike Article 19, the fundamental freedom under clause\n\n(1) of Article 30, is absolute in terms; it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated in Article 19 may be subjected to.\n\nAll minoriiies, linguistic or religious have by Article 30(1) an absolute right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice; and any law or executive direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under Article 30(1) would to that extent be void.\n\nThis, however, is not to say that it is not open to the State to impose regulations upon the .exercise of this right ...... Regulation made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed.\n\nSuch regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed; they secure the proper functioning of the institution, in matters educational\".\n\nThis Court refused to uphold the order of the Government on the ground, that this was only a regulatory measure.\n\nThe Court pointed out that the regulation in order to be valid must satisfy a dual test, namely, (1) that it should be reasonable, (2) that it should be purely regulative of the educational character of the institution so as to make the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community.\n\nThis Court observed thus;-\n\n\"The right established by Article 30(1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Article 19, it is not subject to\n\nreasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right G for the protection of the minorities in the matter of settig\n\nup of ucational institutions of their own choice.\n\nThe right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole.\n\nIf every order which H while maintaining the formal character of a minorny institu- 1ion destroys the power of administration is held justifiable\n\nbecause it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Article 30(1) will be put a \"teasing illusion\", a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either b]' legislative or executive action as a condition of recei<ving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test-the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it.\"\n\nOn an examination of the provisions of the impugned Act in the instant case, it is manifest that the Act contains provisions harsher and more offensive than the order passed by the Government of Bombay in the Bombay case (supra) referred to above.\n\nIn the case of Rev. Father W. Proost & Ors. v. The State of Bihar and Ors.(') Hidayatullah, C. J. speaking for the Court observed as foUows :-\n\n\"In our opinion, the width of Article 30(1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it consideration on which Article 29(1) is based. The latter article is a general protection is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture.\n\nThe former is a special right to minorities to establish educat.ional institutions of their choice.\n\nThis choice is not limited to institution seeking to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstance irrelevant for the application of Article 30\n\n( 1) sine~, no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied. The two Article create two separate rights, although it is possible that they may meet in a given case.\"\n\nThe extent to which the State could interfere with the administrative autonomy of the minority institutions in view of the guarantee contained in Article 30 (1) of the Constitution was again fully discussed and explained in the case of State of Kera/a etc. v. Very Rev.\n\nH Mother Provincial etc. (2) .. JP. this case the Court was considering the\n\n\n(1) [1971] I S.C.R. 734.\n\n.. . ;...\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, J.) 949\n\nconstitutionality of certain provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1969 which was passed with a view to reorganise the University of Kerala and establish a teaching, residential and affiliating University of private Colleges including institutions founded by the minority community. The Court was concerned only with some of the provisions of the aforesaid Act and struck down the offending provisions as amounting to a blatant interference with the rights guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Before analysing the facts of that case, I might indicate that in the instant case it is not disputed by the parties that all the appellants are minority institutions and had a governing body of their own. It is also not disputed that apart from the Christians others were also admitted to the institutions and received education.\n\nEven some of the members of the staff were also non-Christians. In the background of these facts.\n\nI have to see how far the decision of this Court referred to above applies to the present appeals.\n\nWhile explaining the scope and ambit of management or administration Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the Court observe as follows :-\n\n\"Administration means 'management of the affairs' of the institution.\n\nThis management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the rommunity in general and the institution in particular will be best served.\n\nNo part of this management can be taken away and vested in another body without an encroachment upon the guaranteed right.\n\nTI1ere is, however, an exception to this and it is that the standards of education are not a part of management as such.\n\nThese standards concern the b, cidy politic and are dictated by considerations of the advancement of the country and its people.\n\nTherefore, if universities establish syllabi for examinations they must be followed, subject however to special subjects which the institutions may seek to teach, and w a certain extent the State may also regulate the conditions of employment of teachers and the health and hygiene of students. Such regulations do not bear directly upon management as such although they may indirectly affect it. Yet the right of the State to regulate educati<:m, educational standards and the allied matters cannot be denied.\n\nThe minority institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards H of excellence expected of educational institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of -management, to decline to\n\nA follow the general pattern. While the management must be left to them, they may be compelled to keeQ. in step with otl1ers\".\n\nThese observations, therefore, establish three important tests which would determine whether or not the action of the Government amounts\n\nB to interference with the management of the institution ( 1) In order that the management of the institution is free from outside control, the founders must be permitted to mould the institution as they think fit; (2) no part of the management could be taken away by the Government and vested in anoilier body withont an encroachment upon \"4\\\n\n1 the guaranteed right enshrined in Article 30(1) of the Constitution; f C\n\n(3) There is however an exception W this general rule which is that the Government or the University can adopt regulatory measures in order to improve the educational standards which concern the body politic and are dictated by considerations of the advancement of the country and its people, so that the managing institution may not under the guise of autonomy or exclusive right of management be allowed to D fall below the standard of_ excellence that is required of educational institutions.\n\nHaving laid down these tests the Court proceeded to analyse some of the offending sections of the Kerala Act and came to the conclusion that according to some of the sections the governing body set up by education society was to consist of 11 members and the Managing Council of 21 members. 11 members of the government body were\n\n(i) the principal of the private college, (ii) the manager of the private college, (iii) a person nominated by the University in accordance with the provisions in that behalf contained in the statute (iv) a person nominated by the Government and ( v) a person elected in accordance with the procedure laid down on the Act.\n\nSub-section (2) had the effect of making these bodies into bodies corporated having perpetual succession and a common seal.\n\nSub-section ( 6) laid down the powers and functions of the governing body, the removal of members thereof and the procedure to be followed by it, including the delegation of its powers to persons prescribed by the Statutes.\n\nSub-section (7) laid down that the decision in either of the two bodies shall be taken at the meetings on the basis of simple majority of the memb.,_rs present and voting.\n\nThus, if these provisions were to apply to the minority institutions, it is manifest that it would amount to a direct interference in the internal management of the institution and would tantamount to the H institution surrendering its educational personality. In other words, the governing body appointed by the University would replace the governing body of the founders of the institutipils and thus the founders\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, l.) 951\n\nwould have no right to administer the institution iu any way they like.\n\nA Adverting to this aspect of the matter Hidayatullah, C.J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"These sections were partly declared ultra vires of Article 30(1) by the High Court as they took away from the founders the right to administer their own institution. It is obvious that after the election of the governing body or the managing council the founders or even the community, has no band in the administration.\n\nThe two bodies are vested with the complete administration Of the institutions. These bodies have a legal personality distinct from the educational agency or the corporate management. They are not ans_werable to the founders iu the matter of administration ..... .\n\nThe Constituti()n contemplates the administration to be in the bands of the particular community.\n\nHowever desirable it might be to associate nominated members of the kind mentioned in ss. 48 and 49 with other members pf the governing body or the managing council nominees, it is obvious that their vr0ice must play a considerable part in management.\n\nSituations might be conceived when they may have a pr~ ponderating voice.\n\nIn any event, the administration goes td a distinct corporate body which is in no way answerable to the educational agency or the corporate management. The founders have no say in the selection of the members nominated by them. It is, therefore, clear that by the force of subsections (2), (4) and (6) of sections 48 and 49 the minority community loses the right to administer the institution it has founded.\n\nSub-section (5) also compels the governing body or the managing council to follow the mandates of the University in the administration of the institution.\"\n\nTheir Lordships then proceeded to consider the vires of sub-sections (2) and ( 4) of section 56 which laid down the conditions of service of the teachers of private colleges. Sub-section (2) provided\n\n!hat no teacher of a private college could be dismissed, removed or G reduced in rank by the governing body or managing council witbont the previous sanction rOf the Vice Chancellor or {llaced under suspension by the governing body or managing council for a continuon~ period exceeding fifteen days without such previous sanction. Further sub-section ( 4) provided that a teacher against whom disciplinary action is taken shall have a right of appeal to the Syndicate, and the H -Syndicate shall have, power to order reinstatement of the teacher in cases of wrongful removal or dismissal and to order such other reme-\n\n;; UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\ndial easures as it deems fit, and the !jOVerning body or managing council, as the case may be, shall comply with the order. It is thus obvious that in view of the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) of section 56 the managing body bad no discretion in the matter and the right of the management was completely taken away and vested in some other body. In the instant case, although the Act does not at all provide any rules or regulations by which the conditions of service of the teachers are to be governed yet it prohibits dismissal or removal of teachers without prior sanction of a competent authority to be declared by the Government. Similarly, it provides for an appeal to an appellate authority without laying down any guidelines and no right of appeal is given to the management.\n\nThese provisions are contained in section 3, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) and section 4. This Court also considered the effect of section 58 of the Kerala Act by which a teacher of a college who was elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Parliament could not be debarred on bis election, but would be allowed to continue.\n\nUpholding the decision of the High Court and commenting on the unconstitutionality of section 5 6 sub-sections (2) and ( 4) and section 58 this.Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"These provisions clearly take away the disciplinary action from the governing body and the managing council and confer it upon the University.\"\n\n''This enables political parties to come into the picture of the administration of minority institutions which may not like this interference.\n\nWhen this is coupled with the choice of nominated members left to Government and the University by sub-s. 1 ( d) of ss. 4 8 and 49 it is clear that there is much room for interference by persons other than those in whom the founding community would have confidence.\"\n\nIn the end while making it clear that there was no element of malafides in the Act passed by the Legislature, the provisions of the Act unfortunately robbed the founders of their right of administration and were, therefore, hit by Article 30 ( 1) of the Constitution. In this connection, the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"We have no doubt that the provisions of the Act were made bona fide and in the interest of education but unfortunately they do affect the administration of these institutions and rob the founders of that right which the Constitution desires should be theirs.\n\nThe provisions, even if salutary, cannot stand in the face of the constitutional guaravtees\".\n\n• ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL V. GOVT. OF A.P. (Faz.al Ali, J.) 95 3\n\nIn the case of D.A.V. College etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (') this Court was considering the provisions of Chapter V Clauses 2(1)(a), 17 and 18 read with clauses 1(2) and (3).\n\nClause 2(1) (a) provided that a college applying for admission to the privileges of the University had to send a letter of application to the Registrar and would have to satisfy the Senate ( 1) that the College shall have a regularly constituted governing body consisting of not more than 20 persons approved by the Senate (2) that among those persons there should be two representatives of the University and the Principal of the College Exofficio. Clause 17 provided that any staff initially appointed shall be approved by the Vice-Chancellor and any subsequent changes made must be reported to the University for approval. It was also provided that in the case of training institutions the teacher pupil ratio shall not be less than 1: 12. The constitutional validity of these provisions was challenged before this Court on the ground that it violated Article 30( 1) of the Constitution because the College was a minority institution being a College established by the Arya Samaj.\n\nOn a consideration of these provisions, this Court upheld the contention of the appellants and observed thus:-\n\n\"It will be observed that under clause 1 (3) if the petitioners do not comply with the requirements under 1 (a) their affiliation is liable to be withdrawn.\n\nSimilarly it is stated that clause 1 7 also interferes with the petitioners right to administer their College as the appointment of all the staff has to be approved by the Vice-Chancellor and that subsequent changes will also have to be reported to, the University for Vice-Chancellor's approval. We have already held that the Petitioners institutions are established by a religions minority and therefore under Article 30 this minority has right to administer their educational institutions according to their choice. Clause 2(a)(a) and 17 of Chapter Vin our view certainly interfere with that right.\"\n\nThe matter was again fully considered by this Court by a Bench consisting of 9 Judges in all its aspects. In the case of The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society & Anr. etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (') and this is the leading case on the subject. This case has been relied on by counsel for both the parties in support of their respective oo'ntenfons. In this case it appears that certain provisions of the Gujarat\n\nUniversity Act 1949 were challenged. Section 5 of the Act provided\n\n(l) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 688.\n\n(2) [1975] I S.C.R. 173.\n\nthat no educational institution situated within the University cou1d be associated in any way with or seek admission to any privilege of any other University save and except with the sanction of the State Government. Section 33A(l)(a) of the Act provided that every college other than a Government college or a college maintained by the Government shall be under the management of a governing ody which includes among others, the Principal of the College, a representative of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and (ii) in the case of selection of a member of the teaching staff of the College a selection committee would be constituted consisting of the Principal and a representative of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor. Subsection (3) of the section provided that the provisions of section 33A ( 1) shall be deemed to be a condition of affiliation of every College referred to in that sub-section. In other words, according to this provision, even the Colleges which were minority institutions would fall within the mischief of the section. Section 39 provided that within the University area all post-graduate instruction, teaching and training shall be condncted by the University or by such affiliated College or institution and in such subjects as may be prescribed by statutes. Section 40(1) enacted that Court of the University may determine that all instructions, teaching and training in the courses of studies in respect of which the University was to hold examinatipn shall be conducted by the University and shall be imparted by the teachers of the University. Section 41 (1) stated that all Colleges within the University area which were admitted to the privilege of the University under section 5(3) and all Colleges within the said area which may hereafter be affiliated to the University shall be constituent colleges of the University, and their relations with the University would be governed by statutes made by the University in that behalf.\n\nAs regards the conditions of service of the teachers appointed by the University section 51A(a) (b) enacts that no member of the teaching or other academic and non teaching staff of an affiliated college shall be dismissed, or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed in clause (a) and the penalty to be inflicted on him is to be approved by the Vice- Chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf. Sectip'n 52A( 1) provided that any dispute between the governing body and any member of the teaching staff shall on a request of the governing body or pf the member concerned be referred to a Tribunal or arbitration consisting of one member nominated by the governing body of the college, one member nominated by the member concerned and an umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor.\n\nIn view of the provisions referred to above,\n\n' • •\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, J.) 955\n\nthe question that fell for consideration in that case was whether these provisions interfere with the internal management of the minority institutions so as to compel them to surrender all their administrative powers to the University or the Vice-Chancellor or the officers nomi• na!OO by the Vice-Chancellor. There can be no doubt that if these provisions are construed against the background of the objective of the Act the idea was not lo leave any controlling voice either in the courses of studies or in the matter of disciplinary action against the staff and the teacher in the management of the institution but to take over the entire management by the University authorities giving nominal representation to the management of the institntion.\n\nBefore we analyse the decision in St. Xaviers case (supra) we must note that as far back as 1959 in Re Kerala Education Bill this Court had clearly pointed out that while the minority institution had no constitutional right to be affiliated to any college or University the right to .be affiliated flowed from the language of Article 30( 1) of the Constitution and the University concerned could not either refuse\n\naffiliation or impose such conditions which may resnlt in complete surrendering of the management of the minority institution. Thus, the central question to be decided. in Ibis case was whether by virtue of the provisions of the Act set out above, Article 30( 1) had been violated and if so to what extent.\n\nSo far as the question of afliliation was concerned the entire courl held that although there was no fundamental right ta affiliation but recognition or affiliation was necessary for meaningful exercise of the right to establish and administer educational institution conferred on the minority institutions under Article 30(1) of the Constitution.\n\nIn this connection, the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"The consistent view of this Court has been that there is no fundamental right of a minority institution of affiliation.\n\nAn explanation has ocen put upon that statement of law.\n\nIt is that affillation must be a real and meaningful exercise for minority institutions in the matter of imparting general\n\nsecular education. Any law which provides for affiliation on G terms which will inv91ve abridgement of the right of linguistic and religious minorites to administer and establish educational institutions of their choice will offend Article 30( 1). The educational institutions set up by minorities will be robbed of their utility if boys and girls cannot be trained in such institutions for University degrees. Minori- H , ties will virtually lose their right to equip their children for ordinary careers if affiliation be on tenns which would\n\nmake them surrender and lose their rights to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice nnder Article 30 ............................ ..\n\nThe establishment of a minority institution is not only ineffective but also unreal unless such institution is affiliated to a University for the purpose of .conferment of degrees on students\".\n\nRelying on the previous decision in the case of State of Kera/a etc.\n\nv. Very Rev. Mother Provincial etc. (supra) Ray, C.J. reiterated the principles laid down by the previous case and observed as follows :-\n\n\"W11en minority applies for affiliation, it agrees to follow the uniform courses of study.\n\nAffiliation is regulating the educational character and content of the minority institutions. These regulations are not only reasonable in the interest pf general secular education but also conduce to the improvement in the stature and strength of the minority institutions.. .. .. . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . .. . .. .. . ..... ........................................\n\nAffiliation mainly pertains to the academic and educational character of the institution.\n\nTherefore, measures which will regulate the courses of study, the qualifications and appointment of teachers, the conditions of employment of teachers; the health and hygiene of students, facilities for libraries and laboratories are all comprised in matters germane to affiliation of minority institutions. These regulatory measures for affiliation are tor uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses and do not violate any fundamental right of the minority institutions under Article\n\n30\".\n\nThus, to a limited extent affiliation of the minority institution to the University or Colleges concerned was held to be a regulatory measures provided it was aimed at improving the educational standards 'lllld laying down the conditions of employment of the teachers.\n\nThis Court repeated that the minority institutions have the right to administer the institution and shorn of some checks and balances in the shape of regulatory measures the right to administer cannot be tampered with. In this connection, Ray, C.J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"The minority institutions have the right to administer institutions. The right implies the obligation and duty of the minority institutions to render the very best to the students. Iu the rights of administration, checks and balances\n\n' ...\n\nALL SAINTS IDGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali,!.) 957\n\nin the shape of regulatory measures are required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service.\n\nThe right to administer is to be tempered with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth administration. The best administration will reveal no trace or colour of minority.\n\nA minority institution should shine in exemplary eclectism in the administration of the institution ....... .\n\nRegulations which will serve the interest of the students, regulations which will serve the interests of the teachers are of paramount importance in good administration .\n\nRegulations in the interest of effciency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration are necessary for preserving harmony among affiliated institutions\".\n\nAs regards the provision of the Act concerned by which the minority institution became a constituent College this was expressly struck down by thb Court where Ray, C.J. speaking for the Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Once an alfi!iated coQege becomes a constituent college within the meaning of section 41 of the Act pursuant to a declaration under section 40 of the Act it becomes integrated to the university.\n\nA constituent college does not retain its former individual character any longer.\n\nThe\n\nm•nority character of the college is lost.\n\nMinority institu- E tions become part and parcel of the university.\n\nThe result is that section 40 of the Act cannot have any compulsory application to minority institutions because it will take away their fundamental right to administer the educational institutions of their choice\".\n\nExplaning w.hat the concomitants of an autonomy in administration meant Ray, CJ. observed as follows :-\n\n\"Autonomy in administration means right to administer effectively and to manage and conduct the affairs of the institutions.\n\nThe distinction is between a restriction on the right of administration and a regulation prescribing the manner of administration.\n\nThe right of administration is day to day administration.\n\nThe choice in the personnel of management is a part of the administration.\n\nThe university will always have a right to see that there is no mal-adntinistration. If there is mal-administration, the nniversity will take steps to cnre the same. There may be control and <:heck on administration in order to find out whether the\n\nminority institutions are engaged in activities which are not conducive to the interest of the minority or to the requirements of the teachers and the students ................ .\n\nThe provisions contained in section 33A(l) (a) of the Act have the effect of displacing the management and entrusting it to a dillerent agency.\n\nThe autonomy in administration is lost. New elements in the shape of representatives of different type are brought in. The calm waters of an institution will not only be disturbed but also mixed.\n\nThese provisions in section 33A(l)(a) cannot therefore apply to minority institution\".\n\nIt follows from what had been held in the aforesaid case was that there should be no interference in the right of day to day administration of the institution of in the choice of the personality of the managing committee or governing body of the institution. This Court struck down section 33A(l) (a) of the Gujarat Act on the ground that the management of the college was completely displaced and was substituted by the university authorities.\n\nIn other words, the position appears to be that although the university to which the minority institution was affiliated may exercise supervision in so far as the syllabi or the courses of studies are concerned, it cannot be allowed to be associated with the managing committee or the governing body of the institution so as to have a controlling voice in the matters at issue and thereby destroy the very administrative autonomy of the minority institution. This appears to be the main reason why Ray, C.J. was of the opinion that section 33A(l)(a) was violative of Article 30 (1), and, therefore, not applicable to the minority institutions.\n\nThe Court then dealt with the provisions of sections 5 lA and 52A of the Gujarat Act. Under section 51A no member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college should be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges and giwn a reasonable opportunity of being heard and until he had been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation on any such penalty proposed to be inflicted on him and the penal! y to be inflicted on him was to be approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any officer o~ the University authorised by him. This Court held that this is a blanket power given to the Vice-Chancellor without any guidance, and pbserved as follows :\n\n\"The approval of the Vice-Chancellor may be intended to be a check on the administration.\n\nThe provision contained in section 51A, clause (b) of the Act cannot be said to be a permissive regulatory measure inasmuch as it confers\n\n... ,\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Faza/ Ali,!.) 959\n\narbitrary power on the Vice-Chancellor to take oaway the right of administration of the minority institutions, Section _?IA of the Act cannot, therefore, apply to minority institutions.\"\n\nDealing with the provisions contained in Section 52A of the Gujarat Act which contemplated a reference of any dispute between\n\nthe governing body and any member of the teaching or oacademic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college which was connected with the conditions of service of such member to a.Tribunal of Arbitration\n\nconsisting of one member nominated by the governing body of the college, one member nominated by the member concerned and an\n\nUmpire appointed by the Vice;-Chancellor, the learned Chief Justice was of the opinion that the introduction of such an arbitration to a Tribunal would start a spate of fruitless litigation and was likely to impair the excellence and efficiency maintained by the educational institution concerned. In this connection, the learned Chief Justice observed as follows :-\n\n\"These references to arbitration will introduce an area of litigious controversy inside the educational institution.\n\nThe atmosphere of the institution will be vitiated by such proceedings.\n\nThe governing body has its own disciplinary authority.\n\nThe governing body has its domestic jurisdiction. This jurisdiction will be displaced. A new jurisdiction will be created in administration. The provisions contained in section 52A of the Act cannot, therefore, apply to minority institution.\"\n\nJaganmohan Reddy, J. agreeing with the majority judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Chief Justice endorsed his conclusions regarding the constitutional validity to sections 40, 41, 33A(l)(a), 33A(l)(b), 51A and 52A of the Act and observed thus :-\n\n\"We agree with the Judgment of Hon'ble the Chief Justice just pronounced and with his conclusions that sections 40, 41, 33A(l) (a), 33A(l) (b), 51A and 52A of the Act violate the fundamental rights of minorities and cannot, therefore, apply to the institutions established and administered by them.\"\n\nDwelling on the importance of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 30, the learned Judge held that the right under Article 30\n\n7-138 SCJ/80\n\nA could not be exercised in vacuo, and in this connection observed as follows : ·-·\n\n\"The right under Article 30 cannot be exercised in vacuo.\n\nNor would it be right to refer to affiliation or recognition as privileges granted by the State. In a democratic system of Government with emphasis on edncation and enlightenment of its citizens, there must be elements\n\nwhich give protection to them.\n\nThe meaningful exercise of the right under Article 30(1) would and must necessarily involve recognition of the secular education imparted by the minority institutions without which the right will be a mere husk.\n\nThis Court has so far consistently struck down all attempts to make affiliation or recognition on terms tentamount to surrender of its rights under Article 30(1) as abridging or mking away those rights.\n\nAgain as without affiliation there can be no meaningful exercise of the right under Article 30 (l), the affiliation to be given hould be consistent with that right, nor can it indirectly try to achieve what it cannot directly do.\"\n\nSimilar view was taken by Khanna, J. who also held that management of a minority institution should be kept free from governmental or ether interference because the worrls \"of their choice\" appearing in Article 30 have special significance and would actually lose their value and utility if too much interference or unnecessary curbs are placed in the administration of the affairs of the minority institution. The learned Judge observed thus :\n\n\"Administration connotes management of the affairs of the institution.\n\nThe management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit and in accordance with their ideas of how the interest of the community in general and the inslitution in particular will be best served.\n\nThe words \"of their choice\" qualify the educational institutions established and administered by the minorities need not be of some particular class; the minorities have the right anrl freedom to establish and administer such educational institutions as they choose\".\n\nSimilarly, explaining the scope and ambit of Articles 29 and 30 the learned Judge observed as follows :\n\n\"The broad approach has been to see that nothing is done to impair the rights of the minorities in the matter of their\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, !.) 961\n\neducational institutions and that the width and scope of the provisions of the Constitution dealing with those rights are not circumscribed.\n\nThe principle which can be discerned in the various decisions of this Court is that !he\n\nCatholic approach which led to the drafting of the provisions relating to minority rights should not be set naught by narrow judicial interpretation.\n\nThe minc>- rities are as much children of the soil as the ma1ority and the approach has been to ensure that nothing should •be done as might deprive the minorities of a sense of belonging, of a feeling of security, of a consciousness of\n\nequality and of the awareness that the. conservation of their religion, culture, language and script as also the protection of their educational institutions is a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution.\n\nThe same generous, liberal and sympathetic approach should weigh with the courts in construing Articles 29 and 30 as marked the\n\ndeliberations of the Constitution-makers in drafting these D Articles and making them part of the fundamental rights\".\n\nThe learned Judge held that although it was permissible for the authority concerned to prescribe regulations but such regulations should not impinge upon the right conferred on the minority insti- E tutions under Article 30(1). A just balance had to be struck between the two objectives, namely, passing of regulatory measures and preserving the fundamental rights of the minority institutions. The learned Judge observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is, therefore, permissible for the authority concerned to prescribe regulations which must be complied with before an institution can seek and retain affiliation and .recognition. Question can arise whether there is any limitation on the prescription of regulations for minority edu- cational institutions.\n\nSo f, ar as this aspect is concerned, the authority prescribing the regulations must bear in mind that the Constitution has guaranteed a fundamental right to the minorities for establishing and administering their educational institutions.\n\nRegulations made by the authority concerned should not impinge upon that right. Balance bas, therefore, to be kept between the two objectives, that of ensuring the standard of excellence of the institution and that of preserving the right of the minorities to estab- 1ish and administer their educational institutions.\n\nRegula-\n\nF .\n\n·•\n\nA tions which embrance and reconcile the two objectives can be considered to be reasonable.\"\n\nThe learned Judge further held that any law which inter£eres with the minorities choice of a governing body would be violative of Article 3 0 (1) and observed thus :- 8 \"In the light of the above principles, it can be stated that a law which interferes with the minorities choice of a governing body or management council would be violative of the right guaranteed by Article 30(1) .\"\n\n. c\n\n. D\n\nCriticising the constitutional validity of Section 52A of the Gujarat Act Khanna, J. shared the view taken by Ray, C.J. which has been referred to above.\n\nThe learned Judge observed as follows :- \"The provisions of section 52A would thus not as a spoke in the wheel of effective administration of an educational institution. It may also be stated that there is nothing objectionable to selecting the method of arbitration for settling major disputes connected with conditions of service of staff of educational institutions. It may indeed be a desideratum.\n\nWhat is objectionable, apart from what has been mentioned above, is the giving of the power to the Vice.Chancellor to nominate the Umpire.\n\nNormally in such disputes there would be hardly any agreement between the arbitrator nominated by the governing body of the institution and the one nominated by the concerned member of the staff.\n\nThe result would be that the power would vest for all intents and purposes in the nominee of the Vice-Chancelloc to decide all disputes between the governing body and the member of the staff connected with the latter's conditions of service.\n\nThe . governing body would thus be hardly in a position to take any effective disciplinary action against a member of the staff. This must cause an inroad in the right of the governing body to administer the institution. Section 52A should, therefore, be held to be violative of Article 30 ( 1) so far as minority educational institutions are concerned.\"\n\nSimilarly, while striking down sections 40 and 41 of the Gujarat Act, the learned Judge found that the affiliated colleges would become constituent colleges as a result of the provisions of these sections and 11eld that these provisions could not apply to the minority institutions.\n\nIn this connection, Khanna, J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"A provision which makes it imperative that teaching in under-graduate courses can be conducted only by the Uni-\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nversify and can be imparted only by the teachers of the University plainly violates the rights of minorities to establish and administer their educational institution.\n\nSuch a provision must consequently be held qua minority institutions to resqlt in contravention of Article 30(1). I would, therefore, strike down section 40 so far as minority edncational institutions are concerned as being violative of Article 30(1)\". ·\n\nMathew, J. while striking down the constitutional validity of lieCtion 33A(l) of the Gujarat Act observed as follows :-\n\n\"The heart of the matter is that no educational institution established by a religious or linguistic minority can claim total immunity from regulations by the legislature or the university if it wants affiliation or recognition; but the character of the permissible regulations must depend upon their purpose ........ In every case, when the reasonableness of a regulation comes up for consideration before the court, the question to be asked and answered is whet11er the regulation is calculated to subserve or will in effect subserve the purpose of recognition or affiliation, namely, the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general secular education to the minority community and to other persons who report to it.\n\nThe question whether a regulation is in the general interest of the public has no relevance, if it does not advance the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general secular education as, ex-hypothesi, the only permissible regulations are those which secure the effectiveness of the purpose of the facility, namely, the excellence of the educational institutions in respect of their educational standards.\"\n\nSimilarly, the learned Judge took strong exception to the provisions of section 33A which required that the college should have a governing body which should include persons other than those who are members of the society of Jesus, struck provisions of section 33A and observed as follows :-\n\n\"We think that the provisions of sub-sections (l)(a) and\n\n(l) (b) of section 33A abridge the right of !he religious minority to administer edncational institutions of their choice.\n\nThe requirement that the college shollld have a governing body which shall include persons other than those who are members of the governing body of the society of Jesus\n\n. J\n\nF ,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 S.C.lt.\n\nwould take away the management of the college from the governing body constituted by the Society of Jesus and vest it in a different body.\n\nThe right to administer the educational institution established by a religious minority is vested in it. It is in the governing body of the Society of Jesus that the religious minority which established the college has vested the right to >!dminister the same.\n\nThe requirement that the college should have a governing body including persons other than those who constitute the governing body of the Society of Jesus has the effect of divesting that body of its exclusive right to manage the educational institution ....... .\n\nThe learned Judge further pointed out that under the guise of preventing ma1-administration the right of the governing body to manage the affairs of the minority institution should not be taken\n\naway and in the same token observed as follows :- -\n\n\"Under the guise of preventingi mal-administration, the right of the governing body of the college constituted by the religious minority to administer the institution cannot be taken away.\n\nThe effect of the provision is that the religious minority virtually loses its right to administer the institution it has founded. \"Administration\" means 'management of the affairs' of the intitution.\n\nThis management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution according to their way of thinking and in accordance with their idea of how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served.\n\nNo part of this management can be taken away and vested in another body without an encroachment upon the guaranteed right.\"\n\nSimilarly, analysing various provisions of the Gujarat Act like sections 51A(l) (a) and 51A(l)(b) etc. the learned Judge observed as follows :-\n\n\"The relationship between the management and a teacher is that of an employer and employee and it passes one's understanding why the management cannot terminate the\n\nservicei; of a teacher on the basis of the contrac~ of employment.\n\nOf course, it is open to the State in the exercise of its regulatory power to require that before the services of a teacher are terminated he should he given an opportunity of being heard in his defence.\n\nBut to requir<'\n\n). .\n\n8'0~ - 62-. 71\"?\n\nALL SAINTS IIlGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali,].) 965\n\nthat for terminating the services of a teacher after an inquiry has been conducted, the management should have the approval of an outside agency like the Vice-Chancellor or of his nominee would be an abridgement of its right to administer the educational institution.\n\nNo guidelines are provided by the legislature to the Vice-Chancellor for the exercise of his power. The fact that the power can be delegated by the Vice-Chancellor to any officer of the university means that any petty officer to whom the power is delegated can exercise a general power of veto. Theri:i is no obligation under the sub-sections (l)(b) and (2)(b) that the Vice-Chancellor or his nominee should give any reason for disapproval. As we said a blanket power without any guideline to disapprove the action of the management would certainly encroach upon the right of the management to dismiss or terminate the services of a teacher after an enquiry.\"\n\nBeg, J. speaking in the same strain observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is true that, if the object of an enactment is to compel a minority institution even indirectly, to give up t.he exercise of its fundamental rights, the provisions which have this effect will be void or inoperative against the minority institution.\n\nThe price of affiliation cannot be a total abandonment of the right to establish and administer a minority institution conferred by Article 30(1) of the Constitution . . This aspect of the matter, therefore, raises the question whether any of the provisions of the Act are intended to have that effect upon a minority institution.\n\nEven if that intention is not manifest from the express terms of statutory provisions, the provisions may be vitiated if that is their necessary consequence or effect.\"\n\nEven Dwivedi, J. who had sounded a discorded note held that so far as section 33A(l) (a) was concerned it was obnoxious to Article 30 (I ) of the Constitution.\n\nIn the case of Gandhi Faizeam College Shahajahanpur v. University of Agra and Anr.(I) the majority judgment consisting of V. R.\n\nKrishna Iyer and A. C. Gupta, JJ. observed as follows :-\n\n\"What is the core of the restriction clamped down by Statute 14-A ? What is the conscience and tongue of Article 30?\n\nIf the former is in, ongruous with the latter, it\n\n\nwithers as void; otherwise, it prevails and binds.\n\nThat is the crux of the contro¥ersy.\"\n\n\"The thrust of the case is that real regulations are desirable, necessary and constitutional but, when they operate on the 'administration' part of the right, must be B confined to chiselling into shape, not cutting down out of shape, the individual personality of the minority.\"\n\nMathew, J. who gave a dissenting opinion and whose opinion follows the principles laid down by t~ Court in St. Xavier's case (supra) observed as follows :-\n\n\"The determination of the composition of the body to administer the educational institution established by a religious minority must be left to the ntlnority as that is the core of the right to ailminister. Regulations to prevent maladministration by that body are permissible.\n\nAs the right to determine the composition of the body which will adntlnister the educational institution is the very essence of the right to administer guaranteed to the religious or linguistic minority nnder Article 30(1), any interference in that area by an outside authority cannot be anything but an abri<)gernent of that right. The religious or linguistic mino1ity must be given the freedom to constitute the agency through which it proposes to administer the educational institution established by it as that is what Article 30(1) guarantees.\n\nThe right to shape its creation is one thing : the right to regulate the manner in which it would function after it has come into being is another.\n\nRegulations are pennissible to prevent rnal-adntlnistration but they can only relate to the manner of administration after the body which is to administer has come into being.\"\n\nThe entire case law as fully reviewed by this Court recently in the case of Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewlna & Ors.(').\n\nJn this case, Sen, J. speaking for the court and after a deep dischotomy and adroit analysis of St. Xavier's case (supra) and the case• which preceded that case summed up the law thus :-\n\n\"An analysis of the judgments in St. Xavier. Coll<ge's case\n\n(supra) clearly shows that seven out of nine Judge,, held that the provisions contained in clauses (b) of sub-sections ( 1) H and (2) of section SIA of the Act were not applicable to an educational institution established and managed by\n\n(1) [1979] l S.C.R. 820.\n\n.r _ _,.,.,\n\n' f\n\nr I\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, !.) 967\n\nreligious or linguistic minority as they interfere with the diSciplinary control• of the management over the staff of its educational institutions.\n\nThe reasons given by the majority were that the power of the management to terminate the services of any members of the teaching or other academic and non-academic staff was based on the relationship between an employer and his employees and no encroachment could be made on this right to dispense with their services under the contract of employment, which was an integral part of the right to administer, and that these provisions conferred on the Vichancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by him, uncanalised, unguided and unlimited power to veto the actions of the management.\"\n\n\"The power of appeal conferred on the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 4) is not only a grave encroachment -0n the institution's right to enforce and ensure discipline in Hs administrative affairs but it is uncanalised an, J nnguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power.\n\nThe extent of the appellate power of the Vice-Chancellor is not defined; and, indeed, his powers arn unlimited.\n\nThe grounds on which the Vice-Chancellor can interfere in such appeals are also not defined.\n\nHe may not only set aside an order of dismissal of a teacher and order his reinstatement, but may also interfere with any of the punishments enumerated in items (ii) to (v) of Ordinance 33(2); that is to say, he can even interfere against the infliction of minor punishments. In the absence of any guidelines, it cannot be held that the power of the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 4) was merely a check on maladministration.\n\nAs laid down by the majority in St. Xavfrrs College's case (supra) such a blanket power directly interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body of a minority educational institution over its teachers\".\n\nThus, on an exhasutive analysis of the authorities of this Court and the views taken by it from time to time during the last two decades on various aspects, shades and colours, built-in safeguards,\n\nguarantees, scope and ambit of the fundamental right enshrined in Atticles 30(1), the principles and propositions that emerged may be summarised as follows :-\n\n1. 1hat from the very language of Article 30 (1) it is clear that it enshrines a fundamental right of the\n\nSUP'l.EME COURT REPORTS [l 980l 2 s.c.a.\n\nminority institutions to manage and administer their educational institutions which is completely in consonance with the secular nature of our democracy and the Directives contained in the Constitution itself.\n\n2. That although unlike Article 19 the right conferred on the minorities is absolute, unfettered and unconditional but this does not mean that this right gives a free licence for maladministration so as to defeat the avowed object of the Article, namely, to advance excellence and perfection in the field of education.\n\n3. While the State or any other statutory authority has\n\nno right to interfere with the internal administration or management of the minority institution, the State can certainly take regulatory measures to promote the efficiency and excellence of educational standards and issue guidelines for the purpose of ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other employees of the institution.\n\n4. At the same time, however, the State or any University\n\nauthority cannot under the cover or garb of adopting regulatory measures tend to destroy the administrative\n\nautonomy of the institution or start interfering willy nilly with the core of the management of the institution\n\nw as to render the right of the administration of the management of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory.\n\nSuch a blatant interference is clearly violative of Article 30(1) and would be wholly inapplicable to the institution concerned.\n\n5. Although Article 30 does not speak of the conditions\n\nunder which the minority educational institution can be affiliated to a college or University yet the section by its very nature implies that where an affiliation is asked for, the University concerned cannot refuse the same without sufficient reason or try to impose such conditions as would completely destroy the autonomous administration of the educational institution.\n\n6. The induction of an outside authority however high it may be either directly or through its nominees in the governing body or the managing committee of the minority institution to conduct the affairs of the institution would be completely destructive of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the\n\n,..\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL V. GOVT. OF A.P. (Faz.al Ali, J.) 969\n\nConstitution and would reduce the management to a helpless entity having no real say in the matter and thus destroy the very personality and individuality of the institution which is fully protected by Article 30 of the Constitution. Perhaps there may not be any serious objection to the introduction of high authorities like the Vice-Chancellor or his nominee in the admiuistration particularly that part of it which deals with the conditions of service of the teachers yet such authorities should not be thrust so as to have a controlling voice in the matter and thus over-shadow the powers of the managing committee. Where educational institutions have set up a particular governing body or the managirig committee in which all the powers vest, it is desirable that such powers should not be curbed or taken away uDJ.ess the Government is satisfied that these powers are grossly abused and if allowed to continue may reduce the efficacy or the usefulness of the institution.\n\n7. It is, therefore, open to the Government or the University to frame rules and regulations governing the conditions of service of teachers in order to secure their tenure of service and to appoint a high authority armed with sufficient guidance to see that the said rules are not violated or the members of the staff are not arbitrarily treated or innocently victimised. In such a case the purpose is not to interfere with the internal administration\n\nor autonomy of the institution, but it is merely to improve the excellence and efficiency of the education because a really good education can be received only 1f the tone and temper of the teachers are so framed as tc make them teach the students with devotion and dedication and put them above all controversy. But while setting up such an authority care must be taken to see that the said authority is not given blanket and uncanalised a.nd arbitrary powers so as to act at their own sweet will ignoring the very spirit and objective of the institution. It would be better if the authority concerned\n\nassociates the members of the governing body or its nominee in its deliberation so as to instil confidence in the founders of the institution or the committees constituted by them.\n\n8. Where a minority institution is affiliated to a University the fact that it is enjoined to adopt the courses of study or the syllabi or the nature of books prescribed and tht1 holding of examination to test the ability of the students of the Institution concerned does not violate the freedom contained in Art. 30 of the Constitution.\n\n9. While there could be no objection in setting up a high authority to supervise the teaching staff so as to keep a strict vigilance on their work and to ensure the security of tenure for them, but the authority concerned must be provided with proper guidelines under the restricted field which they have to cover. Before coming to any decision which may be binding on the managing committee, the Head of the institution or the senior members of the managing committee must be associated and they should be allowed to have a positive say in the matter.\n\nIn some cases the outside authorities enjoy absolute powers in taking decisions regarding the minority institutions without hearing them and these orders are binding on the institution. Such a course of action is not constitutionally permissible so far as minority institution is concerned because it directly interferes with the administrative autonomy of the institution. A provision for an appeal or revision against the order of the authority by the aggrieved member of the staff alone or the setting up of an Arbitration Tribunal is also not permissible because Ray, C.J. pointed out in St.\n\nXaviers case (supra) that such a course of action introduces an arena of litigation and would involve the institution in unending litigation, thus imparing educational efficiency of the institution and create a new field for the teachers and thus draw them out of purely educational atmosphere of the minority institutions for which they had been established. In other words, notl1ing should be done which would seek to run counter to the intentions of the founders of such imtitutions.\n\nThese are some of the important principles that have been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases discussed above. I shall now endeavour to examine the provisions of the impugned Act in the light of the principles enunciated above. I shall point out hereafter that some of the provisions of the Act arc so harsh and arbitrary and\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL V. GOVT. OF A.P. (Faz.al Ali, J.) 971\n\nconfer uncanalised powers on some of the authorities appointed under the Act so as to amount to a direct and thoughtless interference with the management of the institution.\n\nComing to the provisions of the Act one significant fea_ture may be noticed here. Unlike other' Acts passed by some of the States the impugned Act, while it takes within its sweep even the minority institutions, does not at all lay down any rules, regulations governing the conditions -of service of the teachers of the institution, nor does it provide any guidelines on the basis of which the rules could be m<.de, nor does it contain a mandate directing the minority institution to frame proper rules and conditions of service of its teachers. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act which makes it completely violative of Article 30 of the Constitution and othec provisions read in the light of this lacuna also lose their legal sanctity.\n\nSection 1 ( 3) provides that th~ Act applies to all private educational institutions that is to say including minority institutions.\n\nIn the instant case all the appellants are -institutions established by the Christian community. Sub-section ( 4) of section 1 says that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 5th October, 1974.\n\nSections 2 is the definition clause which defines various terms used in the Act and it is not germane for our purpose to deal with the various definitions which is more or less a foIDiality. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has challenged the constitutional validity of sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 17 of the Act.\n\nSection 3(1) of the Act may be extracted thus:--\n\n\"3 ( 1) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be dismissed removed or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwiSe terminated. except with the prior approval of the competent authority.;\n\nProvided that if any educational management, agency or institution contravenes the provisions of this sub-section, the teachers affected shall be deemed to be in service\".\n\nA perusal of this section would clearly reveal that while no rules regulating the conditions of Service of the teachers employed in private\n\nInstitutions had been made, the power to do so hs been reserved with the Government. The proviso enjoins that any contravention ot the provisions would not affect the teachers who would be deemed to be in service. It is manifest that in the absence of any rules the proviso would have no application. Even if the proviso applies it wonld\n\n:II\n\namount to a serious inroad on the fundamental right of the minority institutions to administer or manage their own affairs.\n\nThus s. 3 (1) as also the proviso is clearly violative of own affairs Art. 30 i1 wholly inapplicable to the minority institutions. Serious exception has been taken by counsel for the appellants to sub-sections (2), (3) and ( 4) of section 3.\n\nSection 3(2) may be extracted thus:--\n\n\"3 (2) Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher employed in any private educational institution is communicated to the competent authority that authority shall, if it is satisfied that there are adequate am:! reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment\".\n\nThis sub-section seeks to control the power of the institution concerned in the matter of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of the appointment of any teacher employed by any private educational institution and enjoins that any action taken against the teacher will be of no consequence unless it is approved by the\n\naid competent authority. It will be rather interesting to note that the competent authority has not been given any guidelines under which it can act.\n\nThe Solicitor General (Mr. S. N. Kacker) submitted that the word 'satisfy' as nsed in the section is a strong term and regulates the powers of the competent authority and the words\n\n\"adequate and reasonable grounds\" contain sufficient guidelines to exclude exercise of any arbitrary power.\n\nI am, however, unable to agree with this contention. In the first place, it was the inherent and fundamental right of the institution to deal with its employees or teachers and take necessary action against them.\n\nIf the State wanted to regulate the conditions of service of the teachers it should have taken care to make proper rules giving sufficient powers to the management in the manner in which it was to act.\n\nSecondly, the induction of an outside authority over the head of the institution and making its decision final and binding on the institution was a blatant interference with the administrative autonomy of the institution.\n\nSub-section (2) does not contain any provision that while giving approval the competent anthority was to ascertain the views of the governing body or the managing committee so as to know their view point and the reason why action has been taken against a particular teacher or teachers.\n\nSimilarly, the words \"adequate and reasonable\" are too vague and do not lay down any objective standard to judge the discretion which is to be exercised by the competent authority whose order Will be binding on the institution. Thirdly,\n\nr ,\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL V. GOVT. OF A.1'. (Fazal Ali; J,) 973\n\nwhile section 4 gives a right to the aggrieved teacher to file an appeal before the appellate authority, no such right has been given to the management to file an appeal against the order of the competent authority if it refuses to grant sanction to the order of the managing committee of the institution. Thus, in my opinion, sub-section (2) suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers and confers unde. fined, uncanalised, absolute and arbitrary powers to grant or to refuse sanction to any action taken by the managing committee and almost reduces the institution to a helpless position.\n\nSuch a provision, therefore, not only interferes with the right of the management of the institution but is completely destructive of the right conferred on th~ institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Even the competent authority mentioned in the sub-section is merely the District Educational Officer and it appears from the record that >t\n\nis not a very high authority such as; the Director of Public Instruction or the Vice-Chancellor which may be presumed to act objectively and reasonably.\n\nAnother material defect in section 3 (2) is that no time limit has been fixed by the statute within which the competent authority is to give its approval. If the competent authority either due to over work endeavours or some other reason chooses to sit over the matter for a pretty long time a stalemate would be created which will seriously impair the smooth running of the institution. Indeed if sub-section (2) would have been cast in a negative form so as to provide that the sanctioning authority was bound to give approval to any action taken by the institution against its teachers unless it was, after hearing the teacher and the management of the institution, satisfied that the order passed by the institution or the action taken by it was in violation of the principles of natural justice, against the statutory provisions of law or tainted with factual or legal malice no objection could be taken. If the section would have been worded in this manner, then its validity could have been upheld on the ground that it was a sound regulatory measure which does not destroy the administrative autonomy of the institution but is meant to ensure the security of tenure of the teaching staff of the institution. But as this is not so, the validity of the provision cannot . be supported.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, I am satisfied that subsection (2) is unconstitutional being violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution and would have no app!i'Cation to any minority institution. • 1\n\nSub-section (3) ad' section 3 runs thus:-\n\n\"3 (3) (a) No teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be placed under suspension, except\n\nwhen an inquiry into the gross misconduct of such teacher is contempleted.\n\n(b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have beeu restored as teacher.\n\nProvided that the competent authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months, for a further period not exceeding two months, if, in the opinion of such competent authority, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher\".\n\nThese provisions deprive the minority institution of the power to suspend any teacher unless an inquiry into the gross misconduct of such teacher is contemplated.\n\nOne could understand if the word 'misconduct' alone was used in sub-section (3) (a) but as it is qualified by the adjective gross, it almost destroys the power of suspension which the minority institution might possess.\n\nEven so, subsection (3)(b) makes it clear that no suspension shall remain in force for a period of more than two months from the date of suspension ahd if no inquiry is completed within this period, the teacher\n\nWOl!ld have to be reinstated. This is indeed a most peculiar provision and gives an unqualified right to a teacher in the matter of supension.\n\nEven a Government servant to whom Article 311 of the CrnJstitution or the statutory rules apply does not enjoy such a liberal facility.\n\nMoreover, the rules make a mockery of any order of suspe'nsion passed pending an inquiry. It is very difficutt to predicate how long an inquiry would last and yet to limit the period of suspension to two months irrespective of the nature, length and the scope of the inquiry to only two months is really to completely cnrb the power of suspension.\n\nThe proviso to section 3 ( 3) again empowers the competent authority to extend the, period of suspension. Thus the cumulative effect of sub-sections (3) (a), 3(b) and the proviso is to interfere with the internal administration of the minority institution and curb the power of suspension a'ng thus deprive the institution H of the right of or taking any discipli'nary action against the teacher to such an extent that the inslit, ution becomes almost a figure-head.\n\nSuch a provision, therefore, cannot be upheld as it is clearly violative\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fazal Ali, !.) 975\n\nof Article 30 ( 1) of the Constitution of India. It is obvious that A whenever an institution suspends a teacher, it is bound to pay subsistance allowahce and any express provision like sub-section ( 4) of section 3 is wholly unnecessary and makes a serious inroad on the internal autonomy of the institution.\n\nThus, in our op1mon, section 3 in its entirety is ultra vires as being violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution and is wholly inapplicable to the appellants .B who are admittedly minority institutions.\n\nSection 4 of the Act may be quoted thus :-\n\n\" 4. Any teacher employed in any private education institution-\n\n(a) who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated; or\n\n(b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions or service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage, by any order;\n\nmay prefer an appeal against the order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different authorities or officers _may be prescribed for different classes of private educational institutions.\n\nExplanation : In this section, the expression 'Order' includes any order made on or after the date of the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date\".\n\nThis section gives a right of appeal to a teacher who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank and whose services are terminated.\n\nNo guidelin•cs arc provided in which manner this powr is to be exercised nor does it contain any provision which may entitle the minority\n\nin, titution '.o be heard by the appellate authority.\n\nNo principles or norms are laid down on the basis of which the order passed by the institution could be examined by the appellate authority.\n\nEven what would amount to misconduct has not been defined or qualified in sections 2, 3 or 4.\n\nI: is, 1hercfc1'e, difficult to understand how the appellate court would exercise this power in deciding whether or not the teacher was guilty of misconduct and what is the correlation between the degree of misconduct and the appropriate punishment which may have been awarded by the institution and approved by the competent authority.\n\nThe conferment of such an\n\n8-138 SC!/80\n\nabsolute and unguided power on the appellate authority which if passed against the management it cannot even file a civil snit to set aside ; his order amounts not only to a direct interference with the right e11shrined in Article 30 ( 1) of the Constitution but makes the minority institution a limp, lifeless and powerless body incapable of effective teaching and/ or attaining excellence in the standards of education.\n\nSuch a course of action is bound to hurt ti;~ feelings of the founders of the institution. For these reasons, therefore, I am of the opinion that scctio'n 4 is also ultra vires as violative of Article 30 of the Constitution and would, therefore, have no application to the minority institutions who are appellants in this case.\n\nSection 5 merely provides for transfer of an appeal pending before any authority to the appellate authority and if section 4. falls\n\nand is inapplicable to the minority institution section 5 also follows the same fate and will not apply to the minority institution.\n\nSection 6 runs thus :-\n\nD \"6. Where any retrenchment of any teacher employed\n\nin any private educational institution is rendered necessary consequent on any order of the Government relating to education or course of instruction or to any other matter, such retrenchment may be effected with the prior approval of the competent authority\".\n\nThis section deals with the contingencies under which the i'nStitu tion may be compelled to retNnch any teacher employed in the school. Whatever be the position in other private educational institutions so far as the minority institution is concerned, this is purely a domestic matter of the institution and cannot be interfered with by any statute. The words \"administer educational institutions of their choice\" clearly indicate that the institution has an absolute right to select teachers, retain them or retrench them at its sweet will accord ing to the norms prescribed by the institution or by the religious Order which has founded the ins'itution.\n\nAs almost all the minority institutions in the present case are not receiving any substantial aid from the Government but have established the institution by their own moneys and are bearing all the expenses themselves, it is none of the business of any outside authority to interfere with or dictate to the institution as to which member of the staff should be retrenched and which should be retained. The provisions of section 6 directly interfere with this valuable right of the institution by providing that the retrenchment shall be made with the approval of the competent au'hority. The power is uncanalised and unguided and suffers from the same vices as has been pointed out in the case of\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Fawl Ali, J.) 9'17\n\naection 3 of the Act.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, section 6 will A fiave no application to the institution.\n\nSection 7 may be extracted thns :-\n\n\"7. The pay and allowances of any teacher employed in any private educational institntion shall be paid on or before such day of every month, in such manner and by or through such authority, officer or person, as may be prescribed\".\n\nThis is purely an innocuous provision which is meant for the benefit of the institution itself by providing how the salaries of the emploa1\n\nyees of the institution should be paid and is purely a regulatory C measure which does not at all touch or effect the administrative autonomy of the mi'nority institution.\n\nSo far as sections 8 and 9 are concerned, they wonld obviously not apply to the minority institutions because these institutions do not receive any aid from the Government and are, therefore, not D liable to maintain or furnish accounts to the University authorities or to the Goven1111ent, nor the prescribed anthority has any right to inspect or pass audit of the accounts kept by the institution. For these reasons, sections 8 and 9 also do not apply to the minority institutions.\n\nSection 10 relates to the inspection or inquiry in respect or private educational institution, its buildings, laboratories etc., or any other matter connected with the institution which may be necessary.\n\nSubsections (2), (3) and (4) of section 10 provide the mode in which the inspection or inquiry is to be made a'nd a report submitted to the concerned authority.\n\nThese provisions are also in the nature of sound regulatory measures and appear to be in the larger interest of the functioning of the institution itself and, therefore, do not offend Article 30 of the Constitution.\n\nSection 11 runs thus :-\n\n\"11. Every educational agency shall, within such time G or within such extended time as may be fixed by the competent authority in this behalf, furnish to the competent authority such returns statistics and other information as the competent authority may, from time to time require.\"\n\nThis section also contains purely a regulatory measure and is in the H best interest of the institution and cannot be said to violate Article 30( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nSection 12 and 13 relate to penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Act which have been held by me to be violative of Article 30 and, therefore, inapplicable to the appellants because that would amol!nt to destroying the very foundation and personality of the minority institution. These sections are also not applicable to the minority institl!tion except n respect of provisions of the Act which have been upheld by me.\n\nSection 15 contains the revisional power and provides that the Government may delegate its powers, or make rules regarding the exercise of such a power.\n\nI have already pointed out that the setting up of a competent authority to sanction or approve the order passed by the institution in respect of a member of the staff where sufficient guidelines and grounds for approval have been prescribed is purely a regulatory measure and does not attract Art. 30 of the Constitution.\n\nThe conferment of a right of revision against any order of the minority institution under the Rules framed which provide sufficient guidelines and allow the minority institutions an opportunity to be heard, is an innocuous provision and does not impinge on the autonomy of the minority imtitution.\n\nI am, therefore, of opinion that such a provision is in the best interests of the institution and does not in any way harm the personality of the institution or destroy the image so as to interfere with its autonomous functioning.\n\nI, therefore, hold that section 15 is constitutionally valid and I might hasten to add that its constitutionality was not challenged before this Court.\n\n'section 16 bars a civil court from deciding the questions which fall under this Act and section 17 contains an indemnity clause. As I have held that almost all the operative and important provisions of this Act are ultra vires, these sections also would have no application to the minority institution. In fact, section 16 suffers from a serious defect, viz., that if it was held by me that the provision regarding appeal to the appellate authority was valid then section 16 completely bars the right of the management to file a suit to challenge the validity of the order of the appellate authority. To this extent, therefore, this Section makes a serious inroad on the fundamental right of the minority institution and must be held to be inapplicable to the minority institution.\n\nI have gone through the judgment of the High Court which does 11 not apear to have comidered the various aspects and features of the matter set out by me, 'nor has it properly applied the propositions summarised by me as culled out from the various decisions of this\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, !.) 979\n\nCourt starting from 1959 (Re: Kerala Education Bill's case) (supra) A to 1979 (Lily Kurian's case) (supra).\n\nFor these reasons, I hold the sections 3 ( alongwith its sub-section), 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16 and 17 are violative of Article 30 of the Constitution and have no application to the appellants which are minority instilutions and which fall withih the protection gnarante- B ed by the Constitution under Article 30.\n\nI accordingly allow all these appeals, set aside the order of the High Court and quash all the directions which may have been issned by the Government or other authorities under the Act to the appeCants except such steps\n\nas are taken under those provisions of the Act which have been upheld by me, viz., sectiohs 7, JO, 11, 14 and 15.\n\nIn the peculiar C circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.\n\nKAILASAM, J. These appeals are by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh.\n\nSeveral writ petitions questioning the validity of certain provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 1975 (hereinafter called the Act) were heard.\n\nThese writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment by the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n\nAggrieved by the judgment of the High Court holding that the impugned sections of the Act is intra vires of the Constitution, not void and operative on schools and institutions of the minorities, the present appeals by special leave have been preferred.\n\nThe purpose of the legislation is set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill.\n\nIt is statod :-\n\n\"Of late, several instances have come to the notice of the State Government regarding the various irregularities committed by the managements of private educational institutions in matters relatir.g to suspension, dismissal, removal or otherwise termination, of members of the teaching staff on flimsy grounds without framing charges and without giving an opportunity to explain.\n\nThe said managements are . also flouting the orders or instructions of Director of Pubiic Instruction or the Universities or the Government in respect of such matters.\n\nHaving regard to the above circumstances, the Government have decided to regulate the service conditions of teachers employed in the private educational institutions to ensure security of service of the said teachers, and also to exercise certain control on such institutions in the matter of their accounts, etc., by undertaking suitable legislation in this regard.\"\n\n980 SUPREME cot.RT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R..\n\nA The salient features of the Bill are given as under :-\n\n(i) to safeguard the service cohditions of teaching staff in the recognised private educational institutions in the matter of suspension, removal, dismissal and retrenchment;\n\n(ii) to make it compulsory for the private managements to obtain the prior permission of the competent authority before a teacher is visited with any of the aforesaid ma jar penalties;\n\n(iii) to provide that the suspension of a teacher pending enquiry, should be for a period of two months only after which the teacher should be deemed to have been restored to duty, unless the competent authority extends the suspension period by another two months; thereby making it specific that in any case the teachers shall not be under suspension for more than four months;\n\n(iv) to provide that no teacher should be retrenched without the prior permission of the competent authority;\n\n(v) to provide for payment of salaries to teachers on the specified day of the month in such manner and by or through such authorities, officer or persons, as may be laid down in the rules;\n\n(vi) to provide for conducting enquiries into the affairs of the recognised private educational institutions and also for issue of suitable directions to the managements of such institutions based on such enquiry, which shall be binding on the monagcments.\n\nThe writ petitions challenged the validity of sections 3 to 7 of the Act.\n\nSections 3 to 7 occur in Chapter II relating to terms and conditions of service of. teachers. It is necessary to set out the impugned G sections ; .....\n\n\"Dis1nissal, ren1oval or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers. employed in private educational institutions. 3(1). Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be dis- R missed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall bis appointment be otherwise terminated, except with the prior approval of the comDetent authority.\n\n').\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, J.) 981\n\nProvided that if any educational management, agency or institution contravenes the provisions of this sub-section, the teachers affected shall be deemed to be in service.\n\n(2) Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher employed in any private educational institution is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment.\n\n(3a) No teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be placed under suspension, except when an inquiry into the. gross misconduct of such teacher is contemplated.\n\n(b) No such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher.\n\nProvided that the competent authority may, for reasons to be D recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months for a further period not exceeding two months, if, in the opinion of such competent authority, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher. ( 4) Every such teacher as is placed under suspension under snbsection (3) shall be paid subsistence allowance at such rates as may be E prescribed during the period of his suspension.\n\nAppeal against orders of punishment imposed on teachers employed in private educational institutions.\n\n4. Any teacher employed in any private educational institution-\n\n( a) who is dismissed, removed or rednced in rank or whose appoinment is otherwise terminated; or\n\n(b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage, by any order;\n\nmay prefer an appeal against theorder to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different auth_9Jities or officers may be prescribed for different classes of private educational institutions.\n\nExplanation-In this section, the expression 'order' includes any order made on or after the date of the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date.\n\nSpecial provision regarding appeal in certain past disciplinary cases.\n\n5. (I) If, before the date of the commencement of this Act, any teacher employed in any private educational institution has been dismissed or removed or reduced in rank or his appointment has been otherwise terminated and any appeal preferred before that date-\n\n( a) by him against such dismissal or removal or reduction in rank or termination; or\n\n(b) by him or the educational agency against any order made before that date in the appeal referred to in clause (a); is pending on ihat date, such appeal shall stand transferred to the appellate authority prescribed under section 4.\n\n(2) If any such appeal as is preferred in sub-section (1) has been disposed of before the date of the commencement of this Act, the order made in any such appeal shall be deemed to be an order made under this Act and shall have effect accordingly.\n\nRetrenchment of teachers.\n\n6. Where any retrenchment of any teacher employed in private educational institution is rendered necessary consequent on any order of the Government relating to education or course of instruction or to any other matter, such retrenchment may be affected with the prior approval of the competent authority.\n\nPay and allowances of teachers employed in private educational institution to be paid in the prescribed manner.\n\n7. The pay and allowances of any teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be paid on or before such day of every month, in such mauuer and by or through such authority, officer or person, as may be prescribed.\"\n\nThe object of the legislation in general and the impugned provisions in particnlar is to regulate the service conditions of the teachers and to ensure their security of service.\n\nThe main attack on the validity ot the impugned sections is that the provisions are violative of the rights conferred on the minorities to establish and administer their institutions under Arts. 29 and 30 of the Constitution.\n\nThe plea is that their right to administer their institutions is taken away by imposing unjustified and complete control with the authorities specified in the Act.\n\nBefore considering the provisions of each of the sections impugned it is necessary to refer to the nature of the right conferred on the mino- H rities. The relevant article is Art. 30 of the Constitution and it is necessary to refer to the Art. and the important decisions rendered by this Court under the Article.\n\n~ ..\n\nAl.1 SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, !.) 9S3\n\n\"Right of minorities to establish and' administer educational insti- A tutions.\n\nArt. 30. (I) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice .\n\n(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.\"\n\nThe educational institutions established and administered by the minorities in the exercise of the rights conferred under Art. 30 may be classified into 3 categories (1) those which do not seek either aid or recognition from the State or affiliation from the University; (2) those which seek aid and (3) those that seek either recognition or affiliation but not aid.\n\nWe are not concerned with institutions which do not seek either aid or recognit'on from the State or affiliation from the University.\n\nThe institutions which require aid may again be classified into two classes namely those which are by Constitution expressly made eligible for receiving grants and (2) which are not entitled to any grant by virtue of the express provisions of the Constitution.\n\nHere again we are not concerned with the first category. We are only concerned with the institutions which are no: entitled to any grant by any express provision in the Constitution.\n\nArticles 28(1), 29(2) and 30(2) deal v1ith educational institutions receiving aid out of State Funds. Certain restrictions are placed and obligations cast on institutions recognised by the State or receiving aid Art. 28(3) provides \"No person attending any educational institutional recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instrucfons that may be imparted in such institutions or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor. his guardian has given his consent thereto. Under the sub-article a peroan attend:ng an institution recognised by the State or receiving aid cannot be compelled by the institution to take part in any religious instruction or to attend relig'ous worship without his consent. Art. 29(2) provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.\n\nUnder Art. 29(2) in institutions receiving aid, a citizen is entitled to seek admission and the institutions is forbidden to deny admission to a citizen on grounds of\n\nreligion, race, caste or language. While Art. 28(3) and 29(2) impose certain restrictions on institutions receiving aid, Art. 30(2) forbids the State from discriminating against any educational institution in granting aid on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. The Constitution does not confer any right on the institution to receive any aid. It however forbids the State in granting aid to educational institutions from discriminating an educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority whether based on religion or language. This would imply that the State has right to grant or not to grant aid. It may be that the State is not in a position to grant aid to education institutions.\n\nIn such circumstances nobody can force the State to grant aid. But if the State grants aid to educational institutions there should not be any discrimination. It is open to the State to prescribe relevant conditions and insist on their being fulfilled before any institution becomes entitled to aid. No institution which fails to1 conform to the requirements thus validly prescribed would be entitled to any aid. Educational institutions receiving aid whether they are' managed and administered by minorities or not have to conform to the requirements prescribed by the State in order to enable the institutions to receive aid. The requirements prescribed shall not be discriminatory on the ground that it is under the management of a minority whether based on religion or language. The character of the minority institution should not also be destroyed. The right of the State to ensure that its funds are properly spent cannot be denied.\n\nIn Re: Kera/a Education Bill,(') at p. 1062 Chief Justice Das ruled that \"the minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars.\"\n\nThe learned Chief Justice proceeded to observe :---\n\n\"It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice docs not necessarily milita•e against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institution to be aided.\"\n\nThe scope of the reasonable regulations that can be imposed is clearly ff explained by the question framed by the Attorney General and the answer furnished by the Court at p. 1063. The State cannot say \"I\n\n!l) !l959] S.C.R. 995.\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, J.) 9g5,\n\nhave money and I shall not give you any aid unless you surrender to A. me your right of administration\" (emphasis supplied) The Court held that regulations prescribed under the various clauses except sub-clause\n\n( 5) of CL 3 which made the educational institutions subject to clauses 14 and 15, valid .\n\nThe Kerala Education Bill which was referred to this Court for the purpose of opinion contained several clauses.\n\nA summary of the clauses is given in the judgment from pages 1023 to 1030 of the Reports, Clauses 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 20 relate to the management of aided schools.\n\nThe Court expressed its view that the provisions in clauses 7, 10, 11(1), 12(1), (2), (3) and (5) may easily be regarded as reasonable regulations or conditions for the grant of aid- (Vide p.\n\n1064) . Clause 7 is extracted at p. 1025. It confers powers enumerated in the clause on the managers. Clause 10 requires the Government to prescribe the qualifications to be possessed by persons for appointment as teachers in Government Schools and in private schools which by the definition means aided or recognised schools. The State Public Service Commission is empowered to select candidates for appointment as teachers in Government and aided schools according to the procedure laid down in cl. 11. Clause 12 prescribes the conditions of service of the teachers of aided schools obviously intended to afford some security of tenure to the teachers of aided schools. It provides that the scales of pay applicable to the teachers of Government schools shall apply to all the teachers of aided schools whether appointed before or after the commencement of this clause.\n\nRules applicable to the teachers of the Government schools arc also to apply to certain teachers of aided schools as mentioned in sub-cl, (2).\n\nSub-cl. (4) provided that no teachers of an aided school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or suspended by the Manager without the previous sanction of the authorised oflker. With regard to sub-cl. l2(1) (2) and (3) which related to conditio.ns of service and security of tenure, the Court held that the purpose may easily be regarded as reasonable regulations or conditions for grant of the aid. It was submitted that claus, s 9, 11 (2) and 12 ( 4) went beyond the permissible limit as by taking over the collections of fees, etc. and by undertaking to pay the salaries of the teachers and other staff the Government is in reality confiscating the -; chool fund and under cl. 11 the power of management is taken away by providing that the appointment of a teacher should be out of the panel to be prepared by the Public Service Commission.\n\nSimilarly it was submitted that by requiring previous sanction by the authorised officer before dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a teacher, the right to administer was taken away. Chief Justice Das observed at p. 1064 of the Reports : \"These are no doubt serious inroads on the right\n\nof administration and appear perilonsly near violating that right. Bm considering that those provisions arc applicable to all educational institutions and that the impugned parts of els. 9, II and 12 are designed to give protection and security to the ill paid teachers who arc engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes, we are prepared, as .at present advised, to treat these clauses 9, 11 (2) and 12(4) as permissible regulations which the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to the'r educational institutions.\" It is clear that so far as aided institutions are concerned conditions similar to those that are mentioned can be validly imposed on the institutions. The only prohibition is that the conditions should not be of such a nature as to deprive the character of the minority institutions in their exercise of the rights conferred on them as minority institutions.\n\nSo long as there are rules for the purpose of maintaining the excellence of educational institutions and not discriminating against the minority educational institutions they will be valic!.\n\nThe decisions rendered (ubsequent to the Kcrala Education Bill case may now be referred to see how for the views exprcssod had been modified.\n\nIn Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai & Ors. v. State of Bombay & A nr. CJ a Bench of 6 Judges held that the order of the Government\n\ndirecting that 80% of seats in the training coH .. gcs should be recrved for Government nominee with a threat that if the order was disobeyed, grant and recognition would be withdrawn, was invalid.\n\nThe Court !aid down that reasonable restrictions in !lie interest of the cffici<':ncy of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation and the like may be imposed as those regulations will not be restrictions on the substance of the right guaranteed, for they secured the proper functioning of the institution in educational matters.\n\nThe Court held that \"if every order which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in !he public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institutions, the right guaranteed by Art. 30 (1) will be but a \"teasing illusion\", a promise of unreality.\n\nRegulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution- The dual test prescribed is the test of reasonableness and the test that is regulat:ve of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of the education of the minority community or the persons who resort to it.\n\nThe requirements of reservation of 80% of the seats will\n\nr' ,\n\n. '1\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, !.) 9Si\n\ndestroy the right to management as a minority institution and as such cannot be imposed even in the case of institutions receiving aid.\n\nConditions of such a nature that would result in surrender of the fundamental right to administer cannot be imposed.\n\nAfter referring to the decision in the Kerala Educational Bill case, the Court observed that it did not decide that a regulation would be deemed unreasonable only if it was totally destructive of the right of the minority to administer the educational institution. This view was affirmed in the St. Xavier's College case [1975] 1 SCR 173. The test laid down requires that the regulation must be for regulating the educational institution for the minority committee as well other persons who resort to it. (emphasis supplied)\n\nThe case of Rev. Father W. Proost and Ors. v. The State of Bihm and Ors. CJ relates to affiliation.\n\nThis Court was considering tbe validity of s. 48-A of the Bihar University Act. Under s. 48-A a Un; versity Service Commission for affiliated Colleges was established. It was provided amongst others that subject to the approval of the Unhcrsity, appointments, dismissals, removals, termination of service or reduction in rank of teachers of an affiliated college not belonging to the State Government shall be made by the governing body of the Collci; c on the recommendation of the Commission.\n\nWhile the petition was pending before this Court the Governor of Bihar promulgated an Ordinllilce by inserting Sec. 48-B which exempted Colleges established and administered by the minorities from the operation of the provisions of clauses (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) of s. 48-A.\n\nAfter the introduction of s. 48-B the petitioners before this Court claimed protection under S. 48-B and submitted that affiliated Colleges established by minorities arc exempt from the operation of the impugned provisions of s. 48-A. It may be noted that nnder s. 48-B the governing body of an affifattcd college established by a minority shall be entitled to make appointments, dismissals, removals, termination of service or reduction in rank of teachers or take other disciplinary action subject only to the approval of the Commission and the Syndicate of the f!uiversity.\n\nThe petitioners did not challenge the provisions which orovided that appointments, dismissals, removals, termination 0f senice and reduction in rank of teache.rs or other disciplinary measures will be subject to the approval of the Commission and the Syndicate of the University.\n\nWhat was objected to was the provisions under s. 48-A which esrablished an University Service Commission on whose recommendations alone appointments, dismissals, removals, termmations of service or reduction in rank of teachers of an affiliated college\n\n\nA can be effected.\n\nA provision requiring prior approval uf the Commis; sion or Syndicate was not challenged as objectionable'.\n\nIn State of Kera/a v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial('), the constitutional validity of certain provisions were challenged on the grounJ that they interferred with the rights of the minority institutions.\n\nThe Kerala University Act, 1979 was passed to re-organise the University of Kerala with a view to establishing a teaching, residential and affiliating University for the Southern Districts of the State of Kerala.\n\nSs. 4d and 49 dealt with the Governing Bodies of private colleges.\n\nThe Edncational Agency of a private College was required to set up a Governing Body for a private College or a managing council for private-colleges under one corporate management. The section provided for the composition of two bodies so as to include Principals and Managers of private colleges, nominees of the University and Government as well as elected representatives of teachers.\n\nSub-s. (2) provided that the new bodies would be having corporate perpetual succession and the members would bold ofti.ce for four years.\n\nSub-section cast a duty on the new governing body or the managing council to administer the private college or colleges in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The provisions of s. 53, sub-ss. (1), (2), (3) and\n\n(9) conferred on the Syndicate of the University power to veto the decision of the Governing Council.\n\nA right of appeal was provided for any person aggrieved.\n\nSection 56 conferred ultimate power on the University and the Syndicate in disciplinary matters in respect of teachers.\n\nThis Court held that sub-s. (2) and ( 4) of Ss. 48 and 49 as ultra vires.\n\nThe Court agreed that the High Court was right in declaring that sub-ss. (1) and (2), (9) and of s. 53, sub-ss. (2) and\n\n(4) of s. 56 as ultra vires.\n\nIn D.A.V. College etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors(') the validity of cl. 18 which required that non-govermnental Colleges shall comply with the requirements laid down in the ordinances governing service of teachers in non-govermnental Colleges as may be framed by the University was considered.\n\nClause 18 so far as it is applicable to the minority institutions empowered the University to prescnbe by regula tion governing the service of teachers which is enacted in the larger interest of the institution to ensure their efficiency and excellance. The Court held : \"It may for instance issue an ordinance in respect of age of superannuation or prescribe minimum qualifica:: 1ns for teachers to be employed by such institutions either generally or in particular sub-\n\n\n(2) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 688.\n\nr A\n\nAJ, L SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, 1.) 989\n\njects. Uniformity in the conditions of service and conduct of teuchers A in all non-Government Colleges would make for harmony and avoid frustration.\"\n\nA reading of the decisions referred to above make it clear that while the right to establish and administer a minority institution cannot be interferred with restrictions, by way of regulations for the purpose of maintaining the educational standards of the institution can be validly imposed.\n\nFor maintaining the educational standard of the institution as a whole it is necessary to ensure that it is properly staffed.\n\nConditions imposing the minimum qualifications of the staff, their pay and other benefits, their service conditions, the imposition of punishment will all be covered and regulations of such a nature have been held to be valid. In the case of institutions that receive aid it is the duty of the Government who grants aid to see that the funds are properly utilised.\n\nAs the Government pays for the staff it is their bounden duty to see that well-qualified persons are selected their pay and other emoluments are guaranteed and service conditions secured.\n\nSo far as the institutions receiving aid are concerned if the regulations are made for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of the staff the validity cannot be questioned as long as the regulations do not discriminate the minority institution on the ground of religion or language.\n\nThe minority institutions have no fundamental right to demand recognition by the State or affiliation by the University but as recognitior: and affiliation is necessary for the effective exercise of the fundamental right of minorities to establish and administer their institutions, they are entitled to recognition and affiliation if reasonable conditions that are imposed by the Government or the University relevant for the purpose of granting recognition or affiliation are complied with.\n\nBefore granting recognition or affiliation it is necessary that the concerned Government or the University is satisfied that the institution keeps up with the required minimum standard.\n\nAs has been held by Das CJ., ''Right to administer cannot obviously inclnde the right to mal-administer\" and in the words of Shah, J. \"The right is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation and the like.\" Jnstice Jaganmohan Reddy has made it clear in upholding cl. 18 of the Guru Nanak University, Amritsar Act, 1961 that regulations relating to the recruitment and service conditions of the teachers of the institution are valid.\n\nThe decision of 9 Judges' Bench in The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society & Anr. etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (') may now\n\n'(I) [1975] l S.C.R. 173.\n\n990 SUPREME COUi<T REPORT':\n\n[ 1980] J.C.R.\n\nbe considered.\n\nAU the 9 Judges were unanimous th11t the right to aid or recognition was not a fundamental right but that aid or recognition cannot be offered on conditions which would involve a surrender of those rights.\n\nBut the rights of recognition and affiliation are subject to regulations which are necessary for maintenance of the educational institutions. In the St. Xaviers College case (supra), S. 33A(l)(a) was challenged. It provided that every college was to be under the management of a governing body which must include a representative of the University and representatives of teachers, non-teaching staff and students of the college.\n\nEight of the nine Judges held that S. 33A\n\n(1) (a) violated Art. 30(1) and could not be applied to minority institutions. This Court in a subsequent decision in G.F. College Shahajahanpur v. University of Agra and Anr.C) held that it would not be unconstitutional to direct that the Principal and the Senior Teacher appointed by the Governing body itself be tnken into the managng\n\ncommittee.\n\nThe Court in St. Xavier's College case also considered the validity of S. 51-A(l)(a), (2) (a) and 51-A(l) (b). Section 51-A(l) (a) and (2) (a) provided that no member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff was to be dismissed, removed or reduced in mnk except after an inquiry in which he had been informed of the charges against him and bad been given a reasonable opportunity of being beard and making a representation on the penalty proposed to be inflicted.\n\nNo termination of service not amounting to dismissal or removal was to be V'a!id unless such member had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed termination.\n\nThe two clauses were held to be valirl, as being reasonable.\n\nHowever, the Court held that S. 51-A(l) (a) and (2) (b) as violative of Art. 30(1). Section 51-A(l) (b) provided that the penalty to be inflicted on him must be approved by the Vice-Ch11ncellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor ln this behalf.\n\nSimilarly, S. 51-A(2) (b) provided that \"such termination is approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf.\" Section 51-A(l) (b) required the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, or other officer authorised by him. for the penalty to be inflicted under sub-s. 1 (a), and S. 51-A(2)(h) required similar approval for the termination of service under sub-s. (2) (al. The Court also held that S. 52-A which required that any dispute between the governing body and anv member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching s'aff of an affiliated college, connected with the terms of service of such member. must be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration consist; ng of O\"e mem-\n\n[; c:· each appointed by the governing body acd hv the member of the\n\n-- -.\n\n(I) (19751 3 S C.R. 810.\n\n.. I'\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVr. OF A.P. (Kwlusam, !.) 991\n\nstaff and an umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor was not V'alid.\n\nSeven out of 9 Judges held that S. 52-A violated Art. 30(1) and coulc:\\ not be applied to minority institution.\n\n Minority institutions seeking affiliation will have to follow statutory measures intended to regulate the conduct of the educational institution.\n\nRay, C.J. p. 193 held:-\n\n'With regard to affiliation a minority institution must follow the statutory measures regulating educational standards and efficiency the prescribed courses of study, cours@s of instructions and the principles regarding the qualification of teachers, educational qualifications for entry of students into educational institutions etc.\n\nWhen a minority institution applies to a University to be affiliated, it expresses its choice to participate in the system of general education and courses of instruction prescribed by that University*''\"'*'''' Therefore. the meamres which will regulate the courses of study. the qualifications and appointment of teachers, the conditions of employment of teachers,*******''\"'* are all comprised in matters germane to affiliation of minority institutions.\n\nThese regulatory measures for affiliation are for uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses and do not violate any fundamental l'ight of the minority institutions under Art. 30\" (emphasis supplied) Ray C.J. held thats. 51A(l) (b) and S. 51A(2) (b) i' not applicable to minority institutions as they \"cannot be said to be pern1issive regulatory mcsurcs inasmuch as it confers arbitrary power on the Vice- Chanccllor to take away the right of administration of the minority institutions.\"\n\nAgreeing with the view of the Chief J us ti cc, regarding his conclusio~ about S. 5!A(l)(a) and (2)(b), Khanna, J. at p. 243 observed :--\n\n\"Although disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution would be with the governing council, regulations in niy opinion, can be nzade for ensuring proper conditions of service of the teachers and for securing a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against .. -· the teachers.\n\nSuch provisions which are calculated to safe~ guard the interest of teachers would result in security of tenure and thus inevitably attract competent persons for the posts of teachers. * • * • * Regulations made for this\n\n9-138 SCJ/80\n\n992 SUPREt1E COlJf-..T REPO~T3 [1980] 2 ~.•:·.n .•\n\n' purpose should be considered to be in thC' interests of minority educational institutions and as such they would not violate Art. 30(1) \". (emphasis supplied)\n\nRegarding S. 5 lA, the learned Judge while holding that prov1s10ns under CL (a) of sub-ss. (1) & (2) of s. SlA which make provision for giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against a penalty to be proposed on a member of the staff would be valid.\n\nCl. (b) of the sub-s. which gives a power to the Vice-Chancellor and officer of the University authorised by him to veto the action of the managing body of an educational institution in awarding punishment to a member of the staff, interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers.\n\nHe was of the view that the power conferred on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer is a blanket power and no guidelines were laid down for the exercise of that power and it is not provided that the approval is to be withheld only in case the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service is roala fide by way of victimisation or other similar cause.\n\nThe conferment of such blanket power on the Vice-Chancellor or other officers authorised for vetoing the disciplinary action of the managing body of a educational institutional made scrious inroads on the right of the managing body to administer an educational institution.\n\nMathew, J. in dealing with S. 51A(l) (a) and (b) at p. 273 observed:-\n\nThe exact scope of the power of the Vice-Chancellor or of the officer of the University authorised by him in this subsection is not clear.\n\nIf the purpose of the approval is to see that the provisions of sub-section 51A(l)(a) are complied with, there can possibly be no objection in lodging the power of approval even in nominee of the Vice-Chancellor.\n\nBut an micanalised power without any guidline to withhold approval would be a direct abridgement of the right of the management to dismiss or remove a teacher or inflict any other penalty after conducting an enquiry.\" (emphasis supplied)\n\nThe learned Judge proceeded to observe :\n\n\"Of course it is open to the State in the exercise of its regulatory power to require that before the services of a H teacher are terminated, he should be given opportuility of being heard in his defence.\n\nBut to require that .for terminating the services of a teacher after\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, J.) 9 :) 3\n\nan enquiry has been conducted, the management should have the approval of an outside agency like the Vice-Chancellor or of his nominee would be an abridgement of its right to administer the educational institution.\n\nNo guidelines are provided by the legislature to the Vice-\n\nChancellor for the exercise of his power. The fact that the power can be delegated by the Vice-Chancellor to any officer of the university means that any petty officer to whom the power is delegated can exercise a general power of veto.\n\nThere is no obligation under the sub-sections l(b) and 2(b) that the Vice-Chancellor or his nominee should give any reason for disapproval.\n\nAs we said a blanket power without any guideline to disapprove the action of the management would certainly encroach upon the right of the management to dismiss or terruinate the services of teacher after an enquiry\".\n\nThe extracts from the judgments of Ray, J.\n\nKhanna, J. and Mathew, J. show that regulations can be made for ensuring the proper conditions of service of the teachers and for securing fair prncedure in the matter of disciplinary action against them.\n\nPrcscribirg uniforruity in the conditions of service and conduct of teachers in ail non-govern1nental colleges would promote har1nony, avoid frustration and is permissible. It is thus seen that the university or the authcrity granting recognition can prescribe the conditions of service of tcachc, s providing them with security of service.\n\nThe rules may require that no Principal of the teaching or non-teaching staff of •a recognised or a approved institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges und making representation on any penalty proposed to be inflicted on him.\n\nThe Government which grants recognition or the University which gives affiliation are entitled to sec that proper conditions of service of the teachers are ensured and fair procedure is observed by the institutions when disciplinary action is taken against them. If the regulations require the approval by the competent authority for safeguarding the rights of the teachers and for securing the procedure there could be no objection.\n\nSuch authority can also interfere with the decision of the private institutions when the punishment is awarded mala fide or by way of victimisation or for similar causes.\n\nIn Kerala Education Bill, 1957 Cl. 14(4) provided that no teacher of an uided school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or\n\n994 SUPREME l; OUaT REPORTS\n\n\nsuspended by the Manager without the previous sanction of the authorised officer.\n\nThis requirement of sanction related to schools that sought aid from the Government.\n\nWhile upholding the validity of\n\ncl. 14, Das CJ. observed that there could be no doubt that these are serious inroads in the right of the administration and appe-ar perilously near violating that right.\n\nBut considering that those provisions '.Ire applicable to all educational institutions and that the impugned parts of els. 9, 11 and 12 'are designed to give protection and security to the ill-paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes we are prepared, \"as at present advised to treat clauses 9, 11 (2) and 12 (4) as permissible regulations the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their educational institutions. Ray CJ. in St. Xavier College case, observed that though the opinion was given in Kerala Education Bill on an order of reference under Art. 143 is not binding on this court in any subsequent matter wherein a concrete case the infringement of the rights under any analogous provision may be called in question, it is entitled to great W•ight. Ray C.J. proceeded to observe that nonetheless the exposition of the various facets of the rights under Art. 29(1) and 30 by Das, C.J. speaking for the majority, with utmost cfarity, great perspicuity and wisdom ha; been the text from which Court has drawn its sustenance in the subsequent decisions.\n\nTo the extent that this Court has applitd these principles to concrete cases there can be no question of there being any conflict with what has been observed by Das, CJ. Ray, C.J. was of the view that similar provisions were held to be invalid as they fell with S. 48 and 49 of the Kerala Education Act, which was similar to cl. 12( 4) was held invalid.\n\nMatbew, J. was of the view that though in the Kerala Education Bill case, the Court upheld the provisions similar to those in S. 51A(l) (b) and 51 (A) (2) (b), the subsequent decisions of this Court left no doubt that the. requirement of subsequent approval for dismissing or terminating the services of teachers would be offending Art. 30. (Learned Judge referred to D.A.V. Coll'g' case).\n\nIn the Kerala Education Act case (supra), the validity of sub-ss. 2 & 4 of S. 48, S. 49, S. 53, Sub-ss. 1-9 and sub-ss. 2 and 4 of S. 56 were challenged. Hidayatullah, CJ. speaking for the Court observed tlrat after the erection of the Governing Body of the Managing Council, the founders or even the minority conimunity had no hand in the administration.\n\nThe two bodies were vested with the complete administration of the institution and were not answerable to the founders in this respect. Sub-ss. (2), ( 4) and (5) and (6) of ss. 48 and 49 clearly\n\n' l:- . \\\n\n'b.DJ - G..f. jfY)\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, J.) 995\n\nvest the management and administration in the hands of the two bodies with mandates from the university. Coupled with this is the power of the Vice Chance!lor and the Syndicate under sub-sections (2) and ( 4) of S. 56 to have the final say in respect of disciplinary proceedings against the teachers.\n\nIn striking down clauses (2) and (4) of S. 56, the Learned Chief Justice at p. 746 stated that the result was that sub-ss. (2) and (4) of S. 56 are ultra vires as they fail with ss. 48 and 49.\n\nThe Scheme of the Act was that a Governing Body or Managing Council was to be set up for private colleges and it was provided that the composition of the bodies were to include Principals, Managers of private Colleges and nominees of the University and Government as well as elected representatives of the teachers.\n\nThis outside body was entrusted with the administration.\n\nThese two sections 48 and 49 which provide for administration by the Governing Body or the Managing Council was held io be ultra vires.\n\nApart from it, the powers were conferred on the Syndicate of the University to veto the decision of the Governing Council.\n\nRegarding disciplinary matters, S. 56 conferred ultimate power on the University and the Syndicate in respect of teachers.\n\nAs the power to take disciplinary action was taken away from the Priv'atc or the Minority Institutions and conferred on the Governing Body or the Managing Council constituted under the Act and a provision was made requiring the previous sanction on the Vice-Chancel!or and provided an unrestricted right to the Syndicate.\n\nIt will be noted that the Chief Justice found Ss. 56(2) and (4) ultra vires as they had to fail alongwith Ss. 48 and 49 which deprived the institution of the right to manage its own affairs.\n\nIn the case of D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (supra), cl. 17\n\n~ provided that the staff initially appointed shall be approved by the '--- Vice-Chancellor and all subsequent changes shall be reported to !he\n\nI'.\n\nUniversity for Vice-Chancellor's approval.\n\nS. 17 does not, in fact, confer on the Vice-Chancel!or the power to veto the disciplinary action taken by the private institution.\n\nIn St. Xavier College case, also the management of the institution was completely taken away under Ss. 40 and 41 of the Act.\n\nThe G Private Institution was required to bo a constituent College of the University and was to be governed by the Statutes that may be framed by the University. Ss. 31A (l) (a) set up a Governing Body which to include amongst its Principals the representatives of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and representatives of the Teachers of the non-teac.hing staff and students of the, college. In the circum- H stances, the Court held that the right to administer and to conduct the affairs of the institution, were taken away from the institution. The\n\n996 SUPREME COUkT REPORrs f1980] 2 S.C.R.\n\ndisciplinary proceedings which were to be conducted against the teachers was required to obtain approval of the Vice-Chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor.\n\npart from the objection to the power conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to nominate any of its subordinate, the power conferred on the Vice-Chancellor was found to be unconstitutional as it was a blanket power unguided and uncanalised.\n\nIn Ully Kurian v. Sr., Lewina and Ors.('),' the provisions of Ordinance 33, Chapter 67 of the Ordinances framed by the Syndicate of the University of Kerala, under S. 19 (1) of \\.] the Kerala University Act, 1957 was challenged. S. 33 (1) . provided that the management may at any time place a teacher under suspension where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending.\n\nHe shall be paid subsistence allowance and other allowances by the Management during the period of suspension at such rates as may be specified by the university.\n\nThe teacher shall have the right to appeal against the order of suspension to the Vice- Chancellor of the University within a period of two months from the date on which he receives the order of suspension. Cl. 4 of Ordinance 3 3 provided that the teacher shall be entitled to appeal to the Vice- Chanccllor of the University against any order passed by the Management in respect of the penalties referred to in items (ii) to (v). Ordinance 33 ( 4) conferred a right of appeal on the teacher to prefer an appeal against the order of Management to the Vice-Chancellor in respect of the penalties imposed on him.\n\nOrdinances 33(1) and 33 ( 4) were struck down by this Court on the ground that the conferment of right of appeal an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) took away the disciplinary power of the minority institution.\n\nThe Vice-Chancellor was given power to veto the -./' disciplinary control which amounted to clear interference with disciplinary power of the minority institution.\n\nIt was found to be a fetter on the right of administration conferred under Art. 30(1). The main ground on which the powers were found to be violative of the right conferred under Art. 30 was that the right of appeal was provided without defining the scope of the appellate authority.\n\nIn the cases referred to, namely, Very Rev. Mother Provincial, D.A.V. College and Lilly Kurian, the powers conferred on the Vice-Chancellor were held to be blanket power, unguided and uncanalised.\n\nThe background of the decisions was that the minority institutions were deprived of the powers of administration by forming a body which deprived the institution of all its powers.\n\nIn such circumstances, it was found that the power was uncana!ised. In the case of Rev. Father W. Proost and\n\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT, OF A.P. (Kailasam, J.) 997\n\nA Ors. (supra), S. 48 was enacted providing that the minority institution shall be entitled to make appointments, dismissal, removal, termination of service and reduction in rank of teachers, subject only to the approval of the Syndicate of the University, which was not challenged.\n\nThe institution claimed exemption under s. 48B.\n\nBearing the facts of the cases set out above, we have to consider the impugned Act and determine whether the impugned provisions infringe the rights conferred on the minority institutions under Art. 30.\n\nThe statements of object and reasons and the salient features of the bill as stated in the objects and reasons and the impugned sections have been set out in full at the beginning of the judgment.\n\nThe main object of the legislation is to regulate the service conditions of the teachers in the private educational institutions and for ensuring the security of service of the teachers. It is further stated that private institution were punishing teachers on flimsy grounds without framing charges and without giving an opportunity to explain.\n\nIn the preamble it is also stated that the Act is to provide for terms and conditions of service of teachers and to control of the recognised private educational institution.\n\nS. 3 of the Act provides that no teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall hls appointment be otherwise terminated except with\n\nthe prior approval of the competent authority. S. 3 (2) will have to be read alongwith S. 3 (1) which provides that when a proposal to dismiss, remove or reduced in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher employed in any private educational institution is communicated to the competent authority, the competent authority shall if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal. reduction in rank or termination of appointment. The Proviso to S. 3 (1) states that if any educational management, agency or institution contravenes the provtsions of this sub-section, the teacher affected shall be deemed to be in service.\n\nThis section was challenged as conferring a power of taking disciplinary proceedings on an outside authority and as such it should be held as violative of the rights conferred on the minority institutions. If the power of approval conferred on the competent authority is a blanket G power uncanalised and without guidelines, it will have to be held as invalid.\n\nThe question, therefore, arises whether the section provides sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power by the competent authority. In the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors.(') it II was l1eld that the statement of objects and reasons could be referred to\n\n(l) [1954] S.C.R. 587.\n\nfor the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevalent at the time which actuated the sponsor of the bill to introduce the same and the extent of urgency and the evil which he sought to remedy since these matters were relevant for deciding whether the restrictions were reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19 (2) to ( 6). The object and reasons for the legislation make it very clear that the legislation was intended to regulate .the service conditions of teachers employed in private educational insti1utions and for the security of service of the said teachers.\n\nThe preamble is also an aid in construing the provisions of the Act.\n\nThe House of Lords in A It. Gen. v.\n\nH.R.H.\n\nPrince Earnest Augustus of Hanover('), held that when there is a preamble it is generally in its recitals that the mischief to be rmedied and the scope of the Act are described.\n\nIt is, therefore. permissible to have recourse to it as an aid to construing the enacting provisions.\n\nTl1e preamble states that the Act it to provide for terms and servke conditions of teachers. If the power conferred under S. 3(1) and s. 3(2) is restricted to regnlating the service conditions of teachers and for ensuring their security of service, the power conferred would be valid.\n\nIt was submitted by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha the learned counsel for the appellants that the power i<; uncanalised because the approval can be withheld even on merits which would in fact deprive the disciplinary powers of the minority institutions.\n\nIt is a well settled rule that in interpreting the provisions of a statute, the court will presume that the legislatio;1 was intended to be intra vi res and also reasonable.\n\nThe rule followed is that the section ought to be interpreted consistent with the presumption which imputes to the le!!is!ature an intention of limitin!! the, direct operatiO(l of its enactment to the extent that is permissible('). Maxwell on lnterpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edn., P. 1 09 under the Caption : \"Restriction of Operation\" States :-\n\n\"Sometimes to keep the Act within the limits of it< scope, and not to distnrb the Cxistitlg liw beyond what the object requires, it is construed as operative between certain persons, or in certain circumstance:is, or for certain purposes only, even though the langnage expresses no such circumscription of the field of operation.\"\n\nThe following passage in Bidie v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation(') was cited with approval in Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala (4) :\n\n(I) [1957] A C. 436.\n\n(2) Street on Doctrine of Ultr01 Vires 1930 Edn. P.444.\n\n(3) [1948] 2 All. E. R. 995, 998.\n\n(4) [1973) Supp. S.C.R. 1 (101).\n\n...~\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.l'. (Kailfrsam, J.) 999\n\n\"The first thing . one has to do, I venture to think, in construing words in a section of an Act of Parliament is not to take those words in vacue, so to speak, and attribute to them what is sometimes called their natural or ordinary meaning.\n\nFew words in the English Jangnage have a natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their meaning is entirely independent of their context.\n\nThe method of construing statutes that I prefer is not to take particular words and attribute to them a sort of prima facie meaning which may have to displace or modify. It is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the question : \"In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that word?\"\n\nAccording to Holmes, J. in Towne v. Eigner(l), a v.ord is not crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.\n\nGwyer, J. in Central Provinces and Berar A ct('), held :\n\n\"A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the satne enactment, by the implication of the context. and even by the consideratrons arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act.\"\n\nTo the same effect are the observations of this Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar: ( 3 )\n\n\"It is well settled that in interpreting an enactment the Court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the Jcgis!ation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to supress. (The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd.\n\n\nChamaurbaugwalla v. The Union of Indici fl 957] S.C.R. 930 cited with approval.\"\n\nThis Court has in several cases adopted the principle of reading down the provisions of the Statute.\n\nThe reading down of a provision of a statute puts into operation the principle that so far as it is reaion-\n\n(1) 245 u. s. 418~62 L. ed. 372, 376.\n\n(2) [1939] F. C.R. 18 & 12.\n\n(3) [1962] 2 Suppl. S.C.R. 769.\n\nrooo\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[19SO] 2 S.C'.R.\n\nably possible to do so, the legislation should be construed as being within its power. It has the principle effect that where an Act\" is expressed in language of a generality which makes it capable, if read literally, of applying to matters beyond the relevant legislative power, the Court will construe it in a more limited sense so as to keep it within power.\n\nApplying the principles laid down in the cases cited above, the power conferred under S. 3 (1) and (2) of the impugned Act will have to be construed. This Court has in St. Xcn-ier's College . case\n\n(supra) held t.hat the proviskms of S.51A(l) of the impugned Act in that case which provided that no member of the other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college and recognised or approved institution shall be dismissed. or removed or reduced in rank except . after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and \"given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on any such penalty proposed to be inflicted on him,' as a valid condition. Mathew, J. affirmed that if the purpose of the approval is to see that the provisions of sub-sec. 51 (A) (1) ('l)are complied with, there can possibly be no\n\nobjection in lodging the power of approval even in nominee of the Vice-Chancellor. Khanna, J. has held that if the power is confined only to cases of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank .or termination of service as mala fide and by way of victimisation, the power would be valid. Regarding the power of interference with the conclusion of a domestic tribunal in disciplinary matters, this Court has held that the decis\\on can be interfered with if there is want of good faith or when there is victimisation or when the management has been guilty of basic F .' error or violation of principles of natural justice or when the material\n\n. findings are completely baseless or perverse_ (Indian Iron and Sieel Co.\n\nLtd. v. Their Workmen('). It has also been held that the authority interfering is not a Court of Appeal and cannot substitute its own judgment.\n\nThe impugned legislation was passed in the year 1975. It must be presumed that the legislature was conscious of the limitations of the power which the competent anthority can have in granting or withholding approval in the , case of disciplinary proceedings conducted by private institution. cl. 12( 4) of the Kera la Education Bill (supra) was held io be valid on the ground that it was designed to give protection and security to the ill-paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the natiol) and protect the backward classes. If the power is\n\n(1) [1958] S.C.R. 667.\n\n....\n\n• \\\n\nALL SAINTS IIIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, J.) 1001\n\nconstrused as conferring unrestricted power and if the provisions are held invalid, it will result in considerable mischief and would result in depriving the protection that is available to the poor teacher regarding their security of service. The legislation was for the specific purpose of regulating the service conditions and providing security of service and for preventing teachers from being punished on flimsy grounds without framing charges and with, out giving an opportunity to explain.\n\nJt is very different from other cases, in which the legislation was aimed at depriving the minority institutions of all its powers. The only aim of the impugned legislation is to provide security of service. As pointed out there are sufficient guidelines in the objects and reasons in the legislation as well as in the preamble. In the circumstances, it is not only reasonable but proper that a restricted meaning is given to the power of prior approval c.onfcrred on the competent authority under s.3.\n\nS.3(1) and (2) will have to be read together. The procedure contemplated is that when the educational insitution proposes io dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher it should communicate to the competent authority its proposal.\n\nThe latter part of S.3 (2) mentions that the competent authority shall !f it is satisfied that there arc adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or otherwise termination of appoinment. The approval of an order of dismissal or removal etc. will have to be read alongwith S.3 (1) which provides that no teacher shall be dismissed etc. without the previous approval of the competent authority. When a domestic enquiry has been conducted and the teacher is given an opportunity to rebut the charges and show cause against the punishment proposed and when fair procedure has been followed and the authority comes to the conclusion that the disciplinary action should be taken against the teacher the proposal w; u have to be sent to the competent authority. The competent authority will examine the proposal alongwith the procedure adopted by the institution and such dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of appointment. Sub. s(2) requires the competent authority to approve such a proposal if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal. The two words \"adequate and reasonable\" in our opinion furnish sufficient guidelines. The competent authority can interfere if there are no material at all for sustaining the order of punishment or when on the materials found the charge is completely baseless and perverse. The word \"adequate\" in sub-section wil! have to be understood as being confined to such examination of the proposal. The word \"reasonable\" would indicate the power of the competent authority is confined to the power of an authority to inter-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT5 (1980] 2 s.;;.R ..\n\nfere with the enquiry and conclusions arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. The competent authority may satisfy itself that the rules of natural- . Justice has been satisfied, that the teacher was given an opportunity to defend the charges against him and to show cause against the punish- ment proposed to be awarded to him and that a fair procedure has . been observed. The authority may also be entitled to interefere when B the punishment was imposed by the institution due to ma/a fides er with a view to victimised. him or such like grounds. The word \"reasonable\" cannol be nnderstood as conferring a power to interfere with the enquiry by the domestic tribunal as a Court of Appeal on merits.\n\nThe law relating to the circumtances under which the proceedings of the tribunal can be interferred with has been clearly laid down.\n\nSufficient guidelines are discernible from the Statements of objects and reason which state that the enactment was for the purpose of preventing private institutions from talcing disciplinary action on flimsy grounds without framing charges and with.out giving an opportunity to explain\n\nand for regulating the service conditions of teachers and for ensuring their security of service. W re are satisfied that sufficient guidelines are indicated in the Act. The.words \"adequate and reasonable\" should be given a restricted meaning so as to validate the pr, ovisions of the section.\n\nThus, understood, the objecti6n raised by . Mr.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, !earned counsel for the appellant, that S.3 (1) and (2) lack guidelines\n\nand have conferred a blanket power, cannot be uphold.\n\nIt was next contended by Mr. Lal Narain Sinha that no question of principles of natural justice arised when the conditions of service between the institution.and the teacher are regulated by contract. We are unable to accept this contention for the legislature is competent to enact provisions limiting the power of dismissal and removal. The Legislature has given security of service to employees in industries and in other institutions. It Wl!S submitted by the learned counsel that the\n\noffence of misconduct has not been classificd in the Act and that no procedure for conducting disciplinary enqui, Y. has been prescribed. Such d<!tails are not essential. It is within the jurisdiction of the institution to G conduct an enquiiy and impose punishments. It is also the right of the 'competent authority to withhold approval on adequate and reasonable grounds. The plea that the competent authority may be any petty officer cannot also ]Je upheld as the competent authority is defined under S.2(1) as meaning any auth, ority. officer or person authorised by notill\n\nfication performing the functions of competent authority under this Act.\n\nThe competent authority or officers of the educational department who are incharge of administration of educational institutions in the area,\n\ncannot be. called petty officers.\n\n,... l\n\nALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL v. GOVT. OF A.P. (Kailasam, !.) I 003\n\nSection 3(3) (a) am! 3(3)(b) relate to suspension of a teacher Sub. s.3(a) requires that a teacher employed in a private institution shall not be placed under suspension.\n\nWithout an enquiry into the gross-misconduct of such teacher is contemplated and sub. s.3(b) requires that the period of suspension shall n,<Yt exceed two months. If it exceeds two months and the enquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher shall, without prejudice to the enquiry, he deemed to have been restored as teacher.\n\nBut the proviso enables the authority to extend the period of suspension for another two months if in his opinion the enquiry could not be completed within the period of two months.\n\nSub. ss.(a) & (b) of S. 3 which relate to suspension are regulatory in nature and are intended to safeguard the teachers from being suspended for unduly long periods without there being an enquiry into gross misconduct.\n\nWe arc unable to say that these provisions interfere with the right of administration of the private institutions.\n\nS.3 ( 4) states that every teacher placed under suspension shall be paid subsistence allowance at \"1ch rates as may be prescribed during the period cf his suspension.\n\nThis sub-section is purely regulatory in nature and unobjectionable.\n\nS.4 confers a right of appeal against the order of punishment imposed on teachers employed in private educati, onal institutions. A teacher who is dismissed. removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated or whose pay and allowances' or any of E the whose conditions of service arc altered , or interpreted to his disadvantage may prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed.\n\nThis section was challenged by Mr. L. N. Sinha, learned counsel, on the ground that the right of appeal conferred is a blanket power without any restriction. In any event, the submission that the right of appeal is conferred only on the teacher and not on the institution. Though NO F restriction arc placed on the appellate power, we feel it may be possible to read down the section. But the learned counsel is on firm ground when he submits that the right of appeal is confined only to the teachers and not available to institution. This infirmity invalidates S.4.\n\nSection 5 is consequential of S.4 in which power is conferred on the G competent authority to hear appeal in certain past disciplinary cases.\n\nS.5 also will have to fail alongwith S.4. S.6 relates to retrenchment of teachers under certain conditions. It provides that when any retrenchment is rendered necessary, consequeut on any order of the Government relating to educational institutions , or course of instruction or any . other matter such retrenchment may be effected with the prior appro- H val of the competent authority. This section is also intended to provide security of service of the teachers and is regulatory in nature and\n\n1004 ~I rrPE!\\.1E CC.l.iRT REPORT'} i.1Y~~(:j 2 S.(.'.R.\n\n!he validity of which cannot be qnestioncd. S. 7 requires the pay and all, o'wances of any teacher employed in any private educational institution shall be paid on or before such day of every month, in such manner and by or through such authority, officer or person as may be prescribed. This section is also regulatory in nature and is mtcnded for securing regular payment of the teachers.\n\nThe validity of other sections was not questioned in the writ petitions, and, therefore, it is not permissible to go into it.\n\nIn the view we have taken, we do not think that we should go into \\. the merits of each of the cases. In C.A. No. 1280 of 1978-The All Saints High School Hyderabad v. The Govt. of , Jndhra Pradesh and Ors.-the learned cow1sel appearing for the school before the High Court sought the decision only on the legal issues and the questions emanating from the provisions of the Act and specifically requested the court not to decide the merits of the case. In some of the petition the facts have been gone into but we would refrain from going into the facts for it has to be decided as to whether the competent authority has acted within the restricted jurisdiction which have been stated with in our judgment. If the competent authority bad exceeded its jurisdiction, it would be apen to the aggrieved institution to question the validity of such action. These matters will have to be decided on merits. In the circumstances, we remit all the Civil Appeals to the High Court for disposal on merits in the light of this Judgment.\n\nORDER\n\nIn the view of the majority, sections 3(3) (a), 3(3) (b), 6 and 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Recognised Private Educational Institutions Control Act, 1975 are valid while sections 3(1), 3(2), 4 F and 5, of the Act are invalid in their application to minority educational institutions. It must follow that such institutions cannot be proceeded against for violation of provisions which are not applicable to them. The matters are remanded to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for final disposal on merits in the light of the judgments.\n\nG There will be no order as to costs.\n\nN.K.A.", "total_entities": 548, "entities": [{"text": "ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL, HYDERABAD ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ALL SAINTS HIGH SCHOOL, HYDERABAD ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 4, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 4, 1980 [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI AND\n\nP. s. KAlLASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Y. V. 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83010, "end_char": 83018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83394, "end_char": 83404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Clause 2(a)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83501, "end_char": 83515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "University Act 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84006, "end_char": 84025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84043, "end_char": 84052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In this case it appears that certain provisions of the Gujarat\n\nUniversity Act 1949", "statute": "In this case it appears that certain provisions of the Gujarat\n\nUniversity Act 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 33A(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84347, "end_char": 84364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In this case it appears that certain provisions of the Gujarat\n\nUniversity Act 1949", "statute": "In this case it appears that certain provisions of the Gujarat\n\nUniversity Act 1949"}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84943, "end_char": 84954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In this case it appears that certain provisions of the Gujarat\n\nUniversity Act 1949", "statute": "In this case it appears that certain provisions of the Gujarat\n\nUniversity Act 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85202, "end_char": 85212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85444, "end_char": 85457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85733, "end_char": 85743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85861, "end_char": 85873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51A(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86204, "end_char": 86218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "St. Xaviers", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87912, "end_char": 87923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we analyse the decision in St. Xaviers case (supra) we must note that as far back as 1959 in Re Kerala Education Bill this Court had clearly pointed out that while the minority institution had no constitutional right to be affiliated to any college or University the right to .be affiliated flowed from the language of Article 30( 1) of the Constitution and the University concerned could not either refuse\n\naffiliation or impose such conditions which may resnlt in complete surrendering of the management of the minority institution."}}, {"text": "Article 30( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88204, "end_char": 88218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88541, "end_char": 88555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88914, "end_char": 88927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89539, "end_char": 89553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89969, "end_char": 89979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90322, "end_char": 90325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra) Ray, C.J. reiterated the principles laid down by the previous case and observed as follows :-\n\n\"W11en minority applies for affiliation, it agrees to follow the uniform courses of study."}}, {"text": "Article\n\n30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91465, "end_char": 91476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93368, "end_char": 93378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93422, "end_char": 93432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93706, "end_char": 93716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94860, "end_char": 94874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95194, "end_char": 95211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95544, "end_char": 95558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96240, "end_char": 96257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96275, "end_char": 96285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96397, "end_char": 96407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96445, "end_char": 96456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 51A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97220, "end_char": 97231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97628, "end_char": 97639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98831, "end_char": 98842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 40, 41, 33A(l)(a), 33A(l)(b), 51A and 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99068, "end_char": 99118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 40, 41, 33A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99255, "end_char": 99278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99518, "end_char": 99528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99574, "end_char": 99584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99702, "end_char": 99712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100039, "end_char": 100052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100357, "end_char": 100370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100497, "end_char": 100507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Khanna", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100671, "end_char": 100677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar view was taken by Khanna, J. who also held that management of a minority institution should be kept free from governmental or ether interference because the worrls \"of their choice\" appearing in Article 30 have special significance and would actually lose their value and utility if too much interference or unnecessary curbs are placed in the administration of the affairs of the minority institution."}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100848, "end_char": 100858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 29 and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101738, "end_char": 101756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 29 and 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102907, "end_char": 102925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103274, "end_char": 103287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104613, "end_char": 104622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104851, "end_char": 104864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104922, "end_char": 104933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105094, "end_char": 105105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106238, "end_char": 106249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106296, "end_char": 106306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106404, "end_char": 106422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107151, "end_char": 107164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107198, "end_char": 107208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107289, "end_char": 107302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107308, "end_char": 107314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew, J. while striking down the constitutional validity of lieCtion 33A(l) of the Gujarat Act observed as follows :-\n\n\"The heart of the matter is that no educational institution established by a religious or linguistic minority can claim total immunity from regulations by the legislature or the university if it wants affiliation or recognition; but the character of the permissible regulations must depend upon their purpose ........ In every case, when the reasonableness of a regulation comes up for consideration before the court, the question to be asked and answered is whet11er the regulation is calculated to subserve or will in effect subserve the purpose of recognition or affiliation, namely, the excellence of the institution as a vehicle for general secular education to the minority community and to other persons who report to it.", "canonical_name": "Mathew"}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108648, "end_char": 108659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108829, "end_char": 108840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108938, "end_char": 108949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 51A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111047, "end_char": 111062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112599, "end_char": 112602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beg, J. speaking in the same strain observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is true that, if the object of an enactment is to compel a minority institution even indirectly, to give up t.he exercise of its fundamental rights, the provisions which have this effect will be void or inoperative against the minority institution."}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113045, "end_char": 113058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dwivedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113420, "end_char": 113427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even Dwivedi, J. who had sounded a discorded note held that so far as section 33A(l) (a) was concerned it was obnoxious to Article 30 (I ) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "section 33A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113485, "end_char": 113499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113538, "end_char": 113548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. R.\n\nKrishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113698, "end_char": 113717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Gandhi Faizeam College Shahajahanpur v. University of Agra and Anr.(I) the majority judgment consisting of V. R.\n\nKrishna Iyer and A. C. Gupta, JJ."}}, {"text": "A. C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113722, "end_char": 113733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Gandhi Faizeam College Shahajahanpur v. University of Agra and Anr.(I) the majority judgment consisting of V. R.\n\nKrishna Iyer and A. C. Gupta, JJ."}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113868, "end_char": 113878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "St. Xavier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114412, "end_char": 114422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mathew, J. who gave a dissenting opinion and whose opinion follows the principles laid down by t~ Court in St. Xavier's case (supra) observed as follows :-\n\n\"The determination of the composition of the body to administer the educational institution established by a religious minority must be left to the ntlnority as that is the core of the right to ailminister.", "canonical_name": "St. Xavier. Coll"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114950, "end_char": 114963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115264, "end_char": 115277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115747, "end_char": 115750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this case, Sen, J. speaking for the court and after a deep dischotomy and adroit analysis of St. Xavier's case (supra) and the case• which preceded that case summed up the law thus :-\n\n\"An analysis of the judgments in St. Xavier."}}, {"text": "St. Xavier's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115829, "end_char": 115841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this case, Sen, J. speaking for the court and after a deep dischotomy and adroit analysis of St. Xavier's case (supra) and the case• which preceded that case summed up the law thus :-\n\n\"An analysis of the judgments in St. Xavier.", "canonical_name": "St. Xavier. Coll"}}, {"text": "St. Xavier. Coll", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115954, "end_char": 115970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn this case, Sen, J. speaking for the court and after a deep dischotomy and adroit analysis of St. Xavier's case (supra) and the case• which preceded that case summed up the law thus :-\n\n\"An analysis of the judgments in St. Xavier.", "canonical_name": "St. Xavier. Coll"}}, {"text": "St. Xavfrrs College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118068, "end_char": 118087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As laid down by the majority in St. Xavfrrs College's case (supra) such a blanket power directly interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body of a minority educational institution over its teachers\"."}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118647, "end_char": 118657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118997, "end_char": 119007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120147, "end_char": 120160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120237, "end_char": 120247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120950, "end_char": 120963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Faz.al Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121018, "end_char": 121028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OF A.P. (Faz.al Ali, J.) 969\n\nConstitution and would reduce the management to a helpless entity having no real say in the matter and thus destroy the very personality and individuality of the institution which is fully protected by Article 30 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Faz.al Ali"}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121241, "end_char": 121251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123567, "end_char": 123574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "St.\n\nXaviers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124743, "end_char": 124755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A provision for an appeal or revision against the order of the authority by the aggrieved member of the staff alone or the setting up of an Arbitration Tribunal is also not permissible because Ray, C.J. pointed out in St.\n\nXaviers case (supra) that such a course of action introduces an arena of litigation and would involve the institution in unending litigation, thus imparing educational efficiency of the institution and create a new field for the teachers and thus draw them out of purely educational atmosphere of the minority institutions for which they had been established.", "canonical_name": "St. Xavier. Coll"}}, {"text": "Acts passed by some of the States the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125912, "end_char": 125962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126508, "end_char": 126518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act", "statute": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126626, "end_char": 126635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act", "statute": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act"}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126877, "end_char": 126886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act", "statute": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126972, "end_char": 126982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act", "statute": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127254, "end_char": 127299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act", "statute": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127313, "end_char": 127325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act", "statute": "Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacnna in the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128429, "end_char": 128433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128494, "end_char": 128501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128655, "end_char": 128664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128667, "end_char": 128679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 129621, "end_char": 129633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Solicitor General (Mr. S. N. Kacker) submitted that the word 'satisfy' as nsed in the section is a strong term and regulates the powers of the competent authority and the words\n\n\"adequate and reasonable grounds\" contain sufficient guidelines to exclude exercise of any arbitrary power.", "canonical_name": "S. N. 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{"document_id": "1980_3_1006_1014_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAJ KANTA v.\n\nFINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB AND ANR.\n\nMay 7, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953, Section 9 intetpretation- Words and Phrast.•s, tneaning of the term 'regularly' in Section 9(i) (if) of the Act-Whether a 'single default' in payment of rent would attract tlie provi'sions of Section 9(1) (ii).\n\nPera Ram, Ganga Ram, Bhago and Kalu Ram were the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs. Raj Kanta, the appellant. The tenants made separate pplications under section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures1 Act, 1953, on September 4, 1961 for purchasing the land held by them from the land ovn1er. These applications werei allowed by the Assistant . Collector on October 31, 1961.\n\nAccordingly, the tenants deposited the first ins.talment m Nove.mber 1961. Ultin1ately, however, the tCnants did not pay the rent of the respective holdings for Kharif 1961. It is common ground that the last date by which the rent for Kharif 1961 was payable by the tenants to the land owner \\Vas January 15, 1962 and thatl the tenant did not pay the. rent and did not show sufficient cause for the same. Jn view of the default, the land owner filed separate applications under s. 9(1) (ii) of the Act on the ground that as the tenants had failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause, they\n\nv; ee entitled to be ejected by the land owner.\n\nThe applications for ejectment \\ve!e, hov; ever, dismissed .. but on appeal the Collector allowed the appeal:s by his order dated May 31, 1962. Second appeals preferred by the tenants in the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 5-11-62 of the Commissioner and ultimately upheld by the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21, 1962.\n\nHaving failed before the Revenue courts~ the tenants-respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court which washeard by a single judge. But in the case of Kalu Ram the Financial Commissioner allowed the petition and rejected the prayer for his ejectment by the land owner as a result of whlch the land owner filed a writ petition in the High Court. All the petitions were consolidated and , heard together, by the single Judge who allowed the writ petition of the tenants and quashed the order of the Financial Commissioner directing ejectment of the tenan~. The writ petition of the land owner against Kalu Rin1 was, however, disntlssed. Hence, the four appea{s by the land owner-appellant to this Court.\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD : I. The Punjab Security of Land .Tenures Act 1953 is a piece of social legislation meant to ameliorate the lot the tenants by conferring on them the status of a permanent tenancy or the, rights to purchase the land on payment of instalments. At the. same time, the landlords within a very limited\n\nsphere have been assured protection in respect of the rights which they possess in the ]and and have been given thei right to eject the tenants on specified grounds which are contained in the various sub-clauses of section 9' of the Act.\n\nSub-Clause. (ii) is one such sub-clause. This right was absolute and could not\n\nI r '\n\nRAJ KANTA v. FINANCIAL COMMR 1007\n\nbe curtailed by interpreting clause (ii) of section 9(1) of the Act through a A process of twisting the law and doing' violence to the language of the section, especially when it admits of no ambigoity. [1010 A-C, IOI! A-Bl\n\n. )..._ Bhagiruth Ram Chand v. State of Punjab and Ors., A.I.R. 1954 Punjabi\n\n\\ -~\n\n' '\n\n167: referred to.\n\nt 2. The word 'regular' which is derived from the word 'regula' which means 'rule', means in a regular manner, methodically, in due order and postulates a state of symmetry, consistency and uniformity.\n\nIn other words, 'regular' means a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach.\n\n[1011 B, D, F & 1012 A]\n\nArab Bank v. Ross, [1952] 2 Q.B.D., 216; Hc11nmond v.\n\nLondon County Council, [1931] Chancery 540; quoted with approval.\n\n3. Although the Act is heavily loaded in favour of the rights of the tenants so as to confer on them several important benefits and privileges yet as the Act is confiscatory in nature, so far as the landlord is concerned, it should. be strictly construed within the limited spherei . ina5mnch as the landlord is conferred limited grounds on which ejectment is permissible under s. 9 of the Act which appears to be a safety valve for the limited rights that are left with the landlord under the Act. In order therefore to advance the object of the Act so as to assure the lirnited protection to the landlord, the language en1ployed in the various clauses of s. 9 has to be construed so Mi to give real benefit to the landlord within the limited range that the Section operates.\n\n[1012 D-F]\n\nA correct interpretation of the plain language' and the words and phrases used in clause (ii) of section 9(1) of the Act would be that the word 'regular' connotes a. consistent course of conduct without any break or breach and the 'regular payment of rent' would mean that the rent should be paid punctnally without 3.ny default or laxity. The Legislature clearly intended to use the word 'regularly' to mean payment of rent in this manner. The Legislature never contemplated that a single default could be condoned. The word 'regularly' has been used immediately after the words 'fails to pay the rent' 3.nd is followed by the words. \"without sufficient cause\", The Legislature clearly provided that if the tenant had committed a default Whether one, two or more, the\n\nsame could only be condoned if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwise.\n\n[1012 A-Dll\n\n4. The words \"failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause'' in Sertion 9 ( 1) (ii) of the Act cause postulate the !ollowiD..11 conditions :\n\n1. there must be a failure on the part of the tenant to pay rent;\n\n2. such failure must be to pay rent regularly, that isl to say, the rent should be paid punctually consistently without any break or breach;\n\n1. if there is any default -ranging from one to several, the tenant has got to show sufficient cause il1 his case is to be taken out of the mischief of s. 9(1)(ii). [1012 F-H]\n\n5. It i~ well settled that the Legislature does not waste words and every word that is used by it must be Presumed to have some significance. The function of the Court is 'jus deoere' not 'jus dare'.\n\nThe Court cannot, therefore, in\n\nA order to promote its social philosophy turn and twist the plain and unambi~ guous language of the law so as to ascribe to it a meaning different from the one intended by the Legislature. The words 'without sufficient cause' clearly indicate that in order to escape ejectment, the tenant must at least be regular in payment of the rent and if he wants to get rid of the consequences of his default, he must prove sufficient cause. Reading the entire :5entence, the cumulative etfect therof unmistakably is tha.t the Act includes even a single defauit B and that is why instead of using the word 'default', the word 'regularly bas been\n\nemployd which is immediately followed by the words 'without sufficient cause.\n\nIf the legislature intended that a single default would not entitle a landlord to eject the tenant under the ACt, then it would ha<ve said so expressly either by way of an explanation or otherwise in clause (ii) of s. 9(1) of the .Act.\n\n[1013 C-1']\n\n6. While the Explanation to section 9(1) of the Act takes care to define as. ro \\Vhen a tenant would be deemed to be in arrears and fixes a period of two months, indeed if the intention of the legislature W<h th'.l.t a single default in payment of rent could be condoned, it should have included this incident also in the explanation. This provides, therefore, the most important intrinsic circumstance to support the interpretation of clause (ii) of section 9(1) of the Act~\n\n[1014 A-B]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1270 & 1317-1319 of 1970.\n\nFrom the .Judgment and Order dated 5-2-1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L. P. A. Nos. 96-99 of 1966.\n\nKapil Sibal, J. B. Dadachanji and Shri Narain for the Appellant E S. Manchanda, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor,\n\nfor the Respo!ldents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.-These appeals by certificate are directed against a Common judgment dated February 5, 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which a Letters 'Patent Appeal agai'nst a decision of the Single Judge was dismissed.\n\n~ ..\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and all the I appeals involve a short point of law relating to the interpretation of -, ' s.9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hreinafter \\ referred to as the 'Act'). The history of the case has been detailed G in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to ,... repeat the same.\n\nShorn of unnecessary details the appeals aros_e out of applications made by Pera Ram. Ganga Ram, Bhago and Kalu Ram who were the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs. Raj Kanta, the appellant in these appeals. The tenants made separate applications under s. 18 of the Act on September 4, 1961 for purchasing the H . land held by them from Mrs. Raj Kanta (hereinafter called the 'land owner').\n\nThese applications were allowed by the Assistant Collector on October 31, 1961.\n\nAccordingly. the tenants deposited the\n\nfirst instalment in November 1961.\n\nUltimately, however, the tenant~ did not pay the rent of the respective holdings for Kharif 1961. It is common ground that the last date by which the rent for Kharif 1961 was payable by the tenants to the land owner was Janu\"ry 15, 1962\n\nand that the tenant did not pay the rent and did not show sufficient cause for the same. In view oI the default, the land owner filed separate applications under s.9 (1) (ii) of the Act on the ground that as the tenants had failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause, they were entitled to be ejected by the land owner. The applications for ejectment were, however, dismissed but on appeal the Collector allowed the appeals by his order dated May 31, 1962.\n\nSecond appeals preferred by the tenants in the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 5.11.62 of the Commissioner and ultimately upheld by the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21, 1962.\n\nHaving failed before the Revenue courts, the tenants-respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court which was heard by a Single Judge.\n\nBut in the case of Kalu Ram the Financial Commissioner allowed the petition and rejected the prayer for his ejectment by the land owner as a result of which the land owner filed a writ petition in the High Court.\n\nAll the petitions were consolidated and heard together, by the single Judge who allowed the writ petition of the tenants and quashed the order of the Financial Commissioner directing ejectment of the tenants. The writ petition of the land owner against Kalu Ram was, however, dismissed. Hence, the four appeals by the land o'.\"'ner-appellant in this Conrt. 1\n\nThe only point that has been canvassed before us is a~ to whether or not the High Court was right in interpreting s.9 of the Act by F holding that the term 'regularly' used in s.9 (1) (ii) would not include a single default.\n\nWhile the Revenue courts had held that the mere fact that the tenants made a single default in payment for the rent for Kharif 1961 was sufficient to attract the penalty of ejectment envisaged bys. 9(1) (ii) of the Act, the High Conrt took the view that on a proper interpretation of the term 'regularly' it will appear that the G legislature did not contemplate that ejectment should be ordered straightaway even if a single default, though unexplained, is committed by the tenant which interpretation would run against the avowed object of the legislation which was to advance and ameliorate the lot of the tenants.\n\nThe High Court had considered the matter al very great length and placed a very wide interpretation on the term H 'regularly' so as not' to include within its ambit one single default.\n\nIt has also referred to a number of authorities and Dictionaries to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nshow that the word 'regularly' does not mean absolute symmetry.\n\nHaving gone through the reasons given by the High Court we are unable to agree with the view taken either by the single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the Act is a piece of social legislation meant to ameliorate the lot of the tenant,; and to further the rights of the tenants by conferring on them the status of a permanent tenancy or the rights to purchase tl)e land on payment of instalments.\n\nAt the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that the landlords within a very limited sphere have been assured protection in respect of the rights which they possess in the land and have been given the right to eject the tenants on specified grounds which are contained in the various sub-clauses of s. 9 of the Act.\n\nOne such sub-clause is sub-clause (ii) which falls for interpre!'ation in. the instant case.\n\nSection 9(1) as also clauses (i) and (ii) may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"9. Liability of tenant to be ejected.- I. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no land-owner shall be competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant-\n\n(i) is a tenant on the area reserved under this Act or is a tenant of a small land-owner; (or)\n\n(ii) fails to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause; E •\n\nWhile interpreting the word 'regular! y' the High Court seems to have overlooked two important circumstances.\n\nIn the first place, the word 'regularly' has been .used immediately after the phrase 'fails to pay rent' and is followvd by the words 'without sufficient cause'.\n\nF Secondly, there \"is nothing in the section to indicate that the legislature intended to exclude one single default. The High Court attempted to supply words to the section which are not there. In doing so it has failed to consider that i{ once the court was to lay down a particular line of demarcation by extending the connotation of the word 'regularly' to exclude one default, it is difficult to explain why the legislature G contemplated only one default and not two or three for that matter.\n\nIn order to construe the plain language of s.9(1) (ii) which admits\n\nI f ~\n\nof no ambiguity, it may be necessary to look to the object and the purposes of the Act. In the case of Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State { of Punjab & Ors.(') a full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court\n\nH held that the Preamble of the Act stated that it was intended to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters. It\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1954 Punjab 167.\n\n·~\n\nis no doubt true that the main thrust of the provisions of the Act are directed towards preventing the landlords from ejecting their tenants except on the grounds mentioned in s.9; but at the same time, it cannot be denied that the legislature undoubtedly provided some protection to the landlords by conferring on them a limited right to eject their tenants and within this limited sphere, the right was absolute end could not b, e curtailed by interpreting clause (ii) ofs. 9(1) of the Act through a process of twisting the law and doing violance to the language of the section. To begin with, the word 'regular' is derived form the word 'regula' which means 'rule' and its first and legitimate signification, according to Webster, is 'conformable to a rule, or ag~ reeable to an established rule, law, or principle, to a prescribed mode.\n\nIn Words and Phrases (Vol. 36A, p.241) the word 'regular' has been defined as 'steady or uniform in course, practice or occurrence, etc., and implies conformity to a rule, standard, or pattern'. It is further stated in the said Book that 'regular' means steady or uniform in course, practice, or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation. The word 'regular' means in a regular manner, methodically, in due ordet.\n\nSimilarly, Webster's New World Dictionary defines 'regular' as 'consistent or habitual in action, not changing, nruform, conforming to a standard or to a generally acccepted rule or mode of conduct :\n\nIn the case of Arab Bank Ld. v. Ross(') while construing tbe word~\n\n'complete and regular', Romer LJ observed as follows:- 'E \"It wold accordingly 'follow, in my judgment, in the present case that the omission of the word \"company\" from the indorsement would reasonably give rise to a doubt whether in point of personality the payees and the indorsers were necessarily the same; and if so the bills cannot, as I think, be said to be \"complete and regular\" on their face.\"\n\nThe view of the Judge clearly indicates that the word 'regular' postulates a state of symmetry, consistency and uniformity.\n\nIn Hammond -v. London County Council(') while construing the tem1 \"rcgularlv\n\nemployed\", Farwell J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"It is of course a question of fact in each case whether a man was regularly employed or not, but in this particular case I think that the plaintiff, who was employed for the five years and paid his wages day in and day out during that period as a servant or officer of the defendants' predecessors, was \"regularly employed\" during that period.\"\n\n(1) [1952] 2 Q. B. D. 216.\n\n2) [l9 31] 1 Chancery 540.\n\nThis interpretation also supports our view that the weird 'regular' means a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach.\n\nOn a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it seems to us that the legislature clearly intended to use the word 'regularly' to mean payment of rent in a uniform and consistent manner without any breach or default. The legislature never contemplated that a single default could be condoned.\n\nThis inference is fortified by the words \"without sufficient cause\". In other words, the legislature clearly provided that if the tenant had committed a default, whether one, two or more, the same could only be condoned 'if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwie. If, however, we accept the interpretation of the High Court, then the words \"sufficient cause\" becomes, absolutely redundant.\n\nOn an overall consideration of the matter, a correct interpretation of the plain language and the words and phrases used in clause\n\n(ii) of s.9(1) of the Act seems to tis that the word 'regular' connotes a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach and the words 'regular payment of rent' mean that the rent should be pi!KI punctually without any default or laxity.\n\nAlthough the Act is heavily loaded in favour of the rights of the tenants so as to confer on them several important benefits and privileges yet as the Act is confiscatory in nature, so far as the landlord is concerned it should be strictly construed within the limited sphere inasmuch as the landlord is conferred limited grounds on which ejectment is permissible under s.9 of the Act which appears to be a safety valve for the limited rights that are left with the landlord under the Act.\n\nIn order therefore to advance the object of the Act so as to assure tjlle llmited protection to the landlord, the language employed in the various clauses of s. 9 has to be construed so as to give real benefit to the landlord within the lin1ited range that the section operates.\n\nIn the instant case, The words 'failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause' postulate the following conditions :-\n\n(1) there must be a failure on the part of the tenant to pay rent;\n\n(2) such failure must be to pay rent regularly, , that is tc say, t the rent should be paid punctually consistently without ' any break or breach;\n\nH l3) if there is any default ranging from one to several, the tenant has got to show sufijcient cause if his case is to be taken out of the mischief of s. 9 (1 )(ii).\n\nWe might add at the risk of repetition that the use of the words 'without sufficient cause' clearly indicates that the intention of the legislature was that in order to escape ejectment, the tenant must at least be regular in payment of the rent and if he wants to get rid of the conseqnences of his default, he must prove sufficient cause. If, however, we construe the word 'regularly' as meaning at regular intervals so as to include a single default, then the term 'without sufficient cause' becomes absolutely redundant.\n\nFor instance, even if a single default in the pajoment of the rent is committed by the tenant, his case could be taken out of the ambit of clause (ii) of s. 9(1) without insisting on the tenant to prove sufficient cause for this single default.\n\nThat would, therefore, make the words 'sufficient cause' meaningless in such cases. It is well settled that the legislatnre does not waste words and every word that is used by it must be presumed to have some significance. The function of the Court, says Sir Fracis Bacon, is \"ius decere and not ; us dare\" (to interpret the law and not to make the law). The Court cannot, therefore, in order to promote its social philosophy tnm and twist the plain and unambiguous Ian-· guage of the law so as to ascribe to it a meaning different from the one intended by the legislature.\n\nWe aw constrained to observe, with due respect, that this is what the High Court seems to have done in this case by aqopting a puerile and pedantic process of reasoning.\n\nIn these circumstances, reading the entire sentence, the cumulative effect thereof umnistakably is that the Act includes even a single.\n\nE default and that is why instead of using the word 'default' the word 'regularly' has been employed which js immediately followed by the , words 'without sufficient cause'.\n\nMoreover, we might mention that in the various Rent Acts passed in the States, ejectment is permissible in some cases where there is a single default, in other cases where there is more than one default and so on.\n\nIf the legislature intended that a single default would not entitle a landlord to eject the tenant under the Act, then it would have said so expressly either by way .of an explanation or otherwise in clause (ii) of s. 9(1) of the Act.\n\nFinally, we cannot lose sight of the explanation used for the various clauses ot s. 9 (1) which runs thus :\n\n\"Explanation.-For the purposes of clause (iii), ,,; tenant shall be deemed to be in arrears of rent at the commencement of this Act, only if the payment of arrears is not made by the tenant within a period of two months from the date of notice of the execution of decree or order, directing him to py such arrears of rent.\"\n\nWhile the explanation takes care to define as to when a tenant would be deemed to be in arrears and fixes a period cf two months,\n\nindeed if the intention of the legislature was that a single default in payment of nt could be condoned, it should have included this incident also in the explanation.\n\nThis provides, therefore, the most important intrinsic circumstance to support the interpretation which we have put on clause (ii) of s.9(1) of the Act and which invalidates the reasons given by the High Court.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we are satisfied that the High Court took an erroneous view of law in interpreting clause (ii) of s. 9(1) of the Act as the tenants have been proved, in this case, to have committed default in the payment of rent for Kharif 1961, they must be held to have failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause as envisaged by clause (ii) and are, therefore, legally entitled to ejectment. The view taken by the High Court is• legally erroneous and cannot be supported. In Civil Appeal No. 1319 of 1970, an objection was taken by the appellant that the appeal had abated as the heirs of respondent No. 1, Ganga Ram, were not brought on record.\n\nThis objection has been overruled and we have allowed substitution as per our separate order dated 28th April 1980.\n\nThe result is that thei appeals are allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Collector directing ejectment of the tenants is restored.\n\nThe wrK petitions filed by tenants before the High Court stand dismissed and the one filed by the appellant against Kalu Ram stands allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS. R.\n\nA ppealJ' alwwed ..\n\nI ,~ \\", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ KANTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJ KANTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 7, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Section 9(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 242, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 351, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Kalu Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pera Ram, Ganga Ram, Bhago and Kalu Ram were the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs. Raj Kanta, the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Kalu Ram"}}, {"text": "Raj Kanta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 463, "end_char": 472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pera Ram, Ganga Ram, Bhago and Kalu Ram were the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs. Raj Kanta, the appellant.", "canonical_name": "RAJ KANTA"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 533, "end_char": 543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "Punjab Security nf Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "September 4, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 598, "end_char": 615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenants made separate pplications under section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures1 Act, 1953, on September 4, 1961 for purchasing the land held by them from the land ovn1er."}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1237, "end_char": 1244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 31, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1543, "end_char": 1555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applications for ejectment \\ve!e, hov; ever, dismissed .. but on appeal the Collector allowed the appeal:s by his order dated May 31, 1962."}}, {"text": "5-11-62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1659, "end_char": 1666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Second appeals preferred by the tenants in the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 5-11-62 of the Commissioner and ultimately upheld by the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21, 1962."}}, {"text": "December 21, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1758, "end_char": 1775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Second appeals preferred by the tenants in the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 5-11-62 of the Commissioner and ultimately upheld by the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21, 1962."}}, {"text": "Kalu Rin1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2384, "end_char": 2393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the petitions were consolidated and , heard together, by the single Judge who allowed the writ petition of the tenants and quashed the order of the Financial Commissioner directing ejectment of the tenan~. The writ petition of the land owner against Kalu Rin1 was, however, disntlssed."}}, {"text": "Tenures Act 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2560, "end_char": 2576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3040, "end_char": 3049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenures Act 1953", "statute": "Tenures Act 1953"}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenures Act 1953", "statute": "Tenures Act 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4340, "end_char": 4344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4619, "end_char": 4623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4849, "end_char": 4861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6125, "end_char": 6136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7315, "end_char": 7322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7378, "end_char": 7390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7801, "end_char": 7813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8046, "end_char": 8059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapil Sibal, J. B. Dadachanji and Shri Narain for the Appellant E S. Manchanda, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor,\n\nfor the Respo!ldents."}}, {"text": "Narain for the Appellant E S. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapil Sibal, J. B. Dadachanji and Shri Narain for the Appellant E S. Manchanda, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor,\n\nfor the Respo!ldents."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8115, "end_char": 8129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapil Sibal, J. B. Dadachanji and Shri Narain for the Appellant E S. Manchanda, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor,\n\nfor the Respo!ldents."}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8139, "end_char": 8152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapil Sibal, J. B. Dadachanji and Shri Narain for the Appellant E S. Manchanda, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor,\n\nfor the Respo!ldents."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8221, "end_char": 8230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.-These appeals by certificate are directed against a Common judgment dated February 5, 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which a Letters 'Patent Appeal agai'nst a decision of the Single Judge was dismissed."}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8599, "end_char": 8602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pera Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8904, "end_char": 8912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shorn of unnecessary details the appeals aros_e out of applications made by Pera Ram."}}, {"text": "Ganga Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8914, "end_char": 8923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganga Ram, Bhago and Kalu Ram who were the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs. Raj Kanta, the appellant in these appeals.", "canonical_name": "Ganga Ram"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9088, "end_char": 9093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953", "statute": "the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9784, "end_char": 9787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5.11.62", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10197, "end_char": 10204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Second appeals preferred by the tenants in the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 5.11.62 of the Commissioner and ultimately upheld by the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21, 1962."}}, {"text": "Kalu Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10924, "end_char": 10932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition of the land owner against Kalu Ram was, however, dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Kalu Ram"}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11145, "end_char": 11148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11207, "end_char": 11210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12978, "end_char": 12982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13090, "end_char": 13102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14336, "end_char": 14342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H held that the Preamble of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14572, "end_char": 14607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14924, "end_char": 14927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Haryana High Court\n\nH held that the Preamble of the Act", "statute": "Haryana High Court\n\nH held that the Preamble of the Act"}}, {"text": "Romer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16318, "end_char": 16323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Ross(') while construing tbe word~\n\n'complete and regular', Romer LJ observed as follows:- 'E \"It wold accordingly 'follow, in my judgment, in the present case that the omission of the word \"company\" from the indorsement would reasonably give rise to a doubt whether in point of personality the payees and the indorsers were necessarily the same; and if so the bills cannot, as I think, be said to be \"complete and regular\" on their face.\""}}, {"text": "Farwell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16913, "end_char": 16920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "London County Council(') while construing the tem1 \"rcgularlv\n\nemployed\", Farwell J. observed as follows:-\n\n\"It is of course a question of fact in each case whether a man was regularly employed or not, but in this particular case I think that the plaintiff, who was employed for the five years and paid his wages day in and day out during that period as a servant or officer of the defendants' predecessors, was \"regularly employed\" during that period.\""}}, {"text": "s.9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18323, "end_char": 18329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18934, "end_char": 18937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19213, "end_char": 19217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19831, "end_char": 19835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20527, "end_char": 20534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fracis Bacon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20878, "end_char": 20890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The function of the Court, says Sir Fracis Bacon, is \"ius decere and not ; us dare\" (to interpret the law and not to make the law)."}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22107, "end_char": 22114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22209, "end_char": 22213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22996, "end_char": 23002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23201, "end_char": 23208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganga Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23711, "end_char": 23720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Ganga Ram, were not brought on record.", "canonical_name": "Ganga Ram"}}, {"text": "28th April 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23850, "end_char": 23865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This objection has been overruled and we have allowed substitution as per our separate order dated 28th April 1980."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1015_1027_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "JAMNADAS DHARAMDAS A\n\nDR. J. JOSEPH FERREIRA AND ANR.\n\nMay 7, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.] B\n\nBon1bay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates, Control Act, 1947, Section 12(3){b) and Section 28, scope of-Jurisdiction of the Court of Small\n\nCauses, Bombay under section 28-Decree for possfflsion of vacant land lvoultl refer only to taking over effective possession of the land by. decree holder with the superstructure if any.\n\nBy a lease dated 14th December 1948, the respondent plaintiff gave to the appellant defendant on leaee two plots Nos. 12 and 13 situated at Sitaladevi Temple Road, Mahim for a period of 15 years commencing from 1st Decem~\n\nber 1948 at the yearly rent of Rs. 10,200/· payable in equal quarterly instal ments of Rs. 2,550/. in advance. The lease deed provided that the appellant was at liberty to erect building and structures on the two plots of land. The appellant agreed to pay and discharge all taxes and outgoings imposed on the above two plots a-s also on the buildings to be erected by the defendant. On the exprration of the term of the lease, the appellant agreed to deliver back the possession of two plots to the respondent 'free of all buildings, erections and structures and levelled and put in gocx:i order and condition to the sati$faction of the respondent'. Clause IV of the lease provided for determina-tion and forfeiture of the lease in the event of the rents having been allo\\ved to be in arrears for more than 30 days or upon breach of conditions of the lease. The forfeiture clause also provided that upon forfeiture the respondent would be entitled to re-enter upon not only the two plots of land but also the structures standing thereon.\n\nThe appellant constructed on plot No. 12 a three-storied building consisting of about 72 flats, shops with carpet area of 13,000 square feet and the cost of the building with superstructures in 1949 was about Rs. 6,60,000/-. Since the appellant defaulted not only in payment of rent but also in payment of dues in respect of lands and buildings which he erected, the respondent filed a suit in 1951 for ejectment. The appellant filed an application for the fixation of standard rent and the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 435/- per month from September 1,\n\n1950. A compromise was entered into between the parties in the suit on 5th March. 1954, by which they agreed on a rent of Rs. 435/· per month from September 1950 to February 1954. An appeal a-gainst the fixation of standard rent of Rs. 435/· per month was disposed of on 28th June, 1955 whereby standard rent was refixed at Rs. 620/· p.m. from !st September 1950.\n\nThe appellant again defaulted in payment of rent and taxes. The arrears of rent amounted to Rs. 11.472.30 and taxes to the extent of Rs. 1.12,053.60\n\nfor the period ending 30th September 1960. The respondent by a notice determined and forfeited the lease and called upon the appeUant to deliver possession H of the lands alongwith structures thereupon. The notice also specified that the notice was not only a notice of forfeiture, but also notice under section 12 of the Bomby Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. On !st\n\nA Decemb.er 1961, as the appellant failed to pay the arrears of rent and the taxes, the respondeut filed the. suit for ejectment and prayed for a decree for ejectlnent\n\na.gainst the appellant in respect of two plots of land Nos. 12 and 13 and also the buildingS i!Dd structures standing thereon, and claimed arrars of rent of H.s. 11,472.50 and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 620/- p.1n. 'fhe. appellant in order to g<t the benefit of section 12 ( 3 )( b) of the Rent Control Act, 194 7, applied fvr time for' making depos.it of arrears. of rent. 'fhe appellant could B not make the payment within the extended time allowed, but after the issues were framed and the suit was taken up for trial, he deposited the arrears of rent and cost in the Cour~ after the -Court made an endorsement \"accept without prejudice''.\n\nSgbsequently, on 11th November, 1964 the Trial Court passed a deqree for eJectment in respect of plots and the buildings in favour of the respondent. A decree was granted regarding arrears of rent and for mesfle profilB. c Both the appellant and the respondent preferred appeals and the Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes by a common judgment disposed of both the appeals on 4th April 1965. The' Appellate Court held that it had no jurisdiction to give a decree for ejectment in respect of the two buildings constructed on plot No. 12 by the appellant. It held that clause IV of the lease which permitted forfeiture was in the natnre of penalty and the appellant was D entitled to be relieved from the liability to deliver possession of the buildings constructed by him upon forfeiture by the respondent. It also found that the appellant was entitled to be relieved from the penalty of forfeiture of the lease under section 114 alld 114A of the Transfer of Property Act. It rejected the plea of the appellant that he was always ready and willing to pay arrears of rents and found that because of repeated defaults the appellant was not entitled for relief from ejectment under section 12(3J(b) of the Bombay Rent Act.\n\nE The respondent filed a revision petition against the order of the appe, llate Court declining to direct possession of the two buildings and the appe1la-nt-tenant filed an appeal against the order of appellate Court directing his ejectment from the two plots of lands Nos. 12 and 13. The High Court disposed of both the revision petition and the cross appeal by a common judgment wheJreby i~ allowed the revision petition of the respondent/landlord and dismissed the peal F of the appellant'/ tenant and decreed the suit of the respondent directing the appe:Jlant to deliver peaceful possession of the land demised to him and also buildings which have been constructed by the appellant on the demised lands.\n\nIt also confirmed the decree regarding arrears of rents and mesne profits.\n\nHence the appeal by _certificate.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court.\n\nHELD : !. Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 confers jurisdiction on the Court of Small Cause, Bombay to entertain and try any suit for proceedings between a landlord and tenant relating to recovery of rents or possession of any premises to which any of the provisionSr of that part applied.\n\nThe jurisdiction thus conferred enables the Court to try any suit between the landlord and the tenant relating to recovery of possession of the premises. [1022 A-B]\n\nImporters and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Tariiporel!<ata and Ors., [1953] 3 SCR 266; Babulal Bhura Mal and Anr. v.\n\nNandra1n Shivram and Ors., [1959] SCR 367; followed.\n\nI (\"\n\n-;...J\n\n~ n\n\nI~ '1\n\n' r\n\n~I It•\n\nRaizado Tapen Das and Anr. v. Ml s Gorakhram Gokalchand [1964] 3 SCR A 214; Sushi/a Kashlnath Dhonde Gnd Or.. v .. Harl/a/ G<Nindji Bhogani and Ors.,\n\n[1970] 2 SCR 950 explained and distinguished.\n\n2. The conditions specified in section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent ~; 1947 will have ta be strictly observed by the tenant if he wants to avail himself Oil' the benefits provided under the section. In the instant case, the persistent defawt of the appellanttenant on various occaoions and his clear statement that B he Was not in a position to pay the arrears would exclude any reJief under section 12(3 )(b) of the Act The respondent-plaintiff would be entitled to a decree for possession of the plots under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and in effect the decree for possessioo of the land would mean that the l;; nd should be delivered to him without the structures. [1023 D-G, 1025 O.E]\n\nGanpat Lodlla v. Sachikant Vishnu Shivalc, [1978] 3 SCR. 198; applied.\n\n3. To contend that as the respondent-plaintiff has sought, two reliefs one under the Bomhay Rent Act and another under the contract, the entire plaint must be rejected is wrong. In aSking for the relief for possession of the land. the respondent-plaintiff is entitled to incidental and consequential reliefs such as for effectively taking possession of the plot without the structure, that is he is. entitled to ask for the demolition of the superstructure.\n\nThe prayeri in the plaint asking for possession of the land including the structures would not take the suit out of the competence of the Small Causes Court. [1025 E, F-G]\n\nRarnachandra Raghunath Shirgaonkar v. Vishnu Balaji Hindalekar,\n\nAIR )920 Born. 87; Khimjee Thakorsee v. Pioneer Fibre Co. Ltd., AIR 1941 Born. 337 and K.· Arumugham Naicker and Anr. v. Tiruvalluva N.alnar Temple by its Trustee, AIR 1954 Mad. 985; approved.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 531 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated the 23-10-1969 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 1596 of 1965.\n\nD. V. Patel, N. N. Keshwani and R. N. Keshwani for the Appellant.\n\nI. Sorab; ee, R. Daruwala, P. G. Gokha/e and J. R. Gagarat for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.\n\nThis appeal is by the defendant-tenant by certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against its judgment dated 21-1-69 is Special Civil Application No. 1596 of 1965 granting a decree directing that the defendant shall vacate and deliver peaceful possession not only of the land demised to him under the lease in the suit but also of the three buildings which have been cons- \\ tructed on the demised land.\n\nBy a lease deed dated 14th December, 1948 the plaintiff !(ave to the defendant on lease two plots Nos. 12 and 13 situated at Sitaladevi 6-610SCl/80\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.It.\n\nTemple Road, Mahim for a period of 15 years commencing from 1st December, 1948 at the yearly rent of Rs. 10,200/- payable in equal quarterly instalments of Rs. 2,550/- in advance.\n\nThe lease deed provided that the defendant was at liberty to erect building and structures on the two plots of land.\n\nThe defendant agreed to pay and discharge all taxes and outgoings imp<l6ed on the 'above two plots as also on the buildings to be erected by the defendant On the expiration of the term of 15 years or sooner termination of the lease the defendant agreed to deliver back the possession of the two plots to the plaintiff 'free of all buildings, erections and structures and levelled arid put in good order and condition to the satisfaction of the plaintiff'.\n\nClause . IV of the lease provided for determination and forfeiture of the lease in the event of the rents having been allowed to be in arrears for more than 30 days or upon breach. of conditions' of the lease.\n\nThe forfeiture clause also provided that upon forfeiture the plaintiff would be entitled to re-enter upon not only tl:\\e two plots of land but also the structures standing thereon.\n\nThe defendant defaulted not only in payment of rent but also in payment of taxes due in respect of lands and buildings which he erected.\n\nThe plaintiff filed a suit in 1951 for ejectrnent. The defendent filed an application for the fixation of standard rent and the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 435 /- per month from September 1, 1950.\n\nA compromise was entered into between the parties in the . suit on 5th March, 1954 by which the parties agreed on a rent of Rs. 435/- per month from September, 1950 to February, 1954.\n\nAn appeal against the fixation of standard rent of Rs. 435/- per mensem was disposed of on 28th June, 1955 whereby standard rent was fixed at Rs. 620/- per month from 1st September, 1950.\n\nThe defendant again defaulted in payment of rent and taxes.\n\nThe arrears of rent amounted to Rs. 11,4 72.30 and taxes to the extent of Rs. 1, 12,053.60 for the period ending 30th September, 1960. The plaintiff by a notice determined and forfeited the lease and called upon the defendant to deliver possession of the lands alongwith structures thereupon.\n\nThe notice also specified that the notice was not only a notice of forfeiture but also notice under section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act).\n\nOn 1st December, 1961 as the defendant failed to pay the arrears of rent and the taxes, the plaintiff filed the present suit and pra, yed for adecree for ejectrnent against the defendant in respect of two plots of land anil also the buildings and structures standing thereon, and claimed arrears of rent of Rs. 11,472.30 and mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 620/-\n\n~· if () \"\n\nper month. 'I)le defendant filed written statemegJ and denied the allegations made in the plaint.\n\nThe defendant in order to get the benefit of the provisions of Section 12(3) (b) of the Bombay Ren!S Act applied for time for making deposit of arrears of rent.\n\nThe application was taken on the 20th June, 1962 and further time was\n\nsranted to enable the defendant to make the deposits.\n\nTune was . extended on several occasions and finally on 6th Augnst, 1962, the defendant informed the court that he was not in a position to make any deposit at all.\n\nAfter the issues were framed and the suit was taken up for trial, Ilic defendant once again applied for relief under S. 12(3)(b) of the Act and prayed that he may be allowed to deposit the arrears of rent and cost.\n\nThe deposit was accepted by the Court after making an endorsement, \"accept without prejudice\". Subsequently, on 11th November, 1964, the trial Court passed a decree for ejectment in respect of plots and the buildings in favour of the plaintiff.\n\nA decree wasi granted regarding arrears of rent and for mesne profits.\n\nBoth the plaintiff and the defendant preferred appea!S and the Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes by a common judgment disposed of both the appeal on 4th April, 1965. The appellate Court held that it had no jurisdiction to give a decree for ejeetment i~\n\nrespect of the two buildings constructed on Plot No. 12 by the defendant. It held that clause N. of the lease whicl:\\ permitted forfeiture was in the nature of penalty and the defendant was entitled to be relieved from the liability to deliver possession of the buildings constructed by him upon forfeiture by the plaintiff. It also found that the defendant was entitled to be relieved from the penalty of forfeiture of the lease under Ss. 114 and 114A of the Transfer of Property Act. It rejected the plea of the defendant that he wa~ always ready and willing to pay all arrears of rents and found that< because of repeated defaults the defendant was not entitled for relief from ejectment under\n\nS. 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act. The plaintiff filed a revision 'petition against the order of the appellate COIUrt declining to direct possession of the two buildings and the defendant/tenant filed af\\ appeal against the order of the appellate Court directing ejectment of the defendant from the two plots of land~ mentioned in the plaint. The High Court disposed of both the revisions by the plaintiff and the appeal by the defendant by a common judgment whereby it allowed the revisio_ns filed by the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal of the defendant and decreed the suit of the plaintiff directing the defendant tq\n\ndeliver peaceful possession of the land demised to him and also buildings which have been constructed by the defendant on the demised.\n\nSUPREME COUJ.T REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA lands. It also confirmed the decr~ regarding arrears df. rents and mesne profits.\n\nOn behalf of the defendant it was submitted that the Court's jurisdiction is limited only to adjudicate. on leased premises under Ille Bombay Rent Act and therefore it had no jurisdiction to try the suit B regarding possession of the structures put upon, the leased lands.\n\nIt was pleaded that a relief regarding the superstructures will not be one under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. It was contended tbii.t as the suit is for a composite relief namely for the possession of the;\n\nleased land and for the superstructures it is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and the suit as a whole should have been dismissed. It was C submitted that in any event as clause IV in the lease deed is in th~ nature of penalty providing for the forfeiture of the structure. which did not form part of the lease, the decree for possesion oil the structures is not maintainable. In any event it was submitted that there could ,}; fl no forfeiture of the structures on thei ground that the municipal pxes were not paid and that the term as to payment of arrears of taxes D cannot be considered as a clause in: the lease deed and the defendafil; should be relieved against the penal clause.. Lastly, it was submitted that the Courts below were wrong in not granting relief under section 12(3)(b) of. the BO!llbay Rent Act.\n\nBefore considering the several coµtentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant it will' be useful to refer to the relevant clauses of the lease deed and the relief prayed for in the plaint.\n\nThe lease deed dated 14th December, 1948 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant was a lease of two plots of land, plot Nos. J 2 and 13 situated at Sitladevi Temple Road, Mahim for a period af 15 years iili an yearly rent of Rs. 10,200/- payable in equal quarterly instalments of Rs. 2,550/ in advance.\n\nSubsequen, tly standatd rent was fixed by the trial Court at Rs. 435 /- which was raised by the appellate court to Rs. 620 /- per mensem.\n\nThe lease permitted the defendant to erect buildings and structures in the two plots of land.\n\nThe buildings were erected in only plot no. 12 and not in plot no. 13 which remains unbuilt and vacant.\n\nThe defendant agreed to pay and discharge all taxes and outgoings imposed on the above two plots as also to the\n\nbru1dings to be erected by the defendant. The defendant also undertook to deliver possession of the two plots to the plaintiff \"free of all buildings, erections and. structures\" on the ration of the lease.\n\nClause IV empowered the lessor to terminate the !easel and prO!vided that.the lessor will be at liberty to re-enter not only upon the two ploti of the lands but also on the structures, standing thereon.\n\nIn the plaint it was stated that as thd defendant had failed to pay rents and taxes. and\n\nI f ~\n\n! j\n\n.j\\\n\n\\ -~\n\nJAMNADAS V. J. JOSEPH (Kai/asam, J.) 1021\n\ncommitted breach of conditions the plaintiff forfei.ted the lease and A called upon the defendant tq pay arrears of rent and taxes. The sui~\n\n'11'111 based not only on the forfei.ture of the lease bu~ also for posses• 11iou. of the leased plots' under S. 12 of the Boinbay Rents Act. In\n\npalagrapbi 9 of the plaint it is alleged \"the plaintifi say that in the event of the defendant contending that he has become a statutory tenant of the said land, after' th~ tenancy had been duly and validly terminated, B the plaintiff would submit that the defendanti had failed and neglected to pay the arrears of standard rent amounting to Rs. 11,472.30 upto 31st August, 1961 and does not observe and perform condition ll(b) of his lease, and so he is not entitled to thei-protet:tion of the Bombay Rent Coutrol Act.\" ' c In paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Plaint, it is alleged that the provisions of the Bombay Rents Act 4 7 of 194 7 apply to the said land and the Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The reliefs asked for by the plaintiff in paragraph 13 (a) is that the defendant may be directed to hand over peaceful possession of the lands to the plaintiff together with the buildings and structures standing thereon.\n\nD Thus it would . be seen that the plaint is based on the terms of the lease deed after forfeiting the lease and for the possession of the leased lands according to the terms of the Bdmbay Rent Act.\n\nThe main defence which was raised by the tenant in the Courts below as well as before us is that the suit is not triable under S. 28 E of the Bombay Rents Act and in any event relief regarding possession of the structures would be beyond the scope of the relief contemplated in the Bombay Rent Act.\n\nSection 28 of the Bombay Rent Act runs as follows :-\n\n\"28 (1). Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithStanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for the provision, be within its jurisdiction, in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small Causes Bombay.\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\nx x\n\nx x\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x x\n\nshall ha~ jurisdiction to enlfftain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this part apply and to decide any application made under this Act and to deal. with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions\n\nand subject to the provisions of sub-secJion ( 2) , no other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such claim or qul'Stion.\"\n\nThe Section confers jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes Bombay to .entertain and try any suit or proceedings between a land-' lord and tenant. relating to recovery of rents or possession of any premises to , which any of \\the provisions of this part apply.\n\nThe jurisdiction thus conferred enables the, Court to try any suit between the landlord and the tenant relating to recovery of possession. of the premises. It is admitted that the premises is the two plots of land only and not the superstructure. The plea of the plaintiff is that the relief. for recovery of possession of the plot which is the subject. matter of the lease, would also include relief relating to the superstructure as being related to relief of recovery of possession of the leased premises namely the plots and land.\n\nThe submission on behalf of the plaintiff is that as the jurisdiction of Civil Courts have been specifically excluded, and the matters relating to possession of the leased premises, it would imply that not only relief of the possession of the leased lands but also matters relating to it would be beyond the jurisdiction of other oourts and therefore the plaintiff has no other option than to file the, suit for relief as to the structure being only ancillary and incidental to the relief of possession. of the leased lands. Before we proceed to consider this plea, we might note that Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned rounsel for the plaintiff submitted that though it might be open to him to contend that the reliefs relating to the structures based on the lerms of the contract would also be decisive on an application made under the act as being related to the recovery of the possession of the leased premises, he would content himself with the plea that the relief as to structures is so closely and inextricably related to possession\n\n•f the land that no effective relief of possession of the leased lands wuld be given without giving relief in respect of structures. Relief as to structures also should inevitably follow. If this submissicm is accepted it would be unnecessary for us to consider. the other limb of the arguments on behalf of the appellants that the relief claimed as a result of the forfeiture is not enforceable by a Court administering Bombay Rent Act or thaf the plaintiff cannot enforce terms of forfeiture which did not relate to leased plots or that the defendant would he entitled to relief against forfeiture under Ss. 114 and 114A of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nAll the Courts below have found that the defendant is not entitled to any relief under S. 12 ( 3) (b) of the Act and that so far as the\n\nleased plots are conceme\\I, the plaintiff i9 entitled to possession 11*' the Bombay Rent Act.\n\nAfter fifuig of the suit it is seen that die\n\ndefendant asked for time f\\lr payment of arrears of rents and the matter A came up before the Court on the 28th June, 5th July and 6th August, 1962 for payment of arrears.\n\nOn the last date the appellant's advocate informed the Court that the appellant was not in a position to pay the arrears.\n\nIt is only two years later on 18th September, 1964 the defendant obtained Court's permission to deposit balance of arrears ' of Rs. 12,800/- and , deposited the amount under protest by the B plaintiff. The Tiial Court after considering all the facts found that there was intention of default a, nd neglect in payment of rent.\n\nThe conduct of the defendant was wilfully not ready and willing to pay the. rent. It again found that the payment of arrears was not made diligently and the defendant had flouted the orders of the Court to deposit the arrears of rent and the discretioncannot be exercised in his favour when he persisted in not paying the taxes for about 12 or 13 years and was constantly in arrears of rent for about 14 months at the time of the notice.\n\nThe appellate Court also came to the same conclusion holding that it is not a case where discretion of the Court under S.12\n\n(3 )(b) should be exercised in favour of the tenant. The High Court also confirmed the findings of the Court below that the defendant was llOt entitled to relief under Section 12 ( 3 )(b) of the Act.\n\nOn the tacts we are also in agreement with the findings of the three courts below that the persistent default of the defendant on various occasions aDd his clear statement that he was not in a position to pay the arrear•, would exclude any relief under section 12 ( 3 )(b) .\n\nIn a recent decision of this Court reported in Ganpat Lad ha v.\n\nSashikant Vishnu Shinde, (') it has been held that when the tenant\n\neloes not fulfil the conditions as required under section 12 ( 3 )(b), he eould not claim protection under section 12{3)(b).\n\nThis Court ebserved that it is difficult to see how judicial discn; tion exercisable F in favour of the tenant can be found under section 12 (3) (b) even where conditio'ns laid down by it were not satisfied.\n\nThis Court overruled the decision of the case of Bombay High Court in Kalidas v.\n\n[Jhavan Bhagwandas•(').\n\nThe conditions sepcified in S. 12(3) (b) will haYe to be strictly observed by the tenant if . he wants to ayail himself of the benefits provided under the Section.\n\nOn the facts therefore we find that the plaintiff is entitled to a '1ecree for possession of the two plots under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act.\n\nAs plot No. 13 has not been built upon a'nd is vacant there could be no difficulty in confirming the decree for poAsession in favour of the plaintiff regarding plot No. 13.\n\n(I} [1978] 3.' S.C.R. 198.\n\n(2) 60 Bombay L.R. 1359.\n\n11)2.(\n\nSUH.BM!! COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.Jt.\n\nin Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Tar\"- porewala and Ors,(') this Court held that the claim for compensation was merely an incidental claim for possession under the Act. \"Section 28 had conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes not only to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord . and tenant for recovery of rent or possession but also to deal with B any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions and s. 28 was thus wide enough to cover the question raised as between the plaintiff and ihe sub-lessee\". It will be seen that the plea that a suit against a sub-lessee is not within the jurisdiction of the Small\n\nauses Court, was negatived by this Court and it was held that secc\n\ntion was wide enough to cover the questions raised between the palin tiff and the sub-lessee.\n\nIn Babula/ Bhuramal and An.r. v. Nandram Shivram and Ors.(') related to sub-lessee of the premises.\n\nThe suit was filed for ejectment of the tenant and the sub-tenant in the Court of Small Causes.\n\nThe tenant and the sub--tenants later filed a suit before the Bombay City Civil Court for declaration that the lessee was a tenant and was protected from eviction by the provisions of the Bombay Rents Act and that as. B and C were lawful sub-tenants, were also entitled to possession.\n\nThis Court agreed with the view taken by the. Higa Court that section 28 of the Act barred the City Civil Court from entertaining the suit filed by the lessees and the sub-lessees as section 28 conferred the right oil the Small causes to entertain a suit between a landlord and a tenant in respect of a claim which arose out of the Act or any of its provisions.\n\nThus it prohibits a suit from being entertained by the City Civil Court at the instance of the tenant.\n\nIn Raizada Topandas and Anr. v. M/s. Gorakhram Gokalchand ( •) it was held that if a suit is framed by a landlord or a tenant and relief asked for is in the nature of a claim which arises out of Act or any of the provisious then only and not otherwise will be covered by s. 28 and as there were no such claim the City Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.\n\nThe plaint in the case proceeded on the footing that during the periOd of agreement the appellants were mere licensees and after the expiry of the agreement they were trespassers.\n\nAs the plaint in terms negatived the relationship of the landlord and tenant, it was held that the Rent Court had no jurisdiction.\n\nThis decision cannot be of any help to the appellant.\n\n(!) [1953] S.C.R. 226.\n\n(2) [1959] S.C.R. 367.\n\n(3) [1964j 3 S.C.R. 214.\n\nJAMNADAS v. J. JOSEPH (Kai/asam, J.) 1025\n\nIn Sushila Kashi.nath Dhonde and Ors. v. Harilal Govindji Bhogani and Ors.,(') this Court held that it is not necessary that there should be relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of all the matters covered bys. 28(1) of the Act so as.to give jurisdiction to the Court of Small Causes.\n\nIt further held that in respect of other matters dealt with snb-section, it is not necessary that the relationship of landlord and tenant shollld exist between the parties before the Court. The Court repelled the contention that a charge created by the deed executed between the parties did not give rise to any claims or questions arising out . of the Bombay Rents Act or its provisions and held that nature of reliefs to be granted to the plaintiff are all daims or questions arising out of the Act and can be dealt with only by the special court constituted under S. 28 of the Act. No doubt, the deed .of charge furnished a cause of action, but its legality, vali- dity and binding nature and other incidental matters connected therewith are all questions arising out of the Act and the plea on behalf of the. appellants that the rights of the plaintiff did not flow from the Act or any of its provisions but from the contract, could not be accepted.\n\nThe decisions referred to above will show that that the plaintiff/ landlocd of the land is entitled to claim the relief for possession of his; land and in effect the decree for possession of the land would mean that the land should be delivered to him without the structures.\n\nApart from the relief under the lease deed, the plaintiff is entitled to wcceed as he has estabished that there was default Of payment under the provisions of the Bombay Rents Act.\n\nThe jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to grant an effective decree for possession of the land cannot be denied.\n\nEqually untenable is the contention _ of the respondent that as the plaintiff has sought two reliefs one\n\nundoc the Bopibay Rent Act and another under the Contract, the entire plaint must be rejected.\n\nAs we have already observed so far as the relief of possession of the premises, i.e. the )and is concerned, it is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court.\n\nIn asking for the relief for possession of the land, the plaintiff is eniitled to incidental and consequential reliefs such as for effectively . taking possession of the plot without the structures. The prayer in the plaint asking for possession of the land including the structures would not take the suit out of the competence of the Small Causes Court In this view if is not necessary toi us to go into the quesiion as to whether the terms in the contract regarding the forfeiture can be enforced by the Small Causes Court. It is sufficient for the purpose of this Suit to hold that the plaintiff is entitled to seek for\n\n(I) (1970] 2 S.C.R .. 950.\n\nA possession of the land which is the premises in the suit, and in getting possession of the land he is entitled to ask for possession\n\nof the land without any superstructures. In this connection reference may be made to the nature of the relief which the plaintiff is entitled to.\n\nIn Ramchandra Raghunath Shirgaonkar v. Vishnu Bala- ji Hinda/akar, ( 1) it was held that the ordinary rule of law is that B the tenant must give up vacant possession of the land demised at ,,\n\nthe end of the term and that if he builds on the laud of the tenancy he builds at. his own risk.\n\nAt the end of the term he can take away his buildii)g but if he leaves it there, it becomes the landlord's property.\n\nThe Court further held that the tenant who had been in possession of land for a large number of years and built a cootly and substantial house on the land of the tenancy witl1 the knowledge of the landlord, is entitled to some compensation.\n\nIn K. Arumugham Naicker and Anr. v. Tiruvalluva Nainar Temple that after the determination of the lease, lessees were required to deliver over possession of the demised premises lo the lessor and the lessees were entitled to remove the structures which they mlght have erected during the continuance of the tenancy.\n\nThe lessees, however, failed to remove the structures on the date of the determinatio)l of the tenancy and on the next date tile premises were occupied by oilier lessees, it was held tile lessees could remove the structures on and not after determination Of the tenancy and having failed to remove the same on the determination of the tenancy they lost not only tlieir right to remove the structures after the determination of the tenancy but also all right, title and interest in tliose structures.\n\nIn K. Arumugham Naicker and Anr. v. Tiruvalluva Nainar Tmiple by its Trustee,(') it was held that where a court directs by a decree or order vacant possession of land, that decree could be made e!Jective by directing its own officers to remove the super-structures in the property and deliver vacant possession of the properties to the decree-holder. It is unnecessary to have any specific power in that behalf.\n\nThe power to remove the superstructures is an incidental, .necessary. and ancillary power to the power to deliver posSCMio!t of\n\ntile property. ' We are satisfied that the Small Causes Court had jurisdicti<m w entertain tile suit of the plaintiff not only for possession of the land which is the premises under the Act but also for otl1er reliefg to make the decree for possession effective.\n\nIn this connection the plaintiff is entitled to ask for relief regarding the superstructuru.\n\nThis incidental or ancillary relief would not take out the suit d\n\n(I) A.LR. 1920 Born. 87.\n\n(2) A.I.R .. 1941Born.337.\n\n(3) A.l.R. 1954 Mad. 985.\n\nJAMNADAS v. J. JOSEPH (Kailasam, J.) 1027 ' the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court.\n\nThe plea that the A composite relief had been asked for and that the entire plaint ought to be rejected is also unsustainable.\n\nIn the result, we agree with the contentions of the plaintiff that in asking for relief as to pooses-- sion of the land, he is entitled to ask for the demolition of the structures and for grant of vacant possession of the plots.\n\nSo far as the plot No. 13 is concerned, there is no difficulty.\n\nThe plot is B not built upon and is vacant and therefore we have o hesitation in confirming the decree for possession so far as the plot No. 13 is concerned. · I Plot No. 12 has been built upon. There are.about three storeys consisting of about 72 flats, shops with carpet area of 13,000 square ft. and the cost of building with superstructures in 1949 was about Rs. 6,00,000/-. We may in this connection note that from the date of the decree passed by the High Court on 23rd October 1969, the defendant has not paid arrears of rents or the taxeg due on the buildings. He is in law bound to pay the arrears of rent and the municipal charges which he has undertaken.\n\nOn a consideration of the facts of the case, we feel that there are no grounds for interfering with the decree passed by the High Court for possession not only of the vacant plot but also of the superstructure and mesne-profits and arrears of rent. The law provides for the tenant to remove the superstructure on the termination of the tenancy. If it is not thus removed the tenant loses all his rights to the superstructure and the landlord becomes entitled to it.\n\nBut in a case where !, here is a substantial building, it is only reasonable that the court should explore the possibility of payment of some compensation to the tenant who had put up this structure. But in this connection we are reminded that for several years neither the arrears of rent nor the taxes amounting to several lacs of rupees had been paid by the tenant.\n\nNot only the tenant but several persons who have put up flats at their own costs may press their claim for compensation and it will be difficult to determine as to who are entitled to compensation and the proportion of the compensation to which they will be entitled to. We enquired of the parties at the conclusion of the arguments if it was possible to come to some arrangement regarding the superstructure but to our regret the parties informed us that they could not arrive at\n\nany settlement.\n\nIn the circumstances, we have no alternative except to confirm the judgment and decree passed by the High Court. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal, but in the special circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs in this Court.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "JAMNADAS DHARAMDAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAMNADAS DHARAMDAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "J. JOSEPH FERREIRA AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. JOSEPH FERREIRA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 7, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 177, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196, "end_char": 209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 217, "end_char": 227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Mahim", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 626, "end_char": 631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 and 13 situated at Sitaladevi Temple Road, Mahim for a period of 15 years commencing from 1st Decem~\n\nber 1948 at the yearly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st Decem~\n\nber 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 673, "end_char": 693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 and 13 situated at Sitaladevi Temple Road, Mahim for a period of 15 years commencing from 1st Decem~\n\nber 1948 at the yearly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "5th March. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2352, "end_char": 2367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A compromise was entered into between the parties in the suit on 5th March."}}, {"text": "28th June, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2552, "end_char": 2567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "435/· per month was disposed of on 28th June, 1955 whereby standard rent was refixed at Rs."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3100, "end_char": 3110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3131, "end_char": 3178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3625, "end_char": 3635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "11th November, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sgbsequently, on 11th November, 1964 the Trial Court passed a deqree for eJectment in respect of plots and the buildings in favour of the respondent."}}, {"text": "4th April 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4396, "end_char": 4410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A decree was granted regarding arrears of rent and for mesfle profilB. c Both the appellant and the respondent preferred appeals and the Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes by a common judgment disposed of both the appeals on 4th April 1965."}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4937, "end_char": 4948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4990, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 12(3J(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5198, "end_char": 5214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Rent Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6124, "end_char": 6145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1953] 3 SCR 266", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6639, "end_char": 6655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 SCR 950", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6932, "end_char": 6948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7010, "end_char": 7020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rent Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rent Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 12(3 )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7372, "end_char": 7389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 SCR. 198", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7723, "end_char": 7740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8828, "end_char": 8839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, N. N. Keshwani and R. N. Keshwani for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. N. Keshwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8841, "end_char": 8855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, N. N. Keshwani and R. N. Keshwani for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "N. N. Keshwani"}}, {"text": "R. N. Keshwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8860, "end_char": 8874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, N. N. Keshwani and R. N. Keshwani for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "N. N. Keshwani"}}, {"text": "I. Sorab", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8895, "end_char": 8903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Sorab; ee, R. Daruwala, P. G. Gokha/e and J. R. Gagarat for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Daruwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8909, "end_char": 8920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Sorab; ee, R. Daruwala, P. G. Gokha/e and J. R. Gagarat for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8922, "end_char": 8933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Sorab; ee, R. Daruwala, P. G. Gokha/e and J. R. Gagarat for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "J. R. Gagarat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8940, "end_char": 8953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. Sorab; ee, R. Daruwala, P. G. Gokha/e and J. R. Gagarat for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9019, "end_char": 9027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.\n\nThis appeal is by the defendant-tenant by certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against its judgment dated 21-1-69 is Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "1st December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9709, "end_char": 9727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Temple Road, Mahim for a period of 15 years commencing from 1st December, 1948 at the yearly rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "5th March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11204, "end_char": 11219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "suit on 5th March, 1954 by which the parties agreed on a rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "620/- per month from 1st September, 1950."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11966, "end_char": 11976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11998, "end_char": 12045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st December, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12100, "end_char": 12118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st December, 1961 as the defendant failed to pay the arrears of rent and the taxes, the plaintiff filed the present suit and pra, yed for adecree for ejectrnent against the defendant in respect of two plots of land anil also the buildings and structures standing thereon, and claimed arrears of rent of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12636, "end_char": 12649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "20th June, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12768, "end_char": 12783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application was taken on the 20th June, 1962 and further time was\n\nsranted to enable the defendant to make the deposits."}}, {"text": "6th Augnst, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12917, "end_char": 12933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "extended on several occasions and finally on 6th Augnst, 1962, the defendant informed the court that he was not in a position to make any deposit at all."}}, {"text": "S. 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13144, "end_char": 13155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th April, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13725, "end_char": 13740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the plaintiff and the defendant preferred appea!S and the Bench of two Judges of the Court of Small Causes by a common judgment disposed of both the appeal on 4th April, 1965."}}, {"text": "Ss. 114 and 114A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14266, "end_char": 14282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14290, "end_char": 14314, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14528, "end_char": 14533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ille Bombay Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15546, "end_char": 15566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16687, "end_char": 16703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th December, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16956, "end_char": 16975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease deed dated 14th December, 1948 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant was a lease of two plots of land, plot Nos."}}, {"text": "JAMNADAS V. J. JOSEPH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18228, "end_char": 18249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j\n\n.j\\\n\n\\ -~\n\nJAMNADAS V. J. JOSEPH (Kai/asam, J.) 1021\n\ncommitted breach of conditions the plaintiff forfei.ted the lease and A called upon the defendant tq pay arrears of rent and taxes."}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18523, "end_char": 18528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st August, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18920, "end_char": 18937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11,472.30 upto 31st August, 1961 and does not observe and perform condition ll(b) of his lease, and so he is not entitled to thei-protet:tion of the Bombay Rent Coutrol Act.\" '"}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19828, "end_char": 19833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20001, "end_char": 20011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20293, "end_char": 20299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithStanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for the provision, be within its jurisdiction, in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small Causes Bombay."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22250, "end_char": 22266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we proceed to consider this plea, we might note that Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned rounsel for the plaintiff submitted that though it might be open to him to contend that the reliefs relating to the structures based on the lerms of the contract would also be decisive on an application made under the act as being related to the recovery of the possession of the leased premises, he would content himself with the plea that the relief as to structures is so closely and inextricably related to possession\n\n•f the land that no effective relief of possession of the leased lands wuld be given without giving relief in respect of structures."}}, {"text": "Court administering Bombay Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23100, "end_char": 23135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss. 114 and 114A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23305, "end_char": 23321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court administering Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Court administering Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23329, "end_char": 23353, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23443, "end_char": 23448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court administering Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Court administering Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "28th June, 5th July and 6th August, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23741, "end_char": 23781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After fifuig of the suit it is seen that die\n\ndefendant asked for time f\\lr payment of arrears of rents and the matter A came up before the Court on the 28th June, 5th July and 6th August, 1962 for payment of arrears."}}, {"text": "18th September, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23960, "end_char": 23980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is only two years later on 18th September, 1964 the defendant obtained Court's permission to deposit balance of arrears ' of Rs."}}, {"text": "S.12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24815, "end_char": 24819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24989, "end_char": 24999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25275, "end_char": 25285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25481, "end_char": 25491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25538, "end_char": 25548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25687, "end_char": 25697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25815, "end_char": 25832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court overruled the decision of the case of Bombay High Court in Kalidas v.\n\n[Jhavan Bhagwandas•(')."}}, {"text": "S. 12(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25901, "end_char": 25909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26661, "end_char": 26671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26947, "end_char": 26952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay City Civil Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27580, "end_char": 27603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenant and the sub--tenants later filed a suit before the Bombay City Civil Court for declaration that the lessee was a tenant and was protected from eviction by the provisions of the Bombay Rents Act and that as."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27866, "end_char": 27876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27987, "end_char": 27997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28542, "end_char": 28547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29989, "end_char": 29994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd October 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35770, "end_char": 35787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may in this connection note that from the date of the decree passed by the High Court on 23rd October 1969, the defendant has not paid arrears of rents or the taxeg due on the buildings."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_101_103_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "N. K. V. BROS (P) LTD.\n\nM. KARUMAI AMMAL AND ORS. ETC.\n\nMarch 21, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND D. A. DESAI; JJ.]\n\nMo1or Vehicles Act-Driver of bus acquitted for rash and negligent driving-Civil suit if must also be dismissed.\n\nIndian Penal Code-Section 304A-Requirement of culpable rashness more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to c1eate liqbility.\n\nThe petitioner's bus driven by a driver hit an over-hanging high tension wire resulting in the death of some passengers and loss of limb to several othen. The driver was acquitted on the ground that the tragedy was an act of God. The Accidents Tribunal held that despite the screams of the passengers about the doogerous over-hanging wire ahead tho rash driver sped towards\n\nthe spot which resulted in the accident. The High Court affirmed the finding\n\nof the Tribunal that the accident bad taken place due to rashness and negli~ D gence of the driver and consequently the petitioner was vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimant.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD : I. The plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that therefore the civil suit must follow suit was rightly rejected by the Tribunal and the High Court. [I 02 BJ\n\n2. The requirement of culpable rashness under section 304A l.P.C. is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. [102 E]\n\n1 [The Accident Tribunal must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must P be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb io niceties and technicalities.] [102. G]\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION Nos .. 937-939 of 1980.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order' dated 1-8-1979 of the Madras High Court in A.A.O. Nos. 815-817 of 1977.\n\nT. A. Ramachandran and K. Ramkumar for the Petitioner.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRtSllNA IYER, J.-Sri Ramachandran, ably assisted by Sri K.\n\nB Ram Kumar, presented the case of the petitioner for special leave, as persuasively as the facts permit but while we were impressed with the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nA industry and advocacy of counsel, we heartily dismiss this petition.\n\nWhy heartily? Because the High Court, if at all, has erred in favour of the petitioner, not against him.\n\nThe Facts : A stage carriage belonging to the pet1t1oner was on a trip when, after nightfall, the bus hit an over-hanging high tension wire resulting in 26 casualties of which 8 proved instantaneously fatal. A criminal case ensued but the accused-driver was acquitted on the score that the tragedy that happened was an act of God! The Accidents Claims Tribunal, which tried the claims for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, came to the conclusion, affirmed by the High Court, that, despite the screams of the passengers about the dangerous over-hanging wire ahead, the rash driver sped towards the lethal spJt. Some lost their lives instantly; several lost their limbs likewise. The High Court, after examining the materials, concluded :\n\n\"We therefore sustain the finding of the Tribunal that the accident had taken place due to the rashness and negligence of R.W. 1 (driver) and consequently the appellant is vicariously liable to pay compensation to the claimant.\"\n\nThe plea that the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that, therefore, the civil sait must follow suit, was rejected and rightly. The requirement of culpable rashness under section 304A I.P.C. is more \"drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The quantum of compensation was moderately fixed and although there was, perhaps a case for enhancement, the High Court b dismissed the cross-claim; also.\n\nBeing questions of fact, we are obvi- ously unwilling to re-open the holdings on culpability and compensation.\n\nRoad accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially w\"iien truck and bus drivers operate .nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often pmuades the courts, as has been observed by us 'Car lier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some :doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability [must\n\nbe inferred fr0m the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes.\n\nWe aro e:nph1sising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic\n\nN. K. v. BROS. v. M. K. AMMAL (Krishna Iyer,!.) 103\n\nimpact of culpable driving of public transport must bring' owner and driver to their responsibility to their 'neighbour'. Indeed, the State\n\nmust seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in com pensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient num)!r of tribanals ani the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States 'Te\n\nunjustly indifferent in this regard.\n\nWe have been taken through a few intricate legal submissions by counsel bat We d!line to interfere ui!r Article 136 of the Consti\n\ntution especially where human misery is pitted against operational D negligence.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition . dismissed.", "total_entities": 20, "entities": [{"text": "N. K. V. BROS (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. K. V. BROS (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. KARUMAI AMMAL AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. KARUMAI AMMAL AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 21, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND D. A. DESAI; JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 228, "end_char": 245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246, "end_char": 258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1276, "end_char": 1288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1897, "end_char": 1914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Special Leave Petition\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order' dated 1-8-1979 of the Madras High Court in A.A.O. Nos."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1948, "end_char": 1966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. A. Ramachandran and K. Ramkumar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. Ramkumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1971, "end_char": 1982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. A. Ramachandran and K. Ramkumar for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nB Ram Kumar"}}, {"text": "KRtSllNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2045, "end_char": 2058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRtSllNA IYER, J.-Sri Ramachandran, ably assisted by Sri K.\n\nB Ram Kumar, presented the case of the petitioner for special leave, as persuasively as the facts permit but while we were impressed with the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt."}}, {"text": "Ramachandran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2067, "end_char": 2079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRtSllNA IYER, J.-Sri Ramachandran, ably assisted by Sri K.\n\nB Ram Kumar, presented the case of the petitioner for special leave, as persuasively as the facts permit but while we were impressed with the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nB Ram Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRtSllNA IYER, J.-Sri Ramachandran, ably assisted by Sri K.\n\nB Ram Kumar, presented the case of the petitioner for special leave, as persuasively as the facts permit but while we were impressed with the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nB Ram Kumar"}}, {"text": "Accidents Claims Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2802, "end_char": 2827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Accidents Claims Tribunal, which tried the claims for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, came to the conclusion, affirmed by the High Court, that, despite the screams of the passengers about the dangerous over-hanging wire ahead, the rash driver sped towards the lethal spJt."}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2879, "end_char": 2897, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 304A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6130, "end_char": 6141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1028_1033_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SHALIMAR ROPE, WORKS LTD. v.\n\nABDUL HUSSAIN H. M. HASAN BHAI RASSIWALA AND ORS.\n\nMay 7, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, P. N. SHINGHAL AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.J\n\nSurnmons, servic~ of-Suits by of against Corporation-Service of . summons how to be effer:ted to be valid.-Code of Civil Procedi1re Code, Order 29 Rule 2, Order 5 Rule 17.\n\nThe respondent filed a suit at Indore on 24-2-1975against the appellant claiming damages to the tune of Rs. 26!000/- on account of the. alleged nondelivery of certain goods.\n\nSummons in the suit was sent to the registered office of the company in Calcutta and was served on Sr( Nav!akha on 17-3-1975 asking the company to appear at Indore on 25-3-1975. Since the company did not appear in the Court on that date, eventually, t~ exparte decree was passed\n\non 22-4-1975. The appellant company came to know about the ex-parte decree for the first time when its constituted attorney Sri Jhunjhunwala received a notice frorn the respondent by registered post demanding the. decretal dues. 'fhereupon 'Sri N. S. Pareek, the Works Secretary of the company who is in-charge of the legal matters \\Vas sent to Indore toi ascertain as to how the ex-parte decree can1e to be passed. Paree-k learnt that the summons was purported to have been served on Navalakha on 17-3-75.\n\nNavalakha .did not bring the fact of the receipt of summons by him to the knowledge of any responsible officer of the company. He was neither secretary nor a Director nor any other principal officer of the company authorised to receive summorls in the suit. The company remained in dark and. learnt for the lint time on 29-7-75 about the passing\n\nof the ex-parte decree. The Trial Court allowed the application\" but the High Cou1t in revision under S. 115 of C.P.C. restored the ex-parte order. Hence the appea-1 by special ]eave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : I. Rule 2 of Order XXIX of C.P.C. is not an exhaustive provision providing for all modes of service on the Company in the sense . as to what is meant by service of summons on the Secretary, Director or Principal Officer.\n\nService on managing agents who are a corporation is valid under clause (a)\n\nof Rule 2 of Order XXIX C.P.C., since a Principal Officer in clause (a) of Rule 2 has been held to include managing agents and it can under this rule, be on a juristic r:erson.\n\n[1031 D1..E]\n\nJute and Guurzy Brokers Ltd.i & .A.nr. v. Union of India and Ors., [1961] 3 SCR p. 20; followed.\n\n2. Sending a summon to a corporatiori by post addressed to it at its registered office may be a good mode of service either by itself, or preferably, by Way of an addition.n l n1ode of service. But leaving the summons at the registered office of the corporation if it is literally interpreted to say that tho summons can be left anywhere nncared for in the registered office of the company. then it will lead to anomalous and absurd results. It has to be read in the background cl' provision contained in Onler 5 Rule 17 of tlie Code. In other\n\n~- -\n\nI i \\\n\nSHALIMAR ROPE WO, RKS v. ABDUL HUSSAIN (Untwalia, !.) . 1029\n\n...ms if the serving peon or bailiff is not able to serve the summon.. on the A or any Director or any other Principal Officer of the Corporation beCanse either be refnses to sign the sullllIIOOS or is not to be found by the llU\\'ing person even after due diligence then he can leave the snmmons at the registered office of the company and make a report to that effect. Jn the instant\n\ncue nothing of the klrul was done. It was also not the case llf the respondent ill i13 rejoindec filed in the Miscellaneons case that the service of the summons was effected in accordance with the fun part of claU!e (b) R.nle 2 of Order B 29 of the Code.\n\n[!()32 B-D]\n\n3. Nowhere in_ the rejoinder a st.and was taken by the respondents that the summons was duly served on the company because it was left at the registered office of the company.\n\nThe company had no knowledge of the exparte decree, evell otherwise, before 29-7-75. Hence the application under O.JX Rule 13 of C.P.C. has been correctly allowed.\n\n[1033 C-DJ C\n\n°CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 366 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and • Order dated 28-2-1978 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) in Civil Revision No. 93 of 1976.\n\nShanker Ghosh and S. K. Gambhir for the Appellant.\n\nR. K. Garg and A. K. Sanghi for Respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the judgmenf\n\nof the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversing the decision of the Second E Additional District Judge, Indore in MisceHaneous Judicial Case No. 23 of 1975. The appellant company had filed that case under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Prooedure, hereinafter called the Code, for setting aside an ex-parte decree for Rs. 28,479 /- passed in favour al. the respondent firm on 22-4-197 5 against the appellant. The learned Additional District Judge held that summons in the suit was not duly F served on the company and it came to know about the decree on 29-7-1975. Hence he set aside the ex-parte decree. The respondent\n\nfirm filed a revision in the High Court under section _115 of the Code.\n\nThe High Court allowed the revision, set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and upheld the passing of the ex-parte decree. Hence this appeal.\n\nThe respondent filed the suit at Indore on 24-2-1975 against the appellant claiming damages to the tune of Rs. 26,00()/- on account of the alleged non-delivery of certain goods. Summons in the suit was !ent to the registered office of the company in Calcutta and is said to\n\nhave been served on one Shri Navlakha on 17-3-1975 asking the H oompany to appear at Indore on 25-3-1975 for settlement of issues.\n\nSince the company did ndt appear in the Court on that date, eventually,\n\n,.i;!l\n\nthe ex-parte decree was pass~ on 22-4-1975. According to the case of the appellant the company came to know about the ex-parte decree for the first time whn its constituted attorney Sjlri S. K. Jhunjhunwllla received a notice from the respondent by registered post demanding the decretal dues. Thereupon Shri N. S. Pareek, the Works Secretary of the company who is in-charge of the legal matters was sent to Indoce\n\nto ascertain as to how the ex-parte decree came to be passed. Pareclc learnt that the summons purported to have been served on Navlakha on 17-3-1975. Navlakha was a mere Office Assistant in the Sales Department of the company. He was neither a Secretary nor a Director nor any other Principal Officer of the company authorised to receive summons in the suit. He did not bring the fact of the receipt of summOfll by him to the knowledge of any responsible officer of the company. Tbs company remained in dark and, as stated above, learnt for the first time on 29-7-1975 .about the passing of the ex-parte decree.\n\nN. S. Pareek was the only witness examined on behalf of the appellant in the . Miscellaneous case tried by the learned Additional District D Judge. No witness was examined on behalf of the respondent. The 1 Trial Court held :-\n\n\"I hold that handing over of summons to N avlakha who was oliy an Office Assistant working in the company and who was not an officer duly authorised td accept summons\n\ndn behalf of the company did not amount to valid service of summons on the applicant company.\"\n\nIt also accepted the ppellant's case about the knowledge of the ex-parte decree for the first time on 29-7-1975 and hence the application filed in about a week's time thereafter was held to be within time.\n\nF The High Court in its impugned judgment has held :-\n\n\"It is not ht dispute that the person who received the\n\nsummons in the office of the Company is not a person who is entitled to be served on behalf of the company in accordance with sub-clause (a) of Rule 2 of Order 29 of\n\nC.P.C.\"\n\nThe High Court, bowever, took the view that since Navlakha was an employee of the company sitting in its registered office in Calcutta the summons will be deemed to have been duly served on the company within the meaning of the first part of clause (b) of Order 29, Rule 2 of the Code. In the opinion of the High Court since the learned Additio- B nal District Judge did not apply his mind to the provision of law contained in clause (b), it committed a material irregularity and illegality in exercise of its jurisdjction in setting aside the ex-parte decree.\n\nI f\n\n' lJHALIMAl\\ ROPE WORKS v. ABDUL HUSSAIN (Untwalia, !.) 1031\n\nIn our opinion the High Court was clearly wrong in upsetting the A judgment of the Trial Court. There was no error in that. judgment much less any error of jurisdiction entitling the High Court to interfere with it.\n\nOrder 29 of the Code is headed \"Suits by or against Corporations\".\n\nTbore are only three Rules in it. We are concerned with Rule 2 which B reads as follows :-\n\n\"Subject to any statutory provision of process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served- ' ·(a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation. or\n\n(b) by leaving it.or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business. n\n\nRule 2 is not an exhaustive provision providing for all modes of service on the company in the sense as to wat is meant by service of summons on the Secretary, Director or Principal Officer in lute and Gunny Brokers Ltd. and another v. The Union of India and others(\") it was held\n\nthat the words \"Principal Officer\" in clause (a) of Rule 2 would include managing agents and it can, under this rule, be on a juristic person.\n\nAccordingly se'i\"ice on managing agents who are a corporation is valid under clause (a) .\n\nThe meaning of clause (b) has got to be understood in the bak ground of the provisions of the Code iu Order 5 which is meant for issue and service of summons on natural persons. Sending a summons by post to the registered office of the company, unless the contrary is shown, will be presumed to be service on the company itself. But the first part <>f clause (b) has got to be understood with reference to the other provisions of the Code. In Rule 17 of Order 5 it has been provided :-\n\n\"Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgement, or where the serving officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the defendant, and there is no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his beha~. nor any other person on whom service can be made, the serving officer shall affix a copy of the summons on the outer door ot some otbei; conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries.on business or personally works for gain,\n\n(I) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 820.\n\nE .\n\nand shall then return the original to the Court from wbich it was issued, with a report endorsed . thereon or annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the person (if any) by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was aflixed.\"\n\nSending summons to a corporation by post addressed to it at its registered office may be a good mode ?f service either by itself, or preferably, by way of an additional mode of service. But leaving the summons at the registered office of the corporation if it is literally interpreted to say that the summons can be left anywhere uncared for in. the registered office of the company, then it will lead to anomalous and absurd results. It has to be read in the background of the provision C9ntained in Order 5 Rule 17 of the Code. In other words, if the serving peon or bailiff is not able to serve the summons on the Secretary or any Director or any other Principal Officer of the Corporation because either he refuses to sign the summons or is not to be found by the serving person even after due diligence then he can leave the summons at the registered office of the company and make a report to that effect In the instant case nothing of the kind was done. It was not the case of the respondent in its rejoinder filed in the Miscellaneous case that the service of the summons as effected in accordance with the first part of clause\n\n(b) of Rule 2 of Order 29 of the Code. Annexure A to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent is the petition filed by the appellant under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code. In paragraph 9 of the said petition it was stated :-\n\n\"Inspection of re.cord of this Ron'ble Court relating to the service of the summons reveals that the bailiff of the Small Cause Court at Calcutta seems to have delivered a copy of the summons to a gentleman who is described as an officeassfutant, on 17-3-1975 at about 12.40 P.M.\n\nNo officeassistant of the defendant No. 1 Company is empowered or authorised to receive summons. The original summons which has been returned by the bailiff to this Hon'ble Court, has been signed by one Shri Nawlakha. Shri Nawlakha was concerned merely with sales and had nothing to do with legal matters generally or with receiving summons in particular. Service of the summons on Shri Na wlakha cannot be regarded as due service on the defendant No. I for the purpose of Order 9 Rule 13 C.p.C.\"\n\nThe rejoinder of the respondent is Annexure B to the colinter affidavit.\n\nPara 9 of the rejoinder which is in reply to para 9 of the petition reads as follows :- \\\n\n' • fl\\ \\•·\n\nSHALIMA!t ROPE WORKS V. ABDUL HUSSAIN (U!J.IW(l/ia, J.) 1033\n\n\"In reply to para 9 i! is stated that the summons was duly served as stated in this para. But it is denied that Shri Nawlakha was concerned merely with sales and has nothing to do with legal matters, generally or with r11eeiving summons in particular.\n\nIt is denied that service on Shri Nawlakha cannot be regarded as due service on thei Com-•\n\npany Defendant No. 1 for the purpose of Order 9 Rule 13\n\nC.P.C.\n\nShri Nawlakha was a responsible officer who could have intimated the receipt of the summons to his so called bosses. Without prejudice it is submitted that the Madhya Pradesh mendment in Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. may kindly be persued.\"\n\nNo where in the rejoinder a stand was taken that the summons was duly served on the. company because it was left at tlle registered office of the company.\n\nRefernce to the Madhya Pradesh amendment of Order 9 Rule 13 is immaterial as the Trial Court has pointed out that the company had no knowledge of the ex-parte decree, even otherwise, before 29-7-1975. No contrary finding has been recorded by the High Court.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the judgment by the Trial Court setting aside the decree was correct. In a:ny event no error of jurisdiction was committed by it.\n\nThe High Court weht wrong in interfering with\n\nit. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the . E High Court and restore that of the Trial Court. The suit shall now pred to disposal in accordance with the law.\n\nWe may, however, make it clear that the api>ellant under the orders of the Court had furnished bank guarantee for the decretal ampunt. 11 has agreed to continue the same till the disposal of the suit. We shall make no order as to costs.\n\nJl'\n\n'S.R.\n\n7-610SCl/80\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "SHALIMAR ROPE, WORKS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHALIMAR ROPE WORKS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ABDUL HUSSAIN H. M. HASAN BHAI RASSIWALA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ABDUL HUSSAIN H. M. HASAN BHAI RASSIWALA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Order 29 Rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 5 Rule 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 575, "end_char": 583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Summons in the suit was sent to the registered office of the company in Calcutta and was served on Sr( Nav!akha on 17-3-1975 asking the company to appear at Indore on 25-3-1975."}}, {"text": "17-3-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 618, "end_char": 627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Summons in the suit was sent to the registered office of the company in Calcutta and was served on Sr( Nav!akha on 17-3-1975 asking the company to appear at Indore on 25-3-1975."}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Summons in the suit was sent to the registered office of the company in Calcutta and was served on Sr( Nav!akha on 17-3-1975 asking the company to appear at Indore on 25-3-1975."}}, {"text": "25-3-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 670, "end_char": 679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Summons in the suit was sent to the registered office of the company in Calcutta and was served on Sr( Nav!akha on 17-3-1975 asking the company to appear at Indore on 25-3-1975."}}, {"text": "22-4-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 786, "end_char": 795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the company did not appear in the Court on that date, eventually, t~ exparte decree was passed\n\non 22-4-1975."}}, {"text": "Jhunjhunwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 911, "end_char": 923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company came to know about the ex-parte decree for the first time when its constituted attorney Sri Jhunjhunwala received a notice frorn the respondent by registered post demanding the."}}, {"text": "N. S. Pareek", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1028, "end_char": 1040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhereupon 'Sri N. S. Pareek, the Works Secretary of the company who is in-charge of the legal matters \\Vas sent to Indore toi ascertain as to how the ex-parte decree can1e to be passed."}}, {"text": "Navalakha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1268, "end_char": 1277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paree-k learnt that the summons was purported to have been served on Navalakha on 17-3-75.", "canonical_name": "Navalakha"}}, {"text": "17-3-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1281, "end_char": 1288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paree-k learnt that the summons was purported to have been served on Navalakha on 17-3-75."}}, {"text": "29-7-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1611, "end_char": 1618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "learnt for the lint time on 29-7-75 about the passing\n\nof the ex-parte decree."}}, {"text": "S. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1740, "end_char": 1746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1750, "end_char": 1755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1889, "end_char": 1894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2184, "end_char": 2189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shanker Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4294, "end_char": 4307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanker Ghosh and S. K. Gambhir for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4312, "end_char": 4325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanker Ghosh and S. K. Gambhir for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4346, "end_char": 4356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and A. K. Sanghi for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4361, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and A. K. Sanghi for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the judgmenf\n\nof the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversing the decision of the Second E Additional District Judge, Indore in MisceHaneous Judicial Case No."}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4705, "end_char": 4720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "22-4-197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4881, "end_char": 4889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the respondent firm on 22-4-197 5 against the appellant."}}, {"text": "29-7-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5060, "end_char": 5069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional District Judge held that summons in the suit was not duly F served on the company and it came to know about the decree on 29-7-1975."}}, {"text": "Navlakha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5650, "end_char": 5658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ent to the registered office of the company in Calcutta and is said to\n\nhave been served on one Shri Navlakha on 17-3-1975 asking the H oompany to appear at Indore on 25-3-1975 for settlement of issues.", "canonical_name": "Navalakha"}}, {"text": "S. K. Jhunjhunwllla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6022, "end_char": 6041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the case of the appellant the company came to know about the ex-parte decree for the first time whn its constituted attorney Sjlri S. K. Jhunjhunwllla received a notice from the respondent by registered post demanding the decretal dues."}}, {"text": "N. S. Pareek", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6863, "end_char": 6875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Pareek was the only witness examined on behalf of the appellant in the ."}}, {"text": "N avlakha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7131, "end_char": 7140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1 Trial Court held :-\n\n\"I hold that handing over of summons to N avlakha who was oliy an Office Assistant working in the company and who was not an officer duly authorised td accept summons\n\ndn behalf of the company did not amount to valid service of summons on the applicant company.\"", "canonical_name": "Navalakha"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7840, "end_char": 7845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Order 29, Rule 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8105, "end_char": 8121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 820", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10820, "end_char": 10839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order 5 Rule 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11683, "end_char": 11698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12463, "end_char": 12478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Small Cause Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12662, "end_char": 12691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 9 of the said petition it was stated :-\n\n\"Inspection of re.cord of this Ron'ble Court relating to the service of the summons reveals that the bailiff of the Small Cause Court at Calcutta seems to have delivered a copy of the summons to a gentleman who is described as an officeassfutant, on 17-3-1975 at about 12.40 P.M.\n\nNo officeassistant of the defendant No."}}, {"text": "Nawlakha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13035, "end_char": 13043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original summons which has been returned by the bailiff to this Hon'ble Court, has been signed by one Shri Nawlakha.", "canonical_name": "Navalakha"}}, {"text": "Na wlakha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13214, "end_char": 13223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Service of the summons on Shri Na wlakha cannot be regarded as due service on the defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Navalakha"}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13300, "end_char": 13315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13950, "end_char": 13965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13967, "end_char": 13972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14162, "end_char": 14177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14178, "end_char": 14183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Order 9 Rule 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14410, "end_char": 14425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1034_1041_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "'RAM SW AROOP RA! v. \\\n\nLILAVATHI May 7, 1980\n\n.-------,\n\n[V. l, l. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nU.P. Rent Control Act (Act 13 of 1972), Section 2(2)-Exemption from application of the provisions of the Act for the period of ten years in respect of uew con.tructions-Burden of Proof is upon the; landlord and not upnn the tenant.\n\nThe respondent landlady purchased sliop No. 66 in the city of Jhansi in 1969 from one Brij Mohan (DW 2), occupied the first floor and allowed the appellant/tenant to occupy the ground floor in 1970 on a leaBe deed which recited that the building was erected in 1965.\n\nIn 1975, the respondent filed the ejection suit on the basis that the bwlding 005 new, that the Act did not deter eviction of new constructions put up within ten years of the suit and so a decree v:as inevitable. The appellanttenant resisted the claim on the plea that the building was constructed 50. years earlier. The Trial Court negatived the defence and decreed eviction and this was upheld by the High Court.\n\nHence the appeal by special leave to this Court.\n\nA1lowing the appeal and remanding the m&tte~ to the Trial Court, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. In the normal course, no doubt the appeal must be dismissed as concluded by findings of fact.\n\nTo avoid posible public mischief through a new .class of litigation for eviction by easy resort to the \"new construction,\" expedient, interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is necessary.\n\n[1037 A-BJ\n\n2. Section 2(2) of the U.P. Act, uses the phrase \"nb{_hing in the rent control legislation shall apply to a building\" during a period of ten year, s from the date on which its construction is completed. In other v,; ords, in regard to all buildings the Act applies save where this exemption operates. '11terefo:re the landlord who .seeks exemption must prove thai excep'tion. The burden is on him to mr.ke out that notwithstanding the rent control legislation, his building F is out of its ambit. lt is not for the tenant to prove that the building has been coDstructed beyond a period of ten years, but it is for the landlady to make out that the construction has been completed within ten years of the suit.\n\nThis is sen$ible not merely because the statute expressly sfates so and thd setting\n\nunncessarily implies so, but also because it is the landlady who knows.. best when the building was completed, and not the tenant. As between the two, the owner of the building must tell the court when the building was Construct- G ed, and not the tenant thereof. Speaking generally, it is faif that the onus of establishing the date of construction of the building is squarely laid on the landlord although in a small categotjr of cases where the landlord is a 'purchaser\n\nfrom another, he will have to depend on his assignor to prove the fact\n\n[1038 C-F]\n\n3. An analysis of Explanation 1 to s. 2(2) of the U.P. Act indicates:\n\nH (I) Where a building has not been assessed, it is the date on which the completion was reported to, or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction. [1038 G-H]\n\n• ' •\n\n; >\n\nRAM SWAROOP V. LILAVATHI 1035\n\nProvided that if the date on which the completion was reported, to, or otherwise reCQrded by, the local authority is earlier Ulan the date of the first assessment, the date of completion will be such ear .. lier. date.\n\n[1039' A-BJ\n\n(3) Where there is no report, record or assessment, it is the date Of B actual oCcupation for the first time (not being an occupation for the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the build ing under construction). [1039 B-CJ\n\nUnfortunately, it is not possible for the purchaser-respondent or the teilant-apptllant to give direct testimony about the time of the construction or C the nature of the construction vis-a-vis Explanation (b) or ( c) . The best testimony is the municipal records about the completion of the building and the verificationby the municipal authorities as to whether a new construction '1as come into being or an old construction has been remodelled and, if so, when . exactly the completion took effect. It is quite conceivable that the municipal records bearing on the completion of the construction\n\n1 may throw conclusive light, whatever might have been the original proposal D in the phm submitted. It is perfectly possible that on a view of the earlier construction, vis a vis the completed new building the former may form but a small part. It may also be that the implication of the expression \"increased assessmenf' may be explained with reference to earlier assessment records ln the municipality.\n\nMoreover, whenever a new building is completed, a report has statutorily to be made and only on a completion survey and certificate~ occupation is ordinarily permitted. These records must also be ;µ:\"ailable in E ihe office of the local '3.Uthority.\n\nThe statutei makes it clear that reliance upon the 'muQicipal records rat, her than on the lips of witne~, is indicated to deter\n\nmine the date of completion and the nature of the construction. This statutory guideline has been wholly overlooked and the burden lying on the landlord has not been appreciated. The result is that the eviction order has to be demolished.\n\n[1039 F-0, 1040 D-GJ In the instant case (i) the Municipal assessment record produced in the F Court merely states \"increased assessment\". It may suggest the existence\n\nof_ an assessment which has been increased or it may perhaps be argued that when the bµilding was nconstructed a new assessment was made which was more than the. previous assessment and, therefore, was described as increased assessment; (ii) the oral evidence is inconsequential being second hand testi mony. Even the recital in the rent deed that there was a new construction in 196S-66 is by the appellant and the respondent, neither of whom has any direct G knoWiedge about the construction.\n\nOf course, an admission by the appellant is evidence against him but an admission is not always conclusive especially in the ilght of the municipal records such as are available and tho burden such as has been laid by the statute; and (iii) the failure of the trial Court specifically to record wlie11 the building was completed and what was the extent of re .. building, whether it was a case of total demolition arid reconstruction or such extensive additions as to push the existing building into a minor J>illjl •. beco; nes . Jl fatal. These basic issues have failed , to receive any attention. from the courts\n\nbelow. A finding recorded on speculative basis is no finding and that is tlie fate of the holding. (1039 G-H, 1040 A-D]\n\n'\"J . 1\n\nOH,'\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2109 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave :from the Judgment and Order dated 7-5-1979 otl the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 900 of 1978.\n\nA. K. Sen, B. S. Banerjee and R. N. Goviml for thei Appellant.\n\nJ, P. Goyal and S. K. Jain for Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKrusHNA IYER, J.-A brief back-drop leads to the short point in issue. Chronic scarcity of accommodation in almost every part of the country has made 'eviction' litigation explosively considerable, and the C strict protection against ejectment, save upon restricted grounds, has become the policy of the State. Rent Control Legislation to give effect to this policy exists everywhere, and we are concern~ with one such in the State of U.P. (U.P. Act 13 of 1972). The legislature found that rent control law had a chilling effect on new building construction, and so, to encourage more building operations, amended the stature D to release, from the shackles of legislative restriction, 'new COIJ!ltructions' for a period of ten years. So much so, a landlord who had let out his new building could recover possession without impedllnent if he instituted such proceeding within ten years of completion.\n\nThe\n\n\\ E\n\nrespondent is a landlady who claims to fill .the bill in this setting and seeks to vict the appellant-tenant untramelled by the provisions of the Act.\n\nShe has succeeded in both the courts below and the appellant challenges the order as illegal and vitiated by a basic error of approach.\n\nWe should have made short work of it had there not been the need for this Court to set the sights right in the class of litigation where exemption from the opef:!tion of the Act is claimed on the ground that the construction is new and the case is filed within the ten-year moratorium. If the exemption is erroneously lib\\lralised to frustrate the principal measure by failure to stick to basic legal principles, the jurisprudence of rent control may become too jejune to 'be socially effectiye. That is why we examine a few fundamentals here in the decisional process of this class of cases.\n\nThe area of controversy, factual and legal, is small. The respondent purchased shop No. 66 in the city of Jhansi in 1969 from one Brij Mohan (DW2), occupied the first floor and allowed the appellant, as tenant, to occupy the ground floor in 1970 on a lea8e deed which recited that the building was erected in 1965. In 1975 the present eviction action was instituted on the basis that the_ building was new, that the Act did not debar eviction of new constructions , put up within ten years of the suit and so a decree was inevitable.\n\n' t\n\n\"'1\n\n* i\n\n~ ,, Q\n\n<:->-'\n\nRAM SWAROOP v. LlLAVATHI (Krishna Iyer,/.) 1037\n\nThe tenant resisted the claim on the plea that the building was constructed 50 years ago: The trial court negatived the defence and decreed eviction and this was upheld by the High Court. ·\n\nIf ir were a bare finding of fact we should not have reopened it, but Shri A. K. Sen argues that fundamental flaws in the understanding of the law have vitiate<I the decision which, if left uncorrected, will spell a new class. of litigation for eviction by easy resort to the 'new construction expedient. Such possible public mischief persuades us to have a closer look at •the Act to the extent . relevllnt.\n\nShri J. P. 6oel rightly reminds us that in the normal course tlie appeal must be dismissed as concluded by findings of fact.\n\nBut we will probe the matter further to explore whether there is any substance in Shri A. K. Sen's argument of fundamental failure bearing on the legality of the conclusions. The anatomy of the Act is substantially the same as that of other. similar legislations. The most important feature , we, have to notice is the exemption from application of the provisions of the Act for the period of ten years in respect of new constructions.\n\nSection 2(2) is relevant in this context and runs as follows:\n\nExcepti'as provided in sub-section (5) of section 12 subsection (lA) of section 21, sub-section (2) of section 24, sections 24A, 24B, 24C or sub-section (3) of section 29,\n\nnothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period E of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. .\n\nxxx xxx xxx\n\nExplanation 1.-For the purposes of this sub-section,\n\n(a) The construction of a buildingi shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which' the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject! to assessment, the date on which the first asse8sment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said' dates, and in the absence of any Such .report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time :\n\nProvided that there may be different dates of completion H of _construct.ion in rspect of difierent parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied\n\nA separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by diffrent tenants.\n\n(b) 'construction' includes any new constructions in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished;\n\nB ( c) Where such substantial addition is made to an existc\n\ning building, that the existing building be.comes only a minor part thereof, the whole of the building including the existi'llg building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. ·\n\nThis sub-section and its construction is decisive of the Jate of the appeal. Notrung in the rent control legislation shall apply to a building \"during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed.\" The first thing that falls to be emphasised is that in regard to all buildings lhe Act applies save where this exemption operates.\n\nTherefore, the landlord who seeks exemption must prove that exception. Tlie burden is on him to make out th.at notwithstanding the rent control legislation, his building is out of its ambit. It is not for the tenant to prove that the building bas been constructed beyond a period of ten years. But it.is for the landlady to make out that the construction has been completed within ten years of the suit.\n\nThis is sensible not merely because the statute expressly state<s so and the setting necessarily implies so, but also because it is the landlady who knows best when the building was completed, and not the tenant. As between the two, the owner of the building must tell the' c.ourt when the building was constructed, and not the tenant thereof.\n\nSpeaking generally, i~ is fair that the onus of establishing the date of construction of the building is squarely laid on the landlord, although in a small category of cases where the landlord is a purchaser rrom another, he will have to depend on his assignor to prove the fact.\n\nFirstly, therefore, we must examine whether the respondent has made out her case for exemption from the operation of the Act based on the vital fact that the buildi'llg has been completed only within ten years of the suit. The second thing we have to remember is Explanation 1 quoted above. When is a building deemed to have been completed? An analysis of Explanation 1 to s.2(2) of the U. P. Act indicates :\n\n(1) Where a building has not been assessed, it is the date . on which the completion was reported to, or other wise recorded by, the local authority having jurisdiction.\n\nI f\n\nRAM SWAROOP 1'. LII; AVATIIT (Krishna Iyer, J.)' 1039\n\nProvided that if the &te on which the completion was reported to, or otherwise recorded by, the local authority i5 earlier than the date of the first assessment, the date of completion will be such earlier date.\n\n(3) Where there is no report, reord or assessment, it is the date of actual occupation for the first time (not being an occupation fdr the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction). '\n\nIt is common case that Shop Nos. 65 and 66 were owned by a common owner, Shri B{ij Mohan,\n\nDW2.\n\nHe sold only Shop No. 66 to the respondent. So, there is no doubt, that there was an existing building, Shop No. 66, long prior to the ten-year period rt1entioned in the statute. According to the testimony of Shri Brii Mohan, DW2, the old construction continued, but certain additions and remodelling. were done. He had submitted a plan to the local authority indicating the original construction and the proposed additions, and that is marked as Exhibit in the case.\n\nThis shows the existence of a prior building, the proposal being for addition or partial reconstruction and not for total demolition. If we go by the plan, it is not possible to conclude automatically that there is a new construction. If we go by Brij Mohan's evidence, the owner of the building at the relevant time, we cannot necessarily hold that the existing building has been substantially demolished and reconstructed.\n\nIndeed, his evidence i5 1 to the effect that the construction such as was made was beyond the 10 yea.r period.\n\nUnfortunately, it is not possible for the purchaser-respondent or the tenant-appellant to give direct testimony about Vie time of the construction or the nature of the construction vz's-a-vis Explanation\n\n(b) or (c). The best testimony i~ the municipal records about the completion of the building and the verification by the municipal auihorities as to whether a new construction has come into being or an old construction has been remodelled and, if so, when exactly the completion took effect.\n\nThe municipal assessment record produced iq the court merely state \"increasd assessment\". It may suggest the existence of an assessment which has been increased or it may perhaps be argued that when the building was 'reconstructed a new assessment was made which was more than the previous assessment and, therefore.\n\n. ~\n\nwas described as increased assessment.\n\nThe oral evidence in the case, apart from what we have set out, is inconsequential, being second hand testimony. Even the recital in the rent deed that there was a new construction is 1965-66 is by the appellant and the respondent, ndther of whoJll has any direct knowledge about the construction.\n\nOf course, an admission by the appellant is evidence against him but an admission is not always conclusi'1e especially in the light of the municipal records such as are available and the burden such as has been laid by the statute.\n\nViewed in this perspective, the failure of the trial court specifical\\y to record when the building was completed and what Wl!S \"the C the extent of re-building, whether it was a case of tofal demolition and reconstruction or such extensive additions as to push the exiSfuig \"\\ building into a minor part, becomes fatal.\n\nTheseJ basic issues have\n\nfailed to receive any attention from the courts below.\n\nA finding recorded on speculative basis is no finding and that is the fate of the holding in the present case.\n\nWe do not want to dwell OR the evidence in greater detail because we propose to remit the case to the trial court (Court of the First Additional District Judge, Jhansi). It is quite conceivable tbat the municipal records beilring on the completion of the construction nfay throw conclusive light, whatever might have been the orginiil propOSfil in the plan submitted. It is perfectly possible that on a view of the earlier construction, vis a vis the completed new building, the! fom; ier may form but a small part It may also be that the implication ofi the expression \"increased assessment\" may be explained with reference to earlier assessment records in the municipality.\n\nMoreover, whenever a new building is completed, a report has statuforily to be made and only on a completion rurvey and certificate,, occupation is ordinarily permitted. These records must also be available in the office of the local authority.\n\nThe statute milkes it clear that reliance upon tlie municipal records, rather than on the lips of witnesses, is indicated to determine the date of completion and the nature of the conStruction.\n\nThis statutory guideline has been wholly overlooked anil the burden lying on the landlord has not been appreciated. The , result is that the viction order has to be demolished.\n\nIt may still be opn to the landlady-reSpondent to make out bis case by producing better municipal evidence in the light of whlit we have indicated.\n\nWe do not wish to deny the landlady this opporlhnity because the trial court has not approached the problem from the correct legal angle.\n\nWe set aside the judgment of the courts below and remit t11e case for hearing to the trial court. The trial coµrt\n\nRAM SWAROOP v. LILAVATHI (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1041 • will give an opportunity to both sides to adduce fresh evidence, docu- A mentary and orill, to make out the ground of exemption from the application f the Act.\n\nOf course, when the entire evidence is before the court, the onus -of proof will play a lesser role.\n\nBefore parting with the case, we wish to notice a submission made by Shri Goel that the landlady's son was an unemployed engineer B who needed the premises for personal requirement. Even if the ct applies, it is open to the landlady to make out any of 11\\l grounds under the Act for eviction. To avoid prolixity and delay of ihe proceedings, we permit the trial court to allow the landlady, if she applies in that behalf, to plead on an alternative basis, for eviction on any of the specified grounds under the Act. c\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the ca_se remitted to the Court of the Addi. District Judge, Jnsi for fresh ditiposal in the light of the observations made above.\n\n11.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n_,,_,", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "RAM SW AROOP RA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM SWAROOP RAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LILAVATHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LILAVATHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 45, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. \\\n\nLILAVATHI May 7, 1980\n\n.-------,\n\n[V. l, l. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "l. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Brij Mohan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 424, "end_char": 434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66 in the city of Jhansi in 1969 from one Brij Mohan (DW 2), occupied the first floor and allowed the appellant/tenant to occupy the ground floor in 1970 on a leaBe deed which recited that the building was erected in 1965."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1406, "end_char": 1417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1468, "end_char": 1480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2854, "end_char": 2861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6828, "end_char": 6837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, B. S. Banerjee and R. N. Goviml for thei Appellant.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "B. S. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6839, "end_char": 6853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, B. S. Banerjee and R. N. Goviml for thei Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. N. Goviml", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6858, "end_char": 6870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, B. S. Banerjee and R. N. Goviml for thei Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6895, "end_char": 6903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, P. Goyal and S. K. Jain for Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6908, "end_char": 6918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, P. Goyal and S. K. Jain for Respondent."}}, {"text": "KrusHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6980, "end_char": 6992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKrusHNA IYER, J.-A brief back-drop leads to the short point in issue.", "canonical_name": "KrusHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Jhansi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66 in the city of Jhansi in 1969 from one Brij Mohan (DW2), occupied the first floor and allowed the appellant, as tenant, to occupy the ground floor in 1970 on a lea8e deed which recited that the building was erected in 1965."}}, {"text": "Brij Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8904, "end_char": 8914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66 in the city of Jhansi in 1969 from one Brij Mohan (DW2), occupied the first floor and allowed the appellant, as tenant, to occupy the ground floor in 1970 on a lea8e deed which recited that the building was erected in 1965.", "canonical_name": "Brij Mohan"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9655, "end_char": 9664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If ir were a bare finding of fact we should not have reopened it, but Shri A. K. Sen argues that fundamental flaws in the understanding of the law have vitiate<I the decision which, if left uncorrected, will spell a new class.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "J. P. 6oel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9995, "end_char": 10005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri J. P. 6oel rightly reminds us that in the normal course tlie appeal must be dismissed as concluded by findings of fact."}}, {"text": "Section 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10553, "end_char": 10565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10658, "end_char": 10668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10688, "end_char": 10698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10719, "end_char": 10729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 24A, 24B, 24C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10731, "end_char": 10753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10776, "end_char": 10786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14078, "end_char": 14084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14321, "end_char": 14333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LII; AVATIIT (Krishna Iyer, J.)' 1039\n\nProvided that if the &te on which the completion was reported to, or otherwise recorded by, the local authority i5 earlier than the date of the first assessment, the date of completion will be such earlier date.", "canonical_name": "KrusHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "B{ij Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14865, "end_char": 14875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "65 and 66 were owned by a common owner, Shri B{ij Mohan,\n\nDW2.", "canonical_name": "Brij Mohan"}}, {"text": "Brii Mohan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15098, "end_char": 15108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the testimony of Shri Brii Mohan, DW2, the old construction continued, but certain additions and remodelling."}}, {"text": "Court of the First Additional District Judge, Jhansi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17915, "end_char": 17967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not want to dwell OR the evidence in greater detail because we propose to remit the case to the trial court (Court of the First Additional District Judge, Jhansi)."}}, {"text": "Goel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19887, "end_char": 19891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before parting with the case, we wish to notice a submission made by Shri Goel that the landlady's son was an unemployed engineer B who needed the premises for personal requirement."}}, {"text": "Court of the Addi. District Judge, Jnsi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20384, "end_char": 20423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nThe appeal is allowed and the ca_se remitted to the Court of the Addi."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1042_1094_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "TARA PRASAD SINGH ETC. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nMay 7, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R .. KRISHNA IYER,\n\nR. S. SARKAR!A, N. L. UNTWALIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND\n\nV. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]\n\nCoal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 67 of 1916-Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act is violative oif the provisi\"ons of Articles 14, 19,(1)(/), 19(1)(g) and 31 of the Constituti<>n of lndia-Applicability of the Act to leases of composite mines in which there are alternate seams of coal and fire clay.\n\nArticle 246(1) of the Constitution of Indiia confers upon the Parliament, notwithstanding anything contained in. clauses 2 and 3 pf that Article, the exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule, called the Union List, Clause 2 of Article 246 deals with thlj power of the Parliament and the State Legisla.tures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Lisi, while clause 3 deals with the {X>Wer of the State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List.\n\nEntry 23 List II, Schedule VU of the Constitution read with Article 246(3) cOnfers legislative power on the State Legisatures in respect of \"Regulatiol). of mines and mineral development\" but that power is \"subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union\". Entry 54 List I enables Parliament to acquire legislative power in respect of, \"Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which suCh regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest\". Entry 24 List II relates to \"Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I\". Entry 7, List I, relates to Industries declased by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. Entry 52, List I, enables 'Parliament to acquire legislntive. power in respect of \"Industries, the control' of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the pub1ic interest\". '\n\nPursuant to these powers the Parliament enacted the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 65 of 1951, the Mines Act 35 of 1952, the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 67 of 1957, the Coking Coal Mines (EmCrgency Pfovisions) Act, 64 of 1971, the Coking Coal Mines {Nationalisation) Act, 36 of 1972, the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment -Act, 56 of 1972, the Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act, 15 of 1973 and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 26 of 1973. Thereafter the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) , i\\mendmcnt Ai:t 6i of 1976 woo p:isscd, the objects and reasons being :\n\n. ):.\n\n\\ .. .J\n\n' l\n\n.-~'\n\n., 'i . \"\n\n' ·~--\"'\"\"\"-\n\n. ;\"\n\nTARA PRASAD V. UNION 1043\n\n\"After the nationalisation of coal mines, a number of persons holding A .coal mining 1eases unauthorisedly started mining of coal in the Dl06t reckless and unstientific manner without regard to considemtions of conservation, safety and welfare of workers. Not only were they resorting to slaughter mining by superficial working of outcrops and thereby destroying a valuable national asset and creating problems of water-logging fires, etc. for the future delopment of the deeper deposits, their unsafe working also caused serious and fatal a.ccidonts. They were making B larger profits by paying very low wages, and by not providing any safety and welfare measures. Thefts of coal from adjacent nationalised mines were also reported after the commencement of these unauthOrised operations which had shown an increasing trend of late. Areas where illegal and unauthorised operations were carried on, were without any assessment of reserves in regard to quality and quantity ol1 coal which could be made available after detailed exploration work was undertaken C and results\" analysed. No scientific exploitation of these deposits could be undertaken in the nationalised sector without these details. It was, therefore, considered that it would oot be appropriate either to nationalise these unauthorisedly worked mines after taking them over under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 or to get the concerned rriining leases prematurely terminated and regranted to Govern ment Companies under the Mining and Minerals ·(Regulation and Deve- D Jopment) Act, 1957. In view of the policy followed by the Central Government that the Coal Industry is to be in the nationalised sector, it was decided that the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973 should be enacted to provide for termination of all privately held coal .leases, except those held by pfivately owned steel companies, so that it may be possible for the Central Government, Government Company or Corporation to take mining leases where necessary, after necessary exploration has E been made as to the extent of the deposits. of coal, etc.\"\n\nThe petitioners who were the lessees of cool mines by the State Government, being aggrieved by the provisions of the Ameridment Aci 67 of .1976, challenged the competence of Parliament to enact the Amendment Act and also the validity of the Act and contended:\n\n(a) Laws made in the exercise of power CO!llferred by Entry 54 must stand F the test of public interest because the very reason for the Parliament acquiring power under that entzy is that it is in public interest that the regulation of - mines and minerals should be under the control of the Union: Jn other words, Entry 54 confers a legislative power which is purposive, that is to say, any law made in the exercise of the power under Entry 54 must be designed to secure the regulation an.d development of coal inines in public interest or else it must fail.\n\nThe Nationalisation Amendment Act is not such a law which Parliament G can pass under Entry 54 because, that Act not only terininates all leases but it destrQys the contracts of service of thousands of Workmen, and indeed it destroys all other contracts and all securities for moneys lent without even so much as making a provision for priorities for the payn1ent of debts.\n\nSince the Nationalisation Amendment Act terminates aU leases, it is a complete negation of the integrated scheme of taking over the management of mes; acquisition of the rights of lease-holders and the running of the mines.\n\n(b) The word 'Regulation' in Entry 54 does not include 'Prohibition'. 'Regulatiun' should not also be confused with the expression 'Restrictions' occur-\n\n.·.J\n\nring in Article 19 (2) to ( 6) of the Constitution. In the very nature of things, there cannot be a power to prohibit the regulation and development of mines and minerals'. Section 3(4) inserted by the Nationalisation Amendment Act impoees no obligation on the Central Government or any other authority to obtain a mining lease and work the mines, the leases in respect of which stand terminated under the Act. The words \"it shall be lawful'' for the Central Government to obtain a lease are words qf discretionary power which create no obligation. They only enable the Central Government to obtain a lease, mal<ing something legal and po6Sible. for .which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. Section 3(4) does not confer a power coupled with a dnty; it merely confers a faculty or power. No Court can by a Writ of Mandamus or otherwise compel the' Central Government to obtain a lease of a coal mine and to nm it under any of the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendmeiit Act.\n\n\" ( c) Where the Legislative power is distributed amoug different legislative bodies, the Legislature may transgress its legislative power either directly or manifestly, or covertly or indirectly.\n\nIn the instant case, the exercise of power by the Parliament is colourable because although in passing the Nationalisation Amendment Act it purported to act within the limits of its legislative power, in substance and in reality it transgressed that power, the transgression beiilg veiled by what appears on proper examination to be a mere pretence or disguise.\n\n(d) In order to tear off the veil or disguise \"1td in order to get at the substance of the law behind the form, the Court must examine the effect of the legislation and take into consideration its object, purpose and design. Where the legislative entry is purposive, like Entry 54 of the Union List, it is the object or purpose of the legislation which requires consideration. The put'pose for which the Parliament is permitted to acquire legislative power of Regulation and Devlopment of mines must dictate the nature of law made in the exercise of that power because public intecest demands that power. Under the provisious of the Nationalisation Amendment Act, not ouly is there no obligation on the Central Government to run a mine, but there is no obligation imposed upon it .even to carry out prospecting or investigation in order to decide whether a particular mine should be worked at oil. Section 3.( 4) merely authorise$ the Central Government to apply for \"a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands determined\". A close examilµtion of the Act thus discloses that far from providing for regulation and development of cool mines, it totally probibits all minlng activity even if the State Government wants to run 3. mine. It does not impose proh.ibitioo! as a step towards running the mines since there is neither 3ny obligation to carry out the prospecting or investigation nor to run the mines.\n\n(e) The Nationalisation Atri.endment Act runs directly counter to the whole policy of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1973, to acquire and run the mines. The Parent Act becomes a dead letter in regard to several of its provisions as a result of the Amendment Act~ t only adopts a colourable device to amend the Nationalisation Act while completely negativing it in fact. 1'he Act therefore lacks legislative competence and is, in the sense indicated, a '-\"Olourable piece of legislation.\n\n; '\n\n• ..\n\n-.-!'\n\nTARA PRASAD V. UNION 1045\n\n(f) Artlcle 31(A) (l)(e) only lifts a restriction on the legislative compe- A tence in so far as violation of fundamental rights is concerned. The most benign motive cannot make a law valid if the legislative competence is lacking.\n\n(g) Under Article 31{1) of the Constitution, no person can be deprived of his property without the authority of law. Article 31A(l) >rtrlch exempts the Jaws mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) from invalidity under Articles 14, 19 and 31 does not dispense with the necessity of the authority of law for depriving a person of his property, because tho opening words of Article 3 IA(l) are \" ..... . no law providing for ...... \" matters mentioned in clanses (a) to (e) shall be deemed to be void as offending Articles 14, 19 and 31.\n\n(h) The Nationalisation Amendment Act confers no authority to terminate a composite lease for mining coal and fire-clay. The right to mine fire-clay is given to the petitioner by law and it can only be taken away by law.\n\n(i) Though the Nationalisation Amendment Act does not in terms prohibit the petitioner from mining fireclay, the effect of the law, in a practical business sense;. is to prohibit the petitioner fronl mining fireclay and, therefore, the posi-..\n\ntion is rhe same1 as th9ugh the Act had enacted the prohibition in express terms.\n\nThe Court must look at the direct impact of the law on the right of the party, and if that impact prohibits him from exercising his right, the fact that there is no express prohibition in the Act is immaterial.\n\n(j) The Nationalisation Amendment Act by m&king it punishahlei to mine coal, in substance and in a practical business sense, prohibits the petitioner from mining fireclay.\n\nFor this prohibition the Amendment Act does not provide, and therefore, there no authority of law for it.\n\nCoal and :fireclay are two distinct minerals as shown by Schedule II to the Mines arul Minerals (Regula\n\ntion and Development) Act, 67 of 1957 wherein item I is coal and item IS is E fireclay. The dictionary meanings of coal and fireclay also show that they are two distinct minerals.\n\n(k) The Nationalisation Amendment Act affects, in substance, two kinds of transfers : the transfer of the lease>-hold inll:rests of the lessees in favour of the lessor, namely the State; and the transfer dfl the mining business of the lessees in favour of the Central Government Sin.cc these transfers amount to acquisition within the meaning of Article 31(2), the Act is open to challenge under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) &nd 31 of the Constitution.\n\n(!) The Nationalisation Amendment Act is open to challenge under Article 14 because lessees who fall within that Act are patently discriminated against in comparison with lessees of other mines, both coking and non-coking, who were paid compensation when their property was taken over first for manll@ec ment under the Management Acts and then under the Nationalisation Acts.\n\n(m) The Nationalisation Amendment Act is open challenge under Article 19(1)(g) because the prohibition against lessees from carrying on their business and the transfer of their business, in substance, to the Central Government or a Company is an unreasonable restriction on the right of the lessees to hold their lease-hold property and to carry on their business of mining.\n\n(n) The Act is open to challenge under Art:icle 31 because no provision is H mad.• for_ the payment '>!- any amount whaer to the lessees whose mining\n\nbusmess ts taken over wider the Act. No pubhc purpose is involved either in the\n\nA termination of the lessees' interest or in the acquisition of their business. Expro~ priation without payment of any amount requires a very heavy public purpose.\n\n(o) Since no provision whatsoever is made for the payment of any amount to the .lessees whose leases are terminated, the Nationalisation Amendment Act is not a 'Law' within the meaning of Article 31(2) and therefore Article l,9(1)(f) is attracted. '\n\n(p) The Act is not saved from the challenge of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by Article 31A (I) (e) because that Article provides for extinguishment which does not amount to acquisition by the State. If. extingµishment amounting to acquisition \\\\'as intended to be saved under' Article 31A(l) (e), the subject IDJ.tter dealt with by clause (e) would have been included in clause (a.) of that Article.\n\nC Dismissing all the \\Vrit Petitions except Writ Petitions Nos. 111, 178, 220, 221, 257, 352, 600 & 1130-1134/77 which are allowed in part, the Court,\n\nHEID: (1) The provisions of the Amendment Act 67 of 1976 are not a mere facade for terminating mining leases without any obligation in the matter '\\ of regulation of mines and mineral development. [1071H, 1072A]\n\n. D Granting that Entry 54, List I is pur_posive since it qualifies the power to\n\npass a law relating to \"Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development\" by the addition of a restrictive clause, \"to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest\", the provisions of the NationalisatiOn Amendment Act show that they are designed to serve progressively the purpose of Entry 54. [1972 A-BJ\n\nThe Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act was passed in order to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in .respect of the Coal mines specified in the Schedule to that Act. This was done with a view to re-organising and reconstructing such coal mines so as to ensure the rational, co-ordinated and scientific development and utilisation of coa~ resources consistent with the growing requirements of the country.\n\nThe high purpose of that Act was to ensnro that tho ownership and control of such resources are vested in the State and thereby so distributed as best to subserve the common ood. [1072 D-F]\n\nThe several provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act, are, (I) by section 3(3) (a) of .the Coal Mines (Ntionalisation) Act, 1973' which was introduced by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, no person other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) can carry on coal mining operations after 'April 29, 1976, being the date on which section 3 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act came into force; (2) by section 3 (3) (b) all mining leases and sub-leases stood terminated except those granted before April 29, 1976 in favour Of the Central Government, a Government company or corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government; (3) section 3(3) (c) prohibits the granting of a lease for winning or mining coal in favour of any person other than the Government, a Government company or a corporation of the above description provided that a sub-lease could be granted by these auth<>- rities to any-pefson if the two conditions mentioned in the proviso are satisfied; and (4) when a mining lease stands terminated under section 3(3), \"it shall\n\nI r \\\n\n\\~ '\n\nTARA PRASAD v. UNION 1047\n\nbe lawful'' for the Centrnl Governmen~ or the Government company or the A corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government to obtain a pros~ pecting licence or a mining leatie in rest of lheJ whole or part of the land\n\ncovered by the mining lease which stands termiriated. Section 4 of the Nation\n\nalisation Amendment Act introduced an additional pena.1 provision in the parent Act. The provisions of .Ss. 3 and 4 are noi a direct negation of the principles of the parent Act a.nd they do not destory the integral scheme of taking over the management of mines, of acquiring the rights of lease-holders and continu B ing to run the .mines.\n\nOn the contrary, the Nationalisation Amendment Act is manifestly in furtherance of the object of nationalisation mentioned in the preamble to the wrent Act and effectuates the purpose mentioned in sections 3(1) and 3(2) of that Act by the addition of a new sub-section, sub-section (3), which terminates all coal mining leases and sub-leases except those referred in sub-section (3) (b). The circumstance that the marginal note to l!\"'lion 3 and the title of Chapter II of the Nationalisation Act are not amended by the C Nationalisation Amendment Act, despite the addition of a new sub-section, is of/ Jittle or no consequence. That sub-section is a logical extension of the scheme\n\nenvisaged by the original sub-sections (I) and (2) of section 3. [1073 C-H.\n\nl074ABJ\n\n2. Besides, marginal notes to the sections of a statute and the titles of its i:hapters cannot take a\\vay the effect of the provisions contained in the Act so D as to render those provisions legisl.ativeJy incompetent, if they are otherwiSe within the competence of the legislature to enact. One must principally have regard to the object of an Act in order to find out whether the exercise of the legislative power is purposive, unless, of course, the provisions of the Act show that the a.vowed or intended objects is a mere pretence for covering a veiled transgression committed by the legislature upon its o.wn powers. Whether. a particular object can be successfully achieved. by an Act, is largely a matter E . of legislative policy. [1074 B-D]\n\n3. The Nationalisation Amendment Act needs no preamble, especially when it is backed up by a statement of objects and reasons. Generally, an amendment Act is passed in order to advance the purpose of the parent Act as reflected iD: the preamble to that Act.\n\nAcquisition of cool mines, is not an end in itself but is only a means to an end. The fundamental object of the Nationalisation Act as also of the Nationalisation Amendment Act is to bring into ex- F istence a state of affairs which will be congenial for regula~ mines and for mineral development. In regard to the scheduled mines, that purpose was achieved by the means of acquisition. In regard' to mines which were not included in the Schednle, the same purpose was achieved by termination of leases and sub-leases M\\d by taking over the right to work the mines. Termination of leases, vesting of lease-hold properties in the State Governments and the grant of leases ID the Central Government or Government Companies are to- G gether the means conceived in order to achieve the object of nationalisation of one of the vital material resources of the community. [1074 D-0]\n\n4. Section 18 of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act 67, 1957 contains a statutory behest and projects a purposive legislative policy.\n\nThe later Acts on the subject of regulation of mines and mineral development are linked up with the policy ennnciated in section\n\n18. Therefore, nothing ff contained in the later analogous Acts can be construed as in derogation of the principle ennnciated in. section 18 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 67 of 1957, which provid .. that it shall be the duty of the\n\nA Central GoVeJ11DMlnt to take all such steps aa may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India. Therefore, even in regard to matters f&lling under the Nationalisation Amendment Act which terminates existing leases and makes it lawful for the Central Government to obtain fresh leases, the obligation of section 18 of the Act of 1957 will continue to apply in its full rigour.\n\n[1074 G-H, 1075 A-BJ\n\n5. Entry 54 refers to two .tirings: (1) regulation of mines and (2) mineral B development.\n\nIt is true that the Entry is purposive, since the exercise of the power under Entry 54 has to be guided and governed by public interest. But neither the power to regulate mines nor the power to ensure min.era) development postulates that no sooner is a mining lease terminated by the force of the statute, then the Central Government must begin to work the mine of which the lease is terminared. It is possible that after the Nationalisation Amendment C Act came into force, there was a hiatus between the termination of eixisting \"- leases and the granting of fresh ones.\n\nBut, the Nationa.Jisation Amendment Act does not provide that any kind of type of mine shall not be developed or worked. Cooservation, prospecting and investigation, developmental steps and finally scientific exploitation of the mines and minerals is the process envisaged • by . the Nationalisation Amendment Act. It is nndeniable that conservation of minerals, whk;.h is brought about by the termination of existing leases and subleases, is vital. for the development of mines. A phased and graded programme I) of conservation is in the ultimate analysis one of the most satisfactory and effective means for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals.\n\n[1075 D-GJ\n\n6. The Nationalisation Amendment Act is not destructive of the prpvisions of the Parent Act The destruction which the Nationalisation An1endment Act brings about is of the lease. or the sub-leHe and not of its 'subject matter, namely, the mine itself. In terminating the lease of a house one does not destroy the house itself.\n\nIt may be arguable that p; phibiting the use of lhe house for any purpose whatsoever may, for practical purposes, amount to the destruction of the house itself. The Nationalisation Amelldment Act neither contains provisions directed at prohibiting the working of mines, the leases in respect of which are terminated. A simple provision for granting sub-leases shows that tho object of the Nationalisation Amendment Act is to ensure that no mine will lie idle or unekplored. Interregnums can usefully be utilised for prospecting and investigation.\n\nThey do not lead to destructiog; of mines.\n\nIn fact, . it is just as well that the Amendment Act does not require the new leases to undertake an adventure, reckless and thoughtless, which goes by the name of 'scratching of mines', which ultimately results in the slaughtering of mines. [1075H, 1976A-D]\n\nNri:tural resources, however, large are not inexhaustible, which makes it imperative to conserve them. Without a wise and planned conservation of such resources, there can neither be a systematic regulation of mines nor a scientific development of minerals. The importance of. conservation of natural resources in any scheme of, regulation and development of such resous can be seep from the fact that the Parliament had to pass in August 1974 an Act called the Coal Mines (Conservation and Development) Act, 28 of 1974, in order, principally, to provide for the conservation 00\" coal and deveiopment of coal mines, Section 4 (1) o£ that Act enables the Central Government, for the pnrpose of conservation of coal and for the development of coal mines, to exercise such powers and take or cause to be taken such measures as it may be necessary or proper or as may be prescribed. By section 5 ( 1), a duty is cast on tho\n\nI I\n\n...\n\nTARA PRASAD V, UNION 1049\n\nO\\\\<uers. of coal mines to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure' the con..\n\nA servation of coal and development of the coaJ. mines owned by them. l\\ieasures' taken for judicious preservation and distribution of natural resources may involve restrictions on their use and even prohibition, upto a degree, of the unplanned working of the repositories of such resources. [1076 D-F, 1077 BJ\n\nAltorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [1896] A.C. 348, 363; Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo [1896J A.C. 88 B expJain.ed and referred to.\n\n7. Section 3(4) of the Act uses an enabling or petmissive expression in order that regulation of mines and mineral development may be ensured after a scientific prospecting, investigation and planning. It is doubtless that, in the. language of Lord Cairns in Julius (1880) 5 Appeal Cases 214, 222, there is something in the nature of the things which the Nationalisation Ameridrnent Act empowers to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done C and something in the conditions under which it iSi to be done which couplts the poVier conferred by the Act with a duty, the duty being not to act in hast0 but with reasonable promptitude depending upon the nature of the problem under investigation. An obligation to act does not cease to be so merely because there is no obliga•tion to act in an ad-hoc or impromptu manner. It is in the context of a conglomeration of these diverse considerations that one must a pprew\n\nciate why, in section 3(4) which was introduced by the Nationalisation Amend- D ment Act, Parliament. used the permissive expression \"it shall be Jaw:ful\".\n\n[1078 H, I 079 A-CJ\n\nA broad and. liberal approach to the field of legisla-tion demarcated by Entry 54, List L an objective :ind practical understanding of the provisions con\n\ntained in the Nationalisation Amendment Act and a realistic perception of cons~ titutional principles will point to the conclusion that the Pa-rliament had the E legislative competence to enact the Nationalisation Amendment Act. f1079 CD]\n\nJulius v. Bishop of Oxford [1880J 5 Appeal cases 214,222 referred to.\n\n8. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1972 and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1973 cover the whole field of \"Coal\" which was\n\nintended to be nationalised. The titles of the two Acts and the various provi sions contained therein show that what was being nationalised was three distinct F categories of mines : mines containing seams of coking coal exclusively; mines containing seams of coking coal along with seams of other coal; and mines containing seams of other coal. Though Parliament had power under Article 31A(l)(e) of the Constitution to terminate mining leases without payment of any compensation or 'amount', it decided to nationalise coal mines on payfilent of amounts specified in the Schedules to the Nationalisation Acts of 1972 and\n\n1973. Besides, even when something apart from coking coal mines was acquiJ-.\n\nG ed, namely, 'coke oven plants', provision was separately made, in section 11 of the Nationalisation Act of 1972, read with the 2nd Schedule, for payment of amounts to owners of coke oven plants. Thus, whatever was intended to be acquired was paid for.\n\nThis scheme is prima fade inconsistent with the Par lian1ent intending to acquire leasehold rights in other minerals, like firec1ay, with\n\nout the payment of any amount. [1082 B-EJ\n\nCoupled with this is the unambigous wordin.g of section 3 (3) (b) and section H 3 (3 )( c) of the Nationalisation Act Of 1973 which were introduced therein by\n\n8-610SCI/80\n\nSUPREME C!J.URT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA section 3 of the Na-tionalisation Amendment Act. These provisions carry the scl:cme of tha: Nationalisation Acts to their logical conclusion by emphasising tliat the target of those Acts is coal mines, pure and simple. What stands\n\nterminated under section 3(3)(b) is certain mining leases and subleases in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal. The embargo placed by section 3 ( 3) ( c) is on the granting of leases for winning or mining coal to persons other than those mentioned in section 3(3)(a). [1082 E-F, H, 1083-A]\n\nB °' The definition of 'coal mine' in section 2(b) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 has an uncertain import and the schen1e of that Act and of the Coking Coa-l Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 makes it plausible that rights in minerals other than coke and coal were not intended to be acquired under the two Nationalisation Acts.\n\nA comparison of the definition of \"coal mine\" in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973 with the-definition cf \"coking coal C mine'' in section 3 (c) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) .Act of 1972 makes it clear that whereas in regard to coking coal mines, the\\ existence of any seam of other coal Vias regarded as inconsequential, the existence of any seam of another mineral was not considered as inconsequential in regard to a coal mine. The definition of coal mine in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973 scrupulously deleted the clause, \"whether exclusively or in addition to\" any other seam.\n\nThe same Legislature which added the particular clause in the definition of D 'coking coa! mine' in; the 1972 Act, deleted it in the definition of 'coal mine' in the 1973 .Act. In so far as coal mines are concerned, b).- reason of the definition of coal mine contained in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973, and the definition of coking coal mine: in section 3(c) of the Act of 1972 which presents a. striking contrast\" to the definition in section 2(b ), composite coal 1nines, that is to say, coal mines iR whlch there are Seams of .coal a-nd hreclay do. not .fall within the scope of the definition of \"coal mine'' in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973.\n\nE [1083 A-B, C-E, G-m\n\n9. The lessees of composite mines, therefore, who hold composite 1nin1ng leases -of winning coal and fireclay, cannot continue their mining operations unabated despite the provisions of the Natlonalisation Amendment Act. It is one thing to say that a composite mine is outside the scope of the definition of coal mine in section 2(b) of the Nationalisation Act of 1972 and quite another to conclude therefrom that the other provisions introduced into that Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act will have no impact on composite leasesforwinning coal and fireclay.\n\nSection 3(3)(a) which was introduced into Hie parent Act by the, Nationalisation Amendment Act provides expressly that on and from the commencement of section 3 of the Amendment Act, that is, from Aptil 29, 1976, no person other than th_ose mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) shall carry on \"coal mining operation, in India, in any fonn\".\n\nThese provisions of sections 3(3) (a-) and 30(2) of the parent Act will apply of their own force, whether or not the lessee holds a composite lease for winning coal and fireclay and whether or not the mine is a composite mine containing alternate seams of coal and fireclay. In other words, if a person holding a composite lease can do fireclay mining without mining coal, he may do so.\n\nBut if. he cannot win or mine fireclay without doing a coal mining operation, that is, without winning or mining coal, he cannot do any mining operation at all. If he does so, he will be. liable for the penal consequences provided for in section 30(2) of the NationaliSl>tion Act of 1973. The provision contained in section 3 (3) (a) totally prohibiting the generality of persons from carrying on c.oat mining operation in India in any form and the penal provision of section 30(2}\n\nTARA PRASAD V. UNION 1051\n\nvirtually leave with the lessees of composite mines the Jiusk of a mining interest., A That they calUlot win or mine coal is conceded and, indeed, there, is no escape\n\nfrom that position in view of the aforesaid provisions. (1084 B-H, 1085 Al\n\nThe lessees of composite mines cannot win or mine fireclay though their composite lease is outside the scope -of section 2 (b) of the Nationalisatio11 Act\n\nof 1973. The lessees of composite mines will, for all practical purpeses, have to 1111rse their deeds of lease without being able to exercise any of the rights :flowing from them.\n\nOn their own showing, they will be acting at their peril if they attempt to win fireclay.\n\nIf they cannot win fireclay \\vithout v.'inning coal, they cannot \\.vin firecJay either, even if they hold composite leases under which they are entitled to win coal and fireclay. [1085 C-D]\n\n(10) Though the Parliant provided for the payment of amounts for acquisition of certain interests under the:. Nationalisation A<;:ts of 1972 and 1973. it did not intend to pay any compensation or amount for the termination of lease-hold rights in respect of composite mines. Mines which have alternate seaW of coa~ and fireclay are in a class by themselves and they appear to be far fe, ver in number a~ compared with the coking coal minesi and coal mines, properly so called.\n\nThe authority of law. for the termination of the righls of compor; ite lessees is. the provision contained in! section 3 (3) (a), -the violation of which attracts the penal provisions of section 30(2) of the Nationalisation Act of J.973.\n\nThe Par1iament has deprived composite lessees of their right to win fireclay because they canont do so without winning .coal. The winning of coal by the generality of people is prohibited by section 3(3)(a) of the Act of 1973.\n\n[1085 E-GJ\n\nTh.is is, just as well, because Parliament could not b&ve intended that such islands of exception should swallow the main stream of the Nationalisation Acts.\n\nObviously, no rights were intended to be left outstanding, once the rights in respect of coking coal mines and coal mines were brought to an end. [1085 G-HJ\n\n11. A close and careful examinntion of the provisions of the Coal Ivline~ (Nationalisation) Act. 1973 and of the amendments made to that Act by Nationalisation Amendment Act makes it clear that by the Nationalisa-tion Amendn1ent Act, neither the petitioners' right to property has been acquired\n\n\\\\'ithout the payment of any amount nor they have been unreasonably deprived F of their right to carry on the business of mining. [1087 E-F]\n\nTJ1e Coal Mines (NtionaJisation) Act. ~~73 nationalised coal mines by rroviding by section 3(1) that on the appointed day, that is on fay 1, 1973, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation! to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall tand trmferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central <Jovemment free from all incumbrances. 'Ibe scheduled mines, 711 in number oo.d situated in reputed coal bearing areas. were the ones which were engaged openly, lawfullv and uninterruptedly in doing coal mining business.\n\nSince it was possible to riscertain and verify the relevant facts pertaining tO! these undertakings, ty were taken over on payment of amounts mentioned in the Schedule to the Act, \\\\hich varied from mine to mine depending upon tbe •al•c of their assets, their potential '\"d their profitability. In the very nature of things, the list of mines in the Schedule oouid not be exhaustive because\n\ndlere were. and perhaps even now there are, unauthoric.ed mines worked by per- . - who did not JlOSSC&'! the semblance of a title or right to do mining business. ht.ons falling within that category cannot cite the Constitution as their charter\n\nto continue to indulge in unauthorised mining which is unscientific, l)nsystematic and detrimental to the national interest by reason of its tendency to destroy the reserve of natural resources.\n\nBut alongside these persons, there couid conceivably be mine operators who may have been doing their business lawfully but who were not easily or readily identifiable.\n\nSection 3 (2) of the Nationalisation Act, 1973 made provision for taking over the management of such mines by declaring for \"the removal of doubts\" that it, after the appointed day, the existence of.any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, shall, until that mine is nationalised by an appropriate legislation, apply to such mine. Owners of mines whose mines were not included in the Schedule but whose right, title and interest was to vest eventually in the Central Government under \"an appropriate legislati0n\" envisaged by section 3 (2) of the Nationalisation Act were, by this method, placed on par with the owners of mines of which the management was taken over under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Ac~ 1973. That Act provides by section 7(1) that every owner of a coal mine shall be given by the Central Government an amount in cash for the vesting in it, under section 3, of the management of such mine.\n\nBy section 7(2), for every months during which the management of a coal mine remains vested in the Central Government, the amount referred to in sub-section (I) shall be computed at the rate of twenty paise per tonne . of coal on the highest monthly production of coal from such mine during any month in the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972. The two provisos to that subsection and the other sub-sections of section 7 provide for other matters relat .. ing to payment of amounts to the owners of coal mines of which the managem&nt was tken over. The Nationalisation Amendment Act carried the scheme of these two Acts to its logical conclusion by terminating the so-called lea8<!' and sub-leases which might have remained outstanding. [1087 G-H, 1088 A-G]\n\nThus, the purpose attained by these Acts is (I) to vest in the Central .\n\nGovernment the right of management of aJ1 coal mines; (2) to nationalise the mines mentionell in the Schedule; (3) to provide for the taking over of management of coal mines the existence of which comes to the knowledge of the Central Government after the appointed day and lastly (4) to terminate aJ1 mining leases. The Management Act and the Nationalisation Act provide for payment of amounts, by no means illusory, to the owners of coal mines whose rights were taken over.\n\nIn the normal course of human affairs, particularly business affairs, it is difficult to conceive that owners of coal mines who had even the vestige of a title thereto would not bring to the notice of the Central Government the existence of their mines, when such mines were not included in the Schedule to the Nationalisation Act. Those who did not care to bring the existence of their mines to the knowledge of the Central Government. even though amounts are pavable undet the Management Act for the extinguishment of the right of management did not evidently possess even the semblance of a titie to the mines. The claims of lessees, holding or allegedly holding under such owners, would be as tenuous as the title of their putative lessors.\n\n[1088 G-H, 1089 A-CJ\n\n12. The Nationalisation Amendment Act by section 3(3)(b) undoubtedly terminates all existing leases a'nd sub-leases except those already granted in favour of persons referred to in clauses (i) to (iii) of section 3(3)(a) Simi~ la riv section 3(3) ra) imposes an embargo on all future coal mining operations except in regard to the persons mentioned. in clauses (i) to (iii). But the\n\n• ..\n\nTARA PRASAD v. UNION 1053\n\ngenefality of leases which are alleged to have rem.ained outstanding despite the coming into force of the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act, were mostly precarious, whose holders could at best present the familiar alibi that the origin of their rights or of those from whom they derived title was lost in antiquity. Neither in law, nor in equity and justice, nor under. the Constitution can these lessees be heard to complain of the termination of their lease-hold rights without the payment of any amount. The provision contained in section 3 (3) (b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act was made ex maiore cautela so as not to leave any lease of a coal mine surviving after theenactment of the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act. There was no reasonable possibility of a lawful lease surviving the passing of those Acts; but if, per chance, anyone claimed that he held a lease, that stood terminated under section 3(3)(b). [1089 CG] .K\n\n13. Section 3(3) (b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act brings about an extinguishment simpliciter of coal mining leases within the meaning of Article 31A(l)(e) of the Constitution. The termination of the mining leases and sub-leases brought about by section 3 (3 )(b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act is not a mere pretence for the acquisition of the mining business of the IeSsees and sub-lessees. The true intent of the Nationalisation Amendment Act was not to \"acquire\" anyone's business. This would be so whether the word 'acquire' is understood in its broad popular sense or in the narrow technical sense which it has come to possess. Whatever rights were intended to be acquired were paid for by the fixation of amount or by the laying down of a formula for ascertaining amounts payable for acquisition. Having provided .for payment of amounts for acquisition of management and oyvnership rights, it is unbelievable that the legislature resorted to the subterfuge of acquiring the mining business of the surviving lessees and sub-lessees by the device of terminating their leases and sub-leases. The legislative history leading to the termination of coal-mining leases points to one conclusion only that, by and large, every lawful interest which was acquired was paid for; the extinguishment of the interest which survived or which is alleged to have survived the passing of the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act was provided for merely in order to ensure that no loophole was left in the implementation of the scheme envisaged by those Acts. Pen; ons dealt with by section 3(3)(b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act are differently situated from those who were dealt with by the two earlier Acts, namely, the Management Act and th~ Nationalisation Act. No violation of Article 14 is, therefore, involved.\n\n[1089 G-1090 DH, 1091 AB]\n\n14. The public purpose which informs the Nationalisation Amendment Act is the same which lies behind its two precursors, the Management Act and the National isatiOn Act. The purpose is to re-organise and re-structure coal n1ines so as to ensure the rational, co-ordinated and scientific development and utilisation of coal re-..sources consistent with the growing requirements of the country.\n\nThe Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Nationalisation Amendment Act points in the same direction. Public purpose runs like a continuous thread through the well-knit scheme of the three Acts under consideration.\n\n[1091 B-D]\n\n 15. Making every allowance in favour of the right to property which was available at the relevant time and having regard to the substance of the matter and not merely to the form adopted for terminating the interest of the lessees and the sub-lessees, the Nationalisation Amendment Act invol'ves no acquisition of the interest of the lessees and the sub-lessees. It merely brings abollt in\n\n.'4 the language of Article 31A(l}(e) \"the extinguishment\" of their right, if any, to win coal. Whichever right, title and interest was lawful and identifiable was acquired by the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act.\n\nAnd whichever interest was acquired was paid for.\n\nTenuous and furtive interests which survived the passing of those Acts were merely extinguished b;.r the Nationalisation Amendment Act. [1091 F-H, 1092 Al\n\nB The interest of the lessees and sub-lessees which was brought to termination by section 3(3)(b) oi the Nationalisation Amendment Act does not come to be vested in the State.\n\nThe Act provides that excepting a certain class of leases and sub-leases, all other leases and sub-leases shall stand terminated in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal. There is no provision in the Act by which the interest so terminated is vested in the State; Nor does such vesting flow as a necessary consequence of any of the provisions of the c Act. Sub-section (4) of section 3 of .the Act provides that where a n1ining lease stands terminated under sub-section (3), it shall be la\\vful frir the Central Government ot a Government Company or a corporation O\\\\'ned or controlled by the Central Government. to obtain a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the nlining lease which stands so terminated. The plain intendment of the Act, which. is neither a pretence nor a facade, is that once the outstanding leases and sub-leases are\n\n1 D terminated, the -Central Government and the other authorities will be free to apply for a mining lease.\n\nAny lease-hold interest which the Central Government, for example, may thus obtain does not directly or immediately flow from the termination brought about by section 3 (3 )(b). Another event has to intervene between the termination of existing leases and the. creation of new interests. The Central Government etc. have to take a positive step for obtaining a prospecting licence or a mining lease. WithOut it, the Act would be ineffec- E tive to create of its own force any right or interest in favour of the Central Government, a Government Company or a CorpG\\fation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government. The essential difference between \"acquisition by the State\" on the one hand and •''modificatjon or extinguishment of rights\" on the other, is that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in the second the beneficiary is not the State. The Nationalisation Amendment Act merely extinguishes the rights of the lessees and the sub- (f lessees. It does not provide for the acquisition of those rights, directly or indirectly, by the State. Article 31Ai(2A) will therefore come into play. It follows that the Nationalisation Amendment Act must receive the protection of Article 31A(l)(e) of the Constitntion, that is to say, that the Act cannot be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31.\n\n[1092 F-H, 1093 A-HJ\n\nAjit Singh '\" State of Punjab [1967]1 2 SCR 143; Madn Mohan Pathak v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors. [19781 3 SCR 334 discussed and distinguished.\n\nD1varkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. [19)41 SCR 674, 733-734 applied.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 111, 150-151, 180, B 205-210, 220, 226, 270-271, 346-352, 355, 403, 396-398, 599, 541, 543, 626, 635-639, 661, 687-692 and 758/77, 154, 178, 571-574, 600, 603, 605, 610, 611, 257, 221 and 1130-1134/77.\n\n- \"\n\nr '\n\ni) ,.\n\nTARA PRASAD v. UNION 1055\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nA. K. Sen, S. C. Banerjee, Y. S. Chitale, K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha, Pradeep Hajela, S. K. Verma, A. K. Srivdstava, M. P. !ha, C. K. Ratnaparkhi, B. N. Lala, Surajdeo Singh, D. P. Mukherjee and A. K. Ganguli for the Petitioners in W.Ps. Nos. 111, 150-151, 154, 178, 610-611 661, 180, 270-271, 599, 220, 226, 205-210,. 396-398 and 600 of 1977.\n\nH. M. Seervai, Kamal Nayan Choubey, A. K. Srivastava, B. P.\n\nSingh and Bimal Kumar Sinhaj for the Petioners in WP Nos. 237, 571-574, 603, 605, 355, 346 of 1977.\n\nD. Goburdhan for the Petitioners in WP Nos. 687, 692, 635-639, 352, and Respondent No. 12 in WP Nos. 150-151/77.\n\nA. K. Sen, S. C. Bannerjee, Y. S. Chitale, S. B. Sanyal;. A. K.\n\nBanerjee and A. K. Nag for the Petitioners in WP Nos. 626, 541, 543 and Respondent No. 15 in WP 154/77. -\n\nS. V. Gupte, S. N. Kacker, U. R. Lalit, S. P. Nayar, R. N. Sachthey and Gobind\"M'ukhoty for the Respondents Nos. 1; 9-12 in WP No. 111, RR. 1, 7, 11 in WP Nos. 150-151, RR. 1, 8 to 12 in WP. 154, RR. 1&7 in WP. 178, RR. 1&7 in WPs. 610-611RR.1,5,6&8 in WP. 661, RR. 1 & 7 in WP Nos. 270-271, RRJ & 7 in WP in 599, RR. 1, 8, 9-12 & 15 in WPs. Nos 571-574, RR. 1, 8-13 & 16 in WP No. 603.\n\nRR. 1, 2 & 9 in WP 605, RR. 1, 2, 10, 11, 14 & 15 in WP. 355, RR. 1, 8-12 in WP 346, RR. 1, 3-5, 8, 9 in WP No. 626, RR. 1, 6-10 & 14 in WP. 541, RR. 1-5 & 9 in WP. 543, RR. 1, 8 & 12 and 15 in WP. 758, RR l, 7 in WP. 257, RR. 1&7 in WPs. 220 and 226 RR. 1&8 in\n\nWP~. 205-210, RR. 1&8 in WP. 600, RR. 1, 3, 11-1,5 in WP 403, RR. 1, 9 & 10 in WP No. 180/77.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh, Shambhu Nath !ha and U. S.\n\nPrasad for the Respondents Nos. 2-8 in WP Nos. 111, 2-7 in 154, 2-6 in 610-611, 2-4, 7 & 8 in 661, 2-8 in 180, 2~6, ,10-12 in 270-271, 2-6 and 10-13 in 599, 2-7 in 571-574, 2-7, 14-15, 17-20 & 23 in 603,\n\n2-7 in 605, 3.,_8, 12, 13, 16-18.; in 335, 2-6 in 687-692, 2-6 in 635-637, 2-6 in 352, 2, 6, 7 & 10 in 62Q, 2-5, 11-13 in 541, 6-8 in 543, 2-6 ln 758/77, 2-7, 13, 14 & 16 in 257, 2-6 in 220 and 226, 2-6, 13, 14 in 205-210, 2-7 in 600, 2-6 in 638-639, 2, 4 to 10 in 403/77.\n\n:~<r Mr. P. ~- Khera for Intervener No. 1 in WP. 111/77.\n\nS. K. Verma for the Intervener No. 2 in WP. 111/77,\n\nA. P. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondents 2 & 6 in II WPs. 150-151 & 2 to 6 in 396-398/77.\n\nM. p. Iha for the Petitioner in WP. No. 758/77.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.-This is a group of 61 Writ Petitions under article 3 2 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)\" Amendment Act 67 of 1976, on the ground that it is violative of the provisions of articles 14, 19(1){f), 19(1)\n\n(g) and 31 of the Constitution. For understanding the basis of that challenge, it will be enough to refer to the broad facts of two representative groups of petitions. The facts of writ petitions 270 and 271 of 1977 are, by and large, typical of cases in which the petitioners claim to be lessees of coal mines, while the facts of writ petition 257 of 1977 are typical of cases in which the petitioners claim to be lessees of composite mines containing al!ernate seems of coal and fireclay.\n\nMost of the facts are undisputed. and only a few of them are in controversy.\n\nIn writ petitions 270 and 271 of 1977, petitioner No. 1 claims tci be the sole proprietor of 'S.D. Coal Company' which is ngaged in coal business and coal mining operations. Petitioner No. 2 is said to be the agent of the company. Both the surface and underground rights in Monza Bundu in the District of Hazaribagh, Bihar, previously belonged to the Raja of Ramgarh from whom or whose successors-ininterest, the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. appears to have obtained a lease of 242 Bighas of coal bearing lands in Monza Bundu, called the 'Bundu Colliery'. After the enactment of the Bihar Land Reforms.\n\nAct 30 of 1950, all rights of tenure-holders landlords and Zamindars, including the rights in mines and minerals, vested in the State of Bihar but, by virtue of section lO of that Act, subsisting leases of mines and minerals in any estate or tenure became leases under the State Government. It is alleged that on 12th June, 1975 the South\n\nKaranpura Coal Co. Ltd. entered into an agreement with the S. D.\n\nCoal Company or prospecting, developing, raising and selling coal from the Bundu Colliery and .that on the strength of that agreement, petitioner No. 1 was put in possession of the entire area of 242 Bighas of coal bering land. The S. D. Coal Company is stated to have made large investments in the colliery and to have started paying rents and royalty to the S!'i\\te of Bihar. The petitioners have cited various facts and figures in support of their contention that they have been in working possession of the cpal mine area in question and that they were entitled to remove nearly 30,000 tonnes of coal raised by them at a heavy cost. It appears that in a proceeding under section 144 of the' Criminal Procedure Code, the Sub-divisional Magistrate (Sadar), Hazaribagb, had made the rule absolute against the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. as well as the S. D. Coal Company, on the ground that\n\n1 /- .. \\\n\nthe State Government had taken over the Bundu Colliery. But, in C.R. Case No. l83l8(W) of 1975, the High Court of Calcutta is stated to have set aside the order of the State Government cancelling the lease of petitioner 1 in respect of the Bundu Colliery.\n\nSince that 'lease stands terminated under the Coal, Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act 1976, the petitioners have filed writ petitions to challenge the validity of that Act. ' On the factual aspect, the contention of the State of Bihar is that the lease of the Bundu Colliery which was held by M/ s South Karan- , pura <;:oal Co. Ltd. was terminated by the Bihar Government on November 24, 1975 on account of , the violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules; 1960 and that, actual possession of the colliery was taken by the State Government on November 26, 1975 prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1976.\n\nIn writ petition No. 257 of 1977, the petitioner Nirode Baran Banerjee made an application dated September 17, 1966 for the grant of a mining lease in respect of fireclay covering an area of 1640.60 acres of the Hesalong Colliery.\n\nOn September 19, 1966 he made a similar application in respect of the same area, for a coal mining lease.\n\nThese applications were deemed to have been rejected since the State Government did not pass any order thereon within the prescribed period. In a Revision application preferred by the petitioner, the Central Government directed the State Government to consider the petitioner\"s application for the grant of a mining lease in respect of fireclay.\n\nThe dispute relating to the petitioner's application for a coal mining lease was brought to the Supreme Court, as a result of which the Central Government on April 1, 1972 directed the State Government to grant a coal mining lease to the petitioner. On October 17, 1973 a formal lease was executed by the State of Bihar in favour of the petitioner in respect of both coal and fireclay.\n\nThe lease was registered on October 18.\n\nAccording to the petitioner, the Hesalong Colliery in respect of which he holds the mining lease for coal and fireclay is situated in an interior area of the hilly portion of the District of Hazaribagh which has its own peculiar nature, trait and character. The reserves of coal in the area are said to be in isolated small pockets and are net sufficient for cientific or economical development in a co-ordinated and integrated manner.\n\nThe coal is ungraded and is not required to be transported by rail.\n\nOn the composite nature of the mine, the petitioner has made a B\n\npecific averment in paragraph 6 of his writ petition to the following effect :\n\nThe coal and fireclay deposits in the said area are so mixed up that one cannot work either for extraction of coal or for extraction of fireclay without disturbing each of the said two minerals.\n\nThe deposits are such that at one layer there is coal, the next layer is fireclay, the other layer is coal, the next layer is again fireclay and so on.\n\nIn paragraph 15 of his writ petition the petitioner has stated that in the Hesalong Mines, the deposit of fireclay is spread over the entir~' area of 1640.60 acres in the first layer and just beneath that, there is a deposit of coal in the second layer, so on and so forth. According to the petitioner, it 1s absolutely impossible to carry on mining operations in coal without disturbing the fireclay and any such disturbance and inadvertent extraction of either coal or fireclay by different lessees, if the composite lease is split up, will amount to unauthorise mining.\n\nThe petitioner contends that he employs about 9,000 workers, has invested a huge amount for making the colliery workable and that a large amount of coal, which was lying exposed and unprotected, was ready for despatch.\n\nSince his composite lease too was in jeopardy under the Amendment Act, he filed a writ petition in t]lis Court to challenge the validity of the Act, contending in addition that the Act is not applicable to composite mines having alternate layers of fireclay and coal.\n\nSome of the petitioners had filed writ petitions in the High Courts under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Amendment Act of 1976. Rules were issued in those petitions and interim orders were passed under which the status quo was maintained on certain terms and conditions. After the passing of the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act, the High Courts became incompetent to grant any relief in (hose petitions whereupon, writ petitions were filed in this Court.\n\nThe petitions were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B. K. Sinha,\n\nSbri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. N'ag. The Attorney General argued in support of the validity of the impugned Act and so did the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India.\n\nShri Lal Naraiq.\n\nSinha and Shri A. P. Chatterjee argued respectively on behalf of the State of Bihar and the State of West Bengal.\n\nShri P. S. Khera and Shri S. K. Verma appeared on behalf of the interveners.\n\nU Before examining the contenJions advanced before us by the yarious learned counsel, it will be useful to trace briefly the history of laws bearing on the working of mines and exploitation of minerals,'\n\nthe taking over of management and the nationalisation of mines and A ' :finally the termination of certain leases under the impugned Act.\n\nAccording to \"India 1976\" (Publications Division,_ Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India), coal mining was first started at Raniganj, We§t Bengal, in 1774. Coal is an important mineral as a source of energy and in India it constitutes a prime il!lrce of energy. On the. attainment of independence, the importance d coal to industrial development was realised by the Planners and the problems of the coal industry were identified by the Planning Commission in its report on the First Five Year Plan.\n\nThe Fifth Plan provided for a production target of 13.5 million tonnes of coal by 1978-79, which amounted to an increase of 5.7 million tonnes from the level of production of 7.79 million tonnes at the' end of the Fourth Five Year Plan.\n\nIn 1950, after coal mining was stepped up, the pro- <luction was 32 million tonnes.\n\nIn 1974-75 it reached a record figure of 88.4 million tonnes. The overall reserves of coal, both coking and non-coking were estimated in 1976 at 8,095 crore tonnes.\n\nBut, howsoever high the coal reserves may be, they are not in- , exhaustible, which underlines the need for a planned development of the natural resources. The reckless and unscientific methods of mining whicl) were adopted by most of the colliery owners without regard to considerations of conservation of the mineral and safety and welfare of workers led the Parliament to pass various legislations on the subject in the light of its accumulated. experience. The coking coal mines were nationalised in 1972 and _the non-coking coal mines were nationalised in the following year.\n\nThe production of coal in the country is now almost completely controlled by the public sector with the exception of isolated pockets wherein res.erves are not sufficient for scientific and economical development and the production is consumed locally.\n\nThe only important mines which are not nationalised are the captive coking coal mines of the two private sector Steel Companies coking coal being a vital ingredient in the production of Steel.\n\nThe production of coal in the public sector is organised through three companies : the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.\n\nA holding company, Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as. separate Divisions, besides other subsidiaries.\n\nEntry 23 List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution read with article 246(3) confers legislative Power on the State legislatures in respect of\n\n\\ B\n\n\"Regulation of mines and mineral development\" but that power is \"sub:ject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union\".\n\nEntry 54 List I enables Parliament to acquire legislative power in respect of \"Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest\".\n\nEntry 24 List U relates to \"Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I\". Entry 7, List I, relates to Industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. Entry 52, List I, enables Parliament to acquire legislative power in respect of \"Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest\".\n\nThe Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 65 of 1951,. which came into force on May 8, 1952 contains a declaration in section 2 that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Scliedule.\n\nItem 2( 1) of the First Schedule comprises 'coal, lignite, coke and their derivatives' under the heading 'Fuels'. The Act provides for the establishment of a Central Advisory Council and Development Counci!_s, registration and licensing of industrial undertakings, the assumption ot managem\\lllt or control of industrial undertakings by the Central GoV'- ernment control of supply, distribution and price of certain articles, etc.\n\nThe Mines Act, 35 of 1952, which came into force on July 1,. 1952, was passed by the Parliament in order to amend and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of labour and safety in mines.\n\nThat Act was evidently p1ssed in the exercise f power under Entry 5 s, '.List I, \"Regulation of labour and safety in mines and oil fields\".\n\nThe Mi'nes and Minerals (Regulation and Dlopment) Act; 67 of 1957, which came into force on June 1, 1958 was passed in order to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union.\n\nSection Z of that Act contains a declaratioh that it was expedient \\n the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided in the Act.\n\nThe Act provides, inter alia, for general restrictions on uhdertaking prospecting and mining operations, the procedure for obtaining prospecting licences or mining leases in respect of lands in which. the minerals vest in the Government, the rule making power for regulating the grant of prospecting licence-s and_ mining leases, special powers of\n\nf '\n\nCentral Government to undertake prospecting or mining operations A in certain cases, and for devel<1>ment of minerals.\n\nThere was a lull in legislative activity in regard to the enactment of further regulatory measures for controlling mines and minera!B.\n\nThe Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 12 of 1971, was passed on October 16,\n\n1971. It was replaced by the Coking Coal mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 64 of 1971, which received the President's assent on December 23, 1971 but was given retrospective operation from the date of the Ordinance.\n\nTile Act was passed to provide for the taking over, in the public interest, of the management of coking coal mines and coke oven plants, pending nationalisation of such mines and plants. By section 3 (1), the .management of all coking coal mines vested in the Central Government from the appointed day-October 17, 1971., Section 6(1) provided that every owner of coking coal mine shall be given by the Central Government an amount, in cash, for vesting in it, under section 3, the management of such mine..\n\nSuch amount was tO be calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 6(2).\n\nThe Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 36 of 1972, was passed in order, inter aUa, to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners of the coking mines and coke oven plants. Sections 30 and 31 , of that Act dealing respectively with penalties, and offences by companies came into force at once but the remaimng provisions were deemed to have come into force on May 1, 1972. Section 3(c) defines \"coking coal mine\" to mean-\n\n\"a coal mine in which there exists one or more seams of coking coal, whether exclusively or in addition to any seam\n\nof other coal\".\n\nBy section 4(1) the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coking coal mines specified in the First Schedule shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central Government, free from all incumbrances. By section 4(2), after the appointed day, that is May 1, 1972 if any other coal mine was found to G contain coking coal the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 were to apply to snch mine until it was nationalised by an appropriate legislation.\n\nBy section 6 (1), the Central Government becomes the lessee of the State Goxemment where the rights of the owner under any mining lease granted in relation to a coking coal mine by the State Government or any other person, vest H in the Central Government under section 4. Section 7(1) empowers the Central Government to direct that the right, title and interest of\n\nA the owners in relatiob to coking coal mines or coke oven plants. shall vest in a government company.\n\nSootions 10 and 11 of the Act provide for payment of the amonnts to owners of the coking coaf mines and coke oven plants for the vesting of their right, title and ibte1pt in the Central Government. \" ·\n\nBy an Amendment Act, 56 of 1972, which came into force on September 12, 1972, section 4A was added to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957. That section provides for premature termination of mining leases and the grant of fresh leases to Government companies or Corporations owned or controlled by Government.\n\nThe Coal\n\n1Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 15 of 1973, which received the assent of the President ob March 31, 1973 was given retrospective effect from January 30, 1973 except section\n\nS (2) which came into force at once.\n\nThe Act was passed in order \"to provide for the taking over, in the public interest, of the manage- D ment of coal mines, pending nationalisatio'n of such mines, with a\n\n• view to ensuring rational and co-ordinated development of coal. production and for promoting optimum utilisation of the coal resources consistent with the growibg requirements of the country, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.\" Section 2(b) of the Act defines a \"coal mine\" to mean a mine\n\n\"in which there exists one or more seams of coal.\"\n\nSection 3 ( 1) provides that on and from the appointed day (that is, January 31, 1973) the management of all coal mines shall vest in the Central Government.\n\nBy section 3(2), the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall be deemed to be the coal mines the F management of which shall vest in the Central Government under sub-section (1 ). Under the proviso to sectiob 3(2), if, after the appointed day, the existence of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, it shall by a notified order make a declaration about the existence of such mine, upon which the management of such coal mine also vests ib the Central Government G and the provisions of the Act become applicable thereto. Section 3(5) casts an obligation on every person in charge of the management of a coal mine, immediately before the date on which the Act received the assent of the President, to intimate the Cenkal Government within 30 days from the said date the name and location of the mine as. well as the name and the address of the owner, if the H mine is not included or deemed to be included in the Schedule. All contracts providing for the management of any coal mine made before the appointed day between the owner of the mine and any per-\n\n> 1\n\nsen in charge of the mine and any person in charge of the management A thereof are to be deemed to have been termlnatd on the appointed day, under section 4, Section 6(1) empowers !he Central Government to appoint Custodians for the purpose of taking over of the management of the mines.\n\nSectidn 7(1) provides that every owner of a coal mine shall be given by the Central Government an amount in cash for the vesting in it under section 3, of the management of B such mine. Section 18 (1) (a) excludes from the operation of the Act any coal mine owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or by a Government Company or by a corporation which is owned, managed or controlled by the Government. Clause (b) of\n\nsectio'n 18 (I) also exclude5 from the operation of the Act a coal mine owned by or managed by a company engaged in the production C of iron and steel.\n\nThe Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 26 of 1973, was given retrospective operation with effect from May 1, 1973 except sections 30 and 31 which came into force at once.\n\nThis Act was passed,\n\n\"to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in respect of the coal mines specified in the Schedule with a view to re-organising and reconstructing such coal mines so as to ensure the rational, co-ordinated and scientific development a'nd utilisation of coal resources consistent with the growing requirements of the country, in order that the ownership and control of such resources are vested in the State and thereby so distributed as best to subserve the common good, and or matters connected therewith cir incidental thereto.\"\n\nSection 2 (b) defines a coal mine in the same way as the corresponding provision of the Management Act viz., a mine \"in which there exists one or more seams of coal,'' Section 3 ( 1) provides\n\ntht on the appointed day (that is, May I, 1973) the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all incumbrances.\n\nSection 4(1) provides that where the rights of an owner under any mining lease granted, or deemed to have been granted, in relation to a coal mine, by a State Government or any other person, vest in the Central Government under section 3, the Central Government shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the lessee of the State Government or such other person, as the case may be, in relation to such coal mine as if a mining lease in relation to such coal mine had been grantee,! to the Central Government.\n\nThe period of such lease\n\nA is to be the entire period for which the lease could have been granted by the Central Government or such other person under the Mineral Concession Rules and thereupon all the rights under the mining lease granted to the lessee are to be deeme.d to have been transferred ~, and vested in, the Central Government. By section 4 (2), on the expiry of the term of any lease referred to in sub-section (I), the lease, at .B the option of the Central Government, is liable to be renewed on the same terms a'nd conditions on which, it was held by the lessor for the maximum period for which it could be renewed under the Mineral Concession Rules.\n\nSection 5 ( 1) empowers the Central Government under certain conditions to direct by an order in writi:ng that the right, title and interest of an owner in relation to a coal mine shall, c instead of continuing to vest in the Central Government, vest in the Government company.\n\nSuch company, under section 5 (2), is to be deemed to have become the Jessee of the coal mine as if the mining lease had been granted to it. By section 6 ( 1), the property which vests in the Central Government or in a Government company is freed D and discharged from all obligations and incumbrances !lffecting it.\n\nThe mortgagees and other holders of incumbrances are required by section 6(2) to give intimation thereof to the Commissioner within the prescribed time.\n\nSection 7 ( 1) provides that the Central Governme'nt or the Government company shall not be liab:~ to discharge any liability of .the owner, agent, manager or managing contractor of a coal mine in respect of any period prior to the appointed day. Sec- E tion 8 requires that the owner of every coal mine or group of coal mines specified in the second column of the Schedule all be given by the Central Government in cash and in the manner specified in Chapter VI, for the vesting in it under section 3 of the right, title and interest of the owner, an amount equal to the amount specified 'F against it in the corresponding entry in the fifth column of the Schedule.\n\nBy secti0n 11 ( 1), the general superintendance, direction, control and management of the affairs and business of a coal mine, the right, title and interest of an owner in relation to which have vested in the Central Government under section 3, shall vest in the Government compa'ny or in the Custodian as the case may be. For the G purpose of disbursing the amount payable to the owner, the Central\n\n1 Government is reqnired by section 17 (1 ) to appoint a Commissioner of Payments. By section 18 (1 ) , the Central Goverrnnent shall within thirty days from the specified date, pay, in cash, to the Commissioner for payment to the owner of a coal mine, an amount equal to the amount specified against the coal mine in the Schedule and also n such sums as may be due to the owner under section 9. Section 26(1) provides that if out of the monies paid to the Commissioner, any balance is left after meeting the liabilities of all the secured and unf\n\n• ,..\n\nsecured creditors of the coal mine, he shall disburse the same to the A owner.\n\nThe Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Ordinance which was promnlgated on April 29, 1976 was replaced on May 27, 1976 by the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 67 of 1976.\n\nThe Amendment Act consists of five sections by which certafu amend- B ments were introduced into the Principal Act, namely, the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 26 of 1973. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Nationalisation Amendment Act reads thus :\n\n\"After the nationalisation of coal miries, a number of persons holding coal mining leases unauthorisedly started mining of coal in the most reckless and unscientific manner without regard to considerations of conservation, safety and welfare of workers. Not only were they resorting to slaughter mining by superficial working of outcrops and thereby destroying a valuable national asset and creating problems of water-logging fires, etc. for the future development of the deeper deposits, their unsafe working also caused serious and fatal acc.idents.\n\nThey were making larger profits by paying very low wages, and by not providing any safety and Welfare measures. Thefts of coal from adjacent nationalised mines were also reported after the commencement of these un; mthorised operations which had shown an increasing trend of late. Areas where illegal and unauthorised operations were carried on, were without any assessment of reserves in regard to quality and quantity of coal which could be made available after detailed exploration work was undertaken and results analysed.\n\nNo scientific exploitation of these deposits could be undertaken in the nationalised sector without these details.\n\nIt was, therefore, considered tljat it would not be appropriate either to nationalise these unauthorisedly worked mines after taking them over under the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973 or to get the concerned mining leases prematurely terminated and regranted to Government Companies under the Mining and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.\n\nIn view of the policy followed by the Central Government that the Coal Industry is to be in the nationalised sector, it was decided that the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973 should be enacted to provide for termination of all privately held coal leases except those held by privately owned steel companies, so that it may be possible for the Central Government, Government company or Corporation to take\n\n9-610SCI/80\n\nA mining leases where necessary, after the necessary exploration has been made as to the extent of the deposits of coal, etc\".\n\nSections 2 and 3 of tl)e Nationalisation Amendment Act were brought into operation with effect from April 29, 1976. By section 2 of !he Amendment Act a new section, section IA, was introduced under Sub-section (I) of which it was declared that it was expedient in the public interest that the. Union should take under its control the regulation and development of coal mines to the extent provided in subsections 3 and 4 of section 3 of the Nationalisation Act and subsection 2 of section 30. By sub-section 2 of section IA, the declaration contained in sob-section (I) was to be in addition to and not in derogation of the declaration contained in section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.\n\nBy section .3 of the Amendment Act a new sub-section, namely, sub-section 3, .was introduced in section 3 of the principal Act. Under clause (a) of the newly introduced sub-section 3 of section 3, on and from the commencement of section 3 of the Amendment Act no person other than\n\n(i) the Central Government or a Gove=ent company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or\n\n(ii) a, person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the proviso to clause ( c) has been granted by any such Government, company or corporation, or (iii) a company eng; iged in the production of iron and steel, shall carry on coal mining operation, in India, in any form.\n\nUnder clanse (b) of sob-section 3, excepting the mining leases granted before the Amendment Act in favour of the Government, company or corporation referred to in clause (a), and any sub-lease granted by any such Government, company or corporation, all other mmmg leases and sub-leases in force immdiately before such commencement shall in so far as they refate to the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated. Clause (c) of the newly introduced sub-section 3 of section 3 prodes that no fease for winning or mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government, company or corporation referred to in clause (a). Under the proviso to cla, use ( c), the Government, the company or the corporation to whom a lease for winning or mining coal has been granted may grant a sublease to any person in any area if, (i) the reserves of coal in the area are in isolated small pockets or are not sufficient for scientifu: and economical. development in a coordinated and integrated manner, and (ii) the coal produced by the sub-lessee will not be required to be H transported by rail. By sub-section 4 of section 3, where a mining lease stands terminated under sub-section 3, it shall be lawful for the Central Government or a Government company or corporation owned\n\nor controlled by the Central Government to obtain a prospecting licence or mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands terminated. Section 4 of the Amendment Act introduces an additional provision in Section 30\n\nof the Principal Act by providing that any person who engages, or causes any other person to be engaged, in winning or mining coal from the whole or part of any land in respect of which no valid prospecting licence or mining lease or sub-lease' is in force, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two 'years and also with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.\n\nSection 5 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act repeals the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Orditlance, 1976.\n\nAs stated at the beginning of this Judgment, we are concerned in these writ petitions to determine the validity of the Coal Mines Nationalisation (Amendment) Act, 67 of 1976, to which we will refer as 'The Nationalisation Amendment Act'.\n\nShri Seervai, who appears on behalf of the petitioners in writ petition No. 257 of 1977, challenges the legislative competence of the Parliament to enact the Nationalisation Amendment Act. Article 246\n\n(1) confers upon the Parliament, notwithstanding anything contained in clauses 2 and 3 of that Article, the exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule, called the 'Union List'. Clause 2 of Article 246 deals with the power of the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, while clause 3 deals with the power of the State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List.\n\nThe relevant entries in List I are Entries 52 and 54 which read th.us :\n\nEntry 52 :-Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.\n\nEntry 54 :-Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to. which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the pnblic interest.\n\nEntry 24 of the State List reads thus :\n\nEntry 24 :-Industries subject ot the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I.\n\nA We are not concerned here with Entry 7 of List I which relates to 'Industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the rrosecution of war'.\n\nShri Seervai's argument runs thus :\n\n(a) Laws made in the exercise of power conferred by Entry 54 must stand the test of public interest because the very reason for the Parliament acquiring power under that entry is that it is in public interest that the regulation of mines and minerals should be under the control of the Union. In other words, Entry 54 confers a legislative power which is purposive, that is to say, an:yi law made in the. exercise of the power under Entry 54 must be designed to secur.e the regulation and development of coal mines in public interest or else it must fail. The Nationalisation Amendment Act is not such a law which Parliament can pass under Entry 54 because, that Act not only terminates all leases but it destroys the contracts of service of thousands of workmen, and indeed it destroys all other contracts and all securities for moneys lent without even so much as making a provision for priorities for the payment of debts. Since the Nationalisation Amendment Act terminates all leases, it is a complete negation of the integrated scheme of taking over the management of mines, acquisition of the rights of lease-holders and the running of the mines.\n\n(b) The word 'Regulation' in Entr:yi 54 does not include 'Prohibition'. 'Regulation' should not also be confused with the expression 'Restrictions' occurring in Article 19(2) to ( 6) of the Constitution. In the very nature of things, there cannot be a power to prohibit 'the regulation and development of mines and minerals'. Section 3( 4) inserted by the Nationalisation Amendment Act imposes no obligation on the Central Government or ai; zy other authority to obtain a mining lease and work the mines, the leases in respect of which stands terminated under the Act. The words \"it shall be fawful\" for the Central Government to obtain a lease are words of discretionary power which create no obligation. They only enable the Central Government to obtain a lease, making something legal\n\nand possible for _which there would otherwise be no\n\nright or authority to do. Section 3 ( 4) does not confer a power coupled with a duty; it merely confers a faculty or power. No Court can by a Writ of Mandamus or otherwise compel the Central Government to obtain a lease of a coal miue and to run it under any of the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act.\n\n( c) Where the Legislative power is distributed among different legislative bodies, the Lel!islature may transgress its legislative power either directly or manifestly, or covertly or indirectly. In the instant case, the exercise of power by the Parliament is colourable because although in passing tile Nationalisation Amendment Act it purported to act within the limits of its legislative power, in substance and in reality it transgressed that power, the transgression being veiled by what appears on proper examination to be a mere pretence or disse.\n\n( d) In order to tear off the veil or disse and in order to get at the substance of the law behind the form, the Court must examine the effect of the legislation and take into consideration its object, purpose and design, Where the legislative entry is purposive, like Entry 54 of the Union List, it is the object or purpose of the legislation which requires consideration. The purpose for which the Parliament is permitted to acquire legislative power of Regulation and Development of mines must dictate the nature of law made in the exercise of that power because public interest demands' that power. Under the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act, not only is there no obligation on the Central Government to run a mine, but there is no ob'ligation imposed upon it even to carry out prospecting or investigation in order to decide whether a particular mine should be worked at all.\n\nSection 3 ( 4) merely authorises the Central Government to apply for \"a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands determined\". A close examination of the Act thus discloses that far from providing for regulation and development of coal mines, it totally prohibits all mining activity even if the State Government wants to run a mine. It does\n\n. 1070 Sill'JUIME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nnot impose prohibition as a step towards running the mines since there is neither any obligation to carry out the prospecting or invetigation nor to run the mines.\n\n(e) The . Nationalisation Amendment Act runs directly counter to the whole policy of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1973, to acquire and run the mines. The Parent Act becomes a dead letter in regard to several of its provisions as a result of the amendment Act. It only adopts a colourable device to amend the Nationalisation Act while completely , negativing it in fact. The Act therefore lacks legislative competence and is, in the sense indicated, a colourable piece of legislation.\n\n(f) Article 3l(A)(l)(e) only lifts a restriction on the legislative competence in so far as violation of fundamental rights js concerned. The most benign motive cannot make a law valid if the legislative competence is lacking.\n\nIn support of his submission that the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act are not conceive.ct in public interest and therefore they transgress the limitations of Entry 54, List I, learned counsel relies on the circumstance that whereas the Coal Mines Management Act and the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act of 1973 contain elaborate preambles, the Amendment Act contains no preamble setting out the mischief to be remedied or the benefit to be secured, for which the parent Act had failed to provide.\n\nAt first blush, it is said, it would appear that the preamble to the parent Act . can be read into the Nationalisation Amendment. Act but that is impermissible since that preamble provides for acquisition and running: of the mines and can have no application to an Act which provides for termination sirnpliciter of all mining leases. The preambles to the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act are said to be signific'lnt in that they show that those Acts were enacted in public interest with a view to rational and co-ordinated development of coal production and for promoting the optimum utilisation of coal production consistently with the growing requirements of the country. Learned counsel has also compared and contrasted the provisions of these two Acts with the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act for making good his point that the Iittter serves no public interest since it merely terminates all existing leases. The contrast, it is argued, is also provided by section 4A of the Mines and Mineral Regulation and Development Act 1957 which, while providing for premature termination of mining leases, requires that\n\nI '\n\n• •\n\nsuch termination has to be followed by the granting of a fresh mining; lease so that the mines will continue to work. Reliance is placed byr counsel on the decision of this Court in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo &\n\nOrs. v. The State of Orissa( 1) to show how although the legislature in passing an Act purports to act within the limits of its legislative pow'er,\n\nin substance and in reality it can transgress that power, the transgression being veiled. by what appears on proper examination to be a mere pretence or disguise. Attention is then drawn to the decision in Attorney General of Alberta v. Attorney General of Canada(') as showing that\n\n- in order to tear off the veil or disguise or in order to get at the substance of the law behind the form, the court can examine the effect of the legislation and take into consideration its object, purpose or design.\n\nIn support of the submission that the word regulation in Entry 54 does not include prohibition, reliance is placed on the decision of the Federal Court in Bho]a Prasad v. The King Emperor(') wherein after setting out two decisions of the Privy Council in Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgo<') and Attorney-General for Ontario\n\nv. Attorney-General for Canada(') in which it was held that 'regulatiQn' did not include 'prohib; tion', Gwyer, C.J. observed that he saw no reason to differ from the view expressed in those cases.\n\nThe central theme of these diverse points is only one : that the Jaws made in the exercise of power conferred by Entry 54, List I, must stand the test of public interest since the very reason for the Parliament acquiring power under that Entry is that it is in the public interest that the regulation of mines and mineral development should be under the control of the Union.\n\nThe contention is that sine~ the Nationalisation Amendment Act does not impose upon the Government the duty to run the mines which are taken over or even to carry out prospecting and investigation but simply provides for the termination of mining leases, the Act is not in public interest. What is in public interest is the regulation and development of coal mines, not total prohibition of their working.\n\nOn a careful consideration of this argument which was made plausible in its presentation, we see no substance in it.\n\nThe. learned Attorney General and the learned Solicitor General have drawn our attention to various facts and circumstances and to the provisions of various Acts including th~ Nationalisation Amendment Act which make it impossible to hold that the provisions of that Act are a mere\n\n(I) [1954] 1 SCR I, 11.\n\n(2) [1939] A. C. 117 130.\n\n(3) [1942] FCR, 17, 26-27.\n\n(4) [1896] A. C. 88.\n\n(5) [1896] A. C. 348, 363.\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA facade for terminating mining leases without any oj)ligation in the matter of regulation of mines and mineral development.\n\nGranting that Entry 54, List I is purposive since it qna!ifies the power. to pass a law re]a!ing to \"Regulation of Mines and Mineral Development\" by the addition of a restrictive clause, \"to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by Yaw to be expedient in the public interest\", the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act show that they are designed to serve progressively the purpose of E!!try 54.\n\nThe Nationalisation Amendment Act, as its very title shows, is an amending Act. It amended the Coal Mines (Nationalisa.tion) Act, 26 of 1973. One must primarily have regard to the object and purpose of that Act in order to find out whether the Nat10nalisation Amendment Act destroys the structure of that Act and is a mere pretence for acquiring new rights without providing for payment of any amount for such acquisition.\n\nThe Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act was passed in order to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in respect of the Coal mines specified in the Schedule to that Act.\n\nThis was done with a view to reorganising and reconstructing such coal mine. so as to ensure the rational, co-ordinated and scientific development and utilisation or' coal resources consistent with the growing requirements of the country.\n\nThe high purpose of that Act was to ensure that the ownership and control of such resonrces are vested in the State and thereby so distribnted as best to subserve the common good. In order to achieve that purpose, the Nationalisation Act provides by secrion 3 (1) that :\n\nOn the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the f, owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall Stand tran_§ferred to, and shall vest absolutely \\ in, the Central Government free from all incumbrances.\n\nThe appointed day is May 1, 1973. For the removal of doubts it was declared \\JY section 3 ( 2) that :\n\nIf, after the appointed day, the existence of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, shall until that mine is nationalised by an appropriate legislation, apply to such mine.\n\nBy section 4, the Central Government became the lessee of the scheditled coal mines while, section 5 empowers it to transfer its leasehold rights to a Government company. Chapter II of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation Act deals with acquisition of the rights of owners of coal mines, Chapter III with payment of amounts to owners of coal mines, Chapter IV with management of coal mines, Chapter V Jays down provisions relating to employees of coal mines, Chapter VI eontains provisions governing the payments of amounts to be made by the Commissioner of Payments aud the last Chapter, Chapter VII,\n\ncontain~ miscellaneous provisions. ,\n\nWe have already set out the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act in extenso, a little before enumerating the various points made out by Shri Seervai during the course of his argument.\n\nIt will now he enough to say by way of a summing-up of the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act that:\n\n(1) by section 3(3) (a) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 which was introduced by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, no person other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) can carry on coal mining operations after April 29, 1976, being the date on which section 3 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act came into force; (2) by section (3)(3)(b) all mining leases and sub-leases stood terminated except those granted before April 29, 1976 in favour of the Central Government, a Government company or corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government; (3) section (3)(c) pro1'ibits the granting of a lease for winning or mining coal in favour of any person other than the Government, a Goverrµnent company or a corporation of the above description provided that a sub-lease could be granted by these authorities to any person if the two conditions mentioned in the proviso are satisfied; and ( 4) when a mining lease stands terminated under section 3 (3), \"it shall be lawful\" for the Central Government or the Government company or the corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government to obtain a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the plining lease which stands terminated. Section 4 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act introduced an additional penal provision in the parent Act.\n\nWe are nnable to appreciate the argument so meticulously woven\n\nt -' that these provisions are a direct negation of the principls of the parent Act and that they destroy the integral scheme of taking over the management of mines, of acquiring the rights of lease-holders and continuing to run the , mines.\n\nOn the contrary, the Nationalisation a Amendment Act is manifestly in furtherance of the object of nationalisation mentioned in the preamble to the parent Act and effec-\n\n1G74\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R. ' tuates the purpose_ mentioned in sections 3(1) and 3 (2) of that Act ·\n\nby the addition of a new sub-section, sub-section ( 3), which terminates all coal mining leases and sub-leases except those referred in sub-section (3(b). The. circumstance that the marginal note to section 3 and the title of Chapter II of the Nationalisation Act are not amended by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, despite the addition of a new subsection, is of little or no consequence.\n\nThat sub-section is a logical extension of the scheme envisaged by the original sub-sections ( 1) and\n\n(2) of section 3. Besides, marginal notes to the sections of a statute and the titles of its chapters cannot take away the effect of the provisions contained in the Act so as to render those provisions legislatively incompetent, if they are otherwise within tqe competence of the legislature to enact. One must principally have regard to the object of an Act in order to find out whether the exercise of the leliislative power is purposive, unless, of course, the provisions of the Act show that the avowed or intended object is a mere pretence _for covering a veiled transgression committed by the legislature upon its own powers.\n\nWhether a particular object can be successfully achieved by. an Act, is lai; gely a matter of legislative policy.\n\nThe Nationalisation Amendment Act needs no preamble, especially when it is backed up by a statement of objects and reasons.\n\nGenerally, an amendment Act is passed in order to adva!lce the purpose of the parent Act as reflected in the preamble to that Act.\n\nAcquisition of coal mines, be it remembered, is not an end in itself but is only a means to an end.\n\nThe fundamental object of the Nationalisation Act as also of the Nationalisation Amendment Act is to bring into existence a state of affairs which will be congenial for regulating mines and for mineral development.\n\nIn regard to the scheduled mines, that purpose was achieved by the mean~ of acquisition.\n\nIn regard to mines which were .not included in the Schedule, the same purpose was achieved by termination of leases and sub-leases and by taking over the right to work the mines.\n\nTermination of leases, vesting of lease-hold properties in the State Governments and the grant of leases to the Central Government or Government Companies are together the means conceived in order to achieve the object of nationalisation of one of the vital material resour~ of the community. An infirmity in Shri Seervai's argument is its inarticulate premise that mere acquisition of coal mines is the end of the Nationalisation Act.\n\nIt is also important to bear in mind while we are on the purposiveness of the Nationalisation Amendment Act that nothing contained II in the later analogous Acts can be construed as in derogation of the principle enunciated in section 18 of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and (Development) Act, 67 of 1957, which provides !hat it\n\n\"' •\n\nshall be the duty of the Central Government to take all §_uch steps as may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India. Therefore, even in regard to matters falling under the Nationalisation Amendment Act which terminates existing leases and makes it lawful for the Central Government to obtain fresh leases, the obligation of section 18 of the Act of 1957 will continue to apply in its full rigour.\n\nAs contended by the learned Solicitor General, section 18 contains a statutory behest and projects a pnrposive legislative ' . policy.\n\nThe later Acts on the subject of regulation of mines. and mineral development are linked up with the policy enunciated in Section 18.\n\nMuch was made by Mr. Seervai of the circumstance that the Nationalisation Amendment Act, While providing by section 3 ( 4) that \"it shall be lawful\" for the Central Government, etc., to obtain a prospecting licence oc a mining lease, did not impose an obligation on any one to work the mine of which the mining lease stood statutorily ter; rtinated. No mandamus, it was urged, could therefore issue to compel, for example the Central Government to work any particular mine.\n\nThis argument overlooks that Entry 54 refers to two things :\n\n(1) regulation of mines and (2) mineral development. It is true that the Entry is purposive, since the exercise of the power under Entry 54 has to be gQided and governed by public interest. But neither the power to regulate mines nor the power to ensure mineral development postulates that no sooner is a mining lease terminated by the force of the statute, than the Central Government must begin to work the mine of which the lease is terminated. It is possible that after the Nationalisation Amendment ct came into force, there was a hiatus between the termination of existing leases and the granting of fresh ones. But, the N ationalis.ation Amendment Act does not provide that any kind or type of mine. shall noi be developed or worked.\n\nConservation, prospecting and investigation, developmental steps and finally scientific exploitation of the mines and minerals is the process envisaged by the Nationalisation Amendment Act.\n\nIt is undeniable that conservation of minerals, which is brought about by the tennination of existing leases and sub-leases, is vital foc the development of mines.\n\nA phased and graded programme of <:onservation is in the ultimate analysis one of the most satisfactory and effective means for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals. ..\n\nLearned counsel contended that the Nationalisation Amendment Act is destrnctive of the provisions of the parent Act. This contention\n\nis wholly unjustified. The destruction which the Nationalisation Amendment Act brings about is of the lease or the sub-lease and not of its subject matter, namely, the mine itself.\n\nIn terminating the lease of a house one does not destroy the house itself. It may be arguable that prohibiting the use of the house for apy purpose whatsoever may, for practical purposes, amount to the destruction of the house itself. But we cannot accept the contention that the Nationalisation Amendment Act contains provisions directed 11t prohibiting the working of mines, the leases in respect of which are terminated.\n\nA simple provision for granting sub-leases shows that the object of the Nationalisation Amendment Act is to ensure that no mine will lie idle or unexplored.\n\nInterregnums can usefully be utilised for pros peeling and investigation.\n\nThey do not lead to destruction of mines.\n\nIn fact, it is just as well that the Amendment. Act does not require the new Jessee to undertake an adventure, reckless and thoughtless, which goes by the name of 'scratching of mines', which ultimately results in the slaughtering of mines.\n\nNatural resources, howsoever large,. are not inexhaustible, which makes it imperative to conserve them.\n\nWithout a wise and planned conservation of such resources, there can neither be a systematic regulation of mines nor a scientific development of minerals.\n\nThe importance of conservation of natural resources in any scheme of regulation and development of such resources can be seen from the fact that the Parliament had to pass in August 197 4 an Act caJ1ed the Coal Mines (Conservation and Development) Act, 28 of 1974, in order, principally, to provide for the conservation of coal and development of coal mines.\n\nSection 4( 1) of that Act enables the Central Govermnent, for the purposes of conservation of , coal and for the development of coal mines, to exercise such powers and take or cause to be taken such measures as it may be necessary or proper or as may be prescribed.\n\nBy section 5 (1), a duty is cast on the owners of coal mines to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure the conservation of coal and development of the coal mines owlied by them.\n\nWhile moving the Nationalisation Amendment Act in. the Lok Sabha on May 17, 1976, the Minister of Energy said that : for proper scientific working of coal mines, you have to have the geological data; you have to have mine plans; you have to know the size of the coal reserves, the 'Lu.antity of coal that can be mined; the quality of coal etc.\n\nFor this, the detailed exploration has to be undertaken. It is oniy after all this is done that the experts can decide. whether it will be economically viable and technically feasible-technical feasibility comes first and then economic viability-to\n\n... •\n\nTARA PRASAD v. UNION (Chandrachud(C.J.)\n\nmine the coal in that particmar area. No scienitfic exploration of coal is possible from these areas until all the facts are known, until investigation is done. The nationalised sector cannot step in unless all this information is gathered. (Lok Sabha Debates, 5th series, volume 61, May 17, 1976, columns 91-92.)\n\nMeasnres taken for judicious preservation and distribution of natnral resources may involve restrictions on their use and even prohibition, upto a degree, of the unplanned working of the repositories of such resonrces.\n\nWe may in this connection refer usefully to a passage .it page 383 of the First Five Year Plan:\n\n\"Though a mining industry has been in existence in this country for about half a century, only a comparatively small number of mines are being worked in an efficient manner under proper technical guidance.\n\nMany units are too small in size or too poorly financed for suclJ working.\n\nLack of a conservation policy is also responsible for the present condition of the industry.\n\nThere is large wastage, especially in minerals of marginal grades, as these are either abandoned in the mines or thrown away on the mine dumps.\n\nWays and means must be devised for the mining and recovery of these low grade materials. Ores which it is not possible to work economically under normal conditions should be left in the mines so that they may be extracted at a later date without serious loss.\n\nThe mine dumps all over the country have to be carefully examined and sampled so that their valuable mineral content may be recovered by methods of beneficiation now available. It should be a rule that selective mining of high grade minerals alone should not be undertaken and that all grades should be worked and wherever possible, blended to produce marketable grades.\"\n\nIt w.as observed in Attorney-General for Ontario (supra) that a power to regulate assumes, naturally if not necessarily, th.e conservation of the thing which is to be made the subject of regulation. This G position does not militate against what was observed by Lord Davey in Virgo (supra) that \"there is marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or goverance of it, and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed\". In the former case, the Canada Temperance Act, 1886 H was held ultra vires the Dominion as it pnrported to repeal the prohibitory clauses of a provincial Act, but its own provisions were held\n\nvalid when duly brought into operation in any provincial area as relating to the peace, order, and good Government of Canada.\n\nIn Virgo the question turned on the scope of power to frame by-laws and the decision of the Privy Council was that a statutory power conferred upon a municipal corporation to make by-laws for 'regulating and governing' a trade, \"does not authorise the making it unlawful to carry on a lawful trade in a lawful manner.,. It may be borne in mind that different considerations apply in the construction of power to frame by-laws but even then, the Privy Council qualified the above statement of law by adding the clause, \"in the absence of an express power of prohibition\".\n\nIn support of his submission that under the Nationalisation Amendment Act there is no obligation on any person or authority to run a mine, Shri Seervai relies on a passage in Craies on Statute Law, 6th edition, page '.!84, to the following effect :\n\nStatutes passed for th_e purpose of enabling something to be done are usually expressed in permissible language, that is to say, it is enacted that 'it shall be lawful', etc. or that 'such and snch a thing may be done'.\n\nPrima facie, tl:tese words import a discretion, and they must be construed as discretionary unless there be anything in the subject-matter to which they are applied, or in any other . part of the statute, to show that they are meant to be imperative\".\n\nBut the very passage, after enunciating this principle, refers to a decision in Julius v, Bishop of Oxford(!) in which Lord Cairns said that though the words 'it shall be lawful' are words making tl:iat legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do and that though those words confer a faculty or power, _still\n\n\"there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, so, mething in the object for which it is to be done, something _in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, whic_h may couple the power with a duty, and make it the auty of the person in whom the power is reposed to execise that power when called upon to do so\".\n\nIt seems to us clear, and we have discussed that aspect at length, that section 3 ( 4) uses an enabling or permissive expression in order that regulation of mines and mineral development may be ensured after a scientific prospecting, investigation and planning. It is doubt-\n\n(!) (1880] 5 Appeal Ca.!es 214, 222.\n\n... •\n\n. •\n\nJess that, in the language of Lord Cairns in Julius,(!) there is some- A thing' in the nature of the thing which the Nationalisation Amendment Act empowers to be done, something in tJie object for which it is to be done and something in the conditions under which it is to be done which couples the power conferred by the Act with a duty, the duty being not to act in haste but with reasonable promptitude depending upon the nature of the problem under investigation An B obligation to act does not cease to be so merely because there is no obligation to act in an ad-hoc or impromptu manner. It is in the context of a conglomeration of these diversr considerations that one must appreciate why, in section 3 ( 4) which was introduced by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, Parliament used the permissive expression \"it shall be lawful\".\n\nC Thus, a broad and liberal approach to the field of legislation .demarcated by Entry 54, List I, an objective and . pi; actical under-\n\nstanding of the provisions contained in the Nationalisation Amendment Act and a realistic perception of constitutional principles will point to the conclusion that the Parliament had the legislative com- D petence to enact the Nationalisat.ion Amendment Act.\n\nThe argument which we, have just disposed of is common to all the matters before us.\n\nThe contention to which we will now turn is 1imited in its application to composite mines which contain layers of coal and some other mineral, usually fireday.\n\nThis branch of Shri Seervai' s argument relates to .!he construction of the Coal Mines E (Nationalisation) Act,. 26 of 1973, and the Nationalisation Amendment Act.\n\nThe argument is that leases of composite mines in which there are altermrite seams of coal and fireclay do not fall within the scope of these Acts.\n\nThe pleadings in this behalf are full and complete in Writ Petition F No. 257 of 1977 argued by Shri Seervai and they are tolerably adequate in a few other petitions..\n\nIt is expressly averred and not effectively .traversed in Writ Petition 257 of 1977 that :\n\nthe coal and fireclay depoits in the said area are so mixed up that one cannot work either for extraction of coal or for extraction of fireclay without disturbing each of the said G lwo minerals. The deposits are such that at one layer there is coal, the next layer is fireclay, the other layer is coal, the next layer is again fireclay and so on. Nirode Baran Banerjee, who is the petitioner in that Writ Petition . ' holds a composite lease dated October 17, 1973 for mining coal as H well as fireclay.\n\n; {I) [1880] 5 Appeal Cases 214, 222\n\nIt is urged by the learned counsel that the Nationalisation Amendment Act terminates mining leases in respect of coal only and that the Jaw terminating leases for mining coal cannot apply to a mine which contains not only coal but fireclay .also.\n\nThe totality of the submission on this point may be put thus :\n\n(a) Under Article 31(1) of the Constitution, no person can be deprived of his property without the authdrity of Jaw. Article 31A(l) which exempts the laws mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) from invalidity under Articles 14, 19 and 31 does not dispense with the necessity of the authority of law for depriving a person his property, because the opening words of Article 31A(l) are \" ... no law providing for ... \" matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) shall be deemed to be void as offending Articles 14, 19 and 31.\n\n(b) The Nationalisation Amendment Act confers no authority to terminate a composite lease for mining coal and fireclay. The right to mine fireclay is given to the petitioner D by law and it can only be taken away by law.\n\n(c) Though the Nationalisation Amendment Act does not in terms prohibit the petitioner from mining fireclay, the effect of the law in a practical business sense, is to prohibit the petitioner from mining fireclay aod, therefore, the position is the same as though the Act had enacted the prohibition in express terms.\n\nThe Court must look at the direct impact of the law on this right of the party, and if that impact prohibits him from exercising his right, the fact that there is no express prohibition in the Act is immaterial,\n\n(d) The Nationalisation Amendment Act by making it punishable to mine coal, in substance and in a practical business sense, prohibits the petitioner from mining fireclay.\n\nFor this prohibition the Amendment Act does not provide, and therefore, there is no authority of law for it.\n\nCoal and fireclay are two distinct minerals as shown by Schedule II to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 67 of 1957, wherein item 1 is, coal and item 15 is fireclay.\n\nThe dictionary meanings of coal and fireclay also show that they are two distinct minerals.\n\nIn support elf these submissions Shri Seervai relies very strongly on the definition of 'coal mine' in section 2 (b) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation Act, 26 of 1973, and the definition, by contrast, of 'coking coal mine' in section 3(c) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 36 of 1972.\n\n• r\n\n~ •\n\n. \\\n\nThese submissions are met by the learned Attorney General with the answer that if a mine has a seam of coal it is a coal mine within the meaning of section 2(b) of Act 26 of 1973, and that, for the purposes of that definition, it makes no , difference whether the mine has seams of fireclay also. The Attorney General says further that the definition of 'coking coal mine' in section 3 ( c) of Act g 6 of 1972 confllins words of surplusage which ought r!ither to be ignored than be allowed !O determine the scope of the definition contained in section 2(b) of Act 26 of 1973.\n\nThe contention, in other words, is that a cool mine is a mine in which thece is at least one seam of coal, no matter whether there are seams therein o, t fireclay or any other mineral.\n\nThe learned Solicitor General contends that the authority of Law extends to whatever is the necessary consequence of that which is authorised. In other words, authority to do a thing necessarily includes the authority to do all other things which are necessary for the doing of that which is authorised. If law authorises the termination of coal mining leaSe&, it must be taken to authorise whatever is necessarily incidental to and consequential upon it. Therefore, composite leases cannot be excepted from the provisions of an Act which terminates coal mining leases. Section 3(3) (a) introduced by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, it is contended, prohibits persons other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) from carrying on coal mining operation in any form.\n\nIf a person holdiog a composite lease can do jireclay mining without mining c%1, he may do so; otherwise section 3 (3) (a) is the authority of law to pre','ent him from mining fireclay. In other words, according to the learned Solicitor General, the necessary implication of law is that though a composite lease for mining coal and fireclay may remain outstanding after the enactrn_ent of the Nationalisation Amendment Act, the lessee cannot work it, if it involves a coal-mining operation.\n\nThe point raised by Shri Seervai is so nicely balanced that it is as difficnlt to rejecv it wholly as it is to accept it wholly. The contrast in definitions favours him.\n\nThe Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 26 of 1973, defines a coal mine by section 2(b) thus : ·\n\nuco'al mine\" means a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal\n\nIf this definition is considered in isolation, the learned Attorney General could perhaps be right in his submission that any mine in which there is one seam of coal, at least one, is a coal mine. The definition takes\n\nno account of whether there are seams of other minerals and if so how ff ' ' many, in the mine. One seam of coal is enough to make a mine a coal mine. For reasons which we will presently mention, it is not easy to\n\n10-610SCI/80\n\nA stretch the definition as far as logic may talre it, for that will produce the result that just one seam of coal at the roof of a mine or at its base will be enough to bring a mine within the definition contained in section\n\n2(b).\n\nThe scheme of the Coal Nationalisation Acts on which Shri Seervai relies has a relevance of its own on this point. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1972 and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1973 cover the whole field of 'Coal' which was intended to be nationalised.\n\nThe titles of the two Acts and the various provisiollS contained therein show that what was being nationalised was three distinct categories of mines : mines contaiJiing seams of coking coal exclusively; mines containing seams of coking coal along with seruns of other coal; and mines containing seams of other coal. Though Parlia ment had power under Article 3 lA (1) ( e) of the Constitution to terminate mining leases without payment of any compensation or 'amount', it decided to nationalise coal mines on payment of amounts specified in the Scpedules to the Nationalisation Acts of 1972 and 1973. Beside5, even .when something apart from coking coal mines was acquired, namely, 'coke oven plants', provision was separately made in.section 11 of the Nationalisation Act of 1972, read with the 2nd Schedule, for payment of amounts to owners of coke oven plants. Thus, whatever was intended to be acquired was paid for. 11iis scheme is prima facie inconsistent with the Parliament intending to acquire lease-hold rights in other minerals like fireclay, without the payment of any amount.\n\nCoupled with this is the unambiguous wording of section 3(3) (b) and section 3(3) (c) of the Nationalisa_tion Act of 1973, which were introduced therein by section 3 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act.\n\nSection 3 (3) (b) says that excepting the miuing leases and sub-leases granted before the commencement of the Act in favour of or by certain bodies or authorities, all other mining leases and sub-leases in force before such commencement,\n\n\"shall in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated''. (emphasis supplied)\n\nSection 3(3)(c) provides that :\n\n\"no lease for winning or mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Gove=ent, company or corporation, referred in clause (a)''. (emphasis supplied).\n\nH The'3e provisions carry the scheme of the Nationalisation Acts to their logical conclusion by emphasising that the target of those Acts is coal mines, pure and simple.\n\nWhat stands terminated under\n\nsection 3(3) (b) is certain mining leases and snb-leases in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal. The embargo placed by Bection 3 (3) ( c) is on the granting of leases for winning or mining coal to persons other than those mentioned in section 3(3) (a).\n\nSince the definition of 'coal mine' in section 2(b) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 has an uncertain import and\n\n~ the scheme of that Act and of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 makes it plausible that rights in minerals other than ..-. coke and coal were not intended to be acquired under the two :Nationalisation Acts, it becomes necessary to compare and contrast the definition of 'coal mine' in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973 with J the definition of 'coking' coal mine' in section 3 ( c) of the Coking \"\"- Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act of 1972. Section 3 ( c) of the latter ' Act says : • \" 'coking coal mine' means a coal mine in which there exists one or more seams of coking coal, whether exclusively or in addition to any seam of other coal\". (emphasis supplied).\n\nThis definition justifies Shri Seervai's argument that whereas in regard to coking coal mines, the existence of ; my seam of otlier coal was regarded as inconsequential, the existence of any seam of' another mineral was not considered as inconsequential in regard to a coal mine. The definition of coal mine in section 2 (b) of the Act r of 1973 scrupulously deleted the clause, \"whether, exclusively or in addition to\" any other seam. The same Legislature which added the particular clause in the definition of 'coking coal mine' in the 1972 Act, deleted it in the delinition of 'coal mine' in the 1973 Act.\n\nThe position ih regard to tihe coking coal mines is crystal clear, ll'. namely, that by section 4(1) of the Act of 1972, the right, title and . interest of owners in relation to the coking coal mines specified in the First Schedule to the Act stood transferred to and vested absolu-\n\n1 tely in the Central Government free from all incumbrances on the appointed day. The same position obtained under section 5 of that Act Ir. in regard to coke oven plants specified in the Second Schedule.\n\nBut G in so far as coal mines are concerned, we have, willy-nilly, to proceed on the basis that by reason of the definition of coal mine contained t\" in section 2(b) of the Act of 1973, and the definition of coking coa1\n\nmine ih section 3 ( c) of the Act of 1972 which presents a striking contrast to the definition in section 2(b), composite coal mines, that is to say, coal mines in which there are seams of coal and firec)ay H (we are only concerned with fireclay in these petition), do not fall withih the scope of the definition of 'coal mine' in section 2 (b) of the\n\nA Act of 1973.\n\nTo that extent Shri Seervai's contention roust succeed.\n\nBut what then is the sequitur? Can the lessees of composite mines (like the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 257, 220, 111, 600, ~\n\n1130-1134, 352, 221 and 178 of 1977) who hold composite mining leases for winhing coal and fireclay, continue their mining operations unabated despite the provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment .,.\n\nAct? We think not.\n\nIt is one thing to say that a composite mine is outside the scope of the definition of coal mine in section 2 (b) of •\"' the Nationalisation Act of 1973 and quite another to conclude therefrom that the other provisions introduecd into that Act by . the ) .\n\nNationalisation Amendment Act will have no impact on composite . leases for winning coal and fireclay.\n\nSection 3 (3) (a) which was - introduced into the parent Act by the N atio'nalisation Amendment ' Act provides expressly that on and from the commencement of section 3 of the Amendment Act, that is, from April 29, 1976, no person other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) shall carry on \"coal mining operation, in India, in any form\".\n\nSection 4 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act which introduced sub-section (2) in section 30 of the parent Act provides :\n\n\"Any pen; on who engages, or causes any other person to be engaged in win'ning or mining coal from the whole or part of any land in respect of which no valid prospecting licence or mining lease or sub-lease is in force, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and also with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees\".\n\nF These provisions of sections 3(3) (a) and 30(2) of the parent Act will apply of their own force, whether or not the lessee holds a\n\ncomposite lease for winning coal and fireclay and whether or not the mine is a composite mine containing alternate seams of coal and l fireclay.\n\nIn other words, as contended by the learned Solicitor 1 General, if a pen; on holding a composite lease can do fireclay mining G without mining coal, he may do so. But if he cannot win or mine fire- ' clay without doing a coal mining operation, that is, without winning or mining coal, he cannot do any mining operation at all. If he does so, he will be liable for the penal consequences provided for in sec-·.....;.,, lion 30.(2) of the Nationalisation Act of 1973. ~\n\nH The provision contained in section 3 ( 3 )(a) totally prohibiting the generality of persons from carrying on coal mining operation in India in any f<l!rlll and the penal provision of section 30(2) vii:tually\n\n• •\n\nTARA PRASAD v. UNION (Chiindrachud, C.l.) 1085\n\nleave with the lessees of composite mines the husk of a mining interest. That t!iey cannot win or mine. coal is conceded and, indeed, there is no escape from that position in view of the aforesaid provisions. The only surviving question then is whether they can win or mi'.ne fireclay since their composite lease is outside the scope of section 2(b) of the Nationalisation A.ct of 1973. The answer has to be in the negative on the basis of the very averments made by the petitioners in their Writ Petitions. For example, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 257 of 1957 has stated in his petition, more partcufarly in paragraph 5 thereof, that the seams of coal and fireclay are so situated in the mine of which he is a lessee, that it is not possible to mine fireclay without mining coal. This position was not only admitted but reiterated by Shri Seervai, both during the course of his oral argument and in his written brief.\n\nThe conclusion is therefore inevitable that the lessees of composite mines will, for all practical purposes, have to nurse their deeds of lease without being able to exercise any of the rights flowing from them. On their own showing, they will be acting at their peril if they attempt to win fireclay. If they cannot win fireclay without winning coal, they cannot win fireclay either, even if they hold composite leases under which they are entitled to win coal and fireclay.\n\nThis position fortifies the argument of the learned Solicitor General that though the Parliament pro'1ded for the payment of amounts for acquisition df certain interests uajer the Nationalisation Acts of 1972 and 1973, it did not intend to pay any compensation or amount for the termination of leasehold rights in respect of composite mines. Mines which have alternate seams of coal and fireclay are in a class by themselves and they appear to be far fewer in number as compared with the coking coal mines and coal mines, properly so called. The authority of law for the termination of the rights of composite lessees is the' promion contained in section 3(3) (a), 1he '1olation of which attracts the penal . provisions of section\n\n30(2) of the Nationalisation Act of 1973. The Parliament has deprived composite lessees of their right to win fireclay because they cannot do so without winning coal.\n\nThe winning of coal by the generality of people is prohibited by the section 3(3) (a) of the Act of 1973.\n\nThis is just as well, becau&e Parliament could not have intended\n\nthat such islands of exception should swallow the main stream of the Nationalisation Acts. Ob\\iously, no rights were intended to be left H outstanding, once the rights in respect of coking coal mines and coal mines were brought to an eiid.\n\nThe petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 257, 220, 111, 600, 1130- 1134, 352, 221 and 178 of 1977 hold composite mining leases for mining fireclay and coal. In these Petitions we had pasied the following order on May 5, 1978 : ,\n\n\"These petitions are allowed partly in that the petitioners therein shall be entitled, for the duration of the unexpired portion of their existing leases, to carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning fireclay so long as, and to the extent that, they do not carry on any coal mining operation or engage in winning or mining coal. In these Writ Petitions there will be no order as to costs\".\n\nAs we have already stated, no tangible benefit will accrue to the petitioners from this order because, on their own showing, they cannot carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning fireclay without carrying on a coal mining operation or without engaging in winning or mining coal. That is how the ma_tter rests.\n\nThe only other arguments which requires consideration is the one made principally by Shri A. K. Sen which, like Shri Seervai's argument of legislative competence, is common to all the writ petitions.\n\nShri Sen's argument may be stated thus :\n\n( 1) The N ationalisatiOD) Amendment Act alfects, in substance, two kinds of transfers : the transfer of the lease- • hold interests of the lessees in favour of the lessor, namely the State; and the transfer of the mining business of .the lessees in favour of the Central Gove=ent. Since these transfers amount to acquisition within the meaning of Article 31 (2), the Act is open to challenge under Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 31 of the Constitution.\n\n(2) The Nationalisation Amendment Act is open to challenge under Article 14 becaUSe lessees who fall within that Act are patently discriminated against in comparison with lessees of other mines, both coking and non-coking, wbo were paid compensation when their property was takeri over, first for management under the Management Acts and then under the Nationalisation Acts.\n\n( 3) The Nationalisation Ammdment Act is open to challenge under Articie 19(1) (g) because the prohibition against lessees from carrying on their business and the transfer of their business, in substance, to the Central Government or a Company_ is an unreaso!lable restriction on the\n\n~ ·-\n\nright of the lessees to hold their lease-hold property and to carry on their business of mining.\n\n( 4) The Act is open to challenge under Article 31 because no provision is made for the payment of any amount whatsoever to the lessees whose mining busine_ss is taken over under the Act. No public purpose is involved either in the termination of the lessees' interest or in the acquisition of their business. Expropriation without payment of any amount requires a very heavy public purpose.\n\n( 5) Since no provision whatsoever is made for the payment of any amount to the lessees whose leases are terminated, the Nationalisation Amendment Act is not a 'Law' within the meaning of Article 31(2) and therefore Article 19(1) (f) is attracted.\n\n' ( 6) The Act is not saved from the challenge of Articles\n\n14, 19 and 31 by Article 31A(l) (e) because that Article D provides for extinguishment which does not amount to acquisition by the State. If extinguishment amounting to acquisition was intended to be saved under Article 31A(1) ( e), the subject .matter dealt with by clause ( e) would have been included in clause (a) ol that Article.\n\nIt shall have been noticed that the entire argument hinges around the premise that, by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, the petitioned right to property has been :µ:quired without the payment of any\n\namount and that they have been unreasonably deprived of their right to carry on the business of mining.\n\nA close and careful examination of the provisions of the Coal Mineto (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 and of the amendments made to that Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act will show that there is no substance in either of the1e contentions.\n\n'The Coal Mines (Nationalisation Act, 1973) ootiona.lised coal minell by providing by section 3 ( 1) that on the appointed day, that is on May 1, 1973, the right, titlie and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central Government free from all incumbrances. The Scheduled D?ines, 711 in numbe.r and situated/ in reputed coal bearing areas, were the ones which were engaged openly, lawfully and uninterruptedly in doing coal mining business. Since it was possible to ascertain and verify the relevant facts pertaining to these undertakings, they were taken over on payment of amounts\n\n' R\n\nmentioned in the Schedule to the Act, which varied from mine to. mine depending upon the value of their assets, their potential and their profitability. In the very nature of thiogs, the list of mines in the Schedule could not be exhaustive because there were and perhaps even now there are, unauthorised mines worked by persons who did not possess the semblance of a title or right to do mining business.\n\nPe, rsons falling within that category cannot cite the Constitution as their charter to continue to indulge in unauthorised mining which is unscientific, unsystematic and detrimental to the national interests by reason of its tendency to destroy the reserve of natural resources.\n\nBut alongside these persons, there could conceivably be mine operators who may have been doing the\\f business lawfully but who were not easily or readily identifiable.\n\nSection 3 (2) of the Nationalisation Act, 1973 made provision for taking over the management of such mines by declaring for \"the removal of doubts\" that if, after the appointed day, the existence of any other coal mine comes\n\nto the knowledge of the Central Government, the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taldng Over of Management) Act, 1973, shall, until\n\nthat. mine is nationalised by an appropriate legislation, apply to such mine. Owners of mines whose mines were not included in the Schedule but whose right, title and interest was to vest eventually in the Central Government under \"an appropriate legislation\" envisaged by section 3(2) of the Nationalisation Act were, by this method, placed on par with the owners of mines of which the management was taken over under the Coal Mine8 (Taking Over of Management) Act,\n\n1973. That Act provides by section 7(1) that every owner of a coal mine shall be given by the Central Government an amowit in cash for the vesting in it, under section 3, of the management of such mine.\n\nBy section 7 (2), for every month during which the management of a coal mine remains vested in the Central Government, the amount referred to in sub-section ( l) shall be computed at the rate of twenty paise per tonne of coal on the highest monthly production of coal from such mine during any month in the years 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972. The two provisos to that sub-section and the other subi; ectfons of section 7 provide for other matters relating to payment of amounts to the owners of coal mines of which the management was l'aken ov.er.\n\nThe Nationalisation Amendment Act carried the scheme of these two Acts to its logical conclusion by \\erminating the scrcalled leases and sub-leases which might have remained outstanding.\n\nThus, the purpose attained by these Acts is (1) to vest in the Central Government the right of management of all coal mines; (2) to nationalise the mines mentioned in the Schedule; ( 3) to provide for the taking over of management of coal mines the existence of which comes to -the knowledge of the Central Government after the' appointv\n\nTARA PRASAJ> v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.!.) 1089\n\ned day and lastly. ( 4) to terminate all mining leases.\n\nThe Management Act and the Nationalisation Act provide for payment of amounts, by no means illusory, to the owners of coal mines whose rights were taken over. In the normal course of human affairs, particularly\n\nbus.i'ness affairs, it is difficult to conceive that owners of coal mines who had even the vestige of a title thereto would not bring to the notice of the Central Government the existence of their mines, when such mines were not included in the Schedule to the Nationalisation Act.\n\nThooe who did not care to bring the existence of their mines to the knowledge of the Central Government, even though amounts are payable under the Management Act for the. extingnishment o1 the right of management, did not evidently possess even the semblance of a title to the mines.\n\nThe claims of lessees, holdin2 or allegedly holding under such owners, would be as tenuous as the title of their\n\nputative lessors. . '\n\nThe Nationalisation Amendment Act by section 3(3)(b) undoubtedly terminates all existi'ng leases and sub-leases except thooe already granted in favour of persons referred to in clauses (i) to (iii) of section 3 (3)(a). Similarly, section 3 (3)(a) imposes an embargo on all future coal mining operations except in regard to the persons mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii). But the generality of leases which are alleged to have remained outstanding despite the coming into force\n\nof the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act, were mostly precarious, whose holders could at best present the familiar alibi that the origin of their rights or of those from whom they derived title was loot in antiquity.\n\nNeither in law, nor In equity and justice, nor under the Constitution can these lessees be heard to complain of the termination of their lease-hold rights without the payment of any amount.\n\nThe provision contained in section 3(3) (b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act was made ex majore cautela so as not to leave any lease of a coal mine surviving after the enactment of the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act.\n\nThere was no reasonable possibility of liiwful lease surviving the passing of those Acts;\n\nblit if, per chance, anyone claimed that he held a lease, that stood terminated under section 3 (3 )(b).\n\nOnce the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act and the Nationalisation Amen4ment Act is appreciated, it will be easy to .see that section 3 (3 )(b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act brings about an extinguishment simpliciter of coal mining leases within the meaning of Article 31 A ff\n\n(1)(e) of the Constitution. That Article, as it stood prior to the 44th Amendment, read thus :\n\nA \"3 lA. ( 1) Notwithstanding anything contain~ in\n\nArticle 13, no law providing for\n\n( e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature tennination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence,\n\nshall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conf:erred by article 14, article 19 or wficle 31''.\n\nWe are not concerned with the amendment introduced by the 44th Arnenment Act which deleted the reference to Article 31, since that Amendment Act ca; me into force prospectively with effect from June 20, 1979.\n\nWe are unable to accept that the termination of the mining leeseil and sub-leases brought about by section 3(3) (b) of the Nationalisa.- tion Amendment Act is a mere pretence for the acquisition of the mining business of the lessees and the sub-lessees. We have already shown how, in the context of the scheme of the Management Act, the Nationalisation Act and the Nationalisation Amendment Ad., it is impossible to hold that the true intent of the last mentioned Act was to 'acquire' anyone's business., This would be so whether the word 'acquire' is understood in its broad popular sense or in the narrow technical sense which it has come to possess. Whatever 'rights were intended to be acqnired were paid for by the fixation of amounts or by the laying down of a formula for ascertaining amounts p!!jllble for acquisition. It is hard to believe that having provided for payment of arnoul\\ts for acquisition of management and ownership rights, the legislature resorted to . the subterfuge of acquiring the mining business of the survi:ving lessees and sub-lessees by the device of terminating their leases and sub-leases. The legislative history leading to the terminatron of coal-mining leases points to one conclu sion only that, by and large, every lawful interest which was acquired was paid for; the extinguishment of the interest which survived or which is alleged to have survived the passing of the Management Act and the Nationalisation Act was provided for merely in order to ensure that no loophole was left in the implementation of the scheme envisaged by those Acts.\n\n.. •\n\n., ..\n\n.. \"'\n\n.,-\n\n This will provide a short answer to Shri Sen's argument that per- A sons whose leases and sub-leases are terminated without payment ot any amount are discriminated against in comparison with other lessees who were paid amounts when their property was taken over.\n\nThe answer is that persons dealt with by section 3 (3 )( b) of the Nationali'1ltion Amendment Act are differently situated from those who were dealt with by the two earlier Acts. No violation of Article 14 ill B tilerefore involved .\n\nLikewise, we see no substance in the contention that no public P:1JfPOse is involved in the tenuination of the interest of the lessees and sub-lesseeS which was brought about by the Nationalisation Amendment Act. The public purpose which informs that Act is the same which lies behind its two precursors, the Management Act and the.\n\nNationalisation Act. The purpose is to re-organise and re-structure coal mines so as to ensure the rational, co-ordinated and scientific development and utilisation of coal resources consistent with the growing requirements of the country. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Nationalisation Amendment Act points in the direction.\n\nPublic purpose runs like a continuous thread through the well-knit scheme of the three Acts under consideration.\n\n'fl!is discussion is sufficient to meet the contention of the petitioners that the interest of the lessees and sub-lessees has been \"acquired\" under the Nationalisation Amendment Act by the termination of leases and sub-leases. But, we may examine that contention in the light of the relevant Constitutional provisions and principles.\n\nIt was observed in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning &.\n\nWeaving Co.\n\nLid. (1) that the provisions of the Constitution touching fundamental rights must be construed broadly and liberally in favour .of those on whom the rights have been conferred. \"The form is unessential. It is the substance that we must seek\". Making every allowance in favour of the right to property which was available at the relevant time and having regard to the substance of the matter and not merely to the form adopted for terminating the interest of the lessees and the suble11sees, we are of the opinion that the Nationalisation Amendment Act involves no acquisition of the interest of the lessees and the sublessees. It merely brings about in the language of Article 31A(l) (e)\n\n''the extinguishment\" of their right, if any, to win coal. Whichever right; title and interest was lawful and identifiable was acquired by\n\nthe Marulgement Act and the Nationalisation Act.\n\nAnd whichever B lli.terest was acquired was paid for.\n\nTenuous and furtive interests\n\n(!) [1954] SCR 674, 733-734.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.it.\n\nA which survi\\'ed the passing of those Acts were merely extingµished by the Nationalisation Amendment Act.\n\nIn Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab,(}.) it was observed by Hidayatullah, J. in the dissenting judgment which he gave on behalf of himself and Shela!, J., that in the case of extinguishment within the meaning of Article 31A, if all the rights in a property are extinguished the result would be nothing else than acquisition, because no property can remain in suspense without the rights therein being vested in some one or the other. These observations made by the learned Judge are not contrary to anything contained in the majority iudgment delivered by Sikri, J., and naturally therefore, great reliance is placed upon them by the petitioners. Even greater sustenance is drawn by the petitioners frnm the judgment of a 7-Judge Bench of this Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India & Ors.(') In that case, a settlement which the Life Insurance Corporation had arrived at with its employees was substantially set at naught by the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976. It was held by ti1is Court that the Act was violative of Article 31 (2) since it did not provide for payment of any amount for the compulsory acquisition of the debts owed by the Life Insurance Corporation to its employees; that the direct effect of the impugned Act. was to transfer ownership of the debts due and owing to Oass III and Class IV employees in respect of annua1 cash bonus to the Life Insurance Corporation and that, since the Corporation is owned by the State, the impugned Act was a law providing for compulsory acquisition of the debts by the State within the meaning of Article 31(2A).\n\nThese decisions have no application to the instant case becanse the interest of the lessees and sub-lessees which was brought to termination by section 3(3)(b) of the Nationalisation Amendment Act does not come to be vested in the State. The Act provides tha.t excepting a certain cfass of leases and sub-leases, all other lea5es and sub-leases shall stand terminated in so far as they relate to the winning or minin!j of coal.\n\nThere is no provision in the Act by whii::h the interest so terminated is vested in the State; Nor does such vesting flow as a necessary c9nsequence of any of the provisions of the Act. Sub-section ( 4) of section 3 of the Act provides tliat where a mining lease stands terminated under sub-section (3), it shall be lawful for the Central Government or a Government Company or a corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government to obtain a prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the whole or part of the land covered by the mining lease which stands so terminated.\n\n(I) [1967) 2 SCR 143.\n\n(2) [19781 3 SCR 334.\n\n.. •\n\nThe plain intendment of the Act, which, may it be reiterated, is neither a pretence nor a facade, is that once the outstanding leases and subleases are terminated, the Central Government and the; other authorities will be free to apply for a mining lease. Any lease-hold interest which the Central Government, for example, may thus obtain does not directly or immediately flow from the termination brought about by section 3 ( 3 )(b) . Another event has to intervene between the termination of existing leases and the creation of new interests. The Central Government, etc. have to take a positive step for obtaining a prospecting licence or a mining lease. Without it, the Act would bi: ineffective to create of its own force any right or interest in favour of the Central Government, a Government Company or a Corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government. As observed _by Sikri, J., in , jjit Singh, (supra) the essential difference between \"acquisition by the Sfate\" on the 1one hand and \"moclification or extinwshment of rights\" on the other, is that in the first case the beneficiary is the Stat~ while in the second the beneficiary is not the State.\n\nThe Nationalisation Amendment Act merely extinguishes the rights of the lessees and the sub-lessees. It does not provide for the acquisition of those rights, directly or indiretly, by the State. Article 31 (2A) mil therefore come into play, by which, '\n\n\"Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives an, y person of his property.\"\n\nThe position in Madan Mohan Pathak (supra) was entirely different because the direct effect of the inipugned Act was to transfer ownership of the debts due and owing to Class III and Class IV employees in respect of annual cash bonus to the Life Insurance Corporation; since the L.I.C. is a Corporation owned by the State, the impugned Act was held to be a law providing for oompulsory acquisition of these debts by the State within the meaning of clause (2A) of Article 31.\n\nShri Sen's argument on the question of acquisitron of the rights of lessees and sub-lessees by the State therefore fails. It follows that\n\nthe Nationalisation Amendment Act must receive the protection of Article 31A(l)(e) of the Constitution, that is to say, thaf the Act cannot be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with H or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31.\n\nA These are our reasons for the order passed by us on May 5, 1978\n\nwhich reads thus :\n\nThe stay orders passed in these Writ Petitions are vacated except in those Writ Petitions, viz., Writ Petitions Nos. 257, 220, 1i1, 600, 1130-1134, 352, 221 and 178/77 in which composite mining leases have been granted for mini.Ilg both fireclay and-t'oal. The stay orders in these latter petitions shall stand modified as from to-day on the lines of the order recorded below.\n\nAll the Writ Petitions are dismissed with costs except Writ Petitions Nos. 257, 220, 111, 600, 1130-1134, 352, 221 and 178/77 in each of which there is a composite mining for mining fireclay and coal. These Petitions are allowed partly in that the petitioners therein s:hall be entitled, for the duration of the unexpi'fed portion of their existing leases, to carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning fireclay so long as, and to the extent that, they do not carry on allj' coal mining operation or engage in winning or mining coal. In these writ petitions there will be no order as to costs.\n\nWe have already indicated how, though the petitioners holding composite leases were permitted to carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning fireclay, they, according to their own showing, cannot win or mine fireclay without doing a coal mining operation or wi>thout engaging in winning or mining coal. It is self-evident that in attempting to win fireclay, they will have to act at their own peril since they will run the risk of being prosecuted undei; section 30(2) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973.\n\n~ Petition Nos. 111, 178, 220, 221, 257, 352, 600 and 1130-1134 partly allowed.\n\nPetition Nos. 150, 151, 180, 205-210, 226, 270-271, 346, 355, 403, 396-398, 599, 541, 543, 626, 635-639, 661, 687-692, 758/77 and 154, 571-574, 603, 605, 610 and 611/77 dismissed.\n\nS.R -,\n\n.. ..", "total_entities": 459, "entities": [{"text": "TARA PRASAD SINGH ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TARA PRASAD SINGH ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 65, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nMay 7, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R .. KRISHNA IYER,\n\nR. S. SARKAR!A, N. L. UNTWALIA, P. S. KAILASAM AND\n\nV. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R .. 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TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 410, "end_char": 425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act", "statute": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Article 246(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 593, "end_char": 607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act", "statute": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 655, "end_char": 665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 246(1) of the Constitution of Indiia confers upon the Parliament, notwithstanding anything contained in."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 835, "end_char": 851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act", "statute": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 876, "end_char": 884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act", "statute": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact 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1253, "end_char": 1267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act", "statute": "Legislative C - competence of the ParliamRnt to enact Nationalisation Amendment Act- Whether the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2355, "end_char": 2364, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the policy followed by the Central Government that the Coal Industry is to be in the nationalised sector, it was decided that the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973 should be enacted to provide for termination of all privately held coal .leases, except those held by pfivately owned steel companies, so that it may be possible for the Central Government, Government 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14110, "end_char": 14123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14220, "end_char": 14242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14246, "end_char": 14257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14444, "end_char": 14458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16147, "end_char": 16159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 29, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16374, "end_char": 16388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1072 D-F]\n\nThe several provisions of the Nationalisation Amendment Act, are, (I) by section 3(3) (a) of .the Coal Mines (Ntionalisation) Act, 1973' which was introduced by the Nationalisation Amendment Act, no person other than those mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) can carry on coal mining operations after 'April 29, 1976, being the date on which section 3 of the Nationalisation Amendment Act came into force; (2) by section 3 (3) (b) all mining leases and sub-leases stood terminated except those granted before April 29, 1976 in favour Of the Central Government, a Government company or corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government; (3) section 3(3) (c) prohibits the granting of a lease for winning or mining coal in favour of any person other than the Government, a Government company or a corporation of the above description provided that a sub-lease could be granted by these auth<>- rities to any-pefson if the two conditions mentioned in the proviso are satisfied; and (4) when a mining lease stands terminated under section 3(3), \"it shall\n\nI r \\\n\n\\~ '\n\nTARA PRASAD v. UNION 1047\n\nbe lawful'' for the Centrnl Governmen~ or the Government company or the A corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government to obtain a pros~ pecting licence or a mining leatie in rest of lheJ whole or part of the land\n\ncovered by the mining lease which stands termiriated."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16414, "end_char": 16423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16485, "end_char": 16494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16729, "end_char": 16741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17116, "end_char": 17128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17463, "end_char": 17472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17592, "end_char": 17603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3(1) and 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18027, "end_char": 18049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Nationalisation Act are not amended by the C Nationalisation Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18289, "end_char": 18381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18568, "end_char": 18577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Nationalisation Act are not amended by the C Nationalisation Amendment Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Nationalisation Act are not amended by the C Nationalisation Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government or Government Companies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20289, "end_char": 20331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Termination of leases, vesting of lease-hold properties in the State Governments and the grant of leases to the Central Government or Government Companies are together the means conceived in order to achieve the object of nationalisation of one of the vital material resour~ of the community."}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20491, "end_char": 20501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20764, "end_char": 20775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20903, "end_char": 20913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21154, "end_char": 21159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "section 18 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 67 of 1957, which provid .. that it shall be the duty of the\n\nA Central GoVeJ11DMlnt to take all such steps aa may be necessary for the conservation and development of minerals in India."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21368, "end_char": 21378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jisation Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22147, "end_char": 22169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Coal Mines (Conservation and Development) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24452, "end_char": 24497, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24606, "end_char": 24615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24872, "end_char": 24881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25526, "end_char": 25538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cairns", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25772, "end_char": 25778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "language of Lord Cairns in Julius (1880) 5 Appeal Cases 214, 222, there is something in the nature of the things which the Nationalisation Ameridrnent Act empowers to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done C and something in the conditions under which it iSi to be done which couplts the poVier conferred by the Act with a duty, the duty being not to act in hast0 but with reasonable promptitude depending upon the nature of the problem under investigation."}}, {"text": "section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26469, "end_char": 26481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27626, "end_char": 27643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28015, "end_char": 28025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28432, "end_char": 28441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28600, "end_char": 28609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nationalisation Acts to their logical conclusion by emphasising tliat the target of those Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28692, "end_char": 28785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28849, "end_char": 28864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nationalisation Acts to their logical conclusion by emphasising tliat the target of those Act", "statute": "Nationalisation Acts to their logical conclusion by emphasising tliat the target of those Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28985, "end_char": 28994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nationalisation Acts to their logical 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"section 2(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30521, "end_char": 30534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30701, "end_char": 30713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31079, "end_char": 31091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31214, "end_char": 31254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31325, "end_char": 31340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act", "statute": "Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Nationalisation Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31390, "end_char": 31419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31476, "end_char": 31485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nationalisation Amendment Act", "statute": "Nationalisation Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Aptil 29, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31522, "end_char": 31536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(3)(a) which was introduced into Hie parent Act by the, Nationalisation Amendment Act provides expressly that on and from the commencement of section 3 of the Amendment Act, that is, from Aptil 29, 1976, no person other than th_ose mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) shall carry on \"coal mining operation, in India, in any fonn\"."}}, {"text": "sections 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31684, "end_char": 31697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nationalisation Amendment Act", "statute": "Nationalisation Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 30(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32290, "end_char": 32303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": 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K.\n\nBanerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48345, "end_char": 48360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K.\n\nBanerjee and A. K. Nag for the Petitioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "A. K. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48365, "end_char": 48374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K.\n\nBanerjee and A. K. Nag for the Petitioners in WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Ganguli"}}, {"text": "S. V. Gupte", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48459, "end_char": 48470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. N. Kacker, U. R. Lalit, S. P. Nayar, R. N. Sachthey and Gobind\"M'ukhoty for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48472, "end_char": 48484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. V. Gupte, S. N. Kacker, U. R. Lalit, S. P. Nayar, R. N. Sachthey and Gobind\"M'ukhoty for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "U. R. 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Sachthey and Gobind\"M'ukhoty for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49205, "end_char": 49221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh, Shambhu Nath !"}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49223, "end_char": 49234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh, Shambhu Nath !"}}, {"text": "Shambhu Nath !", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49236, "end_char": 49250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, U. P. Singh, Shambhu Nath !"}}, {"text": "U. S.\n\nPrasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49257, "end_char": 49270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ha and U. S.\n\nPrasad for the Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "P. ~- Khera", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49752, "end_char": 49763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":~<r Mr. P. ~- Khera for Intervener No.", "canonical_name": "P. ~- Khera"}}, {"text": "S. K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49801, "end_char": 49812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Verma for the Intervener No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Verma"}}, {"text": "A. P. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49854, "end_char": 49870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111/77,\n\nA. P. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondents 2 & 6 in II WPs.", "canonical_name": "A. P. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49875, "end_char": 49891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "111/77,\n\nA. P. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondents 2 & 6 in II WPs.", "canonical_name": "A. P. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "M. p. Iha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49958, "end_char": 49967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. p. Iha for the Petitioner in WP.", "canonical_name": "M. p. Iha"}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50051, "end_char": 50062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.-This is a group of 61 Writ Petitions under article 3 2 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)\" Amendment Act 67 of 1976, on the ground that it is violative of the provisions of articles 14, 19(1){f), 19(1)\n\n(g) and 31 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50113, "end_char": 50122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 14, 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50289, "end_char": 50307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.D. Coal Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50983, "end_char": 51000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 claims tci be the sole proprietor of 'S.D. Coal Company' which is ngaged in coal business and coal mining operations."}}, {"text": "Monza Bundu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51163, "end_char": 51174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the surface and underground rights in Monza Bundu in the District of Hazaribagh, Bihar, previously belonged to the Raja of Ramgarh from whom or whose successors-ininterest, the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. appears to have obtained a lease of 242 Bighas of coal bearing lands in Monza Bundu, called the 'Bundu Colliery'."}}, {"text": "Hazaribagh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51194, "end_char": 51204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the surface and underground rights in Monza Bundu in the District of Hazaribagh, Bihar, previously belonged to the Raja of Ramgarh from whom or whose successors-ininterest, the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. appears to have obtained a lease of 242 Bighas of coal bearing lands in Monza Bundu, called the 'Bundu Colliery'."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51206, "end_char": 51211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the surface and underground rights in Monza Bundu in the District of Hazaribagh, Bihar, previously belonged to the Raja of Ramgarh from whom or whose successors-ininterest, the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. appears to have obtained a lease of 242 Bighas of coal bearing lands in Monza Bundu, called the 'Bundu Colliery'."}}, {"text": "Ramgarh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51248, "end_char": 51255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the surface and underground rights in Monza Bundu in the District of Hazaribagh, Bihar, previously belonged to the Raja of Ramgarh from whom or whose successors-ininterest, the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. appears to have obtained a lease of 242 Bighas of coal bearing lands in Monza Bundu, called the 'Bundu Colliery'."}}, {"text": "South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51302, "end_char": 51331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the surface and underground rights in Monza Bundu in the District of Hazaribagh, Bihar, previously belonged to the Raja of Ramgarh from whom or whose successors-ininterest, the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. appears to have obtained a lease of 242 Bighas of coal bearing lands in Monza Bundu, called the 'Bundu Colliery'."}}, {"text": "12th June, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51807, "end_char": 51822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that on 12th June, 1975 the South\n\nKaranpura Coal Co. Ltd. entered into an agreement with the S. D.\n\nCoal Company or prospecting, developing, raising and selling coal from the Bundu Colliery and .that on the strength of that agreement, petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51834, "end_char": 51857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that on 12th June, 1975 the South\n\nKaranpura Coal Co. Ltd. entered into an agreement with the S. D.\n\nCoal Company or prospecting, developing, raising and selling coal from the Bundu Colliery and .that on the strength of that agreement, petitioner No."}}, {"text": "S. D.\n\nCoal Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51893, "end_char": 51912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that on 12th June, 1975 the South\n\nKaranpura Coal Co. Ltd. entered into an agreement with the S. D.\n\nCoal Company or prospecting, developing, raising and selling coal from the Bundu Colliery and .that on the strength of that agreement, petitioner No."}}, {"text": "S. D. Coal Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52132, "end_char": 52150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The S. D. Coal Company is stated to have made large investments in the colliery and to have started paying rents and royalty to the S!'i\\te of Bihar."}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52575, "end_char": 52586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52595, "end_char": 52618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sub-divisional Magistrate (Sadar), Hazaribagb", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52624, "end_char": 52669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in a proceeding under section 144 of the' Criminal Procedure Code, the Sub-divisional Magistrate (Sadar), Hazaribagb, had made the rule absolute against the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. as well as the S. D. Coal Company, on the ground that\n\n1 /- .. \\\n\nthe State Government had taken over the Bundu Colliery."}}, {"text": "S. D. Coal Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52755, "end_char": 52773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in a proceeding under section 144 of the' Criminal Procedure Code, the Sub-divisional Magistrate (Sadar), Hazaribagb, had made the rule absolute against the South Karanpura Coal Co. Ltd. as well as the S. D. Coal Company, on the ground that\n\n1 /- .. \\\n\nthe State Government had taken over the Bundu Colliery."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52906, "end_char": 52928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l83l8(W) of 1975, the High Court of Calcutta is stated to have set aside the order of the State Government cancelling the lease of petitioner 1 in respect of the Bundu Colliery."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53139, "end_char": 53157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53287, "end_char": 53301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the factual aspect, the contention of the State of Bihar is that the lease of the Bundu Colliery which was held by M/ s South Karan- , pura <;:oal Co. Ltd. was terminated by the Bihar Government on November 24, 1975 on account of , the violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules; 1960 and that, actual possession of the colliery was taken by the State Government on November 26, 1975 prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1976."}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53423, "end_char": 53439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the factual aspect, the contention of the State of Bihar is that the lease of the Bundu Colliery which was held by M/ s South Karan- , pura <;:oal Co. Ltd. was terminated by the Bihar Government on November 24, 1975 on account of , the violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules; 1960 and that, actual possession of the colliery was taken by the State Government on November 26, 1975 prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1976."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53443, "end_char": 53460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the factual aspect, the contention of the State of Bihar is that the lease of the Bundu Colliery which was held by M/ s South Karan- , pura <;:oal Co. Ltd. was terminated by the Bihar Government on November 24, 1975 on account of , the violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules; 1960 and that, actual possession of the colliery was taken by the State Government on November 26, 1975 prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1976."}}, {"text": "November 26, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53621, "end_char": 53638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the factual aspect, the contention of the State of Bihar is that the lease of the Bundu Colliery which was held by M/ s South Karan- , pura <;:oal Co. Ltd. was terminated by the Bihar Government on November 24, 1975 on account of , the violation of Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules; 1960 and that, actual possession of the colliery was taken by the State Government on November 26, 1975 prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1976."}}, {"text": "Nirode Baran Banerjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53750, "end_char": 53771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "257 of 1977, the petitioner Nirode Baran Banerjee made an application dated September 17, 1966 for the grant of a mining lease in respect of fireclay covering an area of 1640.60 acres of the Hesalong Colliery.", "canonical_name": "Nirode Baran Banerjee"}}, {"text": "September 19, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53936, "end_char": 53954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 19, 1966 he made a similar application in respect of the same area, for a coal mining lease."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54483, "end_char": 54496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute relating to the petitioner's application for a coal mining lease was brought to the Supreme Court, as a result of which the Central Government on April 1, 1972 directed the State Government to grant a coal mining lease to the petitioner."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54545, "end_char": 54558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute relating to the petitioner's application for a coal mining lease was brought to the Supreme Court, as a result of which the Central Government on April 1, 1972 directed the State Government to grant a coal mining lease to the petitioner."}}, {"text": "October 17, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54640, "end_char": 54656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 17, 1973 a formal lease was executed by the State of Bihar in favour of the petitioner in respect of both coal and fireclay."}}, {"text": "October 18.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54802, "end_char": 54813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease was registered on October 18."}}, {"text": "Since his composite lease too was in jeopardy under the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56610, "end_char": 56679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56953, "end_char": 56964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since his composite lease too was in jeopardy under the Amendment Act", "statute": "Since his composite lease too was in jeopardy under the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57213, "end_char": 57239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57431, "end_char": 57440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B. K. Sinha,\n\nSbri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. N'ag.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Ganguli"}}, {"text": "H. M. Seervai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57447, "end_char": 57460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B. K. Sinha,\n\nSbri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. N'ag.", "canonical_name": "H. M. Seervai"}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57467, "end_char": 57480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B. K. Sinha,\n\nSbri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. N'ag.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "B. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57487, "end_char": 57498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B. K. Sinha,\n\nSbri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. N'ag.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57506, "end_char": 57518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B. K. Sinha,\n\nSbri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. N'ag.", "canonical_name": "D. Goburdhan"}}, {"text": "A. K. N'ag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57528, "end_char": 57538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitions were argued on behalf of the petitioners by Shri A. K. Sen, Shri H. M. Seervai, Shri Y. S. Chitale, Shri B. K. Sinha,\n\nSbri D. Goburdhan and Shri A. K. N'ag.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Ganguli"}}, {"text": "Lal Naraiq", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57698, "end_char": 57708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Lal Naraiq."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57711, "end_char": 57716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sinha and Shri A. P. Chatterjee argued respectively on behalf of the State of Bihar and the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57803, "end_char": 57823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sinha and Shri A. P. Chatterjee argued respectively on behalf of the State of Bihar and the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "P. S. Khera", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 57831, "end_char": 57842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri P. S. Khera and Shri S. K. Verma appeared on behalf of the interveners.", "canonical_name": "P. ~- Khera"}}, {"text": "Raniganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58396, "end_char": 58404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to \"India 1976\" (Publications Division,_ Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India), coal mining was first started at Raniganj, We§t Bengal, in 1774."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58411, "end_char": 58417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to \"India 1976\" (Publications Division,_ Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India), coal mining was first started at Raniganj, We§t Bengal, in 1774."}}, {"text": "Coal Mines Authority Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60378, "end_char": 60403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The production of coal in the public sector is organised through three companies : the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.\n\nA holding company, Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as."}}, {"text": "Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60409, "end_char": 60434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The production of coal in the public sector is organised through three companies : the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.\n\nA holding company, Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as."}}, {"text": "Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60444, "end_char": 60477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The production of coal in the public sector is organised through three companies : the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.\n\nA holding company, Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as."}}, {"text": "Coal India Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60498, "end_char": 60516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The production of coal in the public sector is organised through three companies : the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.\n\nA holding company, Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as."}}, {"text": "Bharat Coking Coal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60581, "end_char": 60599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The production of coal in the public sector is organised through three companies : the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.\n\nA holding company, Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as."}}, {"text": "Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60608, "end_char": 60648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The production of coal in the public sector is organised through three companies : the Coal Mines Authority Ltd., the Bharat Coking G Coal Ltd., and the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd.\n\nA holding company, Coal India Limited, was formed in 1975 incorporating the Coal Mines Authority, the Bharat Coking Coal and the Coal Mines Planning and Design Institute as."}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60720, "end_char": 60732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60763, "end_char": 60777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61759, "end_char": 61802, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 8, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61842, "end_char": 61853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which came into force on May 8, 1952 contains a declaration in section 2 that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Scliedule."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61880, "end_char": 61889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62048, "end_char": 62062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62466, "end_char": 62475, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 1,. 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62514, "end_char": 62527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mines Act, 35 of 1952, which came into force on July 1,."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62892, "end_char": 62904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mi'nes and Minerals (Regulation and Dlopment) Act; 67 of 1957, which came into force on June 1, 1958 was passed in order to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union."}}, {"text": "Section Z of that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63029, "end_char": 63050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 16,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63948, "end_char": 63965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a lull in legislative activity in regard to the enactment of further regulatory measures for controlling mines and minera!B.\n\nThe Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 12 of 1971, was passed on October 16,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "December 23, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64089, "end_char": 64106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was replaced by the Coking Coal mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 64 of 1971, which received the President's assent on December 23, 1971 but was given retrospective operation from the date of the Ordinance."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64368, "end_char": 64377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 17, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64480, "end_char": 64496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 3 (1), the .management of all coking coal mines vested in the Central Government from the appointed day-October 17, 1971.,"}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64499, "end_char": 64511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64644, "end_char": 64653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64756, "end_char": 64768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 30 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64993, "end_char": 65011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 1, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65180, "end_char": 65191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sections 30 and 31 , of that Act dealing respectively with penalties, and offences by companies came into force at once but the remaimng provisions were deemed to have come into force on May 1, 1972."}}, {"text": "Section 3(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65193, "end_char": 65205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65380, "end_char": 65392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65491, "end_char": 65505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65619, "end_char": 65631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65897, "end_char": 65906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66156, "end_char": 66165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66167, "end_char": 66179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 12, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66626, "end_char": 66644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an Amendment Act, 56 of 1972, which came into force on September 12, 1972, section 4A was added to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957."}}, {"text": "section 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66646, "end_char": 66656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67011, "end_char": 67025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Coal\n\n1Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 15 of 1973, which received the assent of the President ob March 31, 1973 was given retrospective effect from January 30, 1973 except section\n\nS (2) which came into force at once."}}, {"text": "January 30, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67062, "end_char": 67078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Coal\n\n1Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 15 of 1973, which received the assent of the President ob March 31, 1973 was given retrospective effect from January 30, 1973 except section\n\nS (2) which came into force at once."}}, {"text": "Section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67557, "end_char": 67569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67671, "end_char": 67680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 31, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67740, "end_char": 67756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 ( 1) provides that on and from the appointed day (that is, January 31, 1973) the management of all coal mines shall vest in the Central Government."}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67833, "end_char": 67845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68385, "end_char": 68397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cenkal Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 68577, "end_char": 68594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(5) casts an obligation on every person in charge of the management of a coal mine, immediately before the date on which the Act received the assent of the President, to intimate the Cenkal Government within 30 days from the said date the name and location of the mine as."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69072, "end_char": 69081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69083, "end_char": 69095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69355, "end_char": 69364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69400, "end_char": 69410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69901, "end_char": 69912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 26 of 1973, was given retrospective operation with effect from May 1, 1973 except sections 30 and 31 which came into force at once."}}, {"text": "sections 30 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69920, "end_char": 69938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70573, "end_char": 70582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70741, "end_char": 70750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May I, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70801, "end_char": 70812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a mine \"in which there exists one or more seams of coal,'' Section 3 ( 1) provides\n\ntht on the appointed day (that is, May I, 1973) the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all incumbrances."}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71023, "end_char": 71035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71251, "end_char": 71260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71903, "end_char": 71912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72228, "end_char": 72237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72527, "end_char": 72536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72651, "end_char": 72660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72890, "end_char": 72902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72979, "end_char": 72988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Governme'nt or", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73012, "end_char": 73034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 7 ( 1) provides that the Central Governme'nt or the Government company shall not be liab:~ to discharge any liability of .the owner, agent, manager or managing contractor of a coal mine in respect of any period prior to the appointed day."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73471, "end_char": 73480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73881, "end_char": 73890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central\n\n1 Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 74039, "end_char": 74060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the G purpose of disbursing the amount payable to the owner, the Central\n\n1 Government is reqnired by section 17 (1 ) to appoint a Commissioner of Payments."}}, {"text": "section 17", 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{"linked_statute_text": "Nationalisation Amendment Act", "statute": "Nationalisation Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "sections 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125615, "end_char": 125628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nationalisation Amendment Act", "statute": "Nationalisation Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126372, "end_char": 126381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126528, "end_char": 126541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126944, "end_char": 126956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128659, "end_char": 128671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section\n\n30(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128735, "end_char": 128749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128981, "end_char": 128993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "that such islands of exception should swallow the main stream of the Nationalisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129085, "end_char": 129173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 5, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 129537, "end_char": 129548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these Petitions we had pasied the following order on May 5, 1978 : ,\n\n\"These petitions are allowed partly in that the petitioners therein shall be entitled, for the duration of the unexpired portion of their existing leases, to carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning fireclay so long as, and to the extent that, they do not carry on any coal mining operation or engage in winning or mining coal."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 130486, "end_char": 130489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sen's argument may be stated thus :\n\n( 1) The N ationalisatiOD) Amendment Act alfects, in substance, two kinds of transfers : the transfer of the lease- • hold interests of the lessees in favour of the lessor, namely the State; and the transfer of the mining business of .the lessees in favour of the Central Gove=ent."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130871, "end_char": 130881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130922, "end_char": 130940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131039, "end_char": 131049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131779, "end_char": 131789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132320, "end_char": 132333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132348, "end_char": 132361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles\n\n14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132431, "end_char": 132454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132458, "end_char": 132472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132653, "end_char": 132667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act by the Nationalisation Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133216, "end_char": 133256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nationalisation Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133344, "end_char": 133369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133413, "end_char": 133422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nationalisation Act, 1973", "statute": "Nationalisation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134877, "end_char": 134886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nationalisation Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134898, "end_char": 134923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135506, "end_char": 135518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973", "statute": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135728, "end_char": 135740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973", "statute": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135861, "end_char": 135870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973", "statute": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135908, "end_char": 135917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973", "statute": "the Nationalisation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136313, "end_char": 136322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138037, "end_char": 138052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138201, "end_char": 138210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138230, "end_char": 138239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138922, "end_char": 138934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139306, "end_char": 139315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139326, "end_char": 139414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139498, "end_char": 139507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act", "statute": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139640, "end_char": 139650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act", "statute": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act"}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139805, "end_char": 139815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act", "statute": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140237, "end_char": 140247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act", "statute": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140249, "end_char": 140259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act", "statute": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140385, "end_char": 140395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act", "statute": "Once the real nature of the scheme envisaged by the Management Act the Nationalisaon Act"}}, {"text": "June 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 140471, "end_char": 140484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not concerned with the amendment introduced by the 44th Arnenment Act which deleted the reference to Article 31, since that Amendment Act ca; me into force prospectively with effect from June 20, 1979."}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140586, "end_char": 140598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142402, "end_char": 142411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act are differently situated from those who were dealt with by the two earlier Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142445, "end_char": 142537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142556, "end_char": 142566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act are differently situated from those who were dealt with by the two earlier Act", "statute": "Amendment Act are differently situated from those who were dealt with by the two earlier Act"}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144470, "end_char": 144484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.it.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 144796, "end_char": 144834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.it."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145001, "end_char": 145013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was observed by Hidayatullah, J. in the dissenting judgment which he gave on behalf of himself and Shela!,"}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145084, "end_char": 145089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was observed by Hidayatullah, J. in the dissenting judgment which he gave on behalf of himself and Shela!,"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145153, "end_char": 145164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145497, "end_char": 145502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations made by the learned Judge are not contrary to anything contained in the majority iudgment delivered by Sikri, J., and naturally therefore, great reliance is placed upon them by the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146002, "end_char": 146012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31(2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146534, "end_char": 146548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146695, "end_char": 146710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147186, "end_char": 147195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967) 2 SCR 143", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 147572, "end_char": 147588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148035, "end_char": 148044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "jjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 148532, "end_char": 148542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed _by Sikri, J., in , jjit Singh, (supra) the essential difference between \"acquisition by the Sfate\" on the 1one hand and \"moclification or extinwshment of rights\" on the other, is that in the first case the beneficiary is the Stat~ while in the second the beneficiary is not the State.", "canonical_name": "Ajit Singh"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148994, "end_char": 149004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madan Mohan Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 149400, "end_char": 149418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position in Madan Mohan Pathak (supra) was entirely different because the direct effect of the inipugned Act was to transfer ownership of the debts due and owing to Class III and Class IV employees in respect of annual cash bonus to the Life Insurance Corporation; since the L.I.C. is a Corporation owned by the State, the impugned Act was held to be a law providing for oompulsory acquisition of these debts by the State within the meaning of clause (2A) of Article 31."}}, {"text": "L.I.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 149663, "end_char": 149669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position in Madan Mohan Pathak (supra) was entirely different because the direct effect of the inipugned Act was to transfer ownership of the debts due and owing to Class III and Class IV employees in respect of annual cash bonus to the Life Insurance Corporation; since the L.I.C. is a Corporation owned by the State, the impugned Act was held to be a law providing for oompulsory acquisition of these debts by the State within the meaning of clause (2A) of Article 31."}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149847, "end_char": 149857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31A(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150064, "end_char": 150081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150262, "end_char": 150284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151823, "end_char": 151836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_104_138_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAMESH CHANDRA ETC.\n\nSTATE OF U.P. ETC.\n\nMarch 25, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CHANIJRACHUD, C.J., V. R. KRISHNA IYER, N. L. UNTWALIA,\n\nP. N. SHINGHAL AND A. D. KosHAL,. JJ.]\n\nUttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1954 (U.P., Act XXV of 1964), Ss. 2 (a), (p), (y), (k), 6, 17, and Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Niyamawalli 1965, Rules 66, 67 and 68-Levy of market fee by market C Committees in Uttar Pradesh on transactions relating to agricultural produce\n\n--A'\n\n--11alidity of-Declaration of big areas as n1arket area-Whether offends the law.\n\nMarket Committees-To be constituted in a regular manner and on a pernianent baiis-Machinery to be evolved for setting dz'sputes.\n\nThe Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act XXV of 1964) provides for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultµra! produce and for the establishment superintendence and control Of ma .. kets in Uttar Pradesh.\n\nThe enactment Was passed for the development of new market areas and for efficient data collection and processing of arrivals in the Mandies to enable the World Bank to give a substantial help for the establishment of various markets in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It led to the establishment of Market Areas, Principal Market Yards and Sub-Market Yards and levying of the fee in relation to transactions of certain commodities in the State of Uuar Pradesh.\n\nVarious Macket Committees were formed known as Mandi Samitis. Jn order to give effect to the working of the Act the Uttar Pradesh Krisbi Utpadan Mandi Niyamawalli 1965, being Rules under the Act were made by the Governor. The Act was amended several times but the Rules were not accordingly amended as and when required to make them uptodate in accordance with the amended Act.\n\n\"Agricultural Produce\" has been defined in clause (a) of s. 2 of tho Act to mean:-\n\n\"Such items of produce Olf agriculture, horticulture. viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisci-culture, animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule, and includes a mixture of two or more of such items, and also includes any such item in processed form, and further includes gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery.\"\n\nwhile Clause (e) defines \"commission agent\" or \"Arhatiya\" to mean:-\n\n\"a , person who, in the ordinary course of 1 business, makes or offers to make, a purchase or sale of agricultural produce, on behalf of the owner or seller or purchaser of agricultural produce, for Arhat or commission\".\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE 105\n\nunder clause (p),\n\n\"\"producer\" means a person who, whether by himself or through hired labour, produces, rears or catches, any agricultural produce, not being a prOOucer who also works as a trader, broker or Dalal, commission agent or Arhatiya or who is otherwise ordinarily engaged in the business of storage of agricultural produce\".\n\nCause (y) defines a \"trader\" to mean :-\n\n\"a person who in the ordinary course of business is enga8ed in buying or selling agricultural produce as a principal or as a duly authorised agent of one or ni.ore principals and includes a person, engaged in processing of agricultural produce. n\n\nUnder Clause (k), 'Market Area' means an area notified as such under Section 6, or as modified under Section 8, while 'Principal Market Yard' has\n\nbeen defined under clause (o) to mean, the ponion of a Mark,1 Area, declared as such under Section 7, and 'Sub Market Yard' under clause (w) means a portion of a Market Area, declared as such under Section 7.\n\n'Ibe State Goverment under s. 8 has got the power to alter any market area and modify the list of agricultural produce. Section 9 provides for the effects of declaration of Market Area. Chapter IIl of the Act deals with the establishment, incorporation and constitution of, the> Market Committees, section 17 provides for the power of the Committee. Clause (i) authorises\n\na Committee to issue or renew licences under the Act on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as may be prescnOed.\n\nClause (iii) authorises a Committee to levy and collect (a) such Fees as may be prescribed for the issue or renewal of licences, and (b) market fee at the rate and in the manner provided therein. [Though clause (b) of section 17 (iii) had undergone drastic changes from time to time, the Rules Were not correspondingly amended.] Section 19 provides for the Market Committee Fund and its utilisation. Section 19-B was introduced in the Act by U.P. Act 7 of 1978 w.e.f. 29-12-1977 providing for the establishment of 'Market Development Fund' for each committee.\n\nThe Rule making power of the State Government is in Section 40, Rule 66 deals with the levy of market fee, Rule 68 provides for its recovery end Rule 67 provides for licence fee.\n\nBy a State Government notification, which was issued on April fl, 1978 making it effective from May l, 1978, almost the whole of Uttar Pradesh had been declared to be a Market Area, dividing it into 250 areas and indicating in Schedule 8 of the Notification 115 commodities in respect of which the fee could be levied by the Market Committees. Declaration of Principal Market Yards and Sub-Market Yards under Section 7 had also been made.\n\nVarious traders carrying on business in the State of Uttar Pradesh within the jurisdiction of several Market Committees challenged the levy of fee in the High Court from time to time. There were several rounds of litigation and the writ petitions were dismissed. On account of the litigations between the traders and the Market Committees, the workiruz of the Committees had D not successfully proceeded, as fees levied from tune to time could no. be\n\n8-189 SCI/80\n\nrealised in full. Sometimes illegal or unauthorised collections have been made. Money justifiably realised also had not been 'fully utilised as it ought to have been done.\n\nIn the appeals and writ petitions to this court it was contended on behalf of the appe!lants and petitioners that :-\n\n1. Big areas consisting of towns and villages have been notified as Market Areas without rende'ring any service, which is contrary to the whole object of the Act and the concept of fee.\n\n2. No market area or market yard had been validly created.\n\n3. No Mandi Samiti (Market Committee) had been validly appointed.\n\n4. No machinery had been provided in the Rules for adjudication of disputes.\n\n5. Fixation of minimum of I% to be charged as market fee by all the Market Committees under s. 17 (iii )(b) of the Act was illegal as the requirement of and the services to be rendered by the various Market Committees could not be on the same footing.\n\n6. There was no application of mind in issuing the notification dated 11-4-1978 whereby 250 market areas were notified and 115 items of agricul tural produce were specified.\n\n7. There could not be any multi point levy of any market fee either in the same me.rket area or in different market areas.\n\n8. The retrospective operation of the law brought about in s. 17(ili)(b) by U.P. Act 7 of 1978 w.e.f. 12-6-1973 was bad.\n\n9. No market fee could be levied on goods not produced within the limits of a particular market area and if produced outside and brought in sueh area.\n\n10. No market fee could be levied both on paddy and rice.\n\nThe rice millers had been illegally asked to pay market fee on their sale of rice, Similarly no market fee was payable on Ghee either by the producer-trader F of Ghee or by its purchaser.\n\n11. Fee could be charged on sale of animals but could not be charged on hides and skins as was being illegally done. -\n\n12. Fee co, uld be charged on wood or timber but could not be charged either on furniture manufactured from such wood or timber or on Catechu (Katha).\n\n13. Wood cut and brought from the jungle by a manufacturer or paper could not be subjected to levy of fee.\n\n-14. Some of the items mentioned in the notification are Kirana goods brought from outside the market area or even from other States for sale in different Mandis, and cannot be subjected to the levy of 11111rket fee.\n\n15. No market fee could be charged\" on tobacco or tendu leaves nor on bid is.\n\n16. No market fee could be charged on rilb salawat and rah galawat..\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE 107\n\n17. No market fee am be charged if only goods are brought in a market 6rea and despatched outside it without there taking place any transaction of purchase and sale in respect of these goods.\n\n18. If no licence is issued or taken under s. 9(1) of the Act tlien there is no liability to pay a market fee.\n\n19. No market fee ce.n be levied on transactions of match boxes, soyabin B products.\n\n20. No market fee can be charged from the vendors of fruits and vegetables through their Commission Agents.\n\n21. Fee can be charged only on those transactions in which the seller is prcx:I ucer and not on any other transaction, and market fee can be charged C only on_ those transactions in which the seller is the purchaser o( agricultural produce and not on any other transaction.\n\nHELD : 1. Declaration of big areas as Market Areas does not offend any provision of la\\\\'. Any area big or small including towns and villages can be declared as Market Area under s. 6 of the Act. [121 F] D\n\n2. The traders are required to take out licences under s.9(2) read with s.11 of the Act, for such place which is either a principal J\\ifarket Yard or a sub-Market Yard or at any specified place in the Market Area. No body ean be permitted to carry on his business anywhere in the Market Areas a1 the Market Committee will not be able to control and levy fee throughout the Market Area. [121 G-HJ\n\n3. (i) Market Committees have not yet been constituted in accorUance. with the provisions contained in s. 13 of the Act. They have been constituted temporarily under Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samitis (Alpakalik Vyawastha) Adhiniyam, 1972 which \\Vas a temporary Act, extended from year to year. It is high time that Market Committees should be constituted in a regular manner on a permanent basis in accordance with the provisions\n\ncontained in Chapter III of the Act. [123 CJ F\n\n(ii) The levy and collection of fee by the temporary Market Committees is not illegal as argued on behalf of the appellant>;. [123 DJ\n\nKewal Krishan Puri v. State of Puniab [1979] 3 S.C.R. 1217, referred to.\n\n4. A machinery for adjudication of disputes is necessary to be provided under the Rules for the proper functioning of the Market Committees. [123 E] G\n\n5(i) Under clause (b) of s. 17(iii) of the Act a minimum end maximum limit of market fee chargeable has been fixed by the legislatore. The minimum is 1 % and the maximum is H% of the price of the agricultural produce sold. The fixing of the minimum of 1 % fee by itself is not illegal but it would be subject to the rendering of adequate services. [123 G]\n\n(ii) The charging of 1 % fee throughout the State of Uttar Pradesh 1iy all the market Committees is not illegal and does not go beyond the quid\n\npra qua theory discussed in Puri's case. [124 Al\n\n' A .\n\n6. The notification dated 11-4-1978 indicates that in the various Districts, which number about 55, 250 Market Committees have been constituted and about 115 items have been selected in respect of which market fee has been directed to be levied. None of the items so specified is such that it cannnt be covered by the Schedule which is a part of the Act.\n\nThe definition of 'egricultural produce' is very wide, and it is not confined to items of agricultural produce only but includes items of produce of horticulture, viticulture, B apiculture, sericulture, pisCi-culture, animal husbandry or forest. (124 CJ\n\n7(i) All the four clauses of clanse (b) of S. 17(iii) are mutually exclusive.\n\nIf the produce is purchased from a producer directly the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee in accordance with sub-clause (2). But if the trader sells the same produce or any product of the same produce to another trader neither the seller trader nor the purchasertrader can be made t<> pay tho market fee und01' sub-clause (3). [125 CJ\n\n(ii) In a particular market area market fee oonuot be levied both in relation to the transaction of purchase and sale of paddy and the rice produced from the same paddy. Fee can be charged only on one transaction. This finds support from the unamended Rules as they are, wherein is to be found sub-r. (2) of Rule 66, There is nothing in the provisions of the Act or the Rules to warrant the view that in another market area the Market Committee of that area cannot levy fee on a fresh transaction of sale and purchase taking place in that area. [125 H 126 A]\n\n8(i) Before 1973, reading the provisions of the Act and the Rules, market fee was to be charged at such rates as specified in the by&-laws of a particular Market Committee. But it could not exceed 1/2 perccntum of the price of the agricultural produce. The liability to pay the fee was of the seller of the agricultural produce. Market fee was liable to be paid under Rule 68 (2) (ii) even if the specified agricultural produces was sold directly by the seller to the consumer. This provision has oow been superseded by an amendment in the Act brought about by U.P. Act 19 of 1979.\n\n[127 F-GJ\n\n(ii) After the amendment in the Statute, Rules could apply only mutatia F mutandis and wherever there was a conflict between the Rules and the Statute the latter had o prevail. [128 DJ\n\n(iii) The State Legislatures are competent to make retrospective amend ment and retrospective imposition of a fee is valid. However, in a given case and in a given situation the retrospective operation may be hit by Article 19. [129 ABJ\n\n\n(iv) The Rules which were framed in 1965 oomely Rules 66 and 68 are very diffea-ent from the present provision of law.\n\nThe Government bas failed to amend the Rules and bringing it in confirmity with the amended provisions of the Statute from time to time. The Rules will apply as far as possible so long they do not come in conflict with the Statute and eveo\n\nRAMESH CHA\\'IDRA v. U. P. STATE 109\n\nwithout the aid of the Rules the provision in section 17(ili) (b) as it stands after the amendment brought about by U.P. Act 7 of 1978 is workable and can be given effect to. [128 G-HJ\n\nIn the present case the retrospectivity of the law as such is not bad and the only safeguard will be that if market fee has been realised by any Market Committee in respect of transactions of sale of agricultural produce taking\n\nplace b-een 12-6-1973 and the coming into force of U.P. Act 7 of 1978, B in accordance with law as it prevailed then, no market fee under tho amended law can be realized again.\n\nBut if in respect of ariy transactions aforesaid market fee had not yet been roo.lised then it can be realised in accordance with the amended provision of the law. (129 CJ\n\n9. No provision in the Act or the Rules limit the operation of the law in a particular market area only in respect of the agricultural produce pro- C duced in that area. [129 GJ\n\nIO(i) A producer who produces agricultural produce generally does not indulge in trading activities so as to beCome a trader within the meaning of clause (y). He is covered by clause (p) only. If a perse>n is simply a trader indulging in trading acti'1ties he is covered by the definition in clause (y). The expression producer-trader has been coined for a person who is both a pro<jucer of agricultural produce and himself trades in it. For the purposes of the Act he ceases to be a producer and becomes a trader only as the definition indicates. (130 A-BJ\n\n(ii) If paddy is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller 0.nd the same paddy is converted into rice and then sold the rice miller will be liable to pay market fee on his purchase of paddy from the agriculturistproducer under sub-clause (2) of section 17 (iii)(b). He cannot be asked to pe.y market fee over again under sub-clause (3) in relation to the transaction of rice. (130 El\n\n(ill) Market fee has le> be levied and ce>llected in relatie>n IC> the trans actie>n e>f paddy alone. Otherwise there will be a risk of vie>lation of Article\n\n14 if it Is left te> the Market Committee in the case of some rice millen to\n\n~ . charge market fee on the transaction of paddy and in the case of others J' to charge it when the sale of the rice takes place. If, he>wever, paddy is brought by the rice miller from another market area, then the Market Committee of the ma where paddy is converted into rice and se>ld will be entitled le> charro market fee oo the transaction and sale in accordance with .ub-clause (3). (130 F-GJ\n\n(iv) In transactions of Ghee, a dealer who purchases milk or cream G from the villagen and others and manufactures Ghee in his plant will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within tho meaning of the Act and at the same time a trader in Ghee also. When ho sells Ghee to another dealer. in Ghee who is simply a deruer then under sub-clause (3) of Section 17(iii)(b), the manufacturing deeler will be liable to pay market fee to the Market Committee or the transaction of Ghee, but he will be entitled to pass on the bmden to his purchaser. [131 C.DJ H\n\n11. The definition clause (a) of section 2 uses the expression 'animal lm!bandry' by way of a descriptive one without strictly confining to the pro\n\nA products of animal husbandry as the additions, of the words 'specified in the -<\\ achedule' indicates. In the schedule under the group 'husbandry products' are mentioned item 11_ hides and skins, item 12 bones, item 13 meat etc. \\- Market fee is, therefore, leviable on the transactions of hides and skins a& no market fee can be charged on transactions of sale and purchase of aninuils in a market area in the State of Uttar Pradesh the same having not been included in the notification. Had it been included in the notification, then B no market fee could be charged in the same market area on hides and skins.\n\nIt could only be charged in relation to the transaction of purchase and sale of animals. (131 H, G; 132 B-C]\n\n12. Group E of the notification dated 11-4-1978 deals with forest products. The items mentioned therein are (I) Gum, (2) Wood, (3) Tendu leaves, (4) Catechu, and (5) Lac. Market fee can be charged on purchase C of wood by a trader from a producer. No fee can be charged on the sale of furniture manufactured by the purchaser of wood. According to the Market Committees Catechu is a product from timber Ot trees like Gum or Lac, which trickles down from the trees, while, according to the Catechu dealers by processing of Khar trees Catechu is produced. This question of fact is left to be decided by the Market Committees concerned in the first instance and then by a court of law. If Catechu is a product of Khar trees D by some processing as prima facie it appears to be so, it is plain that market fee can be charged only on the purchase of .Khar wood and not on the sale of Catechu.\n\n[D, F1\n\n13. The owner of the jungle wherefrom the wood is cut and brought will be a producer within the meaning of the Act and the licenseeproducer of that wood would be a purchaser of an agricultural produce within the meaning of sub-clause (2) of section 17(iii) (b) of the Act liable to pay market fee. 'It matters little what use is made of the wood by him. The question of quid pro quo and service cannot be decided by a dichotomy of service to every payer of fee as held in Kewal Krishan Puri's case.\n\nThe i; oo.tter has to be judged in a broad sense and not in the sense of rendering •trvice to every individuill payer of the fee. (133 B-C]\n\ni4. In group AVI Spices are mentioned including certain Kirana items such as Ripe Chillies, Sonf, turmeric etc. They are sold by the Kirana dealers. Sometimes they purchase them from the agriculturists in the same market area.\n\nIn relation to those transactions they will be liable to pay market fee under subclause (2) of section 17(iii)(b). More often the.o not such articles are brought from outside and sold by the Kirana merchants.\n\nIf they are sold to consumers, no market fee can be levied in view of the proviso added in the year 1979.\n\nIf they are sold in wholesale, then the transaction can be subjected to the levy of market fee because in a particular market area they enter into the first transaction of sale in respect of the specified agricultural produce. [133 E-F]\n\n15. Market fee can be charged on transaction of tobacco as it is included in group A-V of the notification. Similar is the position in regard to tendu leaves which is mentioned in group E. Bidi cannot be treated as an agricuJ tural produce as it is not an admixture of tobacco and tendu leaves within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Act.\n\nBut if a Bidi manufacturer purchases tobacco and tendu leaves in the market area and uses them in the manufac--\n\n~.·\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE 111\n\nture of bidi, he will be liable to pay market fee in relation to the transaction of tobacco and tendu leaves. [133 Q.134 Al\n\n16. Market fee can be levied on the first transaction of rab taking place in any market area in accordance with any of the sub-clause of section 17(iii)(b), as may be applicable. It cannot be again charged on the second 1i1Ul8action of rab galawat or rab salawat even assuming that it is rah. (134 F]\n\n17. If goods are merely brought in any market area and are despatched outside it without any transaction of sale taking place therein, then no market fee can be charged.\n\nIf the bringing of the goods in a particular market area and their despatch therefrom are as a result of transactions of purchase and sale taking place outside the market area, it is plain that no fee can be levied. [135 BJ\n\n18(i) Producer as defined in clause (p) of section 2 is not required to take any licence for selling his agriccltural produce nor is he required to pay market fee under any of the sub-clauses of section 17(iii) (b). But if he is a producer-trader in the sense explained above, then he will be required tO take out a licence in accordance withs. 9(2) of the Act and no body can be permitted to carry on any trade in agricultural produce in the market area without a valid licence. [135 E]\n\nThe proviso to clause (p) of s. 2 will be attracted only if a question arises as to whether any person is a producer or not for the purposes of the Act and in that event the decision of the Director made after an inquiry conducted in the manner prescribed by the Rules shalt be final. If a question arises whether a pernon is merely & producer or producer-trader the Director will have no power to decide this question. Such a question will have to be decided by the Market Committee itself which will be subject to the final decision of a court of law. [135 G-H]\n\n(ii) The traders cannot escape their li; ibility to pay the fee on account of their default of taking out licencea. [136 DJ\n\n19. Market fee can be charged only on the transactions of purchase of wood and if a manufacturer of match-sticks purchases wood from the produc--\n\ner for the purpose Of manufacturing the sticks he will be required to pay market fee on such purchase of wood only and not on the sale of matchsticks or match boxes. Similarly market fee Will be leviQbte on the transaction of purchase of soye.bin and not on transaction of sale of soyabin products. [136 El\n\n20. Under sub-clause (1) of s. 17(iii)(b) of the Act when fruits and G vegetables are sold through a commission agent by the producer then Iha commission agent is lie.hie to pay the market fee and he can realise it from the purchaser of fruits and vegetables. The burden does not fall on the producer. The liability in the first instance is of the commission agent 9.l1d finally of the purchaser of the articles. [136 HJ\n\n21. In the U.P. Act even traders under certain circumstances have been made liable to P\"Y such fees. The argument that market fee can be charged only on those trausactions in which the seller is the producer of agricul' tural produce and not on any other transaction is devoid of substance. [138 CJ\n\nMangalchand Ramchandra and others etc. v. State of Bihar [1971] B.L J.R. 1038 approved.\n\n22. If anything has been realised from the traders or any other person which goes contrary to this judgment the same should be refnnded by the Market Committee concerned within six months. The form of the order in relation to the refund of the market fee may vary from case to case depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. [138 DJ\n\n23. Market fee due from the traders should be regularised and be charged in the light of this judgment, and paid within a period of six month. If there is any disputed question of fact to be decided by the Market Committee then it should be decided as quickly as possible leaving the person concerned\n\nto agitate the matter in a court of law, preferably, in the High Court, within a short time thereafter. [138 E-FJ\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1841-1846 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos. 4846, 4436, 3815, 5040, 4475 D and 4587 /78.\n\nAND CivIL APPEAL No. 871 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 29-4-1977 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 1749 of 1974.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL No. 1921 OF 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 4566 of 1978.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL No. 1960 OF 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21·9~1979 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 4568/78.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2169-2173 OF 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos. 4542, 5589, 5592 to 5594/78.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2178-2187 of 1978.\n\nD From the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos. 4921, 4625, 4449, 5002, 5003, 5007, 5068, 5069, 5284 and 4568 of 1978.\n\n....[\n\n• •\n\n') ..\n\n·----·\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U; P. STATE 113\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2219-2226 OF 1978 •\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos. 5185 and 5059 of 1978.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2269, 2302, 2373-2375 OF 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos. 5193/78, 5192, 5010, 4584 and 4583 of 1978.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2321, 2322, 2356, 2359, 2386, 2406-2408, 2426-2428, 2430 & 2431, 2457, 2504, 2507/1978 and 142, 144, 174, 230, 385, 388, 429, 438, 599, 635, 745, 821, 929 & 1007, 1009/79, 1149, 1149A, 1346, 1630, 1636, 1638, 1863, 1865, 1866, 1867 & 1869/79 and 2270, 2272/78.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. NQ>s. 5521, 4982, 5001, 4447/78, 4454, 2311, 5134, 3826, 4409, 4020, 5144, 5728, 5002, 4455/78, 6948, 4665, 4560, 4666, 4985,4449, 5540,4823,4619, 5150, 4588, 4593,4926,4947, 4948, 5012, 5062, 5088, 5089, 5191, 5539, 5106, 5097, 4833, 4911, 1398, 2114, 2515, 898/78, 5071, 5454, 5592, 5072, 5034, 4149, 5153, 5169, 5734/78, 4947/ 76, 5533/78, 3299/77, 4943, 4629/78 & 5194, 5195, 5196/79.\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEAL No. 487 OF 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 4445 of 1978.\n\nAND\n\nWRIT PETITION Nos. 257 & 600 of 1979. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution).\n\nF. S. Nariman, R. F. Nariman and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellants G in CA Nos. 2260 & 2261.\n\n...\n\nS. P. Gupta, H.K. Puri, V. K. Bahl and Miss Madhu Moo/chandani for the Appellants in CAs 1841 to 1846, 2426 to 2428, 929, 1007 to\n\n1009, 1630, 2169 to 2172 and 1635.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, G. B. Pai, Mrs. Saran Mahajan, Mr. Arvind B Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind and R. K. Sinha for the Appellants in CA\n\nlfos. 2507, 2322, 2457 and 871.\n\n114 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS\n\n\nA Shanti Bhushan, S. P. Gupta, H. K. Puri and Miss Madhu Moo/· chandani for the Appellants in CA 174. \" L. N. Sinha, S. S. Ray, Ghayyas Alam and R. K. Jain for the Appe- llants in CA 2269, 2270 to 2272.\n\nShanti Bhushan, Subhash Chandra Bir/a and Shreepal Singh for the B Appellants in 2373, 2302, 2374, and 2375. ~\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chabra for\"the Appellants'in'CA 599, 142 to 144, 385, 1638, 2219 to 2226, 1921, 1960, 2173, 2178, 2180\n\nto 2187, 2179, 386 to 388, 429 to 438 and W. P. 257.\n\nc Pramod Swarup for the Appellants in CAs Nos. 230, 2359, and _J 2386.\n\nP.R. Mridul ad All<k Croa fer tle Arrtllzrts in CAs 24C6. to 2408.\n\nVeda Vyasa, N. C. Sikri, A. K. Sikri and Vijay Jaiswal for the\n\nD Appellants in CA 821 & 487 and W.P. 600.\n\n0. P. Vo ma fer tl:e arr<llar.ts in CAs 1867 and 1869.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chita/e, Mrs. M.ardlcra Rouchandran and P. K. Pillai ,!o; Appellant No. 1 in CA 1846, 745 and Appellant No. 2 in CA 1633 and 1634.\n\nE S. K. Jain fer t{, e Arrdlants in CA 187/79. l T. S. Arora fer the Arrcllants in CA 23:6/78 & 1346/79.\n\nY. S. Chitale,' 0. P. Rana and Mrs. S. Ramachandran for the Appellants in CA 1866 and Appellants in CA 1865 and R.1 in CAs 142 & 143 and 144 and for the Anellants in CAs. 1631, 1632 and for appe\n\nF llant No. 1 in CA 1633, 1634 and Appellants in CA 1863.\n\nS. K. Dhingra for the Appellants in CA 2321/78. _ __+..\n\nJ. M. Khanna for the Appellants Jn CA 2430 & 2431.\n\nK. B. Rohtagi and Praveen Jain for the Appellants in CA 2504/ 78.\n\nG M. M. L. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA 1149 & 1149A. ' ....\n\nK. C. Dua for the Appellants in CA 1635 & 1636.\n\nL. M. Singhvi, B. D. Madhyan, R. N. Dikshit and L. K. Pandey ...\n\nfor the Respondents (Mandi Samiti) CA 1841 to 1846, 1921, 2169 to 2173, 2178 to 2187, 2219 to 2226, 2260, 2261, 2269, 2302, 2373 to 2375, H 2322, 2356, 2406 to 2408, 2420 to 2423, 2431, 2426 to 2428, 2507, 142 to 144, 174, 385 to 388, 429 to 439, 599, 230, 635, 1007 & 1008, 1149, 1149A, 1630 & 1631, 1638, 5135, 1346, and 2212.\n\nA-\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, J.) 115\n\nE. C. Aggarwala and R. Satish for RR 2 in CA 2179, 2180, 2222, 2271, 2431, 2433, 2504/78 and 1869 and 143/79 and in other matter, for Mandi Samiti for Muzaffarnagar and Meerut.\n\nRavinder Bana for RR 2 in 2457, 2270, and 2272 and RR 2 and RR 3 in CA 2269, and WP No. 257/79.\n\nM. V. Goswami for RR I in CA 2356.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J., The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 being U .P. Act XXV of 1964, hereinafter called the Act, was passed in that year. It led to the establishment of Market Areas, Principal Market Yards and Sub-Market Yards etc. and the levying of the fee in relation to transactions of certain. ccrr.mcditiu. in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Various Market Committees were formed known as Mandi Samitis. In order to give effect to the working of the Act The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utp1dan Mandi Niyamavali, 1965, hereinafter called the Rules, were made by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. The Act has bee!1 amended several times. But we were distressed to find that the Rules were not accordingly amended as and when required to make them upto-date in accordance with the amen <led Act. Various trders carrying on business in the State of Uttar Pradesh within the jurisdiction of several Market Committees challenged the levy of fee in the High Court of Allahabad from time to time.\n\nThere were several rounds of litigation in which they by and large, failed. Finally many Writ Petitions were dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated September 21, 1978 on which date many WTit petitions were also dismissed in limine. Civil Appeal 1841 of 1978 and about 103 more appeals are from the said judgment and order of the High Court. Immediately preceding the said judgment a longer and more elaborate judgment had been delivered by the High Court on April 29, 1977. Civil Appeal 871 of 1978 and Civil Appeal 1636 of 1979 are from the said judgment. Along with these 106 appeals, two Writ Petitions were also heard being Writ Petition No, 257 of 1979 and Writ Petition No. 600 of 1979. Thus in all 108 matters have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment\n\nAt the outset it may be mentioned that becanse of the litigations cropping up from time to time bet\\\\ een the traders and the Market Committees the working of th, e Committees had not successfully pr~· H ceeded so far, as, fees levied from time to time could not be realied in full. Sometimes illegal or unauthorised collections seem to have been\n\nmade. Money justifiably realised also does not seem to have been fully utilised as it ought to have been done. In order to enable the Market Committees in their attempt to implement the law as far as possible and to save their attempt from being thwarted by any unnecessary litigation we allowed the parties to advance a full throated argument in this Court including some of the points which were not argued in the High Court or in support of which foundations of fact were lacking. In this judgment our endeavour will be to formulate the points of law and decide them as far as practicable so that in future the business of the Market Committees may be conducted in the light of this judgment leaving no scope for unnecessary litigation. Of course even in our judgment at places it would be indicated, and even apart from that, some genuine and factual disputes may crop up which in the first instance may be decided by the Market Committees, preferably a Board constituted by a particular Committee for deciding such disputes and then, if necessary, by the High Court. We do hope that no further time will be lost by the State Government in amending the Rules and making them up-to-date to fit in with the latest amendments in the Act.\n\nThe long title of the Act indicates that it is an Act \"to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence, and control of markets therefor in Uttar Pradesh.\" From the Objects and Reasons of the enactment it would appear that this Act was passed for the development of new market areas and for efficient data, collection and processing of arrivals in the Mandis to enable the World Bank to give a substantial help for the establishment of various markets in the States of Uttar Pradesh. In other States the Act is mainly meant to protect an agriculturist producer from being exploited when he comes to the Mandis for selling his agricultural produce. As pointed out by the High Court certain other transactions also have been roped in the levy of the fee, in which both sides are traders and neither side is an agriculturist. This has been done for the effective implementation of the scheme of establishment or'markets mainly for the benefit of the producers; But as pointed out recently by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab(l) the fee realised from the payer of the fee has, by and large, to be spent for his special benefit and for the benefit of other persons connected with the transactions of purchase and sale in the various Mandis. The earlier cases on the point of fee have been elaborately reviewed in that judgment and certain principles have been called out which will be adverted to hereinafter. While deciding the question of quid pro quo in\n\n(1)1 [979] 3 S.C .R, 1217.\n\n' ··~.\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, !.) 117\n\nrelation to the impugned fees the High Court had not the advantage of tile judgment of this Court. In that regard this judgment is a settler on tile point and we hope that the authorities and all other concerned in the matter will be guided by and follow the said decision in the matter of levy and utilisation of the market fee collected.\n\nWe shall now at the outset refer to the relevant provisions of the B Act as they stood in the year 1978 and some of the rules framed thereunder. Wherever necessary reference will be made to the unamended\n\nprovisions of the Act.\n\nIn clause (s) of s.2 of the Act \"Agricultural produce\" has been defined to mean :-\n\n\"Such items of produce of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisci-culture, animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule, and\n\nincludes admixture of two or more of such items, and also includes any such item in processed form, and further includes gur, rab, shakkar; khandsari and jaggery.\" .\n\nThe 'Board' means the State Agricultural Produce Markets Board] constituted under Section 26-A. Clause (e) defines \"commission agent\" or \"Arhatiya\" to .mean :-\n\n\"person who, in the ordinary course of business, makes or E offers to make, a purchase or sale of agricultural produce, on behalf of the owner or seller or purchaser of agricultural produce, for Arhat or commission.\"\n\nUnder clause (k) \"Market Area\" means an area notified as such under Section 6, or as modified under S.ection 9. Clause ( o) defines \"Principal\n\nMarket Yard\" to mean the portion of a Market Area, declared as such under Section 7. Clause (p) must be read in full :-\n\n\" 'Producer' means a person who, whether by himself or through hired labour, produces, rears or catches, any agricultural produce, not being a producer who also works as a trader, broker or Dalal, commission agent or Arhatiya or who is otherwise ordinarily engaged in the business of storage of agricultural produce.\n\nProvided that if a question arises as to whether any person is a producer or not for the purposes of this Act, the decision of the Director, made after an enquiry, conducted in such manner as may be prescribed, shall be final.\"\n\nUnder clause (w) \"Sub-Market Yard\" means a portion of a Market Area, declared as such under Section 7. Clause (y) defines a \"trader\"\n\nl to mean:-\n\n'.'a person who in the ordinary course of business is engaged in buying or selling agricultural produce as a principal or as a duly authorised agent of one or more principals and includes a person, engaged in processing of agricultural produce.\"\n\nAction under s.5 was takeQ by the State Government declaring its intention to regulate and control sale and purchase of agricultural\n\nproduce in any area and thereafter declaration of Market Area was -made under s.6.\n\nUnder the present impugned notification, which was issued on April II, 1978 making it effective from May I, 1978,' -almost the whole of Uttar Pradesh has been declared fo be ~Market -Area dividing it into 250 areas and indicating in Schedule B of the notification 115 commodities in respect of which the fee could be'\n\nlevied by the Market Committees. Under s.7 declarations of Principal rMarket Yards and Sub-Market Yards have been made. Most of -such areas declared so far are the markets or the Mandis where the traders are carrying on their businesses. It is proposed to establish -Principaf Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards separately in every -market area and a question of asking the traders to carry on their business only in such Market Yards is under consideration of the Government. The State Government under s.8 bas got the power to alter any market area and modify the list of agricultural produce.\n\nSection 9 provides for the effects of declaration of Market Area. Chapter III of the Act deals with the establishment, incorporation and constitution of the Market Committees. The most important section is section 17 which provides for the powers of the Committee. Clause\n\n(i) authorises 'a Committee to issue or renew licences under the Act on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed. Clause (iii) authorises a Committee to levy and collect\n\n(a) such fees as may be prescribed for the issue or renewal of licences, and (b) market fee at the rate and in the manner provided therein.\n\nG Clause (b) of section I 7(iii) has undergone drastic changes from time to time and that enabled the appellants to advance certain serious arguments to challenge the levy of the fees especially when the Rules were not correspondingly amended. We shall advert to this aspect of the matter later in this judgment at the appropriate place. Section\n\nH 19 provides for the Market Committee Fund and its utilisation. Section 19-B was introduced in the Act by U.P. Act 7 of 1978 w.e.f. 29-12-1977 providing for the establishment of 'Market Development\n\n• •\n\ni •\n\n\\ '}\n\n.... }\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, !.) 119\n\nFund' for each committee.\n\nThe rule making power of the State A Government is to be found in Section 40.\n\n- .~~\n\nFrom the Rules no provision is necessary to be specifically referred here except to point out that the State Government will be well\" advised to provide a machinery in the Rules for the adjudication of disputes which may be raised by the persons liable to pay the market B\n\nfee in relation io their factum or quantum of liability. We are not impressed with the argument advanced on behalf of the Market' Coni::'\"\n\n- mittees that no such disputes actually exist or are likely to exist whlch require any machinery of the Market Committee for its adjudication, At places hereinafter in this judgment we shall point out the nature Cir\n\ndisputes which are likely to arise and which have got to be decided in- C the first instance by a machinery of the Market Committee such as a Board or the like. It would be just and proper and also convenient for all concerned if the disputes are thereafter taken to any courr ~~ ,\n\nChapter VI of the Rules deals with levy and collection. of fees.\n\nRule 66 dealing with the levy of market fee and Rule 68 providing for its recovery on reference to the provisions of s.l 7(iii) will be alluded to hereinafter to point out the chaotic conditions in which the Rules have been left inspite of the amendment in s.17(iii)(b) of the Act.\n\nRule 67 provides for licence fee and in none of these appeals we are concerned with the question of levy or quantum of the licence fee.\n\nChapter VII deals with the transaction of business in market Yards.\n\nSeveral sets of arguments were advanced on behalf of the trade;\" appellants in the various appeals by their respective learned counsel.\n\nThree sets of arguments were advanced on behalf of the various Market Committees and a separate argument was addressed to us on behalf of the State. In some of the appeals the State and/or the Market Committees are the appellants. The points urged on behalf of the trader-appellants, although too numerous, broadly speaking are the following :-\n\n(!) Big areas consisting of towns and villages have been notified as Market Areas without rendering any service. This is contrary to the whole object of the Act and the concept of fee.\n\n(2) No market area or market yard has been validly created.\n\n(3) No Mandi Samiti (Market Committee) has been validly appointed.\n\n120 .. _\n\n(4) No machinery has been provided in the Rules for adjudication of disputes.\n\n(5) Fixation of minimum of 1 % to be charged as market fee by all the Market Committees under s.17(iii)(b) of the Act was illegal as the requirement of and the services to be rendered by the various Market Committees could not be on the same footing.\n\n(6) There was no application of mind in issuing the notification dated 11-4-1978 whereby 250 market areas were notified and 115 items of agricultural produce were specified.\n\n(7) There could not be any multi point levy of any market fee either in the same market area or in different market areas.\n\n(8) The retrospective operation of the law brought about in s.17(iii)(b) by U.P. Act 7of1978 w.e.f. 12.6.1973 is D bad ..\n\n(9) No market fee could be levied on goods not produced within the limits of a particular market area and if produced outside and brought in such area.\n\n(10) No market fee could be levied both on paddy and rice.\n\nThe rice millers have been illegally asked to pay market fee on their sale of rice. Similarly no market fee was payable on Ghee either by the producer-trader of Ghee or by its purchaser.\n\n(11) Fee could be charged on sale of animals but could not be charged on hides and skins as was being illegally done.\n\n(12) Fee could be charged on wood or timber but could not be charged either on furniture manufactured from such wood or timber or on Catechu (Katha).\n\n(13) Wood cut and brought from the jungle by a manufacturer of paper such as Star Paper Mills, Saharanpur could not be subjected to levy of fee.\n\n(14) Some of the items mentioned in the notification are Kirana goods brought from outside the market area or even from other States for sale in different Mandis.\n\nThey cannot be subjected to the levy of market fee.\n\n(15) No market fee could be charged on tobacco or Tendu leaves nor on bidis.\n\n• •\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE (UNTWALIA, /.) 121\n\n(16) No fee could be charged in a municipal area as no market committee can be constituted there nor in a Nyaya Panchayat.\n\n(17) No market fee could be charged on rab salawat and rab galawat.\n\n(18) No market fee can be charged if only goods are brought in a market area and despatched outside it without there taking place any transactions of purchase and sale in respect of these goods.\n\n(19)\n\nAny goods sold under any controlled legislation such as rice etc. cannot attract the levy of fee as there is no freedom to make any sale in respect of such commodity.\n\n(20) If no licence is issued or taken under s.9(1) of the Act then there is no liability to pay a market fee.\n\n(21) No market fee can be levied on transactions of matchboxes, soyabin products, articles sold by Kisan Products Ltd. and Pan (betel leaves).\n\n(22) No market fee can be charged from vendors of fruits and vegetables through their Commission Agents.\n\n(23) Fee can be charged only on those transactions in which the seller is producer and not on any other transaction.\n\n(24) Market fee can be charged only on those transactions in which the seller is the purchaser of agricultural produce and not on any other transaction.\n\nPoints I to 4\n\nThese four points are taken up together as there is no substance in any of them. Declaration of big areas as Market Areas does not offend any provision of law. Any area big or small including towns and villages can be declared as Market Area under s.6 of the Act.\n\nAs explained in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri (supra) the whole of the mark~ area is not meant where the traders or the licensees can be allowed to set up and carry on their business. The traders are required to take out licences under s.9(2) read with s.11 of the Act, for such place which is either a Principal Market Yard or a Sub-Market Yard or at any specified place in the Market Area. No body can be permitted to carry on his business anywhere in the Market Area as the Market Committee will not be able to control and levy fee throughout\n\nthe Market Area. The question of rendering service and its co-\n\n9-189 SCI/80\n\nA,\\\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO'RTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt..\n\n A relation to the charging of fee has been elaborately discussed in the said decision and the following principles have been culled out :-\n\n\"(l) That the amount of fee realised must be earmarked for rendering services to the licensees in the notified market area and a good and substantial portion of it must be shown to be expended for this purpose.\n\n(2) That the services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transaction of purchase or sale of the agricultural produce.\n\n(3) That while rendering services in the market area for the purpose of facilitating the transactions of purchase and sale with a view to achieve the objects of the marketing legislation it is not necessary to confer the whole ol the benefit on the licensees but some special benefit must be conferred on them which have a direct, close and reasonable co-relation between the licensees and D the transactions.\n\n- F\n\n( 4) That while conferring some special benefits on the licensee it is permissible to render such service in the market which may be in the general interest of all concerned with the transactions taking place in the market.\n\n(5) That spending the amount of market fees for the purpose of augmenting the agricultural produce, its facility of transport in villages and to provide other facilities meant mainly or exclusively for the benefit of the agriculturists is not permissible on the ground that such services in the long run go to increase the volume of transactions in the market ultimately benefitting the traders also. Such an indirect and remote benefit to the traders is in no sense a special benefit to them.\n\n(6) That the element of quid pro quo may not be possible or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical\n\n. .. exactitude bnt even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that' the .amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee.\n\n(7) At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths, must be shown\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE (UNTWALIA, J.) 123\n\nwith reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering A services of the kind mentioned above.\"\n\nAs already stated, Market Yards also have been established while issuing notifications under s.7. By and large, the Mandis where the 1raders are carrying on their business for the time being have been declared as Market Yards. When the Market Committees are able to construct. their own Market Yards, as in some places they have been able to do, then a question will arise whether a trader can be forced to go to that place only for carrying on his business in agricultural produce or he can be permitted to carry on his business in his old place. For the time being this question is left open. Market Committees have not been constituted yet in accordance with the provi- sions contained in s.13 of the Act. They have been contituted temporarily under Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samitis (Alpakalik Vyawastha) Adhiniyam, 1972 which Act was a temporary Act . and has been extended from year to year.\n\nBut it is high time that Market Committees should be constituted in a regular manner on a permanent basis in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act. But the levy and collection of fee by the temporary Market Committees is not illegal as argued on behalf of the appellants.\n\nA machinery for adjudication of disputes is necessary to be provided under the Rules for the proper functioning of the Market Committees. We have already observed and expressed our hope for 'bringing into existence such machinery in one form or the other.\n\nBut it is not correct to say that in absence of such a machinery no market fee can be levied or collected. If a dispute arises then in the first instance the Market Committee itself or any Sub-Committee appointed by it can give its finding which will be subject to challenge in any court oflaw when steps are taken for enforcement of the provisions for reali- sation of the market fee.\n\n~ Point No. 5\n\nUnder clause (b) of s.17(iii) of the Act a minimum and maximum 1imit of market fee chargeable has been fixed by the legislature. The minimum iFt I% and the maximum is It% of the price of the agricultural produce sold. The fixing of the minimum of I % fee by itself is not illegal but it would be subject to the rendering of adequate services as explained by this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri's case. The facts placed before the High Court as also before us were too meagre to indicate that services to the extent of the fee levied at I % are not .being rendered. In Puri's case we upheld the levy of market fee at 2 % on the value of the goods sold. But there we found that the\n\n, E\n\nMarket Committees were rendering greater services than are being rendered by the Market Co=ittees of Uttar Pradesh. Yet charging of 1 % fee as is being charged throughout the State ofUttar Pradesh\n\nby all the Market Committees is not illegal and does not go beyond the quid pro quo theory discussed in Puri's case.\n\nPoint No. 6\n\nIt is difficult to understand the significance of this point. The notification dated 11-4-1978 indicates that in the various Districts, the number of which is about 55, 250 Market Committees have been. constituted and about 115 items have been selected in respect of which market fee has been directed to be levied. None of the items so specified is such that it cannot be covered by the Schedule which is a part of.the Act. The definition of agricultural produce is very wide. It is not confined to items of agricultural produce only but includes items of produce of horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest. Such items are specified iu the Act which is undoubtedly a part of the Act. That being so challenge to the notificatiou dated 11-4-1978 on the ground that it was issued without any application of mind is devoid of any substance and must be rejected.\n\nPoint No. 7\n\nIt is clear and it was expressly conceded to on behalf of the Market Committees and the State that there cannot be any multi point levy of market fee in the same market area. The reason is obvious. Section 17(iii)(b), as amended by U.P. Act 7 of 1978 reads as follows:-\n\n\"market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one percentum and not more than one and half percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such fee shall be realised in the following manner-\n\n... (!) if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall te liable to pay the same to th<e Committee;\n\n(2) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer the trader shall ce liable to pay the market fee to the._ Committee;\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE (UNTWALIA, J.) 125\n\n(3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling.the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; and ( 4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee.\"\n\nAll the four clauses of clause (b) are mutually exclusive. If the produce is purchased from a producer directly the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee in accordance with sub-clause (2).\n\nBut if the trader sells the same produce or any product of the same produce to another trader neither the seller-trader nor the purchasertrader can be made to pay the market fee under sub-clause (3). So far the position was not disputed by the Market Committees, rather it was conceded, and in our opinion, rightly. But some difficulty .arises in regard to the products of the agricultural produce which has been subjected to the levy of market fee.\n\nThis will be relevant when we come to consider the various agricultural produce in respect -0f which challenge was made on the ground that it amounts to multi point levy. At this stage we may explain our view point by taking a few examples from the Schedule appended to the Act. Wheat, an .agricultural produce, is mentioned under the heading 'Cereals'. Suppose the transaction of wheat, namely, wheat purchased from a prodn- cer by a trader has been subjected to levy of market fee under s.l 7(iii) (b)(2) no further levy of market fee in the same market area could be made, not even on wheat flour if flour were to be included in the Schedule. The better example can be found in the items under the heading 'Animal Husbandry Products' wherein iu the Schedule milk and Ghee both are mentioned. Milk, of course, is not mentioned in the notification dated 11-4-1978. But if it would have been mentioned then only the transaction of milk in a particular market area could be snbjected to levy of fee and Ghee manufactured from milk could not be so subjected. But since milk is not mentioned in the notification the transaction of Ghee can be subjected to the levy of fee in accordance with the principle to be discussed hereinafter. The greater difficulty arises with respect to paddy aud rice as both of them are mentioned in the Schedule as well as in)he'.notification. We shall show hereinafter that in a particular market area market fee can not be levied both in relation to the transaction of purchase and sale of paddy and the rice produced from the same paddy. Fee can be charged only on one transaction. This finds support from the unamended Rules as they are, wherein is to be found sub-r.(2) of Rule {)6. But we find nothing in the provisions of the Act or the Rules to\n\nB ,\n\nc !.\n\nF , .\n\nG l\n\nwarrant the taking of the view that in another market area the Market Committee of that area cannot levy fee on a fresh transaction of sale and purchase taking place in that area. Supposing the Wheat is purchased in market area X by a trader from a producer, fee will be chargeable under s.l 7(iii)(b )(2). If the same Wheat is taken to another market area say Y and another transaction of sale and purchase takes place there between a trader and a trader the market fee will be leviable under sub-clause (3). It is also not correct to say that the agricultural produce must have been produced in the market area in which the first levy is made. It might have been produced in another market area or even outside the State of Uttar Pradesh but if a transaction of sale and purchase takes place of an agricultural produce as defined in the Act and covered by the notification within a particular market area then fee can be charged in relation to the said transaction.\n\nPoint No. 8\n\nIn order to appreciate the implication of this point we have first to read and compare the provisions of s.17(iii)(b) of the Act as they D stood before 1973, between 1973 and 1978 and after the amendment by Act 7 of 1978. The provision as enacted in U.P. Act XXV of\n\n1964 read as follows :-\n\n\"17. A Committee shall, for the purposes of this Act, have the power to :-\n\n(iii) levy and collect:\n\n(b) market fees on transactions of sale or purchase of specified agricultural produce in the Principal Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards from such persons and at such rates as may be prescribed, but not exceeding onehalf percentum of the price of the specified agricultural produce sold or purchased therein;\"\n\nThe Rules which were framed in 1965 prescribed the rates of and the liability of the persons to pay the market fee. The relevant provision of Rules 66 and 68 are quoted below :-\n\n\"66. Market fee-Section 17(iii)-(1) The Market Committee shall have the power to levy and collect fees on the specified agricultural produce brought and sold in the Market Yards at such rates as may be specified in the byelaws but not exceeding one-half of one percentum of the price of the specilied agricultural produce :\n\nProvided that the market fee shall be payable by the seller.\n\n·~\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. U. P. STATE (UNTWALIA, J.)\n\n68. ''Recovery of fees-Section l 7(iii)-(l) The market fee on specified agricultural produce shall be payable as soon as such produce is sold in the Principal Market Yard or Sub-Market Yards in accordance with the terms of and conditions specified in the bye-laws.\n\n(2) The market fee shall be realized from the seller in the following manner :-\n\n(i) If the specified agricultural produce is sold through the Commission agent or directly to the trader, the Commission agent or the trader, as the case may be, shall charge market fee from the seller in sale voucher in Form No. VI and deposit the amount of market fee so realised with the Market Committee in accordance with the directions of the Committee issued in this behalf.\n\n(ii) If the specified agricultural produce is sold directly by the seller to the consumer, the market fee shall be realised by the servant of the Market Committee authorized by it in this behalf.\n\n(3) The licence fee shall ce paid along with the application for licence:\n\nProvided that in case the Market Committee refuses to issue a licence, the fee depcsited by the applicant shall be refunded to him.\n\n( 4) The payment of market fee and licence fee shall be made to the Ccmmittee in cash.\"\n\nIt would thus ce seen that before 1973, reading the provisions of the Act and the Rules, market fee was to be charged at such rates as specified in the bye-laws of a particnlar Market Committee.: But it could not exceedlJ /2 percentum of the price of the agricultural produce.\n\nWe were informed,'at the Bar that almosteveryMarketCommittee'had levied fees @ 1 /2 %. The liability to pay the fee was of the seller of the agricultural prcduce. Market. fee was liable to be paid under Rule 68(2)(ii) even if the specified agricultural produce was sold directly. by the seller to the consumer. This provision has been superseded\n\nnow by an amendment in the Act brought about by U.P. Act 19of1979, whereby a provirn to the following effect has been added to section~ J7(iii)(b) :-\n\n\"Provided that no market fee shall be levied or collected R on the retail sale of any specified agricultural produce where such sale is made to the consumer.\"\n\nClause (b) of section 17(iii) was amended by U.P. Act 13of11973 as re-enacted by U.P. Act 20 of 1974. Tb.e said clause stood as follows after the said amendment :-\n\n\"(b) market fees, which shall be payable by purchasers, on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the Principal Market Yard or a Sub-Market Yard at such rates, being not less than one percentum and not more than one-and-a-half percentum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification in the Gazette;\"\n\nIt would be noticed that by the said amendment in clause (bl the minimum rate fixed was 1 percentumand the maximum 1-1/2 percentum and the liability to pay the fee became that of the p'.lrchaser instead of the seller as prescribed earlier by the Rules. Yet the Rules continued as they were.\n\nNonetheless it is plain that after the amendment in the D Statute, Rules could apply only mutatis mutandis and wherever there was a conflict between the Rules and the Statute the latter had to prevail.\n\n1 B\n\nIn passing, reference may be made to the substitution of the words market area in place of the words \"Principal Market Yard or the Sub-Market Yards\" occurring in clause (b) by U.P. Act 6 of 1977 w.e.f. 20-12-1976. We have already adverted to this aspect of the matter and pointed out that transactions cannot take place in whole of the market area and although theortically fee (is chargeable in the whole of the area now but actually the Rules and especially the Explanation to Rule 66 indicate that the transactions do take place in the Principal Market Yard or Market Yards or some specified place or places in a particular market area. T:1en came the amended section l 7(iii)(b) of U.P. Act 7 of 1978, which had already been extracted above and it was made retrospective w.e.f. 12-6-1973. Under the present provision a liability to pay the fee is under four mutually exclusive clanses. The Rules which were framed in !965 namely Rules 66 and 68 are so very different from the present provision of law that we had to express our distress in the beginning of this judgment for the failure of the Government to amend the Rules and bring it in cJnformity with the amended provisions of the Statute from time to time. Any way, the Rules will apply as far as possible so long they do not come in conflict with the Statute and even without the aid of the Rules the provision in section J7(iii)(b) as it stands after the amendment broughtabout by U.P. Act 7 of 1978 is workable and can be given effect to. The\n\n( _....\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. p, STATE (Untwalia, J.) 129\n\nState legislature was competent to make retrospective amendment vide B. Banerjee v. Anita:Pan(I) and M/s.'.S. K.:G. SugarjLtd. v.Stare:o;:Bihar\n\nand Ors.(2). It has also been pointed out in H. H. Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu Religious & 1Charitable Endowments, Mysore(3) at pages 324-25 that retrospective imposition of a fee is valid. Of course, this cannot be a rule of universal application.\n\nIn a given case and in a given situation the retrospective operation may be hit by Article 19.\n\nBut in the present case we are inclined to take the view that the retrospectivity of the law as such is not bad and the only safeguard which we want to point out is this. If [market fee has been realised by any Market Committee in rosNct of transactions of sale of agricultural produce taking place between 12-6-1973 and comjng into force of U.P. Act 7 of 1978, in accordance with the law as it prevailed then, no market fee under the amended law can be realised again. .. But if in respect of any transactions aforesaid market fee has not yet 'been realised then it can be realised in accordance with the am, nded provision of the law. The only hardship will be to persons covered by sub-clauses (1) and (3) wherein a provision has been made to pass on the burden of fee to others. In the case of sub-clause (I) the commission agent can realise the market fee from the purchaser and the seller-trader under sub-clause (3) can realise it from the purchaser.\n\nIf market fees are realised from such persons in accordance with the amended provision of the law then in turn they may be able to realise it from persons on whom they could pass on the burden. We are not disposed to hold the law bad only on that acount.\n\nPoint No. 9\n\nWe have already alluded to this aspect of the matter earlier in our judgment and taken the view that market fee could be levied on transactions of goods not produced within the limits of a particular market area by the Market Committee of that area even though the goods .are produced outside the State of Uttar Pradesh or outside the market area of that particular Market Committee provided the transactions take place within the limits of that Market area.\n\nOn the other hand we find no provision in the Act or the Rules to limit the operation of the law in a particular market area only in respect of the agricultural produce produced in that area.\n\nPoint No. 10\n\nApropos this point attention is first to be focussed on the definition of the word 'producer' in clause (p) and 'trader' in clause (y) of\n\nti) (1975] 2 S.C.R. 777 f2) (1975] I S.C.R. 312. ,(3) [!96J] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 302.\n\nsection 2 of the Act which have already been quoted. A producer who produces agricultural produce generally does not indulge in trading activities so as to become a : trader within the meaning of clause (y).\n\nHe is covered by clause (p) only.\n\nIf a person is simply a trader indulging in trading activities he is covered by the definition in clause (y). We have coined the expression producer-trader for a person who is both a producer of agricultural produce and himself trades in it. For the purposes of the Act he ceases to be a producer aud becomes a trader only as the definition indicates. While discussing the question of levy of market fee on paddy and rice this aspect of the matter is important and therefore we thought it appropriate to highlight it at this stage. By and large in the notification dated 1April 11,\n\n1978 there is hardly any duplication of any item of agricultural produce.\n\nAs for example, under Group D Animal'Husbandry Products,'milk has . . . been omitted although it is to be found in the Schedule appended to the 1 Act. From milk can be prepared Ghee or Khoya and items 1 and 2\" in Group D are the said articles. Hides and Skins can be had rrrom the animals, so wool is obtained from the sheep. But in case of paddy andj rice mentioned as items 3 and 4 in Group A-I \"Cereals\", there is a duplication as rice is obtained from paddy. We would, therefore, like to\n\nclarify the position of law in this regard.\n\nIf paddy is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller and the same paddy is converted into rice and sold then the rice miller will he liable to pay market fee on his purchase of paddy from the agriculturist-producer under subclause (2) of section l 7(iii)(b ).\n\nHe cannot be asked to pay market fee over again under sub-clause (3) in relation to the transaction of rice.\n\nNor will it be open to the Market Committee to choose between either of the two in the example just given. l Market fee has to be levied and collected in relation to the transaction of paddy alone. [Otherwise, there will be a risk of violation of Article 14 ifit is left to the sweet-will of the Market Committee in the case of some rice mi!lers to charge market fee on the transaction of paddy and in case of others to charge it when the sale of rice takes place. If, however, paddy is brought by the rice-miller from another market area, then the Market Committee\n\nof the area where paddy is converted into rice and sold will be entitled to charge market fee on the transaction of sale in accordance with sub-clause (3). We now take the example of a producer-trader who is an agriculturist and produces paddy in his own field but owns a rice mill also in the same market area. He mills the paddy grown by him into rice and sells it as such. It is plain that in his case no market fee can be charged on paddy because there is no transaction of sale and purchase of paddy and market fee can be charged only on the sale of rice by him in accordance with sub-clause (3) and he will be entitled to\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, J.) 131\n\npass on the burden to his purchaser. Disputes of facts were raised before us as to whether paddy had been subjected to the charge of market fee or not and whether the same paddy has been milled into rice.\n\nWe did not enter into this disputed question of fact, and as observed above, after clarifying the law we direct the Market Committees to levy market fee in the light of this Judgment. It will he open to any trader to go to the High Court again, if necessary, for the redress of his grievance iu connection with a disputed question which may arise even after our Judgment.\n\nIn relation to the transactions of Ghee we had two types of dealers before m-(1) a dealer who purchases milk or cream from the villagers and others and manufactures Ghee in his plant and (2) a dealer who purchases such Ghee from the manufacturer of Ghee and sells it to another trader in the same market area. The first dealer will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within the meaning of the Act and at the same time a trader in Ghee also. When he sells Ghee to another dealer in Ghee who is simply a dealer then under sub-clause (3) of section 17(iii)(b) the manufacturing dealer will be liable to pay market fee to the Market Committee on the transaction of Ghee. But he will be entitled to pass on the burden to his purchaser.\n\nApropos the Market Committee, however, the liability will be of the manufacturing dealer. If milk, butter or cream would have been included in the notification then the charging of fee in relation to the first transaction of sale and purchase of such commodities would have been attracted in the light of the principle of law we have enunciated above with reference to paddy and rice.\n\nBut in the case of Group D such commodities are not mentioned in the notification.\n\nPoint No. 11\n\nAn attempt was made on behalf of the Hides and Skins dealers to show that hides and skins cannot be an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act. They are obtained from the carcass of an animal and not from a living animal. Argument stressed was that under group Gin the Schedule appended to the Act Animal Husbandry Products only can come. Item 11 Hides and Skins, item 12 bones, item 13 meat etc. are not products of Animal Husbandry. Some authoritative books were cited before us on \"Words and Phrases\" to show the meaning of 'Animal', 'Husbandry' and 'Animal Husbandry'. Animal Husbandry means that branch of agriculture which is concerned with farm animals especially as regards breeding, care and production.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument. The definition clause (a) of It section 2 uses the expression 'animal husbandry' by way of a descriptive one without strictly confining to.the products of animal husbandry\n\nas the addition of the words \"specified in the schedule\" indicates. In the schedule under the \"group 'husbandry products' are mentioned all these items. We may also add that one may breed and rear animals in a }arm for the purpose of obtaining hides and skins after they are butchered.\n\nMarket fee is, therefore, leviable on the transactions of hides and skins as no market fee can be charged on transactions of sale and pnrchase of animals in a'markefarea in the State of Uttar Pradesh the same having not been included in the notification. Had it bee~ included in the notification, then no market fee could be charged in the same market area on hides and skins. It could only be charged in relation to the transaction of purchase and sale of animals.\n\nPoint No. 12\n\nFor discussing this point we have to refer to group E of the notification dated 11-4-1978 which deals with forest products. The items mentioned in the said group are(!) Gum, (2) Wood, (3) Tendu leaves,\n\n(4) Catechu and (5) Lac. Market fee can be charged on purchase of wood by a trader from a producer. No fee can be charged on the sale of furniture manufactured by the purchaser of wood. It was also gonceded on behalf of the Market Committees that market fee was not being charged on the sale of furniture. If it has been so charged it will be refunded. Furniture is not an item mentioned in the group of forest products. Therefore, this question does not present any difficulty at all. Difficulty cropped up in relation to the charging of market fee apropos the transaction of Catechu. According to the Market Committees Catechu is a product from timber or trees like Gum or Lac.\n\nIt trickles down from the trees. On the other hand, according to the Catechu dealers by processing of Khar trees Catechu is produced. We leave this question of fact to be deciqed by the Market Committees concerned in the first instance and then by a court of law. If Catechu is a product of Khar trees by some processing as prima facie it appears I to us to be so, then it is plain that market fee can be charged only on the purchase of Khar wood and not on the sale of Catechu.\n\nPoint No. 13 This item presented some difficulty in solution. A licence is granted to a Paper Mill and to other kinds of dealers for cutting wood from the jungle and bringing it to their factories for manufacture of various articles such as paper etc. It was argued that there was no transaction of sale and purchase involved in the above operation. Moreover the wood is cut from the jungle area which although has been roped in the market area but no service is rendered in that jungle area by any Market\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, J.) 133\n\nCommittee. In our opinion in the licence is involved sale of wood and a right to go to that land to cut that wood. The wood may be used by the manufacturer for manufacturing. furniture or may be used in the manufacture of paper or any other commodity. That is immaterial.\n\nThe owner of the jungle wherefrom the wood is cut and brought will be a producer within the meaning of the Act and the licensee-producer of that wood would be a purchaser of an agricultural produce within the meaning of sub-clause (2) of section l 7(iii)(b) of the Act liable to pay market fee. It matters little what use is made of the wood by him.\n\nThe question of quid pro quo and service cannot be decided by a dichotomy of service to every payer of fee as held by this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri's case. The matter has to be judged in a broad sense and not in the sense of rendering service to every individual payer of the fee.\n\nP1Jint No. 14\n\nThis point also presented some difficulty. But on a parity of reasoning mentioned so far in connection with the other items, we have got to hold that such Kirana goods as are included in the notification brought from outside a particular market area or even from outside the State of Uttar Pradesh are chargeable to market fee when their sale takes place in a particular .market area. In group A-VI Spices are mentioned including certain Kirana items such as Ripe Chillies, Sonf,\n\nturmeric etc. They are sold by the Kirana dealers. Sometimes they purchase them from the agriculturists in the same market area. In relation to those transactions they will be liable to pay market fee under ·\n\nsub-clause (2) of section l 7(iii)(b ). More often than not such articles are brought from outside and sold by the Kirana merchants. If they are sold to consumers, no market fee can be levied in view of the proviso added in the year 1979. If they are sold in wholesale, then the transaction can be subjected to the levy of market fee because in a particular market area they enter into the first transaction of sale in respect of the specified agricultural produce.\n\nPoint No. 15\n\nMarket fee can be charged on transaction of tobacco as it is included in groupA-V of the notification. As in the case of other items so in this case also the fee will be leviable if tobacco is purchased in the same market area from an agriculturist in accordance with sub-clause (2). Otherwise it would be leviable under sub-clause (3). Similar is the position in regard to tendu leaves which is mentioned in group E.\n\nBidi cannot be treated as an agricultural produce as it is not an admix: ture of tobacco and tendu leaves within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Act. It was conceded on behalf of the Market Committees that no market fee was being charged on the transactions of Bi di.· But\n\nif a Bidi manufacturer purchases tobacco and tendu leaves in the market area and uses them in the rnannfacture of Bidi, he will be liable to pay market fee in relation to the transaction of tobacco and tendu leaves.\n\nPoint No. 16\n\nThis point has been stated merely to be rejected. There is no snbstance in this point Our attention was drawn to some provisions in the municipal Acts and the Zila Parishad Acts to show that no market committee could be constituted in a municipal area or a Nyaya Panchayat.\n\nWe do not consider it necessary to deal with this point in any detail. We merely reject it as being devoid of any substance.\n\nPoint No. 17 Gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery are expressly include& in the definition of agricultural produce given in clause (a) of section 2 of the Act. We are here concerned with the question as to whether rab galawat and rab salawat are rab within the meaning of section 2(a) or are bye-products of molasses received at the time of manufacture of khandsari. According to the case of some of the appellants who deal in these commodities they are the bye-products and market fee has already been charged on rab and therefore the fee cannot be charged again on rab galawat and rab salawat. Disputes of facts were raised in this connection before us on behalf of the Market Committees.\n\nOn the materials placed before us it was clear to us that rab galawat \\. and rab salawat cannot be subjected to a.separate charge of market fee apart from the transaction ofrab. Market fee can be levied on the first transaction of rab taking place in any market area in accordance with any of the sub-clauses of section 17 (iii) (b), as it may be applicable.\n\nIt cannot be again charged on the second transaction of rab galawat or rab salawat even assuming that it is rab. But on the materials placed before us it appeared to us that rab galawat and rab salawat are not rab in the original form but they are obtained at one stage or the .. ~- other in the process of manufacture of khandsari. Any way the question of fact may be decided as we have indicated in respect of the other items in the first instance by the Market Committee and thereafter by the High Court, if necessary, in a fresh writ petition. It will bear :re petition to say that the only transaction which can be subjected to levy ,.. of market fee in a particular market area is the first transaction of rab _. and no other transaction of rab galawat and rab salawat.\n\nPoint No. 18\n\nThis point urged on behalf of the appellants is well founded and must be accepted as correct. On the very wordings of clause (b) of\n\n' RAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, J.)' 135\n\n-section l 7(iii) market fee is payable on transactions of sale of spcifbd\n\nagricultural produce in the market area and if no transaction of sale 'takes place in a particular market area no fee can b~ charged by the Market Committee of that area .\n\nIf goods are merely brought in any market area and are despatched .outside it without any transaction of sale taking place therein, then no market fee can be charged. If the bringing of the goods in a parti- .cular market area and their despatch therefrom are as a result of transactions of purchase and sale taking place outside the market area, it is plain that no fee can be levied.\n\nl'oint No. 19\n\nThis point has no substance and has got to b~ rejected. As held in Vi$hnu Agencie• (Pvt.) Ltd. etc. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. etc.(1) on a review of earlier decisions even if a commodity is sold pursuant •to the controlled regulations still some small area is left to make it a\n\nc .\n\ntransaction of sale. It may well be that no freedom is left to the parties D .in a large area of the transaction yet it is a transaction of sale .\n\n. Point No. 20\n\nThis point also must be rejected. A pure and simple producer as .defined in clause (p) of section 2 is not required to take any licence for selling his agricultural produce nor is he required to pay market fee under any of the sub-clauses of section I7(iii)(b). But if he is a pro- ducer-trader in the sense we have explained above, then he will be re- . quired to take out a licence in accordance with s. 9(2) of the Act and no body can be permitted to carry on any trade in agricultural prodnce in the market area without a valid licence. Merely for his lapse of not taking out a licence he cannot escape the liability to pay the market fee.\n\nMarket fee will still be chargeable from the trader, as, in s. 17(iii)(b) it is not stated that market fee can be charged only from the licensees.\n\nThe proviso to clause (p) of s. 2 will be attracted only if a question arises as to whether any person is a producer or not for the purposes of the . Act and in that event the decision of the Director made after Jan inquiry conducted in the manner prescribed by the rules shall be final. The proviso has nothing to do with a case of a producer-trader. If a question arises whether a person is merely a producer or producer-trader the Director will have no power to decide this question. Such a question will have to be decided by the Market Committee itself which will be subject to the final decision of a court of law.\n\n\n136 SUPREME COURT REPo; us\n\n\nIn support of the argument reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in Raunaq Rom Tara Chand & Ors. etc. v. The State of Punjab & Ors.(l). But that case is distinguishable because of the\n\nlanguage of rules 29 an<l;3fof the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Rules framed in accordance with the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. Both the rules aforesaid clearly stated that the: fee could be charged from the licensees only. Not only that even the charging section 23 of the Act itself stated :-\"a Committee may, subject to such rules as: may be. made by the State Goverrment in this behalf, llevy on ad valorem basis fees on the agricultural produce brought or sol<! by licensees in the notififd market area at a rate not exceeding rupee one fifty paise for eve1y one hundred rupees, provided ...... \" On the. other hand in section 17 (iii) (b) of the U.P. Act and Rules 66 and 68 of the Rules charging of market fee in terms is not found to be chargeable from the [licensees only. The traders cannot escape their lia~ bility to pay the fee on account of their default of taking out licences.\n\nPoint No. 21 This point is also well founded and must be accepted as comect ...\n\nMarket fee can be charged only on the transactions of purchase of wood and if a manufacturer of match-sticks purchases wood from the prGducer for the purposes of manufacturing the sticks he will be required to pay market fee on such purchase of wood only and not on the sale of match-sticks or match boxes. Similarly market fee will be leviable on the transaction of purchase of soya bin and not on transaction of sale of soyabin products. Exactly the same will be the position with regard to the articles sold by Kisan P1 oducts Ltd. and the sale of Pan. Agricultural produce purchased by the dealers: will be chargeable to market fee and not the sale of the products after one kind of processing or the other.\n\nPoint No. 22\n\nUnder this head the sutmission on behalf of the fruit and vegetable merchants was that they biing their products to the market and sell them in wholesale through their commission agents. No market fee, therefore, should be charged from them. In our opinion the argument so placed on behalf of the merchants is misconceived. Under\n\nrnb-clame (!)of s. 17(iii)(b) of the Act when fruits and vegetables are sold through a commission agent by the producer then the Commission agent is liable to pay the market fee and he can realise it from the purchaser of fruits ar.d vcgctables. The burden doe.s not fall on the producer. The liability in the first instance is of the commission agent and finally of the purchaser of the articles.\n\n(!) [1976] I S.C.R. I.\n\n\\__ I\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, !.)\n\nPoint No. 23\n\nPoint No. 24\n\nReliance was placed urcn a decision of the Mysore High Court (now Karnataka) in the case of K. N. Mardaradhya v. The Mysore .\n\nState(l) but the vit w taktn by the [Myrnre High Ccurt was dissented from by the Patna HiEh Court in the case of Manga/chand Ramchandra\n\nB \" and others etc. etc. v. State of Bihar(2). One of us (Untwalia J,) delivering the judEm<rt of the Patna High Court stated at page 1053 thus :\n\n\"At this stage I would diScuss a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court on which great reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners in support of their contention that no fee can be levied on transaction of buyirg ar.d\n\nselling between a dealer and a dealer even though such transactions take place within the market area or the market proper. The decision of the Mysore High Court is in the case of K. N. Marudaradhya v. The Mysore State\n\nA.I.R. 1970, Mysore 114. At page 126 (column 2) from paragraph 33 starts the discussion on the point at issue.\n\nTo the extent the decision goes to hold that the purchase in respect of which the fee could be levied or collected is the earliest purchase, that is to say, the fee can be levied only on one purchase and not on subsequent purchases, with respect .I am inclined to agree with that view expressed in paragraphs 33 to 38. But while discussing the point, Iyer J., has confined this earliest purchase of the agricultural produce belonging to the producer only. There does not\n\nseem to be a pointed discussion of the question whether the first purcha<e frcm a dealer could be subjected to levy or not. But by necessary implication, as I read the judgment, it seems, their Lordships of the Mysore High Court took the view that such a deal cannot be subjected to the levy of fee.\n\nWith great respect, in that regard, I strike my note of dissent from the view expressed by the Mysore High Court. Firstly, merely because the object of tlte\n\nlegislation is the protection of t1'e agriculturist, the plain meaning of the section cannot be cut down. Secondly, they have relied upon the practice prevailing around the area under different State •tatutes \"-• mentioned in paragraph 36. If I may say with respect, law could not be so\n\n(!) A.I.R. [1970) Mysore 114.\n\n(2) [19711 B. L. J. R. 1038.\n\n19-189SCI/80\n\n1)1\n\n138 SUi'REME COURT REPOOlTS {198-0J 3 s:c.R.\n\ndecided on the blsis of any p'actico. Of C)urse, th! interpretation given to the Statute can be suppDrted by nfoNnce to practice. Thirdly, I am in; lin~ to think th1t the Supreme Court decision in the ca9C of Kis/11111 Coco/fut Company does not lend supp)rt to the limited view expreseed by tire Mysore High Court.\n\nWe approve of the Patna view and in the setu[l of the U.P. Act al'c:r\n\nan elaborate discussion we hw! pJinted oat as to in wlnt kln:I of transaction who is liable to p1y the muket fee. In tlle U. P. Act even traders under certain circumstancos llave been m1de liable to ply such fees. Similarly the argument that market fee can be charged I only on those transactions in which the seller is the producer of a.gricultural produce and not on any other transaction is also devoid of any substance.\n\nConclusions For the reasons stated above, we hold that market fee should be regularised and be charged in the light of this Judgment. If anytlling has been realised from the traders or any other person which goes contrary to this Judgment the same should be refunded by the Market Committee concerned within six months from today. Tb.is may not be treated as a precedent for all cases of this type. The form of the order in relation to the refund of the market fee may vary from case to case depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Market fee due from the traders in the light 0f this judgement should also be charged and paid withi.n a perird of six months from . today.\n\nIf there is any disputed question of fact to be decided by the Market Committee then it should be decided as quickly as possible leaving the person concerned to agitate the matter in a court of law, preferably in the High Court, within a short time thereafter. The High Court will proc:eed to decide the matter in the light of our Judgment.\n\nWe do hope that services are being rendered and will continue to be rendered by the various Market Committees in the light of the Judgment of this Co art in Kewal Krishan Puri's case. If in regard to any particular Market Committee it is found that services are not being rendered or in future lapses are made then it will be open to the pryers cf fees to reagitate the matter in the High court in the light of that judgment.\n\nFor the reasons stated above the appinls an<\\ writ petitions are partly allowed and partly dismissed in the manner indicated above.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs in any of them.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals and petitions partly allowed.\n\n.A:\n\n~ li,. \"li\n\n.~ )", "total_entities": 188, "entities": [{"text": "RAMESH CHANDRA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMESH CHANDRA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. 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levying of the fee in relation to transactions of certain commodities in the State of Uuar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1807, "end_char": 1811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3192, "end_char": 3201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3224, "end_char": 3233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3361, "end_char": 3370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3609, "source": "regex", 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"By a State Government notification, which was issued on April fl, 1978 making it effective from May l, 1978, almost the whole of Uttar Pradesh had been declared to be a Market Area, dividing it into 250 areas and indicating in Schedule 8 of the Notification 115 commodities in respect of which the fee could be levied by the Market Committees."}}, {"text": "Schedule 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4958, "end_char": 4968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5140, "end_char": 5149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various traders carrying on business in the State of Uttar Pradesh within the jurisdiction of several Market Committees challenged the levy of fee in the High Court from time to time."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6412, "end_char": 6417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11-4-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6643, "end_char": 6652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no application of mind in issuing the notification dated 11-4-1978 whereby 250 market areas were notified and 115 items of agricul tural produce were specified."}}, {"text": "s. 17(ili)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6931, "end_char": 6944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12-6-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6974, "end_char": 6983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12-6-1973 was bad."}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8412, "end_char": 8419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9130, "end_char": 9134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9213, "end_char": 9219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9230, "end_char": 9234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9658, "end_char": 9663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 S.C.R. 1217", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10216, "end_char": 10236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10429, "end_char": 10439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10934, "end_char": 10938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "123 G]\n\n(ii) The charging of 1 % fee throughout the State of Uttar Pradesh 1iy all the market Committees is not illegal and does not go beyond the quid\n\npra qua theory discussed in Puri's case. ["}}, {"text": "S. 17(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11617, "end_char": 11627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "None of the items so specified is such that it cannnt be covered by the Schedule which is a part of the Act", "statute": "None of the items so specified is such that it cannnt be covered by the Schedule which is a part of the Act"}}, {"text": "Rules could apply only mutatia F mutandis and wherever there was a conflict between the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13213, "end_char": 13306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13574, "end_char": 13584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules could apply only mutatia F mutandis and wherever there was a conflict between the Rules", "statute": "Rules could apply only mutatia F mutandis and wherever there was a conflict between the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 17(ili)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14041, "end_char": 14056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules could apply only mutatia F mutandis and wherever there was a conflict between the Rules", "statute": "Rules could apply only mutatia F mutandis and wherever there was a conflict between the Rules"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15757, "end_char": 15767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16047, "end_char": 16058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ghee", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16559, "end_char": 16563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "130 F-GJ\n\n(iv) In transactions of Ghee, a dealer who purchases milk or cream G from the villagen and others and manufactures Ghee in his plant will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within tho meaning of the Act and at the same time a trader in Ghee also."}}, {"text": "Section 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16908, "end_char": 16926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ghee in his plant will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within tho meaning of the Act", "statute": "Ghee in his plant will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within tho meaning of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ghee in his plant will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within tho meaning of the Act", "statute": "Ghee in his plant will be liable to pay market fee because he is the producer of Ghee within tho meaning of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 17(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19126, "end_char": 19141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kewal Krishan Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19357, "end_char": 19375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question of quid pro quo and service cannot be decided by a dichotomy of service to every payer of fee as held in Kewal Krishan Puri's case."}}, {"text": "section 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19849, "end_char": 19867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20625, "end_char": 20637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21066, "end_char": 21084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21670, "end_char": 21679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21822, "end_char": 21837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22145, "end_char": 22149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23289, "end_char": 23302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26534, "end_char": 26554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. NQ>s. 5521, 4982, 5001, 4447/78, 4454, 2311, 5134, 3826, 4409, 4020, 5144, 5728, 5002, 4455/78, 6948, 4665, 4560, 4666, 4985,4449, 5540,4823,4619, 5150, 4588, 4593,4926,4947, 4948, 5012, 5062, 5088, 5089, 5191, 5539, 5106, 5097, 4833, 4911, 1398, 2114, 2515, 898/78, 5071, 5454, 5592, 5072, 5034, 4149, 5153, 5169, 5734/78, 4947/ 76, 5533/78, 3299/77, 4943, 4629/78 & 5194, 5195, 5196/79."}}, {"text": "s. 5521, 4982, 5001, 4447", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26566, "end_char": 26591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27138, "end_char": 27148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27172, "end_char": 27185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, R. F. Nariman and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellants G in CA Nos.", "canonical_name": "F. S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "R. F. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27187, "end_char": 27200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, R. F. Nariman and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellants G in CA Nos.", "canonical_name": "F. S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27205, "end_char": 27219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, R. F. Nariman and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellants G in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "S. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27271, "end_char": 27282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nS. P. Gupta, H.K. Puri, V. K. Bahl and Miss Madhu Moo/chandani for the Appellants in CAs 1841 to 1846, 2426 to 2428, 929, 1007 to\n\n1009, 1630, 2169 to 2172 and 1635."}}, {"text": "H.K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27284, "end_char": 27293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nS. P. Gupta, H.K. Puri, V. K. Bahl and Miss Madhu Moo/chandani for the Appellants in CAs 1841 to 1846, 2426 to 2428, 929, 1007 to\n\n1009, 1630, 2169 to 2172 and 1635.", "canonical_name": "H. K. Puri"}}, {"text": "V. K. Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27295, "end_char": 27305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nS. P. Gupta, H.K. Puri, V. K. Bahl and Miss Madhu Moo/chandani for the Appellants in CAs 1841 to 1846, 2426 to 2428, 929, 1007 to\n\n1009, 1630, 2169 to 2172 and 1635."}}, {"text": "Madhu Moo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27315, "end_char": 27324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nS. P. Gupta, H.K. Puri, V. K. Bahl and Miss Madhu Moo/chandani for the Appellants in CAs 1841 to 1846, 2426 to 2428, 929, 1007 to\n\n1009, 1630, 2169 to 2172 and 1635.", "canonical_name": "Madhu Moo/"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27438, "end_char": 27452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. B. Pai, Mrs. Saran Mahajan, Mr. Arvind B Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind and R. K. Sinha for the Appellants in CA\n\nlfos."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27454, "end_char": 27463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. B. Pai, Mrs. Saran Mahajan, Mr. Arvind B Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind and R. K. Sinha for the Appellants in CA\n\nlfos."}}, {"text": "Saran Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27470, "end_char": 27483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. B. Pai, Mrs. Saran Mahajan, Mr. Arvind B Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind and R. K. Sinha for the Appellants in CA\n\nlfos."}}, {"text": "Arvind B Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27489, "end_char": 27503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. B. Pai, Mrs. Saran Mahajan, Mr. Arvind B Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind and R. K. Sinha for the Appellants in CA\n\nlfos."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Arvind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27510, "end_char": 27524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. B. Pai, Mrs. Saran Mahajan, Mr. Arvind B Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind and R. K. Sinha for the Appellants in CA\n\nlfos."}}, {"text": "R. K. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27529, "end_char": 27540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, G. B. Pai, Mrs. Saran Mahajan, Mr. Arvind B Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind and R. K. Sinha for the Appellants in CA\n\nlfos.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "A Shanti Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27630, "end_char": 27646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "114 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS\n\nA Shanti Bhushan, S. P. Gupta, H. K. Puri and Miss Madhu Moo/· chandani for the Appellants in CA 174. \""}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27661, "end_char": 27671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "114 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS\n\nA Shanti Bhushan, S. P. Gupta, H. K. Puri and Miss Madhu Moo/· chandani for the Appellants in CA 174. \"", "canonical_name": "H. K. Puri"}}, {"text": "Madhu Moo/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27681, "end_char": 27691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "114 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS\n\nA Shanti Bhushan, S. P. Gupta, H. K. Puri and Miss Madhu Moo/· chandani for the Appellants in CA 174. \"", "canonical_name": "Madhu Moo/"}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27734, "end_char": 27745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, S. S. Ray, Ghayyas Alam and R. K. Jain for the Appe- llants in CA 2269, 2270 to 2272."}}, {"text": "S. S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27747, "end_char": 27756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, S. S. Ray, Ghayyas Alam and R. K. Jain for the Appe- llants in CA 2269, 2270 to 2272."}}, {"text": "Ghayyas Alam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27758, "end_char": 27770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, S. S. Ray, Ghayyas Alam and R. K. Jain for the Appe- llants in CA 2269, 2270 to 2272."}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27775, "end_char": 27785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, S. S. Ray, Ghayyas Alam and R. K. Jain for the Appe- llants in CA 2269, 2270 to 2272.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27834, "end_char": 27848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, Subhash Chandra Bir/a and Shreepal Singh for the B Appellants in 2373, 2302, 2374, and 2375."}}, {"text": "Subhash Chandra Bir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27850, "end_char": 27869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, Subhash Chandra Bir/a and Shreepal Singh for the B Appellants in 2373, 2302, 2374, and 2375."}}, {"text": "Shreepal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27876, "end_char": 27890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, Subhash Chandra Bir/a and Shreepal Singh for the B Appellants in 2373, 2302, 2374, and 2375."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27946, "end_char": 27962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chabra for\"the Appellants'in'CA 599, 142 to 144, 385, 1638, 2219 to 2226, 1921, 1960, 2173, 2178, 2180\n\nto 2187, 2179, 386 to 388, 429 to 438 and W. P. 257."}}, {"text": "Rani Chabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27972, "end_char": 27983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chabra for\"the Appellants'in'CA 599, 142 to 144, 385, 1638, 2219 to 2226, 1921, 1960, 2173, 2178, 2180\n\nto 2187, 2179, 386 to 388, 429 to 438 and W. P. 257."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28137, "end_char": 28150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c Pramod Swarup for the Appellants in CAs Nos."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28207, "end_char": 28218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul ad All<k Croa fer tle Arrtllzrts in CAs 24C6."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyasa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28275, "end_char": 28285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, N. C. Sikri, A. K. Sikri and Vijay Jaiswal for the\n\nD Appellants in CA 821 & 487 and W.P. 600."}}, {"text": "N. C. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28287, "end_char": 28298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, N. C. Sikri, A. K. Sikri and Vijay Jaiswal for the\n\nD Appellants in CA 821 & 487 and W.P. 600."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28300, "end_char": 28311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, N. C. Sikri, A. K. Sikri and Vijay Jaiswal for the\n\nD Appellants in CA 821 & 487 and W.P. 600."}}, {"text": "Vijay Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28316, "end_char": 28329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, N. C. Sikri, A. K. Sikri and Vijay Jaiswal for the\n\nD Appellants in CA 821 & 487 and W.P. 600."}}, {"text": "P. Vo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28386, "end_char": 28391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Vo ma fer tl:e arr<llar.ts in CAs 1867 and 1869."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chita", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28443, "end_char": 28454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chita/e, Mrs. M.ardlcra Rouchandran and P. K. Pillai ,!", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "M.ardlcra Rouchandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28463, "end_char": 28484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chita/e, Mrs. M.ardlcra Rouchandran and P. K. Pillai ,!"}}, {"text": "P. K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28489, "end_char": 28501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chita/e, Mrs. M.ardlcra Rouchandran and P. K. Pillai ,!"}}, {"text": "E S. K. Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28581, "end_char": 28593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E S. K. Jain fer t{, e Arrdlants in CA 187/79."}}, {"text": "T. S. Arora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28630, "end_char": 28641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l T. S. Arora fer the Arrcllants in CA 23:6/78 & 1346/79."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28687, "end_char": 28700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale,' 0.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28706, "end_char": 28713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and Mrs. S. Ramachandran for the Appellants in CA 1866 and Appellants in CA 1865 and R.1 in CAs 142 & 143 and 144 and for the Anellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "S. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28723, "end_char": 28738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and Mrs. S. Ramachandran for the Appellants in CA 1866 and Appellants in CA 1865 and R.1 in CAs 142 & 143 and 144 and for the Anellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28942, "end_char": 28955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Dhingra for the Appellants in CA 2321/78."}}, {"text": "J. M. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28999, "end_char": 29011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+..\n\nJ. M. Khanna for the Appellants Jn CA 2430 & 2431."}}, {"text": "K. B. Rohtagi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29051, "end_char": 29064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Rohtagi and Praveen Jain for the Appellants in CA 2504/ 78."}}, {"text": "Praveen Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29069, "end_char": 29081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Rohtagi and Praveen Jain for the Appellants in CA 2504/ 78."}}, {"text": "G M. M. L. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29118, "end_char": 29139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. M. L. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA 1149 & 1149A. ' ....\n\nK. C. Dua for the Appellants in CA 1635 & 1636."}}, {"text": "K. C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29187, "end_char": 29196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G M. M. L. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA 1149 & 1149A. ' ....\n\nK. C. Dua for the Appellants in CA 1635 & 1636."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29236, "end_char": 29249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, B. D. Madhyan, R. N. Dikshit and L. K. Pandey ...\n\nfor the Respondents (Mandi Samiti) CA 1841 to 1846, 1921, 2169 to 2173, 2178 to 2187, 2219 to 2226, 2260, 2261, 2269, 2302, 2373 to 2375, H 2322, 2356, 2406 to 2408, 2420 to 2423, 2431, 2426 to 2428, 2507, 142 to 144, 174, 385 to 388, 429 to 439, 599, 230, 635, 1007 & 1008, 1149, 1149A, 1630 & 1631, 1638, 5135, 1346, and 2212."}}, {"text": "B. D. Madhyan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29251, "end_char": 29264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, B. D. Madhyan, R. N. Dikshit and L. K. Pandey ...\n\nfor the Respondents (Mandi Samiti) CA 1841 to 1846, 1921, 2169 to 2173, 2178 to 2187, 2219 to 2226, 2260, 2261, 2269, 2302, 2373 to 2375, H 2322, 2356, 2406 to 2408, 2420 to 2423, 2431, 2426 to 2428, 2507, 142 to 144, 174, 385 to 388, 429 to 439, 599, 230, 635, 1007 & 1008, 1149, 1149A, 1630 & 1631, 1638, 5135, 1346, and 2212."}}, {"text": "R. N. Dikshit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29266, "end_char": 29279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, B. D. Madhyan, R. N. Dikshit and L. K. Pandey ...\n\nfor the Respondents (Mandi Samiti) CA 1841 to 1846, 1921, 2169 to 2173, 2178 to 2187, 2219 to 2226, 2260, 2261, 2269, 2302, 2373 to 2375, H 2322, 2356, 2406 to 2408, 2420 to 2423, 2431, 2426 to 2428, 2507, 142 to 144, 174, 385 to 388, 429 to 439, 599, 230, 635, 1007 & 1008, 1149, 1149A, 1630 & 1631, 1638, 5135, 1346, and 2212."}}, {"text": "L. K. Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29284, "end_char": 29296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, B. D. Madhyan, R. N. Dikshit and L. K. Pandey ...\n\nfor the Respondents (Mandi Samiti) CA 1841 to 1846, 1921, 2169 to 2173, 2178 to 2187, 2219 to 2226, 2260, 2261, 2269, 2302, 2373 to 2375, H 2322, 2356, 2406 to 2408, 2420 to 2423, 2431, 2426 to 2428, 2507, 142 to 144, 174, 385 to 388, 429 to 439, 599, 230, 635, 1007 & 1008, 1149, 1149A, 1630 & 1631, 1638, 5135, 1346, and 2212."}}, {"text": "Mandi Samiti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29323, "end_char": 29335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, B. D. Madhyan, R. N. Dikshit and L. K. Pandey ...\n\nfor the Respondents (Mandi Samiti) CA 1841 to 1846, 1921, 2169 to 2173, 2178 to 2187, 2219 to 2226, 2260, 2261, 2269, 2302, 2373 to 2375, H 2322, 2356, 2406 to 2408, 2420 to 2423, 2431, 2426 to 2428, 2507, 142 to 144, 174, 385 to 388, 429 to 439, 599, 230, 635, 1007 & 1008, 1149, 1149A, 1630 & 1631, 1638, 5135, 1346, and 2212.", "canonical_name": "Mandi Samiti"}}, {"text": "E. C. Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29686, "end_char": 29701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, J.) 115\n\nE. C. Aggarwala and R. Satish for RR 2 in CA 2179, 2180, 2222, 2271, 2431, 2433, 2504/78 and 1869 and 143/79 and in other matter, for Mandi Samiti for Muzaffarnagar and Meerut."}}, {"text": "R. Satish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29706, "end_char": 29715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, J.) 115\n\nE. C. Aggarwala and R. Satish for RR 2 in CA 2179, 2180, 2222, 2271, 2431, 2433, 2504/78 and 1869 and 143/79 and in other matter, for Mandi Samiti for Muzaffarnagar and Meerut."}}, {"text": "Mandi Samiti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29820, "end_char": 29832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA v. u. P. STATE (Untwalia, J.) 115\n\nE. C. Aggarwala and R. Satish for RR 2 in CA 2179, 2180, 2222, 2271, 2431, 2433, 2504/78 and 1869 and 143/79 and in other matter, for Mandi Samiti for Muzaffarnagar and Meerut.", "canonical_name": "Mandi Samiti"}}, {"text": "Ravinder Bana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29864, "end_char": 29877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ravinder Bana for RR 2 in 2457, 2270, and 2272 and RR 2 and RR 3 in CA 2269, and WP No."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29961, "end_char": 29974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. V. Goswami for RR I in CA 2356."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30041, "end_char": 30049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J., The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 being U .P. Act XXV of 1964, hereinafter called the Act, was passed in that year.", "canonical_name": "UNTWALIA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30991, "end_char": 31014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various trders carrying on business in the State of Uttar Pradesh within the jurisdiction of several Market Committees challenged the levy of fee in the High Court of Allahabad from time to time."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31194, "end_char": 31212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally many Writ Petitions were dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated September 21, 1978 on which date many WTit petitions were also dismissed in limine."}}, {"text": "April 29, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31504, "end_char": 31518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately preceding the said judgment a longer and more elaborate judgment had been delivered by the High Court on April 29, 1977."}}, {"text": "From the Objects and Reasons of the enactment it would appear that this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33645, "end_char": 33720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34480, "end_char": 34498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has been done for the effective implementation of the scheme of establishment or'markets mainly for the benefit of the producers; But as pointed out recently by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab(l) the fee realised from the payer of the fee has, by and large, to be spent for his special benefit and for the benefit of other persons connected with the transactions of purchase and sale in the various Mandis."}}, {"text": "shall now at the outset refer to the relevant provisions of the B Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35427, "end_char": 35496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35670, "end_char": 35673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall now at the outset refer to the relevant provisions of the B Act", "statute": "We shall now at the outset refer to the relevant provisions of the B Act"}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36158, "end_char": 36168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall now at the outset refer to the relevant provisions of the B Act", "statute": "We shall now at the outset refer to the relevant provisions of the B Act"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36523, "end_char": 36532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36673, "end_char": 36682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37359, "end_char": 37368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37674, "end_char": 37677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37873, "end_char": 37876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38237, "end_char": 38240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38700, "end_char": 38703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38793, "end_char": 38802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38859, "end_char": 38881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38999, "end_char": 39009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39829, "end_char": 39839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40131, "end_char": 40141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter VI of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41066, "end_char": 41089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41389, "end_char": 41401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Rules", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Rules"}}, {"text": "s.17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42602, "end_char": 42614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43119, "end_char": 43131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12.6.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43159, "end_char": 43168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12.6.1973 is D bad ..\n\n(9) No market fee could be levied on goods not produced within the limits of a particular market area and if produced outside and brought in such area."}}, {"text": "Star Paper Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43930, "end_char": 43946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(13) Wood cut and brought from the jungle by a manufacturer of paper such as Star Paper Mills, Saharanpur could not be subjected to levy of fee."}}, {"text": "Saharanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43948, "end_char": 43958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(13) Wood cut and brought from the jungle by a manufacturer of paper such as Star Paper Mills, Saharanpur could not be subjected to levy of fee."}}, {"text": "s.9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44956, "end_char": 44962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kisan Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45122, "end_char": 45141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(21) No market fee can be levied on transactions of matchboxes, soyabin products, articles sold by Kisan Products Ltd. and Pan (betel leaves)."}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45808, "end_char": 45811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46062, "end_char": 46068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46079, "end_char": 46083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RAMESH CHANDRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48613, "end_char": 48627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(7) At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths, must be shown\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE (UNTWALIA, J.) 123\n\nwith reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering A services of the kind mentioned above.\"", "canonical_name": "RAMESH CHANDRA ETC"}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48853, "end_char": 48856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49452, "end_char": 49456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.17(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50649, "end_char": 50658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State ofUttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51487, "end_char": 51508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yet charging of 1 % fee as is being charged throughout the State ofUttar Pradesh\n\nby all the Market Committees is not illegal and does not go beyond the quid pro quo theory discussed in Puri's case."}}, {"text": "Section 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52765, "end_char": 52783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE (UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53519, "end_char": 53558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Committee;\n\nRAMESH CHANDRA V. U. P. STATE (UNTWALIA, J.) 125\n\n(3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling.the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; and ( 4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee.\""}}, {"text": "s.17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57438, "end_char": 57450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 17(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58231, "end_char": 58246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60826, "end_char": 60841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-12-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62055, "end_char": 62065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20-12-1976."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63921, "end_char": 63931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1975] 2 S.C.R. 777", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 65972, "end_char": 65991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66051, "end_char": 66060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1April 11,\n\n1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66866, "end_char": 66882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By and large in the notification dated 1April 11,\n\n1978 there is hardly any duplication of any item of agricultural produce."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68123, "end_char": 68133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70267, "end_char": 70285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Argument stressed was that under group Gin the Schedule appended to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71178, "end_char": 71253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71741, "end_char": 71750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Argument stressed was that under group Gin the Schedule appended to the Act", "statute": "Argument stressed was that under group Gin the Schedule appended to the Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77214, "end_char": 77226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78137, "end_char": 78146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no snbstance in this point Our attention was drawn to some provisions in the municipal Acts and the Zila Parishad Act", "statute": "There is no snbstance in this point Our attention was drawn to some provisions in the municipal Acts and the Zila Parishad Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78271, "end_char": 78283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no snbstance in this point Our attention was drawn to some provisions in the municipal Acts and the Zila Parishad Act", "statute": "There is no snbstance in this point Our attention was drawn to some provisions in the municipal Acts and the Zila Parishad Act"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79003, "end_char": 79013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81224, "end_char": 81233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81537, "end_char": 81544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81839, "end_char": 81852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81956, "end_char": 81960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83059, "end_char": 83069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Rules framed in accordance with the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961", "statute": "the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Rules framed in accordance with the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83427, "end_char": 83437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Rules framed in accordance with the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961", "statute": "the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Rules framed in accordance with the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Kisan P1 oducts Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84292, "end_char": 84312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exactly the same will be the position with regard to the articles sold by Kisan P1 oducts Ltd. and the sale of Pan."}}, {"text": "s. 17(iii)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84852, "end_char": 84865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court (now Karnataka", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 85383, "end_char": 85415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24\n\nReliance was placed urcn a decision of the Mysore High Court (now Karnataka) in the case of K. N. Mardaradhya v. The Mysore ."}}, {"text": "Patna HiEh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 85548, "end_char": 85564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State(l) but the vit w taktn by the [Myrnre High Ccurt was dissented from by the Patna HiEh Court in the case of Manga/chand Ramchandra\n\nB \" and others etc."}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85662, "end_char": 85670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of us (Untwalia J,) delivering the judEm<rt of the Patna High Court stated at page 1053 thus :\n\n\"At this stage I would diScuss a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court on which great reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners in support of their contention that no fee can be levied on transaction of buyirg ar.d\n\nselling between a dealer and a dealer even though such transactions take place within the market area or the market proper.", "canonical_name": "UNTWALIA"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 85706, "end_char": 85722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of us (Untwalia J,) delivering the judEm<rt of the Patna High Court stated at page 1053 thus :\n\n\"At this stage I would diScuss a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court on which great reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners in support of their contention that no fee can be levied on transaction of buyirg ar.d\n\nselling between a dealer and a dealer even though such transactions take place within the market area or the market proper."}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 85806, "end_char": 85823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of us (Untwalia J,) delivering the judEm<rt of the Patna High Court stated at page 1053 thus :\n\n\"At this stage I would diScuss a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court on which great reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners in support of their contention that no fee can be levied on transaction of buyirg ar.d\n\nselling between a dealer and a dealer even though such transactions take place within the market area or the market proper."}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86659, "end_char": 86663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But while discussing the point, Iyer J., has confined this earliest purchase of the agricultural produce belonging to the producer only."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1095_1103_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "I -\"'-\n\n'\\ t\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nATAMOHD.\n\nMay 8, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA 'FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.)\n\nflttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, Sections 2(23) 7, 116 (g) a11d 118- Scope of.\n\nTho respondent applied in the year 1939, to the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur for granting to him of a lease of plot No. 227 measuring 45'X20' adjoining Patri along with the road running from Golgarh to Alinagar in Gorakhpur.\n\nThe Board declined to grant him the lease. On a second application dat~ 10-10-1945, the Municipal Board passed a resolution on 24-11-1945 granting the lease to the respondent. On 8-3-1S46 the District Magistrate accorded his approval of the resolution of the Mnnicipality. On 12-4-1946 the respondent executed a \"KABULIY Al\"' in favour of the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur. On 23;4-1946 the respondent applied for permission to construct a house and submitted a plan for sanction. The plan was sanctioned by thei Municipality oiii 8-5-1946.\n\nOn receipt of certain representations on 10-6-1947, the District Magistrate directed the Chairman of the Municipal Board not to allow the construction till a decision was taken on the question. On 13-6-1947, the Chairman, Municipal\n\nBoard directed the respondent not to proceed with the construction of the house, E The State Government on being satisfied that the resolution regarding the grant\n\nof the lease was not within the competence of the Municipality, directed the Commissioner to cancel the lease granted to the respondent, whereupon the res--\n\npendent was served with a notice on 13-7-1948 cancelliog the lease and calling upon him to remove the construction and deliver vacant possession within 15 daya of the receipt of the notice.\n\nThe respondent filed a suit no. 86 of 1948 for an injnnction restraining the Municipal Board from demolishing or otherwise F interfering with the Construction made by him on the disputed land. The Civil Judge, GQrakhpur decreed the suit and that has become final.\n\nThereafter, claiming the land as the Nazarul land belonging to the State, the appellant-State filed 5uit no. 109 of i949 in the Court of Civil Judge, Gorakhpur against the re5pondent Ata Mohd. for a mandatory injunction directing the respondent to remove his material and construction and for a decree for G possession over the land measuring 45'X20'. The Civil Judge Gorakhpur dismi55ed the suit by judgment and decree dated 3-10-1950. The appellants plain tiff preferred first appeal No. 27 of 1951 to the High Court of Allahabad. The appeal woo heard by a Bench of two Judges but on a difference of opinion, the matter was referred to the third Judge. In accordance with the view of the majority, the appeal preferred by the appellant plaintiff was dismissed by its\n\njudgment dated 25th August, 1965. On a certificate granted by the High Court H under Art. 135 of the Constitution and also Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, the present appeal in this Court was filed by the plaintiff /appellant.\n\nA Allowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : l. The Municipalities in various States were created undel' the res pective Municipalities Acts in order to facilitate the efficient administration of the Municipal areas and to provide lighting, watering and maintaining of publid streets a.nd places. The duties of the Municipal Boards are specified in S. 6 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. Under S. 118 of the Act, the Municipal Boiird is e'mpowered to manage or control any property entrusted to its management and control. The vesting of the property, in the Municipality is under S. 116 of the Act. S. 116 provides that subject to auy special reserv:>tion made by the State Government, all property of the nature specified in this section and situated within the Municipality shall vest in and belong to the Board, and shalli, with all property which may become vested in the Board, be under its direction, management and control. While under clause (f) of S. 116, all lands and other property transferred to the Board by the Government by gift, purchase or otherwise for local public purposes ves! in the Municipality, under Cl. (g), the streets vest only qua streets and not as absolute property with the Municipality.\n\nIn the present case the property falls within the definition of 'Streee wider section 2(23) of the Act. [1100 A-D, E-F, HJ\n\n2. Though , the street vested in the Mnnicipal Council under section 116 of the U.P. Municipa.l Act, it does no~ transfer to the Municipality the right of the owner in the site or. soil over which the street exists. Therefore, when! a Street ceases to be a highway by its being diverted to some other use, the inrerest of the Corporate body deten, nines. Therefore, what isvested in the municipality under sectioo 116(g) is the street qua street and if the Municipality put the street to any other nser than that for which it was intended, the State as its Own.er, is entitled to intervene and mafntain an action and to get any persrin in, illegal occupation evicted.\n\n[1102 A, G, 1103 A-BJ -\n\nMunicipal Board, Mangalur v. Sri Mahadeoji Maharaj, [1965] S.C.R. 242; followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1513 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by Certificate from the Judgment and decree dated 25th August, 1965 passed by the Allahabad High Court in first Appeal No. 27 of 1951.\n\nG. N. Dikshit and S. Markandeya for the Appellant.\n\nY ogeshwar Prasad, Mr. & Mrs. S. K. Bagga & Mrs. Rimi Chhabra G for Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is preferred by the State of Uttiir Pradesh by certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 18-5-1970 in Supreme Court Appeal No. 105 of 1966 H against its judgment and decree dated 25th August, 1965 passed by it in first appeal No. 27 of 1951 dismissing the suit filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh.\n\n' .\n\nu.P. STATE v. ATA MOHD (Kaiiasam, J.) 1097\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed suit No. 109 of 1949 in the Court A of Civil Judge. Gorakhpur against the respondent Ata Mohd. for a mandatory injunction directing the respondent to remove his material and construction and to clear the land and the plot No. 227 in Mohalla Purdilpur in the City of Gorakhpur and for a decree for possession over the land measuring 45'. X 20'. The Civil Judge, Gorakhpur dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dated 3-10-1950. The plain- R tiff preferred first appeal No. 27 of 1951 to the lfrgh Coun of Allahabad. The appeal was heard by a Bench of two Judges but on a difference of opinion, the matter was referred to the third Judge. In aecordauce with the view of the majority, the appeal preferred by the plaintiff was dismissed by its Judgment dated 25th August,\n\nJ 965.\n\nOn a certificate granted by the High' Court under Art. 135 of the Cons- C titution and also Art. 133 ( 1 )( c) of the Constitution, the present appeal in this Conn was filed by the plaintiff/appellant.\n\nThe facts of the case are briefly as follows : The plot in dispute is plot No. 227 measuring 45' x 20' adjoiniog Patri alongwith the road running from Golgarh to Alina gar in Gorakhpur. The respon- D dent Ata Mohd applied to the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur for grant to him oi a lease in the year 1939. The Board dedined to grant him lease. The respondent again applied on 10-10-1945. The Municipal Board passed a resolution on 24-11-1945 granting to the respondent the lease and forwarded the resolution to the District Magistrate to accord his appi; oval who on 8-3-1946 approved the resolution of the E Municipality.\n\nOn 12-4-1946, the respondent executed a 'KABULI- YAT' in favour of the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur. On 23rd April, 1946, the respondent applied for permission to construct a house and .submitted a plan for sanction.\n\nThe plan was sanctioned by the Municipality on 8th May, 1946. F On receipt of certain representations on 10-6-1')47, the District Magistrate directed the Chairman of the Municipal Board not to allow the construction till a decision was taken on the question. On 13-6- 1947, the Chairman Municipal Board directed the respondent not to proceed with the construction of the house. The State Government on being satisfied that the resolution regardirig the grant of the the lease was not within the competence of the Municipality, directed the Commissioner to cancel the lease granted in favour of the respondent.\n\nThe Executive Officer, Municipal Board, issued a notice on 13-7-1948 to the respondent cancelli'llg the lease and called upon him to remove the construction and deliver vacant possession within l 5 days of the receipt of the notice.\n\nThe respondent filed a suit No. 86 of 1948 for. an injunction restraining the Municipal Board from demolishing _1\n\n11-610SCI/80\n\nor otherwise interfering with the construction. made by him on the disputed land. The Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, decreed the suit as prayed fot. The present suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh subsequently in 1949.\n\nIn the plaint the State of U. P. submitted that plot No. 227 is Nazrul land and is the property of the Government. It described the\n\ndisputed land as adjoining the Patri of the Munibpal Board running from Golgarh crossing to Alinagar and situated beyond the limits of the road and Patri.\n\nAcoording to the Government, the Municipal Board witho\\lt knowing the true position of the land passed the resolution on 24-11-1945 to lease the portion of the land in favour of the defendant.\n\nIn paragraph 10 of the plaint the State of U.P. alleged that the Government or the Distri>et Magistrate were not originally aware of the land being Nazrul r and of its being dealt with by the Municipal Board in an objectionable manner and that the Municipal Board was under the wrong impression and that on realising the true state of affairs on instructions of the Government, the Municipal Board served a notice cancelling the resolution of the Municipality to lease the land to the respondent.\n\nThe Government submitted that it was entitled to retain its possession on the ground (1) that it never leased\n\non( the land to defendant nor did the defendant make the construction with the plaintiff's permission; (2) that the Municipal Board is not the owner of the land and has no interest in it and the Municipal Board did not, in fact, execute any lease in favour of the defendant and that neither the resolution of the Municipality nor the 'KABULIY AT' executed by the defendant would confer any right on the respondent, the respondent in his written statement admitted that the land ig dispute formed part of the Patri of the public road running from Golgarh to Allnagar in the City of Gorakhpnr. He pleaded tha~ there was a. practice in the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur not to execute a leasei but to obtain . KABULIYATS\"from lessees and that he bona fide believed the Mm:iicipal Board is the owner of the plot and asked for permission and acting on the permission granted, put up a double storey house costing more than ten thousand rupees.\n\nHe further contended that even assuming though without admitting that the land in dispute belonged to plainhtt Government, the Municipal Board is fully authorised to let out such a land, to him.\n\nHe further submitted that as the Collector of Gorakhpur has authorised the lease of the land by the Munidpality and sanctioned the grant of the lease to the respondent, the Government is not entitled to' eject him.\n\nFrom the pleadings, it is clear that the disputed land adjoins Patri of the ronJ running from Golgarh to Alinagar. It is also admitted\n\n• • .. \"\n\nI. \"\n\n.._,-'\n\nf '\n\n• I\n\n• .. .. \"\n\n'\\ .\n\nthat the Municipality did not ex.ecute the lease but the respondent executed a 'KABULIYA T' regarding the land. the contention on behalf of the plaintiff State of Uttar Pradesh is that the land belonged to the State and the Municipality had no power to lease ilie land.\n\nThe Trial Court found that the land in dispute does not belong to the plaintiff Government but was a \"street\" and belonged to the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur. It also found that though no lease deed was executed by the Municipality as the defendant took po\"ession under the contract and admittedly built up a house, the plai'Iltiff is estopped from prayi.ng for demolition and for possession of the building.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court accepted the findings of the Trial Cour( that the disputed land is adjoining Patri but as two Judges took the view that land in dispute vested in the Municipality under s. 116\n\n(g) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Act, it was the only competent j authority to sanction the lease in respect of the land and the State\n\nGovernment had no right or interest left in the land and could not, therefore, challenge the validity of the transaction entered into by the Board in exercise of the power conferred under the Municipalities Act.\n\nAs a result 'of the finding that the State had no right to the property, it was held that the Government was not entitled to challenge the lease granted by the Municipal Board.\n\nIn this view, the appeal preferred by the State was dismissed.\"\n\nIt may be noted that the suit filed by the respondent ag, tinst the municipality for injunction restraining the Municipal Board from demolishing or interfering with the constructions made by him was\n\ndecreed in O.S. No: 86/1948 and that decree has become final.\n\nIn the present suit, the municipality is not a party. Therefore, the contention that the municipality had not leased the site to the respondent by a document as required by Municipal Act, would be of no avail.\n\nEqually, the plea that it acted beyond the scope of its [!Uthority, is not available to the municipa'lity. The plea of the State taken before the High Court, and before us, by Mr. Dixit learned counsel for the appellant, is that the State is the owner of the property inspite of the fact it had vested in the municipality as a \"street\" under S. l l 6(g) of the Act. It was submitted that. when the property is put to a different use, it is open to the Government to assert its title and require anyone in illegal possession of the property to vacate.\n\nThere is not much dispute that the property belonged to the State before the Muni, cipal Act was passed.\n\nThe High Court has found that the Sfate was the owner of the property till the Municipal Act was passed and this futding was not challenged before us.\n\nThe only point on which the State lost the suit before the High Court was that aftr the passing\n\n' A of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Act, the property vested in the Municipality and th.e State ceased , to be the owner and, therefore, cannot maintain tbe suit for evicting tbe respondent\n\nThe Municipalities in various States were created under the respective Municipalities Acts, in order to facilitate the efficient administration of the Municipal areas and to provide lighting, waterihg and\n\nmaintaining of public streets and places. The• duties of the Municipal Boards are specified in S.7 of the U. P. Municipalities Act.\n\nUnder S. 118 of the Act, the Municipal Board is empowered to manage or control any property entrusted to its management and control. The vesting of the property, in the Municipality is under S. 116 of the Act. S. 116 provides that subject to any special reservation made by the Stak Government, all property of the nature specified in this section and situated within the Municipality shall vest in iind belong to the Board, and shall, with all property which may become vested in the Board, be under its direction, management and control.\n\nCl.(g) relates to vesting of streets and is as follows :-\n\n\"All public streets and the pavements, stones and other materials thereof, and also all trees erections, matenal9 implements and things existing or on appertaining to such streets\".\n\n• :\n\nIt may be noted that while under cl.(f) of S-116 all lands and otbec ---( property trnnsferred to the board by the Government by gift, purcha'e\n\nor otherwise for local public purposes vest in tbe Municipality, under\n\ncl. (g), the streets vest only qua streets, and not as absolute property with the Municipality. The word 'street' is defined under S.2 (23) as F follows:-\n\nStreet means any road, bridge, footway, lane square, cpurt, alley or passage which .tbe poblic or any portion of the public, has right to pass along, and includes, on eitber. side,\n\n' the drains or gutters and the land upto the defined boundary of any abutting property, notwithstanding the projection over such land of any verandah or other superstructure\".\n\nIt has been found that the property in dispute is Patri and is a land which is within tbe defined boundary of the property abutting into the road. Thus the property in question falls within the H definition of the word 'street'. The question as to the nature of the right that vest in the Municipality under S. 116(g) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act will have to be considered. This Court in Municipal\n\n• ..\n\n... ..\n\nBoard.\n\nMa11galur v. Sri Mahndeoji Maharaj('), had to consider the. nature of the right that vested in the Municipality over the streets, Sll.bba Rao, J. (as he then was) after considering the decisions of the Ellglis!1 Courts and the High Courts, summed up the law on this subject as follows :- •\n\nThe inference that the side lands are also included in the public way is drawn easil; y as. the said lands are between the metal road and the drains admittedly maintained by the Municipal Board. Such a public pathway vests in the municipality, but the Municipality does not own the soil. It has the exclusive right to manage and control the surface of the soil and 'so mucil of the S'Oil below and of the space above the surface as is necessary to enable it to adequately maintain the street as a street It has also a certain property in the soil of the street which would enable it as owner to bring a possessory action against trespassers. Subject to the rights of the Municipality and the public to pass and repass on tbe highway, the owner of the soil i!l general remains the occupier of it and, therefore, he can maintain an action for trespass against any member of the public who acts in excess of his rights.\"\n\nAfter referring to S.116(g) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, under which a public street vests in a Municipality, the learned Judge referred to a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in S. Sundaram Ayyar v. The Municipal Council of Madura and the Secretary of State for India in Council(') where the scope of the vesting under the Madras District Municipalitie~ Act was dealt with.\n\nThe learned Judge extracted the head note from the Madras decision observing that it brought out the gist of the decision. The bead note runs as follows:-\n\n\"When a street is vested in a Municipal Council, such vesting does not transfer to the Municipal authority the rights of the owner in the site or soil over which the street exists.\n\nIt does not own the soil from the centre of the earth Wlque ad caelum, but it has the exclusive right to manage a!1d\n\ncontrol the surface of the soil and so much of the soil below and of the space above the surface as is necessary to enable it to adequataly maintain the street as a street. It has also a certain property in the soil of the street which would enable it as owner to bring a possessory action against trespassers.\"\n\ni l I [!965] 2 S. C. R. 242. 111 [1902] I. L. R. 25 Mad. 635.\n\nThe view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was that though the street vested in the Municipal Council, it does not transfer to the Municipality the rights of the owner in the site or soil over which the street exists. The question has been dealt with at some detail in the Madras decision and as it has been approved by this Court, it may be usefully referred to.\n\nThe High Court while obsetving that if the land itself had been acquired by the Municipality, either by purchase or otherwise and roads and drains formecl thereon, the Municipality would have been the owner of the land but if the street or highway over the land was dedicated to the public either by the State or by the owners of the land adjoining the highW'<1y will continue vested, subject only to the burden of the highway, in 'the State or the respective owners of the land on. either side of the highway ad medium filum, or in any other person who may have dedicated the street to the public as the case may be. The Court after pointing out that the Madras Municipal Act was a modelled after the English Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855 referred to the Englisll cases which dealt with the vesting of the street in the Municipality in1 observed :\n\n\"The conclusion to be drawn from the English case law is that what i~ vested in urban authorities under statutes , similar to the District Municipalities Act, is not the land over which the street is fonned, but the street qua street and that the property in the street thus vested in a Municipal Couucil is not general property or a species of property known to the Common Law, but a special property created by statute and vested in a corporate body for public purposes, that such property as it has in the street continues only so long as the street is a highway by being excluded by notification of Government under section 23 of Act IV of 1884 or by being legally stopped up or diverted, or by the operation of the law of limitation (assuming that by such operation the highway can be extinguished), the interest of the corporate body determines.\" It is, therefore, clear that when a street ceases to be a highway by its being diverted to some other use, the interest of the corporate body determiµcs.\n\nAfter referring to the decisions of the Hi>gh Courts in India, it expressed its concurrence with the decisions in Chairrr.an of the Naihati Municipality v. Kishori Lal Goswami('), Madhu Sudhun Kunda v. Pramode Nath Roy(') and Nihal Chand v.\n\nAzmat A Ii Khan(\") and concluded that the nature or the right that vested in the\n\n(I) !LR 13 Cal .. 171\n\n< 2) !LR 20 Cd. 632 \\.l) !LR 7 All. 362\n\n.. ..\n\n• ..\n\nU.P. STATE v. ATA MOHD (Kai/asam, J.) 11 o3\n\nMunicipality as regards public streets thyre is no disposal by the Indian A Legislature of any land or hereditament vested in the Government. What is vested in the Municipality under S. 116(g) is the street qua street and if the Municipality put the street to any other user than that for which it was intended, the State as its owner, is entitled to intervene and maintain an action and to get any person in illegal occupation evicted .\n\nWe accept the contention of Mr. Dixit, learned counsel for the State of R' U .P. that the State is the owner and in the circumstances of the case entitled to maintain action for eviction of the respondent.\n\nThe view taken by the High Court is erroneous. The result is that the appeal by the State is allowed with costs and there will be decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "t\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ATAMOHD.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ATAMOHD.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 8, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 8, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA 'FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA 'FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. 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executed a \"KABULIY Al\"' in favour of the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur."}}, {"text": "23;4-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 790, "end_char": 799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23;4-1946 the respondent applied for permission to construct a house and submitted a plan for sanction."}}, {"text": "8-5-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 944, "end_char": 952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plan was sanctioned by thei Municipality oiii 8-5-1946."}}, {"text": "10-6-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On receipt of certain representations on 10-6-1947, the District Magistrate directed the Chairman of the Municipal Board not to allow the construction till a decision was taken on the question."}}, {"text": "13-6-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1152, "end_char": 1161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13-6-1947, the Chairman, Municipal\n\nBoard directed the respondent not to proceed with the construction of the house, E The State Government on being satisfied that the resolution regarding the grant\n\nof the lease was not within the competence of the Municipality, directed the Commissioner to cancel the lease granted to the respondent, whereupon the res--\n\npendent was served with a notice on 13-7-1948 cancelliog the lease and calling upon him to remove the construction and deliver vacant possession within 15 daya of the receipt of the notice."}}, {"text": "13-7-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1546, "end_char": 1555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13-6-1947, the Chairman, Municipal\n\nBoard directed the respondent not to proceed with the construction of the house, E The State Government on being satisfied that the resolution regarding the grant\n\nof the lease was not within the competence of the Municipality, directed the Commissioner to cancel the lease granted to the respondent, whereupon the res--\n\npendent 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"CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5085, "end_char": 5113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5237, "end_char": 5257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and decree dated 25th August, 1965 passed by the Allahabad High Court in first Appeal No."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5291, "end_char": 5304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and S. Markandeya for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5309, "end_char": 5322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dikshit and S. Markandeya for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5373, "end_char": 5384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y ogeshwar Prasad, Mr. & Mrs. S. K. Bagga & Mrs. Rimi Chhabra G for Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is preferred by the State of Uttiir Pradesh by certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 18-5-1970 in Supreme Court Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Rimi Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5392, "end_char": 5404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y ogeshwar Prasad, Mr. & Mrs. S. K. Bagga & Mrs. Rimi Chhabra G for Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is preferred by the State of Uttiir Pradesh by certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 18-5-1970 in Supreme Court Appeal No."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5467, "end_char": 5475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y ogeshwar Prasad, Mr. & Mrs. S. K. Bagga & Mrs. Rimi Chhabra G for Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is preferred by the State of Uttiir Pradesh by certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 18-5-1970 in Supreme Court Appeal No."}}, {"text": "State of Uttiir Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5512, "end_char": 5535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y ogeshwar Prasad, Mr. & Mrs. S. K. Bagga & Mrs. Rimi Chhabra G for Respondent\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J.-This appeal is preferred by the State of Uttiir Pradesh by certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 18-5-1970 in Supreme Court Appeal No."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 of 1951 dismissing the suit filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5870, "end_char": 5892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "u.P. STATE v. ATA MOHD (Kaiiasam, J.) 1097\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh filed suit No.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Court A of Civil Judge. Gorakhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "109 of 1949 in the Court A of Civil Judge."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 of 1951 to the lfrgh Coun of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6730, "end_char": 6738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Golgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7034, "end_char": 7041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 measuring 45' x 20' adjoiniog Patri alongwith the road running from Golgarh to Alina gar in Gorakhpur."}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7058, "end_char": 7067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 measuring 45' x 20' adjoiniog Patri alongwith the road running from Golgarh to Alina gar in Gorakhpur."}}, {"text": "Ata Mohd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respon- D dent Ata Mohd applied to the Municipal Board, Gorakhpur for grant to him oi a lease in the year 1939.", "canonical_name": "ATAMOHD."}}, {"text": "10-10-1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7255, "end_char": 7265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent again applied on 10-10-1945."}}, {"text": "8-3-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7446, "end_char": 7454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Board passed a resolution on 24-11-1945 granting to the respondent the lease and forwarded the resolution to the District Magistrate to accord his appi; oval who on 8-3-1946 approved the resolution of the E Municipality."}}, {"text": "23rd April, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7605, "end_char": 7621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 23rd April, 1946, the respondent applied for permission to construct a house and .submitted a plan for sanction."}}, {"text": "8th May, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7766, "end_char": 7779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plan was sanctioned by the Municipality on 8th May, 1946."}}, {"text": "10-6-1')47,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7824, "end_char": 7835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F On receipt of certain representations on 10-6-1')47, the District Magistrate directed the Chairman of the Municipal Board not to allow the construction till a decision was taken on the question."}}, {"text": "13-6- 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7981, "end_char": 7991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13-6- 1947, the Chairman Municipal Board directed the respondent not to proceed with the construction of the house."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Gorakhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, decreed the suit as prayed fot."}}, {"text": "State of U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8965, "end_char": 8979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the plaint the State of U. P. submitted that plot No."}}, {"text": "Alinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9172, "end_char": 9180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It described the\n\ndisputed land as adjoining the Patri of the Munibpal Board running from Golgarh crossing to Alinagar and situated beyond the limits of the road and Patri."}}, {"text": "24-11-1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9357, "end_char": 9367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acoording to the Government, the Municipal Board witho\\lt knowing the true position of the land passed the resolution on 24-11-1945 to lease the portion of the land in favour of the defendant."}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9464, "end_char": 9477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 10 of the plaint the State of U.P. alleged that the Government or the Distri>et Magistrate were not originally aware of the land being Nazrul r and of its being dealt with by the Municipal Board in an objectionable manner and that the Municipal Board was under the wrong impression and that on realising the true state of affairs on instructions of the Government, the Municipal Board served a notice cancelling the resolution of the Municipality to lease the land to the respondent."}}, {"text": "Allnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10596, "end_char": 10604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government submitted that it was entitled to retain its possession on the ground (1) that it never leased\n\non( the land to defendant nor did the defendant make the construction with the plaintiff's permission; (2) that the Municipal Board is not the owner of the land and has no interest in it and the Municipal Board did not, in fact, execute any lease in favour of the defendant and that neither the resolution of the Municipality nor the 'KABULIY AT' executed by the defendant would confer any right on the respondent, the respondent in his written statement admitted that the land ig dispute formed part of the Patri of the public road running from Golgarh to Allnagar in the City of Gorakhpnr."}}, {"text": "Gorakhpnr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10620, "end_char": 10629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government submitted that it was entitled to retain its possession on the ground (1) that it never leased\n\non( the land to defendant nor did the defendant make the construction with the plaintiff's permission; (2) that the Municipal Board is not the owner of the land and has no interest in it and the Municipal Board did not, in fact, execute any lease in favour of the defendant and that neither the resolution of the Municipality nor the 'KABULIY AT' executed by the defendant would confer any right on the respondent, the respondent in his written statement admitted that the land ig dispute formed part of the Patri of the public road running from Golgarh to Allnagar in the City of Gorakhpnr."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11729, "end_char": 11751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the contention on behalf of the plaintiff State of Uttar Pradesh is that the land belonged to the State and the Municipality had no power to lease ilie land.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12450, "end_char": 12456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13706, "end_char": 13711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plea of the State taken before the High Court, and before us, by Mr. Dixit learned counsel for the appellant, is that the State is the owner of the property inspite of the fact it had vested in the municipality as a \"street\" under S. l l 6(g) of the Act."}}, {"text": "S.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14924, "end_char": 14927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14968, "end_char": 14974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15153, "end_char": 15159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15172, "end_char": 15178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16098, "end_char": 16101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 116(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16791, "end_char": 16800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sll.bba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17046, "end_char": 17057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nature of the right that vested in the Municipality over the streets, Sll.bba Rao, J. (as he then was) after considering the decisions of the Ellglis!1 Courts and the High Courts, summed up the law on this subject as follows :- •\n\nThe inference that the side lands are also included in the public way is drawn easil; y as."}}, {"text": "S.116(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18145, "end_char": 18153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18316, "end_char": 18333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to S.116(g) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, under which a public street vests in a Municipality, the learned Judge referred to a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in S. Sundaram Ayyar v. The Municipal Council of Madura and the Secretary of State for India in Council(') where the scope of the vesting under the Madras District Municipalitie~ Act was dealt with."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18585, "end_char": 18591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge extracted the head note from the Madras decision observing that it brought out the gist of the decision."}}, {"text": "Division Bench of the Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19388, "end_char": 19427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was that though the street vested in the Municipal Council, it does not transfer to the Municipality the rights of the owner in the site or soil over which the street exists."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21228, "end_char": 21238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Court after pointing out that the Madras Municipal Act was a modelled after the English Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855", "statute": "The Court after pointing out that the Madras Municipal Act was a modelled after the English Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21672, "end_char": 21677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to the decisions of the Hi>gh Courts in India, it expressed its concurrence with the decisions in Chairrr.an of the Naihati Municipality v. Kishori Lal Goswami('), Madhu Sudhun Kunda v. Pramode Nath Roy(') and Nihal Chand v.\n\nAzmat A Ii Khan(\") and concluded that the nature or the right that vested in the\n\n(I) !"}}, {"text": "S. 116(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22245, "end_char": 22254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of R' U", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22564, "end_char": 22577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accept the contention of Mr. Dixit, learned counsel for the State of R' U .P. that the State is the owner and in the circumstances of the case entitled to maintain action for eviction of the respondent."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1104_1108_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "MANIK CHAND AND ANR. v.\n\nRAMACHANDRA SON OF CHAWRIRAJ\n\nMay 8, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI ANO P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\n1-~\n\nSpecific performance-Enforceability of a contract for purchase of property by a guardian for the benefit_ of the 1ninor--Contract Act, Section I I-Section 8 of the Hindu .Winority Act read with Section 55(5)(h) of Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThe appellants-plaintiffs who were minors entered into an agreement on 30-9-1961, through their mother and guardian with the respondent to purchase a house for a sum of Rs. 11000/-. A sum of Rs. 1000/- was paid as earnest 1noney and the balance was to be paid at thei time of the registration of thC sale deed. Since the respondent did not carry out his part of the agreement, the appellants filed a suit for specific perlormance 1 ofi the contract on 28-3-1962 in the Cou11 of Additional District Judge, Gwhlior. The suit was decreed on 15-4-1966. The appellants deposited J1s. 10,500/- the balance of the price on 13-7-1966. The respondent appealed -, o the High Court against the judgment\n\nand decree of the trial court which 'J.llowed the appeal and dismissed the suit: holding that as the contract was entered into on behalf of the minors a decree for specific performance could not be granted ro( want of mutuality.\n\nAIJowing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHELD : I. The contract entered into by the guardian on behaJf of the minors is enforceable. [1108 EJ\n\n2. A minor has no legal con1petence to enter into a contract or authorise someone else on his behalf to enter into a: contract. But under the Hindu Law, the natural guardian is empowered to enter into a contract on behalf of the minors and the contract would be binding and enforceable if the contract is for the benefit of the minor. [1106 Bl\n\nKrishnaswami v. Sundarappayya, IL~ 18 Mad., 415; relferr'edl to.\n\nMir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohd. Chowdhary, JLR 39 Cal.\n\n(PO); Srikakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subba Rao, 1 Il..R 75 Mad. 115; HanUlJO.. 1nanPrasaud Pandey v. Mussamat Nabooee Munraj Koonwaree (1856) 6 Moor I.A. 393; Mo/10ri Bibee v.\n\nDhuramodas Ghose, LR. 301 IA 114, Srik(lkulam Subrahmanyam v. Ku\"a Subba Rao, ILR 1949 Mad. 143; Suryaprakasam\n\nv. Ganga Raju, A.I.R. 1956 Andb. 33; explained.\n\n3. After the passing of the Hindu Minority i\\ct, 19'56, the 1 guardian of a llindu -minor ha') power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor's estates. Theguardian is entitled to act so as to bind the minor if it is necessary or reasonable and proper for thei behefit of the minor. 'fhe power thus conferred by the Act is in no way restricted than that wa.s recognised under the Hindu Law. Here,· it is quite strange that the respondent should plead that the transaction is not for the benefit of the\n\n(1104)\n\n. .. ,..\n\n• •\n\nMANIK CHAND v. RAMCHANDRA (Kailasam, !.) 1105\n\nnliner when the minor is convinced it is in his benifit and that it is worth A pursuing the litigation upto Supreme Court. [1107 GH, 1108 A-BJ\n\n4. The guardian by the contract for purchase of property does not bind the minor by bis personal covenant. As it is within tho competence of the guar~ dian, the contract is entered into effectively on behalf of the minor ;; nd tbe1 liability to pay the money is the liability of the minor under the Transfer of Property Act. [1108 D~EJ B\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Ovil Appeal No. 1548 of .. 1970.\n\nAppeal by Special Leav!:' from Judgment and Decree dated 9-2-1968 of the M.P. High Court in First Appeal No. 21 of 1976.\n\nShiv Dayal Srivastava and T. C. Sharma for the Appellant.\n\nY. S. Chitale, and Rameshwar Nath for Respopdent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nJ(AILASAM. J.\n\nThis appeal is by the plaintiffs by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and decree dated 9-4-1968 pasi; ed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in first appeal No. 21 of 1966 dismissing the suit for specific pedormance.\n\nThe plaintiffs l and 2 who were minors entered. into an agreement on 30-9-1961 through their mother and guardian Smt.\n\nPboolibai with the respondent to purchase a house situated in Thandi\n\nSllrak for a sum of Rs. 11,000/-. A sum of Rs. 1000/- was paid as earnest money and the balance was to be paid at the time of the registration. of the sale-deed.\n\nAccording to the plaintiffs/appellants, the respondent .did not carry outi his part of the agreement and the appe!lants filed the present suit for specific performance of the contract on 28-3~1962 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Gwalior.\n\nThe suit was decreed on 15-4-1966.\n\nThe plaintiffs deposited Rs. 10,500 the balance of the price on 13-7-1966. 'Thfl respondent appealed to the High Court against the judgment and decree of the trial court which allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The High Court agreed with the findings of the Trial Court on the merits and found that it was the respondents who committed breach of contract but dismissed the suit on the ground that as the contract was entered into on behalf of the minors, a decree for specific perforanance could not be granted to the appellants for want of mutuality.\n\nMr. Shiv Dayal Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the appel- B !ants, submitted that the lower Court erred in holding that the contract for purchase of property by the guardian on behalf of the minors is\n\nI '\n\nA unenforceable due to lack of mutuality and submitted that so long as the transaction is for the benefit of the minor, the defendants. cannot resist the decree for specific performance.\n\nA minor has no legal competence to enter into a contract or authorise someone else on his behalf to enter into a contract.\n\nBut under the Hindu Law the natural guardian is empowered to enter into, a contract on behalf of the minors and the contract would be binding and enforceable if the contract is for the benefit of the minor.\n\nOne of the earliest cases which dealt with the right of the guardian to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor, is Krishnaswami v.\n\nSundrappayyar, where a Bench of the Madras High Court held tbat S.11 of the Contract Act does not exclude the power of the guardian of a minor to represent him and enter into contracts on his behalf either beneficial or necessary to the minor under Hindu Law and that the English Law that a minor cannot claim specific performance which proceeds on the ground of want of mutuality, has no application to this country.\n\nThe position under the Hindu Law is that a guardian has legal competence to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor fot necessit~· or for the benefit of the estate.\n\nDr. Chitale, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he does not dispute the competence of a guardian to enter into a con tract on behalf of the minor if it is for necessity or for the benefit of the estate, but contended tliat the right can only be confined to sale of property and would not extend to the purchase of property. His submission is that regarding the purchase of the property, it involves a minor into an obligation of making a payment and that it would amount to personal covenant by the guardian binding the minor.\n\nIn support of his contention, he strongly relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Molwmad Chowdhury('), which re\" versed the view of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court which held that there was no want of mutuality in the case and that the agreementis enforceable against the minors and that the acts of the guardian in thiis country bind the minor though there is no difference between his position and powers and those of a manager. The Privy Conncil held that they were unable to accept the view of the Divisior\\ Bench that there was no difference between the position and powers of the manager and those of a guarddn. Holding that it is not within the competence of a manager of a minor's estate or of a guardian of a minor to. bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchases of immovable property arid that the minor was not bound by the contract for want of mutuality, the Privy Council held that a decree for specific• per-\n\n(!) !LR 18 Mad 415\n\n(2) !LR 39. Cal. I.\n\n• •\n\n,-A_\n\nMA NIK CHAND v. RAMCHANDRA ( Kailasam, J.) 1 10 7\n\nfonance cannot be granted. The Privy Council in a later decision in Stikakulem Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. Kurra Subba Rao(1), held that a ; guardian of a mrnor is competent to enter into a contract on behalf of the mfnor so as to bind him if it is for the benefit of the mmor.\n\nThough the decision of the PriNy Council in Mir Sarwarian v. Fakhrud- ' dm Mohomed Chowdhury (supra) was brought to its notice, tlm\n\nl'iiv1 Council did not refer to it but referred.to its earlier decision in Han; toumanpersaud Pandey v. Mussumat Nabooee Munraj Koon-\n\nWlirEt(') where it was stated that \"the act of the mother and guardian in enterig into a contract of sale was an act done on behalf of the minGr appellant.\" A passage from Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract l\\{lci Specific Relief Acts wherein the observation of the Privy Connell in lvlolwri Biee v. Dhuramodas Ghose( 3 ), that \"it is, however, different with regard to contract entered into on behalf of a minor by his. guardian or by a manager of his estate,\" was referred to. In such a ciise it has been held by the High Courts of India, in cases which arose subseqncn! to the decision of the Judicial Committee, that the contract can be specifically enforced as being within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it, if it is for\n\nt~ benefit to'the minor. But if either of these two conditions i~ wanting, , the contract cannot be specifically enforced at all Though the earlier decision of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarian v. Fakhruddin lffohomed Chowdhury (supra) was not referred to, the observation~ make it clear that it was not followed.\n\nIn Srikakulam Subrahmcmyan'\n\nv. Kurra Subba Rao(') the Madras High Court expressed its view that it hod no hesitation to hold that the considered judgment of the Judicial Committee in ILR 75 Mad. 115 must be taken as overruling all the previous decisions based on 32 Cal. 232 (P.C.). The same view was expressed by Subba Rao C.J. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (as he then was I in Suryaprakasam v. Gangaraju( 5 ), where he held that there could not b~ any essential distinction betwen the contract of sale and contract of purchase. It is unnecessary to go into this. question any further as after the passing of Hindu Minority Act, 1g56, the guardian of a Hindu Minor has power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for realisation, protection .or benefit of the minor's estate.\n\nThis provision, makes it clear that the guardian is entitled to act so as to bind the minor if it is necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the\n\n(I) !LR 75 Mad. 115\n\n(2) [1856] 6 Moo. I A. 393.\n\n(3) L. R. 301 T. A. 114.\n\n(4) TLR 1949 M2.d. 143. (') AIR 1956 Andh .. 11.\n\n'' '\n\nminor. The power thus conferred by the Section is in no way restricted than that was recognised under the Hindu Law. It is not disputed\n\nin this case th\"at the contract entered into by the guardian is for the benefit .of the minor. It appears quite strange that the respondent should plead that the transaction is not for the benefit of the minoi: when the minor is convinced it is in his behefit and that it is worth pursuing the litigation uptq this Court. It is common knowledge tflat the prices of immovable property have been on the rise and there clin\n\nbe no doubt that the transaction is for the benefit of the minor.\n\nFinding himsel( faced with these insurmountable difficulties, Dr.\n\nChitale, sought to plead that in any event S.8 of the Hindu Minority Act specifically prohibits the guardian from binding the minor by his personal covenant.\n\nThe submission was that the contract by the guardian which binds the minor to make a payment, would be in the nature of a personal covenant and as such is excluded by S. 8. In support of his plea, the learned counsel relied on S.55(5)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act and submitted that so far as the payment of the purchase price is concerned, there is personal covenant.\n\nWe are 1 unable to accept this contention for it cannot be said that the guardian by the contract was binding the minor by his pernonfil covenant. As it is within the competence of the guardian, the contract is entered into effectively on behalf of the minor and the liability to pay the money is the liability of the minor under the Transfer of Property Act. We are unable to accept the plea that in a contract for purchase of property, the.guardioan would be binding the minor by his personal covenant. In the result we find that the contract entered into by the guardian on behalf of the minors is enforceable. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with cost and the decree passed by the Trial Court is restored.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nI f.", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "MANIK CHAND AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANIK CHAND AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMACHANDRA SON OF CHAWRIRAJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMACHANDRA SON OF CHAWRIRAJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 8, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nRAMACHANDRA SON OF CHAWRIRAJ\n\nMay 8, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI ANO P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI ANO P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 268, "end_char": 277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 55(5)(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 335, "end_char": 359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "30-9-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 433, "end_char": 442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants-plaintiffs who were minors entered into an agreement on 30-9-1961, through their mother and guardian with the respondent to purchase a house for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "28-3-1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 814, "end_char": 823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the respondent did not carry out his part of the agreement, the appellants filed a suit for specific perlormance 1 ofi the contract on 28-3-1962 in the Cou11 of Additional District Judge, Gwhlior."}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Gwhlior", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the respondent did not carry out his part of the agreement, the appellants filed a suit for specific perlormance 1 ofi the contract on 28-3-1962 in the Cou11 of Additional District Judge, Gwhlior."}}, {"text": "15-4-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 900, "end_char": 909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed on 15-4-1966."}}, {"text": "13-7-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 978, "end_char": 987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,500/- the balance of the price on 13-7-1966."}}, {"text": "LR. 301 IA 114", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 2987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1105\n\nnliner when the minor is convinced it is in his benifit and that it is worth A pursuing the litigation upto Supreme Court. ["}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3309, "end_char": 3333, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3536, "end_char": 3557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Dayal Srivastava and T. C. Sharma for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "Shiv Dayal Srivastava"}}, {"text": "T. C. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shiv Dayal Srivastava and T. C. Sharma for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, and Rameshwar Nath for Respopdent."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, and Rameshwar Nath for Respopdent."}}, {"text": "J(AILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3691, "end_char": 3700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nJ(AILASAM."}}, {"text": "Thandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4147, "end_char": 4153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pboolibai with the respondent to purchase a house situated in Thandi\n\nSllrak for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "28-3~1962 in", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4505, "end_char": 4517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the plaintiffs/appellants, the respondent .did not carry outi his part of the agreement and the appe!lants filed the present suit for specific performance of the contract on 28-3~1962 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Gwalior."}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Gwalior", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4531, "end_char": 4565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the plaintiffs/appellants, the respondent .did not carry outi his part of the agreement and the appe!lants filed the present suit for specific performance of the contract on 28-3~1962 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Gwalior."}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shiv Dayal Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the appel- B !", "canonical_name": "Shiv Dayal Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6076, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the earliest cases which dealt with the right of the guardian to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor, is Krishnaswami v.\n\nSundrappayyar, where a Bench of the Madras High Court held tbat S.11 of the Contract Act does not exclude the power of the guardian of a minor to represent him and enter into contracts on his behalf either beneficial or necessary to the minor under Hindu Law and that the English Law that a minor cannot claim specific performance which proceeds on the ground of want of mutuality, has no application to this country."}}, {"text": "S.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6104, "end_char": 6108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chitale, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he does not dispute the competence of a guardian to enter into a con tract on behalf of the minor if it is for necessity or for the benefit of the estate, but contended tliat the right can only be confined to sale of property and would not extend to the purchase of property."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his contention, he strongly relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Molwmad Chowdhury('), which re\" versed the view of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court which held that there was no want of mutuality in the case and that the agreementis enforceable against the minors and that the acts of the guardian in thiis country bind the minor though there is no difference between his position and powers and those of a manager."}}, {"text": "Kailasam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8240, "end_char": 8248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\n• •\n\n,-A_\n\nMA NIK CHAND v. RAMCHANDRA ( Kailasam, J.) 1 10 7\n\nfonance cannot be granted."}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A passage from Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract l\\{lci Specific Relief Acts wherein the observation of the Privy Connell in lvlolwri Biee v. Dhuramodas Ghose( 3 ), that \"it is, however, different with regard to contract entered into on behalf of a minor by his."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8990, "end_char": 8995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A passage from Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract l\\{lci Specific Relief Acts wherein the observation of the Privy Connell in lvlolwri Biee v. Dhuramodas Ghose( 3 ), that \"it is, however, different with regard to contract entered into on behalf of a minor by his."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9021, "end_char": 9040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Courts of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9326, "end_char": 9346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In such a ciise it has been held by the High Courts of India, in cases which arose subseqncn!"}}, {"text": "Mir Sarwarian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9765, "end_char": 9778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But if either of these two conditions i~ wanting, , the contract cannot be specifically enforced at all Though the earlier decision of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarian v. Fakhruddin lffohomed Chowdhury (supra) was not referred to, the observation~ make it clear that it was not followed."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10215, "end_char": 10224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view was expressed by Subba Rao C.J. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (as he then was I in Suryaprakasam v. Gangaraju( 5 ), where he held that there could not b~ any essential distinction betwen the contract of sale and contract of purchase."}}, {"text": "Hindu Minority Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10515, "end_char": 10533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11765, "end_char": 11768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12048, "end_char": 12052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.55(5)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12108, "end_char": 12118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12126, "end_char": 12150, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12591, "end_char": 12615, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1109_1121_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "l' l\n\nDELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD. v.\n\nSTATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.\n\nMay 8, 1980\n\n[N: L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nExemption from Sales Tax under the Central Sales Tax Act,-\"Rayou Tyre Cord Fabric'', whether covered by ite1n 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, so as to qualify for exemption under the Central Sales\n\n1ax Act,-ltem 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954,- Whether assessment and payment of_ excise duties under the Additional Duties of .Excise (GOods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, a preconditl'on for claiming exe1nption under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act and therefore under the Central Sales Tax Act.\n\nInterference by Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution, whether hatred by Section 15 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act.\n\nSection 4(2) of the Rajasthan General Sales Tax Act, 1954 empowern the State' Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to exempt from tax the sale of any goods or class of goods on such conditions as may be1 specified in the notification.\n\nBy a notification dated 1st July, 1958, the RajasthaTI'.\n\nGovernment unconditionally exeir.pted all varieties of, textiles made wholly or partly of rayon from !st July, 1958.\n\nS. 4(1) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 provides for exemption from Sales Tax of the goods specified in thci Schedule to that Act provided the conditions mentioned in the Schedule are satisfied. Item 18, inserted in the Schedule by ther Rajasthan Taxation Laws. (Amendment) Act, 1964, included \"rayon fabrics\" as defined in the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957. On this, the notification dated 1st July 1958 was. withdrawn as redundant. When Item 18 was\n\ninserted in the Schedule, no conditions were specified therein as a qualification for the exemption. The unconditional exemption from sales tax granted on the sale of rayon fabrics, that is to say, without the condition that additional eXcise duty was paid by the manufacturer, woo withdrawn by a notification dated 5th March, 1973 made by the Rajasthan State Government und<>r s. 4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. The notification provided that in the case of un processed rayon and artificial silk fabrics the exemption; from sales1 tax would apply only if the additional duty is leviable on them under the Additional\n\nDuties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, !957 and such goods had not specifically been exempted from the said duty and the dealers. thereof furnished proof to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that such duty had been paid,\n\nItem 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax exempts from Sales Tax and purchase tax \"all. cotton fabrics rayon or artiJicial silk fabrics, woollen fabrics as defined in the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (Central Act 58 of 1957)\".\n\nSection 2(c) of the Additional Duties of Excise (GOOds of Special Importance) Act, !956 declares that the e.xpression \"rayon or artificial •ilk\n\n(1109)\n\nA fabrics\" shall have the meaning assigned to it in Item 22 of the First Schedule to the central Excise and Salt, .'-\\ct, 1944, which reads :\n\n\"Rayon or artificial silk fabrics\" means a1l varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly' from rayon or artificial silk and includes e111broidery in the piece, in strips or in metifs and Fabrics impregnated or co:ited with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials .... \"\n\nThe appellant owns an industrial unit, Shriram Rayons, situ..'1'ted at Kota in the Sto'.lte of Rajasthan. It maiWf.actures a product described as \"Rayon Tyre\n\n(ord Fabric''. Rayon fibre is spun into rayon and twistd into cord. The cords are arranged lengthwise, and are commonly described as the \"warp\". They are packed 25 to the inch. By a process of weaving, cotton thread are wefted through a loom across the cords. The wefts are thinner and fewer than the cords, being not more than two to five per inch. The cord component comprises the major content of the product. The unprocessed rayon tyre cord fabric so produced is sold in the form of rolls in the market.\n\nAfter initial chemical treatment it is put through a process of rubberizing in the tyr~ manufacturing plant. The rayon tyre cord fabric is used as a re-inforcing base in the manufacture of tyres. It is a product generally intended for industrial use.\n\nThe rayon tyre cord employed as a component in the manufacture of rayon tyre cord fabric is also sold directly as such.. It is sold packed or cones, somewhat like yarn is sold. Tyre cord is purchased; direct1y by some tyre manufacturers, who by applying the same process of putting in the wefts. convert it into a tyre cord fabric for uSe in the tyre.\n\nThe appellant was assessed to sales ta•x by the, Commerci~ Tax Officer for , the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 on the turnover of rayon tyre cord fabric.\n\nThe plea that the product fell within the item 8 of the Schedule to th~ Rajasthan Sales Tax Act and therefore was exempt from sales tax; was not accepted. The matter came up for adjudication upto the Supreme Court. By its judgment dated 3rd May 1976 reported in 38 S.T.C. 113 (Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. B. R. Gupta and Ors.), the Court observed that the controversy \"requires careful consideration of the technical processes of manufacturing, of the composition of the 'tyre cord fabric', and an evaluation of opinions of experts on the subject, to be .able to decide the question satisfactorily'', as well as \"som~ examination of commercial usoge and terminology or the languageof the market in goods of this type'\", and that the. matter was one for determination by the txing authorities.\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) was ineanwhile seized of not only the two appeals pertaining to the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71 but also appeals against the assessment order for 1971-72 and a provisional assessment for the first six months of the assessment year 1972-73. \\Vhen the nppeals\n\n\\Vere taken up by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) volurninous evidence, both oral and documentary, was led before him. The appeals were, nevertheless, dismissed. Thereafter, the, appellant applied in revision to the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, but again met with no success. The Board expressed the view that the product Wa$ not a fabric and <lismissed the revision! petitions by their order dated 6th October, 1977. The present appeal<; are directed against that order.\n\n...\n\nDELHI CLOTH MILLS v. RAJASTHAN 1111\n\nAllowing the appeals, the. Court.\n\nHELD : 1. In detern1ining the meaning or connotation of \\\\'Ords and expres-- sions describing an article or commodity the turnover of which is taxed in a sales tax enactment, if there is one principle fairly well-settled it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it that consti- B t'utes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted. As sales tax the liability falls on the seller, who in his turn passes it on to the consumer; -as purchase ta-x, the liability falls directly on the purchaser.\n\n[1115 A-CJ\n\nPorritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v: State of Haryana [1978] 42 S.T.C. 433; followed.\n\n2. On a comprehensive consideration of the materials, it is clear that by and large a tyre cord fabric is regarded as a textile fabric. The peculiar feature that the tyre cord constitutes the dominating element indicating the use to which the fabric is put and the close concentration in which it is packed in contrast to the light density with which the weft thread is woven does not detract from the conclusion that what we have is a textile fabric. It is wholly\n\nimmaterial, that once tyre cord fabric has, in the hands of the tyre manufacturer, undergone the process of rubberizing and is embedded in the tyre body the significance of the weft thread is greatly reduced. It may also be thati in the more mern process of manufacturing tyres what is used is cabled rayon With hawser twists with the cords assembled in parallel order and rubberized\n\nwithout the intermediate process of weaving on a loom. The material on the record, however, indicates that the product manufactured by the appellant does not faJl in-that category. It is a woven fabric in which the intermediate process of weaving the weft thread across the warp cord is an integral stage of manu facture.\n\nWhen the purchaser buys the product, it is the entire integrated woven fabric which he buys, it is not merely the tyre cord by itself. If'tyre cord was a11 that he desired, he would purchase that commodity, which is readily available, and not tyre cord fabric. Item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt 'Act speaks of \"a11 varieties of fabfics\", language wide enough to include the rayon tyre cord fabric manufactured by the nppel !ant. [1117 E-H, 1118 A]\n\n3. Item 22 of the First schedule to the Centr3.l Excise and Salt Act does comprehend \"industrial fabrics\" as well as the item refers to \"all varieties of fabrics''. Further Item 22(3) speaks of fabrics impregnated or coated with p-1tparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials which would include rubberized cloth, tarpaulin cloth, P.V.C. cloth, water proo:£ cloth and tent cloth. A whole 7ange of fabric is. included.\n\n[1118 B-C]\n\n4. It is futile to suggest that the tyre plays a less substantial role than other popular commodities in modern life. The tyre' manufacturing industry is of growing importance and bas an increasingly important role to play in everyday Jife. ~That is evident from the overwhelming expansion . of automobile traffic prompted by the complex needs of a constantly enlarging economy.\n\nThe daily life of the average citizen is prof9undly effected by tlie automobile, H be it passenger bus or a goods truck or the ubiquitous scooter.\n\nTyres are needed for all. In ntral areas tyres are no\\v coming into use for bullock carts.\n\nAnd, therefore, it is but a short st'ep to recognising the status of what goes into the manufacture of a tyre-the rayon tyre cord fabric as \"goods of special importance\". It may be that unlike the cotton, silk, woollen and rayon fabrics used as wearing apparel or furnishing material the rayon tyre cord fabric is not directly employed for the satisfaction of a domestic need. Nonetheless, as an integral and vital constituent of an automobile tyre it is intimately involved in the diurnal activity of human life.\n\n[1118 E-0]\n\n 5. Whether Parliament understood the word \"fabric\" to include tyre cord fabric must gathered from all the relevant material and with reference. to tests and criteria accepted in law rather on the basis of a single notification, like the circular dated 11th February 1957 issued by the Revenue Board Ja.ying down th~ tyre and fabric could not be described as \"fabric\". [1119 A-B]\n\n6. In respect of the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72 and the first six months 0; f 1972-73, the turnover of rayon tyre and fo.bric was clearly exempt from sales tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act and there wµ.s no condition in that Act untill 4th March 1973 that the exemption was dependent on payment of additional excise duty under the provisions of Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957. Since from 5th March, 1973 only the exemption from tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act was available only if additional excise duty was leviable, a de3.Ier \\'¥\\ls entitled to exemption from sales tax upto 4th March. 1973 without the requirement of payment of the additional excise duty.\n\n[1120 B-C, E-F]\n\n7. The question in the instant' caseis not one of fact.\n\nIt is a qui-\"stion which concerns the construction of Item 22 of the Schedule to the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957.\n\nIf the rayon tyre cord fabric manufactured by the appellant is covered by that item it is exempt from sales tax a\"nd there is no jurisdiction in the sales tax authorities to assess the appellant on its turnover. The question is one of substantial importance, and having regard to the circumstances there is good reason for entertaining the appeals and deciding them on the merits. The Supreme Court is entitled to entertain appeals directly, not withstanding, that a reference is. open against the impugned orders before the High Court under Section 15 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. [1120 G-H, 1021 A-Cl\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil 'Appeals Nos. 2453-2456 of 1977.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Ord~ dated the 6th October, 1977 passed by the Board of Revenue for Raja; than: at Ajmer, in revisions for the years 1969-70 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73.\n\nF. S. Nariman and H. K. Puri for the Appellant.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, and S . . C. Bhandari, Soh, bag Mal Jain and P. P.\n\nSingh for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivere<l by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThe question raised in these appeals is whether the \"Rayon Tyre Cord Fabric\" manufactured by the appe11ant is a rayon\n\n>- • ..\n\n• \" • ;:\n\n\"£Lffi CLOTH MILLS v. RAJASTHAN (Pathak, I.) 1113\n\nfabric covered by item 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax A Act; 1954, and therefore .uempt from sales tax under the Central Sllles Tu: Act.\n\nThe appellant owns an industrial unit, Shriram Rayons, situated at Kota in the State of Rajasthan. It manufactures a product described as \"Rayon Tyre C-0rd Fabric.\" The appellant claims that the pro- B duct falls within item 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act which exempts from sales tax and purchase tax :-\n\n\"All cotton fabrics, rayon or artificial silk fabrics, woollen fabrics as defined in the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (Central Act 58 of 1957) .\" C\n\nSection 2 ( c) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 declares that the expression \"rayon or artifi cial silk fabrics\" shall have the meaning assigned to it in Item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. Item 22 reads:-\n\n\"Rayon or artificial silk fabrics\" means all varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly from rayon or artificial silk and includes embroidery in the piece, in strips or in motifs and fabrics impregnated or coated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... \" '\n\nThe appellant was assessed to sales tax by the Commercial Tax Officer for the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 on the turnover of rayon tyre cord fabric.\n\nThe plea that the product was exempt from sales tax was not accepted. Two writ petitions were filed by the appellant tn the Rajasthan High Court against the assessments while appeals were also filed before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals).\n\nThe Raiasthan High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the ground that disputed questions of fact were involved in the controversy and recourse should be had to the remedy by way of appeal. Against the order of the High Court the appellant obtained from the Supreme Court special leave to appeal under Article 13 6 of the Constitution.\n\nMeanwhile, the Commercial Tax Officer made a provisional assessment on the turnover of rayon tyre cord fabric for the period 1971-\n\n72. Against the assessment the appellant filed a writ petition dirtly in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The two appeals and the writ petition were dismissed by this Court on 3rd May, 1976.(')\n\n(I) The judgment is reported in De/Iii Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. and Others\n\nv, B. R. Gupta and Other. .38 S. T. C. 113. ll-'fi!O SCl/80\n\n1114 sUPREMJl COURt REPOilts [1980] j s.qR.\n\nThe Court observed that the controversy \"requires careful consideration of the technical processes of manufacturing, of the composition of the 'tyre cord fabric,' and an evaluation of opinions of experts on the subject, to be able to decide the question satisfactorily,\" as well as \"some examfuation of commercial usage and tenninology or the language of the market in goods of this type.\" It upheld the view taken by the High Court that !he matter wa~ one for determination by the taxing authorities.\n\nThe Depty Commissioner (Appeals) was meanwhile seirled of not only the two appeals pertaining to the assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71 but also appeals against the assessment order fot 1971-72 and a provisional assessment for the first six months of the assessment year 1972-73.\n\nWI:ien the appeals, were taken up by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) voluminous evidence, both oral and documentary, was led befoe him; The appeals were, nevertheless, dismissed.\n\nThereafter, the appellant applied in revision to the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, but again met with no success. The Board expressed the view that the product was not a fabric and dismissed the revision pe!itions by their order dated 6th October, 1977. The present appeals are directed against that order.\n\n- Some undisputed facts co9cerning the product manufactured by the appellant may be set out. Rayon fibre is spun into rayon and twisted i!llto cord. The cords are arranged lengthwise, and are com- E monly described as the \"warp\".\n\nThey are packed 25 to the inch, By a process of weaving, cotton threads are wefte<l through a loom across the cordS.\n\nThe wefts are thinner ilnd lewer than the cords, being not more than two to five per inch. The cord component C(\\Jllprises the major content of the product. The unprocessed 'rayon 'tyre\n\nord fabric •so produced is sold in the form of rolls in the market.\n\nF After initial chemical treatment it is put through a process of rubberi~ zing iin the tyre manufacturing plant.\n\nThe rayon tyre cord fabric is used as a re-inforcing base in the manufacture of tyres. It is a product generally intended for industrial use. The rayon tyre cord employed as a component in the manufacture of rayon tyre cord fabric is also sold directly as such. It is sold packed on cones, somewhat G like yarn is sold. Tyre cord is purchased directly by some tyre manufacturers, who by applying the same process, of putting in the wefts, convert it into a tyre cord fabric for use in the tyre.\n\nIn holding that the rayon tyre cord fabric is not a fabric, the Board bas noted that the tyre body or carcass consists of a series of layers of cord fabric in the form of plies buried in rubber, and that H the significant factor in the tyre cord fabric is represented by the tyre cord.\n\nThe properties and characteristics of the fibre constitutini: the\n\n+'.'::'\n\n' .\n\n• ~-\n\nDELHI CLOTH MILLS v. RAl<\\STHAN (Pathak, J.) 1115\n\ntyre cord, it is said, determines the tyre performance. The weft in the . fabric, it is pointed out, merely play~ the subsidiay role of holding the cord in place before the process of tyre manufacturing is commenced.\n\nNow, in determining thei meaning or connotation of word$ and expressrons describing an article or commoditj' the turnover of which is taxed in a sales tax enactment, if there i~ one principle fai!ly wellsettled it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they a.re understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concemi; d with it, and it is t!Je sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted. As sales tax the liability falls on the seller, who i:n his tum passes it on to the consumer.\n\nAs purc}lase tax, the liability falls directly on the purchaser. A long\n\ntrain of authorities supports that view, and we need refer only to the recent Judgment of this Court in Porritts and Spencer (Aia) Ltd.,\n\nv. State of Haryana,(') in which reference has been made to some of them. ·\n\nIn the record before us, a wide range of material has been incorporated for determining liow those who manufacture and deal in fabrics and, in particular, tyre cord fabric, understand them. . And so, a brief reference to that material is appropriate at this point.\n\nWhat is a fabric? The \"Mercury\" Dictionary of Textile Terms E defines \"fabric\" as a term which covers \"all textiles no matter how constructed, how manufactured, or the nature of the material from which made,\" and the expression \"textile\" is described as \"any product manufactured from fibres through twisting, interlacing, bonding, looping, or any other means, in such a manner that the flexibility, strength, and other characteristic properties of the individual fibres are F not suppressed~\" The Man-Made Textile Encyclopaedia (1959) defines fabric as ''.a collective term applied to cloth no matter how constructed or manufactured and regardless of the kind of fibre from which made. In structure it is planar produced by interlacing yams, fibres or filaments. Textile fabrics .include the following vaiieties, bonding, felted; knitted, braided and woven.\" The Fairchild's Dictionary of G Textiles (1959) a:ys that fabric is .\"a cloth .that is woven or knit, braided, netted, with any textile fibre ...... : ... \", and \"textile\" is said to refer to \"a broad cliissification of any material that can be worked into fabric, such as fibres and yarns including woven and knitted fabric, felt, netted fabric, lace and croched goods.\" In \"Textile Terms and Definitions\" (1960) the word cloth. is defined as \"a H\n\n(!) (1978) 42 S. T. C. 433 .\n\n. > .\n\n::-~·~~;\\i:\\i;\"\n\n1116 SUPREMi COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 s.c.tt\n\ngeneric term embraci!llg all textile fabrics and laminar felts\" and '1ex• tile\" is applied in its modern sense\" to \"any manufacture from fibreS, filaments, or yarns, natural or artificia~ obtmned by interlacing.\" The 1967 Annual ok of ASTM Standards defines clotb as \"any textile fabric but .specially one designed for apparel domestic or industrial use,\" and textile fabric as \"a planar Structure consisting of interlaced yarns or fibres.\" The 1973 Annual Book of ASTM Standards reproduces those definitions.\n\nWe may now examine whether a tyre cord fabric has been Ulldl!i' stood as a fabric. A publication IS: 4910 (Part Vl)-1970, put out by the Indian Standards Institution, defines a \"tyre cord fabric\" as \"a C fabric consisting of tyre cord warp with widely spaced weft threads\".\n\nAnother publication IS: 1324-1966 of the same institution gives tbe definition of tyre cord fabrics as \"fabrics which. comprise the main\n\ncarcass of pneumatic tyres constructed predominantly of warp cords . (cabled yarns) with light wefts. The latter merely serve to hold the cords together for processing\". The \"Mercury\" Dictionary of Textile Terms defines cord tyre fabric as a \"cloth made with strong corded sheets for the warp with as little weft as possible. . . . . . the warp takes all the strain ....... \". The Fairchild's Dictionary of Textiles de<:ll!res that a tyre cord fabric is not a true fabric today, but originally a square woven fabric was employed in making the pneumatic automobile tyre. \"The modern tyre fabric is not woven or knitted, but consists of cabled yarns with hawser twists formerly mostly cotton, now usually of high tenacity viscose rayon or nylon.\n\nThese cords are arranged in parallel order and rubberized.\" The tyre cord fabric manufactured by the appellant admittedly consists of warp and weft and therefore this definition, which.does not refer to an interlaced strncture, wou1li nof apply.\n\nOn the contrary, the further definition in the same publication appears to be more pertinent. It says : \"When these tyre cords were first made they were assembled as a warp on a loom and held in place until rubberized by an occasional fine single filling yarn, and it is pr<>J>ably due to this that the term \"fabric\" has remained in use\".\n\nSome doubt is created by the definitions included in Linton's Modern Textile Dictionary and River's Dictionary of Texu1e Terms.\n\nBut tyre cord fabric is clearly described as a fabric by the 1973 Annual Book of AS'I'M Standards the Textile Terms and Definitions (1960), and in India by the Indian Standard Glossary of Textile Terms Relating to Man-Made Fibre & Fabric Industry. The Man-Made Textile Encyclopaedia in its chapter on Industrial Fabrics gives a structural description of tyre H fabrics and refers to the series of layers of cord fabric buried in rubber in the tyre body or carcass.\n\nThe Wellingtion Sears Hand Book of Industrial Textile' describes in some detail the process of manufactur-\n\n\"\" ..\n\n.,, '\n\n-u---,\n\n• '\n\n_, +\n\nDJ!LHI' CLOTH MILLS v. RAJASTHAN (Pathak, !.) 1117\n\nmg tyre card fabrics. It states that \"the tyre cords are woven into a 'fabric' with a very fine cotton or rayon filling yarn, just strong enough to hold the cords together during subsequent handling.\"\n\nNow Jet us see how the Government of India itself, in its various departments, looks at tyre cord fabrics.\n\nThe Revised Indian Trade\n\nClatioo (1965) published by the Central Government in the Department of Commercial Intelligence and. Statistics lists Viscose. tyre fabric (Code 653 .6125) under the classification Group 653-\"Textile\n\nFabrics, Woven (not inchiding narrow or special fabrics), other than cotton and jute fabrics.\" The Ministry of Foreign Trade Resolution dated 27th February, 1971 refers separately to rayon tyre yarn, cord . J and fabric, and speaks of tyre cord units producing both twisted cords -,...__ and' woven fabric.\n\nAnd the Indian Customs Tariff Guide (1 Ith Edi- , tion)shows as item 53 in the Tariff Schedule : \"Rayon tyre fabrics, a loosely :woven material with, rextremely thin cotton threads running breadthwise and introduced merely for keeping the artificial silk threads running lengthwise in position.\" The item is repeated in th!l same terms in the Tariff Schedule to the Indian Customs Tariff Guide (13th Edition). The Table appended to the Customs and P,; ntral Excise Duties Drawback Rules lists \"Viscose tyre cord fabric\" (2621) under Serial No. ~6 \"Textile Fabrics and Hosiery\".\n\nOn a comprehensive consideration of the material before us, there is no. escape from the conclusion that by a, nd large a tyre cord fabric ;\"--- is regarded as a textile fabric. The peculiar feature that the tyre cord constitutes the dominating element indicating the use to which the fabric is put and the close concentration in which it is packed in contmst to the light density with which the weft thread is woven does not detract from the conclusion that what we have is a textile fabric. We are concerned with the product manqfactured and sold by the appellant.\n\nIt is wholly immaterial that once tyre cord fabric has, iii the hancjs of ). . the tyre manufacturer, undergone the process of rubberizing and is\n\n'I! embedded in the tyre body the significance. of the weft thread is greatly reduced. It may also be that in the more modem process: of manufacturing tyres what is used is cabled rayon with hawser twists with the cords assembledin parallel order and rubberized without the intermediate\n\nprs of weaving on a loom. The material on the record, however, md1cates that the product manufactured by the appellant aoes not fall\n\n....... in that category. It is a wqven fabric in which the intermediate process of weaving the weft thread across the warp cord is an integral stage of manufacture.\n\nWhen the purchaser buys the product, it is the entire\n\niillted woven fabric which he buys, it is not merely the tyre cord H by .lt&elf. If tyre cord was all that he desired, he would purchase that c, ommpdity, wmch is readily available, aq\\] pot tyre cord fabric.\n\ni\" ....,,'\"\"\"\"~\n\nmay also p<iint out that Item 22 of the First Schedule to the P'ntral Excises and Salt Act speaks of \"all varieties of fabrics\", language wide enough to include the rayon tyre cord fabric manufactured by the appellant.\n\nIt was contended by Shri L. N. Sinha, for the respondents, that industrial fabrics are not envisaged within the expression \"rayon fabric\" in Item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act. As we have already pointed out, the item refers to \"all varieties of fabrics\" and it will be noticed that Item 22(3) speaks of fabrics impregnated or coated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials which; we are told, would include rubberized cloth, tarpaulin cloth, P.V.C. cloth, water proof cloth and tent cloth.\n\nA whole range of fabric is included.\n\nIt is then urged by Shri Sinha that whn the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance\\ Act, 1957 was enacted Parliament could not have intended the expression \"rayon fabric\" to include rayon tyre cord fabric. It is pointed out that the Statement of Objects\n\nand Reasons pertinent 'to the Act refers to mill-made textiles, and the submission is that the item in the First Schedule to that Act refers to fabric which affects the -common man, which finds place in a popular market and is intended for popular use, and does not refer to a commodity which caters to the needs of a special category of consumers and is devoted to a particular use only.\n\nNow, the tyre manufacturing industry is of growing importance and has an increasingly important role to play in everyday life.\n\nThat is evident from the overwhelming expansion of automobile traffic prompted by the complex needs of a constantly enlarging economy.\n\nThe daily lifo of the average citizen is profoundly effected by the automobile, be it passenger bus or a goods truck or the ubiquitous scooter. Tyres are needed for all. In rural areas tyres are now corning into use for bullock carts.\n\nIt is futile to suggest that the tyre plays a less substantial role than other popular commodities in modem life. And, therefore, it is but a short step to recognising the status of what goes into the manufacture of a tyre--the rayon tvre cord fabric as \"goods of special importance\". It may be that unlike the cotton, silk, woollen and rayon fabrics used as weanng apparel or furnishing material the rayon tyre cord fabric is not directly employed for the satisl'action of a domestic need.\n\nNonetheless, as an integral and vital constituent of an automobile tyre it is intimately involved in the diurnal a<; tivity of hnman life.\n\nH We are then told that when the Additional Duties of Exclse (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 was enacted there was in existence a Circular datd 11th February, 1957 issued by the Revenue Board\n\n\" '\n\n... ,\n\nD!LHf CLOTH MILLS V. RAJASTHAN (Pathak,!.) 1119\n\nIa:yini' doWn thiit tyre cord fabric could not be described as a \"fabric\" within the meaning ot the Central Excise Ttariff. It is said that when that was the popular conception of tyre cord fabrics it could not have been envisaged as a fabric when the statute was enacted. To our mind, the view taken by the Revenue Board cannot be regarded as resolving the question before us.\n\nWhether Parliament understood the word \"fabric\" to include tyre cord fabric must be gathered from all the relevant material and with reference to tests and criteria accepted m Jaw rather on the basis of a single notification .\n\nWe may now turn to the contention of Shri Sinha that the benefit of exemption from sales tax is available to the appellant only if he has paid the additional duty of excise on the. product. It is pointed out ihat the appellant has not been assessed to additional excise duly under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Specilll Importance) Act, 1957 and ig, therefore, not entitled to exemption from sales tax under the C.entral Sales Tax Act.\n\nThe Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 came into force on 24th December, 1957. Sub-section\n\n(1) read with sub-section (2) of s.3 of the Act provide for the levy and collection of an additional excise duly, over and above the excise duty chargeabls under the Central Excises and Sal( Act,.} 944 on certain goods at the rate specified in the Schedule to that Act.\n\nRayon fabrics are mentioned in the Schedule to the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, and are classified by reference to Item 22 in the Fil'St Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act.\n\nIn the present appe3Is, we iire concerned with a claim to exemption from sales tax, and in order to consider the contention of the Reyenue that no such exemption was available to the appellant because 10, bad not paid any additiooal excise duty on rayon tyre cord fabric it is necessary to determine whether indeed the exemption from sales tax was subject to the condition of payment of additional excise <futy.\n\nS.4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 empowers the State G Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to exempt from tax the sale of any goods or class of, goods on such conditions as may he specified in the notification. By a notification dated lSt July, 1958, the Rajasthan Government unconditionally exempted all varieties of textiles mide wholly or partly of rayon frC\\111 1st July, 1958. S.4(1) of the Rajasthap Sales Tax Act, 1954 provides for exemption from H. sillci tax of the goods specified in the Schedule to that Act provided tbt conditions 111ntio1Jed in the Sched11I~ are satisfid. Item 18, in~\n\n. : : ,_,\n\n1120 (1900} 3 s.c.R.\n\nserted in the Schedule by the Rajasthlm Tamtion Laws(Amendment} Act, 1964, included \"rayon fabrics\" as defined in the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of 1Special Importance) Act, 1957.\n\nOu this, the notification dated 1st July, 1958 was withdrawn as reduncfant.\n\nNow when Item 18 was inserted in the Schedule, no conditions were specified therein as a qualification for the exemption.\n\nTherefore, in respect of thy-assessment years with whi<:h these appeals are concerned, the turnover of rayon tyre cord fabric was clearly exempt from sales •tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, and there was no condition in that Act that the exemption was dependent on payment of additional excise duty.\n\nThat being so, there was an unconditional exemption from central sales tax also.\n\nThe unconditional exemption from sales tax grantd on the sale of rayon fabrics, that is to say, without the condition that additional excise duty was paid by the manufacturer, was withdrawn by a noti: fication dated 5th March, 1973 made by the Rajasthan State Government under S.4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act.\n\nThe notification provided tl)at in the case of unprocessed rayon and artificial silk fabrics the exemption from sales tax would apply only if the additional duty is leviable on them under the Additional Duties of Excise -(Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 and such goods had not specifically been exempted from the said duty and the dealers thereof furnished proof to the satisfaction of the assessing authority ti!at such duty had been paid. Therefore, as from 5th March, 1973 the exemption from tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act was available only if additional excise duty was leviable and the dealer had esiablished that he had paid such duty.\n\nAbout the same time, the Rajasthan Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 deleted Item 18 in the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act with effect from Sth March,\n\n1973. It is evident, therefore, that a dealer was entitled to exemption from sales tax up to 4th March, 1973 without the requirement of payment of the additional excise duty. The conclusion is inescapable that even if the appellant did riot pay additional excise duty, he was exempt from sales tax on the turnover of rayon tyre cord fubric for the assessment years under consideration.\n\nFmally, it is urged by Shri Sinha that the question whether the rayon tyre cord fabric falls within the expression \"rayon fabrics\" is a question of fuct and the assessing authority, the appellate authority ru1d the revenue Board are all agreed tllat it cannot be classified as a rayon fabric and, therefore, this Court should not interfere in these appeals. It is also pointed out that under s. 15 of the Rajastb11n Sales T11x Act a 'proc; eeding by way of reference is available to\n\n• f j_\n\nDELHI CLOTH MILLS v. RA.JASTHAN (Pathak,/.) itU\n\nthe appellant and this C0urt. t'llCn if it were. to cans, idm tbe$: appeals on the merits, should exercise no wider jurisdiction than that available to it if it had entertained a reference.\n\nWe are unable to agree that the question is one of fact.\n\nIt is a question which concerns the consideration of Item 22 of the Schedule to the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Iqiport\\Ulce) Act,\n\n1957. If, the. rayon tyre cord fabric manufactured by the appellant is recovrea by that item it is exempt from sales tax and there is no jurisdiction in the sales tax authorities to assess the appellant on its turnover. The question is ol)e of substantial importance, and having regard to the circwnstances there is good reason for entertaining the appeals and deciding them on the merits.\n\nIn the result the appeals are allowed, the assessments in respect of the turnover of rayon tyre cord fabric manufactured by the appellant relating to the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71, 197f-72 and the first six months of 1972-73 are quashed. In the circumstances there is no order as to cost.\n\nS.R .. ...\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n' .. \" :...", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "l\n\nDELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS CO. 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 761, "end_char": 771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954", "statute": "the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 805, "end_char": 817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954", "statute": "the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan General Sales Tax Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 825, "end_char": 862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1233, "end_char": 1240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan General Sales Tax Act, 1954", "statute": "the Rajasthan General Sales Tax Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1248, "end_char": 1277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sales Tax of the goods specified in thci Schedule to that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1306, "end_char": 1367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "5th March, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2044, "end_char": 2059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unconditional exemption from sales tax granted on the sale of rayon fabrics, that is to say, without the condition that additional eXcise duty was paid by the manufacturer, woo withdrawn by a notification dated 5th March, 1973 made by the Rajasthan State Government und<>r s. 4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2072, "end_char": 2098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The unconditional exemption from sales tax granted on the sale of rayon fabrics, that is to say, without the condition that additional eXcise duty was paid by the manufacturer, woo withdrawn by a notification dated 5th March, 1973 made by the Rajasthan State Government und<>r s. 4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2106, "end_char": 2113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax of the goods specified in thci Schedule to that Act", "statute": "Sales Tax of the goods specified in thci Schedule to that Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2873, "end_char": 2885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3093, "end_char": 3107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kota", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3564, "end_char": 3568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "956 declares that the e.xpression \"rayon or artificial •ilk\n\n(1109)\n\nA fabrics\" shall have the meaning assigned to it in Item 22 of the First Schedule to the central Excise and Salt, .'-\\ct, 1944, which reads :\n\n\"Rayon or artificial silk fabrics\" means a1l varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly' from rayon or artificial silk and includes e111broidery in the piece, in strips or in metifs and Fabrics impregnated or co:ited with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials .... \"\n\nThe appellant owns an industrial unit, Shriram Rayons, situ..'1'ted at Kota in the Sto'.lte of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3588, "end_char": 3597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "956 declares that the e.xpression \"rayon or artificial •ilk\n\n(1109)\n\nA fabrics\" shall have the meaning assigned to it in Item 22 of the First Schedule to the central Excise and Salt, .'-\\ct, 1944, which reads :\n\n\"Rayon or artificial silk fabrics\" means a1l varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly' from rayon or artificial silk and includes e111broidery in the piece, in strips or in metifs and Fabrics impregnated or co:ited with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials .... \"\n\nThe appellant owns an industrial unit, Shriram Rayons, situ..'1'ted at Kota in the Sto'.lte of Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4989, "end_char": 5012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5117, "end_char": 5130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter came up for adjudication upto the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "3rd May 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5154, "end_char": 5166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment dated 3rd May 1976 reported in 38 S.T.C. 113 (Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. and Ors."}}, {"text": "6th October, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6440, "end_char": 6457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petitions by their order dated 6th October, 1977."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8851, "end_char": 8865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excise and Salt Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9101, "end_char": 9120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10675, "end_char": 10685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether Parliament understood the word \"fabric\" to include tyre cord fabric must gathered from all the relevant material and with reference."}}, {"text": "11th February 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10916, "end_char": 10934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to tests and criteria accepted in law rather on the basis of a single notification, like the circular dated 11th February 1957 issued by the Revenue Board Ja.ying down th~ tyre and fabric could not be described as \"fabric\". ["}}, {"text": "4th March. 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11686, "end_char": 11701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since from 5th March, 1973 only the exemption from tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act was available only if additional excise duty was leviable, a de3.Ier \\'¥\\ls entitled to exemption from sales tax upto 4th March."}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12540, "end_char": 12550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12879, "end_char": 12892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman and H. K. Puri for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12897, "end_char": 12907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman and H. K. Puri for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12928, "end_char": 12944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, and S . ."}}, {"text": "S . . C. Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12950, "end_char": 12967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, and S . ."}}, {"text": "Soh,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12969, "end_char": 12973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Bhandari, Soh, bag Mal Jain and P. P.\n\nSingh for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "bag Mal Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12974, "end_char": 12986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Bhandari, Soh, bag Mal Jain and P. P.\n\nSingh for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "P. P.\n\nSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12991, "end_char": 13003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Bhandari, Soh, bag Mal Jain and P. P.\n\nSingh for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13071, "end_char": 13077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivere<l by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThe question raised in these appeals is whether the \"Rayon Tyre Cord Fabric\" manufactured by the appe11ant is a rayon\n• ..\n\n• \" • ;:\n\n\"£Lffi CLOTH MILLS v. RAJASTHAN (Pathak, I.) 1113\n\nfabric covered by item 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax A Act; 1954, and therefore .uempt from sales tax under the Central Sllles Tu: Act."}}, {"text": "Rayon Tyre Cord Fabric", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13136, "end_char": 13158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivere<l by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThe question raised in these appeals is whether the \"Rayon Tyre Cord Fabric\" manufactured by the appe11ant is a rayon\n• ..\n\n• \" • ;:\n\n\"£Lffi CLOTH MILLS v. RAJASTHAN (Pathak, I.) 1113\n\nfabric covered by item 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax A Act; 1954, and therefore .uempt from sales tax under the Central Sllles Tu: Act."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13938, "end_char": 13947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14149, "end_char": 14204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14877, "end_char": 14897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two writ petitions were filed by the appellant tn the Rajasthan High Court against the assessments while appeals were also filed before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals)."}}, {"text": "Raiasthan High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14999, "end_char": 15019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Raiasthan High Court dismissed the writ petitions on the ground that disputed questions of fact were involved in the controversy and recourse should be had to the remedy by way of appeal."}}, {"text": "Article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15299, "end_char": 15309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15556, "end_char": 15566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd May, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15658, "end_char": 15671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two appeals and the writ petition were dismissed by this Court on 3rd May, 1976.(')"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24130, "end_char": 24135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But tyre cord fabric is clearly described as a fabric by the 1973 Annual Book of AS'I'M Standards the Textile Terms and Definitions (1960), and in India by the Indian Standard Glossary of Textile Terms Relating to Man-Made Fibre & Fabric Industry."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24867, "end_char": 24886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now Jet us see how the Government of India itself, in its various departments, looks at tyre cord fabrics."}}, {"text": "27th February, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25321, "end_char": 25340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ministry of Foreign Trade Resolution dated 27th February, 1971 refers separately to rayon tyre yarn, cord ."}}, {"text": "Excise Duties Drawback Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25945, "end_char": 25973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27692, "end_char": 27706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excises and Salt Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27722, "end_char": 27742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27897, "end_char": 27908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Shri L. N. Sinha, for the respondents, that industrial fabrics are not envisaged within the expression \"rayon fabric\" in Item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28028, "end_char": 28042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excises and Salt Act", "statute": "Excises and Salt Act"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28501, "end_char": 28506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is then urged by Shri Sinha that whn the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance\\ Act, 1957 was enacted Parliament could not have intended the expression \"rayon fabric\" to include rayon tyre cord fabric."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28856, "end_char": 28870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31573, "end_char": 31586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "24th December, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31680, "end_char": 31699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 came into force on 24th December, 1957."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31747, "end_char": 31750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "St Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32153, "end_char": 32200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32616, "end_char": 32622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "St Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act", "statute": "St Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32630, "end_char": 32659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rajasthan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32898, "end_char": 32918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated lSt July, 1958, the Rajasthan Government unconditionally exempted all varieties of textiles mide wholly or partly of rayon frC\\111 1st July, 1958."}}, {"text": "S.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33025, "end_char": 33031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954", "statute": "the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Rajasthap Sales Tax Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33039, "end_char": 33068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34331, "end_char": 34337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "4th March, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35285, "end_char": 35300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is evident, therefore, that a dealer was entitled to exemption from sales tax up to 4th March, 1973 without the requirement of payment of the additional excise duty."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35971, "end_char": 35976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1122_1126_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, PATIALA\n\nPIARASINGH\n\nMay 8, 1980\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nLosses in business-Deduction under section 10(1) of the Income Tax Act, . 1922.....:./s a smuggler who is taxed on his income from smuggling under the Income Tax Act, 1922 entitled to a deduction under section 10(1) of the Act on account of the confiscation of currency notes e1nployetl in the smuggling activity.\n\nThe respondent Piara Singh was apprehended in September 1958 by the Indian Police while crossing the Inda-Pakistan border into Pakistan. A sum\n\no~ Rs. 65,500/r in currency notes was recovered from his person. On interrogation he stated that he was taking the currency notes to Pakistan to enilble him to purchase gold in that country with a view to smuggling it into India. The Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs ordered the confiscation of the D currency notes.\n\nT ••\n\nIn the proceedings initiated by the Income Tax -Officer, ho found that Rs. 60,500/- constituted the income of tlle assesscc from undisclosed sources.\n\nAn appeal by the assessee was dismissed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In second appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the. assessee\n\nrepresented that if he was regarded as engaged in the business of smuggli!lll gold he was entitled to il deduction under section 10( 1) of the Income Tsx Act, 1922 of the entire sum of Rs. 65,500/, as a loss incurred in tho business on the confiscation of the currency notes. The Tribunal upheld the claim to dedliction. It proceededon the basis that the assessee was carrying on a regular smuggling activity which consisted of taking currency notes out of India and exchanging them with gold in Pakistan which was later smuggled into India. The High Court on a reference at the instance of the Revenue answered the reference against the Revenue. Hence the appca:J.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court.\n\nHEID : I. The assessee is entitled to the deduction of Rs. 65,500 ;, under section 10(1) of the Income T&x Act, 1922. [1124 C, 1126 BJ\n\n2. The assessce was Oarrying on the business of smuggling a.nd, therefore. was liable to income tax on income from that business. The currency notes carried by the assessee across the border was an essential part of the smuggling operation. If the activity of smuggling can be regarded as a business, those who are rrying on that busine§s must be deemed to be aware that a necessary incident involved in the business is detection by the Customs authorities tnd the consequent confiscation of the currency notes. It is an incident as predictable in the course of carrying on the activity as any other feature of il Having regard to the nature of the activity possible detection by the Cus!oma authoritiCS> constitutes a normal feature integrated into all !hat is implied and involved in ir. The confiscation of the currency notea is a loss OOCll8ion<d in pursuinJ the business; it is a Joss in much th• oam1 'fV•Y as if tho currency\n\n. t-'\n\nC.I.T, V., PIARA SINGH (Pathak, ].) 1123\n\nnbtet bad been stolen or dropped on the way while carrying on the bll!iness.\n\nA It is a lqss which springs directly from the carrying on of the business and is\n\nincidental to it. Applying the principle laid down by this Court in Badridas Daga v. Commissioner of Income Tax the deduction must be allowed. '\n\n[1124 D-B]\n\nBodridas Daga v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1958] 34 !TR 10; Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. S. C. Kothari [1971] 82 lTR 194; applied.\n\nHaji Az; iz and Abdul Shakoor Bros. v. Commi.r.sioner of Income Tax, Bombay City IT, [1961] 41 ITR 350, Sari Hinduji K/wshalji & Co. v. Commr . of Income Tax, A.P. (1973] 8' ITR 112; J. S. Parkar v. V. B.\n\nPalekar an<t Ors. [1974] 94 !TR 616; distinguished and explained.\n\nCivlL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2752 of 1972.\n\nAppeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated the 5th November, 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 38 of 1969.\n\nG. A. Shah & Miss A. Subhashini for the appellant.\n\nNaunit Lal & Mr. Kailash Yasudev for respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPA'THAK, J. Is a smuggler, who is taxed on his income from smuggling under the Income Tax Act, 1922, entitled to a deduction under Section 10(1) of the Act on account of the confiscation of currency notes employed in the smuggling activity ?\n\nThe respondent, Piara Singh, was apprehendei:J in September, 1958 by the Indian Police while crossing the Inda-Pakistan border into Pakistan.\n\nA sum of Rs. 65,500/- in currency notes was recovered from his person. On interrogation he stated that he was taking the currency notes to Pakistan to enable him to purchase gold in that country with a view to smuggling it into India.\n\nThe Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs ordered the confiscation of 'thtj. currency notes.\n\nThe Income Tax Officer now took proceedings under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 for assessing t11e assessee's income and determining his tax liability. He came to'the finding that out of Rs. 65,500/- G an amount of Rs~ 60,500/- constituted the income of the assessee from undisclosed sources. An appeal by the assessee was dismissed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In second api\\ea! before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal the assessee represented that if be was reprded as engaged in the business of smuggling gold he was entitled to a deduction iinder Section 10 (1) of the Income Tax Act of the H entire sum of Rs. 65,500/- as a loss incurred in the business on the confiscation of the currency notes. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the\n\n-:2: _,.-\n\nMRB~E COURT REPORTS [1980) 3 s.c.R.\n\n.&. cllloii!l tQi QedtiQn. lt pr~®d on the basis that. t~ ses~ cauying oa a regular smuggling activity which consisted: of tllltiiJg currency notes out of India and exchanging them for gold in Pakistan which was later smuggled into India. At the instance of the Revenue, a reference was made to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on the following question : \" \"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the loss of Rs. 65,500/- arising from the confiscation of the currency notes was an allowable deduction under section 10 ( 1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 ?\"\n\nThe High Court answered the question in the affirmative. c And now this appeal by the Revenue.\n\nIn our Judgment, the High Court is right. The Income Tax authorities found that the assessee was carrying on the business of smuggling They held that he' was, therefore, liable to income-tax on income from that business.\n\nOn the basis that such income was mxable, the D question is whether the confiscation of the currency notes entitles the assessee to the deduction claimed. The currency notes clirried by the assessee across the border constit.uted the means for acquiring gold in Pakistan, which gold he subsequently sold in India at a profit.\n\nThe currency notes were necessary for acquiring the gold.\n\nThe carriage of currency notes across the border was an essential part of E the smuggling operation.\n\nIf the activity of smuggling can be regarded as a business, those who are carrying on that business must be deemed to be aware that a necessary incident involved in the business is detection. by the Custom authorities and the consequent confiscation of the currency notes.\n\nIt is an incident as predictable in t41) F COl; lrSe of cmrying on the activity as any other feature of it. Having regard to the nature of the activity possi\\)le detection by the Custo,111s authorities constitutes a normal feature integrated into all that is implied and involved in it.\n\nThe confiscation of the currency notes is a loss occasioned in pursuing the business, it is a loss in much the sMD.e way as if the currency notes had been stolen or dropped on the G way while carrying on the business. It is a loss which springs directly from the carrying on of the business and is incidental to it. Applying the principle laid down by this Court in Badridas Daga v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') the deduction must be allowed.\n\nIn Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. S.C. Kothari(') this Co1,1It held that for the purpose of Section 1 Q ( 1 ) of the Inc0tne Tax H At, 1922 a loss incurred in carrying on an illegal business wust be .\n\n(I) (l9S8) 34 I. T. R. 10.\n\n(2) (1971) BZ I. T. R. 794\n\n... '\n\n.·~\n\n.·~.·.·.·\n\n• f\n\n.'---\n\n• ..\n\ntJ.t v .. ' iilAilA SINGH (f>atJiak, J.) .\n\ndeducted before the true figure of profits brought to tax caa A Wlllputed.\n\nGrover, J., speaking for the Court, observed :\n\nM the business is illegal, neither the profits earned HOr the lesses mourred woold be enforceable . in law. But, tl!at dCJes not take the profits out of the taxing statute.\n\nSimilarly, the taint of illegality of the business cannot detract from the losses being taken into account for computation of the llilJ.ount Which <.-.ill be subjected to tax as ''t>rofits\" under section 10(1) of the Act of 1922. The tax cOllector cannot be heard to say that he will bring the gross receipts to tax. He can only tax profits of a trade or business.\n\nThat cannot be done without deducting the losses and the legitimate .. e11penses of the business.\"\n\nReliance was placed by the Revenue on Haji Aziz and Abdul Shakoor Bros. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City fl(') In that case, however, the assessee carried on the lawful business of importing dates from abroad and selling them in India.\n\nThei import of dates by steamer was prohibited.\n\nNonetheless he imported dates from Iraq by steamer, and the eonsignments were confiscated by the customs authorities. But the dates were released subsequently on payment of fine. The assessee's claim to deduction under\n\ns. 10(2) (xv) of the Ineome Tax Act was rejected on the ground that the amount was Nid by way of penalty for a breach of the law. An infraction of the law was not a normal incident of business carried on by the assessee, and the penalty was rightly held to fall on the assessee in some character other than that of a trader. Reference w, as made by the Revenue to Soni Hinduji Kushalji & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, A.P( 2). The assessee's claim to the deduction of the value of gold confiscated by the. customs authorities was ound unsustainable by the court. The decision in that case can b~ explained on the ground that the assessee was carrying on a lawful business in gold, silver and jewellery and committed an infraction of the law h1 smuggling gold into the country. Our attention has also been invited to J. S. Parkar v.\n\nV. B. Palekar and Others(') where on a difference of opinion between two learned Judges of the Bombay High Court a third learned Judge agreed with the view that the value of gold confiscated by the customs authorities in smuggling operations was not entitled to deduction against the estimated and assessed income. from an undisclosed 'ource. It was observed that the Joss arose by reason of an infraction\n\n(J) (1961) 41 I. T. R. 350.\n\n(2) (1973) 89 I. T. R. 112 .\n\n(3) (1974) 941. T. R. 616.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA of the Jaw and as it had not fallen on the assessee as a trader or business man a deduction could not be allowed. Apparently, the true significance of the distinction between an infraction of the law \"committed in the carrying on of a lawful business and an infraction of the law committed in a business inherently unlawful and constituting a normal incident of it was not pointedly placed before the High Court B in that case.\n\nWe hold that the assessee is entitled to the deduction of Rs. 65,500/-, and accordingly we affirm the view taken by the High Court on the question of law referred to it.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n... '", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, PATIALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, PATIALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 8, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, PATIALA\n\nPIARASINGH\n\nMay 8, 1980\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. 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A. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3997, "end_char": 4007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. A. Shah & Miss A. Subhashini for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. A. Shah & Miss A. Subhashini for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4049, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal & Mr. Kailash Yasudev for respondent."}}, {"text": "Kailash Yasudev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4066, "end_char": 4081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal & Mr. Kailash Yasudev for respondent."}}, {"text": "PA'THAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4143, "end_char": 4150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPA'THAK, J. Is a smuggler, who is taxed on his income from smuggling under the Income Tax Act, 1922, entitled to a deduction under Section 10(1) of the Act on account of the confiscation of currency notes employed in the smuggling activity ?"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4222, "end_char": 4242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4274, "end_char": 4287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Officer now took proceedings under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4870, "end_char": 4947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5432, "end_char": 5442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Income Tax Officer now took proceedings under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "The Income Tax Officer now took proceedings under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5965, "end_char": 5997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Revenue, a reference was made to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on the following question : \" \"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the loss of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6197, "end_char": 6207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6220, "end_char": 6240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8158, "end_char": 8167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grover, J., speaking for the Court, observed :\n\nM the business is illegal, neither the profits earned HOr the lesses mourred woold be enforceable ."}}, {"text": "section 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8903, "end_char": 8916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iraq", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9504, "end_char": 9508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nonetheless he imported dates from Iraq by steamer, and the eonsignments were confiscated by the customs authorities."}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9689, "end_char": 9697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10622, "end_char": 10639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention has also been invited to J. S. Parkar v.\n\nV. B. Palekar and Others(') where on a difference of opinion between two learned Judges of the Bombay High Court a third learned Judge agreed with the view that the value of gold confiscated by the customs authorities in smuggling operations was not entitled to deduction against the estimated and assessed income."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11021, "end_char": 11056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1127_1142_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "I }-\n\nM ____ 'If.!\n\nFAZLUNBI .. v .\n\nK. KHADER V ALI AND ANR.\n\nMay 8, 1980 [V. R. KRISHNA !YER, 0. CmNNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nCJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 127 (3) (b), scheme and scope of-Whether by the payment of Mahar and Iddat dues, the provisions of s. 127(3)(b) of the Code would be complied with or th• vinculum juris created by the order under s. 125 continues despite the make--believe ritual of miniscule mahar which merely stultified section 127 (3) (b) Cr.P.C.-Precede11ts and binding nature under Article 141 of the Constitution.\n\nF'azlunbi, tho appellant, married Khader Vali, the respondent, in 1966, and during their conjugal life, a son Khader Basha;· was born to them. Tho respondent, husband, an additional accounlt!nt in the Stare Bank of India, drawing a salary of Rs. 1000/-, discarded tho wife and the child, and the tormented woman talaqed out of the conjugal home, -sought shelter in her parent's abode. Driven by destitution, she prayed for maintenance allowance. for .herself and her son under section 125 Cr. P.C. and tho Magistrate granted payment of a monthly sum of Rs. 250/r to the wife and Rs. 150/- to the child. The respondent husband challenged the award in the High Court where thC unjustified neglect was upheld, but the quantum of maintenance of the child .was reduced to Rs. 100/- per menscm.\n\nThereafter, the respondent husband resorted to the unilateral technique of talaq and tendered the magnificent sum of Rs. 500 /- by way of Mahar and Rs. 750/- towards maintenance for the period of iddat, hopeful thereby, of extricating himself from lhe obligation to maintain the appellant The Addi-· tional First Qass Magistrate vacated the grant of maintenance already granted on the score of divorce coupled with discharge of mahar and Iddat dues. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in the Sessions Court. The desperate appellant reached the High Court end invoked its jurisdiction under section 482 Cr!. P.C. A Division Bench of that High Court, though the revision petitioner banked upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahlrris case [1979) '2 SCR 75 in her favour, distinguished that case and dismissed the petition.•\n\nHence the appellant-wife's appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing tho appeal, the Court\n\nHELD. : 1. Tho conscience of social justice, the cornerstone of our Consti tution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code, a secular safeguard of British India vintage against the outrage 0£ jetsam women and 11otsam children, will be defiled if judicial interpretation sabotagca the true meaning and reduces a benign protection into a damp squib. [1131\n\nE-F]\n\n2. Precedents of the Supreme Court are not to be left on the shelves.\n\nNeither could they be brushed aside saying that precedents is an .authority only \"on its actual facts\". Such devices are not permissible for the High Courts when decisions of the Supreme Court are cited before them. not merely because of the jurisprudence of precedents, but because of the imperatives of Article 141.\n\n[1134 DEJ\n\nNo Judge in India, except a laraer Be:n.eh of the Supreme Court, without a departure from judicial discipline can whittle down, wish away or be un .. bound by the ratio in Bai Tahira's case, in which Section 127(3)(b) Of Cr!. P.C. was interpreted. The langual!C used is unmistakable, the logic at play is irresistible, the conClusion reached is inescapable the application of the law as expanded there is an easy task. And yet, the Division Bench, by the fine art of skirting the real reasoning laid d-own \"unlaw\" in the face of th.e law in Bail T ahira which is hardly a service and surely a mischief, unintended by the Court may be, but embarrassing to the subordinate Judiciary. There is no\n\nwarrant whatever for the High Court to reduce to a busk a decision of this Court by its doctrinal gloss. [1132 C-E]\n\n(3) Cr!. P.C. (Sections 125-127) is a secular code deliberately designed to protect destitute women, who are victims of neglect during marriage and after divorce.\n\nIt is rooted in the State's responsibility for the welfare of the weaker sections of women and children and is not confined to members of one religion or region, but the whole community of womanhood. Secondly muslim law show its -reverence for the wife in the institution of Mehar (dower). It is neither dowry nor price for marriage. [1138 C-E]\n\n4. The quintessence of mehar whether it is prompt or deferred is clearly not a contemplated quantification of a sum of money in lieu of maintenanbc upon divorce. Indeed, dower focusses on marital happiness and -is an incident of connubial joy. Divorce is farthest fron1 the thought of the bride and the bridegroom \\Vhen mehar is promised. Moreover, dower MJlY be prompt and is payable during marriage and' cannot, therefore, be a recompense for divorce too distant and unpleasant for the bride and bridegroom to envision on the buptial bed. May be, some how the masculine obsessioll of jurisprudence linked up this promise or payment as a consolidated equivalent of maintenance after divorce. [1140 D-F]'\n\n5. The language of Section 127 (3 )(b) suggests that payment of the sum and the divorce should be essential parts of the same transaction so as to make one the consideration for the other. The payment of money contemp• F lated by section 127(3) (b) should be so linked with the divorce as to become payable only in the event of the divorce. Mehar as understood in Mohammadan Le.w cannot, under any circumstances be considered as consideration for divorce or a payment made in lieu of loss of connubial relationship. Under s. 127(3) (b) of the Cr. P.C., an order for maintenance may be cancelled if the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the said order,_ the whole of the sum G which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was payable on such divorce. Therefore, even by harmonising payments under personal and customary laws with the obligations under ss. 125 to 127 of the Cr. P.C., the conclusion is clear that the liquidated :sum paid at the time of divorce must be a reasonable and not an illusory amount and will release the -.. quondam husband from the continuing liability, only if the sum paid is roolistically sufficient to maintain the ex-wife and salvage her from destitution H which is the anathema of the law. This perspective of social justice alone does\n\niustife to the complex of provisions from s. 125 to s. 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [1140 F-H, 1141 A-CJ\n\n.. ..\n\n• '\n\nPAZLUNDI v. K. K. VAL! (Krishna Iyer, !.) 1129\n\nKunhi Muyln v. Pathimma, 1976 KLT 87 at 96; Kama/akshi v. Sankaran, A AIR 1979 Kerala 116; Hajabean Su/aiman & Anr. v. Ibrahim Gandhabai and Anr., Guj, L.R. Vol. XVIII 1977 p. 133 at 137-139, referred to.\n\n6. (i) Section 127(3)(b) has a setting, scheme and a purpose and no talaq of the purpose different from tb'e sense is permissible in statutory construction. [1141 C.D]\n\n(ii) The payment of an amount, customary or other, contemplated by the measure must inset the intent of preventing destitution and providing a sum which is more or less the present worth of tho monthly maintenance allowances the divorce may need until death or remarriage overtake her. The policy of the law abhors neglected wives and destitute divcrcees and <. 127 (3 )(b) takes care to avoid double payment one under custom at the time of divorce and another under s. 125. [1141 D-EJ\n\n• I (Iii) Whatever the facts of a particular case, the Code, by enacting \"· 12~ to 127, charges the court with the humane obligation of enforcing maintenance or its just equivalent to ill-used wives and castaway ex-wives, only if the woman\n\nbas received voluntarily a sum, at the time of divorce, sufficient to keep her going according to the circumstances of the parties. [1141 E-F] '\n\n(iv) Neither personal law nor other salvationary plea will hold against the policy of public law pervading s. 127(3) (b) as much as it does s. 125. So . a farthing is no substitute for a fortune nor naive consent equimlent to intelli-\n\n&ent acceptance. [1141 F-0]\n\n(v) Here the mahar paid is Rs. 500/- and the income therefrom may will be Rs. S/- a month, too ludicrous to mention as maintenance. The amount earlier awarded is the minimum.\n\n[1141 G-HJ\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by certificate against the Judgment and Order dated he 21 Nov., 1979 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Misc.\n\nPetition No. 1351 of 1979.\n\nA. Suba Rao for the Appellant.\n\nF G. Narasimhulu for Respondent No. 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.- The last judicial lap of the joorney to gender justice made by Fazulnbi, a married woman just past 30 years and talaged into destitution, constitutes the compassionate core of this case.\n\nG The saga of Fazlunbi, who had earlier secured an order for maintenance in her favour under s. 125 Cr. P. C. which was cancelled under s. 127(3)(b) Cr. P. C., by three courts, tier upoo. tier in the vertical system, by concurrent misinterpretation of the relevant provision, constitutes the kernel of her legal grievance. If her plea has substance, social justice has been jettisoned by judicial process and a H just and lawful claim due to a woman in distress has been denied heartlessly and lawlessly.\n\nWe say 'heartlessly', because no sensitive 13-610SCl/80\n\nA juage with empathy for the weaker sex could have callously cancelled an order for a monthly allowance already made in her favour, as has been done here. We say 'lawlessly', because no disciplined judge bound by the decision of this Court which lays down the law for the nation under Art. 141 of the Constitution could have\n\ndefied the crystal clear ruling of this Court in Bai .Tahh\"a v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia(') by the disingenuous process distinguishing the decision. We are surprised by this process of getting round the rule in Bai Tahira's case (supra) by the artful art of concocting a distinction without a difference.\n\nThe Sessions Court and the High Court, who had before them the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, chopped legal logic to circumvent it. Reading their 'reasoning' we are left to exclaim how the high Bench argued itself out of Bai Tahira's case by discovering the strange difference.\n\n\"Twixt Tweeldedum and Tweedledee\", the discipline of law, the due process of law and the rule of law become mere claptrap if judges bmmd to obey precedent choose to disobey on untenable alibi.\n\nD And, behind it all is the unheeded wail of Fazulnbi's womanhood for the karuna and samata of the law and we are conscientized into reversing the judgment under appeal in terms express, explicit and mandatory so that masculine injustice may not crucify the weaker sex.\n\nSmall wonder that many a divorcee, beguiled by Arts. 14 and 15 and\n\nE the decision in Bai Tahira's case, may well exclaim, \"How long, 0 Lord, how long!\"\n\nThe brief facts which have led to this appeal are that Fazlunbi, the appellant married Khader Vali, the respondent, in 1966. and during their conjugal life, a son, Kader Basha, was born to them. The husband, an Additional Accountant in the State Bank F of India, apparently drawing a salary well above Rs. 1000/-, dis carded the wife and the child,_ and the tormented woman, ta/aged out of the conjugal home, sought shelter in her parents' abode. Driven by destitution, she prayed for maintenance allowance for herself and her son under s. 125 Cr. P. C. and the Magistrate granted payment of a monthly sum of Rs. 250/- to the wife and Rs. 150/- to the child. The G husband challenged the award in the High Court where the unjustified J. neglect was upheld but the quantum o1' maintenance of the child was reduced to Rs. 100/- per mensem.\n\nThe respondent-husband resorted to the . unilateral technique of ~-f. talaq, and tendered the magnificent sum of Rs. 500/- by way of\n\n11 mahar and Rs. 750/- towards maintenance for the period of iddat, hopeful thereby, of extricating himself from the obligation to maintain\n\n(!) 11979] 2 SCR 75.\n\n\" •\n\nFAZLUNBI v. K. K. VALi (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1131\n\nthe appellant. The Additio:nal First Class Magistrate vacated the grant A of maintenance on the score of divorce coupled with discharge of mahar and iddat dues. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in the Sessions Court.\n\nThe desperate appellant reached the High Court and invoked its jurisdiction under s. 482 Cr. P.C. A Division Bench of that Court, however, dismissed the revision petition and Fazlunbi has landed up in this Court and banks upon the application of the rule in B Bai Tahirai's case (supra).\n\nThe facts are clear, the ta/aq has snapped the marital tie, the flimsy mahar has been tendered together with the three months' iddat dues and the divorcee remains neglected. The question is whether s. 127 ( 3) (b) of the Code has been complied with or the vinculum juris C created by the order under s. 125 continues despite the make-believe ritual of miniscule mahar which merely stultifies s. 127(3)(b) Cr. P. C. and hardly fulfils it. The matter is no longer res integra. No one in his senses can contend that the mahar of Rs. 500/- will yield income sutlicient to maintain a woman even if she were to live on city pavements! What is the intendment o( s. 127(3)(b)? What is the D scheme of relief for driftwood and destitute wives and divorcees discarded by heartless husbands? What is the purpose of providing absoc lution from the obligation to pay continued maintenance by Iumpsurn liquidation? What, in short is the text and texture of the provision, if read in the light of the mischief to be avoided, the justice to be E advm1ced? The conscience of social justice, the cornerstone of our Constitution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code, a secular safeguard of British Indian vintage against the outrage of jetsam women and flotsam children, will be defiled if judicial interpretation sabotages the true meaning and reduces a benign protection into a damp squib.\n\nThe holistic art of statutory F construction has not the pettifogging craft of lexical and literal reading of the text woefully keeping alive the moribund mores of a bygone age but, in the felicitous diction of Cardozo, 'the task of a translator, the reading of signs and symbols given from without (by those) who have absorbed the spirit, have filled themselves with a love of the language they must read'. Lord Denning's great tribute to the task of G a judge is never barred by .the law of limitation(').\n\nMany of the. Judges of England have said that they do not make law. They only interpret it. This is an illusion _which they have. fostered. But it is a notion which is now being discarded everywhere. Every new decision-on every new situation-is a development on the law.\n\nLaw does nat\n\n(I) Foreward by Denning M. R. to Supreme CoUrt of India by Rajeev Dhavan.\n\nstand still. It moves continually. Once this is recognised, then the task of the Judge is put on a higher plane. He must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the, needs of the time. He must not be a mere mechanic, a mere working mason, laying brick on brick, without thought to the overall design. He must be an architect-thinking of the structure as a whole-building for society a system of law which is strong, durable and just. It is on his work that civilised society itself depends. \\Ve lay so much emphasis on the functional sensitization of a judge lest what is absurd may be fobbed as obvious by judicial semanticisation.\n\nWe need not labour the point because' this Court has already interpreted s. 127(3)(b) in Bai Tahira and no judge in India; except a larger bench of the Supreme Court without a departure from judicial discipline can whittle down, wish away or be unbound by the ratio thereof. The language used is unmistakable, the logic at play is irresistible, the conclusion reached is inescapable, the application of the law as expounded there is an easy task.\n\nAnd yet, the Division Bench, if we may with respect say so, has, by the fine art of skirting\n\nth~ real reasoning laid dpwn 'unlaw' in the' face of the law in Bai Tahira which is hardly a service and surely a mischief, unintended by the Court may be, but embarrassing to the subordinate judiciary.\n\nThere is no warrant whatever for the High Court to reduce to a husk a decision of this Court by its doctrinal gloss. The learned judges observe, to our baftlement--\n\n\"The decision in Bai Tahira v.\n\nAli Hussain Fassalli\n\n(supra) is to be confined only to the fact~ of that case. It falls to be distinguished for the following reasons : (iJ the , compromise of 1962 referred to therein was construed as not affecting the rights of a Muslim divorced wife in seeking to recover maintenance under Sec. 125 Cr. P.C., (ii) what was considered to have been paid to the Muslim divorced wife was only the Mahar amount and not the maintenance amount payable for the Iddat period, (iii) The Mahar amount paid revealed a rate _of interest which for a person residing in Bombay was held to be wholly inadequate to do duty for maintenance allowance, (iv) there was nothing in that caBe to show that the amount of Rs. 130/- paid towards Iddat represented the payment of a sufficient maintenance amount for the three months period of Iddat and (v) the husband in that case did not raise any plea based on sec. 127(3)(b) Cr. P.C.\"\n\n-~ •\n\n• •\n\nPAZLUNBI v. K. K. VALi (Krishna Iyer, !.) 1133\n\nLet us quote a few passages from this Court's ruling in Bai Tahira (supra) to express the untenability of the excuse not to follow the binding ratio.\n\nNor can Sectioh 12 7 rescue the respondent from his obligation, payment of mehar money, as a customary discharge, is within the cognizance of that provision. But what was the amount of mehar?\n\nRs .. 5000/-, interest from which could not keep the woman's body and soul to• &ether for a day, even in that city where 40% of the population are reported to live on pavements, unless she was ready to sell her body and give up her soul! The point must be clearly understood that the scheme of the complex of provisions in Chapter IX has a social purpose. !TI-used wives and despen1te divorcees shall not be driven to material and moral dereliction to seek sanctuary in the streets . • This traumatic horror animates the amplitude of Section,\n\n127. Where the husbahd, by customary payment at the time of divorce, has adequately provided for the divorce, a subsequent series of recurrent doles is contra-indicated and the husband liberated. This is the teleological interpretation, the sociological decoding of the text of Sec.\n\n127. The key-note though is adequacy of payment which will take reasonable care of her mainenance.\n\nThe payment of illusory amounts by way of customary or personal law requirement will be COljSidered in the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate the rate unless it is a reasonable substitute. The legal sanctity of the payment is certified by the fulfilment of the social obligation, not by a ritual exercise rooted in custom.\n\nNo construdfon which leads to frustration of the statutory project can secure validation if the court is to pay true homage to . the Constitution. The only just construqtion of the section is that Parliament intended divorcees should not derive a double benefit. If the payment by ahy mehar or ordained by custom has a reasonable relation to the object and is a capitalised substitute for the order under Section 125-not mathematical! y but fair! y-then Section 127(3)(b) subserves the goal and relieves the obliger, not pro tanto but wholly. The purpose of the payment 'under any customary . or personal law' must be to obviate destitution of the divorcee and to provide her with wherewithal to maintain herself.\n\nThe whole scheme\n\nof Section 127(3) (b) is mainfestly to recognise the substitute maintenance arrangement by lump sum so paid and is potential as provision for maintenance to interpret otherwise is to stultify the project.\n\nLaw is dynamic and its mea'ning cannot be pedantic but purposeful.\n\nThe proposition, therefore, is that no husband can claim under Section 127(3)(b) abs<Jlution from his obligation under Section 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance.\n\nGranville Williams in his \"Learning the Law\" (pp. 77-78) gives one of the reasons persuading judges to distinguish precedents is \"that the earlier decision is altogether unpalatable to the court in the later case, so that the1 latter court wishes, to interpret it a~ narrowly as possible''.\n\nThe same learned author notes that some .iudges may \"in extreme and unusual circumstances, be apt to seize on almost any factual difference between this previous case and the case before him in order to arrive at a different decbion.\n\nSome precedents are continually left on the shelf in this way, as a wag observed, they become very \"distinguished''. The limit of the process is reached when a judge says that the precedent is an authority ottly \"on its actual facts\".\n\nWe need hardly say that these devices are not permissible for the High Courts when decisions of the Supreme Court are cited before them not merely because of the jurisprudence of precedents, but because of the imperatives of Art. 141. .\n\nWe have been painstakingly drawn into many rulings of the High Courts but none except this one has had t.he advantage of the pro- F nouncement in Bai Tahira.\n\nA Division Bench of the Kerala High Court-a ruling which perhaps advances the purpose more than the Full Bench decision which overruled it-dwelt on s. 127(3) (b) of the Code.\n\nKhalid, J. speaking for the court observed, and rightly if we may say so with respect,(')\n\nThis section provides that the Magistrate shall cancel the order for maintena'nce if any sum under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties is paid on divgrce.\n\nThis section may be pressed into service by some ingenious h1jsbands to defeat the provisions contained in section\n\n125. We would like to make ft clear that section 127(3) . (b) refers riot to maintenance during the period of iddat or payment of dower. Unfortunately, place of dower is\n\n{fjKunhfMoyin v-Pathumma 1976 KLT 87 at96.\n\n... •\n\n.. •\n\nFAZLUNBI v. K. K. VAL! (Krishna Iyer, l.)\n\nnow occupied by dowry, payable by the girl's parents, which till 1-6-1961 was paid in public and thereafter in private; thanks to the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It is therefore not a sum of money which under the personal law is payable on divorce as eirpressed i'n Section 127(3) (b A On the other hand, what is impliedly covered by this clause is such sums of money as alimony or compensation made payable on dissolution of the marriage und.er customary or personal law codified 6r uncodified, or such amount agreed upon at the time of marriage to be paid at the time of divorce; the wife agreeing not to claim mainte'nance or any other amount.\n\nWe thought it necessary to clarify this position lest there be any doubt regarding the scope of s. 127(3)(b), for, at the first blush, it might appear that, it takes away by one hand what is given under s.125 by the other hand. This is not so.\n\nWhile, in our view, the Full Bench decision in Kamalakshi v.\n\nSar.karan( 1) in so far as it does not insist on an adequate sum which will yield a recurring income to maintain the divorcee in future, is bad law and the Division Be:nch, in so far as 'it excuses the huoband if he pays a sum which the ignorant, wife at the time of marriage has agreed upon to relinquish maintenance after divorce, does not go far enough. ·\n\nA. division Bench of the Gujarat High Court(') has sought, even by literal construction, to reach the conclusion that unless the divorcee volu'ntarily accepts a sum in lieu of future maintenance she is still entitled to her claim and s. 127(3)(b) will not dissolve the liability of the husband.\n\nThe Judges argue :\n\nWe are concerned with the interpretation of sub-sec.\n\n(3) of sec. 127, more particularly clause (b) thereof.\n\nEvi, dently, this provision which seeks to confer power on the court to cancel an order of monthly allowance passed by it in certain specified contingencies, has to be confined strictly within the narrow limits laid down by snb-sec. ( 3).\n\nThis is because the provision for maintenance of wives, whether married or divorced, who are unable to maintain themselves is a social welfare measure applicable to all people irrespective. of caste, creed, community or nationality.\n\n(!) AIR 1979 Ker. 116.\n\n(2) Hajeben Su/eman & Anr. v. Ibrahim Ganadbhai & Aur. Guj. L. R. Vol.\n\nxvm 1977 p. 133 at 137-139.\n\nWith the aforesaid background, we will now proceed to examine the provisions of sub-sec.\n\n(3) of sec. 127.\n\nA bare reading of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that provision shows that three fact situations have been contemplated by the Legislature in which the Magistrate is given the power to cancel the order for monthly allowance. These fuel situations are shown by the words ( 1) has remarried in clause (a), (2) has received in claiise (b) and (c) and\n\n(3) had vo:untarily surrendered in clause (c). Clauses\n\n(a) and ( c) of the said provision do not postulate any difficulty because they contemplate the fact situations brought about by a voluntary and irrevocable act on the part of the divorced wife.\n\nThus, clause (a) contemplates the act of the wife in getting remarried and clause ( c) contemplates the act of the wife in obtaining divorce from her husband and surrendering her rights to maintenance after divorce. Both these eventualities, as observed earlier, are brought abo1.1t by a voluntary and irrevocable act on the part of the wife. If this is the obvious position to be kept in mind with regard to the scope and content of clauses (a) and (c) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 127, we see no reason why we should adopt a different standard in ascertaining the scope and content of clause (b) ;\n\nxx xx xx .... it is clear that one of the eventualities conferring jurisdiction on the Magistrate to cancel an order of monthly aQowance can come into existence only on doing of a voluntary act by the wife of actually accepting the amount offered as contemplated by clause (b). It is to be noted that the Legislature has not used words indicating mere offer by the husband of the amount contemplated by clause (b) as sufficient to bring into existence the fact situation contemplated or bring into existence the evenfoality on which the power of the Magistrate to cancel the order of maintenance is based. It appears that the Legislature has advisedly used the words \"has received\" in order to indicate and at the same time restrict the power of cancelling the order of monthly allowance to cases where the wife by a voluntary act on her part of receiving the amount contemplated by clause (b) bri\"ngs about the eventuality contemplated for exercise of the said power. . . .\n\nWe, therefore, hold that in order to exercise power conferred by clause (b) of sul:>-sec.\n\n(3) of sec. 127, it has to be\n\n.. •\n\n.. •\n\n' )\n\nFAZLUNBI v. K. K. VALi (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1137\n\nfound as a fact that the wife has done a voluntary act of receiving the who:e sum contemplated to be. payable by clause (b): If the wife showi> ]Jer unwillingness to receive. the amount tendered, the provisions of clause (b) are not applicable.\n\nEven the literal and the purposive approaches may sometimes concur, once we grasp the social dynamics of interpretation, will serve the cause of truth and justice.\n\nWe are reminded of Lord Denning's fascinating reference in his \"The Discipline of the Law\" to Portia's plea for the pound of flesh but not a drop of blood; The traditional English view is Yielding to the pressure of the modern European view (which is also the American view) expressed by Denning in delightful diction as(')\n\n\"the 'schematic and teleological' method of interpretation. It is not really so alarming as it sounds.\n\nAll it means is that the judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words or by the grammatical structure of the sentence.\n\nThey go by the design of . purpose which lies behind it.\n\nWhen they come upon a situation which is to their minds within the spiritbut not the letterf the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and purpose of the legislature-at the effect which it was sought to achieve.\n\nThey then interpret the legislation so as to produce the unashamedly, without hesitation.\n\nThey ask simply: What is the sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect to the presumed purpose of the legislation ? They Jay down the law accordingly.\n\nJf you study the decisions of the European Court, you will see that they do it every day.\n\nTo our eyes-shdrtsighted by tradition - it is legislation, pure and simp:e.\n\nBut, to their eyes, it is fulfilling the true role of the courts.\n\nThey are giving effect' to what the legislature intendfd, or may be presumed to have intended.\n\nI see nothing wrong in this.\n\nQuite the contrary.\n\nAnother angle to the subject of Mahar and its impact on liability\n\nH for maintenance after divorce may be briefly considered. Khalid, J. of the Kerala High Court in two cases has taken the view that s.125 and s.127 Cr.P.C. are conceptually unconnected with payment of mahar and cannot bail out a muslim husband from his statutory obli- H gation under s.125.\n\nWe are aware of the criticism of this conceptual\n\n(1) The Discipline of Law, Lord Denning, pp. 20·21.\n\nA divorce between mahar and post-divorce maintenance by Dr.\n\nTahir Mahmood in his recent book on the 'Muslim Law of india' (see p. l 33) where the learned author. prefers to retain the hexus between mahar and maintenance but has this to say :\n\nIn a recent case the Supreme Court has held that the B sum paid under personal law-referred to in clause (b) of section 127(3) of the Code-should be \"more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance\"; if it is not so it can be considred by the court for the reduction of the maintenance rate but cannot annihilate that rate.\n\nThis, indeed, is a liberal ruling and conforms to the spirit C of Islamic law on the subject.\n\nAside from this controversy, we may look perspicaciously at the legal connotation of 'dower' and the impact of its payment on divorcees' clailll5 for maintenance.\n\nWe must first remember that Cr.P. Code, (s. 125·127) is a secular code deliberately designed to protect destitute D women, who are victilll5 of neglect during marrrage and after divorce.\n\nIt is rooted in the State's responsibility for the welfare of the weaker sections of women and children and is not confined to members ot one religion or region, but the whole community of womanhood.\n\nSecondly we must realise that Muslim law shows its reverence for the wife in the institution of Mahar (dower). It is neither dowry E nor price for marriage.\n\nAs explained i'n an old judgment by Justice Syed Mahmood, mahar is \"not the exchange or consideration given by the man to the woman, but an effect of tl1e contract imposed by law on the husband as a token of respect for its subject : the woman''.\n\nGiving a correct appraisal of the concept of mahar, the Privy Council once described it as \"an essential incident to the status of marriage\".\n\nOn another occasion it explained that mahar was a 'legal responsibility' of the husband.\n\nThese judicial observations evidence a correct understanding of the Islamic legal cohcept of mahar. (')\n\nBaillie in his Digest of Mohammaden Law says :\n\n\"Dower is not the exchange or consideration given by the man to woman for entering into the contract; but ah effect of the contract, imposed by the law on the husband as a token in respect, for its respect the woman ....\n\nDower being, as already mentioned, opposed to the, usu-\n\n(1) Dr. Tahir Mahmood '~The Muslim Law of India\" p. 71.\n\n.,. •\n\n\"' •\n\nFAZLUNBI. v. K. K. VALi (Kn\\<; hna Iyer, !.)\n\nfruct of the woman's person, the right to either is not completed without the other. Hence on the one hand, dower is said to be confirmed and made binding o'n the husband by consummation, or by its substitute, a valid retirement, or by death, which by terminating the maniage, pnts an end to all the contingencies to which it is exposed; and on the other hand the woman becomes entitled to it as soon as she has surrendered her person.\"\n\nI I\n\nJustice Mahmood has described the nature of Meharin Abdul Kadir v. Salima and anr. (8 All. 149 at 157-158). According to him:\n\n\"Dower, under the Muhammadan law, is the sum of money or other property promised by the husba'nd to be paid or delivered to the wife in consideration of the marriage, and even where no . dower is expressly fixed or mentioned at the marriage ceremony, the law confers the right of dower upon the wife as a necessary effect of marriage.\n\nTo use the language of the Hedaya, 'the payment of dower is enjoined by the law merely as a token of respect for its subject (the woman), wherefore the mention of it is not absolutely essential to the validity of a maniage; and, for the same reason, a marriage is also valid, although the man were to engage in the contract on the special condition that there should be no\n\ndower\" .... (Hamilton's Hedaya by Grady, p. 44). Even after the marriage the dower may be increased by the husband during coverture .... In this sense and in no other can dower under the Muhammadan law be regarqed as the consideration for the connubial intercourse, and if the authors of the Arabic Text-books of Muhammadan law have compared it to price in. the contract of sale, it is simply because marriage is a civil contract under that law ...... Such being the nature of the dower, the rules which regulate its payment are necessarily affected by the position of a married woman under the Muhammadan law.\n\nUnder that Jaw marriage does not make her property the property of the husba'nd, nor does coverture impose any disability upon her as to freedom of 'contract.\n\nThe marriage contract is easily dissoluble, and the freedom of divorce and the rule of polygamy place a power in the hands of the husband which the law-giver intended to restrain by rendering the rules as to payments of dower stringent upon the husband. No limit as to the amount of dower has\n\n- E\n\nbeen imposed, and it may either be prompt, that is, immediately payable upon demand, or deferred, that is payable upon the dissolution of marriage, whether by death or divorce.\n\nThe dower may also be partly prompt and partly deferred; but when at the time of the marriage ceremony no specification in this respect is made, the whole dower is presumed to be prompt and due on demand''.\n\nIn Tyabji's Muslim Law (4th Edn) it is stated :\n\n\"Mahar is an essential incident to the status of marriage.\n\nRegarded as a consideration for the marriage it is in theory payable before consummation; but the Jaw allows its division in two parts, one of which is called 'prompt' payable before the wife can be called upon to enter the conjugal domicle, the other '.deferred' payable on the dissolution of the contract by the death of either of the parties or by divorce.\n\nWhen the Kabin nama does hot specify the portion that is prompt and that which is deferred, evi- - dence may be given of the custom or usage of wife's family\".\n\nThe quintessence of mahar whether it is prompt or deferred is clearly not a contemplated quantification of a sum of money in lieu of maintenance upoh divorce.\n\nIndeed, dower focusses on marital happi, ness and is an incident of connubial joy.\n\nDivorce is fartl\\cst from the thought of the bride and the bridegroom when mehar is promised.\n\nMoreover, dower may be prompt and is payable during marriage and cannot, therefore, be a recompense for divorce too dista'nt and unpleasant for the bride and bridegroom to envision on the nuptial bed.\n\nMaybe, some how the masculine obsession of jurisprudence linked up this promise or payment as a consolidated equivalent of maintenance after divorce.\n\nMaybe, some legislatures might have taken it in that light, but the law is to be read as the law enacted.\n\nThe language of s. 127(3)(b) appears to suggest that payment of the sum and the divorce should be essentially parts of the same transaction so as to make one the consideration tor the other.\n\nSuch customary divorce on payment of a sum of money among the so called lower castes are not uncommon.\n\nAt any rate the payment of money contemplated by s. 127(3) (b) should be so Jinked with the divorce as to become payable only in the event of the .jivorce. Mahar as understood in Mohammadan Law cannot under any circumstances be considered as consideration for divorce H or a payment made in lieu of Joss of connubial relationship.\n\nUnder s. 127(3)(b) of the Cr.P.C., an order for maintenahce may be can- . celled if the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has been divorced\n\n' -•\n\n\"' •\n\n., •\n\nFAZLUNBI v. IC. IC. VAL! (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1141\n\nby her husband and that she has received, whether before or after A the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was payable on such divorce .\n\n• We are, therefore, inclined to the view that even by harmonising payments under persona!! and oustomary laws with the obligations under ss. 125 to 127 of the Cr.P.C., the conclusion is clear that the liquidated sum paid at the time of divorce must be a reasonable and not an illusory amount and will release the quondam husband from the continuing liability, only if the sum paid is realistically sufficient to maintain the ex-wife l!nd salvage her from destitution which is the anathema of the law .. This perspective of social justice alone does justice to the complex of provisions from s. 125 to s. 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nWe may sum up and declare the law fool-proof fashion :\n\n(1) Section 127(3)(b) has a setting, scheme and a purpose and. no talaq of the purpose different from the sense is permissible in statutory construction.\n\n(2) The paymeut ot'an amount, customary or other, contemplated by the measure must inset the intent of preventing destitution and providing a sum which is more or less the present worth of the monthly maintenance allowances the .divorce may need until death or remarriage overtake her. The policy of the law abhors neglected wives and destitute divorcees and s. 127(3) (b) takes care to avoid double payment one under custom at the time of divorce and another under s. 125.\n\n(3) Whatever the facts of a particular case, the Code, by enacting ss. 125 to 127, charges the court with the humane obligation of enforcing maintenance or its just equivalent to ill-used wives and castaway ex-wives, only if the woman has received voluntarily a sum, at the time of divorce, sufficient to keep her going according to the circumstances of the parties.\n\n( 4) Neither personal law nor other salvationary plea will hold\n\nI -\n\nagainst the policy of public law pervading s. 127 (3) (b) as much as G it does s. 125.\n\nSo a farthing is no substitute for a fortune nor naive consent equivalent to intelligent acceptance.\n\n(5) Here the mahar paid is Rs. 500/- and the income therefrom may well be Rs. 5/- a month, too ludicrous to mention as maintenance. , The amount earlier awarded is the minimum.\n\nBefore we bid farewell to Faz/unbi it is necessary to mention that Chief Justice Baharul Islam, in an elaborate judgment replete,\n\nA with quotes from the Holy Quoran, has exposed the error of early English authors and judges who deait with talaq in Muslim Law as good even if pronounced at whim or in tantrum, and argued against the diehard view of Batchelor J. (ILR 30 Bombay 539) that this view 'is good in law, though bad in theology'.\n\nMaybe, when th\" point directly arises, the question will have to be considered by this B court, but enough unto the day the evil thereof and we do not express our opinion o'n this question as it does not call for a decision in the present case.\n\nWe allow the appeal.\n\n\" •\n\nAppeal allowed.. ~", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "FAZLUNBI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FAZLUNBI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. KHADER V ALI AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. KHADER V ALI AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 8, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 8, 1980 [V. R. KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "0. CmNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 175, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 282, "end_char": 294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 472, "end_char": 483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 492, "end_char": 498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 537, "end_char": 548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1957, "end_char": 1968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2079, "end_char": 2092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. A Division Bench of that High Court, though the revision petitioner banked upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahlrris case [1979) '2 SCR 75 in her favour, distinguished that case and dismissed the petition.•\n\nHence the appellant-wife's appeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "Consti tution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2353, "end_char": 2436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3051, "end_char": 3062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Consti tution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code", "statute": "Consti tution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3088, "end_char": 3093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1134 DEJ\n\nNo Judge in India, except a laraer Be:n.eh of the Supreme Court, without a departure from judicial discipline can whittle down, wish away or be un .. bound by the ratio in Bai Tahira's case, in which Section 127(3)(b) Of Cr!."}}, {"text": "Bai Tahira", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3248, "end_char": 3258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1134 DEJ\n\nNo Judge in India, except a laraer Be:n.eh of the Supreme Court, without a departure from judicial discipline can whittle down, wish away or be un .. bound by the ratio in Bai Tahira's case, in which Section 127(3)(b) Of Cr!."}}, {"text": "Section 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3276, "end_char": 3293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Consti tution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code", "statute": "Consti tution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5334, "end_char": 5348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mehar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehar as understood in Mohammadan Le.w cannot, under any circumstances be considered as consideration for divorce or a payment made in lieu of loss of connubial relationship."}}, {"text": "Mohammadan Le.w", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5468, "end_char": 5483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehar as understood in Mohammadan Le.w cannot, under any circumstances be considered as consideration for divorce or a payment made in lieu of loss of connubial relationship."}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5626, "end_char": 5635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 125 to 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6068, "end_char": 6082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6528, "end_char": 6534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6538, "end_char": 6544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6872, "end_char": 6889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7501, "end_char": 7507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8015, "end_char": 8024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8048, "end_char": 8054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. Suba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8585, "end_char": 8596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Suba Rao for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "F G. Narasimhulu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F G. Narasimhulu for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.- The last judicial lap of the joorney to gender justice made by Fazulnbi, a married woman just past 30 years and talaged into destitution, constitutes the compassionate core of this case.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Fazulnbi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8782, "end_char": 8790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.- The last judicial lap of the joorney to gender justice made by Fazulnbi, a married woman just past 30 years and talaged into destitution, constitutes the compassionate core of this case.", "canonical_name": "FAZLUNBI"}}, {"text": "Fazlunbi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8921, "end_char": 8929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The saga of Fazlunbi, who had earlier secured an order for maintenance in her favour under s. 125 Cr.", "canonical_name": "FAZLUNBI"}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9000, "end_char": 9006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9755, "end_char": 9763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10902, "end_char": 10917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazlunbi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11064, "end_char": 11072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The brief facts which have led to this appeal are that Fazlunbi, the appellant married Khader Vali, the respondent, in 1966.", "canonical_name": "FAZLUNBI"}}, {"text": "Kader Basha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11173, "end_char": 11184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and during their conjugal life, a son, Kader Basha, was born to them."}}, {"text": "State Bank F of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11249, "end_char": 11270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The husband, an Additional Accountant in the State Bank F of India, apparently drawing a salary well above Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11546, "end_char": 11552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1979] 2 SCR 75", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12128, "end_char": 12142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12174, "end_char": 12186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" •\n\nFAZLUNBI v. K. K. VALi (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1131\n\nthe appellant.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12506, "end_char": 12512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B Bai Tahirai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12682, "end_char": 12695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C. A Division Bench of that Court, however, dismissed the revision petition and Fazlunbi has landed up in this Court and banks upon the application of the rule in B Bai Tahirai's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12911, "end_char": 12917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13013, "end_char": 13019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13105, "end_char": 13117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13368, "end_char": 13380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13810, "end_char": 13892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cardozo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14331, "end_char": 14338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The holistic art of statutory F construction has not the pettifogging craft of lexical and literal reading of the text woefully keeping alive the moribund mores of a bygone age but, in the felicitous diction of Cardozo, 'the task of a translator, the reading of signs and symbols given from without (by those) who have absorbed the spirit, have filled themselves with a love of the language they must read'."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14533, "end_char": 14540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning's great tribute to the task of G a judge is never barred by .the law of limitation(')."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14652, "end_char": 14659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judges of England have said that they do not make law."}}, {"text": "Rajeev Dhavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14974, "end_char": 14987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Law does nat\n\n(I) Foreward by Denning M. R. to Supreme CoUrt of India by Rajeev Dhavan."}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15706, "end_char": 15718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16871, "end_char": 16879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17136, "end_char": 17142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.C., (ii) what was considered to have been paid to the Muslim divorced wife was only the Mahar amount and not the maintenance amount payable for the Iddat period, (iii) The Mahar amount paid revealed a rate _of interest which for a person residing in Bombay was held to be wholly inadequate to do duty for maintenance allowance, (iv) there was nothing in that caBe to show that the amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "sec. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17467, "end_char": 17481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.\n\n127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18718, "end_char": 18727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19570, "end_char": 19581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19619, "end_char": 19636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19901, "end_char": 19915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20235, "end_char": 20252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20291, "end_char": 20302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Granville Williams", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20483, "end_char": 20501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Granville Williams in his \"Learning the Law\" (pp."}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21471, "end_char": 21479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21791, "end_char": 21800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khalid", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21819, "end_char": 21825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khalid, J. speaking for the court observed, and rightly if we may say so with respect,(')\n\nThis section provides that the Magistrate shall cancel the order for maintena'nce if any sum under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties is paid on divgrce."}}, {"text": "section\n\n125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22193, "end_char": 22205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22243, "end_char": 22257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-6-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22538, "end_char": 22546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, l.)\n\nnow occupied by dowry, payable by the girl's parents, which till 1-6-1961 was paid in public and thereafter in private; thanks to the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961."}}, {"text": "Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22607, "end_char": 22634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22740, "end_char": 22754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961", "statute": "the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23218, "end_char": 23230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961", "statute": "the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23325, "end_char": 23330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961", "statute": "the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23814, "end_char": 23832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. division Bench of the Gujarat High Court(') has sought, even by literal construction, to reach the conclusion that unless the divorcee volu'ntarily accepts a sum in lieu of future maintenance she is still entitled to her claim and s. 127(3)(b) will not dissolve the liability of the husband."}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24023, "end_char": 24035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24166, "end_char": 24174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24911, "end_char": 24919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25993, "end_char": 26001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27190, "end_char": 27198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Portia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27784, "end_char": 27790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are reminded of Lord Denning's fascinating reference in his \"The Discipline of the Law\" to Portia's plea for the pound of flesh but not a drop of blood; The traditional English view is Yielding to the pressure of the modern European view (which is also the American view) expressed by Denning in delightful diction as(')\n\n\"the 'schematic and teleological' method of interpretation."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29333, "end_char": 29350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khalid, J. of the Kerala High Court in two cases has taken the view that s.125 and s.127 Cr."}}, {"text": "s.125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29388, "end_char": 29393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29398, "end_char": 29403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29404, "end_char": 29410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29540, "end_char": 29545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Tahir Mahmood", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29712, "end_char": 29725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A divorce between mahar and post-divorce maintenance by Dr.\n\nTahir Mahmood in his recent book on the 'Muslim Law of india' (see p. l 33) where the learned author.", "canonical_name": "Tahir Mahmood"}}, {"text": "section 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30007, "end_char": 30021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30533, "end_char": 30539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Syed Mahmood", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31083, "end_char": 31095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As explained i'n an old judgment by Justice Syed Mahmood, mahar is \"not the exchange or consideration given by the man to the woman, but an effect of tl1e contract imposed by law on the husband as a token of respect for its subject : the woman''."}}, {"text": "Tahir Mahmood", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31960, "end_char": 31973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baillie in his Digest of Mohammaden Law says :\n\n\"Dower is not the exchange or consideration given by the man to woman for entering into the contract; but ah effect of the contract, imposed by the law on the husband as a token in respect, for its respect the woman ....\n\nDower being, as already mentioned, opposed to the, usu-\n\n(1) Dr. Tahir Mahmood '~The Muslim Law of India\" p. 71.", "canonical_name": "Tahir Mahmood"}}, {"text": "Mahmood", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32519, "end_char": 32526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I I\n\nJustice Mahmood has described the nature of Meharin Abdul Kadir v. Salima and anr. ("}}, {"text": "Tyabji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34808, "end_char": 34814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Tyabji's Muslim Law (4th Edn) it is stated :\n\n\"Mahar is an essential incident to the status of marriage."}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36251, "end_char": 36263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36580, "end_char": 36589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36869, "end_char": 36881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36889, "end_char": 36895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 125 to 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37420, "end_char": 37434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37442, "end_char": 37448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37874, "end_char": 37880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37884, "end_char": 37890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 127(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37984, "end_char": 38001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 127(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38494, "end_char": 38503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38601, "end_char": 38607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 125 to 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38677, "end_char": 38691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 127", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39091, "end_char": 39097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 125", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39127, "end_char": 39133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baharul Islam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39497, "end_char": 39510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we bid farewell to Faz/unbi it is necessary to mention that Chief Justice Baharul Islam, in an elaborate judgment replete,\n\nA with quotes from the Holy Quoran, has exposed the error of early English authors and judges who deait with talaq in Muslim Law as good even if pronounced at whim or in tantrum, and argued against the diehard view of Batchelor J. (ILR 30 Bombay 539) that this view 'is good in law, though bad in theology'."}}, {"text": "Batchelor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39765, "end_char": 39774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we bid farewell to Faz/unbi it is necessary to mention that Chief Justice Baharul Islam, in an elaborate judgment replete,\n\nA with quotes from the Holy Quoran, has exposed the error of early English authors and judges who deait with talaq in Muslim Law as good even if pronounced at whim or in tantrum, and argued against the diehard view of Batchelor J. (ILR 30 Bombay 539) that this view 'is good in law, though bad in theology'."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1143_1158_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "\" •\n\n• •\n\nTUMATI VENKAISH ETC. ETC.\n\nSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n. May 9, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD,' C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER,\n\nV. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nThe Atu/hra P; adesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act I of 1913, as aniended by the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms. (Ceiling on Agricuiturnl floldings) Amendment Act, 1977-Section. 4A Constitutional validity of-Whether, by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulatiou) Act 1976 (Central Act), the Andhra Pradesh Act had be\n\ncon1e void and inoperative. as being outside the legilslative competence of the A 11dhra Pradesh Legislature-Resolutions dated 7th April 1972 and 8th April 1972 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council and the Andhra Pra~ desh Legislatil'e Assembly under Art. 252 ( 1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act I of 1973 wa's enacted 011 !st of January 1973. Though a Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh when challenged by some of the land holders held! by its judgment dated I Ith April, 1973, the Act to be constitu\n\ntionally valid; yet the said Act was not brought into force till 1st January 1975.\n\nIn 1977, the Act was amended with retrospective effect from 1st January 1975 by the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Amendment Act 1977. As soon as the Amending Act was pa'ssed, the land holders once again filed writ petitions in the High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act. The main ground, inter alia, was that by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Central Act, 1976, the Andhra Pradesh Act had become void and inoperative.\n\nA Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court held that the enactment of\n\nthe Central Act did not have the effect of invalidating the whole of the F Andhra Pradesh Act, but since the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were repugnant to the provision's of the Central Act so far as concerned land satisfying both the definition of \"land\" in the Andhra Pradesh Act and the :iefini.tion Of \"vacant land\", in the 1 central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Act was held oot applicable to \"vacant lands\" falling within, the ambit of the Central Act. Save for this limited relief, the High Court dismissed the Wit petitions in all other respects. Hence the appeals by the land holders after obtaining G special leave from this Court. Writ Petitions were also filed directly in this Court by ·:some of the land holders.\n\nJ)ismissing the appeals, and writ petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : 1 .. Article 246 of the Constitution of India carves out an exception derogating from t'he normal distriblltion of legislative powers between the Union and the States. The effect of passing of resolutions by the Houses of H Legislature of two Or more State\"s under this constitutional provision is that Parliament which has otherwise no power to legislate with respect to a matter,\n\nI A\n\nexcept as provided in Articles 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with regard to such matter and the State Legislature passing the resolutions ceaseto have power to make law relating to that matter. The resolutions operate as abdication or surrender of the powers of the State Legislatures with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolutions and such matter is placed entirely in the hands of Parliament and Parliament alone can then legislate with respect to each. It is as if such matter is lifted out of list II and placed in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. A plain natural construction of the language of Clauses (!) and (2) of Article 252 makes this position clear. It was in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 352 that a resolution was passed by the Andhra Prade'sh Legislative Council on 7th April, 1972 to the effect that \"the imposition of ceiling of urban immovable property and acquisition of. such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters concerned therewith or ancilliary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law\" and on identical resolution in the same terms was passed on the next day by the Andhra Pradesh LegfsJative Assembly. The result was that at the date when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, Parliament alone was competent to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ciling and all connected, ancilHary or incidental matters, and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature stood denuded of its power to legislate on that subject.\n\n[1149 A, E-H, 1150 A-C]\n\nUnion of India v. V. B. Choudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802; followed.\n\n2. Under the powers thus transfeired Parliament enacted the Central Act with a view to imposing ceiling on vacant land, other tnan land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration.\n\nThe Central Act imposes a ceiling on holding of land in urban agglomeration other than land E Which i's mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture in this connection includes horticulture, but does not include raising of grass, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding live-stock and such cultivation or the grow ing of such plants as maY be prescribed by the Rules, and, moreover, in order to fall within the exclusion, the land must be entered in the revenue er land record before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture and must also not have been specified in rhe master plan for a purpose other than agri F culture. tl159 C-F]\n\n3. It is no doubt true that if the And.bra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it would be outside t\"hc area of its legislative competence, because it cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property.\n\nBut the only urban agglomerations in the State of Andhra Pradesh recognised in the Central Act were those referred to in Section 2(n) (A) (i) end there can be no doubt that so far as these urban agglomerations are concerned, it \\\\US not within the legislative compe tence of the And.bra Pradesh Legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within these urban agglomerations.\n\nBut, the Andhra Pradesh Act is not out side the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legisla tive in so far as lands situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh are concerned. Any other area in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of more than one lakh could be notified as an urban aggleme- H ration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of the Central Act but until it is so notified it would not be an urban agglomeration and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence to provide for imposition of ceilin& on\n\n• •\n\n~ •\n\nTUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. 1145\n\nland situate within such area. No \"SOOner such area is notified to be an urbari agglomeration, the Central Act would apply in relation to land situate within such area, but until that happens the Andhra Pradesh Act would con- L tinue ro .be applicable to determine the ceiling on holding of land. The /' Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st January 1975 and it was with reference to thisdate that the surplus holding of land in excess of the ceiling \"rea was required to be determined and if there was any surplus it was ro\n\nbe surrendered to the State Government.\n\nTherefore, in an area other than that comprised in the urban agglometations referted to in section 2 (n)(A) (i), land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area would be lieble ro be determined as on !st January 1975 under fhe Aildhra Pradesh Act and only\n\nland within the ceiling area will be allowed to remain with him. It is only\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nin respect of land remaining with a person whether an individual or a family ' after the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act, thar the Central Act would apply if and when the area in question is notified to. be an urban agglomera- , tion under section 2(n) (A) (il) of the Central Act. [1155 G-H, 1156 A-G]\n\nMerely because an area may possibly in the future be notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii). of the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would not cease to have competence to legislate with 1'espect to ceiling on land iitllate in such area even thou&h it is not -an urban\n\nagglomeration at the date of the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act.\n\nUn~ D\n\ndoubtedly, when an area is notified as an urbe.n agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii), the Central Act would apply to Ianvituate in such area and the Andhm Pradesh Act wonld cease to have application but by that time the Andhra Pradesh Act would have already operated to determine the ceiling on holding of land falling within the definition in section 3 (i) of that Act and situate within such area. Therefore, the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act is neither ultmvires nor void as being outSide the area of legis E lative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. It i1 only in respect of land situate within the urban agglomerations rcfefred to in section 2(n) (A) (i) of the Central Act that the Andhra Prad., h Act would not apply but it would be fully applicable in rOSpect of land situate in all the other area. of the State of Andhra Pradesh. [1156 G-R, 1157 A-Bl\n\n4. A divided minor calinot be exclud\\; d from the 'family unit' as defu!ed P in section 3 (f) of the Andhro.\n\nPradesh Act. Thllt would be flying in the ' face of sections 3 (f) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Act.\n\nI! is true that a ptlrtitiott affected prior to 2nd May 1972 is not invaliditted by the Andhra Pradeoh Act and therefore any pt<iperty which come• to the share of a divided minor son would in law belong to him and would not be l!Uble to be n!garded as pan of jbh'lt family property. Bui nrider the definition of faniily unit in section :!(f) tile dividc!d minor ; on wbld clearly be included in the family unit and by reason of section -4 his land whether self\n\nacquired or obtained on partition would be liable to be clubbed with tlie land heli! by the other me'mll<irs of the fail:tily unit. The lltnd obtaintd by the divided minor son on partition would be liable to be aggregated with fhe lands of other !1!61!!titrs of' the fmnily unit nm b<!cause the partition is invalid but beoouse tl1!;' !!Ind held by him howsoever acquired is 'liable to be clubbed togothtr with the 1..00. of others for fho purpose of applying the ceiling area to the family unit. . (1151 C, FiIJ\n\n14-610 SCI/80\n\n5. The Andbra Pradesh Act is admittedly an agrarian reform legislation and it is protected against challenge on the ground of infraction of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by the protective umbrella of Article 31A. (1158 B.C]\n\n6. The definition of 'family unit' is not violative of Article 14 'of the Constitution by including a minor son in \"the family unit while excluding a major son from it. (1158 A] • B\n\nSeth Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, (1980] 3 SCR p. 1181 followed.\n\nCivn./ORIGJN.AL JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 14-32, 902, 879, 1130--32, 1121, 1172, 1215, 1201, 1127, 1128, 1222, 1224, 1223, 1275, 1129, 1523, 1539, 1280, 863, 1361, 1323, 1375, 1621,, c 1374, 1410, 1628, 2117, 1961, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920 & 2290 of 1978 & 3447 & 3450/79.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgmeuts and Orders dated 13.10.1977 etc. etc. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1872/77 etc. etc.\n\nAND\n\nWRIT PETITION Nos : 3973, 3998, 3836, 4198, 4199, 4200, 4210, 4263, 4317, 4318, 4414, 4256, 4537 and 4500 of 1978.\n\nF. S. Nariman, K. Krishna Rao and K. Rajendro Choudhary for the Appellants in CA Nos. 14 to 23, 25-29, 1223-1224 & 1628/7& B 3447 and 3449/79.\n\nA. Subba Rao for the Appellants in CA No. 1126 & WP No8. 3973, 4198, 4199, 4200, 4317, 4318 & 4210/78.\n\nA. V. V. Nair for the Appellanls in CA Nos. 1215, 1361, 2117, 1286 and W.P. No. 1374/78.\n\nI' G. S. Ramo Rao for the Appellants in CA No. 1121 & Petitioners in WP Nos. 4256 and 3836/78.\n\nVepa Sarathi and B. Kanta Rao for the Appellants/Petitioners ' tn CA Nos. 24, 30, 32, 1172, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1261, 1323 & 1275/ 78 and WP Nos. 4263, 4500 & 4537 /78.\n\nVenkata Reddy and G. Narsimhulu for the Appellants in CA Nos. 31, 902, 879, 1130-32, 1410, 1621, 1917-20, 1961/78 & 1373/78.\n\nA. K. Ganguli for the Appellants in CAs 1222 and 863/78.\n\nA. v. Rangom for the Petitioners in WP No. 3998/78.\n\nS. BalokrishTiizn for the Petitioner in WP 44~4 /78. .\n\nV. S. Desai and if. Subba Rao for the Applicant/Intervener.\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nTUMATl VENKAISH v. A. P. (Bhagwati, /.) 1147\n\nK. K. Venugopal Addl. Sol. Genl., Ram Chandra Reddy Adv.\n\nA Genl. A. P. and B. Parthasarthy for the appearing respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-These appeals by special leave and the writ petitions represent a last but desparate attempt by the class of land-holders in Andhra Pradesh to defeat an agrarian reform legislation enacted by the State for the benefit of the weaker sections of community. It is indeed a matter of regret that a statute intended to strike at concentration of land in the hands of a few and to act as a great equaliser by reducing inequality in holding of land between the haves and the have-\n\n(. nots should have practical! y remained unimplemented for a period of JI' over seven years.\n\nUnfortunately, this is the common fate of much of our social welfare legislation.\n\nWe can boast of some of the finest legislative measures calculated to ameliorate the socio-economic conditions of the poor and the deprived and to reach social and economic justice to them, but regretably, a large part of such legislation has remained merely on paper, and the benefits of such legislation have not reached the common man to any appreciable extent.\n\nThe Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Andhra Pradesh Act) which is challenged in the present appeals\n\n,).-. was enacted by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature on 1st January 1973.\n\nSoon after its enactment, the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds, but a full Bench of the High Court negatived the challenge and held the Andhra Pradesh Act to be constitutionally valid.\n\nThough this judgment was delivered by the High Court as early as 11th April, 1973, no effective steps for implementation of the Andhra Pradesh Act could be taken, since the Andhra Pradesh Act\n\n':\\ merely remained on the statute book and for some inexplicable reason, it was not brought into force until !st January 1975. Even after the Andhra Pradesh Act was brought into force, not much enthusiasm was shown by the Government in implementing its provisions and in the mean while, it was found necessary to amend the legislation and hence the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultuntl Holdings) Amendment Act 1977 was enacted with retrospective effect from 1st January 1975 and by this amending Act certain amendments were made which included inter alia the introduction of section\n\n4A.\n\nWe shall presently refer to the relevant provisions of the amen- H ded Andhra Pradesh Act, but before we do .so, it is necessary to point out that as soon as the amending Act was passed, another round\n\nof litigation was started by the la!lldholders by filing writ petitions in the High Court challenging once again the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act.\n\nThere were several grounds on which the constitutional validity was challenged but the main ground was that by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act), the Andhra Pradesh Act had become void and inoperative. -Certain other questions involving the interpretation of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were also raised in some of the writ petitions, but they too need not be mentioned here, because in the course of the hearing we made it clear to the parties that we would examine on! y the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act and other questions could be agitated by the landholders in the appeals filed by them against the orders determining surplus land.\n\nIt was pointed out to us that £ome of the landholders had not filed appeals within the prescribed time and grave injustice would therefore result to them if these questiom were not decided by us.\n\nBut the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State fairly stated before us that if appeals have been filed beyond time or are filed within a month of disposal of ihese appeals, the delay in filing the appeals would be condoned.\n\nTurning to the constitutional challenge which in those days was required to be decided by a full Bench of 5 Judges of the High Court, it was held that the enactment of the Central Act did noti have the effect of invalidating the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act, but since the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were repugnant to the provisions of the Central Aet so far as concerned land satisfying both the definition of '1and\" in the Andlira Pradesh Act and the definition of \"vacant land\" in the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Act was held not applicable to \"vacant land\" falling within the ambn of the Central Act.\n\nThe High Court accordingly granted a declaration to ibis effect to the landholders, but save for ibis limited relief, dismissed the writ petitions in all other respects, since in the opinion of the High Court there was no substance in any of the other contentions raised on behalf of the landholders.\n\nThe landholders thereupon preferred the present appeals after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nThe principal contention urged on behalf of the landholders in support of the appeals was that the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. This contention was based on two res- H olutions, one dated 7th April 1972 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council and the other dated 8th April 1972 paS<Sed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly under clause ( 1) of Article\n\n• . \\\n\n.. •\n\nTUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, !.) 1149\n\n252 of the Constitution.\n\nThis Article carves out an exception derogating frol!l the normal distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States under Article 246 and is in the following tef!Ds : Art. 252(1) : If it appears to the legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with reipect to which Parli.anu>I\\t has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Articles Z49 al\\d 250 should 111' regulated in such State11 by Parliainent by law, and\n\nif rewlutio!J$ to that eject are passec; I by !Ill the IJoug, es of tlw Legislatures of tho5e States, it shall be lawful for Par liarnent to pass an Act for regulating thllt matter accordy. am! any A.ct so passed shall ajlply to such Sl; ltes apd to any othor State by which i¢ is adop!eQ afte!'Wlll'.ds by realution J; lllSsed in that behalf by the I!o~ or, where there are two IU>uses, by each of tne House~ of the Legislature of that State.\n\n(Z) An N:t 'o JM~•d by Parllamc11t 1n1y ho qemi- \"i or r'ed by JI\\ A.ct of Parliall\\ellt plli&Cd ot adojltc4 iII like iiwr but '~U not, as rl:i~I~ ...,_y State to whicb it apPlilli, bi amoad\"I or repealod by a11; Act of !114 gis lature of that State.\"\n\n1' The effect of passing al' resolutions by the Hou&ell of Legislature of two of more Stat~ 11ndr this cotutitutiolllll provision is that Parliument wJiich has othefWise no power to l, gis1'te with respect to a matter, except &s pnlvidro in A, rtic~ 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with respect to such matter and the State Legislatures passing the resolutions cease to have power to make law\n\nF ' relating to that matter.\n\nThe resolutions operate 3$ abdication or surrender of the powers of the State Legislatures with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolutions and such matter is placed entirely in the hands of Parliament and Parliament alone can \\\n\nthen legislate with respect to it. It is as if such matter is lifted out of List II and placed in Lilst I of the Seventh Sched\\lk to the Constitution.\n\nThis would seem to be quite clear on a plain natural construct10n of the language of clauses (1) aQd (2) of Article 252 and no authority is necessary in support of it, but if any was wanted,\n\nit may be found in the decision of a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in Union of India v. V. V. Chaudhary(')-in fact the same Bench as the present one--where an identical view has been taken.\n\nH It was in pursuance of clause (1) of this Article that a Resolution ------\n\n(!) 11979] 3 SCR 802.\n\nwas passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council on 7th April 1972 to the effect that \"the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acqnisiti'CJn of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancilliary and incidental -l thereto should be regulated in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law\" and an identical resolution in the same tem1s was passed on the next day by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature Assembly.\n\nSimilar resolutions were also passed by the Houses of Legislature of some other States, though there is no material to show as to when\n\n' '\n\nthey were passed.\n\nIt was however common ground that at best some of these resolutions were passed prior to the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act.\n\nThe result was that at the date when the J Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, Parliament alone was competent ''\"'\\\n\nto legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all connected, ancilliary or incidental matters, and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature stood denuded of its power to legislate on that subject.\n\nNow the Andbra Pradesh Act, as its long title shows, was enacted to consolidate and mnend the law relatirig to the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over of surplus land and matters\n\nconnected therewith. On its plain terms, it applies to land situate in any part of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nSection 3 ( f) creates an artificial unit called 'family unit' by defining it as follows :\n\n\"Sec. 3 ( f) \"family unit\" means- ( i) in the case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses, snch individual, the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters; if any;\n\n(ii) in the case of an individual who. has no spouse such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters;\n\n(iii) in the case of an individual who is a divorced husband and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in his custody or not; and\n\n(iv) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and unmarriej minor daughters.\n\nT Explanation-Where a minor son is married, his wife and their offspring, if any, shall also be deemed to be members of the family unit of which the minor son is a member;\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nTUMATI VBNKAISH v. A. P. (Bhagwati, /,) 1151\n\nThe term \"land\" is defined in section 3 (j) to mean \"land which is used or is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture, or for purposes ancillary thereto, including horticulture, forest land, pasture land, waste land, plantation and tope; and includes land deemed to be agricultural land under this Act\". Explanation I to this definition enacts a rebuttable presumption that land held under Ryotwari settlement shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be 'land' under the Andhra Pradesh Act.\n\nSection 3 ( o) defines 'person' as including inter alia an individual and a faintly unit. Sec tion 10 is the key section which imposes ceiling on the holding of land by providing that if the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the person shall be liable to surrender the '1and held in excess. If therefore an individual or a family unit holds land in excess of the ceiling area, the excess would have to be\n\nurrendered to the State Government. But the question then arises, what is the ceiling area above which a person cannot hold land. The answer is provided by section 4 .which reads as follows :-\n\n\"Sec. 4 (1) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding.\n\n(2) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding plus an additional extent of one-fifth of one standard holding for every such member in excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holdings.\n\n(3) The ceiling area in the case of every individual who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of any other person shall be an exte0t of land equal to one standard holding.\n\nExplanation :-In the case of a family unit, the ceil\" ing area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit\".\n\nIt will thus be seen that the ceiling area in the case of an individual who is not a member of a family unit is equivalent to one sfandard holding and so also in the case of a family unit with not more than five members, the ceiling area is the same, but if the family unit consists of more than five members, the ceiling area would stand increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional member H of the family unit, subject however to the maximum limit of 2 standard holdings.\n\nWhen the ceiling area is applied t<;> the holding of a\n\nA family u¢t, the Explanation requires that the lands held by all the members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing the holding of the family unit.\n\nWhere, therefore, there ill a family unit consisting of father, mother and three minor sons or daughters, the lands held by all these persons would have to be clul>- bed together and then the ceiling area applied to the aggregate ho)d- B ing.\n\nThere is no distii:iction made in the definition of 'family uuit• between a divided minor son and an undivided minor son.\n\nBoth stand on the same footing and a di<vided minor son is as much a member of the family unit as an undivided minor son, and consequently the lands held by a divided minor son would have to be included in the holding of the family unit for the purpose of application of the C . ceiling area. Section 7 invalidates certain transfers of land and provides for inclusion of such lands in the holding of an individual or a family unit.\n\nThen there is a provision in section 8 for furnishing a declaration in respect of his holding by every person whose land exceeds the ceiling area and the Tribunal is required by section 9 to D hold w. quiry d s ttn order determining the land held in excess of the ceiling arCtt• Such l; md has to be surrendered by the person holding the land and on such surrender, the Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered under section 11 to take possession of the land which thereupon vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances.\n\nSection 14 provides inter alia that the land vested in the E State Governmeat 1>hall be allotted for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers, village artisans or other poor persons owning no houses or house-sites or transferred to the weaker sections of the people dependent on agriculture for purposes of agriculture/or for purposes ancilliary thereto in such manner as may be prescribed by the Rnles, subject to a proviso that as far as practicable not less than one-half F of the total extent of land so allotted or transferre_d shall be allotted: or transferred to the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\n\nSection 15 enacts a provision for payment of compensation for fand vested in the State Government at the rates specified in the\n\nSecond Schedule.\n\nThese are the only relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act which need to be referred to for the purpose of the present appeals.\n\nWe may now tum to examine the relevant provisions of the\n\n~.\n\n~ \\\n\nCentral Act.\n\nThis Act was enacted by Parliament pursuant to the M authority conferred upon it by the resolutions passed by the Houses of Legislature of several States~ including the State o' Amllira H Pradesh under clause (1) of Article 252. It received the assent of the President on 17th February 1976 and as its long tide and recita1 'hows\n\nit was enacted to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant\n\n.. •\n\nTUMATI VBNKA!SH V. A. P. (Bhi:zgwati, !.) ll 53\n\nland is urban agglomerations for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the conc.eutr.ation of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an eqii.itabli: distribution of land in urban agglomeflltiOJJs to subserve the common good. We shall ri:i; er to a few material p!Oyisions of this Act. i<m 2(a) (i) l!efines \"appointed day\" to mean in relation to any State to wbich tJiis Act applies i11 the first instimce which includes the State of Andhra Pradesh - t, he date of iutroduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament.\n\nThis was t!Je Bill which culminated in the Act and it was introduced in Parlia111ent on iSth Jam1ary 1976.\n\nConsequently, this date would be the 'appointed day' for the purpose of applicability of the Act to the State of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nThe definition of \"family\" in section 2\n\n(f) is materially in the same terms as the definition of \"family unit\" in the Andhra Pradesh Act.\n\nThen follow two imp<;>rtant !Wfiuitions which needed to be set out in extenso.\n\nThe word \"Pfrson\" is defined in section 2(i) as including intu alia an 'individual' and the 'i!a.mily'.\n\nSection 2(n) defines \"urban agglomeration\" in the following terms :\n\n\"&ec.2(n) (A) in relation to any State of Ullion territory specified in column ( 1 ) of Scheduk l, mllllllS--\n\n(i) lbe url:mn i1wo1;1.eration &l)ecilied in the conpon\n\ndiPJ: entry in column ( 2) tb!:reof and inctndes tlw\n\nperiphe.raJ a.rea specified ip the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof; and\n\n(ii) any other area which the State Government may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, having regard to its location, population (population being more than one lakh) and such other relevant factors as the circumstance of the case may require, by notification in the Official Gaette, declare to be an urban agglomeration and any agglomeration so declared shall be deemed to belong to category D in that Schedule and the peripheral area therefor shall be one kilometre;\n\n(B) xx xx xx xx\n\nTire term 'urban land' is defined in section 2 ( o) to mean:-\n\nSec. 2 ( o) (i) : any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or\n\nxx\"\n\n(ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name dilled), a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the plirpose of agriculture.\n\nExplanation: For the purpose of this clause and clause (q),-\n\n(A) \"agriculture\" includes horticulture, but does not include--\n\n(i) raising of grass,\n\n(ii) dairy farming,\n\n'.D\n\n(iii) poultry farming,\n\n(iv) breeding of live-stock, and\n\n(v) such cultivation, or the growing of such plant, as may be prescribed.\n\n(B) land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the . purpose of agriculture;\n\n(C) notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture; \" (\n\nSection 2 ( q) gives a definition of \"vacant land\" by providing that \"vacant land\" means, subject to certain e.xceptions which are not mat- -0 erial, land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agricultur!,\n\nin an urban agglomeration.\n\nSection 3 is the rebuttal section which imposes ceiling on holding of 'vacant land' by providing that:\n\n\"Sec. 3. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be H entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-section\n\n(2) of section 1.\"\n\n' ,\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nTUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, J.) 1155\n\nSection 4 divides urban agglomeration into categories A, B, C and D lays down different ceiling limits for these different categories.\n\nThen there is a provision in section 5 invalidating in certain circumstances the transfer of vacant land made at any time during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending with the commencement of the Act.\n\nThe procedure for determining \"vacant land\" held in excess of the ceiling limit is laid down in sections 6 to 9 and section 1 O enacts a provision for acquisition of such land held in excess of such limit.\n\nSection 23 provides for disposal of vacant land acquired uJ&!ier the Act and it empowers the State Government to allot such vacant land to \"any person for any purpose relating to or in connection with any industry or for providing residential accommodation of snch type as may be approved by the State Government to the employees of any industry. It will thus be seen that the Central Act imposes a ceiling on holding of land in urban agglomeration other than land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture in this connection inclndes horticulture, bnt does not include raising of grass, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding live-stock and cultivation or the growing of such plants as may be prescribed by the Rules, and, moreover, in order to fall within the exclusion, the land must be entered in the revenue or land record before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture and must also not have been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture.\n\n. Now, as we have already pointed out above, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature had, at the time when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, no power to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable . property.\n\nThat power stood trnnsferred to parliament and as a first step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on immovable property of every other description, the Parliament enacted the Central Act with a view to imposing ceiling on vacant land, other than land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration.\n\nThe argument of the landholders was that the Andhra Pradesh Act sought\n\nto impose ceiling on land in the whole of Andhra Pradesh including land situate in urban agglomeration and since the concept of agglomeration defined in section 2(n) of the Central Act was an expansive concept and any area with an ei1isting or future population of more than one lakh could be notified to be an uban agglomeration, the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competance of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature.\n\nThis argument plausible though it may seem, in our opinion, is unsustainable. It is no doubt true that if the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks H to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it weuld be outside the area of its legislative competence, because it !\n\nI!'\n\ncannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property.\n\nBut the only urban agglomerations in the State of Andhra Pradesh: recognised in the Central Act were those referred to in section 2(n} (A) (ii) and there can be no doubt that so far as these urban agglo merations are concerned, it was not within the legislative competence\n\nof the Andhra Pradesh Legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within these urban aglliomerations. It is, however, dil!icult to see how the Andhra Pradesh Act could be said to be outsil;!e the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature in so far as land situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Praclesh is concerned.\n\nWe accept that any other area in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of more than om> lakh could be notit)!, Xl as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of th~ Central Act but until it is SP notified it would not be an urban 11gglomeration and the Andhrn Pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence tp provide for imposition of ceiling on lane! situate within such area.\n\nNo SOPner such area is notified to bt all urb!ln aggloiru; ratlon, tllC Central Act would apply in relation to land situ/lte within such ania, but until that hiippens the Andhra Pradesh A.ct would continue to be applicable to determine the ceilin, c o• ltol!lins of land. It m.ay be noticed that the Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st Jaa11ary 1975 and it was with reference to tltis !lile thii surplus holding of lam! in excess of the ceiling area wa! requirtd to be determined a11d if there was any surplus it was to be surrendered to the State Governftient.\n\nIt mnst therefore follow that in an area other than that comprised in the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2(n) (A) (i), land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area would be liable to be determined as on 1st January 1975 under _the Andhra Pradesh Act and only land within the ceiling area will be allowed to remain with him. It is only in respect of land remaining with a person whether an individual or a family after the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act, that the Central Act would apply if and when the area in question is notified to be an urban agglomeration under section 2(n) (A) (ii) of the Central Act.\n\nWe fail to see how it can at all be contended G that merely because an area may possibly in the future be nctified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A) (ii) of the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would cease to have competence to legislate with respect to ceiling on land situate in such area even though it is not an urban agglomeration at the date of the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act. l'ndoubtedly, when an area is notified as H an urban agglomeration under section 2(nl (Al (ii), the Central Act would apply to land situate in such area and the Andhra Pradesh Act would cease to have application but by that time the Andhra Pradesh\n\n• f\n\n.. •\n\n• •\n\n.... ~J\n\n.~ -~\n\nTUMAT! VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, /.) llS'/\n\nAct would have already operated to determine the ceiling on holding\n\n>Of land falling within the definition in section 3 (j) of that Act and\n\nsituate within such area. It is therefpre not possible to uphold the. contention of the landholders that the whole of the. Andhra Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void as being outside the area of legislative competence of the . Andhra Pradesh Legislature. It is only in respect oI land situate within the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2 ( n) (A) (i) of the Central Act that the Andhra Pradesh Act would not apply but it would be fully applicable in respect of land situate in all 1he other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh .\n\nThe next contention nrged on behalf of the landholders was that on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Andllra Pradesh Act, a divided minor son was not liable to be included in \"family unit\" as defined in section 3 (f) of that Act. the argument was that sub-section (2) of section 7 did not invalidate all partitions of joint family property but struck only against partitions effected on or before 2nd May 1972 and thus by necessary implication recognised 1he validity of partitions affected prior to that date. If therefore a partition was effected prior to 2nd May 1972 and under that partition a minor son become divided from his father and mother, the divided minor son could not be included in the family unit and his property could not be clubbed with that of his father and mother, because otherwise it would amount to invalidation of the partition though section 7, sub-section (2) clearly recognised such partition as vnlid.\n\nThis argument is clearly fallacious in that it fails to give .due effect to the definition of family unit in section 3 (f) and the provisions of section 4.\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that a partition effected prior to 2nd May 1972 is not invalidated by the Andhra Pradesh Act and therefore any property which comes to the share of a divided minor son would in law belong to him and would not be liable to be required as part of joint family property. But under the definition of family unit in section 3 (I) the divided minor son would clearly be included in the family unit and by reason of section 4 his land whether self-acquired or obtained on partition would be liable to be clubbed with the land held by the other members of the family unit. The land obtained by the divided minor son on partition would be liable to be aggregated with the lands of other members of the family unit not because the partition is invalid\n\nbut because the land held by him howsoever acquired is liable to be clubbed together with the lands of others for the purpose of applying the ceiling area to tlJe family unit. We do not therefore see how a divided minor son can be excluded from the family unit.\n\nThat would H be flying in the face of sections 3 ( f) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh\n\nAct.\n\nA Then a contention was advanced on behalf of the landholders that\n\nthe definition of \"family unit\" was violative of Article 14, of the Constitution in that it made unjust discrimination between a minor son and the major son by including minor son in the \"family unit\" while excluding a major son from it.\n\nThis contention has already been dealt with by learned brother Tulzapurkar, J. in the judgment delivered by him today in the Haryana Land Ceiling matters and we need not repeat what he bad already stated there while repelling this contention.\n\nMoreover, this contention is, no longer open to the landholders since the Andhra Pradesh Act is admittedly an agrarian reform legislation and it is protected against challenge on the ground of infraction of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by the protective umbrella of Article 31A. We do not therefore see any substance in the contentions urged on behalf of the landholders and we accordingly dismiss the appeals and the writ petitions with costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals & Petitions dismissed.\n\n• t\n\n• •\n\n.__,.\n\n( (", "total_entities": 137, "entities": [{"text": "TUMATI VENKAISH ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TUMATI VENKAISH ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. 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{"text": "Je Bill which culminated in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29418, "end_char": 29453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29675, "end_char": 29684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Je Bill which culminated in the Act", "statute": "Je Bill which culminated in the Act"}}, {"text": "section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29897, "end_char": 29909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Je Bill which culminated in the Act", "statute": "Je Bill which culminated in the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29970, "end_char": 29982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Je Bill which culminated in the Act", "statute": "Je Bill which culminated in the Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30430, "end_char": 30448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2(n) defines \"urban agglomeration\" in the following terms :\n\n\"&ec.2(n) (A) in relation to any State of Ullion territory specified in column ( 1 ) of Scheduk l, mllllllS--\n\n(i) lbe url:mn i1wo1;1.eration &l)ecilied in the conpon\n\ndiPJ: entry in column ( 2) tb!:reof and inctndes tlw\n\nperiphe.raJ a.rea specified ip the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof; and\n\n(ii) any other area which the State Government may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, having regard to its location, population (population being more than one lakh) and such other relevant factors as the circumstance of the case may require, by notification in the Official Gaette, declare to be an urban agglomeration and any agglomeration so declared shall be deemed to belong to category D in that Schedule and the peripheral area therefor shall be one kilometre;\n\n(B) xx xx xx xx\n\nTire term 'urban land' is defined in section 2 ( o) to mean:-\n\nSec."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30887, "end_char": 30896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30913, "end_char": 30919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32292, "end_char": 32301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32535, "end_char": 32544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32640, "end_char": 32646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32888, "end_char": 32897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "TUMATI VENKAISH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32916, "end_char": 32931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ,\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nTUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, J.) 1155\n\nSection 4 divides urban agglomeration into categories A, B, C and D lays down different ceiling limits for these different categories.", "canonical_name": "TUMATI VENKAISH ETC. ETC"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32942, "end_char": 32950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ,\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nTUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, J.) 1155\n\nSection 4 divides urban agglomeration into categories A, B, C and D lays down different ceiling limits for these different categories.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32962, "end_char": 32971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33127, "end_char": 33136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 6 to 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33412, "end_char": 33427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33432, "end_char": 33441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33523, "end_char": 33533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35302, "end_char": 35314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(n} (A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36095, "end_char": 36111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Praclesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36582, "end_char": 36597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, however, dil!icult to see how the Andhra Pradesh Act could be said to be outsil;!e the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature in so far as land situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Praclesh is concerned."}}, {"text": "section 2(n)(A)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36767, "end_char": 36786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhrn Pradesh Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36882, "end_char": 36908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Xl as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of th~ Central Act but until it is SP notified it would not be an urban 11gglomeration and the Andhrn Pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence tp provide for imposition of ceiling on lane!"}}, {"text": "1st Jaa11ary 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37354, "end_char": 37371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It m.ay be noticed that the Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st Jaa11ary 1975 and it was with reference to tltis !"}}, {"text": "section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37695, "end_char": 37707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38177, "end_char": 38189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(n)(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38367, "end_char": 38382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(nl (Al (ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38710, "end_char": 38731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39076, "end_char": 39085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39230, "end_char": 39248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39447, "end_char": 39456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39875, "end_char": 39884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39943, "end_char": 39952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra Pradesh Act", "statute": "Andhra Pradesh Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40534, "end_char": 40543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40715, "end_char": 40724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40751, "end_char": 40760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "2nd May 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40821, "end_char": 40833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undoubtedly true that a partition effected prior to 2nd May 1972 is not invalidated by the Andhra Pradesh Act and therefore any property which comes to the share of a divided minor son would in law belong to him and would not be liable to be required as part of joint family property."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41097, "end_char": 41106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41195, "end_char": 41204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41830, "end_char": 41840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41998, "end_char": 42008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42251, "end_char": 42262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention has already been dealt with by learned brother Tulzapurkar, J. in the judgment delivered by him today in the Haryana Land Ceiling matters and we need not repeat what he bad already stated there while repelling this contention."}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42639, "end_char": 42661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42692, "end_char": 42703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1159_1180_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ".. •\n\nAMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC. v.\n\nSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC.\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CliANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRlsHNA IYBR, B\n\nV. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nUttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960-Con.rtitutional Validity-Jlalue of stare decisi.f.-vis-a-vis judicial review.\n\nDismissing !he appeals and the Writ Petitions, the Court\n\nHEID : ( 1) .-It is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season because it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrative action on vit.al issues deteind\n\nby the brooding interest of forensic blow-up. This, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisation of Stare action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, or the basic direction of th'e nation itoelf is in peril of a shake up. The decision in Kesavananda Bharati's case, therefore. upholding the vir'es of Article 3 lA in unequivocal terms binds the conrt on the simple score of stare decisi~ and the constitutional ground of Article 141 •.\n\nFurther, fatal flaws silenced by ea.rlier rulings cannot survive after d'eath because a decision does not lose its authority \"merely because it was badly argu'ed, inad&- quately considered and fallaciously reasoned\". And none of the..., misfortunes can be imputed to Bharati's case. [1164 C-0, 1165 C-DJ\n\n(2). The sweep of Article 3 lA is wide and indubitably em bra= legislation on land ceilings. Equitable distribution of lands, annihilation of monopoly of ownership by imposition of oeiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverre plaaning and strategies a.re covered by the armour of Article 3 IA.\n\nArticle 3 IA repulses, therefore, all invasions on ceiling legislation armed with Articles 14, 19 and 31. [1165 D-B, 1166 D-B]\n\nRaniit Singh and Ors. v. State of Puniab and Ors. [1965] I S.C.R. 82, State of '- Kera/a and Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (W...Wng) Co. Ltd. ' Etc. [1974) I S.C.R. 671, reiterated.\n\n(3). The decision in Maneka Gandhfs case is no universal nostrum or curoall. Nor can it be applicable to the land reform law which is in another donmin\n\nof comtitutional jurisprudence and quite apart from personal liberty in Article 21.\n\nG To contend that land reform law, if unreasonable violates Article 21 as expanllYcly constnled in Maneka Gantlhf• case is incorrect. [1168 E-OJ\n\n(4). Secti<in 5(6) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdinp Act, 1960 is fair, valid and not violative Of Article 19(1 )(f) Of the Constitution.\n\nThere is no blanket ban by it but only qnalffied invalidation of c:er!aln sinister a.ignment! etc. There is nothing in this section which is morally wrong nor la such an embargo which cilmes into force only on a well recognised date not Hfrom an arbitrarily 1etrospectiV'e past constitutionally anathematlc. Article t!l(l)(f) ;,, not aboo!ute in operation and is subject, under Article 19(6), to\n\nreasonable restrictions such as the one contained in Section 5(6).\n\nFurthr it is perfectly open to the legislature as anciUary 'to its main policy to prev'eiit activities which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such action. \\\\'hen th'e alienations are invalidated because they are made after a statutory date fixed with a purpose, there is sense in this prohibition. Otherwise, all the lands would have been transferred and little would have been left by way of surplus.\n\n[1169 AB. D, FG, 1170 C, EF]\n\n(5). Articles 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of ttie Preamble rebel against the defacto denial of proprietory personhood or womanhood. But this legal sentiment and jural value must not run riot and destroy the provisions which do not discriminate between man and woman qua man and woman but merely organise a scheme where life realism is legislatively pragmatised. Such a scheme may marginally affect gender justice but does not abridge, wee-bit, the rights of women. If land-holding .and ceiling thereon are organised with the paramount purpose of maximising surpluses without maim; ng women's ownership, any plea of sex discrimination as a. nieans to sabotage what is socially desirable measure cannot be permitted. [1173 D-F]\n\nFrom a reading of Section 3(7) read with Section 5(3) it is clear that no woman's property is taken away any more than a man's prop1erty. section 5(3) does not confer any property on an adult iOD nor withdraw any property from adult dMJghter. Legal injury can arise only if the daughtds property is taken away whil'e the son's is retained or the daughter e-ets no share while the son gets one. The \\egislation has not done either. [1171 G, 1173 F, H, 1174 CD]\n\n( 6). Section 3 ( 17) of the Act is not cli&criminatory and does not offend Articles 14 & 15 of the Constitution. True, Section 3(17) makes the husband a tenure holder even when the wife is the owner. This is a legislative device for simplifying dealings and cannot therefore be faulted.\n\n[1174 E, FG]\n\n(7). Neither ceiling proceeding& abate nor taking surplus land from tlte tenure holder is barred under the proviiion1 of Se<:tion 4 of the U .P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 read with Section 5(2) of the Ceiling Act. [1177 CJ\n\nThe whol'e scheme of consolidation of holdings is to restructure agrarian land-scape of U.P. so as to promote better farming and economic holdings by 'eliminating fragmentation andi organising oonsolidating, No one is deprived of his land. WMt happens i1, his •tattered bits are taken away and in lieu threof a continuous conglomeration equal in value i1 allotted subject to minimal deduction for community use and better enjoyment. Whatever land belongs to the tenure holder at the time when cons01idation proceedings are in an n-going stage, may or may not belong to him after the consolidation proce'edings a.re completed.\n\nAlternative allotments may be made l\\nd so the choice that he may make before the prescribed authority for the purpose of surrendering surplus lands and proserving 'permissible holding' may have only tentative value. But this factor doet not seriously prejudice the holder. While he chooo\"es the best at the given time the Consolidation Officer will give him its equivalent when a new plot is given to him in the place of th'e old. There is no diminution in the quantum of land and quality of land since the object of consolidation is not deprivation but mere substitution of scattered pieces with a consolidated plot. The tenure holder may Well exercise his option before the prescribed officer and if, later, the Consolida tion Officer takes away these lands, he will allot a real equivalent thereof to the tenure holder el•ewher'e. There is no reduction or damage or other prejudice by this process of statutory exchange. (1177 CG]\n\nI I\n\n1 ..\n\n• * • ..\n\nAMBIKA PRASAD V. U.P. STATE 1161\n\nWhen land is contributed for public purposes compensation is paid in that A behalf, and in tbe event of 'illegal or unjust orders passed, appellate and revisory remedies are also provided. On such exchange or transfer taking place, pursuant to the finalisation of tbe consolidation scheme, tbe holding, upto tbe ceiling available to tbe tenure-holder, will be converted into tbe new allotment und'et' the consolidation scheme.' Thus there is no basic injustice nor gross arbitrari n'ess in tbe continuance of tbe land reforms proceedings even when oonsolidation proceedings are under way. [1178 B-D] B\n\nAgricultural & InduStrial Syndicate Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors., [1974] 1 S.C.R. 253, ctistinguished .\n\nKhatraJl\"l Singh v. State of U.P .. (High Court) [1975] Recent Decisions p. 366, approved.\n\n8. There is no time-wise arbitrariness vitiating: the statute in .that various provisions in tbe Act were bronght into force on random dates witbout any rhyme or reason, !bus violating, from tbe temporaly angle, Article 14.\n\nIt is true that neither tbe legislature nor the Government as its delegate can fix ' fanciful dates for effectuation of . provisions affecting the rights of citiz.ens.\n\nEven so, a larger latitude is allowed to the. State to notify the date on which a particular provision may come iDlo effect.\n\nMany impobles may weigh With the State in choosing tbe date ond when challenge ii; made years later, tbe factors which induced the choice of such dates may be buried under the debris of time. Parties cannot take advantage of tQis handicap and audaciouoly cha!· lenge every date of coming into fon:e of every provision as capriciously picted out.\n\n[1179 B-DJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1543 of 1977.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India.\n\nWITH\n\nW.P. No. 1542/77 and C.A. No. 1379/77, W.P. No. 838/78, 12360-2363/78 and S.L.P. (C) Nos. 1727 /79 & 2333 & 2530 of 1978.\n\nA.ND'\n\nS.L.P. (C) No. 2539 of 1978 and W.P. No. 22~ of 1979.\n\nM. S. Gupta for the petitioners in WPs. 1542, 1543, 838 & CA 1379/77.\n\nArvind Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind & Prakash Gupta for the G petitioners in SLPs. 1727, 2333 & 2S30.\n\np, R. Mridu/, R. K. Jain & Sukumar Sahu for the petitioners in WPs 2360-63.\n\nVeda Vyasa, S. K. Gupta & A. K. Sharma for the petitioners in SLP 2599 and WP 228.\n\nB. P. Singh Chauhan, Addi. Adv. Genl. U.P. and O. P. Rana for ff the appearing respondents. l 5-610SCT/80\n\nA The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-This judgment deals with a flood of cases from Cttar Pradesh relating to limitation on agricultural land holding.;, and specifically disposes of the writ petitions, civil appeals and petitfons B for special leave listed below.\n\nThe pervasive theme of this Jitigative stream is not anti-land-reform as such but the discriminatory flaws in the relevant legislation which make it 'unlaw' from the constitutional angle.\n\nThe mach of the Indian nation to the Promised Land of Social Justice is conditioned by the pace of the process of agrarian reform.\n\nThis central fact of our country's progress has made land distribution and its inalienable ally, the ceiling on land holding, the cynosure of legislative attention. And when litigative confrontation with large holders has imperilled the implementation of this vital developmental strategy, Parliament, in exercise of its constituent power, has sought to pre-empt effectively and protect impregnably such statutory measures by enacting Art. 3 lA as the very first amendment in the very .first y=\n\nafter the Constitution came into force.\n\nConsequent on the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, this court repelled the challenges to land reform laws as violative of fundamental rights ia State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(') but the constant struggle bet-\n\n,., een agrarian reform legislation and never-say-die litigation has led to a situation where every such enactment has been inevitably accompanied by countless writ petitions assailing its vi res despite Art. 31 A, not to speak of the more extensive Chinese walls like Arts. 3 lB, 3 lC and 31D.\n\nThe forensic landscape is cluttered up in this court with appeals and writ petitions and petitions for leave to appeal, the common feature of each of which is a challenge to the validity of one or other of the State laws imposing ceiling on land holding in an inegalitarian milieu of the landed few and the landless many.\n\nOf course, the court is bound to judge the attack on the legi91ative projects for acquisition and distri)mtion, on their constitutional 111erits and we proceed to as say the task with special reference to the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling cn Land Holdings Act, 1960 (abbreviated hereafter as the Act). Several coun.sel have argued and plural objections have been urged but we will grapple with only those contentions which have been seriously pressed and omit others which have either been mtly formally mentioned or left to lie in silent\n\n(I) A.LR. 1952 S.C. 252.\n\n/ I\n\n• ·..-\n\npeace, or but feebly articulated.\n\nIn this judgment, we side-step the bigger issue of the vires of the constitutional amendment.~ in Artie!~\n\n31A, 31B and 3 lC as they are dealt with in other cases disposed of recently.\n\nIndeed, the history of land reform, in its legislative dimension has been a perennial race between judicial pronouncements and constitutional amendments .\n\nThe anatomy of the Act must be scanned as a preliminary exercise so that the Constitutional infirmities alleged may be appreciated in the proper setting.\n\nThe long title gives the primary purpose of the Act as imposition of ceilings on land holdings in Uttar Pradesh and the Preamble amplifies it further.\n\nAll this is tersely pelt -out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons which runs thus :-\n\n\"With a view to provide for more equitable distribution of land by making the same available to the extent possible to landless agricultural labourers and to provide for cultivation on cooperative basis and to conserve part of the available resources in land so as to increase the production and up reserve stock of foodgrains against lean years by carrying on cultivation OIJ scientific lines in State-owned farms, it is expedient to impose ceiling on existing large land holdings.\n\nIt is necessary to provide some land to the village collllllunities for their common needs, such\n\na~ establishment of fuel and fodder reserves.\n\nThe Bill is therefore being introduced to promote the economic interest of the weaker section of community and to subserve the common good.\" Thus we get the statutory perspective of agrarian reform and so, the constitutionality of the Act has to be tested on the touchstone of Art. 3 lA which is the relevant protective armour for land reform laws.\n\nEven here, we must state that while we do refer to the range of constitutional immunity Art. 3 lA , i:onfers on agrarian reform measures we do not rest our decision on that vrovision. 'independently of Art. 3 lA, the impugned legislation can withstand constitutional invasion and so th~ further challenge to Art. 3 lA itself is of no consequence.\n\nThe comprehensive vocabulary of that purposeful provision obviously catches within its pn;>tective net the present Act and, broadly speaking, the antiseptic effect of that Article is sufficient to immunise the Act against invalidation to the extent stated therein.\n\nThe extreme argument that Art. 31 A itself is void as violative of the basic structure of the onstitution 1)as been negatived by my learned brother, Bhagwati, J. in a kindred group of cases of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nThe amulet of Art. 31A is, therefore, potent, so far as it goes, but beyond its ambit it is still possible, as counsel have endeavoured to . ,\n\nspin out some sound argument to nullify one section or the other.\n\nSurely, the legislature cannot run amok in the blind belief that Art. 31A is omnipotent. We will examine the alleged infirmities in due course. It is significant that even apart from the many decisions upholding Art. 31A, Golak Nath's case(') decided by a Bench of 11 Judges, while holding that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act exceeded the constituent power still categorically declared that the said amendment and a few other like amendments would be held good based on the doctrine of prospective over-rnling.\n\nThe result, for our, purpose, is that even Golak Nath's case has held Art. 31A valid The note struck by later cases. reversing Golaknath does not militate against the vires of Art. 31A. Suffice it to say that in the Kesavananda Bharti's\n\ncase(') Article 31A was challenged as beyond the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid.\n\nBut, after listening to the marathon erudition from eminent counsel, a 13 Judges Bench cf this Court upheld the vires of Article 3 lA in unequivocal terms.\n\nThat decision binds, on the simple score of stare decisis and the' constitutional ground of Art. 1.41. Every now discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent.\n\nIn thls view, other submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with hlgh-presswe advocacy, cannot persuade us to re-open, what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemri preposion by the epic Fundamental Rights case. From Kameshwar Singh(') and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesava11anda (supra) and Kanan Devan(') to Gwalior Rayons(•) and after Art.' 31A: has stood judicial scrutiny although, as s~ earlier, we do not base the conclusion on Art. 31A. Even so, it is fundamental that the nation's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season beciime it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrathe action on vital issues deterred by the brooding threat of forensic blowup. Thls, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisatioll. of State action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, qr the basic direction of the nation itself is\n\nin peril of a shakeup. It is surely wrong to prove Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court right when he said(6).\n\n(1) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 762.\n\n(2) [19731 Supp. SCR. !.\n\n(3) AIR 1952 SC 252.\n\n(4) Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kera/a & Anr. [1973]'\n\n1. S.C.R., 356.\n\n(5) Kera/av. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (W•g) Co. Ltd. etc. [1974] I SCR.\n\n(6) Smith v. All wright 321 US 649, 669 and 670 (1944).\n\n• \"\n\n• ...\n\n• '\n\n\"The reason for my concern is that the imtant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for this day and train only ...... It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of thcmght and purpose, this Court which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and fiows of opinion. should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions\".\n\nIt is wise to remember that fatal fiaws silenced by earlier rulings 'Cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority \"merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered\n\nand fallaciously reasoned\". (1) And none of these misfo'rtunes can be imputed to Bharti:s case (supra). For these reasoos, we proceed to consider the contentions of counsel on the clear assumption that Art. 31A is good.\n\nIts sweep is wide and indubitably embraces legislation on land ceilings.\n\nLong years ago, in , Ranjh v. State,(') a Constitution Bench, speaking through Hidayatullall, J., dwelt oa the wide amplitude of Art. 3 lA, referred to Precedents of this Court on agrarian reform vis a vis Art. 3 lA and concluded that equitable clistribution of lands, annihilatign of monopoly of ownership by imposition of ceiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverse\n\nplanning and strategies are covered by the armour of Art. 3 lA. We may qnote a part :\n\nThe scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other, but envisages also the raising of econ<>- mic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions. Provisions for the assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, talll!ing grounds etc. which\n\n(sic) enure for the benefit of rural population must be considered to be an essential part of the redistribution of holdings , and open lands to which no objection is apparently taken. If agrarian reforms are to succeed, more distribu-\n\n(1) Salmond 'Jurisprudence' p. 21S(llth edition).\n\n(2) (1965]1 SCR 82.\n\ntion of lands to the landless is not enough. There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village: panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than, individual owners of small portions of lands.\n\nFurther the village panch:ayat is an authority for purposes of part Ill as was conceded before us and it has the protection of Art. 31 A because of this character even if the taking over of Sham/at deb amounts to acquisition . . . . . . . The setting of a body or agricultural artisans (such as the village caJ11\"lller, the village blacksmith, the village tanner, ferrier, wheelwright, barber, washerman etc.) is a part of rural planning and can be comprehended in a scheme of agrarian reforms. It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self-sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of hpldings, fixing of ceiling on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate.(')\n\nThis review has been reinforced by the later pronouncement of a Constitution Bench in the Gwalior Rayon Case,(') emphatically expressing support for the conceptual sweep of agrarian reform vis-a-vis Art. 3 lA. e proposition, therefore, is invuln:erable that Art. 31A repulses all invasion on \"ceiling legislation\" (armed with Arts. 14, 19 and 31).\n\nThe professed goal of the legislation is to maximise surplus lands for working out distributive justice and rural dev<llopment, with special reference to giving full opportunity to the agrarian masses to become a major rural resource of the nation.\n\nHow to maximise surplus land ? By imposition of severe ceiling on ownership of land holdings consistently with the pragmatics of rural economies and the people's way of life.\n\nThe pervasive, pivotal concepts are, therefore, ceilings on holdings and surrender of surplus land. The working unit with reference to which the legal ceiling is set is the realistic family.\n\nSo, the flexible concept of 'family' also becomes a central object of legislative definition.\n\nHaving regard to the diversity of famlly uniffi among the various communities making np Indian society and having the object of the legislation as the guiding principle, the statute under consideration has given a viable aod realistic definition of 'family', with provision for some variables and special situations. The machinery for implementing the statute is also set up with adjudicative powers, including appeals. Compensation, . with-\n\n(!) [1965] 1 SCR 82 at 94-95.\n\n(2) [1974] 1 SCR 671.\n\n• '\n\n• •\n\n\"' •\n\nout invidious discrimination, has to be paid, according to the scheme, when surplus land is taken away and for the 'determination aud payment of such compensation a whole chapter is devoted.\n\nThe disposal of land secured as surplus is, perhaps, the elimination of the legislatiye project, and so, Chapter 4 stipulates the manner of . disposal and settlement of surplus land.\n\nThus, we have the definitional provision in Chapter 1, followed by imposition of \"ceilings\" with ancillary provisions for exemption.\n\nThe judicial machinery for enforcement and the provisions for pre-emption of manipulation and prevention of fraud ou the statute, the assessment of compensation and its payment and the like have also been enacted in Chapters 2 and 3.\n\nA miscellaneous chapter deals with a variety of factors, including offences and penalties, mode of hearing and appellate -powers\n\nand kindred matters.\n\nInevitably, . such a progressive legislation runs drastically contrary to the feudal ethos of the landed gentry and the investment intancts of the nouveau riche and green revolutionisl!l.\n\nTherefore, the holders who are hurt by the provisions of the Act have chosen to chatlenge their vires and they must succeed if the ground is good.\n\nSince the legislature has plenary power to the extent conferred by the Constitution, the attack has to be based, and, indeed has been, on constitutional infirmities which if sound, must shoot down the Act. By way of aside, one might query whether agrarian reform, with all the fanfare and trumpet, has seriously taken off the ground or is still in the hangar? Any way, the court can only pronounce, the Executive must execute.\n\nWe will now proceed to formulate the points which, according to counsel, are fatal to the legislation and proceed to scan them in due course.\n\nVarious miniscuie matters have been raised in the plethora of cases largely founded on some real or fancied inequity, inequality, legislative arbitrariness or sense of injustice.\n\nSpeaking generally and with a view to set the record straight, injustice is conditioned by the governing social philosophy, the prevailing economic approach 'and, paramountly, by the constitutional parameters which bind the court and the community.\n\nThe Indian Constitution is a radical document, a charter or sociopolitico-economic change and geared to goals spelt out in the Objectives Resolution which commits the nation to a drive towards an egalitarian society, a note struck more articulately by the adjective 'socialis!' to our Republic introduced by a recent Amendment and .survives after Parliament, differently composed, had altered the 42nd Amendment.\n\nThis backdrop suggests that agrarian legislation, organised as egalitarian therapy, must be judged, not meticulously for every in dividual injury but by the larger standards of abolition of fundamental in equalities, frustration of basis social fairness and shocking unconscionableness.\n\nThis process involves detriment to vested interests.\n\nThe perfect art of plucking the goose with the least squealing is not a human gift.\n\nA social surgery, supervised by law, miniinisi:s, not eliminates, . individual hurt while promoting community welfare.\n\nThe court, in its interpretative role, can neither be pachydermic nor hyperreactive when landholders, here and there lament about lost land.\n\nWe wiill examine the contentions form this perspective, without reference to Arts. 3 lB, C and D. Justice Cardozo has a messe for us when he says:(')\n\nLaw and obedience to law are facts confirmed everyday to us all in our experience of life. If the result of a definition is to make them seem to be illusions, so much the worse for the definition; we must enlarge it till it is broad enough to answer to realities.\n\nD Shri Mridul, who led the arguments, mounted a three-point attack.\n\nArticle 3lA(l)(ii) was the target of an obscure submission which counsel, with characteristic fairness, did not press at a later stage.\n\nLinked up with it was queer nexus between Art. 21 and the right to property, deprivation of which was contended to be an unreasonable procedure somehow falling within the lethal spell of Art. 21.\n\nProprietary personality was integral to personal liberty and a mayhem inflicted on a man's property was an amputation of his personal liberty. Therefore, land reform law, if unreasonable, violates Art. 21 as expansively construed in Maneka Gandhi. (2 ) The -Oichotomy between personal liberty, in Art. 21, and proprietary status, in Arts. 31 and 19 is plain, whatever philosophical justification or pragmatic realisation it may possess in political or juristic theory.\n\nMaybe, a penniless proletarian, rs unfree in his movements and has nothing to lose except his chains. But we are in another domain of constitutional the jurisprudence.\n\nOf course, counsel's resort to Art. 21 is prompted by the absence of mention of Art. 21 in Art. 31A and the illusory hope of inflating Maneka Gandhi to impart a healing touch to those whose property is taken by feigning loss of personal liberty when the\n\nState takes only property. Maneka Gandhi is no universal nostrum or cure.-all, when all other arguments fail !\n\nThe last point which had a quaint moral flavour was that transfers H of landed property, although executed after th.e dates specified in the\n\n(!) Cardozo Selected Writing p. 159.\n\n(2) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. [1979] IS. C.C. 249,\n\n• •\n\n• \"\n\n' \\\n\nAct were un-reasonably invalidated by the Act even when there was no \"mens re<i' vis a vis the ceiling law on the part of. the transferor and this was violative of Art. 19 (1) ( f) and of Art. 14 as arbitrary.\n\nA facet of over-inclusiveness which breaches Art. 14 was also urged. It is perfectly open to the legislature, as ancillary to its main policy to prt>- vent activities which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such actions.\n\nWhen the alienations are invalidated because they are made after a statutory date. fixed with a purpose, there is sense in this prohibition.\n\nOtherwise, all the Jaruis would have been transferred ancl little would have been left by way of surplus.\n\nLet us read the text of s.5 ( 6) which is alleged to be bad ing overinclusive or otherwise anomalous.\n\nThe argument, rather hard to follow and too subtle for the pragmatic of. agrarian law, may be clearer when the provision is unfurled.\n\nSection 5 ( 6) runs thus:\n\nTu determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-- holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth\n\nday of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have D been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account :\n\nProvided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to :\n\n(a) a transfer in favour of any person(including Government) referred to in sub-section(2);\n\n(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a beiiami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other mem- . bers of the family.\n\nThere is no blanket ban here but only qualified invalidation of certain sinister assignments etc. Counsel weaves gossamer webs which\n\nbreak on mere judicial touch when he argues that transfer 'in good\n\nfaith and for adequate consideration' have been unconstitutionally ex- G empted.\n\nThe bizarre submission is that 'adequate consideration' is an arl!itrary test.\n\nWe reject it without more discussion. . The second limb of the submission is that while s. (6) ilirects the authority to ignore certain transfers it does not void it. The further spin-off adroitly presented by counsel is that the provision violates the second\n\nproviso to Art. 31. It is a little too baffling to follow and we dis- H\n\niss the submislrlon as hollow.\n\nThe provision in s.5 ( 6), when read Jn the light of the Provisos, is fair and valid ..\n\nA Couusel's further argument is to quote his own words that \"the\n\nimpugned provisions do not establish a reasonable procedure\" because:\n\n\"The expression 'in good faith' is over-inclusive and takes within its sweep situations which are not only very different but which may not have any nexus or legitimate relationship with the objects and purposes of the ceiling law ..... \"\n\nWe are hardly impressed by it and find no substance on it.\n\nThere is no question of morality or constitutionality even if the clause may be a little over-drawn.\n\nOn the contrary, it is legislative folly not to preserve, by appropriate preventives and enacted contraceptives, the 'surplus' reservoir of land without seepage or spill-over.\n\nIt is legal engineering, not moral abandonment.\n\nIndeed, the higher morality or social legitimacy of the law requires a wise legislature to prescribe transfers, lest the surplus pool be drained off by a rush of transactions.\n\nMaybe, individual hardship may happen, very sad in some instances. But every great cause claims human martyrs ! Poor consolation for the victim but yet a necessary step if the large owners are not to play the vanishing trick or resort to manipulated alienations ! After all, this ban comes into force only on a well-recognised date, not from an arbitrary retro-active past.\n\nWe cannot discover anything which is morally wrong or constitutionally anathematic in such an embargo.\n\nArticle 19(1) (f) is not absolute in operation and is subject, under Art.19(6), to reasonable restrictions such as the one contained in s.5 ( 6). We do not th.ink there is merit in the triple submissions spun by Shri Mridul.\n\nEven on the merits, the transfers have been right! y ignored, the vendees who are the grandsons have been held to be not bona fide transferees for adequate consideration; and the findings are of fact and concurrent.\n\nWe over-rule the grounds of grievance as unsustainable.\n\nIn sum, without reliance on Art. 31A, Shri Mridul's contention• can G be dismissed as without merit.\n\nWe will now consider the mini-arguments of the other counselsome of them do merit serious consideration by the court - and even where direct relief does not flow from the judicial process, State action to avoid anomalies may well be called for in the light of genuine H hardships.\n\nShri Veda Vyas, appearing in W.P. No. 228 of 1979 and SLP No. 2599 of 1978, pleaded powerfully for gender justice and sex\n\nequity because, according to his reading, the Act had a built-in masculine bias in the definition of 'family unit' and allocation of ceiling on holdings, and therefore, perpetrated unconstitutional discrimination.\n\nIndeed, his case illU.Strated the anti-woman stance of the statute, he claimed.\n\nThe submission is simple, the inference is inevitable but the invalidati6n does not follow even if Art. 31A is not pressed into service to silence Art. 14.\n\nWe will formulate the objections and examine their merits from the constitutional perspective.\n\nMaybe, there is force in the broad generalisation that, notwithstanding all the boasts about the legendary glory of Indian womanhood in the days of yore and' the equal status and even martial valour of heroines in Indian history, our culture has sufiered a traumatic distortion, not merely due to feudalism and medievalism, but also due to British imperialism.\n\nIndeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the\n\ncountry decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf. Our legal culture and Corpus juris, partly a heritage of the past, do contain strands of discriminatiou to set right which a oommissiou elaborately conducted enquiries and made a valuable report to the Central Government. Shri Veda Vyas may lie right in making sweeping submissions only to this limited extent but when we reach the concrete statutory situation and tackle the specific provisions in the Act, his argumen~ misses the mark.\n\nA better appreciation of his contenti.on must be preceded by excerption of two definitions and consideration of the concepts they embody.\n\nSection 3(7) defines 'family' thus :\n\n'family' in relation to a tenure-holder, means himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughters J ;\n\nThis.definition is incomplete without contextually readings. 5(3) and\n\nso we quote the provision which, in the view of Shri Veda Vyas, R enwombs the vice of discrimination against women.\n\nSec.5(3) (a) &\n\n(b) & Explanation :\n\nSec. 5 (3) : Subject to the provisions of sub-sections ( 4), (5)\" (6) and (7) the ceiling area for purposes of subsection (1 ) shall be\n\n(a) In the case of a tenure-holder having a family of not more than five members, 7.30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of his family) plus two additional hectares of irrigated land or such additional land which together with the land held by him aggregates to two hectares, for each of bis adult sons, who are either not themselves tenure holders or who hold less than two hectares of iirigated land, subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land;\n\n(b) in the case of a tenure-holder having family of more than five members, 7 .30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of bis family) , besides, each of the members exceeding five and for each of his adult sons who are not themselves tenureholders or who held less than two hectares of irrigated land, two additional hectares of irrigated land, or such additional land which together with, the land held by such adult son aggregates to two he<; tare~. subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land.\n\nExplanation : The expression 'adult son' in clause (a) and (b) includes au adult sou who is dead and has left surviving behind him minor sons or miuor daughters\n\n(other than married daughters) who are not themselves tenure holders or who hold land less than two hectares of irrigated land;\n\nThe anti-female kink is patent in that the very definition of family discloses prejudice against the weaker sex by excluding adult daughters without providing for any addition to the ceiling on their account. In G the case of an adult son, s. 5(3)(a) of the Act provides for the addition of two hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holder's) sons where the family has a strength of less than five. Section 5(3)(b) similarly provides for two additional hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holder's) adult sons where the strength of the family is more tha.n 5. It must be remembered that this addition is H on account of the fact that there are adult sons, even though they are not tenure holders or held less than two hectares or none.\n\nThis Fevilege of adding to the total extent that the family of a tenure\n\n' •\n\n• •\n\nAMBIKA PRASAD v. U.P. STATE (KriShna Iyer,!.) 1173\n\nhoilder may keep is denied to an adult daughter, even though unmarried, A and, therefore, dependent on the family for that a married son stands . on a different footing from a married daughter, what justice is there in baring a dependent unmarried daughter in the cold? Assuming without admitting, Shri Veda Vyas further urges that having regard to the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 and the increasing prevalence of unmarried adult daughters in families these days, the discrim, ination B. is not theoretical but real because no minor girl can now. marry.\n\nAnother similar invidious provision is the definition of tenure-- holder. Ceiling on heldings is fixed with reference to tenure-holders.\n\nWe wonder whether the Commission on the Status of Women or the Central Government or the State Governments have considered this aspect of sex discrimination in most land reforms laws, but undoubtedly the State should be fair especially to the weaker sex. Adult damsels should not be left in distress by progressive legislations geared\n\nto land reforms. This criticism may have bearing on the ethos of the community and the attitude of the legislators, but we are concerned with the constitutionality of the provision. Maybe, in this age of nuclear families and sex equal human rights it is illiberal and contrary to tbe zeit geist to hark back to history's dark pages nostalgically and disguise it as the Indian way of life with a view to deprive Wl:mlen of their undeniable half.\n\nArts. 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of the Preamble rebel against the de facto denial of proprietary personhOOd of woman-hood.\n\nBut this legal sentiment and jural value must not run riot and destroy provisions which do not discriminate between\n\nmiln and woman qua man and woman but merely organise a scheme where life's realism is legislatively pragmatised. Such a scheme may marginally ; Ufect gender justice but does not abridge, even a wee-bit, the rights of women. If land-holding and ceiling thereon are organised with the paramount purpose of maximising surpluses without maiming woman's ownership no submission to destroy this measure can be permitted using sex discrimination as a means to sabotage what is socially desirable. No woman's property is taken away any more than a man's property.\n\nSection 5 (3) reduces daughters or wives to the status of stooges.\n\nIt forbids excessive holdings having regard to rural realities of agricultural life. 'Family' is defined because it is taken as the unit for holding land-a fact of extant societal life which cannot be wished away. This is only a tool of social engineering in working out the scheme of setting limits to ownership. Section 5 (3) does not confer any property on an adult son nor withdraw any property from an adult daughter. That ' provision shows a concession to a tenure-holder who has propertyless\n\nadult sons by allowing him to keep two more hectares per such son.\n\nThe propertyless son gets no right to a cent of land on this score but the father is permitted to keep some more of his own for feeding this extra mouth. If an unmarried daughter has her own land, this legislation does not deprive her any more than a similarly situated unmarried son. Both are regarded as tenure-holders. The singular grievance of a chronic spinster vis a vis a similar bachelor may be that the father is allowed by s. 5 ( 3) to hold an extra two hectares only if the unmarried major is a :iOn.\n\nNeither the daughter nor the son gets any land iu consequence and a normal parent will 109k after an unmarried daughter with an equal eye.\n\nLegal injury can arise only if the daughter's property is taken away while the son's is retained or the daughter gets no share while the son gets one.\n\nThe legislation has not done either.\n\nSo, no tangible discrimination can be spun out.\n\nMaybe, the legislature could have allowed the tenure-holder to keep another two hectares of his on the basis of the existence of an unmarried adnlt daughter. It may have grounds rooted in rural realities to do so. The court may sympathise but cannot dictate that.the land-holder may keep more land because he has adult nnmarried daughters. That would be judicial legislation beyond permissible process.\n\nThe same perspicacious analysis salvages, the provision regarding a wife.\n\nTrue, s. 3(17) makes the husband tenure-holder even when the wife is the owner. So long as the land is within the sanctioned limit it is retained as before without affecting ownership or enjoyment.\n\nBut where it is in excess, the compensation for the wife's land, if taken away as surplus, is paid to her under Chapter III. And even in the choice of land, to declare surplus, the law, in s. 12A, has taken meticulous care to protect the wife. The husband being treated as tenureholder even when the wife is the owner is a legislative device for simplifying procedural dealings. When all is said and done, married woman in our villages do need their husband's services and speak through them in public piaces, except, hopefully in the secret ballot expressing their independent political choice. Some of us may not be happy with the masculine flavour of this law but it is difficult to hold that rights of women are unequally treated, and so, the war for equal gender status has to be waged elsewhere; Ideologically speaking, the legal system, true to the spirit of the Preamble and Art. 14, must entitle the Indian women to be equal in dignity, property and personality, with man. It is wrong if the land reforms law denudes woman of her property. If such be the provision, it may be unconstitutional because we cannot expect that \"home is the girl's prison and the woman's work-house\" But it is not.\n\n• •\n\n.. •\n\n, i\n\nIt must be said in fairness, that the legislature must act on hard A realities, not on glittering ideals which fail to work.\n\nNor can large land-holders be allowed to outwit socially imperative land distn'bution by putting female discrimination as a mask.\n\nThere is no merit in these submit; sions of Sri Veda Vyas.\n\nIn the view we have taken, we need not discuss the soundnus of B the reasoning in the ntling in Sucha Singh v. State(').\n\nThe High Court was right, if we may say so with respect, in its justification of the section when it observed:\n\nThe subject of legislation is the person owning or holding land and not his or her children. c\n\nSecti0n 5 provides for the measure of permissible are~ that a person with one or more adult sons will be allowed to select out of the area owned or held by him and his children, whether male or female, have not ooen given any right to make a selection for himself or herself. It cannot, therefore, be said that this section makes a discrimination between a son and a daughter in respect of his or her permissible area on the ground of sex alone, The legislature is the best Judge to decide how much area should be left as permissible area with each owner or holder of land.\n\nInsofar as no distinction between a male and a female holder or owner of the land has been made in respect of the permiss; bJe 11rea in any given circumstances, there is no violation of Article 15 of the Constitution.\n\nThis section doe. not provide for any uccession to the land; it only providu for the measure of the permissible area to be retained by every holder or owner of the land out of the area held or owned by him or her on the appointed day on the basil; of the number of adult sons he or she has.\n\nIt is for the leg; slature to prescribe the measure of permissi6le area and no exception can be taken because only adult sons have been taken into consideration.\n\nShri Veda Vyas objected to the further observations of Tuli J. ' It is evident that distinction between an adult son and an adult daughter has been made not only on the ground of sex but also for the reason that a daughter has to go to another family after her marriage in due course, marrillge being a normal custom which rs universally practised.\n\nThis\n\n(l)\"Sucha s; ngh v. Stat• AIR 1974, P. & H. 162 at 171\n\nA is an institution of general prevalence which is the foundation\n\nof organised and civilised societies and communities.\n\nOur rapidly changing times, when women after long domestic\n\nervitude, seek self-expression, cannot forge new legal disabilities and call it legislative wisdom.\n\nBut, without assent or dissent, we may pass by these observations because no property right of women is taken away, and discrimination, if any, is not il)fiited on rights, but sentiments.\n\nShri Arvind Kumar, who followe<l, also made some persuasive points and seeming dents in the legislation when read in the light of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 ·\n\n(hereinafter called the Consolidation Act) . In general terms, the submission turned on the operation of the law relating to consolidation of holdings.\n\nIt is a great pity that a benign agrarian concept-abolition of fragmentation and promotion of consolidation of agricultural holdingshas proved in practice to be a litigative treachery and opene<l up other vices.\n\nThe provision for appeals and revisions and the inevitable temptation of the vanquishe<l to invoke Art. 226 and Art. 136 qf the Constitution has paved the protracted way for improvident lay-out on speculative litigation.\n\nMore farmers are cultivating litigation than land, thanks to the multi-docket procedure in the concerned law. Even so, we ree no force in counsel's contention which we may now state.\n\nThe thrust of his argument, omitting subsidiary submissions which we will take up presently, is that so long as consolidation proceedings under the sister statute (U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953) are under way, two consequences follow.\n\nFirstly, all other legal proceedings including the ceiling proceedings must abate.\n\nA notification under 5- 4 of the . Consolidation Act has been issued in regard to many areas in the State.\n\nConsolidation has been completed in most places but is still pending in some places. Counsel's argument is that once a notification under s. 4 has been issued, s. 5(2) (a) operates.\n\nThis latter provision states that\n\nevery proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land laying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference of revision, shall, on an order being passed in that\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\nAMBIKA PRASAD v. U.P. STAIE (KriShna.Iyer, J.) 1177\n\nbehalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceediug is pending, stand abated; Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard : Provided further that on the issue of a notification under sup-section (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part as the case may be, shall stand vacated;\n\nThus the ceiling proceeding has abated and surplus land cannot be taken from him.\n\nThis plea has only meretritions attractioD1 and superficial plausibility as we will presently see.\n\nThe whole scheme of consolidation of holding is to restructure agrarian landscape of U.P. so as to promote better farming-and economic holdings by eliminating fragmentation and organising consolidation.\n\nNo one is deprived of his land. What happens is, his scattered bits are taken away and 'm lieu thereof a continuous conglomeration equal in value is allotted subject to minimal deduction for community use and better enjoyment.\n\nOnce this central idea is grasped, the grievance voiced by the petitioner becomes chimerical. Counsel complains that the tenure-holder will not be able to choose his land when consolidation proceedings are in an on-going stage. True, whatever land belongs to him at that time, may or may not 00- . long to him after the consolidation proceedings are completed.\n\nAlternative allotments may be made and so the choice that he may make before the prescribed authority for the purpose of surrendering surplus lands and preserving 'permissible holding' may - have only tentative value.\n\nBut this factor does not seriously prejudice the holder.\n\nWillie he chooses the best at the given time the Consolidation Officer will give him its equivalent when a new plot is given to him in the place of the old.\n\nThere is no diminution in the quantum of land and quality of land since the object of consolidation is not deprivation but mere. substitution of scattered pieces with a consolidated plot.\n\nThe tenure-holder may well exercise his option before the prescribed officer and if, later, the Consolidation Officer takes away these lands, he will allot a real equivalent thereof to the tenureholder elsewhere. There is no reduction or damage or other prejudice by this process of statutory exchange.\n\nChapter ID of the Consolidat, iou Act provides, in great detail, for Br equity and equality, compensation and other benefits when finalising the consolidation scheme. Section 19 (I) (b) ensure th1t\n\nlt>-610 SCl/80\n\n\"the valuation of plots allotted to a tenure-holder subject to deductions, if any, made on account of contributions to public purposes under this Act is equal to the valuation of plots originally held by him.\n\nProvided that, except with the permission of the Director of Consolidation, the area of the holding or holdings allotted to a tenure-holder shall not differ from the area of his original holding or holdings by more then twenty five per cent of the latter.\"\n\nWhen land is contributed for public purposes compensation is paid in that behalf, and in the event of illegal or unjust orders passed, appellate and revisory remedies are also provided. On such exchange or transfer taking place, pursuant to the finalisation of the consolidation scheme, the holding, upto the ceiling available to the tenureholder, will he converted into the new allotment under the consolidation scheme.\n\nThus, we see no basis injustice nor gross arbitrariness in the continuance of the land reforms proceedings even when consolidation proceedings are under way. . We are not all impressed with counsel's citation of the rnling in Agricultural & Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. State of UP and Others,('), particularly because there has been a significant amendme'nt to s. 5 subsequent thereto. The law as it stood then was laid down by this Court in the above case;. but precisely because of that decision an explanation has been added to s. 5 of the Consolidation Act which reads thus :\n\nExplanation:- For the purposes of subsection(2) a proceeding under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 or an uncontested proceeding under Sections 134 to 137 of the U.P. Zamindari . Abohtion and Land Reforms Act, 195(}, shall not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest, in any land. -\n\nThe view of, the Allahabad High Court in Kshetrapal Singh v. State of U.P.( 2 ) (H.C.) is correct, and in effect negatives the submission of Shri Arvind Kumar that there should be a stay of ceiling proceedings pending completion of consolidation proceedings.\n\nThe head note in Kshetrc1pal Singh's case (Supra) brings out the ratio and for brevity's sake, we quote it;\n\nBy adding the Explanation after sub-section(2) of Sec- tion 5 of the Act a legal fiction has been created. What is\n\n(1) [1974] I S. C. R. 253,\n\n(2) [1975] R. D. 366.\n\n• •\n\n• \"\n\n• (\n\n-Otherwise a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land is deemed not to be such a proceeding.\n\nThat is the clear legislative intent behind the Explanation.\n\nOrdinarily an Explanation is intended to explain the scope of the main section and is not expected to enlarge or narrow down its scope but where the legislative intent clearly and unambiguously indicates an intention to do so, effect must be given to ihe legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that the legislature named that provision as an Explanation.\n\nA feeble submission was made that there was time-wise arbitra- riness vitiating the statute in that various provisions in the Act\n\n.~ were brought into force on random dates without any rhyme or reason, thus violating, from the temporaly angle, Art. 14. It is true that neither the legislature nor the Government as its delegate can fix fanciiul dates for effectuation of provisions affecting the rights of citizens.\n\nEven so, a larger latitude is allowed to the State to notify the date on which a particular provision may come into effect. Many imponderables may weigh with the State in choosing the date and when challenge is made years later, the factors which induced the choice of such dates may be buried under the debris of time.\n\nParties cannot take advantage of this handicap and aucfacionsl y challenge every date of coming into force of every provision as .capriciously picked ant. In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been\n\n\"T' brought into force on 8.6.73, s.6(3) on 10.10.75, s.3(4) on 15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(1) (e) on 24.1.71. This last date which was perhaps the one which gave the learned Advocate General some\n\npuzzlement was chosen because on that date the election manifesto of the o; ngress Party in all the States announced a revised agrarian policy and that party was in power at the Union level , and in most of the States. Although a mere election manifesto \\ cannot be the basis for fixation of a date, here the significance . is deeper in that it was virtually the announcement of the political government of its pledge to the people that the agrarian polil:y would be revised accordingly.\n\nThe other dates mentioned above do not create any problem being rationally related to the daie of a preceding ordinance or the date of introduction of the bill.\n\nThe details are not necessary except to encumber this judgment. f.--f We would emphasise that the brief of the State when meeting' constitutional challenges on the ground of arbitrariness must be a complete coverage, including an explanation for the date of enforcement of the provision impugned.\n\nCourt and counsel call'llot dig up materials to explain fossil dates when long years later an enterprising litigant chooses to challenge.\n\n1180 .5lJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R ..\n\nA few other minor infirmities' were faintly mentioned but not argued at all or seriously, such as, for instance, the contention that s. 38B of the Act which understandably excludes res judicata is challenged as violative of the basis structure of the Constitution and otherwise exceeds legislative competence.\n\nWe do not think there is need to. dilate on every little point articulated by one or other of the numerous advocates who justify their writ petitions or civil appeals by formal expression of futile submissions.\n\nWe dismiss all the appeals and all the writ petitions and all the special leave petitions with costs one set in al! the cases together which we quantify as Rs. 5,000/-.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals and Petitions dismissed_\n\n• •", "total_entities": 175, "entities": [{"text": "AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMBIKA PRASAD MISHRA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 76, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 9, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CliANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRlsHNA IYBR, B\n\nV. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 161, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 180, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. 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{"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14792, "end_char": 14800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14939, "end_char": 14947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Golak Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14949, "end_char": 14959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31A, Golak Nath's case(') decided by a Bench of 11 Judges, while holding that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act exceeded the constituent power still categorically declared that the said amendment and a few other like amendments would be held good based on the doctrine of prospective over-rnling.", "canonical_name": "Golak Nath"}}, {"text": "Art. 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Suffice it to say that in the Kesavananda Bharti's\n\ncase(') Article 31A was challenged as beyond the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid.", "canonical_name": "Kesavananda Bharati"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15493, "end_char": 15504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15712, "end_char": 15721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15840, "end_char": 15846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kameshwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16213, "end_char": 16228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Kameshwar Singh(') and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesava11anda (supra) and Kanan Devan(') to Gwalior Rayons(•) and after Art.'"}}, {"text": "Kesava11anda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16263, "end_char": 16275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Kameshwar Singh(') and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesava11anda (supra) and Kanan Devan(') to Gwalior Rayons(•) and after Art.'"}}, {"text": "Kanan Devan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16288, "end_char": 16299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Kameshwar Singh(') and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesava11anda (supra) and Kanan Devan(') to Gwalior Rayons(•) and after Art.'"}}, {"text": "Gwalior Rayons(•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16306, "end_char": 16322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From Kameshwar Singh(') and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesava11anda (supra) and Kanan Devan(') to Gwalior Rayons(•) and after Art.'", "canonical_name": "Gwalior Rayon Case"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16431, "end_char": 16439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Roberts", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17067, "end_char": 17074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is surely wrong to prove Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court right when he said(6)."}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S. C. R. 762", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17138, "end_char": 17159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1952 SC 252", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17192, "end_char": 17207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bharti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18417, "end_char": 18423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) And none of these misfo'rtunes can be imputed to Bharti:s case (supra).", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18538, "end_char": 18546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18710, "end_char": 18723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Long years ago, in , Ranjh v. State,(') a Constitution Bench, speaking through Hidayatullall, J., dwelt oa the wide amplitude of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18760, "end_char": 18766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18837, "end_char": 18843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19066, "end_char": 19072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Salmond", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19860, "end_char": 19867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If agrarian reforms are to succeed, more distribu-\n\n(1) Salmond 'Jurisprudence' p. 21S(llth edition)."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20298, "end_char": 20305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20692, "end_char": 20697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self-sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of hpldings, fixing of ceiling on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate.(')"}}, {"text": "Gwalior Rayon Case", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21053, "end_char": 21071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This review has been reinforced by the later pronouncement of a Constitution Bench in the Gwalior Rayon Case,(') emphatically expressing support for the conceptual sweep of agrarian reform vis-a-vis Art.", "canonical_name": "Gwalior Rayon Case"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21162, "end_char": 21168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21221, "end_char": 21229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21289, "end_char": 21308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1965] 1 SCR 82", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22472, "end_char": 22487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974] 1 SCR 671", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22503, "end_char": 22519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25953, "end_char": 25960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cardozo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25982, "end_char": 25989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 lB, C and D. Justice Cardozo has a messe for us when he says:(')\n\nLaw and obedience to law are facts confirmed everyday to us all in our experience of life."}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26299, "end_char": 26305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Shri Mridul, who led the arguments, mounted a three-point attack."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26361, "end_char": 26370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26540, "end_char": 26547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26685, "end_char": 26692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26892, "end_char": 26899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26928, "end_char": 26941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 as expansively construed in Maneka Gandhi. (", "canonical_name": "Maneka Gantlhf•"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26992, "end_char": 26999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 31 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27028, "end_char": 27043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27365, "end_char": 27372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27414, "end_char": 27421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27425, "end_char": 27433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28119, "end_char": 28126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28143, "end_char": 28150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28211, "end_char": 28218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28688, "end_char": 28691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28902, "end_char": 28911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30270, "end_char": 30277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30381, "end_char": 30384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Couusel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30455, "end_char": 30462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provision in s.5 ( 6), when read Jn the light of the Provisos, is fair and valid ..\n\nA Couusel's further argument is to quote his own words that \"the\n\nimpugned provisions do not establish a reasonable procedure\" because:\n\n\"The expression 'in good faith' is over-inclusive and takes within its sweep situations which are not only very different but which may not have any nexus or legitimate relationship with the objects and purposes of the ceiling law ..... \"\n\nWe are hardly impressed by it and find no substance on it."}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31874, "end_char": 31887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31943, "end_char": 31952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32010, "end_char": 32013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32402, "end_char": 32410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Veda Vyas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32763, "end_char": 32772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Veda Vyas, appearing in W.P. No.", "canonical_name": "Veda Vyasa"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33276, "end_char": 33284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33324, "end_char": 33331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33828, "end_char": 33842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the\n\ncountry decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf."}}, {"text": "Swami Vivekananda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33907, "end_char": 33924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the\n\ncountry decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf."}}, {"text": "Raja Rammohan Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33974, "end_char": 33991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the\n\ncountry decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf."}}, {"text": "Swami Dayainanda Saraswati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33993, "end_char": 34019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the\n\ncountry decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf."}}, {"text": "Maharishi Karve", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34024, "end_char": 34039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the Freedom Struggle Jed by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayainanda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of womanpatriots who flung aside their unrree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Imjian manhood when the\n\ncountry decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitutioo in that behalf."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34623, "end_char": 34641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our legal culture and Corpus juris, partly a heritage of the past, do contain strands of discriminatiou to set right which a oommissiou elaborately conducted enquiries and made a valuable report to the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Section 3(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34999, "end_char": 35011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35458, "end_char": 35466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35495, "end_char": 35501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37203, "end_char": 37213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37375, "end_char": 37390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shri Veda Vyas further urges that having regard to the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38161, "end_char": 38250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Commission on the Status of Women", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38585, "end_char": 38618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We wonder whether the Commission on the Status of Women or the Central Government or the State Governments have considered this aspect of sex discrimination in most land reforms laws, but undoubtedly the State should be fair especially to the weaker sex."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39345, "end_char": 39360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40149, "end_char": 40158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40531, "end_char": 40540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41218, "end_char": 41222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(17)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42162, "end_char": 42170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42544, "end_char": 42550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43238, "end_char": 43245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44982, "end_char": 44992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tuli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45525, "end_char": 45529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Veda Vyas objected to the further observations of Tuli J. ' It is evident that distinction between an adult son and an adult daughter has been made not only on the ground of sex but also for the reason that a daughter has to go to another family after her marriage in due course, marrillge being a normal custom which rs universally practised."}}, {"text": "Arvind Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 46359, "end_char": 46371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Arvind Kumar, who followe<l, also made some persuasive points and seeming dents in the legislation when read in the light of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 ·\n\n(hereinafter called the Consolidation Act) .", "canonical_name": "Arvind Kumar"}}, {"text": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46493, "end_char": 46528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46997, "end_char": 47005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47010, "end_char": 47018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47473, "end_char": 47508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47881, "end_char": 47885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47903, "end_char": 47910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953", "statute": "Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48792, "end_char": 48801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51029, "end_char": 51039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52329, "end_char": 52333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52499, "end_char": 52503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52620, "end_char": 52682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 134 to 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52718, "end_char": 52737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960", "statute": "the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Abohtion and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52762, "end_char": 52791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52921, "end_char": 52941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view of, the Allahabad High Court in Kshetrapal Singh v. State of U.P.( 2 ) (H.C.) is correct, and in effect negatives the submission of Shri Arvind Kumar that there should be a stay of ceiling proceedings pending completion of consolidation proceedings."}}, {"text": "Kshetrc1pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53181, "end_char": 53198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The head note in Kshetrc1pal Singh's case (Supra) brings out the ratio and for brevity's sake, we quote it;\n\nBy adding the Explanation after sub-section(2) of Sec- tion 5 of the Act a legal fiction has been created."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54247, "end_char": 54254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54917, "end_char": 54923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8.6.73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54964, "end_char": 54970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been\n\n\"T' brought into force on 8.6.73, s.6(3) on 10.10.75, s.3(4) on 15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(1) (e) on 24.1.71."}}, {"text": "s.6(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54972, "end_char": 54978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "10.10.75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54982, "end_char": 54990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been\n\n\"T' brought into force on 8.6.73, s.6(3) on 10.10.75, s.3(4) on 15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(1) (e) on 24.1.71."}}, {"text": "s.3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54992, "end_char": 54998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15.8.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55002, "end_char": 55009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been\n\n\"T' brought into force on 8.6.73, s.6(3) on 10.10.75, s.3(4) on 15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(1) (e) on 24.1.71."}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55011, "end_char": 55015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1.7.73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55019, "end_char": 55025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been\n\n\"T' brought into force on 8.6.73, s.6(3) on 10.10.75, s.3(4) on 15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(1) (e) on 24.1.71."}}, {"text": "24.1.71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55043, "end_char": 55050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been\n\n\"T' brought into force on 8.6.73, s.6(3) on 10.10.75, s.3(4) on 15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(1) (e) on 24.1.71."}}, {"text": "s. 38B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56409, "end_char": 56415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1181_1208_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SETH NANO LAL & ANR.\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA & ORS.\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n1(Y .. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA hER,\n\nV. D. TuLZAPURKAR & A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\n• Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Haryana Act 26 of 1972)-\n\n.cnstitutional validity of-Artificial definition of family unit-Sections 4(1), 4(3), 7, 8, 9, 11(1) and (2), whetill?r violate Article 14 of the Consti111tion.\n\nThe Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Act 26 of 1972) received the assent of the President on 22-12·1972 and was publish\\xl in the Oflicial Gazette on 23-12-72. Section 2 contained and even now contains the requisite\n\ndeda.ation that it was enacfed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution. The' Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7·9-1974 a.nd, thereby, it came under the protective um1'rella of Art. 31B of the constitution.\n\nIn Saroj Kuniari's case A.LR. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 353 relying on an earlier decision of that Court in Sucha Singh's case A.LR. 1974 P & H 162, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, being unaware of the inclusion of Act 26 of 1972 in the Ninth Schedule struck down certadn provisions of th:e Act on the ground that these provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. •The Full Bench decision in Sucha Singh's case A.I.R. 1974 Punjab & Haryna 162 was reversed by the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh's case A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 915, taking the view that the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act .are saved by both Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution.\n\nHowever, after the decision in Saroj Kumari's case, Act 26 of 1972 and--the Rules framed under ~. 31, thereof were amended extensively; the Act was first amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule; the Act was further a.nended by Harya.na Acts Nos. 40 and 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18' of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts were not put in the Ninth S<:hedule.\n\nAft'elthe Principal Act was amended as above, several writ petitions were , filed in the Punjab & Haryana High Court challeng\"1g the vires of some of the\n\nprovisions of the Act.\n\nThe Division Bench dismissed all the writ petitions and upheld the validity of all the provisions exC'ept •· WA which barred the appearance of any legal practitioner before any officer of authority other than the Financial Commissioner in proceedings under the Act Th'e Court took the view that such a provision was repugnant to s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act (which had continued in force in view of s. 30 of the Advocates Act 1961 not having come into force), and therefote ultra vires and invalid.\n\nIn their appeals by special leave the appellants have challenged some of the provi!dons of the Act on the grounds substantially different from those that were utged before the High Court. Besides their appeals, a large number of writ\n\nA petitions and also special leave petitions have b\"een filed raising almost identical grounds of challenge to the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to time.\n\nDismissing the appeals and the JX!titions, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The amendments effected in the Principal Act by Amending Act 17 ol 1976 will receive the protective umbrella of Art. 3!B but not the amend\n\nments effected by Acts Nos. 40 & 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978.\n\nMoreover, though the Principal Act as amended by Act 17 of 1976, will be under the protective umbrella of Art. 31B, the Haryana Ceiling on I...aLJ Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed or eve\" after amendments, being subordinate legislation and not specified in the Ninth Schedule may not receive such protection.\n\nPrag Ice and Oil Mills & Anr. v. Union of India, [1978]\n\n3 S.C.R. 293, applied.\n\n2. The Principal Act (Act 26 of 1972) together with all the amendments made therein which essentially is meant for imposition of ceiling on agricultural\n\nholdings and acquisition and distribution of the surplus area to landless and \\veaker sections of the society is in substance and reality an enactment dealing with agrarian reform and squarely falls within Art. 31A of the Constitution and as. such will enjoy the immunity from the attack on the ground of inconsistency with or abridgments of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 1' and 31.\n\n[1192 H, 1193 A-C]\n\nSankari Prasad Singh Deo v.\n\nU11io11 of India etc. etc. [1952] 3 S.C.R. 89~' Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. I, State of Bil1ar\n\nv. Kameshwar Singh, (1952] 3 S.C.R. 252 followed.\n\n3. A reading of ss. 4(1), 4(3), 7, 8, 9 and 11 (I) and (2) makes two or three aspects very clear, namely, (i) there is no doubt that for the purpose of the Act the concept of family has been defined in an artificial manner as meaning husband, wife and their minor children and exclusive of major sons and unmarried daughters. (ii) Under s. 4(1) \"the primary unit of family .. is confined to five metnbers, namely, husband, wife and their minor children upto three with reference to Which permissible area has been prescribed, but under s. 4(2) the permissible area is said to increase by one-fifth of the permissible area of the primary unit for each additional member of the fan1ily, such as the fourth or fifth minor c-hild etc. but subject to the maximum limit prescribed in the proviso, namely, che permissible area shall not exceed twice the permissible area of the primary unit of the family and (iii) in respect of each unit, namely, each adult son living with his parents the permissible area will be 'further increased up to the permissible area of the primary unit of a family under s. 4(3 ), provided that where the adult son also owns any.la.nd the same shall be taken into account for calculating the permissible area. In other words, in cases where the primar;: units of family owns or holds land [say 54 acres under cl. (I) (c) of s. 4] and an adult son living with the family also owns or holds similar 1and of his ov;'n\n\n(say acfes) then the permissible area for the family will be 108 acres after clubbing the two holdings under s. 4(3) and there will be no question of any augmcnt:l!tion of area for the family but in cases where the separate unit (•<lult son) owns or bolds no land of his own but is living with the family the primary unit's holding gets augmented up to two units, that is to say, the family will be entitled to retain 1081 acres and the balance will be surplus simply because the\n\n• •\n\n• \"'\n\n• •\n\nNAND LAL V. HARYANA 1183\n\nadult son is living with the family; but no such augmentation will occur if A. unmarried daughter or daughters are living with the family or if the adult son is living away separately from the family. [1195 C-H, 1196 A]\n\n4. It is true tbat provisions pertaining to artificial definition of family and the adoption of double standard for fixation of ceiling contained in the instant Act are similar to those wich obtained in the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 and the M'1dras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961, but even so, there are two . distinguishing features which would make the ratio of these two decisions dealing with those Acts reported in 1962 Sup. 2 SCR 829 and 1964 (7) SCR 82 inapplicable to the instant case. In the first place, in both these decisions it was an admitted position that the concerned enactments were not governed by or protected under Art. 3 lA of the Constitution s.nd it was in the absence of such protection that the attack to the material provisions of !be enactments on the ground of violation of Art. 14 was entertained by this Court. At page 833 of the Report in the first case, there is a categorical statement made to the effect that the concerned Act, so far as it affected the petitioners therein, V{as not protected under Art. 3 lA and it was open to assail it as violative of the rights conferred on them by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Similarly at page 84 of the Report in the second case, there is a Statement to the similar effect that the Madras Act was not protected under Art. 31A of the Constitution and it was in that background that the Court considered the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling area under s. 5 and compensation under s. 50 read with Schedule III of the Act.\n\nIn the instant case it caunot be disputed that Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended subsently is a piece of agrarian reform legislation squarely falling with Art. 3 lA of the Constitution and, therefore, the Act,. and the concerned provisions would be immune from attack based on Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Secondly, in both these decisions, no material by ay of justification was put before the Court on behalf of the State for the adoption of the doubie standard in the matter of fixing the ceiling read with the artificial definition of the family which resulted in discriminatory results-and this has been specifically mentioned by the Court in both the judgments, while in the instant case on behalf of the State of Haryana ample material has been produced before the Court justifying the adoption of the artificial definition of family and the double standard for fixing the ceiling negativing the violation of Art. 14. [1197 C-H, 1198 Al\n\nThe materials produced before the Court make it clear that the State had applied its nund seriously to these questions : whether family should be adopted as a unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on land holdings, what should be the size of the family, why artificial definition of the family should be adopted and why adoption of double standard-one for the primary unit of the family and another in respect of a separate unit when living with, the family was felt necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed etc. All these questions were considered having regard to the social and economic realities of our rural life and with a view to nullifying the transfers effected in favour of close relations for the purpose of avoiding the impact of ceiling legislation. [1198 D-H, 1199 Al Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kera/a, [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 829; A. P.\n\n\n5. An enactment .particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform whieh has been put on the Statute Book with the avowed purpose of bringing\n\nabout equality or rather reducing the inequality between the haves and havenois cannot be struck down as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution simply because it has failed to make a provision for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency. The material furnished on behalf of the State Government by way of justification for adopting an artificial definition of family and double standard for fixing ceiling is sufficient to repel the attack on these provisions under Art. 14. [1199 E-G]\n\nAdopting \"family'~ as a unit as against \"an individual\" was considered necessary as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by effecting 1nala fide partitions and transfers since such transactions are usually made in favour of family members, that normally in rur3.1 agricultural set up in our country the family is the operative unit and all the lands of a family constitute a single operational holding and that therefore ceiling should be related to the capacity of a family to cultivate the lands personally. (1198 G-H, 1199 Al\n\nIn fact, a provision like s. 4(3) which makes for the augmentation of the permissible area for a family when the adult sons do not on or hold lands of their own but are living with the family has one virtue, that it nsures such augmentation in the case of every family irrespective of by what personal law it is governed, and no discrimination is made between major sons governed by different systems of personal laws. So far as an adult son living separately from the family is concerned, he is rightly regarded as a separate unit who wilJ have to file a separate declaration in respect of his holding under s. 9 of the Act and since he is living separately and would not be contributing his capacity to the family io cultivate the family lands personally there is no justification for increasing the permissible area of the primary unit of the family. , The case of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with the family, was probably considered to be a rare case and it was presuriled that daughters \\\\'ou!d become members of their husband's units, and that is why no separate provisi1Jn was made for giving additional land for every unmarried major daughter living with the family. [1199 A-E, 1199 G-H, 1200 Al\n\n6. There is no question of any discrimination resulting to the wife from the right of selection being given to the husband under s. 9(4)(c) of the Act. In the first place, the selection of permissible area which is desired to _ F be retained will ordinarily be guided by the consideration of retaining the best quality land with the family, be it of the husband or of the \\Vife or even of the minor children, and not by the consideration as to whose land should be sacrificed.\n\nBut, apart from this aspect of the matter, it is precisely to meet\n\n~ such situation that s. 11 (2) has been enacted which provides that the land as retained as permissible area of the family and the separate unit shall be owned or held by the members of the family .nnd also separate unit in the G same proportion in which they owned or held land before the selection of the permissible area. In other words if out of sheer cussedness, the husband were to select his land which he desires to retain as the permissible area and gives away his wife's land as surplus, he will do so at his peril, for in\n\n• •\n\nthe land so retained as permissible area he and his wife shall have a share 1'~-~\n\nin the same proportion in which they owned or held their lands before the selection of the permissible area.\n\n[1200 D. E-H]\n\n7. Section 8 of the A.ct is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nUnder sub-s. (3) it is provided that if any person transfers any land after the appointed day in contravention of sub-s. (1), the land as tmnsferred shall be\n\n• •\n\n•'(\n\nNAND LAL V. HARYANA 1185\n\ndeemed to be owned or held by that person in calculating the permissible A ...area and his surphs area over and above the permissible area will be determined by ignoring the transfer and in case the area left with him after such transfet is equal to the surplus area as: .calculated, the entire area left with him sha11 be deemed to be the surplus area meaning thereby the same shall vest in the State Government. Here again, if tire husband's behaviour is guided by self-interest, as it would normally be, he would be indulging in the type of activity complained of at his own peril for he would B not only be putting his own land into jeopardy of litigation but also lose the wife's Ialtd which will become surplus and vest in the State Government.\n\n[1201 AD]\n\n8. It is s. 7 of the Act which imposes a ceiling on agricultural land oy providing that no person shall be entitled to hold, whether as a tandowner or as a tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in other, within the State of Haryana exceeding the permissible area on C or after the ap11ointed day (24-1-1971). \"Permissible area\" u'nder s. 3(1) means the extent of land specified as such in s. 4. For the purpose of determination Of permissible area s. ( 4) divide land into three categories and prescribes the permissible area in respect of each of the said categories A, B & C. For evaluation of the larids held by a person for determining his permissible area\n\n.one is required to turn to the Rules made in that behalf being Rules 5(1) and 5(2) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules 1973, for s. 4(4) D\n\n-o~ says that evaluation is to be made. in the 'manner prescribed' which must mean the manner prescribed by Rules. Fixation of the extent of permi~ ssible area has been actually done by s.4(1) itself inasmuch as the said provi'Sion apart from dividing land into three categories prescribCs and fixes the -extent of permissible area in respect of each of the three categ-0ries, the extent being mdntioned against each iand it is merely the basis of evaluation to be made for determining the permissible area that is left for being pres- E cribed by Rules. [1202 A-C, p-H, 1204 D-E]\n\n9. It is fairly clear that the three -categories into which s.4 (1) divides land for determination of permissible area are mutually exclusive and ordi- .narily if a land-holder is able to establish that the land hold by him exclusively\n\nfalls within one or the other category his permissible area would get straightaway determiD.ed by the extent specified in the section against each category and it is only when a land-holder has lands of more than one category that F his permissible area shall have to be determined on t'he basis of evaluation to be made in the prescribed nxmner under s. 4(4) read with Rules 5(1) and 5(2). This is made clear by the opening words of Rule 5(1), namely, \"the land held by a person shall be evaluated by converting various cate gorics. Prescribed lnanner is to be tfound in Qoth the Ru1es, namely, Rules 5(1) and 5(2) and not merely in one or the other, but it is celar that the two Rules deal with different topies and operate in different fields; whereas G Rule 5(1) indicates the inter relation betweeri different categories of land by prescribing the equating formula, Rule 5(2) provides for mathematical formula for arriving at the correct figures of different categories of lands by reference to irrigation intensity ratio specied against each of the Government canals or tubewells mentioned iii the Schedule as also in case of land irrigated by private tubewellS: and pumping sets. It is not correct to say that while furnishing illustrations under Rule 5(2) Rule 5(1) has been ignored; in faet, B the lint illustration giyen. under Rule 5(2)(a), while applying the mathemati- .cal formula takes into consideration the inter-relation mentioned in Rule 5(1) and tllere is no question of Rule 5(2)(a) in its application doing reverse\n\n1186 SUPll.EME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nof what Rule 5(1) lays down. Further, if the first illus.tration given below Rule 5(2)(a) is carefully analysed it will be clear there is nothing like Rule 5(2)\n\n(a) going beyond s. 4(1) of the Act and there is no question of reducing the permissible area of a person from 21.8 hectares to only 13.88 hectares.\n\nIn that illustration certain basic facts are assume(i to exist, namely, the person is holding 25 hectares of land command.ed for irrigation by a pereial canal the irrigation intensity ratio where of is 57% and on these facts the illustra~ tion works out his permissible area.\n\nFirst by applying the matheill0.tical formula given in Rule 5(2) (a) the extent of 'A category land' is computed nt 7.12 hectares. (Incidentally the very fact that 25 hectares of land commanded for irrigation by a perennial canal having the irrigation intensity ratio of 51% can comprise 'A category land' upto 7.12 hectares negatives. the contention that to have 'A category land' the canal must have intensity ratio of 200% per annum or to have 'B category land' tlle canal must have intensity ratio of 100% per annum or that any land' irrigated by a canal having less than l OO!f0 per annum intensity ratio must be categorised as 'C category land'). Therefore, after deducting 7 .12 hectares as 'A category land' out of 25 hectares, the balance 17.88 hectares is said to be 'C category land'. Then by applying the equating formula in;· Rule 5 ( 1) his entire holding of 25 hectares is converted into national 'C category land' (7.12 x 3 would give 21.36 to which 17.88 is added) whic~ comes to 39.24. But in reality he holds only 25 hectares. Therefore, by applying the rule of three his permissible area in 'C category land' would be 13.88 hectares and the balance of 11.12 hectares is declared to be surplils.\n\nThere is no reduction of 'C category land' from 21.8 hectares to 13.88 hectar~, for if out of 25 hectares 21.8 hectares were to be allowed to the landholder as 'C' category land by invoking s. 4(1) or only Rule 5(1) that will be ignoring the fact that out of his total holding an area to the extent of 7.12' hectares has the potential of 'A' category land and, therefore., giving him 21.8 hectares as 'C' category land would be clearly wrong. Therefore, Rule 5(2) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holding Rules 1973 is valid. [1204 H, 1205\n\nA-H, 1206 A-D]\n\n10. The amount payable for such surplus land that vests in the State' F Government is to be calculated at the rates shown in the Table given below s. 16 ( 1) and it is clear that the rates a~ based on the actual quality of the 'soil and its yield and the same cannot be said' to be illusory.\n\n[1206 D-E]\n\n11. The right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there is no reasonwhy the legislature while granting the righr cannot impose conditions for the exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory.\n\n[1207 F]\n\nNeither the amended s. 18(7) is onerous in natre nor do that sub-section a_nd sub-sction (8~ of s. 18 put any fetter on the right of appeal and revision provided for 1n s. 18(1) and (2) as originally enaCted in 1972.\n\nIn the first plate, the obj:ct of imposing the condition is obviously to prevent frivolous appeal.s revision thar impede the implementation of the ceiling policy; secondly, having regard to sub-ss.\n\n(5) EJ.nd (9) it is clear that the cash deposit or bank guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in the nature of securing mesne profits from the person who is ultimately found to be in unlawful possession of the land; thirdly, the deposit or the guarantee is soreleted to the land holdings tax (30 times the tax) which, varies in the State\n\n...\n\n• •\n\n> •\n\n• •\n\nNANO LAL V. HARYANA 1187\n\nof Haryana around a paltry amount of Rs. 8/- per acre annually; fourthly, A the deposit to be made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the Jaod holdings tax payable .in rect of the disputed area i.e., the area or part tha'eof which is declared a surplus after leaving the pelllllifible area to the appellant or petitioner.\n\nHaving regard t'o these aspects, particularly the meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right\n\nof appeal/revision, even in the absence .of a provision_ conferring discretion\n\nOQ the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot B be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. [1207 G-H, 1208 A-DJ\n\nAnant Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat A.LR. 1975 S.C. 1234 applied .\n\n12. Section 8 (3) of the Act does not violate the second proviso of s. 31A.\n\nThe Act including - the said provision having been included in the Ninth Schedule will receive the protection of Art. 3JB. [1208 D-E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1361 Of 1977 Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 17-3-1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Writ Petition No. 4766of1976\n\nAND\n\nCIVIL APPEALS NOS. 2785-86, 2935-38, 2893, 2823-25, 2235, 1348, 1362~74, 1525-27, 2022-23, 2144, 22:t4, 2707, 2710, 2831, 2723-24, 2423-26, 2805--09/77,976, 843-44, 1263, 56--67, 1010-1014,\n\n1076, 1898-1901, 1902-16,2043-47, 2064, 1674-76, 120-27, 1079, 291, 318-19, 132, 546, 547, 671, 941-45, 946, 949, 1650, 1876, 1878- 1895, 1813, 1829, 176-77, 139, 276, 576, 581-83, 1645-48, 1554, 992-998, 1789-1803, 1831-33, 2071-74, 2162, 2216, 2233, 2234, 2294, 2436-39 of 1978 & 2725 of 1977.\n\nWITH\n\nS.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 3498-99, 4270, 4419, 4420, 4455, 4735, 5205, 5238/77, 63, 64, 65, 99, 352-353, 442, 443, 454, 455, 608, 635, 622, 623, 778-79, 1819, 1303, 1312, 1414, 1404, 1573, 1576-79, 1715, 1842, 1849-50, 1959, 2370, 2013-14, 2414, 2462, 2491-92, 3102·03, 3225-26, 3569, 3413, 3476, 1423, 4072, 3519, 3521, .3541-44, 3715, 3746, 3819, 3857-58, 3891-96, 4052, 4539, 4500-11, *4655-67, 4617, 4815-17, 4818, 4830, 4831-34, 4836-37, 4849, 4864-76, 4966, 4972, *4973-81,\n\n4983A-5002, 5004-7, 5030, 4850-51, 4863, 5008-22, 5024, 5025, 5049, 512£-29, '5174-84, 5272, 5211, 5250-57, 5271, 5290-93,\n\n53~46, 5385, 5402-08, 541; l-15, 5454, 5460-72, 5516-19, 5628, 5625, 5634-36, 5637-44, 5646-47, 5786'87, 5788-90, 5869-72,\n\n5873, 5907-24, 5939-40, '597C-74,*5975-84, 6C02, 6120, 6126-33, 6158-62, 6208, 6209, 6240, 621£-18, 6246-47, 6361-62, 6395, 6421, 6449-53, 6582, 6645-49, 6677-78, 6654, 6656, 6669/78 and 200-214 & 215/80 ( *4662/78, 4974/98 and 5975-5977/78 Withdrawn)\n\nWITH\n\nWRIT PETITION NOS. 4306, 4312, 43.77 & 4507 of 78.\n\nM.N. Phadke, Nisha! Singh, B.P. Maheshwari, Sureslz Sethi, V.M. Tarkunde, Naunit Lal and Naurang Singh, for the appellant/ petitioners in Civil Appeals 2785-86, 2935-38, 2234-35, 2707-10, 2831 2805-9/77, 120-22, 318-19, 671, 176, 276, 2071-84/78, 177, 2216/78, SLPS. 91-93/78 3541--44, 5126-29, 6216-18, 6421, 5308/78 and WP 4377, tA 2893/77., R.K Mohan and Mrs. Geetanja/i Mohan for th~ appellants/petitioners in CAs. 2823-25, 1525-27, 2022-23/77, 2069-70/78, 1813/78, 2144, 2423-26/77, 1263, 56-67, 1010-14, 1898-1901, 1902--16, 2064--68, 1392, 291, 546-47, 941--45, 946-49, 139, 576, 1789-1803 1828, 2436-39/78, SLPs. 442, 443, 454, 608, 635, 778, 779, 1819, 1401, 1414, 1573, 1576-79, 1849-50, 2013-14, 2414, 2462, 3102-3,!3225-26, 3369, 3746, 5272, 3819, 3857-58, 3891-96, 4052, 4500-11, 4655--67\n\n4983A-5002, 5174--84, 5460-72, 5907-24, 5970-74, 6126-33, 6645--49, 6677-78/78 4270, 4455, 4735, 5205 & 5238/77 & 5030/78.\n\nV.M. Tarkunde, O.P. Malhotra, P.R. Mridul, H.K. Puri, for the appellant in CAs. 1348, 1362-74/77 & petitioners in SLPs. 4539 and 562/78.\n\nNC. Sikri for the appellants in CAs. 2723-24/77 & 2725/77.\n\nLakshmi Arvind for the appellants in CAs. 976, 1076/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 622, 623, 1715/78 and WP No. 4312.\n\nS.K. Mehta for the appellants in CAs. 843-44, 546/78& petitioners in SLPs. 4815-17, 5008-22, 5024, 5025, 5290-93, 5340-46, 5869-72 ! of 1978, 4419-20/77.\n\nS.M. Ashri S.S. Sharma for the appellants in CAs. 2043--47, 1831-34/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 4617, 4830, 5454, 5628, 6246-47/78 & 4863/78.\n\nR.S. Mittal and A. Minocha for the appellants in CAs. 1674-76, 1554/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 5873/78, 5646-47/78.\n\nM.B. Lal for the appellants in CA. 1079/78.\n\nB.P. Maheshwari and S. Grewal for the appellants in CA. 132/78 & petitioners. in SLPs. 63-65, 99, 352, 353, 455/78, 208-14/80, 209-245/80.\n\nSarva Mitter. for the appellants in CAs. 1650, 1878-89/78, H 1890-95/78, and petitioners in SLPs. 4831-34,.4836, 4837, 4864, 76, 4966, 5250-57, 5402-8, 5634-44, 5646-47, 5975-5984, 6158--62,\n\n6449-6453, 6654/78, 5271/78.\n\n• •\n\nNAND LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, !.) 1189\n\nS.K. Sabharwal for the appellants in CAs. 1876, 1645-48/78 A and petitioners in SLPs. 3519, 4972, 5004-5007, 6120/78 and WP.\n\n4507/78.\n\n) S.C. Patel for the appellants in~CAs. 581-83/78, and petitioners in SLPs.(C). 1842/78, 3521, 4849, 4850-51/78.\n\nManoj Kumar for the appellants in CAs. 992-98/78,\n\nS.K. Dhingra for the appellants in CAs.2162/78 and .petitioners m SLPs. 4973-81, 6361-62, 6395, 5413-5415/78.\n\nD. Goburdhan for the appellants in CAs. 02233, 2234/78 and petitioners in SLPs. 5309-10/78.\n\nRamesh Chand for the appellants in CA. 2294/78.\n\n/.S. Ratta, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the petitioners in WP. 4306/77 and SLPs. 3498-99/77.\n\nR. Bana for the petitioners in SLPs.1303/78, 2370, 3413, 3476, 6002, 1423, 4072/78 & 1312/78.\n\nHarbans Singh for the petitioners in SLPs. 1959/78, 5939-40/78.\n\nRameshwar Nath for the petitioners in SLP.'.3715f78.\n\nR.C. Kohli for the petitioners in SLP. 5049/78.\n\nS.R. Srivastava for the petitioners in SLP.5211/78.\n\n' S.K. Bagga for the petitioners in SLP. 5385/78.\n\nJ.D. Jain for the petitioners in SLPs. 5516-19, 5786-90, 6208, 6656, 6669/78, 4818, 6239-40/78 ..\n\nK.K Vem'!_opal, B. Datta, M.N. Shroff, Hemantika Wahi, Anup Sachthey, Miss A. Subhashini, for appearing respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTuLZAPURKAR, J. These appeals, by special leave, directed against the Full Bench d.;; cision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jaswant Kaur' s (') dse, seek to challenge the vires of some of the pro-\n\n' visions of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1972 (26 of G\n\n1972) and accoring to the appellants some of the provisions are pivotal and run through the whole Act and. therefore. the entire Act is liable lo be Strl/Ck down.\n\nThe Act (26 of 1972) received the assent of the President on 22-12-1972 and as published in the Official Gazette on 23-12-1972.\n\nB Section 2 contained and even now contains the requisite declaration\n\n(!) A.l.R. 1977 Punjab & Haryana 221.\n\nthat it was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in els. (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7-9-1974 (vide: Item 72), and, thereby. it came under the protective umbrella of Art. -31-B of the Constitution; however, on 9-9-1974 in Saroj Kumari's(') case a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, being apparently unaware of such inclusion, struck down certain provisions of the Act on the ground that those provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThe Division Bench also held that the provisions were not saved by Art. 31-A of the Constitution as those provision which mainly related to 'Family Unit', could not be said to be in furtherance of Art. 3 9 (b) and ( c) of the Constitution. In so holding, the Division . Bench relied on a Full Bench decision of that Court in Sucha Singh's( 2 ) case where similar provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1973) had been struck down.\n\nThe Full Bench decision in Sucha Singh's case (supra) has since been reversed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1040 of 1976 (reported in AIR 1977 SC 915). This Court has taken the view that the provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act are saved by both Aris 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. The foundation on which the decision in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) striking down certain provisions of the Haryana Act (26 of 1972) rested has thus dis- E appeared.\n\n. H\n\nHowever, after the decision in Saroj Kumari's case (supra) the Act (26 of 1972) and the Rules framed under s. 31 thereof were amended extensively; the Act was first amended by Haryana Act 17 of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule (vide : Item No. 137); the Act was further amended by Haryana Acts Nos. 40 and 47 of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts have not been put in the Ninth Schedule.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the amendments effected in the Principal Act by Amending Act 17 of 1976 will receive the protective umbrella of Art. 31-B but not the amendments effected by the last four Acts.\n\nMoreover, though the Principal Act as amended by Act 17 of 1976 will be under the protective umbrella of Art. 31-B, the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed or even after amendments, being subordinate legislation and not specified in the Ninth Schednle may not receive such protection (Vide : Prag lee & Oil Mills(8) case) .\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 353.\n\n(2) AIR 1974 P & H. 162,\n\n(3) [1978] 3 SCR 293.\n\n• •\n\nIll\n\nNANb LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, J.) 1191\n\n', After the Pi!incipal Act (26 of 1972) was amended as above, several writ petifions were filed in the High Court. Punjab & Har yana challenging the 'vires of some of the prov1Sions of the Act.\n\nSince the Princit. al Act as well as the Amending Act 17 of 1976 had been put i Ninth Schedule, the challenge was based on the ground that tho e . provisions were vague, uncertain, ambiguous and .mutually inconstent and, therefore, should be struck down nd neither Art. 31-{\\ nor Art. 31-B of the Constitution cod save sch provisions- The!, High Court rejected the plea, and m our view .rightly, on the g/-ound that a statute enacted by a Legislature fallin!l within its compeience which did not offend any Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Pint ill of the Constitution arid which did not contravene any othe~ provision of the Constitution could not be declared .ultra vires either'. on the ground tha~ its rovisions were vague'. or uncertain or am guous or mutually mcons1stent. The Court pointed\n\nout that unlike e American Constitution,. there was no 'due process' -clause in our Cqnstitution and, therefore. Indian Courts could not declare a statute 1invalid on the ground that it contained vague, un- certain, ambigum\\s or muluany inconsistent pmvisions, and that it was the duty an4 function of the Indian Court in relation to each forensic situationj to examine the language of the law, the context in which it was inade, to discover the intenticn of 1]ie Legislature and to the interprpt the law to make effective and not to frustrate the legislative intent 'nd in that behalf it could always call in aid wellknown canons of1 interpretation and even where the provisions of a statute appeared be mutually inconsistent there were several wellknown rules of itj.terpretation to guide the Court in giving a proper meaning to the provisions of a statute, such a1;, the rule of harmonious constructioj _the rule tht special shall pnvail over the general etc.\n\nAfter negatrying the mam plea, the Court went on to examine the concerned pr9visions which were said to be vague or uncertain and mutually incqnsistent and came to the conclusion that certain expressions which i were said to be vague were not so vague but had\n\ndite import a~4 conn?tation and that apparently inconsistent pro-\n\nVIs1ons were not ujrcconc1lable and all of them fitted well into the general scheme of I the Act.\n\nThe only provision in respect of which relief was granted y the_ ourt was s. 20A which barred the appearance of any legal I practitioner before any officer of authority other than the Financial' Cmmissioner in proceedings under the Act, and the Court took th~ VIew that such a provision was repugnant to s.\n\n1_4 of the lhdian ar Councils Act (which had mntinued in force in view ef s. 30 f t~~ Advoates Act not havin1~ come into force) and, erefore, mvahd.\n\nSub1ect to holding s. 20A of the Act to be ultra vires and, therfore, issuing a direction to the State not to enforce\n\nA the said provision and subject to giving some further directions in the matter of filing declarations etc. before the authorities nnder the Act, the Court dismissed all the writ petitions. In these appeals the appellants have challenged some of the provisions of the Act on gronnds substantially different from those that were urged before the High Court.\n\nBesides these Civil Appeals, a large number of writ petitions as also petitions for special leave have been filed listed before us where in almost identical points have been raised challenging the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to time and those also will sta'nd disposed of by this judgment.\n\nlti is true that since the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as also the first Amending Act 17 of 1976 have been put in the Ninth Schedule, connsel for the appellants !)ave challenged the constitutional validity of Art. 31-B as also of the' Constitution (34th Amendment) Act\n\nD 1974 and the Constitution (40th Amendment) Act 1976 whereby the Principal Act as well as the first Amending Act were put in t!!e Ninth Schedule on the ground that Art. 31-B and these Constitutional.\n\nAmendments violated the basic structure or features of the Constitution. Sinn1arly since the Principal Act contains the requisite declaration nnder s.2 thereof tht the enactment is for the purpose of giving E effect to the directive principles enshrined in Art. 39 (b) and ( c), counsel for the appellants have also challenged the constitutional validity of Art. 31-C as being violative of the basic features of the Constitution.\n\nHowever, apart from these aspects, it cam1ot be gainsaid that the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to\n\ntime, if it falls within Art. 31-A of the Constitution, would be immune from the attack on the ground of inconsistency with or abridgement of any of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31.\n\nThe constitutional validity of Art. 31-A has all along been upheld by this Court since Sankar Prasad's(') case and its validity was not put in issue in Keshavananda Bharati's(2 ) case but the constitutional validity of Art. 31C was sought to be canvassed by reference to Art. 31A.\n\nMoreover, consequent upon the introduction of Art. 3 lA in the Constitution in 1951 this Court has repelled the challenge to land reform laws as violative of fnndamental rights conferred by Arts.14, 19 or 31 in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh( 3).\n\nIn our view, it is manifestly clear that the Principal Act (26 of 1972) together with•\n\n(I) [1952] 3 SCR 89. (2) [1973] Suppl. SCR I,\n\n(3) A1ll 1952 SC 252.\n\n,..\n\n• •\n\nel'< i .. I ·;.j;{ _if.\n\n\".L\n\n• ..\n\n\" •\n\n. ' NAND LAL v. llMlYANA (Tulzapurkar, !.) 1193\n\nall the amendments made therein which essentially is meant for imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings and acquisition and distribution ()f the surplus area to landless and weaker sections of the society is in substance and reality an en11Ctrnent dealing with agrarian reform an\\! squarely falls within Art. 3 lA of the Constitution and as such will enjoy the immunity mentioned above. The challenges made before us to some specific provisions of the Act will, therefore. assume different complexion and will have to be dealt with accordingly. ·\n\nThe principal attack made against the Act is that it enacts an artificial definition of 'family' in s.3(f), which does not conform to any kind of natural families prevalent in the State like a Hindu Undivided Family known to Hindu Law or any family under Muslim Law etc. and that a double standard has been adopted in s. 4 in the matter of providing ceiling which leads to gross inequalities and as such these provisions are violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Counsel for the appellants urged that this artificial definition of 'family' given in s. 3 ( f) is required to be read with two other definitions, namely; the definition of 'permissible area' given in s.3 (1) ahd the definition of 'separate unit' given in s. 3 ( q) and read in that fashion the artificial definition of family alongwith s.4, which prescribes permissible area by adopting double standard for fixing ceiling in the case of 'primary unit of family' and 'separate unit' produces discriminatory results and\n\naccording to him since the definition of family is pivotal and occurs in major provisions of the Act such as sections 4(1), 4(3). 7, 8, 9, and 11 ( 1) , it wm render the whole Act unconstitutional as being violative of Art. 14i of the Constitution. He also _ urged that these major provisions thr_ough which the artificial definition of family runs are not severable and, therefore, the whole Act will have to be struck down. In order to appreciate this contention it will be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 3 ( f) defines 'family' thus :\n\n\"3. (f) 'family' means husband, wife and their minor children or any two or more of them.\n\nExplanation I-A married minor daughter shall not be treated as a child.\"\n\nExplanation II is not material for the purpose of the point under consideration.\n\nSection 3 ( 1) defines 'permissible area' thus :\n\n\"3. (1) . 'permissible area' means the extent of lied in section 4 as the permissible area;\"\n\n17-610SCI/80\n\nland speci-\n\n1194 SUPRJJME COURT RJlPORTS [1980) 3 S.C.ll.\n\nSection 3 ( q) defines 'separate unit' thus :\n\n\"3 ( q). 'separate unit' means an adult son living with his parents or either of them and in case of his death his widow and children, if any.\n\nExplanation : The adult son or in case of his death his ' widow and children shall be deemed to be living with the parents or either of them unless separated;\"\n\nIt is sec. 7 which imposes the ceiling on agricultural landholding and it provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement, no person shall be entitled to hold whether as landowner or tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in another, land within the State of Haryana exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed day (which under s. 3(c) is 24-1-71). Section 3(m) defines person as including inter alia family. The Explanation to s. 7 is important which provides for clubbing and says that where the person is a family including the separate unit, if any. the land owned or held by such person together with the land owned or held by the members of the family and the separate unit shall be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the permissible area. The next important provision is s. 4 which deals with permissible area and sub-ss.(1), (2) and (3) thereof are material to the point at issue and these provisions run tltus :\n\n\"4(1) The permissible area in relation to a landowner or tenant or mortgae with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in another, or person or family consisting of husband, wife and upto three minor _children (hereinafter referred to as \"the primary unit of family\") , shall be, in-- respect of- '\n\n(a) land under asured irrigation capable of growing at least two crops in a year (hereinafter referred to as the land under assured irrigation, 7.25 hectares (=18 acres).\n\n(b) land under assured irrigation capable of growing at least one crop in a year, 10.9 hectares (=27 acres).\n\n( c) land of all other types including land under orchard. 21.8 hectares (=54 acres);\n\n! l]: I I , ~\n\n• •\n\n• ..\n\nNAND LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\n( 2) The pennissible area shall be increased by onefifth of the permissible area of the primary unit of family for each additional member of family: ' Provided that the permissible area shall not exceed twice the permissible area of the primary unit of family.\n\n1.195\n\n( 3) . The permissible area shall be further increased up to the permissible area of the primary unit of a family for each separate unit; /\n\nProvided that where the separate unit also owns 3!1Y land, the same shall be taken into account for calculating tbe pennissible area.\"\n\nOn reading tbe aforesaid provisions, two or three aspects emerge very clearly. In tbe first place, there is no doubt that for the purposes of the Act the concept of family has been defined in an artificial manner as meaning husband, wife and their minor children and excludes major sons and unmarried daughters.\n\nSecondly, under s.4(1) 'the primary unit of famHy' is confined to five members, namely, husband, wife and their minor children upto three with reference to which permissible area has been prescribed, but under s.4(2), the permissible area is said to increase by one-fifth of the pennissible area of the primary unit for each additional member of the family, such as the fourth or fifth minor child etc. but subject to the maximum limit prescribed in the proviso, namely, the permissible area shall not exceed twice the permissible area of the primary unit of the family.\n\nThirdly, in respect of each separate uni1, namely, ea.Ch adult son living with his parents the permissible area will be further increased up to the pennissible area of the primary unit of a family under s.4 ( 3), provided that where the adult son also owns iny land the same shall be taken into account\" for calculating the permi!; sible area. In other words, in cases where the primary unit of family owns or holds land (say 54 acres under cl.(1) (c) of s.4) and an adult son living with the family also owns or holds similar\n\nland of his own (say 54 acres) then the permissible area for the family\n\n. G will be 108 acres after clubbing the two holdings under s.4 ( 3) and there will be no question of any augmentation of area for the family but in cases where the separate unit (adult son) owns or holds no land of his own but is living with the family the primary unit's holding gets augmented up to two units, that is to say, the family will be entitled to retain 108 acres and the balance will be surplus H simply be4:ause tbe adult son is living with the family; but no such augmentation will occur if unmarried daughter or daughters are\n\nA living with the family or if the adult son is living away separately from the family.\n\nMr. Tarkunde appearing for the appellants, therefore, contended that if the concept of family as artificially defined in s.3(f) is worked out in ss.4(1), 4(3) and 7, gross inequilities result and he explained the resultillg gross inequilities by giving the following illustration: in cases where the separate units do not own or hold . any land of their own, the primary unit of family consisting of father, mother and three minor children under s.4 ( 1) will be able to retain with the family one unit of the permissible area, be it 18 acres or 27 acres or 54 acres, but by reason of the clubbing that is provided for in the Explanation to s. 7 and reading the same with s.4 ( 3) the primary unit comprising father, mother and three minors and one major son liviing with it will be able to retain two units (i.e. either 36 acres or 54 acres or 108 acres); further a primary unit consisting of father, mother and three minors and two major sons living with it will be able to retain three units while the primary unit consisting of father, mother and three minors and three major sons living with it will be able to retain fonr units and so on and this is because the major sons who constitute separate units happen to live with the family.\n\nBut if unmarried daughter or daughters are living with the family the permissvble area for the family is not increased or allowed to be augmented and this is clearly discriminatory.\n\nSimilar discriminatory result occurs if !be adult son is not living with family.\n\nSuch discriminatory treatment becomes possible because of the irrtificial definition of family as given in s.3(f) of the Act and because double standard for fixing the permissible area has been prescn'bed and, therefore, s.4 which prescribes such double standard for fixing the ceiling is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution.\n\nIn support of his contention, reliance was placed by him upon two decisions of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala(') and A. P. Krishnasami Naidu v. State of Madras(').\n\nHe pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 where s.2(12) defined family in an artificial manner which did not conform to any of the three kinds of the families preva1ent in Kerala State and s.58 fixed the ceiling by adopting a double standard and the Court held that s. 58(1) was violative of Art. 14 and as the section was the basic of the entire Chapter III, the whole Chapter must fall with it. Similarly, in the second case, the\n\n(!) [1962) Supp. I SCR 8-29.\n\n(2) (1964] 7 SCR. 82.\n\n• •\n\n.. •\n\n• \" • r\n\nf /\n\nNAND LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, !.) 1197\n\nCourt was dealing with Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 where the definition of family given in s.3(14) was regarded as artificial and since s.5(1)(a) adopted a double standard for fixing the ceiling, the Court held that the _same resulted in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and, therefore, the said provision was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and since it was the basis of Chapter Il the whole Chapter fell with it.\n\nCounsel urged that the ratio of these two decisions of this Court squarely applied to instant case and since the said provisions ran through the major sections of Chapter III of the act the whole Chapter was liable to be struck down.\n\nIt is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde for two reasons. It is true that provisfons pertaining to artificial definition of family and the adoption of double standards for fixation of ceiling contained in the instant Act are similar to those which obtained in the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 and the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on land) Act, 1961, but even so, there are two distinguishing features which would make the ratio of those two decisions inapplicable to the instant case. In the first place, in both these decisions it was an admitted position that the concemd enactments were not governed by or protected under Art.31 -A of the Constitution and it was in the absence of such protection that the attack to the material provisions of the enactments on the ground of\n\nvi\\}Jation of Art.14 was entertained by this Court. At page 833 of the Report in the first case, there is a categorical statement made to the effect that the concerned Act, so far as it affected the petitioners therein, was not protected under Art.31-A and it was open to assail it as violative of the rights conferred on them by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Similarly, at page 84 of the Report in the second case, there is a statement to the similar effect that the Madras Act was not protected under Art. 31-A of the Constitution and it was\n\nin that background that the Court eonsidered the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main Jn'OVisions of the Act, relating to ceiling area under s.5 and compensation under s.50 read with Schedule III of the Act. J:n the instant case it cannot be disputed that the principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended subsequently is a piece of agrarian reform legislation squarely falling with Art.31-A of the Constitution and, therefore, the Act and the; cqncerned provisions would be immune frqm attack base; d on Art.icles 14, 19 and 31 - of the Constitution.\n\nSecondly, in both these decisions, no material by way of justification was put before the Court on behalf of the State for the adoption of the double standard in the matter of fixing the, ceiling rC311 with the artificial definition of the family which resulted in diminatory results,-\n\n,,· . l\n\nand this has been specifically mentioned by the Court in both the judgments, while in the instant case on behalf of the State of Haryana, as we shall indicate presently ample material has been produced before the Court justifying the adoption of the artificial definition of family and the double standard for fixing the ceiling negativing the violation of Art.14. On behalf of the State material in the form extracts from Reports of the Committee on Panel of land Reforms under Plauning Commission, (January 1956), extracts from a note prepared in the Land Reforms Division of the Plauning Commission (1960), extracts from Second Five Year Plan, Chapter 9 on Agrarian Land Remganisati5m, extracts from the Report of the Committee on Ceiling on Land Holdings-Planning Commission (April 1961). extracts from Summary Record of Chief Ministers' Conferenc!} on L\\md Reforms (26-27 September, 1970), extracts from Summary Record of Chief Ministers' Conference on Land Reform (23rd July, 1972), and Guidelines drawn up on the basis of the conclusions of the Chief Ministers' Conference ( 23'rd July 1972) , and extracts from Ceiling an Agricultural Holdings by P.S. Appu published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India in 1972, has been placed before the Court from which it will appear that the State bad applied its mind seriously to these questions : whether family should be adopted as a unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on land holdings, what should be the size of the family, why artificial definition of the family should be adopted and why adoption of double standardone for the primary unit of the family and ahother in respect of a separate unit when living with the family was left necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed etc., and after going through this material we do find that all these questions were considered having regard to the social and economic realities of our rural life and with a view to nullifying the transfers effected in favour of close relations for the purpose of avoiding the impact of ceiling legislation.\n\nIt has been pointed out that a large . number of alternatives were considerro, that every alternative was beset with difficnlties of some kind or the other and no particular course was free from blemish altogether but for that reason the main objective could not be given up and ultimately, on the basis of a consensus reached at the Chief Ministers' Conference hold on July 23, 1972 certain policy decisions were taken on these vexed questions. It has been pointed Out that adopting 'family' as a unit as against 'an individual' was considered necessary as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by effecting ma/a fide partitions and transfers since such transactions are usually made in favour of family members, that normally in rural agricultural set up in our country the family is the operative unit and all the lands of\n\n• •\n\n• ..\n\nNANO LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, !.) 119.9\n\na family constitnte a single operational holding and that therefore ceiling should be related to the capacity of a family to cultivate the lands personally. It has been pointed out that keeping all these . aspects in view the concept of family was artificially defined and double standard for futing ceiling, one for the primary unit and other for the adult son living wiih the family was adopted. In fact, a provision like s.4 ( 3) which makes for the augmentation of the permissible area for a family when the adult sons do not own or hold lands of their own but are living with tihe family has one virtue, that it ensures such augmenta tion in the case of every family irrespective of by what personal law it is governed and no discrimination is made between major sons governed by different systems of personal laws.\n\nSo far as an adult sol! livihg separately from the family is concerned, he is rightly regarded as a separate unit who will have to file a separate declaration in respect of his holdinj! under s.9 of the Act and since he is living separately and would not be contributing his capacity to the family to -cultivate the family lands personally there is no justification for increasing the permissible area of the primary unit of the family. 'the case of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with the family, counsel pointed out, was probably considered to be a rare case and it was presumed that daughters would in normal course get married and would become members of their husbands' units, and that is why\n\nno separate provision was made for giving additional land, for every unmarried . major daughter living with the family.\n\nOn the materials.\n\nE placed and the initial presumption of constitutionally, we find considerable force in this submission. It is, therefore, not possible to strike down an enactment particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform which bas been put on the Statute Book with the\n\navo'Wd purpose of bringing about equality or rather reducing the inequality between. the haves and the have nots, as being violative of .\\ Art.14 of, the Constitution simply because it has failed to make a.\n\nprovisioo for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency. In our view, the material furnished on behalf of the State . Government by way of justification foc adopting an artificial de4inition .ef family and a double standard for fixing ceiling is -suffi- G sient to repel the attack on these provisions under Art.14. However,.\n\nbefore, parting with this point we might like to observe that the State of Haryana should consider sympathetically the case of unmarried major daughters living with the family and for that matter even the case of a divorced daughter who has come back to the family by providing for addition of. some more land to the permissible area of the-, primary unit of the family for each such unmarried m•jor daughter or such divorced daughter which again could be subjected\n\nA to some maximum limit or the State of Haryana may draw inspiration from a kindred legislation like West Bengai Land Reforms Act 19 5 5 as amended by West Bengal (Land Reforms) amendment Act, 1972.\n\nThe next provision challenged by counsel as being violative of Art.14 was s.9 which requires every person, who on the appointed day or at any time thereafter holds land exceeding the permissible area, to furnish within the specified period to the prescribed authority a declaration giving the particulars of all his land and that of the separate unit in the prescn'bed form and __ manner and starting therein his selection of parcels of lands not exceeding in aggregate the permissible area which he desires to retain. Under Explanation I to that section, it is provided that where the person is a member of the family, he shall include in his declaration particulars of land held by him and also of land, if any, held by other members of the family and the separate unit. Under sub-s. ( 4) ( c) such declaration in the case of a family is required to be furnished by the husband, or in his absence, by the wife, or in the absence of both, by the guardian of minor children. It was urged that since the husband has been given the right to fnrnish the declaration as also to make the selection of the lands within the permissible area which he desires to retain, the husband can, while making the selection, give away his wife's land as surplus, and this was discriminatory against wife who might Jose her land declared as surplus.\n\nWe do not find any substance in this contention. In the first place, the selection of permissible area which is desired to be retained will ordinarily be guided by the consideration of retaining the best quality land with the family, be it of the husband or of the wife or even of the minor children, and not by the consideration as to whose land should be sacrificed. But, apart from this aspect of the matter, its preciously to meet such situation that s.11 (2) -has been enacted which provides that the land so retained as permissible\n\nara of Jamil y and the separate nnit shall be owned or held by the members of the family and also separate unit in the same proportion in , which they owned or held land before the selection of the permissible area. In other words, if out of sheer cussedness, the husband were to select his land which he desires to retain as the permissible area and gives away hi~ wiie's land as surplus, he will do so at his peril, for in the land so retained as permissible area he and his wife shall have a shate in the same proportion in which they owned or held their la.tlds before the selection of the permissible area. In our view, therefore, II tlie, e is no question ot any discrimination resulting to the wife from tlie rig.'lt qf selection being given to the husband under s. 9 ( 4 )( e) of the Ac(···· . ·· - .\n\n• •\n\nNANO LAL v. HARYANA (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 1201\n\nSimilar contention was urged by Mr. Tarkunde with reference to s. 8 of the Act which prohibits all transfers of land in excess of the permissibk area, except a bona fide transfer, after the appointed day and declares that such transfers shall uot affect the right of the State Government to the surplus area to which it could be entitled but for such transfer. Under sub-s. (3) it is provided that if any person transfers any land after the appointed day in contravention of sub-s. ( l), the land so transferred shall be deemed to be owned or held by that person in calculating the permissible area and his surplus area over and above the permissible area will be deterinined by ignoring the transfer and in case the area left with hin1 after such transfer is equal to the surplus area so calculated, the entire area left with him shall be deemed to be the siirplus area meanin!ll thereby the same shall vest in the State Government. What was urged by Mr. Tarkunde was that the effect of clubbing of the holdings of the husband and wife on such invalid transfer could be that the husband by transferring his land in contravention of sub-s. (I) will deprive the wife of her land which becomes surplus under sub-s. ( 3). Here again, if the husband's behaviour is guided by self-interest, as it would norn1ally be, he would be indulging in the type of activity complained of at his own peril for he would not only be putting his own la'nd into jeopardy of litigation but also lose the wife's land which will become surplus and vest in the State Government. The challenge to the aforesaid provisions under Art. 14 must fail.\n\nMr. Phadke counsel for some of the appellants in these appeals E challenged the vires of some of the Rules, particularly Rule 5 (2) of the Haryana Ceiling of Land Holdings Rules 1973 framed under s. 31 of the Act on several grounds.\n\nHe contended that effective ceiling has been brought about by the Rules and not by Sections of the Act, that Rule 5(2) was a clear instance of excessive delegati, on of. the essential legislative function, that Rule 5 (2) goes beyond the scope or ambit of p and is, therefore, ultra vires s.4(1), that it was wrong to think that 'prescribed manner' was only to be found in Rule 5 (2) (a) and not in Rule 5(1) and that, in fact, in its working Rllle 5(2)(a) does the reverse of what Rule 5.( 1) lays down, that is to say, instead of first converting: various categories of land of a person into 'C' category and then permitting him to select an area equivalent to 21.8 hectaJ\\,\"S ( =54 acres) G of such converted 'C' category 1and so that his remaining land shall be treated as surplus area, Rule 5(2) first converts all irrigated lands into 'A' category wrongly, and then by substracting it from the rest of tht) land, declares .that the remainder shall be 'C' category land .. In order to appreciate these contentions properly it will be necessary to\n\nxamine '!1.e provi, sios of the Act and the Rules concerning the i.mposi- R t1on of ceiling on agpcultural holdings and the determination of permissible area.\n\nAs pointed out earlier; it is s. 7 of the Act which imposes a ceiling on agricultural land by providing that no P'rson shall be entitled to hold, whether as a landowner or as a tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in other, land within the State of Haryana exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed day (24.1.1971). \"Permissible area\" under s. 3(1) means the extent of land specified as such) in s. 4. For the purpose of determination of permissible areas. 4(1) divides land into three categories and prescribes the permissible area in respect of each of the said categories and, as indicated earlier, it iS 7.25 hectares (=18 acres) for category under s. 4(1)(a), 10.9 hectares (=27 acres) for category under s. 4(1) (b) (styled 'B' category land' under Rule 2) and 21.8 hectares (=54 acres) for category under s.4(1) ( c) (styled 'C category land: under Rule 2).\n\nSection 4(5) further sub-divides land falling under s.4(1 )(a) into two classes : ( i) land under irrigation from a canal or State tubewell (styled 'A category land' under.Rule 2) and (ii) land under irrigation from privately owned tubewel!s, pumping sets, etc. (styled 'AA category land' under Rule 2) .and the inter relation between these two classes is indicated ins. 4(5) thus:\n\n\"4(5) In determining the permissible area for the purpose of clause (a) of sub-section (1), five hectares of land under irrigation from privately owned tubewells, pumping sets, etc., shall be equal to four hectares of land under irrigation from canal as defined in the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 (Central Act 8 of 1873), or from State Tube-well as defined in the Punjab State Tubewell Act, 1954 (Punjab Act 21 of 1954) .\"\n\nSection 4( 4) lays down the manner in which the permissible area shall be d.etcrmined and it runs thus :\n\n\"4( 4) The permissible area shall be determined on the basis of valuation to be calculated in the prescribed manner taking into consideration the ownership of the means of irrigation, their intensity and such other factors as may be prescribed subject to the condition that the total physical holding does not exceed 21.8 hectares.\" ·\n\nIn other words, for evaluation of the lands held by a person for determining his permissible area one is required to tum to the Rules made in that behalf being Rules 5 ( I ) and 5 ( 2) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land n Holdings Rules 1973, for s.4( 4) only says that evaluation is to be made in the 'manner prescribed' which must mean the manner prescribed by Rules. Rule 5 (1) runs thus :\n\n• ..\n\n• 4\n\nNANO LAL I'. HARYANA (Tul:wpurkar, J.) 1203.\n\n\"5.(1) the land held by a person shall be evaluated by A converting various categories into C category land according to the following formula:-\n\nI unit of A category land\n\nl .. 2S units of AA cotegory\n\nland\n\n1.5 unit of B category land\n\n3 units of C category land\n\nSuch person shall be allowed to seh:ct an area equivalent to 21.8 hectares of C category land as permissible area and the remaining land shall be treated as surplus area.\"\n\nRule 5(2) runs thus:\n\n\"5.(2) Land irrigated by Canal/Govermnent Tubewells.-In. case the land is irrigated by canal or Government tubewell,-\n\n( a) 'where land is commanded for irrigation by a perennial canal, the area of such land shall be multiplied by\n\nhalf of the irrigation intensity ratio specified against D each canal in Schedule 'A' appended hereafter. The figure thus arrived at shall be treated as 'A' category land and the remaining area of such land shall be treated as 'C' category land :\n\nProvided that where the whole or part of the land so commanded is prescribed in the revenue record as 'Thur' or 'Kallar', the area so described shall be multiplied by half of the irrigation intensity ratio specified against such canal in .Schedule 'A'. 'The figure thus arrivep at shall be treated\n\na~ 'B' category land and the remaining area of such land shall be treated as 'C' category land; ·\n\n(b) where land is commanded for irrigation by a nonperennial/restricted perennial canal, the area of such land shall be multiplied by the irrigation intensity ratio specified against each canal in Schedule 'A'.\n\nThe figure thus arrived at. shall be treated as\n\n'B' category land and the remaining area of such land shall be treated as 'C' category land;\n\nProvided that the extent of land described in the revenue record as 'Thur' or 'Kallar' shall .be excluded from the com- . manded area for the purpose of calculations and shall be\n\ntreated as 'C' category land; R\n\n( c) where land is commanded for irr.igation by a Government tubewell, the area of such land shall be\n\nmultiplied by half of the irrigation intensity ratio specified against Government tubewell in Schedule 'A'. The figure thus arrived at shall be treated as 'A' category land and the remaining area of such land shall be treated as 'C' category land; ( d) where irrigation by canal water or Government tubewell is supplemented i:ly water drawn from privately owned tubewell, pumping set, well or other sources, the area treated as 'AA' category land in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (4) shall be added to the land determined under the aforesaid clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c), as the case may be.\" (1. Substituted by Notification No. GSR 222/H.A. 26/72/S. 31 Amd. (4)/76 dt. 15-10-76).\n\nCounsel for the appellants at the outset urged that effective ceiling was made by Rules 5 (1) and 5 (2) and not by s. 4 of the Act inasmuch as the basis of evaluation to be made for determining the per- D missible area was provided for by Rules and not by the Section and since the fixation of the extent of the permissible area was essentially a legislative function it could not be delegated to the executive and this was a clear instance of delegation of the essential legislative function and hence the enactment was Eable to be struck down. It is impossible to accept this contention for the simple reason that fixation E of the extent of permissible area has been actually done by s. 4( 1) itself inasmuch as the said provision apart from dividing land into three categories prescribes and fixes the extent of permissible area in respect of each of the three categories, the extent being mentioned against each and it is merely the basis of evaluation to be made for detennining the pennissible area that is left for being prescribed by F Rnles. The contention is, therefore, devoid of any substance.\n\nIt was next contended by him that Rule 5(2) (a) goes beyond s. 4(1) of the Act inasmuch as by its application it produces the effect of reducing the permissible area of a person from 21.8 ooctare11 ( =54 acres) to only 13.88 hectares (=34 acres) as would be clear from G illustration No. I given under Rule 5 (2) (a) and as such the Rule is ultra vi res s. 4 (I). He also urged that 'prescribed manner' was to be found both in Rule 5(1) and 5(2) but in its working Rule 5(2) does the reverse of what Rule 5 ( 1) Jays down. In our view these contentions proceed on a misconception of the functional role of these Rules and a misunderstanding regarding the correct import of the first illus- B tration given under Rule 5(2)(a).\n\nAt the outset we may say that it is fairly clear that the three cate- gories into which s.4(1) divides land for etermination of permissible\n\n• •\n\n• ..\n\nNAND LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, !.) 1205\n\narea. are mutually exclusive and ordiuarily if a land-holder is able to establish that the land heW by him exclusively falls within one or the other category bis permissible area would get straightaway determiuetl by the extent specified iu the section against each Cl!tegory and it is only when a land-bolder has lands of more than one category that his permissible area shall have to be determined on the basis of evaluation to be made in the prescribed' manner under s. 4( 4) read with Rules 5(1) and 5(2). This is made clear by the opening words of Rule 5 (1), namely, \"the land held by a person shall be evaluated by converting various categories into 'C' category land accordiug to the following formula''. In other words, Rules 5(1) and 5(2) cOille into play only when a land-holder is holdiug lands of various categories.\n\nFurther, it cannot be disputed that 'prescribed maruier' is to be found in both the Rules, hamely, Rules 5(1) and 5(2) and not merely in one or the qtber, but it is clear that the two Rules deal with different topics and operate in different fields; whereas Rule 5 (1) iudicates the iuter relation between different categories of land by presCribing the equating formula, Rule 5 (2) provides for mathematical formula for arriviug at the correct figures of different categories of lands by reference to irrigation iuteusity ratio specified agaiust each of the Government canals or tubewells mentioned iu the Schedule as also in case of lands irrigated by private tubewells and pumpiug sets but it is not correct to say that while furnishiug illustrations under Rule 5(2), Rule 5(1) has been ignored; iu fact, the first illustration given under Rule 5 (2)- ( a) while applyiug the mathematical formula takes into consideration the inter-relation mentioned in Rule 5(1) and there is no question of Rule 5(2)(a) iu its application doing reverse of what Rµle 5(1) lays down. Further, if the first illustration given below Rule 5(2)(a) is carefully analysed it will be clear there is nothing like Rule 5 (2)(a) going beyond s. 4( 1) of the Act as contended and there is no question of reducing the permissible area of a person from 21.8 hectares to only 13.88 hectares as suggested. In that illustration certain basic facts are assumed to exist, namely, the person is hoWing 25 hectares of land commanded for irrigation by a perennial canal the irrigation intensity ratio whereof is 57% and on these facts the illustration works out his permissible area. First by applyiug the mathematical formula given in Rule 5(2)(a) the extent of 'A category land' is computed at 7.12 hectares. (Incidentally the very fact that 25 hectares of land commanded for irrigation by a perennial canal having the irrigation intensity ratio of 57% can comprise 'A category land' upto 7.12 hectares negatives the other contention of couµsel for the appellants that to have 'A category land' the canal must have intensity ratio of 200%\n\nper annum or to have 'B category land' the canal must have intensity ratio of 100 % per annum or that any land irrigated by a canal having\n\nII'\n\nA less than 100% per annum intensity ratio must be categorised as 'C category land'.) Therefore, after deducting 7.12 beet.ares as 'A category land' out of 25 hectares, the balance 17. 8 8 hectares is said to be 'C category land'. Then by applying the equating formula in Rule 5 (1) his entire ho:ding of 25 hectares is convert*1 into notional 'C\n\ncategory land' (7.12X3 would give 21.36 to which 17.88 is added) which comes to 39.24. But in reality he holds only 25 hectares.\n\nTherefore, by applying the rule of three his permissible area in 'C category land' would be 13.88 hectares and the balance of 11.12 hectares is declared to be surplus. There is no reduction of 'C category land' from 21.8 hectares to 13.88 hectares as contended, for if out of 25 hectares 21.8 hectares were to be allowed to the land-holder as 'C' category land by invoking Sec. 4(1) or only Rule 5(1) that will be ignoring the fact that out of his total holding an area to the extent of 7.12 hectares has the potential of 'A' category land and, therefore, giving him 21.8 hectares as 'C' category land would be clearly wrong. In our view, therefore, there is no substance in any of the challenges made to Rule 5(2) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973.\n\nCounsel for the appellants feebly argued that the compensation payable in respect of the surplus land that is acquired or gets vested in the State Government as specified in s. 16 is illusory. We find that the amount payable for such surplus land that vests in the State Government is to be calculated at the rates shown in the Table given E below s. 16 ( 1) and it is clear that the rates are based on the actual quality of the soil and its yield and the same cannot be said to be illusory. In any case no materials have been placed before us from which we could infer that the rates shown in the Table lead to illusory compensation. )\n\np The next provision challenged as unconstitutional is the one contained in s. 18(7) imposing a condition of making a deposit of a sum equal to 30 times the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed area before any appeal or revision is entertained by the , appellate or revisional authority-a provision inserted in the Act by Amending Act 40 of 1976. Section 18(1) and (2) provide for an appeal, G review and revision of the orders of the prescribed authority and the position was that prior to 1976 there was no fetter placed on the appellate/revisional remedy by the statute. However, by the amendments made by Haryana Act No. 40 of 1976, sub-ss. (7) and (8) were added and the newly inserted sub-s. (7) for the first time imposed a condition that all appeals under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) and revi- H sions under sub-s. ( 4) would be entertained only on the appellant or the petitioner depositing with the appellate or the revisional authority a sum equal to 30 times the land holdings tax payable in respect of tbe\n\n• •\n\nNANO LAL v. HARYANA (Tu/zapurkar, !.) 1207\n\ndisputed surplus area. Under sul>-s. {8) it was provided that if the A appellant or the petitioner coming against the order declaring the land surplus failed in his appeal or revision, he shall be liable to pay for the period he has at any time been in possession of the land declared surplus to which he was not entitled under the law, a licence fee equal to\n\n30 times the land holdin~ tax recoverable in respect of this area. On 6th June, 1978, the Act was further amended by Amending Act 18 B of 1978 whereby the rigour of the condition imposed under sul>-s. (7) was reduced by permitting the appellant or the petitioner to furnish\n\na bank guarantee for the requisite amount as an alternative to making cash deposit and while retaining sub-s. ( 8) in its original form, a new\n\nsul>-s. (9) inserted under which it has been provided that if the . C appeal or revision succeeds, the amount deposited or the bank guarantee furnished shall be refunded or released, as the case may be but if the appeal or revision fails th;: deposit or the guarantee shall be adjusted against the licence ree recoverable under sub-s. (8). In the High Court, two contentions were urged: first, thats. 18(1) and (2), as originally enacted in 1972, gave an unrestricted and unconditional D right of appeal and revision against the orders of the prescribed authority or the appellate authority but by inserting sub-ss. (7) and\n\n(8) by Act 40 of 1976, a fetter was put on this unrestricted right which was unconstitutional; secondly, even the mellowing down of the condition by Act 18 of 1978 did not have the effect of removing the vice of unconstitutionality, inasmuch as even the conditlons imposed E under the amended sul>-s. (7) were so onerous in nature that they either virtually took away the vested right of appeal or in any event rendered it illusory.\n\nBoth these contentions were rejected by the High Court and in our view rightly.\n\nIt is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there i, s no reason why the legis- F lature while granting the right cannot impose conditlons for the exercise of such right so long as the conditlons are not so onerous as to amount. to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory (vide the latest decision in Anant Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat<:\") Counsel for the appellants, however, urged that the conditions imposed G should be regarded as unreasonably onerous especially when no discretion has been left with the appellate or revisional authority to relax or waive the condition or grant exemption in respect thereof in fit and proper cases and, therefore, the fetter imposed must be regarded as unconstitutional and struck down. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one reason. In the first place, the object of/ B imposing the condition is obviously to prevent frivolous appeals and\n\n(I) A, I. R. 1975 S. C. 1234.\n\nA revision that impede the implementation of the ceiling policy; secondly, having regard to sul:>-ss. ( 8) and ( 9) it is clear that the cash deposit or bank guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in the nature of securing mesne profits from the person who is ultimately found to be in unlawful possession of the land; thirdly, the deposit or the guarantee is co-related to the land holdings tax (30 times the tax) which, we B are informed, varies in the State of Haryana around a paltry amount of Rs. 8 /- per acre annually; fourthly, the deposit to be made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the land holdings tax payable • in respect of the disputed area i.e. the area or part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving the permissible area to the appellant or petitioner.\n\nHaving regard to these aspects, particularly the meagre C rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, even in' the absence of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. The challenge to s. 18(7) must, therefore, fail.\n\nD It may be stated that relying on Kunjukutty Sahib's(') case counsel for the appellants also challenged s. 8 (3) of the Act on the ground that it violates the second proviso to Art. 31-A.\n\nThe Act including said provision having been included in the Ninth Schedule will receive the protection of Art. 31-B and since the challenge to the constitutional validity of Art. 31-B is being separately dealt with it is unnecessary to E deal with the contention here.\n\nIn the result all the Civil Appeals, Writ Petitions and Petitions for Special Leave are dimissed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals and Petitions dismissed.\n\n.. •\n\n-~ ,,\n\n(1) [197311 S.C.R.!326.\n\n. •\n\nI I ..", "total_entities": 293, "entities": [{"text": "SETH NANO LAL & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SETH NAND LAL & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 9, 1980\n\n1(Y .. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA hER,\n\nV. D. TuLZAPURKAR & A. P. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "1(Y .. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. 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HARYANA 1183", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) (c) of s. 4] and an adult son living with the family also owns or holds similar 1and of his ov;'n\n\n(say acfes) then the permissible area for the family will be 108 acres after clubbing the two holdings under s. 4(3) and there will be no question of any augmcnt:l!tion of area for the family but in cases where the separate unit (•<lult son) owns or bolds no land of his own but is living with the family the primary unit's holding gets augmented up to two units, that is to say, the family will be entitled to retain 1081 acres and the balance will be surplus simply because the\n\n• •\n\n• \"'\n\n• •\n\nNAND LAL V. HARYANA 1183\n\nadult son is living with the family; but no such augmentation will occur if A. unmarried daughter or daughters are living with the family or if the adult son is living away separately from the family. 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Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25698, "end_char": 25711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, O.P. Malhotra, P.R. Mridul, H.K. Puri, for the appellant in CAs."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25713, "end_char": 25724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, O.P. Malhotra, P.R. Mridul, H.K. Puri, for the appellant in CAs."}}, {"text": "H.K. Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25726, "end_char": 25735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, O.P. Malhotra, P.R. Mridul, H.K. Puri, for the appellant in CAs."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Arvind", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25881, "end_char": 25895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi Arvind for the appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "S.K. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25995, "end_char": 26005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Mehta for the appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "S.M. Ashri S.S. Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26150, "end_char": 26172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.M. Ashri S.S. Sharma for the appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "R.S. Mittal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26291, "end_char": 26302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.S. Mittal and A. Minocha for the appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "A. Minocha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26307, "end_char": 26317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.S. Mittal and A. Minocha for the appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "M.B. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26407, "end_char": 26415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.B. Lal for the appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "B.P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26452, "end_char": 26467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.P. Maheshwari and S. Grewal for the appellants in CA.", "canonical_name": "B.P. 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Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27164, "end_char": 27176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "992-98/78,\n\nS.K. Dhingra for the appellants in CAs.2162/78 and .petitioners m SLPs."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27275, "end_char": 27287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Goburdhan for the appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27368, "end_char": 27380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramesh Chand for the appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "/.S. Ratta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27417, "end_char": 27427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/.S. Ratta, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "Vimal Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27429, "end_char": 27439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/.S. Ratta, Vimal Dave and Miss K. Mehta for the petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "K. 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Subhashini, for appearing respondent."}}, {"text": "Anup Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28037, "end_char": 28050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5516-19, 5786-90, 6208, 6656, 6669/78, 4818, 6239-40/78 ..\n\nK.K Vem'!_opal, B. Datta, M.N. Shroff, Hemantika Wahi, Anup Sachthey, Miss A. Subhashini, for appearing respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28057, "end_char": 28070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5516-19, 5786-90, 6208, 6656, 6669/78, 4818, 6239-40/78 ..\n\nK.K Vem'!_opal, B. Datta, M.N. Shroff, Hemantika Wahi, Anup Sachthey, Miss A. Subhashini, for appearing respondent."}}, {"text": "TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28143, "end_char": 28154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTuLZAPURKAR, J. 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"start_char": 39710, "end_char": 39749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "permissible area' means the extent of lied in section 4 as the permissible area;\"\n\n17-610SCI/80\n\nland speci-\n\n1194 SUPRJJME COURT RJlPORTS [1980) 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39752, "end_char": 39761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40110, "end_char": 40116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40539, "end_char": 40546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24-1-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40550, "end_char": 40557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 which imposes the ceiling on agricultural landholding and it provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or agreement, no person shall be entitled to hold whether as landowner or tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in another, land within the State of Haryana exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed day (which under s. 3(c) is 24-1-71)."}}, {"text": "Section 3(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40560, "end_char": 40572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40639, "end_char": 40643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41005, "end_char": 41009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41873, "end_char": 41884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l]: I I , ~\n\n• •\n\n• ..\n\nNAND LAL v. HARYANA (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\n( 2) The pennissible area shall be increased by onefifth of the permissible area of the primary unit of family for each additional member of family: ' Provided that the permissible area shall not exceed twice the permissible area of the primary unit of family.", "canonical_name": "TuLZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42766, "end_char": 42772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42960, "end_char": 42966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43525, "end_char": 43528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43777, "end_char": 43780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43983, "end_char": 43986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44560, "end_char": 44568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Tarkunde appearing for the appellants, therefore, contended that if the concept of family as artificially defined in s.3(f) is worked out in ss.4(1), 4(3) and 7, gross inequilities result and he explained the resultillg gross inequilities by giving the following illustration: in cases where the separate units do not own or hold ."}}, {"text": "s.3(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44677, "end_char": 44683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss.4(1), 4(3) and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44701, "end_char": 44720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45002, "end_char": 45005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45197, "end_char": 45201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45228, "end_char": 45231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46170, "end_char": 46176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46284, "end_char": 46287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46365, "end_char": 46371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46713, "end_char": 46720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961", "statute": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46837, "end_char": 46849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 where s.2(12) defined family in an artificial manner which did not conform to any of the three kinds of the families preva1ent in Kerala State and s.58 fixed the ceiling by adopting a double standard and the Court held that s. 58(1) was violative of Art."}}, {"text": "s.58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46854, "end_char": 46858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961", "statute": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 58(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46931, "end_char": 46939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961", "statute": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46957, "end_char": 46964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961", "statute": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "(1964] 7 SCR. 82", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47132, "end_char": 47148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47343, "end_char": 47350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961", "statute": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.5(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47388, "end_char": 47397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961", "statute": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47595, "end_char": 47602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961", "statute": "He pointed out that in the former case the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Art.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48595, "end_char": 48601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48763, "end_char": 48769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48993, "end_char": 48999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49079, "end_char": 49101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49266, "end_char": 49273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49373, "end_char": 49380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49452, "end_char": 49455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49479, "end_char": 49483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule III of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49494, "end_char": 49517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49686, "end_char": 49692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule III of the Act", "statute": "Schedule III of the Act"}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50509, "end_char": 50515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule III of the Act", "statute": "Schedule III of the Act"}}, {"text": "23rd July, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51123, "end_char": 51138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on L\\md Reforms (26-27 September, 1970), extracts from Summary Record of Chief Ministers' Conference on Land Reform (23rd July, 1972), and Guidelines drawn up on the basis of the conclusions of the Chief Ministers' Conference ( 23'rd July 1972) , and extracts from Ceiling an Agricultural Holdings by P.S. Appu published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India in 1972, has been placed before the Court from which it will appear that the State bad applied its mind seriously to these questions : whether family should be adopted as a unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on land holdings, what should be the size of the family, why artificial definition of the family should be adopted and why adoption of double standardone for the primary unit of the family and ahother in respect of a separate unit when living with the family was left necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed etc.,"}}, {"text": "P.S. Appu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51307, "end_char": 51316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on L\\md Reforms (26-27 September, 1970), extracts from Summary Record of Chief Ministers' Conference on Land Reform (23rd July, 1972), and Guidelines drawn up on the basis of the conclusions of the Chief Ministers' Conference ( 23'rd July 1972) , and extracts from Ceiling an Agricultural Holdings by P.S. Appu published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India in 1972, has been placed before the Court from which it will appear that the State bad applied its mind seriously to these questions : whether family should be adopted as a unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on land holdings, what should be the size of the family, why artificial definition of the family should be adopted and why adoption of double standardone for the primary unit of the family and ahother in respect of a separate unit when living with the family was left necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed etc.,"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51334, "end_char": 51378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on L\\md Reforms (26-27 September, 1970), extracts from Summary Record of Chief Ministers' Conference on Land Reform (23rd July, 1972), and Guidelines drawn up on the basis of the conclusions of the Chief Ministers' Conference ( 23'rd July 1972) , and extracts from Ceiling an Agricultural Holdings by P.S. Appu published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India in 1972, has been placed before the Court from which it will appear that the State bad applied its mind seriously to these questions : whether family should be adopted as a unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on land holdings, what should be the size of the family, why artificial definition of the family should be adopted and why adoption of double standardone for the primary unit of the family and ahother in respect of a separate unit when living with the family was left necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed etc.,"}}, {"text": "July 23, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52624, "end_char": 52637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "number of alternatives were considerro, that every alternative was beset with difficnlties of some kind or the other and no particular course was free from blemish altogether but for that reason the main objective could not be given up and ultimately, on the basis of a consensus reached at the Chief Ministers' Conference hold on July 23, 1972 certain policy decisions were taken on these vexed questions."}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53570, "end_char": 53573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54160, "end_char": 54163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55226, "end_char": 55232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55624, "end_char": 55630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55709, "end_char": 55725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "before, parting with this point we might like to observe that the State of Haryana should consider sympathetically the case of unmarried major daughters living with the family and for that matter even the case of a divorced daughter who has come back to the family by providing for addition of."}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56373, "end_char": 56379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56384, "end_char": 56387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58097, "end_char": 58101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58951, "end_char": 58955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59103, "end_char": 59107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60642, "end_char": 60649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haryana Ceiling of Land Holdings Rules 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60801, "end_char": 60844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60858, "end_char": 60863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Haryana Ceiling of Land Holdings Rules 1973", "statute": "the Haryana Ceiling of Land Holdings Rules 1973"}}, {"text": "contended that effective ceiling has been brought about by the Rules and not by Sections of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60899, "end_char": 60998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61185, "end_char": 61191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He contended that effective ceiling has been brought about by the Rules and not by Sections of the Act", "statute": "He contended that effective ceiling has been brought about by the Rules and not by Sections of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62139, "end_char": 62143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24.1.1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62468, "end_char": 62477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out earlier; it is s. 7 of the Act which imposes a ceiling on agricultural land by providing that no P'rson shall be entitled to hold, whether as a landowner or as a tenant or as a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in other, land within the State of Haryana exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed day (24.1.1971). \""}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62505, "end_char": 62512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62560, "end_char": 62564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)(a), 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62817, "end_char": 62831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62874, "end_char": 62881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62976, "end_char": 62982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63030, "end_char": 63042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63082, "end_char": 63092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63682, "end_char": 63725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State Tube-well as defined in the Punjab State Tubewell Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63759, "end_char": 63824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63853, "end_char": 63866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Tube-well as defined in the Punjab State Tubewell Act, 1954", "statute": "State Tube-well as defined in the Punjab State Tubewell Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Haryana Ceiling on Land n Holdings Rules 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64487, "end_char": 64532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.4( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64538, "end_char": 64545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land n Holdings Rules 1973", "statute": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land n Holdings Rules 1973"}}, {"text": "NANO LAL I'. HARYANA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64696, "end_char": 64716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 5 (1) runs thus :\n\n• ..\n\n• 4\n\nNANO LAL I'."}}, {"text": "wpurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64722, "end_char": 64729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARYANA (Tul:wpurkar, J.) 1203."}}, {"text": "S. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67437, "end_char": 67442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67586, "end_char": 67590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68158, "end_char": 68166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68639, "end_char": 68646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68933, "end_char": 68937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69394, "end_char": 69400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69972, "end_char": 69980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71551, "end_char": 71559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73436, "end_char": 73445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73785, "end_char": 73829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74006, "end_char": 74011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973", "statute": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74180, "end_char": 74185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973", "statute": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 18(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74546, "end_char": 74554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973", "statute": "the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74833, "end_char": 74846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th June, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75983, "end_char": 75997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th June, 1978, the Act was further amended by Amending Act 18 B of 1978 whereby the rigour of the condition imposed under sul>-s. ("}}, {"text": "s. 18(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79638, "end_char": 79646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kunjukutty Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79706, "end_char": 79722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D It may be stated that relying on Kunjukutty Sahib's(') case counsel for the appellants also challenged s. 8 (3) of the Act on the ground that it violates the second proviso to Art."}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79776, "end_char": 79780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79849, "end_char": 79856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79922, "end_char": 79936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79968, "end_char": 79975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80036, "end_char": 80043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1209_1242_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ".. .. • \"\n\nSASANKA SEKHAR MAITY & ORS. ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, CJ., P. N BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER,\n\nV. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN; JJ.]\n\nFixation of ceiling of agricultural holdings-Whether the provisions of Chapter JIB of the West Bengal Land &forms Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) inserted by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act TJI of\n\n1971) and replaced by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII of 1972) with retrospective effect from February 15, 1971 is violative of the second proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution.\n\nIn furtherance of the Direc(ive Principles enshrined in Article 39(b), agrarian reforn1 wa~ undertaken in the State of West Bengal in two stages. The -first was the stage of abolition of the zamindari system. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (Act I of !954) which received the assent of the President on February 12, 1954 has been placed in the Ninth Schedule as item No. 59, woas an Act to provide for the acquisition of estates of rights of intefmediaries therein and of certain rights of raiyats and under-raiyats.\n\nBy vfrtue of notification under s. 4 issued on .f\\pril 14, 1955 declaring April 15., 1955 to be the date of vesting the estates and the rights of intermediaries therein, vested in the State free from all encumbrances from that date.\n\nAfter the extinction of the feudal system of zamindari, the big landlords became interni.ediaries, but by virtue of s. 6(1)(a), {cl, (dl,\n\n(e) and (f), they were entitled to retain land comprised in homesteads, nonagricultural land in their khas possession not exceeding 15 acres, agricultural lands in their khas possession not exceeding 25 acres, tank fisheries and land comprised in tea gardens or orchards or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming or dairy.\n\nUnder s. 6(2) they became tenants of the State. The stage was thus set for the imposition of the ceiling on agricultural holdings.\n\nThe West Bengal Land Reform.< Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) caine into force on March 31, 1956.\n\nThe object and purpose of the Al:! as retlected in the preamble was to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent on the vesting of all estates and of ce.rtain rights therein in the State. This v1as followed by notification issued by the State Government under s. 49 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 on April 9, 1956. As a result of the notification under s. 49 the petitioners, who were raiyats, were deemed to be intermediaries and the lands owned and possessed by them as estates and all the lands and the petitioner's rights in such lands vested in the State with effect from April 10, 1956. But the petitioner as intermediaries were permitted to retain the lands as provided for in s. 6 (1).\n\nThis state of affairs continued till February 12, 1971 when the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act ill of 1971) caine into force. This was replaced in due coorsb, by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Ac~ 1972 (Act XII of 1972) with retrospective effect from February 12, 1971. These Acts brought about a drastic change by introducing\n\nchapter IIB for the imposition of a ceiling an agricultural holdingi;.\n\nAs a necessary consequence the Acts deleted s. 4(3) as \"'ell as s. 6.\n\nAs a\n\n18-610 SCT/80 1209\n\n' '\n\nresult of the deletion of s. 4(3), the right of retention of raiyats of agricultural lands to the extent of 25 acres was taken away and the deletion of s. 6(2) relieved the State of thi!· obligation to pay n1arket vaJue for acquisition of the surplus land.\n\nWest Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) and the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII of 1972), which introduced Chapter' IIB therein with retrospective effect fro111 February 12, 1971, have both been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Thirtyfourth Amendment) Act, 1974 being items 60 and 81 thereof.\n\nThey have thus the immunity of Article 3 IB besides being fully protected under Articles 31A and 31C.\n\nThe petitioners being aggrieved by these .agrarian reform challenged in these writ petitions the validity of definition of the term 'family' contained ins. 14K(c), JI.\n\nthe fixation of ceiling limits of a raiyat under s. 14M(l), the provision for ,. lands held, by the members of a family being clubbed under s. 14M(2) the avoidaru:e of transfers by s. 14P, the fixation of a ceiling limit on orchards under s. 140(2), the vesting of surplus land in the.State under s. 14S(l), the penal consequences for failure to file a return provided for in s. 14T( 4). the\n\nimpdsition of a restriction on transfers under s. 14U and the absence of a provision for pa)rment of compensation for acquisition of homestead under s. 14V.\n\nDismissing the petitions, the Court\n\n• •\n\nHELD: (!) Both Articles 31A and 31B were introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment Act) 19'57 with retrospetive effect with a view to validate zamindari abolition Acts and conferred immunity from challenge in Courts.\n\nArticle 3 lA was designed to facilitate agrarian reform as well as social control of the means of production. Article 3 IA reflects the intention of the Govern~ ment to immunise state legislations relating to imposition of ceiling on agri~ cultural holdings from the usual compensation required or other requirements of the, fundamental rights guaranteed under Part Ill which are most likely to\n\nl•fJ!l\n\n1!~-·:··\n\nbe invoked-Articles 14, 19 and 31. [1242 B-1223 C-D, F-H] ' ,.\n\nThe West Bengal Land Reform5 Act is a piece of social legiSlation for agrarian reform. The object of the legislation is to break up the concentration of ownership and control of the materia1 resources of the com.Inunity and to so distribute the same as best to subserve the common good, as enjoined by i\\rticle 39(b) of the Constitution.\n\nHaving regard to the quantity of land available in the State of West Bengal, which has the next highest per capita density in the whole of the country, the ceiling limits, is reasonable and fair.\n\nFor equitable distribution of the natural resources it was essential to design the Act as it is so that the surplus land is available for distn\"bution to the landless pcasantiy. The Act nukes available to each person of the community living below the poverty line, to some extent the minimum means of subsistence.\n\nIn order, therefore, to reconcile the fundamental rights of the community as a whole with the individual rights of the more fortunate section of the community, it was fundamentally necessary to make the impugned leizislation to secure to a certain extent the rights of that part of the community which is denied its legitimate share in the means of livelihood. [1224 F-H, 1225 Al\n\n,,\\!\\\n\n• •\n\nS. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION 1211\n\n(2) The broad objectivity of any iegislation relating to agrarian reform \"A .are D'1;3terially four, namely, ( i) to n1aximise the agricultural output and pro- .ductivity, (ii) a, fair and equitable distribution of agricultural income,\n\n(iii) increase in employment opportunities and (iv) a social or ethical order., Though the abolition of zamindari system in the State of West Bengal was .an important step forward the feudal structure remained so far as the peasants were. concerned.\n\nThese objectives have been achieved through progressive legislation. [1225 BCJ B\n\n(3) The ceiling on agricultural holdings once fixed cannot be static un \"1terable for all times. The expression \"any law for the time being in force\",\n\nobviously refera to t!.e law imposing a ceiling.\n\nHere, it is the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act JI! of 1971) and now the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Act Xll of 1972 l which introduced Chapter IIB imposing a new ceiling . on agricultural holdings of raiyats. That is the law for the time being in. force, and no land\n\nis being acquired by the State under s. 14L within the ceiling limits .prescribed therein. [1226 ACJ\n\nFurther the second proviso to Art. 31A(l) to the \"ceiling limit applicable to him\", \"1lich evidently refers to the law in question and not the earlier law~\n\n!hat is s. 6(1) of the West Bengal &tates Acquisition Act, 1953. Both D s. 4(3) and s. 6(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 stood deleted 'by the West Bengal Land Refo!UJS (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act\n\nIll of 1971) and thereafter by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 with retrospective effect from February 12, 1971. [1226 C-DJ\n\nThe ceiling limit introduced by s. 14M of the impugned Act which came into force on February 15, 1971, is the ceiling limit \"under the law for the time being in force\" within the meaning of the second proviso to Art. 31A(l).\n\nThat being so, the provisions of Chapter JIB have the constitutional immunity of Art. 31A and cannot be challenged on the grOund that they are inconsistent with, take away or abridge the fundamentaJ rights aranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or 31(2). Even if it were not so, they would be under the protective umbrella of Art. 3!B. Indubitably, the provisions of Chapter IlB are a law related to agrarian reform and thus protected. The challenge to the validity of the Constitution (Twentyninth Amendment) Act waS allowed to be raised as an additional ground in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and the court by majority of 7 : 6 upheld the validity of the twentyninth amendment. [1227\n\nE-G, 1228 FG] -\n\nKunjukutty v. State of Kera/a, [1973] 1 S.CR. 326 & 341, Malankara Rubber and Products Co. v. Stqte of Kera/a, [1973] I SCR 399 followed.\n\nKesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Supp. SCR 1 referred to.\n\n( 4) When Art. 3 IB was introduced In the Constitution by the Constitution (Fil1!t Aendment) Acly 1?51, it valida~ rctr~!'°°tively 1~ Acts speced in the Nmth Schedule, which, but for this pr<>vJSion, were hable !<> be =- pugned under Art. 13 (2).\n\nArticle 3 IB conte; red stitutional .in1munity to such lam (all being enactments of State Legislatures) and Parliament alone eould have done so by inserting the said Article in the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power under Art. 368. In substan~ and reality it was cons6tu\n\ntional device employed to protect State laws from becoming void under Art. 13(2). The language in Art. 31B is virtually lifted from Arts. 13(1) and (2) while article 13(2) invalidates legislation, which takes away or abridges tire rights confened by Part III, Art. 3 lB extends 'protective umbrella\" to such legislation.- if it is included in Ninth Scheduele and, therefor'e, the Court will have no poW'er w go into the constitutionality of the enactments as' included in the Ninth :schedule except on the ground of want of legislative competence. [1229 C-F]\n\n(5) The definition of 'family' as contained ins. 14K(c) of the Act is more realistic than the definitions of this term in similar laws for imposition of ceiling on agricultural holding,. enacted in other States. The definition is much wider, and far more generous and humane because it takes into consideration. the existence of a widowed and divorced daughter, v.lhich is absent in other Acts. 1he meaning given by Explanation l to an adult unmarried person is an inclusive one and it includes a daughter who has been divorced.\n\nThis necessarily also includes a widowed daughter.\n\nBy the proviso added lo Explanation It where such widowed daughter is the guardian o~ any minor son or unruarried daughter, or both, she, together with such minor son or unmarried daughter. or both, shall be det:u1ed to be a separate family.\n\nShe, therefore, is treated to be a raiyat in her own right in relation to her family and her holding is not clubbed with that of her father under s. 1411(2). The benefit provided to a divorced daughter would, obviously, also extend to a widowed dau'iI1ter.\n\nE..icplanation 11 deals with the spouse as in relation to a raiyat who is a woman, reference in Gause (c) to wife's son or daughter shall be construed as reference to the husband'~ son or daughter, respectively of such wo1nan.\n\nThe Legislature on a correct perspective has enlarged the definition of a family to the maximum possible exten't, :ind provides for a<> n1any as nine members.\n\n[1230 H, 1231 A-C]\n\nThe marginal cases wherein normally in the fan1ily of a raiyat he has his parents io maintain would be very few. Normally, the father of a raiyat would have his separate holding and would be entitled to a separate ceiling area of his own determined under s. 14M. The Legislature had to draw a line somewhere.\n\nBy s. 14lvl(2) (b) it provided for augn1enting of the holding of a raiyat to the etent of 7 .0 standard hectares by taking into account five plus four, that is, nine members. [1231 C-E]\n\n(6) The creation of an artificial concept of family and ni.aking provIS1on for the clubbing together of land holding of each member of the family are f not violative of the second proviso to Art. 31A(l), an~ even if they were, protected hy Art. 31B. This had necessarily to be done for achieving_ the purpose and object of the legislation, that is, imposition of a cciling on agricultural holding.\n\nThe provisions of Chapter IIB in the Act are a law for imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings of raiyats and are not a_ law for enlargement of such holdings, that is, these put a limit on the maximum limit of a holding of a raiyat.. The Act adopts the individual as the unit and not the family and allows for augmentation of his holding depending upon the normal concept of a family.\n\n[1231 B-GJ\n\n(7) Thete is no question of conferral of any new rights of minor son or ttril:oorrie<f dalighter, as they' would be included in the father's famHy,. whO'\n\n• •\n\nS. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION 1213\n\n.rould get a much larger ceiling of 5 to 7 standard hectares, depending upon the number of children that he has.\n\nNothing prevents a minor son or the unmarried daughter of a raiyat, like his parents, from acquiring property of their own subsequently by inheritance or transfer. It is difficult to envisage a family ' .consisting of 18 members in present times.\n\nNor can the Legislature be ex- .P<Cted to provide for all contingencies because according to s. 14M(b) the .raiyat would be entitled to retain no more than 7 standard hectares, that is, 5 standard hectares for his family up to 5 members and 5.50 standard hectares per head for four other members. The extent of the holdings on which ceil- • ing is fixed varies deplending upon whether it is an irrigated area or aiy other area.\n\nThere is no arbitrariness arid indeed there is no substantial decrease in '1he limit. One standard hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres. The ceiling limits, therefore, work out to 6.18 acres in the case of. an individual, and 12.35 1o 17.29 acres of irrigated land, in the case.of a family, which, in the Oangetic . plains of West Bengal, is n. ot small by any standard.\n\nIn other areas, the ,.! -ceiling limit varies from 8.64 to 24.2 acres.\n\nAccording to agro-ewnomists, an -economic holding is of 5 to 7 acres. [1232 A-C, E-F, 1233 0-H, 1234 A-BJ\n\nIf is not possible to lay down a ceiling standard or prescnDe one limit in terms of fixed acreage for general application throughout the coontry. The productivity of land is not the same in all areas, due allowance has to be made for varying local conditions.\n\nAs per the suggestions made by the four Five- Year Plans. and the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, the ceiling limits were mainly prescribed.\n\nSome States put a ceiling limit on the bolding of an individual owner while the othersimposed a ceiling on family holding. In the States where a ceiling was imposed on individual holding there was greater scope for mala fide transfers than where the ceiling was iDlpO!led on the aggregate area held by all the members of the family. In the latter case there was. no inducemCnt to eifect transfers bet-\n\n-ween the mentbers of the family as their share had already been given due ' recognition. [1234 9'E)\n\n(8) The fixation of a. back date is a usual legislative device to prevent avoidance of change brought about by law. The date mentioned in s. 14 does l>ear a reasonable nexm with th• obje<t or purpose of the legislation. The West\n\nBengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act. 1971 while inserting Chapter II B eaa<tcd s. t•P pr6\"iding that in detemrining the ceiling area of a raiyat any \"transfer elleclbl by sale, gilt or otherwise or by a partition by him after\n\nAugust 7, 1969 and before February 8, 1971, i.e.,.th• daie of pnblicalion of the Act in the official Gazette shall not 1'e taken into aCC-OUDt and the land shall be deemed to form part of the holding of the raiyat.\n\nBy a legal fiction, such ttBmofcrs W\"e pres9*teG! to be ma/a fide as they were calcnlated to defeat the -ceiling law. [1235 J>.F1\n\nG The w .. t Belli31 I.end Reforms (Second Amendment) Bill, 1%9 was published in the offl•ial Gazette oo that date. Though the amendmcllt primarily related to re-assessmelll of revenue, the concept of ''family\" was first sought to be ifttroduced in the West Bengal Land. RefonD$ Act by that amendment. The 'kwd--holders, therefore, had a f°\"\"-warning that the concept of family may come inlo play in tho detemililation of ceiling area of lalld. Prior to the said amend\n\nment, the proposed . legislation ceiling adopted individual as a unit and not the R family. Unless a date-line is' fixed in the mat tor of oeiling or similar agrarian nforms, the very pt1!JIOIC of tht legislation would be fruslntod. The soope and\n\neffect of s. 14P are that all agriculture lands transferred after August 7, 1969 shall be taken into account in computing the ceiling of the raiyat. The effect \\Vas that the ceiling virtually imposed treating the family as the unit in s. 14M\n\n(2) was given a retrospective effect by s. 14P. with effect from August 7, 1969.\n\n[1235 G-H, 1236 A-BJ\n\n(9) Section 14U provides that except where he is permitted, in writing, by the Revenue Officer so to do, a raiyat owning land in excess of the ceiling area\n\napplicable to him under s. 14M, shall not, after the publication of the Act in the official Gazette, i.e., February 8, 1971, transfer, by sale, gift or otherwise or make any partition of any land owned by him or any part thereof until the excess land which is to vest in the State under s. 14S, has been determined and taken possession of by or on behal£ of the St.re. Such provisions are to be found in all the Acts passed by different States relating to imposition of ceilins on agricultural land and indeed they are essential for implementing the scheme of the Act. [1236 B-DJ\n\nIn acutal implementation, the prov1s1on of these Acts \\Vere circun1vented to a large extent by the making of fraudulent transfers. Transfers .of rights in land could be effected by one of several ways such as sale, mortgage. gift and exchange. The Act by s. 14P provides that transfers effected before the dale of D publication of the Act and after August 7, 1969 shall I1ot be taken into consideration. The legislature fixed August 7. 1969 as the date from w\\ich all such transfers or partitions shall be deemed to have been. effected with the intention of defeating the laiw.\n\nSuch transfers were presumed to be ma/a fide as they had taken place in anticipation of the enactment and, therefore, liable to be ignored. As the ceiling was fixed for each individual raiyat and not the family,. as a unit, there was practica.lly noi limit to, the amount Of land that could be held\n\n• •\n\ni •\n\nE by a family in this , Nay, and therefore, the legislature had to insert~- 141\\.1(2) for their shares to be clubbed tog, ther. There \\Vere plenty of reasons to believe that splitting of big holdings betweell members of the family had taken place on considerable scale in anticipation of the legislation. [1236 D-01\n\n(10) There is no absolute bar under section 14U against transfers till the determination of the ceiling area under s. 14M.\n\nAs regards s. 14U the fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property guaranteed under Art. 19( 1) (f) was subject to the right of the Sta.te to impose reasonable restrictions under Art. 19(6). The legislature was fu1ly competent to lay down the maximuin limit on an agricultural. holding and make ancillary provisions to n1ake the f law effective by avoidance of transfers. These provisions contained in s. 14P and s. 14U a.re without which the 'vhole object of enacting Chapter II B for the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural holdings would hav'e been completely frustrated. [1236 G-H. 1237 A-Bl\n\n( 11) The, expression \"agricultural land'\" js wide enough to include an orchard.\n\nThrefore an orchard as defined in s. 140(2) does not come within the definition of land in s. 2(7).\n\nAny contrary construction would imply that there would be no ceiling on agrieultural hold!ings in larg'e tracts of land in thedistrict of Malda which is famous for its mango orchards. Tue legislature by enacting s. 140 (2) treats the land comprised in orchards as falling within the purview of s. 14M, but having rega.rd to the fact that there is a sufficient cluster of fruit-bearing trees in an orchard, which precludes the utilisation of the\n\nland comprised therCin or subtantial portion thereof for effective cultivation,.\n\n.. ;._ • .. • •\n\nS. SBKHARMAITY V. UNION 1215\n\nallows an additional . area of 2 standard hectares -for _each raiyat.\n\nThere is A nothing wrong in the provision contained in s. 140(2). On the contrary, it is a very reasonable provision. [1237 G-H, 1238 A-CJ\n\n(12) Section 14V provides that compensation for vesting of any land in the State under the provisions of Chapter IIB shall be determined on the principles and in the manner as specified in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. The absence , of a provision for payment of compensation in respect of orchards in Chapter Ill of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 does not mean that no compensation is to. be determined or is not payable under s. 14V.\n\nIn such a case, the general Provisions relating to payment -of cOmpensation in respect 'of acquisition of land will apply. The principle on which, and the manner in which, compensation is to be determined aJ\\d given are et out in ss. 16 and 17. Section 16 provides for computation the net an nual income of land. Section 17 provides that the amount of compensation shall be a multiple of the net annual income, the multiple depending upon the extent of income. The multiple ranges from two to twenty times. The compensation has to be calculated according to the graded scale in the table given iI1i s. 17. [1238 E, H, 1239 A-BJ\n\nwhere the leg'islature has 13.id down the principles for computation, the amount of compenSation is not justiciable after the Fourth Amendment. It , c3.nnot be asserted that compensation payable for acquisition of land comprised in orchards jn e:xcess of the ceiling limit in s. 140(2), according to the provisions of s. 14V is illusory. Where the law provides for payment of compensation as much as twenty times the annual income, it is virtually the capitalised value.\n\nThepetitioners who own orchards would, therefore, get much more iis the income. derived by them would be greater than the raiyats holding land in excess of the ceiling limit in s. 14M(2). [1239 B-DJ\n\n(13) The definition of 'land_' as contained ins. 2(7) is an inclusive one and it means agriculfural land other than land comprised in a tea-garden and includes homestead but does not include tank. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter IIB shall apply \":'here the homestead is included in the record of rights as forming part of an agricultural holding.\n\nAgricultnral holding or a raiyat includes bis homestead and the raiyat can_ retain land including homestead under s. 14M(l) up to 7 standard hectares in.irrigated area and 8.9 standard hectares in unirrigated areas.\n\nA raiya.t \\VOuld be entitled to get compensation under s. 14B. according\" to the principles specified in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. [1239 D-FJ\n\n(14) Raiyats are entitled to retain the homestead, Normally raiyats wou1d not be affected as they would be allowed to retain their homesteads as falling within the ceiling limits allowed under s. 14M. [1239 G-HJ\n\nProvisions have been made ins. 16(l)(a) of the Estates Acquisition Act and also in Rule 15(b) and (d) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules, 1954 to provide the procedure for arriving at the comp_ensation for any; homestead if such homestead falls wjthin the category of agricultural land, i.e., where it is so entered in the record of rights as part of agricultural holding of a raiyat If a homestead is entered in the record of rights as non-agricultural land or as a\n\n-q\n\npart of a non-agricultural holding, it does not come within the purview of the Act, and, therefore, the question of vesting of s.uch homestead does not arise.\n\nA raiyat is within his rights IQ retain land upto the <:oiling liJ:nit applicable to\n\nA hi1n in accordance with s. 14M and s. 14T. Thus a raiyat is at liberty to retain his homestead and not to allow it to be vested in or acquired by the State under the Act.\n\nIt is expected that normally raiyats would retain thir homesteads and, therefore, the question of ousting them from their homesteads dOes not arise at all. In other cases, where raiyats willingly give up their homestead to be vested in the State, i.e., to be acquired by the State, without desiring to retain the same within the ceiling area applicable to him, the question of pay- B ment of compensation will a.rise and in such cases, compensation would be computed in accordance withs. 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Estates Acquisition Act read with Ruic !5(b) and (d) of the Estates Acquisition' Rules. (1240 A, D, E, F-H]\n\n( 15) The power of eminent domain 'vhich is inherent in every sovereign State, must be capable of being exercised against every property held by any person in the State.\n\nBeing a fundamental attribute of sovereignty of State one cannot imagine that the framers of the Constitution intended to divest the State of that attribute by implication in the case of property owned by a priv.ate trust.\n\nJust as the property of a private trust is hekl subject to a. law imposing a tax upon it, so also is that property subject to the eminent domain of the State.\n\n(1241 C-D]\n\nAll that s. 14M(5) provides is that land owned by a trust of endowment other than of a public nature, shaH be deemed to be land owned by the bene~ ficiary of the trust or endowment, and each such beneficiary shall be deen1ed to be a raiyat under the Act to the extent of the share of his benefieial intere~! in the said trust or endowment. What is of essence is the capacity i.n which the land is hekt. If a raiyat is a beneficiary of a pri:va.te trust his beneficial interest consists in the offerings or income.\n\nThe provision in effect pres- C>iloes lhal the land should be clubbed foothe computa.tioo of the ceiling a<ea under s. 14M(l). The imposition of suoh a ceiling woold no doubt reduce the holding of the trust but the Government has the power under s. 140(3) to increase the ceiling area in certain cases. Where the Government is satisfied that a corporationor institution established exclusively for a charitable or relfgious pttl]X)Se or bot1i., for which a ceiling limit is prescribed under s. 140( 1) or a person holding any land in, trust or in pursuance of any other endowment. creating a legal obligation exchlsively for a purpose which charitable or religious, or both, requires land, as distinct from the income of such land, for the clue perfOmtance of its obligation, it may having rgard to all the circumstances of the case, increase the ceiling area for such corporation or institutiOR or person to such extent as it may deem fit. The legislature has, threfore, provided adequate safeguards under s. 140(3) to soften the rigour of the Act in relation to 1eligious and charitable trusts. (1241 EH, 1242 A}\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 111-l I 4, 201, 208 ., 738, 885 and 944 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution). '\n\n• • • •\n\nB. K. Datta and S. s. Majumdar and Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind for ._i the Petitioi:iern in WP Nos. 111-114 & 208.\n\nD. P. Mukhe•jee and A. K. Ganguli for the Petitioners in WP H No. 944.\n\nM. N. Plwdke, Am/au Ghosh and Mir Mohanuned Asfuz for the Petitioners in WP 738: .\n\n• ..\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION .(Sen,!.) 1217\n\nM. N. Phadke, P. K. Sahana and Sukumar Ghosh for the Peti- A tioners in WP 885.\n\nA L. N. Sinha, Att. Gen). S. N. Kacker, Govind Mukhoty and Rathin IJas for the Appearing Respondents .\n\nP. K. Pillai for the applicant intervener in WP 208 .\n\nThe Jufigment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN J.\n\nIn this batch of writ petitions, the main question that falls for determination, is whether the provisions of Chapter llB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Ae,1, 1955 (Act X of 1956) inserted\n\nby the West Bengal Land Reforms '(Amendment) Art, 1971 ( Presi- -Oent's Act III <lf 1971), and replaced by the West Bengal Land\n\nReforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII of 1972) with retrosL\n\npective effect from February 15, 1971, which provide for a fixation -0f ceiling on agricultural holdings and for matters ancillary thereto,\n\nare violative of the second proviso to Art. 31A (1.) of the Constitution.\n\nThe challenge in particular is to the validity of the definition of -the term 'family' coniaiaed in s. 14 K ( c) , the fixation of ceiling limits\n\nof a iaiyat under s. 14M(l), the provision for lands held by the\n\nmbers of a family being cl\\lbbed under s. 14M(2), the avoidance e>f transfers. by s. 14 P, t&e fixation of a ceiling limit oo orchards ul!liler s. 140 ( 2) , the vesting of surplus land in the State under s. l4S(l), the penal consequences f-Or failure to file a return pro- vided for in s. 14T( 4), the imposition of a restriction on transfers under s. 14U and the abseilce of a provision for payment of compellSlltion for acquisition of homestead under S 14V.\n\nIt would be convenient t-0 refer, in the first place, to the legislative changes brought about in the State of West Bengal in furtherance of\n\n~ the Directive Principles enshrined i'n Art. 39 (b). Agriuian reform\n\nwas ondl:rtalren in two stages. The first was the stage of abolition Of the zamindari system. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (Act I of 1954) which received the assent of the Pesident on February 12, 1954, and has been placed in the Ninth Schedule as item No. 59, was an Act to provide for the acquisition of estates, ' of rights of intermediaries therein and of certain rights of raiyats and under-raiyats.\n\nBy virtue of notification under s. 4 issued on April 14, 1955 declaring April 15, 1955 to be the date of ting, the .estates and the rights of intermediaries therein, vested in the State\n\n-free from all encumbrances from that' date.\n\nSection 5 provided that on and from the date of vei; ting, the estates and the rights of intermediaries in the estates shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances.\n\nSection 6 (1) provided that, notwithstanding anything contained i'n ss. 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, subject to certain conditions, be entitled to retain (a) land comprised .in homesteads, .(c) non-agricultural land in his khas possession not exceeding 15 acr~ in area, and excluding any land retained under cl. (a), (d) agricul\n\ntural land in his khas possession not exceeding twenty-five acres in area, as may be chosen by him, ( e) tank fisheries, and (f) land comprised in tea gardens or orchards or land used for the pmpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming or dairy etc. Sub-section ( 2) thereof provided that, an intermediary who was entitled to retain posseS5ion of any land under subs. ( 1), shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant.\n\nChapter YI of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, which provided for acquisition of interest of raiyats and Ullderraiyats, however, did not come into force on the publication of the' notification under s. 4 for the acquisition of estates and the right& of the intermediaries therein with effect from April 15, 1955. That ' was' because s. 49 provided that this Chapter was to come into force,\n\non such date as the Government may by notificatio_n appoint. .BY s. 52 it was provided that on the issue of a notification under s. 49, the provisions of Chapters ll, III, V and VII were to apply, with. such modification as may be necessary, mutatis mutandis to raiyats\n\nand under-raiyats as if such raiyats and under-raiyats were inter mediaries and land held by them were estates.\n\nAfter the extinction of the feudal system of zamindari, the big landlords became intermediaries, but by vjrtue of s. 6(1)(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f), they were entitled to retain land comprised in homesteads, non-agncultural land in their khas possession not exceeding 15, acres, agricultural lands in their khas possession not exceeding 25 acres, tank fisheries and land comprised in tea gardens or orchards or land nsed for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming or dairy.\n\nUnder s. 6(2), they became tenants of the State. The stage was thus set for the imposition of a ceiling oil agricutural holdings.\n\nThe West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) came into force on March 31, 195 6. The object ana purpose of the Act, as reflected in the preamble, was to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent on the vesting of all estates and of certain rights therein in the State. This was followed by a Notificatioru\n\nissued by the State Government under s. 49 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 on April 9, 1956.\n\nAs a result of thenotification s. 49, the petitioners who are raiyats, were deemed to\n\n• •\n\n,. •\n\n• 4\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION (Sen, /.) 1219\n\nbe 'intermediaries' and the lands owned and possessed by them as A estates, and all the lands and the petitioners' rights in such lands vested in the State with effect from April 10, 1956. But the petitioners as intermediaries were permitted to retain the lands as provided for ins. 6(1) .\n\nThis state of affairs continued ti!; February 12, 1971) when the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act III of 1971) came into force.\n\nThis was replaced in due course, by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII of 1972) with retrospective effect from February 12, 1971.\n\nThese Acts brought about a drastic change by introducing Chapter II B for ihe imposition of a ceiling on agriculttiral holdinlli_ As a necessary consequence the Acts deleted s. 4(3) as well as 6.\n\nAs a result of the deletion of s. 4(3), the right of retention of raiyats of agricultural lands to the extent of 25 acres was taken away and the deletion of s. 6(2) relieved the State of the obligation to pay\n\nmarket value for acquisition of the surplus land.\n\nWest Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956)· and the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII\n\nof 1972), which introduced Chapter XIB therein with retrospective effect from February 12, 1971, have both been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Thirtyfourth Amendment) Act, 1974 being items 60 and 81 thereof.\n\nThey have thus the immunity of E Art. 31B, be.ides being full protected under Arts. 31A and 31C. ·\n\nLearned counsel for the petition_ers, however, seeks to achieve a break-through in three ways.\n\nIn the first place, he contends that Art: 31A is not atracted because of the breach of the second proviso to Art 31A(1) inasmuch as Chapter IIB provides for acquisition of land within the ceiling limits applicable to the petitioners without making provision for payment of compensation at the market value.\n\nIn the second place, he argues i'n the alternative, that the Parliament cannot in exercise of its constituent power under Art. 368 validate a State law.\n\nThirdly; he tries to get over Arts. 31 B and 31 C on the ground that in so far as the provisions of Chapter IIB are inconsistent with or take away or abridge the fundamehtal right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, they affect the 'basic structure' of the Constitution.\n\nEven if the right to property does not from a basic structure of the Constitution, he contends that Chapter IIB is bad as it offends Arts. 14 and 31. ·\n\nIt is urged that the lowering of the ceiling area of agricultural holdings by s. 14M from 25 acres, which the petitio'ners as raiyats\n\nwere entitled to retain under s. 4(3) of the Act, since deleted by the President's Act 3 of 1971 and Act 12 of 1972, to seven standard hectares, in the case of a raiyat having a family consisting of more than five members infringes Arts. 14, 19(1) (f) and 31(2) of the constitution.\n\nThe submission is that such lowering of the ceiling area, in the case of a raiyat, is tantamount to acquisition of land,\n\nwithin the ceiling limits applicable to him and, therefore, s. 14V of the Act which provides for payment of compensation according to the provisions contained in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, and not for payment of compensation at a rate equivalent to the market value thereof, offends against the second proviso to Art. 31A(l).\n\nI Various other questions are also raised viz., the artificial definition of family contained in s. 14K(c) beam no reasonable nexus with the traditio'nal concept of a family in West Bengal.\n\nThe acquisition of orchards as defined ins. 14K(e), for which a ceiling area is fixed at 2.0 standard hectares bys. 140(2) is ultra vires the State\n\nLegislature 'as orchards cannot be treated as land as defined in s. 2(7). The taking away of homesteads, which the petitioners were entitled to retain under s. 6( 1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act without making any provision for payment of market value thereof deprives them of property without payment of compensation in violation of Art. 31 ( 2). The provisions of s. 14P which provide that in determining the ceiling area any transfer effected by sale, gift or otherwise or by a partition by a raiyat after August 7, 1969, but before !he date of publication in the Official Gazette of President's Act 3 of 1971, i.e., February 8, 1971 shall be taken into account as if such 1aoo had not been tran5ferred or partitioned, as the case may be, in effect, virtually amounts to taking away of land within the ceiling area prescribed for him by s. 14M and is thus bad:\n\nIt is further urged that the restriction on transfer of land by a raiyaJ imposed by s. 14U is an, unreasonable restriction and, therefore, offends against Art. 19(l)(f). The validity of s, 14(5) by which property belonging to a private trust 9r endowment, is treated to be property belonging to the beneficiaries, i.e., shebaits, and each such shcbait to be a raiyat to the extent of the share of his benefi.cial interest in the said trust or endowment, is assailed on the ground that it _ abridges the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 26.\n\nLastly, it is said, tlie fixation of a ceiling area by s. 14M, at a fiat rate, irrespective of the nature and quality of the soil at 2.50\n\nstandard heclaJ'es in the case of a raiyat, who is an adult, unmarried\n\n• • • •\n\n'\" iii\n\n• •\n\n' I\n\nS. SEKHARMAITY V. UNION (Sen, J.) 1221\n\nperson, or the sole surviving ihember of a family; 5.0 standard hec- A. tares in the case of a raiy!t having a family consisting of two or more members, but not more than five members, and 7.0 standard heel tares in the case of a raiyat having a family consisting of more than five members, is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and void .\n\nCh.aper IIB consists of ss. 14J to 14 Y and bears the heading 'Ceiling on Holdings'. The scheme of this chapter is as follows: Section 14J gives to the provisions of this Chapter on over-riding . effect by a norr.-obstante clause. Section 14K deals with the definition of the terms used in various sections. The expression \"ceiling area\" as defined in cl. (a) means the extent of land which a raiyat shall be entitled to own. The definition of 'charitable purpose' in\n\ncl. (b) is an inclusive one and it includes relief of the poor, medical relief or the advancement of education or of any other object of general public utility. The term 'family' is defined in cl. ( c) , and the ·xpression 'irrigated area' in cl. (d). The term 'orchard' is defined in cl. (e) and the expression 'standard hectare' in cl. (f).\n\nSection 14L provides that, on and from the date of the commencement of the provisions of Chapter IIB of the Act, no raiyat shall be entitled to own, in the aggregate, any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him nnder s.14M.\n\nThe provisions of s. 14M lay down the ceiling area with respect\n\nto different classes of raiyats and it varies from 2.50 standard hect- E ares depending on wht:ther he is an adult unmarried person to 7.0 standard hectares, if he has a family consisting of more . than five\n\nmembers.\n\nThis again varies depending UJlOll the nature of the land as the expression 'standard hectares' as defined in s. 14K(f) means, in relation to an agricultural land, an extent of land equivalent to\n\n1.00 hectare in an irrigated area and 1.40 hectares in any\n\nF other area.\n\nSection l 4N provides for the determination of irrigated area and s. 140 provides for an appeal against such determination. Section l 4P provides that in determining the ceiling area, any land which was transferred by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned, by a raiyat after August 7, 1969, but before the date of publication in the official Gazette,• of the West Bengal Land c Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971, i.e., February 8, 1971 shall be taken into account as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned, as the case may lie.\n\nThe ceiling area for a co-operative society, company, co-operative farming society, Hindu undivided family of a firm, is provided Rt for by snb;-s. (1) of s. 140. Snb-<1ection (2) thereof prescribes the ceiling area of an orchard at 2.0 standard hectares or the actual.\n\na1'Ca comprised in such orchard whichever is the l•osser.\n\nSubsection (2A) provides that in determining a ceiling area of trust or\n\ninstitution of a public nature, established exclusively for a charitable or religious purpose or both, the number of its centres. or branches in the State established before August 7, 1969 which do not hold any land as a raiyat shall be taken i'nto account and each such centre or branch shall be deemed to be a raiyat for the purpose of cl. (e) of sub-s. (1) of s. 14M, but the ceiling area of such trust or institution shall not exceed the sum total of the ceiling area of each such centre or branch and of itself.\n\nSub-section\n\n(3) provides that, if the State Government after havi'ng regard . to all the circnmstances of the case, is satisfied that a corporation C or institutiol! established exclusively for a charitable or religious purpose, or both, or a person holding any land in trust, or in pursuance of any other endowment, creating a legal obligation exclusively for a purpose which is charitable or religious, or both requires land, as distinct from the income derived from such land, for the due\n\nperformance of its obligation, it may, by notification in the official Gazette, increase the ceiling area of such corporation or institution or person to such extent as it may think fit.\n\nSection 14R confers exemption from the provisions of s. 14M to certain classes of raiyats like a local authority or any body or authority constituted or established by or under any law for time being in force.\n\nThe vesting of la'nd in excess of ceiling area is provided for by s. 14S, the duty of raiyat to furnish a return is enjoined by s. 14T.\n\nSection 140 interdicts that, except where he is permitted, a raiyat owning land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under s. 14M, shall not, after the publication i'n the 'Official Gazette, of the Act, i.e., after February 8, 1971, transfer by sale, gift or otherwise or make a partition of land owned by him or any part thereof, until! the excess land, which is to vest in the State under s. 14S, has been determined and taken possession of by a'nd on behalf of the State.\n\nSection 14V lays down the mode of computation of compensation payable for the vesting of the surplus land in the State.\n\nSection 14W provides for payment of damages.for use and occupation of land in excess of the ceiling area by a raiyat if he continues to po~Si ess snch land after the commencement of Chapter IIB. Section 14X bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide or deal with any question or determine, any matter which is by or under this Chapter required to be decided or dealt with or to be determined by Revenue Officer or other authority specified therein and no orders passed or proceedings commenced nnder the provisions of this\n\ni •\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION (Sen, !. ) 1223\n\nChapter shall be called in question in any Civil Court. Section 14Y A provides that if after the commencement of this Chapter,, any raiyat acquires any land, whether by transfer, inheritance or otherwise, and such land, together with the land owned by him, exceeds the ceiling area applicable to him under s. 14M, the area of la'nd which is in excess of snch ceiling area shall vest -in the State .. and aU the provisions of this' Chapter relating to ceiling on holding B shall apply to such land.\n\nThe principal qnestion for consideration in these. writ petic tions is, whether in view of Art. 31 A of the Constitution, any of the provisions of Chapter JIB can successfully be impngned for the reason that they violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Arts. 14, 19(1) (f) and 31(2).\n\nBoth Arts. 31 A aad 3 lB were introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 with retrospective effect with a view to validate zamindari abolition Acts, and confer immunity\n\nfrom ohallCnge in Courts. It must be remembered that the o First Amendment was by the First Parliament, i.e., by the Founding Fathers who were the members of the Constituent Assembly.\n\nThey having given to the citizen the rights guaranteed by Part ill of the Constitution, felt that 'primacy' must be given to certain legislations, particularly the laws relating to agrarian reform, over the i:njoyment by the citizen .of his fundamental rights. It was with !hat E 'J f object that Art. 3 IA was designed, i.e. in order to facilitate agrarian reform as well as social control of the means of production.\n\nBy 1955, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the abolition of zamindari had been in large part accomplished throughout the country except in the state of West Bengal. There remained, F and wre to remain for many years, the next stage of agrarian ·\\ change-the imposition of C!Jiling to prevem large holdings, the\n\n~ consolidation f fragmented holdings, and the development of village panchayats for effective village planning and management.\n\nThe statement of objects and Reasons clearly brought out the intention\n\n~ of the Government, to immunize State legislations relating to impo- G sition of ceiling on agricultural. holdings from the usual compensation required or other requirements of the fundamental rights guarf'..r anteed under Part Ill, which were most likely to be invoked- Arts. 14, 19 and 31. The new Art. 31A, as revised by the FOUrth\n\nAmendment in 1955 was in a sense less sweeping than the provi• sion introduced by the First Amendment, exempting laws from the H effect of only three of the fundamental rights-Arts. 14, 19 and 31, instead of the entire Part Ill, whiCh contains all the rights.\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS\n\n[ 1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\n'A The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 made important changes in the definition of 'estates' in Art. 31A(2) in order expressly to include ryotwari interests and measures affecting all kinds of land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary .A thereto.\n\nB ''----- Article 3!A(l), as it stands, provides that no law providing for acquisition of any estate or any rights therein or the modification or extinguishment of any such rights in an estate shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it violates the fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 and 31. Undoubtedly, Art. 31A is attracted when the law in question is one for agrarian reform.\n\nC By adding a proviso to Art. 31A(.1), which, it will be recalled, states that no law providing for the acquisition, modification or extinguishment of property rights of specified kinds (includiug acquisition of estates or modification of rights therein) shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges D any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 . or 31, a change wao. brought about. It reads :\n\n\"Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivtion, it shall not be lawful for the State to E acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the F market value thereof.\"\n\nThe Act is a piece of social legislation for agrarian reform. The object of the legislation is to break up the concentration of ownership j and control of the material resources of the community and to so distribute the same as best to subserve the common good, as enjoined by\n\nG Art. 39 (b) of the Constitution. Having regard to the quantity of f land available in the State of West Bengal, which has the highest per capita density in the whole of the country, the ceiling limits appear to be rease>nable and fair.\n\nFe>r equitable distribution e>f the natural -,.x rese>urces, it was essential to design the act as it is so that the surplus land is available for distributie>n to the landless peasantry. The Act H makes available to each person of the conamunity living below the poverty line, to some extent the minimum means e>f subsistence. In order,\n\ntherefore, to reconcile the fundamental rights of the community as a\n\n• •\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION (Sen,!.) 1225\n\nwhole with the individual rights of the more fortunate section of the A community, it was fundamentally necessary to make . the impugned legislation to secure to a certain extent the rights of that part of the community which is denied its legitimate share in the means of livelihood.\n\nThe broad objectives of any legislation relating to agrarian reforms are materially four viz., (1) to maximise the agricultural output and productivity, (2) a fair and equitable distribution of agricultural income, ( 3) increase in employment opportunities, and ( 4) a social or ethical order. Though the abolition of the zamindari system in the State of West Bengal was an important step forward, the feudal structure remained so far as the peasants were concerned. These objectives have been achieved through progressive legislation.\n\nIt is argued that sub-s. (1) of s. 6 of the West\" Bengal Estates Acquisition Acr, 1953 imposed a ceiling on holdings, as it allowed all intermediaries to retain 25 acres of agricultural land in their khas\n\np0ssession, which became applicable to raiyats and under-raiyats who were deemed to be such intermediaries upon the issue of a notification under s. 49 on April 14, 1956.\n\nThe ceiling limit thus imposed was continued by sub-s. (3) of s. 4 of the West Bengal Land reforms Act, 1955.\n\nOne has to see, it is urged whether there was a law in force, i.e., a law imposing a ceiling when the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act ID of 1971) was brought into force on February 12, 1971 or the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII of 1972) which replaced it with retrospective effect from that date. Once that test is fulfilled it is said, the second proviso to Art. 31A(l) is clearly attracted. It is, further urged that if the ceiling limit of a raiyat in respect of agricultural land under his personal cultivation is curtailed by any subsequent Act prescribing a new ceiling limit, it becomes obligatory for the State to give market value with regard to the land acquired under the new Act.\n\nThe submission rests on the assumption that the expression 'any law for the time being in force', appearing in the second proviso to Art, 31A(l) must mean here in this case the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Our attention is drawn to s. 52 which provides that upon the issue of a notification under s. 49, the provisions of Chapters II, ID, V and VII shall, with such modifications as may be necessary, apply mutatis mutandf,<; to raiyats and under-raiyats as if such raiyats and under-raiyats were intermediaries and the land held by them were estates.\n\nWe are afraid, we cannot accept this line of reasoning. There is an apparent fallacy in the argument.\n\n19-610 SC0/80\n\nSuch a construction, if we may say so, would create a serious impediment to any kind of agrarian reform. The ceiling on agricultural holdings once fixed cannot be static, unalterable for all times.\n\nThe expression 'any law for the time being in force', obviously refers to the law imposing ceiling. Here it is the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act III of 1971) and now the West Bengal Lund Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Act XII ot\n\n1972) .which introduced Chapter IIB imposing a new ceiling on agrtcult; ural holdings of raiyats.\n\nThat is the la\"'1 for the time being in force, and no land is being acquired by the State under s. 14L within the ceiling limits prescribed therein.\n\nIt will be noticed that the second proviso to Art. 31A(l) refers to the 'ceiling limit applicable to him', which evidently refers to the law in question and natl earlier law, that is s. 5(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. It will be noticed that both s. 4(3) and s. 6(2) of the West Benga1 Land Reforms Act, 1955 stood deleted by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act III of 1971) and thereafter by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 with retrospective effect from February 12, 1971.\n\nThe point in controversy is no longer res i11tegra.\n\nThe question directly came up for consideration in Kunjukutty v. State of KeralaC) and l\\1alankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kera/a.(') In Kunjukutty's case the Court disposed of a contention similar to that raised before us. It was urged that when the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, by s. 82 reduced the ceiling limit and required surrender of the land held in excess of the limit fixed by the Amendment Act, without payment of compensation at market value, it violated the constitutional inhibition contained in the second proviso to Art. 31A(l). In repelling the contention, it was observed :\n\n\"It was not disputed that. the ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act was within the competence of the legislature to fix; nor was it contended that the ceiling fixed by the original unamended Act by itself debarred the legislature from further reducing the ceiling limit so fixed.\n\nPrior to the amendment undoubtedly no land within the personal cultivation of the holder under the unamended Act within the ceiling limit fixed thereby could be acquired without payment of compensation according to the market value, but once ceiling limit was changed by the amended A ct, the second proviso to Art. 31-\n\n(1) [1973] I SCR 326 @ 341\n\n[1973] 1 SCR 399.\n\n' •\n\n• •\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. UNIO'N (Sen, J.) 1227\n\nA ( 1) must be held to refer only to the new ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act. The ceiling limit originally fixed ceased to exist for future the moment it was replaced by the amended Act. The prohibition contained in the second proviso operates only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law, at the given time.n\n\nIn Malankara Rubber & Produce Co's case the Court rejected a similar contention l!ased upon the second proviso to Art. 31 A ( 1) , observing:\n\n\" 'Ceiling area' is covered by s. 82.\n\nSuch area with regard to unmarried persons and families fixed by the 1963 Act was cut down considerably by the Amending Act of 1969.\n\nIt was ...... that this was hit by the second proviso to Art. 31-A (I) inasmuch as the ceiling having once been fixed by the 1963 Act any diminution in the extent thereof would only be justified if compensation at a rate not less than the market value thereof was provided which undoubtedly i~ not the case here. ... The contention that reduction in the ceiling area fixed by the 1963 Act had to be compensated for by payment of market value <i the difference between the ceiling areas fixed by the two Acts cannot be accepted i'nasmuch as the 'ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force' in Art. 31-A can refer only to the limit imposed by the law which f4; ed it and not any earlier law which is amended or repealed.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThis furnishes a complete answer to the contention raised on the second proviso to Art. 31A(l). The ceiling limit introduced by s. 14M of the impugned Act which came into force on February 15, ' \\. 1971, i5 the ceiling limit \"under the law for the time being in force\"\n\n~ within the meaning of the second proviso to Art. 31A(l). That be-\n\n. ing so, the provisions of Chapter IIB have the constitutional immunity\n\n!Jf Art .. 31A and cannot be challenged on the ground that they are • inconsistent with, take away or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts.14, 19(1) (f) of 31(2). Even if it were not so, they would be under the protective umbrella of Art. 3 lB. Indubik, r tably, the provisions of Chapter IIB are a law related to agrarian reform and thus protected.\n\nIt is necessary here to mention that in Kunjukutty's case Explanation' to s. 85(1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 was challenged as offending the second proviso to Art. 31A(l). Under the Explanation, subject to certain exceptions, any land transferred by\n\nA a person holding in excess of the ceiling area between certain datt; s, was to be regarded as held by the person for the purpose of fixing the extent of the land to be surrendered by him and such surrender was to be out of the land still held by him.\n\nThe Kerala ·-' High Court struck down the said provision as offending the second\n\nB proviso to Art. 31A(l) observing:\n\n\"If a fiction by which land not held by a person could be taken into account for the determination of the excess lalild • to be surrendered by him, and he coold be forced to surrender land actually held by him although it is within the ceil- '\n\nc ing limit wi>thout payment of the market value thereof, were permitted, the proviso in question could easily be rendered nugatory.\"\n\nThis Court upheld the decision of the High Court and observed:\n\n\"It is clear that by virtue of the second proviso to Art. 3 lA (1) land within the ceiling limit is expressly protected D against acquisition by the State unless the law relating to such acquisition provides for compensation which is not less than its market value.\n\nNo attempt was made to take the impugned explanation out of this constiltutional inhibition. We, therefore, do not find any reason to differ fr&n\n\nthe conclusions of the High Court.\"\n\nAfter the judgment of the High Court, the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 was enacted. When this Court fu Kunju\" kutty' s case upheld the judgment of the High Court strildng down the explanation to s. 85(1) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, Parliament by the Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act, which was assented to by the President on June 9, 1972, inserted both the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 and the / Kerala Land Reforms (Amendmnt) Act, 1971 in the Nmth Schedule f to the Constitution.\n\nThe challenge to the validity of the Constitution (TwentycNmth Amendment) Act was allowed to be raised as an . additional ground in Kesvananda Bharati v. State of Kerala(') and the Court by majority of 7: 6 upheld the validity of the Twenty- Ninth Amendment.\n\nBy parity of reasoning., it must follow as a necessary corollary , )t-\"1 that the West Bengal Land'Reforms Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) and the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII H of 1972) which introduced Chapter IIB therein with retrospective effect, from February 15, 1971, having been placed in the Ninth\n\n(I) [1973] Supp, SCR 1.\n\n• ...\n\n• •\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION (Sen,!.) 1229\n\nschedule by the Constitution (Thirty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1974, as items 60 and 81 thereof, their validity cannot be questioned under Art. 31B.\n\nThe challenge to the constitutional validity of Art. 31-B as well as the Constitution Amending Act, whereby the concerned: enactments were DU! in the Ninth Schedule on the ground that these violate the basic structure of features of the Constitution has been separately dealt with and hence the same need not be discussed here .\n\nAs regilrds the submission that Parliament cannot in exercise of of its constituent power under Art. 368 validate a State law, it seems\n\n4-. to us that the entire submission proceeds on a mis-conception arising C J from failure to distinguish between a law made in exercise of legislative power and the law made in exercise of the constituent powei;.\n\nWhen Art 31-B was introduced in the Constituti®: by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, it validated retrospectively 13 Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule, which, but for this provision, were liable to be impugned under Art. 13(2). Article 31-B D conferred constitutional immunity to such laws (all being enactments of State Legislatures) and Parliament alone could have done so by inserting the said Article in the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power under Art. 36'8. In substance and reality it was a constitutional device employed to protect .,,..\n\nState laws from becoming void under Art. 13(2). It will E appear clear that the language in Art. 31-B is virtually lifted from Arts. 13(1) and (2). While Art. 13(2) invalidates legislation, which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by part m, Art. 31-B extends 'protective umbrella' to such legislation i! it is included in Ninth Schedule and, therefore, the Courts will have no power to go into the constitutionality of the enactments as included in the Nmth 1' \\ Sc)iedule except on the ground of want of legislative competence.\n\nThe challenge to the definition of 'family' in s. 14K(c) is ba~ on the submmsion that it is an artificial definition and does not take \" into account the concept of a family as it exists in West Bengal. The word 'family' as defined in s. 14K(c) is in these terms: G\n\n\"(C) \"family\", in relation to a raiyat, shall be deemed to consist of-\n\n(i) him.self and his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters, if any, ·\n\n(ii) his unmarried adult son, if any, who does not hold any lnd as a raiyat,\n\n(iii) his married adult son, if any, where neither suffi aduk son nor the wife nor any minor son or unmarried daughter of such adult son holds any land as a raiyat,\n\n(iv) widow .of his predeceased son, if any, where neither such widow nor any minor son or unmarried daughter of such widow holds any lands as a raiyat,\n\n(v) minor son or unmarried daughter, if any, of his predeceased son, where the widow of such predeceased son is dead and any minor son or numarried daughter of such predeceased son does not hold any land as raiyat,\n\nbut shall not include any other person.\n\nExplanation 1.-For the purposes of this Chapter, an adult unmarried person shall include a man or woman who has been divorced and who has not remarried thereafter :\n\nProvided that where such divorced man or woman is the guardian of any minor son, or unmarried daughter, or both, he or she, together with such minor soo Qr unmarried daughter, or both, shall be deemed to be a separate family.\n\nE Explanation 11.-References in this clause to wife, son\n\nor daughter shall, in relation to a raiyat who is a woman, be construed as references to the husband, son or daughter, respectively of such woman,\"\n\nIt is argued that the definition of 'family' does not take into consideration the aged parents of a raiyat or his unmarried sisters. It is further argued that the Act suffers from the vice that, the existence of a married son is taken into consideration where neither he nor his j wife or any minor son or unmarried daughter of such adult son holds land as a raiyat for the purpose of augmenting the holding of a raiyat, but where in the family of a raiyat there is a married adult son holding\n\nany land, even a fraction, the family is denied the benefit of his existence.\n\nIn such a case tbe effect is the same because under s. 14M(2) the ceiling area of the ritiyat is still 7. 0 standard hectares.\n\nTo our mind, these submis§ions are wholly unfounded.\n\nThe definition of 'family' as contained in s. !4K(c) of the Act, is u more realistic than the definitions of this term in similar laws for imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings enacted in other state~.\n\nThe definition is much wider, and far more generous and humane\n\n• •\n\n' •\n\ns. SBKHARMAITY v. UNION (Sen, !.) 1231\n\nbecause it takes into consideration the existence of a widowed and divorced daughter, which is absent in other Acts_.\n\nThe meaning given by Explanation I to an adult unmarried person is an inclusive one and it includes a daughter who has been divorced.\n\nThis necessarily also includes a widowed daughter.\n\nBy the proviso added to Expln. I, where such widowed daughter is the guardian of any minor son or unmarried dauhter, or both, she, together with such minor son or unmarried daughter, or both, shall be deemed to be a! separate family.\n\nShe, therefore, is treated to a raiyat in her own right in relation to her family and her holding is not cfubbed with that of her father under s. 14M(2). The benefit provided to a divorced daughter would obvi- '-- ously also extend to a widowed daughter.\n\nExplanation IT deiils with\n\n~'! the spouse as in relation to a raiyat who is a woman, reference in cl ( c) to wife's son or daughter, shall be construed as reference to the husband's son or daughter, respectively of such woman.\n\nThe_ legislature on a correct perspective has enlarged the definition; of a family to the maximum possible extent, and provides for as many as nine members.\n\nWe fail to appreciate the submission that normally in the family of a raiyat he has his parents tci maintain.\n\nSuch margina} cases would be very few.\n\nNormally, the father of a raiyat would have his separate holding and would be entitled to a separate ceiling area of his own determined under s. 14M. The legislature had to draw a line somewhere. Bys. 14M(2) (b) it provided for augmenting of the holding of a raiyat to the extent of 7 . 0 standard hectares by taking into account five plus four, i.e., nine members.\n\nThe creation of an artificial concept of family and making provision for the clubbing together of land holding of each member of the family are not violative of the second proviso to Art. 31A(l), and even if they were, they were protected by Art. 31B.\n\nThis had necessarily to be done for the purpose and object of' the legislation i.e., imposition \\ of a ceiling on agricultural holdings.\n\nOne is apt to forget that the provisions of Chapter JIB in the Act are a law for imposition o~ ceiling on agricultural holdings of raiyats a_nd are not a law for enlargement of such holdings, i.e., these put a limit bn the maximum limit of a holding of a raiya.I,. The Act adopts the individual as the unit and not the family and allows for augmentation of his holding depending upon,\n\n\"--.. the normal concept of a family.\n\nIt is, however, urged that according to the definition of family given ins. 14K(c) of a raiyat, his wife, his minor son and the unmarried daughter are included, bu~ the adult son is not because he owns land _B and can form a unit by himself.\n\nAccording to the provisions of s. 14M(l)(a) the adult unmarried son will be entitled to retain 2.50\n\nstandard hectares, and if married, he with his wife and children, may retain 5.0 standard hectares; but the minor son and unmarried daughter, as they are included in the father's family will not be entitled to retain any land. We are afraid, this cannot be helped. There is no question of conferral of any new rights on minor son or unmarried daughter, ,\n\nas they would be included in the father's family, who woul~ get a much larger ceiling of 5.0 to 7.0 standard hectares, depending upon the number of children that he has. Nothing prevents a minor son or the\n\nunmarried daughter of a raiyat, like his parents, from acquiring property of their own subsequetly by inheritence or transfer.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners tried to highlight certain imporfections in the definition of family which he seems to imagine.\n\nTo illustrate, he speaks of a family of a raiyat having his wife, three married adult sons (having no land of thei~ owni), having wives aftd three minor sons each and one unmarried daughter. The instance of the family given by him consists of 18 members. According to s. 14M\n\n(2) (b), the raiyat would be entitled to retain no more than 7.0 standard hectares i.e. S.O standard hectares for his family up to five members and 0.50 standard hectare per head for four other members.\n\nTherefore, we are told that in this case, nine members of the family including minor sons, who have to be brought up, would be entirely deprived of the right to hold property or any land.\n\nF11rther,, the counsel urges that if the three adult sons died, the raiyat will have to maintain the minor sons of his predeceased sons, besides the unmarried daughters, of his own. The legislature cannot be expected to provide for all these exigencies.\n\nIt is difficult to envisage a family consisting of 18 members in present times.\n\nEven if there are any, they would not be better off even if Chapter IIB had not been enacted.\n\nSection 14M of the Act, so far as relevant, reads :\n\n\"l 4M. Ceiling area--(1) The ceiling area shall be,-\n\n( a) in the case of a raiyat, who is an adult unmarried person, 2-50 tandard hectares;\n\n(b) in the case of a raiyat, who is the sole surviving member of a family, 2.50 standard beet.ares;\n\n( c) in the case of a raiyat having a family consisting of two or more, but not more than five members, 5.00 standard hectares;\n\n( d) in the case of a raiyat having a fann1y consisting of more than five members, 5. 00 standard hectares, plus 0.50 standard hectare for each member in excess of\n\n' •\n\n• •\n\ns .. SE!aiARMAITY v. UNION (Sen, /.)\n\nfive, so, however, that the aggregate of the ceiling area for such raiyat shall not, in any case, exceed 7.00 standard hectares; \\\n\n(e) in the case of any other raiyat, 7.00 standard hectares.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contiained in subection (1), where, in the family of a raiyat, there are more raiya:ts than one, the ceiling area for the raiyat, togetb& with the ceiling area of all the other raiiyats in the family shall nOI, in any case, exceed,-\n\n( a) where the number of members of such family does not exceed; five, 5 . 00 standard hectares;\n\n(b) where such number exceeds five 5 . 00 standard hectares, plus 0. 50 standard hectare for each member in excess of five, so, however, that the aggregate of the ceiling area shall not, in any case, exceed 7 . 00 standard hectilres.\n\n(3) Fpr the purpose of sub-section (2), all the lands owned individually by the members of a family or jointly by some 0r all the members of such family shall be deemed to be owned by the raiyats in the family.\"\n\nThe expression 'standard hectare' is' defined in s. 14K(f) as\n\nfollows:- E\n\n( f) \"Standard hectare\" means,-\n\n(i) in relation to an agricultural land, an extent of land equivalent to-\n\n(i) (a) 1.00 hectare in an irrigated area,\n\n(b) 1.40 hectares in any other area;\n\n(ii) in relation to any land comprised in an orchard, in extent of land equivalent tOl 1.40 hectare.~\n\nThe fixation of ceiling in ca5e of a raiyat who is an adult unmarried or the sole surviving member of a family at 2.50 standard hectares and in case of a raiyat ha\"Ji11g a family , consisting of two or more but not more than five members at 5.0 standard hectares and in the case of a raiyat having a family consisting of more than five members\n\nat 5.0 to 7.0 hectares is objected to as being wholly arbitrary and unreasonable. As already stated, the extent of the holdings on; which .\n\nceiling is fixed varies depending upon whether it is an irrigated area or H, any other ana.\n\nWe fail to see any arbitrariness and indeed there is no substantial decrease in the limit.\n\nOne standard hectare is\n\nequivalent to 2.47 acres. :rile ceiling limits, therefore, woirk out to 6.18 acres in the case of an individual, and 12.35 to 17.29 acres of irrigated land, in the case of family, which, in the Gangetic plains of West Bengal, is not small by any standard. In other areas, the ceiling limit varies from 8.64 to 24.2 acres.\n\nAccordmg to agroeconomists, an economic holding is of 5 to 7 acres.\n\nIt is not possible to lay down a ceiling standard or prescribe one limit in terms of fixed acreage for general application throughout the cow1try. The productivity of land is not the same in all areas, due allowance bas to be; made for varying local conditions.\n\nThe Ffrst Five-Year Plan suggested a ceiling limit to be fixed in terms of a multiple of a family holding.\n\nFollowing the recommendations of the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, it recommended that the ceiling limit of an individual holding should be fixed at three times the family holding(').\n\nThe Second Five-Yenr Plan endorsed this recommendation.\n\nEach State was to specify according to conditions of different regions, class of soil, irrigation and the area of land which was to constitute a family hokling('). In implementation of the policy, the different States adopted different levels of ceiling and different basis for its application. Some States put a ceiling limit on the holding of an individual owner while the others imposed a ceiling on family holding.\n\nIn the States where a ceiling was i>Jnposed on individual holding there was greater scope for ma/a fide transfers than where the ceiling was imposed on the aggregate area held by all the members of the family.\n\nIn the latter case there was no inducement to 'effect transfers between the members of the family, as their share had already been given due recognition.\n\nBut when the comparati'Ve advantages and disadvantages of the two alternative became apparent it was too late to change the stand once taken.(') In the Third Five-Year Plan, the Planning Commission therefore, recommended that ceiling should be either invariably to the aggregate a.rea held by a family, rather than the individual, (as many of the transfers were effected between the members of the family) .\n\nSince legislation had already been , passed, in many States, imposing ceilings on individual holdings it recommended that amendments should aim primarily at eliminating deficiencies and facilities implementation rather than at introducing fundamental changes in the principles underlying the legislation. Accordingly, t11e amendment& provided that transfers after a prescribed date should be disregarded.\n\n(I) First-Five Year Plan. Paras 15 & I' Ch. XII.\n\n(2) ndFive-Year Plan. Para 40.\n\n(3) Third Five-Year Plan. para 26.\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\ns. SEKHAll.MAITY v. UNION (Sen, !.) 1235\n\nThe dates so prescribed were invariably a date anterior to the\n\nactment of law. In some cases it was the date of publication of the Bill, while in others an earlier date was prescribed in view of the special local conditions.\n\nThe first draft of the Fourth Fiveyear Plan, while endorsing the earlier view that the amendments should remove the deficiencies, rather than basically change the Jaw, again suggested as follows :\n\n\"As transfers take place generally between the members of a family, the States might consider the suggestion earlier made by the Panel on Land Reform '(and this has already been provided in some Jaws), namely, to apply ceilings to the aggregate area held by all the members of a family, l'lLther than to individual holdings, the family being defined to include husband and wife, their dependent children and grandchildren.\"\n\nWe may then take up the contention. regarding the alleged invalidity of s. 14P and 14U. The fixation of a back-date is a us11al legislative device to prevent avoidance of change brought about by Jaw.\n\nThere is no warrant for the submission that the date mentioned in s. 14P bears no reasonable nexus' with the object or purpose of the legislation. The West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971, while inserting Chapter IIB enacted s. 14P providing that in determining the ceiling area of a raiyat any transfer effected by sale, gift or otherwise or by a partition by him after August 7, 1969 and before February 8, 1971, i.e., the date of publication of the Act in the Official Gazette shall not be taken into account and the land shall be deemed to form part of the holding of the raiyat.\n\nBy a legal fiction, such transfers were presumed to be ma/a fide as they were ca!cula!ed to defeat the ceiling law.\n\nLearned counsel appearing for the State Government of West Bengal has filed a note explaining the reason why the date specified\n\nin s. 14P was August 7, 1969. It appears that the West Bengal Land Reforms (Second Amendment) Bill, 1969 was published in. the G Official Gazette on that date. Though the amendment primarily related to re-assessment of revenue, the concept of 'famil)'.' was first sought to be introduced in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act by that amendment.\n\nThe land-holders, tlierefore, had a forewarning that the concept of 'family' may also come into play in the determination of ceiling area of land. Prior to the said amendment, II the proposed legislation in ceiling adopted individual as a unit and not the family.\n\nIt needs no mention thati unless a date-line is fixed in\n\nthe matter of ceiling or similar agrarian reform, the very purpose of the legislation would be frustrated.\n\nThe scope and effect of s. r4P are that all agricultural lands transferred after August 7, 1969 shall be taken into account in computing the ceiling oif the raiyat.\n\nThe effect was that the ceiling virtually imposed treating the family as the unit in s. 14M(2) was given a retrospective effect by s. 14P with effect from August 7, 1969.\n\nSection 14U provides that except where he is permitted, in writing, by the. Revenue Officer so to do, .a raiyat owni}lg land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under s. 14M, shall not, after the publication of the Act in the official Gazette, i.e., February C 8, 1971, transfer, by sale, gift or otherwise or make any partition of any land owned by him or any part thereof until the excess land, which is to vest in the Srate under s. 14S, has been determined and taken possession of by or on behalf of the State.\n\nSuch provisions are to be found in all the Acts passed by different States relating to imposition of ceiling on agricultural land and indeed they are essen- D tial for implementing the scheme of the Act.\n\nIt Will be noticed that in actual implementation, the provisions of these Acts were circumvented to a large extent by the making of fraudulent transfers. Transfers of rights in land could be effected by one of several ways such as sale, mortgage; gift and exchange.\n\nThe Act by s. 14P provides that transfers effected before the date of publication of the Act and after August 7, 1969 shall not be taken into cbnsidemtion. The legislature fixed August 7, 1969 as the date from which all such transfers or partitions shall be deemed to have been effected with the intention of defeating the law.\n\nSuch kansfers were presumed to be ma/a fide as they had taken place in anticipation of the enactment and, therefore, liable to be ignored.\n\nAs the ceiling was fixed for each individual raiyat and not the family, as a unit, there was practically no limit to the amount of land that could be held by a family in this way, and therefore, the legislature had to insert s. 14M(2) for their shares to be clubbed together.\n\nThere were plenty of reasons to believe that splitting of big holdings between members of the family had taken place on considerable scale in anticipation of the legislation.\n\nAs regards s. 14U, there is no absolute bar against transfers till the determination of the ceiling area under s. 14M. The fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property guaranteed under H Art. 19(1 )(f) was subject to the right of the State to impose reasonable restrictions under Art. 19(6). The legislature was fully\n\ncompetent to lay down the maximum limit of an agricultural hold-\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. uNION (Sen, 1.) 1237\n\ning and make ancillary provisions to make the law effective by\n\nA.. . 11-.void:ince Of transfers. These provisions contained in s. l4P and s. 14U thus appear to be reasonable without which the whole object of enacting Chapter IJB for the imposition of a ceiling on agricultural holdings would have been completely frustrated.\n\nIt is argued that an 1orchard' as defined in s. 14K ( e) does not fall within the definition of 'land' in s. 2 (7) , a, nd, therefore, it could not be treated as agricultural land and hence the legislature could not have prescribed a ceiling for an orchard under s. 140(2) by two standard hectares. Now section 140(2) provides that where. a raiyat owns land, comprised in orchard, whether or not in addition to other land, the ceiling area in relation to such raiyat shall be increased by 2.00 standard hectares or the actual area of the land comprised in orchards, whichever is the lesser. The term 'orchard' as defined in s. 14K(e) reads: ·\n\n\" ( e) \"orchard\" means a compact area of land having fruit bearing trees grown thereon in such number tliat they preclude; or when fully grown would preclude, a suOstantial part of such land from being used for any agricultural purpose;\"\n\nThe word 'land' is defined in s. 2(7) as :-\n\n\"(7) \"land\" means agricultural land other than land comprised in a tea-garden which is retained under subsection (3) of section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, and includes homesteads but does not include tank.\" I\n\nSome meaning has to be given to the words 'land comprised in\n\norchards' appearing in s. 140(2). For the word 'land' we have to F read 'agricultural land' and that brings out the legislative intent.\n\nIt ill not right to suggest that land COlllprised in an orchard cannot be treated as an agricultural land. The meaning of the expression 'agricultural land' as given in 'Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Vol. I, p. 61, runs thus: G.\n\n\"The expression 'agricultural land' includs arable and meadow land and ground used for pastoral purposes or for market ot nursery gardens, and plantations and woods and orchards .... \"\n\nThus the expression 'agricultural land' is wide enough to include an g; orchard. It is, therefore, futile to contend that orchard as defined ins. 140(2) does not' come within the definition of land ins. 2(7).\n\nA If such a construction were to be adopted, it would imply that there would be no ceiling on ugricu!tura! holdings in large tracts of land in the district of Malda which is famous for its mango orchards.\n\nThe legislature by enacting s. 140(2) treats the land comprised in orchards, as falling within the purview of s. 14M, but having regard to the fact that there is a sufficient cluster of fruit-bearing trees in an orchard, which precludes the utilisation of the land comprised therein, or substantial portion thereof, for effective cultivation, allows an additional area of two standard hectares for each raiyat.\n\nWe find nothmg wrong in the provision contained ins. 140(2). On the contrary, it appears to be a very reasonable provision.\n\nIt is argued that the provision with regard to imposition of a ceiling on orchards contained in s. 140(2) is not protected by Art. 31A as the land comprised in orchards cannot be said to be agricultural land, nor can acquisition of land comprised in orchards be a part of agricultural reform as it is not held or Jet out for the purpose of agriculture and, therefore, cannot be a part of a , scheme of agrarian reform. The validity of s. 140(2) putting on lands comprised in orchards is assailed on the ground that the Act makes no provision for payment of compensation in respect of orchards.\n\nSection 14V provides that compensation for vesting of any land in the State under the provisions of Chapter IIB shall be determined on the principles and in the manner, as specified in Chapter ID of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. It is pointed out that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953 provided bys. 6(1)(f) that, notwithstanding anything contained in ss. 4 and 5 of the Act, for the vesting of estates of rights of intermediaries therein, and off\n\nome rights of raiyats and under-raiyats, an intermediary sh'all be entitled to retain, subject to the provisions of sub-s. (3) land comprised in tea gardens or orchards or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming or dairy.\n\nSince land comprised in orchards did not vest in the State it is urged that no provision was made in Chapter III of the Act for payment of compensation for orchards. From the absence of such a provision, the learned counsel assumes that there is no provision for payment of compensation for acquisition of land comprised in orchards, fixing the ceiling limit of two standard hectares, under s. 140(2).\n\nThe {lbsence of a provision for payment of compensation in II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 does not mean that no compensation is to be determined or is not payable under s. l 4V. In such a case, the general\n\n' •\n\n• • -•\n\ns. SEKHARMAITY v. UNION (Sen,'J.) 1239\n\nprovisions relating to payment of compensation in respect of acqllisi- A tion of land will apply.\n\nThe principle on which, and the manner in which, compensation is to be determined and given are set out in ss. 16 and 17. Section 16 provides for computation the net annual income of land.\n\nSection 17 provides that the amount of compensation shall be a mu; tiple of the net annual income, the multiple depending upon the extent of income. The multiple ranges from two to twenty times.\n\nThe compensation has to be calculated according to the graded scale in the table given in s.\n\n17. Where the legislature has laid down the principles for computation, the amout\n\nof compensation is not justiciable after the Fourth Amendment. It cannot be asserted that compens,.tion payable for acquisition of land C comprised in orchards in excess of the ceiling limit in s. 140(2), according to the provisions of s. 14V is illusory. Where the Jaw provides for payment of compensation as much as twenty times the\n\nannual income, it is virtually the capitalised value. The petitioners who own orchards would, therefore, get much more as the income derived by them would be greater than the raiyats holding land in excess of the ceiling limit in s. 14M(2).\n\nThere remains the question as to whether the provisions of Chapter IIB must be struck down on the ground that it permits the taking away of the homestead of a raiyat without payment of compensation ..\n\nThe definition of land as contained in s. 2(7) is an inclnsive one and means agricultural land other than Janq comprised in a tea-garden and includes homesteads but does not include tank. There can, therefore, be no doub~ that the provisions of Chapter IIB shall apply where the homestead is included in the record of rights as forming part of an agricultural holding.\n\nAgricultural holding of a raiyat includes his homestead and the raiyat can retain land including homestead under\n\nF s. 14M(l) up to 7.0 standard hectares in irrigated area and 6.9 standard hectares in unirrigated areas. For the vested land a raiyat would be entitled to get compensation under s. 14V, according to the principles specified in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953. It is, however, pointed out that nn intermediary was entitled under s. 6(1) (f) of that Act to retain his homestead and, G therefore, there is no provision made in s. 16 or s. 17 for payment ofl any compensation in respect of homestead.\n\nWe are informed by learned counsel appearing for the State of West Bengal that the Government a;: not interested in depriving the raiyats of their homestead, and they are enti.tled to retain it. Normally, H raiyats would not be affected as they would be allowed to retain their homesteads, as falling within the ceiling limit allowed nnder s. 14M.\n\nVisualizing that there may be some exceptional cases of large land holden, having extensive lands spread over different villages, and consequently a number of homesteads, learned counsel for the State\n\nof West Bengal has pointed out that in such an event the provisions of s. 16 ( 1) (a) (ii) of the Estates Acquisition Act would be attracted,. which reads :\n\n\"16(1) For the purpose. of the preparation of the Compensation Assessment Roll\n\n(a) the gross income of an intermediary shall be taken to consist ofxxx xxx\n\n(ii) in respect of the Khas land which the intermediary does not retain under sub-section ( 1) of section 6, the annual iµcome of such land determined in the prescribed manner.\"\n\nIn this connection r. 15(b) and (d) of the West Benga,1 Est.ates Acquisition Rules, 1954, provide the procedure for arriving at the compensation for any homestead if such homestead falls within the category of agricultural land i.e., where it is entered in the record of rights as part of agricultural holding of a raiyat.\n\nIf a homestead is entered in the record of rights as non-agricultural land or as a part of a non-agricultural holding, it does not come within the purview of the Act, and, therefore, the question of vesting of such homestead does not arise.\n\nAs already adumbrated, the State of West Beggal has no intention\n\nI~ to oust any raiyat from his homestead, or not to pay any compensation under the existing . provisions for any homestead which is vested in the State under the provisions of the Act. A raiYat is within his rights { to retain land upto the ceiling limi~ applicable to him in accorC:ance with s. 14M and 14T. Thus a raiyat is at liberty to retain his homes-\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\ntead and npt to allow it to be vested in or acquired by the State under G the Act. It is expected that normally raiyats would retain their homes- -f teads and, therefore, the question of ousting them from their homesteads does not arise at all. In other cases, where raiyats willingly give up their homestead to be vested in the Sta_te, i.e. to be ac- '?-1 quired by the State without desiring to retain the same within the\n\nceiling area applicable to him, the question of payment of compensa-\n\n111 tion will arise anq in such cases, compensation would be computed in accordance with s. 16(1) (a) (ii) of the Estates Acquisition Act read with r. 15(b) and (d) of the Estates Acquisition Rules.\n\n• T\n\n)._\n\ns. SEK!IARMAITY. v. UNION (Sen,1!.) 1241\n\nThe last contention as to the constitutional validity of s. 14M(5)\n\n'1ll the gronnd that it is violative of Art. 26 appears to be misconceived.\n\nThe submission is that since the fundamental right to own property under cl. ( c) of Art. 26 is subject only to the law relating to public order, morality and health, it cannot be made subject to a law for agrarian reform, as tliat has nothing to do with public order, morality or health. In State of Bihar v. Ka.meshwar Singh(') the Court repelled the argument an.\\.s; lid that a charity created by a private individual is not immune mlm sovereign's power of compulsory acquisition for public purposes, and that the vesting of the property in the State Uhder\n\nthe provisions of the Act in question there would not in any way affect the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them. The power of eminent domain which is inherent in every sovereign State, must be capable of being exercised against -every property ~Id by any person in the State, Being a, fnndrunental\n\nattribute of sovereignty of State one cannot imagine that the framers of the Constitution intended to divest the State of that attribute by implication in the case of property owned by a private trust. Just as the property of a private trust is( held subject to a law imposing a tax upon it, so also is that property subject to the eminent domain of the State.\n\nAll that s. 14M(5) provides is that land owned by a trust or E endowment other than of a public natnre, shall be deemed to be land owned by the beneficiary of the trust or endowment, and each such beneficiary shall be deemed to be a raiyat under the Act to the extent of the share of his beneficial interest in the said trust or endowment.\n\nWhat is of essence is the capacity in which the land is held. If a raiyat is a beneficiary of a private trust, his beneficial interest consists F l in the offrings or income.\n\nThe provision in effect prescribes that the\n\n~ 1and should be clubbed for the computation of the ceiling area under s. 14M(l). The imposition of such a ceiling would no doubt reduce the holding of the trust, but the Government bas the power under s. 140 ( 3) to increase the ceiling area in certain cases.\n\nWhere the Government is satisfied that a corporation or institution e, Stablished G exclusively for a charitable or religious purpose or both, for which a ceiling limit is prescribed under s. 140(1), or a person holding any\n\nIan~ i~ trust or pursuance of any other endowment, creating a legal obligation xclus1vely for a purpose which is charitable or religious, or both, reqwres land, as distinct from the income of such land for the due performance of its obligation, it may having regard to an' the cir- H\n\n(I) (1952] SCR 889.\n\n20-610 SCI/80\n\nA cumstances of the case, increase the ceiling area jor such corporation or institution or person to such extent as it may deem fit. The legislature has therefore,_provided adequate safeguards under s. 140(3) to soften the rigour of the Act in relation to religious and charitable A trusts.\n\nB The challenge to the validity of Chapter II B of the West Bengal Lan<l Reforms Act, 1955 introduced by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 must, therefore, fail. •\n\n' t In the result, the petitions must fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed. ~", "total_entities": 392, "entities": [{"text": "SASANKA SEKHAR MAITY & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SASANKA SEKHAR MAITY & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, CJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 159, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 173, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 349, "end_char": 377, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 475, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 15, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 531, "end_char": 548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fixation of ceiling of agricultural holdings-Whether the provisions of Chapter JIB of the West Bengal Land &forms Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) inserted by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act TJI of\n\n1971) and replaced by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act XII of 1972) with retrospective effect from February 15, 1971 is violative of the second proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 31A(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 587, "end_char": 601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 39(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 743, "end_char": 754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In furtherance of the Direc(ive Principles enshrined in Article 39(b), agrarian reforn1 wa~ undertaken in the State of West Bengal in two stages."}}, {"text": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 837, "end_char": 878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 12, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 941, "end_char": 958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "954) which received the assent of the President on February 12, 1954 has been placed in the Ninth Schedule as item No."}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 982, "end_char": 996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1506, "end_char": 1516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1885, "end_char": 1892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "< Act, 1955 (Act X of 1956) caine into force on March 31, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2385, "end_char": 2426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 9, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2430, "end_char": 2443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This v1as followed by notification issued by the State Government under s. 49 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 on April 9, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2483, "end_char": 2488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "April 10, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2707, "end_char": 2721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the notification under s. 49 the petitioners, who were raiyats, were deemed to be intermediaries and the lands owned and possessed by them as estates and all the lands and the petitioner's rights in such lands vested in the State with effect from April 10, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2814, "end_char": 2818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "February 12, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2862, "end_char": 2879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This state of affairs continued till February 12, 1971 when the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act ill of 1971) caine into force."}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2901, "end_char": 2929, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3312, "end_char": 3319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3332, "end_char": 3336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3396, "end_char": 3403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3628, "end_char": 3662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": 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Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 14M(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4427, "end_char": 4433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4485, "end_char": 4494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 14S(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 14T( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4622, "end_char": 4632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4686, "end_char": 4692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4788, "end_char": 4794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4854, "end_char": 4874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4912, "end_char": 4931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5063, "end_char": 5072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "First Amendment Act", "statute": "First Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5173, "end_char": 5182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "First Amendment Act", "statute": "First Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5488, "end_char": 5510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "First Amendment Act", "statute": "First Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7615, "end_char": 7643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7704, "end_char": 7732, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14L", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7945, "end_char": 7951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8040, "end_char": 8051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8175, "end_char": 8182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8209, "end_char": 8230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8239, "end_char": 8246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8251, "end_char": 8258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8436, "end_char": 8464, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8745, "end_char": 8756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8840, "end_char": 8848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8977, "end_char": 8998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9080, "end_char": 9086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955", "statute": "the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "[1973] 1 S.CR. 326", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9499, "end_char": 9517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9690, "end_char": 9696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9914, "end_char": 9921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10036, "end_char": 10046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 3 IB conte; red stitutional .in1munity to such lam (all being enactments of State Legislatures) and Parliament alone eould have done so by inserting the said Article in the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10165, "end_char": 10173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10285, "end_char": 10295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10313, "end_char": 10321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10347, "end_char": 10358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10373, "end_char": 10386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1411(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11746, "end_char": 11756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12521, "end_char": 12527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12579, "end_char": 12584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12954, "end_char": 12965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13003, "end_char": 13011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14212, "end_char": 14221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15425, "end_char": 15460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee, the ceiling limits were mainly prescribed."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16149, "end_char": 16154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16248, "end_char": 16276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 7, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16468, "end_char": 16482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1971 while inserting Chapter II B eaa<tcd s. t•P pr6\"iding that in detemrining the ceiling area of a raiyat any \"transfer elleclbl by sale, gilt or otherwise or by a partition by him after\n\nAugust 7, 1969 and before February 8, 1971, i.e.,.th• daie of pnblicalion of the Act in the official Gazette shall not 1'e taken into aCC-OUDt and the land shall be deemed to form part of the holding of the raiyat."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16494, "end_char": 16510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1971 while inserting Chapter II B eaa<tcd s. t•P pr6\"iding that in detemrining the ceiling area of a raiyat any \"transfer elleclbl by sale, gilt or otherwise or by a partition by him after\n\nAugust 7, 1969 and before February 8, 1971, i.e.,.th• daie of pnblicalion of the Act in the official Gazette shall not 1'e taken into aCC-OUDt and the land shall be deemed to form part of the holding of the raiyat."}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17543, "end_char": 17549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17768, "end_char": 17774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17816, "end_char": 17822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17884, "end_char": 17895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18061, "end_char": 18067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18324, "end_char": 18330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18873, "end_char": 18879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 7. 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19044, "end_char": 19058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legislature fixed August 7."}}, {"text": "section 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19860, "end_char": 19871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19939, "end_char": 19945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19959, "end_char": 19965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20046, "end_char": 20057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20141, "end_char": 20151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20364, "end_char": 20370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20375, "end_char": 20381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20679, "end_char": 20688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20736, "end_char": 20743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Malda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20884, "end_char": 20889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any contrary construction would imply that there would be no ceiling on agrieultural hold!ings in larg'e tracts of land in thedistrict of Malda which is famous for its mango orchards."}}, {"text": "s. 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20958, 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"start_char": 56318, "end_char": 56323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act was cut down considerably by the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56400, "end_char": 56449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56517, "end_char": 56524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was cut down considerably by the Amending Act", "statute": "Act was cut down considerably by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57083, "end_char": 57090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was cut down considerably by the Amending Act", "statute": "Act was cut down considerably by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57316, "end_char": 57327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act was cut down considerably by the Amending Act", "statute": "Act was cut down considerably by 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"start_char": 66903, "end_char": 66909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67311, "end_char": 67322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67370, "end_char": 67378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "One is apt to forget that the provisions of Chapter JIB in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67519, "end_char": 67585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14M(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68218, "end_char": 68230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One is apt to forget that the provisions of Chapter JIB in the Act", "statute": "One is apt to forget that the provisions of Chapter JIB in the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69380, "end_char": 69386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14M", "label": 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appearing for the State Government of West Bengal has filed a note explaining the reason why the date specified\n\nin s. 14P was August 7, 1969."}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77596, "end_char": 77602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78619, "end_char": 78628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78665, "end_char": 78671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78706, "end_char": 78717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78885, "end_char": 78891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February C 8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 78968, "end_char": 78986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Revenue Officer so to do, .a raiyat owni}lg land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under s. 14M, shall not, after the publication of the Act in the official Gazette, i.e., February C 8, 1971, transfer, by sale, gift or otherwise or make any partition of any land owned by him or any part thereof until the excess land, which is to vest in the Srate under s. 14S, has been determined and taken possession of by or on behalf of the State."}}, {"text": "s. 14S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79151, "end_char": 79157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79717, "end_char": 79723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80400, "end_char": 80409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80639, "end_char": 80645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80739, "end_char": 80745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80829, "end_char": 80843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80922, "end_char": 80932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81221, "end_char": 81227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14K", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81454, "end_char": 81460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81515, "end_char": 81519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81672, "end_char": 81681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81712, "end_char": 81726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14K(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82033, "end_char": 82042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82322, "end_char": 82329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82457, "end_char": 82466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82474, "end_char": 82515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82657, "end_char": 82666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83636, "end_char": 83645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85120, "end_char": 85131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It is pointed out that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953", "statute": "It is pointed out that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85856, "end_char": 85865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Since land comprised in orchards did not vest in the State it is urged that no provision was made in Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Since land comprised in orchards did not vest in the State it is urged that no provision was made in Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85927, "end_char": 86013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 16 and 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86390, "end_char": 86403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86405, "end_char": 86415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86473, "end_char": 86483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s.\n\n17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86759, "end_char": 86765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "II respect of orchards in Chapter III of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 140(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87040, "end_char": 87049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87082, "end_char": 87088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87412, "end_char": 87421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87665, "end_char": 87672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88112, "end_char": 88121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14V", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88289, "end_char": 88295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88338, "end_char": 88396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88466, "end_char": 88473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88562, "end_char": 88567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88571, "end_char": 88576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 88689, "end_char": 88709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are informed by learned counsel appearing for the State of West Bengal that the Government a;: not interested in depriving the raiyats of their homestead, and they are enti.tled to retain it."}}, {"text": "s. 14M", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88976, "end_char": 88982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89258, "end_char": 89263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953", "statute": "Chapter III of the West Bengal Estte Acquisition Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89600, "end_char": 89609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Acquisition Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89746, "end_char": 89769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of West Beggal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 90274, "end_char": 90294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already adumbrated, the State of West Beggal has no intention\n\nI~ to oust any raiyat from his homestead, or not to pay any compensation under the existing ."}}, {"text": "s. 14M and 14T", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90606, "end_char": 90620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Acquisition Rules, 1954", "statute": "Acquisition Rules, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91266, "end_char": 91274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14M(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91486, "end_char": 91495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 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"metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land Reforms (Amendment) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94691, "end_char": 94719, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1243_1252_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "• '\n\nSTATE OF'MADHYA PRADESH v.\n\nRAMRATAN\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., S. MURTAZA FAZAL AU AND\n\nD. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nDisciplinary proceediflgs and second show cause notice to ternzinate the service of a government servant-No specification in the shott• cause notice of tf(e particular penalty proposed to e inflicted tind impositipn of penalty other than $UCh proposed penalty, whether bad and illegal-Constitution of India, Article 311(2) and Rule 15(4)(i)(b) of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.\n\nPractice and Procedure-Supreme Court is not bound to set aside the order of the High Court directing reinstatement of the employee when; he has succeeded. in two Courts below-Constitution of India, 1950, Art .. 136.\n\nRespondent Ram Ratan was empJoyed as a Forest Guard in 1the Forest Department of Madhya Pradesh Government. He was served with a barge~\n\nsheet dated March 6, 1969, in which he was accused of misconduct. Respondent refuted the charges. A departmental eilquiry was held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Mr. Malhotra, in respect1 of the charges framed against the respondent.\n\nCharge of misconduct was held pro\\led whereupon the punishing authority served respondent with a second show cause notice dated February 12, 1970, as contemplated by Article 311(2) of !lie 'constitution os it stood prior to its E amendment in 1976.\n\nAfter the respondent rep1ied to the notice the disciplinary--cum-punishing authority imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement on the respondent. The1 respondent questioned the validity and correctness of the punislunent in Civil Suit No. 227-A/73 filed by him in the Court of the Civil Judge. Civil Court.\n\nClass II, Sabalgarh. The trial Court decreed the suit and set aside the order' imposing the m~.joI' penalty of compulsory retirement _and granted a declaration thaf respondent continues in service.\n\nOn appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Second Additional District Judge, Morena, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the respondent.\n\nOn appeal by the respondent to the High Court a learned single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the appeal of respondent and set aside the decree made by the District Judge and restored the one passed by the trial Court with the result that a declaration was granted that the respondent. would continue inl service till the date of his superannuation. Hence this appeal by special leave by tho State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD: I. Article 311(2) as it stood at the relevant time prior to its amendment in 1976 imposed a constitutional obligation upon the punishing authority to serve a second show cause notice where it was proposed after departmental inquiry to impose on the delinqueitt Governn1ent servant any or the\n\npcnai.t1es refererd to in Art. 311 so a~ to give a reasonable opportunity of lnaking representation on the penalty proposed.\n\nRule 15 ( 4) (i) (b) of the 1966 Rules prescribes proc¢ure to be fo1lo¥ied by the disciplinary authority before imposing punishtnent to the effect that the concerned authority should give1 a notice setting out the penalty proposed to be imposed on the .concen:;:ed guvernn1nt se1rvant, and calling upon him to submit within 15 days of the receipt of notice or such further time not exceeding 15 days, as may be allo, ved, such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty on thel basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under rule 14. 'fhe punishing authority has in the second show cause notice to specify the punishment which it tentatively or provisionally decides upon to impose looking to the gravity of the charge which is held proved. At that stage the decision of the punishing: authority is a tentative decision and in the1 very nature of things it must be so because an opportunity has to be given to the delinquent government servant to make a representation on the nature of penalty. This would imply that if the delinquent officer in his representation makes out a case tor a lesser punishment the disciplinary authority would keep an open mind and after applying its mind to the representation made by the delinquent government servant, the\n\nauthority may either confirm its earlier tentative decision or it v1ould be open to it to award a lesser penalty then the one tentatively decided. [1247 C-H]\n\n2. Principle of naturnl justice and fair play implicit in Art. 311(2) and rule 15(4)(i)(b) would require that the disciplinary authority has to take into consideration the representation made by the delinquent gOventment servant in response to the notice which is a constitutional obligation, and if the delinquent officer is in a position to pursuade by his representation. to so mcxlulate the punishment as would accord with the gravity of the misconduct and other mitigating or extenuating circumstances' all pf which may enter into the verdict of deciding upon the penalty. and consequently the disciplinary authority would bo free to impose a lesser penalty than the. one proposed' in the0 second notice. This is the constitu.tional scheme. [1248 A-BJ\n\nIf the view, namely, that the disciplinary authority must 'tentatively decide upon the penalty and specify the penalty in the second sho\"r cause notice and after taking into consideration the representation made by the delinquent government servant in response to the notice it can only confirm te tentative decision but cannot award a lesser punishment, the exercise of giving second show cause notice becomes self-defeating and giving of the notice inviting the representation -f'\n\non the question of penalty would be an exercise in futility. Such an approach \\VOuld render a tentative decision as final and the rest being an empty formality.\n\nSuch could not be the underlying. object in enacting a constitutional n1andate for the protection of government servants. {1248 C-E]\n\nIn service jurisprudence for different types of misconduct various penalties are prescnbed in service rules. 1966- Rules prescribe M, many as 9 penalties which can be awarded for good and sufficient reasons.. Compulsory retirement is one of the major penalties. Similarly, removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future appointment in government service and dis:nlissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the government are the other two major penalties. The disciplinary authority keeping in view the gravity of misconduct committed by the government servant will tentatively determine the penalty to be imposed upon the- <letinquent government servant. Degree of seriousness of misconduct will ordi-\n\n• t\n\n.. •\n\nM. P •. V. RAM RATAN 1245\n\nnily determine the penalty keeping in view the degree of harm that each penalty can inflict upon the government servoo.t Before serving the second show cause notice the disciplinary authority will determine tentatively the penalty keeping in view the seriousness of misconduct. But this is a tentative decision.\n\nOn receipt of representation in response to notice, the disciplinary authority will apply its mind to it, take into account any extenuating or mitigat ing circumstances pleaded in the representation and finally determine what should be the penalty that would bC commensurate with the circumstances of the case. [1248 E-H, 1249 A]\n\nIf a major penalty was tentatively decided upon and a lesser or minor penalty Cannot be awarded because this wasi not the specified penalty, the govern ment servant to whom a notice proposing major penalty is served would run the risk of awarded major penalty because it would not be opea. to. award a lesser or a minor penalty than the on~ specified m the ihow cause notice. Such a view runs counter to the principle of penology. In criminal and\\ quasi-criminal jurisprudence where the penalties are prescribed it ii implicit thereunder tha~ a major penalty would comprehend within its fold the minor penalty. If a major penalty is proposed looting to the circumstancei of the case, at that stage, after taking into consideration the representation bearing on the subject and having an impact on the question of penalty a minor penalty can .always be1 awarded.\n\nIn penal statute maximum sentence for each offence is provided but the matter is within the discretion of the judicial officer awarding sentence to award such sentence within the ceiling prescribed by law 8$ would bo commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the surrounding circumstances except where minimum sentence is prescribed and Court's discretion is by legislation fettered.\n\n[1299 AD]\n\nTherefore, if any particular penalty is specified. as tentatively proposed iii the second show cause notice the disciplinary authority after taking into consider&-- E tion the representation made by the delinquent government servant can awan:t. that penalty or any lesser penalty and in so doing Art. 311 (2 )' will not be violated. In fact, this leaves open) a discretion to the punishing. authority which accords with reason, fair play and justice. [1251 B-C]\n\nHukam Chand Malhotra v. Union of India, [1959] Suppl.\n\nSCR 892; followed.\n\nUnion of India and Ors. v.\n\nK. Raiappa Menon, [1969] 2 SCR 343; explained.\n\n3. Supeme Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Att.\n\n136 of the Constitution, is not bound to set aside the order of the High Court directing reinstatement of the employee, when he has 'succeeded in the two courts below. Quantifying the backwages and the costs would accord with the G demands of social justice, reason and fairplay. [1252 D-El ·\n\nA .\n\nPunjab Beverages P. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand and Ors. [1978] 3 SCR 370; r -...r followed. .\n\nCrvn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 422 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by Special Le.ave from the Judgment and Order dated the H 23-8-1979 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Jabalpur Bench) at Gwalior in Second Appeal No. 42 of 1979.\n\nA S. K. Gambhir for the Appellant.\n\nMr. N. S. Das Bahl for Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J .-Respondent Ram Ratan was employed as a, Forest B Guard iu the Forest Department of Madhya Pradesh Government. He was served with a chargesheet dated March 6, 1969, in which he was accused of misconduct. Respondent refute>! the charges. A departmental enquiry was held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Mr. Malhotra, in respect of the charges framed against the repondent. Charge of misconduct was held proved whereupon the punishing authority served Cf respondent with a second show cause notice dated February 12, 1970,\n\nas contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution as it stood prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976.\n\nThe dispute in this appeal centres around the construction of this notice No. E/1/2053 dated February 12, 1970, and its relevant portion macv be extracted : D\n\n\". . . the Enquiry Officer bas concluded in the report that he is guilty of the above-mentioned charges. Hence as a result of the abovesaid charges having been established, why you shall not be imposed major penalty under the M. P. Civil Services Act ? ...\n\nWhy you will not be removed from the State Service by imposing the abovesaid punishment ?\"\n\nAfter the respondent replied to the notice the disciplinary-cumpunishing authority imposed the. penalty of compulsory retirement on the respondent. The respondent questioned the validity and correctness of the punishment in Civil Suit No. 227 A/73 filed by him in the Court of the Civil Judge, Civil Court, Class II, Sabalgarh. The trial f Court decreed the suit and s'et aside the order imposing the major penalty of compulsory retirement and granted a declaration that respondent continues in service. On appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Second Additional District Judge, Morena, set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit of the respondent. On appeal by the respondent to the High Court a learned single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the appeal of respondent and set aside the decree made by the District Judge and restored the one passed by the trial court with the result that a declaration was granted that the H respondent would continue in service till the date of his superannuation.\n\nHence this appeal by special leave by the State of Madhya Pradesh.\n\n\" •\n\n• •\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that strict compliance with Art. 311(2) of the Constitution along with rule 15(4)(i)(b) of the M. P.\n\nCivil Services .(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 ('1966\n\n_j__ Rules' for short) , must be insisted upon because it provides a safeguard gains_! arbitrary removal from service of Government servants.\n\nConsistent with this approach and drawing sustenance from the decision of this Court in Unipn of India & Ors. v. K. Ra; appa Menon,(') it was held that unless the disciplinary or competent authority tentatively determines to inflict a particular penalty and specifies the particular penalty to be inflicted on the delinquent Government servant, the show-cause notice cannot be sustained without such a particular penalty being specified and the final order cannot be sustained uuless the Y-specified and no other penalty is imposed.\n\nArticle 311 (2) as it stood at the relevant time prior to its amendment in 1976 imposed a constitutional obligation upon the punishing authority to serve a second show cause notice where it is proposed after a departmental inquiry to impose on the delinquent Government servant any of the penalties referred to in Art. 311 so as to give a reasor1able opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. Rule 15(4) (i)(b) of the 1966 Rules prescribes procedure to be followed by the disciplinary authority before imposing punishment to the effect that the concerned authority should give a notice setting the penalty proposed to be imposed on the concerned govert:unent servant calling upon him to submit within 15 days of the receipt of notice or such further time not exceedihg 15 days, as may be allowed, such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty on the basis if the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under rule 14. It would thus appear that the punishing authority has in the second show cause notice to specify the punishment which it tentatively \"-.... or provisionally decides upon to impose looking to the gravity of the\n\n~ charge which is held proved.\n\nAt that stage the decision of the punis-\n\n1 hing authority is a tentative decision and in the very nature of things it must be so because an opportunity has. to be given to the delinquent government servant to make a representation on the nature of penalty.\n\nThis would imply that if the delinquent officer in his representation makes out a case for a lesser punishment tlw disciplinary authority would keep an open mind and after applying mind to the representation made by the delinquent government servant, the authority may either confirm its earlier tentative decision or it would be open to it to award a lesser penalty on them the one tentatively decided.\n\n(!) [!969] 2 SCR 343.\n\nPrinciple of na.tural justice and fair play implicit in Art. 311 (2) and rule 15(4)(i)(b)would require that the disciplinary authority has to take into consideration the representation made by the delinquent government servant in response to the notice which is a constitutional A obligation, and if the delinquent officer is in a position to persuade by his representation, to so modulate the punishment as would accord with the gravity of the misconduct and other mitigating or extenuating circumstances all of which may enter into the verdict of deciding upon the penalty, and consequently the disciplinary authority would be free to impose a lesser penalty than the one propsed in the second notice.\n\nThis is the constitutional scheme.\n\nIf the view that the High Court has taken is to be accepted that . the disciplinary authority must tentatively decide upon the penalty and-'( specify the penalty in the second show cause notice and after takihg into consideration the representation m>!_de by the delinquent government servant in response to the notice it can only either confirm the tentative decision but cannot award a lesser punishment, the exercise of giving second show cause notice becomes selfdefeating and giving of the notice inviting te representation on the question of penalty would be an exercise in futility. Such an approach would render a tentative decision as final and the rest beihg an empty formality. Such cotild not be the underlying object in enacting a constitutional mandate for the protection of government servants.\n\nIn service jurisprudence for difl'erent types of misconduct various penalties are prescribed in service rules. 1966 Rules prescribe as many as 9 penalties which can be awarded for good and sufficient reasons.\n\nIn the list of penalties the first three are styled as 'minor penalties' and the remaining six are styled as 'major penalties'. Com pulsory retirement is one of the major penalties. Similarly, removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future appoint ment in govel'nment service and dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the gov- 1 ernment are the other two major penalties.\n\nThe disciplinary authority keeping in view the gravity of misconduct committed by the government servant will tentatively determine the penalty to be imposed upon the delinquent government servant. Degree of seriousness of misconduct will ordinarily determine the penalty keeping in view tbe\n\ndegree of harm that each penalty can inffict upon the government scr- , van!.\n\nBefore serving the second show cause notice the disciplinary -pt authority will determine tentatively the penalty keeping in view the seriousness of misconduct. But this is a tentative decision.\n\nOh H receipt of representation in response to notice, the disciplinary authority will apply• its mind to it, take into account any extenuating or mitigating circumstances pleaded in the representation and finally\n\n• +\n\ncletermine. what should be penalty that would be commensurate with the circumstances of the case.\n\nNow, if a major penalty was tent'atively decided upon and a lesser or minor penalty cannot be awarded on the view taken by the High Court because this was not the specified penalty, the government servant to whom a notice proposing major penalty is served would run the risk of being awarded major penalty because it would not be open to award a lesser or a minor penalty than the one specified i'n the show cause notice.\n\nSuch a view runs counter to the principle of penology.\n\nIn criminal and quasi-criminal jurisprudence where the penalties are prescribed it is implicit thereunder that a major penalty would comprehend withi'n its fold the minor penalty. If a major penalty is proposed looking to the circumstances of the case, at that stage, after taking into consideration the representation bearing on the subjects apd having an impact on the question of penalty a minor penalty can always be awarded. In penal statute maximum sentence for e1tch offence is provided but the matter is within the discretion of the judicial officer awardinc; sentence to award such sentence within the ceiling prescribed by law as would be commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the surrounding circumstances except where minimum sentence is prescribed and Court's discretion is by legislation fettered.\n\nThis is so obvious that no authority is needed for it bnt if one is needed, a constitution Bench of this Court in Hukam Chand Malhotra v. Union of India(') dealt with this very aspect. Relev, ant portion of the second show cause notice which was before this Court may be extracted :\n\n'On a careful consideration of the report, and in particular of the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer in\n\nresrcct of the charge< flomed against yu the Pre<idcnt is\n\nprovisionally of opinion that a major penalty viz., dismis- F sal, removal or reduction should he enforced on you .... '\n\nUltimately, after taking into consideration th~ representation made by the concerned government servant penalty of removal from service was imposed upon him.\n\nIt was contended before this Court that in ' view of the decision of the Privy Council in High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall,(') and Khem Chand v. Union of India(') it is well settled that the punishing authority must either specify the 'actual punishment' or 'particular punishment' in the second show cause notice otherwise the notice would be had. Repelling this contention this Court observed as under :\n\n(I) [1959] Suppl. I SCR. 892.\n\n(2) [1948] L. R. 75 I. A. 225\n\n(3) [1958] SCR 1080\n\nSU~REME COURT REPORTS [ l980J 3 s.c.R.\n\nLet' us examine a little more carefully what consequences will follow if Art. 311 (2) requires in every case that the\n\n\"exact\" or \"actual\" punishment to be inflicted on the Govern- . ment servant concerned must be mentioned in the show cause notice issued at the second stage. It is obvious, and Art. 311 (2) expressly says so, that the purpose of the issue of a show cause notice at the second stage is to give the Government servant concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, for example, if the proposed punishment is dismissal, it is open to the Government servant concerned to say in his representation that even though the charges have been proved against him, he does not merit the extreme penalty of dismissal, but, merits a lesser punishment, such as removal or reduction in rank. If it is obligatory on the punishing authority to state in the show caue notice at the second stage the \"exact\" or \"particular\" punishment which is to be inflicted, then a third notice will be necessary if the State Government accepts the representation of the Government servant concerned.\n\nThis will be against the very purpose for which the second show cause notice was issued\".\n\n\" , . . If in the present case the show cause notice had merely stated the punishment of dismissal without mentioning the other two punishments it would still be open to the punishing authority to impose any of the two lesser punishments of removal or reduction in rank and no grievance could have been made either .about the show cause notice or the actual punishment imposed\".\n\nThe High Court in support of s decision has relied upon K. Rajappa Menon's rnse (Supra). The High Court appears to be of the view that the decision in Raiappa Menon's case is an authority or the proposition that if the punishing authority fails to specify any particular punishment to be imposed on the Government servant the show cause notice cannot be sustained without such a particular punishment being specified. Such was not the case before this Court in Rajappa Menon's case.\n\nThe contention canvassed before this Court was that 'if disciplinary authority specifies the penalty tentatively decic\\cd upon by it, it would indicate that th~ authority has finally made up its mind and, therefore, the notice would be bad.\n\nThis conte)ltion was in terms negaliived relying upon Khem Chand's case (Supra) and it was observed that the procedure which is to be followed. under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution of affording a reasonable opportunity includes giving of two notices, one, at the enquiry stage and\n\n.. •\n\nthe other when the competent authority as a result of the enquiry tentatively determines to inflict a particular punishment. It is quite obvious that mtless the disciplinary or the competent authority arrives at some tentative decision it will not be in a position to determine what particular punishment to inflict and a second show cause notice cannot be issued without such a tentative determination. This is of no assistance in the case under discussion. ·\n\nIt is thus incontroverttible that if any particular penalty is specilied as tentatively proposed in the second show cause notice the disciplinary authority after taking into consideration the representation made by the delinquent government servant can award that penalty or any lesser penalty and in so doing Art. 311 ( 2) will not be violated. In fact, this !, eaves open a discretion to the punishing authority which accords With reason, fair play and justice. ·\n\nThe fact situation in this appea'L is that in the notice dated February 12, 1970, the disciplinary authority stated that it was tentatively proposed to impose major penalty, viz., removal from service. Originru\n\nnotice is in Hindi language.\n\nIts translation in English language is placed on record. It clearly tranpires from the notice that the punishing authority tentatively proposed to impose a major penalty of removal from service.\n\nUltimately, after taking into' consideration the repre-; sentation of the respondent the disciplinary authority imposed penalty of compulsory retirement. In relation to penalty of removal from service the penalty of compulsory retirement inflicts Jess harm and, therefore, it is a lesser penalty compared to removal from service.\n\nCompulsory retirement results in Joss of service for certain years depending upon the date of compulsory retirement and the normal age of superannuation, but the terminal benefits are assured. In removal from service there is. a further disqualification which may have some repercussion on terminal benefits. It was not disputed before us that in comparison to removal from service compulsory retirement is a lesser penalty. Therefore, when in the second show notice rila.ior\n\npenalty of removal from service was tentatively proposed, it did comprehend within its fold every other minor penalty which can be imposed on the delinquent government servant.\n\nThat having been done, no exception can be taken to it.\n\nThe High Court was accordingly\\ in error in holding that the second show cause notice was invalid and on this ground allowing the second H appeal of the respondent, and decreeing his suit. Accordingly this appeal will have to be allowed. ·\n\nThe next question is, what order we should make in this appeal.\n\nIf the appeal is allowed, naturally the suit of the respondent will stand qismissed.' The respondent was a Forest Guard, a petty servant, serving in the Forest Department of the State.\n\nThe charge against him was that he removed some forest wood worth about Rs. 310.12P.\n\nHe has been in this litigation for the last 10 years.\n\nHe won in the trial court and in the High Court. This appeal wa~ preferred by the State for a decision on the question of law which may affect other cases. Allowing the State appeal would clarify the legal position and that would serve the purpose of the State in prnferring the appeal.\n\nA welfare State would hardly be interested in pursuing its employee serving in the lower echelons of service as would inflict, unbearable .., burden on him. Further, if the order by the High Court is not interfered. ~\n\nwith, the respondent would have to be reinstated in service but by the\\. . passage of time he would have by now retired on uperannuation als.o and accordingly he would be enttitled to his salary for the period commencing from date of his compulsory retirement to the date of his normal retirell)ent on superannnation.\n\nSince we are e, xercising our extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution, we are not bound to set aside the order of the High Court directing reinstatement of the respondent but as he would now only be entitled to his back wages, we quantify the same at Rs. 10,000/- and direct that the State shall pay the same with costs quantified at Rs. 1,000/- to\n\nthe respondent. Such an approach accords with the demands of social )' justice, reason and fair play. [See Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand & Ors.(')]\n\nThe State shall pay the amount herein directed to be paid within two months from today and the respondent shall be entitled to his terminal benefits from the date of his retirement on superannuation.\n\nThis appeal stands disposed of accordingly.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(I) [1978JJ", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF'MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 411, "end_char": 432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Ratan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 776, "end_char": 785, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ram Ratan", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1071, "end_char": 1079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A departmental eilquiry was held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Mr. Malhotra, in respect1 of the charges framed against the respondent."}}, {"text": "February 12, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1268, "end_char": 1285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charge of misconduct was held pro\\led whereupon the punishing authority served respondent with a second show cause notice dated February 12, 1970, as contemplated by Article 311(2) of !"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1306, "end_char": 1320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1917, "end_char": 1940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Second Additional District Judge, Morena, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Second Additional District Judge, Morena", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1946, "end_char": 1986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Second Additional District Judge, Morena, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2147, "end_char": 2172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by the respondent to the High Court a learned single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the appeal of respondent and set aside the decree made by the District Judge and restored the one passed by the trial Court with the result that a declaration was granted that the respondent."}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2546, "end_char": 2560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2862, "end_char": 2870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4466, "end_char": 4477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8967, "end_char": 8975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 SCR 343", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9255, "end_char": 9271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 SCR 370", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9710, "end_char": 9726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A S. K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9981, "end_char": 9996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S. K. Gambhir for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. S. Das Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10021, "end_char": 10035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N. S. Das Bahl for Respondent."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10097, "end_char": 10102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J .-Respondent Ram Ratan was employed as a, Forest B Guard iu the Forest Department of Madhya Pradesh Government."}}, {"text": "Ram Ratan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10119, "end_char": 10128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J .-Respondent Ram Ratan was employed as a, Forest B Guard iu the Forest Department of Madhya Pradesh Government.", "canonical_name": "Ram Ratan"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10649, "end_char": 10660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Civil Services Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11168, "end_char": 11186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12467, "end_char": 12478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13291, "end_char": 13302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13605, "end_char": 13613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15237, "end_char": 15245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "L. R. 75 I. A. 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20818, "end_char": 20836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20972, "end_char": 20980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21195, "end_char": 21203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. Rajappa Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22577, "end_char": 22593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court in support of s decision has relied upon K. Rajappa Menon's rnse (Supra)."}}, {"text": "Raiappa Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22672, "end_char": 22685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court appears to be of the view that the decision in Raiappa Menon's case is an authority or the proposition that if the punishing authority fails to specify any particular punishment to be imposed on the Government servant the show cause notice cannot be sustained without such a particular punishment being specified.", "canonical_name": "Raiappa Menon"}}, {"text": "Rajappa Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22982, "end_char": 22995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such was not the case before this Court in Rajappa Menon's case.", "canonical_name": "Raiappa Menon"}}, {"text": "Khem Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23301, "end_char": 23311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This conte)ltion was in terms negaliived relying upon Khem Chand's case (Supra) and it was observed that the procedure which is to be followed."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23397, "end_char": 23405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24309, "end_char": 24317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Forest Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26406, "end_char": 26423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was a Forest Guard, a petty servant, serving in the Forest Department of the State."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27469, "end_char": 27477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1253_1270_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "NISHI MAOHU ETC. ETC.\n\nl. ,\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND ORS.\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA, S. MVRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASA.'11'., JJ.J\n\nSelecrion t>f candidates admitted to the: G01•ernment Medical College, Jan1mu-Whe1her the notifications issued by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir indicating different categories under clause (2) and earmiirking seats arbitrary and unconstitutional-Articles 14 and 15 of the Constiution--lnter view method of selection whether a valid test.\n\nThe selection of ca.ndidates admitted to the Government Medical College, J ammu are to be made in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in the various orders issued by the Government of J ammu; and Kashmir from time to time. The earliest order made on July 9, 1973 concerns admission t6 technical institutions which include medical colleges and says that ''the man power requirements of various parts, of the State have not received unifc-nn and equal treatment with the result that there has been imbalance in the development of human resources in these parts\", and \"since the admissions to technical institutions also lead to the development of human resources'~, it had, therefore, \"become necessary to provide equal opportunities to the permanent residen~ candidates of all parts of the State and all sections of the. society,'. Asi per this order 50% of the seats were eMmarked for selection on open competition, 25% of the seats were reserved for candidates belonging to the categories specified in clause (2) of the order according to the percentage indicated against each. It was further provided in the order that after selection, as above,,: the remaining 25 % of the seats \"should be filled on the basis: of inter se merit to ensure rectification of imbalance in the admissions for various parts of the State, if any~ so as to give equitabler and uniform treatment to those parts\". In case there. was no ''visible imbalance\" or where no candidates were available under a particular category mentioned in clause (2) above the seats earmarked under these two heads \"shall be added to the percentage under [clause] I above\". The annexure to the order contained instructions concerning the \"idenUfication of th.e persons claiming benefit\" under cJause 2 of the order and \"the procedure connected therewith\". The instructions defined the different categories men tioned in clause (2) :\n\n\"Areas adjoining actual line of control-Candidates permanently\n\nresiding in any village of the' State specified in Appendix I to these' G instructions''.\n\n\"Bad pockets-Candidates permanently residing in any village of the State specified in Appendix Il to these instructions\".\n\n\"Social Castes-Candidates of the State belonging to any of the castes indicated in Appendix Ill to these instructions\".\n\nThe instructions also provided for the issue of a certificate by tho concerned authority stating that a candidate fell under any of the categories.\n\non June 27, 1974 another order was issued refixing the percentage of seats reserved for the different categories \"with a view to affording more accommo-o dation for open merit\". Open merit perc.entage was increased to 60, by reducing by 5 % the percentage of seats allotted for children of freedom fighters and by reducing the percentage of seats of 25% earmarked to ensure \"rectification of imbalance\" from 25% to 20%. 3% of seats reserved for candidates from areas known as. bad pockets which included Ladakh under the category \"socially and educationally backward classes\" was reduced to 1 t; O and the resultant diff~ rence of 2% was earmarked to candidates from Ladakh which was excluded from the above category. By another order dated April 21, 1976, the existing reservation of 20% for meeting regional imbalance \\V<i.'S reduced to I 8 'lo and the .. resultant 2 % vacancies earmarked for candidates possessing outstanding proficiency in sports\". An order made on April 16, 1976 earmarked. 10 seats at the Governn1ent Medical College, Jammu, for girl students \"subject to enough girl students being found otherwise suitable''. The ordeii also laid down the procedure to be followed by the selection committee in selecting cand!dates fer admission to technical training course.\n\nBy this order, comparative performnnce Qf the candidates at an interview to be; conducted for the purpose by the selec~ tion committee was made the only basis of selection.\n\nThe order added that the marks obtained by a• candidate in the qualifying university examination should\n\nbe taken into consideration only to determin~ the initial eligibility to compete for selection. This order was modified by a subsequent order issued on April 3, 1978. Instead of the marks obtained. by a candidate in the qualifying university examination being treated as relervant only to determine eligibility, the subsequent order provided : \"there will be 100 ma-rks for academic merit 'vhich shall be allotted to each candidate in accordance with the percentage of marks secured by hifl1/her in the basic qualifying examination or its equivalent\". This order further provided that 50 marks would be allotted for interview:, 10 marks for each of the five factors : physical, fitness, personality,_ aptitude general knowledge and general intelligence.\n\nBy notification published in the Jammu and Kashn1ir Government Gazette on June 21, 1979 applications were invited for admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the aforesaid college.\n\nOnly those candidates who had passed the Pre-Medical or Inter-Science or First Year T.D.C. (Medical Group) examination from the University of Jammu or any other equivalent examination 3.nd had secured not less than 50 per cent marks in science subjects in aggregate (theory and practical) were eligible to apply for admission; however, for scheduled castes. scheduled tribes Bakarwal and Gujjar candidates and candidates from Ladakh district and 'Bad pockets' the qualifying marks was 45 per cent. Candidates. who had been selected or nominated by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or had been alrady selected by a selection committee constituted by the Government' for any training course in or outside the State were not eligible to apply or to appear for interview for admission to this college. The notification added : \"Comparative merit of the candidates will be adjudged with respect to physical fitness, aptitude, personality, general knowledge and general inte1ligence1 in the interview, for which marks will be a.warded according to the perlormance of the candidates\". It was further provided that the selection would be made in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in the various orders H issued by the Government from time to time. The total number of seats filled by selection in this college for the year 1979-80 was 52. The candidates numbered 526, out of which 473 actually appeared for interview. In addition 10\n\n• •\n\nNISHI MAGHU v. J. & K. 1255\n\nseats were filled by candidates nominated by the Government. The nomina- A tions had to be made only from two sources : \\vards of non-resident Defence personnel, and students from other states.\n\nThe petitioners challenged the selection of candidates admitted to the Government Medical College, Jammu for the academic year 1979-80 as bad and that the categories mentioned in the several orders as arbitrary and unconstitu tional.\n\nHELD : 1. The classification made for rectification of regional imbalance is vague and the selections (serial Nos. 43 to 51 to the List) made under this head are invalid for the following reasons : [1263 C-D, J\n\n(i) The notification dated June 21, 1979 by which applications were invited for admission to the medical college provided thatr the selection of candidates would be made in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in the C va•rious orders issued by the Government from time to time, but none cf these orders contains an explanation 9ffered in the supplenientary affidavit filed by the State of J ammu & KaShmir that '~ \" ...... the State Government has found that for peculiar historical, geographical and topographical reasons there prevails an imbalance in the matter of development of the various part<> of the.\n\nState which has resulted in certain areas being ba.ck\\var~ as compared with the rest. In order therefore to rectify the distinction which inevitably would other- D wise creep in to the selection, the State Government has reserved 18% of seats for rectification of such imbalance\". Even with thiS explanation~ the affidavi~ does not identify the area of imbalarice. There was thus no objective standard to guide the selection committee.\n\n[1261 E~H, 1262 A]\n\n(ii) Even in the supplementary affidavit it is not claimed that the area of imbalance is only another name for the areas adjoining the actual tine of con- E trol and the bad pockets, as contended on behalf of the State. What is said in the affidavit is that the areas of imbalance are similar to thei aforesaid areas in being equally backward. But this does not mean that these categories are all identical and co-extensive in all respects.\n\nFurther in spite of similarity, even areas adjoining the actual line of control and the bad pockets. have been put under different categories; and [1262 B-DJ\n\n(iii) The contention was that the classification was justified on the report of the Anand Committee. The Selection Committee was required to follow not the Anand Committee report but what was provided in the orders passed by the Government. There is no order containing any reference to the Anand Committee Report. Neither the Government adopted the Anand Committee's report nor did the Selection Committee; proceeded on the basis of that report.\n\nThough tlie Anand Committee did not accept \"social castes\" as a category indicative of backwardness, the Selection Coinmittee has selected one candidate under this category which clearly shows that the Selection Committee was not guided by the Anand Committee Report, the selection made was not and could not be on the basis of that report. [1263 A-CJ\n\n2. In Janki Prii.sad Parimoo and Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors., [1973] 3 SCR p. 236, the Supreme Court did not approve 4 out of 23 \"low social castes\" mentioned in the Wazir Committee Report \"as educationally and economically .extremely backward'', as having no basis for inclu-\n\n1256 SlJPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA sion in the List. In Appendix III, 19 of these castes have been retained which were not disapproved in Parimoo's case. Chapter XIlI of the Wazir Committee report makes it clear that the classification is with reference to the nature of occupations which the people belonging to this category pursue. That being so, the classification does not offend Article 14 or Article 15 of the Constitu tion.\n\nThe selection of Edwin Khakkar, a Christian is in order since he falls under one such category listed and since the category is based on occupation B and not on caste as such.\n\n[1263 G-H, 1264 A-BJ\n\n3. The areas adjoining actua1 line of control and bad pockets are rea.lly backward areas and the residents of these areas are indisputably socially and educationally backward. Reservations made for such candidates from such back\\vard classes cannot be said to offend Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\n[1264C-D]\n\nJanaki Prasad Parimoo and Ors. etc. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors., [1973] 3 SCR p. 236; followed.\n\n4. Though the contention that \"interviewing candidates to judge their sullability was not a reliable test as many uncertain factors were likely to affect the result of the interview\" reflects a legitimate point of view, but it is\n\na point of view only and cannot be taken as the last word on the subject.\n\nD However, it is impossible within allotted span of time (4 minutes) to make a fair estimate of a candidate's suitability on a consideration of the five specified factors which are not capable of easy determination such as physical fitness, persooolity, aptitude, general knowledge and general intelligence.\n\nBy merely looking at a candidate, the selection committee could not come to a conclusion about on.p's physical fitness. Therefore, the fact that the allotment of marks is in accordance with a policy decision may not conclude E the matter in all circumstances; if that decision is found to be arbitrary and infringing Article 14. of the Constitution it cannot claim immunity from challenge.\n\n[1264 E-H, 1265 G-H, 1266 AJ\n\nR. Chitralekha and anr. v. State of Mysore and Ors. [1964] 6 SCR 368; A. Peeriakaruppan etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1971] 2 SCR 430; distinguished and held inapplicable to the facts of the instant case.\n\n5. The selection under the category \"wards of Medical College Staff\" is invalid as such a category does not find place in any of the orders. [1266 G-H] j\n\n6. Reservation for students from other States on reciprocal basis, as seen from Anita Jain's case bas not worked in practice and she is entitled to a seat. Nor did the two clauses 17 and 18 of the notification dated June 21, G 1979 apply to Kulbbusban Gupta since be was not selected or nominated by the Government of J ammu and Kashmir for admission to the Engineering College nor was he selected by any selection committee constituted by the Government of fammu and Kashmir.\n\n[1267 E-H, 1268 G-H]\n\nORIGINAL JUR1smcnoN: Writ Petition Nos. 1488-89, 1556-57, H 1571/79 and 29, 201, 222, 249, 260-263, 267, 268-271, 278, 279, 304, 305. 309, 310 and 326 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\n1 41\n\n't~ • •\n\nIii\n\n• .I ..\n\n~--\n\nNISHI MAGHU v. :r. tit 'K. (Gupta, !.) 1257 ' Anil Dev Singh, S. s. Jauhar and Lalit Kumar Gupta for the Peti- A tioners in WP Nos. 148~-89, 1571/79 and 304, 309-310/80.\n\nA nil Dev Singh and S. K. Sabharwal for the Petitioners in WP Nos.\n\nJI,., 201, 249, 267, 278, 279 and 326/80.\n\nNaunlt Lal for the Petitioners in WP Nos. 1556-57 /79, 29, 222, 260-63, 268-271 and 305/80.\n\nS. N. Kackar for the Respondent in WP Nos. 1488-1489/79 .\n\nY. S. Chitale and.Mukul Mudgal for the Respondent in WP Nos. 1556-1557 /79.\n\nAlta/ Ahmed for Respondent Nos. 1-3 in WP 1488 and RR. 1-6 in WP 1489 /79 and in all the matters.\n\nATM Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for RR. 7 in WP No. 1488/79 and 1551-1557 /79.\n\nC.S.S. Rao for RR. 12 in WP No. 1488/79.\n\nS. P. Gupta, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish and E. C. Agarwala and\n\nDwarka Nath Gupta for the Intervener i:n WP Nos. 1556-1557 /79.\n\nD A. K. Sen, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish, S. P. Gupta, Dwarka Nath Gupta and E. C. Agarwala for the Intervener in WP Nos. 1488-1489/ 79.\n\nL. M. Singhvi (Dr.), L. K. Pandey and Mr. Naunit Lal for the I Petitioner in WP No. 29/80.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deilvered by\n\nGUPTA, J.-The selection of candidates admitted to the Government Medical College, Jam.mu, for the academic year 1979-80 is challenged in these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution by some of the candidates who were not selected. By notification published in the Jam.mu and Kaslunir Government Gazette on June 21, 1979 appli- F\n\n' cations were invited for admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the aforer said college. Only those candidates who had passed the Pre-Medical or Inter-SCience or First Year T.D.C. (Medical Group) examination from the University of Jam.mu or any other equivalent examination and had secured not less than 50 per cent marks in science subjects in aggregate (theory and practical) were eligible to apply for admission; however, for scheduled castes,, scheduled tribes, Bakarwal and Gujjar candi- dates and candidates from Ladakh district and 'Bad Pockets' the. qualifying marks was 45 per cent Candidates who had been selected or nominated by.the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or had been already selected by a selection committee constituted by the Government\n\nfor any training course in or outside the State were not eligible to apply\n\nc;>r to appear for interview for admission to this cOllege. The notification\n\n21-610 SCI/80\n\nadded : \"Comparative merit of the candidates will be adjudged with respect to physical fitness, aptitude, personality, general knowledge and general intelligence in the interview,. for which warks will be awarded. according to the performance of the candidates\". It was further provided that the selection would be made in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in the various orders issued by the Govern- B . ment from time to time. The total number of seats filled by selection in this college for the year 1979-80 was 52. The candidates numbered 526, out of which 4 73 actually appeared for interview. In addition\n\n10 seats were filled by candidates nominated by the Government. It appears from the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the State of c Jannnu and Kashmir that the nominations had to be made only from two sources : wards of non-resident Defence personnel, and students from other States.\n\nBefore we proceed to .consider the grounds on which the selection is challenged, it will be necessary to refer to the contents of the orders issued by the Government of J ammu and Kashmir to regulate the selection. The earliest order which is relevnt in this context was made on July 9, 1973. This concerns adntission to technical institutions which include medical colleges. The order starts by saying that ''the man power requirements of various parts of the State have not received uniform and equal treatment with the result that there has been imbalance in the development of human resources in these parts\", and ''since the admissions to technical institutions also lead to the development of human resources\", it had therefore \"become necessary to provide equal opportunities to the permanent resident cndidates of all parts of the State and all sections of society\". The order then lays down the following rules for admission until further orders, it is said, with the aforesaid F object in view :\n\n( 1) 50 per cent of the seats \"should be straightaway earmarked for being filled upon the basis of open merit in accordance with the criteria to be adopted by the concerned selection committee constituted by the Government in this behalf''.\n\n(2) Of the remaining seats, 25 per cent is reserved for candidates falling under the categories specified below to the extent indicated against each, to be filled on the basis of merit in each category : ·\n\n(a) Scheduled castes.\n\n(b) Children of freedom fighters.\n\n{ c) Children of permane!lt resident Defence personnel.\n\n..It ' .. • • •\n\ni f\n\n~ ..\n\nNIS!ll MAGHU v. J. & K. (Gupta, /.) 1259\n\n( d) Candidates belonging to the following socially and educationally back.ward classes at recommended by the Backward Classes Committee; ·\n\n(i) Areas adjoining actual line of control\n\n(ii) Areas known as bad pockets including Ladakb..\n\n(iii) Social castes\n\n39'o\n\nIt is further provided in the order that after selection as indicated in clauses (1) and (2) above had beeu made, the remaining 25 per cent of the seats \"should be filled on the basis of inteHe merit to ensure rectification of imbalance in the admissions for various parts of the State, if any, so as to give equitable and uniform treatment to those parts\". It is added that in case there is no ''visvble imbalance\"· or where no candidates are available under a particular category mentioned in' clause 2 above the seats earmarked under these two heads \"shall be added to the percentage under 1 above\".\n\nThe selection committee while making selections is required by the\n\nord~ to indicate separately the category under which a candidate falls.\n\nThere is an annexure to the order contauung instructions concerning the \"identification of the persons claiming benefit\" under clause 2 of the order and the \"procedure connected therewith\".\n\nThe instructions define the different categories mentioned in clause (2). For the present purpose it will be necessary to refer to the definitions of \"Areas adjoiming actual line of control\", \"Bad pockets'', and \"Social castes\".\n\n\"Areas adjoining actual line of control-Candidates permanently residing in any village of the State specified in Appendix I to these illlstructions.\"\n\n\"Bad pocket8-eandidates permanently residing in any village of the State specified in Appendix II to these instructions.\" ·\n\n\"Social castes-eandidates of the State belonging to any of the castes indicated in Appendix III to these instructions.\"\n\nI The instructions also provide for the issue of a certificate by tlie B concetnecl authority stating that a candidate falls under any of ' the categories.\n\nSIJPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA On June 2 7, 197 4 anoµier order was issued refuting the percentage of seats reserved for the different categories \"with a view to affording more accommodation for open merit\".\n\nThe following changes were made to the earlier order:\n\n( 1) Instead of 50 per cent, 60 per cent of the seats is now earmarked for admission on the basis of \"open merit\".\n\n(2)\n\n(3)\n\nInstead of 25 per cent, 20 per cent is earmarked for admission under the categories mentioned in clause 2 of the order dated July 9, 1973. The percentage of seats allotted for children of freedom fighters is reduced from 7 per cent to 2 per cent. Under the category \"socially and educationally backward classes\" the earlier order had reserved 3 per cent of the seats for candidates belonging to areas known as bad pockets including Ladakh, by this order Ladakh is excluded from that category reducing the percentage of seats from 3 per cent to 1 per cent and a separate category has .been made for candidates from the Ladakh district allotting 2 per cent of the seats to' them.\n\nWhereas in .the earlier order 25 per cent of the seats was earmarked to ensure rectification of imbalance, here the figure is reduced to 20 per cent.\n\nAbout two years later, on April 21, 1976 another order was issued reducing the existing reservation of 20 per cent for meeting regional imbalance to 18 per cent and allotting \"the resultant 2% vacancies\" for candhlates \"possessing outstanding proficiency in sports\".\n\nIt is necessary to refer to two more orders.\n\nAn order made on April 16, 197 6 provides that 10 seats at the Government Medical College, J ammu, shall be earmarked for girl students \"subject to G enough girl students being found otherwise suitable\". The order also lays down the procedure to be followed by the selection committee in selecting candidates for admission to technical traimng courses. By this order, comparative performance of the candidate.s at an interview to be conducted for the purpose by the selection committee is made the only basis of selection.\n\nThe order adds that the H marks obtained by a . candidate in the qualifying university examination shall be taken into consideration only to determine the initial eligibility to compete for selection. This order was modified by a\n\n.. •\n\n' ' \\\n\n~~ ; ,,,_ . '.ifk~--\n\nsubsequent order issued on April 3, 1978. Instead of the marlcs obtiiined by a candidate in the qualifying university examination be- . ing treated as relevant only to determine eligibiJ.ity, the subsequent order provides: \"there will lie 100 marks for academic merit which shall be allotted to each candidate in accordance with the percentage of marks secured by him/her fo the basic qualifying examination or its equivalent\".\n\nThis order further provides that 50 marks will be allotted for interview, 10 marks for each of the five factors; physical fitness, personality, aptitude, general knowledge and general intelligence.\n\nSome of the categories mentioned in these orders have been challenge9 as arbitrary and unconstitutional.\n\nWe may begin witli the classification made for 'rectification or regional imbalance' for which\n\n18 per cent of the seats is reserved.\n\nThe crilicism is that the order creating this category does not identify the . areas which suffer from imbalance nor does it S'UQPly any guidelines for the selection committee. It appears that the selection committee has admitted 9 candidates under this head whose names appear at serial Nos. 43 to 51 D\n\nof the list of selected candidates annexed to .the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent, State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nHow exactly the selection committee understood what regional imbalance was and on what basis they accepted certain areas of the State as suffering from imbalance is not known.\n\nThe supplementary affidavit seeks to explain the category as follows : \" .... the State Government has found that for peculiar. historical, geographical and topographical reasons there prevails an imbalance m the matter of development of the various parts of the State which has resulted i!ll certain areas being backwarl! as compared with the rest. In order therefore to rectify the distortion which inevitably would otherwise creep into the selection, the State Government has reserved 18% of seats for rectification of such imbafance\" . . The affidavit refers to the disadvantages suffered by areas which adjoin the actuai line of control and the bad pockets and states: \"likewise there are other areas in the. State which have recived lesser att- . ention in the past in the matter of economic development These\n\nareas, inter alia, are either inaccessible on account of difficult geographical terrain or suffer from difficult climatic condition .... Naturally therefore the human resources from those areas have also not developed\". It may be recalled that the notification dated June 21, 1979 by which applications were invited for admission to the medical college provided that the selection of candidates would be made in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in the various orders issued by the Government from time to time, but none\n\n, .\n\nof these orders contains an explanation as the one now offered .in the supplementary affidavit.\n\nEven with this explanation the affidaVit does not identify the, areas of imbalance. There was thus no objec- J. tive standard tel guide the selection committee. Mr. Kacker appearing for the State of J ammu and Kashmir sought to argue that by area of imbalance what was meant was really the same thing as areas adjoinll ing actual line of control and bad pockets. But in all the orders issued by the Government from time to time the area of imbalance has been treated as a distinct category. Even in the supplementary affidavit it is not claimed that the area of imbalance is only another name for the areas djoining the actual line of control and the bad pockets, what is C said is that these are similar in being equally backward. But this does ....... . not mean that these categories are all identical and co-extensive in all •.\n\nrespects. It will be noticed that, in spite of the similarity, even areas\n\nadjoining the actual line of control and the bad pockets have been put l!lilder different categories.\n\nMr. Kacker also urged that as the areas suffering from imbalance were backward areas, constituting a separate category for candidates coming from such backward areas was in accordance with . the report of a committee headed by Mr. Justice Anand of Ja.mmu\n\nand Kashmir High Court. The Anand Committee w:is appointed on August 24, 1976 to examine and remove defects in the Jammu and Kashmir Soheduled Castes $d Backward ClasSes (Rese1'Va6on) Rules, 1970 and the Jammu and Kashmir Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointment by Promotion) Rules 1970.\n\nThese rules were framed on the basis of the recommendations of a committee, called the Wazir Committee, set up in 1969 for drawing up a list ol' back.ward classes in the State.\n\nMr. Justice J.N. Wazir, a former Chief Justice of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, was the Chairman of this Committee. The Wazir Committee submitted its report in November 1969 recommending several classes of citizens to be clisrufied as backward classes.\n\nThe validity of these Rules came up for .scrutiny before this Court in Janki Prasad Parimoo G and others etc. ef(:. v. State of Jamrnu and Kashmir and others.('} In Parimoo's case certain defects in the 1970 Rules were pointed out and the Anand Committee was constituted, as stated already, \"with a view , to examine removal of. defects\" in the 1970 Rules. The Anand Committee sbmitted its report in September 1~77. Mr. Kacker drew our attention to the fact that the report was debated on the fibor of both H houses of the Jammu and Kashmir !egislatilre which resolve.I as\n\n(1) [1973] 3 S. C. R. 236\n\nj '\n\n' 1\n\nfollows : \"The report need to be adopted by the Government as .quickly as po5sible and rules made so that the backward classes could -Oerive benefits quickly''. It is no! necessary to examine whether the ' Anand Commitree report identifies the areas of imbalance in the State\n\n.because the selection committee was required to follow not the Anand • Committee report but what was provided in the orders passed by the\n\nGovernment. There is no order containing any reference to the Anand .Committee report. There iSi also nothing to show that the Government\n\nhad adopted the report of that the selection committee proceeded on the basis of tliat report. It appears from page 59 of the Anand , r • • Committee report that the Committee did not accept \"social castes\" Y as a category indicative of backwardness, but the selection committee has selected one candidate under this category which plajnly shows that the selection committee was not guided by the Arland Committee report. There can be no doubt that the selections made were not mid could not be on the basis d that report. It must therefore be held that the classification made for rectification of regional imbalance without identifying the areas suffering from imbalance is vague and the selections made under this head are accordjngly invalid.\n\nIn support of this contention tha_t area of imbalance was only anothec name for bad pocketSi or areas adjoining actual line of control, Mr. Kacker claimed that the 9 candidates selected for 'rectification of imbalance' an came from either bad pockets or froin areas adjoining actuail line of control The claim was questioned by the petitioners who sought to disprove it by reference .to the material on record. We do not consider it necessary to examine the individual cases here. . It may be that some of these candidates really came from areas adjoining actual line of control or bad pockets, yet they cannot be accommodated unless the percentage d seats reserved for these two categories was raised.\n\nAnother category under challenge is \"social castes''. Included in\n\nthis category are candidates of the State belonging to any of the castes indicated in appendix m to the instructpns forming part of the order G dat!ld, JUiy 9, 1973 to which reference has already been made. The Wazir Committee in their rep9rt mentioned 23 low social castes \"as\n\neducationally and economically extremely backward\" but 4 of them have been held 'by this Court in Parinwo' s case as having no basis for inclusion in the list. In appendix m 19 of these castes have been retained which were not disapproved in Parinwo's case. Chapter XIII R , of the Wazir Committee report makes it cleiµthat the classification is with reference to the nature of occupations which the people belong-\n\nSUPREME COUR.T REEORTS\n\n[1980] 3 $.C.R.\n\ning to this category pursue. That being so we find no substance in. the challenge that the classification offends Article 14 or Article 15 of the Constitution. Under this category only one candidate has been selected whose name, Edwin Khokkar, appears at serial No. 33 in the list of selected candidates annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nAn objection was raised against his selection that he being a Christian, as his name s; hows, could not belong to any of the castes mentioned in appendix III. But as the category is based on occupation and not on caste as such, the objection must be overruled.\n\nThe classifications based on areas adjOiJiliig actual line of control ( ., and bad pockets are also challenged as violative of Article 14 of the 1 Constitution. These are really backward areas and the residents of these areas are indisputably socially and educationally backward.\n\nReservations made for candidates from such backward classes cannot be said to offend Article 14. In fact in Parimoo's case the rese, rvation made for residents of bad pockets which were identified in the report of the Wazir Committee, was accepted .'llS valid. We therefore hold. that the challenge to these two categories is not justified.\n\nApart from the challenge to some of the categories mentioned in the Government orders, the validity of interview as a test for selection has also been questioned, not only in principle but also 'in regard to the manner in which it was conducted. It was contended that interviewing candidates to judge their suitability w:i.s not a reliable test as many uncertain factors were likely to affect the result of the interview.\n\nThe criticism reflects legitimate point of view but it is a point of view only and cannot be mken as the last word on the subject.\n\nIn this connection we may refer to the observations of this Court in R.\n\nChitralekhd and another v. State of Mysore and others : (') \"In the f. field of education there are divergent views as regard the mode of tesir ing the capacity and calibre of students in the matter of admissions to colleges.\n\nOrthodox educationists stand by the marks obtained by a:\n\n' \"\n\nstudent in the annual examination. The modern trend of opinion ..[ insists upon other additional tests, such as interview, performance in extra-curricular activities, personality test, psychiatric test etc.\n\nObviously we are not in a position to judge which method is preferable l or which test is .the correct one\". In A. Periakaruppan, etc. v. State\n\nof Tamil Nadu awl others(') this Court said : \"In most cases the first impression need not necessarily be the best impression.\n\nBut under tlte\n\n(!) (19641 6 S. C. R. 368.\n\n(2) (1971] 2 S. C. R. 430.\n\nexisting conditions in ibis country we are unable to accede to the con- A. tention of the petitioners that the system of intrview as in vogue in this country is so defective as to make it useless\".\n\nIn almost all the writ petitions before us the onil test as conducted has been described as a \"farce\". The criticism is based on the allegation that the time spent on each candidate was between t and 2 minutes within which, it was contended, one could hardly assess the suitability of the candidate on a consideration of the five factors : physical fitness, aptitude, personality, general knowledge and general intelligence, some of which are also difficult to evaluate objectively.\n\nIn an affidavit filed on behalf of the State of J ammu and Kashmir,\n\n•C' sworn by Dr. A. H. Fazli, Professor of Pharmacology, Srinagar, who was one of the members. of the selection committee, it is stated that on an average the time spent for interview was \"4 minutes per candidate\".\n\nMr. Kacker for the State of Jammu and Kashmir submitted that it was a policy decision by the Government to convert the full marks of the qualifying examinations to 100 marks and allot 50 marks for interview for l:he purpose selection.\n\nHe explined that the conversion was necessary because the candidates had appeared in different qualifying examinations and the total marks in the different examinations varied between 550 and 300. It was pointed out on behalf of the writ petitioners that allotment of 50 marks for interview after reducing the total marks of the written examination, where it was 550 to 100, amounted to allotting 275 marks for interview as against 550 marks for written examination. It was contended that this was beyond all reasonable proportion especially considering .the fact that only 4 minutes were spent in evaluating a candidate's performance in the intervie, w. Our attention was drawn to Periakaruppan's case where -Olis Court thought \"earmarking 75 marks out of 275 marks for intervillW\n\nas interview marks prima fade appears to be excessive\". However the conclu.<ion reached in Periakaruppan' s case on the point was : \"While we do feel that the marks allotted for interview are on the high >ide and it may be appropriate for the Government to re-examine lho question, we are unable to uphold the contention that if was not within the power of the Government to provide such high marks for interview ...... \". Reserving 50 marks for interview out of a total of 150 (100 for written examination and 50 for interview) does seems excessive. especially when the time spent was not more than 4 minute' on each candidaie. It is difficult to see how it is possible within this short span of time to make a fair estimate of a candidate's suitability on a consideration of the five specified factors which are not capable of easy . determination, such as physical fitness, personality aptitude,. general knowledge and general intelligence. It is also not clear how by1\n\n-.y\n\n'Cl\n\nmerely looking at a candidate the selection committee. could come to a conclusion about his or her physical fitness.\n\nThe fact that the allotment of marks is in ac; cordance with a policy decision may not conclude the matter in all circumstances; if that decision is found to be arbitrary and infringing Article 14 of the Constitution, it cannot claim immunity from challenge. When we say this we are not unmindfl)l of the observations in Per/akaruppan's case quoted above, . which were made in a somewhat similar but not altogether identical situation. It wiis also contended for the writ petitioners that reserving such high marks for interview leaves room for discrimination and manipulation. It has been held in Chitralekha' s case that the faC! that a system is capable of abuse is not a ground for quashing it. There is y no reliable material before us to prove that there has been discrimiqa- !ion or manipulation of the interview marks in any of these eoases.\n\nThat being so, and considering the possible hardship, if the selections were now 'Set aside, to the students in whose case the validity of the selection canuot otherwise be questioned and who have nearly completed two terms, we are not inclined to annul the entire selection, though allotment of 50 marks for interview in the circumstances stated above seem to us excessive. However, we expect the Government of Jamrtm and Kashmir to reconsider the matter in the light of what we have sa.id above and, other things remaining the same, for future years to reduce the percentage of marks allotted for interview to a reasonable proportion of the total marks for the selection test.\n\nCounsel for the petitioners in Writ Petitions 1556-57 of 1979 sought '\n\nto make a point that the regulations framed by the Indian Medical Council under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 do not c:ontemplate interview as a selection device regulating admission of students.\n\nThe position is not so clear from the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners and in any case these regulations came into effect after the j interviews were concluded in September 1979.\n\nThe selection of one candidate has been questioned on the , groundi that he does not fall under any of the categories mentioned in the orders. Shri Sanjay Pathania whose name appears at serial No. 52 in the list of candidates annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the St&te of .J ammu and Kashmir appears to have been selected under the category \"Ward~ of Medical College Staff\". It was argued that this category is not based on a valid classification' and infringes Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt is not necesi; ary ta exanilne the validity of the classification for. the simple reason that this is not a category mentioned in any of the orders. That being so the selection of Shri Pathania must be set aside.\n\n~··\n\nEarlier in this Judgment it has been stated that following a request 1llllde by the Government of India 10 per cent of the seats in the College was reserved for tudents from other States on reciprocal basis.\n\nThis was a policy decision.\n\nHowever, the way the policy has been worke(! is criticised by the writ petitioner in writ petition No. 29 of\n\n1980, Miss Anita Jain.\n\nPursuant to this policy 5 students from Rajasthan and 1 from Andhra Pradesh were admitted to the Government Medical College, J ammu.\n\nMiss Jain states that she was a candidate for admission to the Medical College, Jammu, for the session 1919-80. On November 8, 1979 the Government of )ammu and Kashmir informed her by a letter that she had been nominated for tj admission to the first year M.B.B.S. course in one of the medical coll' 1egei; in Madhya Pradesh.\n\nWhen she went to Bhopal for admission on the basis of the said letter she was refused admission on the ground that the State of Jammu and Kashmir had not admitted nominees of the Madhya Pradesh Government and unless they were admitted she\n\nwould not lie admitted to any medical college in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Her grievance is that even after she had informed the Government of Jammu and Kashmir of what had happened, the Government did 11ot take 1111y step to get her admitted to any medical college in the State or outside. It does not appear from the affidavits filed by the State of Jammu and Kashmir if the candidates admitted to the Government Medical College, J ammu, from outside the State are equal in number to those from the State who have been nomil; ated for admission to outside institutions, anq on what basis the nominations, whatever the number is, have been made. Anita Jain's case makes it clear that the reciprocity policy, has not worked as it should have.\n\nMiss Jain's counsel informed us that Miss Jain was willing to go to\n\naaiy State for admission to a medical college.\n\nHaving npminated her for admission to an outside institution, we do not think the Govern-\n\n\\< ment can avoid responsibility now.\n\nWe therefore direct the first res-\n\n~ pondent, State of Jammu and Kashmir, to find her a seat in any medi- •Cal college outside the State on the basis of reciprocity, unless as a result of our Judgment a few more seats are available in the medical .college at Jammu and she is entitled to one of them on merit. For\n\ndisposing of this writ petition it is not necessary to dilate on the problems that failure of the reciprocity policy in Miss Jain's case brings to prominence.\n\nIt now remains to deal with two more individl!'al cases, one of improper nomination and the other of unjU:St rejection. In the list of nominated candidates, the name of Harish Kumar appears against 11erial No. 62.\n\nNomination, as stated earlier, was to be made from two classes of students--<:andidates from outside the State nf Jammu\n\nand Kashmir and wards of Defence personnel (non-residents). There is no dispute that Harish Kumar belongs to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and it is not claimed that he falls in the other class.\n\nThere was therefore no basis on which .!:Iarish Kumar could be validly nominated. Mr. Kacker; counsel for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, also did not try to justify Harish Kumar's' nomination.\n\nHarish Kumar's admission to the medical college must therefore be set aside.\n\nThe petitioner in writ petition No. 201 of 1980\\Kulbhushan Gupta • obtained 104 marks out of total 150 marks.\n\nOf the 31 candidates who were selected on open competition, the one whose name appears 25th in order of merit got 103.25 marks out of f50.\n\nBut Kulbhu-\\.r shan Gupta was not selected on the plea that he had been selected '\\. earlier for Regional Engineering College. The notification dated Junec ' 21, 1979 by which applications were invited for admission to medical college, Jammu, for the year 1979-80 includes to clauses Nos. 17 and 18 which are as follow : ·\n\n\"17. The candidates, while applying for admission to the M.B.B.S. Course, should specifically mention in their application forms that they have not been selected/nominated by the Govt. of J & K for any training course within or outside the J & K State.\n\n18. The candidates, who have already been selected by any other selection committee constituted by the Govt. of J & K for any other trainmg course within or outside the\n\nState, are not eligible to apply or to appear for interview for\n\nadmission to this college.\n\nA candidate who tries to cheat\n\n1 the Selection Committee on this account, will be disqualified and even if selected under false pretence will not be given admission, or if he/she has secured admission, his/bee admission will stand null and v<lid.\"\n\nIt was contended that in view of these conditions Ku!bhushan Gupta was not eligible for selection though no objection was .n!ised G when he appeared for interview.\n\nThat he is a student of the Regional Engineering College is not disputed, but it appears that he was not selected or nominated by the Government of Jammu and E:as.hmir for admission to the engineering. college nor was he selected by any selection committee constituted by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nClearly, therefore, the bar in clause 17 or clause 18 cannot H apply to his case, and it must be held that he was improperly ~\n\nadmission to the Government Medical College, Jaminu.\n\nKulbbusban Gupta is entitled n merit to a seat in the College.\n\nThe conclusions we have reached on the various jssues do not A . wlitra.rlt cancellation of the entire list of candidates admitted to the\n\nGm>ilrilrl!ent Medical College, Jammu, for the 1979-80 session of the }- M; B.B.S. conrse but call for a revision of the list.\n\nWe therefore direct\n\nJlS f(ifiows :-\n\n( 1) As the classification made for \"rectification of regional\n\nimbalance\" without identifying the areas of imbalance has been held invalid, the seats reserved under this head may be added to the quota of seats earmarked for selection on the basis of merit and filled accordingly.\n\nEven if some of the candidates who have been selected under this category were eligible for selection as candidates from areas adjoining actual line of control or bad pockets, they cannot be accommodated unless the percentage of seats reserved for these two categories was raised.\n\n(2) As the selection of Shri Sanjay Pathania (No. 52 in\n\nthe list of selected candidates) under the category \"wards of medical college staff\" has been set aside, one more seat should therefore be added to the \"open merit\"quota and filled accordingly. ' ·\n\n(3) The Government must find a seat for the petitioner in writ petition No. 29 of 1980. Miss Anita Jain, who was nominated for admission to an outside inStitution, in any medical coilege outside the .State unless as a result of the revision of the list of candidates admitted she finds a place in the Medical College, Jammu, on the basis of merit.\n\n{ 4) The admission of Harish Kumar (No. 62 in the list of admitted candidates) has been set aside.\n\nTo com- , plete the quota of nominated candidates another candidate in his place may be nominated if the Government so desiires.\n\n(5) The petitioner in writ petition No. 201 of 1980\n\nKulbhushan Gupta, it has been found, was wrongly refused admission.\n\nHe is entitled on merit to a seat.\n\nThe writ petitions therefore sncceed to the extent indicated above. [n the circumstances of the cases there will be no order as to cost!!.\n\nA We are conscious that revision of the list of selected candfdates at this stage will not only cause hardship to the students who will be excluded but some of those who might get into the list npw are also likely to experience certain difficulties.\n\nWe are also conscious that the late revision of the list will create problems for the authorities but that, we are afraid, cannot be helped. We hope e authorities will deal & sympathetically with the cases where it may be possible for them to render some help to the students in this situation and relax the rigour of the rules to the utmost permissible extent for the purpose.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions allowed.", "total_entities": 119, "entities": [{"text": "NISHI MAOHU ETC. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NISHI MAOHU ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 9, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA, S. MVRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASA.'11'.,"}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MVRTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 397, "end_char": 415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of J ammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 675, "end_char": 695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selection of ca.ndidates admitted to the Government Medical College, J ammu are to be made in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in the various orders issued by the Government of J ammu; and Kashmir from time to time."}}, {"text": "July 9, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 755, "end_char": 767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest order made on July 9, 1973 concerns admission t6 technical institutions which include medical colleges and says that ''the man power requirements of various parts, of the State have not received unifc-nn and equal treatment with the result that there has been imbalance in the development of human resources in these parts\", and \"since the admissions to technical institutions also lead to the development of human resources'~, it had, therefore, \"become necessary to provide equal opportunities to the permanent residen~ candidates of all parts of the State and all sections of the."}}, {"text": "June 27, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2947, "end_char": 2960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on June 27, 1974 another order was issued refixing the percentage of seats reserved for the different categories \"with a view to affording more accommo-o dation for open merit\"."}}, {"text": "Ladakh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3611, "end_char": 3617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bad pockets which included Ladakh under the category \"socially and educationally backward classes\" was reduced to 1 t; O and the resultant diff~ rence of 2% was earmarked to candidates from Ladakh which was excluded from the above category."}}, {"text": "April 21, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3685, "end_char": 3699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By another order dated April 21, 1976, the existing reservation of 20% for meeting regional imbalance \\V<i.'S reduced to I 8 'lo and the .. resultant 2 % vacancies earmarked for candidates possessing outstanding proficiency in sports\"."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order made on April 16, 1976 earmarked."}}, {"text": "Governn1ent Medical College, Jammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3957, "end_char": 3991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 seats at the Governn1ent Medical College, Jammu, for girl students \"subject to enough girl students being found otherwise suitable''."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was modified by a subsequent order issued on April 3, 1978."}}, {"text": "June 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5337, "end_char": 5350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By notification published in the Jammu and Kashn1ir Government Gazette on June 21, 1979 applications were invited for admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the aforesaid college."}}, {"text": "University of Jammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5569, "end_char": 5588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only those candidates who had passed the Pre-Medical or Inter-Science or First Year T.D.C. (Medical Group) examination from the University of Jammu or any other equivalent examination 3.nd had secured not less than 50 per cent marks in science subjects in aggregate (theory and practical) were eligible to apply for admission; however, for scheduled castes."}}, {"text": "Bakarwal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5816, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "scheduled tribes Bakarwal and Gujjar candidates and candidates from Ladakh district and 'Bad pockets' the qualifying marks was 45 per cent."}}, {"text": "Ladakh district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5867, "end_char": 5882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "scheduled tribes Bakarwal and Gujjar candidates and candidates from Ladakh district and 'Bad pockets' the qualifying marks was 45 per cent."}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5993, "end_char": 6024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "who had been selected or nominated by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or had been alrady selected by a selection committee constituted by the Government' for any training course in or outside the State were not eligible to apply or to appear for interview for admission to this college."}}, {"text": "Government Medical College, Jammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners challenged the selection of candidates admitted to the Government Medical College, Jammu for the academic year 1979-80 as bad and that the categories mentioned in the several orders as arbitrary and unconstitu tional."}}, {"text": "KaShmir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7976, "end_char": 7983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43 to 51 to the List) made under this head are invalid for the following reasons : [1263 C-D, J\n\n(i) The notification dated June 21, 1979 by which applications were invited for admission to the medical college provided thatr the selection of candidates would be made in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in the C va•rious orders issued by the Government from time to time, but none cf these orders contains an explanation 9ffered in the supplenientary affidavit filed by the State of J ammu & KaShmir that '~ \" ...... the State Government has found that for peculiar historical, geographical and topographical reasons there prevails an imbalance in the matter of development of the various part<> of the."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10161, "end_char": 10174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1973] 3 SCR p. 236, the Supreme Court did not approve 4 out of 23 \"low social castes\" mentioned in the Wazir Committee Report \"as educationally and economically .extremely backward'', as having no basis for inclu-\n\n1256 SlJPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Parimoo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10504, "end_char": 10511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Appendix III, 19 of these castes have been retained which were not disapproved in Parimoo's case."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10751, "end_char": 10761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10765, "end_char": 10775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Edwin Khakkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10816, "end_char": 10829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selection of Edwin Khakkar, a Christian is in order since he falls under one such category listed and since the category is based on occupation B and not on caste as such.", "canonical_name": "Edwin Khakkar"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11265, "end_char": 11275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12347, "end_char": 12357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 SCR 368", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12503, "end_char": 12519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 SCR 430", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12577, "end_char": 12593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anita Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12901, "end_char": 12911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reservation for students from other States on reciprocal basis, as seen from Anita Jain's case bas not worked in practice and she is entitled to a seat."}}, {"text": "June 21, G 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13037, "end_char": 13052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor did the two clauses 17 and 18 of the notification dated June 21, G 1979 apply to Kulbbusban Gupta since be was not selected or nominated by the Government of J ammu and Kashmir for admission to the Engineering College nor was he selected by any selection committee constituted by the Government of fammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Kulbbusban Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13062, "end_char": 13078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor did the two clauses 17 and 18 of the notification dated June 21, G 1979 apply to Kulbbusban Gupta since be was not selected or nominated by the Government of J ammu and Kashmir for admission to the Engineering College nor was he selected by any selection committee constituted by the Government of fammu and Kashmir.", "canonical_name": "Kulbhu-\\.r shan Gupta"}}, {"text": "Government of J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13125, "end_char": 13157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor did the two clauses 17 and 18 of the notification dated June 21, G 1979 apply to Kulbbusban Gupta since be was not selected or nominated by the Government of J ammu and Kashmir for admission to the Engineering College nor was he selected by any selection committee constituted by the Government of 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Jauhar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1257 ' Anil Dev Singh, S. s. Jauhar and Lalit Kumar Gupta for the Peti- A tioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "Lalit Kumar Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13635, "end_char": 13652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1257 ' Anil Dev Singh, S. s. Jauhar and Lalit Kumar Gupta for the Peti- A tioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "A nil Dev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13727, "end_char": 13742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A nil Dev Singh and S. K. Sabharwal for the Petitioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sabharwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13747, "end_char": 13762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A nil Dev Singh and S. K. Sabharwal for the Petitioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "Naunlt Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13838, "end_char": 13848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunlt Lal for the Petitioners in WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "Naunlt Lal"}}, {"text": "S. N. Kackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13931, "end_char": 13943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kackar for the Respondent in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13990, "end_char": 14003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale and."}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14008, "end_char": 14020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukul Mudgal for the Respondent in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "ATM Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14166, "end_char": 14177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ATM Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for RR."}}, {"text": "P. N. Ramalingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14182, "end_char": 14198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ATM Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for RR."}}, {"text": "C.S.S. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14247, "end_char": 14257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.S.S. Rao for RR."}}, {"text": "S. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14289, "end_char": 14300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish and E. C. Agarwala and\n\nDwarka Nath Gupta for the Intervener i:n WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. P. Gupta"}}, {"text": "V. K. Pandita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14302, "end_char": 14315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish and E. C. Agarwala and\n\nDwarka Nath Gupta for the Intervener i:n WP Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Satish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14317, "end_char": 14326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish and E. C. Agarwala and\n\nDwarka Nath Gupta for the Intervener i:n WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "R. Satish"}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14331, "end_char": 14345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish and E. C. Agarwala and\n\nDwarka Nath Gupta for the Intervener i:n WP Nos."}}, {"text": "Dwarka Nath Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14351, "end_char": 14368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish and E. C. Agarwala and\n\nDwarka Nath Gupta for the Intervener i:n WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "Dwarka Nath Gupta"}}, {"text": "D A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14416, "end_char": 14427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. K. Sen, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish, S. P. Gupta, Dwarka Nath Gupta and E. C. Agarwala for the Intervener in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "K. Pandita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14432, "end_char": 14442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. K. Sen, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish, S. P. Gupta, Dwarka Nath Gupta and E. C. Agarwala for the Intervener in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Satish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14444, "end_char": 14453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. K. Sen, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish, S. P. Gupta, Dwarka Nath Gupta and E. C. Agarwala for the Intervener in WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "R. Satish"}}, {"text": "S. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14455, "end_char": 14466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. K. Sen, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish, S. P. Gupta, Dwarka Nath Gupta and E. C. Agarwala for the Intervener in WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. P. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Dwarka Nath Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14468, "end_char": 14485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D A. K. Sen, V. K. Pandita, R. Satish, S. P. Gupta, Dwarka Nath Gupta and E. C. Agarwala for the Intervener in WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "Dwarka Nath Gupta"}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14551, "end_char": 14564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi (Dr.), L. K. Pandey and Mr. Naunit Lal for the I Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "L. K. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14572, "end_char": 14584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi (Dr.), L. K. Pandey and Mr. Naunit Lal for the I Petitioner in WP No."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14593, "end_char": 14603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi (Dr.), L. K. Pandey and Mr. Naunit Lal for the I Petitioner in WP No.", "canonical_name": "Naunlt Lal"}}, {"text": "GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14687, "end_char": 14692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deilvered by\n\nGUPTA, J.-The selection of candidates admitted to the Government Medical College, Jam.mu, for the academic year 1979-80 is challenged in these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution by some of the candidates who were not selected."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14846, "end_char": 14856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "University of Jam.mu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15241, "end_char": 15261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only those candidates who had passed the Pre-Medical or Inter-SCience or First Year T.D.C. (Medical Group) examination from the University of Jam.mu or any other equivalent examination and had secured not less than 50 per cent marks in science subjects in aggregate (theory and practical) were eligible to apply for admission; however, for scheduled castes,, scheduled tribes, Bakarwal and Gujjar candi- dates and candidates from Ladakh district and 'Bad Pockets' the."}}, {"text": "State of c Jannnu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16715, "end_char": 16744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the State of c Jannnu and Kashmir that the nominations had to be made only from two sources : wards of non-resident Defence personnel, and students from other States."}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19280, "end_char": 19288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19656, "end_char": 19664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 2 7, 197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20549, "end_char": 20562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA On June 2 7, 197 4 anoµier order was issued refuting the percentage of seats reserved for the different categories \"with a view to affording more accommodation for open merit\"."}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21002, "end_char": 21010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 16, 197 6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22066, "end_char": 22081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order made on April 16, 197 6 provides that 10 seats at the Government Medical College, J ammu, shall be earmarked for girl students \"subject to G enough girl students being found otherwise suitable\"."}}, {"text": "Government Medical College, J ammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22112, "end_char": 22146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order made on April 16, 197 6 provides that 10 seats at the Government Medical College, J ammu, shall be earmarked for girl students \"subject to G enough girl students being found otherwise suitable\"."}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24129, "end_char": 24155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "43 to 51 D\n\nof the list of selected candidates annexed to .the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent, State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25958, "end_char": 25964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kacker appearing for the State of J ammu and Kashmir sought to argue that by area of imbalance what was meant was really the same thing as areas adjoinll ing actual line of control and bad pockets."}}, {"text": "State of J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25983, "end_char": 26010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kacker appearing for the State of J ammu and Kashmir sought to argue that by area of imbalance what was meant was really the same thing as areas adjoinll ing actual line of control and bad pockets."}}, {"text": "Anand of Ja.mmu\n\nand Kashmir High Court", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27043, "end_char": 27082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the report of a committee headed by Mr. Justice Anand of Ja.mmu\n\nand Kashmir High Court."}}, {"text": "J.N. Wazir", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27565, "end_char": 27575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice J.N. Wazir, a former Chief Justice of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, was the Chairman of this Committee."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27603, "end_char": 27631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice J.N. Wazir, a former Chief Justice of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, was the Chairman of this Committee."}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 S. C. R. 236", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28385, "end_char": 28406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parinwo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30870, "end_char": 30877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Wazir Committee in their rep9rt mentioned 23 low social castes \"as\n\neducationally and economically extremely backward\" but 4 of them have been held 'by this Court in Parinwo' s case as having no basis for inclusion in the list."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31343, "end_char": 31353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31357, "end_char": 31367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Edwin Khokkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31458, "end_char": 31471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this category only one candidate has been selected whose name, Edwin Khokkar, appears at serial No.", "canonical_name": "Edwin Khakkar"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31595, "end_char": 31621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 in the list of selected candidates annexed to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32013, "end_char": 32023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32252, "end_char": 32262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1971] 2 S. C. R. 430", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 33956, "end_char": 33977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. H. Fazli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34749, "end_char": 34760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an affidavit filed on behalf of the State of J ammu and Kashmir,\n\n•C' sworn by Dr. A. H. Fazli, Professor of Pharmacology, Srinagar, who was one of the members."}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34789, "end_char": 34797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an affidavit filed on behalf of the State of J ammu and Kashmir,\n\n•C' sworn by Dr. A. H. Fazli, Professor of Pharmacology, Srinagar, who was one of the members."}}, {"text": "Periakaruppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35866, "end_char": 35879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that this was beyond all reasonable proportion especially considering .the fact that only 4 minutes were spent in evaluating a candidate's performance in the intervie, w. Our attention was drawn to Periakaruppan's case where -Olis Court thought \"earmarking 75 marks out of 275 marks for intervillW\n\nas interview marks prima fade appears to be excessive\"."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37255, "end_char": 37265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "akaruppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37394, "end_char": 37403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When we say this we are not unmindfl)l of the observations in Per/akaruppan's case quoted above, ."}}, {"text": "Chitralekha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37667, "end_char": 37678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been held in Chitralekha' s case that the faC!"}}, {"text": "Government of Jamrtm and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38318, "end_char": 38350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, we expect the Government of Jamrtm and Kashmir to reconsider the matter in the light of what we have sa.id above and, other things remaining the same, for future years to reduce the percentage of marks allotted for interview to a reasonable proportion of the total marks for the selection test."}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38723, "end_char": 38788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sanjay Pathania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39216, "end_char": 39231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Sanjay Pathania whose name appears at serial No."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39555, "end_char": 39565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Medical Council under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956", "statute": "the Indian Medical Council under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Pathania", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39776, "end_char": 39784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That being so the selection of Shri Pathania must be set aside."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39894, "end_char": 39913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~··\n\nEarlier in this Judgment it has been stated that following a request 1llllde by the Government of India 10 per cent of the seats in the College was reserved for tudents from other States on reciprocal basis."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40222, "end_char": 40231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this policy 5 students from Rajasthan and 1 from Andhra Pradesh were admitted to the Government Medical College, J ammu."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40243, "end_char": 40257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this policy 5 students from Rajasthan and 1 from Andhra Pradesh were admitted to the Government Medical College, J ammu."}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40321, "end_char": 40325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Jain states that she was a candidate for admission to the Medical College, Jammu, for the session 1919-80."}}, {"text": "Medical College, Jammu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40379, "end_char": 40401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Jain states that she was a candidate for admission to the Medical College, Jammu, for the session 1919-80."}}, {"text": "November 8, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40431, "end_char": 40447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1979 the Government of )ammu and Kashmir informed her by a letter that she had been nominated for tj admission to the first year M.B.B.S. course in one of the medical coll' 1egei; in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Government of )ammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40452, "end_char": 40483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1979 the Government of )ammu and Kashmir informed her by a letter that she had been nominated for tj admission to the first year M.B.B.S. course in one of the medical coll' 1egei; in Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40660, "end_char": 40666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When she went to Bhopal for admission on the basis of the said letter she was refused admission on the ground that the State of Jammu and Kashmir had not admitted nominees of the Madhya Pradesh Government and unless they were admitted she\n\nwould not lie admitted to any medical college in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40822, "end_char": 40836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When she went to Bhopal for admission on the basis of the said letter she was refused admission on the ground that the State of Jammu and Kashmir had not admitted nominees of the Madhya Pradesh Government and unless they were admitted she\n\nwould not lie admitted to any medical college in the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41933, "end_char": 41938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore direct the first res-\n\n~ pondent, State of Jammu and Kashmir, to find her a seat in any medi- •Cal college outside the State on the basis of reciprocity, unless as a result of our Judgment a few more seats are available in the medical .college at Jammu and she is entitled to one of them on merit."}}, {"text": "Harish Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42522, "end_char": 42534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the list of nominated candidates, the name of Harish Kumar appears against 11erial No.", "canonical_name": "Harish Kumar"}}, {"text": "Jammu\n\nand Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42682, "end_char": 42700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nomination, as stated earlier, was to be made from two classes of students--<:andidates from outside the State nf Jammu\n\nand Kashmir and wards of Defence personnel (non-residents)."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42811, "end_char": 42828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute that Harish Kumar belongs to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and it is not claimed that he falls in the other class."}}, {"text": ".!:Iarish Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42924, "end_char": 42939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was therefore no basis on which .!:Iarish Kumar could be validly nominated."}}, {"text": "Kulbhu-\\.r shan Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43414, "end_char": 43435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Kulbhu-\\.r shan Gupta was not selected on the plea that he had been selected '\\. earlier for Regional Engineering College.", "canonical_name": "Kulbhu-\\.r shan Gupta"}}, {"text": "Junec ' 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43560, "end_char": 43576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification dated Junec ' 21, 1979 by which applications were invited for admission to medical college, Jammu, for the year 1979-80 includes to clauses Nos."}}, {"text": "Ku!bhushan Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44551, "end_char": 44567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended that in view of these conditions Ku!bhushan Gupta was not eligible for selection though no objection was .n!ised G when he appeared for interview.", "canonical_name": "Kulbhu-\\.r shan Gupta"}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu and E:as.hmir for", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44800, "end_char": 44837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That he is a student of the Regional Engineering College is not disputed, but it appears that he was not selected or nominated by the Government of Jammu and E:as.hmir for admission to the engineering."}}, {"text": "clause 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45007, "end_char": 45016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45020, "end_char": 45029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government Medical College, Jaminu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45121, "end_char": 45155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clearly, therefore, the bar in clause 17 or clause 18 cannot H apply to his case, and it must be held that he was improperly ~\n\nadmission to the Government Medical College, Jaminu."}}, {"text": "Harish Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46718, "end_char": 46730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "{ 4) The admission of Harish Kumar (No.", "canonical_name": "Harish Kumar"}}, {"text": "Kulbhushan Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46979, "end_char": 46995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "201 of 1980\n\nKulbhushan Gupta, it has been found, was wrongly refused admission.", "canonical_name": "Kulbhu-\\.r shan Gupta"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1271_1277_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SALES TAX (LAW) BOARD OF A,\n\nREVENUE (TAXES) ERNAKULAM v.\n\nPIO FOOD PACKERS\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, V D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nKera/a General Sales Tax Act, Section 5-A(l)(a) \"conmmes such goods in the malrufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise\", meaning of-ExigibiliJy to tax of pineapple ffuit. when processed into slices for the purpose of being IO!d in sealed cans.\n\n-..; Tho respondent assessee, Pio Food Packers carries on the business of manu- . facturing and selling canned fruit besides other products. The Pineapple purchased by the assessee is washed and then the inedible portion, tbe end crown,\n\nskin and inner core are removed, thereafter the fruit is, sliced and the slices are filled in cans, sugar is added as a preservative, the cans are sealed under temperature and then put in boiling water for sterilisation.\n\nIn its return for the year 1973-74 under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 the assessee claimed that a turnover of Rs. 3,84,138-89 representing the purchase of pineapple fruit was not covered by Section 5-A(l)(b) of the Act.\n\nIt was asserted that the pineapple was converted into pineapple slices, pineapple jam, pineapple squash and pineapple juice. The assessee maintained that by\n\nthe conversion Of pineapple fruit into its products no new commodity was created and it was erroneous to say that there was a consumption of pineapple E K fruit \"in the manufacture of\" these goods. The Sales Tax Officer did not accept the contention and completed the assessment on the finding that a manufacturing process was involved and that, therefore, the case fell within s. 5-A\n\n(t):(a). In revision before tbe Sales Ta:ii Appellate Tribunal, the assessee c0nceded that pineapple jam and pineapple squash would be covered by s. 5-A(l)(a), and in regard to pineapple juice the Tribunal found that s. S-l(a) was attracted. The only question which remained was whether the prepara- F lion of pineapple slices fall within s. 5-A(l) (a). On that question two mem- ' bers of the Tribunal. found in favour of the assessee, and the third member\n\nfDund. in favour of the Revenue. The Revenue then applied in revision to\n\nthe High Court and the High Court, has by its judgment dated 24th January, 1978, .maintained the order of the Tribunal.\n\nDismissing the appeal, by special leave, the court\n\nHEID : 1. Wiien pineapple fruit is processed into pineapple slices for. the purpose of being sold in sealed cans, there is no .<:onsumption of the original pineapple fruit for the purpose of manufacture within the meaning of Section 5A(l)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963\n\n[1277 E-FJ\n\n2. Section 5-A(l)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act envisages the consumption of a commodity in the manufacture of another commodity. The goods purchased should be consumed, the consumption should be in the proceos !>f !llllluf&cture, and the result must be the manufacture of other goods.\n\n- : ,;..\n\n. E\n\n.G\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThere are several criteria for determining whether a commo<lity is consumed in the manufacture of another .. The generally prevalent test is whether the article produced is regarded in the trade, by those who deal in it, as distinct in identity from the commodity involved in its manufacture.\n\nCo1LI1monly, manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is madf', to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one case to another, and indeed there may be several stages of processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered, the original commcxlity experience a c:h.an.ge.\n\nBut it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity to the point where commercially it coo no longer be. regarded as the original comm°9ity but instead is recognised 1l8 a new and distinct article that a manufacture can bei said .to take place. Where there is no essential difference in identity between the original commcxlity and the processed article, it is not possible to say that one commodity bM been consumed in the manufacture of another. Although it has. undergone a degree of processing, it must be regarded as still retaining its orfginal identity. [1274 F-H, 1275 A-BJ\n\nIn the present oase, there is no essential difference between pineapple fruit and the canned pineapple slices. The dealer and the consumer regard both as pineapple. The only difference is that the sliced pineapple is a presentation of fruit in a more convenient form 'and by reason of being canned it :is capable of storage withont spoiling.\n\nThe additional sweetness in the canned pineapple arises from the sugar added as a preservative. The pineapple slices continue to possess the same identity as the original pineapple fruit.\n\n[1275 G-H, 1276-A]\n\nTunghabhadr.a Industr:ies Ltd., Kurnool v. Commercial Tax Offecer, Jurnool, [1960J 10 S.T.C. 827 (SC); Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow v .\n\nHarbilas Ral & Sons, [1968J 21 S.T.C. 17 (SC); followed.\n\nEast Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 100 L.ed. 917; Anheuser-Busch Brelving Association v. United States, 52 L. ed. 336~338; quoted with approval.\n\nAnwarkhan Mahboob Co. v. The State of Bombay and Ors., [1960J 11 STC 698, A Hajee Abdul Shukoor and Co. v. The State of Madras, [1964J 15 STO\n\n719; The State of Madras v. Swasthik Tobacco Factory, [1966J 17 STC 316 and Ganesh Trading Co. Karna/ v. State of Haryana and Anr., [1973J 32 STC 623; J. held inapplicable. ' '\n\n3. The fact that the pineapple slices have a higher price in the market than I the original fruit does not imply that the slices constitute a diffd'ent commercial commodity. The higher price, is occasioned only because of the labour put into making the fruit more readily consumable and because of the can employed to contain it. It is not as if the higher price is claimed because it a different commercial commodity. [1277 A-BJ\n\n4. The faot that the pineapple slices appeal to a different sector of the trade and that when a customer asks for a can of pineapple slices he has in mind something very different from fresh pineapple fruit does not give to the canned pineapple slices a sep<>rate identity either. The distinction in the mind of the consumer arises nOt from any difference in tho essential identity of the two, but is derived from the mere fOim in which the fruit is desired. (1277 II-CJ\n\nI SALES TAX BOARD v. PIO FOOD PACKEfS (Pathak, /.) 1273\n\n$. Claiise (l)(a) of Section 5-A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, •peaj<s of goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale or goods\n\nconsum~ in the manufacture of other goods for purposes other than , sale.\n\n[1277 C-D]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2398 of 1978.\n\nAppeal by Special, Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 24-1-1978 of the Kerala High Court at Emalrulam in T.R.C. No. 2 of 1976.\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader, V. J. Francis and M.A. Firoz for the Appellant.\n\n\"'.1.-:- S. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Mrs. S. Gopalakrihnan for the\n\nc _, J' Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of th~ Kerala High Court holding that the turnover of pineapple fruit purchased for preparing pineapple slices for sale in sealed cans is not covered by s. 5-A(l)(a) of the Kenila General Sales Tax Act, 1963.\n\nThe respondent, Messrs. Pio Food Packers (\"the assessee\"), carries on the business of manufacturing and selling canned fruit\n\nbesides other products. In its return for the year 1973-74 under Ii. the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 the assessee claimed that a turnover of Rs. 3,64,138-89 representing the purchase of pineapple fruit was not covered by s. 5-A(l)(a) of the Act. It was asserted that the pineapple was converted into pineapple slices, pineapple jam; pineapple squash and pineapple juice.\n\nSection 5-A(l) {a) of the Act provides : F\n\n\"5-A Levy of purchase tax-\n\n{ I) Every dealer who, in the course of his business, purchases from a registered dealer or from any other person any goods the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act, in circumstances in which no tax is payable under section 5, and , either-\n\n(a) consumes such goods in the manufacture of , other goods for sale or otherwise; or . ' . . shall, whatever be the quantum of the turnover relating to such purcllase for a year, pay tax\n\n22-610SCI/80\n\nJl , ...\n\nSUPREME CO~T REPORTS\n\n(1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\non the taxable turnover relating to such purchase for the year at the rates mentioned in section 5.\"\n\nThe assessee maintained that by the conversion of pineapple -{ fruit into its products no new commodity was created and it was erroneous to say that there was a consumption of pineapple fruit\n\n\"in the manufacture of\" those goods. The Sales Tax Offirer did not accept the contention and completed the assessment on the ' finding that a manufacturing process was involved and that, therefore, the case fell within s. 5-A(l )(a). In revision before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the assessee conceded that pineapple jam and pine-apple squash would be covered by s. 5-A(l)(a), and in regard to pineapple juice the Tribunal found that s. 5-1 (a) was Y attracted. The only question which remained was whether the preparation of pineapple slices fell within s. 5-A(l) (a). On that question two members of the Tribunal found in favour of the assessee, and the third member found in favour of the Revenue. 'Ibe Revenue then applied in revision to the High Court and the High Court has, by its judgment dated 24th January, 1978, maintained the order of the Tribunal.\n\nIt appears that the pineapple purchased by the assessee is washed and then the inedible portion, the end crown, skin and inner core E are removed, thereafter the fruit ii; sliced and the slices are filled in cans, sugar is added as a preservative, the cans are sealed under temperature and then put in boiling water for sterilisation. Is the pineapple fruit consumed in the manufacture of pineapple slices ?\n\nSection 5\"A(l )(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act envisag- F\n\nes the consumption of a commodity in the manufacture of another commodity.\n\nThe goods purchased should be consumed, the oon- - sumption should be in the process of manufacture, and the resnlt i must be the manufacture of other goOds. There are several criteria . , for determining whether a commodity is consumthl in the manufacture of another.\n\nThe generally prevalent test is whether the article produced is regarded in the trade, by those who deal in it, as distinct\n\nin identity from the commodity involved in its manufacture. Commonly, manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one case to another, and lll:deed there may be several stages of processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered, the 1:\"igina! cOS11111odity experiences a change.\n\nBut it is only when the change, er a series of changes, take the_ commodity to the point wbeJe\n\n... . .\n\nSALl.S TAX BOARD v. PIO FOOi> PACKERS (P11thak, !.) 12 7 5 ,, commerciiilly it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distjnct article that a maa1$cture can be said to take place.\n\nWhere there is no essential differelJCll in identity between the original commodity and ' the processed article it is not possible to say that one commodity has been COllSUIIled in the manufacture of another.\n\nAlthough it has undergone a degree of processing, it must be regarded as still retaining i1S original identity .\n\nA Jarge number of cases has been placed before us . by the parties, and in each of them the same principle has been applied :\n\n~ r1Joes the processing of the Original commodity bring into existence . 'j a commercially different and distinct article ?\n\nSome of the cases where it was held by this Court that a different commercial article had come into existence include Anwarkhan Mehboob Co. v. The\n\nState of Bombay and Others(') (where raw tobacco was manufactured into bidi patti), A Hajee Abdul Shukoor and Co. v.\n\nThe State of Madras(') (raw hides and skins constituted a different commodity from dressed hides and skins with different physical properties), The State of Madras v. Swasthik Tobacco Factory(') (raw tobacco manufactured into chewing tobacco) and Ganesh Trading Co. Kamal v. State of Haryana and Another,(') (paddy dehusked into rice). On the other side, cases where this Caurt has held that although the original commodity has undergone a degree of process- )( ing it has not lost its original identity include Tungabhadra Industril!s Ltd., Kurnool v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnoo/( 5 ) (where hydrogenated groundnut oil was regarded as groundnut oil) and Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.; Lucknow v. Harbilas Rai and sons(6 ) (where bristles plucked from pigs, boiled, washed with soap and other chemicals and sorted out in bundles according. to their , size and colour were regarded as remaining the same commercial\n\n\\commodity, pigs bristles).\n\nIn the present case, there is no essential difference tween pineapple fruit and the canned pineapple slices.\n\nThe dealer and the consumer regard both as pineapple.\n\nThe only difference is that the sliced pineapple is .!I presentation of fruit in a more convenient form and by reason of being canned it is capable of storage without\n\n(!) (1960) II S. :r C 698.\n\n(2) (1964) 15 S. T. C. 719\n\n(3) (1966) 17 S. T. C. 316.\n\n(4) (1973) 32 S. T. C. 623,\n\n(S) (1960) 11 S. T. C. 827.\n\n(6) (1968) 21 S. T. C. 17.\n\n'.Jft.i:-~~4 'tt\n\n···. l\n\n.,_,,,,.;.;'~\n\n1276 SUPREME C(1t1RT REPORTS\n\n[1980) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA spoiling.\n\nThe additional sweetness in the canned pineapple arises from the sugar added as a preservative. On a total impression, it seems to us, the pineapple slices must be held to possess the same\n\nidentity as the original pineapple fruit.\n\nWhile on the point, we may refer to East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express,(!) where the U.S. Supreme Court held that dressed and frozen chicken was not a commercially distinct article from the original chicken. It was pointed out :\n\n\"Killing, dressed and freezing a chicken is certainly a change in the commodity.\n\nBut it is no more drastic a change than the chang6 which takes place in milk from pasturising, homogenizing, adding vitamin concentrates, standardising and '\"\"\\ r bottling.\" \".\n\nIt was also observed:\n\n\" .................. there is hardly less difference between cotton in the field and cotton at the gin or in the bale\n\n01 between cottonseed in the field and cottons~ at the gin, than between a chicken in the pen and one that is dressed.\n\nThe ginned and baled cotton and the cottonseed, as well as the dressed chicken, have gone through a processing stage But neither has been \"manufactured\" in the normal sense of the word.\"\n\nReferring to /ifntheusercBusch Brewing Association v. United States(2 ) the Court said:\n\n\"Manufacture implies a change but every change is not manufacture and yet every change in an article is the result F of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is neci, ssary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge, having a l distinctive name, character or use.\"\n\nAnd further:\n\nG \"At some point processing and manufacturing will merge.\n\nBut where the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through tJhe processingj stage we cannot say that it\n\nhas been \"manufactured\".\" ~~\n\nThe comment applies fully in the case before us.\n\nAlthough a ft degree of processing is involved in preparing pineapple slices from r\n\n(!) 100 L. Ed. 917.\n\n(2) 52 L. Ed. 336-338.\n\nSALES TAX BOARD v, PIO FOOD PACKERS (Pathak,!.) 1277\n\nthe original fruit, the commodity continues . to possess its original identity, notwitibstanding the removal of inedible portions, the slicing .... and thereafter canning it on adding sugar to preserve it. It is contended fur the Revenue that pineapple slices have a higher price in the • madet than the original fruit and that implies that the slices constitute a different commercial commodjty. The higher price, it seems to us, is occasioned only because of the labour put into making the fruit more \"\" readily consumable and because of the can employed . to contain it. It .,.\n\n. is notl as if the higher price is claimed because it is a different commercial commodity. It is said that pineapple slices appeal to a different sector of the trade and that when a customer asks for a can of pineapple 'Jsf\"Ces he has in mind something very different from fresh pineapple\n\nfruit Here again, the distinction in the mind of the consumer arises not from any difference in the essential identity of the two, bnt is derived from the mere form in which the fruit is desired.\n\nLearned counsel for the Revenue contends that even if no manufacturing process is involved, the case still falls within .s. 5~ A( 1) (a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, because the statutory provision speaks not only of goods consumed in the manufacture of other goods for slile bnt also goods consumed otherwise. There is a fallacy in the\n\nsubuiission. The clause, truly read, speaks of goods consumed in the m8nufacture of other goods for sale or goods consumed in the manu- )( facture of other goods for purposes other than sale.\n\nIn the result, we hold that when pineapple fruit is processed into pineapple slices for the purpose of being sold in sealed cans there is no\n\nconsumption of the original pineapple fruit for the purpose of manufacture.\n\nThe case does not fall within s. 5-A(l)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act.\n\nThe High Court is right in the view ta ken -~~ F\n\n\\ The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n_)(", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SALES TAX (LAW) BOARD OF A,\n\nREVENUE (TAXES) ERNAKULAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SALES TAX (LAW) BOARD OF REVENUE (TAXES) ERNAKULAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V D. TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Pio Food Packers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 450, "end_char": 466, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Pio Food Packers", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 925, "end_char": 959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1080, "end_char": 1089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1647, "end_char": 1651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1801, "end_char": 1805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 1998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th January, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2249, "end_char": 2267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revenue then applied in revision to\n\nthe High Court and the High Court, has by its judgment dated 24th January, 1978, .maintained the order of the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Section 5A(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2661, "end_char": 2670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court at Emalrulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6877, "end_char": 6907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special, Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 24-1-1978 of the Kerala High Court at Emalrulam in T.R.C. No."}}, {"text": "M. M. Abdul Khader", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6934, "end_char": 6952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader, V. J. Francis and M.A. Firoz for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6954, "end_char": 6967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader, V. J. Francis and M.A. Firoz for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M.A. Firoz", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6972, "end_char": 6982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader, V. J. Francis and M.A. Firoz for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7012, "end_char": 7023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"'.1.-:- S. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Mrs. S. Gopalakrihnan for the\n\nc _, J' Respondent."}}, {"text": "P. A. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7025, "end_char": 7038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"'.1.-:- S. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Mrs. S. Gopalakrihnan for the\n\nc _, J' Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. Gopalakrihnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"'.1.-:- S. T. Desai, P. A. Francis and Mrs. S. Gopalakrihnan for the\n\nc _, J' Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7139, "end_char": 7145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of th~ Kerala High Court holding that the turnover of pineapple fruit purchased for preparing pineapple slices for sale in sealed cans is not covered by s. 5-A(l)(a) of the Kenila General Sales Tax Act, 1963."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7220, "end_char": 7237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of th~ Kerala High Court holding that the turnover of pineapple fruit purchased for preparing pineapple slices for sale in sealed cans is not covered by s. 5-A(l)(a) of the Kenila General Sales Tax Act, 1963."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7366, "end_char": 7370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kenila General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7386, "end_char": 7420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pio Food Packers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7447, "end_char": 7463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Messrs. Pio Food Packers (\"the assessee\"), carries on the business of manufacturing and selling canned fruit\n\nbesides other products.", "canonical_name": "Pio Food Packers"}}, {"text": "Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7622, "end_char": 7656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7777, "end_char": 7781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7928, "end_char": 7937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8237, "end_char": 8246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963", "statute": "the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9029, "end_char": 9033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9067, "end_char": 9095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In revision before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the assessee conceded that pineapple jam and pine-apple squash would be covered by s. 5-A(l)(a), and in regard to pineapple juice the Tribunal found that s. 5-1 (a) was Y attracted."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9180, "end_char": 9184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9251, "end_char": 9255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9372, "end_char": 9376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10088, "end_char": 10097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12252, "end_char": 12267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the cases where it was held by this Court that a different commercial article had come into existence include Anwarkhan Mehboob Co. v. The\n\nState of Bombay and Others(') (where raw tobacco was manufactured into bidi patti), A Hajee Abdul Shukoor and Co. v.\n\nThe State of Madras(') (raw hides and skins constituted a different commodity from dressed hides and skins with different physical properties), The State of Madras v. Swasthik Tobacco Factory(') (raw tobacco manufactured into chewing tobacco) and Ganesh Trading Co. Kamal v. State of Haryana and Another,(') (paddy dehusked into rice)."}}, {"text": "Tungabhadra Industril!s Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12760, "end_char": 12788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other side, cases where this Caurt has held that although the original commodity has undergone a degree of process- )( ing it has not lost its original identity include Tungabhadra Industril!s Ltd., Kurnool v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnoo/( 5 ) (where hydrogenated groundnut oil was regarded as groundnut oil) and Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.; Lucknow v. Harbilas Rai and sons(6 ) (where bristles plucked from pigs, boiled, washed with soap and other chemicals and sorted out in bundles according."}}, {"text": "U.S. Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14140, "end_char": 14158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where the U.S. Supreme Court held that dressed and frozen chicken was not a commercially distinct article from the original chicken."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17077, "end_char": 17081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17744, "end_char": 17748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1278_1301_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "12:78\n\nA SlJPERJNTENDENCE COMPANY OF INDIA (P) LTD.\n\nKRJSHAN MURGAI\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, V. D. TuLZAPURKAR AND AP .. SEN, JJ.]\n\nCovenant in restruiflf of trade-Contract Act, 1872, Section 27, scope off- W lzetht:r a post-service restrictive cpvenant. in restraint of. trade in service t1greement btween the parties is void-Even if it be valid, whether it could be enfiorceable. as enjoined by ittustrations (c) and (d) , to Section 57 of th• C Specific Relief Act, 1963. y\n\nTheappellant company carries on busine$ as valuers and surveyor! undertaking inspection of quality, weighment analysis, sampling of merchandise and commodities, cargoes, industrial products, machinery, textiles etc. It has established a reputation and gocxlwill in its business by developing its own techniques for quality testing and control and possess trade secrets in the D form of these techniques and clientele. It has its headoffice at Calcutta and a branch at New Delhi and employs various persons as managers and in other ccities in Calcutta; New Delhi and other pla.ces~\n\nOn March 27, 1971, the respondent was employed by the appellant company as the Branch Manager of its New Delhi office on terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment issued to him on the same date. Clause ( 10) of the terms and conditions of employment placed the respondent under a post service restraint• that he shall not serve any other competitive firm nor carry on business on Q.is own in similar line as that of the appellant company for two Y\"'l\"' at tho place of his last posting.\n\nOn November 24, 1978, the appellant company terminated the respondent's semces with effect from December 27, 1978. Thereafter, respondent started his own business under the name and style of \"Superintendence and Surveillence Inspectorate of India\" at E.-22 South Extension New Delhi on lines identical with or substantially similar to that of the appellant company.' On April 19, 1979 the appellant company brought a suit in the Delhi HighJ Court on its original side, claiming Rs. 55,000/- as dama8\"8 on account ofT the bch of negative covenant contained in clause ( 10); and for permanent\\\n\ninjunction restraining the respondent by himself, his servants, agents or otherwise, from carrying on the said business or any other business on Imes similu to that of the appellant conipany or associating or representing any competitors of the appellant company 'before the expiry of two ye; m from December 27, 1978.\n\nAfter filing the suit the appellant company sought an ad interim injuncilon by way of enforcing the aforesaid negative covenant a1*i a Single Judge of the Delhi High O>uft initially granted an ad interim injunction on April 29, 1979 which was confirmed by him on May 25, 1979 after hearing the respondent.\n\nOn appeal by the respondent, the Division Bench\" of the High Court reversed the interim ordr and hence the appeal by certificate.\n\nDimlissing the appoal, the Court\n\nI I\n\nSUPERINTl!NDBNGB COMP ANY V. KRISHAN MURGA! 12 7 9\n\nHELD: (Per Tulzapurkar l., on behalf of Untwali~ l. and himself).\n\ni ...\n\n!. Assuming that the negative covenant contained in clause (10) of the service agreement is valid and not hit by section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, it is not enforceable against the respondent at the instance of the appellant company. The appellant company should have taken care to uae appropriate language, while incorporating such reStrictive covenant so as to include every case of 1 cessation of employment arising from any reason whatsoever and not llsed the expression \"leave\", which normally is synonypious to the expression \"quit\" and indicates voluntary act on the part of the employee. [1285 F, 1287 A, B-C]\n\n(2) The word \"leave\" has various shades of meaning depending upon the context or intent with which it is used. According to the plain grammaticel meaning that word in relation to an employee would normally be '\\j'coostrued a& meaning voluntary leaving of the service by him and would not iI}.clude a case 'where he is discharged or dismissed or his services are terminated by his employer.\n\nOrdinarily, the word connotes voluntary action.\n\n[1286-D]\n\n(3) In the instant case, having regard to the context in which the expression leave occurs in clause (10) of tho service agreement and reading it alongwith all the other terms of agreement, it is clear that the word •ieave• was. intended by the parties to refer to a case where the employee voluntarily left the services of his own.\n\n[1286 G-H, 1287 A]\n\nMurray v. Close, 32 Law Times Old series p. 89; held inapplicable to Indian Law.\n\nMuesling v. International Rly. Co., 147 N.Y.S. 177,' 178 85 Misc 309;\n\ny quoted with approval.\n\nPer, Sen 1.:\n\n1. Agreements of service, containing a negative covenant preven.ting the employee from working elsewhere are not void under section 27 of the Contract Act, on the ground that they are in restraint Of trade. Such agreements are enforceable, the reason being that the doctrine of restraint of trade never applies during the continuance of a contract of employment and applies only when the contract comes to an end. While during the pet:iod of employ- \\. ment the Courts undoubtedly would not grant any specific performance of\n\ni a contract of personal service, nevertheless Section 57 of the Specific Relief\n\nAct clearly provides for the grant of an injunction to restxain the breach of such a covenant, as it is not in restraint of, but in furtherance of trade.\n\n[1289 C-EJ\n\n2. There is a clear distinction between a restriction in a ' contract of employment Which is operative during the period of employment and one which is to operate after the termination of employment. Mere existence of negative covenant in a service agreement does not make it void on the ground that it was in restraint of trade and contrary to the Contxact Act.\n\nThe restriction contained in clause 10 of the agreement in this case is clearly in restraint of trade and therefore illegal under section 27 of the Cootract Act. It is not seeking to enforce the negative covenant during the term of employment of the respondent but after the tennination of his . serviceo. [1289 F-G, 1290 F-0, 1291 C-D]\n\n, A Niranjan Shankar Golikari v, Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co.,\n\nLtd., [1967] 2 SCR 378, distinguished.\n\n3. \\Vhen a rule of English law receives statutory recognition by the Indian Legislature, it is the language of the Act which determines the scope, un influenced by the manner in which the anologous provision comes . to be construed narrowly or otherwise modified in order to bring the construc.tion within the scope and limitations of the rule governing the English doctrine of trade.\n\n[1291 H, 1292 A]\n\nSatyavrata Ghosh v. Kurmee Ram Bangor, [1954] SCR 310. followed.\n\n4. A contract which has for its object a restraint of trade is, prima facie\n\noid. The question whether an agreement is void under section 27 must be decided upon the wording of that section. There is nothing in the woro----v--\n\ning of section 27 to suggest that the principle stated therein does not apply when the restraint is for a limited period only or is confined to a particular area.\n\nSuch matters of partial restriction have effect only when the fact fall within the exception to the section. Section 27 of the Contracts Act is general in terms, and declares aU agreements in restraint void pro tanto, except in the case specified in the application and unless a particular contract can be distinctly brought within Exception I there is no escape from the prohibition.\n\nHere the agreement in question is not a \"good will of business\", type of contract, and, therefore does not fall within the exception. If the agreement on the pa.rt of the respondent puts a restraint even though partial, it wa.o void, and, therefore, the contract must be treated as one which cannot be enforced. [1292 E.H, 1293 A, F-GJ\n\nMadhub Chander v. Rai Coomar Dass, (1874) Bom.L.R. 76 @ 85-86; approved.\n\n5. A contract in restraint of trade is one by which a party restricts liis . future liberty to carry on his trade, business or profession in such maniier and with such persons as he choooes. A contract of this class is prima facie void, but it becomes binding upon proof that the restriction is justifiable in the circumstances as being reasonable from the point of view of the parties themselves and also of the community. Under Section 27 of the Contract Act the onus is upon the covenanter. [1292 H, 1293 A. & 1294 DE] {\n\n6. A law does not cease to be operative because it is an anachronism or because it is antiquated or because the reason why it originally became the law could_ be no reason for the introduction of such a law at the present times. Neither the test of reasonableness nor the principle of that the restraint being partial was reasonable are applicable to a case governed by Section 27 of the Contract Act, unless it falls within Exception I.\n\nUnder Section 27 of the Contract Act, a service covenant extended bey00d' the termination of the service is void.\n\n[1299 AMC:/\n\nNor<Je.nfelt v. Maxim. Nordenfelt Guns 'am! Ammunition Co. Ltd.. L.R. [1894] A.C. 535; Mason v. Pruvident Clothing and Supply Co. Ltd.. L.R. [1930] A.C. 724; Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxe/by; discussed.\n\n7. On a true construction of clause 10 of the agreement the negative convenant not serve elsewhere or enter into a competitive business does not, arise\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY V. KRISHAN MU!lGAl 1281\n\n.when. fhe employee does not leave the services but is dismissed from Service.\n\nA Wrongful dismissal is a repudiation of contract of service which relieves the employee of the restrictive covenant. [1299 &F]\n\nGeneral Bil/posting Co. v. Atkinson, L. R. [1909] AC 118; referred to.\n\n8. The word 'leave' has various shades of meaning depending upon the context of intent with which it is used. According to the plain meaning, the word 'leave' in relation to an employee, should be construed to mean where he \"voluntarily\" leaves i.e. of his ovm volition and does not include a. case of dismissal.\n\nThe word 'leave' appears to connote voluntary actiOn, and is syno- DJDlOUS with the word 'quit'. It cloes not refer to the expulsion of an emp- ·\n\nluyee by the act of his employer without his consent and against his remonstrance. That is a meaning in consonance with justice and fair play. ·\n\n[1299 H, 1300 A-BJ\n\n9. Restrictions on comtitions during the period of service a.re Jilormally valid and indeed may be implied by law by virtue of the servant's duty of fidelity.\n\nIll such cases t, he restriction is generally reasonable, 'having regard to the inlernit of the employer and does not cause a.ny undue hardship to the employee, who wi11 receive a wage or salary for the period in question. But if the covenant is to operate after the termination of services, or is too widely v\"orded. tile Conrt may refuse to enforce it. [1300 CD]\n\n10. It is well established that employee's covenants should he carefully scrutinised because there is inequality of bargaining power between the pa.rties; iacleed no bargaining -power may occur because the employee is presented with a standard form of contract to accept or reject. At the lime of the agree- ' ment, the employee may have given little thought to the restriction becauae\n\n'. of' his eagerness for a job; such contracts \"tempt improvident persons, for the\n\n\\~ of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power to make future acquims and expose them to impooition and oppression\". [1300 E-F]\n\n\\ 11. The Courts view. with disfavour a restrictive covenant by an employee nol. to engage in a business similar to or competitive with that of the employer\n\naft¢ the termination of his contract of employment since a. restrictive covenant ,.,, cillary to a contract of employment is likely to affect the employee's means, or procuring a livelihood for himself and hi• family.\n\n[1301 B-C]\n\n12\\ The true rule of construction is that when a covenant or agreement is\n\nimpeahed on the ground that it is in restraint of trade, the duty-of the Court is, frrst 'to interpret the covenant or agreement itself, and to ascertain according to the ordinary rules of construction what is the fair meaning of the parties.\n\nIf there i, o;: an ambiguity it must receive a narrower construction than the wider. The restraint ma.y not be greater than necessary to prptect the employer, nof l, mduly harsh and oppressive to the employee. Even if the word 'leave' cont3ined in clause 10 of the a'greement is susceptible of another construction as ing operative on termination, however, accomplished of the service e.f?. by dismissal without notice, would having regard to the provisions of oection 27 'of the Contract Act, 1972, try to preserve the Government in\n\nclause l 0 by il, ving to it a restrictive meaning, as implying volition i.e. wher, e the employee igns or voluntarily leaves the services. The restriction being too wide, and violative Of section 27 of the Contract Act, must be subjected to a narrower cotruction. [1301 C-G] . \\ . \\\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1933 of 1979. - Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 20th July, 1979 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. (OS) No. 86 of 1979.\n\nA. K. Sen, P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg, R. Venkataramani and S. K.\n\nBisaria for the Appellant.\n\nK. K. Venugopal, H. K. Puri and S. C. Dlumda for the Respondent .\n\n. The following Judgments were delivered\n\nTuLZAPURKAR, J. This appeal at the instance of the appellant company (original plaintiff) is directed against an inter-locutory order passed by the High Court in F.A.O. (0.S.) 86 of 1979 refusing to y grant temporary injunction in a suit which is stil\\ pending. Principally it raises two substantial questions : (a) whether a post-service restrictive covenant in restraint of trade as contained in cl. ( 10) of the service agreement between the parties is void under s. 27 of the Indian Contract Act ? and (b) whether the said restrictive covenant, assruning it to be valid, is on its terms enforceable at the instance of the appellant company against the respondent ?\n\nOn March 21, 1980 we dismissed the appeal at thecopclusion of the hearing and it was stated that our reasons will follow.\n\nWe now proceed to give .our reasons for the dismissal.\n\nI ' Briefly stated the facts are these.\n\nThe appellant company carries on business as valuers and surveyors, undertaking inspection of quality, weighment, analysis, sampling of merchandise and commodities, cargoes, industrial products, machinery, textiles, etc. It has estabilshetl a reputation and goodwill in its business by developing its own tQilniques for quality testing and control and possesses trade secrets in. the form of these. teohniques and clientele. It has its head oflicd at Calcutta and a branch at New Delhi and employs various persons as managers and in other capacitie~ in Calcutta, New Delhi and other places.\n\nOn March 2 7, 1971 the respondent was emplayed by the appellant company as the Branch Manager of its New Delhi office on terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment issued to him on the same date.\n\nCause (10) of the terms and conditions of employment placed the respondent under a post-service restraint that ho shallnot serve any other competitive firm nor carry on business on his own in similar line as that of the appellant company for two years at the place of his last posting.\n\nSince it is vital we set out the< said clause which ran thus :-\n\n. \"10. That you will not be permitted to join any firm of our competitors or run a business of your ow11 ln similar\n\nSUPBIUNTBNDENCB COMPANY V. KR!SHAN MURGA! 1283 (Tulz.apurkar, J.) lines directly and/ or indirectly, for a period of two years at A the place of your lllst posting after you leave the company.\"\n\nOn November 24, 1978 the appellant company terminated tbei re.11pondent's services with effect from December 27, 1978. Thereafter the respondent started his own business under the name and style of. \"Superintendence and Surveillance Inspectorate of India\" at B-'.i?2, South Extension, New Delhi on lines identical with or subStan~\n\ntially 'similar to that of the appellant company. On April 19, 1979 the appellant company brought a suit in the Delhi High Court on its Original Side claiming Rs. 55,000/- as damages on account of the:\n\n'-,,., J.- breach of the aforesaid negative covenant ccntained in cl. (10) and\n\n~ for permanent injunction restraining the respondent by himself, his servants, agents or otherwise, from carrying on the said business , or\n\nany other business on lines similar to that of the appellant company or associating or representing any competitors of the appl'.J!ant cqmpany before the .expiry of two years from December 27, 1978.\n\nAfter filing the suit the appellant company sought an interim injunction by way of enforcirig the aforesaid negative cQlvenant and a Single Judgei 'of the Dt:lhi High Court initially granted an ad interim injunction on: April 29, 1979 which was confirmed by him on May 25, 1979 after hearing . the respondent.\n\nThe learned Single Judge took the view that the\n\nneve covenant, being in partial restraint of trade, was reasonable y inasmuch as it was limited both in point of time (two years) as well:\n\n1 as the area of operation (New Delhi which was his last posting) and, therefore, ll(as not hit by s. 2 7 of the Contract Act.\n\nHe also took the view that the negative covenant was enforceable as the expression,\n\n\"leave\" in cl. ( 10) was not confined to voluntarily leaving of the service by the respondent but was wide enough to include termination of his: services by the appellant company. On appeal by. the respondent, a Division Bench ef the High Court reversed the order of the learned Single Judge on both the points and that is how the two questioru; indicated at the commencement of this judgment arise for our determination in this appeal.\n\n\" ' Since in our vieW the appeal ii; capable of being dispooed of ,, n G 1be second .point we think it unnecessary to decide or express our opinion on the fiist question which was hotly and ably debated at the bar by counsel on either< sidei but we will indicate briefly the rival lines on which the arguments proceeded. On the one hand counsel for th~ reipO!ldent tried to support the view of the Division Bench by pointiilg out that in India the law on the subject was codified by statute which B wu edlaustive and on the topic of agreements in restraint of trade and excefl(ions in that behalf the Indian Courts cannot invoke oc derive\n\nassistance from the English Common Law and the exceptionsi developed thereto by English decisions from time to time, that s. 27 ol. the Indian Contract Act was absolute in terms .in that it did not make any distinction between par_tial or general restraints and that unless. a case was covered by the Exception provided thereunder every restraint ol' trade, whether partial or general would be void under that section. In this behalf reliance was placed on a number of decisions of various High Courts commencing from the celebrated decision of Sir Richard\n\nCouch, C.J. in M.adhub Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss(') wheres. 27 was interpreted in the aforesaid manner. Counsel urged that a distinction between a negative covenant operative during the period of employment and one that is operative during post-service period has been well recogttised and that all post-service restrictive covenants' were prima facie void, that the only exceptions were those given in the statute and that the exceptions developed by' the English case .law could not be invoked here.\n\nAccording to him the tes~ of reasoble ness had been wrongly adopted by the learned Singlei Judge.\n\nHe pointed out that accepting the interpretation placed on s. 27 by High Courts even the Law Commission has recommended a change in that by suitable legislation.\n\nHe further pointed out that the Division Bench has gone a step further and after considering whether the instim~ case would fall wi_thin those exceptions developed by English case .\n\nLaw has come to a negative conclusion against the appellant company.\n\nOn the other hand counsel for the appellant company contended that the interpretation of s. 27 as given by various Hfgh Courts including Sir Richard Couch's decision in Madlmb Chzmder's case (supra) has not been so far considered by this Court and it requires to be examined and considered by this Court, especially in view of certain observations made by this Court in Niranjan Shankar Golikari's (2) case which warrant such reconsideration.\n\nThough i_t was a casei dealing with negative c01Venant that was operative during the employment period counsel pointed out that entire case law Indian as well as English was discussed and this Court at page. 389 of th<1 repo<t observed thus :\n\n\"The result of the above discussion , is that considerations against restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after the termination of the contract than those in cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract.'\"\n\nI (I) [1874] 14 Beng. L. R. 76.\n\n(2) [1967] 2 SCR 378.\n\n...\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY v. KRISllAN MURGA! 1285 . (Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\nAccording to counsel the very fact that this Court has observed that A considerations qua post-service restrictions are different from those that are to be considered in cases of restrictiops during the employiµent suggests that perhaP5 a rigorou~ test of reasonableness may have to be adopted in the former cases but there would be cases where postservice restrictions, if !eason:able, even after app_lying the rigorous tests may be valid as not falling under s. 2 7 of the Act, it was, there-. fore, not correct to say that aU post-service restrictions were volp.\n\nHis precise contention was that even a post-service restrictive covenart, t, if it was reasonable, qualified or limited in operation both iD point bf time l\\Ild area, as was the case here, does not amount to any restraint of trade at all within the meaning of s. 27 and such restrictive covenan could be justified as being necessary and essential to protect th employer's interests, his trade secrets and his trade connections and, therefore, valid.\n\nAs regards the argument based on codified exception, counsel pointed out, that even the case of a restrictive covenant operative during the period of employment between master and servant\n\nhad not been provided for as an exceptiOl!I below s. 27 but even sa 1 o such restrictive covenant was never regarded as amounting to restraint of trade under s. 27 mainly because it was always; regarded as reason-· able and necessary tOI protect the employer's interests, which shows that the statutory exceptions were not exhaustive. . Lastly,· counsel urged that the Law Commission's recommendation on which reliance wa• placed by respondent's coousel would be inconsequential because it proceeds on the acceptance of the interpretation placed on s. 27 by various High•Courts and he is seeking tol get that interpretation eimmined and considered bY-:this Court.\n\nHowever, as we have said above, we do not propose to discuss or decide the aforesaid question inasmuch as this appeal can be disposed of by deciding the second question that has been raised before us and ··, for that purpose we shall proceed on tbe assumption tbat the negative l cvenant contained in cl. (10) of tbe service agreement is valid and not hit by s. 27 of tbe Contract Act. The question is whether tbe said restrictive covenant is on its terms enforceable against the respondent\n\n\\ at tbe instance of tbe appellant1 company.\n\nWe have already quoted the restrictive covenant contained in\n\ncl. ( 10). In terms tbe clause provides that the restriction contained !herein will come into operation \"after you (respondent) leave the company\". Admittedly in tbe instant case the respondent had not on\n\nhis own left the .company but his services were terminated by the appel- B !ant COOlpany by a. notice dated November 24, 1978 with effect from December 27, 1978. The question is whether the phrase \"after you\n\nleave the company\" ml!llllS the leaving of service by the responde!llt voluntarily or would include even e case of termination of his services by the appellant company.\n\nThe Division Bench of the High Court has , taken the view that the word \"leave\" does not include termination Of service by the employer. Counsel for the appellant company con~ tended that the word \"leave\" occurring in the phrase \"after you leave the company\" would be wide enough to include all cases of cessation of service whether brought about by voluntary quitting on the part of the employee or termination of his services by the employer and in that behalf reliance was placed upon an English decision in Murray v.\n\nGiese(•) where it was held that an agreement restricting competition with an employer \"after leaving his ser'1ice\" would be operative on the termination, however accomplished, of the service, e.g. by a disnrissal without notice. ( vide : Stroud's Judicial Dictionery, 4th Edn., Vol. 3, page 1508, Item 13, under the word 'leaving').\n\nIn our view, the word \"leave\" has various shades of meaning depending upon the context or intent with which it is used. According to the plain grammatical meaning that word in relation to an employee would normally be construed as meaning voluntary leaving of the service by him and would not include a case where he is discharged or dismissed or his services are terminated by his employer.\n\nOrdinarily the word \"leave\" appears to connote voluntary action. In Words & Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 24 at page 499 the following statement of law based on an American decision occurs:\n\n\"An application for the employment of a street car conductor provided that in the event of his leaving the services for any reasons whatever within six months, the money paid to him for work under instruction while on trial shol1ld be deducted from such moneys as should be due from the company on the date of his_ \"leaving\".\n\nHeld, that the word \"leaving'; meant to quit or depart, implying, volition on the part of the person leaving, and limited the forfeiture of the instruction wages to a case where plaintiff left defendant's employ of his own volition, nor was such instruction effected by the words, \"for any reason whatsoever.\" Muesling v.\n\nInternational Ry. Co., 147 N.Y.S. 177, 178, 85 Misc. 309_\n\nIn our view having regard to the context in which the expression \"leave\" occurs in cl. (10) o~ the service agreement and reading it alongwith all the other terms of employment it seems to us clear that in the instant case the word \"leave\" was intended by the parties to refer only to a case where the employee has voluntarily left the services\n\n(I) 32 Law Times Old Series 89.\n\n...\n\n_,;;.'\n\nSUP!!RINTBNDENCB COMPANY v. KRISHAN MURGA! 1287 (Sen, 1.) of the appellant company of bis own, and since hem the respondent's services were terminated by the appellant company the restrictive covenant contained in cl. (10) would be inapplicable and, therefore, not enforceable against the respondent at the instance of the appellant company. Counsel for the appellant company urged that our constru~-\n\ning such restrictive covenant so as to include every case of cessation\n\nB tion would lead to puttin8. a premium upon an dishonest employee who by his own misdemeanour and misbehaviour may invite termination of his services . .All that we can say is that the appellant company sholl1d have taken care td use appropriate language while incorporat~\n\nof employment arising from any reason whats0ever and not used the expression \"leave,\" which normally is synonymous to the expression C \"quit\" and indicates voluntary act on the part of the employee.\n\nIn the reswt the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nSEN, J.\n\nI regret that my learned brethren propose to express nd opinion on the question on which, in my view, the appeal turns.\n\nThe question is whether a negative covenant which restricts the right of the employee, after the cdnclusion of the term of service, or the termination of the employment for other reasons, to engage in any business similar to or competitive with that of the employer, is in restraint of1 trade and, therefore, void under section 27 of the Contract Act,' 1972. i have no doubt in my mind that the appeal can'not be decided without deciding this question.\n\nThis appeal on certifiCate from a judgment of the Delhi High court, relates to a covenant in restraint of trade contained in an agreement between the appellant company and the respondent in circumstances which we will explain.\n\nThe appellant company carr- \\.. ies on the business of valuer, surveyor, inspection of quality, weigh-\n\n~ ment, analysis, sampli'ng of merchandise and commodities, cargoes, industrial products, machinery, textiles, etc.\n\nIt has its head office at Calcutta with a branch at New Delhi.\n\nOn or about March 27, 1971, the respondent who is a surveyor and valuer was employed by the appellant as the Banch Manager of its New Delhi office.\n\nOne of the terms and conditions of the employment was that the respondent would 'not serve elsewhere or enter into any business for a period of 2 years after leaving the service.\n\nThe term is contained in\n\ncluse 10 of the agreement which reads :\n\n10. That you will not be permitted to join any firm of our e competitors or run a business of your own in similarity as directly and/or indirectly, for a period of two years at the\n\n. <!i--.\n\n128f3\n\nA place of your last posting after you leave the\n\n. B\n\n' ' /D\n\n! Company.\n\nThe appellant terminated the services of the cespandent by its Jetter dated December 27, 1978. Thereafter the respondent started a business of his own under the name and styic of \"Superintendence aild Surveillance Inspectorate of India\" at E-22, South Bxtensian, New Delhi on Jines identical° with and substantially similar to that of th_e appellant.\n\nOn April 19, 1979, the appellant commenced a suit in the Delhi High Court in its original side claiming Rs. 55,000/- as damages on account of breach of the covenant and for permanent injunction to restrain the respondent by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise from carrying on the said busi'ness or any other business on Jines similar to thg.t of the appellant or associating or representing any Competitors of the appellant before the expiry q_f two years from December 27, 1978.\n\nA Single Judge of the Delhi High Court/adopting the test cf reasonableness, held that under sectian 27 of the Cantract Act to determine whether the agreement is void, one has to see whether the restraint is reaSO'nable; and if so the negative covenent can be enforced as enjoined by illustratians ( c) and (d) to section 57 of the specific Relief Act, 1963. He\n\nE held that Clause 10 of the agreement is not unreasonab:e, because \"'-\n\nthe area of restraint is re&tricted to New Delhi, the place of last posting of the responde'nt and is not unlimited, being limited to a period of two years from the date he left the service.\n\nHe went on to say that negative covenant in a contract of employment has always been enforced, if it is in the protection of the employer, and referred to Niranjan Shankar GoUkari v. Century Spinning and Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1967] 2 S.C.R. p.\n\n378. He further ../ held that the negative covenant was operative as the word \"leave\" ' in clause 10 was wide enough to include terminatio)J of service.\n\nHe, i accordingly, by his order dated May 25, 1979. made the earlier ex parte ad interim injunction granted by him on April 24, 1979 I\n\nablute but restricted its operation to New Delhi and for the period ending 27th December, 1980 or till the decision of suit, whichever is earlier. ~\n\nOn appeal by the respondent, a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the learned Single Judge hold- H ing that negative covenant operating beyond the period of employment was in restraint of trade and, therefore, void under sectioll 27 of the Contract Aot.\n\n. I\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY V. KRISIIAB: MURGA! 1289 (Sen, !.) Four questions arise in this appeal : 1. Whether Clause 1 O of the agreement was in restraint of trade; and if so, being partial was }. valid and enforceable being reasonable?; 2. Whether according to the test of reasonableness laid down by Lor!! Macnaghten irt Norden/ell v. Hakim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd.,(') an injunction to enforce the negative covenent can be granted under illustrations ( c) and ( d) to section 57 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, despite section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872? 3. Whether, and to what extent, the provisions of Section 27 of the Contract Act are subject to the common law doctrine of restraint of trade ? 4.\n\nWhether the word \"leave\" in Clause 10 of the agreement between y the parties makes the negative covenant operative only when a servant voluntarily leaves his employment, or, applies even in a case of termination of his services by an order of dismissal or termination of his services?\n\nAgreements of service, contajl; ting a negative covenant preventing the employee fmm working elsewhere during the term covered by the agreement, are not void under section 27 of the Contract Act, on the ground that !hey are in restraint of trade.\n\nSuch agreements are enforceable. 1be reason is obvious.\n\nThe doctrine of restraint of trade never applies during the continuance of a contract of employment; it applies only when the ¥ contract comes to an end.\n\nWhile during the period of employment, the Courts undoubtedly would not grant any specific performance of a contract of personal service, nevertheless; Section 57 of the Specific Relief A_ct clearly provides for the grant of an injunction to restrain the breach of such a covenant as it is not in restrafut of, but ill furtherance of trade.\n\n\\_ In Niranjan Shankar GoUkari's case, supra, this Court drew a , distinction between a restriction in a contract of employment which is operative du.ring the period of employment and one which is to operate after thP, rermi'nation of employment.\n\nAfter referring to certain Englisn cases where such distinction had been drawn, the Court observed:\n\n\"A similar distinction has also been drawn by the Courts in India and a restraint by which a person binds himself during the term of his agreement directly or indirectly not to take service with any other employer or be engaged by a third party has been held not to be void and not against section 27 of the Contract Act.\"\n\n(1) L. R. [1894] A. C. 535\n\n23-610SCI/80 \\\n\nIt referred to with approval the decision in The Brahmaputra rea Cv. Ltd. v. Scarth, LL.R. (1885) 11 Cal, 545, where the condition under which the covenantee was partially restrained from competing after the term of his engagement with his former employer, was held to be bad but the condition by which he bound himself during the term of his agreement, not, directly or indirectly, to compete with his employer was held good, and observed:\n\n\"At page 550 of the report the Court observed tha1 an agreement of service by which a person binds himself during the term of the agreement 'not to take service with any one else, or directly, or indirectly take part in, promote or did any business in direct competition with that of his employer was not hit by section 27.\"\n\nThe Court further observed: D \"An agreement to serve a person exclusively for\n\na definite term is a lawful agreement, a'nd it is difficult to see how that . can be unlawful which is essential to its fulfilment, and to the due protection of the interests of the employer, while the agreement is in force.\"\n\nThe Court also approved of the several Indian decisions where an agreement of service contained both a positive covenant viz. that the employee shall devote his whole-time attention to the service of the employers and also a negative covenant preventing the employee from working elsewhere during the term of the agreement, and flte High Courts have enforced such a negative covena'nt during the t~ of employment having regard to illustrations ( c) and ( d) to section :{ 57 of the Specific Relief Act which, in terms, recognised such contraets and the existence of negative covenants therein, a:nd stated that the contention that the existence of such a negative covenant in .a service agreement made the agreement void on the ground that it was in restraint of trade and contrary to section 2 7 of the Contract Act had no validity.\n\nIn conclusion, the Court observed:\n\n\"The result of the above discussion is that considerations against restrictive covenants are different in H cases whete the restriction is to apply during the period after the te.J'mination of the qmtract than those in cases where it is to operate during !he period of the contract. Negative\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY V. KRISHAN MURGA! 1291 (Sen, /.) covenants operative during the period of the contract of A . employment when the employee is bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and therefwe do not fall under section 27 of the Con- . tract Act. A negative covenant that the employee would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get himself 1 8 employed by any other master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not therefore a restraint of trade unless the c9ntract as aforesaid is unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one sided.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThe decision in Niranjan Shankar Golikari's case supra is therefore\n\nC \\ of little assistance to the appellant. It is not seeking to enforce the .ll!egative covenant during the term of employment of the respondent\n\nbut after the termination of his services. The restriction contained in Clause 10 of the agreement is obviously in restraint of trade and, therefore, illegal and unenforceable under section 27 of the Contract Act.\n\nIn support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has, in substance, advanced 11. two-fol.d contention. It is submitted, firstly, upon the common law doctrine of restraint of trade that though the y -covenant is in restraint of trade, it satisfies the 'test of reasonableness', .as laid down by Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt E Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd., supra, and is, therefore, enforceable despite section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872, and, secondly, that the word \"leave\" in Clause 10 of the agreement is wide enough to make the covenant operative even on the termination of employment i.e. it 1includes the case of dismissal. I am afraid, the contentions are wholly 'devoid of substance.\n\nWhile the Contract Act, 1872, does not profess to be a complete code dealing with the law' relating to contracts, we emphasise that to '\\. the extent the Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaustive upon the same and it is not permissible to import the principles of English Law de hors the statutory provision, unless the statute is such that it G • .. cannot be understood without the aid of the English Law. The provi- •-\"° sions of Section 27 of the Act were lifted from Hom. David D. Field's Draft Code for New York based upon the old English doctrine of restraint of . trade, as prevailing in ancient tiiles.\n\nWhen a rule of English law receives statutory recognition by the Indian Legislature, it is the language of the Act which determines the scope, uninfluenced H by the manner in which the anologous provision comes to be construed\n\n0narrowly, or, otherwise modified, in order to bring the construction\n\n.u\n\nwithin the scope and limitations of the rule governing the English' doctrine of restraint of trade.\n\nIt has often been pointed out by the Privy Council and this Court that where there is positive enactment of Indian Legislature the proper course is to examine the language of the statute and to ascertain its proper meaning uninfluenced by any consideration derived from the previous state of the law or the English law upon which it may be founded. Ir; Satyavrata Ghosh v. Kurmee Ram Bangor, [1954] S.C.R.\n\n310, Mukherjee J. while dealing with the doctrine of frustration of contract observed that the Courts in India are to be strictly governed\n\n-+.\n\nby the provisions of Section 5 q of the Contract Act and not to be ·\"'v influenced by the prevailing concepts of the English Law, as it has 1'. passed through various stages of development since the enactment of the Contract Act and the principles enunciated in the various decided cases are not easy Jo reconcile. What be says of the doctrine of frus-c tration under s. 5 6 of the Contract Act is equally true of the doctrine of restraint of trade under section 2 7 of the Act.\n\nNow, so far as the present case is concerned, the law is to be found' in section 27 of the Contract Act 1872, which reads:\n\n\"27. Agreem,, ent in restraint of trade void-Every agreement by which any one. is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of. any kind is to that extent void.\n\nException : One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local linllts, so long as the buyer or any other person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein, provided that . such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the busi!ness.\"\n\nThe section is general in terms, and declares all agreements in restraint\n\nvoid pro tanto, except in the case specified in the exception. ~\n\nThe question whether an agreement is void under section 27 must be decided upon the wording of that section. There is nothing in the wording of section 27 to suggest that the principle stated therein does not apply when the restraint is for a limited period only or is confin• ed to a particular area. Such matters of partial restriction. have effect only when the fact fall within the exception to the section.\n\nA contract, which has for its object a restraint of trade, is prirri(.l fpcie, void.\n\nSection 27 of the Contra_ct Act is general in terms and'\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY V, KRIS~ MURGA! 1293 (Sen,!.)\n\n•UJl!ess a particular contract can be distinctly brought within Exception 1 there is no escape from the prohibition.\n\nWe have nothing to do with the policy of such a law. All we have to do is to take the words of the Contract Act and put upon the meaning which they appear ,.._ .plainly to bear.\n\nThis view of the section was expre8sed by Sir Richard Couch C.J. in celebrated judgment in Madhub Chunder v.\n\nRajcoomar Doss [1874] Beng L. R. 76 at pp. 85-86 laying down that whether the restraint was general or partial, unqualified or quaThfied, if it was in the nature of a restraint of trade, it was void.\n\nThe observations of Sir Richard Couch, C.J., in Madhub Chunder\n\nv. Rajcoomar Doss, supra, which have become the locus classicus were ...._,..these:\n\n\"J \"The words 'restraint from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business' do not mean an absolute restriction, and are intended to apply to a partial restriction, a restriction limited to some particular place, otherwise the first exception would have been unnecessary.\" Moreover, \"in the following section (s. 28) the legislative authority when it intends to speak of an absolute restraint and not a partiall one, has introduced the word 'absolutely'. . . The use of this word in s. 28 supports the view that in s. 27 it was intended to! prevent not merely a total restraint from carrying on trade or ; business but a partial one. We have nothing to do with the Y policy of such a law.\n\nAll we have to do is to take thel words of the Contract Act, and put upon them the meanin!J which they appear plainly to bear.\"\n\nThe test laid down by Sir Richard Couch, C.J. in Madhub Chunder\n\nv. Rajcoomar Doss, supra, has stood the test of time and has invariably been followed by all the High Courts in India.\n\n' The agreement in question is not a 'goodwill of business' type of contract and, therefore, does not fall within the exception.\n\nIf the agreement on the part of the respondent puts & restraint even though partial, it was void, and, therefore, the contract must be treated as one which cannot be enforced.\n\nIt is, however, argued that the test of the validit}j of a restraint, whether general or partial, is dependent on its reasonableness. It is -pointed out that the distinction drawn by Lord Macclesfield in Mitchel\n\nv. Reynolds (1711) 1 PMas_161 between general and partial restraint, was removed 5y the House of Lords in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nortlen- Je/t Guns and Ammunition Co. (supra). According to the judgment of\n\nLord Macnaghten in N ordenfelf s case, the validity in either case was. reasonableness with reference to particular circumstces. It is urged that all covenants in restraint of trade partial as well as general a.re prima facie void and they cannot be enforced, according to the test laid down by Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt's case and accepted by the House of Lords in Mason v. Provident C/.othing arui Supply Co.\n\nLtd., L.R. [1930] A.C. 724, unless the test of reasonableness is testified.\n\nIt is also urged that while an employer is not entitled to protect himself against competition per se on, the part of an employee after the employment has ceased, he is entitled to protection of his proprietary interest viz. his trade secrets, if any, and a blisiness connection.\n\n1 c The test of reasonableness which now governs the commoni law\n\ndoctrine. of restraint of trade has been stated in Chitty on Contracts,, . 23rd Edn., Vol. I. p. 867 : I(\n\n\"While all restraint of trade to which1 the doctrine applied are prima facie unenforceable, all, whether partial or total, are enforceable, if reasonable.\"\n\nA contract in restraint of trade is one by which a party restricts his future liberty to carry on his trade, bnsiness or profession in such manner and with such persons as he chooses.\n\nA contract of thi~ class. is prima fade void, but is becomes binding upon proof that th<i restriction is justifiable in the circumstances as being reasonable from the E. point of view of the parties themselves and also of the community.\n\nIn Elizabethan days, all agreements in restraint of trade, whether '<!: general or restrictive to a particular area, were held to be bad; but a distinction came to be taken between covenant in general restraint of trade, and those where the restraints were only partial.\n\nF According to !lie test laid down by Parker, C.J. (later Earl of\n\nMacclesfield) in Mitchel v. Reynolds, supra, the general restraint was one which covered an indefinite area, and was, as a rule held bad,. while a partial restraint was valid if reasonable, the onus being upon f the covenanter to show it to be unreasonable. ,\n\nThere is no higher authority upon this subject than Tindal, C.J .,. who had to do much with moulding of the law on this subject and bringing it into harmony with the needs of the changing times.\n\nIw Mornen v. Graves [1831] 7 Bing. 735, Tindal, C.J. said :\n\n\"The law upon this subject (i.e. restraint of trade) has been laid down with so much authority and precision; by Parker, C.J., in giving the judgment of the Court of B.R. (King's Bench) in the case of Mitchel v. , Reynolds which has been the leading case on the subject from that time: to\n\n• ,\n\n.\"\" r\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY V. KRISHAN MURGA!. 1 95 (Sen, J.) the present, that little more remains than to apply the principle of that case to the present.\n\nNow the rule laid down by the court in that case is . 'that voluntary reitraints, 'by\n\nagreement between the parties, if they amount to a general restraint of trading by either party, are void, whether. with or without consideration, but particular restraints of trading, if made upon a good and adequate consideration, so aS' to be a proper and useful contract, that is, so as it is a reasonable restraint only, are good:'\n\nLater on he goes on to observe :\n\n\"Parker, C.J., says, : a restraint to carry on a: trade throughout the kingdom must be void; a res_traint to carry it. on within a particular place is good, which are rather in-', stances and examples than limits of the application of the. rule, which can only be at least what is a reasonable restraint with reference to the particular cases.\"\n\nB \\\n\nI q\n\nBy decrees, the common law doctrine of restraint of trade, bas been D progressively expanded and the legal principles applied and developed so as to suit the exigencies of the times, with the growth of ade and co=erce, rapid industrialisation and improved means of communication. '\n\nIn Nurdenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd., (supra), Lord. Macnaghton held that the only true test in all cases, whether of. partial .or general restraint, was the test proposed by Tindal, C.J. : What.is a reasonable restraint with reference to a particular\n\ncase?: Thereby he denied that general and partial restraints. fall into distinct categories.\n\nA partial restraint in his opinion was not prima fade' valid. It was on the same footing as a general restraint i.e. prima facie void, but valid, if reasonable. / In Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co. Ltd., supra, the, HmJSe of Lords held that Lord Macnaghton's proposition was a correct statement of the modem law. The House of Lords in this case\n\ndeveloped the law in two respects : First, it held that all covenants in restrnlnt of trade, partial as: well as &eneral, prima fade void and that they cannot be enforced unless the test of reasonableness as propounded by Lord Macnaghton is satisfied. Secondly, it made a sharp distinction, stressed as long ago as 1869 by James, L.J., in Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont [1869] L.R. 9 Eq. 345, between contracts of service and contracts for the sale of a business. '\n\nIn Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby, supra, the House of Lords held that a master cannot protect himself from competition by an ex-servant\n\nA 01 his new employer. He cannot stipulate freedom from competition.\n\nI c!\n\nI H l\n\nP. ut he can protect his trade secrets or his confidential information.\n\nThe 'test of reasonableness' evolved in co=on law after the deciion of Lord Macnaghton, in Nordenfelt's case, supra, and re-affinned by the two decisions in Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co.\n\nLtd.:and Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Sexelby, supra, is that such covenants are prima facie, void and the onus. rests upon the covenante to prove that the restraint is reasonable. In Nordenfelfs case, Lord Macnaghton also adverte.d to the distinction between covenant entered by the seller of the business on the one hand and the covenant by the employee on the other.\n\nFramers of section 833 of Field's Draft Code for New York designed some hundred and twenty-five years ago, expressed the iiiten• tion to replace the co=on law stating that \"contracts in restraint of trade have been allowed by modern decisions td a very dangerous extent\", and they proceeded to draft the provision with the dliberate intention of narrowmg the law. The provision was never applied to New York, but found its way into the Contracti Act, 1872 as section\n\n27. Several sections of the Field's Code were enacted in the! Act.\n\nThe Cede was anathema to Sir Frederick Pollock who in his preface to Pollock and Mulla's Indian Conlf<lct Act, p. 5, described the Code as the evil genius of the Act, the worst principles of codification iever produced, and advocated that 'whenever the Act wasi revised everything taken from the Code should be strnclc out'.\n\nIt must be remembered that the test of reasonableness comes from\n\nth~ judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelfs case in the House of Lords in 1894. In 1862, however, when the Field provision'. was drafted, it was not easy to foresee that the co=on law would shortly discard the distinction drawn by Lord Macclesfield in Mitchel v.\n\nReynolds in 1711, between general and partial restraints. A general restraint was one which covered an indefinite area, and was, as a rule, held bad, while a partial restraint was valid, if reasonable, the onu$ being upon the covenanter to show it to be unreasonable. This was a mere rule of thumb, but was stubbornly adhered to by as great a common lawyer as Bowen, L.J., as late as 1893, when the Nordenfelf:l case was in the Court of Appeals : L.R. [1893] 1 Ch. D. 630.\n\nBe that as it may, in Field's draft, as early as 1862, ar<? clearly expressed two principles th'lt govern the modem o=on law today, - but were unknown to it at that stage, and were not unequivocally stated until 1916, first that restrictive covenants are prima facie, invaJid, and secondly between master and servant covenants on the one hand and vendor and purchaser covenants on the other; there is a great gulf\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY v. KRISHAN MURGA! 1297 (Sen, /.) fixed.\n\nThe onus of proving. reasonableness under Exception 1, was A placed on the covenantee, while the common law at the\\ time placed 1t upon the covenanter to show unreasonableness.\n\nSir Frederick Pollock's criticism(') of the substantive part of ection 27 was that it laid down too rigid' a rule of invalidity, not merely for general bnt also for partial restraints, and of the exceptions that they were too narrow, being based upon an idea of the common law, now outmoded, that a restraint must be confined within loca~ limits. His views on the main body of the section may be illustrated by , twd quotations :\n\n\"The law of India .... is tied down by. the language of the section to the principle, now exploded in England, of a hard and fast rule qualified by strictly limited exceptions •.• \"\n\n\"To escape the prohibition, it is not enough to show that the restraint created by an agreement is partial, and general.\"\n\nTwo passages. from his comments on Exception 1 may also be D -cited ;\n\n\"The extension of modem commerce and means of communication has displaced the old doctrine that the operation <>f agreements of this kind must be confined within a definite neighbourhood. But the Anglo Indian law has stereotyped\n\nthat doctrine ill a narrower form than even the old authodties would justify.\"\n\n\"Meanwhile the common law has, .on the contrary; been widening the old fixed rules as to limits of space have been broken down, and the court has only to consider in every case of a restrictive agreement whether the restriction is 'reasonable in reference to the interests of the parties con-\n\n.,. cemed reasonable in reference to the interests of the public.\" f Reverting to th~ judgment . of Sir Richard Couch in Madlmb Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss, supra, we find that that eminent Judge held that section 27 of the Contract Act does away with the distinction observed in English cases following upon Mitchel v. Reynolds, supra, G :between partial and total restraints of trade, and makes all contracts falling within the terms of section void, unless they fall within the exceptions. As already stated, that decision has always been followed.\n\nIn Shaikh Kalu v. Ram Saran Bhagat, [1908] 13 C.W.N. 388 :Mllkherjee and Camduff, JJ, referred to the history of the legislation H\n\n(l Pollock & Milla's India Contrzct and Specific Relief Act, 9th Ed., at pp,\n\n271, 274 and 292.\n\non the subject and observed that the framers of the Act deliberately reproduced Section, 833 of Field's Code with the. full knowledge that the effect would be to lay down a rule much narrower than what was. recognised at the time by the co=on law, while the rules of the , co=on law, on the other hand, had since been considerably widened and developed, on entirely new lines.\n\nThey held that the wider construction put upon section 27 by Sir Richard Couch.in Madhub Chundur\n\nv. Raj Coomar Doss, supra, is plainly justified by the language used, and that the selection had abolished the distinction between partial and' total restraints of trade and said :\n\n\"The result is that the rule as embodied in sec. 27 of the Indian Contract Act presents an almost startling dissimilarity to the most modern phase of the English rifle on the .subject.\n\nThey went on to observe:\n\n\"As observed, however, by Sir Richard Couch in the case to which we have referred, we have nothing to do with the D policy of the law, specially as the Legislature has deliberately left the provision in sec. 21; in its original form, though other provisions of the Contract Act have from time to time been amended. The interference would be almost irresistible under these circumstances, that the Courts have rightly\n\nascertained the intention of the legislature. The silence of the Legislature in a case of this description is almost as emphatic as an express recognition of the construction which .has been judicially put upon the statute during many years past. In this view of the matter, if we adopt the construction of sec. 27 of the Indian Contract Act as first suggested by Sir Richard Couch and subsequently affirmed in the cases to which we have referred, a construction which is consistent with the plain language of the section, the agreement in this case must be pronounced to be void.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThe Law Commission, in its Thirteenth Report, has recommended that Section 27 of the Act should be suitably. amended to allow such restrictions and all contracts in restraint of trade, general or partial, as were reasonable, in the interest of the parties as well as of the public.\n\nThat, however involves a question of policy and that is a matter for Parliament to decide. The duty of the Court is to interpret the section according to its plain linguage.\n\nThe question for consideration is whether, assuming that the \\vider construction placed by Sir Richard Couch in Madlu1b Clmndur v.\n\n; r-\n\nSUPERL'HENDENCE COMPANY V. KRISHAN MURGA! 129~ (Sen, J.) . - Raj Coomar Doss, supra, to have been the law, at the time of enact- . ment, it has since become obsolete. A law does not cease to be operative becaus~ it is an anachronism or because it is antiquated or because the reason why it originally became the law, would be no reason for the introduction of such a law at the present time.\n\nNeither the test of reasonableness nor the principle of that the restraint being partial was reasonable are applicable to a case governed _ by Section 2 7 of the Contract Act, unless it falls within Exception 1.\n\nWe, therefore, feel that no useful purpose will be served in discussing the several English Decisions cited at the Bar.\n\nUnder Section 27 of the Contract Act, a service covenant extended beyond the termination of the service is void.\n\nNot a single Indian Decision tas been brought to our notice where an injunction has been\n\ngranted against an employee after the termination of his employment.\n\nThere remains the question whether the w01:_d 'leav()' in clause 10 of the agreement is wide enough to make the negative covenant operative D on I.he termination of employment. We may for convenience of reference, reproduce that covenant below :-\n\n\"10. that you shall not be permitted to join any firm of our competitors or run business of your own in similarity as directly and/or indirectly for a period of 2 years at the place of your last posting af!er you leave the Company.\"\n\nOn a true construction of clause 10 of the agreement, the negative covenant not to serve elsewhere or enter into a competitive business does not, in my view, arise when the employee does not lave the services but is dismissed from service. Wrongful dismissal is a repudiation of contract of service which relieved the employee of the restrictive covenant General Bil/posting v. Atkinson L.R. [1909] AC. 116 .\n\n• It is, however, urged that the word 'leave' must, in the context in which it appears, be construed to mean as operative on the termination of employment.\n\nOur attention is drawn to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., Vol. If, Pr. 13 p. 1503. There is reference to Mars\n\nv. Close, 32 L.T.0.S. 89.\n\nAri agreement restricting competition with an employer \"after leaving his service\" was held to be operative on the termination, however, accomplished, of th-e service, e.g. by dismissal without notice.\n\nThe word 'leave' has various shades of meaning depending upon H the context or intent with which it is used.\n\nAccording to the plain , meaning, the word 'leave' in relation to an emplgyee, should be\n\nconstrued to mean where he \"voluntarily\" leavs i.e. of his own volition and does not include a case of dismissal. . The word 'leave' appears to connect voluntary action, and is synonymous with the word 'quit'.\n\nIt does not refer to the expulsion of an employee by the act of his employer without his. consent and against his remonstrance. That is a\n\neaning in consonance with justice and fair play. It is also the ordinary plain meaning of the word 'leave'. ln shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Ed. Vo1. X, page 1192, th, e following meaning is given-\n\n\"to depart from; quit; relinquish, to quit the service of a person.\"\n\nThe drafting of a negative covenant in a contract of employment is often a matter of great difficulty .. In the employment cases so far discussed, the issue has been as to the validity of the covenant operating after the end of the period of_ service.\n\nRestrictions on competition during that period are normally valid, and indeed may be implied by law by virtue of the servant's duty of fidelity. In such cases the restriction is generally reasonable, having regard to the interest of the employer, and does not cause any undue hardship to the employee, who will receive a wage or salary for the period in question. But if the, covenant is to operate after the termination of services, or is too widely worded, the Court may, refuse to enforce it.\n\n, )<; It is well settled that employees covenants should be carefully scrutinised because there is inequality of bargaining power between the parties; indeed no bargafuing power may occur because the employee is presented with a standard form of contract to accept or reject. At the time of the agreement, the employee may have given little thought to the restriction because of his eagerness for a job; such contracts :F \"tempt improvident persons, for the sake of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power to make future acquisitions, and expose them to iinpositiOn and oppression.\"\n\nTI1ere exists a difference in the nature of the interest sought to be protected in the case of an employee and of a purchaser and, therefore, G . as a positive rule of law, the extent of restraint permissible in the two types of case is different. The essential line of distinction is that the p11rchaser is entitled to protect himself against competition on the patt of his vendor, while the employer is not entitled to protection against mere competition on the part of his servant.\n\nIn addition thereto, a restrictive covenant ancillary to a contract of employment is likely to .H affect the employee's means or procuring a livelihood for himself and his family to a greater degree than that' of a seller, who usually receive\n\nample. consideration for the sale of the goodwill of hisbusiness.\n\n\" •\n\nSUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY V, KRISHAN MURGA! 1301 (Sen, !.) The distinction rests upon a substantial basis, since, in the f0rmer class of contracts we deal with the sale of commodities, and in the latter class with the performance of personal service-altogether different in substance; and the social and economic implications !Ire vatly different.\n\nThe Courts, therefore, vi~ with disfavour a restrictive covenant by an employee not to engage in a business similar to or competitive with that of Jhe employer after the termination of his contract of employment.\n\nThe true rule of construction is that when a covenant or agreement is impeached on the ground that it is in restraint of trade, the duty of the Court is, first to interpret the covenant or agreement itself, and to ascertain according to the ordinary rules of construction what is the fair meaning of the parties. If there is an ambiguity it must receive a narrower construction than the wider. In Mills v. Dunham, L.R. (1891] 1 Ch. 576, Kay, Ll. observed:\n\n\"If there is any ambiguity in a stipulation between em- It ployer and employee imposing a restriction on the latter, it ought to receive the narrower construction rather than the wider-the employed ought to have the benefit of the doubt.\n\nIt would not be following out that principle correctly to give the stipulation a wide construction so as to make it illegal and thus set the employed free from all restraint. It is also a E' settled canon of construction that where a clause is ambiguous a construction which will make it valid is to be preferred to one which will make it void.\"\n\nThe restraint may not be greater than necessary to protect the employer, nor unduly harsh and oppressive to the employee. I would,\n\ntherefore, .for my part, even if the word 'leave' contained in clause 10 of the agreement is susceptible of another construction as being operative on termination, however, accomplished of the service e.g. by dismissal without notice, would, having regard to the provisions of Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872, try to preserve the covenant in clause 10 by giving to it a restrictive meaning, as implying volition i.e. where the employee resigns or voluntarily leaves the services. The restriction being too wide, and violative of section 27 of the Contract Act, must be subjected to a narrower construction.\n\nIn the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed but thereshall be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 158, "entities": [{"text": "A SlJPERJNTENDENCE COMPANY OF INDIA (P) LTD.\n\nKRJSHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUPERINTENDENCE COMPANY OF INDIA (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 80, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRJSHAN MURGAI\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, V. D. TuLZAPURKAR AND AP .. SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. 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SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Covenant in restruiflf of trade-Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Covenant in restruiflf of trade-Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "Covenant in restruiflf of trade-Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 434, "end_char": 444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Covenant in restruiflf of trade-Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "Covenant in restruiflf of trade-Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 927, "end_char": 935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has its headoffice at Calcutta and a branch at New Delhi and employs various persons as managers and in other ccities in Calcutta; New Delhi and other pla.ces~\n\nOn March 27, 1971, the respondent was employed by the appellant company as the Branch Manager of its New Delhi office on terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment issued to him on the same date."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 952, "end_char": 961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has its headoffice at Calcutta and a branch at New Delhi and employs various persons as managers and in other ccities in Calcutta; New Delhi and other pla.ces~\n\nOn March 27, 1971, the respondent was employed by the appellant company as the Branch Manager of its New Delhi office on terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment issued to him on the same date."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1069, "end_char": 1083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has its headoffice at Calcutta and a branch at New Delhi and employs various persons as managers and in other ccities in Calcutta; New Delhi and other pla.ces~\n\nOn March 27, 1971, the respondent was employed by the appellant company as the Branch Manager of its New Delhi office on terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment issued to him on the same date."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1575, "end_char": 1592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1978, the appellant company terminated the respondent's semces with effect from December 27, 1978."}}, {"text": "December 27, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1668, "end_char": 1685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1978, the appellant company terminated the respondent's semces with effect from December 27, 1978."}}, {"text": "Superintendence and Surveillence Inspectorate of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1764, "end_char": 1818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, respondent started his own business under the name and style of \"Superintendence and Surveillence Inspectorate of India\" at E.-22 South Extension New Delhi on lines identical with or substantially similar to that of the appellant company.'"}}, {"text": "April 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1942, "end_char": 1956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 19, 1979 the appellant company brought a suit in the Delhi HighJ Court on its original side, claiming Rs."}}, {"text": "Delhi HighJ Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2001, "end_char": 2018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 19, 1979 the appellant company brought a suit in the Delhi HighJ Court on its original side, claiming Rs."}}, {"text": "April 29, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2703, "end_char": 2717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After filing the suit the appellant company sought an ad interim injuncilon by way of enforcing the aforesaid negative covenant a1*i a Single Judge of the Delhi High O>uft initially granted an ad interim injunction on April 29, 1979 which was confirmed by him on May 25, 1979 after hearing the respondent."}}, {"text": "May 25, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2748, "end_char": 2760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After filing the suit the appellant company sought an ad interim injuncilon by way of enforcing the aforesaid negative covenant a1*i a Single Judge of the Delhi High O>uft initially granted an ad interim injunction on April 29, 1979 which was confirmed by him on May 25, 1979 after hearing the respondent."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3201, "end_char": 3211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3219, "end_char": 3238, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 177", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4642, "end_char": 4648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4832, "end_char": 4842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5281, "end_char": 5291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5977, "end_char": 5987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 378", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6265, "end_char": 6281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "\\Vhen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6302, "end_char": 6307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Vhen a rule of English law receives statutory recognition by the Indian Legislature, it is the language of the Act which determines the scope, un influenced by the manner in which the anologous provision comes ."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6899, "end_char": 6909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7004, "end_char": 7014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7270, "end_char": 7280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8388, "end_char": 8398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8853, "end_char": 8863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8928, "end_char": 8938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 10", 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Delhi High Court in F.A.O. (OS) No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13222, "end_char": 13231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg, R. Venkataramani and S. K.\n\nBisaria for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13233, "end_char": 13242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg, R. Venkataramani and S. K.\n\nBisaria for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. D. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13244, "end_char": 13254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg, R. Venkataramani and S. K.\n\nBisaria for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Venkataramani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13256, "end_char": 13272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg, R. Venkataramani and S. K.\n\nBisaria for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K.\n\nBisaria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13277, "end_char": 13291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, P. P. Rao, N. D. Garg, R. Venkataramani and S. K.\n\nBisaria for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13312, "end_char": 13327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal, H. K. Puri and S. C. Dlumda for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13329, "end_char": 13339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal, H. K. Puri and S. C. Dlumda for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "S. C. Dlumda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13344, "end_char": 13356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal, H. K. Puri and S. C. Dlumda for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13421, "end_char": 13432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered\n\nTuLZAPURKAR, J. This appeal at the instance of the appellant company (original plaintiff) is directed against an inter-locutory order passed by the High Court in F.A.O. (0.S.) 86 of 1979 refusing to y grant temporary injunction in a suit which is stil\\ pending.", "canonical_name": "TuLZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13888, "end_char": 13893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13901, "end_char": 13920, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14094, "end_char": 14108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 21, 1980 we dismissed the appeal at thecopclusion of the hearing and it was stated that our reasons will follow."}}, {"text": "March 2 7, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14906, "end_char": 14921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 2 7, 1971 the respondent was emplayed by the appellant company as the Branch Manager of its New Delhi office on terms and conditions contained in the letter of appointment issued to him on the same date."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17337, "end_char": 17341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18327, "end_char": 18332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the one hand counsel for th~ reipO!ldent tried to support the view of the Division Bench by pointiilg out that in India the law on the subject was codified by statute which B wu edlaustive and on the topic of agreements in restraint of trade and excefl(ions in that behalf the Indian Courts cannot invoke oc derive\n\nassistance from the English Common Law and the exceptionsi developed thereto by English decisions from time to time, that s. 27 ol."}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18651, "end_char": 18656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18665, "end_char": 18684, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Richard\n\nCouch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19078, "end_char": 19092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this behalf reliance was placed on a number of decisions of various High Courts commencing from the celebrated decision of Sir Richard\n\nCouch, C.J. in M.adhub Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss(') wheres. 27 was interpreted in the aforesaid manner.", "canonical_name": "Richard\n\nCouch"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19748, "end_char": 19753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20194, "end_char": 20199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Richard Couch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20246, "end_char": 20259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand counsel for the appellant company contended that the interpretation of s. 27 as given by various Hfgh Courts including Sir Richard Couch's decision in Madlmb Chzmder's case (supra) has not been so far considered by this Court and it requires to be examined and considered by this Court, especially in view of certain observations made by this Court in Niranjan Shankar Golikari's (2) case which warrant such reconsideration.", "canonical_name": "Richard\n\nCouch"}}, {"text": "Madlmb Chzmder", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20274, "end_char": 20288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand counsel for the appellant company contended that the interpretation of s. 27 as given by various Hfgh Courts including Sir Richard Couch's decision in Madlmb Chzmder's case (supra) has not been so far considered by this Court and it requires to be examined and considered by this Court, especially in view of certain observations made by this Court in Niranjan Shankar Golikari's (2) case which warrant such reconsideration."}}, {"text": "Niranjan Shankar Golikari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20475, "end_char": 20500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand counsel for the appellant company contended that the interpretation of s. 27 as given by various Hfgh Courts including Sir Richard Couch's decision in Madlmb Chzmder's case (supra) has not been so far considered by this Court and it requires to be examined and considered by this Court, especially in view of certain observations made by this Court in Niranjan Shankar Golikari's (2) case which warrant such reconsideration.", "canonical_name": "Niranjan Shankar Golikari"}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 378", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21115, "end_char": 21131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21190, "end_char": 21201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\nAccording to counsel the very fact that this Court has observed that A considerations qua post-service restrictions are different from those that are to be considered in cases of restrictiops during the employiµent suggests that perhaP5 a rigorou~ test of reasonableness may have to be adopted in the former cases but there would be cases where postservice restrictions, if !", "canonical_name": "TuLZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21669, "end_char": 21673, "source": 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{"statute": null}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27820, "end_char": 27823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J.\n\nI regret that my learned brethren propose to express nd opinion on the question on which, in my view, the appeal turns."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28270, "end_char": 28280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi High court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28454, "end_char": 28470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal on certifiCate from a judgment of the Delhi High court, relates to a covenant in restraint of trade contained in an agreement between the appellant company and the respondent in circumstances which we will explain."}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30743, "end_char": 30753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30770, "end_char": 30786, 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Maxim Nordenfelt E Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd., supra, and is, therefore, enforceable despite section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872, and, secondly, that the word \"leave\" in Clause 10 of the agreement is wide enough to make the covenant operative even on the termination of employment i.e. it 1includes the case of dismissal.", "canonical_name": "Macnaghten"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38319, "end_char": 38329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38337, "end_char": 38355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38397, "end_char": 38406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "the Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "While the Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38612, "end_char": 38640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39057, "end_char": 39067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While the Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "While the Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "New York", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39133, "end_char": 39141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "David D. Field's Draft Code for New York based upon the old English doctrine of restraint of ."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40214, "end_char": 40223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40561, "end_char": 40565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40648, "end_char": 40657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40746, "end_char": 40756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contract Act 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40764, "end_char": 40781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Agreem", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40802, "end_char": 40808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Agreem,, ent in restraint of trade void-Every agreement by which any one."}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41559, "end_char": 41569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contract Act 1872", "statute": "the Contract Act 1872"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41655, "end_char": 41665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contract Act 1872", "statute": "the Contract Act 1872"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42010, "end_char": 42020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All we have to do is to take the words of the Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42294, "end_char": 42352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Richard Couch", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42466, "end_char": 42479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view of the section was expre8sed by Sir Richard Couch C.J. in celebrated judgment in Madhub Chunder v.\n\nRajcoomar Doss [1874] Beng L. R. 76 at pp.", "canonical_name": "Richard\n\nCouch"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43195, "end_char": 43200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All we have to do is to take the words of the Contract Act", "statute": "All we have to do is to take the words of the Contract Act"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43368, "end_char": 43373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43400, "end_char": 43405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All we have to do is to take thel words of the Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43575, "end_char": 43634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Macclesfield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44384, "end_char": 44396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is -pointed out that the distinction drawn by Lord Macclesfield in Mitchel\n\nv. Reynolds (1711) 1 PMas_161 between general and partial restraint, was removed 5y the House of Lords in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nortlen- Je/t Guns and Ammunition Co. (supra)."}}, {"text": "Nordenfelt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44926, "end_char": 44936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged that all covenants in restraint of trade partial as well as general a.re prima facie void and they cannot be enforced, according to the test laid down by Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt's case and accepted by the House of Lords in Mason v. Provident C/.othing arui Supply Co.\n\nLtd., L.R. [1930] A.C. 724, unless the test of reasonableness is testified.", "canonical_name": "Nordenfelfs"}}, {"text": "Chitty", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45503, "end_char": 45509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of restraint of trade has been stated in Chitty on Contracts,, ."}}, {"text": "Parker", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46449, "end_char": 46455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lie test laid down by Parker, C.J. (later Earl of\n\nMacclesfield) in Mitchel v. Reynolds, supra, the general restraint was one which covered an indefinite area, and was, as a rule held bad,."}}, {"text": "Tindal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46791, "end_char": 46797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no higher authority upon this subject than Tindal, C.J .,."}}, {"text": "Macnaghton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48627, "end_char": 48637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Macnaghton held that the only true test in all cases, whether of.", "canonical_name": "Macnaghten"}}, {"text": "James", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49601, "end_char": 49606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, it made a sharp distinction, stressed as long ago as 1869 by James, L.J., in Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont [1869] L.R. 9 Eq."}}, {"text": "Nordenfelfs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50414, "end_char": 50425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Nordenfelfs case, Lord Macnaghton also adverte.d to the distinction between covenant entered by the seller of the business on the one hand and the covenant by the employee on the other.", "canonical_name": "Nordenfelfs"}}, {"text": "section 833", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50612, "end_char": 50623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contracti Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51037, "end_char": 51056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section\n\n27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51060, "end_char": 51071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Contracti Act, 1872", "statute": "the Contracti Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Frederick Pollock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51166, "end_char": 51183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cede was anathema to Sir Frederick Pollock who in his preface to Pollock and Mulla's Indian Conlf<lct Act, p. 5, described the Code as the evil genius of the Act, the worst principles of codification iever produced, and advocated that 'whenever the Act wasi revised everything taken from the Code should be strnclc out'."}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51218, "end_char": 51223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cede was anathema to Sir Frederick Pollock who in his preface to Pollock and Mulla's Indian Conlf<lct Act, p. 5, described the Code as the evil genius of the Act, the worst principles of codification iever produced, and advocated that 'whenever the Act wasi revised everything taken from the Code should be strnclc out'."}}, {"text": "Bowen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52156, "end_char": 52161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was a mere rule of thumb, but was stubbornly adhered to by as great a common lawyer as Bowen, L.J., as late as 1893, when the Nordenfelf:l case was in the Court of Appeals : L.R. [1893] 1 Ch."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53461, "end_char": 53468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the language of the section to the principle, now exploded in England, of a hard and fast rule qualified by strictly limited exceptions •.• \"\n\n\"To escape the prohibition, it is not enough to show that the restraint created by an agreement is partial, and general.\""}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54544, "end_char": 54554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mllkherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54949, "end_char": 54959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shaikh Kalu v. 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{"document_id": "1980_3_1302_1337_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAGHBlR SINGH GILL\n\nGURCHARAN SINGH TOHRA & ORS.\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, Section 94-Secrecy of voting -Scope of Section 94--Constitution of India Articles 326 & 327--Tampering with records-Applicability of Section 64A of the Act to the present case-Rule 56(2) of the Election Rules, scope of-Section !OO(d)(l)\n\n(iii) of the Act and void elections--Petition for recount, when to be ordered-Non-appearance of election Petitioner in tile witness box, whether vitiates the petition-Interference by Supren1e Court in an election petition.\n\nAn election petition waS :filed by the respondent against the appellant, a returned oo.ndidate1 to the council of the State from the constituency of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, on the ground that the result of the election was materially effected (a) by non-compliance with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the rules made thereunder; (b) by improper reception of votes in his favour by tampering with the postal ballot papers and by commission of corrupt practice in the interest of the al>pellant by it8 agents and also commission of corrnpt practice by obtaining assistance of persons in the service of the Punjab Government. The appellant denied all the allegations and contested the petition. The High Court found that the four baHot papers one each allotted to iP.Ws. (the voters) Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16 were tampered with in that each the voter had cast his firn preference vote in favour of unsuccessful Akali candidate Gurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was so altered as to appear that each one of them has cast his first prefer ence vote in favour of the appellant and second preference vote in favour of Gurcharan Singh. The High Court allowed the election petition and declared the unsuccessful Akali candidate Gurcharan Singh Tohra as elected and set aside the election of the appellant.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD: (1) Section 94 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 cannot be interpreted or examined in isolation. Its scope, ambit and underlying object must be a!certained in the context in which it finds its place in the Act, and further in the context of the fact that the Act itself was enacted in exercise of power conferred by Articles in Part XV titled \"Election\" in the Constitution with a. view to achieve the constitutional goal, viz., setting up of democratic sovereign socialist secular republic.\n\nFor this a free and fair election, a fountain spring and corner stone of democracy, b~ on universal adult suffrage is the basic. The regulatory procedure for achieving! free and fair election for setting up democratic institution in the country is provided in the Act which includes the cross or performooce indicated by the dumb-sealed lip voter in the ballot paper. That is his right and the trust reposed by the Constitution in him that he will act as a responsible citizen choosing his masters for governing the countiy for the period prescribed by it. Therefore, any interpretation of s. 94 must essentially subserve the purpose for which it is enacted. The interpretative process must advance the basic postulate of free and fair election for setting up democra<ic institution and not retard it.\n\n[1312 G-H, 1313 AC, E-F]\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL V. GURCHARAN SINGH 1303\n\nH. II, Kr., avananda Bharali Sripadaga/avaru v. State of Kera/a, [1973] A • '.Suppl. S.C.R. 1; Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commis.rioner,\n\nNew Delhi & Ors., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 272, referred to.\n\n(2). It is legitimate and indeed proper to have recourse to heading and sub-heeding given to a group of sections in an Act of Parliament to find guidance for the construction of the words in a statute. One of the canons of construction is that every section Of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other sections of the Act, so as, as far as posSl'ble, to B make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.\n\n[1316 F-G]\n\nRex v. Board of Trade, Ex-parte St. Martin's Prrving Co.\n\nLtd., [1965] 1 Q.B. 603 at 607 referred to.\n\n\"--'. (3). Provisions cast in negative words are generally treated as absolute I\" . .admitting of no exception. But this is not a universal rule. The words 'negative' and 'affirmative' statutes mean nothing in particular. The question is one of intendment. Emphasis is more easily demonstrated_ when a statute is negative than when it is affirmative, but the question is one 'of intendment.\n\nIf tbe language is open to two constructions one must ascertain the intendmoot, the mischief sought to be remedied and the remedy provided to cure the mischief. And, in such a situation the court must escalate in favour of that construction which carries out the intendment behind enactment and >1ccords with reason and fairplay.\n\n[1318 E-G]\n\nMa, or of London v. Rex, [1848] 3 Q.B. 30; Victoria Sporting Club Ltd.\n\nv. Hannam, (1969) 2 W L.R. 454 referred to.\n\n(4). The words \"shall be required\" in s. 94 of the Act, which is cast in negative language indicate an inbuilt element of compulsion.\n\nSection 94 carves out an exception to section 132 of the Evidence Act and also section 95 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. In view of the imperati_ve language of s. 132 of the Evidence Act and also from the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination as enacted in Article 20(3) of the Constitution a witness when questioned in the witness box relevant to the matter in issue in a proceeding in which he is called as a witness bas to answer the question put to him and cannot escape the obligation to answer the question even if the answer was likely to incriminate him except to the extent the .qualified privilege is extended to him under the proviso to section 132 of Evidence Act. A conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and ss. 93, 94 and 95 of the Representation Act makes it clear that they\n\nprovide for a procedure, including the procedure for examination of witnesses, their rights and obligations in the trial of an election petition. The expres- -sion ffother person\" extends the protection to a forum outside courts. Sec\n\ntion 94, therefore, cannot be singled out as a substantive provision and being unrelated to the procedure prescribed . for trial of election petitioo. [1314 A, B, E, F, 1315 A, F-G, 1316 C-F]\n\nDr. Chhotalal Jivabhai Paiel v. Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta and Ors. (1971) 12 Guj. LR. 850 @ 860 approved.\n\n(5) Section 94 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 can be construed in two possible ways firstly, that , the section casts an . absolute prohibition and seals the mouth of the voter permanently and ad.mi~ of n?\n\nexception in which he can divulge his vote, and secon?JY, that 1t is a pnvilrge of the voter to disclose his vote if he voluntarily hooses to do so\n\nbut he cannot be compelled by court or any other authority to divulge his. vote. [1318 GH, 1319 Al\n\nIf s. 94 is interpreted to mean to be e. privilege of the voter to divulge or not to divulge how he voted and if he chooses not to divulge, s. 94 pro 4 tects him inasmuch as he cannot be compelled to divulge that information,. then it does not stand in conflict with the other important principle of free and fair elections to sustain parliamentary democracy. When it is said that no witness or other person shall be required to state for whom he has voted at an election it only means that both in the Court when a. person is styled as a witness and outside the Court when he may be questioned about how he voted though he would not have the character or the qualification of a witness yet in either situation he is free to refuse to answer the question \\Vithout incurring any penalty or forfeiture. That guarantees the vital principles behind secrecy of ballot in that the voter would be able to vote uninhibited by fear.\n\nBut if he chooses to open his lips of his own free will with out direct or indirect compulsion and waive the privilege, nothing prevents him from disclosing how he voted as there is no provision in the Act which would expose him to any penalty. If a voter voluntarily chooses to disclose how he voted or for whom he voted s. 128 of the Representation of People Act has nothing to do with the voter disclosing for whom he voted. It casts an obligation of secrecy on those connected with the process of election and not on the voter.\n\n[1319 AD]\n\nIf the other construction is adopted the mischief thereby perpetrated can be demonstrably established. One can then manipulate the vote cast by a voter and poor voter will be helpless and unable to assist the couit by his testimony which is the best direct evidence to establish for whom he voted and what mischief has been played with his vote. [1319 E-F]\n\n(6) Free and fair election is not an a priori concept but of cherished constitutional goal oriented value. Secrecy of ballot though undoubtedly a vital principle for ensuring free and fair elections, it was enshrined in law to subserve the larger public interest, namely, purity of election for ensuring free and fair election. The principle of secrecy of ballot cannot stand aloof or in isolation and in confrontation to the foundation of free and fair elections, namely, purity of election. They can co-exist but where one is used to destroy the other, the first one must yield to principle of purity of election\n\nJ,, in larger public interest. Jn fact secrecy of ballot, a privilege of the voter, f is not inviolable and may be waived by him as a responsible citizen of this country to ensure free and fair election and to unravel foul play.\n\n[1320 F-H, 1321 A]\n\nN. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency & Others, [1952) S.C.R. 218 at 230, referred to.\n\n(7). Ordinarily secrecy of ballot has to be guarded, but where secrecy ...,.....-1 of the ballot itself is sought to be availed of as a protective sheath against disclosure of fraud, forgery or wrongful conduct, it must yield in the larger public interest to ensure purity of free and fa.ir ele'ction.\n\n[1322 D-E]\n\nB Queen v. Beardsall, LR [187'.5-76] 1 Q.B. 452 quoted with approval.\n\n(8) - Section 94 of the Act enacts a qualified privilege in favour of the voter in that no one can compel him to disclose for whom he voted but the\n\n'f.'\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH 1305\n\nprivilege ends there for if he desires to waive the privilege and volunteers to A give information as to for whom he voted, neither s. 94 noi any provision of the Act is violated. No one can prevent him from doing so nor a complaint can be entertained from any one including the person who wants to keep the voters mouth sealed as to why he disclosed for whom he voted . ..once the voter chooses to waive the privilege and volunteers to disclose for whom he voted there is no contravention of s. 94 nor any other provision of the Act. and there is no illegality involved in it. [1324 B-E] B\n\n(9) Normally, where a prohibition enacted is founded on public policy Courts should be slow to apply the doctrine of waiver. But, if a privilege was granted for the benefit of an individual, in the instant case for the benefit of voter, even if it was conferred to advance a principle enacted in public interest nonetheless the person for whose benefit the privilege was enacted has a right to waive it because the very concept of privilege inheres a right lo waive it.\n\nAnd where a voter waives his privilege not to be compelled to disclose for whom he voted, if he wants to nm !he gamut of risk of disclosure it does not violate any other principle because it was enacted lo help him to vote free from any inhibition or fear or apprehension of being subjected to some calamity. (1321 E-G]\n\nBasheshar Nath v. lhe Commissioner of Income.tax, Delhi & Rajastha.n and Another, [1959] Suppl. I S.C.R. 528 at 610; Bthram Khurshed Pesikaka\n\nv. The State of Bombay, (1955] I S.C.R. 613 at 654 applied.\n\n(10) A recount of votes cannot be ordered just for the asking. A peti: tion for recount after inspection of some bB.Ilot papers must contain an ade quate statentent of material facts on which the petitioner relies in support of his case.\n\nThe Tribunal must be prima facle satisfied that in order to decide the dispute end to do complete justice between the parties an inspection of the ballot papers is necessary.\n\nOnly on the special facts of a given case sample inspection may be ordered to -lend fu, rther assurance to the prima facle satisfaction of the Court regRrding the truth of the allegations- Jl}ade for a recount and not for the purpose of fishing out materisls for declaring an election void. [1324 H, 1325 A-C]\n\n\nS.C.R. 202; Ram Autar Singh Bhadouria v. Ram Gopa/ Singh & Ors., (1976] I S.C.R. 191; and R. Narayanan v. S. Semma/ai & Ors. [1980] I S.C.R. 511 followed.\n\n(11) In an election appeal under s. 116A of the Act the Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere' with the finding of facts recorded by the High Court particularly when the High Court comes to, a conclusion on app reciation of all material evidence placed before it As a corollary this Court would be slow to interfere with such findings of facts based on appraisal of evidence unless there. is something radically wrong with the app~ roach of the learned judge trying the election petition. [1330 C-EJ\n\nRam/i Lal v. Ram Babu Maheshwari & Anr. A.IR 1970 SC 2075; D. Gopala Reddy v. S. Bai Talpalikar & Ors. (1972) 39 Election Law Reports\n\n(SC) and Smt. Sumitra Devi v. Sheo Shanker Prasad Yadav & Ors. [1973] 2. S.C.R. 920, applied.\n\n24-610SCI /80\n\n(12) A petition for a recount on the allegation of n1iscount or error in counting is based upon not specific allegation of miscounting but errors which may indicate a miscount and recount becomes necessary.\n\nWhen it is alleged that postal ballot papers were . tampered with, the implication in law is that those postal ballot papers have been wrongly received i in fa.vour of a candidate not entitled to the same and improperly refused in favour of the candidate entitle.:J. to the same and therefore there is a miscount and a recount is necessary, In the very nature of things the \"t allegation can be not on each specific instance of an error of counting or miscount but broad llegations' indicating error in counting or miscount necessitating a recount. In the instant case, the discretion used regarding the necessity of inspection of ballot papers is amply justified. Further it is established that the four ballot papers have been tampered with.\n\n[1326 CF, 1333 CJ\n\n(13 To avail of the procedure prescribed in s. 64A of the Act the cony ditions prescribed in that section must be satisfied. Section 64A envisages \\ a situation where tampering, damaging, destruction or loss of ballo!. papers used at a. polling station is on such a large scale that the result of the poll at the polling station C{lnDOt be ascertained. But s.64A is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case. The four ballot papers sent from different jails and .received as postal ballot papers are sh(.lWL. to have been tampered with. The voteS cast by the ballot papers can be succinctly ascertained and have in fact been ascertained.\n\n[1333 G-H, 1334 A]\n\n(14) The decision in Jagannath Rao v. Raj Kishore & Ors. AIR [1972] SC 447 does niJt purport to lay down that as soon as it is shown that some ballot papers have been tampered \"1th, the Court has merely to chart an E easy course of rejecting these ballot papers. Such an approach, apart from anything else, would be a premium on unfair election practice.\n\nWhere voting is by the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote, if a tampering as of the nature indulged into in this case is brought to light, the necessity of rejecting such ballot papers as invalid would give an unfair advantage to the very person who indnl ged into such pr3.ctice. When the Returning Officer did not reject the F ballot paper as being invalid, under Rule 56 (2) of the Election Rules, 1961, once tampering is held proved if the circumstances permit and evidence of unquestionable character is available it would be perfectly ( legitimate for the CoWt in an election petition to ascertain for whom the . vote was cast before it was tampered with and if it can be ascertained as a valid vote it must be accepted as such. Any other approach has t an inbuilt tendency to give an unfair advantage either to the candidate who G himself might have indulged in tampering or someone who must haVe acted .f for bis benefit.\n\n[1334 C-G]\n\n(15). The expression \"improper reception\" and \"improper refusal\" of vote must carry out the purpose underlying the provision contained in s.100 of the R. P. Act. Section 100(1) (d)(iii) comprehends a situation where the result of an election in so far as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially afiect:ed by improper reception, or improper refusal of any vote o. tile recept; on of. any vote which is yoid.\n\nThe adjeotive 'im proper' qualifies not only the word 'reception' but also the word\n\nrefusal'.\n\nWhen a vote is received by the returning officer at\n\nRAGHl!lll SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, !.) 1307\n\ntire time of counting it implies two things, that it is not only A received as a valid vote but that the valid vote is cast in favour of one of the contesting candidates at the election. Similarly, when it is said that 4 .there is improper refusal of any vote it implies again two things, namely, a vote which ought to have been accepted as valid vote has been in1properly refused as an invalid vote, or there is an improper refusal to accept the vote in favour of a particular candidate. Therefore, an improper reception of any vote or an improper refusal of any B vote implies not only reception or refusal of a vote contended to be invalid or valid, as the case may be, but subsequent reception in favour of any contesting candidate at the election which would simultaneously show the vote being refused in counting to . any other candidate at the election.\n\nThe expression 'refusal' implies 'refuse to accept' and the expion 'reception' implies 'refuse to reject'.\n\n[1335 D-HJ y- (\n\n16) The wide comprehensive panoram~ of s. 100 of the Representation C ' of People Act, 1951 embraces within its fold, all conceivable infirmities which may be urged for voiding an election.\n\nTo construe otherwise will have the election petitioners without a remedy. It would mean that even though one can indulge into forgery what is tampering of ballot papers, if not forgery-and get away with it.\n\n[1337 D-H]\n\nM-ohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Conzmissioner, New Delhi\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1035 of 1978.\n\nAppeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of People Act 1951 from the Judgment and Order dated the 5th June 1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 1 of 1976. E\n\nU.R. Lalit, O.P. Sharma, Vivek Seth and Miss Anil Katyar for the Appellant.\n\nHardev Singh, R.S. Sodhi, M.S. Gupta and Miss Manisha Gupta for Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by '\\ DESAI, J.-Purity of election and secrecy. f ballot, two central\n\npillars supporting the edifice .of Parliamentary democracy envisioned in the Constitution stand in confrontation with each other or are complimentary to each other, present the core problem in this appeal.\n\nFirst to the factual matrix.\n\nPunjab Legislative Assembly formed a constituency for electing members to the Council of States.\n\nOn March 3, 1976, a notificatio, n was issued calling upon the memb.ers t--r of Punjab Legislative Assembly to elect three members to the Council of States. The election programme was : March 10, 1976, wa& prescribed as the last date for filing nominations; the scrutiny of the nominations was to be made on March 11, 1976; March 13, 197.6, q: Wiil! the last date by which it was permissible to withdraw Jrom the e)ection; in the event of contest, poll was to take place on Mareh 27,\n\n1976; counting was to be done on the same day.\n\nRespondent 4 Smt.\n\nAmarjit Kaur and respondent 5 Sat Pal Mittal were nominated as candidates of the political party described as Indian National Congress.\n\nAppellant Sardar Raghbir Singh Gill claimed to be an inde-\n\nJ.. pendent candidate.\n\nRespondent 1 Gurcharan Singh Tohra was a nominee of the Akali Party. As there were three seats and B four candidates, poll was conducted on March 27, 1976. The voting\n\nwas in accordance with ihe system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.\n\nCounting took place on th~ same day after the poll closed at the prescribed hour. Two candidates of the Indian National Congress, Smt. Amarjit Kaur and 5at Pal Mittal c\n\nsecured 29 and 27 first pred'erence votes respectively.\n\nAppellant secured 23 ftrst preference votes.\n\nResponden! 1, the Aka1i nomin~ also seoured 23 first preference votes.\n\nThe quo; a was 25.51 votes.\n\nAccordingly, Smt. Amarjit Kaur and Sat Pal Mittal who had secured first preference votes in e; xcess of the ascertained quota were declared elected. The. surplus first preference votes according to , the second preference votes to the tune of 4.81 votes were added to the first preference votes polled by the appellant and he was declared elected to the third seat Respondents1 Z and 3 two sitting members of Punjab Legislative Assembly and, therefore, eligible electors, filed an election petition on May 10, 1976, challenging the election of' the present appellant, the independent candidate who was declared elected to the third Seat, inter alia, contending that the result of the electiOil of the present appellant has been materially affected\n\n(i) by non- compliance with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the Rules made thereunder; (ii) by improper reception of votes in favour of respondent 1, and (iii) by commission of corrupt practice in the interest of appellant by hisi agent as also commission of corrupt practice by obtaining assistance of persons in the service of the Punjab Government.\n\nThe allegation was that Giani Zail Sin~ was the Chief Minister of Punjab at the relevant time and it was \"If' who had put up the appellant as a candidate even though the mems of the Assembly belonging to Indian National Congress computing their voting strength in the Assembly had only fieldeii two candidates , l G Smt. Amarjit Kaur and Sat Pal Mittal. The Chief Minister Giani Zall Singh in order to snatch the third seat not legitimately available, fielded appellant as his candidate and to secure his \\)lection, power of office was abused.\n\nSeven members of Assembly belonging to Akali Party T\"~ and a lone Jan Sangh ML A. were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detenns included P.W. 16 S.\n\nParkash B Singh Badal, detained in Tihar central Jail at Delhi, P.W. 15, S. Jaswinder Singh Brar, and P.W. 15 S. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, detained in Central Jail at Patiala, S. Basant Singh Khalsa, detained in Jail at\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILLY. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, ],) 1309\n\nNabha, P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Barnala,. detained in Jail at Jullwidur, S. Gurbachan Singh and S. Kundan Singh, Patang, detained in Jail at -\"\"' Sangrur, all belonging to Akali Party and Dr. Baldev Prakash belonging to Jan Sangh.\n\nThese detenus applied for postal ballots with a t view to exercising their right of franchise and they did in fact exercise 'tlleir franchise.\n\nIn course of counting it transpired that four postal ballot papers were tampered with and the tampering indicated that the first preference vote in favour ofrespondent 1, Gurcharan Singh Tohni, the Akali candidate was altered to show second preference vote as also to indicate .a first preference vote .in favour of the, appellant.\n\nThis w:is noticed by PW. j S. Manjit Singh Khera who was the counting agent ·;,,,.; of respondent 1. It was alleged that Giani Zail Singh abused his ?\\power as Chief Minister by bringing pressure upon S. Partap, Sfugh,\n\nthe Returning Officer, Sardar Tirth Singh Sobti, a Sub-Po8t Master and the Superintendents of Jails at Sangrur, Patiala and Nabha, fQr facilitating the. tampering and thereby four additional first preference vote!;\n\nwere wrongly received in favour of the appellant to which he was not entitled and the valid votes in favour of first respondent were denied. to him by improper refusal and that it has directly and materially . affected the result of the election. It was, however, stated in the petition that though the tampering of four ballot papers wa8 self-evident, they, the petitioners were not in a positionl to State exact method adopted in this behalf.\n\nThe allegati0n of corrup~ practice was that Y with the assistance of Chief Minister Giani Zall Singh official machinery was pressurised and utilised to ge~ the appellant elected.\n\nTo the election petition the returned cindidite, Dimily, Hliii pnient appellant whose election was called in queition, two other returned candidate!I and the defeated Akali candidate were impleaded as respondents.\n\nThe returned candidate, the present appellant contested the peti- '; J!on, inter alia'. contending tht the whole petition is based on conjec-\n\n'Tbres and surmises. The allegation of corrupt practice wu firmly denied.\n\nHe also denied his relationship with Giani Zai1 Singh and further denied that he was a candidate put up by Giani Zall Singh. Any allegation of ta111pering was denied and it wa$ cootended that Akllli Party\n\nprsented a picture oll a house divided and, therefore,. the sumrtso made . that members belonging to the Akali Party would en block vote . for the Akali candidate is not justified.\n\nIt was contended that th\" petioners as admitted by them in the petition were/ not in a position to state the exact method and procelis adopted by the Returiiing Officer and his accomplices in tampering with the postal ballots, and, therefore,\n\nth~ cai:e put forth in the petition is a figment of imagination, devoid of particulars and the petition m liable to be thrown out Ori this ground.\n\nThe le.arned Judge of the High Court before whom the petition came up for hearing framed as many as seven issues.\n\nOne issue was whether a case for inspection of ballot papers is made out? Tbe central issue was whether four bl!Jlot papers were unauthorisedly tampered with after the voters thereof had cast their first preference. on them in favour of Akali candidate, and if so, whether they were hereby converted in favoor of the returned candidate by changing the figure I placed against the name of the Akali candidate into figure Il and further placing the figure I in favour of the returned candidate? , On the finding of this issue a further issue had to be answered whether the four votes were improperly received nd counted in favour of the returned candidate and improperly refused t<? Akali candidate in w hQSl\\ ,.., favour they were cast, and if this miscount materially affected theJI, result of the election? There was an issue about alleged corrupt practice which was held not proved and was answered in favour of the returned candidate.\n\nIt may be noticed that neither the election petitioners (respondents 2 and 3 in this appeal) nor the appellant, the returned candidate, nor respondent 1 the unsuccessful Akali candidate stepped into the witness box.\n\nElection petitioners examined P .W. 2 Sardar M.\n\nKhera, counting agent of respondent 1 four voters whose votes were alfeged to have been tampered with and an expert P.W. 171 Dewan K, S. Puri.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant R.W. 1 S. Partap Singh, the Returning Officer, R.W. 2 Karnail Singh Marhari, R.W. 3 Master Jagir Siugh to 'I prove defection from Akali Party, and R.W. 4 the expert Mr. R.\n\nVijh to prove that though the four ballot papers appear to be tampered, it must be by voters themselves, were examined.\n\nThe leruned Judge held that the four ballot papers, one each allotted to P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Bamala, P.W. 14 S. Jagdev Singh T!\\iwandi, P.W. 15 S. Jaswinder Singh Brar and P.W. 16 S. Parkash Singh Badal, were tampered with in that each of the voter had cast hi';/ first preference vote in favour of the unsuccessful Akali candidate S.\n\nGurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was altered so as to appear that each oniY oil' them had cast his first preference vote in favour of the returned candidate, the appellant, and second preference vote in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra.\n\nOn this finding the learned Judge concluded that these four votes were improperly received in favou; of returned --,-1 candidate and improperly refused to the unsuccessful Akali candidate and there has thus been a miscount and a recount Wall necesary and\n\n011 the recount the unsuccessful Akali candidate secured 2 7 first preference votes by the addition of the aforementioned four tampered votes to the 23 first preference, votes already polled by him and that\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SING'ri (Desai, J.) 1311\n\ndedu~'ting four first preference votes from the 23 first preference voteS already counted in favour of returned candidate he polled 19 first preference votes.\n\nOn this recount unsuccessful Akali candidate resp<Jlll• dent 1 was shown to have polled first preference votes in excess of the quota and, therefore, there was no necessity to take into account the second preference votes. Accoiidingly the election petition wa~ allowed and the unsuccessful Akali candidate was declared elected and the election of the returned candidate was set aside.\n\nHence this appear by the returned candidate.\n\nWhen the petition was set down for recording parol evidence M. S. , Khera, polling and counting agent for respondent 1 was examined on behalf of the petitioners.\n\nHe was followed by P.W. 13 S. S. Barnala.\n\nIn his examination-in-chief the following two questions were aslied : \"Q. How many preferences did you ca&t on the ballot paper afore said\" ? This was objected to on behalf of the returned camlidate which objection was overruled and the follmving answer was recorded:\n\n\"A. I cast only one preferooce vote and did •ot caat any second pre- D ference in favour of any other candidate\". \"Q. In whose favour did 1 you cast your first pref\"llace vote\" ? An objection was taken Oll1 behalf of the returned candidate that the question violates the secrecy of the ballot ai; ensured by s. 94 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ('Act' for 11hort), aad, therefore, the question was impermissible. At that stage Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 13-E of 1977 was presented on behalf of the election petitioners purporting to be under s. 115 of the Code of Civit Procedure, requesting the Court that the four tampered postal ballot papers be allowed to be inspected and the concerned witnesses be permitted to be questiQl1ed withreference to them when they enter the witness box.\n\nThe application was con.tested. Ultimately, the learned Judge by his reasoned order dated \\, October 25, 1977, granted the application.\n\nAs a serious exception r was mken to a part of this' direction, the saine may be reproduced in extenso:\n\n\"I would accordingly allow the application and direct the inspection and examlliation of the postal ballot papers in the present case.\n\nIneyi.tably the witnesses relevant to these ballot papers are also allowed . to be examined with regard thereto in the interest of justice.\"\n\nThis order was questioned by the returned candidate by filing a petition to obtajn special leave to appear to this Court but sUbscquently it B wa.s thdi; awn. Thereafter all the four concerned witnesses\\ were questioned ill their respectiVe examination-in-chief with reg.ird to the\n\nff.\n\nfirst preference vote cast by each of them and also a negative answer was taken that none of them had cast his second preference vote.\n\nMr. P .R. Mridul, learned counsel 'who appeared for the appellant directed a frontal attack on the order dated October 25, 1977, by which the learned Judge not only allowed the inspection and examina tion of the postal ballot papers but also permitted the witnesses to be questioned relevant to the ballot papers.\n\nThe contention is that the inlpugned order dated October 2.5, 1977, is bad in law and unsustainable on facts and if that order is illegal, the evidence permitted pursuant to the order would be inadmissible and if that inadmissible evidence is excluded even if the Court accepts, the evidence of the expert examined on behalf of the election petitioners that the four ballot papers were tampered with, yet there would not be further material to show as to what was the vote originally recorded by the voter and the natqre and character of simultaneous or subsequent alteration.\n\nConsequently, he says that these four postal ballot papers will have to be excluded from counting and if they are so excluded the appellant returned candidate would still be hiiving greater number of first preference votes and his election could not be set aside.\n\nThis is the fundamental issue in this appeal and it is the appellant's sheet anchor and as it goes to the root of the matter and the fate of appeal substantially hang)l on it, in fairness to the! appellant the contention may be examined in all its ramifications. There were various\n\nlinlbs of the submission and for clarity each submission may be exanlined separately.\n\nThe first limb of the contention isi that the Order dated October 25, 1977, violates/ the mandate of s. 94 of the Act and strikes at the root of a fundamental principle governing elections in a democratic polity and is, therefore, inlpermissible. Section 94 of the Act reads as under:\n\n\"94. Secrecy of voting not to be infri11ed-No witness or other person shall be required to stite for whom he bas voted at u. election\".\n\nSection 94 cannot be interpreted or examined in isolation. Its scope, ambit and underlying object must be ascertained in the context of the Act in which it finds its place, viz., the Representation of lthe People, Act, 1951, and further in the context of the fact that this Act. itself was enacted in exercise of power conferred by the articles in Part XV titled 'Elections' in the Constitution.\n\nAn Act to give eff()!:t to the basic feature of the Constitution adumberated and boldly proclaimed in the preamble to the constitution, viz., the people of India\n\n·,:\n\nRAGHBm SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, ],) 1313\n\nconstituting into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic repubUc, has to be interpreted in a way that helpsi achieve the constitutional\n\ngoal.\n\nPreamble sets ont the political society which we witnted to set up and, therefore, it must be given all importance.\n\nThe realisation of goals and vision set out in the preamble forms the fabric and permeates the whole scheme of constitution.\n\nThe goal on the constitutional horizon being a democratic republic, a free and fair election, a fountain spring and cornerstone of democracy, based on universal adult suffrage is the basic.\n\nThe regulatory procedure for achieving free and fair election for setting up democratic institution in the country is provided in the Act.\n\nFurther, Sikri,\n\nC.J., Shela!, Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea & Reddy, JJ. in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kera la(') , have in clear and unambiguous temfs laid down that republic democratic form of Government is one of the basic and essential features of our Constitution. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.(2 ), ·\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. has quoted with approval a statement of Sir Winston Churchill which reads as under :\n\n\"At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking into a little booth, with a little ; pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper-no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussions can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of the point.\"\n\nTo adopt it with a slight variation, nothing can diminish the overwheln:llng importance of that croSll or preference indicated by the dumb sealed lip voter.\n\nThat is his right and the trust reposed by the Constitution in him is that he will act as a responsible citizen choosing his masters for governing the country for the period pm; cribed by it.\n\nAny interpretation of s. 94 must essentially subserve the purpose for \\.. wllich it is enacted.\n\nThe interpretative process must advance the basic ' postulate of free and fair election for setting up democratic institution and not retard it. Section 94 clllllot be interpreted divorced from the constitutional values mibrincd in. the Constitution.\n\nTo start with it is neceHarY to examine the format and setting of seaion 94. It finds place in. Ckapter ID headed \"Trial of Election Petitions\". A cursory l!llance at various provisions included in Chapter ID from s. 86 to s. 107 would leave no room for doubt that the C\"'hapter prescribes 'l'rocedure for trial of election petitions.\n\nSection\n\n87 (2) provides for application of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act ('Evidence Act' for short) to the trial of election petitions subject H\n\n(J)l (1973] Suppl. SCR. !.\n\n(2) [1978] 2 SCR 272.\n\nto the provisions of the Act. In order to unfetter election petitions from the fetter of property laws a far reaching exception had to be enacted in S 93 lifting the embargo on the ; idmissibility of documents for want of registration or inadequacy of s..tamp.\n\nSection 95 is to some extent in pari materia w.i1]t s. 132 of the Evidence Act inasmuch as it does not excuse a witness from answering questions in the trial of an election petition upon the ground that the answer may incriminate him or may expose him to any penalty or forfeiture but extends protectio'n\n\nin respect of such answer by giving him a certificate of indemnity in respect of specified offences.\n\nLooking to the format anq setting, the question is : does s. 94 create merely a processual inhibition against compelling a witness to ans\"'.er a questibn disclosing for whom he had' Y voted or does the substantive provision, as was contended on behalf \"\"·\n\nof the appellant, enacted with a view to ensuring total secrecy of ballot\n\nas an integral part of free and fair election vouchsafed by the Constitution, put a complete embargd on the disclosure for whom the witness voted ? The larger question whether free and fair elections necessaril:y<\n\nimply secrecy of voting or to ensure free and fair elections in a given situation srecy or voting has to yield to the fundamental principle of free and fair election, will be presently examined.\n\nAt this stage it is necessary to confine to the language in which the provision is couched.\n\nDoes s. 94 prevent any one from seeking information about how- E a person has cast his vote from the mouth of the person or is it the privilege of the voter not to be compelled to disclose for whom he has voted ? The provision i~ cast in negative language.\n\nThe important words are \"shall be required\".\n\nThe word 'required' has an inbailt elenient of compulsion.\n\nWhen it is said that no witness shall be required to state for whom he has voted at an election, on a pure gram- F matical construction uninhibited by any other consideration it would mean that the witness cannot be compelled against his will to disclose how he has voted iYr for whom he has voted. When a witness is put in the witness box and he is questioned under oath as to any matter relevant to the issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, in which he is' called to give evidence, the witness is not excused from G answering any question relevant to the matter under enquiry upon any gro'und including the ground that the answer to such question will\" criminate or may tend. directly or indirectly to criminate such witness or that it will expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind as provided in s. 132 of the Evidence Act.· There is a proviso to the section which extends protec- H tion in respect of such compelled testimony to the extent indicated in the proviso.\n\nSection 87 (2) of the Act was enacted to avoid any contention that an election petition is neither a civil ndr a criminar\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, /.} 1315\n\nproceeding and hence s. 13i of the Evidence Act is not attracted. But as the proviso to s. 132 of the Evidence Act extends only a qualified privilege, s. 95 of the Act which is in pari materia with s. 132 of the Evidence Act had to be incorporated in the chapter with its own provisd for a slightly larger protection.\n\nIn view of the imperative language of s. 132 of the Evidence Act a witness cannot refuse to answer a question which is relevant to the matter 'under enquiry in which he is called as a witness even on the pain of self-incrimination. In the past in the countries governed by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence the witness was privileged both from answring questions and producing documents the tendency of which :was to expose the witness JO any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture (see Spokes v. Grosvenor Hotel)(l).\n\nThis privilege was founded upon the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, meaning, no one is bound to criminate himself and to place himself in peril.\n\nOver a period, as Wigmore puts it, the privilege indiretly and ultimately works for good-for the good of the innocent accused and of the community at large, but directly and concretely it works for illfor the protection of the guilty and the; consequent derangement of civic order and, tlierefore, there ought to be an end of judicial cant towards crime.\n\nThe result is that the privilege is withdrawn as clearly\n\ntranpires from the language of s. 13.2 of the Evidence Act and the proviso only affords a qualified privilege inasmuch as any such answer which a witness shall be compelled to give under the main part of s. 132 shall not subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.\n\nOne may recall hee the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination as enacted in Article 20(3) which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It would, therefore, appear that a witness when questioned in the witness box relevant to the matter in issue in\n\na proceeding in which he is called as a witness has to answer the question put to him and cannot escape the obligation to answer the question even if tlie answer was likely to incriminate him except to the extent the qualified privilege is extended to him under the proviso.\n\nSection 87 (2) of the Act provide~ that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be G deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition.\n\nSection 95 (1) of. the Act re-enacts the main part of s. 132 of the Evidence Act. The combined effect of s. 87(2) read withs. 95 of the Act, and omitting s. 94 for the time being, would be that if a witness in an election petition is questioned as to for whom he voted he would :8\n\nbe under an obligation to answer that question.\n\nThe principle {1f\n\n(I) [1897] 2 QB 124.\n\nsecrecy of ballot necessitated a specific provision excusing the witness from answering such a question which he would be under an obligation to answer under s. 132 of the Evidence Act or s. 95 (1) of the Act.\n\nction 94 precedes s. 95 which obliges a witness to answer all questidns relevant to the enquiry in an election petition even on the pain of self-incrimination. But for s. 94, the witness could not have avoided answering the question put to him as to for whom he voted.\n\nSecrecy of ballot undoubtedly is an indispensable adjunct of free and fair elections.\n\nA voter had to be statutorily assured that he would not be compelled to disclose by any authority as to for whom he voted so that a voter may vote without fear or favour and is free from any apprehension of its disclosure against his will from his own lips.\n\nTo that extent s. 94 of the Act carves out an exception to s. 132 of the Evidence Act and s. 95 of the Act (see Dr. Chhotalal Jivabhai Patel v.\n\nVadilal Lallubhai Mehta & Ors.)(1).\n\nAs section 94 carves out an exception to s. 132 of the Evidence Act as also to s. 95 of the Act it was necessary to provide for protection of the witness if he is compelled to answer a question which may tend to incriminate him.\n\nSection 9 5 provides for grant of a certificate of indemnity in the circumstances therein set out.\n\nA conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and ss. 93, 94 and 95 of the Act would affirmatively show that they provide for a procedure, including the procedure for examination of Witnesses, their rights and obligations in the trial of an election petition.\n\nThe expression 'witness' used in the section is a poi, nter and the further expression 'other person' extends the protection to a forum oµtside courts.\n\nSection 94, therefore, cannot be singled out as was contended on behalf of the appellant as a substantive provision and being unrelated to the procedure prescribed for trial of election petition. This conclusion is reinforced by the title of Chapter m ''Trial of Election Petitions\" because it is legitimate and indeed proper to have recourse to headingi and sub-heading given to a group cl sections in an Act of Parliament to find guidance for the construction of the words in\n\nI a statute (see R. v. Board cif Trade; Ex-parte St. Martin's Pruerving Co. Ltd.) ('). Coupled with this one can advantageously rcler to a: known canon of construction that every section of a sfatnte is ro be construed with reference to the context and other sections of the Act, so as, as far as possib1e, to make a consistentenactment of the whole statnte.\n\nThe marginal note of s. 94 says 'secrecy of voting not to be H infringed'.\n\nSection 128 of the Act casts an obligation on every officer,\n\n(I) [1971] 12 G. L. R. 850 at 860\n\n(2) [1965] I Q. B. 603 at 607,\n\n'l 11\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, !.) 131 7\n\nclerk, agent or other person to maintain 3!J.d aid in maintaining secrecy of the voting and they shall not (except for some purpo'se authorised by or under any law) communicate to any person any information calculated to violate such secrecy.\n\nRule 23(3) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 ('Rules' for short) imposes a duty to conceal the serial number of the ballot paper effectively before it is issued at electi011 m any local authorities' constituency or by assembly members.\n\nSimilarly, rules 23(5)(a) and (b) of the Rules provide for effectively maintaining the secrecy of the postal ballot papers in the manner pres- ' cribed therein.\n\nRules 31(2}, 38(4}, 39(1), (5), (6) and (8), 40(1) second proviso, 38A(4), 39A(l) & (2) and similar other rules provide for maintaining secrecy of ballot. It cannot be gainsaid that various provisions referred to above ensure secrecy of ballot and even s. 94 has been enacted to relieve a petson ft:om a situation where he may be obliged to divulge for whom he has voted under testimonial compulsion.\n\nSecrecy of ballot can be appropriately styled as a postulate of constitutional democrilcy. It enshrines a vital principle of parliamentary institutions set up under the Constitution. It subserves a very vital public interest in that an elector or a voter should be absolutely free in exercise of his franchise untrammeled by any constraint which includes\n\n' constraint as to the disclosure.\n\nA remote or distinct possibility that at some point a voter may under a compulsion of law be forced to disclose for whom he has voted would act as a positive constraint and check on ·\n\nhis freedom to exercise his franchise in the manner he freely chooses to exercise.\n\nTherefore, it can be said with confideqce that this postulate of constitutional democracy rests on public policy.\n\nHaving said this, the substantial question is whether\" s. 94 enacts an absolute prohi)lition or a total embargo on a voter being questioned about how he voted which wilL infringe the secrecy of a ballot ? The question is whether it is the privilege of the voter to refuse to answer a question as to for whom he voted ()r in order to ensure the secrecy-ef-- ballot there is a total embargo and absolute prohibition on finding ont through the mouth of a voter for whom he voted ? Is it inviolable in any situation, or contingency ? Undoubtedly, secrecy of ballot is a key stone in the arch of constitutional democrocy and . that it rests on public policy, namely, that a voter shall be free from any kind of constraint or fear or untrammeled by any apprehension while voting. ' But this basic postulate of constitutiooal democracy, namely, secrecy of ballot was formulated not in any abstract situation or to be put on a pedestal and worshipped but for achieving another vital principle sustaining collStitutional democracy, viz., free and fair election.\n\nFree and fair elections are the mainsprig of a healthy democratic I life and a barometer of its strength and vitality. Electoral administra-1\n\ntion must, therefore, be free from pressure and interference of the executive and legislature. It should be able to secure falrness to all parties and ca, ndidate§.\n\nAn awareness by the people of the significance of their vote and the need for them to exercise it responsibly and an assurance that the voter would be able to exercise the franchise untrammeled by any fear and apprehension of any adverse consequence flowing therefrom are the main ingredients of a truly democ.ratic and successful electoral system (see Elections in India by R. P. Bhalla).\n\nIf free and fair election is the life-blood of constitutional democracy and if secrecy of ballot was ensured to achieve the larger public purpose of free and fair elections eitl)er both must be complimentary to each other and co-exist or one must yield to the other to serve the larger public interest.\n\nThis situation immediately raises the question of construction of . s. 94.\n\nDoes it lend itself open to two constructions ? If so, are there inner indicia to prefer one to the other ? Can external aid be sought for correct construction to unravel the intention of the Parliament in enacting s. 94 ?\n\nIt was said that s. 94 lends itself open to one construction alone.\n\nIt is cast in negative language which usually is treated as absolute.\n\nProceeding further it was said that this negative provision admits of no exception and enacts an absolute prohibition. Provision cast in negative words are generally treated as absolute admitting of no exception. But this is not a universal rule.\n\nThe words 'negative' and 'affirmative' statutes mean nothing in particular. The question is, what was the intendment ? Emphasis is more easily demonstrated when statute is negative than, when it is affirmative but the question is one of intendment (see Mayor of London v. R.) (').\n\nIf language is open to two constructions one must ascertain the intendment, the mischief sought to be remedied and the remedy provided to cure the mischief (see Victoria Sporting Club Ltd. v. Hannam)('). And in such a situation the Court must escalate in favour of that construction which carries out the intendment behind enactment and accocds with reason and fairplay.\n\nTwo possible constructions are, firstly, that the section casts an absolµte prohibition and i; eals the mouth of the voter permanently and admits of no exception in :which he can divulge vote, and secondly, that it is a privilege of the voter to disclose his vote if he voluntarily chooses to do so but he cannot be compelled by co.urt or any other authority to\n\n(t) l1'~1] 3 Q B. 30.\n\n(2) [1969] 2. W. ~. R. 454.\n\n( <\n\n• •\n\nllAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, J.) 1319\n\n. .divulge his vote. Which of the two constructions advances the object\n\n-0f enactment?\n\nIf s. 94 is interpreted to mean to be a privilege of the voter to J_ divulge or not to divulge how he voted and if he chooses not \\to .divulge, s. 94 protects him inasmuch as he cannot be compelled to divulge that information, then it does not stand in conflict with the other important principle of free and fair elections to sustain parliar\n\n...\n\n. mentary democracy. Whei; i it is said that no witness or other person\n\nshall ibe required to state for whom he has voted at an election, it only means that both in the Court when a person is styled as a witness .and outside the Court when he may be questioned about . how he voted though he wouW not have the character or the qualification '\"'-.: of a witness yet in either situation he is free to refuse to\n\n.f' answer the question without incurring any penalty or forfeiture. That guaranteeS' the vital principle behind secrecy of ballot in that the voter would be able to vote uninhibited by fear. But if he chooses to open his lips of his own free will without direct or indirect compnlsion and waive the privilege, nothing prevents him from disclosing how he voted.\n\nNo provision was brought to our notice which would expose him to any penalty if a voter voluntarily chooses to disclose how he voted or for whpm he voted. Section 128 has nothing to do with the voter disclosing for whom he voted. It casts an obligation of secrecy on those connected with the process of election and not on the voter . . If the other 'construction is adopted, the mischief thereby perpetrated can be demonstrably established.\n\nOne can then manipulate the vote cast by a voter and poor voter wilVbe helpless an.cl unable to asst the Court by his testimony which is the best direct evidence to establish for whom he voted and what mischief has been played with his vote.\n\nThe interpretation of s. 94 which appeals to us ensures free and \\...fair elections.\n\nSecrecy of ballot was mooted to ensure free and fair\n\n~ elections. If the very secrecy of ballot instead of ensuring free and fair , elections strikei; at the root of the principle of free and fair elections this basic postulate of democracy would be utilised for undoing free and fair elections which provide life-blood to parliamentary democracy. !f secrecy of baHot instead of ensuring free and fair elections is used, as is done in this case, to defeat the very public purpose for which it is\n\n-enacted, to suppress a wrong coming to light and to protect a fraud on the electioo process or even to defend a crime, viz., forgery of ballot papers, this principle o'f secrecy of ballot will have to yield to the larger principle of free a'.nd fair elections.\n\nIt was, however, contended that like secrecy of ballot the concept <if purity of electioo is one of the essential postulates of a democratic\n\nprocess but the concept of purity of electiollS is not an esoteririnci\n\nple but a principle enshrined in and codified by the provisions of the Act.\n\nSays, Mr. Mridul, that this principle is operative only to the extent it is enacted in the various provisions of the Act and vague, theoretical concept of purity not articulated in the provisions of Jaw cannot be the basis for overriding the concept of secrecy which is expressly provided for in s. 94 of the Act. Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act and to N.P. Ponnuswami\n\nv. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency & Others,(') where it was observed that the Act is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned which means that whenever one has, to ascertain the true position in regard to any matter connected with the elections, one has only to look at the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Undoubtedly, yl\". the Act is a self-contained Code but the Act was enacted in exercise \"'\\ of the power conferred by Part XV of the Constitution which envisages . setting up of an independent Election Commission. Article 326 ensures that elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of every State shall be on the; basis of adult suffrage. Article 327 confers power on Parliament to make provision with respect to all matters relating to or in connection with elections to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State including the preparation of electoral. rolls, the delimitation of constituencies and all other matters necessary for securing the due constitution of such House or Houses.. The preamble to the Constitution enshrines a solemn declaration to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic Republic.\n\nTherefore, the Act enacted pursuant to a power conferred by the Constitution for setting up Parliamentary institutions in this country envisaged by the Constitution for the governance of this country cannot be interpreted divorced from the constitutional values enshrined in the Constitution. And there is one r; fundamental principle which permeates through all democratically ' elected parliamentary institutions, viz., to set them up by free and fair ( election: It is not an a priori concept but of cherished constitutional goal onented value. Secrecy of ballot though undoubtedly a vital principle for ensuring free and fair elections, it was enshrined in law to subserve the larger public interest, namely, purity of election for ensuring free and fair election. The principJe of secrecy of ballot cannot stand ailoof or in isolation and in confrontation to the foundation of free and fair elections, viz., purity of election. They can co-exist but Yi as stated earlier, where Ol)e is used to de_stroy the other, the first one must yield to principle of purity of election in forger public interest In fact secrecy of ballot, a privilege of the voter, is not inviolable and ·\n\n(I) (1952] SCR 218 at 230\n\nI . ,. •\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, J.) 1321\n\nmay be waived by him as a reswnsible citizen of ti$ conntry to ensure A free and fair election and to nnravel foul plaY.\n\nAn apprehension was, however, voiced that the principle of secrecy enshrined in s. 94 of the Act having been enacted in public interest and it being a prohibition based on public policy, it cannot be waived.\n\nReliance was placed on Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner .of Income-tax, Delhi & Rajasthan and Another,(') where the question whether the doctrine of waiver can be invoked when the constitutional or statutory guarantee of a right is not conceived .in public interest or when it does not affect the jurisdiction of the authority infringing the said right, was examined. It was held that if the privilege conferred or '>.the right created by the statute is sorely for the benefit-of the individual, he can waive it. It was, however, said that even in those cases the Courts invariably administered a caution that having regard to the nature of the right some precautionary and stringent conditions should be applied before the doctrine is invoked or applied.\n\nIn Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay,(2 ) it was observed that fundamental rights have not been put in the Constitution merely for individual benefit, though ultimately they come into operation in considering individual rights. They have been put there as a ma)ter of public policy and the doctrine of waiver can have no application to provisious of law which have been enacted as a matter of constitutional policy.\n\nUndoubtedly, where a prohibition enacted .is founded on public rolicy r Courts should be slow to apply the doctrine of waiver but this approach overlooks the fact that if a privilege was granted for the benefit of at_1 individual, in the instant case for the benefit of voter, even if it was coriferred to advance a principle encated in public interest nonetheleiis the person for whose benefit the privilege was enacted has a right to waive it because th.e very concept of privilege inheres a right to waive 'i\n\n.t. And w)]ere a voter waives his privilege not to be compelled to dislose for whom he voted, if he wants to run the gamut of risk disclosure t does not violate any other principle because it was enacted to help him to vote free from any inhibition or fear or apprehension of being subjected to some calamity. To hold otherwise is to perpetuate the very mischief which is sought to be suppressed.\n\nThe inescapable conclusion is that s. 94 enacts a qualified privilege in favour of a voter not to be compelled to disclose for whom he voted but if he chooses to\n\nf\"'T volunteer the information s. 94 is not violated.\n\nHaving dealt with the question of construction of s. 94 of the Act on first principle, a reference to the precedents to which our attention\n\n(I) [1959] Suppl. I SCR 528 at 610.\n\n1 (2) [1955] I SCR 613 at 654.\n\n25--610SCI/80\n\nwas drawn would buttrss our conclusion.\n\nIn the Queen v. Beardsall,( ') at a trial of indictment against a Deputy Returning Officer, for offence under the Ballot Act, 1872, charging hlm with having fraudu• lently placed papers purporting to be, but to his knowledge not being, , l. ballot papers in the ballot box, Blackburn, J. allowed the counterfoils and marked register produced. under the aforesaid order to be given in l evidence, and the face of the voting papers to be inspected so as to show how the votes appeared to have been given.\n\nUpholding this order, Kelly, C.B., observed that, \"the legislature has no doubt provided that secrecy shall be preserved with respect to ballot papers and all documents connected with respect to ballot papers and all documents connected with what is now made a secret mode of election. But this-\\,/ secrecy is subjec£ to a condition e5sential to the due administration.'°\"\\ of justice and the prevention of fraud, forgery, and other illegal acts affecting the purity and legality of elections.\"\n\nLush, J., observed as under:\n\n\"It was argued that secrecy was the only object of the Ballot Act, but I do not agree to the proposition. . Secrecy was one object, the other was to secure purity of election; and it is difficult to say which is most important\".\n\nIt thus clearly transpires that ordinarily secrecy of ballot has to be guarded but where secrecy of the ballot itself is sought to be availed of as a protective sheath against disclosure of fraud, forgery or wrong ful conduct, it must yield in the larger public interest to ensure purity of free and fair election.\n\nSchofield in \"Parliamentary Elections'', 3rd Edn., p. 453, states the law as under :\n\n\"Evidence may be called but witnesses must not be asked for whom they voted for no person who has voted at the election shall in any legal proceeding to question the election or return be required to state for whom he voted.\n\nThere would appear to be no objection to the witness volu'n- teering this information particularly in a case of personation\".\n\nIt was however, said that Schofield's statement of law should not be accepted because this proposition is not noted in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 1?, p. 494, p!ll'a 909, wherein on the question of secrecy of vote the following statement of law is to be found:\n\n\"A witness may not be required to disclose for whom he has voted and it is only in those cases where he has\n\n(I) LR [1875-76] l.Q. B. 452.\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCBARAN SINGH (Desai, !.) 1323\n\npublicly held himself out as belonging to some political A party that he may be asked to which party he belongs.\n\n_...\n\nThe Court may not discover how a person has voted untill it has been proved that he voted and his vote has been decf Jared to be void\".\n\nA passage at page 21 O in Parker's Conduct of Parliamentary B.ec- B lions, 1970 Edn., was read out to us in support of the contention that there are certain provisions in an election law containing an absolute enactment which must be obeyed strictly and a breach of which will render the vote void. There is no reference to a provision similar to \"..:one found in s. 94 of the Act nor any decision quoted to show its scope G J'and ambit. . '1\n\nIn American Jurisprudence, 2d Vol. 26, page 166, paras 347 and 348 it is stated as under :\n\n\"As an incident of the secret ballot system and in order to preserve the purity and independence of the exercise of the elective franchise, the rule is well established that a legal and honest voter is privileged from testifying as to the candidate for whom he cast his vote . . . . . . the privilege of a legal voter to refuse to testify for whom he cast his ballot may be waived by the voter but since the privilege is personal to the voter, it may be waived only by him\".\n\nIn Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 29, pam 278, it is stated iii under:\n\n' In the absence of proof or claim of fraud, illegality, or irregularity, parol evidence is not admissible to cq__ntradict a ballot, and a voter will not be permitted to testify that be voted in a manner different from that shown by his ballot.\n\nHowever, a voter may testify that another ballot has been substituted for the one he cast, or that his ballot has been . changed since it was cast\".\n\nIn para 281 in the same volume it is stated as un~ :\n\n\"The policy of the law is to protect legal voters in the secrecy of the ballot.\n\nAccordihgly a legal voter cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he voted, in .the absence of a showing of fraud on the part of the election officers sufficient to invalidate the returns; and it has been held that the same considerations of public policy which reHeve the voter himself from bemg compelled to testify for whom he voted should preverrt other proof of that fact''.\n\n\"Exemption a personal privilege.-By the weight of authority the exemption from obligation to disclose the character of his vote can .be claimed only by the voter himself, and, if he sees fit to answer the question, there can be ho objection to the testimony, but, according to some authorities, in an election contest voters cannot be permitted to testify at all as to how they voted\".\n\nHaving anxiously examined the matter both on principle and precedent, there is no. gainsaying the fact that s. 94 of the Act enacts a privilege in favour of the voter in that no one can compel him to disclose for whom he voted but the privilege ends there for if he ../ desires to waive the privilege and volunteers to give information as \" to for whom he voted, neither s. 94 nor any provision of the Act is violated.\n\nNo one can prevent him from doing so nor a complaint can be entertained from a'ny one including the person who wants to keep the voter's mouth sealed as to why he disclosed for whom he voted. The learned Judge was, therefore, justified in permitting the four voters who were examined as witnesses to waive the privilege and then disclose for whom each one of them voted. If any one of them wanted to claim the privilege, neither the Court nor any other authority could have compelled him to open his mouth a:nd he could have kept his lips sealed but there the embargo placed by s. 94 ends.\n\nOnce the voter chooses to waive the privilege and volunteers to disclose for whom he voted there is no contravention of s. 94 nor any other provision of the Act and there is no illegality involved. in it.\n\nIt was, however, contended that apart from the prohibition enacted in s .. 94 ensuring secrecy of ballot, the order dated October 25, 1977, is erroneous and unsustainable on facts disclosed in the{ petition and the evidence recorded till the date of the order. It was contended that the allegations in this behalf in the election peti ( tion are vague and wholly devoid of particulars.\n\nSays, Mr. Mridul, that virtually the petitioners themselves confess this pooition when they say that they were hardly in a position to make any specific assertion, a fact demonstrably established, that the election petitioners were not in a position to state the exact method and process adopted by the returning officer and his associates in tampering with the postal ballot.\n\nUndoubtedly, in para 18 of the petition the election petitioners have said that they are not in a position to state the exact method and process adopted by the returning officers and his accomplices to tamper with the postal ballots.\n\nThis is in substance a petition for recount.\n\nTrue, recount carinot be ordered just for the asking.\n\nA petition for recount after\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, !.) 1325\n\ninspection of the ballot papers ntain 'an adeqnate statement on material facts on which the petitioner relies in support of his case and secondly the Tribunal must be prima facie stisfied that in order to decide the dispute a'nd to do complete justice between the parties an inspection of the ballot papers is necessary.\n\nThe discretion conferred in this behalf should not be exercised in such a way so as to enable the applicant to indulge in a roving inquiry with a view to :fishing out materials for declaring the election void. Only on the special facts of a given case sample inspecting may be ordered to lend further assurance to the' prima facie satisfaction of the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount and not for the purpose of fishing out materials. This is well settled by a catena of '--./ decisions. (see Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Krishna Behan & Ors.,(') .? Smt. Sumitra Devi v. Sheo Shanker Prasad Yadav & Ors,,(2 ) Bhabhi\n\nv. Sheo Govind & Ors.,( 3) Ram Autar Singh Bhadauria v. Ram Gopal\n\nSingh & Ors.,( 4 ) and R. Narayanan v. S. Semmalai & Ors(').\n\nThe petitioners aver in the petition that the returning officer in collaboration and conspiracy with the Superintendents of Jails and under the directions of Giani zail Singh the then Chief Minister, to help the present appellant, tampered with the postal ballots and changed four of them to this extent that they should be considered and counted as first preference votes for the appellant instead of respondent 1, the unsuccessful candidate. There is also an assertion that l>' when the postal ballot papers were sorted out for fue purpose of counting, M. S. Khera. P. W. 2, the counting agent of respondent 1 found to his dismay fuat the four postal ballot, papers were tampered with a'nd the manner in which fue tampering appeared to have been done has also been set out in the petition.\n\nIt was also stated that there was overwriting and there were interpolations in the baL!ot papers masmuch as what was originally first preference vote was made to \\ . appear second preference and the first preference vote was. indicated\n\n~ in favour of the appellant.\n\nIt was alleged that the comiti'ng agent M. S. Khera and his companions objected to receiving the four tampered postal ballot papers in favour of the appellant.\n\nThis shows '\\ that there were sufficient allegations in fue election petition about the tampering of four postal ballot papers. Undoubtedly, the method\n\nemployed in tampering being hatched i'n and carried out in secrecy ,. _,.- may not be known or may not come to light but the result of tam-\n\n(!) [1970] I SCR 852.\n\n(2) [19731 2 SCR 920.\n\n(3) [1975] Suppl. SCR 202.\n\n(4) [1976] I SCR 191.\n\n(5) [1980] I SCR 571.\n\nA '\n\npering became manifest as soon as the postal ballot papers were taken out of the envelopes and sorted out for counting.\n\nConpled ( with this one must remember that eight electors being members of the Legislative Assembly had voted by postal ballot.\n\nThose who opted for postal ballot papers were detenus detained under the Maintenance of Internal Secrnity Act.\n\nWho they were was known to every one inasmnch as seven of them belonged to Akali Party and one was a member of Jan Sangh.\n\nTheir political alignments were known.\n\nTherefore, when the postal ballot papers were opened and the counting agent of Akali candidate respondent 1 found that four out of eight postal ballot papers appeared to have been tampered with it was easy for him to deduce that the four voters belonging to Akali Party, if the ballot disclosed a true state of affairs, had cast X their votes in favour of the appellant, a candidate opposed to. the ·\n\nofficial Akali candidate.\n\nSimultaneously a mere glance at those tampered postal ballot papers would show that the tampering was rather crude and no expertise was necessary to form an opinion that these four post&! ballot papers were tampered.\n\nAnd these allegations have been made in the petition.\n\nA petition for a recount on the allega tion of miscount or error in counting is based upon not specific allegation of miscounting but errors which ml.ly indicate a misconduct and recount becomes necessary.\n\nWhen it is alleged that postal ballot papers were tampered with, the implication in Jaw is that those postal ballot papers have been wrongly received in favour of a candidate not entitled to the same and improperly refused in favour of the candidate entitled to the same, and this is a miscount and recount is necessary.\n\nIn the very nature of things the allegation can be not on each specific instance of an error of counting or miscount but broad allegations indicating error in counting or miscount necessitating a recount.\n\nCoupled with the allegation in the petition, when the election { petitioner8 started examining the witnesses on their behalf, Shri M ..\n\nS. Khera, P.W. 2 a practising Advocate and counting agent for the ( unsuccessful Akali candidate gave evidence to the effect that when eight envelopes containing postal ballot papers were taken up for counting two of them were found properly sealed and sew! of the Superintendent of the Jail was decipherable.\n\nHowever, the wax seal on the other six envelopes containing ballot papers was not decipherable at all. He said that these six envelopes containing ballot papers did not have the seal of the Superintend~! of Jail from where they were despatched. His evidence was further to the effect that after the small inner envelopes containi!ng the ballot papers were opened and the ballot papers were put down on the table with their faces in reverse\n\n. \"\n\nRAGHBm SINGH GILL v GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, ]. ) 13 2 7\n\nso that the agents and candidates could not see as to for whom the vote had been cast, he kept a close watch.\n\nTherealter the ballot box was opened, and folded ballot papers were unfolded and mixed up , with the postal ballot papers.\n\nThereafter, according to him all these ballot papers were placed in different trays eanna_rked for the candidates and counted with regard to their preferences. Then comes the very important statement which may be extracted :\n\n' ''\n\n\"When this was done, I noticed that the bundle of the returned candidate S. Raghbir Singh contained four postal ballot papers and these had first preference in favour of the returned candidate S. Raghbir Singh and second preference in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tobra.\n\nThe reason only which I could detect this was that the pencil used for marking first preference in the. booth was a red one whilst the postal ballots on the other hand had been marked with blue ink! and one of them had been marked with red-ball-point.\n\nIt was, therefore, that I could detect that these were postal ballots.\n\nMy suspicions were at once aroused because I could not conceive that the postal ballots which were from the leaders of the Akali Party could be of second preference for Mr. G. S.\n\nTohra.\n\nI then asked the Returning Officer to recount the ballot papers of the returned candidate as I seriously doubted the counting thereof.\n\nHe did so and in the process of this recount I particufarly kept a sharp eye on these four ballot papers.\n\nIndeed I asked him to count the ballot papers for the third time a'nd he . complied with my request as my object was to see as minutely and as surely as possible these ballot papers.\n\nIn the process aforesaid I found that two out of. the ' four postal ballot papers which were marked with a blue ink were heavily overwritten and especially so as regards the marking for the second preference. The third b!lllot paper was not as heavily overwritten but it was clear that this also had been so done twice or thrice.\n\nAs regards the fourth ballot paper marked with a red ballpoint the second preference marking showed a difference >n colour of the two lines and as distinguished from the other three which were marked in the Roman whilst this contained two parallel lines for two.\n\nFrom these observations at least I was convinced that the postal ballot papers had been tampered. The aforesaid tampering was in the column opposite the name of s. Gurcharan Singh Tohra.\"\n\nIf the allegations in the petJt1on coupled with the evidence of , lo..\n\nPW.2, M. S. Khera, the counting agent is evaluated, what further proof was needed for inspectio'n of ballot papers? His cross-examination on the relevant point, to say the least, is inept and the witness has remained unshaken.\n\nIt was, however, contended that evidence of M. S. Khera should not be accepted because he is an interested and partisan witness and his evidence lacked credibility because there was no contemporaneous follow up action taken by him by rf!ising objection i'n writing and as a practising advocate he was expected to know that such a serious mal-practice when-'A'I. noticed by him sllould have found its place in a contempora- - neons written record.\n\nIt was said that he was aware of the necessity of ra1smg a written objection because on an earlier occasion he in fact did so when voter Sbri Kamai] Singh Marhari had shown his ballot paper to Shri Prithi Pal Singh which is impermissible. It was also said thlat election petitioners after making serious allegations in the petition, shunned the witness box and, therefore, the case should be rejected.\n\nThe criticism is not well merited.\n\nNon-appearance of electio'n petitioners in the witness box has to be appreciated in the background of the nature of allegations.\n\nAnd let it be noted that the appellant against whom various allegations were made equally shied off from the witness box.\n\nFurther, in view of the nature of allegations, P.W. 2 M. S. Khera and the four voters would provide the best evidence.\n\nThe accusation that P.W. 2 M. S. Khera is not an independent witness may be appreciated in the light of the fact that in an election fought on party lines tire. election agent, the polling agent a'nd the counting agent of any candidate would ordinarily be one who shares his political philosophy and ( owes allegiance to the party discipline.\n\nThe undisputed fact that\n\n' be was a counting agent establishes his presence at the relevant time. After postal ballot papers were taken out and mixed up and then unfolded for the purpose of counting, if the counting agent keeps a watchful eye he is bound to notice the glaring tampering.\n\nHe did in fact lodge an oral protest and at his instance recount was ordered thrice.\n\nHis failure to prepare and submit a contemporaneous \"ritten record of what he bad noti}- ced cannot detract from his evidence.\n\nAnd a writte'n contemporaneous protest at the counting is not a coudition precedent to filing an election petition for recount. It thus clearly transpQ:es\n\nthat the allegation in the petition coupled with the evidence of\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai,!.) 1329\n\nM. S. Khera would rather satisfy the test laid down by this A Court, namely that the learned judge had material to be prima jacie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete justice. between the parties an inspection of ballot papers was necessary. The discretion used in this behalf is amply justified.\n\nOnce the inspection of ballot papers was permitted and the four voters PW. 13 S. S. Barnala, P.W. 14 Jagdev Singh Talwandi, P.W. 15 Jaswindr Singh Brar and P.W. 16 Prakash Singh Badal were examined and each one was shown his ballot paper and each one volunteered to give information as to for whom be voted, it became crystal clear that their ballot papers were tampered with.\n\nIn an election of a member to Council of States; the election is by' a system of proportional respresentation by means of the single transferable vote.\n\nEach voter had to show his preference by marking hls first, second preference. etc. and he may mark as many preferences as there are candidates.\n\nBut no candidate can mark .his first preference for more than one candidate which if done would render his vote invalid (vide Rule 73 of the Rules).\n\nThe four voters in their ,'respective evidence emphatically stated that each one them cast his first preference vote in favour of the Akali candidate respondent 1 and did not cast second preference voe in favour of any one else. Their ballot papers show that their first preference is in favour of the E appel!ant a candidate opposed to the Akali candidate and the second preference is in favour of the Akali candidate. This evidence was objected to on two grounds, firstly , that it violates secrecy of ballot, and secondly, that the witnesses answered the question and there is nothing to show that they volunteered the information.\n\nWhen it is said that no witness would be required to disclose for\n\nwhom he has voted it does not inean that he can'not be questioned but it merely implies a privilege of the voter to refuse to answer the question without incurring any liability and if the witness volunteers the information even in answer to a question, s. 941 -Of the Act is not violated. Coupled with this is the evidence of the expert P. W. 1 7 Dewan K. S. Puri.\n\nOn this evidence it is affirmatively established that these four ballot papers have been tampered with and the alteration of ballot papers disclosing tampering is to the effect that in each case the voter cast his first preference vote for respondent 1 whlch was altered to ; show second preference vote, and against the name of the appellant a first preference vote is indicated.\n\nA mere casual or cursory glance at th<,: four ballot papers would convince even a lay man that :these ballot papers have been tampered with.\n\nTo say the least,\n\nA the tampering is rather crude and lacks. finnese.\n\nIn the light of this evidence RW. l Partap Singh, the Returning Officer, cuts a sorry figure.\n\nHe has an ostrich like attitude because he observes no\n\ntampering.\n\nHis evidence has to be discarded. ~\n\nMr. Mridul frankly said on behalf of the appellant that the findihg of the learned judge that these four Eiallot papers have \\ been tampered with is not questioned in this appeal.\n\nWith his usual fairness he said that this Court may proceed upon the basis that these four ballot papers have been tampered ._ with.\n\nHe made it abundantly clear that the limited concession on behalf of the appellant is that the four ballot papers show overwritings and difference in ink and the use of different instru- ·.J ments.\n\nThis concession spares us the agonising task of re- \"' appraisal of evidence of two experts.\n\nBut even here both the. experts are agreed that there is overwriting, the variance being the\n\nsourc7 of overwriting.\n\nIn fact, in an electioh appeal under s. ll 6A of the Act this Court does not ordinarily interfere with the finding of fact reached by the High Court particularly when the High Court comes to a conclusion on appreciation of all material evidence placed before it. As a corollary this Court .would be slow to interfere with such findings of fact based on appraisal of evidehce unless there is something radically wrong with the approach of the learned judge trying the election petition (see Ramji Lal v.\n\nRam Babu Maheshwari ·& Anr., (') D. Gopala Reddy v. S. Bai Ta/apalikar & Ors and Sumitra Devi. (2)\n\nIt must, therefore, be held succinctly estab'.ished that the four ballot papers of the four witnesses have been tampered with and if their evidence is to be accepted, the tampering is to the F effect that each one of them had cast his first preference vote in favour of respondent t' but it was altered to show that it was a / second preference vote and the first preference vote was cast in favour of the appellant.\n\nMr. Mridul, however, contended that in the circumstances dis G closed in this case a possibility that the tampering was indulged into by the very four voters cahnot be ruled out and it 1s impennissible to further probe into the matter.\n\nThis argument has merely to be mentioned to be rejected.\n\nEight postal ballot ~- ~, papers were received.\n\nOut of the detained M.L.A. vaters under Maintenance of Internal Security Act, seven belonged to Akali H Party and one to Jan Sangh.\n\nAkali Party ahd Jan Sangh had alig\n\n(I) AIR 1970 SC 2075\n\n(2) [1972] 39 Election I.aw Reports 305 (SC).\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, 1.) 1331\n\nned against Indian National Congress. Detenus exercised the A option of voting by postal ballot. Strength of the constituency. i.e.\n\nPunjab Legislative Assembly and the Partywise strength at the rele-\n\n_.t. vant time was under :\n\n. '' -'~\"\"-\n\nIndian National Congress Communist Party of lndia Akali Party Jan Sangh Communist Party (Marxist)\n\n65 memebrs.\n\n10 members. 25 members. 1 member. 1 member.\n\nTOTAL ; 102 members.\n\nIndian National Congress and Communist Party of India had aligned in this election. Similarly, Akali Party, Jan Sangh and Communist Party (Marxist) had aligned in opposition. Now, when the election is by the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote, it is easy to work out the mechanics of voting party strengthwise after ascertaining the quota.\n\nBeing conscious of the position the Indian National Congress fielded only two candidates.\n\nAppellant was not a candidate of the Indian N atiohal Congress. He was in fact claiming to be an independent candidate but tbe respondents contend that he was supported by the then Cheif Minister Giani Zail Singh who was keen to snatch the third seat though on the purely anthmetical calculation and partywise voting there was no ghost of a chance for him to be elected. The quota was worked out at 25.51 first preference votes.. Even if the two official candidates of Indian National Congress were assigned specific votes to the exent of quota only, the third candidate supported by that party would have 14 first preference Congress votes and 10 first preference votes of the Communist Party of India.\n\nAgai'nst that, the Akali candidate would have 27 first preference votes.\n\nAs a measure of abundant caution the Congress Party seems to have divided its votes between two of its candidates .as would be evident from the result of voting that the two candidates secured 29. and 27 first preference votes. Thus 56 first preference votes from among the combined strength of 75 of the Congress and Communist Party of India were appropriated by the two official candidates. The third candidate conld at best expect 19 first preference votes.\n\nHe has secured 23 first preference votes.\n\nMr. Mridul urged that these fpur voters deliberately pretended to vote for Akali Party candidate so as to avoid any disciplinary action by the Akali Party but in fact they were keen to vote for the appellant.\n\nThis necessitates examination of who these four voters are.\n\nOut of\n\nthe four, one is Sardar S. S. Barnala who, when be gave evidence, was Member of Parliament elected on Akali ticket an associate of Janata Party and was a Member of the Central Cabinet.\n\nSecond was Sardar Parkash Singh Badal who was elected on AkaH ticket and associated with Janta Party and joined first as Cabinet Minister in 1977 March when J anata Party was returned to power in 1977 general elections and then subsequently he became Chief Minister of Punjab.\n\nThe third was Sardar Jagdev Singh Talwandi who was a member of working committee and subsequently became the Vice President of Akali Dal and since the death of Sant Fateh Singh he was President of the Akali Dal.\n\nThe last is Sardar Jaswinder Singh Brai: who was elected to Punjab Legislative Assembly oil Akali ticket.\n\nHe had courted arrest in response to a cal'l given by the Party. He became a Minister when Akali Party formed Ministry after the election to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1977.\n\nCoupled with this is the fact that all the four were arrested under Maintenance of Internal Security Act by the Government led by Giani Zail Singh who was alleged to be supporting the appellant in his bid to get elected.\n\nEven though it is pointed out that there were defections from the Akali Party it is difficult to believe that these members who belonged to the hard core of the Akali Party, denied their liberty by a Party in power and opposed to it, would ever contemplate voting for a protege of the Chief Minister whose Government was responsible for deprivation of their liberty.\n\nAgain, these four persons were detained in three different jails.\n\nThere was no meeting of the minds that in each case, unless a case of rriental telepathy is made out, each started with a hesitation to vote for Akali Party and, therefore, voted for respondent 1 and before the ballot paper was sealed in an envelope specially provided for the same he changed his mind and indu; ged into overwriting indicating that the first preference vote was cast in favour of the appellant.\n\nUnless a number of fortuitous circumstances and some untenable surmises are indulged into, it is impossible to entertain this contention.\n\nAnd as for de:fections from Party, less said the better in this judgment because like the biblical phrase. \"Let that man cast the first stone who has not committed a sin\", similarly, \"Let that Party complain of defections whose birth is not rooted in defections or has not suffered defections\".\n\nAnd against this innqendo there is the evidence of the four witnesses to M1hom no such suggestion was made and it has remained UjlShaken.\n\nCommon course of human conduct and prudent man's approach militates against acceptance of such contention.\n\nIt is, therefore, ail inescapable conclusion that after each of these four voters cast his first preference vote in favour of the Akali candidate and handed in sea'!ed envelopes but before the envelopes' contain-\n\n• I\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, J.) 1333\n\ning the ballot papers were opened at the time of counting someone has indulged into mischief of tampering with these votes.\n\nThat the votes have been tampered with has 'not been questioned.\n\nThe nature of tampering and the advantage derived thereby is self-evident.\n\nThe question then is, who would be interested in this tampering ?\n\nIt must be confessed that there is no direct evidence on this point and presumably there could be none on such a point unless some accomplice betrays the confidence of the ocmspirators.\n\nPetitioners made serious allegations against the Returning Officer but that again is a matter of surmise.\n\nIt is not possible to say that the Returning Officer obliged the then Chief Minister and was amply rewarded.\n\nSo also we need not examine the suggestion that the Sub-Post Master was amply rewarded.\n\nThe most uncongenial fact that stares into the face is that these four ballot papers have been tampered with and the tampering has benefited none else than the appellant.\n\nWe say no more.\n\nThe seco'nd limb of the submission was that even if the tampering\n\nof the four ballot papers is held proved, in view of the provision D contained in s. 64A of the Act the election petitioners could have obtained relief from the Election Commission as befit the circumstances of the case but not the relief granted to them. Section 64A(i) reads as under :-\n\n\"64A. Destruction, loss, etc., of ballot papers at the time of counting-(1) If at any time before the counting of votes is completed any ballot papers used at a polling station or at a place fixed for the poll are unlawfully taken out of the custody of the returning officer or are accidentally or intentionally destroyed or lost or are damaged or tampered with, to such an extent that the result of the poll at that polling station or place cannot be ascertained, the returning officer shall forthwith report the matter to the Election Commission\". ' '\n\nUndoubtedly s. 64A comprehends tampering of ballot papers used at a polling station to such an extent that the result of the poll at\n\nthat polling station cannot be so ascertained; and in that event the G procedure prescribed in that section can be availed of. Section 64A envisages a situation where tampering, damaging, destruction or loss of ballot papers used at a polling station is on such a: large scale that the result of the poll at that polling stat. cannot be ascertained; Such is not.. the situation. Here four ballot papers received as postal ballot papers are shO'Wn to have been tampered with. They were sent H from different jails. It cannot be S!lid that becau~ of this tampering the votes cast by the ballot papers could not be ascertained. On the\n\n1334 SUPREME COURT llEPORTS l1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\ncontrary they can be succinctly ascertained and have in fact been as'certained. Therefore, s. 64A is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case.\n\nI Alternatively it was contended that where .certain ballot papers are shown to have been tampered with, all that a Court ought to do is to ignore them and it is not open to the Court to attempt to ascertain as to for whom the vote was cast. Support was sought for this proposition from an observation of this Court in Jagannath Rao v. Raj Kishore & Ors. ( 1) wherein, after recording a finding that the ballo.! papers have been tampered with in the High Court at the time of inspection it was observed that in the circumstances the only proper course was to proceed on the basis that the decision of the Returning Officer should be presumed to be correct, and there was no point in the Court trying to find out as to which candidate had obtained more valid votes. The decision does not purport to lay down a wider pro position canvassed on behalf of the appellant in this case that as soon as it is shown that some ballot papers have been tampered with, the Court has merely to chart an easy course of rejecting those ballot papers. Such an approach, apart from anything else, would be a premium on unfair election practice. Where voting is by the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote, if a tampering as of the nature indnlged into in this case is brought to light, the necessity of rejecting such ballot papers as invalid would give an unfair advantage to the very person who indnlged into such . practice. Rule 56 of 1961 Rules would shed some light on this point.\n\nSub-rule (2) provides various situations ln which the returning officer is under an obligation to reject a ballot paper. It does not refer to a tampered ballot paper though it refers to damaged and mutilated ballot paper and how it should be dealt with.\n\nSub-rule (2) further provides' that every ballot paper which is not rejected under the rule shall be counted as one valid vote. And in this case the Returning Officer dld not reject the ballot paper as being invalid.\n\nIn such a situation once tampering is held proved if the circumstances permit and evidence of unquestionable character is available it would be perfectly legitimate for the Court in an election petition to ascertain for whom the vote was cast before it was tampered with and if it can be ascertained as a valid vote it must be accepted as such. Any other approach has an inbuilt tendency to give an unfair advantage either to the candidate who himself might have indulged in tampering or someone who must have acted for his benefit. u In this context it was further cont_ended that the Court should not examine the question of benefit which is an equitable principle\n\n(I) Affi [1972] SC 447.\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, J.) 1335\n\nas it belongs to the doctrine of equity known as that of unjust enrich- . ment. This question does not arise in the situation disclosed in this appeal and it is not necessary to examine the same.\n\nIt was lastly contended that the grievance made by the election petitioners in the petition and. sought to be established in the case could not be. comprehended under s. I 00 of the Act and, therefore, no relief could be. granted either to respondent I or to the election petitioners. Section 100 sets out grounds for declaring election to be void.\n\nThe relevant portion of s. IOO(l)(d)(iii) provides as under :\n\n\"100. Grounds for declaring election to be void-( 1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion-\n\n( d) that the result of the election, in so fr as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected-\n\n(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, ·\n\nthe High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void\".\n\nSection !OO(l)(d) (iii) comprehends a situation where the result of an election in so far as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially affected by im'jiroper reception, or improper refusal of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void.\n\nThe objective 'improper' qualifies not only the word 'reception' but also the word 'refusal'. When a vote is received by the Returning Officer at th,!l time of counting it implies two things, that it }s not only received as a valid vote but that the valid vote is cast in favour of one of the contesting candidates at the election.\n\nSimilarly, when it is said that there is improper refusal of any vote it implies again two things, viz., a vote which ought to have been accepted as valid vqte has been improperly refused as an invalid vote, or there is an improper refusal to accept the vote in favour of a particular candidate. On a pure grammatical con;\n\nstructiol). Olf the relevant clause it cannot be gainsaid that an improper reception of any vote or an improper refusal of any vote implies not only reception or refusal of a vote contended to be invalid cy: valid, as the case may be, but consequent reception in favour of any contesting candidates at the election which wonld simultaneously show the vote being refused in counting to any other candidate at the election.\n\nThe expression 'refusal' implies 'refuse to accept' and the expression 'reception' implies 'refuse to reject'. Apart from the setting and the context in which the clause finds its place, in its interpretation it is' to be borne in mind that it seeks to specify one of the grounds for\n\nIll\n\n1336 SUPREME COURT REPOR1lS\n\n\ndeclaring an election to be void.\n\nIn this situation the expressions 'improper reception' and 'improper refusal' have to be interpreted as would carry out the purpose underlyin~ the provision contained iI s. JOO.\n\nIn the instant case the contention is that each of the four voters cast his fi; st preference vote in favour of respondent I and did not cast any second preference vote at the time when each of them exercised his franchise and subsequently these four ballot papers were tampered with by altering them to show that not only each of the four voters cast both first and second preference votes but each of them had cast his first preference vote in , favour of the appellant and second preference vote in favour of respondent I. If once tampering is held proved and not controverted in this appeal, keeping in view the direct testimony of four voters that each one of them signified his first preference vote in favour of respondent 1,. the action of the Returning Officer m counting these votes as first preference votes in favour of appellant, would implY' improper reception of the first preference vote in favour of appellant for whom it was not meant to be and simultaneously it would imply improper refusal by the Returning Officer to count these four votes as first preferepce votes in favour of respondent 1 and also concluding that each of them had not exercised his franchise of second preference vote.\n\nWhat was said before this Court was, and we would accept it as a limited concession, that the four ballot papers show overwritings and difference in ink or different instruments used, it would unquestionably establish that what these four ballot papers purported to be at the time of counting were not the ballot papers in their original condition when the four voters exercised their franchise. In such a situation it was the bounden dutY' of the Returning Officer at the counting as per the second proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 56 to ascertain the intention of the voter by finding out for whom the vote was cast and add the vote for the candidate for whom it was meant to be.\n\nProviso to sub-rule (2) shows that the ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on the ground that the mark indicating the vote is indistinct or made more than once, if the intention that the vote shall be for a particular candidate clearly appears from the wayt the paper is marked. Shorn of tampering, the intention of each voter was clearly indicated and if the gloss of tampering was removed the Returning Officer would have no difficulty in ascertaining the intention of the voters after so ascertaining the intention count the vote accordingly. It is not open to him to take an easy escape route as was contended in this case that once tampering is shown, the ballot paper should be rejected as invalid. The Court in an election petition will have to undertake this exercise.\n\n.. ..\n\n.RAGHBIR SINGH GILL v. GURC!!ARAN SINGH (Gupta, !.) 1337\n\nThe ground on which the election is sought to be avoided in the election petifon is clearly covered bys. 100(1) (d) (iii). Even apart from this, this position is no more res integra in view of the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill .& Anr. (supra).\n\nKrishna Iyer, J., has netly summed up all embracing and pervasive panorama covered by s. 100 which reads as under :\n\n\"Knowing the supreme significance of speedy elections in our system the framers of the Constitution have, by impJ:- cation, postponed all election disputes to election petitions and tribunals.\n\nIn harmony with this scheme s. 100 of the Act has been designedly drafted to embrace all conceivable infirmit es which may be urged.\n\nTo make the project foolproof s. JOO(l)(d)(iv) has been added to absolve everything left over.\n\nThe Court has in earlier rulings pointed out that s. 100 is exhaustive of all grievances regarding an election\"'.\n\nTherefore, the wide comprehensive panorama of s. 100 will cer~ tainly embrace the gr:evance made by the election petitioners in this petition.\n\nConversely, s. 80 provides that no election , shall be called in question except by an election petition presented i_n accordance with the provisions of Chapter II in the Act. Section 100 which finds :ts place in Chapter III sets out grounds for declaring eiection to be void. \" If the contention of the appellant that the grievance for voiding the election made in the petition ; s not comprehended in any of the subsections of s. 100 is accepted and there is no other provision in the Act for voiding election, the election petitioners would be without .. a remedy.\n\nIt would mean that even though one can indulge into forgery-what is tampering of ballot papers, if not forgery,-and. get '\\ away with it. In order to ensure the purity of election it is better to\n\n,.so construe s. 100 as to embrace within its fold, as has been done by\n\n~.the Constitution Bench, all conceivable infirmif es which may be urged for voiding an election.\n\nTherefore, the contention of the appellant must be negatived.\n\nHaving examined all the contentions of the appellant with care that an election appeal deserved, I find no merit in any of them and acc9rd'.ngly this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearin!? fee in one set.\n\nInterim relief, if any, granted during the pendency of the 11ppeal is hereby vacated.\n\nGUPTA, J.\n\nI agree with the order made by my learned brother\n\nDesai, J. and the essential reasoning in support of it.\n\nS.R.\n\n26-610SCI/80\n\nAppeal dJsmwed.", "total_entities": 260, "entities": [{"text": "RAGHBlR SINGH GILL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHBlR SINGH GILL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GURCHARAN SINGH TOHRA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURCHARAN SINGH TOHRA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 9, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. C. 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commission of corrupt practice in the interest of the al>pellant by it8 agents and also commission of corrnpt practice by obtaining assistance of persons in the service of the Punjab Government."}}, {"text": "Gurcharan Singh Tohra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13, 14, 15 and 16 were tampered with in that each the voter had cast his firn preference vote in favour of unsuccessful Akali candidate Gurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was so altered as to appear that each one of them has cast his first prefer ence vote in favour of the appellant and second preference vote in favour of Gurcharan Singh.", "canonical_name": "GURCHARAN SINGH TOHRA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Gurcharan Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13, 14, 15 and 16 were tampered with in that each the voter had cast his firn preference vote in favour of unsuccessful Akali candidate Gurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was so altered as to appear that each one of them has cast his first prefer ence vote in favour of the appellant and second preference vote in favour of Gurcharan Singh.", "canonical_name": "GURCHARAN SINGH TOHRA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2034, "end_char": 2044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2052, "end_char": 2086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3121, "end_char": 3126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 S.C.R. 272", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3575, "end_char": 3594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5050, "end_char": 5055, "source": 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16052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16728, "end_char": 16733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "the Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16752, "end_char": 16766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "the Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18244, "end_char": 18250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18280, "end_char": 18296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18763, "end_char": 18774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "People Act, 1951", "statute": "People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18784, "end_char": 18817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "E\n\nU.R. Lalit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18943, "end_char": 18956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E\n\nU.R. Lalit, O.P. Sharma, Vivek Seth and Miss Anil Katyar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "O.P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18958, "end_char": 18969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E\n\nU.R. Lalit, O.P. Sharma, Vivek Seth and Miss Anil Katyar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Vivek Seth", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18971, "end_char": 18981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E\n\nU.R. Lalit, O.P. Sharma, Vivek Seth and Miss Anil Katyar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Anil Katyar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18991, "end_char": 19002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E\n\nU.R. Lalit, O.P. Sharma, Vivek Seth and Miss Anil Katyar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19023, "end_char": 19035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, R.S. Sodhi, M.S. Gupta and Miss Manisha Gupta for Respondents."}}, {"text": "R.S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19037, "end_char": 19047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, R.S. Sodhi, M.S. Gupta and Miss Manisha Gupta for Respondents."}}, {"text": "M.S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19049, "end_char": 19059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, R.S. Sodhi, M.S. Gupta and Miss Manisha Gupta for Respondents."}}, {"text": "Manisha Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19069, "end_char": 19082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, R.S. Sodhi, M.S. Gupta and Miss Manisha Gupta for Respondents."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19147, "end_char": 19152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by '\\ DESAI, J.-Purity of election and secrecy.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Punjab Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19449, "end_char": 19476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Legislative Assembly formed a constituency for electing members to the Council of States."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19855, "end_char": 19869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election programme was : March 10, 1976, wa& prescribed as the last date for filing nominations; the scrutiny of the nominations was to be made on March 11, 1976; March 13, 197.6, q: Wiil!"}}, {"text": "March 13, 197.6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19871, "end_char": 19886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election programme was : March 10, 1976, wa& prescribed as the last date for filing nominations; the scrutiny of the nominations was to be made on March 11, 1976; March 13, 197.6, q: Wiil!"}}, {"text": "Mareh 27,\n\n1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20021, "end_char": 20036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the last date by which it was permissible to withdraw Jrom the e)ection; in the event of contest, poll was to take place on Mareh 27,\n\n1976; counting was to be done on the same day."}}, {"text": "Amarjit Kaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20099, "end_char": 20111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarjit Kaur and respondent 5 Sat Pal Mittal were nominated as candidates of the political party described as Indian National Congress.", "canonical_name": "Amarjit Kaur"}}, {"text": "Sat Pal Mittal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20129, "end_char": 20143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarjit Kaur and respondent 5 Sat Pal Mittal were nominated as candidates of the political party described as Indian National Congress.", "canonical_name": "Sat Pal Mittal"}}, {"text": "Sardar Raghbir Singh Gill", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20246, "end_char": 20271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant Sardar Raghbir Singh Gill claimed to be an inde-\n\nJ.. pendent candidate."}}, {"text": "Gurcharan Singh Tohra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20333, "end_char": 20354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 1 Gurcharan Singh Tohra was a nominee of the Akali Party.", "canonical_name": "GURCHARAN SINGH TOHRA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Amarjit Kaur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20731, "end_char": 20743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarjit Kaur and 5at Pal Mittal c\n\nsecured 29 and 27 first pred'erence votes respectively.", "canonical_name": "Amarjit Kaur"}}, {"text": "Pal Mittal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20752, "end_char": 20762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarjit Kaur and 5at Pal Mittal c\n\nsecured 29 and 27 first pred'erence votes respectively."}}, {"text": "Amarjit Kaur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20988, "end_char": 21000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarjit Kaur and Sat Pal Mittal who had secured first preference votes in e; xcess of the ascertained quota were declared elected.", "canonical_name": "Amarjit Kaur"}}, {"text": "Sat Pal Mittal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21005, "end_char": 21019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amarjit Kaur and Sat Pal Mittal who had secured first preference votes in e; xcess of the ascertained quota were declared elected.", "canonical_name": "Sat Pal Mittal"}}, {"text": "May 10, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21472, "end_char": 21484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "surplus first preference votes according to , the second preference votes to the tune of 4.81 votes were added to the first preference votes polled by the appellant and he was declared elected to the third seat Respondents1 Z and 3 two sitting members of Punjab Legislative Assembly and, therefore, eligible electors, filed an election petition on May 10, 1976, challenging the election of' the present appellant, the independent candidate who was declared elected to the third Seat, inter alia, contending that the result of the electiOil of the present appellant has been materially affected\n\n(i) by non- compliance with the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the Rules made thereunder; (ii) by improper reception of votes in favour of respondent 1, and (iii) by commission of corrupt practice in the interest of appellant by hisi agent as also commission of corrupt practice by obtaining assistance of persons in the service of the Punjab Government."}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21769, "end_char": 21807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Giani Zail Sin~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22130, "end_char": 22145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation was that Giani Zail Sin~ was the Chief Minister of Punjab at the relevant time and it was \"If' who had put up the appellant as a candidate even though the mems of the Assembly belonging to Indian National Congress computing their voting strength in the Assembly had only fieldeii two candidates , l G Smt.", "canonical_name": "Giani Zall Singh"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22172, "end_char": 22178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation was that Giani Zail Sin~ was the Chief Minister of Punjab at the relevant time and it was \"If' who had put up the appellant as a candidate even though the mems of the Assembly belonging to Indian National Congress computing their voting strength in the Assembly had only fieldeii two candidates , l G Smt."}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22310, "end_char": 22334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation was that Giani Zail Sin~ was the Chief Minister of Punjab at the relevant time and it was \"If' who had put up the appellant as a candidate even though the mems of the Assembly belonging to Indian National Congress computing their voting strength in the Assembly had only fieldeii two candidates , l G Smt."}}, {"text": "Giani Zall Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22479, "end_char": 22495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Minister Giani Zall Singh in order to snatch the third seat not legitimately available, fielded appellant as his candidate and to secure his \\)lection, power of office was abused.", "canonical_name": "Giani Zall Singh"}}, {"text": "Akali Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22690, "end_char": 22701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seven members of Assembly belonging to Akali Party T\"~ and a lone Jan Sangh ML A. were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detenns included P.W. 16 S.\n\nParkash B Singh Badal, detained in Tihar central Jail at Delhi, P.W. 15, S. Jaswinder Singh Brar, and P.W. 15 S. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, detained in Central Jail at Patiala, S. Basant Singh Khalsa, detained in Jail at\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILLY."}}, {"text": "Parkash B Singh Badal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22828, "end_char": 22849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seven members of Assembly belonging to Akali Party T\"~ and a lone Jan Sangh ML A. were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detenns included P.W. 16 S.\n\nParkash B Singh Badal, detained in Tihar central Jail at Delhi, P.W. 15, S. Jaswinder Singh Brar, and P.W. 15 S. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, detained in Central Jail at Patiala, S. Basant Singh Khalsa, detained in Jail at\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILLY."}}, {"text": "S. Jaswinder Singh Brar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22901, "end_char": 22924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seven members of Assembly belonging to Akali Party T\"~ and a lone Jan Sangh ML A. were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detenns included P.W. 16 S.\n\nParkash B Singh Badal, detained in Tihar central Jail at Delhi, P.W. 15, S. Jaswinder Singh Brar, and P.W. 15 S. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, detained in Central Jail at Patiala, S. Basant Singh Khalsa, detained in Jail at\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILLY."}}, {"text": "S. Jagdev Singh Talwandi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22938, "end_char": 22962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seven members of Assembly belonging to Akali Party T\"~ and a lone Jan Sangh ML A. were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detenns included P.W. 16 S.\n\nParkash B Singh Badal, detained in Tihar central Jail at Delhi, P.W. 15, S. Jaswinder Singh Brar, and P.W. 15 S. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, detained in Central Jail at Patiala, S. Basant Singh Khalsa, detained in Jail at\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILLY."}}, {"text": "S. Basant Singh Khalsa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23001, "end_char": 23023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seven members of Assembly belonging to Akali Party T\"~ and a lone Jan Sangh ML A. were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the detenns included P.W. 16 S.\n\nParkash B Singh Badal, detained in Tihar central Jail at Delhi, P.W. 15, S. Jaswinder Singh Brar, and P.W. 15 S. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, detained in Central Jail at Patiala, S. Basant Singh Khalsa, detained in Jail at\n\nRAGHBIR SINGH GILLY."}}, {"text": "Nabha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23101, "end_char": 23106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, ],) 1309\n\nNabha, P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Barnala,."}}, {"text": "S. Surjit Singh Barnala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23116, "end_char": 23139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GURCHARAN SINGH (Desai, ],) 1309\n\nNabha, P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Barnala,."}}, {"text": "S. Gurbachan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23173, "end_char": 23191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "detained in Jail at Jullwidur, S. Gurbachan Singh and S. Kundan Singh, Patang, detained in Jail at -\"\"' Sangrur, all belonging to Akali Party and Dr. Baldev Prakash belonging to Jan Sangh.", "canonical_name": "S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra"}}, {"text": "S. Kundan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23196, "end_char": 23211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "detained in Jail at Jullwidur, S. Gurbachan Singh and S. Kundan Singh, Patang, detained in Jail at -\"\"' Sangrur, all belonging to Akali Party and Dr. Baldev Prakash belonging to Jan Sangh."}}, {"text": "Patang", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23213, "end_char": 23219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "detained in Jail at Jullwidur, S. Gurbachan Singh and S. Kundan Singh, Patang, detained in Jail at -\"\"' Sangrur, all belonging to Akali Party and Dr. Baldev Prakash belonging to Jan Sangh."}}, {"text": "Baldev Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23292, "end_char": 23306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "detained in Jail at Jullwidur, S. Gurbachan Singh and S. Kundan Singh, Patang, detained in Jail at -\"\"' Sangrur, all belonging to Akali Party and Dr. Baldev Prakash belonging to Jan Sangh."}}, {"text": "Gurcharan Singh Tohni", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23647, "end_char": 23668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In course of counting it transpired that four postal ballot papers were tampered with and the tampering indicated that the first preference vote in favour ofrespondent 1, Gurcharan Singh Tohni, the Akali candidate was altered to show second preference vote as also to indicate .a first preference vote .in favour of the, appellant.", "canonical_name": "GURCHARAN SINGH TOHRA & ORS"}}, {"text": "S. Manjit Singh Khera", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23836, "end_char": 23857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j S. Manjit Singh Khera who was the counting agent ·;,,,.;"}}, {"text": "Giani Zail Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23930, "end_char": 23946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that Giani Zail Singh abused his ?", "canonical_name": "Giani Zall Singh"}}, {"text": "S. Partap", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24010, "end_char": 24019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\power as Chief Minister by bringing pressure upon S. Partap, Sfugh,\n\nthe Returning Officer, Sardar Tirth Singh Sobti, a Sub-Po8t Master and the Superintendents of Jails at Sangrur, Patiala and Nabha, fQr facilitating the."}}, {"text": "Sardar Tirth Singh Sobti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24052, "end_char": 24076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\power as Chief Minister by bringing pressure upon S. Partap, Sfugh,\n\nthe Returning Officer, Sardar Tirth Singh Sobti, a Sub-Po8t Master and the Superintendents of Jails at Sangrur, Patiala and Nabha, fQr facilitating the."}}, {"text": "Nabha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24153, "end_char": 24158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\power as Chief Minister by bringing pressure upon S. Partap, Sfugh,\n\nthe Returning Officer, Sardar Tirth Singh Sobti, a Sub-Po8t Master and the Superintendents of Jails at Sangrur, Patiala and Nabha, fQr facilitating the."}}, {"text": "Giani Zai1 Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25341, "end_char": 25357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also denied his relationship with Giani Zai1 Singh and further denied that he was a candidate put up by Giani Zall Singh.", "canonical_name": "Giani Zall Singh"}}, {"text": "Akllli Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25496, "end_char": 25508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any allegation of ta111pering was denied and it wa$ cootended that Akllli Party\n\nprsented a picture oll a house divided and, therefore,."}}, {"text": "Akali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27308, "end_char": 27313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that neither the election petitioners (respondents 2 and 3 in this appeal) nor the appellant, the returned candidate, nor respondent 1 the unsuccessful Akali candidate stepped into the witness box."}}, {"text": "Sardar M.\n\nKhera", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27393, "end_char": 27409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Election petitioners examined P .W. 2 Sardar M.\n\nKhera, counting agent of respondent 1 four voters whose votes were alfeged to have been tampered with and an expert P.W. 171 Dewan K, S. Puri."}}, {"text": "Dewan K", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27529, "end_char": 27536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Election petitioners examined P .W. 2 Sardar M.\n\nKhera, counting agent of respondent 1 four voters whose votes were alfeged to have been tampered with and an expert P.W. 171 Dewan K, S. Puri."}}, {"text": "S. Puri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27538, "end_char": 27545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Election petitioners examined P .W. 2 Sardar M.\n\nKhera, counting agent of respondent 1 four voters whose votes were alfeged to have been tampered with and an expert P.W. 171 Dewan K, S. Puri."}}, {"text": "S. Partap Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27582, "end_char": 27597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant R.W. 1 S. Partap Singh, the Returning Officer, R.W. 2 Karnail Singh Marhari, R.W. 3 Master Jagir Siugh to 'I prove defection from Akali Party, and R.W. 4 the expert Mr. R.\n\nVijh to prove that though the four ballot papers appear to be tampered, it must be by voters themselves, were examined."}}, {"text": "Karnail Singh Marhari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27629, "end_char": 27650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant R.W. 1 S. Partap Singh, the Returning Officer, R.W. 2 Karnail Singh Marhari, R.W. 3 Master Jagir Siugh to 'I prove defection from Akali Party, and R.W. 4 the expert Mr. R.\n\nVijh to prove that though the four ballot papers appear to be tampered, it must be by voters themselves, were examined."}}, {"text": "Jagir Siugh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27666, "end_char": 27677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant R.W. 1 S. Partap Singh, the Returning Officer, R.W. 2 Karnail Singh Marhari, R.W. 3 Master Jagir Siugh to 'I prove defection from Akali Party, and R.W. 4 the expert Mr. R.\n\nVijh to prove that though the four ballot papers appear to be tampered, it must be by voters themselves, were examined."}}, {"text": "R.\n\nVijh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27744, "end_char": 27752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant R.W. 1 S. Partap Singh, the Returning Officer, R.W. 2 Karnail Singh Marhari, R.W. 3 Master Jagir Siugh to 'I prove defection from Akali Party, and R.W. 4 the expert Mr. R.\n\nVijh to prove that though the four ballot papers appear to be tampered, it must be by voters themselves, were examined."}}, {"text": "S. Surjit Singh Bamala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27950, "end_char": 27972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leruned Judge held that the four ballot papers, one each allotted to P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Bamala, P.W. 14 S. Jagdev Singh T!\\iwandi, P.W. 15 S. Jaswinder Singh Brar and P.W. 16 S. Parkash Singh Badal, were tampered with in that each of the voter had cast hi';/ first preference vote in favour of the unsuccessful Akali candidate S.\n\nGurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was altered so as to appear that each oniY oil' them had cast his first preference vote in favour of the returned candidate, the appellant, and second preference vote in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra."}}, {"text": "S. Jagdev Singh T!\\iwandi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27982, "end_char": 28007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leruned Judge held that the four ballot papers, one each allotted to P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Bamala, P.W. 14 S. Jagdev Singh T!\\iwandi, P.W. 15 S. Jaswinder Singh Brar and P.W. 16 S. Parkash Singh Badal, were tampered with in that each of the voter had cast hi';/ first preference vote in favour of the unsuccessful Akali candidate S.\n\nGurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was altered so as to appear that each oniY oil' them had cast his first preference vote in favour of the returned candidate, the appellant, and second preference vote in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra."}}, {"text": "S. Parkash Singh Badal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28053, "end_char": 28075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leruned Judge held that the four ballot papers, one each allotted to P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Bamala, P.W. 14 S. Jagdev Singh T!\\iwandi, P.W. 15 S. Jaswinder Singh Brar and P.W. 16 S. Parkash Singh Badal, were tampered with in that each of the voter had cast hi';/ first preference vote in favour of the unsuccessful Akali candidate S.\n\nGurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was altered so as to appear that each oniY oil' them had cast his first preference vote in favour of the returned candidate, the appellant, and second preference vote in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra."}}, {"text": "S.\n\nGurcharan Singh Tohra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28205, "end_char": 28230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leruned Judge held that the four ballot papers, one each allotted to P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Bamala, P.W. 14 S. Jagdev Singh T!\\iwandi, P.W. 15 S. Jaswinder Singh Brar and P.W. 16 S. Parkash Singh Badal, were tampered with in that each of the voter had cast hi';/ first preference vote in favour of the unsuccessful Akali candidate S.\n\nGurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was altered so as to appear that each oniY oil' them had cast his first preference vote in favour of the returned candidate, the appellant, and second preference vote in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra."}}, {"text": "S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28480, "end_char": 28505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leruned Judge held that the four ballot papers, one each allotted to P.W. 13 S. Surjit Singh Bamala, P.W. 14 S. Jagdev Singh T!\\iwandi, P.W. 15 S. Jaswinder Singh Brar and P.W. 16 S. Parkash Singh Badal, were tampered with in that each of the voter had cast hi';/ first preference vote in favour of the unsuccessful Akali candidate S.\n\nGurcharan Singh Tohra and no second preference vote was indicated and each one of the vote was altered so as to appear that each oniY oil' them had cast his first preference vote in favour of the returned candidate, the appellant, and second preference vote in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra.", "canonical_name": "S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra"}}, {"text": "Khera", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29691, "end_char": 29696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the petition was set down for recording parol evidence M. S. , Khera, polling and counting agent for respondent 1 was examined on behalf of the petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. S. Barnala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29813, "end_char": 29826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was followed by P.W. 13 S. S. Barnala."}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30406, "end_char": 30411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30419, "end_char": 30457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30664, "end_char": 30670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "October 25, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31003, "end_char": 31019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, the learned Judge by his reasoned order dated \\, October 25, 1977, granted the application."}}, {"text": "P .R. Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31858, "end_char": 31870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P .R. Mridul, learned counsel 'who appeared for the appellant directed a frontal attack on the order dated October 25, 1977, by which the learned Judge not only allowed the inspection and examina tion of the postal ballot papers but also permitted the witnesses to be questioned relevant to the ballot papers."}}, {"text": "October 2.5, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32218, "end_char": 32235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention is that the inlpugned order dated October 2.5, 1977, is bad in law and unsustainable on facts and if that order is illegal, the evidence permitted pursuant to the order would be inadmissible and if that inadmissible evidence is excluded even if the Court accepts, the evidence of the expert examined on behalf of the election petitioners that the four ballot papers were tampered with, yet there would not be further material to show as to what was the vote originally recorded by the voter and the natqre and character of simultaneous or subsequent alteration."}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33483, "end_char": 33488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33629, "end_char": 33639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33805, "end_char": 33815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35157, "end_char": 35162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, Sikri,\n\nC.J., Shela!,"}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35171, "end_char": 35176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, Sikri,\n\nC.J., Shela!,"}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35179, "end_char": 35185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea & Reddy, JJ."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35187, "end_char": 35192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea & Reddy, JJ."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35194, "end_char": 35203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea & Reddy, JJ."}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35206, "end_char": 35211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grover, Hegde, Mukherjea & Reddy, JJ."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35532, "end_char": 35544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.(2 ), ·\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. has quoted with approval a statement of Sir Winston Churchill which reads as under :\n\n\"At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking into a little booth, with a little ; pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper-no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussions can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of the point.\""}}, {"text": "Winston Churchill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35593, "end_char": 35610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors.(2 ), ·\n\nKrishna Iyer, J. has quoted with approval a statement of Sir Winston Churchill which reads as under :\n\n\"At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking into a little booth, with a little ; pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper-no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussions can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of the point.\""}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36290, "end_char": 36295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36510, "end_char": 36520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36831, "end_char": 36836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36840, "end_char": 36846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36953, "end_char": 36964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37019, "end_char": 37038, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 272", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37144, "end_char": 37160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S 93", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37312, "end_char": 37316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37425, "end_char": 37435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37477, "end_char": 37483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37891, "end_char": 37896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38674, "end_char": 38679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39911, "end_char": 39917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40083, "end_char": 40093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40283, "end_char": 40288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40350, "end_char": 40356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40413, "end_char": 40418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40460, "end_char": 40466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40619, "end_char": 40625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wigmore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41260, "end_char": 41267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Over a period, as Wigmore puts it, the privilege indiretly and ultimately works for good-for the good of the innocent accused and of the community at large, but directly and concretely it works for illfor the protection of the guilty and the; consequent derangement of civic order and, tlierefore, there ought to be an end of judicial cant towards crime."}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41687, "end_char": 41692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41860, "end_char": 41866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42124, "end_char": 42137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42633, "end_char": 42643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42695, "end_char": 42720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42843, "end_char": 42853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42897, "end_char": 42903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 87(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42948, "end_char": 42956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42997, "end_char": 43002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43373, "end_char": 43379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43403, "end_char": 43408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43444, "end_char": 43449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43594, "end_char": 43599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44057, "end_char": 44062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44101, "end_char": 44107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44132, "end_char": 44137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44227, "end_char": 44237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44265, "end_char": 44271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44303, "end_char": 44308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44454, "end_char": 44463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 93, 94 and 95", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44618, "end_char": 44635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44982, "end_char": 44992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45395, "end_char": 45405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This conclusion is reinforced by the title of Chapter m ''Trial of Election Petitions\" because it is legitimate and indeed proper to have recourse to headingi and sub-heading given to a group cl sections in an Act of Parliament to find guidance for the construction of the words in\n\nI a statute (see R. v. Board cif Trade; Ex-parte St. Martin's Pruerving Co. Ltd.) (')."}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45842, "end_char": 45847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45897, "end_char": 45908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46352, "end_char": 46383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46991, "end_char": 46996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47971, "end_char": 47976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. P. Bhalla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49654, "end_char": 49666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should be able to secure falrness to all parties and ca, ndidate§.\n\nAn awareness by the people of the significance of their vote and the need for them to exercise it responsibly and an assurance that the voter would be able to exercise the franchise untrammeled by any fear and apprehension of any adverse consequence flowing therefrom are the main ingredients of a truly democ.ratic and successful electoral system (see Elections in India by R. P. Bhalla)."}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50042, "end_char": 50047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50265, "end_char": 50270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50291, "end_char": 50296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51890, "end_char": 51895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52031, "end_char": 52036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 128", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53165, "end_char": 53176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53718, "end_char": 53723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54844, "end_char": 54850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Says, Mr. Mridul, that this principle is operative only to the extent it is enacted in the various provisions of the Act and vague, theoretical concept of purity not articulated in the provisions of Jaw cannot be the basis for overriding the concept of secrecy which is expressly provided for in s. 94 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55130, "end_char": 55135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55148, "end_char": 55217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N.P. Ponnuswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55225, "end_char": 55240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act and to N.P. Ponnuswami\n\nv. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency & Others,(') where it was observed that the Act is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned which means that whenever one has, to ascertain the true position in regard to any matter connected with the elections, one has only to look at the Act and the Rules made thereunder."}}, {"text": "Article 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55794, "end_char": 55805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act", "statute": "Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act"}}, {"text": "Article 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55945, "end_char": 55956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act", "statute": "Reference was made to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57963, "end_char": 57968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60228, "end_char": 60233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60387, "end_char": 60392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60461, "end_char": 60466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ballot Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60791, "end_char": 60807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60951, "end_char": 60960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Queen v. Beardsall,( ') at a trial of indictment against a Deputy Returning Officer, for offence under the Ballot Act, 1872, charging hlm with having fraudu• lently placed papers purporting to be, but to his knowledge not being, , l. ballot papers in the ballot box, Blackburn, J. allowed the counterfoils and marked register produced."}}, {"text": "Kelly", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61203, "end_char": 61208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upholding this order, Kelly, C.B., observed that, \"the legislature has no doubt provided that secrecy shall be preserved with respect to ballot papers and all documents connected with respect to ballot papers and all documents connected with what is now made a secret mode of election."}}, {"text": "Lush", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61677, "end_char": 61681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lush, J., observed as under:\n\n\"It was argued that secrecy was the only object of the Ballot Act, but I do not agree to the proposition. ."}}, {"text": "Schofield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62253, "end_char": 62262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Schofield in \"Parliamentary Elections'', 3rd Edn.,"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62830, "end_char": 62837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was however, said that Schofield's statement of law should not be accepted because this proposition is not noted in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63786, "end_char": 63791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65911, "end_char": 65916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66174, "end_char": 66179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66801, "end_char": 66806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66934, "end_char": 66939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Giani zail Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69460, "end_char": 69476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners aver in the petition that the returning officer in collaboration and conspiracy with the Superintendents of Jails and under the directions of Giani zail Singh the then Chief Minister, to help the present appellant, tampered with the postal ballots and changed four of them to this extent that they should be considered and counted as first preference votes for the appellant instead of respondent 1, the unsuccessful candidate.", "canonical_name": "Giani Zall Singh"}}, {"text": "M. S. Khera", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 69857, "end_char": 69868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also an assertion that l>' when the postal ballot papers were sorted out for fue purpose of counting, M. S. Khera."}}, {"text": "M. S. Khera", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70403, "end_char": 70414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the comiti'ng agent M. S. Khera and his companions objected to receiving the four tampered postal ballot papers in favour of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 71416, "end_char": 71425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Who they were was known to every one inasmnch as seven of them belonged to Akali Party and one was a member of Jan Sangh."}}, {"text": "M ..\n\nS. Khera", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 73036, "end_char": 73050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coupled with the allegation in the petition, when the election { petitioner8 started examining the witnesses on their behalf, Shri M ..\n\nS. Khera, P.W. 2 a practising Advocate and counting agent for the ( unsuccessful Akali candidate gave evidence to the effect that when eight envelopes containing postal ballot papers were taken up for counting two of them were found properly sealed and sew!"}}, {"text": "S. Raghbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74396, "end_char": 74412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then comes the very important statement which may be extracted :\n\n' ''\n\n\"When this was done, I noticed that the bundle of the returned candidate S. Raghbir Singh contained four postal ballot papers and these had first preference in favour of the returned candidate S. Raghbir Singh and second preference in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tobra."}}, {"text": "S. Gurcharan Singh Tobra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74568, "end_char": 74592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then comes the very important statement which may be extracted :\n\n' ''\n\n\"When this was done, I noticed that the bundle of the returned candidate S. Raghbir Singh contained four postal ballot papers and these had first preference in favour of the returned candidate S. Raghbir Singh and second preference in favour of S. Gurcharan Singh Tobra.", "canonical_name": "S. Gurcharan Singh Tol1ra"}}, {"text": "G. S.\n\nTohra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75093, "end_char": 75105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "My suspicions were at once aroused because I could not conceive that the postal ballots which were from the leaders of the Akali Party could be of second preference for Mr. G. S.\n\nTohra."}}, {"text": "Sbri Kamai] Singh Marhari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77204, "end_char": 77229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that he was aware of the necessity of ra1smg a written objection because on an earlier occasion he in fact did so when voter Sbri Kamai] Singh Marhari had shown his ballot paper to Shri Prithi Pal Singh which is impermissible."}}, {"text": "Prithi Pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77265, "end_char": 77281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that he was aware of the necessity of ra1smg a written objection because on an earlier occasion he in fact did so when voter Sbri Kamai] Singh Marhari had shown his ballot paper to Shri Prithi Pal Singh which is impermissible."}}, {"text": "Jagdev Singh Talwandi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 79431, "end_char": 79452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 S. S. Barnala, P.W. 14 Jagdev Singh Talwandi, P.W. 15 Jaswindr Singh Brar and P.W. 16 Prakash Singh Badal were examined and each one was shown his ballot paper and each one volunteered to give information as to for whom be voted, it became crystal clear that their ballot papers were tampered with."}}, {"text": "Jaswindr Singh Brar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 79462, "end_char": 79481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 S. S. Barnala, P.W. 14 Jagdev Singh Talwandi, P.W. 15 Jaswindr Singh Brar and P.W. 16 Prakash Singh Badal were examined and each one was shown his ballot paper and each one volunteered to give information as to for whom be voted, it became crystal clear that their ballot papers were tampered with."}}, {"text": "Prakash Singh Badal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 79494, "end_char": 79513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 S. S. Barnala, P.W. 14 Jagdev Singh Talwandi, P.W. 15 Jaswindr Singh Brar and P.W. 16 Prakash Singh Badal were examined and each one was shown his ballot paper and each one volunteered to give information as to for whom be voted, it became crystal clear that their ballot papers were tampered with."}}, {"text": "s. 941", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81114, "end_char": 81120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dewan K. S. Puri", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 81208, "end_char": 81224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coupled with this is the evidence of the expert P. W. 1 7 Dewan K. S. Puri."}}, {"text": "l Partap Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 81857, "end_char": 81871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l Partap Singh, the Returning Officer, cuts a sorry figure."}}, {"text": "Sumitra Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83334, "end_char": 83346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Gopala Reddy v. S. Bai Ta/apalikar & Ors and Sumitra Devi. ("}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84155, "end_char": 84191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Akali H Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84211, "end_char": 84224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the detained M.L.A. vaters under Maintenance of Internal Security Act, seven belonged to Akali H Party and one to Jan Sangh."}}, {"text": "Jan Sangh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84236, "end_char": 84245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of the detained M.L.A. vaters under Maintenance of Internal Security Act, seven belonged to Akali H Party and one to Jan Sangh."}}, {"text": "AIR 1970 SC 2075", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 84288, "end_char": 84304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84421, "end_char": 84445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1331\n\nned against Indian National Congress."}}, {"text": "Indian National Congress Communist Party of lndia Akali Party Jan Sangh Communist Party", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84652, "end_char": 84739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-'~\"\"-\n\nIndian National Congress Communist Party of lndia Akali Party Jan Sangh Communist Party (Marxist)\n\n65 memebrs."}}, {"text": "Communist Party of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84860, "end_char": 84884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian National Congress and Communist Party of India had aligned in this election."}}, {"text": "Communist Party (Marxist)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84953, "end_char": 84978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, Akali Party, Jan Sangh and Communist Party (Marxist) had aligned in opposition."}}, {"text": "Indian N atiohal Congress", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85344, "end_char": 85369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant was not a candidate of the Indian N atiohal Congress."}}, {"text": "Party of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85995, "end_char": 86009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The quota was worked out at 25.51 first preference votes.. Even if the two official candidates of Indian National Congress were assigned specific votes to the exent of quota only, the third candidate supported by that party would have 14 first preference Congress votes and 10 first preference votes of the Communist Party of India."}}, {"text": "Congress Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86123, "end_char": 86137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a measure of abundant caution the Congress Party seems to have divided its votes between two of its candidates .as would be evident from the result of voting that the two candidates secured 29."}}, {"text": "Sardar S. S. Barnala", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 86887, "end_char": 86907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of\n\nthe four, one is Sardar S. S. Barnala who, when be gave evidence, was Member of Parliament elected on Akali ticket an associate of Janata Party and was a Member of the Central Cabinet."}}, {"text": "Janata Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 87001, "end_char": 87013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of\n\nthe four, one is Sardar S. S. Barnala who, when be gave evidence, was Member of Parliament elected on Akali ticket an associate of Janata Party and was a Member of the Central Cabinet."}}, {"text": "Sardar Parkash Singh Badal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 87067, "end_char": 87093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Second was Sardar Parkash Singh Badal who was elected on AkaH ticket and associated with Janta Party and joined first as Cabinet Minister in 1977 March when J anata Party was returned to power in 1977 general elections and then subsequently he became Chief Minister of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Janta Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 87145, "end_char": 87156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Second was Sardar Parkash Singh Badal who was elected on AkaH ticket and associated with Janta Party and joined first as Cabinet Minister in 1977 March when J anata Party was returned to power in 1977 general elections and then subsequently he became Chief Minister of Punjab."}}, {"text": "J anata Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 87213, "end_char": 87226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Second was Sardar Parkash Singh Badal who was elected on AkaH ticket and associated with Janta Party and joined first as Cabinet Minister in 1977 March when J anata Party was returned to power in 1977 general elections and then subsequently he became Chief Minister of Punjab."}}, {"text": "Sardar Jagdev Singh Talwandi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 87348, "end_char": 87376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third was Sardar Jagdev Singh Talwandi who was a member of working committee and subsequently became the Vice President of Akali Dal and since the death of Sant Fateh Singh he was President of the Akali Dal."}}, {"text": "Akali Dal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 87461, "end_char": 87470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third was Sardar Jagdev Singh Talwandi who was a member of working committee and subsequently became the Vice President of Akali Dal and since the death of Sant Fateh Singh he was President of the Akali Dal."}}, {"text": "Sant Fateh Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87494, "end_char": 87510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third was Sardar Jagdev Singh Talwandi who was a member of working committee and subsequently became the Vice President of Akali Dal and since the death of Sant Fateh Singh he was President of the Akali Dal."}}, {"text": "Sardar Jaswinder Singh Brai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87559, "end_char": 87586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last is Sardar Jaswinder Singh Brai: who was elected to Punjab Legislative Assembly oil Akali ticket."}}, {"text": "s. 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91029, "end_char": 91035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91108, "end_char": 91127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The seco'nd limb of the submission was that even if the tampering\n\nof the four ballot papers is held proved, in view of the provision D contained in s. 64A of the Act the election petitioners could have obtained relief from the Election Commission as befit the circumstances of the case but not the relief granted to them."}}, {"text": "Section 64A(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91203, "end_char": 91217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91804, "end_char": 91810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92053, "end_char": 92064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92695, "end_char": 92701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95980, "end_char": 95991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mohinder Singh Gill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101410, "end_char": 101429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even apart from this, this position is no more res integra in view of the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill .&"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101534, "end_char": 101540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101787, "end_char": 101793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102039, "end_char": 102045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102150, "end_char": 102156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102260, "end_char": 102265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102401, "end_char": 102422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102424, "end_char": 102435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II in the Act", "statute": "Chapter II in the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102677, "end_char": 102683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II in the Act", "statute": "Chapter II in the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103028, "end_char": 103034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II in the Act", "statute": "Chapter II in the Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 103093, "end_char": 103111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to ensure the purity of election it is better to\n\n,.so construe s. 100 as to embrace within its fold, as has been done by\n\n~.the Constitution Bench, all conceivable infirmif es which may be urged for voiding an election."}}, {"text": "GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103554, "end_char": 103559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUPTA, J.\n\nI agree with the order made by my learned brother\n\nDesai, J. and the essential reasoning in support of it."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103616, "end_char": 103621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUPTA, J.\n\nI agree with the order made by my learned brother\n\nDesai, J. and the essential reasoning in support of it.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1338_1369_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ".1 :138\n\nKASTOR! LAL LAKSHMI REDDY\n\nv. . •\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & ANOTHER A\n\nMay 9, 1980 ~\n\n[P. N, BHAGWATI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nGovernment co11tracts-Limita1ions -on the Government to gr(lll.t contracts -Test of reasonableness-Concept of reasonableness and concept of public interest, explained-Articles 14 & 19 of the Constitution.\n\nResin is a forest produce extracted from certain pieces of trees popularly / .C known as Chir trees. The process of extraction is called tapping, involves -\"\\ several steps, and requires elnployment of skilled labour and involves a considerable a.mount of expenditure. The State of J ammu & Kashmir started tapping operation in respect of its Chir trees since about 1973 by giving contracts to private parties for extraction and collection of resin. The contracts were of three types; one was contract on wage basis commonly known as wage contract which was given by auctioning the blazes to the person who was prepar- D ed. to undertake the work of extraction and Co11ection of resin at the lo\"WeSt rates of labour charges and in such contract the entire resin extracted and d.uected by the contractor would belong to the State and the contractor would be entitled only to the wage or labour charges for ex.traction and collection of resin; the second type of contract was on the basis of royalty without load and under this contract which was given by auction stipulating for payment\n\n<:I. royalty per blaze, the entire resin extracted and collected by the contractor\n\n. E 'WDuld belong to him and .he would be free to .sell or process it as he likes; the \"I tmro type of contract ,... on the basis of royalty with load and under this contract which was also given by auction. the royalty was payable per blaze and out of resin extracted and collected by the companies, a certain pa.rt would have to be surrendered to tho Sta.le, while the balance wonld remain with !he • contractor.\n\nEsery year, the State auctioned the blazes in the different forests within .its territory and about 40 per cent of the forests were given on royalty basis, some{ wlth load and some without load, while the balance of about 60 per cent were. given on wage coiitrac:t basis.\n\nMost of the contractors bidding at the auction' were having their factories outside Jarnmu & Kashmir either in U.P. or in Punjab. The State in furtherance of its policy to bring about rapid industria, · lisation decided that from the year 1979-80 onwards the resin extracted from its £oreots should not be allowed to be exported outside the territories of the State\n\nand should be utilised only by industries set up -within the State. The State, in fact, entered into contracts with three manufacturers, namely, P.rabhat Turpentine & Synthetics Pvt. Ltd., Dujedwala Resin and Turpentine Co. Ltd. and 'l'ine Chemieals Ltd. Under these oontracts the three manufacturera agreed to set up factories in the State for the manufacture of resin twpentine end other derhatives and the State agreed to make available to them respectively an e=red supply of 4000, 3 500 and 8000 metric tonnes of resin per year. The H State had also commitments to supply reSin: to its ownconcerns namely, J&K.\n\nIndustries Ltd. which was running a factory for manufacture of resin and turpentine a1 also to various small scale units which are set up in the State. Since\n\nKAStURI LAL LAKSHMI Rl!Dl>Y V. STAT!! OF .r. & K 1339\n\n1!1e total requirement of theee 24,000 metric tonnes a.lways fell abort it wu A deeided at a meeting held on 9th Deoember, 1976 of .the .Forest officials that\n\nthe increue of target of production could be achievi:d only through replace- .A ment of royalty contracts by wage contracts wherever possible and hence Jn future blazes should be auotionecl for tapping only on was• contract baiis.\n\nThere were certain forests in Resin and Ramban Division of the State which was out of access on account of their distance from the roads and so were some torests in the Poonch Division near the line of actual control and there were 1,28,856 blazes situated in the lower regions of inaccessible forests and no contractors could be fowid for taking tapping contracts even on the basis of royalty without load for blazes in the higher regions of the inacoesoible areas.\n\nJn the Rasi Division out of 6,08, 115 bla.zes which were attempted to be given \"'rfor tapping in the year 1976-77 on royalty contract basis without load, only\n\n\"'-1,28,856 blazes were taken by one Prem Kumar Sood and that too on royalty of only Rs. 2.55 per blaze as against royalty of about Rs. 6 per blaze obtained by the State in other inaccessible areas by giving contract on royalty basis with load of 3 Kg. per blaze. For the year 1978-79 no one came forward to make .a bid for taking the contract even on royalty basis without load, with the result that practically no tapping was done from these 6.08,115 blazes in the forests of the Rasi division upto 1979,80. There were also some new blazes marked in the forests of the Rasi division for the year 1979-80 \"-\"\" out of them 4,20,340 blazes were in areas which were inaccessible on account of their being .at a distance of 8 to 40 kilo-metres from the mad side. Even out of the olli\n\n6,08,115 there were 3,10,604 blazes which were situated in the same category -Of inaccessible areas.\n\nSo far as the forests in the Ramban Division are con~ rerned there were 1,24.400 blazes which .were equally inaccessible \"due to tong lead up to coupe boundaries and transit depots\" and the position in regard to 3,39,000 blazes which were under tapping in Poonch Division was also similar to that of the inaccessible areas in Rasi and Ramban Division wih the addi tional handicap of their bein2 situated along the line of actual control. There were thus in all about 11,85,414 blazes in the Rasi, Ramban and Poonch Division which were inaccessible areas and having regard to the high cost of eX traction and collection of resin as also the scarcity 61 trained labour in those .areas it was not possi&te t6 give out those blazes by auction on wage contract bn.sis. The past experience showed that even on the basis of royalty without contractors were not forthcoming for taking contracts in respect of blazetr be inaccessible areas of the Rasi Division and giving out of the aforesaid azes fo the Rasi Ramban and Poonch Division on wa~ contract basis was, 'tl>erefore, a.lmost an impossible proposition. The Chief Conservator of Forests\n\namt other Forest Officer> accordingly decided at the meeting held on Decem- ber 9, 1978 that those blat.es could not be tapped through wage contract because uapart from the total non-availability of local labour in these areas cost of.production due to long lead up to coupe boundaries and transit deoots would te prohibitive\" and all ouch areas should, therefore, be excluded from tanping\n\n~ 1\"· through wage contract. These decisions taken at the meeting on 9th December, 1978 were confirmed at subsequent meeting which took place between Forest Minister, the Forest Secretary, the Ch; ef Conservative Forest Officer and other .Forest Officen on 26th December, 1978. It was further decided in this meeting that the \"denartrnental tanping through wage contract should be confined to accessible Chir forests\" only and so far as 11.85.414 blazes in the iuacc ... ible areas of the R11si, Rambl!n and Poonch Divbion are concerned _ 1he eomensus was that 'hese blauo should be allotted to oome private party\n\nSUPREMB COURT :REPORTS U980] 3 s.c.a.\n\nas procurement of resin from them through wage contracts was not feasible being ddficult and costly\" and \"the financial stat\\.w and experience in extractiOJb. of resin from fore.-:.t and its distillation in tne factory should be decisive factors'' in 1egard to such allotment. Therefore, the second respondent who had earlier addressed a letter dated 15th April, 1978 to the State Government offering to\n\nset up a factory for manufacture of resin turpentine oil and other derivatives in the State with the latest know-how under the supervision of the State . Gov enunent and seeking allotment of 10,000 metric tonnes of resin annually for the purpose was, by an Order of the State Government dated 27th April, 1979,.. sanctioned allotment of 11.85 la~ blazes in the inaccessible areas of Rasi,_.\n\nRalnban and Poonch Divisions for a period of 10 years on the terms and conditions set out in the order. ·\n\nThe petitioners, thereupon challenged this order made by the State Government under Article 32 of the Constitution on the grounds. namely, (a) thaf\\/ the order is arbitrary, 1nala fide and not in public interest, inasmuch as a huge\\ beneht has been conferred on the 2nd re1pondents at the cost of the State;.. (h J the order creates monopoly jn favour of the 2nd respondent who is a private party and constitutes unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on tapping contract business under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; and ( c) the State has acted arbitrarily in selecting the 2nd respondent for awarding tapping contract, \\Vithout affording any opportunity to others to-· complete for obtaining such contract and this action of the State is not based on any rational or relevant principle a:d is, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution as also of the rule of administrative Law which inhibits arbitrary action by the Slate.\n\nDismissing the petitions, the Court\n\nHEW : (I ) With the growth of the welfare state, new forms of property in the shape of Government largess are developing, since the Government is. increasingly assuming the rqle of regulator and dispenser of social services and provider of a large number of benefits including jobs, contracts, licences,..- quotas, mineral rights etc.\n\nThere is i:i.creasing expansion of the magnitude and range of governmental functions, as we move closer to the welfa.re state, and' the result is that more and more of our wealth consists of these new forms.. of property.\n\nSome of these forms of wealth maiy be in the nature of privilege.\n\nThe law has however not been slow to recognise the importance of thf\"s: new kind of wealth and the need to protect individual interest in it and wi that end in view, it has developed new forms of protection. Some interests Qovernment large.o; s, formely rega. .. ded as privileges, have been recognised aS rights, while others have been given legal p .. otection not only by forging procedural safeguards but also by confining, structuring and checking Government\" discretion in the matter of grant of such largess.\n\n[1354 F-H, 1355 A] -\n\nThe discretion of the Government is not unlimited in that the Government' cannot give largess in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet 'Nill or on such• terms as it chooses in its absolute discretion. There are two limitatiors impos- \"f. • ed by law which structure and control the discretion of the Government in this behalf. The first is in regard to the terms on which largess may be granted' and the other, in regard to the persons who may be recipients of such largess ..\n\n[1355 A-BJ;\n\nSo far as the first limitation is concerned, it flows directly from the thesis. that. unlike a private individua.l, the State cannot act as it pleases in the mattet\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI UDDY I'. STATE OP J, & K 1341\n\ncl giving largess. Though ordinarily a private individual would be guided by <COOOmic considerations of selfgain in any actiqn taken by him, it is always <>pen to him under the law to act contrary to his self-interest or to oblige anothe1 in entering into a contract or dealing with his property.\n\nBut the Gov ... -ernment is not free to act as it likes in granting largess such as awarding a con\n\ntract or selling or leasing out its property. Whatever be its activity, lhe Gov • ernment is still the Government and is, subject to restraints inherent in its posi tion in a democratic~ society. The constitutional power conferred on the Gov .ernment cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in an unprin ..\n\nipled manner; it has to be exercised for the public good. Every activity of\n\n_... the Government has a public element in it and it must therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. If '1.rtbe Government awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its\n\n1roperty or grants any other largess, it would be liable to be tested for its ' '\\'alidity on the touch-stone of reasonableness and public interest and if it fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and itvalid.\n\n[1355 B-F]\n\nRamana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India .& Ors. [1979] 3 S. C. R. 1014, reiterated.\n\n(2) In forming his own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circum- D -stances of a given case. it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale -of values of the judge participating in th~ decision. would play an important\n\n, part, but even so, the test Of reasonableness is not a wholly subjective test and its contours are fairly indicated by the Constitution. The concept of reasonableness in fact pervades the entire constitutional scheme. The requirement of reasonableness runs like a golden thread through the entire fabric of fundameniY tal rights and, as several decisions of this Court show, this concept of reason- .E -ableness finds its positive manifestation and expression in the lofty ideal of -social and economic justice which inspires and anj.mates the Directive Principles. Article 14 strikes at arbitrarihess in State action and since the principlo .of reasonableness and rationality, which is legally as well as philosophically .an essential element of equality or non-, arbitrariness, is proj::cted by this article, it must characterise every governmental action, whether it be under the authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law.\n\nSo also F \"' 1he concept of reasonableness runs through the totality of Art. 19 and requires\n\nWliat restrictions on the freedoms of the citizens, in order to be permissible, must lt the teast be reasonable. Similarly Art. 21 in the full plenitude of its activist\n\n~Bgnitude as discovered by Maneka Gandhi's case, insits that no one sha'l be deprivf'd of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with procedure \\ .established by law and such procedure must be reasonable, fair and just.\n\n[1355 G-H, 1356 A-DJ G\n\nState of Madras v. V. G. Rao [1952] SCR 597; Maneka Gandhi v. ClniM -of India f19781 2 SCR 621; E. P. Rqyappa v. State uf Tamil Nadu {1974) '2 SCR 348 referred to.\n\n(3) The Directive Principles concrtise and give shape to the concept of i'eason.ableness envisaged in Artic1\" 14, 19 and 21 and other Articles enumerat the . fundamental rights. By defining the natio'1al aims and thf\" <\"o., stitu..\n\nH tional goals, they set forth the standards or no'111s of reasonableness which must :auide and animate governmental action. Any action taken by the Government\n\n1342 SUPRl!ME COURT itllfOUS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwith a. view to giving effect to any one or more of the Directive Principles would ordinarily, subject to any constitutional or legal inhibitions or other overriding considerations, qualify for being regarded as reasortable, while an, action \\Vhich is inconsistent with or runs counter to a Directive Principle would incur the reproach of being unreasonble.\n\n[1356 D-FJ\n\n( 4) The concept of public interest must as far as possible receive its orienla.1ion from the Directive Principles. What according to the founding fathers constitutes the plainest requirement of public interest io; set out in the Directive Principles and they embody par excellence the constitutional concept of publicinterest. If, therefore any governmental action is calculated to implement OI'\" give effect to a Directive Principle, it would ordinarily, subject to any other overnding considerations, be informed with public interest. [1356 .A..-H, 1357 Aj\n\n( 5)- Where any governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest and is found to be wanting in the qualities of re3.so~~-' i\" bleness or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to ~\n\nstn1ck do, vn as invali;. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this propo-- sit.ion that the Government cannot act in a manner which \\\\-'Ould benefit a private\n\nparty at the cost of the State; such an action would be both unrea<onable and contrary to public interest.\n\nThe Government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or selJ or Ieae-out its property for a co'1sideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other consider ations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so. Such consi derations may be that some Directive Principle is sought to be advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view, te earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying out a welfare scheme for the benefit of a particular group or section of people deserving it or that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not otherwise fit to be iven the contract at the property. These considerations are referred to only illustratively ---...,,_ fothere may be an infinite varity of considerations which may have. to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is 0tr a total eva'ufltion of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particulars action, that the Court would have t<>' decide whether the action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest. [1357 A-El\n\nBut one basic princiole which must guide the Court in arr1v1ng at its / determination on th:s question is that the is always a presumption that Lh!r' Governmenal action is reasonnble and in public interest and it is for the party1 cha11enging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is nOt informed With public intef'f'st. This burden is a hPavy one and it has to bedic:charged to the sa1i.;; faction of the Court by proper and adequate material.\n\nThe Court cannot lightly assume that the action taken bv the Government is;\n\nunrea.c:onable or without public interest . because, there are a 1arp number of policy considerdtions which must nece.sarily weigh with the Governrltent in taking action and therefore the Court would not strike dowt): governmental action as invalid on this ground, unless it is clearly satisfied that the action is unreasonable or not in public iterest. But where. itis SO' satisfied, it would be the plainest duty of the Court under the Constitution 10' invalidate the govemmenttt•l action. This is one of the most imnortant fu'nc.-- tion of the Court and al•o QDe of the nwst essential for preservation of dw role of law. (1357 E-HJ\n\n... •\n\n< •\n\n.J..\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY v. STATE\"OF J. & K 13.f3\n\nIi iS imperative in a democracy governed by the rule ol law that govemmel!lltl A action must be kept with_in the limits Of the law and if there is any transgres-; sion, the Court must be ready to condemn it, .It is a matter of historical experience that there is a tendency in every government to assume more and more powers and since it is not an uncommon phenomenOn in many countries that the legisllltive ckeck is getting diluted, it is left to the Court as the only other reviewing authority under the Constitution to be increasinglyvigilant to ensure observance with the rule of law and in this task, the Court n1ust not B flin.::h or falter. This ground of invalidity, namely, that the governmental action is unreasonable .or lacking the quality of pub'ic interest, is different from that of mala fides though it may, in a given case, furnish evidence of ma/a (ides. [1358 A-Cl\n\n( 6) The second limitation on the discretion of the Government in. grant of . largess is in regard to the persons to whom such largess may be granted. The C .,, Govemment is not free like an ordinary individual, in selecting the recipients /\"..for its largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it please! in its.\n\nabsolute and unfettered discretion.\n\nThe law Is now well established that the Government need not deal with anyone, but if it does so, it must. do so fairly without discrimination am without unfair procedure.\n\n[1358 C-E]\n\nWhere the Government ia deali.ag with the public, whether by way lilf giving jobs or entering into contract$ or. granting other forms of largess, the D Government cannot act arbitrarily at its. sweet will and, like a private ind.iVi~\n\nchl&l, deal with any personit pleases-,. but its action must be in conformitywith some standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The governmental action must not be arbitrary or capricious, but m1:1St bebased on some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance.\n\n[135& :S-FJ\n\nIn the Wtant case; E\n\nA. The impugned order cannot be said to be disadvantageous to the State or in any way favouring the second respondents at the cost of the State.\n\n[1363 BJ\n\n(i) It was not a tapping contract simpliciter which was intended to be given to the second respondents. The whole object of the itnpugnW onler was to make ava'lable 3500 metric tonnes of resin to the second respondents for ''\\ tile purpose of running the factory to be set up by them.\n\n[1361 H, EJ\n\n~- (ii} 'The advantage to the State was that a new factory for manufacture ' ol :resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives would come up within itstierritmits offerinJ? more job oppcnunities to the State and' increasing their pronerity and augmenting the State revenuesand in addition the State would be assured of a definite supply of at least 1500 metric tonnes of resin for itself without a'ly fiJ'IAnciat involvement or risk and with thi!t additional quantity of resin available to it, it would be able to set up another factory:· creating mi)re employment opportunities.\n\n[1361 E-G]\n\n(ili) The Stat~ would be able to secure extraction of resin from the. ina.:-\n\nciblC areas on the best poSsihle term instead of allowing them to remaia\n\ntQICxploited or given over at Tidiculously h>w royalty.\n\n[1161 E-HJ\n\nH ··\n\n(;.) No huge benefit wa• eonferred on the \"'con<! rospondenr. at tlle cost or Ille State. The 11u1111 of the cmrract made It cre.r t!iat the \"\"'°\"\" respon-\n\n1U4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.tt.\n\nA denll would have to extraot at least 5000 metric tonnes of resin from the blazea allotted to them in order to be entitled to retain 3500 metric tonnes. [Do~ AllJ\n\n(v) Under the impugned order the State would get 1500 metric tonnes of resin at the rate of , Rs. 114 /-per quintal while the second respondent would have to pay at the rate of Rs. 474/- per quintal for the balance of 3500 metric tonnes retained by them.\n\nObviously, a large benefit would accrue to tho State under the impugned Order.\n\nIf the State were to get the b!az s in these inaccessible areas tapped through wage contract, the min:mum cost would be Rs. 175/- per quintal, without taking into account the additional expenditure on account of interest, but under the impugned Order the State would get t 500 metric tonnes of resin at a greatly reduced tale of Rs. 114/- per quintal without any risk or hazard. The State would also receive for 3500 m:tric\n\ntonnes of resin retained by the second respondent 'price or royalty at the rate of Rs. 474/- per quintal which would be much higher than the rate of Rs. 260/· per quintal at which the State was allotting resin to medium scale inJutrial units and the rate of Rs. 320/-per qu!ntal at which it was allotting resin of small scale units within the State.\n\n[1362 G-H, 1363 A-BJ\n\nThe impugned order neither created any monopoly in favour of the second respondent nor imposed unreasonable restriction on tht: right of the D petitioner to carry on tapping business under Article 19(l)(g). [1364 DJ\n\n(i) The impugned Order did not hand over the tapping of the entire forest area in the State exclusively to the 2nd reSpondent so as to deny the opportunity of tapping Goy forest areas to the petitioner. What was done under the impugned order was merely to allot 11,85,414 blazes rn the inac~ cessible areas of Rasi, Ramban and Poonch divisions to the 2nd respondent so that the respondent could have an assured supply of 3500 metric tcnnes\n\nof resin for the purpose of feeding the factory to be set up by them in the State and a large number of blaz\"s amounting to about 60 lacks in other forest areas of the State were left available for tapping by the petitioners and other forest contractors.\n\n[1364 D-01\n\n(ii) The petitioner and otherforest contractors could bid for wage contract in respect of the other blazes which were more than five times in number than the blazes allotted to the second respondent. The pet1t1oners in writ petition 481 of 1979, in fact, obtained a wage contract for extraction of resin from an easily accessible forest in Rajouri Division for the aggi egate sµm of I, Rs. 2,80,250/· in the year 1979-80 and though it is true that the petitionera in writ petition No. 482f.79 did not obtain any wage contract for tapping 1n this year, it was not becauSe blazes were not available -for tapping, but becalise the petitioner did not get ; heir registration renewed. l1364 F-HJ\n\nC. Neither the impugned order in favour, of the second respondents could be said to be arbitrary and unr; sonable. U365 Al\n\n(i) The State was not unjustified in excluding 11,85,414 blazes situated in tbC inaccsible areas of Rasi, Ramban and Poonch divisions from the auc. tiOns, since the past experience showed that e_ven on the basis of royalty without load. it was difficult to attract bidders and the maximum that could be\n\nobtaine~, and that too only in one solitary year. was Rs. 2-55 per blaze without\n\nload, which was an absurdly low return and it was, therefore, felt quite\n\n• •\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE OP J, It K 1345\n\njUstifiably, that it would be futile to include thcoc blazes in the auctions for tapping on wage contract basea. The State also could not award' a contract 1imphci1er for tapping on the basis of royalty with or without load because as a matter of policy, witb a view to encouraging industrialisation, the State did not\n\nwant resin to go outside its territories but wanted it to be used only for the put\n\npoe of feeding industries set up within the State and even if a condition could legitimately be imposed on the contractor that he shou.d sell the resin extract eel and retained by him only to industries within the State, it would be difficult to ensure observance of such condition end moreover the object of the State to make resin available to the local industries at a reasonable price might be f. ustrated, because the contractor taking advantage of scarcity tn supp:y of resin might, and in all probability Would, try to extract a much higher price from the industries needing resin. It was thus found to be an impracticable proposition to tap these blazes either on \\\\Uge contract basis or on the basis of 1 oyalty with or without load. 11365 A-Fl\n\n(ii) The impugned Order W88 unquestionable and without doubt in the interest of the State and even with a microscopic examination er~ in nothing\n\nin it which could possibly incur the reproach of being condemned as arbitrary <ir irrational. 11366 B-Cl\n\nB .\n\n(iii) It is true the.t no advertisements were issued by the State inviting tenders for award of tapping contract in respect of these blazes or stating D that tapping contract would b~ given to any party who is prep;:i.red to put up .a factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives within\n\nthe State, but it was not a tapping contract simpliciter which \\Vas being given by the State. The tapping contract was being given by way of allocation ot raw material for feeding the factory to be set up by the 2nd respOndent. l1366 A-CJ\n\nThe predominent purpose of the transaction was to ensure setting up of E .a. factory by the 2nd respondent as part of the process of industrialh:e.tion of\n\nthe State and since the 2nd respondent wanted assurance of a definite supply of resin as a conditin of putting up the factory, the State awarded the tapping conrtact to the 2nd respondent for that purpose. If the State were giving tap ping contract simpliciter there can be no doubt that the State would have to aucti<.1n or invite tenders for securing the highest price, subject. of course, to HOY other relevant oveniding considerations of publiJ: weal or interest, F but in a case like this where the State is allocating resources such as \\vater, power, raw material etc., for the purpose of encouraging: setting up of industries within the State, the State is nqt bound to advertise and tell the people that it wants a particular iiidustry to be set uo wthin the State and invite those interested to come un wth proposals for the purpose. The State\n\nmay choose to do so if it thinks fit and in a given Situation, it may even tum out to be advantageous for the Sttl1e to do so, but if any private party comes G before the State and offers _to set up an industry, the State would not be com~ olittine brea\"h of anv conc; fitutional or legal ob 1 ition if it negotiates which liJch party and agrees to prov•de resources and other facilities for the purpose of setting up the industry. The State is not obliged to tell such party'. \"P 1P.llSe\n\nit-I will first adv\"rticie, see wh .. th\"r any other offers are forthcoming and then aftf\"f c0nc; idering all off,,.rs. dec:de whether I should let you set up the inducitry'', It _would b\"' moc; t unr,, aJistic to •nsist on such a procedure, particularly H hi an area like Jammu and Kashmir which on account of historical. rolitical\n\nalid other reasons, is not yet fodustrially developed and. where entrepreneurs mve to be Offered attractive terms in Order to ptrsuade them lo set Up an\n\n1346 SUPRllMB COURT REPORTS\n\n£1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA industry.\n\nThe Stale must be free in such a case to negotiate with a prival!>· entreprenetir with a view to inducing him to set up an industry within tbe,: State and if the State enters into a contract with such entrepreneur for pro- ·. viding resources and other facilities for setting up an industry, the contract , cannot be assa1ed as invalid so long as the Stnote has acted bona fide, reason-. ably and in public interest.\n\nIf the terms and conditions of the contract or the surrounding circumstances show that the State has acted ma/a fide or out of\n\n. B, improper or corrupt motive or in order to promote the prhnote interests of some one at the cost of the State, the Court will undoubtedly interfere and\n\nstrik~ down State action as arbitrary, unreasonable or contrary to public interest.\n\nBut so long as the State action is bona fide and reasonable, tbe- Court will not interfere merely on the ground thut no advertisement was giveD: or publicity made or tender> invited.\n\n11366 C-H, 1367 A-DJ\n\nc ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : wr; t Petitions Nos. 481482 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).\n\nK. N. Bhatt for the Pet; tioner.\n\nAltaf Ahmed for Respondent No. 1.\n\nD E. C. Agarwal for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nBnAGWATI, J.-These two writ petitions under Art. 32 of the Con stitution raise questions of some importance in the field of constitu tional law, but they are not exact questions which can be divorced from the facts giving rise to them and in order to resolve them satis factorily, it is necessary to state the facts in some detail. TJ; ough the petitioners in the two writ petitions are different, the respondents are the same and the same Order of the State of J ammu and Kashmir is challenged in both the writ petitions. Hence whatever we say in regard to the first writ petition, applies equally in regard to the second.\n\nThe dispute in these writ petitions relates to the validity of an Order dated 27th Apri~ 1979, passed by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, allotting to the 2nd respondents 10 to 12 lacs blazes annuiilly for extraction of resin from the inaccessible chir forests in Poonch,.\n\nR easi and Ramban Divisions of the State for a period of 10 years on the terms and conditions set out in the Order. The valjdity of the Order has been challenged on various grounds which we shall presently 'set out, but in order to understand and appreciate these grounds, it is neces~. sary to state br:efly the circumstances in which the Order came to be passed by the Government of J ammu and Kashmir. There is a commo dity called Oleo-resin, which we shall hereafter refer shortly as resin,· which is a forest produce extracted from certain spec:es of trees popularly known as chir trees. The process of extraction is called 'tapping'. antl it involves several steps. Chir trees are annually given one or t'il!I)'\n\nllASTUIU LAL LAKSHMI lll!DDY v. STATE OF J. & K. (Bhagwati, !.) 1347 I .\n\nwounds which are technically called blazes and cups and lips are fixed at the bottom of each blaze for collection of resin. The actual collection of resin starts from 1st April an~ ends on 31st October every year. The maximum fiow of resin from blazes is during the months of May and June and in the subsequent months of the working season, namely. July to October, the fiow gradually decreases due to the rainy season followed by fall in temperature. The tapping of resin is a continuous process and the initial blazings have to be followed by freshenings given every week. If the blazes are not freshened regularly, the resin ducts get blocked and the blazes become dry and once a blaze bee: mes dry, the fiow of resin stops completely. The resin that is collected in the cups is transferred to tin containers every week-end or earlier :r required, and the tin containers are then tran, ported to the transit depots fer being carried to the destination. This process of tapping requires employment of skilled labour and involves a considerable amount of exp:nditure.\n\nThe State of Jarnmu and Kashmir started tapping operations in respect\n\nof its chir trees since about 1973 by g'ving contracts to private parties for extraction and collection of resin. The contracts were of three types :\n\n(I) One was contract on wage basis, commonly known as wage contract, which was given by auctioning the blazes to the person who was prepared to undertake the wcrk of extraction and collection of resin at the lowest rates of labour charges and in such contract, the entire res; n extrac ed and collected by the contractor would belong to the State and ·\n\nthe contractor would be entitled only to the wage or labour charges for extraction and collection of resin.\n\n'2) The second type of contract was on the basis cf royalty without load and under th's contract, which was again given by auction stipulating for payment of royalty per bia.le, the entire resin extracted and collected by the contractor would belong to him and he would be free to sell or process it as he liked.\n\n(3) The third type of contract given by the S•ate was on the G basis of royalty with load and under th's contract, which was al<o given by aucti 0 n, the royalty was payable per blaze and out of the resin extracted and collected by the contractor, a certain part would have to be surrendered to the State while the balance would remain with the contractor.\n\nl:very year the State auct'oned the blazes in the different fore<ts within u ter1itory and about 40 per cent of the forests were given on royalty\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nA basis, some with load and some without lead, while the balance of about\n\n60 per cent were given on wage contract ba, is.\n\nThe resin, wh.ch was thus obtained by the State by giving out blazes on contract whether on royalty-cum-load or on wage basis, was auctioned by the State !rem time to time ard manu.acturers hav ng factories for manufactures of resin, turpentine and other derivatives purchased it at the auctions. It is common ground that most of these purchasers were manufacturers having their factories in Hoshiarpur district of Punjab and at the material time, they depended for their requirement of raw-material solely on the resin available at the auct.on held by the State since supply of resin had ceased to be available from Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh on account of the policy adopted by the Governments in these territories.\n\nThe State, however, in furtherance of its policy to bring about rapid indus ria'irnti n, dee ded that from the year 1979-80 onwards, the resin extracted from its forests should not be allowed to be exported outside the territories of the S ate and should be utilised only by industries set up w thin the Sta e. The sate n fact entered into contracts with three manufacturers, namely, Prabhat Turpentine and Synthetics Pvt. Ltd., Dujodwala Resin and Turpentine Pvt. Ltd. and Pine Chemicals Ltd. under wh'ch these three manufacturers agreed to pvt-up factories in the State for mannfacture of resin, turpent ne and other derivat, ves and the State agreed to make available to them respectively an assured supply of 4,000, 3500 and 8000 metric tonnes of resin per year. The validity of thece contracts was challenged before us in _writ petitions Nos. 37-38 of 1979, but these writ peti ions were d smissed by us by an Order made on 21-12-79. The Sate had a'so ccmmitments to supply resin to its own concern, namely, J & K Indus tr.es L d., which was running a factory for manufacture of resin and turpentine as also to various small scale units wh ch were set-up in the State. It appears that the total requirements of the State for the purpose of meeting these commitments was in the pdghbourhood of 24,000 metric tonnes of resin.\n\nNow ir. view of the fact that quite a large n11mber of forests were being given out by the State for tapping on royalty contract basis, sometimes wth load and som'times ern without I ad, the aggrega e quant ty of resin whicli was being collected by the state was very much short of the total requirement of 24,000 metr:c tonnes and it was. therefore, felt to be abrnlutely necessary for the State to increase its procurement of resin so as to be able to meet its commitments. With this end in view a meeting of the Chief Conservator of forests and other forest officials was held on 9th December, 1978 for the purpose of discu'sng ways and means for achieving a higher target of production of resin. Jt Wai decided at this meeting that the increaect target of production could be achieved only through replacement of royalty contracts by wage con-\n\n.)(ASTUlll LAL LAKSHMI IU!DDY v. STATE OP J.\"' K (Bhagwati, J.) 1349\n\ntrncts wherever possible and hence in future blaze should be auctioned A\n\nfor tapping only on wage con\\f'dct basis.\n\nNow there were certa.n fores's in Reasi and Ramban Divisions of the State which were difficult of acce8s on acccunt of their & tance from the roads and so were some forests in the Poonch Division near the line of actual control. So far as the forests in the Rea i Division were con- ' a\n\ncerned, there were 6,08,115 blazes which were attempted to be given for tapp:ng in the year 1976-77 on rcyalty contract bas, s w'thcut load but out of them only 1,28,856 blazes were tzken by one Prem Kumar\n\nSood and that too on a royalty of only Rs. 2.55 per blaze, as against royalty of about Rs. 6/- per blaze obtained by the State in other inaccessible areas by giving contract on royal y basis with I' ad cf 3 Kg.\n\nC per blaze. Moreover, these 1,28,856 blazes were situate in the lower reaches of inaccessible forests and no contractors could be found for taking tapping contracts. even on the basis of royalty without load, for blazes in the h:gher regions of the inaccessible areas. The same 1,28,856 blazes were again put-up for auction for the year 1977-78, hut D no bidders came forward to take a contract even on royal y with0ut load basis. Then for the year 1978-79, out of these 1,28,856 biazes, 72.951 blazes were once again pu'-up fer auction and thrugh th'se were situate in less inaccessible areas than the rest of the blazes, the response\n\nwas most diecouraging and no one came forward to make a bid for taking the contract even on royalty basis without le ad.\n\nThe result was that practically no tapping was dcne frcm these 6,08,115 blazes in the forests of the Reasi Division upto 1979-80. There were also sorre new k blazes marked in the forests of the Reasi D.vi ion for the year 1979-80 and out of them, 4,20,340 blazes were in areas which were inaccess'ble on account of their being at a distance of 8 to 40 k.ms. frcm !he roadside. Even out of the o'd 6,08,115 blazes there were 3,10,674 blazes which were situate in the same ca' egory of inaccessible areas. So far as the forests in the Ramban Divis.on are ccncerned, :here were 1,24,400 blaze:, which were equally inaccessible \"due to long lead upto coupe boundanes and transit depots\" and the position in regard lo 3,30,000 blazes which were under tapp'.ng in Poonch Division, was also similar\n\nto that of the inaccessible areas in Reas[ and Ramban Divisions \\\\ ith the additional handicap of their being situate along the line of actual control. There were thus in all about I l,85,414 blazes ; n the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions which were in inaccessible areas and having regard to the high cost of extraction and collection of resin as also the scarcity of trained labour in those areas, it was not poss'ble to give out these blazes by auction on wage contract basis. The past experience showed that even on the basis of royalty without load, contractors were not forth-coming for taking contracts in respect of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n11980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nblazes in the inaccessible areas of the Reasi Division and giving out of the aforesaid blazes in the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions on wage contract basis was, therefore, almost an impdssible proposition, The Chief Conservator of Forests and other forest officers accordingly decided at their meeting of December 9, 1978 that these blazes could not be tapped through wage contract because \"apart from the total non-availablity of local Jabour in these areas, cost of production due to long lead upto coupe boundaries and transit depots would be prohibitive\" and all such areas should, therefore, be excluded from tapping wage contracts.\n\nThese decisions taken in the meeting of 9th December, 1978 were confirmed at a subsequent meeting which took place between the Fomt Minister, the Forest Secretary, the Chief Conservator of Forests and 1other forest officers on 26th December, 1978. It was further decided in this meeting that \"the departmental tapping through wage contracts should be confined to accessible chir forests\" only and so far as 11,85,414 blazes in the inaccessible areas of the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions were concerned, the consensus was that \"these blazes should allotted to some private party as procurement of resin from them through wage contracts was not feasible, being difficult and costly\" and \"the financial status and experience in extraction of resin from forests and its distillation in the factory should be decisive factors\" in regard to such allotment.\n\nNow it is necessary to point out that, prior to the date of this meeting, the 2nd respondents had addressed a letter dt. 15th April 1978 to the Minister for Industries, offering to setup a factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives in the State \"with the latest know-how under t11e supervision of the State Government\" and seeking allotment of 10,000 metric tonnes of F resin annually for that purpose.\n\nThe 2nd respondents pointed out in their ktter that they possessed vast exper'ence in processing of resin and re-processing of resin and turpentine oil and manufacture of a wide range of derivatives, since they had 2 factories for manufacture of resin and turpentine oil, one in Hoshiarpur and the other in Delhi and more-\n\nG over, they had also been working as resin extraction contractors since 197 4 antl were also bulk purchasers of resin at the auctions held by the state. It was also stated by the 2nd respondents that they had reliably learnt that Camphor and Allied Products Ltd. and Prabhat General Agencies were being considered by the State for allotment of resin to feed the units to be set-up by them within the State and they expressed their willingness to take the allotment df resin for their proposed factory U on the same terms and conditions. This offer of the 2nd respondents was forwarded to the Forest Minister, but despite the policy of the Slate !o encourage setting-up of resin:based industrial ullits in the State, it\n\nI (\n\n', ll, f\n\n'' ,, :\n\n.. ~ASl'UB.l LAL LAKSlJMI IU!4ll)l' v. STATE pp J, it K (Bhagwati, J.)1351\n\n; was not found possible, having regard to the commitments already .made by the State, to .make any allotment of resin to the 2nd respondents. A was, therefore, mooted by the forest offic; ah that about 10 to ..1£ lacs blazes in inaccesaible areas could be made available for tapping\n\nto the 2nd respondents on certain terms and conditions, so that out of\n\n.the .quantity tapped, a certain portion could be retained by the 2nd res- ·{IDlldents for be:ng utilised in the factory to be .set-up by them within .the State and the balance could be surrendered to the Government. The 2nd respondents were .agreeable to this proposal and in fact\n\nthey put it forward as an alternative proposal for consideration by the Stale, but no decision was taken on it until the meeting of 26th\n\nDecember, 1978.\n\nWhen, as a re!il/!t of di&cnssions at this meeting, c .the consensus was reached that 11,85,414 blazes in the inaccessible\n\nareas of Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions should be allotted to some private party for ensuring supply of resin to be utilised in the\n\nfactory to be set-up by such party within the State, !he proposal of the 2nd respondents was considered alongwith the applications of some others including the petitioners in the light of the factors agreed upon lit the meeting and having regard to the vast experience of the 2n~ 1'espondents in extraction and processing of resin and in view <if the fact that they were large purchaser_s of resin at the auctions held by the State, it was decided that the case of the 2nd respondents should be processed for submission to the Government.\n\nIt appears that J & K Resin Contractors Association (hereinafter referred to as the association) came to know sometime in October, 1978 that the 2nd respondents had approached the State Government\n\n1111d .there was a propllSal to allot to them \"certain resiri coupes on royalty system of 10 years\" on the basis that they would install a ftctory for manufacture of resjn and turpentine at J ammu w:th sizable investment. The association thereupon added a letter to the Chief • Minister in Ocotber, 1978 pamplaining against giving of contract to\n\nan outllide party by private negotiations and pleading that contract, Whether on royalty basis or otherwise, should be given only by open \"• 11uction. It is significant to note that no offer was made by the association in this letter to set up a resin-based industrial unit in the ')tate and the only plea was that tapping contract should not be given by \"\"\"'* 1 'PfiV&te negutiations to a non-state party; but should be given only by open auction. Since the decision was taken at the meetings of 9th :December, 1976 ana 26th Dl:cember, 1978 that blazes in\"the inacces. -sible areas of Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions should not bel -given on wage contract basis, they were excluded from the auctions -held by the State and the association, therefore, addressed .a letter ; Jfated 22nd Jannuaryi 1979 to the Chief Conservator of Forests\n\n1352 SUPREME COURT l\\l!PORTS C1980] 3 s.c.a..\n\nrequesting . him to include these blazes in the auctions. This was. followed by another letter dated 5th Febru1ry, 1979' addressed by the association to the Forest Minister where the request for inclusiou of these blazes in the auctions was repeated by the association.\n\nThe assoclat:on also pleaded with the Forys! Minister that instead of adopting the wage contract method for giving out blazes for tapping contracts, \"The system of rciyalty contract with increased load\"' should be continued in the forests divisions including Reasi, Ramban and Poonch. The same request was repeated by the association : n a letter dated 8th March, 1979 addressed to the Chief Minister. There was obviously no reply to these communications since it had already been decided that tapoing of blazes in the accessible chir forests should be done only through wage contracts and 11,85,414 b'azes ini the inaccess'ble areas of Reasi Ramban and Poonch Divisions shculd be allotted to some private party, which was prepared to set-up a factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine and other derivatives in the State.\n\nThe 2nd respondents presumably, on coming to kn0w that their alternative proposal for allotment of 10 to 12 lacs blazes in inaccessible areas was being processed by the Government, addressed a letter dated 22nd February, 1979 to the Secretary to the Forest Department formulating the broad terms of the proposal and' requesting the State Government to cons der the proposal favourably and come to a decision immediately. since the tapping season was commencing from 1st April, 1979. The association by its letter dated'\n\n18th March, 1979 addressed to the Chief Min; ster pretested aainst the blazes in the Reasi, Ramban ard Poonch Divisions being gven to• the 2nd respondents by negotiations on royalty basis for 10 years and urged that doing so would be contrary to Wie interests of the local contractors and local labour and \"will also be a source of huge loss to the Government exchequer\" since the price of resin was increasing . day by day.\n\nOnce again a plea was made by the association that these blazes should be' given out for tapping contract by public auction. The petitioners also complained to the Chief Minister by a letter addressed in March, 1979 against giving of contract to the 2nd respondents who were an outside party and offered to take \"all the unt1ooed forests in the State 0n 2 to 3 years' lease on r<'tational bas's\" stating that they would pay 50 oaise per blaze more than that offered under any other proposal and that out of the quantity tapped by them they would retain 3,000 metric tonnes which thev 'Would utilise for manufacturing resin, turpentine oil artd other derivatives in a new modem factol')< tc, be set-up by them in some backward are• of the\n\nState. The State did not acoept this offer made by the P!ltitioners and\n\n.. ,,.\n\n KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATI! OF J, & K (B/tagwaJi, /.).1353\n\ndecided to go ahead with giving tapping contrac~ in respeC1j of these\n\nblazes to the 2nd respoodnts.\n\nThe State accordingly, passed an Order dated 27th April, 1979 sanctioning allotment of 11.85 lacs blazes in the inaccessible areas of Reasi, Ram.ban and Poonch Divisions to the 2nd respondents for a period of 10 years on the terms and conditions set out in the ordei: •\n\nThe 2nd respondents were required by clause II (iii) of the Orde1 to surrender 25 % of the annual resin collected by them, subject to a minimum of 1500 metric tonnes per annum, to the State for feeding . the new resin 4istfilation plant which J & K Industries Ltd. proposed\n\nto set up Rajouri/Sunderbani and they could retain the balance of c _X the extracted resin subject to a maximum of 3500 metric tonnes per annum. Clauses lI (iv) and V of the Order provided that the 2nd respondents shall set-up a resin distillation plant in the small scale sector for processing of npto 3500 metric tonnes of resin and the extracted resin which is allowed to remain with them under the Order shall be utilised only in the plant to be set-up by them and shall not be removed outside the State. Clause Il(v) of the Order stipulated that the 2ud respondents shall : 1,\n\n\"(a) be paid the same wages for part of the resin extracted\n\nand delivered to the depai:\\!nnt as would be sanctioned by the Forest Department from Ytlll! to year for other departmental resin extruction contracts for the adjoining blocks in the respective locality;\n\n{b) get proportionate rebate in royalty on the quantity thus surrendered (i.e. no royalty shall be charged for. such quantity) ; and\n\n( c) deliver such resin at the JKL factory at Rajouri/ Sunderbani fur which no transport charges will. be allowed.\n\nCause m provided that the price of resin retained by the 2nd respon\" dents shall be Rs. 350/- per quintal and it shall be subject to review . G. after three years and every year thereafter and so far as the royalty is concerned, Clause IV stated that it shall be worked out by a com- . mittee, the basis of calculation being the cost of resin extraction. and collection in adjoining areas given ont on wage-contracts from year to year and the sale price of resin as fixed at Rs. 350/- . per quinta!, fur a period of three years after which it shall be reviewed annually.\" H This Order made by the State Government is being challenged in the present pet:tions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\n27-610 SCI/80\n\n1354 SUPIUlME COURT ~EPORTS\n\n\nA There were in the main three grounds on which the validity of\n\nthe Order was assailed on behalf of the petitioners. They were as. follows:\n\n(A) That the Order1is ar_]]itrary, nialafide and not in public interest, inasmuch as a huge benefit has been conferred on the 2nd respondents at the cost of the State.\n\n(B) The Onler creates monopoly in favour of the 2nd respondents who or a private party and constitutes unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on tapping contract business under Art. J 9 (I) (g) of the Constitution.\n\n(C) The State has acted arbitrarily in selecting the 2nd' respondents for awanling tapping contract, without affording any opportunity to others to compete for obtaining such contract and this action of the State is not based on any rational or relevant principle and is therfore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution as also of the rule of administrative law which inhibits arbitrary action by the State.\n\nWe shall examine these grounds in the order in which we have set them out. but, before we do so, we may preface what we have to say by making a few preliminary observations in regard to the law on tho: subject.\n\n'It was pointed out by this Court in \"Ramana Dayaram' Shetty v.\n\nx_.·\n\nThe International Airport Autlwrfty of India & Ors.''(') that with the growth of the welfare state, new forms of property in the shape of 1\" Government largess are developing, since the Government is increasingly ass\\:mllng the role of regulator and dispenser of social services( and provider of a large number of benefits including jobs, contracts, licences, quotas, mineral rights etc.? There is increasing expansion of' the magnitude and range' of , governmental functions, as we move G closer to the welfare state, and the result is that more and more of our .( wealth consists of these new forms of property. Some of these forms of wealth may be in the nature of legal rights but the large majority of them are in the nature of privileges. The la>y has however not been ~·~ slow to recognise the importance of this new kind of wealth and tile need to protect individual interest in it and with that end in view, it B has developed new forms of protection. Some interests in Government largess, formerly regarded as privileges, 1\\ave been recognised:\n\n(1) [1979] 3 S C. R. 1014.\n\nXASTURI LAL LAKSHMI ltl!DDY v. STATE OF J. & K (Bhagwati, J.) 1355\n\nall rights, while others have been given legal protection not only by A forging procedural safeguards but also by confining, structuring and checking Government discretion in the matter of grant of such largess.\n\nThe discretion of the Government has been held to be not unlimited in that the Government cannot give largess in its arbitrary discretion or as its sweet will or on sucl'.I terms a8 it chooses in its absolute discretion.\n\nThere are two limitations imposed by law which structure B and control the discretion of the Goemment in this behalf. The fits! is in rgard to the terms on which largess maY be granted and the other, m regard to the. persons who may be receipients of such largess.\n\nSo far as the first limitation is conce!ned, it fiows directly from the '}::, thesis that, unlike a private individual, the State cannot act as it pleases in the matter of giving largess. Though onlinarilyi a private individual wotild be guided by economic considerations of self-gain in any action taken by him, it is always open to him under the law to act contrary to his self-inte1cst or to oblige another in entering into a contract or dealing with his property. But the Gdvernment is not free to act as it lil:es in granting largess such as awarding a contract or selling or leasing out its property.\n\nWhatever be its activity, the Government is still the Government and is, subject to restraints inherent in its position in a democratic society. The constitutional power confened on the Government cannot be exercised by it arbitrarily or capriciously or in and unprincipled manner; it hllS to be exercised for the public good.\n\nEvery activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must therefore, be informed with reason. and guided by public interest.\n\nEvery action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the 6overriment cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does,\n\nits action wouTci be liable to be invalidated. If the Government awards a contract or leas'es out or otherwi!le deals with its property or grants any other largess, it would be liable to be tested for its validity on the\n\n~ touch-stone of reaSo!lableness and public interest and if it fail~ to ' satisfy either best, it would be unconstitutional and invalid.\n\nNow what is the test of reasonableness which has to be applied in order to determine the validity of governmental action. It ts un-\n\n. G doubtedly true, as poirited out by Patanjali Shastri, J. in State of Madra.i 'v. V. G, Rau,(') that in forming his own conception of what is reasonable, in all the dreumstaDccB of. a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the acale of values of the judge participating in the decision, would play an important part, but even so, the test of reasonableness is not a wholly subjective test and its con- H tours are fairly indicilted by the Constitution. The concept of reason-\n\n(I) [1952] SCR 597.\n\n1356 SUPREMI!: COUltT REPORTS\n\n\nA ableness in fact pervades the on.tire constitutional scheme. The interaction of Arts. 14, 19 and 21 lllfl, YiC(lby this Conrt in Maneka Galtdhi\n\nv. Union of India('), clearly dclllOllltratea that the requirement of im.ronableness runs like a golden thread through the entire fabric of fundamental rights and, as several decisions of this Court show, 1his concept of reasonableness finds ilii positive manifestation and expces- B sion in the lofty ideal of social and economic justice which inspires and animates the Directive Principle&. It has been laid down by< this Court in E. P. Royappai v. State of Tamil Nadu,(2) and Maneka Gand/u's case (supra) that Art. 14- ~!riles at arbitrariness in Sl!lte action and since the princip~ of rusonableness and rationality, which .c\n\nis legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, is pro(jected byi this article, it must characterise ,,,~ every governmental action, whether it be under the authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law.\n\nSo also the concept of reasonableness runs through the totality of Art. 19 and requires that restrictions on the freedoms of the citizen, in order to be permissible, must at the best be reasonable. Similarly Art. 21 in the full plenitude of its activist magnitude as discovered by Manelca Gandhi's case, insists that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in. accordance with procedure established by Jaw and such procedure must be rea.wnable, fair and just. The Directive Principles concretise and give shape to the concept of reasonableness envisaged in Articles 14, 19 and 21 and other articles enumerating the fundamental rights.\n\nBy defining the national aims and the constitutional goals, they setforth the standards or norms of reasonableness which must guide and animate governmental action. Any action taken by the Government with a view to giving effect to any one or more .of the Directive Principles would ordinarily, subject to any constitu- F tional or legal inhibitions or other over-riding considerations, qualify\n\nfor being regarded as reasonable, while an action which is inconsistent f with or runs counter to a Directive Principle would incur the reproach of being wrreasonable. ' · ..\n\nI So also the concept of public interest must as far as possible receive its orientation from the Directive Principles. What according to the founding fathers constitutes the plainest requirement of public interest is set out in the Directive Principles and they embody par excellence the constitutional concept of public interest. If, therefoce, any\n\ngovernmental action is calculated t1> ilmplement or give effect to a\n\n(1) [1978] 2 SCR. 621.\n\n(~) (1974] 2 SCR. 348.\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY v. SYATI! OF J. & K. (Bhagwati, /,) 1357\n\nDirective Principle, it would. ordinarily, subject to any other ovC{f' A riding considerations, be informed with public interest. ·\n\nWhere any governmental action tails to satisfy the test of reason- . ableness and public interest discusaed above and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableneSI or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost. of the State; such an actilon would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest.\n\nThe Government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of coune there are other comiderations which render \\t fe\\\\SOnable and in public interest to do so.\n\nSuch considerations' may be that some DirectiY~ Principle is sought to be advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view to earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying out a welfare scheme for the benefit at. a particular group or section of people deserving it o~ that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not otherwise fit to be given the contract 0r the property. We have referred to these considerations only illustratively, for there may be an iinfinite variety of consideratiOllS which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the Court would have to decide whether the action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest.\n\nBut one basic principle which must guide the Court in arriving at its detennination on this question is that there is always a presumptioo tkat the Governmental action is rble and in public ineat and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public interest: This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged tci the satisfaction of the Court by proper and adequate material.\n\nThe Court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is unreasonable or without. public interest because, as we said above, there are a large number of policy considerations which must necessarily weigh with the Government in taking action and therefore tho Court would not strike down governmental action as invalid on this ground, unleM it is clearly satisfied that the action is unreasonable or not in public interest.\n\nBut where it is so satisfied, it would be the pla.ines.t duty\n\nof the Court under the Constitution to invalidate the governmenta.l B action.\n\nThis is one of the most important functions of the Court anll also one of the most essential for preservatim ol the. rule of law.\n\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R,\n\nIt is imperative. in a democracy governed by the rule of law that f!l:Y\n\nvernmental action must be kept within the limit~ of the law if t~ is any transgression, the Court must be ready to condemn it. It is a matter of historical experience that there is a tendency in every government to assume more and more powers and since it is not an uncommon phenomenon in countries: that the legislative check is getting diluted, it is le¥'! to the Court as the only other reviewing authority under the Constitution to be increasingly vigilant to ensure observance with the rule of law and in tl1iB task, the court must not flinch or falter. It may be pointed out that this gronnd of invalidity, namely, that the governmental action is unreasonable or lacking in the quality of public interest, is different from that of mala-(ides '#' though it may, in a given case, furnish evidence of mala-fides. ~\n\nThe second limitation on the discretion of the Government in grant of largess is in regard to the persons to whom such largess may he granted. It is now well settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Ramona D. Shelly v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (supra) that the Government is not free like an ordinary individual, in selecting the recipients for its largess and it cannot choose to deal with any person it pleases in its abs<>lute and unfettered discretion. The law iS now well established that the Government need not deal with anyone, but id'. it does so, it must do so faidy without discrimination and without unfair procedure. Where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way 'of giving jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms of largess, the Government ernnot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its actioq must be ill conformity with some standard or norm which is not arbitrary, mational or irrelevant.\n\nThe governmental action must not be arbitrary , or capricious, but must be based on some principle which meets the ' r test of reason and relevance This rule was enunciated by the Court f, as a rule of administrative law and it Was also validated by the Courll' as an emanation flowing directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Art. 14.\n\nThe Court referred to the activist magnitude of Art. 14 as evolved in E. P. Royapp(i v. Sttite of Tamil Nadu (supra) and Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) and observed that it must follow • \"as a necessary corollary from the p<:inciple of equality enshrined in Art. 14 that though the State is entitled to refuse' td enter into relationship with anyone, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily , choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness and non-discrimination and any departure from such standard or\n\nKASTURI LAL. LAKSHMI REDDY v. STATI! OF J. & Ko (Bluigwa.t.i, J.)1359 ' '\n\nprinciple would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on BOme rational and non-discriminatory> ground.\" This decision reaftirmed the principle of reasonableness and non-arbitrarine!ls in\n\n.Agovernmental action which lies at the core of our entire constitutional scheme and structure.\n\nIt is in the light of ihese two limitations on the discretiton of th~ Government in the matter of grant of !!rgess that we must proceed to examine the grounds of attack urged on behalf of the petitiop.ers.\n\nRe Ground A: The argument under this head of challenge was that the State h(id . under the impugned Order. granted tapping c01; itmct to the 2nd res- .'°\"' pondents on terms which were highly disadvantageous to the State\n\n./'-and involved considerable loss of f(Wenue to the Government exchequer. 1be petitioners contended that the price of resin realised at the auction held in December 1978 was Rs. 484/- per quintal; it was Rs. 520/- per quintal at the auc; tion h<; ld in January 1979 and it rose to Rs. 720/- per quintal at the auction held in April 1979 but des-\n\n. pite this phenomenally high price which could have been obtained D in auctibn, the State chose to sell resin to the 2nd respondents at a low price of Rs. JSOiper quintal foe a period of 3 years under the impugned Order, conferring huge benefits on the 2nd respondents at the cost of the Government exchequer. The impugned Order therefore, said the petitioners, was wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to public interest and was liable to be struck down as invalid.\n\nE This argument plausible though it may seem at. first blush, is in our opinion not well founded and a closer look at the facts will clearly show that it cannot be sustained.\n\nWe may first clear the ground by stating a few undisputed facts.\n\nThe practice which was being followed by the State until the yeru: F ., 1979-80 wa§ to give out blazes in the chir forests either on wage l contract basis or on royalty basis with or without load.\n\nThe result was that about 50 per cent of the resin extracted used to be take~ away 1\\Y the contractoi:s and the balance of 50 per cent remained \\ with tht) State which the State partly made available to its ow'n faotories and small scale units in the State and partly sold by auotioni G and out of the quantity auctioned the bulk was purchased by manu-\n\n~ \"f facturers having factories in Hoshiarpur. It appears that from about 1975 onwards the State embarked upon a policy of industrialisation and in furtherance of this policy, it decided some time in the later half of J 978, that from the year 1979-80, no resin should be allowed\n\nto be expotted outside the Stare tecritories and that it should be' H made available for being utilised ooly in industries set up witJ¥n the State. But this measure by itself was not enough, because so long as\n\nSUPREME COURT ~EPORTS\n\n\ncontracts for extracting resin were given on royalty basis with oc without lood, a sizable quantity of resin extracted would g0 into the hands of the contractors and would not become avail.able to the State for fulfilling its commitments.\n\nThe State, thereifore, decid!P as a matter of policy to replace royalty can.tracts by wage contracts\n\nwherever pos&ble and to auction blazes for tapping only on wagei contracts basis. But, as pointed out a_bove, there were certain forests in Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions which were difficult of access\n\non account of their distance from the roads and some of the foresta in Poonch Division were near the line of actual control and consequently it was found impracticable to give them for tapping on wage\n\nconact basis. It. was difficult .to give th\".111 for tapping even on thq .#' ba&tS of royalty without load and the maxunum that could be obtain- /'\\._ ed for a part of the blaz.es in the Reasi, Division in the year 1976-77 was royalty of Rs. 2.55 per blaze without load. It was, therefore, decided by the State to exclude about 11,85,414 blazes in the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions from tapping through wage contract and they were kept out of the auctions held by the State.\n\nThe Association undoubtedly made representations requesting the State to include these blazes in the auctions, but as is evident from the letters dated 5th February 1979 and 8th March 1979 addressed respectively to the Forest Minister and the Chief Minister, the emphasis of the Association was that 'the system ofj working should be changed from wage contract to royalty contract\" and that these blazes should be put to auction on royalty basis. Tire State obviously, in view of its policy, could not accede to this request made on behalf of the Association and since, having regard to past experience, it was felt that it would be futile to offer these blazes for tapping through wage contract, the State was not unjustified in not including them in the auctions. Now the second respondents offered to set up a factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives in the State and requested /'\n\nto State to make allotment Qf resin annually fur this purpose on the f same terms and conditions on which allotment was propos~ to be< made to Camphor and Allied Products Ltd. and Prabhat General Agencies.\n\nThe State, in view of its policy of Industrialisation, was interested in the setting up of the factory by the second respondents, particularly since! the second respondents had two factoriesfor manu- . facture of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives and they possessed larger experience in processing of resin and reprocessing of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives.\n\nBut, having regard to the commitments already llll!de by it, it was not possible H for the State to make any definite allotment of resin to the second respondents. The State, however, had these blazes in the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions which it was finding impracticable to tap\n\nI l\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY v. STATE OF J. & K (Bhagwati, !.) 1361\n\ntllrough wage clmtraet and the State, therefore, decided to give them for tapping to the second respondents on certain terms and conditions, so that th~ second responde11ts could if they were prepared to tap these blazes in inaccessible areas, secure an assured supply of 3500 metric tonnes of resin for the purpose of the factory to be set up by them within the State.\n\nIt was in these circumstances that the impugned Order dated 27th April 1979 ciµne to be passed by the State.\n\nIt is clear from the back-drop of the facts and circumstances in which the impugned Order came to be made and terms and conditions set out in the impugned prder that it was not a tapping contract simpliciter which was intended to be given to the second respondents.\n\nThe second respondents wanted to be assured of regular supply of raw material in the shape of resin before they could decide to set up a factory within the State and it was for the purpose of ensuring supply of such raw material that the impugned Order was made giving tapping contract to the second respondents. It was really by way of allocation of raw material for running the factory that the impugned Order was passed.\n\nThe terms of the impugned Order show beyond doubt that the second respondents were under an obligation to set up a factory within the State and that 3500 metric tonnes of resin which was permitted to be retained by the 8econd respondents out of the resin extracted by them was required to be utilised in the factory to be set up by them and it was provided that no part of the resin extracted should be allowed to be removed outside the State.\n\nThe whole object of the impugned Order was to make available 3500 metric tonnes of resin to the second respondents for the purpose of running the factory to be set up bY' them. The advantage to the State was that a new factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives would come up within its terriiories offering more job opportunities to the people of the State increasing their prosperity and augmenting the State revenues and in addition the State would be assured of a definite supply of at !east 1500 metric tonnes of resin for itself without any financial involvement or risk and with this addition.al quantity of resin available to it, it would be able to set up another factory creating more emploYll!ent opportunities and, in fact, as the counter affidavit of Ghulam Rasul, under secretary to the Government filed on behalf of the State shows the Government lost no time in taking steps to set up a public sector resin distillation plant in a far tlung area of the State, namely, Sundarbani, in Rajouri District.\n\nMoreover, the State would be able to secure extraction of resin from these inaccessible areas on the best possible terms instead of allowing them to remain unexploited or given over at ridiculously low fOYll:lty.\n\nWe cannot accept the contention of the petitioners tht under the im-\n\n\npugned Order a huge benefit was conferred on the second respondents at the cost of the State. It is clear from !he terms of the impugned\n\nOrder that the second respondents would have to extract at least 5000 metric .tonnes of resin from the blazes allotted to them in order to be entitled to retain 3500 metric tonnes.\n\nThe counter affidavit al Ghulam Rasul on behalf of the first respondent and Guran Devaya Oii behalf of the second respondents show that the estimated cost of extraction and collection of resin from these inaccessible areas would be at the least Rs. 175/- per quintal, though according to Guran Devaya it would be in the neighbourhood of Rs. 200 per quintal, but even if we take the cost at the minimum figure of Rs. 175 / per quintal, the total cost of extraction and collection would come to Rs. 87,50,000, iand on this .investment of Rs. 87 ,50,000 /- required to be made by the second respondents the amount of interest at the prevailing bank rate would work out to about Rs. 13,00,000/-. Now, as against this expenditure of Rs. 87,50,000/- plus Rs. l3,00,000/- the second respondents would be entitled to claim from the State, in respect of 1500\n\nmetric tonnes of resin to be delivered to it only at the rate sanctioned by the Forest Department for the adjoining accessible forests which were being worked on wage contract basis.\n\nIt is stated in the counter affidavits of Ghulam Rasul and Guran Devaya and this statement is not seriously challenged on behalf of the petitioners, that the cost of extraction and collection as sanctioned by the Forest Department for the adjoining accessible forests given on wage contract basis in the year 1979-78 was Rs. 114 /- per quintal and the second respondents would, thus, be entitled to claim from the State no more than Rs. 114/- per quintal in respect of 1500 metric tonnes to be delivered to it and apart from bearing the difference between the actual cost of extraction and collection and the amount received from the State at the rate of Rs. 114/- per quintal in respect of 1500 metric tonnes, the second respondents would have to pay the price of the remaining 3500 metric tonnes to be retained l:iy them at the rate of Rs. 350/- per quintal. On this reckoning, the cost of 3500 metric tonnes to be retained by the second respondents would work out at Rs. 474/- per quintal.\n\nThe result would be that under the impugned OrdeL the State would get 1500 metric tonnes of resin at the rate of Rs. 114 /- per quintal while the second respondents would have to pay at the rate of Rs. 474/- per\n\nquintal for the balance of 3500 metric tonnes retained by thelll.\n\nObviously, a large benefit wouhl accrue to the State under the impngJled Order. If the State were to get the blazes in these inaccessible area.> tapped through wage contract, the minimum cost would be Rs. 175/- per quintal, without taking into account the additional expenditure on account of interest, but under the impugned Order the State would get\n\n1500 metric tones of resin at a greatly reduced rate of Rs. 114/- per\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY v. STATE OF J. & K (Bhagwati, l.) 1363\n\nquintal without any risk or hazard. The State would also receive for\n\n3500 metric tonnes pf resin retained by the 2nd respondents price or royalty at the rate of 474/- per quintal which would be much higher than the rate of Rs. 260/- per quintal at which the State was allottiog\n\nresin to medium scale industrial units and the rate of Rs. 320/- pe~ quintal at which it was allotting resin to small scale units within the State. It is difficult to see how on these facts the impugned Order could be said to be disadvantageous to the State or in any way favouring the second respondents at the cost of the State. The argument of the petitioners was that at the auctions held in December 1978, January 1979 and April 1979, the price of resin realised was as much as Rs. 484/\", Rs. 520/- and Rs. 700/- per quintal respectively and when the market price was so high, it was improper and contrary to public interest on the part of the State to sell resin to the second respondents at the rate of Rs. 320/- per quintal under the impugned Order. This argument, plausi11!e though it may seem, is fallacious because it does not take into account the policy of the State not to allow export of resin outside its territories but to allot it only for use in factories set up within the State. It is obvious that, in view of this policy, no resin would be auetioned by the State and there would be no question of sale of resin in the open market and in this situation, it would be totally irrelevant to import the concept of market price with reference to which the adequacy of the price charged by the State to the 2nd respondents could be judged. If the State were simply selling resin, there can be no doubt that the State must endeavour to obtain the highest price subject, of course, to any other overriding conmderations of public interest and in that event, its action in giving resin to a private individual at a lesser price would be arbitrary and contrary to public inte, rest. But, where the State has, as a matter of policy, stopped selling resin to outsiders and deci<jed to allot it only to industries set np within the State for the purpose of encouraging industrialisation, there can be no scope for complaint that the State is giving resin at a lesser price than that which could be obtained in the open market. The yardstick of price in the open market would be whoHy inept, because in view of the State policy, there would be no question of any resin being sold in the open market. The objeet of the State in such a case is not to earn revenue from sale of resin, but to promote the setting up of industries within the State.\n\nMoreover, the prices realised at the auctions held in December 1978, January 1979 and April 1979 did not reftect the correet and genuine price of resin, because by the time these auctions came to be held, it had become known that the State had taken a policy decision to ban export of resin from its territories with effect from 1979-80 and the price8 :realised at the auctions were therefore scarcity prices. In fact, tire\n\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R',\n\nA auction held in April 1979 was the last auction in the State and since it was known that in future no resin would be available for saie\" by auction in the open market to outsiders, an unduly high price of Jo.\n\nRs. 700/· per quintal was offered by the factory owners having their factories outside the State, o that they would get as much resin or the )..\n\n~ purpose of feeding their industrial units for some time. The counter B affidavits show that, in fact, the average sale price of resin realised dur• ing the year 1978-79 was only Rs. 433 /- per quintal and as compared to this price, the 2nd respondents were required to pay price of royalty at a higher rate of Rg. 474/- per quintal for 3500 metric tonnes of resin to be retained by them under the impugned Order. It is in the c circumstances impossible to see how it can at all be said that any ;{ benefit was conferred on the second respondents at the cost of the State.\n\nThe first head of chaHenge against the impugned Order must, there• fore, be rejected.\n\nRE. GROUND \"8\" :\n\nIt is difficult to appreciate how the impugned Order could be assau1ted on the ground that it created monopoly in favour of the 2nd respondents or imposed unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on tapping business under Article 19 (1 )(g) . The E impugned Order did not hand over the tapping of the entire forest area in the State excl\\isively to the 2nd respondents so as to deny the opportunity of tapping any forest areas to the petitioners. What was done under the impugned order was merely to allot 11,85,414 blazes in the inaccessible areas of Reasi, Ramban and Poonch divisions to the 2nd respondents so that the 2nd respond.ents could have an assured F upply of 3500 metric tonnes of resin for the purpose of feeding the factory to be set up by them in the State and a large number of blazes { amounting to about 68 lacs in other forest areas of the State were left available for tapping by the petitioners_ and other forest s; ontractors. ,\n\nNo monopoly was created in favour of thesecond respondents; the petitioners and other forest contractors could bid for wage contract in •\n\nG respect of the other blares hich were more than five times in number 1\n\nthan the blazes allotted to the second respondents. The petitioners in writ petition 481 of 1979, in fact, obtained a wage contract for extrac~\n\n~· tion of resin from an easily accessible forest in Rajouri Division for the aggregate sum of Rs. 2,80,250/- in the year 1979-80 and though it fa true that the petitioners in writ petition No. 482/79 did not obtain H any wage contract for tapping in this year, it was not because blazes were not available for tapping, but because the petitioners did. not get their registration renewed.\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY v. STATE OF J. & K. (Bhagwati, J.) 1365\n\nRE. GROUND \"C'\n\nThe third and last ground of c_hallenge is also difficult to sustain; .~;-'We fail to see how the action of the State in makin~ the iJllpecl\n\nOmer in favour of the 2nd responden~ could be said to be arbitrary _. or unreasonable. It is clear from the facts we have narrated above and we need not repeat those facts again, that the State was not unjustified in excluding 11,85,414 blazes 11ituate in the inaccessible areas of Reasi, Ramban and Pooncbi Divisiom from the auctions, since the put\" experience showed that even on the basis of royalty without load, it was difficult to attract bidders and the maximum !tha~ could be . obtained, and that too ooly in one solitary year, was Rs. 2.55 per blaze without load, which was an absurdly low return and i~ was, therefore,\n\n~ felt quite justifiably, that it would be futile to include these blaze8 in the auctions for tapping on wage contract basis. The state also could not award a contract simpliciter for tapping on the basis of royalty with or without load, because, as a matter of policy, with a view to encouraging industrialisation, the State did not want resin to go outside\n\nitll territories but wanted it to be used only foc the purpo8e of feeding industries set up within the State and even if a: condition could legitimately be imposed on the contractor that he should sell the resin; extracted and retained by him only to industries within the State, it would be difficult to ensure observance of such condition and moreover the object of the State ta make resin available to the local industries at a reasonable price might be frustrated, because the eontrattor taking advantage of scarcity in supply of resin, might, and in all probability would, try to extract a much higher price from the industries\n\nnding resin. It was thus found to be an impracticable proposition to tap these blazes either on wage contract basis or on the basis of royalty with or without load. ' l Now the 2nd respondents had 'made an offer far putting up . :t\n\nmodem plant for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other deri vatives within the State provided they were assured a definite supoly of resin every year.\n\nBut having regard to the commitments already made by it, it was not possible for the State to make any definite G allocation of resin ta the 2nd respondents and a proposal was therefore mooted that 11,85,414 blazes in inai:cessible areas oe Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions could be allocated to the 2nd respondents for tapping on certain terms and conditions, so that the 2nd respondents could tap these blazes and out of the resin extracted, obtain for themselves an assured supply for running the factory to be set uo H by them and make the balance quantity available to the State for ; ts\n\nown purpose.\n\nThe 2nd respondents wece agreeable to this proposal •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1920] 3 s.c.R.\n\nand they accordingly put forw11Id an alternative propo!ial on these lines for the consideration of the Slate and eveny. the impugned Order crune to be made in favour of the 2nd respondents. We ,,,-, .\n\nhave already discussed the tenns of the impugned Order and it is cleat\n\nA'-• from what we have said that the impugned Order was unquestionable and without doubt, in the interest of the State ancl even with a micros- B copic examination we fail to see anything in it which could possibly incur the reproach of being condemned as arbitrary or irrational. It is true that no advertisements were issued by 'the State inviting tenders for award of tappmg contract in respect ot these blazes or stating that tapping contract would be given to any party who is prepared to put c\n\nup a factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other deriva- 'Ir\n\nlives within the State, but it must be remembered that it was not a /'\"\\,._ tapping contract simpliciter which was being given by the State.\n\nThe tapping contract was being given by way of allocation ,, f raw material for feeding the factory to be set up by the 2nd respondents.\n\nThe predominant purpose of the transaction was to ensure setting up of a factory by the 2nd respondents as part of the process of industrialisation of the State and since the 2nd respondents wanted assurance of a definite supply of resin as a condition of putting up the factory,, the State awarded the tapping contract to the 2nd respondents. for that purpose. If the State were giving tapping contract si; mpliciter there can be no doubt that the State would have to auction or invite tenders for securing the highest price, subject, of course, to any other relevant overriding considerations of public weal or interest, but in a ase like\n\nthi~ where the State is allocating resources such as water, power, raw materials etc .. for the purpose of encouraging setting up of industries within the State, we do not think the State i~ bC)und to advertise and tell the people that it wants a particular industry to be set up within F the State and invite those interested to come up with proposals for the\n\npurpose.\n\nThe State may choose( to do so, if it thinks fit and in a given I situation, it may even tum to be advantageous for the State to do\n\nso, but if any private party comes before the State and offers to set UP'\n\nan industry, the State would not be committing breach of any constitutional or legal obligation if it negotiates with such party and agrees to provide resources and other facilities for the purpose of setting up the industry. The State is not obliged to tell such party; \"Please wait.\n\nI will first advertise, see whether any other offers are forthcoming and then after considering all offers, decide whether I should let you set up the industry.\" It would be most unrealistic to insist on such a procedure, particularly in an area like Jammu and Kashmir which on account of historical, political and other reasons, is not yet industrially developed and where entrepreneurs have to be offered attractive tenns in order to persuade them to. set up an industry. The State\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE OF J, & K. (Bhaglvati, J,) 1367 - - . ..\n\nmust be free in such a case tlJ negotiate with a private entrepreneur with a view to inducing him to set up an industry w, ithill the State and if the State enters into a. ~ntract wi~ such entre_preneur for providing ....._\n\n- esources and other facilities for setting up an mdustry, the contract cannot be assailed as invalid so long as the State had acted bona fide, reasonably and in public interest. If the terms and conditions of the contract or the surrom1ding circumstances show that the . State j.las acted !'Ulla fide or out of in1proper or corrup~ motive or in order to promote the private interest_s of some one at the cost of the State, the Court will undOllbtedly interfere and strike down State action as arbiirary, unreasonable or contrary to publid interest. But so long as the State action is bona fide and reasonable, the Court will not interfere -,._, merely on the ground that no advertisement was given or publicity made or tenders invited.\n\nHere, the 2nd respondents approached the State for the purpose of setting up a modern factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives and asked for allocation of resin and the State, with a view to offering an incentive to; the 2nd respondents to set up the factory, made the impugned Order awarding the tapping contract in respect of these blazes to the 2nd respondents as a part of a package deal.\n\nWe have already pointed out and we need not repeat again, that the impugned Order was reaspnable and in the interest of the State and in the circumstances, we are clearly of the view that it cannot be assailed as invalid merely, because no advertisements were issued inviting offers for setting up a factory and tal<lng the tapIJing contract as an integral part of the transaction.\n\nIt may, however, be pointed out that though no advertisements were issued by the State, the Chief Minister of J ammu iind Kashmir had in. the course of three speeches' delivered by him--<me in Bombay, the other in Calcutta and the third in New Delhi invited entrepreneurs to set up industries within the State with a view to bringing about rapid industrialisation and economic development of the State by utilising its \"peculiar natural resources\" and converting them into finished or semi-finished products and pronrising \"various fonns of assistance and incentives\" for the purpose. These speeches were widely advertised in the newspapers and it_ was, therefore, kno'wn to entrepreneurs that the State would be willing to provide resources and other facilities to those who were interested in setting up industries within the State and, in fact, the State was anxious to attract entrepreneurs to start indusi'ries and it was in pursuance of this invitation that Prabhat Tarpens and Synthetics Private Limited, Dujodwala Resins and Terpens Pvt.\n\nLtd., Pine Chemicals Limited and the see-0ncl respondent~ made their respective offers for putting up factories within the State. It is, therefore, in any event not correct to say! that the petitioners had no oppor-\n\n\ntunity oi making an offer of setting up a factory and obtaining a tapping contract for the purpose. ·\n\n. th 1 . . f h . .\n\n. ,-J,.\n\nIt is also necessary to p01nt out that e c aims o t e petJ.ttoners lit writ petition No. 481 of 1978 and some others were considered by tho ;,..\n\nForest Minister and other forest officials at the meeting held on 25tb December, 1978 and applying the criterion of \"financial status and its. distillation in the factory\"-which criterion cannot be said to be irrational or irrelevant-the application of the 2nd respondents was una.filmously accepted.\n\nThis decision cannot be said to be ma/a fide: or prompted by improper or corrupt motive.\n\nThere is, in fact, no evidence before us to show or even as much a~ to, suggest that any favour . ·'It' was conferred on the 2nd respondents at the cost of the State or tMt the 2nd respondents were preferred to some others without any basis or justification. The petitioners in writ petition No. 481 of 1979 had very little experience of extraction of resin, since they had taken tapping contract for the first time only in 1978-79 and so far as processing of resin is concerned, !hey had no experience at all, as they did not have any factory for processing of resin nor had they at any time in the past, participated in any auction of resin. The petitioners in writ petition No. 481. of 1979 were principally grocery and provision merchants and thongh they had taken some tapping contracts in the past, they had no experience at all in processing of resin since they did not own any factory. The 2nd respondents, on the other hand, had large experience in extraction of resin from inaccessible forests of Poonch Division and they also possessed considerable experience in distillation and processing of resin since they had two factories, one iD.\n\nHoshiarpur and the other in Delhi. The State had in fact given two contracts to the 2nd respondents in the year 197 4-7 5 to install factories for manufacture of resin and turpentine oil in the public sector and\n\nthese contracts have been carried out by the 2nd respondents to the entire satisfaction of the State. Therefore, !IO far as the relative' merits of the petitioners on one hand and the 2nd respondents on the other\n\nwere concerned, the 2nd respondents were definitely superior and it ca..'lnot be said that the State acted unreasonably or contrary to publio interest in preferring the 2nd respondents and permitting them to put up a factory within the State and awarding them tapping contract in respect of these 'blazes for the purpose of the factory.\n\nIt may be pointed that the petitioners in writ petition No. 482 of 1979 bad not even got their registration renewed for the year 1979-80 and hence no tapoing contract could possibly he given to them. We must, accordingly, reject the third ground of challenge urged on behalf of the petitions.\n\n,'\\.'\n\nI I\n\nKASTUIU LAL LAKSHMI REDDY v. STATE OF J. & K (Bhagwati, /.) 1369\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that there is no subst:mce in. any A of dm contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and it was for this reason that by an Order dated 15-2-1980, we dismissed both tbese writ petitions with no order as to costs. ·\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed •\n\ntGSCI/80", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "138\n\nKASTOR! LAL LAKSHMI REDDY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KASTORI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 95, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR & ANOTHER A\n\nMay 9, 1980 ~\n\n[P. N, BHAGWATI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 14 & 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 325, "end_char": 341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of J ammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 637, "end_char": 662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of J ammu & Kashmir started tapping operation in respect of its Chir trees since about 1973 by giving contracts to private parties for extraction and collection of resin."}}, {"text": "Jarnmu & Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2308, "end_char": 2324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the contractors bidding at the auction' were having their factories outside Jarnmu & Kashmir either in U.P. or in Punjab."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2335, "end_char": 2339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the contractors bidding at the auction' were having their factories outside Jarnmu & Kashmir either in U.P. or in Punjab."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2346, "end_char": 2352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the contractors bidding at the auction' were having their factories outside Jarnmu & Kashmir either in U.P. or in Punjab."}}, {"text": "P.rabhat Turpentine & Synthetics Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2736, "end_char": 2778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State, in fact, entered into contracts with three manufacturers, namely, P.rabhat Turpentine & Synthetics Pvt."}}, {"text": "Dujedwala Resin and Turpentine Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2780, "end_char": 2819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd., Dujedwala Resin and Turpentine Co. Ltd. and 'l'ine Chemieals Ltd. Under these oontracts the three manufacturera agreed to set up factories in the State for the manufacture of resin twpentine end other derhatives and the State agreed to make available to them respectively an e=red supply of 4000, 3 500 and 8000 metric tonnes of resin per year."}}, {"text": "l'ine Chemieals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2825, "end_char": 2845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd., Dujedwala Resin and Turpentine Co. Ltd. and 'l'ine Chemieals Ltd. Under these oontracts the three manufacturera agreed to set up factories in the State for the manufacture of resin twpentine end other derhatives and the State agreed to make available to them respectively an e=red supply of 4000, 3 500 and 8000 metric tonnes of resin per year."}}, {"text": "J&K.\n\nIndustries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The H State had also commitments to supply reSin: to its ownconcerns namely, J&K.\n\nIndustries Ltd. which was running a factory for manufacture of resin and turpentine a1 also to various small scale units which are set up in the State."}}, {"text": "KAStURI LAL LAKSHMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3367, "end_char": 3386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since\n\nKAStURI LAL LAKSHMI Rl!Dl>Y V. STAT!!", "canonical_name": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE"}}, {"text": "9th Deoember, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3531, "end_char": 3549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K 1339\n\n1!1e total requirement of theee 24,000 metric tonnes a.lways fell abort it wu A deeided at a meeting held on 9th Deoember, 1976 of .the .Forest officials that\n\nthe increue of target of production could be achievi:d only through replace- .A ment of royalty contracts by wage contracts wherever possible and hence Jn future blazes should be auotionecl for tapping only on was• contract baiis."}}, {"text": "Resin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3844, "end_char": 3849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were certain forests in Resin and Ramban Division of the State which was out of access on account of their distance from the roads and so were some torests in the Poonch Division near the line of actual control and there were 1,28,856 blazes situated in the lower regions of inaccessible forests and no contractors could be fowid for taking tapping contracts even on the basis of royalty without load for blazes in the higher regions of the inacoesoible areas."}}, {"text": "Poonch Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3983, "end_char": 3998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were certain forests in Resin and Ramban Division of the State which was out of access on account of their distance from the roads and so were some torests in the Poonch Division near the line of actual control and there were 1,28,856 blazes situated in the lower regions of inaccessible forests and no contractors could be fowid for taking tapping contracts even on the basis of royalty without load for blazes in the higher regions of the inacoesoible areas."}}, {"text": "Prem Kumar Sood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the Rasi Division out of 6,08, 115 bla.zes which were attempted to be given \"'rfor tapping in the year 1976-77 on royalty contract basis without load, only\n\n\"'-1,28,856 blazes were taken by one Prem Kumar Sood and that too on royalty of only Rs.", "canonical_name": "Prem Kumar Sood"}}, {"text": "Ramban Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5355, "end_char": 5370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the forests in the Ramban Division are con~ rerned there were 1,24.400 blazes which .were equally inaccessible \"due to tong lead up to coupe boundaries and transit depots\" and the position in regard to 3,39,000 blazes which were under tapping in Poonch Division was also similar to that of the inaccessible areas in Rasi and Ramban Division wih the addi tional handicap of their bein2 situated along the line of actual control."}}, {"text": "Rasi and", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5652, "end_char": 5660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the forests in the Ramban Division are con~ rerned there were 1,24.400 blazes which .were equally inaccessible \"due to tong lead up to coupe boundaries and transit depots\" and the position in regard to 3,39,000 blazes which were under tapping in Poonch Division was also similar to that of the inaccessible areas in Rasi and Ramban Division wih the addi tional handicap of their bein2 situated along the line of actual control."}}, {"text": "Rasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5817, "end_char": 5821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were thus in all about 11,85,414 blazes in the Rasi, Ramban and Poonch Division which were inaccessible areas and having regard to the high cost of eX traction and collection of resin as also the scarcity 61 trained labour in those .areas it was not possi&te t6 give out those blazes by auction on wage contract bn.sis."}}, {"text": "Ramban", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were thus in all about 11,85,414 blazes in the Rasi, Ramban and Poonch Division which were inaccessible areas and having regard to the high cost of eX traction and collection of resin as also the scarcity 61 trained labour in those .areas it was not possi&te t6 give out those blazes by auction on wage contract bn.sis."}}, {"text": "Decem- ber 9, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6532, "end_char": 6550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Conservator of Forests\n\namt other Forest Officer> accordingly decided at the meeting held on Decem- ber 9, 1978 that those blat.es could not be tapped through wage contract because uapart from the total non-availability of local labour in these areas cost of.production due to long lead up to coupe boundaries and transit deoots would te prohibitive\" and all ouch areas should, therefore, be excluded from tanping\n\n~ 1\"· through wage contract."}}, {"text": "9th December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6923, "end_char": 6941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These decisions taken at the meeting on 9th December, 1978 were confirmed at subsequent meeting which took place between Forest Minister, the Forest Secretary, the Ch; ef Conservative Forest Officer and other .Forest Officen on 26th December, 1978."}}, {"text": "26th December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7111, "end_char": 7130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These decisions taken at the meeting on 9th December, 1978 were confirmed at subsequent meeting which took place between Forest Minister, the Forest Secretary, the Ch; ef Conservative Forest Officer and other .Forest Officen on 26th December, 1978."}}, {"text": "27th April, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8206, "end_char": 8222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gov enunent and seeking allotment of 10,000 metric tonnes of resin annually for the purpose was, by an Order of the State Government dated 27th April, 1979,.. sanctioned allotment of 11.85 la~ blazes in the inaccessible areas of Rasi,_."}}, {"text": "Ralnban", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8305, "end_char": 8312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ralnban and Poonch Divisions for a period of 10 years on the terms and conditions set out in the order. ·"}}, {"text": "Poonch", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8317, "end_char": 8323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ralnban and Poonch Divisions for a period of 10 years on the terms and conditions set out in the order. ·"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8496, "end_char": 8506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8926, "end_char": 8939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9264, "end_char": 9271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI UDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11243, "end_char": 11267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "unlike a private individua.l, the State cannot act as it pleases in the mattet\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI UDDY I'.", "canonical_name": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE"}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 S. C. R. 1014", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12806, "end_char": 12828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13653, "end_char": 13663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14117, "end_char": 14124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14336, "end_char": 14349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 in the full plenitude of its activist\n\n~Bgnitude as discovered by Maneka Gandhi's case, insits that no one sha'l be deprivf'd of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with procedure \\ .established by law and such procedure must be reasonable, fair and just.", "canonical_name": "Manelca Gandhi"}}, {"text": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18985, "end_char": 19010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1357 E-HJ\n\n... •\n\n< •\n\n.J..\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY v. STATE\"OF J. & K 13.f3\n\nIi iS imperative in a democracy governed by the rule ol law that govemmel!lltl A action must be kept with_in the limits Of the law and if there is any transgres-; sion, the Court must be ready to condemn it, .It is a matter of historical experience that there is a tendency in every government to assume more and more powers and since it is not an uncommon phenomenOn in many countries that the legisllltive ckeck is getting diluted, it is left to the Court as the only other reviewing authority under the Constitution to be increasinglyvigilant to ensure observance with the rule of law and in this task, the Court n1ust not B flin.::h or falter.", "canonical_name": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE"}}, {"text": "Article 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24001, "end_char": 24017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajouri Division", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25078, "end_char": 25094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pet1t1oners in writ petition 481 of 1979, in fact, obtained a wage contract for extraction of resin from an easily accessible forest in Rajouri Division for the aggi egate sµm of I, Rs."}}, {"text": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26019, "end_char": 26053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2-55 per blaze without\n\nload, which was an absurdly low return and it was, therefore, felt quite\n\n• •\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE OP J, It K 1345\n\njUstifiably, that it would be futile to include thcoc blazes in the auctions for tapping on wage contract basea.", "canonical_name": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE"}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29814, "end_char": 29831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dec:de whether I should let you set up the inducitry'', It _would b\"' moc; t unr,, aJistic to •nsist on such a procedure, particularly H hi an area like Jammu and Kashmir which on account of historical."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31153, "end_char": 31163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31171, "end_char": 31192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. N. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31196, "end_char": 31207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Bhatt for the Pet; tioner."}}, {"text": "Altaf Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31230, "end_char": 31241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Altaf Ahmed for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D E. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31265, "end_char": 31280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D E. C. Agarwal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "BnAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31349, "end_char": 31357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\nBnAGWATI, J.-These two writ petitions under Art.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31393, "end_char": 31400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31802, "end_char": 31829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TJ; ough the petitioners in the two writ petitions are different, the respondents are the same and the same Order of the State of J ammu and Kashmir is challenged in both the writ petitions."}}, {"text": "27th Apri~ 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32052, "end_char": 32067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute in these writ petitions relates to the validity of an Order dated 27th Apri~ 1979, passed by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, allotting to the 2nd respondents 10 to 12 lacs blazes annuiilly for extraction of resin from the inaccessible chir forests in Poonch,."}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32083, "end_char": 32114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dispute in these writ petitions relates to the validity of an Order dated 27th Apri~ 1979, passed by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, allotting to the 2nd respondents 10 to 12 lacs blazes annuiilly for extraction of resin from the inaccessible chir forests in Poonch,."}}, {"text": "Government of J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32623, "end_char": 32655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The valjdity of the Order has been challenged on various grounds which we shall presently 'set out, but in order to understand and appreciate these grounds, it is neces~. sary to state br:efly the circumstances in which the Order came to be passed by the Government of J ammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "State of Jarnmu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34119, "end_char": 34146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Jarnmu and Kashmir started tapping operations in respect\n\nof its chir trees since about 1973 by g'ving contracts to private parties for extraction and collection of resin."}}, {"text": "Hoshiarpur district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36175, "end_char": 36194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that most of these purchasers were manufacturers having their factories in Hoshiarpur district of Punjab and at the material time, they depended for their requirement of raw-material solely on the resin available at the auct.on held by the State since supply of resin had ceased to be available from Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh on account of the policy adopted by the Governments in these territories."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36400, "end_char": 36413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that most of these purchasers were manufacturers having their factories in Hoshiarpur district of Punjab and at the material time, they depended for their requirement of raw-material solely on the resin available at the auct.on held by the State since supply of resin had ceased to be available from Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh on account of the policy adopted by the Governments in these territories."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36418, "end_char": 36434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that most of these purchasers were manufacturers having their factories in Hoshiarpur district of Punjab and at the material time, they depended for their requirement of raw-material solely on the resin available at the auct.on held by the State since supply of resin had ceased to be available from Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh on account of the policy adopted by the Governments in these territories."}}, {"text": "Prabhat Turpentine and Synthetics Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36894, "end_char": 36937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State, however, in furtherance of its policy to bring about rapid indus ria'irnti n, dee ded that from the year 1979-80 onwards, the resin extracted from its forests should not be allowed to be exported outside the territories of the S ate and should be utilised only by industries set up w thin the Sta e. The sate n fact entered into contracts with three manufacturers, namely, Prabhat Turpentine and Synthetics Pvt."}}, {"text": "Dujodwala Resin and Turpentine Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36939, "end_char": 36979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd., Dujodwala Resin and Turpentine Pvt."}}, {"text": "Pine Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36984, "end_char": 37003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. and Pine Chemicals Ltd. under wh'ch these three manufacturers agreed to pvt-up factories in the State for mannfacture of resin, turpent ne and other derivat, ves and the State agreed to make available to them respectively an assured supply of 4,000, 3500 and 8000 metric tonnes of resin per year."}}, {"text": "21-12-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37439, "end_char": 37447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "37-38 of 1979, but these writ peti ions were d smissed by us by an Order made on 21-12-79."}}, {"text": "J & K Indus", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37523, "end_char": 37534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sate had a'so ccmmitments to supply resin to its own concern, namely, J & K Indus tr.es L d., which was running a factory for manufacture of resin and turpentine as also to various small scale units wh ch were set-up in the State."}}, {"text": "Wai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38543, "end_char": 38546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jt Wai decided at this meeting that the increaect target of production could be achieved only through replacement of royalty contracts by wage con-\n\n.)(ASTUlll LAL LAKSHMI IU!DDY v. STATE OP J.\"' K (Bhagwati, J.) 1349\n\ntrncts wherever possible and hence in future blaze should be auctioned A\n\nfor tapping only on wage con\\f'dct basis."}}, {"text": "Prem Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39359, "end_char": 39369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the forests in the Rea i Division were con- ' a\n\ncerned, there were 6,08,115 blazes which were attempted to be given for tapp:ng in the year 1976-77 on rcyalty contract bas, s w'thcut load but out of them only 1,28,856 blazes were tzken by one Prem Kumar\n\nSood and that too on a royalty of only Rs.", "canonical_name": "Prem Kumar Sood"}}, {"text": "Ramban", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41912, "end_char": 41918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The past experience showed that even on the basis of royalty without load, contractors were not forth-coming for taking contracts in respect of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n11980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nblazes in the inaccessible areas of the Reasi Division and giving out of the aforesaid blazes in the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions on wage contract basis was, therefore, almost an impdssible proposition, The Chief Conservator of Forests and other forest officers accordingly decided at their meeting of December 9, 1978 that these blazes could not be tapped through wage contract because \"apart from the total non-availablity of local Jabour in these areas, cost of production due to long lead upto coupe boundaries and transit depots would be prohibitive\" and all such areas should, therefore, be excluded from tapping wage contracts."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42112, "end_char": 42128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The past experience showed that even on the basis of royalty without load, contractors were not forth-coming for taking contracts in respect of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n11980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nblazes in the inaccessible areas of the Reasi Division and giving out of the aforesaid blazes in the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions on wage contract basis was, therefore, almost an impdssible proposition, The Chief Conservator of Forests and other forest officers accordingly decided at their meeting of December 9, 1978 that these blazes could not be tapped through wage contract because \"apart from the total non-availablity of local Jabour in these areas, cost of production due to long lead upto coupe boundaries and transit depots would be prohibitive\" and all such areas should, therefore, be excluded from tapping wage contracts."}}, {"text": "Reasi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42903, "end_char": 42908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further decided in this meeting that \"the departmental tapping through wage contracts should be confined to accessible chir forests\" only and so far as 11,85,414 blazes in the inaccessible areas of the Reasi, Ramban and Poonch Divisions were concerned, the consensus was that \"these blazes should allotted to some private party as procurement of resin from them through wage contracts was not feasible, being difficult and costly\" and \"the financial status and experience in extraction of resin from forests and its distillation in the factory should be decisive factors\" in regard to such allotment."}}, {"text": "15th April 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43424, "end_char": 43439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15th April 1978 to the Minister for Industries, offering to setup a factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine oil and other derivatives in the State \"with the latest know-how under t11e supervision of the State Government\" and seeking allotment of 10,000 metric tonnes of F resin annually for that purpose."}}, {"text": "Hoshiarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44014, "end_char": 44024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondents pointed out in their ktter that they possessed vast exper'ence in processing of resin and re-processing of resin and turpentine oil and manufacture of a wide range of derivatives, since they had 2 factories for manufacture of resin and turpentine oil, one in Hoshiarpur and the other in Delhi and more-\n\nG over, they had also been working as resin extraction contractors since 197 4 antl were also bulk purchasers of resin at the auctions held by the state."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44042, "end_char": 44047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondents pointed out in their ktter that they possessed vast exper'ence in processing of resin and re-processing of resin and turpentine oil and manufacture of a wide range of derivatives, since they had 2 factories for manufacture of resin and turpentine oil, one in Hoshiarpur and the other in Delhi and more-\n\nG over, they had also been working as resin extraction contractors since 197 4 antl were also bulk purchasers of resin at the auctions held by the state."}}, {"text": "Camphor and Allied Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44290, "end_char": 44322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also stated by the 2nd respondents that they had reliably learnt that Camphor and Allied Products Ltd. and Prabhat General Agencies were being considered by the State for allotment of resin to feed the units to be set-up by them within the State and they expressed their willingness to take the allotment df resin for their proposed factory U on the same terms and conditions."}}, {"text": "Prabhat General Agencies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44327, "end_char": 44351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also stated by the 2nd respondents that they had reliably learnt that Camphor and Allied Products Ltd. and Prabhat General Agencies were being considered by the State for allotment of resin to feed the units to be set-up by them within the State and they expressed their willingness to take the allotment df resin for their proposed factory U on the same terms and conditions."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44861, "end_char": 44869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o encourage setting-up of resin:based industrial ullits in the State, it\n\nI (\n\n', ll, f\n\n'' ,, :\n\n.. ~ASl'UB.l LAL LAKSlJMI IU!4ll)l' v. STATE pp J, it K (Bhagwati, J.)1351\n\n; was not found possible, having regard to the commitments already .made by the State, to .make any allotment of resin to the 2nd respondents.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "26th\n\nDecember, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45652, "end_char": 45672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondents were .agreeable to this proposal and in fact\n\nthey put it forward as an alternative proposal for consideration by the Stale, but no decision was taken on it until the meeting of 26th\n\nDecember, 1978."}}, {"text": "J & K Resin Contractors Association", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46492, "end_char": 46527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that J & K Resin Contractors Association (hereinafter referred to as the association) came to know sometime in October, 1978 that the 2nd respondents had approached the State Government\n\n1111d .there was a propllSal to allot to them \"certain resiri coupes on royalty system of 10 years\" on the basis that they would install a ftctory for manufacture of resjn and turpentine at J ammu w:th sizable investment."}}, {"text": "9th :December, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47518, "end_char": 47537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the decision was taken at the meetings of 9th :December, 1976 ana 26th Dl:cember, 1978 that blazes in\"the inacces."}}, {"text": "8th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48533, "end_char": 48548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same request was repeated by the association : n a letter dated 8th March, 1979 addressed to the Chief Minister."}}, {"text": "Reasi Ramban", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48817, "end_char": 48829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was obviously no reply to these communications since it had already been decided that tapoing of blazes in the accessible chir forests should be done only through wage contracts and 11,85,414 b'azes ini the inaccess'ble areas of Reasi Ramban and Poonch Divisions shculd be allotted to some private party, which was prepared to set-up a factory for manufacture of resin, turpentine and other derivatives in the State."}}, {"text": "22nd February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49212, "end_char": 49231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd respondents presumably, on coming to kn0w that their alternative proposal for allotment of 10 to 12 lacs blazes in inaccessible areas was being processed by the Government, addressed a letter dated 22nd February, 1979 to the Secretary to the Forest Department formulating the broad terms of the proposal and' requesting the State Government to cons der the proposal favourably and come to a decision immediately."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49472, "end_char": 49487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "since the tapping season was commencing from 1st April, 1979."}}, {"text": "18th March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49527, "end_char": 49543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The association by its letter dated'\n\n18th March, 1979 addressed to the Chief Min; ster pretested aainst the blazes in the Reasi, Ramban ard Poonch Divisions being gven to• the 2nd respondents by negotiations on royalty basis for 10 years and urged that doing so would be contrary to Wie interests of the local contractors and local labour and \"will also be a source of huge loss to the Government exchequer\" since the price of resin was increasing ."}}, {"text": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50774, "end_char": 50808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATI!", "canonical_name": "KASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE"}}, {"text": "Ram.ban", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51085, "end_char": 51092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State accordingly, passed an Order dated 27th April, 1979 sanctioning allotment of 11.85 lacs blazes in the inaccessible areas of Reasi, Ram.ban and Poonch Divisions to the 2nd respondents for a period of 10 years on the terms and conditions set out in the ordei: •\n\nThe 2nd respondents were required by clause II (iii) of the Orde1 to surrender 25 % of the annual resin collected by them, subject to a minimum of 1500 metric tonnes per annum, to the State for feeding ."}}, {"text": "J & K Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51458, "end_char": 51479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the new resin 4istfilation plant which J & K Industries Ltd. proposed\n\nto set up Rajouri/Sunderbani and they could retain the balance of c _X the extracted resin subject to a maximum of 3500 metric tonnes per annum."}}, {"text": "Rajouri/", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52519, "end_char": 52527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "such quantity) ; and\n\n( c) deliver such resin at the JKL factory at Rajouri/ Sunderbani fur which no transport charges will."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53260, "end_char": 53267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54183, "end_char": 54190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "International Airport Autlwrfty of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54587, "end_char": 54627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The International Airport Autlwrfty of India & Ors.''(')"}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 S C. R. 1014", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 55643, "end_char": 55664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patanjali Shastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58184, "end_char": 58201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G doubtedly true, as poirited out by Patanjali Shastri, J. in State of Madra.i 'v. V. G, Rau,(') that in forming his own conception of what is reasonable, in all the dreumstaDccB of."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58781, "end_char": 58800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59325, "end_char": 59336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been laid down by< this Court in E. P. Royappai v. State of Tamil Nadu,(2) and Maneka Gand/u's case (supra) that Art.", "canonical_name": "Manelca Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59359, "end_char": 59366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59821, "end_char": 59828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59962, "end_char": 59969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Manelca Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60035, "end_char": 60049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 in the full plenitude of its activist magnitude as discovered by Manelca Gandhi's case, insists that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in.", "canonical_name": "Manelca Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60335, "end_char": 60357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR. 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 61412, "end_char": 61429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1974] 2 SCR. 348", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 61436, "end_char": 61453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramona D. Shelly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65610, "end_char": 65626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is now well settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Ramona D. Shelly v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66779, "end_char": 66786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66837, "end_char": 66844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67045, "end_char": 67052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "5th February 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71787, "end_char": 71804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Association undoubtedly made representations requesting the State to include these blazes in the auctions, but as is evident from the letters dated 5th February 1979 and 8th March 1979 addressed respectively to the Forest Minister and the Chief Minister, the emphasis of the Association was that 'the system ofj working should be changed from wage contract to royalty contract\" and that these blazes should be put to auction on royalty basis."}}, {"text": "8th March 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71809, "end_char": 71823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Association undoubtedly made representations requesting the State to include these blazes in the auctions, but as is evident from the letters dated 5th February 1979 and 8th March 1979 addressed respectively to the Forest Minister and the Chief Minister, the emphasis of the Association was that 'the system ofj working should be changed from wage contract to royalty contract\" and that these blazes should be put to auction on royalty basis."}}, {"text": "27th April 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73928, "end_char": 73943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in these circumstances that the impugned Order dated 27th April 1979 ciµne to be passed by the State."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Rasul", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75907, "end_char": 75919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "east 1500 metric tonnes of resin for itself without any financial involvement or risk and with this addition.al quantity of resin available to it, it would be able to set up another factory creating more emploYll!ent opportunities and, in fact, as the counter affidavit of Ghulam Rasul, under secretary to the Government filed on behalf of the State shows the Government lost no time in taking steps to set up a public sector resin distillation plant in a far tlung area of the State, namely, Sundarbani, in Rajouri District.", "canonical_name": "Ghulam Rasul"}}, {"text": "Sundarbani", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76127, "end_char": 76137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "east 1500 metric tonnes of resin for itself without any financial involvement or risk and with this addition.al quantity of resin available to it, it would be able to set up another factory creating more emploYll!ent opportunities and, in fact, as the counter affidavit of Ghulam Rasul, under secretary to the Government filed on behalf of the State shows the Government lost no time in taking steps to set up a public sector resin distillation plant in a far tlung area of the State, namely, Sundarbani, in Rajouri District."}}, {"text": "Rajouri District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76142, "end_char": 76158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "east 1500 metric tonnes of resin for itself without any financial involvement or risk and with this addition.al quantity of resin available to it, it would be able to set up another factory creating more emploYll!ent opportunities and, in fact, as the counter affidavit of Ghulam Rasul, under secretary to the Government filed on behalf of the State shows the Government lost no time in taking steps to set up a public sector resin distillation plant in a far tlung area of the State, namely, Sundarbani, in Rajouri District."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Rasul", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76791, "end_char": 76803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter affidavit al Ghulam Rasul on behalf of the first respondent and Guran Devaya Oii behalf of the second respondents show that the estimated cost of extraction and collection of resin from these inaccessible areas would be at the least Rs.", "canonical_name": "Ghulam Rasul"}}, {"text": "Guran Devaya Oii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 76842, "end_char": 76858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The counter affidavit al Ghulam Rasul on behalf of the first respondent and Guran Devaya Oii behalf of the second respondents show that the estimated cost of extraction and collection of resin from these inaccessible areas would be at the least Rs.", "canonical_name": "Guran Devaya Oii"}}, {"text": "Guran Devaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77054, "end_char": 77066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "175/- per quintal, though according to Guran Devaya it would be in the neighbourhood of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Guran Devaya Oii"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83926, "end_char": 83936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Pooncbi Divisiom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85930, "end_char": 85946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from the facts we have narrated above and we need not repeat those facts again, that the State was not unjustified in excluding 11,85,414 blazes 11ituate in the inaccessible areas of Reasi, Ramban and Pooncbi Divisiom from the auctions, since the put\" experience showed that even on the basis of royalty without load, it was difficult to attract bidders and the maximum !"}}, {"text": "K. (Bhaglvati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91519, "end_char": 91532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State\n\nKASTURI LAL LAKSHMI REDDY V. STATE OF J, & K. (Bhaglvati, J,) 1367 - - . .."}}, {"text": "J ammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93433, "end_char": 93439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may, however, be pointed out that though no advertisements were issued by the State, the Chief Minister of J ammu iind Kashmir had in."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93516, "end_char": 93522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the course of three speeches' delivered by him--<me in Bombay, the other in Calcutta and the third in New Delhi invited entrepreneurs to set up industries within the State with a view to bringing about rapid industrialisation and economic development of the State by utilising its \"peculiar natural resources\" and converting them into finished or semi-finished products and pronrising \"various fonns of assistance and incentives\" for the purpose."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93537, "end_char": 93545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the course of three speeches' delivered by him--<me in Bombay, the other in Calcutta and the third in New Delhi invited entrepreneurs to set up industries within the State with a view to bringing about rapid industrialisation and economic development of the State by utilising its \"peculiar natural resources\" and converting them into finished or semi-finished products and pronrising \"various fonns of assistance and incentives\" for the purpose."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93563, "end_char": 93572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the course of three speeches' delivered by him--<me in Bombay, the other in Calcutta and the third in New Delhi invited entrepreneurs to set up industries within the State with a view to bringing about rapid industrialisation and economic development of the State by utilising its \"peculiar natural resources\" and converting them into finished or semi-finished products and pronrising \"various fonns of assistance and incentives\" for the purpose."}}, {"text": "Prabhat Tarpens and Synthetics Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94287, "end_char": 94333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These speeches were widely advertised in the newspapers and it_ was, therefore, kno'wn to entrepreneurs that the State would be willing to provide resources and other facilities to those who were interested in setting up industries within the State and, in fact, the State was anxious to attract entrepreneurs to start indusi'ries and it was in pursuance of this invitation that Prabhat Tarpens and Synthetics Private Limited, Dujodwala Resins and Terpens Pvt."}}, {"text": "Dujodwala Resins and Terpens Pvt.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94335, "end_char": 94374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These speeches were widely advertised in the newspapers and it_ was, therefore, kno'wn to entrepreneurs that the State would be willing to provide resources and other facilities to those who were interested in setting up industries within the State and, in fact, the State was anxious to attract entrepreneurs to start indusi'ries and it was in pursuance of this invitation that Prabhat Tarpens and Synthetics Private Limited, Dujodwala Resins and Terpens Pvt."}}, {"text": "Pine Chemicals Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94376, "end_char": 94398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd., Pine Chemicals Limited and the see-0ncl respondent~ made their respective offers for putting up factories within the State."}}, {"text": "25tb December, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94932, "end_char": 94951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "481 of 1978 and some others were considered by tho ;,..\n\nForest Minister and other forest officials at the meeting held on 25tb December, 1978 and applying the criterion of \"financial status and its."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1370_1387_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "EMPIRE JUTE CO. LID.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[P .. N. BHAGWATI, v. D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R s. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nAllowing deduction under section 10(2>(xv) of the Income Tax Act- Revenue expenditure and Capital expendituret--Membt:r of the Jute Mill Ass0t:iation entering into a working time agreement restricting the number o/ lt•orking hours per week for which the mills shall be entitled to work their looms, and also providing for transfer of such working hours between one mill and another amongst a particular Croup of Mills--Transfer styled as sale of ,~ loom hours-Whether the purchase revenue expenditure or capital expenditure ?\\.\n\nfor the purposes of Section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. '\n\nRight from 1939, the demand of jute in the world market was rather lean and with a view to adjusting the production of the jute mills to the dema.nd\n\nof the world market, various jute mills formed an Association styled as Indian Jute Mills Association and the appellant is one such member of the said Association. As per the objects of the Association a quinquenniel working time agreement was entered into between the members of the Association restric:ing the number of working hours per week, for which the mills shall be entitled to work their looms. The fourth working time Agreement was en:ered into between the members of the Association on 9th December, 1954 and it Was to remain in force for a period of five years from 12th December 1954. As per the first clause of te fourth working time Agreement no signatory shall work ' t more than forty five hours of work per week subject -to alteration in accordance with the provisions of clauses 7(1)(2) and (3) and further subject inter al'a to the provision of clause (10) and under that clause, a joint and several ag~ ment coUld be made providing that throughout the duration of the working time agreement, members with registered complements of loOm not exceeding 220 shall be entitled to work upto seventy two hours per week. Clause 6(a) enabled members to be registered as a \"Group of Mills\" if they happened to be under the control of the same managing agents or were combined bv eny ... arrangement or agreement and it was open to any member of the Group Mills-}\n\nso registered to utilise the allotment of hours of work per week of other mem-J hers in the same group who were not fully utilising the hours of work allowable to them under the working time agreement, provided such transfer of hours of 'work was for a period not less than six months. Clause 6(b) further \"i prescn\"bed three other conditions precedent subject to which the allotment of .. hours of work transferred by one membor to another could be utilised by the latter and two of them were: (i) All agreements to transfer shall. as a condition precedent to any rights being obtained by transferee, be submitted wilh\n\nan explanation to the Committee and Committee's decision ... whether the ... transfer shall be allowed sball be final and conclusive and (iD If the Committee sanctions the transfer, it shall be a condition prec.edent to its utffisation that a certificate be issued and the transfer registered.\n\nThis transaction of tramfer of allotment of hours of wort per week was commooly referrod to as sale of looms hour> by otle member to anotber. The consequence of. oacb\"\n\n:-.: \"-~\n\nEMPIRE JUTE CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1371\n\nuansfer was that the hours of work per week transferred by a member wero A liable to be deducted from the working hours per week allowed to such member under the working time agreement and the member in whose favour euch transfer was made entitled to utilise the number of working hours per ,4. week tramferred to him in addition to the working hours per week allowed to him under the working time agreement\n\n, The assessee, under this clause purchased loom hours from four different jute manufacturing concerns which were signatories to the .working time agreement, for the aggregate sum of Rs. 2,03,255/- during the year 1st.\n\nAugllSt 1958 to 31st July 1959. ln the course of the assessment year 1960-61 for which the relevant accounting year was the previous year 1st August 1958 to 31st July 1959, the assessee claimed this amount of Rs. 2,03,255/- as zevenue expenditure on the ground that it was part of the cost of operating thC loom<1 which constituted the profit making apparatus of the assessee. The cleim was disallowed by the lncome Tax Officer, but on appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the claim and allowed the deduction on the view that the MSCSSee did not acquire any capital as.set when it purchased the loom hours and the amount spent by it was incurred for running the business of working it with a view to producing day-to-day profits and it was part of operating cost or revenue cost of production. The Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal, and, having Jost before it, carried the matter before the High Court by a reference. The High Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of lncome1 Tax v.\n\nMaheshwari Devi Jute Mills Ud., [19661 57 ITR 36 held that the amount paid by the assessee for purchase of the loom hours was in the nature of capital expenditure and W8'JI therefore not deductible under section 10(2) (J<V) of the lncome Tax Act Hence the appeal by assessee by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD: 1. An expenditure incurred by an assessee can qualify for deduction under section 10(2) (xv) only if it is incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of his business, but even if it fulfills this requiremenit, it is not enongh it must further be of revenue as 'distinguished from capital nature. ' .\n\n(1378 IJ..E]\n\n2. Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills' case was a converse case where the question \" was whether an amount received by the assessee for .sale of loom hours was l In the nature of capital receipt or revenue receipt and the Supreme Court took the view that it -was in the nature of capital receipt and hence not tax .. able. The decision in Maheshwari Devi lute Mills' case cannot on this account l>e regarded as an authority for the proposition that payment made by an asoessee for purchase of loom hours woold be capital expenditure, because it is not a universally true proposition that what may be capital receipt in the llands of the payee must nece<sarily be capital expenditure in relation to the payer. The fact that a certain payment constitutes income or capital receipt in the hands of a recipient is not material in determining whether the pavlD\"'nt is revenue or capital disbursement qua the payer. Whether it is capital .. x~-ri llitnre or revenue expenditure would have to be determined having re1111rd to the nature of the tranSaction and other relevant factors. (1378 G-H, 1379 A-DJ\n\nRaet Course Betting-Control Board v. Wild, 22 Tax Cases 182, quoled 1rith approval.\n\n3. Again, Maheshwari Devi lute Mills' Case proeeeded on the. a\"\"\"l*d basis that loom hours were a capital asset and tbe only issue debated waa whether tbe transaction in question constituted sale of this asset or it represented exploitation of tbe asset by permitting its user by anotber while retain• ing ownenhip. No question was nUsed before tbe Court as to whetber the loom hours were an asset at all nor was any argument advanced as to what was tbe true nature of tbe transaction. This question is res integra and therefore this d<cision cannot be regarded as an authority for tbe proposition that Ille amount paid for purchase of loom hours was capital and not revOllW> expenditure._ 11379 E, 1380 C-Fl\n\n4. It is quite clear from the terms of the working time agreement that tbe allotment of loom hours to different mills constituted merely a contraclual restriction on tbe right of every mill under the general law to work its looms to tbeir full capacity. If there had been no working time agreement, each mill would have been entitled to work its looms uninterruptedly for twenty four \"'I' hours a day throughout the week, but tbat would have resulted in production ./\\.__ of jute very mncli in excess of the demand in tbe world market, leading to unfair competition and precipitous fall in jute price and in tbe process, preju dicially affecting all tbe mills and tberefore with a view to protecting tho interest of the mills who were members of tbe Association, tbe working agreement was entered into restricting the number of working hours per wee!< for which each mill could work its looms. The allotment of working hours per week und01C the working time agreement was clearly not a right conferred on a mill, signatory to tbe working time agreement. It was ratber a restriction voluntarily accepted by each still with a view to adjusting the production to tbe demand in the world market and this restriction conld not possibly be regarded as an asset of such mill> This rostriction necessan1y bad tbe effect of limiting tbe production of the mill and consequentially also tbe profit which tbe mill could otherwise make by working full looms hours. But a proviaion was made in clause 6(b) of tbe working time agreement tbat tbe whole or a part of the working hours per week could be transferred by one mill to another for a period of not less than six montbs and if such transfer was approved and registered by the Committee of tbe Association, tbe transferee mill wool4' be entitled to utilise tbe number of worl<ing hours per week transferred to it\n\nin addition to tbe working hours per week allowed to it under tbe worl<ing time agreement, while tbc transferor mill could cease to be entitled to avail of the number of working hours per week so transferred and tbose wonld be { liable to be deducted from tbe number of working hours per week otberwise.\n\nallotted to it. The purchase of loom hours by a mill had therefore tbe etl'ect of relaxing tbe restriction on the op\"\"8tion of looms to tbe extent of tbe munber of working hours per week transferred to it, so tbat tbe transf01Cee mill could work its looms for looger boors tban permitted under the working thne agreement and increase its profitability.\n\nThe amount spent on purchase of looms hours tbus repreoented consideration paid for being able to worlc the looms for a longer number of. boors. Such payment for tbe purchase of loom\n\nboors cannot be regarded as expenditure on capital account. -'<t • [1380 F-H, 1381 Al\n\n6. The decided cases have, from time to time, O'Volved various tests for distinguishing between capital and revenue expenditure but no test is po.171mount or conclusive. There is no all embracing formula which csn provide a ready solution to tbe problem; no touchstone bas been devised. Every case lw\n\nto be decided oo its own facts keeping in mind the broad picture of the wtioi..\n\nii !!\n\nEMP!llE JUTE CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX. 1373\n\n<>peration in respect of whicll the expM1diture has been incurred. Two of A .these tests are :\n\n(a) The test of enduring benefit as laid down in British Insulated and B.Uby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton, 10 Tax Cases 155. Even this test must yield\n\nwhore there are special circumstances leading to a contrary decision.\n\nThere .may be aises where expenditure, even if incurred for obtaining advantage of\n\nenduring benefit, may, noDe-the-less, be ODJ revenue account and the test of enduring benefit may break down. It is not every advantage of enduring nature acquired by an a.sessee that brmgs the case within tho principle laid down\n\nin this test. What is material to consir is the nature of tile advantage in a <:01D111ercial sense that it is only where the advantage is in the capital field that\n\nthe expenditure would be disallowable on an application of this test. If the. advantage consists merely in facilitating the assessee'o trading operalions or ernibliJI@ the management and conduct of the assessee's business to be carried on more dlk:iently or more profitably while leaving the fixed capital untouched, • expenditure would be on revenue account, even though tho advantage may endure for an indefinit.e future. The test of enduring bendil is therefore not a certain or conclusive test and it cannot be applied blindly .,.. mechanically without regard to the particular facts and circumstances all a given case. l1381 E-G, 1382 A-El\n\nCommissioner of Taxes v. Nchangdi Consolrda1ed Copper Mines Ltd., L'l96SJ 58 ITR 241; followed.\n\n(bl The test based on distinction between fixed and circulating capital as applied in John Smith and Sons v. Moore, 12 Tax Cases, 266. So long as the expenditure in question can be clearly referred to the acquisition of an asaetl which falls within one or the other of these two categories such a test would be a critical one. But this test also sometimes breaks down because there aro many forms of expenditure which do not fall easily within thfse two categories and not infrequently, the line of demarcation is difficult to draw andi leads to subtle distinctions between profit that is made \"out nf' a5Bell9 andi profit that is made ''upon\" assets or \"with\" assets. Moreover, there may be cases where expenditure though referable to or in connection with fixed capital \",,,.,,., iS nevertheless allowable as revenue expenditure e.g. expenditure incurred in\n\n•.~ preserving or maintaining capital assets. This test is therefore clearly not one r of univen!al application. [1383 A-Dl\n\nCommissioner of Taxes v.\n\nNchanga Consolidated Coper Mines Ltd.\n\nC. f1965]58 ITR 241; followed.\n\n6. It is true that if disbursement iS made for acquisition of a source ol! profit or income, it would ordinarily be in the nature of capital expenditure.\n\nBut it cannot be said in the present case that the assessee acqnired a source of Jll'(lfit or income when it purchased loom hours. The source of profit or income\n\nwas the profit making apparatus and this i; emained untouched and unaltered, Thero was no enl<l.rgement of the permanent structure of which the incomil\n\nwould be the produce or fruit.\n\nWhat the assessee acquiml was merely mi advantage in the nature of relaxation of restriction on working hours imposccl q the worlting time agreement, so that the _. could operate its profit. earning structure for a longer number of hours. Undonbtedly the profit earn<\n\nA ing structure Of the assessee waa enabled to produce more goods, but that was not because of any addition or augmentatioo in the profit malting stroctme,\n\nbut because the profit making structure could be operated for longe< worf<inl!I hours. The expenditure incurred for this purpose was primarily and essentially related to the operation or working of tho looms which constitufed the prollt\n\nearning apparatus of the usessee.\n\nIt waa an expenditure for operating \"\" working the fooms for longer working hours with a view to producing a B larger quantity of goods and earning moro income and was therefore in the nature of revenue expenditure. [1384 ADl\n\n7. When dealing with cases where the question is whether expendi1Dre incurred by an as.sessee is capital or revenue expenditure, the question must be viewed in the larger context of business necessity or expediency. If tile\n\noutgoing expenditure is so related to the carrying on or the cooduct of the ~, . • C business that it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning pm- _ cess and not foc acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent charactec.\n\nthe possession of which is a condition of the carrying on of the business, the expenditure may be regarded as revenue expenditure.\n\nU384 H, 1385 A.0\n\nNelletrorm' Property Ltd. v. Federal Commr. of Taxation, 72 CLR 634; Robert Addis & Sons Collieries Ltd. v. Inland Revenue 8 Tax Cases, 671 D quoted with approval.\n\nBombay Steam N_avigation Co. P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax,. [19531 55 ITR 52; followed.\n\n9. Jn the instant case\n\n(a) the payment made by tho assessee for the purchase of loom hours E was expenditure laid out as part of the prooess of profit earning. It was mr outlay of \" business in onler to carry it on and to earn profit out of this expense as an expense of carrying it on. It was part of the cost Of operating the profit earning apparatus and wa'i clearly in the nature of revenue expenditure; and C1385 D-EJ\n\n(b) the payment of Rs. 2,03,255/- made by the assesace for purchase of loom hours represented Revenue expenditure and was allowable as a dednctiDR under section 10(2) (xv) of the Incomo Tax Act.\n\n[1387 CD]\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax vi Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd .• [19651 58 ITR 241; Commissioner of Taxe9 v. Curron Company, 45 Tax Cases 18; followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1197 (NT) of\n\n1n~ \\\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated • 3-8·1973 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 109' of 1968.\n\nD. Pal, T. A. Ramachandran & D. N. Gupta for the Appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, B. B. Ahuja & Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.\n\n' BMPIRI! JUTI! CO. V. COMMI&'SIONl!R OF INCOMB TAX\n\n(Bhagwati, J.) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the vexed question whether a particular expenditure incurred by the assessee is of capital: or revenue nature.\n\nThis question has always presented a difficult problem and continually baffied the courts, because it has not been possible, despite occasional judicial valour, to fonnulate a test for distinguillhing between capital and revenue expenditure which will provide an infallible answer in all situations.\n\nThere have been numerous decisiOns where this question has been debated but it is not possible to reconclle the reasons given in all of them, since each decision has tum- ·\"6r ed upon some particular aspect which has been regarded as cru.cial and \"-.no general principle can be deduced from any decision and applied - blindly to a different kind of case where the con5tellation of facts may 1\" dissimilar and other factors may be present which may give a different hue to the case. Often cases fall on the border line and in such cases, as observed by Lord M. R. in Inland Revenue v. British Salmon 'iiro Engines Ltd.(') \"the spin of coin would decide th~ matter almost as satisfactorily as an attempt to find persons.\" But this is not one of those border line cases. The answer to the question here is fairly clear.\n\nBut first let us state the necessary facts.\n\nThe assessee is a limited company carrying-on business of manufacture of jute. It has a factory with a certain number of looms situate in West Bengal. It is a member of the Indian Jute Mills Association\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Association). The Association consists of various jute manufacturing mills as its members and it has been fonned with a view to protecting the interests of the members.\n\nThe obj!lcts of the Association, inter alia, are (i) to protect, focward and defend the trade of members; (ii) to impose restrictive conditions on the conduct of the trade; and (iii) to adjust the production of the Mills ': in the membership of the Association to the demand of the world market. It appears that right from 1939, the demand of jute in the world\n\nmarket was ra, t; her lean and with a view to adjusting the production of the mills to the demand in the world market, a working time agreement\n\nW3.!i lllllered into between the members of the Association restricting tll(l number of working hours per week, for which the mills shall be entitled to work their looms.\n\nThe first working time agreement was\n\n~ ,,_ ente(ed into on 9th January 1939 and it was for a duration of five years and on its expiration, the second and thereafter the !ltird working time agreements, each for a period of five years and in more O£ less similar t.erms, were entered into on 12th I une, 1944 and 25th November 1949 respectively.\n\nThe thiid working time agreemmt was about to expire on 1 lth December, 1954 and since it\n\n(I) 22 Tax Cases 29.\n\n1376 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS\n\n11980) 3 S.C.Jt,\n\nwas elt that the necessity to restrict the number of working boutl per week still continued, a foorth wprking time agreement was entered into between the members of the Association on 9th December 1954 lllld it Ji. was to remain in force for a period of five years from 12th December\n\n1954.\n\nWe are concerned in this appeal with the fourth working time agreement and since the decision of the controversy before us turns\n\nupon the interpretation of its true nature and effect, we shall refer to some of its relevant provisions.\n\nThe first clause of the fourth working time agreement (hereinafter referred to as the \"working time agreement\") to which we must refer is clause ( 4) which provided that, subject to the provisions of clauses ..i,\n\n11 and 12, \" ............ no signatory shall work more than forty A five hours of work per week and such restriction of hours of wed per . week shall continue in force until the number of working hours allowed shall be altered in' accordance with the provisions of Clauses 7 (1), (2) and (3).\" Clause (5) then proceeded to explain that the number of working hours per week mentioned in the working time agreement reJ)-\n\nresented the extent of hours to which signatories were in all entitled in each week to work their registered complement Of looms as determined under clause ( 13) on the basis that they used the full complement Of\n\ntheir loomage as registered with and certified by the committee.\n\nThis clause also contained a provision for increase of the number of working hours per week allowed to a signatory in the event of any redaction in his loomage.\n\nIt was also stipulated in this clause that the hours of work allowed to be utilised in each week shall cease at the end Of\n\nthat week and shall not be allowed to be carried forward.\n\nThe num• ber of working hours per week prescribed by clause ( 4) was, as indicated in the opening part of that clause, subject inter alia to the provision of clause ( 10) and under that clause, a joint and several agreement could be made providing that throughout the duration of the work- / ing time agreement, members with registered complements of not exceeding 220 shall be entitled to work upto 72 hours per weekl\n\nClause 6 (a) enabled members to be registered as a \"Group Of. Mills\" if they happened to be under the control of the same managing agents or were combined by any arrangement or agreement and it was open to any member of the Group of Mills. so registered to utilise the aRotment of hours of work per week of other members in the same group who were not fully utilising the hours of work allowable to them llnder the working time agreement, provided that such transfer of hours of work was for a period of not less than six months.\n\nThen followed clause 6 (b) which is very material and it provided, inter alia, as follows:-\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of sub-claUS'eS (i) to (iv) ... signatories to this agreement shall be entitled to transfer in\n\nEMPIRE JUTE CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1377 (Bhagwati, J.) ; part or wholly their allotment of hours of work per week to\n\nany one or more of the other signatories; and upon iruch transfer being duly effected and registered and a certificate issued by the committee, the signatory or signatories to whom the allotment of working hours has been transferred sha.11 be entitled. to utilise the allotment of hours of work per week so transferred.\"\n\nThere were four conditions precedent subject to which the allotment -0f iloors of work trnsferred by one member to another could be utilis- £d by the latter and those of them were as under :\n\n\" ( 1) No hours of work shall be transferred unless the transfer covers hours of work per week for a period of not less than six months;\n\n(ii) All agreements to transfer shall, as a condition precedent to any rights being obtained by transferees, be. submitted with an explanation to the Committee and the Committee's decision ......... whether the transfer shall be allowed shall be final and conclusive.\n\n(iii) If the Committee sanctions the transfer, it shall he a condition precedent to its utilisation that a certificate be -issued and the transfer registered.\" E\n\nthis transaction of transfer of allotment of hours of work per week was commonly referred to as sale of looms hours by one member to another.\n\nThe consequence of such transfer was that the hours of work. per week transferred by a member were liable to be deducted from the working hours per week allowed to such member under the working time agreement and the member in whose favour such transfer was made was entitled to utilise thl: number of working hours per\n\nweek IJ'am; ferred to him in addition to the working hours per week .allowed to him under the working time agreement. It was under this\n\nclause that the assessee purchased loom hours from four different jute\n\nJD3llufacturing concerns which were signatories to the working time agreement, for the aggregate sum of Rs. 2,03,255 /- during the yeirr\n\nht August 1958 to 31st July 1959. In the course of assessment for the assessment year 1960-61 for which the relevant accounting yi:ar was the previous year 1st August 1958 to 31st July 1959, the assessee\n\nclaimed to deduct this amount of Rs. 2,03,255 /- as revenue expenditure on the ground that it was part of the cost df operating the looms wflich constituted the profit making apparatus of the assessee.\n\nThe daim was disallowed by the Income-tax Officer but on appeal, the\n\nAppellate Assistant CommiS§ioner accepted the claim and allowed the deduction on 11he view that the assessee did not acquire any capital asset when it purchased the loom hours and the amount spent by it was incurred for running the business or working it with a view to producing day-to-day profits and it was part of operating cost or revenue cost of production. The Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tn\"bunal but the appeal was unsuccessful and the Tribunal taking the same view as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, held that the expenditure incurred by the assessee was in the nature of revenue expenditure and hence deductible in computing the profits and gains of business of the assessee.\n\nThls view taken by the Tribunal was chAflenged in a reference made to the Higb Court at the instance of the Revenue.\n\nThe Higb Court too was inclined to take the same view as the Tribunal, but it felt compelled by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills Ltd.(') to decide in favour of the Revenue and on that view it overturned\n\nthe decision of the Tribunal and held that the amount paid by the assessee for purchase of the loom hours was in the nature of capital expenditure and was, therefore, not dednctible under section 10(2)\n\n(xv) of the Act.\n\nThe assessee thereupon preferred the present appeal by special leave obtained from this Court.\n\nNow an expenditure incurred by an assessee can qualify for deduction under section 10(2) (xv) only ff it is incurred wholly and aclusively for t)le purpose of his business, but even if it fUlfils this requirement, it is not enough; it must further be of revenue as distinguished from capital nature.\n\nHere in the present case it was not contended on behalf of the Revenue that the sum of Rs. 2,03,255/- wa5 not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the assessee's business but the only argument was and this argument found favour with the High Court, that it represented capital expenditure and was hence not deductible under section 10(2)(xv). The sole question which therefore arises for determination in the appeal is. whether the sum of Rs. 2,03,255/- paid by the assessee represented capital expenditure or revenue expenditure.\n\nWe shall have to examine this question on principle but before we do so, we mnst refer to the decision of this Court in Maheshwari Devi Jute Mi11s case ( snpra) since that is the decision which weighed heavily with the Higb Court in fact, cmnpelled it to negative the claim of the assessee and held the expenditure to be on capital account. That was a con-\n\nVet'se case where the question was whether an amaunt received by the\n\nas&essee for sale of loom hours was in the nature of capital receipt or revenue receipt.\n\nThe view taken by this Court was that it was in the:\n\n(\\) [1965) 57 l.T.ll. 36.\n\nr 4\n\nEMPIRE JUTE CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 13 7~ (Bhagwati, l.) nature of capital receipt and hence not taxable. It was contended on A be.half a( the Revenue, relying on this decision, that just as the amount ..._ reillised for sale of loom hours was held to be capital receipt, so also the amount paid for purchase of loom hours must be held to be of -\". capital nature.\n\nBut this argument suffers from a double fallacy ..\n\nIn the first place it is not a univel'Sally true proposition that what may be a capital receipt in the hands of the payee must necessarily be cajlital expenditure in relation to the payer.\n\nThe fact that a certain payment constitutes income or capital receipt in the hands of the recipient is not material in determining whether !, he payment is revenue '6 or capital disbursement qua the payer. It was felicitously pointed -·\"\"--- out by Macnaghten, J. in Race Course Betting Control Board v.\n\nWild(') that a \"payment may be a revenue payment from the point of view of the payer and a capital payment from the point of view of the receiver and vice versa. Therefore, the decision in Maheshwari Devi lute Mills' case (supra) cannot be regarded as an authority for the proposition that payment made by an assessee for purchase of loom hours would be capital expenditure. Whether it is capital expenditure woold have to be determined having regard to the nature of the tranS>- action and other relevant factors.\n\nBut, more importantly, it may be pointed out that Maheshwari Devi lute Mills' case (supra) proceeded on the basis that loom liours\n\nwere a capital asset and the case was decided on that basis. It was common ground between the parties throughout the proceedings, right from the stage of the Incom6-tax Officer upto the High Court, that the\n\nri&bt to work the looms for the allotted hours of work was an asset capable of being transferred and thi' Court therefore did not allow \"-... counsel on behalf of the Revenue to raise. a contention that loom hours were in the nature of a privilege and were not an asset at all. t Since it was a co=only accepted basis that loom hours were an asset of _the assessee, the only argument which could be advanced on behalf of the Renue was that when the assessee transferred a part of its hours of work per week to another member, the transaction did not amount to sale of an asset belonging to the assessee, but it was merely the turning of an asset to account by permitting the transferee to use that asset and hence the amount received by the assessee was income from business.\n\nThe Revenue submitted that \"where it is a part of the normal activity of the assessee's business to earn profit by Iilaking use of its asset by either empl?ying it in its O'Wn manufacturing concern or by letting it out to others, consideration received for allowing the transferee to use that asset is income received from busi- -------- - (I) 22 Tax Cases 182.\n\n:,-,,.\n\nness and chargeable to income tax\".\n\nThe principle invoked by the Revenue was that \"receipt by the exploitation of a commercial asset is the profit of the business irrespective of the manner in which the asset is exploited by the owner in the business, for the owner is entitled to exploit it to his best advantage either by using it himoo1f personally or. by letting it out to somebody else.\" This principle, supported as it was by numerous decisions, was accepted by the comt . as a valid principle, but it was pointed out that it had no application in the case before the court, because though loom hours were an as8et, they could not from their very nature be let out while retaining property jn them and there could be no grant of temporary right to me them.\n\nThe court therefore concluded that this wiis really a case of '\"1r sale of loom hours and not of exploitation of loom hours by pennitt- _/\\_ ing user while retaining ownership and, in the cirCllrnstances, the amount received by the assessee from sale of loom hours was liable to be regarded as capital receipt and not income. It will thus be seen that the entire case proceeded on the commonly acceped basis that loom hours were an asset and the only issue debated was whether the transaction in question constituted sale of this asset or it represented merely exploitation of the asset by permitting its user by another whDe retaining ownership.\n\nNo question was raised before the court as to whether loom hours were an asset at all nor was any argument advanced as to what was the true narure of the transaction. It is quite possible that if the question had been examined fully on principle, unhampered by any pre-determined hypothesis, the court might have come to a different conclusion.\n\nThis decision cannot, therefroe, be regarded as an authority compelling us to take the view that the amount paid for purchase of loom hours was capital and not revenue expenditure.\n\nThe question is res integra and we must proceed to examine it on first principle. .('\n\nIt is quite clear from the terms of the working time agreement the allotment of loom hours to different mills constituted merely a ' contractual restriction on the right of every mill under the general law to work its looms to their full capacity. If there had been no working time agreement, each mill would have been entitled to work its looms uninterruptedly for twenty four hours a day throughout the week, but that would have resulted in production of jute very much in excess of the demand in the world market, leading to unfair competition and precipitous fall in jute price and in the process, prejudicially affecting all the mills and therefore with a view to protecting\n\nthe interest of the mills who were members of the Association, the working time agreement was entered into restricting the number of working hours per week for which each mill could work its looms.\n\nEMPIRE JUTJ; l CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1381 (Bhagwati, /.)\n\nThe allotment of working hours per week under the working time agreement was clearly not a right conferred on a mill, signatory to the working time agreement. It was rather a restriction voluntarily accepted by each mill with a view to adjusting the production to the demand in the world market and this restriction could not possibly be regarded as an asset of such mill.\n\nThis restriction necessarily had the effect of limiting the production of the mill and consequentially also the profit which the mill could otherwise make by working full loom hours. But a provision was made in clause 6(b) of the working time agreement that the whole or a part of the working hours per week could be transferred by one mill to another for a period of not ....._ r less than six months and if such trans.fer was approved and registered\n\n)'_ by the Committee of the Association,, the transferee mill would be - entitled to utilise the number of working hours per week transferred to it in addition to the working hours per week allowed to it under the working time agreement, while the transferor mill would cease to be\n\nentitled to avail of the number of working hours per week so transferred and these would be liable to be deducted from the number of working hours per week otherwise allotted to it.\n\nThe purchase of loom hours by a mill had therefore the effect of relaxing the restriction on the operation of looms to the extent of the number of working hours per week transferred to it, so that the transferee mill could work its looms for longer hours than pennltted un_der the working time\n\nagreement and increase its profitability.\n\nThe amotlnt spent on purchase of loom hours thus represented consideration paid for being able to work the loom for a longer number of hours. It is difficult to see l!_ow such payment could possibly be regarded as expenditure on capital account.\n\nThe decided cases have, from time to time, evolved various tests distinguishing between capital and revenue expenditure but no test is paramount or conclusive. There is no all -'i embracing formula which can provide a ready solution to the problem;\n\nt110 touchstone has been devised.\n\nEvery case has to be decided on its own facts keeping in mind the broad picture of the whole operation in respect of which the expenditure has been incurred.\n\nBut a f.ew tests formulated by the conrt may be referred to as they might help to arrive at a correct decision of the controversy between the parties.\n\nOne celebrated test is that laid down by Lord Cave, L.C. in British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton(') where the learned Law Lord stated: \"When an expenditure is made, not only once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, there is very\n\n(I) 10 Tax Cases !SS at 189.\n\ngood reason (in the absence of special circumstances leading to an opposite conclusion) for treating such an expenditure as properly attr; butable not to revenue but to capital.\" This test, as the parenthetical clause shows, must yield where there are special circumstances lea<ling to a contrary conclusion and, as pointed out by Lord Radcliffe in Commissioner of Taxes v. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd.,(') it would be misleading to suppose that in all cases, securing a benefit for the business would be prima facie capital expenditure \"so long as the benefit is not so transitory as to have no endurance at all.\" There may be cases where expenditure, even if incurred. for obtaining advantage of enduring benefit, may, none-t!Je.-less, be on revenue account and the test of enduring benefit may break down. It ., j' is not every advantage of enduring nature acquired by an assessee ~. that brings the case within the principle laid down in this test What is material to consider i~ the nature of the advantage in a commercial sense and it is only where the advantage is in the capital field that the expenditure would be disallowable on an application of this !e6t.\n\nIf the advantage consists merely in facilitating the assessee's trading operations or enabling the management and conduct of the assessee's business. to be carried on more efficiently or more profitably while leaving the fixed capital untouched, the expenditure would be on revenue account, even though the advantage may endure for an indefinite future. The test ol enduring benefit is therefore not a certain or conclusive test and it cannot be applied blindly and mechanically\n\nbout regard to the particular facts and circumstances of a given case.\n\nBut even if this test were applied in the present case, it does not yield a conclusion in favour of the Revenue.\n\nHere, by purchase of loom hours no new asset has been created. There is no addition to or expansion of the profit making apparatus of the assessee. The income earning machine remains what it was prior to the purchase of loom hours. The assessee is merely enabled to operate the profit ( making structure for a longer number of hours.\n\nAnd this advantage is clearly not of an enduring nature.\n\nIt is linrited in its duration to six months and, moreover, the additional working hours per week transferred to the assessee have to be utilised during the week and cannot be carried forward to the next week. It is, therefore, not possible to say that any advantage of enduring benefit in the capital field was acquired by the assessee in purchasing loom hours and the test of enduring benefit cannot help the Revenue.\n\nAnother test which is often applied is the one based on distinction between fixed and. circulating capital.\n\nThis test was applied by\n\n(I) iI96S] SS I. T. R. 241.\n\n/, '\n\nr ..\n\n( ... ) 'ff\n\nEMPIRE JUI; E CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1383 (Bhagwati, !.) Lord Haldant1 in the leading case of Jahn Smith & Son v. Moore(!) -where the learned law Lord draw the distinction between fixed capital .and circulating capital in words which have almost acquired the status of a definition. lle said: \"Fixed capital (is) what the owner turns .to profit by keeping it in his own possession; circulating capital (is) -what he makes profit of by parting with it and letting it change mastms.\" Now as long as the expenditure in question can be clearly xeferred to the acquisition of an asset which falls within one or the .other of these two categories, such a test would be a critical one.\n\nBut this test also sometimes breaks down because there are many :forms of expenditure which do not fall easily within these two categories and nQ.t infrequently, as pointed' out by Lord Radcliffe in Com- .missioner of Taxes v. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd.\n\n(supra), the line of demarcation is difficult to draw and leads to subtle distinctions between profit that is made \"out of\" assets and profit that is made \"upon\" assets or ''with\" assets. Moreover, there may be caees where expenditure, though referable to or in connection with fixed capital, is never-the-less allowable as revenue expenditure. An illustrative example would be of expenditure incurred in preserving or maintaining capital assets. This test is therefore clearly not one of universal\n\napplication. But even if we were to apply this test, it would not be possible to characterise the amount paid for purchase of loom hours as capital expenditure, because acquisition of additional loom hours does not add at all to the fixed capital of the assessee. The permanent struc- ture of which the income is to be the produce or fruit remains the same; it is iiot enlarged. We are not sure whether loom hours can be regarded as part of circulating capital like labour, raw material, power etc., but it is clear beyond doubt that they are not part of fixed capital and hence even the application of this test does not compel the conclusion that the payment for purchase of loom hours was in the nature of caplial expenditure. \" .\n\nThe Revenue .however contended that by purchase of loom hours the assessee acquired a right to produce more than what it otherwise would have been. entitled to do and this right to produce additional quantity of goods constituted addition to or augmentation of its profit making structure. The assessee acquired the right to produce a larger quantity of goods and to earn more income and this, according to the Jlevenue, amounted to acquisition of a source of profit or income which though intangible was never-the-less a source or 'spinner' of income and the amount spent on purchase of this source of profit or .:inc9me therefore rented expenditure of capital nature. Now it is\n\n(l) 12 Tax Cases 266.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nA true that if disbursement is made for acquisition of a source of profit oc income, it would ordinarily, in the absence of any other couniervalling\n\ncircumstances, be in the nature of capital expenditure. But we fail to\n\nsee how it can at all be said in the present case that the assessee acquired a source of profit or income when it purchased loom hours.\n\nThe source of profit or income was the profit making apparatus and this remained untouched and unaltered. There was no enlargement of the permanent structure of which the income would be the produce or fruit.\n\nWhat the assessee acquired was merely an advantage in the nature of relaxation of restriction on working hours imposed by the working time agreement, so that the assessee could operate its profit-earning structure _ for a longer number of hours. Undoubtedly, .the profit earning struc-\n\n_..... ~' )~ v\n\nC ture of the assessee was enabled to produce more goods, but that was\n\n, )T' • not because of any addition or augmentation in the profit making struc- _,,.c, ture, bnt because the profit making structure could be operated for\n\nlonger working hours. The expenditure incurred for this purpose was primarily and essentially related to the operation or working of the looms which constituted the profit earning apparatus of the asses,, ee.\n\nIt was an expenditure for operating or working the looms for looger working hours with a view to producing a larger quantity of goods and earning more income and was therefore in the nature of revenue expenditure. We are conscious that in law as in life, and particularly in the field of taxation law, analogies are apt to be deceptive and misleading, but in the present context, the analogy of quota right may not be inappropriate. Take a case where acquisition of raw material is regulated by quota system and in order to obtain more raw material, the ilssessee purchases quota right of another. Now it is obviaus that by purchase of such quota right, the assessee would be abl.e to aoquire more raw material and that would increase the profitability of his profit\n\nI.I making apparatus, bnt the amount paid for purchase of such quota right would indubitably be revenue expenditure, since it is incurred for acquiring raw material and is part of the operating cost. Similarly, if. ( payment .has to be made for securing additional power every week, ._,, such payment would also be part of the cost of operating the profit making structure and hence in the nature of revenue expenditure, even G though the effect of acquiring additional power would be to augment the productivity of the profit-making structure. On the same analogy. payment made for purchase of loom hours which would enable the assessee to operate the profit-making structure for a longer number of hours than those permitted under the working time agreement woold\n\nB also be part of the cost of performing the income earning operatioos and hence revenue in character.\n\nWhen dealing with cases of this kind where the question is whclhei expenditure incurred by an assessee is capital or revenue expoodi(me, 1\n\nEMPIRE JUTE CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1385 (Bhagwati, !.) it is necessary to bear in mind what Dixon, J. said in Hal/strom's Property Limited v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation(•) : \"What is an 4 outgoing of capital and what is an outgoing on acconnt of revenue depends on what the expendiure is calculated to effect from a practical . and business point of view rather than upon the justice classification of the legal rights, if any, secured, employed or exhausted in the process.\" The question must be viewed in the larger context of business necessity\" or expediency. If the outgoing expenditure. is so related to the carrying on or the conduct of the business that it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process and not for acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character, the possesion of which ·\"\\ 'l is a condition of the carrying on of the business, the expenditure may _f\"iie regarded as revenue expenditure. See Bombay Steam Navigation Co.\n\n(1953) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax( 2 ) The same test was formulated by Lord Clyde in Robert Addle & Son's Collieries Ltd. v.\n\nInland Revenue(8) in these words : \"Is it part of the company's working expenses, is it expenditure laid out as part of the process of profit earning? or, on the other hand, is it a capital outlay, is it ex~ penditure necessary for the acquisition of property or of rights of permanent character, the possession of which is a condition of carrying on its trade at all ?\" It is clear from the above discussion that the payment made by the assessee for purchase of loom hours was expenditure laid out as part of the process of profit earning. It was, to use Lord Soum- >- nar's words, an outlay of a business \"in order to carry it on and to earn a profit out of this expense as an expense of carrying it on.u It was part of the cost of operating the profit earning apparatus and was clearly in the nature of revenue expenditure.\n\nIt was pointed out by Lord Radcliffe in Commissioner of Taxes\n\nv. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. (supra) that \"in consi- .'- dering allocation of expenditure betweeQ the capital and income ', accouuts, it is almost unavoidable to argue from analogy.\" Thete are\n\n~!ways cases falling indisputably on one or the other side of the line and it is a fam\"liar argument in tax courts that the case under review\n\n~ JOlrs close analogy to a case falling on the right side of the line and \"' must therefore be decided in the same manner. If we apply .this l methoJ, the case closes to the present one that we can find is Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines case (supra).\n\nThe facts of this case • 1- Were that three companies which were engaged in the business of copper mining formed a group and consequent on a steep fall in the price of copper in the world market, this group decided voluntarily to\n\n(I) 72 C. L. R. 634.\n\n(2) 56 I. T. R. 52.\n\n(3) 8 Tax Cases 671.\n\n25'-6IOSCI/80\n\ncut its production by 10 per cent which for the three companies together meant a cut of 27000 tons for the year in question, It was agreed between the three companies that for the purpose of giving A effect to this cut, company B should cease production for one year and that the assessee company and company R should undertake between them the whole group programme for the year reduced by the overall cut of 27000 tons and should pay compensaticm to company B for the abandonment of its production for the year. Pursuant\n\nto this agreement the assessee paid to company B £ 1,384,565 by \\\\Cay of its proportionate share of the compensation and the question arose whether this payment was in the nature of capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. The Privy Council, held that the compensation paid if\n\nby the assessee to company B in consideration of the latter agreeing tcY\"\\_ cease production for one year was in the nature of revenue expenditure and was allowable as a deduction in computing the taxable income of the assessee.\n\nLord Radcliffe delivering the opinion of the Privy Council observed that the assessee's arrangement with . companies R and B \"out of which the expenditure arose, made it a cost incidental to the production and sale of the output of the mine\" and as such its true analogy with an operating cost.\n\nThe payment compensation represented expenditure incurred by the assessee for enabling it to produce more goods despite the cut of 10 per cent and it was plainly part of the cost of performing the income-earning operation.\n\nThis decision bears a very close analogy to the present case and if payment made by the assessee company to company B for acquiring an advantage by way of entitlement to produce more goods notwithstanding the cut of 80 per cent was regarded by the Privy Council as revenue expenditure, a fortiorari, expenditure incurred by the assessee in the present case for purchase of loom hours so as to enable the assessee to work the profit making apparatus for a longer number , . . / of hours and produce more goods than what the assessee would other:-, r\n\nwise be entitled to do, must be held to be of revenue character. 1 / '\n\nThe decision in Commissioner of Taxes v. Carron Company(') also bears comparison with the present case.\n\nThere certain expenditure was incurred by the assessee company for the purpose of obtaining a supplementary cJ; iarter altering its constitution, so that the management of the company could be placed on a sound commercial footing and restrictions on the borrowing powers of the assessee company could be removed. The old charter contaned certain antiquated provisions and also restricted the borrowing powers of the assessee company and t.!Jese features severely handicapped the assessee company in the development of its trading activities. The House\n\n(I) 45 Tax Cases 18.\n\nw •\n\n• /\n\n• •\n\n EMPIRE. JUTE CO. V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 1387 (Bhagwati, I.) of Lords held that the expenditure incurred for obtaining the reviSed charter eliminating these features which operated as impediments to tbe profitable development of the assessee company's business was in the nature of revenue expenditure since it was incurred for facilitating the day-to-day trading operations of the assessee company and enabling the management and conduct of the assessee company's business to be carried on more efficiently. Lord Reid emphasised in the course of bis speech that the expenditure was incurred by the assessee company \"to remove antiquated restrictions which were preventing profits from being earned\" and on that account held the expenditure to be of rewnue character. It must follow on an analogical reasoning that expenditure incurred by the assessee in the present case for the purpose of removing a restriction on the number of working hours for which it could operate the looms, with a view to increasing its profits, woofd also be in the nature of revenue expenditure.\n\nWe are therefore of the view that the payment of Rs. 2,03,255 /- lllllde by the assessee for purchase of loom hours represented revenue\n\nexpenditure and was allowable as a deduction under section 10(2) (xv) D of !he Act. We accordingly allow the appeal and answer the question referred by the Tribunal in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The Revenue will pay to the. assessee costs throughout.\n\ns.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "EMPIRE JUTE CO. LID", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EMPIRE JUTE CO. LID", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX\n\nMay 9, 1980\n\n[P .. N. BHAGWATI, v. D. TuLZAPURKAR AND R s. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P .. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v. D. TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R s. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 10(2>(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 672, "end_char": 689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Jute Mills Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 927, "end_char": 956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Right from 1939, the demand of jute in the world market was rather lean and with a view to adjusting the production of the jute mills to the dema.nd\n\nof the world market, various jute mills formed an Association styled as Indian Jute Mills Association and the appellant is one such member of the said Association."}}, {"text": "9th December, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1353, "end_char": 1371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth working time Agreement was en:ered into between the members of the Association on 9th December, 1954 and it Was to remain in force for a period of five years from 12th December 1954."}}, {"text": "12th December 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fourth working time Agreement was en:ered into between the members of the Association on 9th December, 1954 and it Was to remain in force for a period of five years from 12th December 1954."}}, {"text": "Clause 6(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1990, "end_char": 2001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2517, "end_char": 2528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st July 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4164, "end_char": 4178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln the course of the assessment year 1960-61 for which the relevant accounting year was the previous year 1st August 1958 to 31st July 1959, the assessee claimed this amount of Rs."}}, {"text": "MSCSSee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cleim was disallowed by the lncome Tax Officer, but on appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the claim and allowed the deduction on the view that the MSCSSee did not acquire any capital as.set when it purchased the loom hours and the amount spent by it was incurred for running the business of working it with a view to producing day-to-day profits and it was part of operating cost or revenue cost of production."}}, {"text": "Jost", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4879, "end_char": 4883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal, and, having Jost before it, carried the matter before the High Court by a reference."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of lncome1 Tax v.\n\nMaheshwari Devi Jute Mills Ud., ["}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5251, "end_char": 5264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5702, "end_char": 5728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills' case was a converse case where the question \" was whether an amount received by the assessee for .sale of loom hours was l In the nature of capital receipt or revenue receipt and the Supreme Court took the view that it -was in the nature of capital receipt and hence not tax .. able.", "canonical_name": "Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills"}}, {"text": "Maheshwari Devi lute Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6030, "end_char": 6056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Maheshwari Devi lute Mills' case cannot on this account l>e regarded as an authority for the proposition that payment made by an asoessee for purchase of loom hours woold be capital expenditure, because it is not a universally true proposition that what may be capital receipt in the llands of the payee must nece<sarily be capital expenditure in relation to the payer."}}, {"text": "Maheshwari Devi lute Mills", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6885, "end_char": 6911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again, Maheshwari Devi lute Mills' Case proeeeded on the.", "canonical_name": "Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills"}}, {"text": "clause 6(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9065, "end_char": 9076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16324, "end_char": 16337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. Pal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16744, "end_char": 16750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Pal, T. A. Ramachandran & D. N. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16752, "end_char": 16770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Pal, T. A. Ramachandran & D. N. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16773, "end_char": 16784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Pal, T. A. Ramachandran & D. N. Gupta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16805, "end_char": 16816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. B. Ahuja & Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "B. B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16818, "end_char": 16829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. B. Ahuja & Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16837, "end_char": 16850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, B. B. Ahuja & Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16926, "end_char": 16934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. COMMI&'SIONl!R OF INCOMB TAX\n\n(Bhagwati, J.) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the vexed question whether a particular expenditure incurred by the assessee is of capital: or revenue nature.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16984, "end_char": 16992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. COMMI&'SIONl!R OF INCOMB TAX\n\n(Bhagwati, J.) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal by special leave raises the vexed question whether a particular expenditure incurred by the assessee is of capital: or revenue nature.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "M. R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18003, "end_char": 18008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Often cases fall on the border line and in such cases, as observed by Lord M. R. in Inland Revenue v. British Salmon 'iiro Engines Ltd.(') \"the spin of coin would decide th~ matter almost as satisfactorily as an attempt to find persons.\""}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18447, "end_char": 18458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has a factory with a certain number of looms situate in West Bengal."}}, {"text": "9th December 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20083, "end_char": 20100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1376 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS\n\n11980) 3 S.C.Jt,\n\nwas elt that the necessity to restrict the number of working boutl per week still continued, a foorth wprking time agreement was entered into between the members of the Association on 9th December 1954 lllld it Ji."}}, {"text": "12th December\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20169, "end_char": 20188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was to remain in force for a period of five years from 12th December\n\n1954."}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22107, "end_char": 22115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22652, "end_char": 22660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assistant CommiS§ioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25366, "end_char": 25388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The daim was disallowed by the Income-tax Officer but on appeal, the\n\nAppellate Assistant CommiS§ioner accepted the claim and allowed the deduction on 11he view that the assessee did not acquire any capital asset when it purchased the loom hours and the amount spent by it was incurred for running the business or working it with a view to producing day-to-day profits and it was part of operating cost or revenue cost of production."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26621, "end_char": 26634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26825, "end_char": 26838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27389, "end_char": 27406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maheshwari Devi Jute Mi11s", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27717, "end_char": 27743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall have to examine this question on principle but before we do so, we mnst refer to the decision of this Court in Maheshwari Devi Jute Mi11s case ( snpra) since that is the decision which weighed heavily with the Higb Court in fact, cmnpelled it to negative the claim of the assessee and held the expenditure to be on capital account.", "canonical_name": "Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills"}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29068, "end_char": 29078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was felicitously pointed -·\"\"--- out by Macnaghten, J. in Race Course Betting Control Board v.\n\nWild(') that a \"payment may be a revenue payment from the point of view of the payer and a capital payment from the point of view of the receiver and vice versa."}}, {"text": "clause 6(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34691, "end_char": 34702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cave", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36626, "end_char": 36630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One celebrated test is that laid down by Lord Cave, L.C. in British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. v. Atherton(') where the learned Law Lord stated: \"When an expenditure is made, not only once and for all, but with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade, there is very\n\n(I) 10 Tax Cases !"}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37274, "end_char": 37283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This test, as the parenthetical clause shows, must yield where there are special circumstances lea<ling to a contrary conclusion and, as pointed out by Lord Radcliffe in Commissioner of Taxes v. Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd.,(') it would be misleading to suppose that in all cases, securing a benefit for the business would be prima facie capital expenditure \"so long as the benefit is not so transitory as to have no endurance at all.\""}}, {"text": "Haldant1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39859, "end_char": 39867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Haldant1 in the leading case of Jahn Smith & Son v. Moore(!)"}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45915, "end_char": 45920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is necessary to bear in mind what Dixon, J. said in Hal/strom's Property Limited v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation(•) : \"What is an 4 outgoing of capital and what is an outgoing on acconnt of revenue depends on what the expendiure is calculated to effect from a practical ."}}, {"text": "Clyde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46896, "end_char": 46901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax( 2 ) The same test was formulated by Lord Clyde in Robert Addle & Son's Collieries Ltd. v.\n\nInland Revenue(8) in these words : \"Is it part of the company's working expenses, is it expenditure laid out as part of the process of profit earning?"}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52146, "end_char": 52150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Reid emphasised in the course of bis speech that the expenditure was incurred by the assessee company \"to remove antiquated restrictions which were preventing profits from being earned\" and on that account held the expenditure to be of rewnue character."}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52895, "end_char": 52908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1388_1397_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "TRAVANCORE TEA CO. LTD. BTC.\n\nSTATE OF KERALA AND ORS.\n\nJune 3, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND p, S. 'KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\nKer:Jla Moror Vehicles Taxation Act (Act 24 of 1963) S<ctioru 3, 5 .and 6, scope of-\"Motor Vehicles used for use in the State\", whether the JUer or keeping for use in the State means user on public roads only.\n\nThe Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (Act 24 of 1963) \"\"\"' bmnght into force on 1-7-63. The Act provides that a \"tax at the rates fixed lly the Government by nOtification in the Gazette not exceeding tho marimnm rate specified in the First Schedule shall be levied on all motor vehicles or 1'ept for me in the state\".\n\nThe alJpellant company owned 17 motor vehicles, tracton, trailelll and lorries all of which are registered in the Company's name under the lillJO)r Vehicles Act. Tue Company alleged that the vehicles were purcbaoed by it oolely and exclusively for use in the estates and intended to be mcd Ollly for agricultural purpose and were not used nor kept for use in the S1are as oontemplated under section 3 of the Act. The Company is a tea pll'Ulllllioo having eight estates which )ie contiguous to each other and have an extent of 9422.44 acres in the aggregate. The Company for tlie purpose of plonlation are maintaining roods fit for vehlculer traffic in the eight estates covering a length of 131 miles in the aggregate.\n\nOn 23rd September, 1964 a Bcd.fonl Lorry owned by the Company and bearing registration No. KLK 1540 wa.. seized by the Police and taken into custody in Tangamullay Estate wblch is one of the estates owned by the Company but later released on payment under protest a sum of Rs. 3150/- as tax for the period between 1-7-1963 to 31-1U4.\n\nThe appellant Company filed O.P. 199 /65 before the High Court of Kerala claiming that they were not liable to pay any tax on the Motor Vehicles. The H'gh Court remanded the matter to the Transport Authority for a ftDdlag on\n\nthe question raised. Since the Transport authorities was of the view that / Section 3 covers private roads as well and decided against the appellant, the ,4 appellant moved the High Court once again in O.P. 2173/68.\n\nHaving Jost'/ before the single bench and the Division Bench in the Letters Patent appeal, the appellant oome up in appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeals in part, the Court\n\nHELD :\n\n1. On reading sections 3, 5 and 6 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles f Taxation Act (Act 24 of 1963), it is clear that a levy of tax is contemplaaod\n\nenly on the vehicles that are uoed or kept for the uso on the public \"\"\"\"' of • the State.\n\n[1394GJ\n\nBoiani Ores Ltd., v. Stale of Ort.so, [197S] 2 SCR 13! @ US, explained H and distingnishcd. ·\n\n2. Entry 57 in List II of the Constitution relates to taxeo on vchicleo, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, including mun-\n\nTRAVANCORE TEA CO. V. STATE OF KERALA 1389\n\n'Clll'S subject to the provisions of entcy 35 of List Ill. This entry enables the\n\nState Government to levy a tax on <ill vehicles whether mechanically propelled <lr not, suitable for use on roads. Section 3 Of uie Kemla Motor Vehicles\n\nTaxation Act (Act 24 of 1963) provides that a tax \"shall be levied on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State 1'. The vehicles in the instant case are mechanicWly propelled and suitable for use on roads. The levy is Within the competence of the State Legislature as Entcy 57 in List II auth<>- rires the levy on vehicles suitable for use tm roods. [1393 B-EJ\n\n3. In order to lvy a tax on vehicles used or kept for use on public roads of the Stare and at the same time to avoid evasion of tax the legislature has prescribed the procedure. Under sub section 2 of section 3 there is a pre- \"1llllption that a motor vehicle for which l, he certificate of regisjration is ::\"\\; t shall be deemed to be used or kept for use in the State. Section 3(2)\n\neguanls the revenue of the State by relieving it from the burden of proving - tbBt the vehicle was used or kept for use on the public roods of the State.\n\nAt tfu same time the interest of the bonafide ownel'ls safeguarded by enabling him to claim and obtain a certificate of non-user from the prescribed authority . .In order to enable the owner of the vehicle or the person who is in pos.5e'SSion or being in control of the motor vehicles of which the certificate Of registration is c; urrent to claim exemption from tax he should get a certificate in the prescn'bed manner from the Regional Transport Officer. Section 5 provides far exemption from payment of tax under certain circumstances. Section 6 enables the registered owner or a person in possession or control of su, ch a vehicle to get refund of tax if the conditions specified therein are satisfied.\n\nThus in order to enable the registered owner or person in possessiOI; l or control of a vehicle o get exemption of tax, ad.van.Ce intimation to the R.T.O. along with the surrender of certificate of registration iS necessary. The provision of t-- s. 3 sub-sec. (2) as well as s. 5 and s. 6 are meant to prevent e\"VBSion of tax .and to provide for exemption from tax in proper cases. Though the purpose of. the Act is to tax vehicles that are used or kept for use on the public roads o0f the State, the State is entitled for the purpose of safeguarding the revenues of the State and to prevent evasion of the nu to enact provision like provision as in s. 3 raising a presumption that the vehicle is used or kept for 11se in the State witlwut any further proof unless exemption is claimed under s. 3(2),\n\n~· 5 and s. 6. [1393 G-H, 1394 A-G]\n\n'-1r---.{ In order to claim exemption from payment of tax requirements of s. 3(2) .or \"ss. 5 and 6 should be. satisfied. Surrender of the registration certifioote .contemplated under s. 5 is for me.king sure that the motor vehcles is not being\n\nput to any use and does not have the effect of annulling the 'certificate of registration. If the requirement contemplated under the Act is not satisfied the\n\nrered owner or person in possession or coptrol of the vehicles would not be entitled to claim any exemP!ion from payment of tax. [1394 H, 1395 A-BJ\n\nn fo-\n\n5. The Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Ac~ 1963 (Act 24 of 1963) came into force on 18-3-63. Section 2(1) of the Taxation Act provides that words 3nd expression used but not defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Centr:tl :Act. 4 of 1939) shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in :!Mt Act.\n\nOn the date when the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act was .enacted,. Motor VehiCles Act 1939 was amended (by Act 100 of 1956) and . the oded definition on the date when the Taxation Act came into force .exempted o!!ly motor vehicles wbicli are of a special type adopted for use\n\n1:190\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R:.\n\nonly in .factory or in any other enclosed premises.\n\nThis amended defi, nitioo will have to be read into the Taxation Act which was enacted subsequent to the date of the amendment (by Act 100 of 1956) of the definition of \"mo!D< vehicle\" in s. 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act (Central), 1939. [1396 F•H,\n\n1397 Al\n\nCrvn. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 437-43& and 1460 ot 1970.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgments and Orders dated 24-3-1969 & 10-11-1969 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 451/79, 630/69 & 807169.\n\nA. B. Divan, M. Vellapally and T. M. Ansari for the Appellant in CA 437170. \\T C M. Vellapally and T. M. Ansari for the Appellant in C.A .. 43&;\\_\n\n70.\n\nKapi! Sibal, M. Vel!apally , and T. M. Ansali for the Appellant in\n\nCA 1460170.\n\nK. T. Harindranath and K. M. K. Nair for the Respondents in all the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAlLAsAM, J.\n\nThese three appeals are by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala in Writ Appeals Nos. 451, 630 and 807 of 1969 respectively. The questions that arise for consideration in all the. three appeals are! the same and can be dealt with together. As. the facts so far as they ,,. are necessary for decision in these appeals are similar, we will confine the judgment to the facts in Civil Appeal No. 437 of 1970.\n\nThe appellant in Ciivil Appeal No. 437 of 1970 is Travanrore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. Vandiperiyar in Kerala State.\n\nThe 1st respondent is the State of Kerala and respondents nos. 2 and 4 are the\n\nuthities functioning under the Kerala.\n\nMor Ve!1k~ faxation Act (Act 24 of 1963) which will hereatter be referred to~ the Act, was brouijit into force on 1-7-1963. TheAct\n\nprovides tbat \"a tax at the rates fixed by the Government by nofifi.\" cation in the Garette not exceeding the maximum rates specified in ,, the First Schedulf> shall be levied onl all Motor Vehicles used or .keptl for use in the State.\" The appellant company owned 17 motor vebir\n\ncles, tractors, trailers and lorries all of which are registered in tbe _t • company's name under the Motor Vehicles Act.\n\nThe company alleged that the vehicles were purchased by it solely and exclusively &'.Ji' use in the estates and intended to be used only for agricultural purposa\n\nand were not used nor kept for use in the State as contemplalsl .\n\nI under s. 3 of the Act. The compwiy is a tea plantation having eighi . estates which lie contiauous to each other and have an extent of\n\n\"TRAVANCORE TEA co. v. STATE OF KERALA (Kailasam, !.) 1391\n\n9422.44 .acres in the aggregate.\n\nTil_e company for the purpose of plantation are maintaining roads fit for vehicnlar traffic in the eight\n\nestates covering a length of 131 miles in the . aggregae. On 23rd September, 1964 a Bedford Lorry owned by the company an<\\ bearing registration No. KLK-1540 was seized by the police and taken into custody under s. 13 of the Act. According to the appellant the -seizure was effected in Tengamullay Estate which is one of the eight estates owned by the company. The company wrote to the Department on 28-12-1964 stating that the vehicle was being used for agricultural purpose on private roads in the :Estates aDJl the company is not liable to pay tax and asked for the release Of the vehicle.\n\nOn the company paying a sum of Rs. 3,150/- as tax under '\\iprotest for the period between 1-7-63 to 31-12-64, the vehicle w~ _!')deased. The department proceeded to prosecute the appellant in the Pee.rmade 1st Oass Magistrate's Court ind the case is still pend• ing. The appellant company filed 0. P. No. 199/65 before \\he High\n\nCourt of Kerala claiming that they were not liable to pay any tax. on the motor vehicles.\n\nThe High Court by its judgment dt. 3rd March, 1966 directed the Regional Transport Officer, Kottayam-2rul\n\nrespondent herein, to examine the question raised in the writ peti~ ·!ion.and to pass final orders.\n\nIt also directed that if the.petitioner was aggrieved with the order he was at liberty to approach the High Cburt.\n\nfu the meanwhile it directed stay of prosecution and collection of tax. The matter was taken up for consideration by the 2nd respondent. The\n\n. 2nd 1espondent rejected the pleas of the appellant and by his order dt. 12-4-68 held that the 13 vehicles mentioned in the Original Petition\n\nwere liable to pay ax under the Act. The appellant filed a petition before the High Court for appropriate relief. The High Court disposed of the petition 0. P. No. 2173/68 along with 0. P. No. 2081/68 filed by Peermade Tea Co. who are the appellants in C.A. 438/70 in this .Court, by a common or<ler dt 19th December, 1968.\n\nTh.e learned! held that the language in. s. 3 of the Act showed that there i$ a, dure from the legislative policy o:f restricti; ng the tax liabifay\n\nonly to vehicles using public roads. It held that the tax is imposed\n\nby s. 3 on all the moitor vehiclres used or kept for use in the State irrespective of any , question as to whether they are used or kept for G use on public roads or not. It rejected the contention on behalf. of the appellant that legislature must be taken to have intended to levy \" f.- mich . tax only on motor vehicles , using or kept for use on pubfil: roads. The learned .Judge also held that the Act is not beyond the competence of thio legislative powers of the State as the tax.is le_viable by the State in respect of all m.otor vehicles are used or kept for use , in the State quite irrespective of any question as •cy whether or not such vehicles are us.ed on public roads.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS !1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nAggrieved by the decision of the single Judge the appellant took the matter up on Letters Pate¢ Appeal. The main contention raiself on bebalf c:4. the appellant was that the learned single Judge was in\n\nerror in holding that all motor vehicles used or kept for 'use in the Stlte quite irrespective of any question as to whether or not they are used on public roads, is eaoneous in so far as i~ related to m.otOC\n\nvehicles used or kept exclusively for use in private estate and not used oc kept for use on the public roads of the State. The Letters Patent Bench affinned the decision of the single Judge and rejec!OO the appeal. The constitutional validity of the Act was not questioned before the Bench. Holding that the legislative Entry 57 of the State l.ist only required that the vehicles should be suitable for use on roadsJ\n\nand the charging section QO!y provided that the vehicle should bJ:\\_ used or kept for use in the State the required conditions were satisfied and there would be no justification for reading into the statute wordSthat are not there, and restricting the levy only on vehicle; i using public roads. While not contesting the correctness oll the observatioo of the Bench of the Kerala High Court that the levy cannot ba restricted to vehicles using the public roads, it was submitted thall tllo words in s. 3 cl. ( l ) of he Act \"shall be levied on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State\" should be confined to vehlcles used or kept for use on the public roads of the State, and not to vebic1es. . tbat are intended to be confined within the premises of the Estate. In other words the controversy between the parties before the R. T.O. the single Judge of the High Court and the Bench of the High Court can be stated by el(traeting the question at issue as framed by tilt\n\nR.T.O.\n\n\"I understand that the roads used by these vehicles (even those within the estates) come under the definition of \"Public Roads and Public Place\" since at present I have not afforded opportunity to the company to refute the basis on which that fact is to be found.\n\nI make it clear that I am not relying on that matter as a basis for this order and I reserve my right to investigate that matter if needed be later.\n\nI assume for argument sake (without conceding) that the estate roads are private roads. E\\ren in that case, I am of the view that the company's vehicles are liable to pay tax.\n\nIt is not in dispute that the vehicles are used and are kept for usei' within the State (The company roads are within the Krala State). It is also not disputed that the vehicles are registered and their registration certificates are current and they are usable .motor vehicles. The tax levied under the K.M.V.T. Act is a tax on the possession of usable motor\n\nI \\-\n\nTJUYANCOll.B TEA co. v. STATE OF KERALA (Kai/asam, J.)\n\nI 39J\n\nvdlide and it is realised for the propose of State Revenue.\n\nSuch being the nature of the levy accooling to me, I feel that irrespective of the qtion whether the road on which llill veilicle is intend~ to be used is private or public, the\n\ntlU: ill attracted.\"\n\nThe question that falls for decision is whether on the assumption that tb6 motoc vehicles are used or kept for use within the estate. and aot intended to be used on public roads of the State; the tax is leviatlle? In order to appreciate the question raised, it is n~ to refer to the relevant entry in the Omstitution, the provisiODS oji the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act ;!lid the decision relating to the quealioa rendered by this Court. (Entry 57 in List II of the Constitution: relates to taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled oo not,.\n\nBOita.ble for use on roads, including tramcars subject to the proviSloos of entry 35 of List ill. This entry enables the State Government to levy a tax on all vehicles whether mechanically Jml'- petle.d Ot' not, suitable for use on roads.) (emphasis supplied). There is no dispute that the vehicles are mechanically propelled and suitable lbr use on roads.\n\nSection 3 cA. the impugned Act (Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation: Act (Act 24 Of 1963) provides that a tax \"@hall be levied on all motor mllcles used or kept for use in the State.\" The levy is within\n\nthe mmpdm<:e of the State legij; lature as entry 57 in List II antho- E rises hwy on vehicles suitable for use on roods. It has been laid d<*ll by this Court in \"Boiani Ores Ltd. v. Orissa,\"(') that under Eofi:y 57 of List II, the power of taxation cannot exceed compeasatocy nature which must have some nexus with the vehicles using tho l\"Olldll i.e. public roads. If the vebicles do not use the roads, notwithstanding that they are registered under the Act, they cannot be F taxed..\n\n. If the words used or kept for use fu the State is coostrued as wed or kept for use on the public toads of the State, the Act would\n\nbe iil caofonnity with the powers conferred on the State legislafilre\n\nunder Entry 57 of List II. If the vehicles are Sllitable for use on publio roads they are liable to be taxed. In order to levy a tax on vehii:fea used or kept foc use on: public roads of the State and at the same t11nc to avoid evasion Q!i tax the legislature has prescribed the procedure.\n\nSub-section 2 o~ sec. 3 provides that the registered OWB\" or any person having possession of or control of a motoc vehicle of. wbich a certificate Of registration is current shall for the H pw:pase of. this Act be deemed to use dr kept such vehicles for use\n\n(I) [1975] 2 SCR 138 at 155.\n\n1394 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nin the State except during any period for which the Regional Tmnsport Authority has certified in the prescribed manner that lhe\n\nmotor vehicle has not been used or kept for use. Under tbia subsection there is a presumption that a motor vehicle for whick the certificate of registration is current shall be deemed to be used or kept for use in the Slate. This provision safeguards the revenue of the State by relieving it from the burden of proving that the vebicle was uesd or kept fur use on the public roads of the State. At the same time the interest of the bonafide owner is safeguarded by enabling him to claim and obtain a certificate of non-user from the prescribed authority. In order to enable the owner of the vehicle or th\"e person who is in possession or being in control of the motor vehicle of which the certificate of registration is curre111 to clai; m exemption from tax he should get a certificate in the pr=rlbed manner from the Regional Transport Officer.\n\nSection 5 of the Act provides for exemption from payment of tax under certain circumstances. It enables the registered owner or the person having possession or control of such vehicle to gie previous intimation in writing to the R.T.O. that the vehicle .would be used !Or such period and at the same time surrender certificate ot registration and permit oil the vehicle. Section: 6 enables the registered\n\nowner or a person in possession or control of such a vehicle to ge~ refund cf tax if conditions specified in s. 6 are satisfied.\n\nThus, in order to enable the registered owner or person in possession or control of a vehicle to get exemption of tax, adva_nce intimation to the R T.O. along with the surrender of certificate of registration is necessary. The provision of s. 3, susec. (2) as \"'.ell as s. 5 and s. 6 are meant to prevent evasion of tax 'l!ld to provide for exemption from tax in proper cases. Though the purpose of the Act is to .tax vehicles that are used or kept for use on the public roads of the State, the Slate is entitled for the purpose of saftlguarding the revenues of the State and to prevent evasion of the tax, to enact provision like provi\" sion as in s. 3 raising a presumption tha~ the vehicle is used or. kep~ for use in the Staie without any further proof unless exemption is: claimed under s. 3 (2), s. 5 and S 6. It niay be observed that reading sections 3, 5 and 6 it is clear that a levy of tax is contem plated only on the vehicles that are used or kept for use on the public roads of the State.\n\n'While we agree with the contentios of the learned counsel for the appellant that the tax is only exigible on vehicles used oc kept H fur use on public roads, we must observe that in order to claim exemption from payment of requirements of s. 3 (2) or ss. 5 and 6 should be atisfied. Surrender of the registratlon certificaie\n\n• '+\n\n; I . ' . ·~\n\nTRAVANCORE TEA co. v. STATE OF KERALA (Kai/asam, l.) 1395\n\n•contemplated under s. 5 is for making sur~ .that the motor vehiclei is not being put to any use andj does not have the effect of annulling the certificate of registration. If the requi=ent contemplated under the Act iS not satisfied the registered owner or person in posssession or. control of the vehicle would not be entitled to claim any exemptionJrom payment of tax'.\n\nit remains for consideration as to what is the appropriate order that should be passed on the facts and circumstances of this 'c:ise: As a general proposition of law as exemption from payment of !aX; had not been claimed and obtained as required under this Act,. the appe1- . !ant would be liable to pay tax but as already pointed out and set out clearly in the onler of the R.T.O., the question that was raised and disputed was whether on the assumpti-On that the vehicles were kejJil: for use in the estates ; i.Ione and not for use on the public roads of the State, tax is leviable.\n\nThe authorities proceeded on the basis that even assuming that the vehicles were not intended to be used on the public roads, they are liable to tax. _In this view, the appellant did not apply for exemption or notify non-user as required under thel piovi<; kms of the Act- But on the facts :ind circumstances of the case it is clear that the appellant claimed f.or exemption from tax on thei grounrl that it was not1being u-'ed on the public roads. In the circumstances of the case we have to take it that though, in terms, requiremen; of ss. 3 and 5 have not been complied \"ith, in effect the requireiments have been satisfied as the dispute proceeded throughout or\\ that basis. But as has been specifically stated by the R.T.0., the question whether estate roads. are public roads is reserved for further investigation and decision. Equally the R.T.O. will be at liberty to act un<ler s. 5(2) of the Act and decline exemption from tlie: liability to pay tax for the relevant period if on verification it is found that the , vehicle has been used during that period on the public road. ' .. Before concluding, we would refer to a contention miSed. by the learned counsel based on the. decision of this Court in Boiani Ores Ltd. v. Orissa, (supra). The plea of the learned couasel is that the word \"motor vehicle\" should be understood as defined by s. 2(18) of the Motor V\"hicles Act, 1939 and excluded from taxation motor\n\nvehi<:les \"used solely upon the premises of the owner.\" As the vehicles \\vith which we are concerned were claimed to have been kept for use solely in the premises of the . company, it was contended that the vehicles are not exigible to tax.\n\nThis Court in the decision cited was dealing with the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930. Section 2(c) of the Orissa Taxation Act adopted the definition of Motor vehicles Act as found in Motor Vehicles Act,\n\n1914. The Motot'. -vehicles Act, 1914 was repealed and replaced by the Motor Vehicles\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA Act, 1939. The definition of 'motor vehicle' in s. 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 excluded motor vehicles used solely upon thee pmnises ct. the owner. The Orissa Motor vehicles Taxa, tion Act wa& amended and Orissa Amendment Act, 1943 re-enacted the provisions Of the Taxation Act. 'Motor Vehicles' was defined under s. 2 ( 18) of •\n\nthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 excluding vehicles used solely upoo; the premises Of the OWller. Subsequently the definition ct. 'motor, vehicle' under s. 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act was amended by die Act 100 of 195 6 which confined the exemption from taxtion to \"motor vehicles of a special type adopted for use only in a fact.Ory 'QI in any other enclosed premises.\" The exemption from tax CllII\n\nonly be claimed after amendment to s. 2(18) by Act, 100 of 19S6, if the vehicle was of special type ado¢ed for use only in a fact.ocy ;(_ or in any other enclosed premises and the exemption that was srailable before the amendment by Act 100 of 1956 to Motoc Vdlldes\n\nused solely upon the premises of the owner was taken away. This.\n\nCourt held \"if the subsequent, Orissa Motor Vehicles TBXMion (Amendment) Act, 1943, incorporating the definition ct. 'motor: vehicle' referred to the definition of 'motor vehicle' under the Ari. as then existing, the effect of this legislative method would, in our view,\n\namount to an incorporation by reference of the provisions of s. 2(1); of the Act in s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act . Any subsequent ameodment in the A!:t or a total repeal of the Act under a fresh legislation.\n\nE on that topic would not affect the definition of 'motor vehicle' in s. 2(c) of the Taxation Act.\" As a result this Court held that fue definition of 'motor vehicle' given in s. 2(18) of the Motoc Veiticles .\n\nAct, 1939 before the amendment by Act 100 of 1956 was applicable.\n\nRelying on this decision, the learned counsel submitted that the test that is to be applied to determine whether motor vehicle is l1able to F tax or not is whether it comes under the exemption provided by under s. 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the amendment .. We / are unable to accept the contention mainly on the ground that the \"i Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 (Act 24 of 1963) came into force on 18-3-63. Section 2(1) of the Taxation Act provide& that words and expression used but not defined in the Motor V ehicle11 Act,.\n\nG 1939 (Central Act 4 of 1939) shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in that Act.\n\nOn the date when the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act was enacted, Moto~ hicles Act 1939 was amended by Act 100 of 1956 and the amended definition on the date 1' •\n\nwhen the Taxation Act came into force exempted only motor vehicles. which are of a special type adopted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises. The amended definition will have to be read into the Taxation Act which was enacted subsequent to the date of the amendment of the definition of 'Motor Vehicle' by Act 100 of 1956<\n\n, •\n\nTRAVANCORE TEA co. v. STATE OF KERALA (Kailasam, !.) 139 7\n\nIn this vi.ew we feel that the decision in Bolani's case (supca) will not A. be of any assistance to the learned counsel for the appellants.\n\nThe appeals are allowed to thei extent indicated above. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R. 1.ppeals allowed in part.", "total_entities": 107, "entities": [{"text": "TRAVANCORE TEA CO. LTD. BTC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TRAVANCORE TEA CO. LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF KERALA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "June 3, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "June 3, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND p, S. 'KAILASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. 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B. Divan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7317, "end_char": 7328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. B. Divan, M. Vellapally and T. M. Ansari for the Appellant in CA 437170."}}, {"text": "M. Vellapally", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7330, "end_char": 7343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. B. Divan, M. Vellapally and T. M. Ansari for the Appellant in CA 437170.", "canonical_name": "C M. Vellapally"}}, {"text": "T. M. Ansari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7348, "end_char": 7360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. B. Divan, M. Vellapally and T. M. Ansari for the Appellant in CA 437170.", "canonical_name": "T. M. Ansari"}}, {"text": "C M. Vellapally", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7396, "end_char": 7411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\T C M. Vellapally and T. M. Ansari for the Appellant in C.A .. 43&;\\_\n\n70.", "canonical_name": "C M. Vellapally"}}, {"text": "Kapi! Sibal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7470, "end_char": 7481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapi!"}}, {"text": "M. Vel!apally", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7483, "end_char": 7496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sibal, M. Vel!apally , and T. M. Ansali for the Appellant in\n\nCA 1460170.", "canonical_name": "C M. Vellapally"}}, {"text": "T. M. Ansali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7503, "end_char": 7515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sibal, M. Vel!apally , and T. M. Ansali for the Appellant in\n\nCA 1460170.", "canonical_name": "T. M. Ansari"}}, {"text": "K. T. Harindranath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7551, "end_char": 7569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Harindranath and K. M. K. Nair for the Respondents in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "K. M. K. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7574, "end_char": 7587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. T. Harindranath and K. M. K. Nair for the Respondents in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "KAlLAsAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7672, "end_char": 7680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAlLAsAM, J.\n\nThese three appeals are by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala in Writ Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Travanrore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. Vandiperiyar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8199, "end_char": 8243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "437 of 1970 is Travanrore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. Vandiperiyar in Kerala State."}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8247, "end_char": 8259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "437 of 1970 is Travanrore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. Vandiperiyar in Kerala State."}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8288, "end_char": 8303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1st respondent is the State of Kerala and respondents nos.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8915, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9156, "end_char": 9160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9698, "end_char": 9703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28-12-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9886, "end_char": 9896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company wrote to the Department on 28-12-1964 stating that the vehicle was being used for agricultural purpose on private roads in the :Estates aDJl the company is not liable to pay tax and asked for the release Of the vehicle."}}, {"text": "31-12-64", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10180, "end_char": 10188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,150/- as tax under '\\iprotest for the period between 1-7-63 to 31-12-64, the vehicle w~ _!')"}}, {"text": "High\n\nCourt of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10403, "end_char": 10424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "199/65 before \\he High\n\nCourt of Kerala claiming that they were not liable to pay any tax."}}, {"text": "12-4-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12-4-68 held that the 13 vehicles mentioned in the Original Petition\n\nwere liable to pay ax under the Act."}}, {"text": "Peermade Tea Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11320, "end_char": 11336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2081/68 filed by Peermade Tea Co. who are the appellants in C.A. 438/70 in this .Court, by a common or<ler dt 19th December, 1968."}}, {"text": "19th December, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11413, "end_char": 11432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2081/68 filed by Peermade Tea Co. who are the appellants in C.A. 438/70 in this .Court, by a common or<ler dt 19th December, 1968."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11476, "end_char": 11480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11658, "end_char": 11662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13584, "end_char": 13601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While not contesting the correctness oll the observatioo of the Bench of the Kerala High Court that the levy cannot ba restricted to vehicles using the public roads, it was submitted thall tllo words in s. 3 cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13710, "end_char": 13714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14915, "end_char": 14926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not in dispute that the vehicles are used and are kept for usei' within the State (The company roads are within the Krala State)."}}, {"text": "ODS oji the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15813, "end_char": 15855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16395, "end_char": 16404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ODS oji the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "ODS oji the Act and the Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17580, "end_char": 17589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17593, "end_char": 17599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 138", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17839, "end_char": 17855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18888, "end_char": 18897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19403, "end_char": 19407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19664, "end_char": 19668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19694, "end_char": 19698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19703, "end_char": 19707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20073, "end_char": 20077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20216, "end_char": 20220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20226, "end_char": 20230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20235, "end_char": 20238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3, 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20273, "end_char": 20292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20667, "end_char": 20671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20679, "end_char": 20690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20853, "end_char": 20857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22333, "end_char": 22344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22681, "end_char": 22688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23143, "end_char": 23151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "This Court in the decision cited was dealing with the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23460, "end_char": 23554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23556, "end_char": 23568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This Court in the decision cited was dealing with the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930", "statute": "This Court in the decision cited was dealing with the Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Orissa Taxation Act adopted the definition of Motor vehicles Act as found in Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23576, "end_char": 23671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23850, "end_char": 23858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Taxation Act adopted the definition of Motor vehicles Act as found in Motor Vehicles Act,\n\n1914", "statute": "the Orissa Taxation Act adopted the definition of Motor vehicles Act as found in Motor Vehicles Act,\n\n1914"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23866, "end_char": 23890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Orissa Amendment Act, 1943", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24017, "end_char": 24043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24126, "end_char": 24130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Amendment Act, 1943", "statute": "Orissa Amendment Act, 1943"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24147, "end_char": 24171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24292, "end_char": 24300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24308, "end_char": 24326, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24579, "end_char": 24587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25210, "end_char": 25217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25233, "end_char": 25240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25427, "end_char": 25434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25533, "end_char": 25541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25846, "end_char": 25854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25862, "end_char": 25886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25985, "end_char": 26025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "-3-63", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26064, "end_char": 26069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying on this decision, the learned counsel submitted that the test that is to be applied to determine whether motor vehicle is l1able to F tax or not is whether it comes under the exemption provided by under s. 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the amendment .. We / are unable to accept the contention mainly on the ground that the \"i Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 (Act 24 of 1963) came into force on 18-3-63."}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26071, "end_char": 26083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963", "statute": "Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "On the date when the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26289, "end_char": 26344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bolani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26911, "end_char": 26917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "139 7\n\nIn this vi.ew we feel that the decision in Bolani's case (supca) will not A. be of any assistance to the learned counsel for the appellants."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1398_1401_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "...\n\nRAZIA UMAR BAKSHI\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nJune 23, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, J.]\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, Section 3-When grounds of detention are couched in English, a language not known to the detenu and the grounds are not explained in the language\n\nknown to the detenu either, the detention order is vitiated-Fact that the grounds of detention was explained to the detenu in the language should be ·\n\nexplained by sworn affidavit by the afjicer who explained the grounds and not by any other-Constitution of India, Article 22(5)-Right to repre.{entation 10 the Central Government Section 11 of COFEPO, S'A, explained.\n\nAllowing the petition, the Court\n\n, HELD : 1. Where. the detaining authority is s:1tisfied that the grounds ai:-e couched in a language which is not known to the detenu, it must see to it that the grounds are explained to the detenu, a trv.nslated script is given to him and the grounds bear some sort of a certificate to show that the grounds have been explained to the detenu in the language, which he understands.\n\n[1400 D-El\n\nA bare denial at the stage when the Habeas Corpus petition is :filed in 1he court by the detaining authority that these formalities ere observed would be of no consequence particularly when it is not supported by any document or by any affidavit of the person who had done the job of explaining or translation.\n\n[1400 E-F]\n\nHadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack and Anr. [1968] 1 SCR 227; followed.\n\n2. Courts frown on detention without trial and insist on the strict compliance of the constitutional safeguards enshrined in .A.rticle 22(5) to the letter of the law, because a non-compliance of these safeguards would itself be sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. [1400 l~-G]\n\n3. Section 11 of COFEPOSA confers a constitutionat right on the detenu to have his representation considered by . the Centml Government. It is true that the Central Government has a discretion to revoke or confirm the detention but the detenu' has undoubtedJy a right that his representation should be considered by the Central Government for whatever worth it is.\n\nThe mere fact the.t the detenu had sent a copy to the Central Government does not absolve the detaining authority from the statutory duty of forwarding the representation to the Central Govennent. [1401 B-D]\n\n[The Court expressed the hope that in future the detaining authorities should fully apply their mind so as to result in a. strict compliance of the constitutional safeguards contained in the Constitution, more particularly, because the liberty of the subject is in peril.]\n\n• .j/\n\nt •\n\nRAZIA UMAR BAKSHI v. UNION OF INDIA (Fazal Ali, !.) 1399\n\nOiuGINAL JURISDICTION: :Writ Petition No. 631 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)\n\nRam Jethmalani, M. M. Lodha and Harjinder, Singh for !he Petitioner.\n\nR. B. Datar, R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nFAZAL Au, J. (Vacation Judge) The detenu was detained under sub-Section ( 1) of Section 3 of The. Conservation of Foreign Exchange aad Prevention of Smuggling Activities (in short COFEPOSA) by tho Government of Gujarat by its order dated January 30, 1980.\n\nTue.order was passed by Mr. P. M. Shah, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat who authenticated the said order on behalf of the State Government. The detenu while making a representation to the State Government .also prayed for supply of documents to him in order to make a more ef!.ective representation.\n\nThese documents however were supplied on March 27, 1980 although the order\n\nof detention was itself confirmed on March 21, 1980. In the representation sent to the Government, the detenu had made a specific prayer that his representation shou!d be forwarded to the Central Government for being considered.\n\nIn support of the rule, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, counsel appearing fot the detenu raised two points before this Court. In the first place it 'Was submitted that the counsel on behalf of the detenu has expressly\n\npleaded that the grounds of detention were couched in English, a hlnguage which the detenu did not understand at all and these grounds\n\nwere not explained to him.\n\nA specific ground on this aspect of the matter has n taken in ground No. XID at page 21 of the petition\n\nwhich may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"That the detenu does not know English. . The ground~ of detmtion and the order of detention were in English. No vernacular translation of the grounds was given nor they were explained to detenu in a language known to him.\"\n\nThis allegation seems to have been denied by the respondents in para 14 of the affidavit of Mr. P. M. Shah, on-behalf of the detaining authority, where he stated that the grounds Were explained to the\n\nu in the language known to him. It was averred in para S that <ibe Mr. A. K. Sharma, Police Inspector, C.I.Dc (Crime Branch),\n\nAhlnedabad had explained to the detenu the order 6f detenti<>n and 1lle grounds communica1ed to him on January 30, 1980. This affida'Yit, in my Opinion, is wholly inadmissible in evidence. If it wa8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\na fact that Mr Sharma had personally explained the grounds to the detenu the'n the respondents should have filed an affidavit of Mr.\n\n- Shanna himself to show that he had actually explained the contents\n\nof the grounds to the detenu by translating the same in the language whic)l he understood.\n\nNo such affidavit is forthcoming.\n\nNo contemporaneous record has been produced to show that Mr. Sharma had actually explained or translated the grounds to the detenu. The r vice of the grou'nd of detention on the detenu is a very precious constitutional right and where the grounds are couched in a language which is not known to the detenu, unless the contents of the grounds , are fully explained and translated to the deteno, it will tantamount to 'not serving the grounds of detention to the detenu and would thus vitiate the detention ex-facie.\n\nIn case of Hatlibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack & Anr. [1969 (1) SCR 227), it was clearly held that merely oral explanation of an order without supplying him a translation in a script or language which the detenu understood amounted to a denial of right of being communicated the grou'nds. In the instant case, it is not even alleged in the affidavit of Mr. Shah that any tranSlation or translated script of the grounds was famished to the detenu.\n\nIn case of Hadibandhu Das v. District Magie/rate, Cutlack -.!< ground alone.\n\nI would however like to observe that in eases where the detaining authority is satisfied that the grounds are couched in a language which is not known to the detenu, it must see to it that the grounds are explained to the detenu, a translated script is given to him and the grounds bear some sort of a certificate to sh01' that the grounds have been explained to the detenu in the language which he understands.\n\nA bare de'nial at the stage when Habeas Corpus petition is filed in the court by the detaining authority that these formalities were ooorrved would be of no consequence particularly when it is not supported by ariy document or by any affidavit of the person who had done the job of explaining or translation.\n\nWe have pointed out in several cases that courts frown on detention without trial and insist on the strict compliance of the constitutional safeguards enshrined in Article 22(5) to the letter of the law, because a non-compliance of these safeguards would itself be sufficient to vitiate the order of detention. Despite our repeated observations, unfortunately, however the detaining authority continues to pass orders of detention in a casual or cavalier fashion with the result\n\nthat the courts are compelled to release the detenus.\n\nWe hope and trnst that in future the detaining authorities should fully apply their mind so as to result in a strict compliance of the constitutional safegnards contained in the Constitution, more particularly because th~ liberty of the subject is in peril.\n\nllAZIA UMAR BAKSHI_v. UNION OF INDIA (Fazal Ali, !.) 1481\n\nAnother ground taken by Mr. Ram Jetbmalaiii in support of the rule is that although the detenu had made a specific prayer in Im\n\nrepresentation to the State Government that his representation should be fmwarded to the Central Government for consideration Uhder sectian 11 of the Act; yet the detaining authority did not choose to forward the representation to the Central Government at all.\n\nThis position is admitted and the defence taken is that as the detenu had himself sent a copy to the Central Government, the detaining authority did not think it necessary to forward the representation to the -central _Government.\n\nThis defence is wholly unacceptable.\n\nSection 11 al. the Act confers a constitutional right on the detenu to have his\n\nrepresentation considered by the Ce'nfra!. Government. It is true that the Central Government has a discretion to revoke or confirm the\n\ndetention but the detenu has undoubtedly a right that his representation should be considered by the Central Government for whatever . worth it is.\n\nThe mere fact that the detenu had se'nt a copy to the Omtra1 Government does not absolve the detaining authority from the stamtory duty of forwarding the representation of the detenu to the Central Government.\n\nFor these reasons therefore I am satisfied that the continued detention of the dete'nu in this case is iegally invalid.\n\nI therefore allow this application and direct that the detenu be released forthwith.\n\nAs the deten.u has now been transferred to Bhavnagar, the order be sent to the Jailor at Bhavnagar.\n\n:S.R Petition allowed.\n\nMGIPF-610SCl/80-2S00-18-3-8J ·", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "RAZIA UMAR BAKSHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAZIA UMAR BAKSHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "June 23, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "June 23, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, J.]\n\nConservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, Section 3-When grounds of detention are couched in English, a language not known to the detenu and the grounds are not explained in the language\n\nknown to the detenu either, the detention order is vitiated-Fact that the grounds of detention was explained to the detenu in the language should be ·\n\nexplained by sworn affidavit by the afjicer who explained the grounds and not by any other-Constitution of India, Article 22(5)-Right to repre.{entation 10 the Central Government Section 11 of COFEPO, S'A, explained."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "statute": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 558, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 646, "end_char": 656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1968] 1 SCR 227", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1495, "end_char": 1511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1814, "end_char": 1824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1968, "end_char": 1986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the Central Government has a discretion to revoke or confirm the detention but the detenu' has undoubtedJy a right that his representation should be considered by the Central Government for whatever worth it is."}}, {"text": "Central Govennent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2355, "end_char": 2372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mere fact the.t the detenu had sent a copy to the Central Government does not absolve the detaining authority from the statutory duty of forwarding the representation to the Central Govennent. ["}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2793, "end_char": 2803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2827, "end_char": 2841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, M. M. Lodha and Harjinder, Singh for !", "canonical_name": "Ram Jetbmalaiii"}}, {"text": "M. M. Lodha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2843, "end_char": 2854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, M. M. Lodha and Harjinder, Singh for !"}}, {"text": "Harjinder, Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2859, "end_char": 2875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, M. M. Lodha and Harjinder, Singh for !"}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar, R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar, R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2929, "end_char": 2941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar, R. N. Sachthey and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2964, "end_char": 2972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZAL Au, J. (Vacation Judge) The detenu was detained under sub-Section ( 1) of Section 3 of The."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3044, "end_char": 3053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange aad Prevention of Smuggling Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. M. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue.order was passed by Mr. P. M. Shah, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat who authenticated the said order on behalf of the State Government."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3577, "end_char": 3591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These documents however were supplied on March 27, 1980 although the order\n\nof detention was itself confirmed on March 21, 1980."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3649, "end_char": 3663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These documents however were supplied on March 27, 1980 although the order\n\nof detention was itself confirmed on March 21, 1980."}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3870, "end_char": 3884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the rule, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, counsel appearing fot the detenu raised two points before this Court.", "canonical_name": "Ram Jetbmalaiii"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4848, "end_char": 4860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was averred in para S that <ibe Mr. A. K. Sharma, Police Inspector, C.I.Dc (Crime Branch),\n\nAhlnedabad had explained to the detenu the order 6f detenti<>n and 1lle grounds communica1ed to him on January 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5159, "end_char": 5165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it wa8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\na fact that Mr Sharma had personally explained the grounds to the detenu the'n the respondents should have filed an affidavit of Mr.\nShanna himself to show that he had actually explained the contents\n\nof the grounds to the detenu by translating the same in the language whic)l he understood."}}, {"text": "Shanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it wa8\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\na fact that Mr Sharma had personally explained the grounds to the detenu the'n the respondents should have filed an affidavit of Mr.\nShanna himself to show that he had actually explained the contents\n\nof the grounds to the detenu by translating the same in the language whic)l he understood."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6360, "end_char": 6364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, it is not even alleged in the affidavit of Mr. Shah that any tranSlation or translated script of the grounds was famished to the detenu."}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Jetbmalaiii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8133, "end_char": 8148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1481\n\nAnother ground taken by Mr. Ram Jetbmalaiii in support of the rule is that although the detenu had made a specific prayer in Im\n\nrepresentation to the State Government that his representation should be fmwarded to the Central Government for consideration Uhder sectian 11 of the Act; yet the detaining authority did not choose to forward the representation to the Central Government at all.", "canonical_name": "Ram Jetbmalaiii"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8767, "end_char": 8777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhavnagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9595, "end_char": 9604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the deten.u has now been transferred to Bhavnagar, the order be sent to the Jailor at Bhavnagar."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_139_178_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "KATYANI DAYAL AND ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nMarch 26, 1981)\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, R. S. PATHAK AND 0. CHIN1'/.APPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\n' Temporary Assistanl Engineers, gazetted -service recruited by Railway Board -Neither cla.ssi/ied as Class I or Class 11 but given the junior scale of pry of Jndian Service of Engineers Class I, and eligible to be considered for absorption\n\nin permanent vacancies as per quota fixed per year-Whether belong to the cadre of Indian Service of Engineers-Whether treating them purely temporary:\n\noffends Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution-Constitution of 'India Arlidu\n\n53, 73(1) (a) and 109-lndian Railway Establishment Ru/ea 102(3) (13), UIS,\n\n106-109, 112, 116, 118(i), 125, 129, 130-133, 140 and RJJ/e 20Q3(3), (22), (211),\n\n(30), (31).\n\nSeveral assignments such as the construction of major bridges, new Jines, doubling of and electrification of existing lines etc. were taken up the Engineer ..\n\ning Department of the Indian Rail\\\\ays and to carry out these works, a number _ of temporary posts of Class I (Indian Railway Service of Engineers) and Clas!\n\nII engineers v.ere created. It was not thought possible to meet additional personnel requirements from eXisting sources, i.e. direct recruitment to Class I by competitive examination and promotion to class II from class Ill Instead, under a special scheme' the various writ petitioners were appointed at various times bet~ ween 1955 and 1964 as temporary Assistant Engineers by the Railway Board.\n\nEveryone of them was told that the appointment, would be on a ten1porary basis, that the ost to which they were appointed would be neither in Class I nor in Class II service though they were eligible, on completion of three year's service, to be considered along with other temporary Assistant Engineers for absorption\n\n1n Class I (Junior Seal~) _against vaaa11cies ear-marked from time to time for G such absorption in the Indian Railway Service of Engineers cadre upto a maximum of six pe~ year, and that in the event of their being selected in Class I Service their seniority would count from the date of the permanent appointment to Class I service. They were required to execute service agreements \"as applicable to temporary officers\". The petitioners accepted the terms offered to them and joined duty in the post to which they were appointed. The petitioners , aJso executed agreements in a standard form known as \"Agreement for Tempol'lll'Y Assistant Officers of the Indian Railways~.\n\nA Though in their orders of lapointment as temporary Assistant Engineers tho petitioners and others were told that six of them would be absorbed into tho.\n\nIndian Railway Service of Engineers Class I every year, the quota was increaa~ ~\"\"\"\" ed to eight per year in 1957 and fifteen per year in 1961. In 1960, the quota. was fixed at 60 per cent of the actual intake of probationers from the CESetc.. ,. examinations. Again in 1975 the quota was increased to 25 per year. The B net result was that all but a 107 temporary Assistant Engineers were left UO absorbed by the time of the filing of the writ petitions and they too wercfullllly absorbed in 1979 by a blanket order.\n\nOn September 17, 1965, the Railway Board decided that the temporary officers so absorbed ioto the Railway Service of Engineers should be given wcightage in seniority \"on the basis of c half the total number of Years of continuous seice in working posts on Ilailways prior to their permanent absorption into Class I, subject to maxirnum weightage of five years.\"\n\nOne of the writ petitioners, Katyani Dayal field a writ petition in the llla habad High Court claiming promotion to the Senfor scale post of District D Officer.\n\nHe found his claim on Rule 133(3)(c) of the Railway Establishment Code on the basis that he was an Assistant Officer within the meaning of that expression as then defined by Rule 102(3). The High Court allowed the writ petition and gave a direction to the Railway Administration to consider the claim of the petitioner for appointment in officiating vacancies to the post of District Officer as soon as vacancies arose, ignoring the circulars which gave E preference to Class I junior scale officers of four years standing or .more. as.\n\nagaiost temporary Assistan.t Engineers.\n\nAn appeal filed by the Railway Admi nistration under the Letters Patent was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court. Though. the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on August 1, 1974, the Railway Administration did not implement the judgment but instead on December 12, 1975 amended the Rule 102(3), !33(3)(c) and (f) and F introduced new rule 102(17) so as to expressly exclude temporary Assistan< Officers (newly defined by Rule 102 (7), fromr tho category of Assistant Offi cep and thus make them ineligible for promotion to the senior scale un.der Rule 133(3)(c) and (f).\n\nG The petitioners, therefore, have filed these writ_ petitions in a representaHve capacity purporting to represent all temporary Assistant Engineers appoi!lted on the recommendation of the Union Public ServiCe Commission, claiming that, in law they could only be and were appoioted to tho Indian Railway Service of Engioeers Oass I right from the beginning and that the Railway Board was \\vrong in_ treating them as belonging to neither Class I nor aass H II. They claimed that they were appointed to temporary posts io the cadre\n\n0£ Indian Railway Service of Engioeers aass I and that their seniority had to be reckoned on the basis of their length of continuous service, though they\n\n·~\n\n··\"'---\n\nKATYANI DAYAL V. UNION Ul\n\nconceded that in any given year those appointed on the asis of th~ results of A .the competitive examination might. be placed above those appointed on the basis of the selection by the Unio?- Public Service Commission.\n\nDismissing the petitions the Court\n\nHELD: (1) Arts. 53, 73(1)(a) and 309, make it clear that the Pmi- 11ent, acting directly or through officers Subordinate to him is free to constitute a service (with as many cadres as he chooses)' to create posts without -constituting service or to create posts outside (the cadres of) the constituted service. The President (or the person directed by him) may, or, again, if he\n\n\"SO chooses he may not make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to such service or posts. He is also free to make 9r not to mlake appointments to such services or posts. Nor is it obligatory for him to make rules of recruitment etc. before a service may be constituted or a post created or filled.\n\nBut, if there is an Act of Parliament or a\n\nru1e:: under the proviso to Article 309 on the matter, the executive power under Articles 53 and 73, may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with or contrary to •uch Act or Tule. [162DF]\n\nB. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, [1966] SCR 682 @ 686; State of KerGla v. M. K. Krishnan Nair and ors., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 864 at 874; referred to.\n\n(2) The previous existence of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers -and the rules made for recruitment to that service do not bar the constitution\n\nof another service or the creation of posts outside the cadres of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers.\n\nThough to start with there was no Presidential sanction for the creation of the posts of Temporary Assistant Officers in the various departments of Indian Railways, which were neither in Class I nor in Class II but merely in gazetted service, the matter was soon rectified by 1he grant of Presidential sanction for the posts in November 1956, and by the President further specifying the Railway Board as the authority competent to make appoiniment of such temporary Assistant Officers.\n\nThe posts of Temporary Assistant Officers were thus created and appointments made, under '\\'alid authority and outside the existing cadres of the Indian Railway Service\n\n<>f Engineers. The letters of ''indent\", the advertisements, the letters of appointment nnd the agreements show that the temporary Assistant Officers appointed in this fashion after selection by the Union Public Service Commis- 'Sion were to be a source of recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I. If Temporary Assistant Officers were to be a source of <ecruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class, no temporary Assistant Officer could possibly be under any misapprehension tblat he was\n\nA appointed to the ltl, d, iaa Railwy Service of Ellgineers Class I or could claim t.bllt Ile W!IS appoin~ to such service. [162G-H, 163G-H, 164A]\n\nThe petitioners cannot be conside.red to have been appointed under rule- 130 ( d) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code which provides for occll.- sional admission of other qualified persons on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Coon merely because they were selected for appointnient by the Union Public Service Commission, their scale of pay was. the same as that of the Class I Junior ScaJe Officers of the Indian Riailway Service of Engineers and their duties were the same. [164A-C]\n\n(3) It is no doubt true that a cadre may consist of permanent vacancies. in permanent as well as temporary posts borne on the dldre. But it does. not follow that appointments stated to be made to posts outside the very service and therefore necessarily otside the cadre must be considered to be made to temporary posts borne on the cadre merely because the posts were likely to continue indefinitely and did so CORtimre.\n\n[164 F-G]\n\nThe Annual Administrative Reports merely refer to appointments, teinJ:Klmry as well as permanent, made in the gazetted service by direct recruitme.nt.\n\nGazetted Railway services must include both the Indian Railway Service of Engineers and the Gazetted Railway Service constituted by the temporary Assisfunt Officers. Therefore, by merely taking into account the number Ji: of Temporary Assistant Officers for the purpose of calculating the total nmnber of persons appointed to Gazetted Railway Service it cannot conceivably be said that Temporary Assistant Officers were appointed tocadre posts in tJle Indian Railway Service of Engineers. Even the classified lists of Gazett1d offic_ers do not indicate that persons who were appointed as Temporary Assistant Officers were appointed to posts borne on the cadre of Indian Railway Service of Engineers. On the other hand under the column \"Date of appointment to Class\" no entry is made against the names of any of the Temporary Assistant Officers who had not yet been absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. [165 B-C, D-E]\n\nIf posts were initially created and sanctioned, the subsequent coatinuao.ceof the posts indefinitely would not make persons appointed to the posts members. of the Railway Service, namely, the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class.\n\nI. [165 F-G]\n\n( 4) The note below Rule 106 of the Railway Establishment Code merdJ' states an existing &ct known to all. concerned, namely, that posts of Tempo· rary Assistant Officers in gazetted railway service who were not to be classi· fied 'either as Class I or as Class IT had been sanctioned by the Presidenl<\n\nKATYANI llo\\YAL v. UNION 143\n\nwho had designated the Railway Board as the authority competent to make A appointments to those posts. With or wilhoot !he note, the Temporary Assistant Officers would still not be classified either as Class I or Class II.\n\nTheir classification outside Class I and Class II was not dependant on the note but on the Presidential sanction in .regard to the creation of the posts. [166 A-Bl\n\n(5) Temporary Assistant Officers are not Assistaot Officers within the\n\nmeaning of that expression in the Indian Railway Establispment Code. The\n\nCJC.pression \"Temporary Assistant Officer\", which was not previously_ defined in\n\nthe Railway Establishment Code, was sought to be defined by new clause 17 of R. 102 to mean ''I> Gazetted Railway Servaot drawing pay on the scale applicable to junior Scale Officers but not classified either as Class I or as\n\nClass II Officer\". The expression Assistant Officer was redefined so as nut\n\nto include a Temporary Assistant Officer who was not 'classified' either as Oass I or as Class II.\n\n[166 C-D]\n\nThe amendments do not have any effect one way or the other on the status D of the Temporary Assist3J1t Officers.\n\nWhat was always well known to the\n\nTemporary Assistant Officers and the Railway Board and whlat was the inevitable result of the Presidential sanction for the creatjon of posts which were not to be classified either as Cass I or Class II, was made explicit in the Indian Railwny Establishment Code also by the introduction .of these amendments. This became necessary because in the Writ Petition filed by Katyani Dayal, the Allahabad High Court, while appearing to hold ffiat Temporary Assistant Officers belonged neither to Class I nor to Class II service, held that they came within the then existing definition of 'Assistant Officer' so as to entitle them for promotion under r. 133 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. [166E-G]\n\nThe definition of Assistant Officer was not to be read in isolation but should have been read conjunctively with Rules 105, 106 and 108. A reference to Rule 105 would show that for the purposes of the rules in the Indian Railway\n\nEstablishment Code, Railway services were to be classified into Class I, Gass\n\nII, Class rn, Class IV and workshop sWf.\n\nRule 106 specified the appointments and categories falling under the services mentioned in Rule 105. Rule 108 required the Railway Board to fix the •trength of the Railway Services, aaso\n\nI and II. There could therefore, be no question of an officer not falling witBin the class, C>tegory or cadres specified in rules 105, 106 and 108 claiming to\n\nbe an 'Assistant Officer' within the meaning of that expressioJl. A person re- H oorited to the pool of Temporary Assistant Officer not classified as Qass I or aa.. II Officer could not claim to belong to the Class, categ0ry or cadre speci:fied in Rules 105, 106 and 108 and was, therefore, not an A.s.!itant Officer within the meaning of that expression even before the 1975 amendment.\n\n[167 D-F] ( 6) Tuer~ are and there can be no absolutes when the Court considers claims to justice on complaints of inequality.\n\nThe Marxian of a classless society, ful\\vever laudable that may be, is evidently not what is sought to be achieved by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The goal is a limited one.\n\nIt is equality among comparables. A necegsary, but not necessarily 1::ynical,\n\nimplication of equality among comparables is the permissibility of reasonable classification, havin,& nexus with the object to be achieved. If two :'ervices started and continued dissimilarly, though they apparently discharged similar C duties, they were not comparable services so as to furnish a basis for tbe claim to equality.\n\nBut if in the same service there were two sources of recruitment to the same service, a classification based solely on source of recruitw!nt was not permissible. [176 E-G]\n\nState of Puniab v. Jogindtr Singh, [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 169, 191, 192;\n\nD Roshan Lal 'fandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185 and Mervyn Coutindo & Ors. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay an!J Ors., [1966] 3 SCR 600;\n\nreferred to.\n\n(7) Those who were appointed to ex-cadre posts outside the rules and .\\./\n\n\\Vhose tenure was therefore precarious could not claim to be treated on the\n\nsame footing as those who were appointed strictly in accordance vith the\n\nrules and posts borne on the cadre of the service.\n\n[177 F-G]\n\nlf. S. V crma & Ors. v. Secretary, Ministry of Shipping and Transpor.t & Ors.\n\n[1979] 4 sec 415 @ 427, 428; referred to.\n\n(8) The classification of Temporary Assistant Office!s separately from the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I is neither discriminatory nor is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constituttion for the reason that it bad no nexus to the object to be achieved namely efficiency of service.\n\n[167 G-H]\n\n_ The service comprising the Temporary Assistant Officers and the Indian --( Railway Service of Engineers Class I started separately and never became one.\n\nThe objects of their recruitment were different, the methods of recruitment were dissimilar and the appointing authority was not the same. The training that was imparted was also unlike. The very tenure of the Temporary Assistant\n\n II Officers was precarious and their immediate aspiration was only to be absorbed into the Indian Railway Services of Engineers Class I.. These distinctivu features marked out the Temporary Asistant Officers as a Qass apart from the Indian\n\nKATYANI DAYAL V. UNION 145\n\n.Railway Service of Engineers Class I and therefore there w.. no question A\n\n>-' -Of entitlement of equal rights with the latter.\n\nOf course, once they were .absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers they would be entitled not to be treated differently thereafter. Their seniority would ordinarily be reckoned from the date of their absorption into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers, as promised in their letters of appointment. No doubt these\n\nofficers merite<l something more than the 'long wait' at the portals of the B Indian Railway Service of Engineers. The Railway Board however, l>ppeara to have 'tried to make the long wait a little less tedious by giving them weiaht- .age of half of their length of service as Temporary Assistant Officers, subjec• .to maximum of five years [ 177 D-G]\n\nEqually important, is . the fundamental qualitative difference, linked with the method of recruitment. True, the minimum educationa! gualification is the same. But, those who are recruited directly to the Indian Railway Service\n\nof Engineers Clla-ss I are subjected to stiff and competative, written and personality tests. Only the very best can aspire to come out successful. The\n\nTemporary Assistant Officers were not subjected either to a ¥iTitten or to a D\n\n~ personality test but were selected on the basis of an interview by the Union\n\nPublic Service Commission. In addition to the minimum educational qualification, three years' experience as a Civil Engineer was alo prescribed. Thu! while brilliance 'va\\l the beacon light which beckoned those aspiring to beCome\n\nmembers of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I, it was replaced\n\n.!by experience in the case of those wanting to be Temporary Assistant Officers.\n\nE Again the appointing authority in the case of Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I is the President while the appointing authority in the case -0f Temporary Assistant Officers was the Railway Board, no doubt, pursuant\n\nto the authority given by the President. Different courses of train!ng wre prescribed for the Indian Railway Service of Engineers and the Temporary Assistant Officers. For the Indian Railway Service of Engineers the training is an F intensive and comprehensive one designed to equip them for higher posts in ·the Department too; while the training for Temporary Assistant Engineers was a brief six months' training intended merely to equip them for carrying out\n\n-1he specific jobs. In the matter of terms and conditions_ of service, while\n\nthe provisions of the Iµdian Railway Establishment Cbde are fully applicable to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I, those provisions are appli- -cable to 'Temporary Assistant Officers' to the extent there is no specific provision in their letter of appointment and agreement. [169 C-H]\n\nState of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, [!963] Supp. 2 SCR 169, @ 191, 192, ..Ki5hori Mohan/al v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1139, Jammu & Kashmir 8\n\nv. Triloki Nath Klwsa and Ors., (1974] 1 SCR 771 @ 790, 792 Roshan Lal l'andon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 185; Mervyn C'Jutindo and Ors. v.\n\nU6 SUPREME COURT llEl'O:ll.TS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R •.\n\nA Call\":fM' of CJISI...,., Bomb•y and Ors., [1966] 3 llCR 600, Mohammad\" Su;.t Ali lllld Ors. v. Union' of India and Ors. ete., [1975] 1 SCR 449 @ 481, S. II. Potw\"\"\"lwl aNI Ors. etc. v. State of Maha, tJ!Jhtra and Ors. [1977] 3 SCR 775; A. K. Subraman v. Union of India, [1975] 2 SCR 979 and M. S. Verma and Ors. v. Secty. Ministry of Shipping & Transport and Ors., [1979] 4 SOC. 415 @ 4!7, 428; discussed.\n\nOhse:rv.ation :\n\nThere is nothing 'doctrinnaire' in the principle of \"equal pay for equal work\" and \"equal status for equa.l pay and equal work\".\n\nThey are not goals to be~ C liCOffed at. It may be that in the present societal context, the goals may appear to be distant.\n\nBut they are goals worthy of attainment and would be achieved in Ille not too distant future. [178 A-BJ\n\nORIGINAL ! (CIVIL) APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition.\n\nB Nos. 147 to 151 of 1976.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nWITH\n\nSPECIAL LEA VE PETITION (CIVIL) No. 7905 OF 1979\n\nE From the Judgment and Order dated 29-8-1978 of the Allahabad'\n\nHigh,. Court)n. S.A. No. 887 /70.\n\nM. C. JJhandare, Mrs. S. Bhandare and T. Sreedharan for the l Petitioners.\n\nL. N. Sinha, Attorney General, Mr. M. K. Banerjee, Addi. Solicitor- Genera/, R. B. Datar, A. K. Ganguli, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for RR. 1 and 2.\n\nF. S. Nariman, Anil B. Dawan, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and' R. Karanjwala for RR 18 & 19.\n\nS. C. GTJpta and Ramesh= Chand for RR 14.\n\nMadan Bhatia and D. Goburdhan for RR 20.\n\nY.~S. Chitale,, V. M. Tarkunde, and A. N. Karkhanis for RR 28' and 31.\n\nS. D. Gupta in person for impleading RR in WP 147/76.\n\nGirdharee Singh and S. K. Jain for the Intervener.\n\nKATYAM DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 147\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by, A.\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-Several hundred Railway Engineers who should have been busy elsewhere, building bridges, laying or doubling tracks and so on have found themselves in the corridors of this Court in pursuit of the leaves of career. Quite a contingent was present in Court anxiously watching the proceedings and listening with expect Battention to every word that fell from counsel and judge. One could~ not help wondering whether this multitiered. 'multi-varne' Servicesystem was itself not productive of a career. neurosis, destructive of the very efficiency which is sought to achieve.\n\n2. In this case, as in most other service matters that reach this Court, the question which arise for consideration relate to classification, con1irmation, seniority, promotion etc., questions which appear to agitate the minds of the members of all services. Administrators seeking to find solutions to some of the problems very soon discover that their solutions are no more than illusions and have created other problems. First one party and then another party, all seek the pro\n\ntection of the Court. The Court is no expert administrator. Lacking expertise, lacking the administrator's access to information, there are obvious limitations to what the Court may be. The Court may at best attempt to solve some basic legal issues.' That the Court strives to do without disturbing the administrative equilibrium.\n\n3. The service with which we are concerned in this Case is the Indian Railway Service of Engineers, Class I. While the petitioners claim that they were appointed to this service after selection by the Union Public Service Commission, the respondents allege that the petitioners were appointed as temporary Engineers only, constituting a special class and service by themselves, and were not appointed to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I at all.\n\n4. It appears that from the time of the first Five Year Plan onwards several important assignments such as the construction of major bridges, new lines, doubling of electrification of existing lines etc. were taken up by the Civil Engineering Department of the Indian Railways. It became necessary to create a number of temporary posts of Class I (Indian Railway ervice of Engineers) < nd Class II Engineers to carry\n\nout these works. In 1955 it was estimated that about 2CO additional Engineers would 1:e necesrn1y within the rext two years to deal with It the planning, surveying, estimating and construction of the multitude of the prorosed development works. It was not thought possible to\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO~US\n\n\nmeet the additional personnel requirements from ex1stmg sources, which were direct recruitment to Class I on the basis of the results of a competitive examination and promotion to Class II from Class III.\n\nThough the conversion of some of the temporal)' posts into perma.nent ones might meet part of the requirement, it was thought, recruitment through normal channel to such posts would necessarily have to be spread over a period of years so as to avoid 'bunching of officers within particular age group'. It was, therefore, decided to recruit, in the first instance, fifty temporary Engineers immediately. Their scale of pay was to be the same as that of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers.\n\nThe age limit was to be 25 to 35 years so as to attract Engineers with practical experience. The appointments. were to be normally made on the minimum of the time scale but persons with previous experience could be fitted into the scale at a higher stage.\n\nAs the posts were to be temporary, it was decided that an incentive should be given to attract suitable candidates by reserving a:firoportiou of the permanent vacancies in the Indian Railway Service of Engineers each year for being filled by such temporary Engineers. Six vacancies in the Indian Railway Service of Engineers were to be so earmarked annually to start with.\n\nThe quota could be increased later. On permanent appointment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers seniority would count from the date of such appointment. Proposals on these lines were conveyed by the Railway Board to the Union Public Service Commission on February 21, 1955 with a request to take steps for the early recruitment of temporary Engineers. A formal requisition in the prescribed form was also sent to the Union Public Service Commission. In thTh form, the post was designated as \"Assistant Engineer\", the number of posts was mentioned as 50, and, the class of service to which the post belonged was mentioned as \"Gazetted Railway Service\". Against the heading \"whether permanent or temporary\", the posts were mentioned as \"temporary\". Against the column \"if the post is temporary, please state : (a) when it was sanctioned; (b) the period for which it has been sanctioned and (c) irrespective of the period of sanction how long it is expected to last and whether it is expected-to be retained on a permanent basis eventually\", it was mentioned that the posts would be sanctioned shortly in connection with a number of projects, that the period would be two years in the first instance but was likely to be extended upto five years and that the employment might continue indefinitely but on a temporary basis. It was specified that the candidates would be eligible to be considered tor absorption in permanent vacancies at the rate of six per year. The scale was mentioned as Rs. 350-350-380-380-30-590-E.B.-30-770-40-850, this being the Junior Scale of pay of Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I. It was\n\nI '\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 149\n\nsaid that higher initial salary was permissible according to experience and qualifications. The academic qualifications were to be the same as for regular recruitment to Indian Railway Service of Engineers.\n\nAgainst the heading prospects of promotion to higher post it was stated that they might be considered for promotion to senior scale posts in the grade of Rs. 600-40-1000-50/2-1150 according to the exigencies of service. Similar proposals and \"indents\" for recruitment of temporary officers to six other departments of the Railways were also simultaneously made.\n\n5. Pursuant to the requisition by the Railway Board, the Union Public Service Commission issued an advertisement inviting applications .for \"50 posts of Assistant Engineers, Ministry of Railways,\n\nService Class I (Gazetted), posts temporary for two years in the first instance but likely to continue\". The minimum educational qualification was stated to be a Degree in Civil Engineering, but an additional qualification of 'about 3 years experience as a Civil Engineer' was also prescribed. The qualification was relaxable at the discretion of the commision in the case of candidates otherwise well qualified.\n\nIt was mentioned in the advertisement that the candidates would be eligible 'for being considered for absorption in permanent vacancies at the rate of six per year' and might be considered 'for promotion to senior grade posts in the scale of Rs. 600-40-1100-50/2-1150 according to the exigencies of service'. It appears that the reference to Class I in the advertisement was considered by the Railway Board to be a mistake. The Railway Board, therefore, addressed a letter dated October 31, 1955 to the Union Public Service Commission pointing out that in their requisition they had indicated \"Gazetted Railway Service\" as the service to which recruitment was to be made and that it was not intended that it should be either Class I or Class II. It was also mentioned that statements had been made on the floor of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha that the posts were \"temporary\" and \"neither in CTass- -fnor in Class II\". The Commission was accordingly requested to issue asuitable correction slip. Thereafter, in the subsequent advertisements\"\"\n\nissued by the Union Public Service Commission there was no reference to Class I. It was merely mentioned that applications were invited for specified number of posts of \"Assistant Engineers (Civil), Ministry of Railways, posts temporary but likely to continue\".\n\n6. The petitioners in the various Writ Petitions who submitted B their applications in re•ponse to such advertisements, were selected by the Union Public Service Commission, at various times between 1955\n\n15 0 SUPREME COURT !tEPO.., TS\n\n(1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nand 1964 aa:ui were offered appointments as 'Temporary Assistant Ent\\neers' by the Railway Board. Everyone of them was told that the appointment would be on a temporary basis in the scale of Rs. 3 50- 3'°\"380-38tJ..30-590-E.B.-30-770-40-850. They were also . expressly oold that the posts to which they were appointed would be neither in CJ:ass I nor in Class II, service though they were eligible, on compleition of three years service, to be considered alongwith other tempo:rary Assistant Engineers for absorption in Class I (Junior Scale) agB, inst vacancies ear-marked from time to time for the absorption of temporary Assistant Lngineers in the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Cadre upto a maximum of six per year. They were also expressly informed that in the event of their being selected in Class I Service their seniority would count from the date of their permanent appointment to Class I Service. They were required to execute service agreements \"as applicable to temporary officers\". It was also stipulated that in all matters not specifically referred to in the order of appointment, the person appointed would be governed by the provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Code and the extant orders issued from time to time. The petitioners accepted the terms offered to them and joined duty in the posts to which they were appointed.\n\n7. The agreements which the petitioners and others like them were required to execute and which they presumably did execute (were in a standard form known as 'Agreement for Temporary Assistant Officers of the Indian Railways'. Paragraph 2 of the standard form and agreement specified that the appointment was in a gazetted post C wloich is neither in Class I nor in Class II service) on scale Rs. 350-350-380-380- 30-590-E.B.-770-40-850. Paragraph 5 mentioned that the person appointed would be eligible along with other temporary Assistant Officers \"for being considered for absorption in the permanent vacancies in the Class I (junior scale) of the ............ department upto a L\n\n~.\n\nmaximum number of vacancies in a year as may be fixed by the Govern- ···· ment\" and that in the event of his being selected for that service his seniority would count from the date of confirmation. Paragraph 6 recited that he would be considered for appointment to a Senit>r Scale post. The agreement provided that in respect of matters for which no provision was made in it, the provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Code from time to time in force or rules made thereunder shall apply to the extent they were applicable to temporary Assistant officers.\n\nIt was further provided that the decision of the Government as to their applicability, interpretation and effect shall be final.\n\n8. It should be mentioned here that though there was no previous Presidential sanction for making appointments to posts which were\n\n-,\\_ .\n\nKATYANI DAYAL l'. um(; N (Chinltf1{1(HI Reddy, J.). t 51\n\n-neither in-Class lljror in Class II but merely in 'gazetletl serviae', the\n\ntJllltter was rectified and Presidential ., sanction was St!bseqnently ell- __ __ _ - . tained in November, 1956. This was communicated by the Raitwi'y Board to the General Managers of all Indian Railways by letter No.\n\nE-55RC-16 (Pt. A) dated November, 22, 1956. It was also decided by -<tile President that the Railway Board of the competent authority M I\n\nawoint Temporary Assistant Officers in the various departments ef the\n\nRailways. This was mentioned by the Board in letter No. E. (GF-P) 56RC-16 Pt. A dated 18-12-57 addressed to the General Managers of , au Indian Railways.\n\n9. Between the years 1955 and 1964 as many as 553 temporary Assistant Engineers were appointed after selection by the Union PubliC Service Commission. Though in their orders of appointment as tem- porary Assistant Engineers, the petitioners and others were told that six of them would be absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engi- neers Class I every year, the quota was increased to eight per year in 1957 and fifteen per year in 1961. In 1960 the quota was fixed at \"60% . of the actual intake of Probationers from the CBS etc. examinations\".\n\nAgain in 197 5 the quota was increased to 25 per year. The net result -was that all but a 107 temporary Assistant Engineers were left unabsorbed by the time of the filing of the Writ Petitions and they too were finally absorbed in 1979 by what was described to us as a 'blanket order'. We were informed that the validity of the absorption on this mass scale is under challenge in some Writ Petitions filed by members -of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers, Class I. A~ this juncture we also find it necessary to mention that the Railway Board decided, on September 17, 1965, that the temporary officers so absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers should also be given weightage in seniority \"on the basis of half the total number of years of continuous service in working posts on Railways prior to their permanent absorp- tion into Class I, subject to a maximum weightage of five years\".\n\nThis, of course, was the result of representations made by the temporary \"officers. This too we are told is under challenge.\n\n10. The petitioners have filed these Writ Petitions in a represen- tative capacity purporting to represent all temporary Assistant Engi- . neers appointed on the recommendation of the Union Public Service\n\nCommission, claiming that, in law, they could only be and were appointed to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I right from the beginning and that the Railway Board was wrong in treating them as belonging to neither Class I nor Class II. They claim that they wer~ ;; appointel to temporary posts in the cadre of Indian :Railway Service\n\n.-..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO~US\n\n\nof Engineers Class I and that their seniority had to be reckoned on the basis of their length of continuous service, though they concede that in any given year those appointed on the basis of the resnlts of the compe titive examination might be placed above those appointed on the basis of the selection by the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nTh•~Y contend that the Railway Board had no authority to create an unclas:; ified service, as it were, outside the provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. Notwithstanding the reqnisitions issued by the Railway Board, the advertisements issued by the Union Public Service Commission and the letters of appointment issued to the petitioners, they contend that they were appointed to the cadre of Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I and to no other service. They contend that they were recruited to Class I service under rule 130(d) of the Indian Railway Establishnient Code which provides for \"occasional admission of other qualified persons on the recommendations of the - Union Public Service Commission\". They question the vires of the note to Rule 106 which was added by way of amendment in 1956 and which provided that 'temporary Assistant Officers would not be classified either as Class I or as Class II'. The petitioners claim that the distinction made by' the Railway Administration between Assistmt Officers recruited on the basis of the results of the competitive examination and the temporary Assistant Officers recruited on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission was discriminatory and offended Articles 14 and 16. They contend that all Assistant Officers formed one class under the Indian, Railway Establishment Code. The further classification of Assistant Officers into those that were recruited on the basis of a competitive examinatwn andthosefnat were recruited on the recommendation of the Union Public Sen•ice <;:ommission :was a \"micro-classification\" not permissible under the law. They point out that the minimum academic qualifications and the scales of pay of the Permanent and the Temporary Engineers (for the sake of brevity the Assistant Officers appointed on the basil; of the results of the competitive examination may hereafter be described as permanent Engineers while those appointed on the basis of\"ffie recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission may be described as Temporary Engineers) were identical, the duties and functions were the same , and they occupied interchangeable pests.\n\nThey further allege that, in any case, the right of absorption of six tm p6rary Engineers only every year into the Indian Railway. Service of Engineers were arbitrary and inequitous. It had resulted in such gross injustice that two decades of service of several of the petitioners was to be count, ed for nothing.\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)' 153\n\n11. Before proceeding to consider the various contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners it is necessary to make a brief reference to tbe history, service and legal, of one of the many petitioners. Shri Katyani Dayal was working as an Assistant Engineer in the service of the Punjab Government from 1952 onwards. He was one of those who . was selected by the Union Public Service Commission and appointed as a temporary Engineer in 1958. He was drawing pay in the junior scale. He crossed the Efficiency Bar in 1966 and according to him he was thereafter entitled to be considered for promotion to the senior scale to the post of District Officer. He founded his claim l)n r. 133(3)\n\n(c) on the basis that he was an Assistant Officer within the meaning of that expression as then defined by r. 102(3). As he was not so promoted and as it was proposed, on the basis of some circulars, to promote permanent Engineers of four years standing, he filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Allahabad claiming that he was entitled to be considered for promotion to officiating post of District Officer. The Railway Board opposed the claim of Katyani Dayal on the ground that he was a temporary Assistant Engineer and not an Assistant Officer and therefore, not entitled to be promoted in terms of r. 133(3)(c).\n\nThe Railway Board's contention was over-ruled by a learned Single Judge of the High Court and a direction was given to the Railway Administration to consider the claim of the petitioner for appointment in officiating vacancies to the posts of District Officers as soon as vacancies arose. The Railway Administration was directed to ignore the circulars which gave preference to Class I junior scale officers of four years standing or more as against temporary Asistant Engineers.\n\nAn appeal filed by the Railway Administration under the Letters Patent was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court. Though the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on August I, 1974, the Railway Administration did not implement the judgment but instead on Decem ber 12, 1975 amended rule 102(3), 133(3)(c) and (f) and introduced new rule 102(17) so as to expressly exclude temporary Assistant Officer [newly defined. by r. 102(7) from the category of Assistant Officer and thus make him ineligible for promotion to the senior scale under r. 133 (3){c) and (f)].\n\n12. It appears that the status of the temporary Assistant Engineers recruited on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission has been the subject matter of the decisions of several High Courts. Some of them have been placed before us .\n\n13. The relevant provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment It- Code may now be referred to.\n\n11-189 SCl/80\n\n14. Rule 102(3) originally defined an Assistant Officer to mean 'a Gazetted Railway Servant drawing pay on the scale applicable to Junior Scale Officers', but 'was not to include a Class II Officer'. By an amendment made on December 31, 1975, the expression was redefined and an 'Assistant Officer' now 'means a Gazetted Class I Railway Servant drawing pay in the junior scale. It does not include a Class II Officer or a temporary Assistant Officer who is not classified either as Class I or Class II'.\n\nPrior to December 31, 1975 \"Temporary Assistant Officer\" was not defined but by an amendment dated December 31, 1975 \"Temporary Assistant Officer\" has been defined and now means \"a gazetted Railway servant drawing pay on the scale applicable to junior Scale Officers but not classified either as Class I or as Class II Officer\".\n\nRule 102(13) defines a 'Railway, Servant' as meaning a person who is a member of a service or who holds a post under the administrative control of the Railway Board, including a person who holds a post in the Railway Board:\n\nRoles 105 and 106.to the extent they are relevant are as follows :\n\n\"105. For the purpose of the rules in this Volume the railway services shall be classified as follows :-\n\nGazetted\n\n(1) The Railway Services, Class I.\n\n(2) The Railway Services, Class II.\n\nNon-gazetted.\n\n(3) The Railway Services, Class III.\n\n(4) The Railway Services, Class IV.\n\n(5) The Workshop Staff.\n\n106. Establishments and categories (including probationers), falling under the services mentioned in rule\n\n105, are shown below-\n\nClass I\n\n(1) Posts in the Railway Board;\n\ni ..\n\nKATYANI L>AYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 155\n\n(2) Directors, Joint Directors, Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors, Railway Board and Research, Designs and Standards Organisation; Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary and Section Officers, Grade II, Railway Board.\n\n(3) Indian Railway Service of Engineers; ( 4) Indian Railway Accounts Service;\n\n(5) Indian Railway Traffic Services;\n\n(6) Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers;\n\n(7) Indian Railway Service of Electrical Engineers;\n\n(8) Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers!\n\n(9) Indian Railway Medical Service;\n\n(10) Indian Railway Stores Service; (II) Senior Revenue Establishment, Indian Railways, comprising such specialist and Miscellaneous posts as have been included in Class I e.g., Chemist and Metallurgists (Senior Scale) and Chief Cashiers (Senior Scale).\n\nClass II\n\nGazetted posts not included in Class I.\n\nNote.-Temporary Assistant Officers will not be classified either as Class I or Class II.\n\nClass III\n\n• • • • • •\n\nClass IV\n\n• • * • •\n\n' It must be mentioned here that this Note to rule 106 was not there originally but was added in 1956.\n\nRule 107 provides that the prescribed scale of pay admissible to H Railway servants belonging to Railway Service Class I and Class II !hall be as specified in appendix XIV.\n\nSUPREME COU.11.T REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C, R.\n\nA Rule 108 may also be extracted here and it is as follows :\n\n\"108. Sanctioned strength of cadres.-Subject to any statutory provision in this regard, the strength, including both the number and character of posts of the Railway Services, Class I and II, shall be determined oy the Railway Board, General Managers of Indian Railways may create temporary posts in the Railway Services, Class I and Class II, subject to such limits as may be laid down by the Railway Board.\n\nNote.-Provided the total number of sanctioned gazetted post in any grade (Heads of.Departments, Deputy Heads of Departments, District Officers, Assistant Officers are Class II Officers) of the service concerned is not exceeded, General Managers are empowered to vsry solely in the public interest having regard to changes in the work and responsibilities of the posts, concerned (and not in the interest of individual officers), the distribution of posts within that grade for a period not exceeding 12 months\".\n\nRule 109 to the extent it is relevant in this case is as follows :\n\n\"109. The cadres of the services and departments included in Railway Services, Classes I and II (other than the Medical Department and specialists posts) on Indian Railways shall be fixed in accordance with the principles stated below :-\n\n(I) Separate cadres shall be maintained for each Indian Railway.\n\n(2) The number of permanent working posts, that is, posts required for ordinary duty on the railway, shall be first determined for each service or de partment and divided into the following grades :-\n\n(i) Administrative,\n\n(ii) District Officers,\n\n' . .._\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)' 157\n\n(iii) Assistant Officers and Class II Services.\n\n(b) • * * • •\n\n(c) The number of posts to be allotted to the Assistant Officers' grade shall be calculated with reference to the total number of Administrative and District Officers' Posts, and shall be so fixed as to allow of a continuous flow of promotion from the Assistant Officers' grade to the higher grade after a given period of service. For this purpose, all the administrative posts, including the general administrative posts, shall be taken into account.\n\n(d) The rest of the posts included in (a) (iii) shall be allotted to the Class II Service.\n\n(e) The total number of posts thus arrived at for\n\neach grade in a department shall form the per- D manent duty strength of each service or department.\n\n(3) * • * * • •\n\n(4) • • * * * •\n\nRule 112 provides that the number of posts sanctioned in each grade in a department shall in no case be exceeded without the sanction\n\nof the authority competent to create a post, either permanent or tern- F porary in the grade.\n\nRule 116 prescribes that except as provided in r. 133(4) officiating promotion to the Assistant Officer's grade or to a higher grade of gazetted Railway Servants from Class II service or from the nongazetted establishment is not permissible.\n\nRule 118(1) provides that the number of Gazetted Railway servants on duty in a department shall not exceed the permanent duty strength sanctioned for that department.\n\nRule 125 prescribes that all appointments to a Railway Service Class II shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the H Union Public Service Commission from time to time in accordance with the rules framed by them.\n\nRule 129 provides that the rate of normal recruitment shall be determined by the President with reference to the sanctioned strength of a service or Department.\n\nRule 130 is important and may be fully extracted here.\n\nIt is 'as follows : B •\n\n\"130. Method of recruitment-Recruitment to Class I service in the various departments of Railways shall be made through- ·\n\n(a) competitive examination held in .India by the\n\nUnion Public Service Commission;\n\n(b) promotion of specially qualified gazetted railway servants of the Class II Service including officiating gazetted railway servants of the service or department;\n\n(c) in the case of Transportation (Power) and Mechanical Engineering Department, by appointment of candidates as Special Class Apprentices; and\n\n( d) occasional admission of other qualified persons on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission.\n\nNote.-The quota reserved for permanent promotion from Class II to Class I has been fixed at 33-1/3 % of the vacancies in the Junior Scale, Class I (Senior Scale in the case of Medical Department).\n\nRule 131 provides that Probationers to the Railway Service Class I shall be required to undergo a period of training as may be prescribed by the President.\n\nRule 132 provides fo(recruitment to Railway Service Class II.\n\nRule 133 deals with promotions to gazetted posts. We are concerned with rule 133(3)(c) and (f) which to tte extent relevant were previously as follow& :\n\n\"133. Promotions to gazetted posts.--·\n\n(I) •\n\n(2) •\n\n• • • * •\n\n/ I _k.\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 159\n\n(3) The General Manager may appoint-\n\n(a) •\n\n(b) •\n\n• • • • • •\n\n(c) An Assistant Officer to officiate as District Officer, provided that such a gazetted railway servant who B has not passed the efficiency bar may be so appointed only, if-\n\n(i) a gazetted railway servant who has passed the efficiency bar is not available; or\n\n(ii) the vacancy is not expected to exceed three months;\n\n(d) (e) • • •\n\n(f) substantively, an Assistant Officer to the District grade provided such promotions are made in strict order of seniority subject further to the condition that no officer shall be so promoted unless he has rendered not less than ten years of total service and has been declared fit to cross the eflieiency bar in the junior scale.\n\nNote.-The period of 10 years of total service will also include the two years of training in the case of direct recruits. In respect of promoted gazetted railway servants all those placed in the Seniority list above the last direct recruit who fulfils the above condition will receive confirmation in their turn.\"\n\nThese provisions were also amended on December 31, 1975, and they are now as follows :-\n\n\"(c) an Assistant Officer to officiate in the Senior Scale provided that such an Assistant Officer who has not passed the efficiency bar may be so appointed only, if an\n\nAssistant Officer, who has passed the efficiency bar is not available;\n\n(d) • • • •\n\n(f) substantively, an Assistant 'Officer to the Senior Scale, provided such promotions are made in strict order of seniority subject further to the condition that no officer shall be so promoted unless he has rendered not less than eight years of total service and has been declared fit to cross the efficiency bar in the junior scale .\n\nNote.-The period of eight years of total service will also include the two years of training in the case of direct recruits. In respect of promoted gazetted railway servants all those placed in the seniority list above the last direct recruit who fulfils the above condition will receive a confirmation in their turn\".\n\nRule 139 makes provision for the making of recruitment rules and the note to rule 139 provides that in the case of recruitment to gazetted posts, the rules should be published in the Gazette of India in the section allotted to Statutory Rules and Orders.\n\nRule 144 obliges every railway servant to execute an agreement with the President of India at the time of his substantive appointment and further provides that those appointed for a limited period may also be required to execute such agreements.\n\nRule 2003(3) defines cadre as meaning 'the strength of a service E or a part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit'.\n\nRule 2003(22) defines a permanent post as meaning a post carrying a definite rate of pay sanctioned without limit of time.\n\nRule 2003(29) defines a temporary post as meaning a post carrying a definite rate of pay sanctioned for a limited time.\n\nRule 2003(30) defines a tenure post as meaning a permanent post which an individual Railway servant may not hold for more than a limited period.\n\nRule 2003(31) defines time scale of pay and whole of it may be extracted here :\n\n\"(31) (a) Time-scale pay means pay 'which subject to any conditions prescribes in these rules, rises by periodical increments from a minimum to a maximum.\n\nIt includes the slabs of pay formerly known as progressive. e\n\n(b) Time-scales are said to be identical if the minimum, the maximum, the period of increment and the rate of increment of the time-scales are identical.\n\nI -*-\n\nKATYAM 11.WAI. v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.). 161\n\n(c) A post is said to be on the same, time-scale :as another post on a time-scale if the two time scales are identical and the posts fall within a cadre, or a class in a cadre, such cadre or class having been created in order to fill all posts involving duties of approximately the same character or degree of responsibility, in a service or establishment or group of establishments; so that the pay of the holder of any particular post is determined by his position in the cadre or class, and not by the fact that he holds that post\".\n\n15. The earlier narrated facts show that for quite several years it was distinctly understood by the appointing authority a.s well as the persons appointed that those who were appointed as Temporary Assistant Engineers on! the basis of the selection made by the Union\n\nPublic Service Commission did not belong either to Class I or to Class II of the Indian Railway Service of Enginc<rs.\n\nIt was understood that they would be eligible for being considered for absorption: in the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I in an annual quota reserved for such absorption and that their seniority would be reckoned thereafter from the date of their confirmation in Class J.\n\nIt was also understood that they would be eligible for being considered for promotion to officiating posts in the senior scale. This position in regard to their status was made clear, without the possibility of a shadow of doubt, in the letters of appointment issued to them and the agreements which they were required to execute.\n\nConsiderable argument as advanced on the question whether a service not contemplated by the Indian Railway Establishment Code could be created and whether appointments of Gazetted Railway servants not falling in Class I or Class II and therefore falling outside the provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Code could be made. The submission was that the Indian Railway Establishment Code did not contemplate a class of service which did not belong either to Class I or Class II, and that every gazetted railway servant had to belong either to Class I or Class II and the question whether the posts to which appointments were made belonged to Class I or not had to be determined with reference to the minimum educational qualifications prescribed for the post, the scales of pay, the functions and duties ete. It was submitted that notwithstanding the clear assertion in the letters of appointment and the agreements, the petitioners must, in law, be considered to have been appointed to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I and to no other service.\n\n16. Art. 53 of the Constitution vests the executive power of the Union in the President, to be exercised by him either directly or through\n\nofficers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution.\n\nArt. 73(t)(a) stipulates that the executive power of the Union shall extent \"to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws\". \"Union Public Service and all-India Services\" are included in item 70 of the Union List (List I of the Seventh Schedule) enumerating the matters with respect to which Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws. The proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution makes it competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, to make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the Parliament to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union.\n\n17. The inevitable sequitur from these Constitutional provisions is that the President, acting directly or through Officers subordinate to him, is free to constitute a service (with as many cadres as he chooses), to create posts without constituting a service or to create posts outside (the cadres of) the constituted service. The President (or the person directed by him) may, or, again ifhe so chooses he may not, make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to such service or posts. He is also free to make or not to make appointments to such services or posts. Nor is it obligatory for him to make rules of recruitment etc. before a service may be constituted or a post created or filled. But if there is an Act of Parliament or a rule under the proviso to Art. 309 on the matter, the executive powe, r, under Articles 53 and 73, may not be exercised in a manner in consi stent with or contrary to such Act or rule (vide B. N.Nagarajan & Ors.\n\nv. State of Mysore & Ors., (1) State of Kera/a v. M. K. Krishan Nair & Ors.,(2) etc. etc.\n\n17a. So, the previous existence of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers and the rules made for recruitment to that service do not bar the constitution of another service or the creation of posts outside the cadres of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. That, precisely, was what was done in 1956 and subsequent years upto 1965.\n\nThe administrative expedience and exigence of the time required the creation of temporary posts outside the cadres of the Indian Railway\n\n(1) (1966) 3 S.C.R. 682@ 686.\n\n(2) (1978) 2 S.C.R. 864 @ 874.\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, l.) 163\n\nService of Engineers.\n\nThe circumstances and the reasons necessitating the creation of these posts of Temporary Engineers were fully set out in the 'letters of indent' addressed by the Railway Board to the Union Public Service Commission, the details of which have already been mentioned by us in paragraph 4 supra. The posts so created were not to be confused with the posts in the cadre of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I notwithstanding that the scale of pay and the duties were to be the same. That the posts were not to be treated as in Class I or in Class II of the Indian Railway Ser\n\nvice of Engineers was expressly mentioned and clarified in the requisitions made by the Railway Board to the Union Public Service Commission and the correspondence which ensued between the Railway Board and the Union Public Service commission. It was also made clear in the letters of appointment and the agreements required to be executed by the persons appointed. Though to start with there was no Presidential sanction for the creation of the posts of Temporary Assistant Officers in the various Departments of Indian Railways, which were neither in Class I nor in Class II but merely in gazetted service, the matter was soon rectified by the grant of Presidential sanction for the posts in November 1956 and by the President further specifying the Railway Board as the authority competent to make appointments of such temporary Assistant Officers. This is apparent from the letter No. E-55RC-16(Pt. A) dated November 22, 1956 and letter No. 5 (GF-P)56 RC-16/Pt. A dated December 12, 1956 to which we have referred in paragraph 8 supra.\n\n18. The posts of Temporary Assistant Officers were thus created, and appointments made, under valid authority and outside the existing cadres of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. The letters of \"indent\", the advertisements, the letters of appointment and the agreements show that the temporary Assistant Officers appointed in this fashion after selection by the Union Public Service Commission were to be a source of recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I. It was so understood from the inception by the persons appointed as well as the Railway Administration. In fact subsequent absorptions into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers was the sugar, if one may use such an expression, held cut to those seeking appointment as temporary Assistant Officers. Year by year a few Temporary Assistant Officers were indeed absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers after selection by a Departmental Promotion Committee and be it noted, not automatically on the basis of seniority. If Temporary Assistant Officers were to be a source of recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I, we do not see how any temporary Assistant Officer could possibly be under\n\nany misapprehension that he was appointed to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I or could claim that he was appointed to such service.\n\n19. It is not possible to accept the submission that they must be considered to have been appointed under r. 130(d) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code which provides for occasional admission of other qualified persons on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission merely because they were selected for appointment by the Union Public Service Commission, their scale of pay was the same as that of the Class I Junior Scale Officers of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers and their duties were the same. There were special reasons for recruiting Temporary Assistant Officers outside the cadres of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers and when it was admittedly and avowedly so done, and when right through such officers were merely treated as a source of recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers, it would not be permissible for us to hold that the Temporary Assistant Officers were recruited to the cadre of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I.\n\n20. One of the submissions of the petitioners was that whatever the Railway Board might be asserting now or might have asserted even from the inception, factually, the Temporary Assistant Officers were appointed to temporary posts borne on the cadre of Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I and nc;>t to any ex-cadre posts. It was submitted that the posts to which appointments were made were not temporary posts in the sense that they were posts of short duration; they were posts, which admittedly were likely to continue indefinitely and even made permanent. The appointments could, therefore, have only been made to temporary posts borne on the cadre of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. We do not think that there is any substance in these submissions. It is no doubt true that a cadre may consist of permanent as well as temporary posts and there may be permanent vacancies in permanent as well as temporary posts borne on the cadre. But it does not follow that appointments stated to be made to posts outside the vary service and therefore necessarily outside the cadre must be considered to be made to temporary posts borne on the cadre merely because the posts were likely to continue indefinitely and did so continue.\n\nWe do not see how we can ignore the very purpose of scheme of recruitment of Temporary Assistant Officer which was to recruit Temporary Assistant Officers outside the existing Service\n\nand cadres to meet the anticipated requirements of certain special objects. Even in the requisition made in the prescribed form by the Railway Board to the Union Public Service Commission it was men-\n\nKATYA NI DAYA:L v. UNION (Chinnap11a Reddy, J.)' 165\n\ntioned \"the posts will be sanctioned shortly in connection with a number of projects\". It was not mentioned that the posts were already home on the cadre of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. Our attention was invited to the Annual Administrative Reports where, it was said, no distinction was made between classified and unclassified service. We do not think that these reports are of the slightest help.\n\nThe reports merely refer to appointments, temporary as well as permanent, made in the gazetted service by direct recruitment. Gazetted Railway services must include both the Indian Railway Service of Engineers and the Gazetted Railway Service constituted by the temporary Assistant Officers. Therefore, by merely taking into account the number of Temporary Assistant Officers for the purpose of calculating the total number of persons appointed to Gazetted Railway Service it cannot conceivEbly be said that Temporary Assistant Officers were appointed to cadre posts in the Indian Railway Service of Engineers.\n\nOur attention was also invited to the oiassified lists of Officers published by the Railway Board. This list takes the case of the petitioners no further. There is nothing in the list to indicate that persons who were appointed as Temporary Assistant Officers were appointed to posts borne on the cadre of Indian Railway Service of Engineers.\n\nOn the other hand under the column \"Date of appointment to Class\" no entry is made against the names of any of the Temporary Assistant.\n\nOfficers who had not yet been absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. We were also referred to the reports of the Administrative Reforms Commission where it is said \"In the Railways there , is a sizeable number of unclassified posts equivalent to Junior Class,! and only a small number of them are taken each year into the regular service\". This statement does not support the case of the petitioners that they were appointed to posts borne on the cadre of.\n\nInclian Railway Service of Engineers. Far from it. Passages from the reports of the Central Pay Commission were also read out to us to emphasize that the posts have continued over the years indefinitely.\n\nIf posts were initially created and sanctioned for short periods, we do. not see how the subsequent continuance of the posts indefinitely would make persons appointed to the posts members of the regular service, namely, the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I.\n\n21. Considerable argument was advanced on the question of the 'status' and the effect of the 'note' found below rule 106. It was said ' that the note did not form part of the rules made by the President under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and therefore it could not\n\namend the other statutory rules. The note was neither declaratory nor R explanatory and was of no a_ffect whatever.\n\nWe think that the argument regarding the 'status' and the effect of the note is of no real\n\nrelevance. The note merely states an existing fact known to all concerned. It was known that posts of Temporary Assistant Officers in gazetted railway service who were not to be classified 'either as Class I or as Class II' had been sanctioned by the President who had designated the Railway Board as the authority competent to make appointments to those posts. The note below rule 106 merely stated th.ts fact.\n\nWith or without the note, the Temporary Assistant Officers would still not be classified either as Class I or Class II. Their classification outside Class I and Class II was not dependant on the note bot on the Presidential action in regard to the creation of the posts.\n\n22. This is perhaps an appropriate stage for referring to the amendments, introduced in 1975, to the Indian Railway Establishment Code.\n\nThe expression 'Temporary Assistant Officers', which was not previously defined in the Railway Establishment Code, was sought to be defined by new clause 17 of R. 102 to mean \"a Gazetted Railway Servant drawing pay on the scale applicable to Junior Scale Offices but not classified either as Class I or as Class II Officer\". The expression Assistant Officer was redefined so as not to include a Temporary Assistant Officer who was not 'classified either as Class I or as Class II'.\n\nApart from the principal submission that the 1975 amendments were violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution, it was submitted that the amendments were prospective in nature and did not affect the petitioners all of whom bad been appointed as Temporary Assistant Officers long prior to the 1975 amendment. We do not think that the amendments have any effect one way or the other on the status of the Temporary Assistant Officers. What was always well known to the Temporary Assistant Officers and the Railway Board and what was the inevitable result of the Presidential sanction for the creation of posts which were not to be classified either as Class I or Class II, was made explicit in the Indian Railway Establishment code also !bY the introduction of these amendments. This became necessary because in the Writ Petition filed by Katyani Dayal, the Allahabad High Court, while appearing to bold that Temporary Assistant Officers belonged neither ' to Class I nor to Class II service, held that they came within the then existing definition of 'Assistant !Officer' so as to entitle them for promotion under r. 133 of the Indian Railway !Establishment Code. We are afraid it was the use of the expression 'Temporary Assistant Officer' that has led to considerable confusion. The expression 'Temporary Assistant Officer' was coined to describe the new post created for the first time in 1955. The expression was not used to signify officers temporarily holding the posts of Assistant Officers in the several established Railway Services. For instance a Class If Assistant Engineer\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, l.) 167\n\nwho is temporarily promoted to hold the post of an Assistant Engineer Class I may be described as a Temporary Assistant Officer but he certainly would not be a 'Temporary Assistant Officer' appointed to any of the posts specially creat<d by the President which were neither in Class I nor in Class II. The word 'Temporary' in the expression 'Temporary Assistant Officer' was not used to qualify the words Assistant Officer. The whole of the expression was intended to describe the particular post, which was neither in Class I nor Class II, which was created iu 1955. There would not have been any confusion and it would have been much happier if instead of the expression Temporary Assistant Officer some other expression such as Special Assistant Officer or Special Assistant Engineer had been chosen. We are of the view that the Allahabad High Court was not justified in looking at the amended definition of 'Assistant Officer' in isolation and concluding that the expression 'Assistant Officer' included Temporary Assistant Officer because Temporary Assistant Officer was also a gazetted Railway servant who drew the junior scale of pay. The definition of Assistant Officer was not to be read in isolation in that manner. It should have been read conjunctively with Rules 105, 106 and 108. A reference to Rule 105 would show that for the purposes of the rules in the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Railway services were to be classified into Class I, Class II, Class III, Class IV and Workshop staff. Rule 106 specified the appointment and categories falling under the services mentioned in Rule 105. Rule 108 required the Railway Board to fix the strength of th~ Railway Services' Class I and Class II. There could therefore, be no question of an officer not falling within the class, category or cadre specified in rules 105, 106 and 108 claiming to be an 'Assistant Officer' within the meaning of that expression. A person recruited to the post of 'Temporary Assistant Officer' not classified as Class I or Class II Officer could not claim to belong to the\n\nClass, category or cadre specified in Rules 105, 106 and 108 and was, therefore, not an Assistant Officer within the meaning of that expression even before the 1975 amendment.\n\n23. We now come to the principal submission made to us namely\n\nthat the classification of Temporary Assistant Officers separately from G the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I was discriminatory and had no nexus to the object to be achieved namely efficiency of service and was, therefore, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was argued that the minimum academic qualification for the posts of 'Temporary Assistant Officer' was the same as that pre- &cribed for entry into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I, ff the scale of pay of 'Temporary Assistant Officer' was the same as hat of a Class I Officer of Junior Scale, the functions and dnties were\n\nsimilar and on all matters not expressly provided, the Temporary Assistant Officers like Class I officers were to be governed by the provisions of the Railway Establishment Code and the Rules made thereunder. There was so much identity on all vital and important matters that the classification of 'Temporary Assistant Officers' outside the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I was arbitrary. It led to all manner of discrimination in the matter of advancement in service, seniority, promotion etc. The unfairness of it all was sought to be graphically demonstrated by pointing out how after twenty years of service Temporary Assistant Officers continued to be Temporary Assistant Officers while Class I officers recruited much later were placed much higher than them in order of seniority and had risen to much higher positions in the service. Another limb of the argument on the question of discrimination was that all Assistant Officers whether they were permanent Assistant Officers or Temporary Assistant Officers constituted as ingle cadre and it was not permissible to further classify them on the basis of the manner of their recruitment, namely, by competitive examination or by selection by the Union Public Service Commission. Part of this submission has already been met by us and we have shown how Temporary Assistant Officers are not Assistant Officers within the meaning of that expression in the Indian Railway Establishment Code.\n\n24. It is true that the minimum educational qualification for the post of Temporary Assistant Officer was the same as that for recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I. It is true that the scale of pay is the same, and the functions and duties are the same. It is also true that except to the extent provided, the Temporary Assistant Officers were also subject to the provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Code and the rules made thereunder. But, there are certain fundamental differences between two classes which cannot be ignored and which demand attention. To begin with, the object of recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers is to provide Officers of the highest quality to meet the requirements of all posts in the service including Senior Administrative posts.\n\nRule 109(2)(c) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, extracted earlier expressly provides that the number of posts to be allotted to the Assistant Officers' grade shall be calculated with reference to the total number of administrative and District Officers' posts, and shall be so fixed as to allow of a continuous flow of promotion from the Assistant Officers' grade to the higher grades after a given period of service.\n\nFor this purpose all the administrative posts including the general Administrative posts are required to be taken into account. On the\n\nKArYANI DAY/IL v. UNJl)N (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 169\n\nother hand the object ofrecrtiiting Temporary Assistant Officers was to meet specific requirements of various projects with a prospect of promotion in a temporary capacity to a senior scale post and absorption into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I. They were not to be members of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers but were to be a source of recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. Thus the very appointments of Temporary Assistant Officers were to temporary posts outside the cadre and outside the recruitment rules of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I and the very nature of this tenure was prec1rious, whereas Class I Officers recruited on the basis of a result of competitive examination were appointed to cadre posts strictly in accordance with the recruitment rules.\n\n25. Next and equally important, is the [fundamental qualitative differences, linked with the method of recruitment. True, the minimum educational qualification is the same. But, those who are recruited directly to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I are subjected to stiff and competitive, written and personality tests. Only the very best can aspire to come out successful. The Temporary Assistant Officers were not subjected either to a written or to a persoaality test but were selected on the basis of an interview by the Union Public Service Commission. In addition to the [minimum educational qualification, three Years' experience as a Civil (Engineer was also prescribed. Thus while brilliance was the beacon light which beckoned those aspiring to become members of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class J, iwas replaced by experience in the case of those wanting to be Temporary Assistant Officers. Again the appointing authority in the case of Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I iUhe President while the appointing authority in the case of Temporary Assistpt Officers was the Railway Board, no doubt, pursuant to the authority given by the President. Different courses of training were prescribed for the\" Indian Railway Service of Engineers and the Tempo1ary Assistant Officers. For the Indian Railway Service of Engineers the training is an intensive and comprehensive one designed to equip them for higher posts in the Department too, while the training for Temporary Assistant Engineers was a brief six months' training intended merely to equip them for carrying out the specific jobs. In the matter of terms and conditions of service, while the provisions of the Indian Railway Establishment Code are fully applicable to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I, those provisions are applicable to \"Temporary Assistant Officers\" to the extent there is no specific provision in their Jetter of appointment and agreement.\n\n12-J89SC!/80\n\n26. Keeping in mind these similarities and dis-similarities, let us examine the legal pJsition. We cannot do better than to refer to the deci&ions cited at the Bar, not all, but a few illustrative cases.\n\n27. In State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh(}-), the question arose whether the constitution by the State of two S\"rvices consisting of B employees doing the same work but with different scales of pay or 1mbject to different conditions of service such as promotional opportunities was.violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The , argument\n\nbasedon the postulate that equal work must receive equal pay was repelled, by quoting the following observations fr.om an earlier decision\n\nof the Court in Kishori Mohan/a/ v. Union of India.(2) :\n\n\"The only other contention raised in that there is discri- . mination between Class I and Class II officers inasmuch as though they do the same kind of work their pay scales are different.. This, it is said, violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. If this contention had any validity, there could be no incremental scales of pay fixed dependant on the duration of an officer's service. The abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work has nothing to do with Art. 14.\n\nThe contention that Art.· 14 of the Constitution has been violated therefore, also fails.\"\n\nThe second postulate tha(if there was equality in pay and work there must be equal conditions of service was rejected as unsound. If was observed (at p. 191-192) :\n\n\"If, for instance, an existing service is recruited on the basis of a certain qualification, the creation of another service for doing the same work, it might be in the same way but with better prospects of promotion cannot be said to be unconstitutional, and the fact that the rules framed. permit free transfers of personnel of the two groups to places held by the other would not make any difference.\n\nWe are not basing this answer on any theory that if a government servant enters into any contract regulating the conditions of his service he cannot call in aid the constl~ tutional guarantees because he is bound by his contract.\n\nBut this conclusion rests on different and wider public grounds, viz., thatthe government which is carrying on the administration has necessarily to have a choice in the constitution of the services to man the administration and that the limitations imposed by the constitution are not\n\n(!) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 169@ 191, 192.\n\n(2) A.l.R. 1962 SC 1139.\n\nKATYAM DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 171\n\nsuch as to preclude the creation of such services. Besides, there might, for instance, be temporary recruitment to meet an exigency or an emergency which is not expected to last for any appreciable period of time. To deny to the government the power to recruit temporary staff drawing the same pay and doing the same work as other permanent incumbents within the cadre strength but governed by different rules and conditions of service, it might be including promotions, would be to impose restraints on the manner of administration which we believe was not intended by the constitution.'.\n\nExamining the facts of the case before them the Court noticed that the two services started as independent services, the qualifications prescribed for entry into each were different, the method of. recruitment and the machinery for recruitment were different and they continued as different services and were never interpreted into one service. 0The\n\nCourt said (at p. 193) :\n\n\"If they were distinct 'services, there was no question of inter se seniority between members of the two services, nor of any comparison between the two in the matter of promotion for founding an argument based upon Art. 14 or Art. 16(1). They started dis-similarity and they continued dissimilarly and any dis-similarity in their tre1tment would not be a denial of equal opportunity, for it is common ground that within each group there is no denial of that freedom guaranteed by the two Articles''.\n\n28. In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Tri/oki Nath Khosa & Ors.(l) a rule which provided that only those Assistant Engineers who possessed a degree in Engineering would be eligible for promotion as Executive Engineer and which totally denied any opportunity for promotion to Assistant Engineers who were Diploma holders was challenged as infringing the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Under the rules, recruitment to the cadre of Assistant Engineer was to be made by direct recruitment of Degree holders in Civil Engineering or by transfer of degree, or diploma holders who bad served as Supervisors for a period of not less than five years. The argument was that degree holders and diploma holders having been integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, there was no justification for the classification for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer. The Court upheld the rule and held that the classification of Assistant Engineers into degree-holders\n\n(I) (1974] 1 S.C.R. 771 @ 790, 792.\n\n' '\n\n, F\n\nand Diploma-holders could not he said to rest on any unreal or unreasonable basis. Classification made with a view to achieving adminiscyative efficiency in the Engineering Service was clearly co-related to higher educational qualifications since higher educational qualifications was atleast presumptive evidence of higher mental equipment.\n\nEducational qualification was always recognised as a safe criteria for determining the validity of classification. The earlier decisions of the Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India,(1) and Moryan Coutindo & Ors. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay & Ors.,(2) were distinguished on the ground that they were cases where direct recruits and promotees who were fused into a common stream of service were sought to be treated differently by reference to the consideration that they were recruited from different spurces whereas in the case before the Court the classification rested fairly and squarely on the consideration of educational qualifications. It was pointed out that the earlier cases did not rule out a classification on a basis other than that they were drawn from different sources. However, while uphol<ling the validity of the rule Chandrachud, J., and Krishna Iyer, J., uttered words of caution and it is upon these words of caution that the petitioners rely. Chandrachud, J., said (at p. 790) :\n\n\"But we hope that this judgment will not be construed as a charter for making minute and microcosmic classifications. Excellence is, or ought to be, the goal of all good government and excelleµce and equality are not friendly bed-fellows. A pragmatic approach has therefore to be adopted in order to harmonize the requiremeµts of public services with the aspirations of public servants. But let us not evolve,[through imperceptible:extensions, a theory of classification which may subvert, perhaps submerge, the previous guarantee of quality. The eminent spirit of an ideal society is equality and so we must not be left to ask in wonderment. What after all in the operational ' residue of equality and equal opportunity?\"\n\nKrishna Iyer, J., said (at p. 792) :\n\n\"Mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to onr egalitarian faith and only [substantial and straightforward classifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo equality\".\n\n(I) (1968] l S.C.R. 185.\n\n(2) (1966] 3 S.C.R. 600.\n\n.··~.\n\n.. ~.\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION ( Chinnappa Reddy, !.) . 17 3\n\n29. In Mohammed Shujat Ali & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & A Ors. etc.(l) one of the questions which arose for consideration was whether the distinction made between Graduate Supervisors and non-Graduate Supervisors and the allocation, to these categories, of three and one vacancies respectively out of every four vacancies in the next higher promotional posts was violative of Articles)4and16ofthe Constitution. After quoting with approval the observations of B Chandrachud, J., and Krishna Iyer, J., in State of J. & K. v. Trilokinath Khosa (supra). Bhagwati J., observed (at p. 481) :\n\n\"To permit discrimination based on educational attainments not obliged by the nature of the duties of the higher post is to stifle the social thrust of the equality clause.\n\nC A rule of promotion which, while conceding that non graduate Supervisors are also fit toe promoted as Assistant Engineers, reserves a higher quota of vacancies for promotion for graduate supervisors as against non-graduate Supervisors, would clearly be calculated to destroy the guarantee of equal opportunity\".\n\nAfter saying so much the Court, however, upheld the rule which made the differentiation between Graduate and non-Graduate Super visors on the ground that the differentiation had not been made for the first time by the impugned rule and graduate Supervisors had always been treated as a distinct .and separate class and the two were never integrated into one class. Since the two categories of Super visors were never fused into one class, it was held, there was no question of unconstitutional discrimination on the ground of diffe rential treatment being given to them.\n\n30. In S. B. Patwardhan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & On(2) the question concerned a formula of seniority. Direct recruits and promotees, though drawn from two different sources, constituted, in that case, a single integrated cadre. They discharged identical functions, bore similar responsibilities and acquired an equal amount of experience in their respective assignments. Yet, the formula pro vided that probationers recruited during any year shall in a bunch be treated as senior to promotees confirmed in that year. While the formula gave to the direct recruits the benefit of even the one year's period of training and another year's period of probation for the purposes of seniority, it denied to promotees the benefit of their long . and valuable experience.\n\nThere was no intelligible ground for the differentiation, bearing nexus with efficiency in public service.\n\n(!) [1975] l S.C.R. 449, 481.\n\n(2) [1977) 3 S.C.R. 775.\n\n174 SUPREME COURT REPO!l TS\n\n\n'Confirmation was one of the inglorious uncertainties of government service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor en the availability of substantive vacancies, and it. was on confirmation that the promotees seniority was made to depend. The formula was struck down by the Court. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Court in A. K. Subraman v. Union of lndia,(1) where it had been held, while interpreting rules relating to Central Engineering Service\n\nClass~I,!tha(though in cases where recruitment was made frcm different sources a quota system could be validly applied, the quota rule was to be enforced at the time of initial recruitment to the post of officiating Executive Engineer and not at the time of their confirmation. The Court had further observed that there was a well recognised distinction between promotion and confirmation and that the tests to be applied for the purpose of promotion were entirely different from those that had to be applied at the time of confirmation.\n\n31. In H. S. Verma & Ors. v. Secretary, Ministry of Shipping & Transport & Ors.(2), the facts were somewhat peculiar. Certain persons were directly recruited to the Engineering Service of the Ministry of Shipping and Transport (Roads Wing) as a result of a written competitive examination. Certain other persons were-also directly recruited but by interview through the Union Public Service Commission, although such a method of selection was not contemplated by the rules.\n\nIn 1966 a rule was added providing for selection by interview through the Union Public Service Commission. The 1966 rule was held not to be retrospective in some Writ Petitions filed in the Delhi High Court by the persons who had been recruited as a result of written competitive examination. The High Court while holding that the amendment was not retrospective did not hold that those appointed prior to 1966 by the interview method were not regularly appointed. Instead, the High Court held that they were appointed and promoted to ex-cadre posts.\n\nIn 1973 a notification was issued by the Government to; the effect that the Officers appointed by the interview method must be deemed to have been industed into the service as temporary officers in 1966. Later in 1976 the Government decided to set up two Services to be called the Central Engineering Service (Roads). Group 'A', comprising of Officers appointed by the method of examination and the otber the Central Engineering Pool, Group 'A', comprising of officers appointed by tbe method of interview. Officers of both the services were eligible\n\nto be promoted to certain posts called \"isolated posts\". Appointments to the 'isolated posts' were to be made by selection or promotion, as the case may be, on the recommendation of a Departmental Pro- •\n\n(I) [19751 2 S.C.R. 979.\n\n(2) [1979] 4 s.c.c. 415, 427, 428.\n\nKATYANl DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 175\n\nmotion Committee from an integrated list of officers to be drawn up on the basis of the length of their continuous service in their respective grades. The officers appointed by the method of interview assailed the rules contending that though they were appointed to their posts long before the officers appointed by the method of competitive examination, they would rank much below the latter in the list cf seniority and would consequently be denied promotional opportunities to higher posts. Having regard to the vety complicated nature of the facts, the Court after discnssion with the learned counsel appearing for the various parties and the Government made an order, which they thought was best and just in all the circumstances of the case. While issuing the directions certain observations were made. It was said (at p. 427) :\n\n\" .... We are. unable to suggest the contention that persons holding similar posts and having similar responsibilities to discharge can be classified into different caegories for the mere reason that some of them were recruited directly by the interview method and some were recruited directly on the result of a competitive examination. Were it permissible to make such classifications, ingenuity may suggest the natur~ of curriculum in different years as the basis of classification. If subjection to different kinds of tests as a condition of eligibility produces qualitative difference in the ability of persons recruited to similar posts, it may perhaps become necessary to limit the promotional opportunities, in regard to the relatively higher posts, to those whose abili ties are remarkably higher. But, it is nobody's case and the Government has made no grievance that the petitioners who were appointed by the interview method are in any way inferior in ability, efficiency or educational qualifications to those who were appointed after a written competitive examination. In the matter of experience too, the peti tioners are In no way inferior to the contesting respondents\" .\n\n1l.e Court however, took care to add ·\n\n\"Though classification which proceeds merely on the basis that certain persons were recruited after going through one test and certain others after going through another test would be unscientific, it cam1ot be said on the facts of the instant case that there can be no valid basis or justification for classifying the various officers of the Roads Wing into separate categories. As we have stated earlier,\n\nthe appointments of some of the petitioners and some of the respondents were made in violation of the rules which were in force at the relevant time. It is in respect of that class of persons that the Delhi High Court was driven to hold that they must be deemed to have been appointed to excadre posts. . ............ But, the fact remains that persons who were appointed contrary to the rules but to excadre posts were taken initially for purposes of certain projects to which we have already referred. Their precarious tenure was continued from time to time but that will not furnish justification for treating them on the same footing as others whose appointments were made strictly in accordance with the rules and who were appointed to posts borne on the cadre of the Central Engineering Service. A division of these two classes of officers into separate categories will remove possible injustice to those who were appointed to cadre posts in that their promotional opportunities will not be blocked or hindered by ex-cadre officers who were recruited on a large scale to meet an urgent necessity. Such a classification will also minimise the injustice which would otherwise have been caused to those who were appointed to ex-cadre posts\"·\n\nWe have referred, without comment, to a few earlier decisions of this Court and quoted the observations of learned Judges therein.\n\nThese decisions and the observations extracted therefrom illustrate and emphasise that there are and there can be no absolutes when we consider claims to justice on complaints of inequality. The marxian ultimate of a classless society, however laudable that may be, is evidently not what is sought to be achieved by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The goal is a limited one. lt is equality among comparables. A necessary, but not necessarily cynical, implication of equality among comparable is the permissibility of reasonable classification, having nexus with the object to be achieved. So, it was said that if two services started and continued dissimilarly, though they apparently discharged similar duties, they were not comparable services so as to furnish a basis for the claim' to equality (State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh) (supra). But, if in the same service there were two sources of recruitment to the same posts, a classification based solely on source of recruitment was not permissible (Rosha11 Lal Tandon v. Union of India, and Mervyn Coutinda & Ors. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay & Ors.) (supra). This was also the principle of the decision in S. p. Patwardhan & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (supra). Even so, Chandrachud, J., Krishna Iyer,\n\nKATYANI DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 177\n\nJ., and Bhagwati, J., had to recognise, even if reluctantly, that even A among the members of the same service, a classification based otherwise than on mere source of recruitment such as educational qualification was at times permissible. But necessary words of caution against makiug 'minute and micro-cosmic'.dassifications were uttered. (State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Trilokinath Khosa, (Supra) and Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. (supra). Chandrachud, J., B however drew the line when among members of the same service a classification was sought to be made between those who had been recruited on the basis of results of a competitive examination and those who had come in by the method of interview. But, here again he felt constrained to say that those who were appointed to ex-cadre posts outside the rules and whose tenure was therefore precarious C could not claim to be treated on the same footing as those who were appointed strictly in accordance with the rules and to posts borne on the cadre of the service (H. S. Verma & Anr. v. Secretary, Ministry of Shipping & Transport & Ors.) (supra).\n\nIf we now look at the facts of the case before us, we find that the service comprising the Temporary Assistant Officers and the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I started separately and never became one. The objects of their recruitment were different as explained earlier, the methods of recruitment were dissimilar and the appointing authority was not the same. The training that was imparted was also unlike. The very tenure of the Temporary Assistant Officers was precarious and their immediate aspiration was only to b~ absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers class I.\n\nThese distinctive features marked out the Temporary Assistant Officers as a Class-apart from the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I and therefore there was no question of entitlement of equal rights with the latter. Of course, once they were absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers they would be entitled not to be treated differently thereafter.\n\nTheir seniority would ordinarily be reckoned from the date of their absorption into the Indian Railway .\n\nService of Engineers, as promised in their letters of appointment. No doubt these officers merited something more than the 'long wait' at the portals of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. The Railway Board however, appears to have tried to make the 'long wait' a little less tedious by giving them weightage of half of their length of service as Temporary Assistant Officers, subject to a maximum of five years. We wish to say nothing about the validity of such weightage as we understand it is in question elsewhere.\n\nThough we are denying the claim of the petitioners to equality because of the history; origin, and structure of the Services and the\n\n/ existing legal position in relation thereto, we do not wish to be understood as saying: that there is any thing 'doctrinnaire' In the principles of 'equal pay for equal work' and 'equal status for equal pay and equal work'.\n\nThey are not goals to be scoffed at.\n\nIt may be that in the present societal context the goals appear to be distant. But they are goals worthy of attainment and let us hope, with no overtones of cynicism, that these goals will be achieved in the not too distant future.\n\nAll the Writ Petitions and applications for the grant of Special Leave are dismissed but without any order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition~ dis1ilissed~\n\nI ~.", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "KATYANI DAYAL AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KATYANI DAYAL AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 26, 1981)", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 26, 1981)\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA, R. S. PATHAK AND 0."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHIN1'/.APPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 530, "end_char": 548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3162, "end_char": 3180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 17, 1965, the Railway Board decided that the temporary officers so absorbed ioto the Railway Service of Engineers should be given wcightage in seniority \"on the basis of c half the total number of Years of continuous seice in working posts on Ilailways prior to their permanent absorption into Class I, subject to maxirnum weightage of five years.\""}}, {"text": "Katyani Dayal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3551, "end_char": 3564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the writ petitioners, Katyani Dayal field a writ petition in the llla habad High Court claiming promotion to the Senfor scale post of District D Officer.", "canonical_name": "KATYANI DAYAL AND ORS"}}, {"text": "August 1, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on August 1, 1974, the Railway Administration did not implement the judgment but instead on December 12, 1975 amended the Rule 102(3), !"}}, {"text": "December 12, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4528, "end_char": 4545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on August 1, 1974, the Railway Administration did not implement the judgment but instead on December 12, 1975 amended the Rule 102(3), !"}}, {"text": "Union Public ServiCe Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5037, "end_char": 5068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The petitioners, therefore, have filed these writ petitions in a representaHve capacity purporting to represent all temporary Assistant Engineers appoi!lted on the recommendation of the Union Public ServiCe Commission, claiming that, in law they could only be and were appoioted to tho Indian Railway Service of Engioeers Oass I right from the beginning and that the Railway Board was \\vrong in treating them as belonging to neither Class I nor aass H II."}}, {"text": "Arts. 53, 73(1)(a) and 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5840, "end_char": 5866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6580, "end_char": 6590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, if there is an Act of Parliament or a\n\nru1e:: under the proviso to Article 309 on the matter, the executive power under Articles 53 and 73, may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with or contrary to •uch Act or Tule. ["}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6625, "end_char": 6636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 53 and 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6678, "end_char": 6696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 S.C.R. 864", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6898, "end_char": 6917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Coon", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8754, "end_char": 8779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "162G-H, 163G-H, 164A]\n\nThe petitioners cannot be conside.red to have been appointed under rule- 130 ( d) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code which provides for occll.- sional admission of other qualified persons on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Coon merely because they were selected for appointnient by the Union Public Service Commission, their scale of pay was."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8838, "end_char": 8869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "162G-H, 163G-H, 164A]\n\nThe petitioners cannot be conside.red to have been appointed under rule- 130 ( d) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code which provides for occll.- sional admission of other qualified persons on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Coon merely because they were selected for appointnient by the Union Public Service Commission, their scale of pay was."}}, {"text": "Indian Riailway Service of Engineers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the same as that of the Class I Junior ScaJe Officers of the Indian Riailway Service of Engineers and their duties were the same. ["}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Engineers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10503, "end_char": 10538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand under the column \"Date of appointment to Class\" no entry is made against the names of any of the Temporary Assistant Officers who had not yet been absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engineers. ["}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Railway Service, namely, the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class."}}, {"text": "meaning of that expression in the Indian Railway Establispment Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11601, "end_char": 11668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11821, "end_char": 11830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Temporary Assistant Officers are not Assistaot Officers within the\n\nmeaning of that expression in the Indian Railway Establispment Code", "statute": "Temporary Assistant Officers are not Assistaot Officers within the\n\nmeaning of that expression in the Indian Railway Establispment Code"}}, {"text": "Katyani Dayal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12691, "end_char": 12704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This became necessary because in the Writ Petition filed by Katyani Dayal, the Allahabad High Court, while appearing to hold ffiat Temporary Assistant Officers belonged neither to Class I nor to Class II service, held that they came within the then existing definition of 'Assistant Officer' so as to entitle them for promotion under r. 133 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. [", "canonical_name": "KATYANI DAYAL AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12710, "end_char": 12730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This became necessary because in the Writ Petition filed by Katyani Dayal, the Allahabad High Court, while appearing to hold ffiat Temporary Assistant Officers belonged neither to Class I nor to Class II service, held that they came within the then existing definition of 'Assistant Officer' so as to entitle them for promotion under r. 133 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. ["}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14357, "end_char": 14372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1968] 1 SCR 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15116, "end_char": 15132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15203, "end_char": 15219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 415", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15613, "end_char": 15620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15812, "end_char": 15830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16981, "end_char": 16995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their seniority would ordinarily be reckoned from the date of their absorption into the Indian Railway ."}}, {"text": "Union\n\nPublic Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17966, "end_char": 17998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nTemporary Assistant Officers were not subjected either to a ¥iTitten or to a D\n\n~ personality test but were selected on the basis of an interview by the Union\n\nPublic Service Commission."}}, {"text": "(1974] 1 SCR 771", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19613, "end_char": 19629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 1 SCR 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19679, "end_char": 19695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 1 SCR 449", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19905, "end_char": 19921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 SCR 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19997, "end_char": 20013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 979", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20049, "end_char": 20065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20659, "end_char": 20669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. JJhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20848, "end_char": 20863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. JJhandare, Mrs. S. Bhandare and T. Sreedharan for the l Petitioners."}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20870, "end_char": 20881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. JJhandare, Mrs. S. Bhandare and T. Sreedharan for the l Petitioners."}}, {"text": "T. Sreedharan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20886, "end_char": 20899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. JJhandare, Mrs. S. Bhandare and T. Sreedharan for the l Petitioners."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20924, "end_char": 20935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Attorney General, Mr. M. K. Banerjee, Addi."}}, {"text": "M. K. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20959, "end_char": 20973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, Attorney General, Mr. M. K. Banerjee, Addi."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21001, "end_char": 21012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor- Genera/, R. B. Datar, A. K. Ganguli, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for RR."}}, {"text": "A. K. Ganguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21014, "end_char": 21027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor- Genera/, R. B. Datar, A. K. Ganguli, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for RR."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21029, "end_char": 21043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor- Genera/, R. B. Datar, A. K. Ganguli, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for RR."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nSubhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21053, "end_char": 21067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor- Genera/, R. B. Datar, A. K. Ganguli, R. N. Sachthey and Miss A.\n\nSubhashini for RR."}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21086, "end_char": 21099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Anil B. Dawan, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and' R. Karanjwala for RR 18 & 19."}}, {"text": "Anil B. Dawan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21101, "end_char": 21114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Anil B. Dawan, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and' R. Karanjwala for RR 18 & 19."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21116, "end_char": 21128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Anil B. Dawan, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and' R. Karanjwala for RR 18 & 19."}}, {"text": "C. B. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21130, "end_char": 21141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Anil B. Dawan, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and' R. Karanjwala for RR 18 & 19."}}, {"text": "R. Karanjwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21147, "end_char": 21160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Anil B. Dawan, P. H. Parekh, C. B. Singh and' R. Karanjwala for RR 18 & 19."}}, {"text": "S. C. GTJpta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21178, "end_char": 21190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. GTJpta and Ramesh= Chand for RR 14."}}, {"text": "Ramesh= Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21195, "end_char": 21208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. GTJpta and Ramesh= Chand for RR 14."}}, {"text": "Madan Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21221, "end_char": 21233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia and D. Goburdhan for RR 20."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21238, "end_char": 21250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madan Bhatia and D. Goburdhan for RR 20."}}, {"text": "Y.~S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21263, "end_char": 21276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.~S. Chitale,, V. M. Tarkunde, and A. N. Karkhanis for RR 28' and 31."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21279, "end_char": 21293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.~S. Chitale,, V. M. Tarkunde, and A. N. Karkhanis for RR 28' and 31."}}, {"text": "A. N. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21299, "end_char": 21314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.~S. Chitale,, V. M. Tarkunde, and A. N. Karkhanis for RR 28' and 31."}}, {"text": "S. D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21335, "end_char": 21346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D. Gupta in person for impleading RR in WP 147/76."}}, {"text": "Girdharee Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21390, "end_char": 21405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girdharee Singh and S. K. Jain for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21410, "end_char": 21420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Girdharee Singh and S. K. Jain for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21535, "end_char": 21554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KATYAM DAYAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 147\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by, A.\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-Several hundred Railway Engineers who should have been busy elsewhere, building bridges, laying or doubling tracks and so on have found themselves in the corridors of this Court in pursuit of the leaves of career."}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23352, "end_char": 23395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The service with which we are concerned in this Case is the Indian Railway Service of Engineers, Class I. While the petitioners claim that they were appointed to this service after selection by the Union Public Service Commission, the respondents allege that the petitioners were appointed as temporary Engineers only, constituting a special class and service by themselves, and were not appointed to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I at all."}}, {"text": "Civil Engineering Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23630, "end_char": 23658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were taken up by the Civil Engineering Department of the Indian Railways."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23666, "end_char": 23681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were taken up by the Civil Engineering Department of the Indian Railways."}}, {"text": "February 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25718, "end_char": 25735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Proposals on these lines were conveyed by the Railway Board to the Union Public Service Commission on February 21, 1955 with a request to take steps for the early recruitment of temporary Engineers."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Railways", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27888, "end_char": 27908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the requisition by the Railway Board, the Union Public Service Commission issued an advertisement inviting applications .for \"50 posts of Assistant Engineers, Ministry of Railways,\n\nService Class I (Gazetted), posts temporary for two years in the first instance but likely to continue\"."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28804, "end_char": 28820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Railway Board, therefore, addressed a letter dated October 31, 1955 to the Union Public Service Commission pointing out that in their requisition they had indicated \"Gazetted Railway Service\" as the service to which recruitment was to be made and that it was not intended that it should be either Class I or Class II."}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Engineers Cadre", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30537, "end_char": 30578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "expressly oold that the posts to which they were appointed would be neither in CJ:ass I nor in Class II, service though they were eligible, on compleition of three years service, to be considered alongwith other tempo:rary Assistant Engineers for absorption in Class I (Junior Scale) agB, inst vacancies ear-marked from time to time for the absorption of temporary Assistant Lngineers in the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Cadre upto a maximum of six per year."}}, {"text": "Indian Railways'", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31454, "end_char": 31470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreements which the petitioners and others like them were required to execute and which they presumably did execute (were in a standard form known as 'Agreement for Temporary Assistant Officers of the Indian Railways'."}}, {"text": "KATYANI DAYAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32769, "end_char": 32782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KATYANI DAYAL l'.", "canonical_name": "KATYANI DAYAL AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Union PubliC Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33607, "end_char": 33638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between the years 1955 and 1964 as many as 553 temporary Assistant Engineers were appointed after selection by the Union PubliC Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Engi- neers Class I", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33795, "end_char": 33840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though in their orders of appointment as tem- porary Assistant Engineers, the petitioners and others were told that six of them would be absorbed into the Indian Railway Service of Engi- neers Class I every year, the quota was increased to eight per year in 1957 and fifteen per year in 1961."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37251, "end_char": 37269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Railway Establishment Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37347, "end_char": 37373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union Public Sen•ice", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37553, "end_char": 37573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further classification of Assistant Officers into those that were recruited on the basis of a competitive examinatwn andthosefnat were recruited on the recommendation of the Union Public Sen•ice <;:ommission :was a \"micro-classification\" not permissible under the law."}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38823, "end_char": 38840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Katyani Dayal was working as an Assistant Engineer in the service of the Punjab Government from 1952 onwards."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39518, "end_char": 39541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As he was not so promoted and as it was proposed, on the basis of some circulars, to promote permanent Engineers of four years standing, he filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Allahabad claiming that he was entitled to be considered for promotion to officiating post of District Officer."}}, {"text": "August I, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40508, "end_char": 40522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on August I, 1974, the Railway Administration did not implement the judgment but instead on Decem ber 12, 1975 amended rule 102(3), 133(3)(c) and (f) and introduced new rule 102(17) so as to expressly exclude temporary Assistant Officer [newly defined."}}, {"text": "Decem ber 12, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40597, "end_char": 40615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on August I, 1974, the Railway Administration did not implement the judgment but instead on Decem ber 12, 1975 amended rule 102(3), 133(3)(c) and (f) and introduced new rule 102(17) so as to expressly exclude temporary Assistant Officer [newly defined."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41492, "end_char": 41509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an amendment made on December 31, 1975, the expression was redefined and an 'Assistant Officer' now 'means a Gazetted Class I Railway Servant drawing pay in the junior scale."}}, {"text": "Railway Services, Class I.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42520, "end_char": 42546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the purpose of the rules in this Volume the railway services shall be classified as follows :-\n\nGazetted\n\n(1) The Railway Services, Class I.\n\n(2) The Railway Services, Class II.", "canonical_name": "Railway Services, Class III"}}, {"text": "Railway Services, Class II", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42556, "end_char": 42582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the purpose of the rules in this Volume the railway services shall be classified as follows :-\n\nGazetted\n\n(1) The Railway Services, Class I.\n\n(2) The Railway Services, Class II.", "canonical_name": "Railway Services, Class III"}}, {"text": "Railway Services, Class III", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42608, "end_char": 42635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The Railway Services, Class III.", "canonical_name": "Railway Services, Class III"}}, {"text": "Railway Services, Class IV", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42646, "end_char": 42672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) The Railway Services, Class IV.", "canonical_name": "Railway Services, Class III"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Engineers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43160, "end_char": 43195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Indian Railway Service of Engineers; ( 4) Indian Railway Accounts Service;\n\n(5) Indian Railway Traffic Services;\n\n(6) Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers;\n\n(7) Indian Railway Service of Electrical Engineers;\n\n(8) Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers!", "canonical_name": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Traffic Services", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43240, "end_char": 43271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Indian Railway Service of Engineers; ( 4) Indian Railway Accounts Service;\n\n(5) Indian Railway Traffic Services;\n\n(6) Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers;\n\n(7) Indian Railway Service of Electrical Engineers;\n\n(8) Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers!", "canonical_name": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43278, "end_char": 43324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Indian Railway Service of Engineers; ( 4) Indian Railway Accounts Service;\n\n(5) Indian Railway Traffic Services;\n\n(6) Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers;\n\n(7) Indian Railway Service of Electrical Engineers;\n\n(8) Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers!", "canonical_name": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Electrical Engineers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43331, "end_char": 43377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Indian Railway Service of Engineers; ( 4) Indian Railway Accounts Service;\n\n(5) Indian Railway Traffic Services;\n\n(6) Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers;\n\n(7) Indian Railway Service of Electrical Engineers;\n\n(8) Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers!", "canonical_name": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43384, "end_char": 43426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Indian Railway Service of Engineers; ( 4) Indian Railway Accounts Service;\n\n(5) Indian Railway Traffic Services;\n\n(6) Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers;\n\n(7) Indian Railway Service of Electrical Engineers;\n\n(8) Indian Railway Service of Signal Engineers!", "canonical_name": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Medical Service", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43433, "end_char": 43463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(9) Indian Railway Medical Service;\n\n(10) Indian Railway Stores Service; (II) Senior Revenue Establishment, Indian Railways, comprising such specialist and Miscellaneous posts as have been included in Class I e.g., Chemist and Metallurgists (Senior Scale) and Chief Cashiers (Senior Scale).", "canonical_name": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers"}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Stores Service", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43471, "end_char": 43500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(9) Indian Railway Medical Service;\n\n(10) Indian Railway Stores Service; (II) Senior Revenue Establishment, Indian Railways, comprising such specialist and Miscellaneous posts as have been included in Class I e.g., Chemist and Metallurgists (Senior Scale) and Chief Cashiers (Senior Scale).", "canonical_name": "Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers"}}, {"text": "Senior Revenue Establishment, Indian Railways", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43507, "end_char": 43552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(9) Indian Railway Medical Service;\n\n(10) Indian Railway Stores Service; (II) Senior Revenue Establishment, Indian Railways, comprising such specialist and Miscellaneous posts as have been included in Class I e.g., Chemist and Metallurgists (Senior Scale) and Chief Cashiers (Senior Scale)."}}, {"text": "H Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47463, "end_char": 47496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 125 prescribes that all appointments to a Railway Service Class II shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the H Union Public Service Commission from time to time in accordance with the rules framed by them."}}, {"text": "General Manager", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49143, "end_char": 49158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "159\n\n(3) The General Manager may appoint-\n\n(a) •\n\n(b) •\n\n• • • • • •\n\n(c) An Assistant Officer to officiate as District Officer, provided that such a gazetted railway servant who B has not passed the efficiency bar may be so appointed only, if-\n\n(i) a gazetted railway servant who has passed the efficiency bar is not available; or\n\n(ii) the vacancy is not expected to exceed three months;\n\n(d) (e) • • •\n\n(f) substantively, an Assistant Officer to the District grade provided such promotions are made in strict order of seniority subject further to the condition that no officer shall be so promoted unless he has rendered not less than ten years of total service and has been declared fit to cross the eflieiency bar in the junior scale."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51382, "end_char": 51387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 139 makes provision for the making of recruitment rules and the note to rule 139 provides that in the case of recruitment to gazetted posts, the rules should be published in the Gazette of India in the section allotted to Statutory Rules and Orders."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52692, "end_char": 52707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)."}}, {"text": "Art. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55333, "end_char": 55340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 73(t)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55536, "end_char": 55549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union Public Service", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55687, "end_char": 55707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union Public Service and all-India Services\" are included in item 70 of the Union List (List I of the Seventh Schedule) enumerating the matters with respect to which Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55789, "end_char": 55805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55917, "end_char": 55925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57244, "end_char": 57252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 53 and 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57297, "end_char": 57315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1966) 3 S.C.R. 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 58001, "end_char": 58020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1978) 2 S.C.R. 864", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 58032, "end_char": 58051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union Public Service commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58929, "end_char": 58960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the posts were not to be treated as in Class I or in Class II of the Indian Railway Ser\n\nvice of Engineers was expressly mentioned and clarified in the requisitions made by the Railway Board to the Union Public Service Commission and the correspondence which ensued between the Railway Board and the Union Public Service commission."}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60202, "end_char": 60246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letters of \"indent\", the advertisements, the letters of appointment and the agreements show that the temporary Assistant Officers appointed in this fashion after selection by the Union Public Service Commission were to be a source of recruitment to the Indian Railway Service of Engineers Class I. It was so understood from the inception by the persons appointed as well as the Railway Administration."}}, {"text": "Administrative Reforms Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65436, "end_char": 65469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We were also referred to the reports of the Administrative Reforms Commission where it is said \"In the Railways there , is a sizeable number of unclassified posts equivalent to Junior Class,!"}}, {"text": "Central Pay Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65865, "end_char": 65887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Passages from the reports of the Central Pay Commission were also read out to us to emphasize that the posts have continued over the years indefinitely."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66480, "end_char": 66491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67718, "end_char": 67727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68133, "end_char": 68148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72251, "end_char": 72269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78828, "end_char": 78846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kishori Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79040, "end_char": 79053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , argument\n\nbasedon the postulate that equal work must receive equal pay was repelled, by quoting the following observations fr.om an earlier decision\n\nof the Court in Kishori Mohan/a/ v. Union of India.(2) :\n\n\"The only other contention raised in that there is discri- ."}}, {"text": "Union of India.(2) :", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79060, "end_char": 79080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , argument\n\nbasedon the postulate that equal work must receive equal pay was repelled, by quoting the following observations fr.om an earlier decision\n\nof the Court in Kishori Mohan/a/ v. Union of India.(2) :\n\n\"The only other contention raised in that there is discri- ."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79299, "end_char": 79306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79539, "end_char": 79546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82030, "end_char": 82037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82041, "end_char": 82051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82699, "end_char": 82717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1974] 1 S.C.R. 771", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 83326, "end_char": 83345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84561, "end_char": 84572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, while uphol<ling the validity of the rule Chandrachud, J., and Krishna Iyer, J., uttered words of caution and it is upon these words of caution that the petitioners rely.", "canonical_name": "B Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84582, "end_char": 84594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, while uphol<ling the validity of the rule Chandrachud, J., and Krishna Iyer, J., uttered words of caution and it is upon these words of caution that the petitioners rely."}}, {"text": "(1966] 3 S.C.R. 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 85777, "end_char": 85796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86329, "end_char": 86342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After quoting with approval the observations of B Chandrachud, J., and Krishna Iyer, J., in State of J. & K. v. Trilokinath Khosa (supra).", "canonical_name": "B Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86420, "end_char": 86428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati J., observed (at p. 481) :\n\n\"To permit discrimination based on educational attainments not obliged by the nature of the duties of the higher post is to stifle the social thrust of the equality clause."}}, {"text": "[1977) 3 S.C.R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 88433, "end_char": 88452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ministry of Shipping and Transport (Roads Wing)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 89689, "end_char": 89736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain persons were directly recruited to the Engineering Service of the Ministry of Shipping and Transport (Roads Wing) as a result of a written competitive examination."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 90162, "end_char": 90178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1966 rule was held not to be retrospective in some Writ Petitions filed in the Delhi High Court by the persons who had been recruited as a result of written competitive examination."}}, {"text": "Central Engineering Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94640, "end_char": 94667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their precarious tenure was continued from time to time but that will not furnish justification for treating them on the same footing as others whose appointments were made strictly in accordance with the rules and who were appointed to posts borne on the cadre of the Central Engineering Service."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95561, "end_char": 95579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_15_21_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "NIRANJAN SINGH & ANR.\n\nPRABHAKAR RAJARAM KHAROTE.& ORS.\n\nMqrch 10, 1980\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A.P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nCriminal Procedure Code 1973, Section 439(1) (ai)-Enlargement on bail- PerSOff to be accused of an offence and in custody-Wiren is a person in custndy.\n\nBait.--Orders on bail application-Detailed examination of evidence, elaborate documentation to be avoided.\n\nSuspension-Police Officers-Serious charges framed by a criminal court- Placing such officers under suspension-Necessity of.\n\nThe petitioner was the complainant in a criminal case where the accused were two sub-inspeetorn and eight police constables (respondents l to 10). The case of the complainant was that in pursuance to a conspiracy his brother was way laid by a police party consisting of these respondent•. It was alleged that he was caught and removed from the truck in which he was travelling, tied with a rope to a tree and one of the sub-inspectors fired two shots from his revolver on the chest of the deceased at close range which killed him instantaneously.\n\nHaving perpetrated this villainy the policemen vanished from the scene. The respondents' version was that the victim was himself a criminal and was sought to be arrested.\n\nAn encounter ensued, both sides sustained injuries and the deceased succumbed to a firearm shot.\n\nThe State not having taken any action, the petitioner was constrained to file the private complaint.. The Magistrate who ordered an inquiry under section 202 Cr.P.C. took oral evidence of the witnesses and found that there was sufficient ground to proceed against all the respondents under sections\n\n382, 341, 395 and 404 read with section 34 IPC.\n\nNon-bailable warrants were issued for production of the accused and the Magistr:ite who refused the bail I' litayed the issuance of the warrants.\n\nThe respondents moved the Sessions Court for bail which granted bail subject to certain directions and conditions.\n\nFeeling aggrieved, the petitioner moved the High Court but it declined to interfere in revision but imposed additional conditions to ensure that the bail was not abused and the course of justice was not thwarted.\n\nIn the special leave petition, the petitioner contended that the respondents G could not be released on bail asi they were not in custody and being on bail they were abusing their freedom by threatening the petitioner.\n\nlia.D : I. Cutody, in the context of section 439 Cr.P.C. is physical control or at least physical presence of the accnsed in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the court. He can be in cust<X1y not merely when the police arrests him., produces hin1 before a Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in juidic; ial\n\ncns.tody when he surrenders before the court and submits to its directions.\n\nHY F-GJ\n\n2. A responsible Government, responsive to appearances of justice, would have placed police officers against whom serious charges had betn framed by a criminal c0urt, under suspension unless exceptional circumstances suggesting a conaary course exist A gesIDre of justice to courts of jU.sticc is the least that\n\na government owes to the governed. [20 H-21 A]\n\n3. Detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the B merits should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications.\n\nNo party should have the impression that his case has been prejudiced.\n\nTo be satisfied about a prin1a facie case is needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of the merits in the order itself. [18 CJ\n\n4. Grant of bail is within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge but the court must not, in grave cases, gullibly dismiss the possibility of police-accused\n\n.t C intimidating the witnesses with cavalier ease.\n\nIntimidation by polictmen, when they are themselves accused of offences, is not an unknown phenomenon. [18 D-El\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION (Criminal) No. 393 of 1980.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25-9-1979 of the Bombay High Court in Cr!. Appln. No. 607 of 1979.\n\nPetitioner No. 1 in person.\n\nP. R. Mridul, S. V. Deshpande and N. M. Ghatate for Respondents l to 11.\n\n0. P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 13.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. ''No one shall be subjected to torture or to ' cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment\" is a part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The content of Art. 21 of our Constitution, read in the light of Art. 19, is similarly elevating.\n\nBut romance about human rights and rhetoric about constitutional mandates lose credibility if, in practice, the protectors of law and minions of the State become engines of terror and panic people into fear. We are constrained to make these observations as our conscience is in consternation when we read the facts of the case which have given rise to the order challenged before us in this petition for special leave.\n\nThe petitioner, who has appeared in person is the complainant-in a criminal case where the accused are 2 Sub-Inspectors and 8 Constables attached to the City Police Station, Ahmeanagar. The charges against them, as di, dosed in the private complaint, are of murder and allied offences under ss. 302, 341, 395, 404 read with ss. 34 and !20B of the Penal Code. The blood-curdling plot disclosed in the complaint is\n\nNIRAN.JAN SINGH v. P. R. KHAROTE (Krishr; a Iyer, J.) 17\n\nthat pursuant to a conspiracy the brother of the complainant was waylaid by the police party on August 27, 1978 as he was proceeding to Shirdi. He had with him some gold ornaments and cash. He was ca'ught and removed from the truck in which he was travelling, tied with a rope to a neem tree nearby, thus rendering him a motionless target to a macabre shooting. One of the Sub-lnspectors fired two shots from bis revolver on the chest of the deceased at close range and killed him instantaneously. The policemen, having perpetrated this villainy, vanished from the scene. No action was taken by the State\n\nagainst the criminals. How could they, when the preservers of the peace and investigators of crime themselves become planned'executors Of murders? The victim's brother was an advocate and he filed a private complaint. The learned m,; gistrate ordered an inquiry under s. 202 Cr. P.C., took oral evidence of witnesses \"t scme length and held: \"Thus taking au overall survey of evidence produced before me, I am .of the opinion that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against all the accused for the offences undet es. 302, 323, 342; read with s. 34 I.P.C.\" Non-bailable warrants were issued for production of the accused and the magistrate who refused bail, stayed the issuance of the warrants although we are unable to find any provision to enable him to do so. The police-accused moved the sessions (conrt for bail and, in an elaborate order the sessions court granted bail subject to certain directions and conditions. The High Court, which was moved by the complainant for reversal of the~ order enlarging, the accused on bail, declined to interfere in revision but added additional conditions to ensure that the bail was not abused and the course of justice was not thwarted.\n\nIt is fair to state that the case in the complaint, verified under s. 202 Cr. P.C. to have some veracity, does not make us leap to a conclusion of guilt or refusal of bail. On the contrary, the accused policemen have a version that the victim was himself a criminal and was sought to be arrested. An encounter ensued, both sides sustained injuries and , the deceased succumbed to a firearm shot; even as some of the police party sustained revolver wounds but survived.\n\n1 Maybe, the defence case, if reasonably true, may absolve them of the crime, although the story of encounters during arrest and unwitting injuries resulting in 'casualties, sometimes become a mask to hide easy liquidation of human life by heartless policemen when[some one allergic to Authority resists their vices. The police have the advantage that they prepared the preliminary record which may 'kill' the case against them. This dis- . . . ·(]meting syndrome of policemen committing crimes of killing and , m 1 king up perfect paperwork cases of innocent discharge of duty\n\nshould not be ruled out when courts examine rival versions. Indeed, we must emphasise that the trial judge shall not be influenced by what we have said and shall confine himself to the evidence in the case when adjudging the guilt of the accused. We were constrained to make the observations above because the Sessions !Judge, quite un warrantedly, discussed at prolix length the probabilities of police party's exculpatory case and held :\n\n\"So it is reasonable to hold that there was a scuflle and resistance offered by the victim AmarjeefSingh before shots were fired at his person by the accused No. !.\"\n\nDetailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documenta- + tion of the merits should be avoided while passing orders on bail applications. No party should have the impression that his case has. been prejudiced. To be satisfied about a prima facie case is needed but it is not the same as an exhaustive exploration of the merits in, the order itself.\n\nGrant of bail is within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge but the court must not, in grave cases, gullibly dismiss the possibility of police-accused intimidating the witnesses with cavalier ease. In our country, intimidation by policemen, when they are themselves accused . of offences, is not an unknown phenomenon and the judicial process .,_. will carry credibility with the community only if it views impartially and with commonsense the pros and cons, undeterred by the psychic 'pressure of police presnce as indictees.\n\nLet us now get to grips with the two legal submissions made by the petitioner. The first jurisdictional hurdle in the grant of bail,.\n\nargues the petitioner, is that the accused must fulfil the two conditions specified in s. 439 Cr. P.C. before they can seek bail justice. That: provision reads : ~\n\n439. (l) A High Court or Court of Session may direct-\n\n( a) that any person accu>ed of an offence, and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in rnb-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section:\n\n(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified.\n\nHere the respondents were accused of offences but were not in> custody, argues the petitioner. So no bail, since this basic condition.\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH v. P. R. KHAROTE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 19\n\nof being in jail is not fulfilled. This submission has been rightly rejected by the courts below. We agree that, in our view, an outlaw cannot ask for the benefit of law and he who flees justice cannot claim justice. But here the position is different. The accused were not absconding but had appeared and surrendered before the Session~ Judge. Judicial jurisdiction arises only when persons are already in custody and seek the precess of the court to be enlarged. We agree that no person accused of an offence can move the court for bail under s. 439 Cr. P.C. unless he is in custody.\n\nWhen is a person in custody, within the meaning of s. 439 Cr. P.C. ?\n\nWhen he is in duress either because he is held by the investigating agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control of the court having been nmanded by judicial order, or having offered himself to the court's jutisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical presence.\n\nNo lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the purpose of s. 439. This word is of elastic semantics but its core meaning is that the law has taken control of the person. The equivocatory quibblings and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in court that the police have taken a man into informal custody but not arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but not taken him into foqnal custody and other like terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of the straightforwardness of the law. We need not dilate on this shady facet here because we are satisfied that the accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose.\n\nCustody, in the context of s. 439, (we are not, be it noted, dealing with anticipatory bail under s. 438) is physical control or a1 least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the court.\n\nHe can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when he\n\nsurrrndus before the ccmt and submits to its directions. In, the present case, the police offic¢rs applied for bail before a Magistrate who refused bail and still the accused, without surrendering before the Magistrate, obtained an order for stay to move the Sessions Court.\n\nThis direction of the Magistrate was wholly irregular and maybe, l'nabled the accused persons lo circumvent the principle of s. 439 Cr.P.C.\n\nWe might have taken a serious view cf such a course, indifferent to\n\nmandatory provisions by the subordinate magistracy but for the fact that in the present case the accused made up for it by surrender before the Sessions Court. Thus, the Sessions Court acquired jurisdiction to consider the bail application. It could have refused bail and remanded the accused to custody, but, in the circumstances and for the reasons mentioned by it, exercised its jurisdiction in favour of grant of bail.\n\nThe High Court added to the conditions subject to which bail was to be granted and mentioned that the accused bad submitted to the custody of the court. We therefore, do not proceed to upset the order on this ground. Had the circumstances been different we would have demolished the order for bail. We may frankly state that had we been left to ourselves we might not have granted bail but sitting under Art. 136do not feel that we should interfere with a discretion exercised by the two courts below.\n\nWe are apprehensive that the accused being police officers should not abuse their freedom and emphasise that the Inspector General of Police of the State of Maharashtra will take particular care to take two steps. He should have a close watch on the functioning of the concerned police officers lest the rule of law be brought into discredit by officers of the law being allowed a larger liberty than other people especially because the allegations in the present case are grave and even if a fragment of it be true, does little credit to the police force.\n\nIt must be remembered that the allegations are that the deceased was dragged out of a truck to a secluded place later tied to a tree and shot and killed by the police officers concerned.\n\nWe hasten to make it clear that these are one-sided allegations and the accused have a counter-version of their own and we do not wish to make any implications for or against either version. The accused policemen are entitled to an unprejudiced trial without any bias against the 'uniformed' force which has difficult tasks to perform.\n\nWe conclude this order on a note of anguish. The complainant has been protesting against the State's bias and police threats. We must remember that a democratic state is the custodian of people's interests and not only police interests. Then how come this that the team of ten policemen against whom a magistrate after due enquiry found a case to be proceeded with and grave charges including for murder were framed continue on duty without so much as being suspended from service until disposal of the pending sessions trial? On\n\nwhose side is the State? The rule of law is not a one-way traffic and the authority of the State is not for the police and against the people.\n\nA responsible Government responsive to appearances of justice, would\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH v. P. R. ICHAROTE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 21\n\nhave placed police officers against whom serious charges had been A. framed by a criminal court under suspension unless exceptional circumstances suggesting a contrary course exist. After alla gesture of justice to courts of justice is the least that a government owes to the governed. We are confident that this. inadvertance will be made good and the State of Maharashtra will disprove by deed( Henry Clay's famous censure : Bo\n\n\"The arts of power and its minions are the same in all countries and in all ages. It marks its victim denounces it; and excites the public odium and the public [hatred to conceal its own abuses and encroachments.\"\n\nThe observations that we have made in the concluding portion of the order are of such moment, not merely to the State of Maharashtra but also to the other States in the country and to the Union of India, that we deem it necessary to direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Home Ministry in the Government of India for suitable sensitized measures to pre-empt recurrence of the error we have highlighted.\n\nN.V.K.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "NIRANJAN SINGH & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIRANJAN SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRABHAKAR RAJARAM KHAROTE.& ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRABHAKAR RAJARAM KHAROTE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 439(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1973", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code 1973"}}, {"text": "section 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1475, "end_char": 1481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections\n\n382, 341, 395 and 404", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1649, "end_char": 1659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1660, "end_char": 1663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2400, "end_char": 2411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2412, "end_char": 2418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4099, "end_char": 4111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, S. V. Deshpande and N. M. Ghatate for Respondents l to 11."}}, {"text": "S. V. Deshpande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, S. V. Deshpande and N. M. Ghatate for Respondents l to 11."}}, {"text": "N. M. Ghatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4133, "end_char": 4146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, S. V. Deshpande and N. M. Ghatate for Respondents l to 11."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4176, "end_char": 4183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. ''No one shall be subjected to torture or to ' cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment\" is a part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4454, "end_char": 4461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "City Police Station, Ahmeanagar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5111, "end_char": 5142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, who has appeared in person is the complainant-in a criminal case where the accused are 2 Sub-Inspectors and 8 Constables attached to the City Police Station, Ahmeanagar."}}, {"text": "ss. 302, 341, 395, 404", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5249, "end_char": 5271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5282, "end_char": 5288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5305, "end_char": 5315, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 27, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5526, "end_char": 5541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The blood-curdling plot disclosed in the complaint is\n\nNIRAN.JAN SINGH v. P. R. KHAROTE (Krishr; a Iyer, J.) 17\n\nthat pursuant to a conspiracy the brother of the complainant was waylaid by the police party on August 27, 1978 as he was proceeding to Shirdi."}}, {"text": "Shirdi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The blood-curdling plot disclosed in the complaint is\n\nNIRAN.JAN SINGH v. P. R. KHAROTE (Krishr; a Iyer, J.) 17\n\nthat pursuant to a conspiracy the brother of the complainant was waylaid by the police party on August 27, 1978 as he was proceeding to Shirdi."}}, {"text": "s. 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6304, "end_char": 6310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6583, "end_char": 6588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7289, "end_char": 7295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "AmarjeefSingh before", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8803, "end_char": 8823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judge, quite un warrantedly, discussed at prolix length the probabilities of police party's exculpatory case and held :\n\n\"So it is reasonable to hold that there was a scuflle and resistance offered by the victim AmarjeefSingh before shots were fired at his person by the accused No. !.\""}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9988, "end_char": 9994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10269, "end_char": 10280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10662, "end_char": 10674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NIRANJAN SINGH v. P. R. KHAROTE (Krishna Iyer, !.)", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11229, "end_char": 11235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11322, "end_char": 11328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11867, "end_char": 11873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12518, "end_char": 12524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12589, "end_char": 12595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13336, "end_char": 13342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13343, "end_char": 13349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14249, "end_char": 14257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cr.P.C", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure"}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14496, "end_char": 14516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are apprehensive that the accused being police officers should not abuse their freedom and emphasise that the Inspector General of Police of the State of Maharashtra will take particular care to take two steps."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16210, "end_char": 16222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A responsible Government responsive to appearances of justice, would\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH v. P. R. ICHAROTE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 21\n\nhave placed police officers against whom serious charges had been A. framed by a criminal court under suspension unless exceptional circumstances suggesting a contrary course exist.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16585, "end_char": 16605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "inadvertance will be made good and the State of Maharashtra will disprove by deed( Henry Clay's famous censure : Bo\n\n\"The arts of power and its minions are the same in all countries and in all ages."}}, {"text": "Henry Clay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16629, "end_char": 16639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "inadvertance will be made good and the State of Maharashtra will disprove by deed( Henry Clay's famous censure : Bo\n\n\"The arts of power and its minions are the same in all countries and in all ages."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17066, "end_char": 17080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations that we have made in the concluding portion of the order are of such moment, not merely to the State of Maharashtra but also to the other States in the country and to the Union of India, that we deem it necessary to direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Home Ministry in the Government of India for suitable sensitized measures to pre-empt recurrence of the error we have highlighted."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17183, "end_char": 17202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations that we have made in the concluding portion of the order are of such moment, not merely to the State of Maharashtra but also to the other States in the country and to the Union of India, that we deem it necessary to direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Home Ministry in the Government of India for suitable sensitized measures to pre-empt recurrence of the error we have highlighted."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17294, "end_char": 17300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_179_186_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SUNIL KUMAR BANERJEE A v.\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.\n\nMarch 26, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISllNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND 0. CmNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J B\n\nService matter-All India Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1969- Consultation with Vigilance Commissioner, if vitiates the order-Enquiry Offi cer if combined the roles of prosecutor and judge-Reasonable opportunity, if )'- - denfrd.\n\nThe appellant \\\\'as a n1en1ber of the Indian Administrative Service. In an C enquiry under rulC 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 against him the Commissioner for Departmental Enquiries, Vigilance Com. mission, West Bengal was appointed as the Enquiry Officer.\n\nHe held that certain charges framed against the appellant were proved, certain others were partly proved and one was considered to be a technical omission mther than a serious lar-; e.\n\nThe State Vigilance Commission expressed its view on the Enquiry Officer's Report. Thereafter, after consulting the Union Public Ser :0. vice Comn1ission, the State Government, which was the Disciplinary Authority, imposed on the appellant the punishment of reduction in rank from the stage of Rs. 2,750 p.m. to the stage of Rs. 2,500 p.m. with certain other consequences.\n\nThe appellant's writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court and his appeal to the Division Bench was also dismissed.\n\n-In appeal to this Court it was contended by the appellant that instead cf holding the enquiry under the All India Services Disciplinary Rules, 1969 it was held under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 which were repealed and that this caused prejudice to him; as required by rule 8 .(19) of the 1969 rules he v,.as not questioned with reference to the circumstances appearing against him which denied him that opportunity of explaining the circumstances which \"eighed in the mind of the Enquiry Officer; the Govrnment should not have consulted the Vigilance Commis4 sioner \\Vho had no statutory st..1.tus; though the ultimate finding was based on the report of the Vigilance Commission his report was not supplied to him; the Enquiry Officer combined in hin1self the role of prosecutor and judge and he \\Vas denied a reasonable opportunity Of defending himself as important \\vitness..::s were not called to enable hini to cross-examine them.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1. There is no substance in the contention that the 1955 ru!es and not 1969 rules were followed.\n\nThe charges framed against the _appellant as well as in the first show-cause notice, the reference was clearly tO the 1969 rules.\n\nThe appellant himself mentioned in one of his letters that the charges had been framed under 1969 rules. The enquiry report mentioned that the Enquiry Officer was appointed under the 1969 rules. [183 B-C].\n\n2. The appellant was' not questioned by the Enquiry Officer under rule $(19) of the 1969 rules. The failure tO comply with this requirement did\n\nA not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer was able to establish pre judice. [183 C-DJ\n\nIn the instant case the single judge as well as the Division Bench found that the appellant was in no way prejudiced by the failure to observe the requirement of rule 8(19). [183 G]\n\n3. The provision incorporated in rule 8(19) is akin to section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1974.\n\nIt is now well-established that mere non 8 examination or defective examination under section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for inter ference unl.ess prejudice is established. [183 E-Fl ·\n\nK. C. Mathew v. The State of Travancore-Cochin, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1057; Bibhutl Bhusan Das Gupta and Anr. v. State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 104; referred to.\n\n4. The appellant was not in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in accordance with rule 8(19). He crossexamined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself at all stri.ges.\n\nThe appellant was fully alive to the allegations against him ond dealt Vvith all aspects of the allegations in his written defence.\n\n[183 G-H, 184 A]\n\n5. If the disciplinary authority arrived at its own conclusion on the material available to it, its findings and decision cannot be said to be tainted with any illegality merely because the disciplinary authority consulted the Vigilance Commission and obtained its views on the very same material. [184 D-E]\n\n6. The findings which were cornn1unicated to the appellant were those of the disciplinary authority and it was \\I/holly unnecessary for the disciplinary\n\nuthority to furnish the appellant the copy of the report of the Vigilance Commissioner when the findings con1muniooted to the appellant were those of the disciplinary authority and not of the vigilance commission. [184 F-G]\n\n7. From the circumstances that the Enquiry Officer considered the report of investigation with a view to find out if there was material for framing charges and prepared draft charges, it cannot possibly be said that when he was later appointed he constituted himself both as prosecutor and judge. There is nothing strange in the same Magistrate who finds prinia-facie case at an earlier stage trying the case, after framing charges. There is therefore ncy basis for the contention that the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced against the appellant and combiiled in himself the role of the prosecutor and judge. [185 A.\n\nC-EJ\n\n8. The appellant cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and also examine ed defence \\Vitnesses.\n\nTherafter when the matter v.\"1s posted for argument and was adjourned at least once at the instance of the appellant, the appele lant came forward with an application seeking permission to engage a lawyer.\n\nThe Enquiry Officer rejected the application noticing that it was made at a very late stage. The rules give a discretion to the Enquiry Officer to permit or not to permit n delinquent officer to be represented by a lawyer.\n\nNo prejudice has resulted by the denial of a lawyer. [185 E-Gl\n\n9. A11 the necessary documents were called and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the appellant wanted any particular witness to be called and the request was turned down. The grievance of the appe11ant that if the\n\n' ·~\n\n) ~\n\nofficers who made the notings on the file in connection with some of the A. charges had been called, he would have been in a position to crossxamine them and elicit statements to substantiate his defence, has neither reasonabl\"' basis nor force.\n\n[186 B-0]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1277/1975.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8 19-9-1975 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 299/73.\n\nS. N. Chaudhary for the Appellant.\n\nGobinda Mukhoty and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nCmNNAPPA REDDY, J.-The appellant, a member of the Indian Administrative Service, while working as Divisional Commissioner, Nprth Bengal, was served on May 2, 1970, with a memorandum of charges and was informed by another memorandum to which a list of documents and witnesses was attached, that it was proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, and that, if he so desired, the appellant could inspect the documents mentioned in the enclosed list. He was further informed that he should submit a written statement of defence within fourteen days from the date of completion of inspection. The appellant submitted his written statement of defence on June 9, 1970. On August 12, 1970 Shri\n\nA. N. Mukherjee, Commissioner for Department Enquiries, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal, was appointed as Enql)iry Officer to enquire into the charges against the appellant. After completing the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted a report giving his findings on the various charges. Charge Nos. 2 and 5 were held to be proved, charge Nos. 3 and 4 partly proved and charge No. 1 also proved but considered to be a technical omission rather than serious lapse. The Vigilance Commission which considered the Enquiry Officer's report, found that charge Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 were fully proved and charge No. 4 partly proved. On April 6, 1971, the disciplinary authority namely the Government of West Bengal issued a notice to the appellant informing him that, on a consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer they had come to the conclusion tllat charges Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 were fully proved and that charge No. 4 was partly proved and calling upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be reduced in rank. The Union Public\n\nService Commission was then consulted and their advice obtained.\n\nAccording to the Union Public Service Commission charg~ No. 3 bad not been proved while charge No. I was proved but was conc\n\n'• E\n\nSUPREMJJ COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 SC.R,\n\nsidered to be a technical irregularity and charge Nos. 2, 4 and 5 were partly proved.\n\nThereafter the Government of West Bengal came to the final conclusion that charge No. 3 had not been proved, charge No. 1 had been proved but was only a technical irregularity and charge Nos. 2, 4 and 5 were partly proved. On those findings the punishment which was imposed on the appellant was reduction 'from the stage of Rs. 2750/- per month to the stage of Rs. 2500/- per month in the scale of Rs. 2500/· 125/- 2750/- with effect from the date of issue of the order'. This was, however, not to be a bar to his earning increments from the stage of Rs. 2500/- from the date of reduction to the lower stage. Aggrieved by the order of the Government the appellan, t filed a Writ Petition iu the High Court of Calcutta. A learned Single Judge of the High Court went into the matter in great detail, almost as if he was hearing a regular . appeal, perhaps because one of the arguments urged before him was that there was no evidence to sustain any of the charges. The learned Single Judge found that charge Nos. 2, 3 and 5 were not provec\\, charge No. 4 was partly proved, charge No. 1 was proved but was only a technical irregularity. He was, however, of the view that the punishment which was actually imposed on the appellant could be imposed in respect of charge No. 4 to the extent to which it was proved. He, therefore, dismissed the Writ Petition. On appeal under the Letters Patent a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court came to the conclusion that charge No. 5 was proved, charge No. I was proved but was a technical irregularity and charge No. 2 was partly proved. There was a difference of opinion on ' the question whether charge No. 4 was proved. Both the learned Judges agreed in dismissing the appeal.\n\nThe appellant who argued the appeal in person raised several contentions. He contended that though the enquiry was to have been held under All India Services Disciplinary Rules 1969, it was i-n fact held under the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955, which had been repealed. He was thereby prejudiced and in particular he pointed out that he was not questioned with reference to the circumstances appearing against him as provided by sub rule 19 of rule 8 of the 1969 rules. He was thus denied an opportunity of explaining the circumstances which weighed in the mind of the Enquiry Officer. The appellant also contended that the Vigilance Commissioner had no statutory status and he should not have been consulted by the Government. He made a grievance of the circums tance that th~ report of the Vigilance Commissioner was not furnished to him though the ultimate findings of the Government were based on the report of the Vigilance Commissioner. He further\n\nsubmitted that the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced against him and A that he combined in himself the role of both prosecutor and judge. ' + He further submitted that he was denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself as important witnesses were not called so as to enable him to cross examine them though the notings made by them in the files were relied upon against him. Some of the additional documents sought by him were not also made available.\n\nB He was also not permitted to engage a lawyer.\n\nThere is no substance in the contention of the appellant that the 1955 rules and not the 1969 rules were followed. As pointed out by the High Court, in the charges framed against the appellant and in the first show cause notice the reference was clearly to the C 1969 rules. I The appellant himself mentioned in one of his letters that the charges have been framed under the 1969 rules.\n\nThe enquiry report mentions that Shri Mukherji was appointed as an Enquiry Officer under the 1969 rules. It is, however, true that the appellant was not questioned by the Enquiry Officer under rule 8 (!'9) which provided as follows: D\n\n\"The enquirying authority may, after the member of the services closes his case and shall if the member of the service has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence\" for the purpose of enabling the member of E the service to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him\".\n\nIt may be noticed straightaway that this provision is akin to sectlon 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1974. It is now well established that mere non examination or defective examination under section 342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established, vide, K.\n\nC. Mathew\n\nv. State of Travancore-Cochin (1), Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta & Anr. v.\n\nState of West Bengal (2). We are similarly of the view that failure to coinply with the requirements of rule 8 (19) of the 1969 rules does not vitiate the enquiry unless the delinquent officer is able to establish prejudice. In this case the learned single Judge of the High Court as well as the learned Judges \" of the Division Bench found that the appellant was in the way prejudiced by the failure to observe the requirement of rule 8 (19).\n\nThe appellant crossexamined the witnesses himself, submitted his defence in writing\n\n\n(2) (1969] 2 S.C.R. 104\n\nin great detail and argued the case himself at all stages. The appellant was fully alive to the allegations against him and dealt with all aspects of the allegation in his written.defence. We do not think that he was in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry Officer to question him in accordance with rule 8 (19).\n\nWe do not also think that the disciplinary authority committed any serious or material irregularity in consulting the Vigilance Commissioner, even assuming that it was so done. The conclusion of the disciplinary authority was not based on the advice tendered by the Vigilance Commissioner but was arrived at indepen• dently, on the basis of the charges, the relevant material placed before the Enquiry Officer in support of the charges, and the de fence of the delinquent officer. In fact the final conclusion of the disciplinary authority on the several charges are so mnch at variance with the opinion of the Vigilance Commissioner tbat it is impossible to say that the disciplinary authority's mind was in any manner influenced by the advice tendered by the Vigilance Commissioner. We think that if the disciplinary authority arrived at its own conclusion on tbe material available to it, its findings and decision cannot be said to be tainted with any illegality merely because the disciplinary authority consulted the Vigilance Commissioner and obtained his views on the vary same material. . One of the submissions of the appellant was that a copy of the report of the Vigilance Commissioner should have been made available to him when he was called upon to show cause why the punishment of reduction in.rank should not be imposed upon him. We do not see any justification for the insistant request made by the appellant to the disciplinary authority that the report of the Vigilance Commissioner should be made available to him. In the preliminary findings of the disciplinary authority which were CO!D municated to the appellant there was no reference to the views of the Vigilance Commissioner. The findings which were communkated to the appellant were those of the disciplinary authority and it was wholly unnecessary for the disciplinary authority to furnish the appellant with a copy of the report of the Vigilance Commissioner when the findings communicated to the appellant were those of the disciplinary authority and not of the Vigilance Commission. That the preliminary findings of the disciplinary authority happened to coincide with the viel'(s of the Vigilance Commission is neither here nor there.\n\nWe find no basis for the contention of the appellant that there was a reasonable apprehension in his mind that the Enquiry Olllcer\n\n• .,. •\n\nwas prejudiced against him. Nor do we agree with the statement that e Enquiry Officer combined in himself the role of the pro~\n\nsecutor and the judge. It appears that when the preliminary report of investigation was considered by the Vigilance Commissioner with a view to recommend to the disciplinary authority whether a disciplinary proceeding should be instituted or not, the report of investigation wa£ referred by the Vigilance Commissioner to Shri A.N. Mukherji for his views and for the preparation of draft charges if institution of disciplinary proceedings was to be recommended.\n\nShri Mukherji expressed his opinion that there was material for framing five charges and he also prepared five draft charges and forwarded them to the. Vigilance Commissioner. The Vigilance Commissioner in turn forwarded the papers to the Government who finally decided to institute a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant. Thereafter Shri A. N.\n\nMukherji was appointed as Enquiry Officer. From the circumstance that Shri Mukherji considered the report of investigation with a view to find out if there was material for framing charges and prepared draft charges, it cannot possibly be said that Shri A. N. Mukherji, when he was later appointed as Enquiry Officer constituted himself both as prosecutor and judge. Anybody who is familiar with the working of criminal courts will atonce realise that there is nothing strange in the same Magistrate who finds a prima facie case and frames the charges, trying the case also. It cannot for a moment be argued that the Magistrate having found a prima facie case at an earlier stage and framed charges is incompetent to try the case, after framing charges.\n\nThis was one. of the circumstances on which the appellant relied to substantiate his allegation of apprehension of bias.\n\nThe other circumstances were that he did not permit the appellant to engage a lawyer and that he allowed the Presenting Officer to introduce extraneous matters. The rules give a discretion to the Enquiry Officer to permit or not to permit a delinquent Officer to be represented by a lawyer. In the present case the appellant cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and also examined defence witnesses.\n\nThereafter when the matter was posted for arguments and was adjourned atleast once at the instance of the appellant, the appellant came forward with an application seeking permission to engage a lawyer. The Enquiry Officer rejected the application noticing that it was made at a very belated stage. We think he was right m doing so. Nor is it possible for us to infer bias from the circumstance that the Enquiry Officer did not allow the appellant to engage a lawyer.\n\nWe may mention that the appellant who himself presented his case before us argued admirably and with such clarity\n\n13-189 SC!/80\n\nA and precision as would have done credit to the best of advocates.\n\nWe cannot conceive of any prejudice resulting to him by the denial of a lawyer. The other circumstance regarding extraneous matters being allowed to be brought in is also equally weightless and we need say nothing more about it.\n\nThere is also no substance in complaint of the appellant that necessary documents and witnesses were not called. All necessary documents were called and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the appellant wanted any particular witness to be called and the request was turned down. The grievance of the appellant is that if the Officers who made the notings ou the file in connection with some of the charges had been called, he would have been iu a position to cross examine them and elicit statements to substantiate his defence. We do not think that there is any reasonable basis in the record for such a submission. We find no force in any of thecontentions raised by the appellant and having given our earnest consideration to all the contentions raised by him we dismiss the appeal. but, in the circumstances of the case, without oosts.\n\nThe appellant made a complaint before us that his pension and other retirement benefits have not yet been finalised though it is quite a considerable time since he voluntarily retired from service.\n\nShri Mukhoti learned counsel for the State of West Bengal stated at the Bar that all steps would now be taken to finalise the matter.\n\nWe hope the Government will take immediate steps to redress forthwith this grievance of the appellant.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal di8misseti.\n\n' ·~ •", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "SUNIL KUMAR BANERJEE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUNIL KUMAR BANERJEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 26, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 26, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISllNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND 0."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISllNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CmNNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Service matter-All India Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3286, "end_char": 3297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3341, "end_char": 3352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3480, "end_char": 3491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 1057", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 2 S.C.R. 104", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3719, "end_char": 3738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6711, "end_char": 6730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8 19-9-1975 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Chaudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6754, "end_char": 6769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Chaudhary for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Gobinda Mukhoty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobinda Mukhoty and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6810, "end_char": 6826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobinda Mukhoty and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7045, "end_char": 7056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CmNNAPPA REDDY, J.-The appellant, a member of the Indian Administrative Service, while working as Divisional Commissioner, Nprth Bengal, was served on May 2, 1970, with a memorandum of charges and was informed by another memorandum to which a list of documents and witnesses was attached, that it was proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, and that, if he so desired, the appellant could inspect the documents mentioned in the enclosed list."}}, {"text": "June 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7614, "end_char": 7626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant submitted his written statement of defence on June 9, 1970."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 12, 1970 Shri\n\nA. N. Mukherjee, Commissioner for Department Enquiries, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal, was appointed as Enql)iry Officer to enquire into the charges against the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 12, 1970 Shri\n\nA. N. Mukherjee, Commissioner for Department Enquiries, Vigilance Commission, West Bengal, was appointed as Enql)iry Officer to enquire into the charges against the appellant.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "April 6, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8280, "end_char": 8293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 6, 1971, the disciplinary authority namely the Government of West Bengal issued a notice to the appellant informing him that, on a consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer they had come to the conclusion tllat charges Nos."}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8333, "end_char": 8358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 6, 1971, the disciplinary authority namely the Government of West Bengal issued a notice to the appellant informing him that, on a consideration of the report of the Enquiry Officer they had come to the conclusion tllat charges Nos."}}, {"text": "Union Public\n\nService Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8678, "end_char": 8710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union Public\n\nService Commission was then consulted and their advice obtained."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8775, "end_char": 8806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the Union Public Service Commission charg~ No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9712, "end_char": 9734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggrieved by the order of the Government the appellan, t filed a Writ Petition iu the High Court of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Mukherji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12650, "end_char": 12658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The enquiry report mentions that Shri Mukherji was appointed as an Enquiry Officer under the 1969 rules."}}, {"text": "section 313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13319, "end_char": 13330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13455, "end_char": 13466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1969] 2 S.C.R. 104", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14177, "end_char": 14196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.N. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17341, "end_char": 17354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that when the preliminary report of investigation was considered by the Vigilance Commissioner with a view to recommend to the disciplinary authority whether a disciplinary proceeding should be instituted or not, the report of investigation wa£ referred by the Vigilance Commissioner to Shri A.N. Mukherji for his views and for the preparation of draft charges if institution of disciplinary proceedings was to be recommended.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "A. N.\n\nMukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17825, "end_char": 17840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Shri A. N.\n\nMukherji was appointed as Enquiry Officer.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "A. N. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18086, "end_char": 18100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the circumstance that Shri Mukherji considered the report of investigation with a view to find out if there was material for framing charges and prepared draft charges, it cannot possibly be said that Shri A. N. Mukherji, when he was later appointed as Enquiry Officer constituted himself both as prosecutor and judge.", "canonical_name": "A. N. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "Mukhoti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21067, "end_char": 21074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mukhoti learned counsel for the State of West Bengal stated at the Bar that all steps would now be taken to finalise the matter."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21099, "end_char": 21119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mukhoti learned counsel for the State of West Bengal stated at the Bar that all steps would now be taken to finalise the matter."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_187_206_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "• .,._\n\n1 8 'l\n\nTHE PALACE ADMINISTRATION BOARD A v.\n\nRAMA VERMA BHARATIIAN THAMPURAN & ORS.\n\nMarch 27, 1980 [V. R. KRISHNA !YER, D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.J\n\nReview-when the Court would review its earlier judgment-earlier judq B ment clarified.\n\nPER KRISHNA IYER AND DESAI JJ.\n\nIn a petition for review, once a clear error in the judgment is revealed no sen,!le of shame or infallibility complex absesses or dissuades this Court fiom the anxiety to be ultimately right, not consistently wrong. [189 HJ\n\nThree points were raised for review of the earlier judgment.\n\n!. The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act 1975 (Act 30 of 1976) governs the erstwhile ruling family of former Cochin State and observations of this Court giving a contrary in1pression may be modified.\n\n2. -The observations of the Court that the Board is composed of the heads\n\nor seniormost members of the four branches of the family is not wholly cor D rect.\n\n3. The order of this Court dated 30th July, 1979 should not have the intent and effect .of nullifying the enormous amount of work and considerable steps taken by the Board so far for partitioning the properties of the family.\n\n[193 A-CJ\n\n1. (a) The second point arising out of three reliefs mentioned above was .an inconsCquential error which has crept in by oversight. The statement in the judgment that \"the Board, being an old institution in plenary management since 1949 and wisely composed of the seniormost members of the four branches . ....... \" \\Vas not correct because the Board \\Vas constituted by the Royal Proclamation of 1124 and continued by later Acts. [193 DJ\n\n(b) The Cochin Maharaja had the power to nominate the five trustees p of the Board and there was no objection on him to choose the seniormost\n\nembers of the Thavashies. What he had to comply with was the directh'e in section 4 to secure representation so far as possible for each of the four main Thavashies. It is sufficient if its composition secures fair representation so fer as possible for each of the four Thavashies of the family. The senior~ most need not necessarily be chosen. The Board which has been functioning all these decades is beyond legal cavil and has been rightly eonstituted. (193 G] G\n\n2. (a) The first relief telescopes into the third. From the materials on record it is quite clear that the Board had done good and satisfactory work especially because competent engineers and valuers have been pressed into\n\nsice. A retired judge of !he High Court has been playing the role of a mentor and a small committee of members has democratised and legitimated th.e process of partition by participation. There is no reason to sweep off the work of valuation done all these years. , The argument that the Board's labours shmtld be liquidated cannot be acceded to. The valuation the Board has carried out, the alienations it has effected Qnd provisional allotments it\n\nA has made will be allowed to stand only subject to the obligation to hear objections and to take follow-up action. [196 CD]\n\n' c\n\n(b) It is not necessary to demolish the work done by the Board upto now. The Boards decision cannot be arbitrary. It bas to be reasonable and fair and for that purpose must comply with the opportunity for a hearing to every sharer. Group allotn1ent may be permissible provided the sharers composing the groups consent. Otherwise each member is entitled to a per capita share.· If the Board bad made group allotments it has to be justified by practical considerations and by acceptance by the members of the group concerned. The valuation made and the sales effected must be subject to the objections of those who have not had a say in the matter.\n\nThe draft partition deed, with necessary particulars regarding properties and their value shall be made available for the inspection of the various partiesfrom the office of the Board. The Boord will consider the objections and decide them on their merits.\n\nParties affected by such decision will be given\n\n~ brief hearing by the Board. [196 H; 197 A-CJ\n\n3. The 1976 Act leaves in tact, in large part, the proclamation as '\\Ye11 as the 1961 Act. Section 7 of the 1976 Act expressly repeals the scheduled Acts. It also renders texts of Hindu law, customs and usages contrary to the provisions of the 1976 Act ineffective. The consequence of the omission of the Proclamation and the 1961 Act from the schedule is tbet they survive and co-exist with the 1976 Act. The definition of joint Hindu family is wide enough to include the Cochin royal family and prima-facie section 4(2) spells a division in status and substitutes a tenancy-in-common in the place of jointness vis a vis the Cochin royal family also. This consequences can be obviated only if there is something in section 7 which compels a contrary conclusion. The omission in the repealing section of 1961 Act by itself does not render inapplicable section 4(2) which creates the division in status.\n\nIt admits of no doubt that until Act 30 of 1976 was passed, there was no partition effected by any decision of the Meharaja persuant to the 1961 Act. Thus one of the joint Hindu families which subsisted at the time of the 1976 Act was the Cochin royal family and section 4(2) could\n\n<lnd, therefore, did operate on it.\n\nNor is the rule of per capita division provided for in the 1976 Act contrary to the shares prescribed in the 1961 Act.\n\nThe survival of the 1961 Act. because of its onnss1on from the Schedule of the Ats. repealed has .one effec: and that is that the Boar~ alo~ has the power to d1v1de the properties. Section 3 of the 1961 Act provides for it and must prevail despite the 1976 Act in view of section 7 of the later Act read with the Schedule thereto. The non-repeal of the 196{ Act also leads to the conclusion that child in the lVomb is entitled to a she.re, whatever the meaning of section 4(2) of the 1976 Act may be. Thus a closeup view of the statutory scene vis-a-vis the Cochin royal family, it is clear that in 1976, the family was divided in statuts with shares for every member including the per capita share for fl child in the womb and such partition is to be worked out by metes and bounds only by the Board and not by the Civil Court. [200 B-G]\n\nKesha!, J. (concurring in the final result)\n\nThe proclamation coupled with the 1961 Act constituted an exception to the provisions of the 1976 Act which otherwise applied to all joint Hindu families.\n\n• -<(\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 189\n\nUnder the proclamation 1124, the Cochin royal family was impartible. The concept of partition in relation to it was for the first time introduced by the\n\n1961 Act subject to three conditions mentioned in section 3 of the Act. All the three conditions had to be satisfied before the Estate could be considered partible and till it acquired that character the Proclamation remained in full force. The 1976 Act did not make the slightest difference to the position prevailing till that Act into force. Neither the Proclamation nor the 1961 Act was repealed by the 1976 Act and, therefore, tbey continued to co-exist with the 1976 Act. Inview of the provisions of_ section 3 of the 1961 Act which were left in tact by the 1976 Act the Estate could become partible only if all the three conditions specified in section 3 of 1961 Act were fulfilled. The result is that when the 1976 Act was enforced in its original form the Estate continued to be impartible and, therefore, there was no question of section 4(2) of that Act being applicable to it. [203 H-204 A-Gl\n\nAfter the promulgation of the 1978 Act the Proclamation has to govern the Cochin royal family subject to section 3 of the 196 l Act as mended\n\nby the 1978 Act which would fully apply to that family notwithstanding anything contained in the 1978 Act or any other law for the time being in force.\n\nFinality haS thus been given to the provisions of that section which states that the partition is to be made \"among all the members entitled to a share of the\n\nEstate, and the. Palace Fund under section 4 of the Kerala Joint Hindu D Family System (Abolition) Act 1975 (30 of 1976.)\" Section 4 of the 1976 Act is thus made specifically applicable to the Cochin royal family by reason of the amendment of section 3 of the 1961 Act by the 1978 Act. If this be so the crucial date for determining the number and identity of the members of the family entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace Fund would be 1st of December, 1976, that is, the date on which the 1976 Act came into force. [206 D-El IC\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Review Petition No. 150/1979.\n\nReview of this Court's Order dated 30-7-1979 in SLP (Civil) No. 5863 of 1979.\n\nT. S. Krishnamoorthy, Vishnu Bahadur Saharya and Sardar 'Ji..._ Bahadur Saharya for the Appellant.\n\nP. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents.\n\nThe Order of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. and D.A. Desai, J. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. Koshal, J. gave a concurring Opinion.\n\nKR1sHNA IYER, J.-Horace wrote : \"But if Homer, who is good nods for a moment, I think it a shame\". We, in the Supreme Court do 'nod' despite great care to be correct, and once a clear error in our judgment is revealed, no sense of shame or infallibility complex obsesses us or dissuades this Court from] the anxiety to be ultimately right, not consistantly wrong. The present petition for review is one such and we have listened, at unusual length, to\n\ncounsel's oral submissions, having felt that an error in the judgment under review, likely to injure and unsettle, needed to be mended.\n\nWe may narrate, very briefly, the necesrnry facts and catena of statutes so that the flaw may be identified and rectified. The subject-matter is the partition of the assets of the erstwhile royaf family of the Maharajah of Cochin, if we may avoid the jaw-breaking description used in :one of the relevant legislations viz.\n\nThe Valiamma Thampuran Kovi/akam Estate and Palace Fund belonging to the.family of the Maharajah of Cochin. A capsulated survey of the landmark legislations will help locate the controversy and liquidate the error, if any. This family, to begin with, was impartible and its administration was statutorised by a Royal Proclamation of 1124 (hereinafter called the Proclamation) which constituted a Board in this behalf consisting of five trustees to be nominated by the Maharajah with an equitable eye on representation for each branch (tavazhi) of the family. Sec. 2 (a) read with Sec. 4 of the Proclamation defines the Board's composition which shows a slight oversight on our part in the earlier order. And thereafter, came the Great Divide in the story of the royal family and began. its slow integration into the commonalty, retaining in some measure,. its peculiar individuality. By Act 16 of 1961 (The Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and, Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 {for short the 1961 Act) impartibility was abolished conditionally, as it were. Sec. 3 therein laid down :\n\n3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 22 of the Proclamation, if a request in writing is made by the majority of the major members and the Maharajah of Cochin is satisfied that in the interests of the family it would be desirable to partition the Estate and the Palace Fund, among all the members he may declare his ~. decision to effect a partition under his supervision and control, and direct the Board to proceed with the partition.\n\n(2) The decision of the Maharaja of Cochin under sub-section\n\n(1) shall be published by the Board in the Gazette in English and I Malayalam, and a copy of the notifiction shall be affixed in consicuous place at the office of the Board. \"'--'-- Of course, partibility nflcctcd the spirit of the times both in Kerala -and in the Hindu fold of India and royalty lost its regalia, including the privy purse, with the enactment of the Constitution (26th fAmeJidment) Act. Even though royalty had become fossilised and Maharaja's family had become partible the latter retained its. legislative_ [distinctiveness in important features, because of its uni-\n\n• '\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 191\n\nque history, unwieldy membership and statutory singularity since\n\n1949. The legislature took pragmatic note of these legitimate factors while enacting Act 16 of 1961. Thus partibility was not automatic but dependent on the Maharaja's decision. The division was not to be affected by the civil courts as in ordinary cases but by Board only.\n\nThe structure and identity of the Board created under the earlier Proclamation was preserved even for the purpose of effecting partition of the family assets. Once the majority's request was made and the Maharaja was satisfied about the desirability of partitioning the Estate and the Palace Fund, the process of partitioning was the responsibility of the Board, although under the supervision and control of the Maharaja himself. A ticklish question, which is one of the aspects involved in the pre, ei:t review petitic.n, turns on the division among the members and, more particularly, the fixation of shares, depending, as it does, on the number of members. This , number, in turn, is determined by the date of division in status of the family, Section 3 of the 1961 Act makes partition contingent on the Maharaja's declaration of his decision to effect a partition.\n\nOnce he declares his decision, there is, eo instanti a division in status. Thereafter, s. 4 of Act.16.of 1961 operates. That Section states:\n\n4. Share of Members (!) Each member shall be entitled to an equal share of the Estate and the Palace Fund.\n\n(2) The share obtained by a member on partition shall be the separate property of the member.\n\n(3) A child who is in the womb on the date of the publication of the decision under Section 3 and who is subsequently born alive shall have the some right for a share in the Estate and Palace Fund as any other member as if he or she had been born on or before the date of such publication.\n\nWe may state even here that the Maharaja never made the statutory declaration under Sec. 3 and so no division in status took\n\nplace. The next statutory milestone which has relevance to our G legal journey is the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976) (for short 1976 Act). By this measure, the joint family system among Hindus in the state of Kerala was extinguished. All Marumakkathayam families were embraced by the Act and the right by birth in ancestral properties was also put an end to. By force of s. 4 of that Act, joint family ownership B was converted into tenancy-in-common as if partition had taken place among all the members. We may read s. 4 (2) at this point.\n\nAll members of a joint Hindu family, other than an undivided Hindu family referred to in sub-section (1) holding any joint family property on the day this act comes into force, shall, with effect from that day be deemed to hold it as tenants in common, as if a pal'tition of such property per capita had taken place among all the members of the family Jiving on the day aforesaid, whether such members were entitled to claim such partition or not under the law applicable to them, and as if each one of the members is holding his or her share separately as full owner thereof.\n\nThe emphasis, from the point of view of the date of transformation into tenancy-in-common, is on the date of coming into force of Act 30 of 1976. From that date (1-12-76) onwards a !division in status and a quantification of shares per capita must be deemed to have occurred.\n\nSection 7 of this Act repeals certain enactments mentioned in the schedule thereto; but what is of significance in that schedule is that the Proclamation of 1124 and Act 16 of 1961 (which are measures specially devoted to Cochin Royal Family) are not repealed. What the impact of this omission is, is a subject of debate between the parties and we will come presently to it.\n\nWe then move on to ordinance 1 of 1978 promulgated on 6-1-1978 which was replaced duly by Act 15 of 1978, published in the Gazette on 19-3-78.\n\nThis Act (The Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Family System Abolition) (Amendment Act, 1978),, is an amendatory adventure affecting vitally the partitioning of the Cochin Royal Family. The implications of the provisions of this legislation constitute the subject matter of the review petition on which the parties bitterly join issue.\n\nIt cannot be denied that partition by metes and bounds of the Cochin Royal Family properties is a stupendous effort, a timeconsuming task and an operation involving legal know-how, valuers' •kills and adjudicatory steps. We must remember that the assets are immense and varied even as the members are numerous, being well over 700 in strength. Each member being entitled to a share, the partition is sure to be complicated and if in the shortrun of a human life the partition is to be completed and the properties are to be enjoyed by the shares, innovative strategies of speedy justice must be resorted to. On this basis we have to appreciate the grounds raised for review by the petitioner herein who had substantially succeeded in the first round when we pronounced a lengthy order on the special leave petition.\n\n• ' ,._\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 193\n\nThe review sought revolves round three points:\n\n(1) The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System. (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976) governs the erstwhile ruling family of former Cochin State and observations of this Court giving a contrary impression may be suitably modified:\n\n(2) The observation of the Court that the Board is composed -0f the heads or senior most members of the 4 branches of the family is not wholly correct.\n\n(3) The Order of this Court dated 30-7-1979 should not have the intent and effect of nullifying the enormous amount of work and considerable steps taken by the Board so far for partitioning the properties of the family.\n\nThe 2nd point may readily be conceded as it is an inconsequential error which has crept in by oversight which may be corrected\n\ntraightway. It is true that in the judgment earlier delivered in this case, it has been stated in passing that \"the Board, being an old institution in plenary management since 1949 and wisely composed of the rseniormost members of the 4 branches .. .... \"Strictly\n\nspeaking, this is not correct because the Board was constituted by the Royal Proclamation of 1124 and continued by later Acts.\n\nSection 2 (a) of the Proclamation states that the '\"Board\" means the Board of Trustees appointed under Sec. 3 of this Proclamation.\n\nSection 4 defines the composition of the Board and reads thus:\n\nThe Board shall 'consist of five Trustee' who shall be nominated by us from among the male members of our family so as to secure representation as far as possible for each of the four main thavashies of our family. One\n\nof the Trustees shall be appointed as the President of the Board by us.\n\nIt follows that the Cochin Maharaja had the power to nominate the five trustees of the Board and there was no objection on him to choose the seniormost members of the thavashies. What he had to\n\ncomply with was the directive in sec. 4 to secure representation G as far as possible for each of the four main thavashies. We regret the mistake in this detail although so far as the judgment was concerned it made little difference in the reasoning or the result.\n\nEven so, when cantankerous persons seek to read this court's judgment with scriptural regard, mischief may follow. The petitioner in his review petition states that some member of the family has H gone to court with a suit (O.S. 391 of 1976) and has issued a notice dated September 19, 1979 wherein he has challenged the validity\n\nof the Board on the score that it did not consist of the seniormost members of the four thavashies as required by the judgment of this court. It is sufficient if its composition secures fair representation as far as possible for each of the four thavashies of the family. The seniormost need not necessarily be chosen. The Board, which, has been functioning all these decades, is beyond legal cavil and has been rightly constituted. We regret the pecadil!o and are surprised at the tendency to impugn the Board's doings on the unexpected score of illegal composition.\n\nEven the 3rd relief, although hotly contested by Shri Govindan• Nair for the opposite party, cannot be wholly refused.\n\nThe grievance of the Palace Administration Board is that by virtue of the judgment of this Court and some observations contained therein the valuable, enormous and irreplaceable volume of work turned out over the years stands nullified. Were this consequence true, the consternation of Board might well be justified.\n\nIf the basis. for the nullification of the Board's work is the invalidity of the composition of the Board, there is no need for apprehension becanse we have already clarified the position. The Board was rightly constituted and validly continues. The grievance of the Board isdifferent and is based upon its plea that, not being a party to the special leave petition, it should not be hit adversely without being heard adequately.\n\nIndeed, it is for this reason that we have afforded a full length hearing. Actus curiae nomihem gravabit is a wliolesome admonition to the court itself.\n\nThere are two substantial controversies implied in the third: relief. In essence, the first relief telescopes into the third and may well be considered in a composite manner.\n\nA partition by metes and bounds becomes possible only if the number of sharers is clearly settled. The first point over which the parties have fought before us in this review proceeding relates to the number of sharers which, in turn, follows from the date of divisiorr in status. The Board has proceeded on the basis that Act 30 of 1976 has brought about a division in status as on 1-12-1976 If that point of time were legally sustainable, there were 719 members in the family, each being entitled to one share. The rival contention put forwara by the oppo8ite parties is that the division in status took place much later when Ordinance 1 of 1978 was promulgated i.e. on 6-1-78. If this later date were to be taken as decisive more members would have been born into the family and their shares would also have to be given by the Board on partition.\n\nThere would also have been some exits by death whose heirs could\n\n• '\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VF.RMA (Krishna Iyer,!.) 195\n\nnot claim shares on behalf of their proposite. We have, therefore, to see which view-point is correct in the light of the statutory; provisions and their rather ambivalent wordin~.\n\nThe other essential factor in making a satisfactory partition is the valuation of the numerous assets and their allocation to the plurality of sharers. Er ch one being entitled to his share and group partition not being the rule, the Board's submission is that it has proceeded on the footing of 719 sharers taking the date, 1-12-1976 when Act 30 of 1976 came into force as the crucial dateline. On\n\nthis basis, the Board claims that it has turned out a tremendous amount of work by way of valuation of properties through highly competent and fairly expensive architects and engineers. It is further stated that the services of a retired judge of the Kerala High Court had been relied on all and along to tender advice as and when required so that legal guidance may be available for the Boarc't An Advisory Committee of leading members of the family had also been constituted to assist the Board with its suggestions. Valuation sheets had been prepared and handed over to each group and in the light of representations made and duly considered, revaluation had been directed to be done wherever objections had been raised.\n\nIt is asserted that all these Himalayan labours have materialised in valuations of properties which, if subverted sterilised, or otherwise invalidated, would spell great loss, waste of energy and indefinite postponement of effective partition. The many members who are virtually royal proletarians cannot afford the price of further procrastination, bewails the Board. True, the court, in search of perfection, should not abandon pragmatic justice and play into the hands of those who have a vested interest in keeping the litigative pot boiling and actualisation of the fruits of partition a teasing illusion. Even so, we must not ignore the law and be stampeded into affirming the Board's blunders, if any, in the name of early finality.\n\nCounsel for the first respondent has contested the ground urged by the Board and has sought to maintain that there has been no error in the judgment of this court and that the review sought must be repelled. The number of shares into which the properties must be divided depends. on the number of members entitled to shares. If the date were to be fixed with reference to Act 30 of 1976 i.e. 1-12-1976, 719 sharers have claims on the family assets.\n\nOn the other hand, if the later Act 15 of 1978 were to be operative the relevant date will be 6-1-1978. During this period of around 13 months it is conceivable that a few more members might have\n\nbeen born or dead; but shares have to be precisely accounted and no person can be deprived of his property if the law confers on him a right thereto. Therefore, we will presently proceed to decide this issue, bnt before that, we wish to make it clear that the substantial amount of work done by the Board should not be allowed to go waste. After all, a creative, rather than a negative, application of law makes it truly functional. We are satisfied from the materials on record that the Board has done good and satisfactory work especially because competent engineers and valuers have been pressed into service, a retired judge of the High Court of Kerala has been playing the role of a mentor and a small committee of members has, in a way, democratised and legitimated the process of partition by participation. Without exaggerating the role of the Board or the turn-out of work it has done, we see no reason to sweep off the work of valuation d.one all these years and decline to accede to the argument that the Board's considerable labours should be liquidated.\n\nThere is no substantial reason for doing so. Even so, we cannot exclude the possibility of the Board having made errors, even blunders. After all, there is much force in hearing aggrieved parties before a correct conclusion is reached. That is why, we have in a later paragraph, subjected the acts and doings of the Board to a clear condition which stems from natural justice. The valuation the Board has carried out, the alienations it has effected and provisional allotments it has made will be allowed to stand only subject to the obligation to hear objections and to take follow-up action, as indicated below.\n\nSri Govindan Nair has two submissions which merit serious notice. Firstly, the number of shares have been fixed with reference to Ist December, 1976 and group allotments have been made and these are contrary to the •one man one share' basis and the valid date of disruption in status. Secondly, many members have had no say in the valuation and sales made by the Board and natural justice cannot be sacrificed at the alter of expediency.\n\nTaking the second objection first, we feel that there is force in it bnt do not consider it necessary to demolish the work done by the Board upto now. The situation can be salvaged by a few practical directions which will take care of natural justice and resolve the grievances of affected sharers. It was represented by Shri Krishnamoorty Iyer, appearing on behalf of the Board, that the work of partition was almost complete and even the draft deed had been drawn up. But we must make it clear that the Board's decision\n\n• '\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 197\n\ncannot be arbitrary, as explained in our earlier judgment. It has to be reasonable and fair and for that purpose must comply with the opportunity for a hearing to every sharer. Group allotment may be permissible provided the sharers composing the groups consent.\n\nOtherwise, each member is entitled to a per capita share. Therefore, if the Board has made group allotments, it has to be justified by practical considerations and by acceptance by the members of the group concerned. Secondly, the valuation made and the sales effected must be subject to the objections of those who have not had a say inthe matter. So we direct that the draft partition deed, with necessary particulars regarding properties and their value etc., shall be made available for the inspection of the various parties from the office of the Board.\n\nA notice shall be put .up within one month from today on the office notice board stating that requisite copies of the draft partition deed and the necessary details will be available in the office for the inspection of the members or their. representatives. They will also be permitted to take such number of copies as they want. This is necessary for the members who wish to file objections. Within six weeks thereafter, any sharer will be entitled to file his objections, with specificity, to the various valuations and sales and other actions impugned. The Board will consider these objections and decide them on their merits.\n\nParties affected by such decision will naturally be given a brief hearing by the Board. In short, although without the full panoply of natural justice, a fair and impartial consideration of the '.objections d< novo will be made by the Board. Its decisions will, as far as possible, be made within three months of the last date for objections and be published on the office notice board. Those who ask for copies of the decision or portion of the decision will be furnished them In the course of the arguments in Court we felt that the decisions of the Board should be subject to review by a judicial functionary of high stature, ifthat were practical. Mr. Govind an Nair, appearing for the first respondent, stated that Shri Justice Mathew, a distinguished\n\nretired Judge of the Supreme Court, was available in Cochin and his G presence could be taken advantage of for this purpose. Speaking for the Board, Mr. Krishna Moorthy also agreed with the choice.\n\nWe would have been very happy had Shri Justice Mathew been appointed the final Arbitrator to consider the objections by the parties to the Board's decisions in regard to any of the matters covered by the partition. We are unable to make a formal direction to this effect H because many of the sharers are not before us. We must however, observe that taking advantage of the fact that the group represented by\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQRJS\n\nU 989) 3 S.C.R.\n\nShri Govindan Nair is willing to abide by Shri Justice Mathew's arbitral decision, the Board may if possible contact other sharers for their consent. If all the sharers agree in writing to abide by the decision of Mr. Justice Mathew in regard to contested points in the Board's partition arrangement we tliink that Shri Justice Mathew may be persuaded to agree. Indeed, if it is brought to our notice that all parties are agreeable, the Court itself may make a request and clothe Shri Justice Mathew with necessary decisional powers. We do not say more than make these observations. But even apart from the appointment of Mr. Justice Mathew as sole Arbitrator, it is necessary to insist that the other directions regarding hearing and compliance with natural justice will bind the Board before its completion of the partition.\n\nThis takes us to the most contentious issue viz. the number of shares and the date with reference to which the division in status must be deemed to have taken place. Certain fundamental facts must be under scored for appreciating the hotly asserted competing contentions. At the outset, we may mention that the drafting of the legislation has been somewhat slippery breeding semantics confusion.\n\nThis feature has accentuated the plausibility of both points of view.\n\nGoing to the basics, we must observe that originally the royal family was impertible but the concept of partition in relation to it subject to certain conditions was introduced by the 1961 Act. However, notwithstanding the 1961 Act, the Cochin Maharaja had not declared his decision that the family properties be partitioned. A few items out of the enormity of the assets were, it is said, divided. But it seems probable and parties, perhaps proceeded on the footing that there was no royal decision to divide the family pursuant to the enabling provision in the 1961 Act. The family continued joint.\n\nNow we shift the focus to the statutory scene of 1976 and find a comprehensive Kerala legislation abolishing the joint family status of all coparcenaries generally. The Cochin royal family, prima facie, was covered by the 1976 Act. In that event, there must normally have occurred a division in status in the Cochin royal family too and quantification of shares would then have had to be done by the Board with reference to 1-12-1976 when that Act came into force. This is the Board's stand and it has proceeded on this premise. This position would have been unassailable but for the two circumstanceswhich, in a way, we have adverted to earlier. The 1976 Act contains a schedule repealing certain Acts and as indicated earlier the Proclamation and the 1961 Act do not find a place in the Schedule. We must infer from this circumstance argues Sri Govindan Nair, that the 1961 Act and\n\n_,.J_\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 199\n\neven the Proclamation modified by the 1961 Act survived the 1976 Act. Did they, and if they. did, to what extent and effect ?\n\nThis complication is accentuated by the later 1978 Act which amends the 1976 Act and the 1961 Act.\n\nSection 8 and 9 are the .p:rtinent pro visions. Section 8 iPserts a new sec. 8 in the 1976 .Act with retrospective effect:-\n\n\"8. Amendment of Act 30 of 1976 : In the Kerala 'Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976), after Section 7, the following soction shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been inserted, namely:-\n\n8. Proclamation IX of 1124 and Act 16 of 1961 to !continue in force: Notwithstanding] anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force Proclamation (IX of 1124) dated the 29th June, 1949, promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin, as amended by the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act 1978 and the Valiamma] Thampuran Kovilakam j Estate and th< Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 (16 of 1961), as amended by the said Act, shall continue to be in force and shall apply to the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund administered by the Board of Trustees appointed under sec. 3 of the said Pcoclam1tion.\"\n\nSection 9 also is significant and runs thus:\n\n\"9. Repeal and Saving:-(!) The Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund [(Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Aboliton) Amendment Ordinance, 1978 (I of 1978), is hereby repealed .\n\n. (2) Not withstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the principal Act or the Proclamation (IX of\n\n1124) dated the 29th June, 1949, promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin or the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System\n\n(Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976 ), as amended by the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act or the said Proclamation or Act, as the case may be, as amended by this Act as if this Act had come into force on the 6th day of January, 1978.\"\n\nThere is a sharp divergence between counsel: on the role of the various provisions we have briefly referred to above in determining the date on which division in status of the Cochin royal family took place. The 1976 Act, as we have indicated earlier, leaves intact, in large part, the Proclamation as well as the 1961 Act. Section 7 of the 1976 Act expressly repeals the scheduled Acts. It also renders texts of Hindu Law, customs and usages, contrary to the provisions of the 1976 Act, ineffective. The consequence of the omission of the Proclamation and the 1961 Act from the schedule is that they survive and co-exist with the 1976 Act. The crucial point on which much debate took place is as to whether section 4(2) of the 1976 Act which produce a statutory division in status of all Kerala undivided Hindu Families effects such a division in the Cochin royal family also. The definition of Joint Hindu Family is wide enough to include the Cochin royal family and, prima facie, sec. 4(2) spells a division in status :and substitutes a tenancy-in-common in the place .of jointness vis-a-vis the Cochin royal family also. This consequonce~ can be obviated only ifthere is something in sec. 7 which compels a contrary conclusion. The omission in the repealing section of the 1961 Act, by itself, does not render inapplicable sec. 4(2) which creates the division in status. It admits of no doubt that, until Act 30 of 1976 was passed, there was no partition effected by any decision of the Maharaja pursuant to the 1961 Act. Thus or.e oft~.e joint Hindu Families which subsisted at the time of :;·, e 1976 Act was the Cochin royal family and sec. 4(2) could, and, therefore, did opertec. on it. Nor is the rule of per capita division provided for in the 1976 Act contrary to the shares :prescribed in the 1961 Act. The survival of ; the 1961 Act, because of its omission from the Schedule of Acts repealed, , has one effect and that is that the Board alone has the p\"ower to divide the properties.\n\nSec. 3 of the 1961 Act provides for it and must prevail despite the 1976 Act in view of sec. 7 of the later Act read with the :sch<dule thereto, J The non-repeal of the 1961 Act also leads to _the conclusion that chi d . in the womb is entitled to a share, (sec. 4 of the 1961 Act), whatever the meaning of sec. 4(2) of the 1976 Act may be. Thus, if we take a close-up of the statutory scene, vis-a-vis the Cochin royal family, in 1976, we get the position that the family is divided in status with shares for every member including ; a per capita share for a child in the womb and such partition is to be worked out by metes and bounds only by the Board and not by the civil court.\n\nThings would have been simple had the situation er.ded here.\n\nH .l!ut sections 8 and 9 of ihe 1978 Act have left a , trail of seemingly queer consequences, or, at any rate, scope Jor plausible, yet contra-\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Krishna lyer, !.) 201\n\ndietary interpretations.\n\nWe will, therefore, examine these two pro- A visions which will be the final exercise in this review proceeding.\n\nAccording to Shri Krishnamurthi Iyer for the Board, the determination of the date of division in status and consequently the number of shares and the persons eligible thereto, are not affected by sections 8 and 9 of the 1978 Act. Shri Govindan Nair, on the contrary, argues that sections 8 and 9 will be rendered otiose and the statute stultified were we to treat the two sections as of functional irrekvance in fixing the shares and the sharers. Sec, 8 contains a non-obstante clause and so must prevail over other provisions.\n\nThe substantive directive in sec. 8 of the 1978. Actis that the proclamation, as amended by the 1961 Act, as further amended by the 1978 Act, shall continue to be in force, and shall apply is the assets of the Cochin royal family. Of course, the Section has been drafted in a jaw-breaking fashion and its combersomeness could have been simplified had a different type of legislative drafting skill been brought to bear upon the subject. Sec. 8 reminds one of the old British Jingle :\n\nI'm the parliamentary draftsman I compose the country's laws And of half the litigation I'am undoubtedly the cause.\n\nWhy only half the litigation half the frustration too t Be that as it may, stripped of the complexities, sec. 8 merely means that the Proclamation, as amended by the subsequent legislation, shall continue to apply to the Estate and the Fund of the royal family. Shri Krishnamurthy Iyer construes this provision to mean that the processual part of the Proclamation, as amended by the 1961 Act, which, in turn had been amended by the 1978 Act was preserved by the legislature with a deliberate design, namely, to speed up the partition without getting clogged up in the formal coils of court proceedings with inevitable delays and interminable appeals. The legislature know that handing up the partition litigation to the civil courts would be denying for a life time any share to any member of the royal family in effect and would aslo mean undoing the considerable work which had already been done in the direction of division. Therefore, the anxiety of the legislature to preserve and consolidate what had been done and to accelerate the actual partition persuaded it to enact s. 8. The intent and achievement of s: 8 .was to keep. out the civil court and to continue the Board's jurisd!c!Jon to part1twn. Nothing more, nothing less. Sec. 9 merely gives retrospecl!vely to the Act and, more importantly preserves a&\n\n14-189 SCI/80 '\n\nA valid all acts done under the Proclamation and the 1976 Act as amended by the 1978 Act. This is meaningful because anything done or any section taken under the 1976 Act is also preserved. In our view only purpose of this saving clause is the quantum of shares, the number of shares, the particular shares having been decided by the 1976 Act,\n\nthe Board's proceedings on that footing are left unaffected.\n\nThere is force in Sri Krishnamurthy Iyer's contention that the goal of ss. 8 and 9 of the 1978 Act was to continue the Board intact to keep as valid all that it had done and)o preserve the shares as settled by the 1976 Act. There was no intent, nor effect, of upsetting everything that had been done uptil then by a process of statutory reversal.\n\nSuch an interpretation would be Jetting a statutory bull in a china shop demolishing the concrete work already done.\n\nLet us, for a moment, examine the rival plea, which is to the effect that the Proclamation and the 1961 Act having been brought back to life the shares had to be determined on that basis updated to 1978, D having special regard to s. 3 of the 1978 Act. For convenience, we may re-read that section:\n\n3. Partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund :(I) The senior. most male member of the family shall, within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment Ordinance, 1978 direct the Board to effect Partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund among all the members entitled to a Share of the Estate and the Palace Fund under section 4 of the Kera/a, Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976), and such direction shall be published by the Board in the Gazette.\n\n(2) If the seniormost male member fails to direct the Board as required by sub-section (1), the Board shall on the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section proceed to effect the partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund among the members referred to in sub-section (I) and the Partition so affected shall be valid notwithstanding anything contained in section 17 of the Proclamation.\n\nThe plausible inference is that in tune with the Proclamation (which survives) the seniormost male member-the Maharaja system having H ended is to give direction to the Board to effect a partition of the Estate and the fund among the members \"entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace Fund under section 4 of the Kera/a Joint Hindu\n\nPALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Koshal, J.) 203\n\nFamily System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976)\". Sub-section (2) of section 3 says that if the seniormost male member fails to make snch a direction within 60 days, the Board shall proceed to effect the Partition. According to Shri Govindan Nair, the total effect is the resnscitation of the Proclamation and the direction for Partition willy nilly by virtue ofs. 3 of the 1978 Act and, therefore, the date of division-in-status has to be reckoned as that date which falls on the expiry of the 60 days of the promulgation of the 1978 Act. There is a meritrious appeal for this interpretation provided we overlook the vital direction in s. 3 (1) that the division is to be among \"all the members entitled to a share under s. 4\" of the 1976 Act. None born later can claim, none dying later can lose. Thus, in our view, the inevitable consequence of Act 15 of 1978 is not to throw out of gear everything done so far but to clarify possible ambiguities and to stabilise the work of Partition by the Board. We read the meaning of the various provisions of the 1978 Act in this sense only. The net result is that the division among the members is to be effected according to s.4 of 1976 Act. The Partition by metes and bounds is to be effected by the Board. The work done upto now is to retain its force.\n\nWhile considering the constitutionality of the impugned Act in our earlier judgment we had made it clear that the Board was not entitled to behave arbitrarily or unreasonably and had to conform to the norm of natural justice. We maintain that conclusion and, indeed, counsel for the Board has not challenged it. In fact, we have strengthened that conclusion by providing for objections and even an appeal against the decision by the Board to the limited extent indicated above to an arbitral body so that the hearing component may not be sacrificed for the speedy component of justice.\n\nIn the light of the directions we have made and the elaborate\n\n.~· explanation we have given, the petition for review, in substantial part, is allowed.\n\nKosHAL, J. I have had the advantage of going through the judg ment prepared by my learned brother Krishna Iyer, J., and find myself in agreement with him in regard to the conclusions arrived at by him on the three points around which the petition for review revolves but I regret that I am unable to subscribe to the reasons listed by him in relation to the effect of the 1976 and 1978 Acts. I am therefore recording this short note which may be read 'in continuation of that judgment.\n\n2. There is no dispute regarding the proposition that nnder the Proclamation of 1124 the Cochin royal family was impartible and that\n\nthe concept of partition in relation to it was for the first time introdnced by the 1961 Act, subject to certain conditions which are contained in section 3 of that Act and are to the effect that the Estate would l; ecome partible only if-\n\n(i) a request in writing is made to the Maharaja of Cochin by by the majority of the major members of the family;\n\n(ii) the Maharaja is satisfied that in the interests of the family it would be desirable to partition the Estate and the Palace Fund among alJ the members of the family; and\n\n(iii) the Maharaja declares his intention to effect a partition under his supervision and control and directs the Board to proceed with the partition.\n\nAll these three conditions had to be satisfied before the Estate could be considered partible and till it acquired that character the Proclamation remained in full force so that the Estate remained impartible and no question could therefore arise as to the persons entitled to a D share on a partition.\n\nThis position prevailed till the 1,976 Act was promulgated and, in my opinion, that Act also did not make the slightest difference to it, Section 7 of the 1976 Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act. Those enactments were twelve in number and did not include either the Proclamation or the 1961 Act which therefore, as pointed out by Iyer, J., survived and continued to coexist with the 1976 Act. In view of the provisions of section 3 of the 1961 Act which were left intact by the 1976 Act the Estate could become partible only if all the three conditions above specified were fulfilled which has never been the case so far. The result is that when the 1976 Act was enforced in its original form the Estate ~'Ontinued to be impartible and therefore there was no question of section 4(2) of ' that Act being applicable to it, the specification of shares being incompatible with impartibility. In this view of the matter, the Proclamation coupled with the 1961 Act constituted an exception to the provisions of the 1976 Act which otherwise applied to all Joint Hindu Families.\n\n3. The 1978 Act however brought about certain basic changes in the 1961 and the 1976 Acts. Section 8 of the 1978 Act added a new section 8 to the 1976 Act with effect from the date on which the 1976 Act had come into force, i.e., the !st of December, 1976 and that new section stated in no uncertain terms that the Cochin royal family would be governed by- ( a) the 1978 Act itself, and,\n\n.pALACE ADMN. BOARD v. RAMA VERMA (Koshal, l.) 205\n\n(b) the Proclamation as amended by the 1961 Act which itself was to be read as obtaining after its amendment by the 1978 Act •\n\nIt is therefore necessary to examine the changes effected by the 1978 Act in the 1961 Act. They are detailed in the following table l\n\n1961 Act as prevailing before the 1978 amendment\n\nSection 2 : In this Act .......... ..\n\n(a) 'Board' means the Board of Trustees\n\nappointed under s. 3 of the Procia. mation.\n\n(b) 'Estate• means the Valiamma Thsm\n\npuram Kovilakam Estate and all properties bolonging to the said\n\nEstate.\n\n1961 Act as obtaining after the 1978 amendment\n\nSection 2 1 In this Act ............. .\n\n(a) 'Board' means the Board of Trustees\n\nappointed under 1. 3 of the Procla.\n\nmation.\n\n(b) 'Estate' means the Valiamma Tham. puram Kovllakam Estate and 'all\n\nproperties belonging to the said Estate.\n\n(c) 'Maharaja of Cochin' means Ruler (c) of former State of Cochin within\n\n•family' means the Marumakkatha yam joint family lT consisting of\n\nth~ four main tha vashie!I of the the meaning of Clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution.\n\nRuler of the former State of Cochin within the meaning\"of Clause (22) of article 366 of the Constitution\n\nOf India,\n\nd) \"Member\" means a member of the (d) 'Member' means a member of the family of the Maharaja of Cochin. family.\n\n(e) 'Palace Fund' shall have the same (e) meaning as in Clause (c) ofs. 2 of the Proclamation.\n\n'Palace Fund' shall have the same meaning as in Clause le) ofs. 2. of the Proclamation.\n\n(f) 'Proclamation•m, ans Proclam1tion (f) (IX of 1124) dated 29th June, 1949, promulgated by Maharaj• of O>chin.\n\n'Proclamation' means Proclama\n\ntion QX of 1124) dated 29th June, 1949, promulgated bv Maharaja ol Cochin.\n\nSection 3\n\nMaharaja of Cochin to order Partition(!) Notwithstanding anything contain ed in s. 22 of the Proclamation, if request in writing is made by the majority of the major members and the Maharaja of Cochin is satisfied that in the interest of the family it would be desirable to partition tho Estate and the Palace Fund, among all members, he moy declare his\n\nSection 3\n\nPartition of the Estate and the Palace Funp\n\n(i) The seniormost male member or the family shall within sixty days from the date of the commencement of the Valiamma Thsmpuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition)\n\nand Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment !Ordinance 1978 direct the Board to eft'ect partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund\n\ndecision to effect a partition under his supervision and control, and direct the Board to proceed with the Partition.\n\n(2) The decision of the Mabaraja of Cochin under sub-section (I) shall be published by the Board in the Gazette in English and Malayalam and a copy of the notification shall be affixed in a\n\nconspicuou~ place at the office of the Board.\n\namong an the members entitled to a share of the Estate and thePaJaceFund under Section 4 of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 Of 76) and such direction shall be published by the Board in the Gazette.\n\n(2) If the seniormost male member failed to direct the Board as required by subsection (1), the Board shall, on the expiry of the period specified in that sub-section proceed to effect the partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund among the members referred to in sub-section (1 )and Partition so effected shall be valid notwithstanding anything contained in section 17 of the Proclamation.\n\nAfter the promulgation of the 1978 Act therefore the Proclamation has to govern the Cochin royal family subject to section 3 of the 1961 Act as amended by the 1978 Act which would fully apply to that family \"notwithstanding anything contained\" in the 1978 Act or any other law for the time being in force. Finality has thus been given to the provisions of that section which states that the partition is to be made '. \"among all the members entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace Fund under section 4 of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976)\". Section 4 of the 1976 Act is thus made specifically applicable to the Cochin royal family by reason of the amendment of section 3 of the 1961 Act by the 1978 Act; and if this be so, the crucial date for determining the number and identity of the j members of the family entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace\n\n- · Fund would be the 1st of December, 1976, i.e., the date on which the 1976 Act came into force.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition partly allowed.", "total_entities": 148, "entities": [{"text": "l\n\nTHE PALACE ADMINISTRATION BOARD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PALACE ADMINISTRATION BOARD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAMA VERMA BHARATIIAN THAMPURAN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMA VERMA BHARATHAN THAMPURAN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PER KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 254, "end_char": 270, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "30th July, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 981, "end_char": 996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of this Court dated 30th July, 1979 should not have the intent and effect .of nullifying the enormous amount of work and considerable steps taken by the Board so far for partitioning the properties of the family."}}, {"text": "Cochin Maharaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1634, "end_char": 1649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "193 DJ\n\n(b) The Cochin Maharaja had the power to nominate the five trustees p of the Board and there was no objection on him to choose the seniormost\n\nembers of the Thavashies."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1843, "end_char": 1852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4136, "end_char": 4145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4761, "end_char": 4770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Meharaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5064, "end_char": 5072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It admits of no doubt that until Act 30 of 1976 was passed, there was no partition effected by any decision of the Meharaja persuant to the 1961 Act."}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5212, "end_char": 5224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5570, "end_char": 5579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5661, "end_char": 5670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5853, "end_char": 5865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus a closeup view of the statutory scene vis-a-vis the Cochin royal family, it is clear that in 1976, the family was divided in statuts with shares for every member including the per capita share for fl child in the womb and such partition is to be worked out by metes and bounds only by the Board and not by the Civil Court. ["}}, {"text": "Kesha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6229, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "200 B-G]\n\nKesha!,"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6698, "end_char": 6707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7155, "end_char": 7164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7300, "end_char": 7309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7488, "end_char": 7500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7659, "end_char": 7668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8045, "end_char": 8054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8133, "end_char": 8142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8253, "end_char": 8262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st of December, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8459, "end_char": 8480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this be so the crucial date for determining the number and identity of the members of the family entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace Fund would be 1st of December, 1976, that is, the date on which the 1976 Act came into force. ["}}, {"text": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy, Vishnu Bahadur Saharya and Sardar 'Ji..._ Bahadur Saharya for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Vishnu Bahadur Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8716, "end_char": 8738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy, Vishnu Bahadur Saharya and Sardar 'Ji..._ Bahadur Saharya for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sardar 'Ji..._ Bahadur Saharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnamoorthy, Vishnu Bahadur Saharya and Sardar 'Ji..._ Bahadur Saharya for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8794, "end_char": 8810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "N. Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8815, "end_char": 8828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "V.R. Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8864, "end_char": 8881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. and D.A. Desai, J. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. Koshal, J. gave a concurring Opinion."}}, {"text": "D.A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8890, "end_char": 8900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. and D.A. Desai, J. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. Koshal, J. gave a concurring Opinion.", "canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8922, "end_char": 8934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. and D.A. Desai, J. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. Koshal, J. gave a concurring Opinion.", "canonical_name": "Krishnamoorty Iyer"}}, {"text": "KR1sHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KR1sHNA IYER, J.-Horace wrote : \"But if Homer, who is good nods for a moment, I think it a shame\".", "canonical_name": "Krishnamoorty Iyer"}}, {"text": "Homer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9018, "end_char": 9023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KR1sHNA IYER, J.-Horace wrote : \"But if Homer, who is good nods for a moment, I think it a shame\"."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9088, "end_char": 9101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, in the Supreme Court do 'nod' despite great care to be correct, and once a clear error in our judgment is revealed, no sense of shame or infallibility complex obsesses us or dissuades this Court from] the anxiety to be ultimately right, not consistantly wrong."}}, {"text": "Valiamma Thampuran Kovi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9896, "end_char": 9919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Valiamma Thampuran Kovi/akam Estate and Palace Fund belonging to the.family of the Maharajah of Cochin."}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10451, "end_char": 10457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10472, "end_char": 10478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10954, "end_char": 10960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11027, "end_char": 11037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11743, "end_char": 11749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, partibility nflcctcd the spirit of the times both in Kerala -and in the Hindu fold of India and royalty lost its regalia, including the privy purse, with the enactment of the Constitution (26th fAmeJidment) Act."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11776, "end_char": 11781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, partibility nflcctcd the spirit of the times both in Kerala -and in the Hindu fold of India and royalty lost its regalia, including the privy purse, with the enactment of the Constitution (26th fAmeJidment) Act."}}, {"text": "Maharaja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11948, "end_char": 11956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even though royalty had become fossilised and Maharaja's family had become partible the latter retained its."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13236, "end_char": 13245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13446, "end_char": 13450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13788, "end_char": 13797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14079, "end_char": 14085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All Marumakkathayam families were embraced by the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14396, "end_char": 14449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14533, "end_char": 14537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All Marumakkathayam families were embraced by the Act", "statute": "All Marumakkathayam families were embraced by the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14680, "end_char": 14684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All Marumakkathayam families were embraced by the Act", "statute": "All Marumakkathayam families were embraced by the Act"}}, {"text": "1-12-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15445, "end_char": 15452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From that date (1-12-76) onwards a !"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15560, "end_char": 15569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6-1-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15990, "end_char": 15998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We then move on to ordinance 1 of 1978 promulgated on 6-1-1978 which was replaced duly by Act 15 of 1978, published in the Gazette on 19-3-78."}}, {"text": "19-3-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16070, "end_char": 16077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We then move on to ordinance 1 of 1978 promulgated on 6-1-1978 which was replaced duly by Act 15 of 1978, published in the Gazette on 19-3-78."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16209, "end_char": 16228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kerala Joint Hindu Family System. (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1976)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17412, "end_char": 17484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "193\n\nThe review sought revolves round three points:\n\n(1) The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System. ("}}, {"text": "30-7-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17818, "end_char": 17827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) The Order of this Court dated 30-7-1979 should not have the intent and effect of nullifying the enormous amount of work and considerable steps taken by the Board so far for partitioning the properties of the family."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18526, "end_char": 18535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18629, "end_char": 18635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18659, "end_char": 18668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19244, "end_char": 19250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 391", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19703, "end_char": 19709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19749, "end_char": 19767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in his review petition states that some member of the family has H gone to court with a suit (O.S. 391 of 1976) and has issued a notice dated September 19, 1979 wherein he has challenged the validity\n\nof the Board on the score that it did not consist of the seniormost members of the four thavashies as required by the judgment of this court."}}, {"text": "Govindan• Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20431, "end_char": 20445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even the 3rd relief, although hotly contested by Shri Govindan• Nair for the opposite party, cannot be wholly refused.", "canonical_name": "Govindan• Nair"}}, {"text": "Palace Administration Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20518, "end_char": 20545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grievance of the Palace Administration Board is that by virtue of the judgment of this Court and some observations contained therein the valuable, enormous and irreplaceable volume of work turned out over the years stands nullified."}}, {"text": "1-12-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21959, "end_char": 21968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board has proceeded on the basis that Act 30 of 1976 has brought about a division in status as on 1-12-1976 If that point of time were legally sustainable, there were 719 members in the family, each being entitled to one share."}}, {"text": "6-1-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22248, "end_char": 22254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rival contention put forwara by the oppo8ite parties is that the division in status took place much later when Ordinance 1 of 1978 was promulgated i.e. on 6-1-78."}}, {"text": "Act 30 of 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23077, "end_char": 23091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Er ch one being entitled to his share and group partition not being the rule, the Board's submission is that it has proceeded on the footing of 719 sharers taking the date, 1-12-1976 when Act 30 of 1976 came into force as the crucial dateline."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23388, "end_char": 23405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further stated that the services of a retired judge of the Kerala High Court had been relied on all and along to tender advice as and when required so that legal guidance may be available for the Boarc't An Advisory Committee of leading members of the family had also been constituted to assist the Board with its suggestions."}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25886, "end_char": 25906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are satisfied from the materials on record that the Board has done good and satisfactory work especially because competent engineers and valuers have been pressed into service, a retired judge of the High Court of Kerala has been playing the role of a mentor and a small committee of members has, in a way, democratised and legitimated the process of partition by participation."}}, {"text": "Govindan Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26937, "end_char": 26950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Govindan Nair has two submissions which merit serious notice.", "canonical_name": "Govindan• Nair"}}, {"text": "Krishnamoorty Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27698, "end_char": 27716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was represented by Shri Krishnamoorty Iyer, appearing on behalf of the Board, that the work of partition was almost complete and even the draft deed had been drawn up.", "canonical_name": "Krishnamoorty Iyer"}}, {"text": "Govind an Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30068, "end_char": 30082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Govind an Nair, appearing for the first respondent, stated that Shri Justice Mathew, a distinguished\n\nretired Judge of the Supreme Court, was available in Cochin and his G presence could be taken advantage of for this purpose.", "canonical_name": "Govindan• Nair"}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30145, "end_char": 30151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Govind an Nair, appearing for the first respondent, stated that Shri Justice Mathew, a distinguished\n\nretired Judge of the Supreme Court, was available in Cochin and his G presence could be taken advantage of for this purpose."}}, {"text": "Krishna Moorthy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30323, "end_char": 30338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking for the Board, Mr. Krishna Moorthy also agreed with the choice."}}, {"text": "Govindan Nair", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33564, "end_char": 33577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must infer from this circumstance argues Sri Govindan Nair, that the 1961 Act and\n\n,.J\n\nPALACE ADMN.", "canonical_name": "Govindan• Nair"}}, {"text": "Section 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33893, "end_char": 33908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33941, "end_char": 33950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33965, "end_char": 33971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34135, "end_char": 34144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "29th June, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34439, "end_char": 34454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "continue in force: Notwithstanding] anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force Proclamation (IX of 1124) dated the 29th June, 1949, promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin, as amended by the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Amendment Act 1978 and the Valiamma] Thampuran Kovilakam j Estate and th< Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 (16 of 1961), as amended by the said Act, shall continue to be in force and shall apply to the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilakam Estate and the Palace Fund administered by the Board of Trustees appointed under sec."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34634, "end_char": 34652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34947, "end_char": 34953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1978", "statute": "Amendment Act 1978"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34982, "end_char": 34991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1978", "statute": "Amendment Act 1978"}}, {"text": "Amendment Ordinance, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35180, "end_char": 35205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act or the said Proclamation or Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35609, "end_char": 35644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "6th day of January, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35731, "end_char": 35755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) Not withstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the principal Act or the Proclamation (IX of\n\n1124) dated the 29th June, 1949, promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin or the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System\n\n(Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976 ), as amended by the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act or the said Proclamation or Act, as the case may be, as amended by this Act as if this Act had come into force on the 6th day of January, 1978.\""}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36083, "end_char": 36092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or the said Proclamation or Act", "statute": "Act or the said Proclamation or Act"}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36467, "end_char": 36479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act or the said Proclamation or Act", "statute": "Act or the said Proclamation or Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36742, "end_char": 36751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36947, "end_char": 36953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37086, "end_char": 37095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37402, "end_char": 37411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37759, "end_char": 37765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37847, "end_char": 37853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38017, "end_char": 38023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38066, "end_char": 38075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38513, "end_char": 38529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishnamurthi Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38865, "end_char": 38883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Shri Krishnamurthi Iyer for the Board, the determination of the date of division in status and consequently the number of shares and the persons eligible thereto, are not affected by sections 8 and 9 of the 1978 Act.", "canonical_name": "Krishnamoorty Iyer"}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39043, "end_char": 39059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39126, "end_char": 39142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39405, "end_char": 39411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39813, "end_char": 39819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40083, "end_char": 40089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishnamurthy Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40245, "end_char": 40263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Krishnamurthy Iyer construes this provision to mean that the processual part of the Proclamation, as amended by the 1961 Act, which, in turn had been amended by the 1978 Act was preserved by the legislature with a deliberate design, namely, to speed up the partition without getting clogged up in the formal coils of court proceedings with inevitable delays and interminable appeals.", "canonical_name": "Krishnamoorty Iyer"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41056, "end_char": 41060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41213, "end_char": 41219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41791, "end_char": 41802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42417, "end_char": 42421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Partition of the Estate", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42489, "end_char": 42512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund :(I) The senior."}}, {"text": "Amendment Ordinance, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42764, "end_char": 42789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42943, "end_char": 42952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Ordinance, 1978", "statute": "Amendment Ordinance, 1978"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43462, "end_char": 43472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Ordinance, 1978", "statute": "Amendment Ordinance, 1978"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43798, "end_char": 43807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43956, "end_char": 43965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44524, "end_char": 44528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44609, "end_char": 44613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45057, "end_char": 45060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45928, "end_char": 45934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KosHAL, J. I have had the advantage of going through the judg ment prepared by my learned brother Krishna Iyer, J., and find myself in agreement with him in regard to the conclusions arrived at by him on the three points around which the petition for review revolves but I regret that I am unable to subscribe to the reasons listed by him in relation to the effect of the 1976 and 1978 Acts."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46696, "end_char": 46705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47674, "end_char": 47683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47696, "end_char": 47772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47908, "end_char": 47912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those enactments were twelve in number and did not include either the Proclamation or the 1961 Act which therefore, as pointed out by Iyer, J., survived and continued to coexist with the 1976 Act."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48000, "end_char": 48009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "section 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48349, "end_char": 48361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48742, "end_char": 48751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act", "statute": "Act effected a repeal of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule to the Act"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48780, "end_char": 48789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "st of December, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48886, "end_char": 48906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of December, 1976 and that new section stated in no uncertain terms that the Cochin royal family would be governed by- ( a) the 1978 Act itself, and,\n\n.pALACE ADMN."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49405, "end_char": 49414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49501, "end_char": 49505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49690, "end_char": 49699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharaja of Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49936, "end_char": 49954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c) 'Maharaja of Cochin' means Ruler (c) of former State of Cochin within\n\n•family' means the Marumakkatha yam joint family lT consisting of\n\nth~ four main tha vashie!I of the the meaning of Clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja of Cochin"}}, {"text": "Article 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50137, "end_char": 50148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50244, "end_char": 50255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50806, "end_char": 50815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50897, "end_char": 50902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51172, "end_char": 51181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mabaraja of Cochin", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51698, "end_char": 51716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The decision of the Mabaraja of Cochin under sub-section (I) shall be published by the Board in the Gazette in English and Malayalam and a copy of the notification shall be affixed in a\n\nconspicuou~ place at the office of the Board.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja of Cochin"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51991, "end_char": 52000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52503, "end_char": 52513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52651, "end_char": 52660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53037, "end_char": 53046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53124, "end_char": 53133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53244, "end_char": 53253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_1_14_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "...\n\nR. R. ENGINEERING CO.\n\nZILA PARISHAD, BAREILLY & ANR .\n\nMarch 10, 1980\n\n:{Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J., V. R. KRISHNA IYER, N. L. UNTWALIA,\n\nP. N. SHINGHAL AND A. D. KoSHAL, JJ.]\n\nU. P. KJhetra Samitis & Zila Parishads Act 1961-Circumstances and Pro- _perty Tax-Nature of tax-If a tax on income or profession.\n\nState Legislature, if competent to impose tax.\n\nActing under the power conferred by section 108 of the District Boards Act, 1922 the District Board, Bareilly imposed \"Circumstances_ and Property\n\nTax\" on persons according to their circumstances and property, Jn 1958 the .powers and functions of the District Boards were vested in or were transfer- -red to the Antarim Zila Parishads and later they were transferred to the Zila 'Parishads constituted under the U.P. Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act 1961.\n\nThe 1961-Act empowered lhe Zila Parishads to impose the \"Clrcum- stances and Property Tax.\" It also provided that where before the appointed date there was in force \"Circumstances and Property Tax\" under the 1922 Act such tax may continue to be levied by th~ Zila Parishads at the same rates and on the same condition$ under which it V.'as. being levied under the 1922 Act.\n\nThe tax which till then was being levied by the District Boards was henceforth levied by the Zila Parishads.\n\nDismissing the appellants' writ petition impugning the constitutional validity of the Act the High Court held (I) that the tax on circumstances and property was a single tax possessing altogether a separate and distinct identity from other taXes and could neither be equated with a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments nor with a tax on property and (2) that the tax feli under the residuary entry of List I, namely, Entry 97 (any matter not enumeraied in any other Entry in List I or in any of the Entries in list\n\nII and lll) and that it could be continued to be levied by virtue of Article 277 of the Constitution. ·\n\nIn CA 564 of 1973 the appellants were assessed to the tax by the Town Area Committee under the U.P. Town Areas Committee Act, 1914 as amended in 1950. The appellants' suit challenging the validity of the tax was allowed by the Munsiff on the ground that the tax on circumstances and property was in truth and substance a tax on income and since prior to the Constitution it was not lawful for the Town Area Committee to Jevy it, it was not saved\n\ny Article 277. The Civil Judge dismissed the appeal of the Committee, The High Court upheld the validity of the tax.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended that the limitation contained in Article 276(2) of the Constitution cannot be transgressed by the State Legis- B Jature by adopting the subterfuge of impooing a consolidated tax by clubbing\n\nl1p two or more entries in List II, and that the State Legislaturo could not\n\nA exercise the power to levy a tax on circumstances and property by an artificial understanding on that expression so as to acqnire power to impose a laxc \\.\n\non income.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHEID : 1. (a) There is a basic distinction between a tax on income and a tax on circumstances and property.\n\nWhile income tax can only be levied on income, tax on circumstances and property can be on the total turnover of the\n\nassessee from his trade or calling or the fact of his having an interest in property. For the levy of tax on circumstances and property it is not necessary\n\nthat there should be income in the f¥mds of the assessee, in the sense of the Income Tax Act A person can be subjected to tax on circumstances and property in relation to the status which he occupies by reason of the pnrsuit~ by him of a beneficial calling or the possession by him of an interest in property.\n\nWhile determining the status of an individual for the purpose of the tax on circumstances, the total turnover of his business or avocation may, therefore, be legitimately taken into consideration. [8 G-H; 9 C.DJ\n\n(b) The fact that the tax on circumstances and property is levied on the basis of income which an assessee receives from bis profession, trade, calling or property is not conclusive of the naiture of the tax. It is only as a matter of convenience that income is adopted as a yardstick or measure for assessing\n\nthe tax. The measure of the tax is not a true test of the nature of the tax and, therefore, while determining the nature of a tax, thongh the standard on which the tax is levied may be a relevant consideration, it is not a conclusive\n\nconsideration. [9 El\n\nDistrict Board of Farrul:habad v. Prag Dutt, AIR 1948 AIL 382 (PB), Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar & Anr. v. JugaZ Kishore Ram Swarup and Anr.\n\nAIR 1969 All 40, approved.\n\nRe. a Rpference under Government of Ireland Act, (1936] A. C. 352; Governor-General in Council v. Province of Madras, 72 I.A 91, 99, referred to.\n\n2. (a) The tax is referable to Entry 49 (taxes on lands buildings) Entry 60 (taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments) and among otber items to item 58 (taxes on animals and boats) .of List II.\n\nThe impupied' tax is a composite tax, one of its components being the circumstances of the assessee.\n\nBy 'circumstances' is meant his financial position, his status 1111 a whole, which depends inter-alia on his income from bis lands and buildings fllld from his trade or calling. The tax is wide enough to cover certain. other items in List II like Item 58 which relates to \"tax on animals and boats\".\n\n[12 H;·\n\n11 G-HJ\n\nThe Notified Area Committee & Anr. v. Sri Ram Singhasan Prasad Kal'ri•ar.\n\nAIR 1970 Allahabad 561, approved.\n\n(b) Yet the fact that one of the components of the tax, namely, the com ponent of 'circulnstances' is referable to other Entries in addition to Entry 60 should not be construed as conferring an unlimited charter on. the local authorities to impose disproportionately ext.•essive levies on the assessees who, are subject to their jurisdiction. [13 A-BJ\n\nR. R. ENGINEERING CO. V. ZILA PARISllAD 3 ( Chandrachud, C. l.)\n\n3. The High Court was wrong in holding that by reason of the fact that A the circumstances and property tax is a composite tax and since the clement of 'property' necessarily enters into that composition, the tax cannot be identified as a tax on profions, trades, callings or employments.\n\nIt is alsO not co1rect to say that since the tax on circumstances and property did not place as an entry expressly .enumerated in any of the three Lists of the Seventh\n\nSchedule it falls under the residuary entry, namely, Entry 97 of List I. It is erroneous to take resort to Article 277 for the purpose of saving the tax. The B. mere name of a tax does not bear on legislative competence and the absence of express enumeration of a tax by a particular name will not justify the tracing of legislative authority to the residuary entry. [13 D-GJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1528 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 23-5-1969 of the Allahabad c- High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 37/67\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 564 of 1973.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 29-11-72 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 2359 of 1966. -\n\nYogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Ashoke Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant in C.A. No. 1528/70.\n\nE. C. Agarwal a for the Appellant in C.A. 564/73.\n\n K. C. Agarwa/a and M. M. L. Srivastava for the Respondent in\n\nC.A. 1528/70.\n\nJ. P. Goyal and S. K. Jain for the Respondent in C.A. 564/73.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J .-These are two appeals from Uttar Pradesh involving the validity of a levy which bears the somewhat unusual name of 'Circumstances and Property Tax'. Civil Appeal 1528 of 1970 is by certificate granted _by the Allahabad High Court under Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution while Civil Appeal 564 of 1973 is by Special Leave granted by this Court.\n\nThe facts leading to Civil Appeal 1528 of 1970 are as follows-:-\n\nThe appellant M/s. R. R. Engineering Company is a partnership firm engaged jn the business of manufacture and sale of machinery, machine tools and as structural engineers. Its registered office is situated at Clutterbukganj which was at one time within the local . limits of the jurisdiction of the District Board ofBareilly. Acting under the power conferred by section 108 of the District Boards Act, 1922,\n\nA the District Board, Bareilly, by Resolution No. 3 dated February 18, 1928 decided to impose the 'Circumstances and Property Tax' on per- . sons according to their circumstances and property. Rule 7 framed under section 172 of the Act for assessment and collection ol the said tax was published on March 10, 1928, providing for the maximum assessment of Rs. 2,000/- on any single assessee.\n\nLater by a Noti- B fication dated November 29, 1933 the State Government directed under section 114(d) of the Act that the total amount of tax on circumstances and property imposed by a District Board on any single assessee shall not in any year exceed the sum of Rs. 2,000/-.\n\nOn April 20, 1958 the U. P. Antarim Zila Parishad Ordinance -C 1958 was enacted by the State Government, providing for the establishment of Antarim Zila Parishads for the internal administrationJof local self-Government in rural areas, thereby facilitating the establishment of Zila Parishads for the co-ordinated administration of affairs concerning economic and social planning and of local self-Government in the various Districts ofUttar Pradesh. The Ordinance was repealed by the D U.P. Antarim Zita Parishad Act 1958.\n\nIn 1961, the U. P. Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 33 of 1961, was passed. By section 274 of that Act, the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, was repealed as from the date Kshetra Samitis were established in a District, and the U. P. Antarim Zita Parishads Act was re- E pealed as from the date on which the Zila Parishad was established in a District. The powers and functions of District Boards were vested in or were transferred to the Antarim Zila Parishads and from them to the Zila Parishads on their establishment in the District.\n\nBy section 119 of the U. P. Kshetra Samitis and Zita Parishads F Act 1961, the Zita Parishads were empowered to impose the 'Circumstances and Property Tax'.\n\nSction 120 of that Act provides that where, before the appointed date, there was in force •circumstances and Property Tax' under the District Boards Act, 1922, such tax may continue to be levied by the Zila Parishad at the same rates and on the same conditions under which it was being levied under the District Boards -G Act. Section 121 provides that the total amount of the tax shall not exceed the amount as may be prescribed by rules framed under the Act.\n\nRule 7 framed under section 172 of the District Boards Act, 1922,\n\n.vhich provides for a maximum levy of Rs. 2,000/- on a single assessee, r remains in force until the framing of rules under the Act of 1961.\n\nII The appellant's registered office which was situated within the jurisdiction of the District Board of Bareilly is now within the jurisdiction of the Zita Parishad, Bareilly. The Circumstances and Property Tax\n\nR. R. ENGINEERING CO. V. ZILA PARISHAD 5 ( Chandrachud, C. J.) which was being levied by the District Board of Bareilly is now being A- J levied by the Zila Parishad of Bareilly.\n\n• ~\n\nThe appellant having been assessed to a tax of Rs. 2,000/- for the year 1965-66, filed Writ Petition 37of1967 in the High Court of Allahabad to challenge the constitutional validity of that tax. A learned single Judge referred the Petition to a Division Bench which in turn referred it to a Full Bench. The Full Bench consisting of Mr. Justice R. S. Pathak, Mr. Justice M. H. Beg and Mr. Justice H; C. P. Tripathi dismissed the Writ Petition but granted certificate to the appellant to appeal to this Court under Articles 132(1) and !33(I)(c) of the Constitution.\n\nIn Civil Appeal 564 of 1973, appellants who are residents of Kuraoli, District Mainpuri, were assessed to Circumstances and Property Tax l:y the Town Area Ccn:mittee of Kuraoli, for the years 1961-64.\n\nThe tax was levied by the Committee under section 14([) of the U.P.\n\nTown Area Act, 1914, as amended by the U.P. Town Area (Validation and Amendment) Act,. 1950, which empowers the Town Area Committees to impose a tax on persons according to their \"circumstances and\n\nproperty\", not exceeding such rate and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be prescribed.\n\nThe appellants filed a suit, 62 of 1964, to challenge the validity of the tax. That suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, Munsir, on the\n\ngiound that the tax on circumstances and property was in truth and substance a tax on income and since, prior to the Constitution, it was not lawful for the Town Area Committee to levy it, it was not saved by Article 277 of the Constitution.\n\nThe appeal filed by the Committee against that judgment was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Mainpuri, but in Second Appeal 2859 of 1966, the High Court of Allahabad by its judgment dated November 29, 1972, took a contrary view, allowed the Committee's appeal and directed the dismissal of the appellant's suit. The learned Single Judge who decided the Second Appeal, followed the Full Bench decisions of the High Court in (i) Mfs R. J?.\n\nEngineering Co.(l) which has given rise to the companion appeal herein, namely, Civil Appeal 1528of1970, and (ii) The Notified Area Committee & Anr. vs. Sri Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar.(2) Being aggrieved by the ; udgment of the High Court, the appellants have filed this appeal by Special leave of this Court.\n\nTt.e three learned Jtdges \\\\l:o ccnstituted the Full Bench of the High Court in R. R. Engineering Co.\n\n(supra) delivered separate judgments,. coming ultimately to the same cdnclusion though not by\n\nH '\n\n(1) AIR 1970 Allahabad 316.\n\n(2) AIR 1970 Allahabad 561-Full Bench.\n\nthe same process of reasoning. ilt was urged. before the High Court that the tax on 'circumstances and property' was a tax on professions, trades, callings and employments and therefore the total amount of tax in respect of any one person could not, by reason of Article 276(2) of the Constitution, exceed Rs. 250 per annum.\n\nIt was further contended that though the proviso to Articlei276(2) enables the levy of a tax on professions, trades, callings and !employments in excess of Rs. 250/- per annum if in the financial !year immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution the tax was being imposed, the authority which is now seeking to impose the tax being different from the. one which was imposing the tax immediately before the Constitution came into force, the proviso would have no application.\n\nMr. Justice R. S. Pathak and Mr. Justice M. H. Beg rejected the contention that th@ tax on 'circumstances and yroperty' was a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments. Consequently, they held that the limitation contained in Art. 276(2) of the Constitution to the effect that the total amount payable in respect of any one person to the State or to any one municipality, district board, local board or other local authority in the State by way of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments shall not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees per (annum was not applicable.\n\nJustice Pathak held that the tax on circumstances and property is a composite tax and although a person's status and property are two intertwined strands which enter into the composition of the tax, the tax cannot be considered as consisting of two distinct taxes under a single denomination. According to the learned Judge, the tax on circumstances and property is a single tax possessing altogether a separate and distinct identity from other taxes and could neither be equated with a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments nor with a tax on property; that is to say, the constituent elements which enter into the composition of the tax could not be separated. On the question whether the circumstances and property tax levied by District Boards prior to the Constitution could be levied thereafter, the learned Judge relied upon Art. 277 of the Constitution as authorising the continued imposition of the tax. When the Constitution came into force, said the learned Judge, circumstances and property tax did not find a place in any of the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule and therefore it fell under the residuary entry, namely, entry 97 of List I which refers to any matter not enumerated in any other entry in List I or in any of the entries in Lists II and III.\n\nU Justice M.H. Beg largely shared the view of Justice Pathak that the tax on circumstances and property was a composite tax and not merely a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments and therefore,\n\n....\n\n• __,., .\n\nR. R. ENGINEERING CO. v. ZILA PARISHAD 7 (Chandrachud, C. J.) .the limit imposed by Art. 276(2) was not applicable to the tax. Accord A ingto'.thepearned Judge, the relevant enquiry in regard to the tax was . u to!what .was the legal basis of the tax or the reason without which there could be no such tax. He answered that question by saying that the best answer'one could give was that the tax on circumstances and property was a tax on the status of a person. The learned Judge .shared the view of Pathak, J., that after the enactment of the Constitution, B Art. 277 authorised the continued imposition of the tax.\n\nTripathi, J. followed\"an\"earlier Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court and held that the tax on:circumstances and property was in the nature of a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments. The limitation prescribed by Art. 276(2) would, therefore, be .attracted, but the proviso to that article saved the imposition of the tax\n\neven if it was in excess of Rupees two hundred and fifty per annum because the tax was in force in the financial year immediately pre- -oeding the co=encement of the Constitution and the Parliament had not by law made any provision to the contrary. The contention, that the Proviso would apply only if the authority imposing the tax .after the enactment of the Constitution was the same which did so\n\ni=ediately prior to the Constitution was rejected by the learned Judge on the ground that what was important for the purposes of the Proviso was the identity of the purpose for which the tax was and is imposed, and the area of its operation, and not the identity of the authority imposing the tax. ·\n\nIn the companion Appeal, 564 of 1973, a different consideration arose in a significant respect, namely, that the tax was not in force in the financial year immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution. The assessment.having been made by the Town Area Committee under section 14(f) of the U.P. Town Areas Act, which was introduced by a post-Constitution amendment of 1950 the proviso to Art 276(2) had no application and therefore the le~ in excess of Rs. 250 per annum could not be saved by the proviso if the . . ' tax was 1~ respect of professions, trades etc. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, however, upheld the validity of the tax following the Full Bench judgment in R. R. Engineering Co. (supra) .\n\n. Before u~ also, the main controversy centred round the application of Article 276, the contention being that the imposition of the impugned tax in excess of Rs. 250 per annum is invalid. It was urged\n\nb~ !'fr E. C. Agarwala, who appears on behalf of the appellant in Cml Appeal No. 564of1973, that although Entry 60 in List II empowers\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [ l980] 3 S.C.lt\n\nState Legislatures to levy tax on professions, trades, callings and emp- . loyments, the exercise of that power is necessarily limited by Article 276(2) of the Constitution. The constitutional limitation, according to the learned counsel, contained in Article 276(2) must be given its full effect and that limitation cannot be transgressed by the State Legislature by adopting the subterfuge of imposing a consolidated tax. by clubbing-up two or more entries in List II. Counsel further contended that the State Legislature cannot over-reach its taxing power by making an rtificial definition of words and expressions used in the legislative entries. Just as it cannot, by an artificial definition of 'sale of goods', exercise a power to legislate in respect of a subject matter outside its sphere, it cannot exercise the power to levy a tax on 'circumstances' by an artificial and colourable understanding of that expression so as to acquire the power to impose a tax on inclilme.\n\nLastly, it was contended by Shri Agarwala, and by Shri Y ogeshwar Prasad who appears in thl' companion appeal, that the power to levy a tax oa circumstances not being incidental to the power to tax professions, trades, etc. the doctrine of pith and substance had noapplication and could not save the impugned tax on circumstances and property.\n\nThe nature and validity of the tax on 'circumstances and property' have agitated the minds of the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court for a long time, as is evident from various Full Bench judgments, .which are not quite consistent with one another, and some of which. have even taken conflicting positions. In some cases decided by single Judges or Division Benches, the view was taken that the tax on 'circumstances and property' is a tax on 'income'. (Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd.\n\nv. District Board of Allahabad;(l) Western U. P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. Etawah v. Town Area Jaswant Nagar(\") and Raghubir Singh v. Town Area Committee.(3).\n\nThe correct position is, however, the one which was pointed out by Malik C.J., in his Full Benc!L judgment in District Board of Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt(4).\n\nThe. learned Chief Justice elaborated the point by dwelling upon the basic distinction between a tax or> 'income' and a tax on 'circumstances and property'.\n\nIt is trite that income-tax can only be levied on income, that is to say, it can be !levied provided the assessee .. is in receipt of an income. . If there (s no income, there can be no income-tax. In contrast, the relevant consideration in the case~\n\n(!) 1955 All LJ 630.\n\n(2) AIR 1957 All 433.\n\n(3) 1961 All LJ 743.\n\n(4) l\\IR 1948 All 382 (FB).\n\n• '\n\nR. R. ENGINEERING CO. V. ZILA PARISHAD 9 (Chandrachud, C. J.) of a tax on 'circumstances and property\" can be the total turnover\n\nof the assessee from his trade or calling or the fact of his. having an interest in a property.\n\nThis consideration assumes relevance because the tax on circumstances and property is a tax, so to say, on the status of the assessee. In their endeavour to give to that tax a local name and habitation, in order perhaps to soften resistance to it, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court have describe<l it as a tax on 'Haisiat' which, as far and as best as translation ca11\n\ngo, means 'status'. For the levy of tax on circumstances and property, it is not necessary that there should be income in the hands of th~ assessee, in the sense of the Income-tax Act. The outgoings, the der\n\nductions, the carry-forward losses, the development repate and the like may leave no income in the hands of an assessee which could be\n\nbrought to tax under the Income-tax Act. But a person can be subjected to tax on circumstances and property in relation to his 'Haisiat' •.\n\nthafis to say, the status which he occupies by reason of the fact of the pursuit by him of a beneficial calling or the possession by him of an: interest in property. While determining the status of an individuar for the purposes of the tax on circumstances, the total turnover of his business or avocation may therefore be legitimately taken into consideration.\n\nIt may be, and is often so, that the tax on circumstances and property is levied on the basis of income which the assessee receives from his profession, trade, calling or property. That is, however, not conclusive on the nature of the tax. It is only as a matter of convenience that income is adopted as a yardstick or measure for assessing the tax. As. pointed out in Re a Reference under Govt. of fre/anif Act.(I) the measure of the tax is not a true test of the nature of the tax. Therefore, while determining the nature of a tax, though tlo.e standard on which the tax is levied may be a relevant consideration, it is not a conclusive consideration. One must have regard in such matters, as stated by the Privy Council in Governor-\n\nGeneral in Council v. Province of Madras,(2) not to the name of the tax but to its real nature, its pith and substance, which must determine into what category it falls. Applying these tests; the tax on 'circun:- stances' will faU in the category of a tax on \"a man's financial position, his status taken as a whole and includes what may not properly be comprised under the term 'property' and at the same time ought not to esape assessment.\" This quotation finds place in the judgment of Malik C.J. in the Full Bench decision in\n\n(!) [1936] A. C. 352.\n\n(2) 72 I. A. 91, 99.\n\n2-!89SCI/80\n\nt\\ .\n\nDistrict Board of Farrukhabad. (supra) The formulation, which the learned Chief Justice would appear to have extracted from anolh!r source, since he has put it within quotes, is in similar term; as that of this Court in Pandit Ram Narain r. The State of U.P.(1) In that case an ssessee challenged his liability to pay the tax on circumstances and property under section 14 (1) (f) of the U. P. Town Areas Act, 1914 on the greund that he did not reside within the jurisdiction of the Town Area Committee of Karhal and that Rule 3 framed under aeetion 39 (2) of the Act was invalid.\n\nThis Court, after referring approvingly to the decision in District Board of Farrukhabad, (supra) particularly to the staten~mt therein that the name given to a tax did not matter and that what had to be considered was the pith and substance of it, observed:\n\nA tax on 'circumstances and property' is a composite tax and the word 'circumstances' means a man's financial position, his status as a whole depending, among other things, on hts mcome from trade or business.\n\nThe Full Bench decision under appeal in the instant case, R. R.\n\nEngineering Co. (supra) has taken the same view of the nature of the tax on circumstances and property by holding that it is not a tax on income but is a tax on a man's financial position, his status as a whole, depending upon his income from trade or business. Earlier another Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had held in Zila Parishad Muzajfarnagar v. Jugal Kishore (1) that the tax on circumstances jand property is fundamentally distinct fromand cannot be equated with income tax, that it is not covered by item 82, List I, Schedule 7, of the C-Onstitution and that it is essentially a tax on status or financial position combined with a tax on property. These decisions correctly describe the natu<e of the tax on circumstances and property. We affirm the view ta1<en therein, especially that the aforesaid tax is not a tax on income.\n\nBut even though the impugned tax is not a tax on income, it is necessary to consider whether it is within the legislative competence of the State legislature and, if so, under which entry it would fall. The reason for such an inquiry is mainly two-fold: firstly, even if the tax on circumstances is within the legislative competence of the State legislature, being referable to entry 60 of List II which relates to taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments, it carmot exceed the limit of two hundred and fifty rupees per annum prescribed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution, unless the proviso to that article\n\n(I) [1956] S.C.R. 664, 673.\n\n(l) AIR 1969 All. 40.\n\n• '\n\nR. R. ENGINEERING CO. v. ZILA PARISHAD 11 (Chandrachud, C. J.) .; s attracted: secondly, if the tax is beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature, being a composite tax not liable to lbe split up into distinct component parts, it will be necessary to .examine whether the tax is saved by article 277 of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 276(1) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything in article 246, no law of the legislature of a State relating to taxes for the benefit of the State or of a municipality, district board, local board or other local authority therein in respect of professions, tra- .<Jes, callings or employments shall be invalid on the ground that it relates to a tax on income. By clause (2) of that Article, the total amount 1'.)ayable in respect of any one person to the State or to any one municipality, district board, local board or other local authority in the State by way of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments shall not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees per annum. The proviso to this clause says that if in the financial year immediately preceding the commencement of this Constitution there was in force in the case of any State or any such municipality, board or authority a tax on profes- 1lions, trades, callings or employments the rate, or the maximum rate of which exeeded two hundred and fifty rupees per annum, such tax may .continue to be levied until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament by law, and any law so made by Parliament may be made either generally or in relation to any specified States, municipalities, boards or authorities.\n\nEntry 49 of List II Seventh Schedule, relates to \"taxes on lands and buildings\" while Entry 60 of the same list relates to \"taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments\". Having already consider- ed the true nature of the tax on circumstances and property, we are of the opinion that it is, in any event and at the least, referable to Entries 49 and 60 of List II. The profession, trade, calling or employment which a person pursues and the lands and buildings which he owns determine the status which he occupies. The impugned tax is a composite tax one of its components being the 'circumstances' of the assessee. By 'circumstances' is meant his financial position, his status as a whole which depends, inter a/ia, on his income from his lands and building~ .and from his trade or calling. That is the view which was taken by a Full Bench 0f the Allahabad High Court in Zila Parishad, Muzaffar- 41agar & Anr. v. lugal Kishore Ram Swarup and Anr. (supra). Broome, J. who spoke for the court in that case observed thatit wasclearfrom the very nomenclature of the tax that it was of a composite character and .consisted of two components : a tax on property and a tax on circum- 'Stances. The tax on property was confined to immovable property and\n\nfell within the jurisdiction of the Statel.egislature by virtue of Item 49 . of the State List whiie; the tax on circumstances, that is to say, status or financial position, meant the tax on man's trade, business, profession or employment which was covered by Item 60 of the State List.\n\nThis question was also considered by a Special Bench consisting of Five Judges of the Allahabad High Conrt in The Notified Area Committee and Anr. v. Sri Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar(l).\n\nMr. Justice.S.N. Dwivedi who delivered the Judgment of the Special Bench traced t.he entire history of the impugned tax in reference to three periods : (!) the period prior to the 1935 Constitution Act; (2)· the period between 1935 and 1950; and (3) the post-Constitution period. After a careful examination of the nature of the tax the, learned Judge summed up the position thus :\n\nTo sum up, the history of the tax on circumstances and. property after 1935 definitely shows that it was not a distinct and separate impost. The Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution treat it as a composite tax as its name suggests. As its constituents are already covered by one or the other entry in the legislative Lists, it is not enumerated as a category in the Lists as it was enumerated in the White Paper.\n\nThe conclusion to which the Special Bench came was that a tax on cir-. cumstances and property is a composite tax, that its components are varied, but that two of such components are firstly a tax on trades, callings, professions and employments and secondly, a tax on lands and buildings. In coming to this conclusion, reliance was placed by the learned Judge on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pandit Ram Narain (supra) and that of the Full Bench in the District I /3oard of Farrukhabad (supra). But the amplification of the legislative authority which the Special Bench made is significant. It did not say as Broome, J. said in the Full Bench decision in the Zi/a Parishad, Muzaffarnagar\n\n(supra) that the tax on circumstances and property is referable only to two entries in List II namely, Entries 49 and 60. According to the Special Bench, the tax was wide enough to cover certain other items in List II, like Item 58 which relates to \"taxes on animals and boats\".\n\nWe are of the opinion that the Special Bench was right in coming to this conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm its view that the tax on cir, cumstances and property is referable to items 49 and 60 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, and amongst other items, to item 58 of that Lis~ The validity of the tax has therefore to be upheld.\n\n(!) A.l.R. 1970 All. 561 (F.B.).\n\nR. R. ENGINEERING CO. V. ZILA PARISHAD 13 ( Chandrachud, C. !. ) While doing so, we would like to utter a word of caution. The fact that one of the components of the impugned tax, namely, the component of 'circumstances' is referable to other entries in addition to Entry 60, should not be construed as conferring an unlimited charter on the local authorities to impose disproportionately excessive levies on the assessees who are subject to their jurisdiction. An excessive levy on circumstances will tend to blur the distinction between a tax on income and a tax on circumstances. Income will then cease to be a mere measure or yardstick of the tax and will become the very; subjectmatter of the tax. Restraint in this behalf will be a prudent prescription for the local authorities to. follow.\n\nAll that remains to be done is to express our inability to accept •as correct the view taken by Mr. Justice R. S. Pathak and Mr.\n\nJustice M. H. Beg in R.R. Engineering Co. (supra)that by reason of the\n\nfact that the circumstances and property tax!is a'.composite tax'.and; since\n\nthe element of 'property' necessarily enters into that composition, the tax cannot be identified as a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments. Our conclusion that the tax is referable, inter alia, to entries 49 and 60 of List II must necessarily result in the rejection of that view. The learned Judges were of the opinion, with which we are respectfully unable to agree, that since the tax on circumstances and property did not find place as an entry expressly enumerated in any of the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule, it falls under the residuary entry, namely, Entry 97 of List I. On that basis they held that Article 277 of the Constitution would save the tax since it; was within the competence of the Parliament to impose it. In the view that we have taken, namely, that the impugned tax falls within the competence of the State\n\nLegislature by virtue of entries 49 and 60, inter a/ia, of List II, this part of the reasoning of the learned Judges has to be rejected. It is unnecessary and in fact erroneous to take resort to Article 277 of the <Constitution for the purpose of saving the tax on circumstances and pro- perty. The mere name of a tax does not bear on legislative competence and the absence of express enumeration of a tax by a particular name will not justify the tracing of legislative authority to the residuary entry. What is true in other jurisdictions is true in this branch of law also, namely, that one must have regard to the substance of the matter and not to the form or label.\n\nWe may [also mention that in so far as the Town Area Committees are concerned, Article 277 will not save the impugned tax since it was levied by the Town Area Committee in pursuance of the power conferred 'by clause (f) of section 14 of the Town Areas Act, which was intro-\n\n.. duced by a post-Constitution amendment. We accept the reasoning\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.Rc\n\nA of Mr. Justice S. N. Dwivedi in The Notified Area Committee,\n\n(supra) by which the Special Bench expressed its disagreement with the view taken by the two learned Judges in R. R. Engineering Co.\n\n(supra) in regard to the application of Article 277 on the basis. 1 that the residuary entry is attracted.\n\nB For these reasons we uphold the validity of the tax on circumstances and property in both the appeals and dismiss the appeals with.costs.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 123, "entities": [{"text": "R. R. ENGINEERING CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. R. Engineering Company", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ZILA PARISHAD, BAREILLY & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ZILA PARISHAD, BAREILLY & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 10, 1980\n\n:{Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J., V. R. KRISHNA IYER, N. L. UNTWALIA,\n\nP. N. SHINGHAL AND A. D. KoSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KoSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 178, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Zila Parishads Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 205, "end_char": 228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 396, "end_char": 407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zila Parishads Act 1961", "statute": "Zila Parishads Act 1961"}}, {"text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 415, "end_char": 440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Antarim Zila Parishads", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 673, "end_char": 695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting under the power conferred by section 108 of the District Boards Act, 1922 the District Board, Bareilly imposed \"Circumstances_ and Property\n\nTax\" on persons according to their circumstances and property, Jn 1958 the .powers and functions of the District Boards were vested in or were transfer- -red to the Antarim Zila Parishads and later they were transferred to the Zila 'Parishads constituted under the U.P. Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act 1961."}}, {"text": "Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 778, "end_char": 821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1909, "end_char": 1920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Areas Committee Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2045, "end_char": 2075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2394, "end_char": 2405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Areas Committee Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Areas Committee Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Article 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Areas Committee Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Areas Committee Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "AIR 1969 All 40", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4633, "end_char": 4648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rpference under Government of Ireland Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5945, "end_char": 5956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. ZILA PARISllAD 3 ( Chandrachud, C. l.)\n\n3.", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Seventh\n\nSchedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6416, "end_char": 6433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6532, "end_char": 6543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7140, "end_char": 7156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Ashoke Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "Y ogeshwar Prasad"}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Ashoke Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Ashoke Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant in C.A. No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "Ashoke Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7186, "end_char": 7203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Ashoke Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7213, "end_char": 7225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Ashoke Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7266, "end_char": 7279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E. C. Agarwal a for the Appellant in C.A. 564/73.", "canonical_name": "E. C. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "K. C. Agarwa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7318, "end_char": 7330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. Agarwa/a and M. M. L. Srivastava for the Respondent in\n\nC.A. 1528/70.", "canonical_name": "E. C. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "M. M. L. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7337, "end_char": 7356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. Agarwa/a and M. M. L. Srivastava for the Respondent in\n\nC.A. 1528/70."}}, {"text": "J. P. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7395, "end_char": 7406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and S. K. Jain for the Respondent in C.A. 564/73."}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7411, "end_char": 7421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. P. Goyal and S. K. Jain for the Respondent in C.A. 564/73."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7502, "end_char": 7513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J .-These are two appeals from Uttar Pradesh involving the validity of a levy which bears the somewhat unusual name of 'Circumstances and Property Tax'.", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7757, "end_char": 7786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. R. Engineering Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7967, "end_char": 7992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts leading to Civil Appeal 1528 of 1970 are as follows-:-\n\nThe appellant M/s. R. R. Engineering Company is a partnership firm engaged jn the business of manufacture and sale of machinery, machine tools and as structural engineers.", "canonical_name": "R. R. Engineering Company"}}, {"text": "Clutterbukganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8157, "end_char": 8171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its registered office is situated at Clutterbukganj which was at one time within the local ."}}, {"text": "section 108", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8310, "end_char": 8321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8329, "end_char": 8354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 18, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8415, "end_char": 8432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 dated February 18, 1928 decided to impose the 'Circumstances and Property Tax' on per- ."}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8570, "end_char": 8581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "the District Boards Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "March 10, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8656, "end_char": 8670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 7 framed under section 172 of the Act for assessment and collection ol the said tax was published on March 10, 1928, providing for the maximum assessment of Rs."}}, {"text": "November 29, 1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8783, "end_char": 8800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later by a Noti- B fication dated November 29, 1933 the State Government directed under section 114(d) of the Act that the total amount of tax on circumstances and property imposed by a District Board on any single assessee shall not in any year exceed the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 114(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8837, "end_char": 8851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "the District Boards Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "April 20, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9030, "end_char": 9044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 20, 1958 the U. P. Antarim Zila Parishad Ordinance -C 1958 was enacted by the State Government, providing for the establishment of Antarim Zila Parishads for the internal administrationJof local self-Government in rural areas, thereby facilitating the establishment of Zila Parishads for the co-ordinated administration of affairs concerning economic and social planning and of local self-Government in the various Districts ofUttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Antarim Zila Parishad Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9055, "end_char": 9086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ofUttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9461, "end_char": 9476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 20, 1958 the U. P. Antarim Zila Parishad Ordinance -C 1958 was enacted by the State Government, providing for the establishment of Antarim Zila Parishads for the internal administrationJof local self-Government in rural areas, thereby facilitating the establishment of Zila Parishads for the co-ordinated administration of affairs concerning economic and social planning and of local self-Government in the various Districts ofUttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Antarim Zita Parishad Act 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9519, "end_char": 9549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9571, "end_char": 9609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 274", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9638, "end_char": 9649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act", "statute": "Kshetra Samitis and Zila Parishads Act"}}, {"text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9673, "end_char": 9698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Antarim Zita Parishads Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9792, "end_char": 9818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 119", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10100, "end_char": 10111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Antarim Zita Parishads Act", "statute": "Antarim Zita Parishads Act"}}, {"text": "Kshetra Samitis and Zita Parishads F Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10125, "end_char": 10170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Zita Parishads", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10176, "end_char": 10190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 119 of the U. P. Kshetra Samitis and Zita Parishads F Act 1961, the Zita Parishads were empowered to impose the 'Circumstances and Property Tax'."}}, {"text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10388, "end_char": 10413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 121", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10582, "end_char": 10593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "the District Boards Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10737, "end_char": 10748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Boards Act, 1922", "statute": "the District Boards Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "District Boards Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10756, "end_char": 10781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11441, "end_char": 11464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,000/- for the year 1965-66, filed Writ Petition 37of1967 in the High Court of Allahabad to challenge the constitutional validity of that tax."}}, {"text": "R. S. Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench consisting of Mr. Justice R. S. Pathak, Mr. Justice M. H. Beg and Mr. Justice H; C. P. Tripathi dismissed the Writ Petition but granted certificate to the appellant to appeal to this Court under Articles 132(1) and !"}}, {"text": "M. H. Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11694, "end_char": 11703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench consisting of Mr. Justice R. S. Pathak, Mr. Justice M. H. Beg and Mr. Justice H; C. P. Tripathi dismissed the Writ Petition but granted certificate to the appellant to appeal to this Court under Articles 132(1) and !", "canonical_name": "M. H. Beg"}}, {"text": "H; C. P. Tripathi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11720, "end_char": 11737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench consisting of Mr. Justice R. S. Pathak, Mr. Justice M. H. Beg and Mr. Justice H; C. P. Tripathi dismissed the Writ Petition but granted certificate to the appellant to appeal to this Court under Articles 132(1) and !"}}, {"text": "Articles 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11837, "end_char": 11852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14([)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12133, "end_char": 12146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12160, "end_char": 12179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Munsir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12590, "end_char": 12596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, Munsir, on the\n\ngiound that the tax on circumstances and property was in truth and substance a tax on income and since, prior to the Constitution, it was not lawful for the Town Area Committee to levy it, it was not saved by Article 277 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12815, "end_char": 12826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Area Act, 1914", "statute": "Town Area Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Mainpuri", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12934, "end_char": 12955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal filed by the Committee against that judgment was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Mainpuri, but in Second Appeal 2859 of 1966, the High Court of Allahabad by its judgment dated November 29, 1972, took a contrary view, allowed the Committee's appeal and directed the dismissal of the appellant's suit."}}, {"text": "November 29, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13042, "end_char": 13059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal filed by the Committee against that judgment was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Mainpuri, but in Second Appeal 2859 of 1966, the High Court of Allahabad by its judgment dated November 29, 1972, took a contrary view, allowed the Committee's appeal and directed the dismissal of the appellant's suit."}}, {"text": "R. R. Engineering Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13685, "end_char": 13706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tt.e three learned Jtdges \\\\l:o ccnstituted the Full Bench of the High Court in R. R. Engineering Co.\n\n(supra) delivered separate judgments,."}}, {"text": "Article 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14140, "end_char": 14154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14930, "end_char": 14941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15293, "end_char": 15299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Pathak held that the tax on circumstances and property is a composite tax and although a person's status and property are two intertwined strands which enter into the composition of the tax, the tax cannot be considered as consisting of two distinct taxes under a single denomination."}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16130, "end_char": 16138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16359, "end_char": 16375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.H. Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16580, "end_char": 16588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U Justice M.H. Beg largely shared the view of Justice Pathak that the tax on circumstances and property was a composite tax and not merely a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments and therefore,\n\n....\n\n• ,., .", "canonical_name": "M. H. Beg"}}, {"text": "Art. 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16880, "end_char": 16891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17357, "end_char": 17365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tripathi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17415, "end_char": 17423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tripathi, J. followed\"an\"earlier Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court and held that the tax on:circumstances and property was in the nature of a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17475, "end_char": 17495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tripathi, J. followed\"an\"earlier Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court and held that the tax on:circumstances and property was in the nature of a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments."}}, {"text": "Art. 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17653, "end_char": 17664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17950, "end_char": 17960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "276(2) would, therefore, be .attracted, but the proviso to that article saved the imposition of the tax\n\neven if it was in excess of Rupees two hundred and fifty per annum because the tax was in force in the financial year immediately pre- -oeding the co=encement of the Constitution and the Parliament had not by law made any provision to the contrary."}}, {"text": "section 14(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18746, "end_char": 18759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Areas Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18772, "end_char": 18786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18865, "end_char": 18875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Areas Act", "statute": "Town Areas Act"}}, {"text": "Article 276", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19266, "end_char": 19277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Areas Act", "statute": "Town Areas Act"}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19405, "end_char": 19419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fr E. C. Agarwala, who appears on behalf of the appellant in Cml Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "E. C. Agarwala"}}, {"text": "Article 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19713, "end_char": 19727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Town Areas Act", "statute": "Town Areas Act"}}, {"text": "Article 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19827, "end_char": 19841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20591, "end_char": 20599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, it was contended by Shri Agarwala, and by Shri Y ogeshwar Prasad who appears in thl' companion appeal, that the power to levy a tax oa circumstances not being incidental to the power to tax professions, trades, etc."}}, {"text": "Y ogeshwar Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20613, "end_char": 20630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, it was contended by Shri Agarwala, and by Shri Y ogeshwar Prasad who appears in thl' companion appeal, that the power to levy a tax oa circumstances not being incidental to the power to tax professions, trades, etc.", "canonical_name": "Y ogeshwar Prasad"}}, {"text": "Malik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21626, "end_char": 21631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The correct position is, however, the one which was pointed out by Malik C.J., in his Full Benc!L judgment in District Board of Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt(4)."}}, {"text": "AIR 1957 All 433", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22153, "end_char": 22169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23007, "end_char": 23021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23208, "end_char": 23222, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25381, "end_char": 25391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Town Areas Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25413, "end_char": 25433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karhal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25525, "end_char": 25531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra) The formulation, which the learned Chief Justice would appear to have extracted from anolh!r source, since he has put it within quotes, is in similar term; as that of this Court in Pandit Ram Narain r. The State of U.P.(1) In that case an ssessee challenged his liability to pay the tax on circumstances and property under section 14 (1) (f) of the U. P. Town Areas Act, 1914 on the greund that he did not reside within the jurisdiction of the Town Area Committee of Karhal and that Rule 3 framed under aeetion 39 (2) of the Act was invalid."}}, {"text": "District Board of Farrukhabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25660, "end_char": 25689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court, after referring approvingly to the decision in District Board of Farrukhabad, (supra) particularly to the staten~mt therein that the name given to a tax did not matter and that what had to be considered was the pith and substance of it, observed:\n\nA tax on 'circumstances and property' is a composite tax and the word 'circumstances' means a man's financial position, his status as a whole depending, among other things, on hts mcome from trade or business."}}, {"text": "R. R.\n\nEngineering Co.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26130, "end_char": 26152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Full Bench decision under appeal in the instant case, R. R.\n\nEngineering Co. (supra) has taken the same view of the nature of the tax on circumstances and property by holding that it is not a tax on income but is a tax on a man's financial position, his status as a whole, depending upon his income from trade or business.", "canonical_name": "R. R. Engineering Company"}}, {"text": "Schedule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26671, "end_char": 26681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 276(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27538, "end_char": 27552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27971, "end_char": 27982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 276(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28005, "end_char": 28019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28082, "end_char": 28093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29325, "end_char": 29341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Broome", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30272, "end_char": 30278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Broome, J. who spoke for the court in that case observed thatit wasclearfrom the very nomenclature of the tax that it was of a composite character and .consisted of two components : a tax on property and a tax on circum- 'Stances."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Conrt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30937, "end_char": 30957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was also considered by a Special Bench consisting of Five Judges of the Allahabad High Conrt in The Notified Area Committee and Anr."}}, {"text": "Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar(l", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31005, "end_char": 31034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Sri Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar(l)."}}, {"text": "S.N. Dwivedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31050, "end_char": 31062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Dwivedi who delivered the Judgment of the Special Bench traced t.he entire history of the impugned tax in reference to three periods : (!)", "canonical_name": "S. N. Dwivedi"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31566, "end_char": 31595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32233, "end_char": 32246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to this conclusion, reliance was placed by the learned Judge on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pandit Ram Narain (supra) and that of the Full Bench in the District I /3oard of Farrukhabad (supra)."}}, {"text": "Pandit Ram Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32250, "end_char": 32267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to this conclusion, reliance was placed by the learned Judge on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pandit Ram Narain (supra) and that of the Full Bench in the District I /3oard of Farrukhabad (supra)."}}, {"text": "Farrukhabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32331, "end_char": 32342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In coming to this conclusion, reliance was placed by the learned Judge on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pandit Ram Narain (supra) and that of the Full Bench in the District I /3oard of Farrukhabad (supra)."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33038, "end_char": 33054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.R. Engineering Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34141, "end_char": 34161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that remains to be done is to express our inability to accept •as correct the view taken by Mr. Justice R. S. Pathak and Mr.\n\nJustice M. H. Beg in R.R. Engineering Co. (supra)that by reason of the\n\nfact that the circumstances and property tax!is a'.composite tax'.and; since\n\nthe element of 'property' necessarily enters into that composition, the tax cannot be identified as a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34788, "end_char": 34804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34899, "end_char": 34910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35317, "end_char": 35328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35874, "end_char": 35885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36018, "end_char": 36028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.Rc", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36138, "end_char": 36175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accept the reasoning\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.Rc\n\nA of Mr. Justice S. N. Dwivedi in The Notified Area Committee,\n\n(supra) by which the Special Bench expressed its disagreement with the view taken by the two learned Judges in R. R. Engineering Co.\n\n(supra) in regard to the application of Article 277 on the basis."}}, {"text": "S. N. Dwivedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36194, "end_char": 36207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accept the reasoning\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.Rc\n\nA of Mr. Justice S. N. Dwivedi in The Notified Area Committee,\n\n(supra) by which the Special Bench expressed its disagreement with the view taken by the two learned Judges in R. R. Engineering Co.\n\n(supra) in regard to the application of Article 277 on the basis.", "canonical_name": "S. N. Dwivedi"}}, {"text": "Article 277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36415, "end_char": 36426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_207_223_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "DR. RAJENDRA PRAKASH SHARMA v.\n\nGY AN CHANDRA & ORS.\n\nMarch 27, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK. JJ.]\n\nAdministration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 (31 of 1950). Sections 2(d), 7, 7A 8, 28 a11d 46 & Displaced Persom (Compe11Sation a11d Rehabilitation) Act 1954 (44 of 1954) Sections 2(c), 22, 23, 24 a11d 27 Property acquired undier section 12 and auctioned under section 20 of 1954 Act-Property not declared by Custodian as evacuee property under section 7 of 1950\n\nAct-Jurisdiction of Civil Court to determine question whether property declared evacuee property-Section 46 of 1950 Act whether a bar-Section 27 of 1954 Act-Whether applicable.\n\nThe appellant field a suit in the civil ccurt alleging that the house in dispute was owned by one Abdul Rashid and that he had let out the house to his father who was paying rent to him, that Abdul Rashid had migrated to Pakistan and the house was declared evacuee property. Later, the house was put to auction on January 29, 1969 under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation a.nd Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was purchased by him anti that the sale certificate was also issued. He further pleaded that the respondents-defendants had also filed suit No. 67 of 1970 for ejectment and arrears of rent against his father, that the suit was decreed on May 10, 1971, and that in pursuance of that decree they tried to dispossess him, and as he was not impleaded in the ejectment suit, he was not bound by that decree. The appellant claimed a declaration of his titlC to the property and prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from dispossessing him in execution of the ejectment decree.\n\nThe respondents resisted the suit, denied that the property in dispute was ever declared evacuee property or that it was ever acquired under the provisions of the Act of 1954, and asserted that the appropriate authorities never passed any order under section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property\n\nAct, 1950 declaring the property to be evacuee property. The 1st defendant F further pleaded that Abdul Rashid had only ! /6th share in the house in question which was purchased by his father and therefore the respondents are exclusive owners of the House. The said Abdul Rashid had migrated to Pakistan in the year 1967 long after he had transferred his interest and share in the house in question and that the father of the appellant had in collusion with the Custodian Department prepared fictitious proceedings relating to the sale of the house in question, that the Custodian Department had no juris- G diction to declare the property as evacuee property, much less could they sell it under the Act of 1954, and that the auction if any held, was a nullity having been brought about by misrepresentation and fraud.\n\nThe trial court held that Abdul Rashid was not the owner of the house in question, that the entire proceedings taken by the Custodian Department were illegal and without jurisdiction and the pla.intiff did not acquire any title by virtue of the sale held by the Authorities under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1954, and accordingly dismissed the suit.\n\nOn appeal, the Additional District Judge, affirmed the findings of the trial court and held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred by section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and that it could go into the question whether or not the matter had been adjudicated upon by the authorities under that Act.\n\nIt found that no inquiry, as con templated under section 7 of the 19 50 Act was held and no Notification was issued by the Authorities under that Act, declaring the suit property to be evacuee property. It further held that Abdul Rashid had nG title or interest, whate,•er, in the house in question after lluly 31, 1953, when, in accordance with the decree of the Civil Court in partition Suit No. 289 of 1953, Phool Chand had deposited the value of I/6th share of Abdul Rashid in this property.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the Second Appeal preferred by the appellant affirming the concurrent findings of the conrt below. It also held that Abdul Rashid was in India much after the repeal of UP Ordinance No. I of 1949 and consequently there was no question of the property vesting automatically in the Custodian under the aforesaid Ordinance.\n\nIn the appeal to this court it was contended on behalf of the appellants :\n\n(1) in view of th'e decision in Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab & Ors.\n\nv. Jatran Begum [1967] 3 SCR 736 and section ~6 of the 1950 Act, the D Civil Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question whether the suit property or any right or interest therein is or is not evacuee property,\n\n(2) the sale of the suit property had been effected in favour of the appellant under section 20 of the 1954, Act, after it had been acquired by the Central Government under section 12 of that Act, free from all encumberances and formed part of the compensation pool, (3) the order of its acquistion passed under section 12, and its sale under section 20 of the 1954 Act had become E final and conclusive, the respondents could not be allowed to go behind those orders and question their finality on the ground that the property has never been evacuee property vesting in the Custodian, because section 27 of the 1954 Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into this question.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHEW : I (i) Section 46 will not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the Custodian has never declared the property as evacuee property after taking proceedings under section 7 of the 1950 Act. [219 CJ\n\nCustodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab & Ors. v. Jafran Begum [1967] 3 S.C.R. 736 referred to and explained.\n\n(ii) Form a conjoint reading of section 7 & 8 of the 1950 Act it is, clear that the making of a declaration after inquiry under section 7 that the property is 'evacuee property' is a sine qua non for giving the Custodian dominion over the property.\n\nIf no proceeding is taken under section 7, there can be no vesting of the property in the Custodian. [216 Cl\n\n\nIn the instant case Abdul Rashid was throughout residing in India and personally managing the suit property and collecting its rent till 1963. He migrated or went away from India for good some time in 1963 or thereafter.\n\nTherefore, if the Custodian had not taken any proceedings under section 7\n\nR. P. SHARMA v. G. CHANDRA & ORS_. 209\n\nof the 1950 Act to declare the suit property as evacuee property before the 7th day of May, 1954, and no such proceedings were pending on May 7, 1954, the property of Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act, the power of the Custodian to do so having been terminated by section\n\n7A. [217 B-CJ\n\n(iii) It was for the plaintiffappellant to show by producing relevant notifications or other documentary evidence that the Custodian had taken proceedings and declared the suit property to be evacuee property in a.ccor dance with the provisions of section 7 or that such proceedings had been initiated earlier and were pending on the 7th day of May, 1954. Despite ample opportunity granted to the plaintiff he did not produce any such docu mentary evidence in the courts below. All that he showed was that Rehabi litation Authorities bad purporting to act under the 1954 Act sold the suit property to him and issued the sale certificate in his favour on April 1st,\n\n1969. [217 DJ\n\n(iv) Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of section 46 postulate that at the time when the question whether or not a property is evacuee property comes for adjudication the power of the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act of 1950 to determine the question is subsisting. That is to say, if at the point of time when the question arises, the power of the authorities cons tituted under this Act to adjudicate that question stands terminated or extin guished by the operation of section 7 A of the 19 54 Act, none of the clauses (a), (c) and (d) of section 46 will bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine that question, \\Vhich had not been decided by the Custodian during the period he had the power to determine it. l219 F-G]\n\n(v) Section 28 bas no application to the facts of the instant case because no order made by any of the authorities mentioned in that section is being called in question. Section 46, also, does not come in the way because no proceedings under section 7 of the 1950. Act to declare the suit house a.s evacuee property can be taken by the Custodian against Abdul Rashid. [219 H\n\n220 A]\n\n(vi) No notification under Sub-section (3) of section 7 published in the Official Gazette has been placed on the record. Nor was it sho\\vn that any proceedings initiated under section 7 of the Act to declare it evacuee property were pending on May 7, 1954, and the question of saving those proceedings under the Proviso to section 7 A does not arise. I220 B]\n\nIn the instant case Qazi Abdul Rashid was throughout resident of India till 1963 and was personally managing the suit house and collecting rent of\n\nit from the tenant. After May 7, 1954, therefore, the Custodian had no jurisdiction under the 1950 Act to declare the suit house as evacuee property.\n\nG The jurisdiction of the Courts below to go into this question was thus not barred by anything in sections 28 and 46 of the 1950 Act. [220 CJ\n\n2(i) Section 20 of the 1954 Act confers powers on the managing officer to transfer any property out of the compensation pool by sale or in any other manner indicated in clauses (b) to ( e) of that Section. The necessa.-y pre- requisite for sale is that the prope1ty must have been declared under section 7 of the 1950 Act to be evacuee property by the Custodian or it must be evacuee , property under the deeming provisions of any law which may be applicable to 1he case of the evacuee. In other words, only that property could be acquired\n\nunder section 12 and form part of the oompensation pool which satisfies the definition of \"evacuee property'\" given in section 2(c) of the 1954 Act. If the property was never evacuee property, as defined in section 2 ( c), it does not legally form part of the compensation pool and, therefore, cannot be disposed of under section 20 or the Rules framed under this~ statue.\n\n[220 C, 221 H~\n\n222 BJ\n\n(ii) The necessary prerequisite for acquiring property under section 12 is that it must be 'evacuee property' as defined in section 2(c) of the 1954 Act.\n\nIn the absence of this essential prerequisite the Central Government is not competent to acquire, that property under this section for throwing it into the compensation pool. This prerequisite or condition precedent, was lacking in the instant case. No notification published in the Official Gazette either undef sub-section ( 1) or sub-section (3) of section 12 appears to have been brought on the record of this case, nor attention drawn to any such.·\n\nnotifications. [221 F-GJ\n\n3. Section 27 of the 1954 Act is not attracted because the plaintiff, who filed the original suit and is now appellant in this appeal, is not questioning the finality of the order of the sale alleged to have been made by the manag .. ing officer.\n\nIt is the defendant-respondents who are resisting the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the sale is a nullity.\n\nIt could not be made under D this Act of 1954 for the reason that it was never declared evacuee property under section 7 of the Act and thus never formed part of the compensation pool. The vlords \"under this Act'' occuring in section 27 are significant.\n\nThey sho.w that those orders which are not made by any officer or authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act, but outside the provisions of this Act in excess of jurisdiction, can be. called in question in the civil court.\n\nThe language of section 27 is not as wide as that of section 46 of the 1950 E Act. [222 G-223 A]\n\n4. As Qazi Abdul Rashid remtained in India continuously upto 1963, no question of automatic vesting under the U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 could arise. That ordinance was not applicable to him at all. [214 H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 424 of 1979-1\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgmeut and Order dated 23-8-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 34/78.\n\nD. R. Gupta and B. V. Desai for the Appellant.\n\nB. R. Agarwala for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated August 23, 1978, whereby a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, dismissed the appeal of the appellant herein. It arises out of these circumstances.\n\nThe plaintiff, Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma, is the appellant before us. He filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahar, alleging that the house in dispute was owned by one Qazi Abdul Rashid, son of Qazi Abdul Raza~. Qazi Abdul Rashid had let out this house to Dr. Bhu Deo Sharma, father of the appellant, who was paying rent for the same to Qazi Abdul Rashid. He further alleged that the said Abdul Rashid had migrated to Pakistan and the house in dispute was declared evacuee property under the then existing law. Later on, it was put to auction on January 29, 19@ under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, and was purchased by the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1,000/-, and the appellant was declared purchaser of this property with effect from April, 1, 1969. Sale Certificate, dated March 19, 1969, was alsoissuedinhisfavour.\n\nHe further pleaded that the defendants-respondents had also filed Suit No. 67 of 1970 for ejectment and arrears of rent against the appellant's father, Bhu Deo Sharma. The suit was decreed on May 10, 1971, and that in pursuance of that decree they were trying to dispossess the plaintiff-appellant. He further stated that since he was not impleaded in the ejectment suit, he was not bound by that decree. On\n\nthese facts, the plaintiff-appellant claimed a declaration of his title to the property in question and further prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing him in execution of the said decree obtained by the defendants in Suit No. 67 of 1970.\n\nThe defendants resisted the suit. They denied that the property in dispute was ever declared evacuee property or that it was ever acquired under the provisions of the Act of 1954. They asserted that the appropriate authorities never passed any order under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act declaring this property to be evacuee property. The contesting defendant, Gyan Chandra, further pleaded that Qazi Abdul Rashid had only I/16th share in the house in question which was purchased by the defendants father (since deceased) and, therefore, the defendants are exclusive owners\n\n0f the house. Gyan Chandra further alleged that Qazi Abdul Rashid had migrated to Pakistan in the year 1967, long after he had kansferred his interest and share in the house in question; that Dr.\n\nBhu Deo Sharma, father of the appellant had in collusion with the Custodian Department, prepared fictitious proceedings relating to the sale of the house in question; that the Custodian Department had no jurisdiction to declare the property in suit as evacuee property, much less could they sell it under the Act of 1954. According to the defendant, the auction if any held, was a nullity having been brought about by misrepresentation and fraud.\n\nThe trial court held that Qazi Abdul Rashid was not the owner of\n\nthe house in question; that the entire proceedings taken by the Custo- H dian Department were illegal and without jurisdiction and the plaintiff did not acquire any title by virtue of the sale held 'by the Authorities\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nunder the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (No. 44 of 1954) (for short, called the 1954 Act). In the result, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit.\n\nOn appeal, the Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr affirmed the findings of the trial court. He held that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not barred by section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (No. 31 of 1950) (hereinafter called the 1950 Act) to go into the question whether or not the matter had been adjudicated upon by the Authorities under that Act. It found that no inquiry, as contemplated under Section 7 of Act 31 of 1950 was held and no Notification was issued by the Authorities under that Act, declaring the suit property to be evacuee property. It held that Abdul Rashid had no title or interest, whatever, in the house in question after July 31, 1953, when, in accordance with the decree of the Civil Court in the partition Suit No. 289 of 1953, Phool Chand had deposited Rs. 343/- regarding the value of !/6th share of Abdul Rashid in this property.\n\nOn the deposit of that amount, Phool Chand and his sons had become sole:owners of the property in question and the plaintiff's father became their tenant of the suit property.It was in that capacity that a decree for ejectment was passed against him and in favour of the respondents.\n\nIn the result, it was held that since the property had never been declared evacuee property after following the prescribed procedure under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the rights of the defendantsrespondents remained unaffected by the :auction held by the Custodian Department and the consequent issue of the sale certificate in favour of the plaintiff-appellant.\n\nThe High Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the two F courts below and dismissed the Second Appeal '.preferred by the plaintiff. It agreed with the lower appellate court that the auction in favour of the plaintiff-appellant was a nuJlity and wholly without jurisdiction and did not confer any rights on him because the suit property had never been declared as evacuee property in accordance with law. It also held that Abdul , Rashid was\"in India much after the repeal of the G U.P. Ordinance I of 1949 and consequently there was no question of the property vesting automatically in the Custodian under the aforesaid Ordinance. The High Court, however, granted six months' time to the plaintiff-appellant to deliver vacanfpossession of the suit house to the defendants-respondents without the intervention of the court.\n\nH After obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, the aggrieved plaintiff has now come in appeal before this Court.\n\nThe main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is A. two-fold : (a) In view of Section 46 of the 1950 Act, the Civilj Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question whetherthe suit property or any right or intere•t therein is or is not evacuee property . (Reliance for this contention has been placed on the decision of this Court in Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab and Ors. v. Jafran Begumr).\n\n(b) The sale of the suit property has been effected in favour of the appellant under Section 20 of the 1954 Act, after it_ had been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of that Act, free from all encumbrances, and formed part of the compensation pool. It will therefore, be presumed that prior to its acquisition under Section 12 of C the 1954 Act, it was evacuee property vesting in the custodian. The orders of its acquisition passed under Section;12 and its sale under Section 20 of the 1954 Act had become final and conclusive.\n\nThe respondent could not be allowed to go behind those orders and question their finality on the ground that the property.has never been evacuee property vesting in the custodian, because Section 27 of )) 1954 Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to go into this question.\n\nThe only remedy of the defendants-respondents is to claim compensa tion under the 1954 Act. Reference in this connection'.has been made to N. S. Gujral v. Custodian of Evacuee Property and Anr.(2)]\n\nBefore dealing !with these contentions, some basic facts concur- .E rently found by all the courts below may be noticed.\n\nQazi Abdul Rashid obtained a money decree in suit No. 523 of 1935 against one Ami Chand S/o Phool Chand and brother of present respondents (original defendants 1 to 4). In execution of that decree, he purchased with the permission of the court, the share of Ami Chand in 1937. At that time, a partition suit No. 3 of 1931 amongst the family mem hers of the said Ami Chand was pending in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr. Qazi Abdul Rashid did not join as a party in the said partition suit. However, he instituted Suit\n\nNo. 452 of 1949 against the said Phool Chand and others in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for partition and separate possession of his share. The suit was contested. The Munsif decreed the suit hold ing that Qazi Abdul Rashid had l/16thshare in the house in question and one other shop. Applying the provisions of Section 4 of the Partition Act, the Munsif evaluated Qazi Abdul Rashid's !/16th share in the suit house at Rs. 343/- and directed the sale of that share.\n\n(1) [1967] 3. S.C.R. 736.\n\n(2) [1961!] J. S.r\"'.R. 497.\n\nFeeling aggrieved by the said decree, Qazi Abdul Rashid preferred Civil Appeal No. 289 of 1953. The First Appellate Court by its judgment, dated December 20, 1954 (Ex. A-2), partly allowed the appeal and modified the decree of the trial court in so far as it related to the shop. But it upheld the decree of the trial court in so far as it related to the house now in question, whereby Phool Chand defendant was required to deposit Rs. 343/- as the value of Qazi Abdul Rashid's share. In accordance with the decree affirmed by the First Appellate Court, Phool Chand on July 31, 1953 deposited Rs. 343/- (vide Ex.\n\nA-1) to the credit of Qazi Abdul Rashid, the then plaintiff in the Court. Qazi Abdul Rashid being aggrieved bythedecreeoftheFirst Appellate Court, preferred Second Appeal No. 235 of 1955 in the High Court. The High Court dismissed this appeal as abated by an order, dated February 25, 1959 (Ex. A-1), due to the failure of Qazi Abdul Rashid to take proper steps for substitution of the legal representatives of the then respondents 7 and II, who had died during the pendency of the appeal.\n\nDuring the pendency of the said litigation, Phool Chand and his two sons, Gyan Chand and Raghbur Sharan, instituted Suit No. 323 of 1953 in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for the recovery of the damages for use and occupation of the house in dispute against Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid. By a judgment dated September 30, 1959 (Ex. A-4) the trial court decreed that suit against Qazi Abdul Rashid.\n\nAggrieved by that judgment and decree, Qazi Abdul Rashid preferred Civil Appeal No. 461 of 1959 which was partly allowed by the First Appellate Court on December 21, 1960.\n\nThe trial court further found---and this finding has been upheld b) the First Appellate Court and the High Court that Abdul Rashid definitely remained in India at least till 1963, if not till 1965. Upto 1963, he was directly receiving rent from his tenant, the father of the present plaintiff-appellant, in respect of the suit house. This was held primarily on the basis of documentary evidence (Ex. A-,14/A).\n\nIn view of the fact that Qazi Abdul Rashid remained in India continuously upto 1963, no question of automatic vesting nnder the U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949, could arise. That Ordinance was not applicable to him at all. For our pnrpose, only the 1950 Act and the 1954 Act are relevant. It will, therefore, be worthwhile to notice, very briefly, the material provisions of these statutes.\n\n( l\n\nClause (d) of Sectiou 2 of the 1950 Act defines \"evacuee;\" this A -definition so far as material, reads: \"Evacuee means any persons-\n\n(i) who on account of the' setting up of the Dominions ofindia and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, leaves or has, on or after the 1st day of March, 1947, left any ploce in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part ofindia, or\n\n(ii) who is a resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan\n\nand who for that reason is unable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his proporty in any p1rt of the territories to which this Act extends, or whose property in any p1rt of the said territories has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or ........ \"\n\n(iii) to (iv) are not relevant for this case.\n\nClause (h) defines \"evacuee property\" to mean \"any property of an evacuee (whether held by him as owner or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or as a tenant or in any other capacity) and includes any property which has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after the 14th day of August 1947, by any mode of transfer which is not elfoctive by reason of the provisions contained in Section 40 :) but does not include ........ \" Sub-section (1) of Section 7 requires that where the Custodian is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of this Act, he may after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persni interested, and after holding such inquiry into the m1tter ai the ciru.nitanees of the case permit, pass an order deelaring a•w suoh prop\"ty to be evacuee property. Sub-section (3) of the Section peremptorily requires the Custodian to notify from ti:m to ti:n' bf p1',\\i01tin'in t'D OJicial Gazette or in such other manner as m1y be prc1cribe1, all proinrties declared by him to be evacuee properties under S; ib-section (1).\n\nRule 6 of the Rules framed under the 1950 Act requires that the notice to be served underjSection 7(1) on persons interested in the property proposed to be declared evacuee property shall be in Form I.\n\nSection 8 provides, \"Any property doclared to be evacuee property under Section 7 shall be d\"m'd to hive nsted in the Custodian for the State-\n\n( a) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in subclause (i) of clause {d) of Section 2, from the date on which\n\nhe leaves or left any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India;\n\n(b) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in subclause (ii) of clause (d) of Section 2, from the 15th day of August, 1947; and\n\n(c) in the case of any other property, from the date of the notice given under sub-section (I) of Section 7 in respect thereof. (The rest is not material).\"\n\nFrom a conjoint reading of Sections 7 and 8, it is clear that the making of a declaration after inquiry under Section 7, that the property is 'evacuee property' is a sine qua non for giving the Custodian dominion over the property. If no proceeding is taken under Section 7, there can be no vesting of the property in the Custodian. (See observations in Fazalbhoy v. Official Trustee of Maharashtra(l).\n\nThe other point to be noted is that in the case of an 'evacuee' falling under sub-clause (i) cf the ddinilicn cf 'evacuee', that is one, who on account of the things mentiLned in that sub-clause, leaves India or has left India on or after August 14, 1947, the vesting will date from the date he leaves India fer any outside destination. Jn the instant case, Qazi Abdul Rashid left India to settle in Pakistan long after August 14, 1947 (in 1963).\n\nSection 9 gives power to the Custodian to take possession of evacuee property which vests in him under Section 8.\n\nThen, there is Section 7 A which was inserted by the Administration of Evacuee Prcp<rty (Amendment) Act, 1954 (42 of 1954) with effect from May 7, 1954.\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in [this Act, no property' shall be declared toj be evacuee property on or after the 7th day of May 1954;\" This is made subject to two Provisions. Clause {a) of the First Proviso saves from the application of this Section any property in respect of which proceedings are pending on the 7th day of May, 1954 for declaring such property , to be evacuee property. Clause (b) of the Proviso saves from the bar of this Section property of any person who became an evacuee on or after the Jst day of March, 1947, and who on the 7th day of May, 1954 was resident in Pakistan.\n\nThe second Proviso lays de wn that no notice under Section 7 for declaring any property to be evacuee property with reference to Clause (b) of the preceding ?roviso shall be issued after the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Administration of Evacuee\n\n(l).[1979] 2 s.c.R..699 at_p. 712.\n\nProperty (Amendment Act, 1954). Then, there are three Explanations,\n\nA , which are not material for our purpose.\n\nIt is clear from the facts concurrently found in the' instant case that Qazi Atdul Rrshid was throughout residing in India and personally ncanagitg the rnit rroperty and collecting its rent till 1963. He migrated or went away from India for good sometime in 1963 or thereafter.\n\nTherefore, if the Custodian had not taken any proceedings under Section 7 of the 1950 Aot to declare the suit property as evacuee pro .. uerty before the 7th day of May 1954, and no such proceedings were pending on May 7, 1954, the property of Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act, the power of the Gusto\n\n<lian to do so having been terminated by Section 7A.\n\nIt was for the plaintiff-appellint to show by producing relevant notifications or other documentary evidence that the Custodian had taken proceedings and declared the suit property to be evacuee property in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 or that such proceedings had been initiated earlier and were pending on the 7th day\n\nbf May, 1954. Despite ample opportunity granted to the plaintiff, he did not produce any such documentary evidence in the courts below. 1 All that he showed was that the Rehabilitation Authorities had, purporting to act under the 1954 Act, sold the suit property to him and issued the sale certificate in his favour on April 1, 1969 .\n\n. .f.\n\nSection 24 gives a person aggrieved of an order made under E\n\nSection 7 by the Custodian a right of appeal.\n\nSection 27 confers power of revision on the Custodian-General to revise suo motu or on the application made to him, any order passed by the Custodian if it is not found to be legal or proper.\n\nSections 28 and 46 bar the jurisdiction of courts. Section 28 reads thus:\n\n\"Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Chapter, every order made by the Custodian-General, Custodian, Additiona Custodian, Authorised Deputy Custodian, Deputy Custodian or Assistant Custodian shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court by way of appeal or revisi<>n or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.\"\n\nSection 46 of the 1950 Act provides:\n\n\"Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil or revenue court shall have jurisdiction-\n\nF ,\n\n(a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether R any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not evacuee property; or 15-i 89SCJ /80\n\n(c) to question the legality of any action taken by the Custo\n\ndian-General or the Custodian under this Act, or\n\n(cl) in respect of any matter-which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to determine.\"\n\nThe scope of Sections 28 and 46 of the 1950 Act came up for consideration before this Court in Jafran Begum's case (ibid). The facts of that case were that a person who was in possession of a house inlndia, migrated to Pakistan. Notice was issued to his son under s.7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and after hearing him the Deputy Custodian declared the house to be evacuee property. Jafran Begum, who was the mother of the evacuee and on whom the notice under s.7 of the Act was not served, started proceedings before the Custodian, claiming that the owner of the house had executed a will bequeathing the property to her and so the property could not be declared evacuee property. That application was dismissed by the Custodian.\n\nWhen she failed before the authorities constituted under the Act, she filed a suit in the civil court basing Ii.er case on the will and prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the auth0rities from evicting her from the house. On the question of jurisdiction being raised, the High Court held that determination of a complicated question of law relating to title by authorities under the 1950 Act was not final and could be reopened in the civil court, and Section 46 did not bar the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain such a question. After examining the scheme of the 1950 Act, Wanchoo, C.J., speaking for the Bench constituted _by three learned Judges, laid down the law, thus:\n\n\"(Where) the question whether certain properties are evacuee properties has been decided under s. 7 etc., whether that decision is based on issues of fact or issues oflaw, jurisdiction -0f courts is clearly barred under S. 46(a).\n\nIt is difficult to see how a distinction can be drawn between decisions under S. 7 based on questions of fact and decisions based on questions -0f Jaw. The decision is made final whether based on issues of law or of fact by S. 28 and S. 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts in matters which are decided under S. 7 whatever may be the basis of decision, whether issues of fact or of law and whether simple or complicated.\"\n\n( Empha is supplied)\n\n-~-\n\n\" .......... S.46 is a complete bar to the jurisdiction of civil or revenue courts in any matter which can be decided under\n\nS. 7.\n\nThis conclusion is reinforced by the provision contained in S. 4(1) of the Act which provides that the Act overrides other Jaws and would thus override S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure on a combined reading of Ss.4,\n\n28 and 46. (But) ...... S. 46 or S. 28 cannot bar the B jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n'From the crucial Words underlined in the above extract, it is clear that\n\neven according to the rule of the above decision section 46 will not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court where the Custodian has never declared the property as evacuee property after taking proceedings under Section 7 of the 1950 Act.\n\nA Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Khalil Ahmed Khan\n\nv. Malka Mehar Nigar Begum(I), held that where the matter as to whether a property is evacuee property or not, has never been adjudi cated upon by the Custodian himself but he merely takes action on the basis of the judgment of the court of first instance, without deciding the matter for himself, that judgment being subject to correction by the court of appeal does not become final merely because the Custodian had taken action on the basis thereof. In such a case, the jurisdiction .of the civil court of appeal to determine the correctness of an adjudi-\n\n-cation already made by the civil court is not barred. This decision was .noticed by this Court in Jafran Begum (ibid) , and it was observed that to some extent, \"this case is in line with the view we have taken.\"\n\nThe matter can be looked at from another angle . also. Clauses {a), (c) and {d) of section 46 postulate that at the time when the question whether or not a property is evacuee property comes for adjudi- cation, the power of the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act of 1950 to determine that question is subsisting. That is to say, if at the point of time when the question arises, the power of the authorities constituted under this Act to adjudicate that question stands terminated or extiµguished by the operation of Section 7A of 1954, none of the clauses (a), (c) and (d) of section 46 will bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine that question which had not been decided by the custodian during the period, he had the power .to determine it.\n\nsection 28 has no application to the facts of the instant case because II no order made by any of the authorities mentioned in that section is\n\n(I) A.J.R. 1954 All. 362.\n\nbeing called in question. Section 46, also, does not come in the way because no proceedings under section 7 of the 1950 Act to declare the suit house as evacuee property were taken by the Custodian against Qazi Abdul Rashid. No notification under sub-section (3) of section 7 published in the Official Gazette has been placed on the record. Nor was it shown that any proceedings initiated under section 7 of the Act to declare it evacuee property were pending on May 7, 1954, and the question of saving those proceedings under the proviso to section 7 A does not arise.\n\nQazi Abdul Rashid was throughout a resident of India till 1963 and was personally managing the suit house and collecting rent of it from the tenant. After May 7, 1954, therefore, the Custodian had no jnrisdiction under the 1950 Act to declare the suit house as evacuee property. The jurisdiction of the courts below to go into this question was thus not barred by anything in sections 28 and 46 of the 1950-\n\nAct.\n\nD We, therefore, negative the first contention of the appellant.\n\nNow let us have a look into the relevant provisions of the 1954 Act.\n\nSection 2(c) of the 1954 Act defines \"evacuee property\" to mean any property which bas been declared or is deemed to have been declared as evacuee property under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. At this place, it may be recalled that the second part of the definition which contains a deeming provision has no application to the facts of the instant case because Qazi. Abdul Rashid was throughout residing in India till his migration to Pakistan in 1963.\n\nThat is to say, he had not become an evacuee before the repeal of the U.P. Ordinance No. I of 1949. This Ordinance is not relevant for the purposes of the present case. The first part of the definition, also, is not applicable because the suit house has never been declared as evacuee property under the 1950 Act.\n\nThe next provision is to be found in section 12, which reads as G follows:\n\n\"S. 12. Power to acquire evacuee property for rehabilitation of displaced persons.-\n\n(!) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary to acquire any evacuee property for a public purpose, being a purpose connected with the relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons, including payment of compensation\n\n--~-.\n\nto such persons, the Central Government may at any time acquire such evacuee property by publishing in the Official Gazette a notification to the effect that the Central Government has decided to acquire such evacuee property in pursuance of this section.\n\n(2) On the publication of a notification under subsection (1), the right, title and interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property specified in the notification shall, on and from the beginning of the date on which the notification is so published, be extinguished and the evacuee property shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.\n\n(3) It shall be lawful for the Central Government, if it so considers necessary, to issue from time to time the notifications referred to in sub-section (I)\n\nin respect of-\n\n(a) al! evacuee property generally; or\n\n(b) any class of .evacuee property; or\n\n(c) all evacuee property situated in a specified area; or ( d) any particular evacuee property.\n\n( 4) All evacuee property acquired under this section\n\nshal1 form part of the compensation pool.\"\n\nIt may be noted that the necessary prerequisite for acquiring property under Section 12 is that it must be 'evacuee property' as ilelined in section 2(c) of the 1954 Act. In the absence of this essential prerequisite, the Central Government is not competent to acquire that property under this section for throwing it into the compensation pool. This prerequisite or condition precedent, as already noticed, was lacking in the instant case. No notifications published in the Official Gazette either under sub-section (I) or sub-section (3) of section 12 appear to have been brought on the record of this case. Our attention was not drawn to any such notifications.\n\nThen, there is section 20 which confers power on the managing officer to transfer any property out of the compensation pool by sale\n\nor in any other manner indicated in clauses (b) to (e) of that section.\n\nAgain, the necessary prerequisite for sale is that the property must ll have been declared under section 7 of the 1950 Act to be evacuee property by the Custodian or it must be evacuee property under the\n\ndeeming provisions of any law which may be applicable to the case of the evacuee. In other words, only that property which was evacuee property could be acquired under section 12 and form part of the com- pensation pool which satisfies the definition of \"evacuee property\" given in section 2(c) of the 1954 Act. If the property was never evacuee property, as defined in section 2(c), it does not legally form part of the compensation pool and, therefore, cannot be disposed of under Section 20 or the Rules framed under this statute.\n\nThen, there are Sections 22, 23 and 24. Section 22 gives a right of appeal to a person aggrieved by an order of the Settlement Officer or a managing officer, to the Settlement Commissioner.\n\nAny person aggrieved by the order of the Settlement Commissioner/Additional Settlement Commissioner/Assistant Settlement Commissioner or a managing officer has been given a right to prefer an appeal to the Chief Settlement Col)lmissioner under Section 23. But no appeal is competent from any order passed in appeal under Section 22. Section 24 confers the power of revision on the Chief Settlement Commissioner to revise any order of the authorities mentioned in that Section, including that of the managing officer.\n\nSome argument was made by the learned counsel for the appel !ant that the only remedy of the respondents was to prefer an appeal or revision, under the aforesaid provisions of this Act and that, since they did not avail of the same under Section 27, the sale made by the managing officer in favour of the plaintiff-appellant has become final and cannot be questioned in any court. Section 27 reads thus :\n\n\"27. Finality of orders.-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or iluthority under this Act, including a managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.\"\n\nIt will be seen that Section 27 is not attracted because the plaintiff;.\n\nG who filed the original suit and is now coming before us by way of appeal, is not questioning the finality of the order of the sale alleged' to have been made by the managing officer. It is the defendant. respondents who are resisting the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the sale is a nullity. It could not be made under this Act of 1954 for the reason that it was never declared evacuee property under Sec- -U tion 7 of the Act and thus never formed part of the compensation pool.\n\nThe words \"under this Act\" occurring in Section 27 are significant.\n\nThey show that those orders which are not made by any officer or\n\nauthority in accordance with the provisions of this Act, but outside the provisions of this Act in excess of jurisdiction, can be called in question in the civil court. It may be noted that the language of Section 27 is not as wide as that of Section 46 of the 1950 Act.\n\nThe facts of N.S. Gujral (ibid) were entirely different. There, an Indian citizen held a money decree against a person who, subsequent to the passing of the decree, turned an evacuee. It was held that at no time, the decree-holder had any right whatsoever in the property which vested in the Central Government on the issue of the notification under Section 12. It was further held that though the decree-holder cannot claim to proceed against the property in suit or its income after the date on which it vested in the Central Government by virtue of the notification under Section 12, he can ask the Custodian to pay him out of the moneys lying with him on the date of such vesting if he can satisfy him in the manner provided in Section !0(2)(n) read with Section 10(1) of the 1950 Act. The ratio of that decision has no application to the facts of the pncent cas.\n\nThe second contention, also, being meritless. is over-ruled.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nBefore parting with this judgment, we may note here that at 1te conclusion of final arguments in this Court, counsel for the appellant represented that his client was making all efforts to search out and produce the Gazette Notification, whereby the suit property was declared and notified as evacuee property by the Custodian under subsection (3) of Section 7 of the 1950 Act. He wanted some time. We therefore, reserved this judgment to give the plaintiff-appellrnt a last chance to produce such a notification of which the Court could take judicial notice. But, he has failed to produce any such Gazette Notification. Instead, he has produced, what purports to be, a copy of an order, dated January 5, 1951, of the Assistant Custodian. This is not a copy of any Gazette Notification of which judicial notice, without formal p1oof, could be taken. We, therefore, do not find any good ground to reopen the case, and decline the appellant's request for permitting him to produce additional evidence at this very late stage.\n\nNVK.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 215, "entities": [{"text": "RAJENDRA PRAKASH SHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJENDRA PRAKASH SHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GY AN CHANDRA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GYAN CHANDRA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 2(d), 7, 7A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Sections 2(c), 22, 23, 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280, "end_char": 305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 370, "end_char": 380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 570, "end_char": 580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 607, "end_char": 617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "Abdul Rashid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 749, "end_char": 761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant field a suit in the civil ccurt alleging that the house in dispute was owned by one Abdul Rashid and that he had let out the house to his father who was paying rent to him, that Abdul Rashid had migrated to Pakistan and the house was declared evacuee property.", "canonical_name": "Abdul , Rashid"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 872, "end_char": 880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant field a suit in the civil ccurt alleging that the house in dispute was owned by one Abdul Rashid and that he had let out the house to his father who was paying rent to him, that Abdul Rashid had migrated to Pakistan and the house was declared evacuee property."}}, {"text": "January 29, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 965, "end_char": 981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, the house was put to auction on January 29, 1969 under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation a.nd Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was purchased by him anti that the sale certificate was also issued."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 988, "end_char": 998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "May 10, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1308, "end_char": 1320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "67 of 1970 for ejectment and arrears of rent against his father, that the suit was decreed on May 10, 1971, and that in pursuance of that decree they tried to dispossess him, and as he was not impleaded in the ejectment suit, he was not bound by that decree."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1926, "end_char": 1935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1979, "end_char": 1988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3336, "end_char": 3346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3575, "end_char": 3584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Act was held and no Notification was issued by the Authorities under that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3598, "end_char": 3675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "lluly 31, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further held that Abdul Rashid had nG title or interest, whate,•er, in the house in question after lluly 31, 1953, when, in accordance with the decree of the Civil Court in partition Suit No."}}, {"text": "Phool Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3937, "end_char": 3948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "289 of 1953, Phool Chand had deposited the value of I/6th share of Abdul Rashid in this property.", "canonical_name": "Phool Chand"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4185, "end_char": 4190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also held that Abdul Rashid was in India much after the repeal of UP Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "[1967] 3 SCR 736", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4539, "end_char": 4555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4834, "end_char": 4844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4922, "end_char": 4932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5061, "end_char": 5071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5092, "end_char": 5102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5343, "end_char": 5353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 3 S.C.R. 736", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5734, "end_char": 5753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7 & 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5814, "end_char": 5827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6064, "end_char": 6073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6429, "end_char": 6438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "7th day of May, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "209\n\nof the 1950 Act to declare the suit property as evacuee property before the 7th day of May, 1954, and no such proceedings were pending on May 7, 1954, the property of Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act, the power of the Custodian to do so having been terminated by section\n\n7A. [217 B-CJ\n\n(iii) It was for the plaintiffappellant to show by producing relevant notifications or other documentary evidence that the Custodian had taken proceedings and declared the suit property to be evacuee property in a.ccor dance with the provisions of section 7 or that such proceedings had been initiated earlier and were pending on the 7th day of May, 1954."}}, {"text": "Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6647, "end_char": 6712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section\n\n7A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6776, "end_char": 6787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "April 1st,\n\n1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7454, "end_char": 7470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that he showed was that Rehabi litation Authorities bad purporting to act under the 1954 Act sold the suit property to him and issued the sale certificate in his favour on April 1st,\n\n1969. ["}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7514, "end_char": 7524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7961, "end_char": 7970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8031, "end_char": 8041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8227, "end_char": 8237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8393, "end_char": 8403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8465, "end_char": 8474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8653, "end_char": 8662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8783, "end_char": 8792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 7, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8851, "end_char": 8862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor was it sho\\vn that any proceedings initiated under section 7 of the Act to declare it evacuee property were pending on May 7, 1954, and the question of saving those proceedings under the Proviso to section 7 A does not arise."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8930, "end_char": 8939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8987, "end_char": 9004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I220 B]\n\nIn the instant case Qazi Abdul Rashid was throughout resident of India till 1963 and was personally managing the suit house and collecting rent of\n\nit from the tenant.", "canonical_name": "Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid"}}, {"text": "sections 28 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9365, "end_char": 9383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9415, "end_char": 9425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9706, "end_char": 9715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9957, "end_char": 9967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10070, "end_char": 10082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10158, "end_char": 10167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10273, "end_char": 10283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10410, "end_char": 10420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10473, "end_char": 10485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10554, "end_char": 10572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of this essential prerequisite the Central Government is not competent to acquire, that property under this section for throwing it into the compensation pool."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10856, "end_char": 10866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10988, "end_char": 10998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11459, "end_char": 11468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11574, "end_char": 11584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11856, "end_char": 11866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11893, "end_char": 11903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12286, "end_char": 12306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "424 of 1979-1\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgmeut and Order dated 23-8-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "D. R. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12336, "end_char": 12347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Gupta and B. V. Desai for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. V. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12352, "end_char": 12363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Gupta and B. V. Desai for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12384, "end_char": 12398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. Agarwala for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12465, "end_char": 12473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated August 23, 1978, whereby a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, dismissed the appeal of the appellant herein."}}, {"text": "August 23, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12545, "end_char": 12560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated August 23, 1978, whereby a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, dismissed the appeal of the appellant herein."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Prakash Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12726, "end_char": 12749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff, Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma, is the appellant before us.", "canonical_name": "RAJENDRA PRAKASH SHARMA"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Bulandshahar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12815, "end_char": 12840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahar, alleging that the house in dispute was owned by one Qazi Abdul Rashid, son of Qazi Abdul Raza~. Qazi Abdul Rashid had let out this house to Dr. Bhu Deo Sharma, father of the appellant, who was paying rent for the same to Qazi Abdul Rashid."}}, {"text": "Qazi Abdul Raza~.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12920, "end_char": 12937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahar, alleging that the house in dispute was owned by one Qazi Abdul Rashid, son of Qazi Abdul Raza~. Qazi Abdul Rashid had let out this house to Dr. Bhu Deo Sharma, father of the appellant, who was paying rent for the same to Qazi Abdul Rashid.", "canonical_name": "Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid"}}, {"text": "Bhu Deo Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 13000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed a suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahar, alleging that the house in dispute was owned by one Qazi Abdul Rashid, son of Qazi Abdul Raza~. Qazi Abdul Rashid had let out this house to Dr. Bhu Deo Sharma, father of the appellant, who was paying rent for the same to Qazi Abdul Rashid."}}, {"text": "January 29, 19@", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13272, "end_char": 13287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, it was put to auction on January 29, 19@ under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, and was purchased by the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13294, "end_char": 13304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April, 1, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13519, "end_char": 13533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000/-, and the appellant was declared purchaser of this property with effect from April, 1, 1969."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13559, "end_char": 13573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sale Certificate, dated March 19, 1969, was alsoissuedinhisfavour."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14548, "end_char": 14557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gyan Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14678, "end_char": 14690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contesting defendant, Gyan Chandra, further pleaded that Qazi Abdul Rashid had only I/16th share in the house in question which was purchased by the defendants father (since deceased) and, therefore, the defendants are exclusive owners\n\n0f the house.", "canonical_name": "Gyan Chandra"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15823, "end_char": 15860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial court held that Qazi Abdul Rashid was not the owner of\n\nthe house in question; that the entire proceedings taken by the Custo- H dian Department were illegal and without jurisdiction and the plaintiff did not acquire any title by virtue of the sale held 'by the Authorities\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16059, "end_char": 16097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr affirmed the findings of the trial court."}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16207, "end_char": 16217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16474, "end_char": 16483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Notification was issued by the Authorities under that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16518, "end_char": 16575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 31, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16722, "end_char": 16735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It held that Abdul Rashid had no title or interest, whatever, in the house in question after July 31, 1953, when, in accordance with the decree of the Civil Court in the partition Suit No."}}, {"text": "Abdul , Rashid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18025, "end_char": 18039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also held that Abdul , Rashid was\"in India much after the repeal of the G U.P. Ordinance I of 1949 and consequently there was no question of the property vesting automatically in the Custodian under the aforesaid Ordinance.", "canonical_name": "Abdul , Rashid"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18465, "end_char": 18476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18658, "end_char": 18668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19076, "end_char": 19086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19164, "end_char": 19174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19325, "end_char": 19335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19478, "end_char": 19488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19727, "end_char": 19737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20142, "end_char": 20159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qazi Abdul Rashid obtained a money decree in suit No.", "canonical_name": "Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid"}}, {"text": "Ami Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20220, "end_char": 20229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "523 of 1935 against one Ami Chand S/o Phool Chand and brother of present respondents (original defendants 1 to 4).", "canonical_name": "Ami Chand"}}, {"text": "Ami Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20400, "end_char": 20409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of that decree, he purchased with the permission of the court, the share of Ami Chand in 1937.", "canonical_name": "Ami Chand"}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Bulandshahr", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20546, "end_char": 20570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of 1931 amongst the family mem hers of the said Ami Chand was pending in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr."}}, {"text": "Phool Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20704, "end_char": 20715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "452 of 1949 against the said Phool Chand and others in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for partition and separate possession of his share.", "canonical_name": "Phool Chand"}}, {"text": "court of the Munsif, Khurja", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20734, "end_char": 20761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "452 of 1949 against the said Phool Chand and others in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for partition and separate possession of his share."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20986, "end_char": 20995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Partition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21003, "end_char": 21016, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 20, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21343, "end_char": 21360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The First Appellate Court by its judgment, dated December 20, 1954 (Ex."}}, {"text": "First Appellate Court, Phool Chand", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21729, "end_char": 21763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with the decree affirmed by the First Appellate Court, Phool Chand on July 31, 1953 deposited Rs."}}, {"text": "February 25, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22084, "end_char": 22101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court dismissed this appeal as abated by an order, dated February 25, 1959 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Gyan Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22377, "end_char": 22387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the said litigation, Phool Chand and his two sons, Gyan Chand and Raghbur Sharan, instituted Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Gyan Chandra"}}, {"text": "Raghbur Sharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22392, "end_char": 22406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the said litigation, Phool Chand and his two sons, Gyan Chand and Raghbur Sharan, instituted Suit No."}}, {"text": "Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22562, "end_char": 22582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "323 of 1953 in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for the recovery of the damages for use and occupation of the house in dispute against Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid.", "canonical_name": "Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22604, "end_char": 22622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a judgment dated September 30, 1959 (Ex."}}, {"text": "December 21, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22848, "end_char": 22865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "461 of 1959 which was partly allowed by the First Appellate Court on December 21, 1960."}}, {"text": "1st day of March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23984, "end_char": 24006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( l\n\nClause (d) of Sectiou 2 of the 1950 Act defines \"evacuee;\" this A -definition so far as material, reads: \"Evacuee means any persons-\n\n(i) who on account of the' setting up of the Dominions ofindia and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, leaves or has, on or after the 1st day of March, 1947, left any ploce in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part ofindia, or\n\n(ii) who is a resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan\n\nand who for that reason is unable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his proporty in any p1rt of the territories to which this Act extends, or whose property in any p1rt of the said territories has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or ........ \"\n\n(iii) to (iv) are not relevant for this case."}}, {"text": "14th day of August 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24835, "end_char": 24858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (h) defines \"evacuee property\" to mean \"any property of an evacuee (whether held by him as owner or as a trustee or as a beneficiary or as a tenant or in any other capacity) and includes any property which has been obtained by any person from an evacuee after the 14th day of August 1947, by any mode of transfer which is not elfoctive by reason of the provisions contained in Section 40 :) but does not include ........ \" Sub-section (1) of Section 7 requires that where the Custodian is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of this Act, he may after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persni interested, and after holding such inquiry into the m1tter ai the ciru.nitanees of the case permit, pass an order deelaring a•w suoh prop\"ty to be evacuee property."}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24948, "end_char": 24958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25013, "end_char": 25022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25756, "end_char": 25768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25869, "end_char": 25878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25941, "end_char": 25950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26105, "end_char": 26114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26337, "end_char": 26346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26357, "end_char": 26381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the 1950 Act requires that the notice to be served underjSection 7(1) on persons interested in the property proposed to be declared evacuee property shall be in Form I.\n\nSection 8 provides, \"Any property doclared to be evacuee property under Section 7 shall be d\"m'd to hive nsted in the Custodian for the State-\n\n( a) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in subclause (i) of clause {d) of Section 2, from the date on which\n\nhe leaves or left any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India;\n\n(b) in the case of the property of an evacuee as defined in subclause (ii) of clause (d) of Section 2, from the 15th day of August, 1947; and\n\n(c) in the case of any other property, from the date of the notice given under sub-section (I) of Section 7 in respect thereof. ("}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26486, "end_char": 26495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 7 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26573, "end_char": 26589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26656, "end_char": 26665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26810, "end_char": 26819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 14, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27189, "end_char": 27204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other point to be noted is that in the case of an 'evacuee' falling under sub-clause (i) cf the ddinilicn cf 'evacuee', that is one, who on account of the things mentiLned in that sub-clause, leaves India or has left India on or after August 14, 1947, the vesting will date from the date he leaves India fer any outside destination."}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27398, "end_char": 27407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27501, "end_char": 27510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27528, "end_char": 27537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jst day of March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28186, "end_char": 28208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause (b) of the Proviso saves from the bar of this Section property of any person who became an evacuee on or after the Jst day of March, 1947, and who on the 7th day of May, 1954 was resident in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28324, "end_char": 28333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28587, "end_char": 28606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Qazi Atdul Rrshid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28763, "end_char": 28780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from the facts concurrently found in the' instant case that Qazi Atdul Rrshid was throughout residing in India and personally ncanagitg the rnit rroperty and collecting its rent till 1963.", "canonical_name": "Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29034, "end_char": 29043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1954", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29214, "end_char": 29284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29351, "end_char": 29361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29605, "end_char": 29614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30019, "end_char": 30032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 All that he showed was that the Rehabilitation Authorities had, purporting to act under the 1954 Act, sold the suit property to him and issued the sale certificate in his favour on April 1, 1969 ."}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30043, "end_char": 30053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30105, "end_char": 30114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30152, "end_char": 30162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act", "statute": "Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 28 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30345, "end_char": 30363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30396, "end_char": 30406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30777, "end_char": 30787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 28 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31340, "end_char": 31358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jafran Begum", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31422, "end_char": 31434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scope of Sections 28 and 46 of the 1950 Act came up for consideration before this Court in Jafran Begum's case (ibid)."}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31591, "end_char": 31594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31602, "end_char": 31646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31811, "end_char": 31814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32545, "end_char": 32555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32673, "end_char": 32680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After examining the scheme of the 1950 Act, Wanchoo, C.J., speaking for the Bench constituted _by three learned Judges, laid down the law, thus:\n\n\"(Where) the question whether certain properties are evacuee properties has been decided under s. 7 etc.,"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32870, "end_char": 32874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 46(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32995, "end_char": 33003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33084, "end_char": 33088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33230, "end_char": 33235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33240, "end_char": 33245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33331, "end_char": 33335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33485, "end_char": 33489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33597, "end_char": 33601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33664, "end_char": 33671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33756, "end_char": 33760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33764, "end_char": 33791, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ss.4,\n\n28 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33817, "end_char": 33833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33848, "end_char": 33853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33857, "end_char": 33862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33917, "end_char": 33925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34094, "end_char": 34104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34257, "end_char": 34266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35206, "end_char": 35216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35655, "end_char": 35665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35715, "end_char": 35725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35897, "end_char": 35907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36094, "end_char": 36104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36166, "end_char": 36175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36334, "end_char": 36343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36463, "end_char": 36472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36610, "end_char": 36619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 28 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37015, "end_char": 37033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37190, "end_char": 37202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37356, "end_char": 37400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Qazi. Abdul Rashid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37570, "end_char": 37588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At this place, it may be recalled that the second part of the definition which contains a deeming provision has no application to the facts of the instant case because Qazi.", "canonical_name": "Qazi ,£ Abdul Rashid"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38015, "end_char": 38025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38055, "end_char": 38060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39535, "end_char": 39545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39599, "end_char": 39611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40001, "end_char": 40011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40139, "end_char": 40149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40427, "end_char": 40436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40703, "end_char": 40713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40817, "end_char": 40829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40905, "end_char": 40917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41018, "end_char": 41028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 22, 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41086, "end_char": 41108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41110, "end_char": 41120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41505, "end_char": 41515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41582, "end_char": 41592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41594, "end_char": 41604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42017, "end_char": 42027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42160, "end_char": 42170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42537, "end_char": 42547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43119, "end_char": 43129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43420, "end_char": 43430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43457, "end_char": 43467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.S. Gujral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43499, "end_char": 43510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of N.S. Gujral (ibid) were entirely different."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43836, "end_char": 43846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44061, "end_char": 44071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44245, "end_char": 44258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44842, "end_char": 44851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 5, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45185, "end_char": 45200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instead, he has produced, what purports to be, a copy of an order, dated January 5, 1951, of the Assistant Custodian."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_224_234_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "JAI SINGH JAIRAM TY AGI ETC.\n\nMAMANCHAND RATILAL AGARWAL AND ORS.\n\n• March 28, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nThe Canton111ents (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 as amended retrospectively by An1ending Act 22 of 1972-Efject of the provi.sions of the Amending ACt-Whether a compromise decree passed in 1967 before the amendment is saved by tlze Amending Act.\n\nDoctrine of Re.s judicata-C'o1npro111ise decree declared nullity by the Excut ing Court as the Bornbay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate~ Control Act, 1947 had no application to buildings in Cantonment area-All decrees validated by Amtnding Act 22 df 1967-fVhether earlier decision of the Ex, ecutive Court barsfurther execution stit on the ground of res ; udicata.\n\nThe respondents in Civil Appeal , No. 708 /78 Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and others, who are the landlords of premises b.earing door No. 16 in Nawa Bazar Area Kirkee Cantonment, filed a civil suit No. 1730 of 1964 against the Appellant-tenant for recovery of possession and arrears of rent under the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rt:ttcs Control Act, 1947.\n\nThe suit was decreed. There was an appeal by the tenant. It resulted in a compromise decree dated.July 12, 1967 by \\Vhich some time was given to th~ tenant to vacate the premises.\n\nOn April 29, 1969, in the case of In.du Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi and Anr. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443, this Court held that Parliament alone had and the State Legislature did not have the necessary competence to make a law in regard to the \"regulation of house accommodation in Cantonment Areas.\" The expression \"regulation of house accommodation\" was interpreted as not to be confined to allotment only but as extending to other incients, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of house accomn1odation etc. To get over the situation created by the said decision, on Deceinber 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other cantonment areat:;. On June 2, 1972, the Parliatnent also eoocted Act 22 of 1972 amending the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Con~\n\ntrot l, aws) Act 1957, purporting to enable the Central Government to make the Rent Control L'lws in the sel\\feral States applicable to Cantonment areas from diltes anterior to the dates of notification and further purporting to validate cer~ tain pre-existing decrees. In the meanwhile, taking advantage of the decision in the case of lndu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi and Anr., the appellanttenant filed Miscellaneous Application No. 597 /70 for a declaration that the decree obtained against him was a nullity and incapable of being executed. This iapplication 'vas allowed by the <; ourt on November, 19, 1971. But, after the enactment of Act 22 of 1972, on January II, 1973 the landlords filed Darkhast No. 104 of 1973 to execute the decree in their favour. The appellant-tenant raised three objections, namely, (i) subsequent to the compromise decree there was a\n\n ..\n\nJAJSINGH V. MAMANCHAND 225\n\nfresh agreement of lease between the Iaridlords and himself; (ii) the provisions A of the lam.ending Act 22 of 1972 were not extensive enough to save the decree :dated July 12, 1967; (iii) in any case, the decision in Miscellaneous Application No. 597 /70 holding the decree to be a nullity operated as res judicau~ between the parties. The first objection was left open by all the Courts for future adjudication, as the landlord denied the existence of any fresh agreement.\n\nThe second and third objections alone were considered. In the judgment under appeal, the High Court overruled them and hence this appeal by special le:tve B and two other similar appea1s.\n\nDisn1issing the appeals the Court,\n\nHELD:\n\n\nThough this AC\"t came into force on .December 18, 1957, no notification was issued extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to Kirkee and other Cantonment la.Teas within the State\n\nof Bombay until 1969. Apparently such a notification was thought unneces5ary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act was supposed to operate within the said Cantonment area-s because of the consistent vie\\v taken by the Bombay High Court regarding the applicability of the Bombay Act to such areas. In view of the Supreme Court decision in Indu. Bhushan's case, it became necessary that a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Thws) Act, 1957, should be issued. It was accordingly done on December 29,\n\n1969. But it v1as realised that the entire problem was not thereby solved since all such notifications as the one issued on December 29, 1969 could only be prospec .. ve and could not save decrees which had already been passed. Therefore, Amending Act 22 of 1972 was enacted for the express purpose of saving decrees which htad already been passed. By section 2 of the Amending Act of 1972 the Principal Act of 1957 was itself deemed to have come into force on January 26,\n\n1950. Original Section 3 was renumbered as sub-section 1 and the words \"on: the' date of the notification\" were omitted and \"were deemed always to have been ·.omitted.\" [229 B-G & 230 C-D]\n\n2. Under section 3 of the unamended Act, 1957, ta• notification could be issued extendinr a State Legislation to a Cantonment area with effect from the -date of notification. As a result of the introduction of sub-section 2 of section H 3 the notification can be given effect from an anterior date or a future late .but it cannot be made effective from a date earlier than the commencement\n\nA of the State Legislation or the establishment of the Cantonment or the commencement of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act,.\n\n1951. Sub-section 3 is merely consequential to sub-section 2, in that it provides that a State Legislation when extended to a Cantonment area wit_h effect from the date of the notification from an anterior date, such legislation is to stand extended with all the amendments to such State Legislt¥tion made after such: anterior date but before the commenement of the 1972 Amending Act, the B amendments being applicable as and when they come into force.\n\nSub-s. 4 makes provision for the saving of decrees or orders for the regulation of or for evictionfrom any house accommodation in a Cantonment made before the extension of the State Legislation to the Cantonment provided certain conditions are fulfiled.\n\nOne condition is that the decree or order must have been made by any Court, Tribunal or other authority in accordance with a law for the conror of rent and regulation of hous-e accommodation for rthe time being in force C in the State in which such Cantonment is situated.\n\nIn other words the decree or order must have been n1ade by the wrong application of the Slate l..egi<>- lation to the Cantonment area. If a decree or order has been made by such, Vi•rong applica¢ion of the State Legislation to the Cantonment area it shall be deemed, with effect fron1 the date of the notification to have been properly made under the relevant provisions of the State LegislatiO!n. [23 l AH, 232 A-BJ\n\n3. The applicability of sub-section 4 cannot be confined to cases where\n\nnotifications are issued with retrospective effect under sub-section z. Subr.; ection 4 is nOt so confined. It applies to all cases of dercees or orders made before the extension of a State Legislation to a Cantonment area irrespective of the question whether such extension is retrospective or not. The essential. condition to be fulfilled is thnt the decree or order must have been tnade as if the State Legislation was already in force, although, strictly speaking, it was not so in force.\n\nSub-section 4 is wide enough to save all decrees and orders made by the wrong application of a. State rent control and house accommodatio~ legislation tO a Cantonment 'area, though sUch State Legislation could not in law have been applied to Cantonment areas at the time of the passing of the decrees or order. The decree obtained by the respondent is saved by the provisionsof section 3, sub-section 4 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act of 1957, as amended by Act 22 of 1972. [232 E-F]\n\n4. If the decision in the previous proceeding was to be regarded as res iudicata it would assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the mle declared by the legislature. [234 Al\n\nJn the present case, the executing Court had refused to exercise jurisdiction and to execute the decree on the ground that the decree was a nullity as... the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, had no application to buildings in Cantonment areas. 'fhla.t defect having been re moved and all decrees obtained on the basis that the Bombay rent law applied' to the Kirkce Cantonment area having been validated by Act 22 of 1972, it\n\nCannot be said that the earlier decision holding that the decree was a nullity operated as res judicata. [234 B-D]\n\nMathura Prasad Bajoo laiswal and Ors. v. Dessibai N. B. ]eejeebhoy, [1970}l 3 S.C.R. 830 @ 836; followed.\n\nJAIS!NGH v. MAMANCHAND (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 227\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISD!Cl!ON : Civil Appeal Nos. 708 to 710 of 1978.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18-2-1978 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 2564/74, 5997/78 and 5999/78.\n\nV.M. Tarkunde, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, V.N. Ganpule, Mrs. Veena ·Devi Khanna and Miss Manik 1arkunde for the Appellants in all the appeals.\n\nSo/i J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Respondents 1 to 6 in CAs 708 to 710/1978.\n\nP.H. Parekh, C.B. Singh, BL. Verma, Miss V. Caprihan, Hemani C Sharma and Raian Karanjawala for the Respondent No. 5 in CA\n\n710/78.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHl\"iNAPPA REDDY, J. The respondents in Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978, Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and others, who are the landlords of premises bearing door No. 16 in Nawa Bazar Area Kirkee Cantonment, filed civil suit No. 1730 of 1964 against the appellanttenant for recovery of possession and arrears of rent under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1947. The suit was decreed. There was an appeal by the tenant.\n\nIt resulted in a compromise decree dated July 12, 1967 by which some time was given to the tenant to vacate the premises. As the tenant failed to vacate the premises within the time given to him, the landlords were compelled to take out execution.\n\nOn April 29, 1969, in the case of lndu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr.(1), this Court held that Parliament alone had and the State\n\nLegislature did not have the necessary competence to make a law in regard to the \"regulation of house accommodation in Cantonment areas\". The expression \"regulation of house accommodation\" was interpreted as not to be confined to allotment only but as extending to other incidents, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of house accommodation etc.\n\nTo get over the situation created by Indu Bhusan Bosev!Rama Sundari Devi &Anr.(1), on December 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other Cantonment areas. On June 2, 1972, the Parliament also\n\n(I) (1970] I S.C.R. 443.\n\nenacted Act 22 of 1972 amending the C1ntonments (Extension of Rent Control L 1w J) Aot, IJ57, p1rp >rtin~ to en1b!, th' Central GJvernment to mike the rent control law; in theseveral States applicable to lCantonment are1s frJm dites anterior to the dates of notifbation and further purporting to validate certain pre-existing decrees.\n\nIn the meanwhile taking advantage of the decision in the case of Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), the appellant-tenant filed Misc, elleneous. -Application No. 597 of 1970 for a declaration that the decree obtained against him was a nullity and incapable of being executed. This application was allowed by the Court on November 15, 1971. But, after the enactment of Act 22 of 1972, on January 11, 1973, the landlords filed Darkhast No. 104of1973 to execute the decree in their favour.· The tenant raised various objections. One of the objections was that subsequent to the compromise decree there was a fresh agreement of lease between the landlords and himself. This was denied by the landlords., Another objection was that the provisions of the Amending Act 22 of 1972 were not extensive enough to save the decree dated July 12, 1967. The third objection was that in any case the decision in miscellaneous application No. 597 of 1970 holding the decree to be a nullity operated as res judicata between the parties. The first of the objections was left open by all the Courts for future adjudication.\n\nThe second and third objections alone were considered, for the time being. In the judgment under appeal, the High Court over-ruled the second and third objections of the tenant and hence this appeal by special leave.\n\nThe first question for our consideration is whether the compromise decree dated July 12, 1967 is saved by Amending Act 22of1972?\n\nBefore the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bo; se v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), there was a conflict of views on the question whether Entry 3 of List I of Schedule VII to the Constitution which enabled Parliament to legislate in regard to \"the regulation of housing accommodation (including the control of rents)\" in Cantonment areas was wide enough to include the subject ofrelationship of landlord and tenant of buildings situated in Cantonment areas. The High Courts of Bom- 0bay, Nagpur and Patna had taken the view that regulation of the relationship of landlord and tenant did not fall within Entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Govt. of India Act, 1935 (which corresponded to Entry 3 of List I l'f Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that the Provincial Legislature was competent to legislate even in regard to the regulation of the relationship between landlord and tenant in Cantonment areas by virtue of Entry 21 of List II of the\n\n.~\\\n\n...\n\nJAISINGH v. MAMANCHAND (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 229\n\nSeventh Schedule to the Govt. of India Act, 1935 (which\"corresponded to Entry 18 of the list If of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution).\n\nOn the other hand the High Courts of Calcutta and Rajasthan held that the power of the State legislatre to legislate in respect oflandlord and tenant of buildings was to re found net in Ent1y 18 of list II but in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of list JII of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that such power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of list I.\n\nThe view expressed by the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts was accepted as correct by this Ccurt in Jndu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), But even before the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bose v. Ram~ Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), Parliament appeared to take view of the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts as the correct view and prcce<ded to enact the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control laws) Act, 1957, by Section 3 of which the Central Government was enabled, by notification in the Official Gazette, to extend to any Cantonment with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit. Any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation which was in force on the date of the notification in the State in which the Cantonment was situated. Though this Act came into force on December 18, 1957, no notification was issued extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to Kirkee and other Cantonment areas within the State of Bombay until 1969. Apparently such a notification was thought unnecessary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act was supposed to cperate within the said Cantonment areas because of the consistent view taken by the Bombay High .. Court, regarding the applicability of the Bombay Act to such areas. But the position was upset as a result of the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bose\n\nv. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra). Thereafter it became necessary \\{ that a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, should be iuued. It was acordingly done on December 29, 1969. But it was scon realised that the entire problem was not there by solved since all such notification as the one issued on December 29, 1969 could cnly be rrospective and could not save decree which had already ban pamd. Amending Act 22 of 1972 was; therefore, enacted for the express purpose of saving decrees which had already been pamd. Th statrnco, t; cf objects and reasons of the amending act stated :\n\n\" ........ But these notifications could be issued H only prospectively. and could not save the decrees already passed. A number of representations had been received\n\nfrom and on behalf of tenants and tenants' associations, ventilating their grievances in this regard. It was accordingly proposed to amend s. 3 to empower the Governme'lt to extend to any Cantonment any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation in force in the State in wluch the Cantonment was situated either from the commencement of such enactment or from 26-1-1950, the date when the Constitution came into force, whichever was later, and to save decrees already passed under the enactment deemed to have been in force in the Cantonment before such extension.\"\n\nBy section 2 of the Amending Act of 1972 the Principal Act of 1957 was itself deemed to have come into force on January 26, 1950.\n\nOriginal s. 3 was renumbered as sub.-s. 1 and the words \"on the date of the notification\" were omitted and \"were deemed always to have been omitted\". New sub.-sections 2, 3 and 4 were introduced o and they are as follows :\n\n\"(2) The extension of and enactment under subsection (I) may be made from such earlier ofifuture date as the Central Government may think fit :\n\nProvided that no such extension shall be made from a date earlier than-\n\n(a) the commencement of such enactment, or\n\n(b) the establislunent of the cantonment, or\n\n(c) the commencement of this Act, whichever is later.\n\n(3) Where any enactment in force in any State relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation is extended to a cantonment from a date earlier than the I date on which such extension is made (hereafter referred to as the \"earlier date\"), such enactment, as in force on such . earlier date, shall apply to such cantonment, and where any such enactment, has been amended at any time after the earlier date but before the commencement of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws Amendment Act 1971, such enactment, as amended, shall apply to the cantonment on and from the date on which the enactment by which such amendment was made, came into force.\n\n(4) Where, before the extension to a cantonment of any enactments, relating to the control of rent and regula-\n\nI y\n\nJAISINGH v. MAMANCHAND (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\ntion of house accommodation therein (hereafter referred to as the \"Rent Control Act\"):-\n\n(i) any decree or order for the regulation of, -0r for eviction from, any house accommodation in that cantonment, or\n\n(ii) any order in the proceedings for the execution -0f such decree or order, or\n\n(iii) any order relating to the control of rent or other incident of such house accommodation,\n\nwas made by any court, tribunal or other authority in accordance with any law for the control of rent and regulation of house acccommodation for the time being in force in the State in which such cantonment is situated, such decree or order shall, on and from the date on which the Rent Control Act is extended to that cantonment, be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the Rent Control Act, as extended to that cantonment, as if the said Rent Control Act, as so extended, were in force in that Cantonment, on the date on which such decree or order was made\".\n\n2 il I\n\nThe effect of the provisions of the Amending Act appear to us to be very clear. Under s. 3 of the unamended Act, a notification could be issued extending a State Legislation to a Cantonment area with effect from the date of the notification. As a result of the introduction of sub.-s. 2 of s. 3 the notification can be given effect from an anterior date or a future date, but it cannot be made effective from a date earlier than the commencement of the State Legislation or the establishment of the Cantonment or the commencement of the Can- .'( tonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957. Sub.-•. 3 is merely consequential to sub.-s. 2 in that it provides that a State Legislation when extended to a Cantonment area from an anterior date, such legislation is to stand extended with all the amendments to -such State Legislation made after such anterior date but before the • -commencement of the 1972 Amending Act, the amendments being\n\nl>- applicable as and when they come into force. Sub-.s. 4 makes pro- \" vision for the saving of decrees or orders for the regulation of or for eviction from any house accommodation in a Cantonment made before the extension of the State Legislation to the Cantonment provided certain conditions are fulfilled. One condition is that the -decree or order must havebeen made by any Court, Tribunal or other :authority in accordance with a law for the control of rent and regula-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO&TS\n\n\ntion of house accommodation for the time being in force in the State in which such Cantonment is situated. In other words the decree or order must have been made by the wrong application of the State legislation to the Cantonment area. If a decree or order has been made by such wrong application of the State Legislation to the Canton ment area, it shall be deemed, with effect from the date of the notification, to have been properly made under the relevant provisions of the State Legislation.\n\nShri V.M. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the appellant urged that sub.-s. 4 bad to be read in the context of sub.-ss. 2 and 3 and that it was to be applied only to cases where a notification issued under sub.-s. 1 was given retrospective effect under the provisions of sub.-s. 2. We see no justification for confining the applicability of sub.-s. 4 to cass where notifications are issued with retrospective effect under sub.-s. 2.\n\nSub.-s. 4 in terms is not as confined. It applies to all cases of decrees or orders made before the extension of a State Legislation to a Cantonment area irrespective of the question whether such extension is retrospective or not. The essential condition to be fulfilled is that the decree or order must have been made as if the State Legislation was already in force, although, striclty speaking, it was not so in force.\n\nIn our view sub.-s. 4 is wide enough to save all decrees and orders made by the wrong application of a State rent control and house accommodation legislation to a Cantonment area, though such State Legislation could not in law have been applied to Cantonment areas at the time of' the pass'ing. of the decrees or order. We, therefore, hold that the decree obtained by the respondents is saved by the provisions of s. 3, sub.-s. 4 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act of 1957, as amended by Act 22 of 1972.\n\nThe second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that tlie decision of the executing Court in Miscelleneous 'Application No. 597 of 1970 declaring the decree to be a uullity seperated as res judicata between the parties. The learned counsel relied upon the following observations of this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors., v. Dessibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy(l).\n\n\"The matter in issue, if it is one purely of act, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between\n\n\n' '\n\nJAISINGH v. MAMANCHANU ( Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 2 3 3\n\nthe same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of Jaw, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression 'the matter in issue' in s. 11 Code of Civil Porcedure means the right litigated between the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the Jaw applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of Jaw and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the Jaw of the land.\n\nIn the very observations relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant the last sentence is clearly against the appellant. The matter J becomes clear if certain observations made earlier in the very judgment D are considered. They are :\n\n\"A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it E has no jurisdiction, the question would not, jin our judgment, operate as re• judicata.\n\nSimilarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same F or otherwise\". ~\n\nIn that case the appellant who had a lease of an open land for construetion of buildings bad applied for determination of standard rent under the Born bay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The application was rejected on the ground that the Act did not apply to open land let for construction, The view was confirmed by the High Court. Later in another case, the view taken by the High Court was over-ruled by the Supreme Court and it was held that the Act applied to open land let out for construction. The appellant once again filed an application for determination of standard rent. The lower Courts and the High Court held that the previous decision operated as res judicata between the parties. The Supreme Court 1eversed the view of the lower courts and the High Court. It !6--I89SC!i80\n\nS\\JPRilM!l COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C .R.\n\nwas held that the earlier decillion that the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for determination of standard rent\n\nWll.S wrong in view of the judgment of the Supreme Conrt. If the decision in the previous proceeding was to be regarded as res judicata it would assume the statm of a llpecial rule of law applicable to the .parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the legislature. The &ituation in the present case is amtfogous. The executing Court had refused to exercise jurisdiction and to execute the decree on the ground that the decree was a nullity as the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, had no application to buildings in Cantonment areas. That defect having been removed and all; decrees obta\n\n ined on the basis that the Bombay rent law applied to the Kirkee .Cantonment area having been validatedjby Act 22 of 1972, it cannot bh said that the earlier decillion holding that the:decree was a nullity operated as res judicata.\n\nA& pointed out by this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswa/ & Ors.\n\nv. Dassibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (supra) if the darlier decision in the Miscellaneous Application is to be regarded as rJs judicata it would assume. the status of a special rule of jurisdiction applicable to the parties iu :ierogatiou of the.1law declared by the legislature. We, therefore, see no substance '., in the second. submissioi; i. Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978 is accordingly dismissed with cqsts.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 709 of 1978, the only question is about the validity of a decree obtained before the date of the notification issued under s. 3 of the Cantonments (Eftension of Rent Control\n\nLaw~) Act, 1957. In view of what we have said above, this question 'fu to be decided against the appellant. Thls appeal is also dismissed with costs.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 718 of 1978, spec!rl leave was granted under a misapprehension that the appeal raised tqe same questions as were raised in Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978. It Is now stated that it is not so. This appeal is also dismissed with costs,\n\nS.R. •", "total_entities": 117, "entities": [{"text": "JAI SINGH JAIRAM TY AGI ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAI SINGH JAIRAM TYAGI ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAMANCHAND RATILAL AGARWAL AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAMANCHAND RATILAL AGARWAL AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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["}}, {"text": "[1970] 1 S.C.R. 443", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1406, "end_char": 1425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1448, "end_char": 1458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1970] 1 S.C.R. 443, this Court held that Parliament alone had and the State Legislature did not have the necessary competence to make a law in regard to the \"regulation of house accommodation in Cantonment Areas.\""}}, {"text": "Deceinber 29, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1932, "end_char": 1950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To get over the situation created by the said decision, on Deceinber 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other cantonment areat:;."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1956, "end_char": 1974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To get over the situation created by the said decision, on Deceinber 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other cantonment areat:;."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2003, "end_char": 2012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2120, "end_char": 2167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January II, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2990, "end_char": 3006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, after the enactment of Act 22 of 1972, on January II, 1973 the landlords filed Darkhast No."}}, {"text": ".December 18, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disn1issing the appeals the Court,\n\nHELD:\n\nThough this AC\"t came into force on .December 18, 1957, no notification was issued extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to Kirkee and other Cantonment la."}}, {"text": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4394, "end_char": 4411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apparently such a notification was thought unneces5ary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act was supposed to operate within the said Cantonment area-s because of the consistent vie\\v taken by the Bombay High Court regarding the applicability of the Bombay Act to such areas."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4488, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the Supreme Court decision in Indu."}}, {"text": "Indu. Bhushan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the Supreme Court decision in Indu."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4582, "end_char": 4591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "December 29,\n\n1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4699, "end_char": 4717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was accordingly done on December 29,\n\n1969."}}, {"text": "December 29, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4837, "end_char": 4854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it v1as realised that the entire problem was not thereby solved since all such notifications as the one issued on December 29, 1969 could only be prospec .. ve and could not save decrees which had already been passed."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5065, "end_char": 5074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "January 26,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5174, "end_char": 5191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 2 of the Amending Act of 1972 the Principal Act of 1957 was itself deemed to have come into force on January 26,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5386, "end_char": 5395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5922, "end_char": 5931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6370, "end_char": 6374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7341, "end_char": 7350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7884, "end_char": 7893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8258, "end_char": 8267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8273, "end_char": 8282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8824, "end_char": 8871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISD!Cl!ON :", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9382, "end_char": 9412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAIS!NGH v. MAMANCHAND (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 227\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISD!Cl!ON : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9611, "end_char": 9624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, V.N. Ganpule, Mrs. Veena ·Devi Khanna and Miss Manik 1arkunde for the Appellants in all the appeals.", "canonical_name": "V.M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "C.K. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9626, "end_char": 9642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, V.N. Ganpule, Mrs. Veena ·Devi Khanna and Miss Manik 1arkunde for the Appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "V.N. Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9644, "end_char": 9656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, V.N. Ganpule, Mrs. Veena ·Devi Khanna and Miss Manik 1arkunde for the Appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "Veena ·Devi Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9663, "end_char": 9681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, V.N. Ganpule, Mrs. Veena ·Devi Khanna and Miss Manik 1arkunde for the Appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "Manik 1arkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9691, "end_char": 9705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, V.N. Ganpule, Mrs. Veena ·Devi Khanna and Miss Manik 1arkunde for the Appellants in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9751, "end_char": 9762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/i J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Respondents 1 to 6 in CAs 708 to 710/1978."}}, {"text": "S.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9764, "end_char": 9774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/i J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Respondents 1 to 6 in CAs 708 to 710/1978."}}, {"text": "P.N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9776, "end_char": 9785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/i J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Respondents 1 to 6 in CAs 708 to 710/1978."}}, {"text": "E.M.S. Anam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9790, "end_char": 9801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/i J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Respondents 1 to 6 in CAs 708 to 710/1978."}}, {"text": "P.H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9854, "end_char": 9865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.H. Parekh, C.B. Singh, BL."}}, {"text": "C.B. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9867, "end_char": 9877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.H. Parekh, C.B. Singh, BL."}}, {"text": "BL. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9879, "end_char": 9888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.H. Parekh, C.B. Singh, BL."}}, {"text": "V. Caprihan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9895, "end_char": 9906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma, Miss V. Caprihan, Hemani C Sharma and Raian Karanjawala for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Hemani C Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9908, "end_char": 9923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma, Miss V. Caprihan, Hemani C Sharma and Raian Karanjawala for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Raian Karanjawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9928, "end_char": 9945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma, Miss V. Caprihan, Hemani C Sharma and Raian Karanjawala for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHl\"iNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10031, "end_char": 10047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHl\"iNAPPA REDDY, J. The respondents in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Kirkee Cantonment", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10213, "end_char": 10230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 in Nawa Bazar Area Kirkee Cantonment, filed civil suit No."}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10383, "end_char": 10429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indu Bhusan Bosev!Rama Sundari Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11306, "end_char": 11341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To get over the situation created by Indu Bhusan Bosev!Rama Sundari Devi &Anr.(1), on December 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other Cantonment areas."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11425, "end_char": 11434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1947", "statute": "Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11442, "end_char": 11496, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kirkee", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11600, "end_char": 11606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To get over the situation created by Indu Bhusan Bosev!Rama Sundari Devi &Anr.(1), on December 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other Cantonment areas."}}, {"text": "June 2, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11638, "end_char": 11650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 2, 1972, the Parliament also\n\n(I) (1970] I S.C.R. 443."}}, {"text": "November 15, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12374, "end_char": 12391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was allowed by the Court on November 15, 1971."}}, {"text": "January 11, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12440, "end_char": 12456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, after the enactment of Act 22 of 1972, on January 11, 1973, the landlords filed Darkhast No."}}, {"text": "Another objection was that the provisions of the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12753, "end_char": 12814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13674, "end_char": 13686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Another objection was that the provisions of the Amending Act", "statute": "Another objection was that the provisions of the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "High Courts of Bom- 0bay, Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13977, "end_char": 14009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Courts of Bom- 0bay, Nagpur and Patna had taken the view that regulation of the relationship of landlord and tenant did not fall within Entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Govt."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14014, "end_char": 14019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Courts of Bom- 0bay, Nagpur and Patna had taken the view that regulation of the relationship of landlord and tenant did not fall within Entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Govt."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14143, "end_char": 14159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14176, "end_char": 14191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14237, "end_char": 14253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14538, "end_char": 14554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14571, "end_char": 14586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14641, "end_char": 14657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "High Courts of Calcutta and Rajasthan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14703, "end_char": 14740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand the High Courts of Calcutta and Rajasthan held that the power of the State legislatre to legislate in respect oflandlord and tenant of buildings was to re found net in Ent1y 18 of list II but in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of list JII of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that such power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of list I.\n\nThe view expressed by the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts was accepted as correct by this Ccurt in Jndu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. ("}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14933, "end_char": 14949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15130, "end_char": 15164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand the High Courts of Calcutta and Rajasthan held that the power of the State legislatre to legislate in respect oflandlord and tenant of buildings was to re found net in Ent1y 18 of list II but in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of list JII of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that such power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of list I.\n\nThe view expressed by the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts was accepted as correct by this Ccurt in Jndu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. ("}}, {"text": "Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control laws) Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15482, "end_char": 15536, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15541, "end_char": 15550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "December 18, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15946, "end_char": 15963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though this Act came into force on December 18, 1957, no notification was issued extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to Kirkee and other Cantonment areas within the State of Bombay until 1969."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16024, "end_char": 16030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though this Act came into force on December 18, 1957, no notification was issued extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to Kirkee and other Cantonment areas within the State of Bombay until 1969."}}, {"text": "Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16038, "end_char": 16085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Apparently such a notification was thought unnecessary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16163, "end_char": 16257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High .. Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16359, "end_char": 16379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apparently such a notification was thought unnecessary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act was supposed to cperate within the said Cantonment areas because of the consistent view taken by the Bombay High .. Court, regarding the applicability of the Bombay Act to such areas."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16629, "end_char": 16638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Apparently such a notification was thought unnecessary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act", "statute": "Apparently such a notification was thought unnecessary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17477, "end_char": 17481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26-1-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17735, "end_char": 17744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was accordingly proposed to amend s. 3 to empower the Governme'lt to extend to any Cantonment any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation in force in the State in wluch the Cantonment was situated either from the commencement of such enactment or from 26-1-1950, the date when the Constitution came into force, whichever was later, and to save decrees already passed under the enactment deemed to have been in force in the Cantonment before such extension.\""}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17945, "end_char": 17954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18054, "end_char": 18070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By section 2 of the Amending Act of 1972 the Principal Act of 1957 was itself deemed to have come into force on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18082, "end_char": 18086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18110, "end_char": 18114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 2, 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18232, "end_char": 18251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extension of Rent Control Laws Amendment Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19133, "end_char": 19182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19568, "end_char": 19584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20352, "end_char": 20368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20568, "end_char": 20572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20764, "end_char": 20768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20772, "end_char": 20776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21122, "end_char": 21126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21482, "end_char": 21486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22432, "end_char": 22445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri V.M. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the appellant urged that sub.-s.", "canonical_name": "V.M. 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{"document_id": "1980_3_22_31_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ". E\n\n' -G\n\nKUSHALBHAI MAHOJIBHAI PATEL\n\nA FIRM OF MOHMADHUSSAIN RAHIMBUX\n\nMarch 11, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]\n\nPrlvity of Contract-Supply made by appellant Plaintiff to respondent de}eti dant of 268 Bengali Maunds of Tobacco and accepted by the larrer-Pour cheques issued by the latter covering th£ value bumped-No document was executed to evidence the contract-Whether suit for recovery of n1oney is main tainable, for want of privity of contract ?-Onus of proof is on the defendant in such cases by producing best evidence like Books of Accounts.\n\nIn the money suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff to recover the value of tobacoo, sold to respondent-defendant after the four cheques covering the value of tobacco and issued by latter bumpe<l, the defendant took a plea of nonexistence of privity of contract and while admitting both the receipt of the tobacco from and issuance of cheques to plaintiff, explained the tobacco bad been supplied to defendant by the plaintiff at the instaru:e of another Firm R. K. Patel with whom the defendant had placed the order for the supply of the tobacco and, that the four cheques were issued in favour of plainlllf at the instance of Firm ''R. K. Patel\", in respect of another tr<tnsaction for the supply by that Firm of 900 bags of tobacco, which transaction later failed .\n\nThe Trial Court decreed the suit after rejecting the evidence and plead ings of the defendant In appeal the High Court reversed the judgment and set a')idc decree of the trial Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal by certificate, the Court\n\nHEW : Supply of the goods by the plaintiff to the defendant and the issuance of. cheques by the latter ill favour of the former shifted the onus of proof on the point of privity of contract to the defendant. The fact that the\n\ngoods had been sent to the defendant by the plaintiff and had been receivro by the former was admitted on all hands and was sufficient to raise a presumption, till the contrary wa& proved, that an order had been placed for the supply of the goods with the plaintiff by the defendant firm. The plaintiff could thus bank on the said fact for the purpose of discharging t!ji> initial onus Which lay on him to prove> the privity of contract between the parties and it \\Vas for the defendant to rebut the presumption which the fact raised. [27 G-H, 28 Al\n\n(ii) Tue books of account maintained by the defendant being the best evidence available in proof of the stand of the defendant firm that no order had been placed by it with the plaintiff the failure of the defendant to place on record those books is a clincher.\n\nNon production of these books by the defendant raises a presumption against it that if such evidence had been produced, the same would have gone against the case propounded by it, more\n\nI _l;,.\n\n, ./\n\nK. M. PATEL v. FIRM OF MOHAMAD l!USS~IN (Koshal, J.) 23\n\n1 ••o when the defendant fail• to bring witnesses to the transactions set up, by it A foto witness-box and examine them. l28 A-C, 29 A-El\n\nCVllL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1376 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 29th/30th October, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Appeal No. 795/61.\n\nD. V. Patel, T. U. Mehta and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant.\n\nDr. W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J -This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under sub-clause (a) of clause (I) of Article 133 of the Consti- 1ution of India is directed against its judgment dated the 29th/30th\n\nOctober, 1969, accepting a first appeal preferred by the defendant firm 10 it and dismissing the plaintiff's suit which had been decreed by the >trial court.\n\n2. The said suit was filed on the 24th November, 1958, in the court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad, by one K. M. Patel for the recovery of Rs. 38,718/- from the defendant firm on account of the price of 225 bags of tobacco weighing 268 Bengali matmds at the irate of Rs. 112/- per such maund and interest thereon. The case set ·<>Ut in the plaint was that the tobacco in question had been purchased 1>y the defendant firm on the 28th of November, 1955, that the same was despatched to the defendant firm by train from Anklav railway station on the !st of December, 1955, on which date a bill for Rs. 30,523/- covering the price of the goods and incidental expenses was sent to the defendant firm, that the goods were received by the defen- ·<lant firm who failed to pay for the same, that ultimately the defendant firm gave to the plaintiff four cheques, each for Rs. 5,000/- drawn on a banking company of Santa but that all of them were dishonoured on presentation. In addition to the said amount of Rs 30,523/-, the plaintiff claimed Rs. 8,195/- on account of interest at the rate of 9 per c:ent per annum for the period preceding the suit. He further prayed , for award of future interest and costs.\n\n3. The defendant firm denied the plaintiff's claim in toto. It .. averred in the written statement that no goods had been received by it from the plaintiff and that it had given no cheques to him. According •to the defendant firm the goods in question had been purchased by it from a firm carrying on business in the name and style of 'R. 1K. Patel' .at'Jabalpur, which had told the defendant firm that the goods would\n\n.be sen to it by the plaintiff. In relation to the four cheques the defen- dant firm stated that on the 29th November, 1957, it had enteren into\n\na transaction for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco from firm R •. K ..\n\nPatel, that these goods had also to be supplied from the plaintifl's warehouse and that it was at the instance of one Chhotabhai belonging to firm R. K. Patel that the four cheques were issued by the defendant firm in the name of the plaintiff and given to Chhotabhai, although the agreement for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco was ultimately cancelled.\n\n4. On the pleadings of the parties the main question which arose for determination was whether a privity of contract existed between them in relation to the sale and purchase of the goods in dispute in regard to which no document was admittedly executed. ---f-\n\n5. At the trial the plaintiff examined only one witness besides himself. He deposed that the transaction was entered into at his business premises in Joshi Kurva by Khudabux, a munim of the dei fondant firm, with himself in the presence of Indravadan Muljibha~, P.W. 2 who supported that stand. The plaintiff also banked on documents showing that he had obtained permission of the Central Excise authorities for the transfer of 225 bags of tobacco from hjs_ godown to the defendant firm at Mahiyar where the defendant firm carried on its business, that the goods were actually received by tl\\e defendant firm on the 17th of December, 1955, and that they were stored by the defendant firm in its warehouse. The plaintiff produce() his cash book which contained an entry (exhibit 54) indicating that .an amount of Rs. 30,523/- was debited on the !st December, 1955, to the account of the defendant firm on account of the price of 225 bags of\" tobacco at the rate of Rs. Il2/- per Bengali maund and incidental expenses. The ledger entry (exhibit 55) conforms to the cash boo_k entry.\n\nOn the other hand, Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbux, one of the partners of the defendant firm appeared as its sole witness who denied that any contract had been entered into by it with the plaintiff for the supply of the disputed tobacco through Khudabux or Otherwise.\n\nAccording to the witness Khudabux was not an employee of the defen~\n\ndant firm at the relevant time although it was admitted that he had acted as a [munim for the defendant firm earlier to and also some time after November,' 1955. The witness produced some documents purporting to evidence a transaction of purchase of 225 bags of tobacco y the defendant firm from firm R. K. Patel. These documents consisted mainly of three letters and a bill.\n\nLetter exhibit 124 bears the d&t~ 19th November, 1955, and is signed by Chhotabhai. It informs the defendant firm that 225 bags of tobacco had been purchased by the writer and' that the same would be booked to t\"e defendant firm within, . .\n\n, ,,\n\n• I\n\na period of eight days. Another letter (exhibit 125) is dated the 17th A of December, 1955. This is also signed by Chhotabhai and states that the tobacco had already been despatched to the defendant firm.\n\nBil exhibit 126 is dated 4th of January, 1956 and states the price of225 bags of tobacco as Rs. 30,361-14-0. The only other letter worth mention is exhibit 119. It is dated the 13th September, 1958 and states that accounts had been settled between firm R. K. Patel and the defendant B firm so that firm R. K. Patel owed a sum of Rs. 340-2-0 to the defendant firm. The letter specifically mentions that the disputed transaction formed part of the settlement of accounts.\n\n6. In the above state of the evidence the trial court accepted the plea of the plaintiff that an order for the supply of the disputed tobacco C was placed by the defendant firm with the plaintiff as alleged by the latter. The plaintiff was further held entitled to interest but at the reduced rate of 6 per cent per annum. The learned Civil Judge therefore granted to the plaintiffja decree for the recovery of Rs. 35,986 33\n\nwith proportionate costs of the suit and also directed that the plaintiff would receive interest at the said rate from the date of the suit till the D date of realisation of the decretal amount.\n\n7. The High Court did not believe the word of the plaintiff that an order had been placed with him by Khudabux acting on behalf of the defendant firm. In doing so the High Court gave reasons which may be summarised as under : E\n\n(i) The plaint did not mention that the defendant firm had placed the order in question through Khudabux acting as its agent.\n\n(ii) Although the order was of considerable magnitude and the only transaction of its kind to be entered into between the parties )t was not authenticated by Khudabux in writing.\n\n(iii) The plaintiff would not have remained silent for two years in regard to the money due to him.\n\n(iv) The evidence does not disclose any other occasion on which Khudabux may have acted as the agent of the defendant firm.\n\n(v) Bill exhibit 56 and entries in the plaintiff's account books (exhibits 54 and 55) do not mention the name of Khudabux.\n\n(vi) No letter from the defendant firm to the plaintiff acknowledging the receipt of the goods at Mahiyar has been placed on the record.\n\n(vii) No notice of dishonour of the chqeues was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant firm. 3-189SCl/80\n\n(viii) The plaintiff would not have sent the goods without de. mantling advance payment or earnest money.\n\n(ix) Khudabux has not been produced by the plaintiff in the wit ness box. Plaintiff's own munim Ashabhai who is said to have been present at the time of the alleged agreement also does not figure as a B witness.\n\n(x) The testimony of Indravadan does not inspire confidence.\n\nThe High Court then took up for examination the evidence produced by the defendant firm and accepted letters exhibits 119, 124 and 125 as also bill exhibit 126 at their face value. In this connection the -·+ c\n\nHigh Court remarked that it was difficult for it to imagine that the de-. fondant firm could have manufactured the letter-heads of firm R. K.\n\nPatel. The testimony of Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbax was also accepted by it as trustworthy. It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the plaintiff that the failure of the defendant firm to produce its own account books and th 1se of firm R. K. Patel, as well as Chhotabhai, was fatal to its case. The argument was rejected with the observation that it was for the plaintiff to have the said account books produced and to examine Chhotabhai as a witness. It noted the admissions made by the defendant firm's own witness to the effect that Khudabux had been in its employment both before and after the transacti<:m in dispute but remarked that there was nothing to indicate that Khudabux was in the employment of the defendant firm on the crucial date, i.e., the 28th of November, 1955, or that he had authority from the defendant firm to place the disputed order. It refused to believe that the railway receipt and the bill for the price of the goods (exhibit 56) along with the covering letter (exhibit 57) were sent by the plaintiff to the defendant firm at Mahiyar. It examined the account books of the plaintiff and rejected them as unreliable mainly on the grounds that the cash book was maintained in fortnightly instalments and not on a daily basis and that the four cheques above mentioned were made the subject matter of entries therein long after their issuance. The story of the cheques having been given to the plaintiff by the defendant firm in part payment of his dues was also discredited. In this connection it was observed :\n\n \" .... It is difficult for us to believe that if the plaintiff was suffering any damage at the instance of the defendant on account of the dishonour of these cheques, he'would have really remained content as if with trusting his destiny and trusting the defendant ..... if the plaintiff had obtained these cheques after making several attempts to recover\n\nthe amount due to him, as he states in his deposition, Ju\n\nwould have taken immediate action. against the defendant after the dishonour of the cheques .... \".\n\nThe' High Conrt further remarked :\n\n\" ...... The cheques must have reached the plaintiff not , directly from the defendant but through some other route and it is clear that he must have complain('d of their dishonour to the person from whom they arrived in his hands.\n\nHis silence after the cheques were dishonoured also indicates in the same direction. Absence of any correspondence with the plaintiff throughout a period of more than two years also indicates in the same direction ...• \".\n\nTwo main contentions were pointedly raised before the High Court: '(!) that the supply of the goods by the plaintiff to the defendant firm and the issuance of cheques by the latter in favour of the former shifted the onus of proof on the point of privity of contract to the defendant\n\n8 .\n\nfirm, and, (2) that the failure of the defendant firm to produce\"the bes D evidence which was available to it in the form of its own and firm R. K.\n\nPatel's account Books should have been treated as a .clincher.\n\nThe first contention was turned down with the remark that the plaintiff could not be deemed to have <lischarged the initial onus which was on him to prove privily of contract because he had failed to put E Khudabux in the witness-box. The second was repelled for the reason that the defendant firm could not \"be deemed to have withheld any , document when there was no notice given by the plaintiff to it for pro\n\n, duction thereof.\n\n8. It was in the above premises that the High Court passed the F impugned judgment.\n\n9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length we are of , the opinion that the very approach of the High Court to the determination of the crucial question in the case, namely, that of privily of contract between the parties, is erroneous. The fact that the goods G had been sent to the defendant firm by the plaintiff and had been received by the former was admitted on all hands and was sufficient to pise a presumption, till the contrary was proved, that an order had been placed fc:>r the supply of the goods with the plaintif! by the defen- , dant firm; and it was immaterial whether the person actually placing the order was a partner of the defer, dant firm or a person authorised by B it. The plaintiff could thus bar, k on the said fact for the purpose of .discharging the initial onus which lay on him to prove privity of\n\n: G\n\ncontract between the parties and it wafor the defendant firm to rebut the presumption which the fact_ raised as stated above. In rejecting the first of the two main contentions raised before thejHigh; Cour(on behalf of the plaintiff, therefore, the High Court fell into a serious error.[\n\nThe same is true of the second main contention which was raised by learned counsel for the; plaintiff and was turned down by the High Court. In the circumstances of the case it was the duty of the defendant firm to place its books of account on record, those books being the best evidence available in proof of the stand of the defendant firm that no order had been placed by it with the plaintiff. The:production of letters exhibits 119, 124 and 125 and bill exhibit 126[does not serve the purpose sought to be achieved. In the absence of such production they are loose documents which could have come into existence even after the suit was filed, if Chhotabhai chose to oblige the defendant firm and colluded with it. And there is intrinsic evidence ava1labk Tn letter exhibit 119 that such was the case. That letter purports tojiave\n\ncome into existeuce on the 14th of September, 1958, i.e., about threC: months and a half after the defendant firm had been informed of the plaintiff's claim through a notice dated the 27th of May, 1958, and that claim had been repudiated by the defendant firm. The contents of the:\n\nletter are tell-tale and may be reproduced in extenso :\n\n\"To \"Bhai Mohammad Hussain Rahim Bux of Mahiar written, from Jabalpur by R.K. Patel of Jabalpur whose salutations. to you be pleased to accept. Further it is learnt that [on the date 13-9-58 the account is made by the partner of our firm Shri Chhotabhai Patel upto the date 12-9-58 by taking into account the balance of Rs. 75/- seventy five at the end of 1954-55 and balance of Rs. 340-2-0 are found due by us. The same is agreed. The price of 225 bags of tobacco-- of Kbusbalbbai Mahijibbai Patel of Joshikuva (Anklav). is also included in the said account and so Rs. 340-2-0 are found balance payable by us including the said amount and if any dispute arises subsequently in the said account we shall be responsible in every way about the same.\n\n\"It is respectfully to be stated that this note is written_ while in sound state of mind so that it may remain as. authority and may become useful when required.\n\n\"C::bbotabbai Kbusbalbhai Pate)\n\n\"Partner R. K. Patel\n\n\"Jabalpur \"Date 14-9-58.'\"\n\n.J.._\n\n, _,.\n\n\\.-.\n\n\\ ,\n\nHad the accounts been really settled as the letter claimed, there is no reason at all why a copy of the settlement, which must, in the very nature of things, have contained a statement of all the transactions ·covered by it was not furnished to the court. Such a statement must : have been provided by firm R. K. Patel to the defendant firm who was entitled to scrutinize the correctness of the settlement and point out any inaccuracies therein to firm R. K. Patel. Besides, we fail to under- . stand why the transaction disputed before us came in for special mention in letter exhibit 119 when no other transaction covered by the settlement found a place therein. The conclusion is irresistible that the 'Jetter had been procured merely to serve as evidence in rebuttal of the . plaintiff's case and not because any settlement really took place.\n\n10. lf the case propounded by the defendant firm at the trial is correct, its account books must be containing entries to the effect that the agreement of purchase of 225 bags of tobacco was entered into with firm R. K. Patel and not with the plaintiff and that some time in Decem- 'ber, 1955, the account of firm R. K. Patel was credited with the amount of the price of the goods. Entries would further be available therein indicating unmistakably the periods for which Khudabux was admittedly employed with the defendant firm. The non-production of those books by the defendant firm and the production by it of stray letters\n\n0and a bill constitute failure on its part to produce the best evidence and a presumption has therefore to be raised against it that if such evidence had been produced, the same would have gone against the case propounded by it. The matter does not end there. The failure of the defendant firm to bring Chhotabhai and Khudabux into the witnessbox and the fact that it made no attempt to have the account books of 1irm R. K. Patel (the entries in which account would perhaps have clinched the matter in dispute) must be similarly construed and a presumption drawn that this evidence also would have gone against the defendant firm.\n\nI I. The view we have just above taken of the approach of the High Court is sufficient to dislodge its judgment and for a restoration of the decree passed by the trial court. We may add, however, that .apart therefrom the impugned judgment suffers from another serious defect and that is that the appreciation of the evidence of the parties is based more on conjectures than logic. We may give a few instan- ces. The absence of the name of Khudabux from the plaint is immaterial pecause pleadings are required merely to state facts and not the evidence through which they are to be proved. The relevant fact was that an agreement for the purchase of goods had been entered into by Jhe defendant firm with the plaintiff. The manner in which that\n\ncontract came into being was a matter of evidence which need not have formed part of the plaint. Again, the circumstances that the agreement of purchase was not reduced to writing, that Khudabux was not shown to have acted as the agent of the defendant firm on any other occasion and that the name of Khudabux does not appear in entries exhibits 54 and 55 do not disclose any abnormality when it is borne in mind that goods were actually supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant firm and were received by the latter. The other reasons given by the High Court in disbelieving the plaintiff's word that the order for the supply of goods had been placed with him by Khudabux are equally untenable. Jn this connection it is to be noted that no plausible reason can be found for the plaintiff recording in his books the name of the defendant firm as the purchaser ifthe goods had really been sold to firm R. K. Patel. We may point out that the name of the defendant firm as the purchaser is entered in the cash book maintained by the plaintiff and it is no reason at all for that book to be rejected as un-· reliable that it is maintained on a fortnightly ad not daily basis. The failure of the plaintiff to demand advance payment or earnest money and to keep quiet for a long period of time are also not relevant matters in view of the admitted fact of the supply of the goods by the plaintiff to the defendant firm and its failnre to produce on record its own books of account and those of firm R. K. Patel.\n\n12. The four cheques issued by the defendant firm in favour of the plaintiff furnish another very important circumstance in derogation of the claim made by the former. The explanation furnished by its solitary witness that they were issued at the instance of Chhotabhai to whom they were delivered does not inspire confidence in us, the main reason therefor being again the non-prcduction of the account books of the two firms-a reason which makes us repel as untenable the inference drawn by the High Court (from the plaintiff's failure to act immediately after the dishonour of the cheques) that \"the cheques must have reached the plaintiff not directly from the defendant but through some. other ronte\".\n\n13. There is no reason whatsoever for us to believe that ifthe caseof the defendant firm was true the plaintiff would have made out the story given by him in the plaint, absolved the real debtor of the responsibility to pay and claimed his dues from some one not at all Hable for them. Firm R. K. Patel being the party liable to the plaintiff, according to the case set np by the defendant firm, the plaintiff could not be expected to make false entries in this account books and. file._ a suit not against firm R. K. Patel but against the defendant firm~\n\n-~.\n\nI ._;___\n\n14 For the reasons stated we have no hesitation in accepting this appeal, setting aside the impngned judgment and restoring the decree passed by the trial court with a direction thRt the plaintiff will be entitled to his costs throughout.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "G\n\nKUSHALBHAI MAHOJIBHAI PATEL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KUSHALBHAI MAHOJIBHAI PATEL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A FIRM OF MOHMADHUSSAIN RAHIMBUX", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FIRM OF MOHMADHUSSAIN RAHIMBUX", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 88, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E\n\n' -G\n\nKUSHALBHAI MAHOJIBHAI PATEL\n\nA FIRM OF MOHMADHUSSAIN RAHIMBUX\n\nMarch 11, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. K. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1034, "end_char": 1045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the money suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff to recover the value of tobacoo, sold to respondent-defendant after the four cheques covering the value of tobacco and issued by latter bumpe<l, the defendant took a plea of nonexistence of privity of contract and while admitting both the receipt of the tobacco from and issuance of cheques to plaintiff, explained the tobacco bad been supplied to defendant by the plaintiff at the instaru:e of another Firm R. K. Patel with whom the defendant had placed the order for the supply of the tobacco and, that the four cheques were issued in favour of plainlllf at the instance of Firm ''R. K. Patel\", in respect of another tr<tnsaction for the supply by that Firm of 900 bags of tobacco, which transaction later failed .", "canonical_name": "R. K. Patel"}}, {"text": "R. K. Patel", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1209, "end_char": 1220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the money suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff to recover the value of tobacoo, sold to respondent-defendant after the four cheques covering the value of tobacco and issued by latter bumpe<l, the defendant took a plea of nonexistence of privity of contract and while admitting both the receipt of the tobacco from and issuance of cheques to plaintiff, explained the tobacco bad been supplied to defendant by the plaintiff at the instaru:e of another Firm R. K. Patel with whom the defendant had placed the order for the supply of the tobacco and, that the four cheques were issued in favour of plainlllf at the instance of Firm ''R. K. Patel\", in respect of another tr<tnsaction for the supply by that Firm of 900 bags of tobacco, which transaction later failed ."}}, {"text": "Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", ./\n\nK. M. PATEL v. FIRM OF MOHAMAD l!USS~IN (Koshal, J.) 23\n\n1 ••o when the defendant fail• to bring witnesses to the transactions set up, by it A foto witness-box and examine them.", "canonical_name": "Koshal"}}, {"text": "D. V. Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3184, "end_char": 3195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, T. U. Mehta and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. U. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3197, "end_char": 3208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, T. U. Mehta and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. V. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3213, "end_char": 3226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. V. Patel, T. U. Mehta and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "W. S. Barlingay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3271, "end_char": 3288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J -This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under sub-clause (a) of clause (I) of Article 133 of the Consti- 1ution of India is directed against its judgment dated the 29th/30th\n\nOctober, 1969, accepting a first appeal preferred by the defendant firm 10 it and dismissing the plaintiff's suit which had been decreed by the >trial court.", "canonical_name": "Koshal"}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J -This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under sub-clause (a) of clause (I) of Article 133 of the Consti- 1ution of India is directed against its judgment dated the 29th/30th\n\nOctober, 1969, accepting a first appeal preferred by the defendant firm 10 it and dismissing the plaintiff's suit which had been decreed by the >trial court."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3467, "end_char": 3478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th November, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3757, "end_char": 3776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said suit was filed on the 24th November, 1958, in the court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad, by one K. M. Patel for the recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3798, "end_char": 3834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said suit was filed on the 24th November, 1958, in the court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad, by one K. M. Patel for the recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "K. M. Patel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3843, "end_char": 3854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said suit was filed on the 24th November, 1958, in the court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad, by one K. M. Patel for the recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "28th of November, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4165, "end_char": 4187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case set ·<>Ut in the plaint was that the tobacco in question had been purchased 1>y the defendant firm on the 28th of November, 1955, that the same was despatched to the defendant firm by train from Anklav railway station on the !"}}, {"text": "Anklav", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case set ·<>Ut in the plaint was that the tobacco in question had been purchased 1>y the defendant firm on the 28th of November, 1955, that the same was despatched to the defendant firm by train from Anklav railway station on the !"}}, {"text": "st of December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4285, "end_char": 4305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st of December, 1955, on which date a bill for Rs."}}, {"text": "29th November, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5464, "end_char": 5483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In relation to the four cheques the defen- dant firm stated that on the 29th November, 1957, it had enteren into\n\na transaction for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco from firm R •. K ..\n\nPatel, that these goods had also to be supplied from the plaintifl's warehouse and that it was at the instance of one Chhotabhai belonging to firm R. K. Patel that the four cheques were issued by the defendant firm in the name of the plaintiff and given to Chhotabhai, although the agreement for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco was ultimately cancelled."}}, {"text": "Chhotabhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5699, "end_char": 5709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In relation to the four cheques the defen- dant firm stated that on the 29th November, 1957, it had enteren into\n\na transaction for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco from firm R •. K ..\n\nPatel, that these goods had also to be supplied from the plaintifl's warehouse and that it was at the instance of one Chhotabhai belonging to firm R. K. Patel that the four cheques were issued by the defendant firm in the name of the plaintiff and given to Chhotabhai, although the agreement for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco was ultimately cancelled.", "canonical_name": "Chhotabhai Patel"}}, {"text": "Joshi Kurva", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6352, "end_char": 6363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed that the transaction was entered into at his business premises in Joshi Kurva by Khudabux, a munim of the dei fondant firm, with himself in the presence of Indravadan Muljibha~, P.W. 2 who supported that stand."}}, {"text": "Khudabux", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6367, "end_char": 6375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed that the transaction was entered into at his business premises in Joshi Kurva by Khudabux, a munim of the dei fondant firm, with himself in the presence of Indravadan Muljibha~, P.W. 2 who supported that stand."}}, {"text": "Indravadan Muljibha~", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6442, "end_char": 6462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He deposed that the transaction was entered into at his business premises in Joshi Kurva by Khudabux, a munim of the dei fondant firm, with himself in the presence of Indravadan Muljibha~, P.W. 2 who supported that stand."}}, {"text": "Mahiyar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6692, "end_char": 6699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff also banked on documents showing that he had obtained permission of the Central Excise authorities for the transfer of 225 bags of tobacco from hjs godown to the defendant firm at Mahiyar where the defendant firm carried on its business, that the goods were actually received by tl\\e defendant firm on the 17th of December, 1955, and that they were stored by the defendant firm in its warehouse."}}, {"text": "17th of December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff also banked on documents showing that he had obtained permission of the Central Excise authorities for the transfer of 225 bags of tobacco from hjs godown to the defendant firm at Mahiyar where the defendant firm carried on its business, that the goods were actually received by tl\\e defendant firm on the 17th of December, 1955, and that they were stored by the defendant firm in its warehouse."}}, {"text": "st December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7047, "end_char": 7064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st December, 1955, to the account of the defendant firm on account of the price of 225 bags of\" tobacco at the rate of Rs."}}, {"text": "Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbux", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7303, "end_char": 7328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbux, one of the partners of the defendant firm appeared as its sole witness who denied that any contract had been entered into by it with the plaintiff for the supply of the disputed tobacco through Khudabux or Otherwise."}}, {"text": "Khudabux", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7524, "end_char": 7532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbux, one of the partners of the defendant firm appeared as its sole witness who denied that any contract had been entered into by it with the plaintiff for the supply of the disputed tobacco through Khudabux or Otherwise."}}, {"text": "17th A of December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8313, "end_char": 8337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another letter (exhibit 125) is dated the 17th A of December, 1955."}}, {"text": "4th of January, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8478, "end_char": 8498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bil exhibit 126 is dated 4th of January, 1956 and states the price of225 bags of tobacco as Rs."}}, {"text": "13th September, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8630, "end_char": 8650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is dated the 13th September, 1958 and states that accounts had been settled between firm R. K. Patel and the defendant B firm so that firm R. K. Patel owed a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Khudabux", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9648, "end_char": 9656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court did not believe the word of the plaintiff that an order had been placed with him by Khudabux acting on behalf of the defendant firm.", "canonical_name": "E Khudabux"}}, {"text": "Indravadan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11017, "end_char": 11027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(x) The testimony of Indravadan does not inspire confidence."}}, {"text": "R. K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11405, "end_char": 11410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fondant firm could have manufactured the letter-heads of firm R. K.\n\nPatel."}}, {"text": "Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbax", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11436, "end_char": 11461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The testimony of Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbax was also accepted by it as trustworthy."}}, {"text": "Chhotabhai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11846, "end_char": 11856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument was rejected with the observation that it was for the plaintiff to have the said account books produced and to examine Chhotabhai as a witness."}}, {"text": "E Khudabux", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14675, "end_char": 14685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first contention was turned down with the remark that the plaintiff could not be deemed to have <lischarged the initial onus which was on him to prove privily of contract because he had failed to put E Khudabux in the witness-box.", "canonical_name": "E Khudabux"}}, {"text": "27th of May, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17151, "end_char": 17168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That letter purports tojiave\n\ncome into existeuce on the 14th of September, 1958, i.e., about threC: months and a half after the defendant firm had been informed of the plaintiff's claim through a notice dated the 27th of May, 1958, and that claim had been repudiated by the defendant firm."}}, {"text": "Bhai Mohammad Hussain Rahim Bux of Mahiar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17312, "end_char": 17353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contents of the:\n\nletter are tell-tale and may be reproduced in extenso :\n\n\"To \"Bhai Mohammad Hussain Rahim Bux of Mahiar written, from Jabalpur by R.K. Patel of Jabalpur whose salutations."}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17368, "end_char": 17376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contents of the:\n\nletter are tell-tale and may be reproduced in extenso :\n\n\"To \"Bhai Mohammad Hussain Rahim Bux of Mahiar written, from Jabalpur by R.K. Patel of Jabalpur whose salutations."}}, {"text": "R.K. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17380, "end_char": 17390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contents of the:\n\nletter are tell-tale and may be reproduced in extenso :\n\n\"To \"Bhai Mohammad Hussain Rahim Bux of Mahiar written, from Jabalpur by R.K. Patel of Jabalpur whose salutations.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Patel"}}, {"text": "13-9-58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17490, "end_char": 17497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further it is learnt that [on the date 13-9-58 the account is made by the partner of our firm Shri Chhotabhai Patel upto the date 12-9-58 by taking into account the balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "Chhotabhai Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17550, "end_char": 17566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further it is learnt that [on the date 13-9-58 the account is made by the partner of our firm Shri Chhotabhai Patel upto the date 12-9-58 by taking into account the balance of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Chhotabhai Patel"}}, {"text": "12-9-58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17581, "end_char": 17588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further it is learnt that [on the date 13-9-58 the account is made by the partner of our firm Shri Chhotabhai Patel upto the date 12-9-58 by taking into account the balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kbusbalbbai Mahijibbai Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17777, "end_char": 17805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The price of 225 bags of tobacco-- of Kbusbalbbai Mahijibbai Patel of Joshikuva (Anklav)."}}, {"text": "Joshikuva", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17809, "end_char": 17818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The price of 225 bags of tobacco-- of Kbusbalbbai Mahijibbai Patel of Joshikuva (Anklav)."}}, {"text": "C::bbotabbai Kbusbalbhai Pate", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18220, "end_char": 18249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"C::bbotabbai Kbusbalbhai Pate)\n\n\"Partner R. K. Patel\n\n\"Jabalpur \"Date 14-9-58.'\""}}, {"text": "Decem- 'ber, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19450, "end_char": 19467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lf the case propounded by the defendant firm at the trial is correct, its account books must be containing entries to the effect that the agreement of purchase of 225 bags of tobacco was entered into with firm R. K. Patel and not with the plaintiff and that some time in Decem- 'ber, 1955, the account of firm R. K. Patel was credited with the amount of the price of the goods."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_235_247_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "HJ.MAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD.\n\nFRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS .\n\nMarch 28, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nLand Acquisition Act 1894 (I of 1894) Section 18(1) & Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1962 (31 of 1962) S<etion 7 Scope of.\n\nLand acquisition proceedings 'person interested' who is.\n\n,,.fcquisitio11 for company before July 20, 1962-Po.rsession not vesting in government-acquisition not complete-Invalidity nor cured by Section 7 of amen ding Act.\n\nThe appellant a private company was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles.\n\nIn or about 1957 the company moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes of the compeny and the Government on January 7, 1958 issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition .Act, 1894, which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acquisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by another notification under section 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on January 25, 1960. The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned in the notification, as \"public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd.\" The acquisition proceedings culminated in an award made under section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December II, 1961 a letter was written on behalf of the Government inlforming the owner of the acquired llllld that possession would be taken on or about tho 12th of January, 1962.\n\nThe first respondent in his writ petition to the High Court, contended that , tho Government was not competent to acquire the land for purposes of a 'nte company which could not be said to ho a public purpose under section 4 of the Act and prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings shoold bo quashed. A Single Judge of the High Court accepted the plea, allowed the writ petition and quashed tho land acquisition proceedings along with the notificatiOllS.\n\nThe appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal, as it was not 'a person interested' within the meaning of section 18(1) of the Act.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant :\n\n(1) the Letten Patent Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was not 'a person interested' and therefore had no locus standi to file an appeal, and (2) in view of the various amendments in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 particularly in sections 40 and 41 it could not be said that the acquisition under section 4 was ultra vlru Olf the Act.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQRTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : 1 (i) The appellant was undoubtedly 'a person interested' as con- \"ttemplated by section 18(1) of the Act. 'Ihe gh Court committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on fthe ground that it had no locus • standi to file an appeal before the Bench.\n\n[243F]\n\n(ii) The 'definition of 'a pemon interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusiVe definition and must be liberally coll8trued so as o embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested, either in the title tO the land or in the quantum of compensation.\n\n[240D]\n\nIn the instant case, the lands were actually acquired for the pnrpose of the Company and once the land vested in the <(iovernment, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the Company under' the agreement entered into between the Company and tho Government. Thus it cannot be said that the Company had no claim or tide to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the Company had to pay tho cof1pensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of. compensation was fixed so that the Company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this pnrpose, the Company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantnrn of compen.ation.\n\n~240E-F]\n\n(iii) The preponderance of judicial opinion seem, s to favour the view that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for wose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agrume11t to ay the compensation. This view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. [243 B]\n\n(iv) The view taken by the Ori1Sa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, Local authority or a r_e:rson for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person is not 1correct.\n\nSuch a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property rui also in the compensation to be paid\n\ntherof because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him seriously prejudice hi• rits. [243EJ\n\nSunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas [1968] 1 S.C.R. 362 referred to; The Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd.\n\nBahadurgarh. & Anr. v. The State of llaryana & Ors. A.I.R. [1972] Punjab & llaryana 59, M. Kuppu>wami v. The .\n\nSpecial Tahsildar (L.A.) 11 Industrial &taff, Ambathur ai. Saidapet, Madria....J [1967] 1 M.L.J. 329 approved; Comil/a Eleetric Supply Ltd. v. East Bengal \" Bank Ltd. Comilla & Ors. A.I.R. [1939} Calcutta 669; State of Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collecto1',. Sambalpur v. Amarandra Pratap Singh & Anr.\n\nA.I.R. [1967] Orissa, 180 over-ruled.\n\nI 2(i)The properties not having vested in the Government the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by section 7 of the amendment Act. [246 G]\n\n\n(iii) Even under section 7 of the amending Act; an acquisition made by a company prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfill the following conditions : (a) that\n\nHIMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, !.) 237\n\nthe land has been acquired and is vested in Government, (b) that the acquisi- A tion has been made under Clauses (a) and \\b) of section 41, (c) ftrat wery such acquisition and any proceeding, order etc. shall be deemed always as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by tho amending Act, were in force at all material times; and ( d) that by virtno of section 7 validity to the acquisition is given to all actions taketi in connection tQerewith in spite of any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary. {244FH]\n\nIn the instant case the first condition that there must be a complete acquisition before section 7 could validate the same has not been fulfilled at all. [245A]\n\n(iv) Until the possession of the entire land acquired was taken by the Government, the acquisition could not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of section 7 of the amending Act.\n\n[246H-247A]\n\n,/>, In the instant case the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in C the writ petition filed by th' respondents and the petition was contested only by\n\nthe State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as his interests were fully safeguarded by the Government, it was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court. The pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the Government and thus no title vested in the Government despite the notification acquiring the land. [246F-G] D\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1098 of 1971.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-7-1970 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 13 of 1965.\n\nY. S. Chitale, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwala for the Appellant.\n\nV. S. Desai, Mrs. Urmila Sirur far the Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.\n\nEx-parte for the RR 4 and.5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL1Au,'J. :-This appeal'!by special leave is directed'against a judgment dated November 3, 1970 of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant against a decision of a Single Judge allowing a writ petition filed by the first respondent.\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may\n\nbriefly summarised as follows : G The appellant was a private company which was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles and other accessories at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, East Bombay. The company was spread over about 10 acres ofland.\n\nSometime in 1957 or 1958 the company moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes:of the company. Accordingly, H on the 7th January 1958, the Government issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, )894 (hereinafter referred to\n\n- B\n\nas the 'Act') which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acqnisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by another notification under s. 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on the 25th January, 1960. In pursuance of these notifi-' cations the acquisition proceedings went on which culminated in an award mad~ under s. 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December 11, 1961, a letter was written on behalf of the Government informing the owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken on or about the 12th of January 1962. The purpose of the acquisition, as mentioned in the notification, was 'public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (Pvt.) Ltd'. The first respondent in the writ petition filed in the High Court before a Single Judge prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings should be quashed because the land was not acquired for any public purpose as contemplated by s. 4 of the Act. It was contended before the Single Judge that the Government was not competent to acquire the land for purposes of a private company which could not be said to be a public purpose under s. 4 of the Act. The plea taken by the first respondent found favour with the Single Judge who af!owed the writ petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings alongwith the notifications mentioned above.\n\nThereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal before the Bench inasmuch as it was not a person interested within the meaning of s. 18(1) of the Act.\n\nIn support of this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant, Dr. Chi tale, has argued two points before us. In the first place, it was submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was not a person interested and therefore had no locus to file an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench. Secondly, it was argued that in view of the various amendments in the Act, particularly in ss. 40 and 41, it could not be said that the acquisition under s. 4 was ultra vires of the Act. We might mention here that in the case of R.L. Arora v. State of U.P.(1) majority of the Judges of this Court took the view that a mere acquisition for the benefit of a company was not a public purpose and therefore the notification made in that case was strnck down. Sarkar, J., however, took a contrary view. In view of the decision Parliament amended certain provisions of the Act particularly ss. 40, 41, 44A, 44B and added a new sub-\n\n(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R.149.\n\nHIMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTO!l (Fazal Ali, J.) 239\n\nsection 5A after section 5. In other words, by virtue of the amendments, the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the first Arora case was removed.\n\nBy virtue of s. 7 of the amending Act, retrospective effect was given to the amendment superseding any judgment, decree or order passed before July 20, 1962. Section 7 of the l amending Act may be extracted thus : Validation of certain acquisitions\n\n\"7. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or 01 der of any court, every acquisition of land for a Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962, shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have lJeen made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-section, and accordingly every such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at all material times when rnch acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken .... \" Thls amending Act was also challenged in the case of R.L. Arora\n\nv. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,(1) 'where this Court:upheld its constitutional validity subject to certain conditior.s. The appellar.t crntended before us that in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court the previous decision of this Court stood superseded and the land acquisition proceedings taken even before the amendments were validated.\n\nIn support of this argument, Dr. Chitale drew our attention to various provisions of the Act.\n\nDefore, however, deciding the question as to whether or not the proceedings taken under s. 4 were cured by the amending Act, we would first deal with the contention of Dr. Chitale that the High Court w1s wrong iu holding that the company had no locus standi to file an appeal befo1 e the Letters Patent Bench. Learned counsel submitted that the definition of 'a person interested' ins. 18 is an inclusive one and is wide enough to include the appellant for whose benefit the land was acquired and who had to pay the entire compensation in accordance with the agreement entered into by the Government with the appellant. He argued that it could not be said that the appellant was not interested in defending the acquisition or in the\n\n\nI!'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.Jl\n\nquantum of compenstion which was to be awarded by the Court on a reference made by the Collector. The High Court was of the view that as the land was acquired by the Government, the company had no interest in the same and was, therefore, not entitled either to appear or to defend the proceedings before the court. In order to decide this question it may be necessary to extract the relevant part of s. 18(1) which runs thus :-\n\n\" 18(1).\n\nAny person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, ot the apportionment of the compenation among the persons i11terested.\"\n\nIt seems to us that the definition of 'a person inte1ested' given in s. 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land 01 in the quantum of compensat10n.\n\nIn the instant case, it is not disputed that the landi were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all.\n\nSecondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money.\n\nFor this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compep, ation.\n\nSo far as this aspect of matter is concerned, there appears to be a general consensus of judicial opinion that even though the company may not have any title to the property yet it certainly has a right to appear and put forward its case in the matter of determination of the quantum of compensation.\n\nIn the case of Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas(l) this Court observed as follows :\n\n\"It will be noticed that it is an inclusive definition.\n\nJt is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land, which has been Ii acquired.\n\nA person becomes a person interested if lie claims an interest in compens1tion to be awarded.\n\nIt seems\n\n(I) [1968] I S.C.R. 362.\n\nIIlMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 241\n\nto us that Paramsukhdas is a \"persou interested\" within s. 3(b) of the Act because he claims an inte1est in compensation.\n\nIt seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a person interested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the references made to it and that he was also a person whose interest would be affected by the objections, within s.21. He was cccmc'.il'gly entitled to be made a party.\"\n\nIn the case of The Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd.\n\nBahadurgarh & Anr. v. The State of Haryana & Ors{l); Pandit J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"From the facts stated above, it is apparent that the compensation amount has to be paid by the two companies.\n\nIf the said amount is increased by the learned Additional District Judge on a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it would be the two companies who would be prejudiced .... No authority even was cited by him that under similar circumstances any Court had ever held that the persons who had actually to pay the compensation, could not be allowed to lead evidence and say that the compensation amount be not enhanced.\"\n\nIn the case of Camilla Electric Supple Ltd. v. East Bengal Bank Ltd., Comila & Ors.(2) while the High Court took the view that the company for whose benefit the land was acquired may not strictly be an interested person yet it had undoubtedly a right to appear and adduce evidence on the quantum of compensation. In this connection, Mukherjea, J. observed thus :-\n\n\"Section 50, cl. (2) purports to remedy this disability and it lays down that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.\n\nThe reason is plain. It is the company or the local authority who has got to pay the money in such cases and it would be unjust to deny them the right to appear and adduce\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1972 Punjab & Haryana 59.\n\n(2) A.I. R. 1939 Calcutta 669.\n\nF .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO&TS (1980] 3 S.C.lt\n\nevidence which would have a bearing on the amount of the compsenation money.\"\n\nRoxburgh, J, made the following observations :-\n\n\"Thus the first question for decision is clearly settled by the above decision and there can be no doubt that in the circumstances at present being considered the company is a person interested, as defined in the Act, and is entitled to reqnire a reference under s. 18 unless that right is restricted by the terms of the proviso to s. 50(2).\"\n\nIn the case of M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (L.A.) II Industrial Estate, Ambathur at Saidapet, Madras (1) Venkatadri, J. interpreting the definition of 'interested [person' observed as follows:-\n\n\"The only question for consideration therefore is whether the petitioner is a person interested, as defined in section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nThe definition section says that the expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act. The expression 'person interested' is very comprehensive and it does not profess to give an exhaustive definition. The expression 'person interested' has been interpreted, by various Courts, and the trend of the opinion seems to be that I should give a liberal interpretation ....\n\nOn a review of the case-Jaw on the subject, it seems to me that the expression 'person interested' does not require that a person must really have an interest in the land sought to be acquired. It is enough if he claims an interest in compensation, as distinguished from an interest in the property sought to be acquired. As long as a person.claims an interest in the compensation, he is a person interested within the meaning of the definition of that expression.\"\n\nThe only case which appears to have taken a contrary view is a Division Bench decision of the Orissa Hiih Court in the case of State of 'Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collector, Samba!pur\n\nv. AmarandraPratap Singh & Anr., (2) where the High Court held that\n\n(I) (1967) I M. L. J. 329 .\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1967 Orissa 180.\n\n• +\n\nHIMALAYAN TILES V. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, !.) 243\n\nthe expression 'person interested' did not include a local authority or a company on whose behalf acquisition is made by the State. At the same time, it was clearly held that it was open to the company in any proceeding before the Collector or court to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.\n\nThus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of 'person interested' must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agree. ment to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital ? For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly, if such a person is not beard by the Collector or a court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person or whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him, seriously prejudice his rights.\n\nMoreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by s. 18(1) of the Act. The Higl1\n\nCourt, therefore, committed an errorl:in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the IJench.\n\nThe next point that was argued before us was as to whether the land acquisition proceedings are cured by s. 7 of the amending Act referred to above. Mr. V.S. Desai, appearing for the respondents, submitted that in the second Arora case (supra) while upholding the.' constitutional validity of s. 4 and other amendments, this Court laid down certain conditions which had to be fulfilled if an acquisition made prior to July 20, 1962 was held to be valid. In this connection, reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents on.the following passage from R.L. Arora's case (supra) :\n\n\"Therefore~ before s.p can validakan acquisition made before July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition is complete and the land acquired has vested in Government. This means that the land acquired has vested in Government either under s. 16 or s. 17(1) of the Act.\n\nThuss. 7 of the Amendment Act validates such acquisitions in which property has vested absolutely in Government either under s. 16 ors. 17(1). Secondly s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that where acquisition has been made for a company before July 20, 1962 or purported to have been made under cl.(a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) and those clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in R.L. Arora's case [1962 (2) Supp. S.C.R. 149), it shall be deemed that the acquisition was for the purpose mentioned in cl. (aa) as inserted in s.40(1) of the Act by the Amendment Act. Thirdly s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement, or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act were inforce at all material times when any action was taken for such acquisition.\n\nFinally, this validity is given to such acquisitions and to all actions taken in connection therewith notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court.\"\n\nA perusal of these observations would manifestly reveal that even under s. 7 of the amending Act, an acquisition made for a company prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfil the following conditions :-\n\n(a) that the land has been acquired and is vested in Government;\n\n(b) that the acquisition has been made under clauses (a) and (b) of s. 40 (I)\n\n(c) that every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, etc., shall be deemed always as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the amending Act, were in force at all material times; and\n\n(d) that by virtue of s. 7 validity to the acquisition is given to all actions taken in connection therewith inspite of any judgment. decree or order of any court to the contrary.\n\n., +\n\n• -+\n\nllIMALAYAN TILES '\" FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 245\n\nWe are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first con- A dition adumbrated by this Court, viz., that there must be a complete acquisition before s. 7 could validate the same, has not been !fulfilled at all. In this view of the matter we need not go into the other conditions indicated by this Court.\n\nIt was contended by Mr. Desai that according to the unchallena ged pleadings of the respondents, including the Government, which was a party before the District Court and also before !lie Single Judge of the High Court, there is nothing to show that after the issue of notification the Government had taken possession of the land so that it could be said that the land had vested in the Government in which case alone the acquisition prcceedings would have been completed. In C this connection, our attention was drawn to para 1 of the petition filed by the respondents before the High Court, which runs thus :\n\n\"The petitioners have become the owners of the said lands by inheritance, and the present lands records in respect of the said lands stand in the name of the petitioners.\n\nThere is no dispute between the petitioners and the respondents that the petitioners are the owners of the said immovable property. The petitioners were at all times and still are in possession of the said immovable properties.\"\n\nAccording to this averment, it is clearly pleaded that inspite of the notifications, the possession had not been given to the Government and the respondents (petitioners before the High Court) were still in possession of the properties in question. A similar averment has been made in para 15 of the petition which maybe extracted thus :-\n\n\"The petitioners say that they are still in possession of the said lands and possession of the said lands has not been taken away from them and the tenants of the petitioners numbering about 53 at present are in physical occupation of the same.\"\n\nIt was also alleged that the Government had : threatened the petitioners in the High Court that possession would be taken through police but despite such threats given by the Government, the petitioners were still in possession of the said lands and the structures were in possession of the tenants. The Government in its reply-affidavit did not deny these averments. On the other hand, they admitted the same. Para 8 of the reply-affidavit may be extracted thus :\n\n\"with reference to paragraph 1 of the petition, I believe H the contents thereof to be substantially correct though as stated above the petitioners' names do not appear as\n\noccupants or owners in the record of rights relatfog to the land in question.\"\n\nSimilarly, in para 21 of the reply, the contents of para 15 of the petition were admitted and further the fact that possession was with the petitioners, was not denied but was admitted to be correct. Para 21 of the reply-affidavit runs thus :-\n\n\"21. With reference to paragraph 15 of the petition, I believe the contents thereof to be substantially correct.\"\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant, however, drew our attention to a letter sent by the' respondents and went on to show that posses- C sion of only one acre of land has been taken by the Government.\n\nEven the High Court clearly found that. possession had not been fully delivered to the Government after the notification. In this connection, the Division Bench observed as follows :-\n\n\"On the question of possession being delivered to the Government the petitioners specifically averred at the end of paragraph 15 of the petition. \"The Petitioners further say that notwithstanding the said letter and the threat therein contained the petitioners are still in possession of the said lands and their tenants are occupying the said structures standing thereon and possession thereof has not been taken by the respondents\". They made similar averments at the end of paragraph I of the petition, that \"the petitioners were at all times and still are in possession of the said immovable properties\".\"\n\nAdmittedly, the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the respondents and the petition was contested only by the State.\n\nPerhaps the appellant may have thought that as its interests were fully safeguarded by the Government, it was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court.\n\nEven so, the pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the Government and thus no title vested in the Government despite the notification acquiring the land. In these circumstances, therefore, it is unmistakably clear that the properties not having vested in the Government, the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by s. 7 of the amendment Act as pointed out by this Court in the case referred to above. On this ground alone the appellant must fail.\n\nDr. Chitale, however, suggested that out of 2 2 acres, possession of one acre may have been taken by the Government.\n\nAssuming that to be so, until the possession of the e11tire land acquired was taken\n\n' y\n\nHIMALAYAN TILES\"· l'RANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, l.) 247\n\nby the Government, the acquisition conld not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of s. 7 of the amending Act. Io this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to prove that one of the essential conditions for application of s. 1 of the amending Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the acquisition proceedings suffer, has been fulfilled. The inescapable\n\nconclusion, therefore, is that the land acquisition proceedings were\n\nvoid and no benefit accrued to the appellant from the amending Act. _ The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "HJ.MAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HIMAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "January 7, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 745, "end_char": 760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In or about 1957 the company moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes of the compeny and the Government on January 7, 1958 issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition .Act, 1894, which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acquisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 789, "end_char": 798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 986, "end_char": 995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act 1894"}}, {"text": "January 25, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1045, "end_char": 1061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by another notification under section 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on January 25, 1960."}}, {"text": "Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1182, "end_char": 1219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned in the notification, as \"public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd.\" The acquisition proceedings culminated in an award made under section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1283, "end_char": 1293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 11, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1308, "end_char": 1322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned in the notification, as \"public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd.\" The acquisition proceedings culminated in an award made under section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1368, "end_char": 1382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned in the notification, as \"public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd.\" The acquisition proceedings culminated in an award made under section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961."}}, {"text": "December II, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1387, "end_char": 1404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December II, 1961 a letter was written on behalf of the Government inlforming the owner of the acquired llllld that possession would be taken on or about tho 12th of January, 1962."}}, {"text": "12th of January, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1545, "end_char": 1566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December II, 1961 a letter was written on behalf of the Government inlforming the owner of the acquired llllld that possession would be taken on or about tho 12th of January, 1962."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1784, "end_char": 1793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2298, "end_char": 2311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2618, "end_char": 2644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2661, "end_char": 2679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2728, "end_char": 2737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2918, "end_char": 2931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3165, "end_char": 3175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Ori1Sa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4509, "end_char": 4526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "243 B]\n\n(iv) The view taken by the Ori1Sa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, Local authority or a r_e:rson for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person is not 1correct."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4542, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "243 B]\n\n(iv) The view taken by the Ori1Sa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, Local authority or a r_e:rson for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person is not 1correct."}}, {"text": "[1968] 1 S.C.R. 362", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.I.R. [1939} Calcutta 669; State of Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collecto1',."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5641, "end_char": 5650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5700, "end_char": 5709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 20, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5773, "end_char": 5786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "246 G]\n\n(iii) Even under section 7 of the amending Act; an acquisition made by a company prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfill the following conditions : (a) that\n\nHIMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, !.)"}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6020, "end_char": 6030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6278, "end_char": 6287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6541, "end_char": 6550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6783, "end_char": 6792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwala for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7613, "end_char": 7626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwala for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y. S. Chitale, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwala for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7666, "end_char": 7677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, Mrs. Urmila Sirur far the Respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "Urmila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7684, "end_char": 7696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, Mrs. Urmila Sirur far the Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "FAZAL1Au,'J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7803, "end_char": 7815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL1Au,'J. :-This appeal'!by special leave is directed'against a judgment dated November 3, 1970 of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant against a decision of a Single Judge allowing a writ petition filed by the first respondent."}}, {"text": "Majas Mogra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8334, "end_char": 8345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may\n\nbriefly summarised as follows : G The appellant was a private company which was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles and other accessories at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, East Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8364, "end_char": 8370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may\n\nbriefly summarised as follows : G The appellant was a private company which was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles and other accessories at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, East Bombay."}}, {"text": "7th January 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8563, "end_char": 8579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, H on the 7th January 1958, the Government issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, )894 (hereinafter referred to\nB\n\nas the 'Act') which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acqnisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8624, "end_char": 8633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8864, "end_char": 8868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25th January, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8922, "end_char": 8940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by another notification under s. 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on the 25th January, 1960."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9057, "end_char": 9062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 11, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9156, "end_char": 9173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 11, 1961, a letter was written on behalf of the Government informing the owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken on or about the 12th of January 1962."}}, {"text": "12th of January 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9312, "end_char": 9332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 11, 1961, a letter was written on behalf of the Government informing the owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken on or about the 12th of January 1962."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9727, "end_char": 9731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9930, "end_char": 9934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10453, "end_char": 10461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chi tale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10545, "end_char": 10553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant, Dr. Chi tale, has argued two points before us.", "canonical_name": "Chi tale"}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10967, "end_char": 10971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar, J., however, took a contrary view."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11335, "end_char": 11345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the decision Parliament amended certain provisions of the Act particularly ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 40, 41, 44A, 44B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11397, "end_char": 11417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11527, "end_char": 11537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11633, "end_char": 11646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, by virtue of the amendments, the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the first Arora case was removed."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11698, "end_char": 11702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11843, "end_char": 11852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12032, "end_char": 12112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20th day of July 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12124, "end_char": 12145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or 01 der of any court, every acquisition of land for a Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962, shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have lJeen made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-section, and accordingly every such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at all material times when rnch acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken .... \" Thls amending Act was also challenged in the case of R.L. Arora\n\nv. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors."}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12275, "end_char": 12285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act", "statute": "Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act"}}, {"text": "sections 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12526, "end_char": 12544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act", "statute": "Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act"}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13207, "end_char": 13214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this argument, Dr. Chitale drew our attention to various provisions of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Chi tale"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13357, "end_char": 13361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14448, "end_char": 14456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14941, "end_char": 14946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Paramsukhdas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16649, "end_char": 16661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IIlMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 241\n\nto us that Paramsukhdas is a \"persou interested\" within s. 3(b) of the Act because he claims an inte1est in compensation."}}, {"text": "s. 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16694, "end_char": 16701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16998, "end_char": 17002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pandit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17172, "end_char": 17178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The State of Haryana & Ors{l); Pandit J. observed as follows :-\n\n\"From the facts stated above, it is apparent that the compensation amount has to be paid by the two companies."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17412, "end_char": 17422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18089, "end_char": 18098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Mukherjea, J. observed thus :-\n\n\"Section 50, cl. ("}}, {"text": "Section 50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18122, "end_char": 18132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPO&TS (1980] 3 S.C.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18644, "end_char": 18681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPO&TS (1980] 3 S.C.lt\n\nevidence which would have a bearing on the amount of the compsenation money.\""}}, {"text": "Roxburgh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18762, "end_char": 18770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roxburgh, J, made the following observations :-\n\n\"Thus the first question for decision is clearly settled by the above decision and there can be no doubt that in the circumstances at present being considered the company is a person interested, as defined in the Act, and is entitled to reqnire a reference under s. 18 unless that right is restricted by the terms of the proviso to s. 50(2).\""}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19074, "end_char": 19079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 50(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19143, "end_char": 19151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatadri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19271, "end_char": 19281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (L.A.) II Industrial Estate, Ambathur at Saidapet, Madras (1) Venkatadri, J. interpreting the definition of 'interested [person' observed as follows:-\n\n\"The only question for consideration therefore is whether the petitioner is a person interested, as defined in section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act."}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19472, "end_char": 19484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Hiih Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20548, "end_char": 20565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only case which appears to have taken a contrary view is a Division Bench decision of the Orissa Hiih Court in the case of State of 'Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collector, Samba!pur\n\nv. AmarandraPratap Singh & Anr., ("}}, {"text": "State of 'Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20581, "end_char": 20597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only case which appears to have taken a contrary view is a Division Bench decision of the Orissa Hiih Court in the case of State of 'Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collector, Samba!pur\n\nv. AmarandraPratap Singh & Anr., ("}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22278, "end_char": 22295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person or whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person."}}, {"text": "s. 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22855, "end_char": 22863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IJench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23033, "end_char": 23039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Higl1\n\nCourt, therefore, committed an errorl:in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the IJench."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23147, "end_char": 23151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23195, "end_char": 23205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. V.S. Desai, appearing for the respondents, submitted that in the second Arora case (supra) while upholding the.'", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23335, "end_char": 23339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.L. Arora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23605, "end_char": 23615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents on.the following passage from R.L. Arora's case (supra) :\n\n\"Therefore~ before s.p can validakan acquisition made before July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition is complete and the land acquired has vested in Government."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23886, "end_char": 23891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23895, "end_char": 23903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24042, "end_char": 24047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24069, "end_char": 24073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24234, "end_char": 24242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24463, "end_char": 24470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24512, "end_char": 24516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24743, "end_char": 24756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25120, "end_char": 25124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25378, "end_char": 25383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25510, "end_char": 25523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25632, "end_char": 25636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "llIMALAYAN TILES", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25803, "end_char": 25819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+\n\n• -+\n\nllIMALAYAN TILES '\" FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 245\n\nWe are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first con- A dition adumbrated by this Court, viz.,"}}, {"text": "FRANCIS VICTOR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25823, "end_char": 25837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+\n\n• -+\n\nllIMALAYAN TILES '\" FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 245\n\nWe are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first con- A dition adumbrated by this Court, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25839, "end_char": 25848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+\n\n• -+\n\nllIMALAYAN TILES '\" FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 245\n\nWe are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first con- A dition adumbrated by this Court, viz.,"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26016, "end_char": 26020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26196, "end_char": 26201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended by Mr. Desai that according to the unchallena ged pleadings of the respondents, including the Government, which was a party before the District Court and also before !"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30609, "end_char": 30613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31110, "end_char": 31114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31276, "end_char": 31280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_248_253_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "i4s\n\nNASIR AHMED\n\nASSISTANT CUSTODIAN GENERAL, EVACUEE PROPERTY\n\nU.P., LUCKNOW AND ANOTHER\n\nMarch 28, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]\n\nAdministration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950-Notice issued under .rec~ lion 2(d) (iii)-Dec/aration made under section 2(d) (i) and (ii)-Validity of.\n\nA notice under section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950, Wa! Issued by the filsistant Custodian of Evacuee Property to the appel~ lant and his brother (since deceased) stating that there WM \"credible infor~ mation in possession of the Custodian\" that they were evacuees under ~1ause\n\n(iii) of oection 2(d) of the Act and calling upon them to ohow cause why they should not be declared evacuees and their property as evacuee property.\n\nThe .Assistant CustOOian eventually declared the appellant and his brother as evacuees under clauses (i), (ii) & (iii) of section 2(d) of the Act.\n\nThe Authorised Deputy Custodian, although he .clismiosed the appellant'• appeal under ection 24 of the Act, pointed out that the ground based on . clause (iii) of section 2(d) was \"very vague\" and that the notice was \"defective\n\nto th:!t extent''. The Assistant Custodian General Evacuee Property dismissed the appellant's review petition and the High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The notice and the declaration that followed stating that the appellant was an evacuee under clauses (i) and (ii) of section 2(d) of the Act are invalid.\n\n[252E-F]\n\n1. The notice called upon the appCllant and his brother to show cause why F they should not be declared evacueeo under clause (iii) of section 2.( d) and the ground mentioned in the notice was also based on that clause, yet the Assistant Cmtodian found that they were evacuees under clauses (i) and (ii) as well. The Authorised Deputy Custodian held that the ground given in the notice in support of the case based on clause (iii) was vague and the notice was defective so far as that ground was concerned, but that was the only case G the appellant was called upon to answer.\n\nThe foundation of a proceeding under section 7 is a valid notice and an inquiry which travels beyond the bounds of the notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that .extent. [2.521)..E]\n\n2. From the facts statid above, it would appear that the Authority concerned did not apply his mind to the relevant material before issuing the notice.\n\nThe same thing is apparent from another fact.\n\nOn November 29, 19.52 the Deputy Custodian dropped the proceeding seeking to declare the appellant an intending evacuee and that on the same day directed initiation of a proceeding under section 7. Section 7 required the Custodian to form an opinion that the property in question was evacuee property within the meaning of the Act\n\n; +\n\nbefore any action under that section was taken.\n\nUnder rule 6 of the Admini:;;- tration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rriles 1950 the Custodian had to be satisfied from information in his possession or otherwise that the property was prim'.a facie evacuee property before a notice was issued.\n\nOn November 29, 1952 no evidence was found to support a declaration that the appellant was an intending evacuee. There was no material on record to suggest on that very day the authority had before him any evidence to justify initiation of a proceeding to declare the appellant an evacuee and his property as evacuee proprty.\n\nThe notice under section 7 appears to have been issued without any basis.\n\nThe Assistant Custodian General, who found no merit in the revisionnl application preferred by the appellant, overlooked these aspects of the case.\n\n[252H, 253 AB]\n\nCtv1t APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 512 of 1979.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and order dated 18-5-1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ No. 2945 of 1964.\n\nDanial Latifi and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellant.\n\nNemo for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGUPTA, J.-A notice issued under section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) gives rise to this appeal brought on a certificate granted by the Allahabad High\n\nCourt on August 18, 1969 under Article 133(l)(a) of the; Constitut10n ...( of India. Sub-section (1) of section 7 states :\n\n\"Where the Custodian is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of this Act, he may, after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persons interested, and after holding such inquiry into the matter as the circumstances of the case permit, pass an order declaring any such y property to be evacuee property.\"\n\nRule 6 of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950 (hereinafter called the Rules) which lays down the manner of inquiry under section 7 provides in sub-rule (I) that where the Custodian is satisfied from inforn1ation in his possession or other\\Visc jJ1at\n\nany property or an interest therein is prima facie evacuee propl!'tty, he shall cause a notice to be served in the prescribed form on the person claiming title to such property or interest and on any other person or , persons whom he considers to be interested in the property. Subru1e (2) of rule 6 says that the notice \"shall, as far as practicable, mention the grounds on which the property is sought to be declared evacuee property and shall specify the provision of the Act under which the person claiming any title to, or interest in, such property is alleged\n\n17-189 SCI/80\n\n• A to be an evacuee\". \"Evacuee\" has been definedinsection 2(d) of the Act to include several categories of persons, but for the purpose of this case it is necessary to refer only to first three of them. The relevant part of the definition is as follows :\n\n\"2(<l) \"evacuee\" means any person,-\n\n( i) who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, leaves or has, on or after the !st day of March, 1947, left, any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India, or\n\n(ii) who is resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan and who for that reason is unable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his property in any part of the territories to which this Act extends, or whose property in any part of the said territories has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or\n\n(iii) wh& has, after the 14th day of August, 1947, obtained, otherwise than by way of purchase or exchange, any right to, interest in or benefit from any propertyjwhich is treated as evacuee or abandoned property under any law for the time being in force in Pakistan.\"\n\nThe appellant was declared an evacuee by the Assistant Custodian (Judicial), Deoria. Having failed to have the declaration set aside by the appellate and the revisional authorities under the Act, the appellant moved the High Court by a writ petition challenging the notice under section 7 and the subsequent proceedings based on it. This appeal is from the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition in Iirffine. The notice in question was issued by the Assistant Custodian, EV!icuee Property, Deoria, to the appellant and his brother Bashir Ahmad on March 11, 1954 stating that there was \"credible information in possession of the Custodian\" that they were evacuees under clause (iii) of section 2(d) of the Act and calling upon them to show cause why orders should not be passed declaring them evacuees and their property as evacuee property. The notice purports to have been issued in accordance with rule 6 which requires a statement of the factual grounds on which the notice is based. The notice in this case\n\n:appears to be merely a copy of the prescribed form without parti-\n\nA '\n\n~ .culars. The ground stated in the notice reproduces only what the form\n\n.contains and that is as follows : •\n\n\"Acquisition of any rights to, interest in or benefit from any evacuee or abandoned property in Pakistan, otherwise than by way of purchase or exchange.\"\n\n'By this order dated December 14, 1955, the Assistant Custodian (Judicial), Deoria, declared the appellant and his brother evacuees under clauses (i), (ii) & (iii) of section 2{d) though in the notice issued it was alleged that the information in possession of the Custodian was that they were evacuees under clause (iii) only. An appeal preferred under section 24 of the Act was dismissed by the Authorised Deputy Custodian on August 30, 1963 who upheld the order of the Assistant C'utodian (Judicial). The Authorised Deputy Custodian, however, found that the ground based on clause (iii) of section 2(d) of the A<t\n\nwas \"very vague\" and that the notice was \"defective to that extent\".\n\nIt has been stated already that the notice issued under rule 6(1) was •based only on that ground and clauses (i) and (ii) of section 2(d) were not mentioned at all in that notice. The Assistant Custodian General, Evacuee Property, U.P. to whom the appellant and his brother preferred a revision found no merit in the applicants' case. The High Court dismissed in limine the writ petition made by the appellant and his brother Bashir Ahmad on the view that the order of the Assistant Custodian General did not suffer from any error. Bashir Ahmad died after the High Court had disposed of the writ petition, and the appeal before us is by Nasir Ahmad alone.\n\nIt is necessary to state a few more facts. It appears that several years before the present notice under section 7 of the Act was issued, V on November 22, 1949 when the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, replaced by the Act in 1950 was in force, a notice was •issued to the appellant and his brothers including Bashir Ahmad by Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, Deoria, Uttar Pradesh, .alleging that they were transferring their movable and immovable properties to Pakistan and stating that for this reason they were being considered as evacuees and their property was being treated as evacuee property. The notice invited objections from them, if any, within 30 days. At the instance of District Magistrate, Deoria, a similar notice was issued to the appellant and his brothers by the authority in District Chapra in the State of Bihar where also they had some pro- perties, asking them to show cause why they should not be declared 1ntending evacuees. The Act had then come into force and this •notice was issued under section 19 of the Act. Section 19 provided\n\nfor issue of notice to a person]before declaring him an \"intending evacuees\". The Act as originally passed contained in clause (e) of section •2 a definition of \"intending evacuee\" as meaning a person who had transferred after August 14, 1947 any of his assets to Pakistan.\n\nSection 19 was repealed and clause (e) of section 2 was deleted in 1953.\n\nOn enquiry it was found that there was uo reliable evidence to justify a declaration that the appellant and his brothers were intending evacuees and the Deputy Custodian, Chapra, dropped the proceeding on May 24, 1952. On November 29, 1952 the Deputy Custodian, Deoria, also dropped the proceeding started upon the notice issued by him, but on the same day he initiated a proceeding!under section 7 of the Act against the appellant and his brother Bashir Ahmad that ended in the declaration challenged in this appeal.\n\nThe facts stated above clearly show that the notice and the declaration that followed are both invalid. The notice called upon the appellant and his brother to show cause why they should not be declared evacuees under clause (iii) of section 2( d) of the Act and the D ground mentioned in the notice was also based ou that clause, yet the Assistant Custodian found that they were evacuees under clauses (i) and (ii) as well. The Authorised Deputy Cusdodian held that the ground given in the notice in support of the case based on clause (iii) was vague and the notice was defective so far as that ground was concerned, but that was the only case the appellant was called upon to E answer. The foundation of a proceeding under section 7 is a valid notice and an inquiry which travels beyond the bounds of the notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that_ extent. Therefore the declaration that the appellant was an evacuee under clauses (i) and (ii) of section 2( d) of the Act must be held invalid.\n\nF Under rule 6 the notice under section 7 must be issued in the prescribed form and contain the grounds on which the property is sought to be declared evacuee property. As stated earlier, the notice that was issued in this case merely reproduced the form without mentioning the particulars on which the case against the appellant was based. It was essential to state the particulars to enable the appellant to answer the G case against him. Clearly therefore the notice did not comply with rule 6 and could not provide a foundation for the proceedings that followed.\n\nWhat is said in the preceding paragraph makes it plain that the authority concerned did not apply his mind to the relevant material H before issuing the notice. The same thing is apparent from another fact. It has been stated that on November 29, 1952 the Deputy Custodian, Deoria, dropped the proceeding seeking to declare the appellant\n\n.an intending evacuee and that on the same day he directed the initiation A of a proceeding under section 7. Section 7 required the Custodian to form an opinion that the property in question is evacuee property within the meaning of the Act before any action under that section is taken. Also, under rule 6 the Custodian has to be satisfied from information in his possession or otherwise that the property is prima facie evacuee property before a notice is issued. On November 29, B 1952 no evidence was found to support a declaration that the appellant was an intending evacuee. There is no material on record to suggest that on that very day the authority had before him any evidence to justify the initiation of a proceeding to declare the appellant an evacuee and his property as evacuee property. The notice under section 7 thus appears to have been issued without any basis. The Assistant C Custodian General who found no merit in the revisional application preferred by the appellant overlooked these aspects of the case. We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the Assistant Custodian General's order did not suffer from any error.\n\nWe allow this appeal and quash the notice issued to the appellant D on March 11, 1954 and all subsequent proceedings based on it. The respondents have not appeared to contest the appeal; there will be no order as to costs. ·\n\nP.B.R .\n\nAppeal allowed,", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "i4s\n\nNASIR AHMED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NASIR AHMED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ASSISTANT CUSTODIAN GENERAL, EVACUEE PROPERTY\n\nU.P., LUCKNOW AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASSISTANT CUSTODIAN GENERAL, EVACUEE PROPERTY U.P., LUCKNOW AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257, "end_char": 269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 312, "end_char": 321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 329, "end_char": 372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 874, "end_char": 886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1063, "end_char": 1075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950"}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1444, "end_char": 1456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1627, "end_char": 1636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 29, 19.52", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2471, "end_char": 2489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 29, 19.52 the Deputy Custodian dropped the proceeding seeking to declare the appellant an intending evacuee and that on the same day directed initiation of a proceeding under section 7."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2655, "end_char": 2664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2666, "end_char": 2675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 29, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3102, "end_char": 3119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 29, 1952 no evidence was found to support a declaration that the appellant was an intending evacuee."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3786, "end_char": 3806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and order dated 18-5-1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ No."}}, {"text": "Danial Latifi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3840, "end_char": 3853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danial Latifi and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Urmila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3863, "end_char": 3875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Danial Latifi and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Nemo", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3896, "end_char": 3900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nemo for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3966, "end_char": 3971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGUPTA, J.-A notice issued under section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act) gives rise to this appeal brought on a certificate granted by the Allahabad High\n\nCourt on August 18, 1969 under Article 133(l)(a) of the; Constitut10n ...( of India."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3998, "end_char": 4007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 133(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4202, "end_char": 4219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4275, "end_char": 4284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4816, "end_char": 4825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5579, "end_char": 5591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5881, "end_char": 5886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant part of the definition is as follows :\n\n\"2(<l) \"evacuee\" means any person,-\n\n( i) who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, leaves or has, on or after the !"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5891, "end_char": 5899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant part of the definition is as follows :\n\n\"2(<l) \"evacuee\" means any person,-\n\n( i) who, on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, leaves or has, on or after the !"}}, {"text": "14th day of August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st day of March, 1947, left, any place in a State for any place outside the territories now forming part of India, or\n\n(ii) who is resident in any place now forming part of Pakistan and who for that reason is unable to occupy, supervise or manage in person his property in any part of the territories to which this Act extends, or whose property in any part of the said territories has ceased to be occupied, supervised or managed by any person or is being occupied, supervised or managed by an unauthorised person, or\n\n(iii) wh& has, after the 14th day of August, 1947, obtained, otherwise than by way of purchase or exchange, any right to, interest in or benefit from any propertyjwhich is treated as evacuee or abandoned property under any law for the time being in force in Pakistan.\""}}, {"text": "Deoria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6869, "end_char": 6875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was declared an evacuee by the Assistant Custodian (Judicial), Deoria."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7071, "end_char": 7080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Iirffine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7205, "end_char": 7213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal is from the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition in Iirffine."}}, {"text": "Bashir Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7337, "end_char": 7349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice in question was issued by the Assistant Custodian, EV!icuee Property, Deoria, to the appellant and his brother Bashir Ahmad on March 11, 1954 stating that there was \"credible information in possession of the Custodian\" that they were evacuees under clause (iii) of section 2(d) of the Act and calling upon them to show cause why orders should not be passed declaring them evacuees and their property as evacuee property."}}, {"text": "March 11, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7353, "end_char": 7367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice in question was issued by the Assistant Custodian, EV!icuee Property, Deoria, to the appellant and his brother Bashir Ahmad on March 11, 1954 stating that there was \"credible information in possession of the Custodian\" that they were evacuees under clause (iii) of section 2(d) of the Act and calling upon them to show cause why orders should not be passed declaring them evacuees and their property as evacuee property."}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7491, "end_char": 7503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 14, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8179, "end_char": 8196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'By this order dated December 14, 1955, the Assistant Custodian (Judicial), Deoria, declared the appellant and his brother evacuees under clauses (i), (ii) & (iii) of section 2{d) though in the notice issued it was alleged that the information in possession of the Custodian was that they were evacuees under clause (iii) only."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8325, "end_char": 8334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8512, "end_char": 8522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 30, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8586, "end_char": 8601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal preferred under section 24 of the Act was dismissed by the Authorised Deputy Custodian on August 30, 1963 who upheld the order of the Assistant C'utodian (Judicial)."}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8751, "end_char": 8763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8971, "end_char": 8983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nasir Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9483, "end_char": 9494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bashir Ahmad died after the High Court had disposed of the writ petition, and the appeal before us is by Nasir Ahmad alone."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9608, "end_char": 9617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9646, "end_char": 9663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that several years before the present notice under section 7 of the Act was issued, V on November 22, 1949 when the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, replaced by the Act in 1950 was in force, a notice was •issued to the appellant and his brothers including Bashir Ahmad by Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, Deoria, Uttar Pradesh, .alleging that they were transferring their movable and immovable properties to Pakistan and stating that for this reason they were being considered as evacuees and their property was being treated as evacuee property."}}, {"text": "Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9673, "end_char": 9723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9894, "end_char": 9907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that several years before the present notice under section 7 of the Act was issued, V on November 22, 1949 when the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, replaced by the Act in 1950 was in force, a notice was •issued to the appellant and his brothers including Bashir Ahmad by Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, Deoria, Uttar Pradesh, .alleging that they were transferring their movable and immovable properties to Pakistan and stating that for this reason they were being considered as evacuees and their property was being treated as evacuee property."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Deoria", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10212, "end_char": 10239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of District Magistrate, Deoria, a similar notice was issued to the appellant and his brothers by the authority in District Chapra in the State of Bihar where also they had some pro- perties, asking them to show cause why they should not be declared 1ntending evacuees."}}, {"text": "Chapra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10332, "end_char": 10338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of District Magistrate, Deoria, a similar notice was issued to the appellant and his brothers by the authority in District Chapra in the State of Bihar where also they had some pro- perties, asking them to show cause why they should not be declared 1ntending evacuees."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10355, "end_char": 10360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of District Magistrate, Deoria, a similar notice was issued to the appellant and his brothers by the authority in District Chapra in the State of Bihar where also they had some pro- perties, asking them to show cause why they should not be declared 1ntending evacuees."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10545, "end_char": 10555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10568, "end_char": 10578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "statute": "the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949"}}, {"text": "August 14, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10816, "end_char": 10831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act as originally passed contained in clause (e) of section •2 a definition of \"intending evacuee\" as meaning a person who had transferred after August 14, 1947 any of his assets to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10864, "end_char": 10874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10906, "end_char": 10915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 24, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11143, "end_char": 11155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On enquiry it was found that there was uo reliable evidence to justify a declaration that the appellant and his brothers were intending evacuees and the Deputy Custodian, Chapra, dropped the proceeding on May 24, 1952."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11327, "end_char": 11336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11691, "end_char": 11704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12183, "end_char": 12192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12421, "end_char": 12434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12501, "end_char": 12510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13474, "end_char": 13483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13485, "end_char": 13494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 29, B 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13845, "end_char": 13864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 29, B 1952 no evidence was found to support a declaration that the appellant was an intending evacuee."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14196, "end_char": 14205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_254_276_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.\n\nM. J. SIDDIQUI AND ORS.\n\nMarch 31, 1980\n\nB [N. L. UNTWALIA, s. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.J\n\nSeniority, inter-se of direct recruits and promotees prior to the merger of PMS I and PMS II as per order 18-12-68-Validity of the seniority list dt. 31-12-71 pursuant to the order fixing the principles Dt 18-12-11-Pradeshik Medical Services, 1964-Whether the order is inconsistent with Rule 18 of the U.P. Medical Services Rules 1945.\n\nIn the State of U.P. there were two Medical Services consisting of doctors serving in the State.\n\nThe senior service was called the Provincial Medical Service (P.M.S.) This service was a gazetted service carrying a higher scale of pay than the other service which was known as\n\nP.S.M.S. (Provincial Subordinate Medical Service). So far as the P.M.S. was concerned, the in .. cumbents of the posts in the service were appointed by the Governor, whereaa in the case of the P.S.M.S., the employees were appointed by the Director,_ Health Services.\n\nOn JW1e 14, 1945, the Government of U.P. framed rules known as the \"United Province Medical Services ('Men's Branch) Rules, 1945,. which were applicable to P.M.S. only. Rule 3(b), (f), and (h) defined uDirect Recruitment\", \"Member of the Service\" and \"Subordinate Medical Service\", respectiVely.\n\nRule 5 provided for two modes of recruitment. Rule 12 provided that selection of candidate for direct recruitment shall be made in consultation with the Public Service Commission Rule 13 prescribed the mode of interview, Ilule 15 laid down modes of recruitment by promotions.\n\nRule 17 specified the \"appointing authority\" and the manner in which the vacancies should be filled in. Under Rule 18, seniority in the service shall be determined by the date of order of appointment in a substantive vacancy. Rule 19 requiredthat all persons whether recruited directly or by promotion be placed on probation, while Rule 20 laid down the circumstances under which a person appointed to a post in the Service on probation may be confirmed.\n\nOn 14-3-1946, two Medical Services were constituted, namely (i) Provincial Medical Service Grade I (popularly known as P.M.S. I ) and (ii) Provincial Medical Service Grade II (known as P.M.S. II). It was decided that existing members of PMS II were to be absorbed in PMS I anrl further recruitment of medical graduates should be made to PMS II in order to replace the PSMS,_ By an order dated July 24, 1951, the Government laid dnwn that 50 per cent of the vacancies in PMS I were to be filled in by direct recruitment and 50 per cent by promotion. The principle for determination of inter se seniority between direct recruits and the promotees in PMS I was not laid down at tho time when the Government order was made. In spite of the quota fixed by the order dated 24-7-1951, no promotion from PMS II to PMS I could be made between the years 1952 to 1963, except on an ad /we basis.\n\nOn July 14, 1962 by virtue of an advertisement, the Public Service Commission invited applicatioris for recruitments to 56 gazetted posts out of which 9 posts were permanent and the rest were temporary but were likely to continue. In pur ...\n\n·~.\n\nU. P. STATE V. M. J, SIDDIQUI 255\n\nsuance. of this advertisement, the appellants applied for direct recruitment to PMS 1 and they were ultimately appointed on a temporary basis •ome time in June 1963, but before the merger of the two services (PMS I and PMS II) which came into existence on November 1, 1964.\n\nThis merger was brought about through an order of Government dt. 2-11-64.\n\nBy this order the Prad.eshik Medical Service (Men/Women) was constituted which had two grades; aamely-ordinary grade which included all the existing posts of PMS I, and PMS II and Selection Grade to consist of 7!% of the total number of pennanent posts in the ordinary grade.\n\nBy para 2 it was specified that \"the permanent and temporary posts in PMS I and PMS II grades shall continue to remain\n\n3:i such on their merger until the temporary posts are made permanent subsequently\". By para 4, the Government proposed to issue a further order regarding the fixation of the inter-se seniority while the right to fix inter-se seniority of the members of the two services was . reserved, no provision was\n\nmade in the Order which either applies or oontinues the Rules of 1945 even in respect of inter-se seniority of members of each merging service. Thereafter another order was passed on 20-2-1965 by which the U.P. :rvfedical Service\n\n(Men's Branch) Rules 1945 were made applicable provisionally to the new PMS with the words \"unless otherwise ordered\". Ultimately, a final order laying down the principles on the basis of which the int\"!r-se seniority of the members of the two services was to be determined in the new service was made on 18-12-68. In consonance with the directions contained in this order, the Government fixed the seniority of appellants 1 to 7 and petitioners 1 to 12.\n\nThe appellants fell within the ambit of direction (b) of the order dt. 18-12-68 which provided for officers appointed to PMS either on a permanent or temporary basis prior to the merger in a regular manner in consultation with rhe Lok Sewa Ayog (Public Service Commission) in order of their seniority. By a Notification dated July 3, 1970 issued under Art. 309 of the Constitution, the Governor made certain amendments to Rule 25 of the 1945 Rules, which dealt with promotion to the post of Civil Surgeon.\n\nThe Government thereafter directed through its order dt. 18-12-71 certain principles to be followed regarding fixation of seniority.\n\nAs per this order the Government by i!s order dt. 31-12-71 fixed the inter-se seniority of the members of the ne\\v service, placing the appellants above the petitioners/respondents and awarding to them the selection grade prior to the petitioners.\n\n, The petitioners/respondents challenged the vires of these orders as (a) ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution; (b) in consistent with the Rules 17 and 18 of the 1945 Rules. The High Court accepted the plea of the petitioners/respondents. Hence the appeals by special leave by the appellants ancl the State.\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD: 1. The combined effect of Rules 12, 13, 15 and 17 of the United Province Medical Service (Men's Branch), Rules, 1945 is that whereas in the case of direct recruitment, the matter was to be considered by the Public S_ervice Commission after advertising the vacancies, so far as recruitment to the Service by promotion is concerned, a Selection Committee constituted under the Rules had to send the lists to the Commission. In a third category of cases ta which appointments _were made purely on a temporary or officiating basis there was no provision for reference either to a Selection Committee or to\n\nB .l\n\nG l\n\n\\ A\n\nthe Commission and such appointments could be made by the Governor und\" sub-rule (2) of Rule 17.\n\n[262B-C]\n\nIn the instant case, the direct recruits applied to the Government in pursuance of an advertisement and they were appointed to the Senior Service only after they were recommended by the Public Service Commission.. The appointment, therefore, was not a purely officiating, temporary or ad hoc appointment 8 as contemplated by Rule 17(2). [262D-E]\n\n\\ D\n\nt F\n\n; G\n\n2. There is no magical formula or special charm in the word \"substantive\".\n\nThe mere use of the term 'appointment in a temporary vacancy' by itself would not conclude the matter or lead to the irresistible inference that the appointment was not made in a substantive capacity, because even a substantive appointment could be made to a purely temporary vacancy.\n\nIn order, therefore, to determine the nature of appointment, the Court must look to the substance of the matter, the surrounding circumstances, the mode, the manner and the terms of appointment and other relevant factors.\n\nIn the instant case. Reading the advertisement and the manner and mode of the appointment of the appellants it is clear that they were appointed in a substantive capacity 10 temporary posts which according to the advertisement were likely to continue.\n\nMoreover the appellants were appointed to PMS I which was doubtless a superior service carrying a higher scale than PMS II of which the petitioners were members.\n\n[265B-E]\n\nPurshottan1 Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] SCR 828; follO\\\\'ed.\n\n3. The fact that due to some oversight on the part of appointing authority or to other fortuitous circumstance the order placing the appellants on probation was not passed for long would not give any special advantage to the petitioners, (respondents) who were themselves drawn from a lower service and even if they held a substantive post in such service, they cannot by virtue of promotion to the higher service after the appellants, claim seniority over the latter.\n\n[266E-F]\n\n4. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution have not been violated because a person who is appointed to a higher service carrying a higher scale must ordinarily be deemed to be senior to an employee who is promoted from a lower service to the higher service even though his appointment may have been substantive in the lo\\ver service. [266 F-G]\n\nKewal Krishan Bagga v. The Chairman Railway Board and Ors., [1976] 4 S.C.C. p. 733; followed.\n\n5. In the absence of any provision in the order dated 2-11-64 either applying or continuing the Rules of 1945 even in respect of the inter-se seniority of members of each merging service, which was also passed under Art. 309 of the Constitution and was therefore of a statutory character or at any rate bad a statutory flavour, the Rules of 1945 could not be applied to the situation obtaining after 2-11-64. [268G-H]\n\n6. The Directions in the order dated 18-12-68 strike a just balance between the officers of erstwhile services after they were merged into the New Services. Direction (b) qf order dt. 18-12-68 regarding fixation of seniority does not speak of any substantive appointment whatsoever but equates the\n\nU. P. STATE V. M. J. SIDDIQUI 257\n\n, officers appointed to PMS I on permanent or temporary basis prior to the merger.\n\nIn other words, the direction ontemplates that any officer appointed to a post whether permanent or temporary in PMS I which was the Senior Service prior to merger, would rank after merger above those officers who were , drawn from PMS II. [27 IB, C, Gl .\n\n7. The 1945 Rules did not apply to the New Service at its inception and\n\nthat they were made applicable to the new service only for a shortwhile by B virtue of the order dated 20th February 1965, purely on a provisional basis as the Government made it quite clear in that order itself that the 1945 Rules will apply 'unless otherwise ordered' and thus had reserved the right to pass final orders regarding seniority later which was done in 1968. [271D-E]\n\n8. Direction (b) of the order dt. 18-12-68 is not inconsistent with Rule 18 of the 1945 Rules.\n\nHaving regard to the history of PMS I and PMS H, if Rule 18 of the 1945 Rules were applied to the parties and the 1968 order ignored, the resultant effect would be that equals and unequals would be treated similarly which would amount to a direct infraction of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The appellants and the petitioners were not similarly situate and if the petitioners were put above the appellants in the matter of seniority, it would have resulted in a gross and wholly unreasonable discrimination by making junior officers senior to superior officers.\n\nThis is clear from the following propositions :\n\n(i) To begin with, the Rules of 1945 had absolutely no application to the new Service. Those Rules applied to the old PMS I Service only and, therefore, to a situation completely different from that which prevailed after the merger of the two Services on 1-11-1964.\n\nAs the Government Order merging the two Services was also an Order passed under Art. 309 of the Constitution, it had statutory E force and as binding on all the officers of the new Service.\n\n(ii) At the time when the 1964 Order \\Vas passed the Government deliberately did not frame any rules in order to determine the .inter se seniority of the members of the new Service but reserved the right to do so.\n\n(iii) It was under the Order dated February 20, 1965 that for the first time the Rules of 1945 \\Vere applied to the new Service and that too \"unless otherwise ordered\" i.e., purely on a provisional basis.\n\nThe order of 1968 laid down the principles for fixing seniority and, being a statutory order, superseded all the Rules in question including Rules 17 and 18 of the 1945 Rules. It wa~ further confirmed by the order dated 18-12-1971. [273G-H, 274A-E, 275D-E]\n\nClVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2870 & 2869 , of 1977.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n31~1-1977 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc Writ Petition\n\nNo. 2852 of 1972.\n\nG. L. Sanghi, Manoj Swarup, Afiss La/ita Kohli and Miss Indu .Khindri for the Appellant in CA 2869/77.\n\nA L. N. Sinha, Attorney General, G. N. Dixit and 0. P. Rana for the Appellant in CA 2870/70. '\n\nS. P. Gupta and Pramod Swarup for RR 12 in both the appeals,\n\nR. K. Jain for RR 13 in CA 2870/77.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-These two appeals by special leave are directed' against a judgment dated January 31, 1977 of the Allahabad High Court by which the High Court accepted the writ petitions filed by the present respondents I to 12 and quashed the order dated December 31, 1971 of the Government of U.P. insofar as it related to respondents numbers 3 to 12 and 14 to 39 before the High Court. The High Court further directed the State to redetermine the seniority of the regular PMS II officers and the temporary PMS I officers in the light of the observations made and the findings given by the High Court.\n\nAgainst the order of the High Court two appeals have been filed to this Court-one by the State ofUttar Pradesh (which is Civil Appeal No. 2870 of 1977) and the other by the appellants 1 to 8 (Civil Appeal No. 2869 of 1977) who were respondents numbers 3 and 33 to 39 before the High Court. For the purpose of brevity and to avoid confusion we would refer to respondents 1 to 12 before the High Court as the 'petitioners' and respondents numbers 3 and 33 to 39 before the High Court as the 'appellants',\n\nThe main controversy between the parties centered round fixation of their seniority in a new service which was created by an order of the Government dated November 2, 1964. Shorn of unnecessary details the broad facts which have given rise to the present appeals may be briefly summarised thus :\n\nIn the State of U.P. prior to 1945 there were two Medical Services consisting of Doctors serving in the State. The senior service was called the P.M.S., that is to say, the Provincial Medical Service. This service was a gazetted service carrying a higher scale of pay than the other service which was known as P.S.M.S. (Provincial Subordinate Medical Service) which was a non-gazetted service with a lower scale of pay. It may also be noticed that so far as PMS was concerned, the incumbents of the posts in the Service were appointed by the Governor whereas in the case of the PSMS, the employees were appointed by the Director, Health Services. We have mentioned these two facts because the nature of the Services, the scales of pay, the mode and manner of appointment of incumbents to the two Services would be a very relevant factor in order to determine whether or not the decision rendered by the\n\n• -\n\nHigh Court was correct. On June 14, 1945, the Government of U.P. framed rules known as 'The United Provinces Medical Service (Men's Branch) Rules, 1945' which were applicable to PMS only and contained definitions, the relevant parts cf whom being covered by clauses (b ), (f) and (h) may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"3. (b) 'Direct recruitment' means recruitment under B rule 5(1).\n\n(f) 'member of the Service' means a person appointed in a substantive capacity under the provisions of these rules or of the rules in force previous to the promulgation of these rules, to a post in the cadre of the service;\n\n(h) 'Subordinate Medical Service' means the Subordinate Medical Service (Men's Branch) of the U.P.\"\n\nRule 5 provided that recruitment to the Service covered by the Rules (hereinafter referred to as the 'Senior Service') was to be made\n\nby two modes- D\n\n(i) by selection from among the persons who were eligible for appointment to the Service under the provisions of the Rules whether or not they were already in the permanent service of the Crown, and\n\n(ii) by promotion from the Subordinate Medical Service\n\nprovided that the number of posts to be filled by promotion was limited to 10 per cent of the total number of posts borne on the permanent cadre of the service.\n\nRule 9 provided that a candidate for appointment to the Senior Service must be between 22 and 32 years of age on the !st July of the year in which the recruitment was to be made. By a subsequent amendment it was provided that in the case of scheduled caste candidates the age limit could be extended by another five years, and that the Governor could, in consultation with the Public Service Commission, relax the upper age limit upto 40 years in favour of any candidate or class of candidates. Rule IO laid down the academic qualifications for a candidate to be eligible for recruitment to the Senior Service. The relevant portion of that Rule may be quoted thus :-\n\n\"10. Academic qualifications\n\nA candidate for recruitment to the Service must-\n\n(a) hold a M.B.B.S. or an equivalent degree of a B University established by law in India and recognised by the Medical Council in India; OR\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.It.\n\n(b) possess a foreign qualification recognised by the Medical Council of India if he does not hold a M.B.B.S. or an equivalent degree of a University established by law in India.\n\nA candidate who possesses post-graduate degree or diplorna recognised by the Medical Council of India in any branch of Medical Science shall, be given preference in the n1atter of recruit111ent to the Service.\"\n\nRule 12 provided that selection of candidates for direct recruitment shall be made in consultation with the Public Service Commission who, when called upon to do so, was to invite applications in the prescribed form. Rule 13 prescribed the mode in which the interview was to be held in respect of candidates who applied for recruitment to the Service.\n\nThe relevant portion of that Rule may be extracted thus :-\n\n\" 13. Interview-(!) The Commission will scrutinise the applic.ations received by them and require so many candidates qualified for appointment under these rules as seem to them desirable to appear before them for interview at their own expense.\n\n(2) No candidate will be admitted to the interview unless he holds a certificate of admission granted by the E Commission.\n\n(3) The Commission shall draw up a list of such candidates as it considers suitable for appointment in order of preference and shall forward it to the Government.\n\n( 4) Subject to the provisions of rules 6 and 16(2) the Governor shall appoint as vacancies occur the candidates who stand highest in order of preference in the list prepared by the Commission under sub-rule (3), provided that he is satisfied that they are duly qualified in other respects.\"\n\nRule 15 was the provision which required the recruitment of candidates by promotion and may be quoted thus :-\n\n\" 15. Recruitment by promotion-(!) Officers of the Subordinate Medical Service, who have more than 14 years' service and are less than 45 years of age on the !st of August of the year in which recruitment is to be made, shall be eligible for promotion to the Service.\n\n(2) The principle of selection shall be seniority subject to the exclusion of those who are not fit for promotion.\n\n'--·~\n\n(3) The Inspector-General shall recommend names of officers of the Subordinate Medical Service who are eligible and whom he considers suitable for promotion to the Service on the basis of the record of their work and, if necessary, interview.\n\n( 4) A preliminary selection from amongst the officers recommended by the Inspector General and other eligible persons shall be made by departmental selection committee consisting of the-\n\n(i) Secretary to Government, United Provinces, Medical department,\n\n(ii) Inspector-General, and\n\n(iii) Director of Public Health, U.P.\"\n\n2Gl\n\nIt would thus be seen that so far as promotion from the Subordinate Medical Service to the Senior Service was to be made, this could be done on the recommendation of the Inspector-General which was to be endorsed by a Selection Committee constituted under Rule 15( 4), quoted above. It was further provided under Rule 15 that the Selection Committee after considering the relative merits of the candidates will submit lists to the Government and Rule 15(5) required the Government to forward both the lists to the Commission alongwith the necessary papers. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 15 empowered the Governor to make the final selection after considering the advice of the Commission. Rule 17 which has been the subject matter of serious controversy between the parties may be extracted thus :-\n\n\" 17. Appointing aut/, ority : (!)Appointment to the Service shall be made by the Governor on the occurrence of substantive vacancies. Appointment in vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment shall be made from amongst the persons included in the list prepared under rule 13(3).\n\nSimilarly appointments in vacancies to be filled by promotion shall be made from amongst the persons selected under rule 15(6).\n\n(2) The Governor may make appointments in temporary or officiating vacancies from amongst persons who are eligible for permanent appointment to the Service under these rules.\"\n\nA perusal of Rule 17 would reveal that the appointment was to II be made to the Senior Service by the Governor on the occurrence of substantive vac.ancies. It is also clear from this rule that appointment\n\nin vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment would have to be made r from amongst persons included in the lists prepared under rule 13(3)\n\n(supra) and appointment in other vacancies to be filled by promotion under Rule 15(6) (supra). Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 empowered the Governor to make temporary or officiating appointments in vacancies from amongst persons who were eligible for permanent appointments to the Service under these Rules. We might mention here that the combined effect of Rules 12, 13, 15 and 17 is that whereas in the case of direct recruitment, the matter was to be considered by the Public Service Commission after advertising the vacancies, so far as recruit ment to the Service by promotion is concerned, a Selection Committee constituted under the Rules had to send the lists to the Commission. In a third category of cases which were appointments made purely on a temporary or officiating basis there was no provision for reference either to a Selection Committee or the Commission and such appointments could be made by the Governor. This is rather important because while the High Court had laid very great emphasis on the fact that appellants I to 8 were appointed not in substantive vacancies but on a purely temporary basis, it cannot be contended by any sh8W of force that the appointment of the appellants, who were admittedly direct recruits, could be made under Rule 17(2). The admitted posi tion is that the direct recruits applied to the Government in pursuance of an advertisement and they were appointed to the Senior Service only after they were recommended by the Public Service Commission. The appointment of the appellants, therefore, was not a purely officiating, temporary or ad hoc appointment as contemplated , by Rule 17(2) (supra). We might also emphasise the fact at this stage that it is undisputed that the petitioners while being members of PSMS bad also applied for promotion to the Senior Service sometime in the year 1963 but their cases were not recommended by the Selection Committee at all. We shall, however, deal with this aspect of the matter at a later stage of this judgment. Rule 18 is the provision which lays down the criterion for determining seniority and may be extracted thus, because the High Court has strongly relied on this . provision :·-\n\n\"18. Seniority\n\nSeniority in the Service shall be determined by the date of order of appointment in a substantive vacancy, provided that if two or more candidates are appointed on the same date their seniority shall be determined according to the order in which their names are mentioned in the order of appointment.\"\n\nAccording to this Rule, the yardstick to determine the seniority\n\nppears to be the date of the order of appointment in a substantive vacancy. The sheet-anchor of the argument of the petitioners both in the High Court and in this Court has been that as the appellants were not appointed; in substantive vacancies they cannot claim seniority under Rule 18 whereas the petitioners having been promoted to the 'Senior Service from the PSMS and in more or less substantive vacancies, they would be deemed to be senior to the appellants. The lligh Court, as already noticed, accepted the case of the petitioners although the State of U.P. supported the case of the appellants and has also filed an appeal against the order of the High Court.\n\nRelevant part of Rule 19 which is also important may be extracted .thus:-\n\n\"19. Probation, Discharge, etc. : (1) All persons whether recruited directly or by promotion, shall on their appointment in or against a substantive vacancy be placed on probation for a period of one year, provided that the Government may extend the period of probation in individual case. The previous officiating or temporary service in a post in the cadre of the Service shall count toward the period of probation.\"\n\nlRule 20 lays down the circumstances under which a person appointed to a post in the Service on probation may be confirmed. According to this Rule the incumbent can be confirmed if he has completed the period of his probation or any extended period and the Governor is satisfied that he is fit for promotion.\n\nOn the 14th of March 1946, two newJMedical Services werelconstituted, viz., (1) Provincial Medical Service Grade I, popularly known .as 'PMS I', in the scale of Rs. 200-10-320-15-500, and (2) Provincial Medical Service Grade II, known as PMS II, carrying a scale of Rs. 120-4-160-8-200. It was decided that existing members of PMS were 1o be absorbed in PMS I and further recruitment of medical graduates should be made to PMS 11 in Qrder to replace the PSMS. By Order No. 4534A/V-614/1949 dated July 24, 1951, the Government laid down that 50 per cent of the vacancies in PMS I were to be filled in by direct recruitment and 50 per cent by promotion. Unfortunately, the prin -ciple for determination of inter se seniority between direct recruits and the promotees in PMS I was not laid down at the time when the Government Order was made. It appears that upto the year 1952, while five PMS II officers were promoted to PMS I and four officers of merged States working in PMS I were adjusted against the promotion quota in\n\nPMS I, 23 officers were appointed to PMS I by direct recruitment\n\nagainst substantive vacancies. Certain modifications were made by Government Office Memorandum No. 1591/II B-50-1955 dated May 15, 1956 as mcdified by another Government Office Memorandum No. 4760/II B•50-55 dated December 18, 1956. But these changes are not germane for the purpose of the present appeals. It appears, however, that in spite of the quota Dxed by the Order dated 24-7-1951, no promotion from PMS II to PMS 1 could be made between the years 1952 to 1963 except on an ad hoc basis. This brings us to a very important date which forms the pivotal basis for the decision of the points in controversy and for the determination of inter se seniority of the petitioners and the appellants. On July 14, 1962 by virtue of an advertisement, the Public Service Commission mv1ted applications for recruitment to 56 Gazetted posts out of which 9 posts. were permanent and the rest were temporary but were likely to continue. The relevant portion. of the advertisement may be extracted thus :\n\n\"Applications are invited for the following 56 Gazetted posts (a) For Medicine-8, (b) For Surgery-8, (c) For Orthopaedics-5, (d) For E.N.T. Surgery-4, (e) For T.B.-7, (f) For Radiology-8, (g) Mental Specialists-3,\n\n(h) For Anaesthesia-13; 9 posts of (h) are permanent, rest are temporary but likely to continue (Advt. No. 671), Dept. No. R.B. 6) ....\n\nE Qualifications :\n\n(i) M.B.B.S. degree from Lucknow or Agra University.\n\nApplicant should be amongst First twenty position holders in order of merit from K.G. Medical College.\n\nLucknow or S.N. Medical College, Agra or must have any of the post graduate qualifications approved by the Indian Medical Council.\n\nDesi1able : Experience as Resident Officer or an Equivalent post .......... \"\n\nIt is not disputed that in pursuance of this advertisement, the G appellants applied for direct recruitment to PMS I and they were ultimately appointed on a temporary basis sometime in June 1963 but before the merger of the two Services (PMS I & PMS II) which came into existence on November 2, 1964. One of the dominant questions to be determined in this case is whether the appellants were appointed purely on a temporary basis or in a substantive capacity H though against temporary posts. In our opinion, the High Court seems to have laid undue stress on the fact that the appellants wer~ appointed on a temporary baJi< while overlooking the rniToundil1g\n\n.. >-.__.\n\n.. .....\n\ncircumstances and the terms of the advertisement and the Rules, A referred to above, under which the appellants were appointed. We have already indicated that Rule 17(2) was the only Rule under which a temporary or an officiating appointment could be made by the Governor without reference to the Public Service Commission. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the appellants were appointed after reference to and on the recommendations of the Public Service Com- B mission. The appointment of the appellants, therefore. would, not ·\n\nfall under Rule 17(2). What then is the nature of the appointments of the appellants is the serious question to be decided. In our opinion, reading the advertisement and the manner and mode of the appointment of the appellants, it must be held that they were appointed in a substantive capacity to temporary posts which according to the advertisement were likely to continue. There does not appear to be any magical formula or special charm in the word 'substantive'. The mere use of the term 'appointment in a temporary vacancy' by itself would not conclude the matter or lead to the irresistible inference that the appointment was not made in a substantive capacity because even a substantive appointment could be made to a purely temporary vacancy. In order, therefore, to determine the nature of the appointment, we have to look to the heart and substance of the matter, the surrounding circumstances, the mode, the manner and the terms of appointment and other relevant factors. In the instant case, we cannot ignore the advertisement which forms the pivotal basis of the direct recruitment in pursuance of which the appellants were appointed.\n\nAnother circumstances that supports our view is that the appellants were not appointed merely on an ad hoc basis but through the Public Service Commission and in a regular way. Finally, the appellants were appointed to PMS I which was doubtless a superior service carrying a higher scale than PMS II of which the petitioners were members.\n\nThe question as to what is a 'substantive appointment' is no longer res integra but was clearly expounded in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India:(!) where this Court made the following observations :\n\n\"The appointment of a Government servant to [a permanent post may be substantive or on probation or on an officiating basis. A substantive appointment to a permanent post in public service confers normally on the sevant so appointed a substantive right to the post. ...... .\n\nLikewise an appointment to a temporary post in a Government service may be substantive or on an officiating basis. Here also, in the absence of any special stipulation\n\n(I} [19581 S.C.R. 828. 18-189 SCl/80\n\nor any specific service rule, the servant so appointed acquires no right to the post and his service can be terminated at any time except in _one case, namely, when the appointment to a_ temporary post is for a definite period ...... .\n\nThe substantive appointment to a temporary post, under the rules, used to give the servant so appointed certain benefits regarding pay and leave, but was otherwise on the same footing as appointment to a temporary post on probation or on an officiating basis.\" -\n\nIt was contended.by Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners that according to the 1945 Rules, the appellants could not be said to have been appointed in a substantive capacity because one of the essential ingredients of such an appointment was that they should have been placed on probation for a period of one year. Reference was made in this connection to Rule 19, the relevant portion of which may be again quoted thus :\n\n\"All persons whether recruited directly or by promotion, shall on their appointment in or against a substantive vacancy be_-placed on probation for a period of one year\n\n\" It was submitted that there is nothing to show that the appellants were on their appointment to the PMS I placed on probation and, on the other hand, the order of probation was passed long afterwards, i.e., in 1970, which was shortly before their confirmation. It does appear that due to some oversight on the part of the appointing authority or to other fortuitous circumstance, the order placing the appellants on probation was not passed for long but that would not give any special advantage to the petitioners who were themselves drawn from a lower service and even if they held a substantive post in such service, they cannot by virtue of promotion to the higher serv ce after the appellants, claim seniority over the latter. The petitioners also cannot complain ot any discrimination on the gronnd that Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution was violated because a person who is appointed to a higher service carrying a higher scale must ordinarily be deerred to be seniN to an employee who is promoted from a lower service to the higher service even though his appointment may have been substantive in the lov er service. In the case of Kewa! Krishan Bagga v. The Chairman, Raz1way Board & Ors.(1) this Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"It was finally urged that clerks in the old establishment were wrongly accorded seniority over godown keepers in\n\n(!) [1976] 4 s.c.c. 733.\n\n.. -\n\nthe cadre of clerks in the Northern Railway in which both clerks and godown keepers were assimilated. This argu\n\nmen! overlooks the basic consideration that clerks in the Amritsar godown while working under the Punjab Govern men! were placed in a higher scale of pay than godown keepers. The decision to treat clerks as senior to godown keepers was therefore not arbitrary or irrational. In fact, some injustice done earlier to clerks by fixing their inter se seniority with godown keepers in the new establishment on the basis of their length of service in the respective cadres was later rectified by providing that clerks will be considered as senior to godown keepers.\"\n\nIn view of the circumstances discussed above, we are inclined to take the view that not much can be made of the fact that the order appointing the appellants J. 7 does not mention that they were ap pointed m a substantive capacity and that what is said is that they were appointed on a temporary basis. We shall consider this aspect more fully after we have completed the history of the Services and their ultimate merger as well as the events following thereafter. We might mention, however, that Dr. M. J. Siddiqui (respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 2870 of 1977) bad filed a petition in the High Court regard ing bis seniority and other matters but before the petition could be heard the two Services were merged and the petition was ultimately dismissed on 2-8-1965 as infructuous.\n\nAfter making promotions from the lower service to the highe;· service, the Government finally decided to have one medical service and with this object in view by Order No. U-1312-A-II/V-2566/63 dated 2-11-64, the Government merged the two Services, namely, PMS I and PMS II with effect from 1-11-64. The relevant portions of this Order may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"With a view to removing this shortage as also to making the service conditions more attractive, the Governor is pleased to order that instead of having two medical services, viz, P.M.S. I and PMS II and a selection grade in . PMS I, there shall be, with effect from November 1, 1964, one service to be called Pradesbik Medical Service (Men/Women) :arrying the scale of Rs. 250-25-350-EB-25-475-EB-25-600- EB-25-700, ordinary grade, and Rs. 500-50-1000-E.B. 50-1200 selection grade, and shall consist of the following:\n\n(a) Ordinary Grade :\n\n(i) all the existing posts of P.M.S. I (both Men and Women)\n\n(ii) all the existing posts of P.M.S. II (both Men and Women)\n\n(b) Selection Grade :\n\n7-! per cent of the total number of permanent posts in the ordinary grade.\n\n2. The permanent and temporary posts in PMS I and PMS II cadres shall continue to remain as such on their merger into PMS until the temporary posts are subsequently converted into permanent ones.\"\n\nA persual of this Order manifestly reveals that the distinction between PMS I and PMS II was abolished and the two Services were constituted into one designated as 'Pradeshik Medical Service (Men/ Women)' (hereinafter called the 'new Service') which had two grades\n\n(1) the ordinary Grade which was.in the range of Rs. 250-700 and (2) the sectction grade which was in the range of Rs. 500-1200. It was further provided that 7-l per cent of the total number of permanent posts in the ordinary grade would be reserved for the selection grade.\n\nPara 2 of the Order is rather important as it appears to have kept alive, to some extent, the distinction between the permanent and the temporary posts in PMS I and PMS II. Para 4 of the Order is very im. portant for our purpose and may be extracted thus :\n\nE \"4. Orders regarding fixation of the inter seniority of\n\nthe existing P.M.S. I and P.M.S; II officers in the P.M.S. will issue separately.\"\n\nIt was rather unfortunate that while merging the two services into one, the Government did not consider it expedient to lay down rules for fixing inter se seniority of the offiers of the two erstwhile services. It was, however, mentioned in para 4 that rules regarding fixation of the said seniority wonld issue separately.\n\nAnother important aspect of the matter which is germane to the issues arising in these appeals is that while the right to fix inter SI seniority of the members of the two services was reserved, there is no provision in the order which either applies or continues the Rules of 1945 even in respect of the inter se seniority of members of each merging service.\n\nIt was, therefore, rightly contended by the appellants that in the absence of any such provision in the order which was also passed under . Art. 309 of the constitution and was therefore of a statutory character or, at any rate, had a statutory flavour, the Rules of 1945 could not be applied to the situation obtaining after 31-10-1964 subsequent orders passed by the Govern ment throw some light on this point, As the Government was not in\n\n-......!'\n\na position to lay down the Rules for fixation of inter se seniority i=e A diately after the constitution of the new service, by way of a stopgap arrangement, the Government passed Order No. 20661-AII/V 2566-1963 dated February 20, 1965, the relevant portions of which may be extracted thus :-\n\nSir,\n\n\"Subject :-Merger of P.M.S. I and II into P.M.S.\n\nIn continuation of G.0. No. U-1312-All/V-2566/1963 dated November 2, 1974 on the subject mentioned above, I am directed to say that in supersession of all previous orders on the subject the Governor has been pleased to order as follows :- C\n\n(I) The U.P. Medical Service (Men's Branch) Rules, I 945 shall apply to the new, PMS unless otherwise ordered.\n\n(2) The appointing authority of P.M.S. shall be the Governor.\n\n(3) Disciplinary proceedings against the officers _of the P.M.S. will be drawn at Secretariat _level, as in the case of other gazetted officers.\n\n(5) The following will be eligible for appointment to\n\nP.M.S.\n\n(a) Medical graduate of all Universities in India recognised by the Indian Medical Council.\n\n(b) Medical graduates who hold the M.B.B.S. degree of Lucknow University, provided they have served in house appointment for a term of nine months in a teaching hospital before they offer themselves for appointment.\n\n3. The number of permanent and temporary post in P.M.S. I and II (Men and Women) as on the afternoon of October 31, 1964 may please be reported to Government immediately so that the strength of P.M.S. cadre on November I, 1964 may be fixed. Seniority lists of the officers (Men & Women) in P.M.S. I and II also kindly be furnished at once in duplicate as in the attached proforma.\"\n\nIt is, therefore, manifest that during the interregnum, that is to $Sy, 1-11-64 to 22-2-65, the Rules of 1945 were inapplicable so far as\n\nF .\n\nthe new Service was concerned. It was for the first time on the 20th February 1965 that by the Order, extracted above, the U.P. Medical Service (Men's Branch) Rules, 1945 were made applicable to the new Service and that too on a purely provisional basis until fresh Rules were framed by the Government for determining the inter se seniority of the officers concerned. The words 'unless otherwise ordered' clearly show that the application of the 1945 Rules was purely provisional and was to remain in .force unless fresh rules were made. Another order by the Government was passed on 26-12-67 regarding the mode of recruitment, qualifications, etc., which is not very releva11t for our purpose. Ultimately, a final order laying down the principles on the basis of which the inter se seniority of the members of the two Services was to be determied in the new Service were laid down. This Order was passed by virtue of G.O. No. 3976 A-II/V-68/1757 /65 dated 18-12-68 which may be extr&cted thus :\n\n\"In supersession of G.0. No. 1004-A-II/V-2566/63 dated April 23, 1963, on the above subject, I am directed to say that the Governor has been pleased to order that the inter se seniority of the officers of the merged cadre known as PMS should be arranged in the following order :-\n\n(a) Permanent PMS I officers in order of their seniority already determined by Government followed by,\n\n(b) officers appointed/promoted to PMS I on per-·\n\nmanent or temporary basis prior to the merger of PMS I and PMS II in the regular manner in consultation with the Lok Sewa Ayog in order of their seniority determined by Government, followed by,\n\n(c) officers of PMS II in order of their seniority in the\n\nPMS II cadre prior to the merger of PMS I and\n\nPMS II.\n\nNote : If a PMS II officer was officiating in PMS I but he has not been approved for promotion/appointment to PMS I by the Lok Sewa Ayog, he shall rank in the PMS in accordance with his seniority in PMS II.\n\n2. I am to request that a seniority list of PMS officers may please be prepared on the lines indicated above and it niay be serit to Government for their approval as early as possible.\" .\n\nIt was in consonance 1with these directions that the Government fixed the seniority of appellants 1 to __ 7 and petitioners 1 to 12.\n\nSe>·\n\n tar as the appellants were concerned, they clearly fell within the ambit of t!irection (h) which provided for officers appointed to PMS I either on a permanent or temporary basis prior to the merger in a regular manner in consultation with the Lok Sewa Ayog (Public Service Commission) in order of their seniority. It may be pertinent to note here that direction (b) does not speak of any substantive appointment whatsoever but equates the officers appointed to PMS I on permanent or temporary basis prior to merger. In other words, what the direction contemplates is that any officer appointed to a post whether permanent or temporary in PMS I which was the Senior Service prior to merger, would rank after merger above those officers who were drawn from PMS II. That the appellants fulfilled all the conditions mentioned in direction (b) is not disputed but the constitutionality of that direction was challenged before the High Court on the ground that it was inconsistent with Rule 18 of the 1945 Rules. This contention found favour with the High Court which held that direction (h) was invalid as being inconsistent with the Rules of 1945. In coming to this finding, the High Conrt appears to have overlooked the fact that the 1945 Rules did not apply to the new Service at its inception and that they were made applicable to the new Service only for a shortwhile by virtue of the order dated 20th February 1965, purely on a provisional basis as the Government made it quite clear in that order itself that the 1945 Rules will apply 'unless otherwise ordered' and thus had reserved the right to pass final orders regarding seniority later which was done in\n\n1968. In these circumstances, therefore, the order of the High Court suffers from two infirmities--\n\n(i) that there was no real or apparent inconsistency between rule 18 of the 1945 Rules and the 1968 directions,\n\n(ii) that initially the 1945. Rules ceased to apply to the new Service but were made applicable thereto only for a shortwhile by way of a stop-gap arrangement in 1965.\n\nThe High Court appears to have interpreted the directions of 1968 completely out of context. On the other hand, we feel that those directions seek to strike a just balance between the officers of the erstwhile Services after they were merged into the new Service. We shall immediately show that having regard to the exigencies of the situation created by the merger, no othe(mode of seniority, which was just and fair, could be evolved for the new Service.\n\nBy a notification dated July 3, 1970 issued unde1 Art. 309 of the Constitution, the Governor made certain amendments in the 1945°\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPCYRTS Tl 980] 3 S.C.R,\n\nRules including Rule 25 which related to recruitment to the posts of Civil Surgeons and other PMS selection grade posts. The amended rule may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"Part IX-Promotion to the post of Civil Surgeon and other PMS-Selection grade posts.\n\nRule 25 (i) Recruitment to the posts of Civil Surgeons and other PMS Selection grade posts, borne on the cadre of the Service, shall be made by promotion on the basis of seniority subject to rejection of the unfit from among the members of the Service who hold the M.B.B.S. or higher degree and who have rendered not less than 10 years' service.\"\n\nUnder this rule the promotion to the selection grade of the ne:w Service was to be made purely on the basis of seniority subject to rejection of the unfit from among the members of the Service or those who had rendered service for less than ten years. The petitioners appear to have put forward their claim to seniority as being above the appellants in order to earn the selection grade before the appellants on the ground that they had been appointed in a substantive capacity, though in a lower service, prior to the appointments of the appellants to the higher service. Thereafter, it appears that the Government, after considering the representations received from the former officers of PMS and in consultation with the Public\n\nService Commission, more or less endorsed the principles laid down for fix; ation of seniority in the 1968 order and directed in an order dated 18-12-19'11 seniority should be fixed on the following principles:-\n\n\"(k) Keeping in view the balance in the seniority list among the appointment by direct recruitment upto 1951 and the promotee officers. 19 promotee officers may be given first 19 posts at the same time.\n\n'. (kh) Jn the list of the officer by promotion and direct recruitment, Ratio of 1 : 1 may be kept in the seniority list in both the categories of the officers from the 20th post, i.e, 20th post to the promotee officer and 21st post may be given to officer by direct recruit· men!. This will continue until the batch of direct recruits upto 1963. Thereafter the remaining promotee officers of batch 1963 may be placed all together in the seniority list. Thereafter, the direct recruits of batch 1964 may be placed in the seniority li>t togetl1er.\n\n·._/\n\n• .>'\n\n(G) The officers selected for permanent posts in a year may be placed over the officers selected for ternporary posts in the same year.\n\n(GH) Five officers of the reserve list by the direct recruitment of the year 1951 who were appointed temporarily in 1952 and whose permanent appointment was approved by the Commission in 1958 may be placed below in the list of the officers by direct recruitment in 1957 batch.\n\nNote : 1. The lists of the officers by direct recruitment and by promotion will contain only the names who were appointed temporary and permanent in PMS . (!) with the approval of the Public Service Commission.\n\n2. In accordance with the aforesaid principles 'G' the names of the officers will be placed in the list by direct recruitment after approval by the Commission for regular appointment.\n\n3. The names of the officers will be placed in the list _ of promotee officers in order of the determined seniotity\n\nin accordance with the above mentioned principles 'G' vide notification No. 2780 K/5/247/57 dated the 13th June\n\n1963.\"\n\nIt was in consequence of these directions that the Government by virtue of the order impugned fixed the seniority of the members of the new Service, placing the appellants above the petitioners and awarding to them the selection grade i:irior to the petitioners.\n\nTilus, in short, thi heart of tile matter is whether the order of 1968 as confirmed by the order dated 18-12-1971 was in any way inconsistent with Rules 17 and 18 of the 1945 Rules so as to nullify the mode of seniority adopted by the Government and the promotion to the selection grade made by it under the impugned order. In our opinion, the following propositions emerge from the history of the ne\\\"\n\nservice and the foregoing discussion :-\n\n(1) To begin with, the Rules of 1945 had absolutely no application to the new Service. Those Rules applied to the old PMS I Service only and, therefore, to a situation completely different from that which prevailed after the merger of the two Services on 1-11-1964.\n\nAs the Government Order merging the two Services was also an Order passed under Art. 309 of the Constitution,\n\nit had statutory force and was binding on all the officers of the new Service.\n\n(2) At the time when the 1964 Order was passed the Government deliberately did not frame any rules in order to determine the inter se seniority of the members of the new Service but reserved the right to do so.\n\n(3) It was under the Order dated February 20, 1965 that for the first time the Rules of 1945 were applied to the new Service and that too \"unless otherwise ordered\" i.e., purely on a provisional basis. The order of 1968 laid down the principles for fixing seniority and, being a statutory order, superseded all the Rules in question including .Rules 17 and 18 of the 1945 Rules.\n\nIt was further confirmed by the Order dated 18-12-1971.\n\nWe, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken l!>y the High Court that direction (b) of the 1968 Order should be struck D down as being inconsistent with Rule 18 of the 1945 Rules.\n\nWe might further point out that having regard to the history of PMS I and P.M.S. II if Rule 18 of the 1945 Rules were applied to the parties and the 1968 Order ignored, the resultant effect would be that equals and unequals would be treated similarly which would E amount to a direct infraction of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nIn order to illustrate our point we give below a chart showing the different attributes possessed by the two set of officers, namely, the appellants and the petitioners\n\nAppellants\n\n1. Appellants were direct recruits to\n\nPMS I; appointed in a substantive capacity in a regular manner on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission though to temporary posts.\n\nPetitioners\n\n1. The Petitioners' cEses were sent for consideration by the selection Com mittee in June 1963 but they \\\\ere not considered fit for selection vide the relevant extracts below from the Affidavit of Mukund Swarup Srivasta .. va, Upper Division Assistant, Medical Section. U. P. Civil Scretariat :\n\n\"All the petitioners Who were eligible for promotion were considered for promotion by the Public Service- Commission and the Departmental Selection Committee in the manner prescribed, vide office memorandum dated May IS, 1956 as modified by\n\noffice memorandum dated December 18, 1956. The cases of the petitioners were not recommended by the Selection Committee for promotion to Provincial Medical Servir; e I.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours) B-\n\n2. Ti1~ tp;:i; lla1ts w:.r.:. admttedly a)JJ\\n!ed by th; Q)V!rnor to a high:!r\n\nService, viz., PMS I carrying a higher\n\nsell~ of p1y with b:!tter prospects and higher responsibilities.\n\n3. At the time of appointment to the\n\nsl;.:tion gra1; th; a.)_>)llants h1d put in tb!rquisiteexp:!rience of m0re than eight years in\n\nPMS I required for pro:n'.ltion to the selection grade.\n\n2. The Petitioners belonged to PMS II which was a subordinate servi:e with a lower scale ; their appointing authority being the Director, Medical\n\nService and not the Governor.\n\n3. The petitioners did not put in the\n\nrquisite exprience in PMS I for promotion to selection grade.\n\nHaving regard to these factors, it is obvious that the appellants and the petitioners were not similarly situate and if the petitioners were put above the appellants in the matter of seniority, it would have resulted in a gross and wholly unreasonable discrimination by making junior officers senior to superior officers.\n\nA number of authorities were cited before us on the question of the principles of seniority but they are not at all applicable to the peculiar facts of the present case which have special features of their own and we have therefore not considered it necessary to deal with those authorities.\n\nAs regards the case of appellant No. 8, Dr. Sudhir Gupta, it stands on an altogether different footing which is even higher than those of appellants I to 7. To begin with this appellant was recruited. directly to PMS I from PMS II through the Public Service Commission on 13-7-1959. He actually joined the PMS I Service on 11-11-1959. He passed M.B.B.S. in 1954 and was among the first ten candidates.\n\nIn 1956, he obtained Child Health Diploma. Thus, in all respect the case of appellant No. 8 is exactly similar to that of the other appellants with this difference that he was appointed to PMS I about five years before the PMS II was merged into PMS land therefore the petitioners could not claim seniority over him.\n\nA Thus, on a careful consideration of all the circumstances of this case, we are clearly of the opinion that the High Court committed an error of law in quashing the Order of the Government dated 31-12-1971 and directing it to refix the seniority of the parties. Accordingly, Appeals Nos. 2869 and 2870 of 1977 are allowed and the orders passed by the High Court are set aside. The Order of the Government dated B December 31, 1971 is hereby restored. In the circumstances of the: case, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. J. SIDDIQUI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. J. SIDDIQUI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 31, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 31, 1980\n\nB [N. L. UNTWALIA, s. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.J\n\nSeniority, inter-se of direct recruits and promotees prior to the merger of PMS I and PMS II as per order 18-12-68-Validity of the seniority list dt."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Medical Services Rules 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 436, "end_char": 463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 482, "end_char": 486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the State of U.P. there were two Medical Services consisting of doctors serving in the State."}}, {"text": "JW1e 14, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1015, "end_char": 1028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On JW1e 14, 1945, the Government of U.P. framed rules known as the \"United Province Medical Services ('Men's Branch) Rules, 1945,."}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1034, "end_char": 1052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On JW1e 14, 1945, the Government of U.P. framed rules known as the \"United Province Medical Services ('Men's Branch) Rules, 1945,."}}, {"text": "14-3-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2045, "end_char": 2054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14-3-1946, two Medical Services were constituted, namely (i) Provincial Medical Service Grade I (popularly known as P.M.S. I ) and (ii) Provincial Medical Service Grade II (known as P.M.S. II)."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was decided that existing members of PMS II were to be absorbed in PMS I anrl further recruitment of medical graduates should be made to PMS II in order to replace the PSMS,_ By an order dated July 24, 1951, the Government laid dnwn that 50 per cent of the vacancies in PMS I were to be filled in by direct recruitment and 50 per cent by promotion."}}, {"text": "24-7-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2809, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of the quota fixed by the order dated 24-7-1951, no promotion from PMS II to PMS I could be made between the years 1952 to 1963, except on an ad /we basis."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2931, "end_char": 2944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 14, 1962 by virtue of an advertisement, the Public Service Commission invited applicatioris for recruitments to 56 gazetted posts out of which 9 posts were permanent and the rest were temporary but were likely to continue."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3467, "end_char": 3483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of this advertisement, the appellants applied for direct recruitment to PMS 1 and they were ultimately appointed on a temporary basis •ome time in June 1963, but before the merger of the two services (PMS I and PMS II) which came into existence on November 1, 1964."}}, {"text": "2-11-64", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3551, "end_char": 3558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2-11-64."}}, {"text": "Prad.eshik Medical Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3579, "end_char": 3605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this order the Prad.eshik Medical Service (Men/Women) was constituted which had two grades; aamely-ordinary grade which included all the existing posts of PMS I, and PMS II and Selection Grade to consist of 7!% of the total number of pennanent posts in the ordinary grade."}}, {"text": "20-2-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4446, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter another order was passed on 20-2-1965 by which the U.P. :rvfedical Service\n\n(Men's Branch) Rules 1945 were made applicable provisionally to the new PMS with the words \"unless otherwise ordered\"."}}, {"text": "18-12-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4799, "end_char": 4807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, a final order laying down the principles on the basis of which the int\"!r-se seniority of the members of the two services was to be determined in the new service was made on 18-12-68."}}, {"text": "Lok Sewa Ayog (Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5181, "end_char": 5221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18-12-68 which provided for officers appointed to PMS either on a permanent or temporary basis prior to the merger in a regular manner in consultation with rhe Lok Sewa Ayog (Public Service Commission) in order of their seniority."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5276, "end_char": 5288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Notification dated July 3, 1970 issued under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5302, "end_char": 5310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18-12-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18-12-71 certain principles to be followed regarding fixation of seniority."}}, {"text": "31-12-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5641, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31-12-71 fixed the inter-se seniority of the members of the ne\\v service, placing the appellants above the petitioners/respondents and awarding to them the selection grade prior to the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5926, "end_char": 5944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Selection Committee constituted under the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6535, "end_char": 6582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7115, "end_char": 7140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[262B-C]\n\nIn the instant case, the direct recruits applied to the Government in pursuance of an advertisement and they were appointed to the Senior Service only after they were recommended by the Public Service Commission.. The appointment, therefore, was not a purely officiating, temporary or ad hoc appointment 8 as contemplated by Rule 17(2). ["}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8857, "end_char": 8875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9509, "end_char": 9517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11200, "end_char": 11218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-11-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11816, "end_char": 11825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those Rules applied to the old PMS I Service only and, therefore, to a situation completely different from that which prevailed after the merger of the two Services on 1-11-1964."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11908, "end_char": 11916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 20, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12269, "end_char": 12286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iii) It was under the Order dated February 20, 1965 that for the first time the Rules of 1945 \\Vere applied to the new Service and that too \"unless otherwise ordered\" i.e., purely on a provisional basis."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12917, "end_char": 12929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, Manoj Swarup, Afiss La/ita Kohli and Miss Indu .Khindri for the Appellant in CA 2869/77."}}, {"text": "Manoj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12931, "end_char": 12943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, Manoj Swarup, Afiss La/ita Kohli and Miss Indu .Khindri for the Appellant in CA 2869/77."}}, {"text": "Afiss La/ita Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12945, "end_char": 12963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, Manoj Swarup, Afiss La/ita Kohli and Miss Indu .Khindri for the Appellant in CA 2869/77."}}, {"text": "Indu .Khindri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12973, "end_char": 12986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. L. Sanghi, Manoj Swarup, Afiss La/ita Kohli and Miss Indu .Khindri for the Appellant in CA 2869/77."}}, {"text": "A L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13021, "end_char": 13034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A L. N. Sinha, Attorney General, G. N. Dixit and 0."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dixit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13054, "end_char": 13065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A L. N. Sinha, Attorney General, G. N. Dixit and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13070, "end_char": 13080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A L. N. Sinha, Attorney General, G. N. Dixit and 0."}}, {"text": "S. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13117, "end_char": 13128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta and Pramod Swarup for RR 12 in both the appeals,\n\nR. K. Jain for RR 13 in CA 2870/77."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13133, "end_char": 13146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta and Pramod Swarup for RR 12 in both the appeals,\n\nR. K. Jain for RR 13 in CA 2870/77."}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta and Pramod Swarup for RR 12 in both the appeals,\n\nR. K. Jain for RR 13 in CA 2870/77."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13260, "end_char": 13269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.-These two appeals by special leave are directed' against a judgment dated January 31, 1977 of the Allahabad High Court by which the High Court accepted the writ petitions filed by the present respondents I to 12 and quashed the order dated December 31, 1971 of the Government of U.P. insofar as it related to respondents numbers 3 to 12 and 14 to 39 before the High Court."}}, {"text": "State ofUttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13952, "end_char": 13973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order of the High Court two appeals have been filed to this Court-one by the State ofUttar Pradesh (which is Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "2, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14531, "end_char": 14538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the purpose of brevity and to avoid confusion we would refer to respondents 1 to 12 before the High Court as the 'petitioners' and respondents numbers 3 and 33 to 39 before the High Court as the 'appellants',\n\nThe main controversy between the parties centered round fixation of their seniority in a new service which was created by an order of the Government dated November 2, 1964."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15600, "end_char": 15613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 14, 1945, the Government of U.P. framed rules known as 'The United Provinces Medical Service (Men's Branch) Rules, 1945' which were applicable to PMS only and contained definitions, the relevant parts cf whom being covered by clauses (b ), (f) and (h) may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"3. ("}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16269, "end_char": 16273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(f) 'member of the Service' means a person appointed in a substantive capacity under the provisions of these rules or of the rules in force previous to the promulgation of these rules, to a post in the cadre of the service;\n\n(h) 'Subordinate Medical Service' means the Subordinate Medical Service (Men's Branch) of the U.P.\"\n\nRule 5 provided that recruitment to the Service covered by the Rules (hereinafter referred to as the 'Senior Service') was to be made\n\nby two modes- D\n\n(i) by selection from among the persons who were eligible for appointment to the Service under the provisions of the Rules whether or not they were already in the permanent service of the Crown, and\n\n(ii) by promotion from the Subordinate Medical Service\n\nprovided that the number of posts to be filled by promotion was limited to 10 per cent of the total number of posts borne on the permanent cadre of the service."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17678, "end_char": 17683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Academic qualifications\n\nA candidate for recruitment to the Service must-\n\n(a) hold a M.B.B.S. or an equivalent degree of a B University established by law in India and recognised by the Medical Council in India; OR\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.It."}}, {"text": "Medical Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17830, "end_char": 17854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) possess a foreign qualification recognised by the Medical Council of India if he does not hold a M.B.B.S. or an equivalent degree of a University established by law in India."}}, {"text": "Selection Committee constituted under the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22805, "end_char": 22852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PSMS", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25140, "end_char": 25144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sheet-anchor of the argument of the petitioners both in the High Court and in this Court has been that as the appellants were not appointed; in substantive vacancies they cannot claim seniority under Rule 18 whereas the petitioners having been promoted to the 'Senior Service from the PSMS and in more or less substantive vacancies, they would be deemed to be senior to the appellants."}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25328, "end_char": 25341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lligh Court, as already noticed, accepted the case of the petitioners although the State of U.P. supported the case of the appellants and has also filed an appeal against the order of the High Court."}}, {"text": "14th of March 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26258, "end_char": 26276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 14th of March 1946, two newJMedical Services werelconstituted, viz., ("}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28734, "end_char": 28741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.B. 6) ....\n\nE Qualifications :\n\n(i) M.B.B.S. degree from Lucknow or Agra University."}}, {"text": "K.G. Medical College.\n\nLucknow", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28844, "end_char": 28874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applicant should be amongst First twenty position holders in order of merit from K.G. Medical College."}}, {"text": "S.N. Medical College, Agra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28878, "end_char": 28904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lucknow or S.N. Medical College, Agra or must have any of the post graduate qualifications approved by the Indian Medical Council."}}, {"text": "November 2, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29361, "end_char": 29377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Desi1able : Experience as Resident Officer or an Equivalent post .......... \"\n\nIt is not disputed that in pursuance of this advertisement, the G appellants applied for direct recruitment to PMS I and they were ultimately appointed on a temporary basis sometime in June 1963 but before the merger of the two Services (PMS I & PMS II) which came into existence on November 2, 1964."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33017, "end_char": 33022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended.by Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners that according to the 1945 Rules, the appellants could not be said to have been appointed in a substantive capacity because one of the essential ingredients of such an appointment was that they should have been placed on probation for a period of one year."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34407, "end_char": 34417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. J. Siddiqui", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36159, "end_char": 36173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We might mention, however, that Dr. M. J. Siddiqui (respondent No.", "canonical_name": "M. J. SIDDIQUI AND ORS"}}, {"text": "2-8-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36421, "end_char": 36429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2870 of 1977) bad filed a petition in the High Court regard ing bis seniority and other matters but before the petition could be heard the two Services were merged and the petition was ultimately dismissed on 2-8-1965 as infructuous."}}, {"text": "1-11-64", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36738, "end_char": 36745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U-1312-A-II/V-2566/63 dated 2-11-64, the Government merged the two Services, namely, PMS I and PMS II with effect from 1-11-64."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39540, "end_char": 39548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31-10-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39726, "end_char": 39736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309 of the constitution and was therefore of a statutory character or, at any rate, had a statutory flavour, the Rules of 1945 could not be applied to the situation obtaining after 31-10-1964 subsequent orders passed by the Govern ment throw some light on this point, As the Government was not in\n......!'"}}, {"text": "P.M.S.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40679, "end_char": 40685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Disciplinary proceedings against the officers of the P.M.S. will be drawn at Secretariat level, as in the case of other gazetted officers."}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40898, "end_char": 40920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(5) The following will be eligible for appointment to\n\nP.M.S.\n\n(a) Medical graduate of all Universities in India recognised by the Indian Medical Council."}}, {"text": "Lucknow University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40977, "end_char": 40995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) Medical graduates who hold the M.B.B.S. degree of Lucknow University, provided they have served in house appointment for a term of nine months in a teaching hospital before they offer themselves for appointment."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41244, "end_char": 41260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The number of permanent and temporary post in P.M.S. I and II (Men and Women) as on the afternoon of October 31, 1964 may please be reported to Government immediately so that the strength of P.M.S. cadre on November I, 1964 may be fixed."}}, {"text": "November I, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41350, "end_char": 41366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The number of permanent and temporary post in P.M.S. I and II (Men and Women) as on the afternoon of October 31, 1964 may please be reported to Government immediately so that the strength of P.M.S. cadre on November I, 1964 may be fixed."}}, {"text": "22-2-65", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41606, "end_char": 41613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, manifest that during the interregnum, that is to $Sy, 1-11-64 to 22-2-65, the Rules of 1945 were inapplicable so far as\n\nF ."}}, {"text": "20th February 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41731, "end_char": 41749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was for the first time on the 20th February 1965 that by the Order, extracted above, the U.P. Medical Service (Men's Branch) Rules, 1945 were made applicable to the new Service and that too on a purely provisional basis until fresh Rules were framed by the Government for determining the inter se seniority of the officers concerned."}}, {"text": "26-12-67", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42251, "end_char": 42259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another order by the Government was passed on 26-12-67 regarding the mode of recruitment, qualifications, etc.,"}}, {"text": "April 23, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42719, "end_char": 42733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1004-A-II/V-2566/63 dated April 23, 1963, on the above subject, I am directed to say that the Governor has been pleased to order that the inter se seniority of the officers of the merged cadre known as PMS should be arranged in the following order :-\n\n(a) Permanent PMS I officers in order of their seniority already determined by Government followed by,\n\n(b) officers appointed/promoted to PMS I on per-·\n\nmanent or temporary basis prior to the merger of PMS I and PMS II in the regular manner in consultation with the Lok Sewa Ayog in order of their seniority determined by Government, followed by,\n\n(c) officers of PMS II in order of their seniority in the\n\nPMS II cadre prior to the merger of PMS I and\n\nPMS II."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46502, "end_char": 46510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RBPCYRTS Tl 980] 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46583, "end_char": 46621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "309 of the Constitution, the Governor made certain amendments in the 1945°\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPCYRTS Tl 980] 3 S.C.R,\n\nRules including Rule 25 which related to recruitment to the posts of Civil Surgeons and other PMS selection grade posts."}}, {"text": "Public\n\nService Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47947, "end_char": 47973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, it appears that the Government, after considering the representations received from the former officers of PMS and in consultation with the Public\n\nService Commission, more or less endorsed the principles laid down for fix; ation of seniority in the 1968 order and directed in an order dated 18-12-19'11 seniority should be fixed on the following principles:-\n\n\"(k) Keeping in view the balance in the seniority list among the appointment by direct recruitment upto 1951 and the promotee officers."}}, {"text": "18-12-19'11", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48099, "end_char": 48110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, it appears that the Government, after considering the representations received from the former officers of PMS and in consultation with the Public\n\nService Commission, more or less endorsed the principles laid down for fix; ation of seniority in the 1968 order and directed in an order dated 18-12-19'11 seniority should be fixed on the following principles:-\n\n\"(k) Keeping in view the balance in the seniority list among the appointment by direct recruitment upto 1951 and the promotee officers."}}, {"text": "13th June\n\n1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49964, "end_char": 49979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2780 K/5/247/57 dated the 13th June\n\n1963.\""}}, {"text": "18-12-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50350, "end_char": 50360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tilus, in short, thi heart of tile matter is whether the order of 1968 as confirmed by the order dated 18-12-1971 was in any way inconsistent with Rules 17 and 18 of the 1945 Rules so as to nullify the mode of seniority adopted by the Government and the promotion to the selection grade made by it under the impugned order."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51039, "end_char": 51047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order should be struck D down as being inconsistent with Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51916, "end_char": 51977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52299, "end_char": 52317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order should be struck D down as being inconsistent with Rule", "statute": "Order should be struck D down as being inconsistent with Rule"}}, {"text": "Mukund Swarup Srivasta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52918, "end_char": 52940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Petitioners' cEses were sent for consideration by the selection Com mittee in June 1963 but they \\\\ere not considered fit for selection vide the relevant extracts below from the Affidavit of Mukund Swarup Srivasta .. va, Upper Division Assistant, Medical Section."}}, {"text": "Sudhir Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54767, "end_char": 54779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8, Dr. Sudhir Gupta, it stands on an altogether different footing which is even higher than those of appellants I to 7."}}, {"text": "13-7-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54995, "end_char": 55004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "directly to PMS I from PMS II through the Public Service Commission on 13-7-1959."}}, {"text": "11-11-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55046, "end_char": 55056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He actually joined the PMS I Service on 11-11-1959."}}, {"text": "31-12-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55640, "end_char": 55650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Thus, on a careful consideration of all the circumstances of this case, we are clearly of the opinion that the High Court committed an error of law in quashing the Order of the Government dated 31-12-1971 and directing it to refix the seniority of the parties."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55858, "end_char": 55875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Government dated B December 31, 1971 is hereby restored."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_277_279_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAGHBIR SINGH\n\nS'I'ATE OF !JARYANA\n\nMarch 31, 1980\n\n[V. R, KRISHNA !YER AND E. S. VENKATARAM!AH, JJ.j\n\nCriminal trials-Death of a suspect in police custody-Use of third dtgree methods by police in investigation-Disapproved.\n\nThe pr06ecution aille.ged that the petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspccor of Police, subjected one of the suspects in a theft case to severe flagellation which\n\nA resulted in the death of the suspect. Medical examination of the deceased re- C vealed that death was due to asphyxiation.\n\nOn a study of the circumstances and the incontrovertible facts of ftasella tion and asphyxiation within police premises and the testimony of eye witnesses, the trial court found the petitiorn:r guilty of the offence with which he waa\n\ncharged and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. His explanation that death was due to suicidal hanging was rejected by the trial court as well as by the High Court.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD : There was no error either in the appreciatio:nl of evidence or th• concJusion reached by the courts below.\n\n[278 D]\n\n[It is disturbing to find diabolical recurrence of police tortures resulting in a terrible scare in the minds of common citizens that their lives and liberty E are under a new peril when the guardians of the law gore human rights to d'eath. Police lock-ups are becoming more and more awesome cells. This development is disastrous to the human rights awareness and the humanist comtitutional order.] [278 El\n\nCruM!NAL APPELLATE JURJSD!Cl!ON : Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 679/1980.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 6-12-1979 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Cr!. A. No. 880/78.\n\nA. N. Mui/a, T. L. Garg and N. D. Garg for the Petitioner.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRI•HNA IYER, J., The criminal scenario with a tragic'crescendo which has been unfurled in this Special Leave Petition starts with'a bunch of 'suspects' being brought up to the police postjwhich was'in charge of the petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspctor. A; case of theft in some officer's house had been reported to the police the previous night and so as part of the investigation the suspects were picked'up and suffered as part of the processlof 'investigation' severe flagellation.\n\nChhabila, one of those so tortured, succumbed to his injuries. This\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\n•• triggered off investigation into the murderous conduct of the investigator, the petitioner, and another. Medical examination revealed the cruel cause of death as asphyxiation. One of the injuries which, according to the doctor, made the deceased unconscious was torture on both the soles of the foot of the victim. A trial for murder fol lowed, a conviction under s. 302 was entered and eventually the High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment so far as the petitioner was concerned. ' A false explanation of suicidal hanging was set up by the police: officer-accused but this was rejected and eventually on a study of the circumstances and the incontrovertible facts of flagellation and asphyxiation within police premises and the testimony of eyewitnesses about nocturnal detention; within)he police station and beating up of the victim, the courts below concurrently found the guilt of the petitioner proved beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nStrenuous submissions have been made to us by Shri Mulla to discredit the prosecution version of murder but we are not in the least convinced that there is any error in the appreciation or the conclusion.\n\nWe are deeply disturbed by the diabolical recurrence of police torture resulting in a terrible scarce in the minds of common citizens that their lives and liberty are under a new peril when the guardians of the law gore human rights to death. The vulnerability of human rights assumes a traumatic, torturesome poignancy when violent vio- E lation is perpetrated by the police arm of the State whose function is to protect the citizen and not to commit gr.uesome offences against them as has happened in this case. Police lock-up if reports in newspapers have a streak of credence, are becoming more and more awesome cells. This development is disastrous to our human rights awareness and humanist constitutional order.\n\nThe State; at the highest administrative and political levels, we --'-' hope, will organise special strategies to prevent and punish brutality by police methodology. Otherwise, the credibility of the rule of law in our Republic vis-a-vis the people of the country will deteriorate.\n\nWe conclude with the disconcerting note sounded by Abraham Lincoln:\n\n\"If you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens you can never regain their respect and esteem. It is true 11 that you can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.\"\n\nRAGHDIR SINGH v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, I) 2 7 9\n\nThese observations have become necessary to impress upon; the State\n\npolice echelon.s the urgency of stamping out the:vice; or 'third degree' from the investigative armoury of the police.\n\nP. B. R • Petition dismissed.", "total_entities": 12, "entities": [{"text": "RAGHBIR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHBIR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I'ATE OF !JARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SIATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 31, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JARYANA\n\nMarch 31, 1980\n\n[V. R, KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "A. N. Mui", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1656, "end_char": 1665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a, T. L. Garg and N. D. Garg for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "T. L. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1669, "end_char": 1679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a, T. L. Garg and N. D. Garg for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "N. D. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1684, "end_char": 1694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Mui/a, T. L. Garg and N. D. Garg for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "KRI•HNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1757, "end_char": 1769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRI•HNA IYER, J., The criminal scenario with a tragic'crescendo which has been unfurled in this Special Leave Petition starts with'a bunch of 'suspects' being brought up to the police postjwhich was'in charge of the petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspctor."}}, {"text": "Chhabila", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2245, "end_char": 2253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhabila, one of those so tortured, succumbed to his injuries."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2314, "end_char": 2349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2720, "end_char": 2726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Strenuous submissions have been made to us by Shri Mulla to discredit the prosecution version of murder but we are not in the least convinced that there is any error in the appreciation or the conclusion."}}, {"text": "Abraham Lincoln", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We conclude with the disconcerting note sounded by Abraham Lincoln:\n\n\"If you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens you can never regain their respect and esteem."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_280_280_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SOM NATH v.\n\nSTATE OF HARY.l\\NA\n\nMarch 31, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] B Indian Evidence Act Section 32-Dying Declaration-Value of.\n\nThe petitioner was found guilty of burning his wife by the Courts below.\n\nBy Special Leave Petition, the Petitioner sought to discredit the dying declara· lions.\n\nDismissing the petition, HEID : Concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed on enormity of improbability. The dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, are the groaning utterances of a dying woman in the grip of dreadful agony which cannot be judged by the standards of fullness of particulars which witnesses lll.3; Y give in other situations.. To discredit such dying declarations for shortfalls here and there or even in many places, is unrealistic, unnatural and unconscionable, if basically there is credibility. [280E-G]\n\nCruMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 3478 of 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 10-8-197.9 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Criininal Appeal No. 427/77.\n\nN.C. Ta/ukdar, J.P. Malhotra and J.D. Jain for the Petitioner The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J., Wife burning-that atrocious species of murder horrendously escalating in some parts: of this country-is the shocking crime proved, according to two courts, by the prosecution in this case.\n\nConcurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed save on enormity of improbability which we are unable to see in the present case. The three dying declarations corroborated by other circumstances are . sufficient in our view to bring home the offence. Counsel has sought to discredit these declarations relevant under s. 32 of the Evidence Act forgetting that they are the groaning utterances of a dying woman in the grip of dreadful agony which cannot be judged by the standards of fullness of particulars which witnesses may give in other situations.\n\nTo discredit such dying declarations for shortfalls here or there or even in many places is unrealistic, unnatural and unconscionable if basically there is credibility. The terrible in this case has taken place in the house and in the presence of the husband who has been convicted. We hardly see any reason for interfering with this conviction, and would have been shocked ourselves if any other course had been adopted either by the trial court or by the High Court. Gender justice has a high place in Indian criminal jurisprudence. Dismissed.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 12, "entities": [{"text": "SOM NATH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 8, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SOM NATH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 463, "end_char": 473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "10-8-197.9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 1000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 10-8-197.9 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Criininal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Punjab & Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1008, "end_char": 1035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 10-8-197.9 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Criininal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "J.P. Malhotra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1084, "end_char": 1097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Ta/ukdar, J.P. Malhotra and J.D. Jain for the Petitioner The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J., Wife burning-that atrocious species of murder horrendously escalating in some parts: of this country-is the shocking crime proved, according to two courts, by the prosecution in this case."}}, {"text": "J.D. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1102, "end_char": 1111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Ta/ukdar, J.P. Malhotra and J.D. Jain for the Petitioner The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J., Wife burning-that atrocious species of murder horrendously escalating in some parts: of this country-is the shocking crime proved, according to two courts, by the prosecution in this case."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1697, "end_char": 1702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.K.A.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2480, "end_char": 2486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.K.A.\n\nPetition dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_281_289_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR\n\nSANAULLAH MIR\n\nApril I, 1980\n\n(A. C. GUPTA AND N. L. UNTWAL!A, H:]\n\n Jammu und Kashmir State Land Acquisition Act, 1934 Section 4-Scope of,\n\nThe respondent's forefather \\vas the landholder of a piece of land in the\n\nState. 1be land was taken possession of in 1897 as the land came urrder a Timber dopot established on land adjacent to Government land.\n\nThe practice prevalent during the Maharaja's time was that only rent was remitted and no compensation was paid for the taking over the land. The respondent's aiices C tors had no proprietory right in the land and the right of possession was also\n\nIQ!\\! oo the Government dispossessing him.\n\nSome sixty years later, the respondent filed an application before the then Prime Minilter of the State for payment of compensation of the said land.\n\nInstead of deciding as to whether the State ~'as liable to pay compens.ation in respect of the land which had been taken over sixty years ago, a new land acquWtion proceeding under the Jammu and Kashmir State Land Acquisition Act, 1934 was started in the year 1955 and an Award for Rs. 32,645.62 as compensation for the land was made by the Collector. On reference the District Judge increas'ed the amount of compensation.\n\nOn appeal by the State, the High Court restored the amount fixed by the Collector. The respondent's\n\napplication under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was dismissed by the High Court.\n\nA review petition that the land had already been acquired and that the land acquisition proceeding was without jurisdiction and a nullity was rejected.\n\nA suit was filed that the Jand acquisition proceedings had been taken as a result of mistake of fact and law and that the entire proceeding was vitiated.\n\nThe suit was dis.missed. Appeal to a division Bench was also dismissed.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : In 1894 the Assamidar lost his assamidari right when the State p resumed the land from him. There was no law then that compensation was , __ Jo be given. It depended upon the sweet-will of the Riyasat to give some \"../ other )ancl in lieu of the land acquired. Only the land revenue was remitted, and docnments indicate, compensation was also paid for the standing crops in the land. No right was left in the landholder in respect of which he could acquire a better right. Whatever right was possessed by the respondent's ances tor was dead and gone in the year 1894. [285H, 286A-B] G\n\n2. The land was resumed by the Durbar from the ancestor of the respondent before the end of the 19th century and it was recorded as 'Khalsa'. The Ian<! bad become the State land in the full sense of the term and belonged to the State since then. No semblance of any right, title or interest was left in the respondent's ancestor thereafter. [286D-E]\n\n3; A que<r procedure was adopted for acquiring the land under the State R Lad Acqoisition Act afresh, thus determining the compensation on the basis of the market value of the land prevailing 60 years later. Under the in!luence ol\n\n19-IS9~C 1 180\n\nSUPREME COURT\n\n1 REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA some high ups, a case was made out for' payment of compensation to tlte res\n\npondent in respect.of the land acquired'sixty years ago by acquiring it again which led to the determination of the market value of the land in the year 1955.\n\n[286G, 287AJ\n\n4. The State Exchequer cannot be made to suffer for illegal actions of its officers. The land had been resumed long ago and belonged to the State. The .8 whole proceeding of land acquisition was a nullity and the Award resulting therefrom was ultra vires. It mattered ttle whether the proceeding waa taken as a result of fraud or mistake or otherwise. The respondent had not practised any fraud nor was the land acquisition' proceeding started as a result of any mistake of fact It was either as a result of gross negligence or a deliberate act on the part of the officials at the instanCIO of some high-ups to help the respondent There is no question of any acquisition of the State's own land as was purported to be done in this case. [287B-DJ 0 Government Off Bombay v. Esufali Salebhai, I.L.R. XXXIV Bombay, 618; 1vlohammad Wajeeh Mirza v.\n\nSecretar:y of Statt for India in Council, A.LR. 1921 Oudh, 31, The Deputy Collector , Calicut Division v. Aiyavu Pil/ay amf others, IX Inciian Cases, 341; The Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Others [1955] I S.C.R. 1311 referred to.\n\nSecy. of State v. Tayasaheb Yeshwantrao Holkar, A.LR. 1932 Born. 386, & D Narriot v. Hamoton [1797] 2 Sm. L.C., 386 distinguished.\n\n5. The plea taken in the appeal by , filing a petition under order 41 Rule 27 or in the review matter in the High Court was beyond the scope of the appeal filed under the State Land Acquisition 'Act. The scope of that appeal was the determination of the amount of compe'nsation and not to , declare the whole of the land acquisition proceeding a nullity.\n\nWhatever, therefore, was said by the g High Court either in appeal on the question of adverse possession or while re- ')- jecting the review petition was outside, the scope of the land acquisition appeal.\n\nIt could not operate as resjudicata in the present suit. The observations of the High Court were without jurisdiction. Nor did any question of estoppel arise in this cae because the respondent waS not made to change his position by starting the land acquisition proceeding against him.\n\nHe had already lost his land.\n\nHe merely wanted compensation.\n\nThe method adopted for the F payment of compensation was wholly ultra vires and without jurisdiction.\n\n[288H, 289A-B]\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATB JURISDICTION': Civil Appeal No. 1347 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 29-4-1969 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1965.\n\nG G. L. Sanghi, V. K. Boone and Shri Narain for the Appellant.\n\nGopi Nath Kunzru, K. L. Taneja and S. L. Aneja for the Res- \"° : pondent. -.._ The Judgment of the Court was delivered by •\n\nUNTWALJA, J.,-A piece of land measuring 113 Kanals and 11 Marlas situated in Chawni Badam Singh, Chattabal, Srinagar in the State of Jammu & Kashmir bejonged to the forefathers of the defendant-respondent in this appeal, by certificate. Indisputably the reg-\n\n• •\n\npondent's ancestor was Assamidar of the land, that. s to say, he was the land holder as distinguished from land owner. The land owner was the Maharaja Bahadur of Jammu & Kashmir fin whose Riyasat the land was situate. Proposals were made in the year 1893 to take this land from the ancestor of the respondent as it came under a timber depot established on adjacent Government land. The land was taken possession of and as was the practice prevalent during the Maharaja's time only rent was remitted and no compensation was paid for taking over the land. The respondent's ancestor had merely a right of possession and no proprietory right in the land. He lost the right of possession too on the Government dispossessing him and taking possession for the purpose of the timber deoot. Sixty years later the respondent filed an application before the then Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir for payment of compensation of the land. Inquiries were made from the various officers of the various department and eventually instead of deciding as to whether the State was liable to pay any compensation in respect of the land which had been taken over 60 years ago or not the decision taken was to start a new land acquisition proceeding under the Jammu & Kashmir State Land Acquisition Act, 1934 which is at pari materia with the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Notice under s. 4 of the said Act was issued in or about the year 1955 and the Collector, Srinagar made an Award determining the compensation for the land at Rs. 32,645·62 paise.\n\nThe respondent asked for a reference and on reference being made the learned District Judge determined the compensation at Rs. 35,908·10 paise. The State preferred an appeal. The High Court restored the amount fixed by the Collector and knocked down the enhancement made by the District Judge. For the first time in the High Court an application was filed under Order 4 I Rule 27 of the Code of Civil procedures claiming adverse possession of the land and for the taking _ of additional evidence. The High Court repelled this contention . ..,...,. Later a Review Petition was filed in the High Court claiming that the land had already been acquired and the entire land acquisition proceeding was without jurisdiction and a nullity. The High Court was asked to award no compensation. The High Court rejected this Review Petition. Thereafter the present suit was filed saying that the defendant respondent had committed fraud and the land acquisition proceeding had been taken as a result of mistake of fact and law and that the entire proceeding was vitiated. The suit was filed on the Original side of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir. The learned Judge dismissed the suit. The State, the appellant in this appeal, failed in appeal before the 1 etters Patent Bench of the High Court.\n\nThe matter has now come before us.\n\nSUPREME COUR~ REPORTS\n\n(191!0] 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe findings of the learned single Judge are :-\n\n\"(1) That the lands in dispute were in continuous possession of the forest department since 1894 A.D.\n\n(2) That no rent or compensation was paid to the defendant or his ancestor for these lands.\n\n(3) That the lands in dispute were recorded as \"Khalsa\n\nSarkar\" which means that the proprietory inte1est vested in the Government.\n\n(4) That at the time when the land acquisition proceedings were initiated, the o)Iicers concerned of the plaintiff were fully aware of the facts mentioned above.\n\nBut their attention was not specifically drawn to the council resolutions.\n\n(5) That the forest records paving been burnt in the year 1943 and after a fresh. enquiry was initiated at the instance of the Advocate general, the council resolutions were traced in the Government repository at Jammu.\n\n(6) That the old settlement, file which contained the resolutions perhaps did not form part of the land acquisition file.\"\n\nIn regard to finding no. 6 there was some controversy as to whether the land acquisition file contained the old resolutions or not and whether the attention of the authorities was drawn to them. We shall assume in favour of the respondent as found by the learned Trial Judge that there was no fraud jlractised by him nor was there any mistake of fact on the part of th<; authorities concerned in starting the land acquisition proceeding.\n\nThe Appellate Bench of the High Court consisted of Mian Jalalud-Din J. and Anant Singh J. , They differed on most of the points although agreed in their conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. The findings of Miao Jalal-ud-Din J. are :-(1) \"That it could not be said that the authorities dealing with the acquisition proceedings were ignorant about the factual aspect of the matter that the land had been resumed in the year 1893 under council resolution and that no compensation was to be paid for this, and that its character was that of \"KHALSA\" and it rejllained in possession of the forest department for over 60 years ..... \" (2) \"In our opinion the initiation of acquisition proceedings was wholly uncalled for as there was nothing to be acquired. Land, which was meant to be acquired, was already\n\n• •\n\nresumed by the Government and in possession of the Forest Department right from the year 1893 A.O. under the orders of the council and was shown as Khalsa;\" (3) \"It appears to be a case of gross negligence on the part of the officers of the Government dealing with the acquisition matter. The plaintiff cannot avoid the decree on the ground that his officers have acted in gross negligence;\" and ( 4) that the order of the High Court in appeal and in review operated as res judicata. The plaintiff-aippellant was also estopped from challenging the land acquisition proceeding. Mian Jalal-ud-Din J. agreed in this regard with the learned single Judge.\n\nArrant Singh J. did not agree with the other learned Judge on the\n\nquestion of estoppel and res-judicata but agreed with him that negli C gence was no ground for setting aside the Award made in the land acquisition proceeding and concurred in the dismissal of the appeal.\n\nEven on the findings recorded by the courts below this appeal must succeed. We shall, however, briefly refer to some facts which emerge from the council resolutions and some other documents of the D years 1893 and 1894.\n\nExt. P.W. 5/1 is State council Resolution No. 2 dt. 7-6-1893 by which sanction was accorded to the allotment of land with existing house situated at Purani Chawni for opening a Government Timber Depot. Eventually land in question al so came under this depot.\n\nExt. P.W. 5/2 is State Council Resolution No. 17 dated 4-9-1893 showing that from the report of the Tehsildar it appeared that the Forest Department wanted to take possesion of the land in question which was a sown land by storing timber there. Council Resolution No. JO dated 28-10-1893, Ext. PW 5/3 is very important. Now this resolution states that the land shall have to be compulsorily acqnired but \"as per practice in the country only the land revenue shall have to be remitted and the cultivators cannot get any compensation in cash nor can the Council sanction taking of the land on lease. Of course there is no bar to the grant of cultivated land of the same quality to the cultivators in exchange by the Government.\"\n\nNext comes the Resolution No. 8 dated 17-2-18~4, Ext. PW 5/4 showing \"(a) The Governor should give the land required by the Conservator of Forests and the land Revenue of the land which has come under the timber depot should be remitted.\" Thereafter the order recorded is \"The proposal ofthe Settlement Commissioner is accepted. The Revenue Department shall comply.\"\n\nIt is thus clear that in the year 1894 the Assamidar lost his assamidari right when the State resumed the land from him. There was no\n\nlaw prevalent then that compensation was to be compulsorily given.\n\nIt depended upon the sweet-will of the Riyasat to give some other land in lieu of the land acquired. In this case also it appears only the land revenue was remitted. And probably, as documents indicate, compensation was also paid for the standing crops in the land. But what is clear to us with certainty is that no right was left in the land holder in respect of which he could acquire a better right on the basis of the report of the Glancy Commission in 1932 as has been remarked by the learned Trial Judge. Whatever right was possessed by the respondent's ancestor was de.ad and gone in the year 1894.\n\nExt. P. W. 14/2 is Intikhab Jamabandi Mauza Chawni Badam Singh Tehiil. In the remarks column the note made runs thus :-\n\n\"By order of Durbar No. 2381 dated 5th Assuj '55 the total area of village has been excluded from the land revenue, and the total land of this village !las come under the timber depot and therefore the total land has been recorded as Khalsa. The original file has been returned to Durbar on 29th Assuj after necessary action.\n\nDated 29th Assuj '55.\"\n\nThe year '55 is samvat year 1955 which will roughly correspond to\n\n1897. Thus there is no doubt that the land was resumed by the Durbar from the ancestor of the respondent before the end of the 19th century and it was recorded as 'Khalsa'. The land had become the\n\nState land in the full sense of the term and belonged to the State since then. No semblance of any right title or interest was left in the respondent's ancestor thereafter.\n\nYet after 60 years the matter was re-agitated by the respondent by claiming compensation in respect of the land which had been taken possession of long ago by the State. The respondent did not claim that any right title or interest was left in him. He merely wanted on compassionate grounds compensation for the land. One can understand if on compassionate grounds some compensation with reference to the year when the land was taken possession of could be determined and paid. But that was not done. A very queer procedure was adopted of acquiring the land under the State Land Acquisition Act afresh thus determining the compensation on the basis of the market value of the land prevailing 60 years later. We have gone through the letter dated 17-12-1954 Ext. P.W. 14/A written by Tehsildar; the Patwari's Report dated 12-4-1955 Ext. D.W.4/A; the Tehsildar's Report dated 21-4-55 Ext. P.W. 19/B/2; letter dated 3-5-55 Ext. D.W.12/1 written by the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner; Ext. P.W.\n\n1/2 the letter dated 2·6-1955 written by the Conservator of Forests to the Chief Conservator of Forests; the Office Note dated 9-6-1955 Ext.\n\nP.W. 1/3 and Chana's letter dated 22-6-1955, Ext. P.W. 1/5. On going through these documents it appears to us that under the influence of some high-ups a case was made out for payment of compensation to the respondent in respect of the land acquired 60 years ago by acquiring it again which naturally led to the determination of the market value of the land in or about the year 1955. , The State Exchequer cannot be made to suffer for such wanton and illegal actions of its officers. The land had been resumed long ago. It belonged to the State. The whole proceeding of land acquisition was a nullity. The Award resulting therefrom was also ultra vires and a nullity. It mattered little whether the proceeding was taken as a result of the fraud or mistake or otherwise. We are accepting the findings of the courts below that the respondent had not practised and fraud nor was the land acquisition proceeding started as a result of any mistake of fact.\n\nIt was either as a result of gross negligence or a deliberate act on the part of the officials at the instance of some high-ups to help the respondent. It is well-settled that there is no question of any acquisition of the State's own land as was purported to be done in this case.\n\nIn The Government of Bombay v. Esufali Sa/ebhai(l) it has been observed at page 624 thus :-\n\n\"It is quite true that there can be no such thing as the compulsory acquisition ofland, owned by and in the ; occupation and control of the Crown. The Land Acquisition Act cannot apply to such lands, because all Crown lands being vested in the Government, they are competent and free to devote any of those lands to a public purpose.\n\nIt is a contradiction in terms to say that the Government are compulsorily acquiring that which they have already acquired otherwise, both as to title and possession.\"\n\nThe same view has been taken in Mohammad Wajeeh Mirza v. Secretary of State for India in Counci/(2) when at page 33 the passage from the jud, gment of Chandavarkar J. extracted above was quoted with approval. In the case of The Deputy Co!/ector, Ca!icut , Division v.\n\nAiyavu Pi/lay and others(l) Wallis J. of the Madras High Court, in our opinion, correctly observed-\"lt is, in my opinion, clear that the Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already belongs to Government in land which is being acquired\n\n(I) I, L. R. XXXIV Bombay, 618.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1921 Oudh, 31\n\n(3) IX Indian Cases, 341.\n\nunder the Act but only for the acquisition of such interests in the land. as do not already belong to Government.\" Venkatarama Ayyar J. speaking for. this Court in The Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & others(l) after quoting the above passage of Wallis, J. from the Madras decision aforesaid remarked at page 1322-\"With these observations, we are in entire agreement\" and added \"When Government possesses an interest in land which is the subject of acquisition under the Act, that interest is itself outside such acquisition, because there can be no question of Government acquiring what is its o\\vn.\"\n\nThe Courts below have heavily relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Secy. ofpState v. Tayasaheb Yeshwantrao Ha/kar.(2) This decision, in our opinion, is clearly distinguishable.\n\nFirstly the principle in the case of Marriot v. Hamoton(l) which was applied in the Bombay case is not applicable in the present case. Tn the Bombay case the money under the land acquisition Award had been paid and the suit was for its recovery back. In that situation it was held that what was paid under the compulsion of law, namely, the land acquisition Award, cannot be recovered back. In the instant case the money has not yet been paid. The suit is for the cancellation of the Award which is a nullity. The second point of distinction between the Bombay case and the present case is that in the former though the title belonged to the Government, possession was with the other side. In the land acquisition proceeding possession was acquired on payment of compensation. In that event it was held that money paid was not under any mistake of fact or law. It was paid for divesting the defendant of his possession. In the instant case neither title nor possession was with the defendant. The entire bundle of right~ in the land had vested in the State loug ago and there was nothing left to be acquired. In such a situation the High Court was wrong iR following the Bombay decision and in applying its ratio to the facts of this case.\n\nWe may briefly dispose of the point of estoppel and res-judicata.\n\nWe approve of the view taken by Anant Singh, J. in that regltrd. We may also add that the plea taken in the appeal by filing a petition under Order 41, Rule 27 or in the review matter in the High Court was beyond the scope of the appeal filed under the State Land Acquisition Act.\n\nThe scope of that appeal was the determination of the amount of compensation and not to declare the whole of the land acquisition\n\n(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 1311.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1932, Bombay, 386.\n\n(3) (I 797) 2 Sm.L.C. 386.\n\n...\n\nJ. & K. v. SAN AULLAH MIR (Untwalia, I.) 289\n\nproceeding a nullity. Whatever, therefore, was said by the High Court A either in appeal on the question of adverse possession or while reject•\n\ning the review petition was outside the scope of the land acquisition appeal. It could not operate as res-judicata in the present suit. The observations of the High Court were without jurisdiction. Nor did arise any question of estoppel in this case because the respondent was not made to change his position by starting the land acquisition pro- B ceeding against him. He had already lost his land. He merely wanted compensation. The method adopted for the payment of compen• sation was wholly ultra vires and without jurisdiction. That being so no question of estoppel arose in this case.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal; set aside the C judgments and decrees of the High Court; decree the plaintiff's suit; declare the land acquisition proceeding and the Award or the decree made thereunder as nullities. Since the defendant-responde; it has been unnecessarily harassed in the suit by the wrong and illegal actions of the authorities of the State, we direct that the plaintiff-appellant will get no costs. On the other hand, the defendant-respondent will D get costs of the suit and the appeals in all the three courts, namely, the Trial Judge, the Division Bench and this Court.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SANAULLAH MIR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SANAULLAH MIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. 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L. Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G G. L. Sanghi, V. K. Boone and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. K. Boone", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G G. L. Sanghi, V. K. Boone and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5789, "end_char": 5795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G G. L. Sanghi, V. K. Boone and Shri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Gopi Nath Kunzru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5816, "end_char": 5832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopi Nath Kunzru, K. L. Taneja and S. L. Aneja for the Res- \"° : pondent. -.._"}}, {"text": "K. L. Taneja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5834, "end_char": 5846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopi Nath Kunzru, K. L. Taneja and S. L. Aneja for the Res- \"° : pondent. -.._", "canonical_name": "K. L. Taneja"}}, {"text": "S. L. Aneja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5851, "end_char": 5862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopi Nath Kunzru, K. L. Taneja and S. L. Aneja for the Res- \"° : pondent. -.._", "canonical_name": "K. L. Taneja"}}, {"text": "UNTWALJA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by •\n\nUNTWALJA, J.,-A piece of land measuring 113 Kanals and 11 Marlas situated in Chawni Badam Singh, Chattabal, Srinagar in the State of Jammu & Kashmir bejonged to the forefathers of the defendant-respondent in this appeal, by certificate."}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by •\n\nUNTWALJA, J.,-A piece of land measuring 113 Kanals and 11 Marlas situated in Chawni Badam Singh, Chattabal, Srinagar in the State of Jammu & Kashmir bejonged to the forefathers of the defendant-respondent in this appeal, by certificate."}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6368, "end_char": 6383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The land owner was the Maharaja Bahadur of Jammu & Kashmir fin whose Riyasat the land was situate."}}, {"text": "Kashmir State Land Acquisition Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7452, "end_char": 7492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7527, "end_char": 7561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7576, "end_char": 7580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Central Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "High Court of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8849, "end_char": 8878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was filed on the Original side of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9936, "end_char": 9941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "enquiry was initiated at the instance of the Advocate general, the council resolutions were traced in the Government repository at Jammu."}}, {"text": "Mian Jalalud-Din", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Bench of the High Court consisted of Mian Jalalud-Din J. and Anant Singh J. , They differed on most of the points although agreed in their conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Miao Jalal-ud-Din"}}, {"text": "Anant Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10582, "end_char": 10593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Bench of the High Court consisted of Mian Jalalud-Din J. and Anant Singh J. , They differed on most of the points although agreed in their conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "Miao Jalal-ud-Din", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10724, "end_char": 10741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The findings of Miao Jalal-ud-Din J. are :-(1) \"That it could not be said that the authorities dealing with the acquisition proceedings were ignorant about the factual aspect of the matter that the land had been resumed in the year 1893 under council resolution and that no compensation was to be paid for this, and that its character was that of \"KHALSA\" and it rejllained in possession of the forest department for over 60 years ..... \" (2) \"In our opinion the initiation of acquisition proceedings was wholly uncalled for as there was nothing to be acquired.", "canonical_name": "Miao Jalal-ud-Din"}}, {"text": "Mian Jalal-ud-Din", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11903, "end_char": 11920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mian Jalal-ud-Din J. agreed in this regard with the learned single Judge.", "canonical_name": "Miao Jalal-ud-Din"}}, {"text": "Arrant Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11978, "end_char": 11990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arrant Singh J. did not agree with the other learned Judge on the\n\nquestion of estoppel and res-judicata but agreed with him that negli C gence was no ground for setting aside the Award made in the land acquisition proceeding and concurred in the dismissal of the appeal."}}, {"text": "7-6-1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12524, "end_char": 12532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-6-1893 by which sanction was accorded to the allotment of land with existing house situated at Purani Chawni for opening a Government Timber Depot."}}, {"text": "4-9-1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12787, "end_char": 12795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 dated 4-9-1893 showing that from the report of the Tehsildar it appeared that the Forest Department wanted to take possesion of the land in question which was a sown land by storing timber there."}}, {"text": "Forest Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12863, "end_char": 12880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 dated 4-9-1893 showing that from the report of the Tehsildar it appeared that the Forest Department wanted to take possesion of the land in question which was a sown land by storing timber there."}}, {"text": "28-10-1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13009, "end_char": 13019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JO dated 28-10-1893, Ext."}}, {"text": "17-2-18~4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13498, "end_char": 13507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 dated 17-2-18~4, Ext."}}, {"text": "Intikhab Jamabandi Mauza Chawni Badam Singh Tehiil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14657, "end_char": 14707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 14/2 is Intikhab Jamabandi Mauza Chawni Badam Singh Tehiil."}}, {"text": "Durbar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15040, "end_char": 15046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The original file has been returned to Durbar on 29th Assuj after necessary action."}}, {"text": "17-12-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16295, "end_char": 16305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have gone through the letter dated 17-12-1954 Ext."}}, {"text": "12-4-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16370, "end_char": 16379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 14/A written by Tehsildar; the Patwari's Report dated 12-4-1955 Ext."}}, {"text": "3-5-55", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16462, "end_char": 16468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 19/B/2; letter dated 3-5-55 Ext."}}, {"text": "9-6-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16677, "end_char": 16685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W.\n\n1/2 the letter dated 2·6-1955 written by the Conservator of Forests to the Chief Conservator of Forests; the Office Note dated 9-6-1955 Ext."}}, {"text": "Chana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16705, "end_char": 16710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 1/3 and Chana's letter dated 22-6-1955, Ext."}}, {"text": "22-6-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16726, "end_char": 16735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 1/3 and Chana's letter dated 22-6-1955, Ext."}}, {"text": "Chandavarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18677, "end_char": 18689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same view has been taken in Mohammad Wajeeh Mirza v. Secretary of State for India in Counci/(2) when at page 33 the passage from the jud, gment of Chandavarkar J. extracted above was quoted with approval."}}, {"text": "Wallis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18823, "end_char": 18829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of The Deputy Co!/ector, Ca!icut , Division v.\n\nAiyavu Pi/lay and others(l) Wallis J. of the Madras High Court, in our opinion, correctly observed-\"lt is, in my opinion, clear that the Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already belongs to Government in land which is being acquired\n\n(I) I, L. R. XXXIV Bombay, 618."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18840, "end_char": 18857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of The Deputy Co!/ector, Ca!icut , Division v.\n\nAiyavu Pi/lay and others(l) Wallis J. of the Madras High Court, in our opinion, correctly observed-\"lt is, in my opinion, clear that the Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already belongs to Government in land which is being acquired\n\n(I) I, L. R. XXXIV Bombay, 618."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19273, "end_char": 19290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama Ayyar J. speaking for."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19444, "end_char": 19450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court in The Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & others(l) after quoting the above passage of Wallis, J. from the Madras decision aforesaid remarked at page 1322-\"With these observations, we are in entire agreement\" and added \"When Government possesses an interest in land which is the subject of acquisition under the Act, that interest is itself outside such acquisition, because there can be no question of Government acquiring what is its o\\vn.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19843, "end_char": 19860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Courts below have heavily relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Secy."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20059, "end_char": 20065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Firstly the principle in the case of Marriot v. Hamoton(l) which was applied in the Bombay case is not applicable in the present case."}}, {"text": "Order 41, Rule 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21425, "end_char": 21442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_290_304_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE OF KERALA & ORS. ETC.\n\nT. N. PETER & ANR. ETC.\n\nApril I 1980 • (V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHrnNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nCochin Town Planning Act-S.34(1) validity of.\n\nThe Cochin Town Planning Act in particular contemplates the creation of a town planning trust, the preparation of town planning schemes (section 12) acquisition of lands in this behalf (section 32) compensation for such compul C sory taking (section 34) and modifications in the manner of acquisition and the mode of compensation in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act.\n\nThe petitioners' writ petitions challenging the validity of the Town Planning Act were allowed by the High Court on the gronnd that the provisions of Section 34(1) and 34(2A) were unconstitutional being violative of article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nD In appeal to this Court it was contended that by the use of the provisions for making schemes under section 8 or section 10, the authority may indefinitely immobilize the owner's ability to deal with his land since section 15 clamps restrictions and this is unreasonable.\n\nHELD : 1. City improvement schemes have facets which mark them out from other land acquisition proposals. To miss the massive import of the z specialised nature of important schemes is to expose one's innocence of thedynam.ics of urban development. The statute has left it to the government to deal expeditiously with the scheme and there are sufficient guidelines in the Act not to make the gap between the draft scheme and governmental sanction too procrastinatory to be arbitrary. [294 G-H]\n\n2. Section 12(6) imparts :finality to the scheme and this corresponds to the declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. A conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Act makes it clear that improvement scheme cannot hang on indefinitely and an outside limit of two years is given for the preparation and publication of draft schemes from the time the initial resolution to make or adopt the scheme is passed by the Municipal Council. Conceptwise and strategy-wise dt:velopment schemes stand on a separate footing and classification of town planning schemes differently from the routine projects demanding compulsory acquisition may certainly be justified as blised on rational differentia which has a reasonable relation to the end in view namely improvement of towns and disciplining their d'evelopment. (295 F-G]\n\n3. There is no substance in the argument that if the land is acquired under the Town Planning Act no solatium is payable while if the land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act it is a statnlory obligation of the acquiring government to pay solatium. The Town Planning Act is a special statute where lands have to be acquired on large scale and as early and as quickly as possible so that schemes may be implemented with promptitude. There isin addition a specific and, purposeful provision excluding some sections of the-\n\nSTATE V. T. N. PETER 291\n\nKerala Land Acquisition Act. In such circumstances it is incredible that the A authority acting under the Act will sabotage chapter VII, in particular section 34, by resorting to the Kerala Land Acquisition Act in derogation of the express provision facilitating acquisition of lands on less onerous terms. [299C-D]\n\nMagan/al v. Municipal Corporation, [1975] I S.C.R. p. 23, referred to.\n\n4. The amount of compensation payable has no bearing on the distinction B whether the lands are acquired for housing or hospital, irrigation schemes or town improvement, school building or police station.\n\nS(a) The exclusion of section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act from section 34 of the Act is unconstitutional.\n\nBut it is severable. [302G]\n\n(b) The only discriminatory factor as between section 34 of the Act and section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act vis-avis quantification of compensation C is the non-payment of solatium in the former case because of the provisions of section 34(1) and that section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act shall have no application.\n\nTo achieve the virtue of equality and eliminate the vice of inequality what is needed is the obliteration of section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act from section 34(1) of the Town Planning Act.\n\nThe whole of section 34(1) does not have to be struck down.\n\nOnce the discriminatory and void part in section 34(1) of the Act is excised equality is restored. The owner will D then be entitled to the same compensation including solatium that he may be eligible under the land Acquisition Act.\n\n[303E-F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 848-850 of 1977.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 16-7-1976 of the Kerala E High Court in W.A. Nos .. 910, 194 and 253/75.\n\nAND\n\nCiVlL APPEAL Nos, 666-669 of 1978.\n\nFrom the Judgment and decree dated 8-6-1977 of the Kerala High F Court in W.A. Nos. 364-365, 472 and 473 of 1975.\n\nP. Govindan Nair and K. R. Nambiar for the Appellants in CAs. 848/77 _and 666-667 /78 and for Respondents 2 to 4 in CA 849 /77 and 2-3 in CA 850/77.\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant in CAs. 849-850/77 and Respondent 2 in CA 848/77 and RR! in CA 666/78, 667 /78 and RR 2 in CA 668-669/78.\n\nT. S. Krishnarr.oorthy Iyer, T. P. Sundara Rajan and P. K. Pillai for Respondent No. 1 in 848/77.\n\nT. L. Vishwanath Iyer, and S. Baiakrishnan for the Respondent No. I in CAs. 668-669/78 and RR 2 in CAs. 666-667 /78.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Law and development, as yet a Cinderella of our corpus juris, is a burgeoning branch of creative jurisprudence which needs to be nourished with judicious care, by courts in developing countries. The Town Planning Act, a developmental legislation amended and updated by the Kerala Legislature, was designed to draw up plans and to execute projects for the improvement of the towns and cities of that over-crowded State with its populous multitudes uncontrollably spiralling, defying social hygiene and economic engineering. Although the Act is of 1932 and originally confined to the Travancore portion of the Kerala State, it has received amendatory attention and now applies to the whole of Kerala with beneficial impact upon explosive cities like Cochin. This legislation, naturally, has made some deviation from the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, but having received insufficient attention from the draftsman on constitutional provisions, has landed the Act in litigation through a challenge in the High Court where it met with its judicial Waterloo when a Division Bench invalidated Section 31(1) and 34(2A) which were the strategic provisions whose 'exit from the statute would virtually scotch the whole measure. The State of Kerala has come ap in appeal, although the immediate victim is the Cochin Town Planning Trust.\n\nThe schematic projection of the Town Planning Act (the Act, for short) may be a good starting point for the discussion of the submissions made at the Bar. The Act, with a prophetic touch, envisions explosive urban developments leading to terrific stresses and strains, human, industrial and societal. Land is at the base of all development, and demand for the limited space available in the cities may so defile and distort planned progress as to give future shock nnless scientific social engineering takes hold of the situation. The State of its specialized agencies must take pre-emptive action and regulate the process of growth. The Act fills this need and contemplates the creation of a Town Planning Trust, preparation of town planning schemes, acquisition of lands in this behalf, compensation for betterment by citizens and other miscellaneous provisions, apart from creation of development anthorities. While this is the sweep of the statute, our concern is limited to schemes sanctioned by Section 12, acquisition of lands for such schemes under Section 32, compensation for such compulsory taking under Section 34 and the modifications in the manner of acquisition and the mode of compensation wrought into the Land Acquisition Act by the above provisions of the Town Planning Act. It is indisputable that the compensation payable and certain other matters connected therewith, differ as between the provisions in this Act and the Land Acquisition Act. The latter is more beneficial\n\n.....\n\nto the owner and the challenge, naturally, has stemmed from this allegedly invidious discrimination. In two separate cases, two judges upheld the challenge and, on appeal, the High Court affirmed the holdings that the provisions of Sub-section 34(1) and 34(2A) were unconstitutional, being violative of Article 14. Hence these appeals.\n\nWe will now proceed to scan the substance of the submissions and\n\nJI, the reasoning in the High Court's judgment.\n\nCounsel for the State, Shri P. Govindan Nair, supported by counsel for the Trust, Shri Abdul Khader, have canvassed the correctness of the reasons which have appealed to the High Court, and some decisions of this Court have been brought to our notice in this con- C nection. The owners of the lands acquired have been represented before us by Sri T. C. Raghavan who has, in his short submission, supported the judgment under appeal. One of the appeals has become infructious, because the State, after the High Court invalidated Section 34 of the Act, proceeded under the Land Acquisition Act, acquired the land, paid compensation and took possession thereof, I> thus completely satisfying the land owner. Shri T. S. Krishnamurthi Iyer, appearing for the owner, pointed out this circumstance and so we dismissed that appeal but mention it here because Shri T. C. Raghavan has relied on this fact in support of one of his arguments, as we will presently disclose. Before entering into the merits, we may recall the submissions of Shri T. L. Viswanathan, a young lawyer from E Kernla, who made us feel that orality, marked by pointed brevity and suasive precision, is more telling than advocacy with counter-productive prolixity. Although the responsible scrutiny that a bench decision of the High Court deserves has been bestowed, we are unable to support the judgment under appeal or the arguments of counsel in support.\n\nThe controversy regarding the vires of Sec. 34 revolved round a few points. Before us, Art. 14 has loomed large and a submission has been made that by use of the provisions for making schemes under Sec. 8 or Sec. IO the authority may indefinitely immobilise the owner's ability to deal with his land since Sec. 15 clamps restrictions, and this is unreasonable.\n\nWe agree that it is a hardship for the owner of the land if his ability to deal with his property is either restricted or prevented by a notification, and nothing happens, thereafter, leaving him guessing as to what the State may eventually do. Indeed, if such a state of suspense continues for unlimited periods, it may be unreasonable restriction on the right to property, although currently the right to pro-\n\nI F\n\n294 SUPREME COURT REPOlUS l l 980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nperty itself has been taken away from Part III. That apart, we must see whether there is any justifiable classification between common cases of compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and the special class of acquisitions covered by the Town Planning Act which may furnish a differentia sufficient to repel the attack of Article 14. Section 15 of the Act forbids dealings by the owner in many ways, once the publication of a notification is made. The grievance particularised by Shri Raghavan is that after a draft scheme has been prepared by the municipal council and published, it becomes operational only on the sanction by Government but there is no time limit fixed in Sec. 12 within which Government shall sanction. Supposing it takes several years for Government to express its approval or dis-approval, the owner may suffer.\n\nWe regard this grievance as mythical, not real, for more than one reason. The scheme is for improvement of a town and, therefore, has a sense of urgency implicit in it. Government is aware of this import and it is fanciful apprehension to imagine that lazy insouciance will make Government slumber over the draft scheme for long years.\n\nExpeditious despatch:is writ large on the process and that is an in-built guideline in the statute. At the same time, taking a pragmatic view, no precise time scale can be fixed in the Act because of the myriad factors which are to be considered by Government before granting sanction to a scheme in its original form or after modification. Section 12 and the other provisions give us some idea of the difficulty of a rigid time-frame being written into the statute especially when schemes may be small or big, simple or complex, demanding enquiries or provoking discontent. The many exercises, the differences of scale, the diverse consequences, the overall implications of developmental schemes and projects and the plurality of considerations, expert techniques and frequent consultations, hearings and other factors, precedent to according sanction are such that the many-sided dimension of the sanctioning process makes fixation of rigid time limits by the statute an impractical prescription. As pointed out earlier, city improvement schemes have facets which mark them out from other land acquisition proposals. To miss the massive import and specialised nature of improvement schemes is to expose one's innocence of the dynamics of urban development. Shri Raghavan fairly pointed out that, in other stages, the Act provides for limitation in time (for example, sec. 33 which fixes a period of three years between the date of notification and the actual acquisiton). Only in one minimal area where time-limit may not be workable, it has not been specified. The statute has left it to Government to deal expeditiously with the scheme and we see sufficient guideline in the Act not to make the gap between the\n\ndraft scheme and governmental sanction too procrastinatory to be A arbitrary. We need hardly say, that the court is not powerless to quash and grant relief where, arbitrary protraction or mala fide inaction of authorities injures an owner.\n\nAn aside : We are surprised at the obsolescent and obscurantist vocabulary surviving in the Town Planning Act because there are many B feudal and incongruous expressions such as 'our Governments and references to a Land Acquisition Act which has already been repealed by the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961. Modernisation is a pro cess necessary even for the statute book and yet it has not been done, despite opportunity for the legislature, while amending later, to carry out such simple, verbal and yet necessary changes. Be it remembered C that the Town Planning Act did undergo an extensive amendment as late as 1976 when, surely, some of the verbal replacements could easily have been made. Medievalism lingering in legislations is hardly a tribute to the awareness of our legislators.\n\nSection 12 of the Act provides for publishing the draft schemes so that objections or suggestions may be put forward by affected per sons. The scheme is then passed by the Municipal Council, of course, after considering objections and suggestions. Thereupon, it is sub\n\nmitted to the Government for sanction and the fact of such submis sion is also published so that the public may still raise objections or make suggestions to Govt. which will consider them, make further inquiries, if necessary, and ultimately sanction the scheme with or without modifications or may even refuse sanction or return the scheme to the Council for fresh consideration. Once the scheme is sanctioned by the Government, it is again published. Section 12(6) imparts finality to the scheme and this virtually corresponds to the declaration under sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Chapter III of the Act is comprehensive and complex because the subject of scheme-makinlf\n\nliemands expert attention and affects community interest. A Director of Town Planning is appointed who shall be consulted by Munici pal Councils in matters of town planning. Developmental schemes are not sudden creations. On the other hand, the Municipal Council first decides to prepare a scheme, adopts a draft scheme, if any, made by the owners of the lands, prepares the necessary plan of the lands which is proposed to be included in the scheme and notify its reso lution for public information. A copy of the plan is kept for the inspection of the public. Since all improvement schemes are matters of public concern, on the passing of a resolution and its notification under sec. 8, a time-bound obligation is cast on the Municipal Council by s. 9, which reads thus :\n\nA \"S. 9 ; Publication of draft scheme :\n\n(1) If the resolution is to make a scheme, municipal council shall, within twelve months from the date of the notification under s.8 or within such further period not exceeding twelve months, as our Govermnent may allow, and after consulting, in the prescribed manner, the owners of lands and buildings in the area affected, prepare and publish a draft scheme.\"\n\nIt is apparent that improvement schemes cannot hang on indefinitely and an outside limit of 2 years is given for the preparation and publication of draft schemes from the initial resolution to make or adopt the scheme is passed by the Municipal Council. Government itself may step in and direct the Municipal Council to prepare schemes and sec. 10 empowers it in this behalf. Sec. 11 contains detailed provisions regarding the material to be included in the draft scheme.\n\nThese are preparatory exercises, and then comes the sanction of the scheme by the Government under Sec. 12. We indicate the elaborate character of the strategy, stages, contents and character of schemes for improvement and the opportunities for objections and suggestions to the public and the consultation with technical experts and Government, time and again, only to emphasise the complex nature of modern urban development schemes which makes it a different category altogether from the common run of 'public purposes' for which compulsory acquisition is undertaken by the State. Conceptwise and strategywise, development schemes stand on a separate footing and classification of town planning schemes differently from the routine projects demanding compulsory acquisition may certainly be justified as based on a rational differentia which has a reasonable relation to the end in view viz., improvement of towns and discipling their development.\n\nOnce this basic factor is recognised, the raison detre of a separate legislation for and separate treatment of town planning as a special subject becomes clear. It was pointed out that under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, there is a time limit of 2 years written into Section 6 by engrafting a proviso thereto through an amendment of 1968 Act (Act 29 of 1968). Section 6 deals with a declaration that land is required for a public purpose and the relevant proviso thereto reads :\n\n\"S.6(i) Proviso :\n\nProvided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under sub-section (l) of\n\nSec. 3 shall be made after the expiry of two years from the A date of publication of such notification.\"\n\nAn argument was put forward that under the Land Acquisition Act there is thus a protection against unlimited uncertainty for the owners once Jands are frozen in the matter of dealing with them by an initial notification. This protection against protraction and inaction on B the part of the State and immobilisation of ownership is absent in the Town Planning Act. According to Mr. T. C. Raghavan, appearing for sorre respondents, this makes for arbitrariness and discrimination invalidatory of the relevant provisions of the Town Planning Act.\n\nIn our view there is no substance in this submission, having regard to the specialised nature of improvement schemes and the democratic 0 participation in the process required in such cases. We repel the submission ..\n\nMuch argument was addressed on the 'either or' arbitrariness implicit ins. 33 of the Act. The precise contention is that it is open to the Trust to acquire either under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act or under Chapter VII of the Town Planning Act. In the latter event, no solatium is payable while under the former statute it is a statutory obligation of the acquiring Govt. Thus, if an Authority has an option to proceed under one statute or the other and the consequences upon the owner are more onerous or less, such a facultative provision bears the lethal vice of arbitrariness in its bosom and is violative of Art. 14 and is therefore, void. Section 32 of the Act is the foundation for this argument and reads thus :\n\n32. Modification of Land Acquisition Act :\n\nImmovable property required for the purpose of town planning scheme shall be deemed to be land needed for a purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, XI of 1089, and may be acquired under the said (Act) modified in tbe manner provided in this chapter.\n\nWhat is spun out of the words used is that for the purposes of town planning schemes an immovable property \"may be acquired under the said Act (The Land Acquisition Act) modified in the manner provided in this Chapter\". Of course, Chapter VII, particularly sub-sec. (I) of s. 34 thereof, relates to compensation and does not provide for payment of solatium. Moreover, it is mentioned that the provisions of ss. 14, 22 and 23 (both sides agree, this should be read a> Sec. 25) of the Land Acquisition Act shall have no application in the acquisition of prcperty for the purpose of the Town Planning Act.\n\n2Q-189SCI/80\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.Jt.\n\nWe do not accept the argument that there is a real option for the authority to acquire either under the Land Acquisition Act or under the Town Planning Act when land is needed for a scheme. Theoretically, yes, but practically, no. Which sensible statutory functionary, responsible to the Treasury and to the community, will resort to the more expensive process under the Land Acquisition Act as against the specially designed and less costly provision under s. 34? Fanciful possibilities, freak exercise and speculative aberrations art not realistic enough for constitutional invalidation on the score of actual alter· natives or alive options, one more onerous than the other. ln Magan lal's case, the Court pointed out : (l-)\n\n\"The statute itself is the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of evicting unauthorised persons occupying them. This is a sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the power has been conferred. With such an indication clearly given. in the statutes one expects the officers concerned to abail themselves of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court. . Even normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter. Administrative officers, no less than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal to hold that an administrative officer would in taking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Govt. property or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts in one case and to the ordinary Civil Court in the other. The provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion. In considering whether the officers would be discriminating between one set of persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human behaviour and not behaviour which is abnormal. It is not every fancied possibility of lliscrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account.\n\nThis 1s not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large on the face of the statute. Discrimi-\n\n(1) Magnnlalv. Munic Corporation, [1975] t S.C.R. p. 23.\n\n) \"'-'\n\nSTATE v. T. N. PETER (Krishna Tyer, J.)\n\nnation may be possible but is very improbable. And if there is discrimination in actual practice this Court is not powerless. Furthermore, the fact that the Legis: lature considered that the ordinary procedure is insufficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorized occupants of Govt. and Corporation property and provided a special speedy prncedure therefor is a clear guidance for the authorities charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised occupants. We. therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the majority in the Northern India Caterers' case.\"\n\n- The same reasoning applies to the present situation. The Town Planning Act is a special statute where lands have to be acquired on a large scale and as early and quickly as possible so that schemes may be implemented with promptitude. What is more, there is a specific and purposeful provision excluding some sections of the Kerala Land .Acquisition Act.\n\nJn such circumstances, it is incredible that the authority acting under the Act will sabotage Chapter VII, in particular s. 34, by resorting to the Kerala Land Acquisition Act in derogation of the express provision facilitating acquisition of lands on less onerous terms. He functions under the Town Planning Act, needs lands for the schemes under that Act, has provisions for acquisition under that Act. Then would be, by reckless action, travel beyond that Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act, disregarding the non obstante provision in Sec. of the Act? Presumption of perversity cannot be the foundation of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the expression, used in the context of s. 32, clearly does not bear the meaning attributed to it by the counsel for the respondents.\n\nAll that it means is that when immovable property is found necessary for the purpose of a 'scheme' it may be acquired by the compulsory process written into s. 32. It is, as if there were only one option, not two. If the scheme is to be implemented, the mode of acquisition shall be under s. 32 and the manner of such acquisition is the same under the Land Acquisition Act minus ss. 14, 22 and 25 thereof. A slight reflection makes it clear that the mode prescribed is only one, and so the theory of alternatives one of which being mere onerous than the -0ther, and the consequent inference of arbitrariness, cannot arise.\n\nWe overrule that argument.\n\nWe must notice, before we part with this point, the argument of Sri Raghavan for the respondents that the existence of alternatives\n\nis not theoretical nor chimerical but real, and proof of the pudding is II in the eating.\n\nHe pointed to one of the appeals in this batch where the proceedings under sec. 34 of the Act were given up, the provision\n\nof the Land Acqnisition Act used, and full compensation and so la ti um paid to the owner. This instance gave flesh ar.d blood to the submission about discrimination. Shri Khader, for the trust countered this argument by stating that because the High Court struck down the Act and the land was needed. the only statute then available to the State was the Land Acquisition Act. So, the authority was reluctantly constrained to notify and acquire under the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nHad Sec. 34 of the Act been available, this step would not have been taken and absent Sec. 34 the argument of alternatives has no basis.\n\nWe agree with this reasoning and repel the submission of arbitrary power to pick and choose.\n\nAt worst, a swallow does not rr.ake a summer but we must warn that prodigal state action to favour some owner when sec. 34 has been resuscitated will be betrayal of public interest and invalidated as mala fide even at the instance of a concerned citizen. The legislature cannot be st11ltified by the suspicious improvidence, or worse, of the Executive.\n\nThe more serious submission pressed tersely but clearly, backed by a catena of cases, by Shri Viswanathan merits our consideration.\n\nThe argument is shortly this. As between two owners of property. the presence of public purpose empowers the State to take the lands of either or both. But the differential nature of the public purpose does not furnish a rational ground to pay more compensation fe>r one owner and less for another and that impertiner.ce vitiates the present measure. The purpose may be slum clearance, flood control or housing for workers, but how does the diversity of purposes warrant payment of differential scales or quantum of compensation where no constitutional immunity as in Art. 3!A, B or C applies? Public purpose sanctions compulsory acquisition, not discriminatory compensation, whether you take A's land for improvement scheme or irrigation scheme, how can you pay more or less, guided by an irrelevance viz. the particular public purpose? The State must act equ oily when it takes property unless there is an intelligent and intelligible differentia between two categories of owners having a nexus with the object, namely the scale of compensation. It is intellectual confusion of constitutional principle to regard classification good for one purpose, as obliteration of differences for unrelated aspects. This logic is neatly applied in a series of cases of this Court.\n\nIt is trite that the test to rebuff Art. 14 turns of the differentia visa-vis the object of the classification. In Vajarve.u Muda iar's case,(!) H the Court took the view, (on this aspect the decision is not shown to have been overruled) that where there is no rational relation in the\n\n(I) P. v. Mudaliar v. Dy. Collector, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 634.\n\nmatter of quantum of compensation between one public purpose and another you cannot differentiate between owners. Whether you acquire for a hospital or university, for slum clearance or housing scheme, compensation cannot vary in the rate or scale or otherwise.\n\n \"Out of adjacent lands of the same quality and value, one may be acquired for a housing scheme under the Amending Act and the other for a hospital under the Principal Act, out of two adjacent plots belonging to the same individual and of the same quality1and value, one may be acquired under the Principal and the other under the Amending Act. From whatever aspect the matter is looked at, the alleged differences have no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved.\n\nIn Durganath Sharma's case, a special legislation for acquisition of land for flood control came up for consitntional examination.\n\nWe confine ourselves to the differentiation in the rate of compen. sation based on the accident of the nature of the purpose where the Court struck a similar note. In the l'vagpur Improvement Trwt case and in the Om Prakash case, this Court voided the legislation which provided differential compensation based upon the purpose. In the latter case the Court observed. :\n\n\"There can be no dispute that the 'Govt. can acquire land for a public purpose including that of the Mahapalika or other local body, either under the unmodified Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or under that Act as modified by the Adhiniyam. If it chooses the first course, then the land-owners concerned will be entitled to better com pensation including 15 % solatium, the potential value of the land etc. nor will there be any impediment or hurdle such as that enacted by s. 372(a) of the Adhiniyam in the way of such land owners, dissatisfied by the Collector's award, to approach the Court under s. 18 of that Act. .... It is not necessary to dilate further on this point at this matter stands concluded by this Court's decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust's case by the ratio of which we bound. It will be sufficient to close the discussion by extracting here what Sikri C.J., speaking for the Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust's case said :\n\n\"Can the Legislature say that for a hospital land will be acquired at 50 % of the market value, for a school at\n\n60 % of the value and for a Govt. building at 70 % of the\n\nmarket value? All three objects are public purposes and as far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Art. 14 confers an individual right and in order to justify a classification there should be something which justifies a different treatment to this individual] right. It seems to us that ordinarily a classification based on the public purpose is not permissible under Art. 14 for the purpose of determining compensation. The position is different when the owner of the land himself is the recipient of benefits from an improvement scheme, and the benefit to him is taken into consideration in fixing compensation. Can classifications be made on the basis of authority acquiring the land? In other words can different principles of compensation be laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement ::rust or Municipal Corporation or the Government?\n\nIt seems to us that the answer is in the negative because as far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether the land is acquired by one authority or the other.\n\nIt is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the existence of two Acts could enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another equally situated the owner who is discriminated against, can claim the protection of Article 14.\"\n\nThe principle that may be distilled from these rulings and the ' basics of 'equality' jurisprudence is that classification is not permissible for compensation purposes so long as the differentia relied on has no rational relation to the object in view viz. reduction in recompense.\n\nIs it rational to pay different scales of compensation, as pointed out by Sikri, C.J. in the Nagpur Improvement Trust case, depending on whether you acquire for housing or hospital, irrigation scheme or town improvement, school building or police-station? The amount of compensation payable has no bearing on this distinction, although it is conceivable that classification for purposes of compensation may exist and in such cases the statute may be good. We are unable to discern any valid discremen in the Town Planning Act vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act warranting a classification in the matter of denial of solatium.\n\nWe uphold the Act in other respects but not when it deals invidiously between two owners based on an irrelevant criterion viz. the acquisition being for an improvement scheme. We are not to be\n\n.,,,;\n\nunderstood to mean that the rate of compensation may not vary or must be uniform in all cases. We need not investigate this question further as it does not arise here although we are clear in our mind that under given circumstances differentiation even in the scale of com- . pensation may comfortably comport with Art. 14. No such circumstances are present here nor pressed. Indeed, the State, realising the force of this facet of discrimination offered, expilatory fashion, both before the High Court and before us, to pay 15% solatium to obliterate the hostile distinction.\n\nThe core question now arises. What is the effect even if we read a discriminatory design in Sec. 34? Is plastic surgery permissible or demolition of .the section inevitable? Assuming that there is an untenable discrimination in the matter of compensation does the whole of s. 34 have to be liquidated or severable portions voided?\n\nIn our opinion, scuttling the section, the course the High Court has chosen, should be the last step. The Court uses its writ power with a constructive design, an affirmative slant and a sustaining bent.\n\nEven when by compulsions of inseverability, a .destructive stroke becomes necessary the court minimises the injury by an intelligent containment. Law keeps alive and \"operation pull down\" is de mode.\n\nViewed from this perspective, so far as we are able to see, the only discriminatory factor as between s. 34 of the Act and s. 25 of the Land Acquisition Act vis-a-vis quantification of compensation is the non-payment of solatium in the former case because of the provision in s. 34(1) that s. 25 of the Land Acquisition Act shall have no application. Thus, to achieve the virtue of equality and to eliminate the vice of inequality what is needed is the obliteration of s. 25 of the Land Acquisition Act from s. 34(1) of the Town Planning Act. The whole of s. 34(1) does not have to be struck down. Once we excise the discriminatory and, therefore, void part in Sec. 34(1) of the Act, equality is restored. The owner will then be entitled to the same compensation, including solatium, that he may be eligible for under the Land Acquisition Act. What is rendered void by Art. 13 is only to the extent of the contravention of Art. 14. The lancet of the Court may remove the offending words and restore to constitutional health the rest of the provision. .\n\nWe hold that the exclusion of Sec. 25 of the Land Acquisition Act from sec. 34 of the Act is unconstitutional but it is severable and we sever it. The necessary consequence is that s. 34(1) will be read omitting the words 'and s. 25' . What follows then? Section 32 obli- H gates the state to act under the Land Acquisition Act but we have struck down that part which excludes sec. 25 of the Land Acquisition Act\n\nand so, the 'modification' 'no longer covers s. 25. It continues to apply to the acquisition of property under the Town Planning Act, Section 34(2) provides for compensation exactly likes. 25(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and, in the light of what we have just decided, s. 25(2) will also apply and \"in additi9n to the [market value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per cen tum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition!'\n\nThe upshot of this litigation thus is that the appeal must be allowed except to the extent that solatium shall be payable as under the Land Acquisition Act. Since the State has always been willing to pay that component and has repeated that offer even before us right from the beginning, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs,\n\nP, B.R, Appeal allowed.\n\n''y'", "total_entities": 141, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF KERALA & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KERALA & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "T. N. PETER & ANR. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T. N. PETER & ANR. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April I 1980 • (V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHrnNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. 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Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4825, "end_char": 4841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and K. R. Nambiar for the Appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4846, "end_char": 4859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and K. R. Nambiar for the Appellants in CAs."}}, {"text": "M. M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4975, "end_char": 4993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant in CAs."}}, {"text": "N. Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant in CAs."}}, {"text": "T. S. Krishnarr.oorthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. S. Krishnarr.oorthy Iyer, T. P. Sundara Rajan and P. K. 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Baiakrishnan for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Law and development, as yet a Cinderella of our corpus juris, is a burgeoning branch of creative jurisprudence which needs to be nourished with judicious care, by courts in developing countries.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5997, "end_char": 6007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the Act is of 1932 and originally confined to the Travancore portion of the Kerala State, it has received amendatory attention and now applies to the whole of Kerala with beneficial impact upon explosive cities like Cochin."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6023, "end_char": 6029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the Act is of 1932 and originally confined to the Travancore portion of the Kerala State, it has received amendatory attention and now applies to the whole of Kerala with beneficial impact upon explosive cities like Cochin."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6163, "end_char": 6169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the Act is of 1932 and originally confined to the Travancore portion of the Kerala State, it has received amendatory attention and now applies to the whole of Kerala with beneficial impact upon explosive cities like Cochin."}}, {"text": "Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 31(1) and 34(2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6505, "end_char": 6529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961", "statute": "the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6641, "end_char": 6656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Kerala has come ap in appeal, although the immediate victim is the Cochin Town Planning Trust."}}, {"text": "Cochin Town Planning Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6717, "end_char": 6743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Kerala has come ap in appeal, although the immediate victim is the Cochin Town Planning Trust."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7747, "end_char": 7757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7803, "end_char": 7813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7861, "end_char": 7871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act and the Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8177, "end_char": 8209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 34(1) and 34(2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Act and the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8552, "end_char": 8562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Act and the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8788, "end_char": 8800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the State, Shri P. Govindan Nair, supported by counsel for the Trust, Shri Abdul Khader, have canvassed the correctness of the reasons which have appealed to the High Court, and some decisions of this Court have been brought to our notice in this con- C nection."}}, {"text": "T. C. Raghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9048, "end_char": 9062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The owners of the lands acquired have been represented before us by Sri T. C. Raghavan who has, in his short submission, supported the judgment under appeal."}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9229, "end_char": 9239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "T. S. Krishnamurthi Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9411, "end_char": 9435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri T. S. Krishnamurthi Iyer, appearing for the owner, pointed out this circumstance and so we dismissed that appeal but mention it here because Shri T. C. Raghavan has relied on this fact in support of one of his arguments, as we will presently disclose."}}, {"text": "T. L. Viswanathan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9734, "end_char": 9751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before entering into the merits, we may recall the submissions of Shri T. L. Viswanathan, a young lawyer from E Kernla, who made us feel that orality, marked by pointed brevity and suasive precision, is more telling than advocacy with counter-productive prolixity."}}, {"text": "E Kernla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9773, "end_char": 9781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before entering into the merits, we may recall the submissions of Shri T. L. Viswanathan, a young lawyer from E Kernla, who made us feel that orality, marked by pointed brevity and suasive precision, is more telling than advocacy with counter-productive prolixity."}}, {"text": "Sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10161, "end_char": 10168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10209, "end_char": 10216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10320, "end_char": 10326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10428, "end_char": 10435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11282, "end_char": 11292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11294, "end_char": 11304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grievance particularised by Shri Raghavan is that after a draft scheme has been prepared by the municipal council and published, it becomes operational only on the sanction by Government but there is no time limit fixed in Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11635, "end_char": 11642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12473, "end_char": 12483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13501, "end_char": 13508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "are surprised at the obsolescent and obscurantist vocabulary surviving in the Town Planning Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14103, "end_char": 14198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Be it remembered C that the Town Planning Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14616, "end_char": 14661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14884, "end_char": 14894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Be it remembered C that the Town Planning Act", "statute": "Be it remembered C that the Town Planning Act"}}, {"text": "Section 12(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15608, "end_char": 15621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Be it remembered C that the Town Planning Act", "statute": "Be it remembered C that the Town Planning Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15709, "end_char": 15715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter III of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15745, "end_char": 15767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16517, "end_char": 16523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16585, "end_char": 16589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "S. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16614, "end_char": 16618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter III of the Act", "statute": "Chapter III of the Act"}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16781, "end_char": 16784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17355, "end_char": 17362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17391, "end_char": 17398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17587, "end_char": 17594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18710, "end_char": 18719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18803, "end_char": 18812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.6(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18924, "end_char": 18930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19057, "end_char": 19063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20544, "end_char": 20551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20576, "end_char": 20586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Modification of Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20656, "end_char": 20692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21236, "end_char": 21241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Modification of Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Modification of Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 14, 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21370, "end_char": 21387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Modification of Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Modification of Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21430, "end_char": 21437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Modification of Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Modification of Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22079, "end_char": 22084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Magan lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22302, "end_char": 22311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln Magan lal's case, the Court pointed out : (l-)\n\n\"The statute itself is the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of evicting unauthorised persons occupying them."}}, {"text": "Krishna Tyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24157, "end_char": 24169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ") \"'-'\n\nSTATE v. T. N. PETER (Krishna Tyer, J.)\n\nnation may be possible but is very improbable.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25216, "end_char": 25221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "functions under the Town Planning Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25370, "end_char": 25407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25869, "end_char": 25874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26121, "end_char": 26126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26253, "end_char": 26258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 14, 22 and 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26343, "end_char": 26360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Act and with a view to oblige the private owner betray the public interest and resort to the power under the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26915, "end_char": 26922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27136, "end_char": 27142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Khader, for the trust countered this argument by stating that because the High Court struck down the Act and the land was needed."}}, {"text": "Sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27446, "end_char": 27453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27528, "end_char": 27535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27789, "end_char": 27796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viswanathan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28122, "end_char": 28133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The more serious submission pressed tersely but clearly, backed by a catena of cases, by Shri Viswanathan merits our consideration."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28729, "end_char": 28735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29469, "end_char": 29476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vajarve.u Muda iar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29548, "end_char": 29566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Vajarve.u Muda iar's case,(!)"}}, {"text": "[1965] 1 S.C.R. 634", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29757, "end_char": 29776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Durganath Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30526, "end_char": 30542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Durganath Sharma's case, a special legislation for acquisition of land for flood control came up for consitntional examination."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30868, "end_char": 30878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the l'vagpur Improvement Trwt case and in the Om Prakash case, this Court voided the legislation which provided differential compensation based upon the purpose."}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31187, "end_char": 31213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 372(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31496, "end_char": 31505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31622, "end_char": 31627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Nagpur Improvement Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31758, "end_char": 31782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary to dilate further on this point at this matter stands concluded by this Court's decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust's case by the ratio of which we bound."}}, {"text": "Sikri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31892, "end_char": 31897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be sufficient to close the discussion by extracting here what Sikri C.J., speaking for the Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust's case said :\n\n\"Can the Legislature say that for a hospital land will be acquired at 50 % of the market value, for a school at\n\n60 % of the value and for a Govt."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32304, "end_char": 32311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32573, "end_char": 32580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33544, "end_char": 33554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34984, "end_char": 34991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are unable to discern any valid discremen in the Town Planning Act vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "We are unable to discern any valid discremen in the Town Planning Act vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35339, "end_char": 35346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are unable to discern any valid discremen in the Town Planning Act vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "We are unable to discern any valid discremen in the Town Planning Act vis-a-vis the Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35520, "end_char": 35525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36087, "end_char": 36092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36108, "end_char": 36113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36261, "end_char": 36269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36275, "end_char": 36280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36454, "end_char": 36459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36493, "end_char": 36501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36541, "end_char": 36549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36646, "end_char": 36656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36854, "end_char": 36861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36908, "end_char": 36915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37069, "end_char": 37076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37110, "end_char": 37117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37220, "end_char": 37228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37266, "end_char": 37271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37294, "end_char": 37304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37416, "end_char": 37423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37498, "end_char": 37503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37587, "end_char": 37600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37724, "end_char": 37732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_305_308_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "KRISHAN LAL\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nApril 1, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND E. S. VENKATARAM.IAH, JJ.]\n\nIndian Penal Cade 1860 (XLV of 1860) Section 376-Rape on young girl -Necessity of corroboration of girl's testimony-Nature and extent of corrcr boration necessary.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that a girl below 16 years of age was sleeping outside her hou•e with her family and that the petitioner in the comJ1\"11Y of an C other (acquitted accused) carried her away under intimidation to a neigh.- bowing godown belonging to another acquitted accused and in that secluded\n\nvenue committed rape on the young woman and afteN\\lirds put her back on her cot.\n\nThe trial court convicted the petitioner but on grounds of benefit of doubt acquitted the other accused. The High Court affirmed this order.\n\nIn thespecial leave petition to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the evidence of the prosecutrix without substantial corroboration, was inadequate to rest a conviction under section 376 IPC.\n\nDismissing the special leave petition,\n\nHEID 1. To forsake vital consideration and go by obsolete demands for E substantial corroboration is to sacrifice commonsense in favour of an artificial <:oncoction called 'judicial' probability. [308A]\n\n2. Human psychology and behavioural probability must be borne in mind when assessing the testimonial potency of the victim's version. What girl would foster rape charges on a stranger uriless a remarkable set of facts or clearest motives are made out? The inherent bashfullness, the innocent naivete and the feminine tendency to conceal the outrage of masculine sexual aggres F tion are factors which are relevant to improbabilise the hypothesis of false implication. The injury on the person of the victim has corroboratb•e value. [3070] '1\n\n3. The court loses its credibility if it rebels against realism. The Jaw court io not an unnatural world. [308 BJ\n\n4. Merely because the trial court has ultra-cautiously acquitted someone, the higher court must, for that reason, cannot acquit everyone. [308CJ\n\n5. A socially sensitized judge is a better statutory armour against gender <'41trag'e than Jong clauses of a complex section with oU the protections wri(\n\ninto it. [308C]\n\n6. Observation on probative force of circumstances are not universal laws H of nature but guidelines and good counsel. [307 Fl\n\nGurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2661 referred lo.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1980) 3 S.C.R.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) 2599 of 1979.j\n\nFrom the Judgment and OH'e(C:<~<d 9·7·1~~9 <f tre F1rj<b:rrd i Haryana High Court in Crl.A. 1228/1976.\n\nS. K. Sabharwa/ and R. C. Kohli for the petitioner. i.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by,\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J, A rapist-if the concurrent findings of the courts below were correct has chosen to seek special leave to challenge his crime and punishment, and his counsel has attacked the ver diet of culpability as wholly unfounded. Indeed, it is redundant, and absent exceptional circumstances, out of bounds, for this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 136, to launch upon an explora tion and re-appreciation of the evidence, its strengths and weaknesses with a view to sit in judgment over the holdings of the High Court in affirmance of those of the trial Court.\n\nBriefly, we will touch upon one or two circumstances without claiming to be exhaustive in any manner. One Shashi Bala of Ambala was sl.eeping, with her mother and other children, outside her house in hot July (1975). The petitioner, in the company of another (acquitted accused), carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring godown belonging to one Tilak Raj (another acquitted accused) and in that secluded venue committed rape on the young women. After subjecting her to these beasteal acts of lust, Shashi Bala, who by then was nearly unconscious, was put back in her cot from where she had been' removed .. In the morning, the mother of the victim found blood on the daughter's salwar and thereupon she complainingly narrated the criminal assault of the previous night. On the return of the father, P.W. 7, who had been away, the victim went, in his company, to the police station, lodged a report which was followed by investigation and chargesheet. The Court, after a trial, convicted the present petitioner but, on grounds of benefit of doubt, acquitted the rest. Medical evidence showed that the raped girl was below 16 years of age. We are not too happy about the acquittal but since the State has not chosen to come up in appeal against the acquittal, we do not probe the matter further.i\n\nCounsel for the petitioner persistently urged that the evidence of the prosecutrix, without substantial corroboration, was inadequato to rest a conviction under s. 376 I.P.C. He relied on observations of this Court in Gurucharan Singh v. State of Haryana (1) for the pro-\n\n(!) A. I.~R.1972_S.C.2. 2661.\n\nKRISHAN LAL v. HARYANA (Krishna Iyer, J) 307\n\nposition that although a prosecutrix is not an accomplice, her evidence, as a rule of prudence, is viewed by courts unfavourably unless reinforced by corroboration \"so as to satisfy its conscience that she is telling the truth and that the present accused of rape on her has not been falsely implicated\". It is true that old English cases, followed in British Indian courts, had led to a tendency on the part of judge- , made law that the advisability of corroboration should be present to the mind of the Judge \"except where the circumstance make it safe to dispense with it\". Case-law, even in those days, had clearly spelt out the following propositions ;\n\n\"The tender years of the child, coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case, such, for example as its demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there mnst, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed, to stand.\"\n\n\"It would be impossible, indeed it would be dangerous to formulate the kind of evidence which should, or would, be regarded as corroboration. Its nature and extent must necessarily vary with circumstances of each case and also according to the particular circumstances of the offence charged.\"\n\nObservations on probative force of circumstances are not universal laws of nature but guidelines and good counsel.\n\nWe must bear in mind human psychology and behavioural probability when assessing the testimonial potency of the victim's version.\n\nWhat girl would foist a rape charge on a stranger unless a remarkable set of facts or clearest motives were made out? The inherent bashfulness, the innocent naivete and the feminine tendency to conceal the outrage of mesculine sexual aggression are factors which are relevant to improbabilise the hypothesis of false implication. The injury on the person of the victim, especially her private parts, has correborative value. Her complaint to her parents and the presence of blood on her clothes are also testimony which warrents credence.\n\nMore than all, it ba!Hes belief in human nature that a girl sleeping with her mother and other children in the open will come by blood on her garments and injury in her private parts unless she has been subjected to the torture of rape. And if rape has been committed,\n\nSUPREME COURT REP<YRTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nas counsel more or less conceded, why, of all persons in the world, should the victim hunt up the petitioner and point at him the accusing finger? To forsake these vital considerations and go by obsolescent demands for substantial corroboration is to sacrifice commonsence in favour of an artificial concoction called 'Judicial' probability.\n\nIndeed, the court loses its credibility if it rebels against realism. The law court is not an unnatural world.\n\nWe are not satisfied that merely because the trial court has ultracautiously acquitted someone, the higher court must, for that reason, acquit everyone, Reflecting on this case we feel convinced that a socially sensitised judge is a better statutory armour against gender outrage than long clauses of a complex section with all the protections writ into it.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 16, "entities": [{"text": "LAL\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 44, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHAN LAL\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nApril 1, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "Section 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 994, "end_char": 1005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1006, "end_char": 1009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "AIR 1972 SC 2661", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2396, "end_char": 2412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K. Sabharwa/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2651, "end_char": 2666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sabharwa/ and R. C. Kohli for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "R. C. Kohli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2671, "end_char": 2682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Sabharwa/ and R. C. Kohli for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2749, "end_char": 2761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by,\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J, A rapist-if the concurrent findings of the courts below were correct has chosen to seek special leave to challenge his crime and punishment, and his counsel has attacked the ver diet of culpability as wholly unfounded."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3113, "end_char": 3121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shashi Bala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Shashi Bala of Ambala was sl.eeping, with her mother and other children, outside her house in hot July (1975)."}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3452, "end_char": 3458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Shashi Bala of Ambala was sl.eeping, with her mother and other children, outside her house in hot July (1975)."}}, {"text": "Tilak Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, in the company of another (acquitted accused), carried her away under intimidation to a neighbouring godown belonging to one Tilak Raj (another acquitted accused) and in that secluded venue committed rape on the young women."}}, {"text": "s. 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4801, "end_char": 4807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4808, "end_char": 4813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8402, "end_char": 8408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nPetition dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_309_324_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "' \"\n\nBHIMRAO ANNA INGAWALE AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 2, 1980\n\n(R. S. PATIIAK AND A. D. KOSHA!. JJ.j\n\nft/tdian P<nal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860) Ss. 302, 149 & 148-AnimosUy and enmity between the six accused and the two deceased [assault by the party of tlte accused on the deceased and their brothers-Party of the accused\n\nwhether aggressors and have acted in exercise of the right of private defenceconPlclicm-whdh<r valid.\n\nAppoilants Nos. I to 6 were charged and convicted for two offences under oection 302 read with section 149 and one under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code for having caused the death of two persons,\n\nAppellants Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 are interrelated, while appellant No. 5 is their friend, and the two deceased are brothers. Appellants Nos. I to 4 and 6 lived jointly in a house which abutted on a road 14 feet wide. Opposite their house lay the one belonging to the two deceased. The waste water emanating from the house of the appellant No. 1 had been flowing towards the road and seeping into the western wall of the house of the deceased. This resulted in inimical relation between the two parties. Animosity also prevailed among the partieo on account of the fact that the family of th~ deceased had earlier sold\n\nto a !bird person some land which they wanted to repurchase but were thwarted in their designs by the appellants who were instigating the vendee not to re-sell the load to the deceased.\n\nThe prosecution alleged that on the fateful day, in the morning there was a dispute and altercation between the two deceased and the appellants.\n\nThe incident was noticed by PW 20 who intervened and separated them di•-armed the two deceased and threw away the sticks which he snatched from them. \\ At about 2 P.M. on the same day all .the appellants entered the house of the ' r deoeascd armed with axes and sticks dragged out the deceased on the road and started beating them with their respective weapons, PW 10 and PW 11, the wives of the deceased intervened and they also received injuries at the hands of the appellants. In the meantime PW 13, PW 14 and their brother Jayakar who came to the place of occurrence were beaten by the appellants who thtnafter mllde gOOd their escape. The four injured brothers and the two ladies were removed to the Civil Hospital. The two deceased succumbed to their injuries later.\n\nMeanwhile appellant No. 1 reached the police station and he complained\n\nto the sub-inspector (P.W. 24) that he and his family members had been attacked by the party of the deceased, , On learning that the opposite party had arrived at the local Civil Hospital, the sub-inspector reached the hospital and\n\nrecorded the statement (Ex. 55) of P.W. 12. This formed the basis of the B first information report registered at the police station. On returning to the police stat10n the sub-inspector arrested appelkmt No. I.\n\nThe case of the appe11ants was that feelings of enmity existed between the two opposing families for two or three years prior to the date of the occur rence, that on that date there was exchange of abuses between appellants Nos. 1 to 3 on the one hand and the deceased on the ot':her when the latter were about to assault the former but could not do so on account of the intervention of PW 20, that soon afterwards the two deceased and their three brothers assaulted appellants Nos. 1 to 4 with 's:ticks and axes at the latter's house when some of the as.sailants were disarmed and beaten back, tbild that appellanlq Nos. 4 to 6 \\Vere not present at the scene of the occurrence and h!d been involvCd in the case merely because they were related to the other appellants by ties of blood or friendship.\n\nThe Sessions Judge was of the opinion. that the incident in which the two contending parties exchanged abuses and which came to a close .with theintervention of PW 20 provided the motive for the ossault in which the two dereaeed lost their Jives and that the eye-witnesses had given details of the occurrence which were omitted from their statements made to the police but that no significance could l:>e attached to this aspect of the matter. He further held that the occurrence took place on the road lying in between the respective houses of the parties, that the pl!rticipation of all the acCUBed in the occurrence was natural El.nd probable, that the party of the accused were able to inflict serious injuries on their opponent~ and themselves escaped with core1paratively a mild beating and th&t therefore, there was no right of private defence available to the appellants.\n\nOn this finding the Sessions Judge con victed and sentenced the six appellants.\n\nThe appeal to the High Court was heard by a Division Bench, but on eccount of difference of opinion among the Judges. the matt.er was referred to a third Judge and the appeal was dismissed in accordance with the majority opinion. All the three Judges re-appraised the evidence and while the majority arrived at th:e same conclusion as the Sessions Judge, the third Judge come to the finding that there was no reliabl~ evidence to support he prosecutlon case that the accused were the aggre.s_, ors.\n\nIn the appeals to this Court on the questions: (a) Whether the prooecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the party of the appellants were tbe\n\naggre&&0111 and whether it wii.s made out from the records that the latter mllY . have acted in exercise of the right of private defence, and (b) whether the --~ ' participation of all the appellants in the occurrence was satisfactorily made out;\n\nHELD: (a) (i) The consideration of the ocular evidence coupled wiUI the testimony of PW-20 and the circumstantial evidence especially the medical part of it, prove beyond reasonable doubt that the party of the appellants were the\n\naggressors. [323EJ\n\n(ii) The occurrence admittedly took place on the road in between the respective houses of the deceased and the appellants which is fully made out f:tiom the deposition of PW 20 who is no doubt a wholly independent and reliable Witness.\n\nHe attracted to the place of occurrence by a not\"te which reached him in his field after he had gone there subsequent to his witnessing the three brothe\"' of the deceased running towards their house. The circumstance\n\nthat their other two injured brothers were also found lyiii.g on the road lends further strength to the conclusion that the occurrence took place on the road\n\nlllIIMRAO ANNA V. MAHARASHTRA 311\n\nitself and not at the house of the appellants. It may also be safely 1168umed, A apart from the fact that all the prosecution witnesses say so, that PW's 12, 13 and Jayakar were not with the deceused at the inception of the fight and were, on the other band, working in their fields. [320 D-G]\n\n(iii) H the party of the deceased were the aggressors and had made a concerted attack on the appe11ants who Were taken unares there is no reason why the former should !:lave conie out second best in the combat. The fact B that practically all the injuries received by the deceased were located in the head region and were inflicted with great force lllllkes it highly probable that it WM they who were taken unawares and had to bear the brunt of the attack which they had perhaps no means to repulse. (321 Bl\n\n(iv) The fact that the women-folk of the deceased were elso injured during the oceumncc makes it probable that the ladies had to intervene because the fight WM unequal and their respective husbands found it difficult to cope with C\n\ni~ [321 GJ\n\n( v) Another inference which may well be drawn from the consequences of tbe combat is that PWs 12 and 13 and their brother Jayakar probably reached the place of occurrence while their brothers were being belaboured and that it wu a-t this stage that the three new--comerB entered the arena and took up cudgels on behalf of their hapless family members. [321 Dj\n\n(vi) It is not unoften that improvements in an earlier version are made at the trial in order to give a boost to the prosecution case, albeit foolishly. But that doell not mean that falsity of testimony in one material particular would ruin it from beginning to _end.\n\nOn the other hand the circumstance will be a good nuon merely for the court to be put on gnard and sift the evidence\n\nwith ectnordinary caution and to accept those pOrtions of -it which appear E fully trmtwortby either intrinsically or by reason of corroboration from other\n\ntru!lworthy sources. [321 Gl\n\n(vii) The road has a width of only 14 feet and if two opposing parties .consistiq in all of six to ten persons, engage themselves in violence against each other, f.he exact place where the members of each would be Injured may not melJ1 BDything especially if one of the parties is tnkcn unawares and is F unarmed. f323 Bl\n\nIn the instant case, none of the injuries suffered by the appellants (except for one) was located on a vital part and all of them without exception were\n\nsimple In nature, the injuries on the two dec.etlfSed persons being in contrast practically all deadly. 1323 DJ\n\n(b)(I) Appellants N06. 4 to 6 are entitled to the benefit of doubt in the 111atter of their participation in the occurrence. [324 BJ\n\n(b )(ii) Appellants Nos. I to 3 aro proved beyond reasonable doubt to 'have taken part in the fight.\n\nThey ll<e not merely named in that behalf by the eye-witness but admit thefr participation in the occurrence which is further aasured by reason of the fact that all three of them were found injured immediately thereafter. The same is not true of the other there who have denied\n\ntlaoir preoence at the time and place of_ the occurrence and about whose parti- .ci-paUoa. in the fight no other assuring factors is forthcoming. [323 Gl\n\n(iii) According to PW 20, appellant No. 4 was present at the scene when the abuses were exchanged but that fact is no guarantee of his participation in the occurrence which took place t11bout a couple of hours later. No incongruity results from the exclusion of appellants Nos. 4 to 6 from the fight becai.J.se the other three appellants would have as effectively caused all the injuries found on the two deceased and the two ladies all by themselves a. if they were caused by them with the .. sistance of appellants Nos. 4 to 6. [323H-324Al\n\n(c) The offence under section 148 of the Code falls to the ground with the acquittal of appellant Nos. 4 to 6, and so does that under section 149 thereof.\n\nThe two offences of murder were committed by appellants Nos. 1 to 3 in furtherance of their common intention so that each one of them is liable to conviction on two counts under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian\n\nPenal Code. [324C-D!\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 349 o[ 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27/28-9-1977 of Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 593/76.\n\nS. D; Dashme,\n\nV. N.\n\nGanpu'e, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, C. K Ratnaparkhi and Miss Geeta Sharma for the Appellants.\n\nM. C. Bhandare and M- N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This apppeal by special leave is directed against E a judgment dated 27th/28th of September, 1977, of the High Court of Maharashtra npholding the conviction of the six appellants recorded by the learned Session; Judge for two off, nces under section 302 read with section 149 and of one under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, the sentence awarded being imprisonment for life on each of the first two counts and of rigorous imprisonment for one year on the third F with a direction that the sentences shall run concurrently.\n\nThe first appeal in the High Court was originally heard by Vaidya and Sawant, JJ., who differed with each other on the judgment to be rendered, Vaidya, J., holding that the appeal merited dismissal and Sawant, J., being of the opinion that it deserved acceptance in full.\n\nThe case was therefore laid under section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before Apte, J., who concurred with Vaidya, J., so that the appeal stood dismissed by the impugned order.\n\n2. Certain facts are not in dispute and m.ay be stated at the outset The occurrence took plac, on the !Ith of Novomber, 1974, in village H Kole to which all the ap\"dlants except Kha<haba (appellant No. 5) belong, Appellants Nos. I to 4 and 6 live join.tly in a house which abuts on a road 14 feet wide. Opposite that house lies the one belong- ·\n\n' _-\\--.\n\nBH!MRAO ANNA v. MAHARASHTRA (Koshal, I.) 313 . ·: ';'!. • .. ·;,\n\ning to the two unfortuqate persons who lost their lives as a result of A the occurrence which is said to have taken place in consequence of inimical relations between the accused and the opposite party. The waste water emanating from the house of appellant No. I had been flowing towards the other side of the road and seeping into the western wall of the house of the deceased. This was one of the factors leading to animosity between the parties, another being that the family B of the deceased had earlier sold to a third person some land which they wanted to re-purchase but were thwarted in their design by the accused who were instigating the vendee not to re-sell the land to the deceased.\n\n3. The deceased were related to five of the eye witnesses as would C appear from the following pedigree-table ; Anandrao\n\nAbasaheb (eye\n\nwitness (PW-19)\n\nShripati D\n\nNivas Balasa.heh (deceased) (deceased) =Lakshmi =Droupadi (eye witness (eye witnegs\n\nPW-10)\n\nPW-II)\n\nBhimrao (eye witness\n\nPW-12)\n\nUttam (eye witnes&\n\nPW-13)\n\nJayakar (eye witness not produced)\n\nThe relationship inter se between accused-appellants Nos. J to 4 and 6 is shown in the table below along with the weapons of offence said to have been wielded by each of them and an absconding accused during the occurrence :\n\nAnna (appellant No. 2stick)\n\nBbimrao (appellant No. I-axe)\n\nBanda alis Man1ti (appellant No. 3-stick) Ki.,;,, (appellant\n\nNo.4-axe)\n\nDhondiram (appellant No. 6-stick)\n\n21~189 SCI/80\n\nSham'rao (absconding accused-stick)\n\n-·· ' 314\n\nSUPREME COURT J.IPCJRTS\n\n[1980] 3 S; C.R.\n\nA Khashaba accused No. 5 is sai<; I to be a. friend_ of the family of the --t\n\noth-er accused and. belongs to anOther village. He was said to be armed with a stick at the time of the occurrence. ~\n\n4. The proseeutiOn case niay be stated-thus. On the fateful day Nivas deceased left his house at about JO A.M. for Karad where he wanted to have himself medically checked up. He returned home at about midday and told his wife that he had been driven back by Anna appellant No. 2. By then Balasaheb deceased also came to hls house from the sugar factory where he was working. It was at this juncture that the two brothers heard abuses being hurled at them by all the accused and after emerging from their house picked up two small sticks and went towards the accused. A scuflle was imminent between the two contending parties when Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 who hails from another village lying about a mile away and who was then returning home from his field intervened, separated them, disarmed the two deceased and threw away the sticks which he snatched from them before continuing his journey.\n\nAt about 2 P.M. all the accused entered the house of the deceased, armed as aforesaid, dragged them out of it on to the road and started beating them with their respective weapons. Lakshmi PW-10 and Droupadi PW-11 intervened and received injuries at the hands of the accused. In the mean-time Bhimrao PW-13, Uttam PW-14 and their brother Jayakar who had been working in their field and were informed by a boy about the assault on the deceased, came running to the place of occurrence but they too were beaten up by the accused who then made good their escape.\n\nJayakar brought a motor vehicle from lslampur and took his four _ injured brothers as well as the two ladies to the Civil Hospital there. ---,- In the meantime Bhimrao appellant No. 1 reached police station Islampur whete he complained to Police Sub-Inspector Pandurang that he (appellant No. I) and his family members had been attacked by the party of the deceased. On learning that the opposite party had arrived at the local Civil Hospital, the Police Sub-Inspector reached the Hospital at about 8 P.M. and recorded the statement (exhibit-55) of Bhimrao PW-12 which forms the basis of the formal first information report registered at the police station.\n\nUnder the advice of the Medical Officer, Islampur, the injured left the same evening for the Civil Hospital at Sang!i on the way to which Nivas and Balasabeb expired.\n\nOn return to the police station Pandurang PW-24 arrested Bhimrao appellant No. !.\n\n1 l\n\nBHIMRAO ANNA V, MAHARASHTRA (Koshal, /,) 315\n\nLakshmi PW-10 was exanlined on the date of the orourrence itself by Dr. Bhaskar PW-17 and was found. to haye in the web connecting the right thumb and the index finger a muscle-deep incised wound having the dimensions l\"x !\"· Droupadi PW-11 was examined by another doctor on the same day but she was1not produced at the trial for the reason that she had in the mean-time been transferred to Nagpur. She was examined again on the 18th of November, 1974, by Dr. Shridhar PW-14 who found that on the mid-outer aspect of her left thigh was located a blue-black discolouration having a probable duration of eight days.j\n\nBhimrao PW-12 was examined by Dr. Kantilal Shah PW-16 on the 11th of November, 1974, at the Civil Hospital, Sangli, and was found to have suffered six injuries consisting of a scalp-deep incised wound located on the central parietal area and having the dimensions 3\" x !\", two contused lacerated wounds located over the .ame area, two contusions and an [abrasion. The same doctor examined Uttam\n\nPW-13 on the same day when the latter was found to have on his person five injuries consisting of two contused lacerated wounds located in the head and three contusions on other parts of the body. - Appellants Nos. I to 3 were examined by Dr. Sh, ridhar PW-14 -on the !Ith of November, 1974 atthe Civil Hospital, Islampur. Bhim - rao appellant No. I had on his person three injuries consisting of a contusion on the right forearm having the dimensions 8 cm. x 5 cm., a weal mark on the right shoulder iblade and an abrasion. Anna appellant No. 2 was found to have suffered eleven injuries consisting of six lacerated wounds, two contusions, two weal marks , and one abrasion, only one of them, i.e., a lacerated woµnd, being located on a vital part (the head). Maruti appellant No. 3 had an incised and a lacerated wound on the head and another lacerated wound, two weal mar:ts a11d a contusion on other parts of the body. ,\n\nThe injuries so far described and found on various members of the opposing parties were presumably all simple in nature. '\n\nDr. Digambar Joshi PW-15 carried out the post 11Wrtem examination ofthe two dead bodies on the 12th of November, 1974. Nivas deceased was found to have suffered four external injuries two of which were bone-deep contused lacerated wounds located iu the head region.\n\nAccording to the doctor the scalp was all •boggy' and the injuries were 'fresh'. The internal damage to the head, the doctor noted, consisted of an extensive haematoma on the scalp; multiple fractures of the left temporal and parietal bones, fracture of the right frontal blade, fracture of the middle cranial fossa on the right side and extradural haema-\n\n~:-'•'.'\n\n--- ; ~\n\n316 SUPREME COURT REPo:RTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA. toma on the right fronto-parietal region, the left temporal region and the left fronto-parietal region.\n\nIn the opinion of the doctor the deceased must have become unconscious immediately after the receipt of the injuries which were inflicted with force and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature B to cause death.\n\nBalasaheb deceased was found by the same doctor to have suffered four external injuries two of which were located in the head re gion, one being a contused lacerated wound and the other an incised wound. The right temporal region, according to the doctor, WlJS C 'boggy' and the injuries were 'fresh'. The internal damage to the head, the doctor noted, consisted of an extensive haematoma under the scalp, numerous fractures of the right and left frontal bones, right and left parietal bones and the right temporal bone, congestion of.the cortical vc; ssels and bleeding in the brain substance. The right frontoparietal region was found by the doctor to be soft and lacerated. The D brain-matter, according to him, was coming out. He was categorical in stating that the death mnst have been instantaneous and that the injuries were individually sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.\n\n5. 24 witnesses were examined at the trial in support of the prosecution case. They included five eye-witnesses, namely, Lakshmi PW-10, Droupadi PW-11, Bhimrao PW-12, UttamPW-13 and Abasaheb PW-19, all of whom gave substantially the same version of the occurrence as has been set out above. Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 deposed that at about noon on the fateful day he was returning home from his fields which lie only at a distance of about -250 feet from the houses of the parties, when he found appellants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 exchanging abuses with the two deceased who were armed with sticks. According to the witness he disarmed the deceased and threw away the sticks ·-~ on to the roof of their house. The witness claimed to have gone away after advising both the parties to settle their disputes amicably. He then testified to having met Bhimrao PW-12, Uttam PW-13 and.their . brother Jayakar when he returned to his field the same day. He further stated that they were running but were not armed. The rest of his testimony-in-chief may be .summarised thus :\n\n\"I again heard shouts from the houses of the parties.\n\nI again came back to the road in between their houses and saw that Nivas, Balasaheb, Uttam and Bhimrao had injuries and they were lying on the road. All these injured were . unconscious and their clothes were stained with blood.\n\nf! i .\n\nBHIMRAO ANNA v. MAHARASHTRA (Koshal, J.) . 317\n\nLakshmi and Droupadi were by their side. The accused were not present at that time. This was at about 2 30 P.M. or 3 P.M.\".\n\nJ When asked in cross-examination as to what was the exact place where he met the brothers of Nivas, he replied : t \"I immediately started to my field and I met them • at a distance of about 50 or 100 feet. I again heard the noise after a very short time after reaching the field.\"\n\nThe witness was questioned about what he saw on reaching tb, e'place -Of occurrence for the second time and what transpired later. He stated : 6\n\n\"Uttam and Bhimrao were lying on'the road near the door of the house of the accused. Nivas was lying .in the middle of the road opposite to the door of the accused.\n\nThere were blood stains on the road at the place. Jayakar was present at the scene of offence and I told him to inform D the police at Islampur. Afterwards l went to the house of the accused. I found that there were injuries on accused No. 2 Anna and accused No. 3 Banda. Accused No. 2 Anna was lying unconscious. Banda told me that Nivas and all his brothers came to their house and assaulted them.\"\n\nThe last question put to him in cross-examination was whether it was true that Bhimrao PW-12, Uttam PW-13 and their brother Jayakar were armed with sticks and axes. He replied; that they had something (in their hands) but that he could\"not say if they had sticks and axes.\n\n6. The defence case may. be summed up as follows. Feelings of animosity existed between the two opposing families for two or three\n\nyoers prior to the date of the occurrence as alleged y the prosecution. On that date there was an exchange of abuses between appellants Nos. 1 to 3 on the one hand and the deceased on the other when the latter were about to assault the former but could not do so on account of the intervention of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20. Soon afterwards the two deceased and their three brothers assaultedappellants Nos. I to 3 with sticks and axes at the latter's house when some of the assailants were disarmed and beaten back. Appellants Nos. 4 to 6 were not present at the scene of occurrence and had been involved in the case merely beoause they were related to the other appellants by ties of blood or friendship.\n\n\\ .\n\n,.. ...\n\n7. The learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion' that the incident In which the two contending parties exchanged abuses and which came\n\nto a close when Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 intervened provided the motive for the assault in which the two deceased lost their lives. Wlu1c examining the ocular testimony he arrived at the findings detailed below;\n\n(a) That part of the prosecution story acc6rding to which the two deceased were dragged out of their house by the seven accused was never put forward during the investigation and was concocted to serve as an improvement over the version given earlier.\n\n(b) The eye-witnesses had given details of the occurrence which were omitted from their statements made to the police but no aignificance could be attached to this aspect of the matter. ·\n\n. (c) Lakshmi PW-10, Droupadi PW-11, Bhimrao PW-12 and Uttam PW-13 were certainly present at the occurrence as is made out\n\n D from the fact that they were found to have injuries on their pereon immediately thereafter. Assurance to the presence of Abasaheb.\n\nPW-19 at the time and place of occurrence is also available in the fact that his house adjoins that of the deceased.\n\n(d) The incident in which abuses were exchanged provided the E motive for the party of the accused to assault their opponents rather than the other way round, because the deceased had really had an upper hand in that incident. It would also be natural, in this view of the matter, for appellants Nos. 1 to 3 to summon help and open a concerted attack. 1he participation of all the accused therefore in the\n\noccurrence was natural and probable.\n\n(e) The occurrence took place orl the road lying in between the~-- ' respective houses f the parties. I\n\n(f) 'the circumstances that two persons from the side of the eyewitnesses lost their lives and that four other eye-witnesses belongiiig to the same family received injuries are sufficient to suggest that it W86 the party of the appellants who were the aggressors even though appellants Nos. 1 to 3 were also injured during the occurrence; and the fut that all the eye-witnesses were unreliable in relation to the dragging part of the prosecution story is immaterial, their testimony being otherwise credible. In this connection it has to be borne in mind that the party of the accused were able to inflict seriOus injuries on their opp&- nents and themselves escai>ed with comparatively a minor beating.\n\nThere was thus no right of private defence available to the accused.\n\n,...,, .\n\n.....\n\nt-· . ' \"'\\_ '•i\n\n_:-,·\n\nl BHIMRAO ANNA v. MAHARASHT.RA (Koshal, /,) 319\n\n(g) Bhimrao PW-12 and Uttam PW-13 reached the place of occurrence after the fight between the party of the accused on the ono hand and the two deceased on the other was already over and that in respect of the injuries caused to Lakshmi PW-10, Droupadi PW-11, Bhimrao PW-12 and Uttam PW-13 the party of the appellants had a right of private defence. It was in these premises that the learned Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced the six appellants as aforesaid and acquitted them of the minor charges which had been framed against them in relation to the injuries caused by them to the four eye-witnesses just above named.\n\n8. In the High Court all the three judges who considered the appeal fully reappraised the evidence and while Vaidya and Apte, JJ., arrived at more or less the same conclusions as the learned Sessions Judge, Sa want, J., recorded diametrically opposed findings although he found Bhimrao Kadam PW,20 to be a wholly independent and therefore a reliable witness. Those findings were :\n\n(i) There is no reliable evidence whatsoever to support the prosecution case that the accused were the aggressors.\n\nOn the other hand, the following five circumstances point to the contrary : ·\n\n(a) The concoction of that part of the' prosecution story according to which the deceased were dragged out of their house by the appellants.\n\n(b) During the incident in which abuses were ex\n\nchanged, appellants Nos .. 2 and 3 were merely sitting on the door steps of their house while the two deceased had gone there armed with sticks in an attempt to assault their adversaries.\n\n(c) \"Immediately after\" that incident came to ia\n\nclose on the intervention of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20, the deceased were reinforced by their three brothers and the occurrence commenced\n\n\"immediately thereafter\".\n\n(d) Bodies of the persons injured on the side of the deceased were found lying nearer the house of the . accused than that of their opponents.\n\n(e) Appellants Nos. l' to 3 also received injuries which were sufficiently serious and numerous.\n\n(ii) Merely because two of the opponents of the appellants died and the number of persons injured on\n\n• !\n\ntheir side was greater than on that of the appellants, it . will not follow that the latter were the aggressors.\n\n9. The case has been argued before us at great lenatJi by learned counsel for the parties and the two main questions requiring determination are :\n\n(A) Has the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the party of the appellants were the aggressors and that it is not made out on the record that the latter may well have acted in xercise of the right of private defence?\n\n(B) If the answer to question (A) is in the affirmative, whether the participation of all the appellants in the occurrence is satisfactorily made out ?\n\n10. On question (A) we have no hesitation in agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge and Vaidya and Apte, JJ., and we shall record our reasons briefly. The occurrence admittedly took place on the road in between the respective houses of the deceased and the appellants which is fully made out from the deposition of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 who is no doubt a wholly independent and reliable witness. When he was attracted to the place of occurrence by a noise which reached him in his field after he had gone there subsequent to his witnessing the three brothers of the deceased running towards their house, he found thatBhimraopW-12, Uttam PW-13 and their other two injured brothers were all lying unconscious on the road where Lakshmi PW-10, Droupadi PW-11 and Jayakar were also present. It is to be noted that the heads of Nivas and Balasaheb had been smashed to pulp so that in all prn- .bability neiter of the~. co.uld hve moved a step befor~ falling do~ j/\n\nafter the receipt of the mJuries which were detected on their dead bodies by Dr. Digambar Joshi PW-15. We have to take it for granted therefore that they were hit where they fell. The circumstance that their other two injured brothers were also found lying on the road lends\n\n\"\"t •·\n\n~. \"i\" .¥\n\nh 1\n\n;;-\n\nfurther strength to our conclusion that the occur.rence took place on ,... . '. the road itself and not at the house of the appellants. It may also be safely assumed, apart from the fact that all the witnesses say so, that Bhimrao PW-12, Uttam PW-13 and Jayakar were not with the deceased at the inception of the fight and were, on the other hand, working in their fields. This follows from the testimony of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 which bears repetition on the point. He stated that while he was returning from his house to the fields at 2 30 or 3P.M. he found. the three brothers of the deceased 'running' which obviously mean\n\n,-\"'> •.\n\nBHIMRAQ ANNA v: MAHARASHTRA (Koshal, 1.) 321\n\nrunning towards their house. It is the case of Bhimrao PW-12 and ' Uttam PW -13 that they were informed in their field by a boy named Mehar that their brothers were being attacked by the party of the appellants and that it was on that account that they ran towards their house. This assertion fully fits in with the narration of events by Bhim rao Kadam PW-20. Another very decisive circumstance is the nature of the injuries receiv.ed by the two contending parties. If the party of the deceased were the aggressors and had made a concerted attack on the appellants who were taken unawares there is no reason why the former should have come out second best in the combat. The fact that practicaUy all the injuries received by the deceased were located in the head region and were inflicted with great force makes it highly probable that it was they who were taken unawares and had to bear the brunt of the attack which they had perhaps no means to repulse. The fact that tlieir womenfolk were also injurea during the occurrence makes it probable that the ladies had to intervene because the fight was unequal and their respective husbands found in difficult to cope with it. Another inference which may well be drawn from the consequences of the combat is that Bhimrao PW-12, Uttam PW-13 and their brother Jayakar probably reached theplace of occurrence while their brothers were being belaboured and that it was at th.at stage that the three newcomers entered the arena and took up cudgels on behalf of their hapless family members. That is the only reasonable way, it appears to us, in which all the injuries suffered by the combatants on the two sides can be explain!l(l.\n\n11. It is true, as pointed out by Sawant, J., as well as the learned Sessions Judge, that the eye witnesses have improvd their case at the trial over the story which they put forward at the investigating stage and therefore prove their unreliability in material particulars; but then they are rorroborated in certain other material aspects of their testimony by unimpeachable evidence in the form of the injuries suffered by the two sides, the place where they were inflicted and the consequences which flowed from them, and, in those aspects we cannot but believe them.\n\nIt is not unoften that improvements in an earlier version are made at the trial in order to give a boost to the prosecution case, albeit foolishly. But that does not mean that falsity of testimony in one material particular would ruin it from beginning to end. On the other hand the circumstances will be a good reason merely for the court to be put on guard and sift the evidence with extraordinary caution and to accept those portions of it which appear fully trustworthy either intrinsically or by reason of corroboration from other trustworthy sources. And that is how we have accepted the eye-witness account in part as stated above.\n\n' F\n\n322 SUPREME COURT REPo:RTS\n\nU980] 3 S~C.R.\n\n12. We may here frankly state that the reasons given by Sawant, J., in holding that the party of the deceased were the aggressors do not commend themselves to us. The fact' that improvements were made hy the eye-witnesses on the earlier story and the dragging incident was in.troduced at the trial stage has already been noticed by us but, without more, it cannot be taken to mean that it was the party of deceased who set the ball rolling. The incident in which abuses were exchanged between the two contending parties again does not lead to the inference that it was the party of the deceased who were guilty of aggression.\n\nThat incident no doubt provided the motive for the occurrence but such motive was attributable to both parties and perhaps more so to .that of the appellants who must have felt humiliated by the show of force indulged in by the deceased. It further appears to us that Sa want, J., misread the testimony of Bhimra0 Kadam PW-20 when he remarkyd that the fight took place \"immediately after\" the exchange-of-abusesincident which had come to a close at the intervention of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20. It is no doubt true that that witness did state in answer to a question in cross-examination :\n\n\"I immeqiately started towards my field and I met them at a distance of about 50 or 100 feet. I again heard the noise after a very short time after reaching the_ field.\"\n\n-- - The words \"I 'immediately started ctowards my field\" have no connection whatsoever with the incident in which abuses were exchanged. Jn this connection we may refer to that portion of the evidence of the witness in which he categorically stated that that incident had taken place about midday when he was returning home from his Aield, that he left after the incident and that he met Uttam, Bhimrao and Jayakar \"while I was again going back-to my field.\" The inference is clear that after the incident in which abuses were exchanged, the witness had gone home to his village which lies at a distance of about a mile from the place of occurrence and that he was again returning t0 his field when he met the three brothers of the deceased which was, according to the witness, 'at about 2 30 or 3 P.M.'.\n\nThis misinterpretation ot the evidence of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 by Sawant, J., appears to us to have influenced the learned Judge in not a little measure in coming to the conclusion which he ultimately arrived at. But then he was also not right, in our opinion, in inferring aggression on the part of the party of the deceased from the cir- !' cuinstance that \"the bodies of the inj'!red were found nearer the house -ef the accused than the house of the deceased\". It is true that Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 did assert : - -\n\nl!HIMRAO ANNA v. MAHARASHTRA (Kos?uil, !.) 323\n\n\"Uttam and Bhimrao were lying on the road near the A house of the accused. Nivas was lying in the middle of the road opposite to the door of the accused.\"\n\nBut from this no inference such as has been drawn by the learned Judge is reasonably possible. Admittedly the road has a width of only 14 feet and if two opposing parties, consisting in all of six to ten persons, engage themselves in violence against each other, the exact place where the members of each would be injured may not mean anything, especially if one of the parties is taken unawares and is unarmed. In any case the fact that the road was a narrow one makes\n\n- _,..___ the circumstance relied upon by the learned Judge wholly innocuous.\n\nThe only other circumstance which he pressed into service in support of his conclusion that the accused appeared to have acted in exercise of the right of private defence was that they too \"received iajuries which were sufficiently serious and numerous\" which does not appear to be an accurate statement of facts. The injuries referred to by him were no doubt as numerous as those suffered by the other party; but then they cannot be classified as 'sufficiently serious'.\n\nExcept for one. none of them was located on a vital part and all of them without exception were simple in nature, the injuries on the two deceased persons being in contrast practically all deadly.\n\n13. Thus, the consideration of the ocular evidence coupled with\n\nthe testimony of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 and the circumstantial evi- E deuce, especially the medical part of it, lead us to an alliwer in the affirmative to question (A) posed above.\n\n14. On the question of the participation of the appellants in the occurrence we have again to proceed with extraordinary caution in \\ _view of the fact that Jhe eye-witnesses are not only highly interested in r exaggerating the number of the opposite party during the attack but have also n shown to have scant regard for truth when their selfish interests so demand. In this view of the matter we consider it safe to hold that appellants Nos. 1 to 3 are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have taken part in the fight.· They are not merely named in that • behalf by the eye-witnesses but admit their participation in the occur- .- rence which is ftlrther assured by reason of the fact that all three of them were found injured immediately thereafter. The same is not true of\n\nthe other three who have denid their presence at the time and place of the occurrence and about whose participation in the fight no other\n\nassuring factor is forthcoming. It is true that according to Bhimrao Kadam PW-20, appellant No. 4 was present at the scene when the abuses were exchanged but that fact is no guarantee of his participation in the occurrence which took place about a couple of hours later •\n\nAnd no incongruity results from the exclusion of appellants Nos. 4 to 6 J from the fight because the other three appellants would have as effec- tively caued all the injuries found on the two deceased and the two ladies all by themselves as if they were cauSed by them with the assis- tance of appellants Nos. 4 to 6. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that appellants Nos. 4 to 6 are entitled to the benefit of doubt in the matter of their participation in the occurrence. We therefore accept the appeal in so far as they are concerned, set aside the conviction recorded against and the sentences imposed upon them by the courts below and acquit them of the charge in its entirety.\n\n15. The appellants were convicted by the learned Sessions Judge -+ of an offence under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code and of two offences of murder under section 302 read with section 149 of the Code.\n\nThe first ol):'ence, namely, that under section 148 of the Code, falls to the ground with the acquittal of appellants Nos. 4 to 6, and so does that under section 149 thereof. It is however quite clear from the findjhgs arrived at by us, especiaUy those relating \\o the nature of the injuries suffered by the two deceased and the consequences resulting from them that the two offences of murder were committed by appellants Nos. 1 to 3 in furtherance of their common intention so that each /one of them is liable to conviction on two counts under section 302\n\nread with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. We hold accordingly '~ and sentence each of those three appellants to imprisonment for life on each count with a direction that the two sentences of life imprisonment shall run concurrently.\n\nAccordingly, the appeal fails in so far as they are concerned except in relation to the modification in the conviction and 'sentences as directed above. ·\n\nN.V.K;", "total_entities": 93, "entities": [{"text": "BHIMRAO ANNA INGAWALE AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHIMRAO ANNA INGAWALE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 2, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' \"\n\nBHIMRAO ANNA INGAWALE AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nApril 2, 1980\n\n(R. S. PATIIAK AND A. D. KOSHA!."}}, {"text": "Ss. 302, 149 & 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 531, "end_char": 542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 557, "end_char": 568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 576, "end_char": 593, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jayakar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime PW 13, PW 14 and their brother Jayakar who came to the place of occurrence were beaten by the appellants who thtnafter mllde gOOd their escape."}}, {"text": "lllIIMRAO ANNA V. MAHARASHTRA", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6409, "end_char": 6438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstance\n\nthat their other two injured brothers were also found lyiii.g on the road lends further strength to the conclusion that the occurrence took place on the road\n\nlllIIMRAO ANNA V. MAHARASHTRA 311\n\nitself and not at the house of the appellants."}}, {"text": "s 12, 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6596, "end_char": 6604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jayakar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7617, "end_char": 7624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "321 Bl\n\n(iv) The fact that the women-folk of the deceased were elso injured during the oceumncc makes it probable that the ladies had to intervene because the fight WM unequal and their respective husbands found it difficult to cope with C\n\ni~ [321 GJ\n\n( v) Another inference which may well be drawn from the consequences of tbe combat is that PWs 12 and 13 and their brother Jayakar probably reached the place of occurrence while their brothers were being belaboured and that it wu a-t this stage that the three new--comerB entered the arena and took up cudgels on behalf of their hapless family members. ["}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10255, "end_char": 10266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10367, "end_char": 10378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10567, "end_char": 10578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10589, "end_char": 10599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10615, "end_char": 10625, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. D; Dashme", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10829, "end_char": 10841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D; Dashme,\n\nV. N.\n\nGanpu'e, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, C. K Ratnaparkhi and Miss Geeta Sharma for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "V. N.\n\nGanpu'e", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10844, "end_char": 10858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D; Dashme,\n\nV. N.\n\nGanpu'e, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, C. K Ratnaparkhi and Miss Geeta Sharma for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "V. D. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10865, "end_char": 10877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D; Dashme,\n\nV. N.\n\nGanpu'e, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, C. K Ratnaparkhi and Miss Geeta Sharma for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "C. K Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10879, "end_char": 10895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D; Dashme,\n\nV. N.\n\nGanpu'e, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, C. K Ratnaparkhi and Miss Geeta Sharma for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Geeta Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10905, "end_char": 10917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D; Dashme,\n\nV. N.\n\nGanpu'e, Mrs. V. D. Khanna, C. K Ratnaparkhi and Miss Geeta Sharma for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10939, "end_char": 10953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare and M- N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M- N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10958, "end_char": 10970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare and M- N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11036, "end_char": 11042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This apppeal by special leave is directed against E a judgment dated 27th/28th of September, 1977, of the High Court of Maharashtra npholding the conviction of the six appellants recorded by the learned Session; Judge for two off, nces under section 302 read with section 149 and of one under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, the sentence awarded being imprisonment for life on each of the first two counts and of rigorous imprisonment for one year on the third F with a direction that the sentences shall run concurrently."}}, {"text": "High Court of Maharashtra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKosHAL, J. This apppeal by special leave is directed against E a judgment dated 27th/28th of September, 1977, of the High Court of Maharashtra npholding the conviction of the six appellants recorded by the learned Session; Judge for two off, nces under section 302 read with section 149 and of one under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, the sentence awarded being imprisonment for life on each of the first two counts and of rigorous imprisonment for one year on the third F with a direction that the sentences shall run concurrently."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11289, "end_char": 11300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11311, "end_char": 11322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11340, "end_char": 11351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11359, "end_char": 11376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vaidya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11636, "end_char": 11642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appeal in the High Court was originally heard by Vaidya and Sawant, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Sawant", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11647, "end_char": 11653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appeal in the High Court was originally heard by Vaidya and Sawant, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "Sa want"}}, {"text": "section 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11884, "end_char": 11895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11903, "end_char": 11929, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Apte", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11937, "end_char": 11941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was therefore laid under section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before Apte, J., who concurred with Vaidya, J., so that the appeal stood dismissed by the impugned order."}}, {"text": "H Kole", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12174, "end_char": 12180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ith of Novomber, 1974, in village H Kole to which all the ap\"dlants except Kha<haba (appellant No."}}, {"text": "Kha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12215, "end_char": 12218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ith of Novomber, 1974, in village H Kole to which all the ap\"dlants except Kha<haba (appellant No."}}, {"text": "haba", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12219, "end_char": 12223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ith of Novomber, 1974, in village H Kole to which all the ap\"dlants except Kha<haba (appellant No."}}, {"text": "Anandrao\n\nAbasaheb", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13270, "end_char": 13288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased were related to five of the eye witnesses as would C appear from the following pedigree-table ; Anandrao\n\nAbasaheb (eye\n\nwitness (PW-19)\n\nShripati D\n\nNivas Balasa.heh (deceased) (deceased) =Lakshmi =Droupadi (eye witness (eye witnegs\n\nPW-10)\n\nPW-II)\n\nBhimrao (eye witness\n\nPW-12)\n\nUttam (eye witnes&\n\nPW-13)\n\nJayakar (eye witness not produced)\n\nThe relationship inter se between accused-appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "Shripati D\n\nNivas Balasa.heh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13312, "end_char": 13340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased were related to five of the eye witnesses as would C appear from the following pedigree-table ; Anandrao\n\nAbasaheb (eye\n\nwitness (PW-19)\n\nShripati D\n\nNivas Balasa.heh (deceased) (deceased) =Lakshmi =Droupadi (eye witness (eye witnegs\n\nPW-10)\n\nPW-II)\n\nBhimrao (eye witness\n\nPW-12)\n\nUttam (eye witnes&\n\nPW-13)\n\nJayakar (eye witness not produced)\n\nThe relationship inter se between accused-appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "Droupadi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13373, "end_char": 13381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased were related to five of the eye witnesses as would C appear from the following pedigree-table ; Anandrao\n\nAbasaheb (eye\n\nwitness (PW-19)\n\nShripati D\n\nNivas Balasa.heh (deceased) (deceased) =Lakshmi =Droupadi (eye witness (eye witnegs\n\nPW-10)\n\nPW-II)\n\nBhimrao (eye witness\n\nPW-12)\n\nUttam (eye witnes&\n\nPW-13)\n\nJayakar (eye witness not produced)\n\nThe relationship inter se between accused-appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "Bhimrao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13425, "end_char": 13432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased were related to five of the eye witnesses as would C appear from the following pedigree-table ; Anandrao\n\nAbasaheb (eye\n\nwitness (PW-19)\n\nShripati D\n\nNivas Balasa.heh (deceased) (deceased) =Lakshmi =Droupadi (eye witness (eye witnegs\n\nPW-10)\n\nPW-II)\n\nBhimrao (eye witness\n\nPW-12)\n\nUttam (eye witnes&\n\nPW-13)\n\nJayakar (eye witness not produced)\n\nThe relationship inter se between accused-appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "Uttam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13455, "end_char": 13460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased were related to five of the eye witnesses as would C appear from the following pedigree-table ; Anandrao\n\nAbasaheb (eye\n\nwitness (PW-19)\n\nShripati D\n\nNivas Balasa.heh (deceased) (deceased) =Lakshmi =Droupadi (eye witness (eye witnegs\n\nPW-10)\n\nPW-II)\n\nBhimrao (eye witness\n\nPW-12)\n\nUttam (eye witnes&\n\nPW-13)\n\nJayakar (eye witness not produced)\n\nThe relationship inter se between accused-appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "Anna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13745, "end_char": 13749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J to 4 and 6 is shown in the table below along with the weapons of offence said to have been wielded by each of them and an absconding accused during the occurrence :\n\nAnna (appellant No.", "canonical_name": "Anna"}}, {"text": "Bbimrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13774, "end_char": 13781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2stick)\n\nBbimrao (appellant No.", "canonical_name": "BHIMRAO ANNA V"}}, {"text": "Banda alis Man1ti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13805, "end_char": 13822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I-axe)\n\nBanda alis Man1ti (appellant No."}}, {"text": "Dhondiram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13878, "end_char": 13887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant\n\nNo.4-axe)\n\nDhondiram (appellant No."}}, {"text": "Sham'rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13928, "end_char": 13936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6-stick)\n\n21~189 SCI/80\n\nSham'rao (absconding accused-stick)\n·· ' 314\n\nSUPREME COURT J.IPCJRTS\n\n[1980] 3 S; C.R.\n\nA Khashaba accused No."}}, {"text": "Nivas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14281, "end_char": 14286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the fateful day Nivas deceased left his house at about JO A.M. for Karad where he wanted to have himself medically checked up."}}, {"text": "Karad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the fateful day Nivas deceased left his house at about JO A.M. for Karad where he wanted to have himself medically checked up."}}, {"text": "Balasaheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14505, "end_char": 14514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By then Balasaheb deceased also came to hls house from the sugar factory where he was working.", "canonical_name": "Balasaheb"}}, {"text": "Bhimrao Kadam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14847, "end_char": 14860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A scuflle was imminent between the two contending parties when Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 who hails from another village lying about a mile away and who was then returning home from his field intervened, separated them, disarmed the two deceased and threw away the sticks which he snatched from them before continuing his journey."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15290, "end_char": 15297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi PW-10 and Droupadi PW-11 intervened and received injuries at the hands of the accused."}}, {"text": "lslampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15707, "end_char": 15715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayakar brought a motor vehicle from lslampur and took his four _ injured brothers as well as the two ladies to the Civil Hospital there. ---,-"}}, {"text": "Bhimrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15830, "end_char": 15837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime Bhimrao appellant No.", "canonical_name": "BHIMRAO ANNA V"}}, {"text": "Islampur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16370, "end_char": 16378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the advice of the Medical Officer, Islampur, the injured left the same evening for the Civil Hospital at Sang!i on the way to which Nivas and Balasabeb expired."}}, {"text": "Sang!i", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16440, "end_char": 16446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the advice of the Medical Officer, Islampur, the injured left the same evening for the Civil Hospital at Sang!i on the way to which Nivas and Balasabeb expired."}}, {"text": "Balasabeb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16477, "end_char": 16486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the advice of the Medical Officer, Islampur, the injured left the same evening for the Civil Hospital at Sang!i on the way to which Nivas and Balasabeb expired.", "canonical_name": "Balasaheb"}}, {"text": "Pandurang", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16529, "end_char": 16538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On return to the police station Pandurang PW-24 arrested Bhimrao appellant No. !."}}, {"text": "BHIMRAO ANNA V", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16585, "end_char": 16599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 l\n\nBHIMRAO ANNA V, MAHARASHTRA (Koshal, /,) 315\n\nLakshmi PW-10 was exanlined on the date of the orourrence itself by Dr. Bhaskar PW-17 and was found.", "canonical_name": "BHIMRAO ANNA V"}}, {"text": "Bhaskar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16703, "end_char": 16710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 l\n\nBHIMRAO ANNA V, MAHARASHTRA (Koshal, /,) 315\n\nLakshmi PW-10 was exanlined on the date of the orourrence itself by Dr. Bhaskar PW-17 and was found."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17022, "end_char": 17028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Droupadi PW-11 was examined by another doctor on the same day but she was1not produced at the trial for the reason that she had in the mean-time been transferred to Nagpur."}}, {"text": "18th of November, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17060, "end_char": 17082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was examined again on the 18th of November, 1974, by Dr. Shridhar PW-14 who found that on the mid-outer aspect of her left thigh was located a blue-black discolouration having a probable duration of eight days.j\n\nBhimrao PW-12 was examined by Dr. Kantilal Shah PW-16 on the 11th of November, 1974, at the Civil Hospital, Sangli, and was found to have suffered six injuries consisting of a scalp-deep incised wound located on the central parietal area and having the dimensions 3\" x !\","}}, {"text": "Shridhar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17091, "end_char": 17099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was examined again on the 18th of November, 1974, by Dr. Shridhar PW-14 who found that on the mid-outer aspect of her left thigh was located a blue-black discolouration having a probable duration of eight days.j\n\nBhimrao PW-12 was examined by Dr. Kantilal Shah PW-16 on the 11th of November, 1974, at the Civil Hospital, Sangli, and was found to have suffered six injuries consisting of a scalp-deep incised wound located on the central parietal area and having the dimensions 3\" x !\","}}, {"text": "Kantilal Shah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17281, "end_char": 17294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was examined again on the 18th of November, 1974, by Dr. Shridhar PW-14 who found that on the mid-outer aspect of her left thigh was located a blue-black discolouration having a probable duration of eight days.j\n\nBhimrao PW-12 was examined by Dr. Kantilal Shah PW-16 on the 11th of November, 1974, at the Civil Hospital, Sangli, and was found to have suffered six injuries consisting of a scalp-deep incised wound located on the central parietal area and having the dimensions 3\" x !\","}}, {"text": "11th of November, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17308, "end_char": 17330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was examined again on the 18th of November, 1974, by Dr. Shridhar PW-14 who found that on the mid-outer aspect of her left thigh was located a blue-black discolouration having a probable duration of eight days.j\n\nBhimrao PW-12 was examined by Dr. Kantilal Shah PW-16 on the 11th of November, 1974, at the Civil Hospital, Sangli, and was found to have suffered six injuries consisting of a scalp-deep incised wound located on the central parietal area and having the dimensions 3\" x !\","}}, {"text": "Civil Hospital, Sangli", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17339, "end_char": 17361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was examined again on the 18th of November, 1974, by Dr. Shridhar PW-14 who found that on the mid-outer aspect of her left thigh was located a blue-black discolouration having a probable duration of eight days.j\n\nBhimrao PW-12 was examined by Dr. Kantilal Shah PW-16 on the 11th of November, 1974, at the Civil Hospital, Sangli, and was found to have suffered six injuries consisting of a scalp-deep incised wound located on the central parietal area and having the dimensions 3\" x !\","}}, {"text": "Sh, ridhar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17886, "end_char": 17896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to 3 were examined by Dr. Sh, ridhar PW-14 -on the !"}}, {"text": "Civil Hospital, Islampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17940, "end_char": 17964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ith of November, 1974 atthe Civil Hospital, Islampur."}}, {"text": "Digambar Joshi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18697, "end_char": 18711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Digambar Joshi PW-15 carried out the post 11Wrtem examination ofthe two dead bodies on the 12th of November, 1974."}}, {"text": "12th of November, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18788, "end_char": 18810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Digambar Joshi PW-15 carried out the post 11Wrtem examination ofthe two dead bodies on the 12th of November, 1974."}}, {"text": "Abasaheb", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 20798, "end_char": 20806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They included five eye-witnesses, namely, Lakshmi PW-10, Droupadi PW-11, Bhimrao PW-12, UttamPW-13 and Abasaheb PW-19, all of whom gave substantially the same version of the occurrence as has been set out above."}}, {"text": "Uttam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21810, "end_char": 21815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I again came back to the road in between their houses and saw that Nivas, Balasaheb, Uttam and Bhimrao had injuries and they were lying on the road.", "canonical_name": "Uttam"}}, {"text": "Bhimrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21820, "end_char": 21827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I again came back to the road in between their houses and saw that Nivas, Balasaheb, Uttam and Bhimrao had injuries and they were lying on the road.", "canonical_name": "BHIMRAO ANNA V"}}, {"text": "Lakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22011, "end_char": 22018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "317\n\nLakshmi and Droupadi were by their side."}}, {"text": "Droupadi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22023, "end_char": 22031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "317\n\nLakshmi and Droupadi were by their side."}}, {"text": "Islampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22866, "end_char": 22874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayakar was present at the scene of offence and I told him to inform D the police at Islampur."}}, {"text": "Anna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22973, "end_char": 22977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 Anna and accused No.", "canonical_name": "Anna"}}, {"text": "Banda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22996, "end_char": 23001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 Banda."}}, {"text": "Mehar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31731, "end_char": 31736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the case of Bhimrao PW-12 and ' Uttam PW -13 that they were informed in their field by a boy named Mehar that their brothers were being attacked by the party of the appellants and that it was on that account that they ran towards their house."}}, {"text": "Bhim rao Kadam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31936, "end_char": 31950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This assertion fully fits in with the narration of events by Bhim rao Kadam PW-20."}}, {"text": "Sa want", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35429, "end_char": 35436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further appears to us that Sa want, J., misread the testimony of Bhimra0 Kadam PW-20 when he remarkyd that the fight took place \"immediately after\" the exchange-of-abusesincident which had come to a close at the intervention of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20.", "canonical_name": "Sa want"}}, {"text": "Bhimra0 Kadam", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35467, "end_char": 35480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further appears to us that Sa want, J., misread the testimony of Bhimra0 Kadam PW-20 when he remarkyd that the fight took place \"immediately after\" the exchange-of-abusesincident which had come to a close at the intervention of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20."}}, {"text": "Sawant", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 36790, "end_char": 36796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This misinterpretation ot the evidence of Bhimrao Kadam PW-20 by Sawant, J., appears to us to have influenced the learned Judge in not a little measure in coming to the conclusion which he ultimately arrived at."}}, {"text": "Uttam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37291, "end_char": 37296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "323\n\n\"Uttam and Bhimrao were lying on the road near the A house of the accused.", "canonical_name": "Uttam"}}, {"text": "section 148", 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{"document_id": "1980_3_325_330_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SANTOSH MEHTA . v.\n\nOM PRAKASH AND ANR.\n\nApril 2, 1980 .\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Sections 15(7) scope of-Striking of] defence for non-payment of arreaTs of rent, Court's duty.\n\nDelhi Rent Control Act, 195S~Appeal against order .striking out defence- Correct section applicable is section 38 and not section 2SB,. of tlie Delhi Rl!flt\n\nControl Act.\n\nThe appellant tenant, a working woman .engaged an advocate to appear on her behalf and take proper steps to protect her interests, as she had a difficulty in appearing in Court for every hearing. She paid all the arreats of rent by cheque or in cash to her advocate who failed either to deposit in the Court or to pay to the landlord. Tho Rent Controller refused to look into this and struck off her defence onder section 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The I> appeal was dismissed as noi maintainable in view of section 2SB of the Act.\n\nHence the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court.\n\nHELD : I. Rent Control laws are basically designed to protect tenants because scarcity of accommodation is a nightmare for those who own none and, if evicted, will bo helpless. Even so, the legislature has provided some groonds for eviction, and the Delhi law contains an extreme provision for striking out altogether the defence of the tenant which means that even if he has excellent pleas to negative the landlord's clahn the Court will not hear hhn. Obviously, this is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legisla• tion this drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situations where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. That is why a discretion is vested, not a mandate impos~ in Section IS (7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. !327 C-Dl\n\n2. If a socially informed perspective is adopted while construing the provisions of Section 15(7), then it will be plain that the Controller is armed with a facultative power. He may, or may not strike out the tenant's defence. A judi4 cial discretion has built-in-self-restraint, has the scheme of the statute in mind,. cannot ignoie the conspectus of circumstances which are preSent in the case and has the brooding thought playing on the power, that, in a court, striking out a party's defence is an exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive extreme following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all, there must be failure to pay rent which, in the context, indicates \\\\'ilful failure, deliberate default or volitional non-performance. Second!}', the Section provides no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes no mechanical conseqneru:e but invests a power to overcome intransigence.\n\nThus, if a tenant fails or ..efu.es to pay or deposit rent and the court discerns a mood of defiance or gross neglect, the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. A 'last resori cannot be converted into the first resort a punitive direction of court\n\nA cannot be used as a booby trap to get tho tenant out. Once this telool<>Sical interpretation dawns, the mist of misconception about matter-of-course invocation of the p<>wer to strike out will vanish. Farewell to the realities of a given case is playing truant with the duty underlying the power. [327 F-H, 328 A-BJ\n\n3. The exercise of the power of striking out of the defence under sectiOn 15 (7) is not imperative whenever the tenant fails to deposit or pay any amol!Ut B as required by section 15. The provisions contained in s. 15(7) of the Aet are directory and not mandatory. It cannot be disputed that s.15(7) is a penal provision and given to the C.Ontroller discretionary power in the matter of striking out of the defence, and that in appropriate cases, the Contfoller may refuse, to visit upon the tenant the penalty of non-payment or non-deposit. The effect of Bili!<\n\ning out of the defence under s.15(7) is that the tenant is deprived of !be pro!e<(- tion given by s,14 and, therefore, the powers under s.15(7) of the Act must be\n\nC:: eXercised with due circumspection. Section 15 (7) of the Act is not couched in mandatory language. It uses the word \"may\". The difference in the language of Section 15(7) with that of Section 13(5) of the repealed Act is significant and 'indicates that in !be present Act there is a deliberate modification of law in favour of the tenant. Under Section 15(7) of the Act, it is in the liberal discretion of the Rent Controller, whether or not to strike out the defence. The Court should be aware of the milieu before exercise of this extreme power. [328 B-D, 329 A-BJ D In the instant case, the tenant did all she could by paying to the advocate the sums regularly but the latter betrayed her and perhaps helped himself. To tmst one 9S advocate is not to sin deliberately.\n\nShe was innocent but her advocate was noeent. No party can be punisheq because her advocate behaved unprofessionally. The Rent Cotttroller should have controlled himself by a plain look at the eloquent faets and not let down the helpless woman who in good E faith believed in the basic ethic of a noble profession. She did not fall to pay or deposit and, in any view, no case for punitive exercise of discretion bas been made out. The conclusion necessarily follows that the striking out of the defence was not legal and the nppellant should have been given an opportunity to contest the claim of the landlord for her eviction. A sensiti7.ed jll<licial appreciation was missing and unfortunately, the High Court did not closely look at this facet of the issue. (329 E-H] • V. K. Varma v. Rm/hey Shyam, A.LR. 1964 S.C 1370; referred to.\n\n4. An order striking out the defence is appealable under s.38. SO this order is appealable. The reliance on s. 25B(8) to negative an appeal ;,, inept bccautle\n\nthis is not a.n order under that special section but one under .s. IS. Morover, o.25B(l0) preserves the procedure except to the extent contra-indicated in 1.25B.\n\nNegation of a right of appeal follows from s.25B(8) only if the order for reco- G nry is made 'in accordance with the procednre specified in this Section' (i.e. 25B).\n\nHere the dispossession was not ordered under tho special provision in s.25B but under s.15. Nor can the theory of merger. salvage the order because the legality of the eviction order depends on the lega!iiy of the order under s.15(7). Once that order is found illegal what follows upon that cannot be sustained. [330 A.c:J\n\nOv!L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1445 of 1979 .\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 17th October, 1978 of the Delhi High Court in Revision Petition No. 689 of 1978.\n\n.. ~\n\n·~\n\nSANTOSH MEHTA v. OM PRAKASH AND ANR. (Krishna Iyer, /.) 327\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, P. H. Parekh, Rain Karanjawala and Miu Vineeta Caprihan for the Appellant.\n\nB. D. Shqrma, for the Respondents.\n\nThe following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-A short but interesting point affecting the val\\dity and propriety of an order under s. 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short, the Act), has been raised bycounsel for the appellant. The decision of this question 'is of importance and we regard it as necessary to clarify the position so that the error committed by the trial judge may not be repeated. __._.\n\nRent Control laws are basically designed to protect tenants because scarcity of accommodation is a nightmare for those who own i; ione and if evicted, will be helpless. Even so, the legislature has provided some grounds for eviction, and the Delhi law contains an extreme provision for striking out altogether the defence of the tenant which means that even if he has excellent pleas to negative the landlord's claim the court will not hear him. Obviously, this is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legislation this drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situations where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. That is why a discretion is vested, not a mandate imposed; Section 15(7) reads thus :\n\n\"If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by this section, the Controller inay order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed 1wit!> the hearing of the application.\"\n\n_ We must adopt a socially informed perspective wlii!e construing the provisions and then it will be plain that the Controller is armed \\ with a facultative power.\n\nH'e may, or not strike out the 'y-· tenant's defence. A judicial discretion has built-in-self-restraint, has\n\nthe scheme of the statute in mind, cannot ignore the conspectus of circumstances which are present in the case and has the brooding , thought playing on the power that, in a court, striking out a party's\n\n defence is an exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive extreme following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all, there la. must be a failure to pay rent .which, in the context, indicates wilful ,..-. failure, deliberate default or volitional non-performance. Secondly,\n\nthe Section provides no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes no mechanical consequence but invests a power to overcome intransigence. Thus, if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and the court discerns a mood of defiance or gross neglect,· the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. The last resort\n\n, G.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S; C:it.\n\ncannot be converted into the first resort; a punitive direetion of court cannot be used as a booby trap to get the tenant out. Once this teleological interpretation dawns, the mist of misconception about matterof-course invocation of the power to strike out will vanish. Farewell to the realities of a given rase is playing truant with the duty underlying the power .\n\nThere is no indication whatsoever in the Act to show, that the exercise of the power of striking out of the defence under' s. I 5(7) was imperative whenever the tenant failed to deposit or pay any amount as required by s. 15. The provisions contained in s. 15(7) of the Act are directory and not mandatory. It cannot be disputed that s. 15(7) is a penal provision and gives to the Controller discretionary power in the matter of striking out of the defence, and that in appropriate cases, the Controller may refuse to visit upon the tenant the penalty of nonpayment or non-deposit, The effect of striking out of the defence under s. 15(7) is that the tenant is deprived of the protection given by s. 14 and, therefore, the powers under s. 15(7) of the Act must be exercised with due circumspection.\n\nIt will be noted that s. 15(7) of the Act is not couched in mandatory language. It uses the word 'may'. The difference in the language of s. 15(7) with that of s. 13(5) of the repealed Act is significaqt and indicates that in the present Act there is a deliberate modification ) of law in favour of the tenant. In this connection, it would be pertinent to refer to the observations of the Court in V. K.\n\nVerma v.\n\nRadhey Shyam.(1) In that case, the Court compared s. 13(5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1952 which laid down that on the failure of a 'tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within the prescribed t_ime, \"the\n\ncourt shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck out.\" with s. 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958 which substituts 'may' •·-~ ' ~~ed: ' ~\n\n\"The change of the words from \"The Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck out\" to the words \"the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out\" is clearly deliberate modification in law in favour of the tenant. Under the old Act the Court had no. option but to strike out the defence if the failure to pay or deposit 'the rent is proved; under the new Act the Controller who takes the place of the Court has a discretion in the matter, so that that in proper cases he may refuse to strike out the defence.\"\n\n(I) A.LR. 1964 SC 1370.\n\n1~., ,. •. ~·~~ •\n\n, ,, . \"\"--1''!'' ,•\n\nSANTOBH MEHTA v. OM PRAKASH AND ANR. (Krishna Iyer,!.) 329\n\nThese ob3Crvations leave no doubt that under s. 15(7) of the Act, it is in the liberal discretion of the Rent Controller whether or not to strike out the defence.\n\nWe stress the need for the Court to be aware of the milieu before exercise of this extreme power because the present case is 'illustrative of its erroneous use .\n\nThe facts in this case cry for intervntion, if one may say so. The appellant is a working woman who has to get to office and be there between 9 00 a.m. to 5 00 p.m. Naturally, she has a difficulty in appearing in court for every hearing and so she prudently engaged an advocate to appear on her be)lalf•and take proper steps to protect her interests. It, is common ground that all the arrears of rent had been paid by her by cheque or in cash to her advocate. It also transpires that the amounts received by cheque or in cash by the advocate were not depoited in court or paid to the landlord. It i& further seen that when the tenant found that the amounts were not paid to the landlord by her advocate, she made a complaint to the .Bar Council of Delhi and the matter is pending inquiry. From these circumfilances, we are inclined to conclude-indeed, that is the only reasonable conclusion in the circumstances-that the tenant has not failed •\n\nto pay and, in any case, the exercise of judicial discretion must persuade the court.not to strike out the defence of the tenant but give her fresh opportunity to make deposit of the entire arrears due. In the present case the deposit has eventually been made in this Court when it directed such deposit to be made. ' The tenant did all she could by paying to the advocate the sums regnlarly but the latter . betrayed her and perhaps helped himself . . \\- To trust one's advocate is not to sin deliberately. She was innocent .\n\n- but her advocate was nocent. No party can be punished because her advocate behaved unprofessionally. The Rent Controller should have controlled himself by a plain look at the eloquent facts and not let down the helpless woman who in good faith believed in the basic .ethic of a noble profession. She did not fail to pay or dej, osit and, in any view, no case for punitive exercise of discretion has been made out. The conclusion necessarily follows that the striking out of the .defence was not. legal and the appellant should have been given an opportunity to contest the 'claim of the landlord for her eviction. A sensitized judicial appreciation was missing and, unfortunately, the High Court did not closely look at this facet of the issue. On the -0ther hand, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable in view of s. 2SB.\n\nAn order sfrikitig out the defence is appealable under s. 38. So Tus order is appealable. The reliance on s. 25B(8) to negatiYe an appeal is inept because this is not an order llOder that special aeetion but one under s. 15. Moreover, s. 25B(l0) preserves the proce• dure except to the extent contra-indicated in s. 25B. Negation of the right of appeal follows from s. 25B(8) only if the order for recovery is made 'in accordance with the procedure specified in this section' (i.e. 25B). Here the dispossession was not ordered under the special provision in s. 25B but under s. 15. Nor can the theory of merger salvage the order because the legality of the eviction order depends on the legality of the order under s. 15(7) .. Once that order is found illegal what follows upon that cannot be sustained.\n\nIn thy view we take of the effect of s. 15(7) we allow the appeal in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 and direct the case to go back to the Rent Contro lier. Having regard to the fact that the landlord has not been able to make out his case of bona fide requirement for long because of the pendency of these proceedings, we direct the Rent Controller to dispose of the petition for eviction expeditio11Sly and, as fa as possible, within fuu1 months from today.\n\nAny further arrears, if accrued, will be paid under the direetions , of the Rent Controller on or before a date fixed by him. The otder for eviction passed in this case after striking out the defenc'e mult fail B in view of our holding that the order striking out the defence itself is illegal. Necessarily, the orders of the Rent Controller and of the High Court must be and are hereby set aside. The parties will appear before the Rent Controller on 16th April, 1980. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal a//(lwed. _ I __,,\n\nMG~2S00-17-11-81l-189 SCI/80", "total_entities": 67, "entities": [{"text": "SANTOSH MEHTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SANTOSH MEHTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OM PRAKASH AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 225, "end_char": 247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 347, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "section 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 832, "end_char": 860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "Section 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1890, "end_char": 1903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3492, "end_char": 3502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3612, "end_char": 3619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3913, "end_char": 3920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4020, "end_char": 4027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4087, "end_char": 4097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4209, "end_char": 4222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4236, "end_char": 4249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4397, "end_char": 4410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5719, "end_char": 5723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25B(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5770, "end_char": 5779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.25B(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6028, "end_char": 6036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6239, "end_char": 6243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6379, "end_char": 6386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SANTOSH MEHTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6690, "end_char": 6703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. ~\n\n·~\n\nSANTOSH MEHTA v. OM PRAKASH AND ANR. (", "canonical_name": "SANTOSH MEHTA"}}, {"text": "OM PRAKASH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6707, "end_char": 6717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. ~\n\n·~\n\nSANTOSH MEHTA v. OM PRAKASH AND ANR. (", "canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Shyamala Pappu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6756, "end_char": 6770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, /.) 327\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, P. H. Parekh, Rain Karanjawala and Miu Vineeta Caprihan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, /.) 327\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, P. H. Parekh, Rain Karanjawala and Miu Vineeta Caprihan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Rain Karanjawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6786, "end_char": 6802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, /.) 327\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, P. H. Parekh, Rain Karanjawala and Miu Vineeta Caprihan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Miu Vineeta Caprihan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6807, "end_char": 6827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Iyer, /.) 327\n\nMrs. Shyamala Pappu, P. H. Parekh, Rain Karanjawala and Miu Vineeta Caprihan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B. D. Shqrma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6848, "end_char": 6860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Shqrma, for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6938, "end_char": 6950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-A short but interesting point affecting the val\\dity and propriety of an order under s. 15(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short, the Act), has been raised bycounsel for the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7040, "end_char": 7048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7056, "end_char": 7084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8052, "end_char": 8065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10040, "end_char": 10045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10075, "end_char": 10083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10155, "end_char": 10163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10451, "end_char": 10459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10518, "end_char": 10523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10557, "end_char": 10565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10643, "end_char": 10651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10759, "end_char": 10767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10781, "end_char": 10789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11086, "end_char": 11094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11102, "end_char": 11130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11318, "end_char": 11326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1952", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act,1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11334, "end_char": 11361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12125, "end_char": 12133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958"}}, {"text": ".Bar Council of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13139, "end_char": 13160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It i& further seen that when the tenant found that the amounts were not paid to the landlord by her advocate, she made a complaint to the .Bar Council of Delhi and the matter is pending inquiry."}}, {"text": "s. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14704, "end_char": 14709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14768, "end_char": 14773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25B(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14819, "end_char": 14828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14931, "end_char": 14936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25B(l0)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14948, "end_char": 14958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15026, "end_char": 15032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25B(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15079, "end_char": 15088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15271, "end_char": 15277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15288, "end_char": 15293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15428, "end_char": 15436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15555, "end_char": 15563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15622, "end_char": 15633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "16th April, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16446, "end_char": 16462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties will appear before the Rent Controller on 16th April, 1980."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_32_43_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "VISHESH KUMAR\n\nSHANTI PRASAD\n\nMarch 12, 1980\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nCode of Civil Procedure-S. 115-State amend1nents bifurcated revisional jurisdiction between High Court and District Court-High Court-ff possessea revisional jurisdiction from an order of District Judge disposing of revision C pelitiou.\n\nProvincial Small Cause Courts Act-Section 25-High Court-If possesses jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. against an order of District Judge under section 25 of the Act disposing of a revision petition.\n\nSection 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers on the High Court of & State poWer to remove any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate court in cases where the error cannot be corrected by resort to its appellate jurisdiction.\n\nFrom its inception there was increasing resort to the revisiooal jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115. To alleviate the burden of arrears and reduce the vo1ume of litigation which had reached an insuportable point, s. 115 was amended by successive state amendments, each amendment attempt~ ing to close the gap left by its predecessor. The amendments conferred revisional jurisdiction both on the High Court and the District Court each enjoying mutually exclusive revisional powers.\n\nThe consistent object bhind the succoosive amendments was to divide the work load of revision petitions between the High Court and the District Court and decentralise the jurisdiction.\n\nA proviso was added to s. 115 by the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1973 declaring that \"in respect of cases ...... arising out of original suits of any valuation decided by the District Court the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section.\"\n\nThe Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 superseded the acheme of bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction with effect from I st February 1977.\n\nWith certain modifications the position reverted to what it was under the original s. 115. An exception was made where a revision petition under\n\n1. 115 had been admitted after preliminary hearing before 1st February 1977; it would continue to be governed by s. 115 as it stood before that date.\n\nBut the Code of Civil Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act 1978 substantially restored the status quo ante.\n\nSection 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was amended from time to time in its application to the State of U.P. 'The first amendment substituted the District Judge for the High Court. A further amendment made in 1972 added a proviso which declared that in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes Court the power of revision under s. 25 would vcat in the High Court.\n\n._.L.\n\nVISHESH KUMAR V. SHANTI PRASAD 33\n\nThe two questions that fell' for consideration were : (il whether the High .\\ <:wrt possesses the revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 of the Code of CTvil tl'rocedv.re in respect of an oro'r of the District Court under s. 115 disposin1\n\nof a revision petition and (ii) whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 against an order of District Court under s. 25 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act disposing of a revision petition,\n\nHEID : The High Court is not vested with revisional jurisdiction under 8\n\n1. 115 Code of Civil Procedure over the revisional order made by the District 'Court under that section. [40 HJ\n\n(1) To recognise a revisional power in the High 'Court over the revisional --order passed by the District Court would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction-to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court-would be frustrated.\n\nThe scheme would lose its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court arising out\n\nof a suit of a value less than Rs. 20,000 a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Cwrt and the District Court, for the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation -of below Rs. 20,000 /-· [39 G-H]\n\n(b) What the proviso introduced in s. 115 by the Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1973, stated was that no matter what the valuation of the original suit, !f a case arising out of such suit was decided by the District Court, the case -would be amenable to the revisional power of the High Court. What is covered by the substantive provision are cases arising out of original suits of .a value of Rs. 20,000/- or more. The other category covered by the proviso would include those instances where an original suit, although of a value making it triable by a court subordinate, is transferred to the District Court\n\nfor trial. Orders passed by the District Court in such a suit could constitute :a case decided by it and amenable to the revisional power of the High Court.\n\nThe test incorporated in the proviso is the fact that the case has been decided \"by the District Court. The valuation of the suit is irrelevant. The proviso\n\ncannot be construed to include the case of a revisional order passed by the :Oiltrict Conrt for that would be in direct conflict with the fundlunental structure itself of section 115. A proviso cannot be permitted by construction :lo defoot the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision. [40 C-F]\n\nMjs. Jupiter Fund (P>'t.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal and others A.l.R. '1979 AD. 218 approved.\n\n2. {a) An order passed under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by a District Court is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the .'High Court under s. 115 of the C.P.C. [42 Fl\n\n(b) An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act indicates that it is a self-sufficient code so far as the present enquiry ia c.oo.cemed. The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order made ·<by a Coort of Small Causes should be final subjeot only to correction by the .,...medics provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.\n\nAll the ru.dications contained in the Act point to the conclusion that a case falling\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R •.\n\nwithin the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nBy \\Vay of abundant caution, s. 7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of ss. 96 to 112 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.\n\nSection 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle against resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues to take effect. No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional power under s. 25, before th, e proviso was added, was now entrusted to the District Judge. The legislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts' Act.\n\nTherefore the central principle conti-· nues to bold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in s. 25, that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act represents a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another: statute. [41 E-42A-Dl\n\nBim/a Rani Kohli v. M/s. Bandu Motor Finance Pvt. Ltd. A.I.R. 1972 AIL 342; over-ruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2844of1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n17-8-197~ pf \\he Allahabad Hi~ <;'ourt in Civil Revision No. 1273 \\)f 1976.\n\n-Pramod SwariijJ for the Appeliant N. K. Agarwal for the Respondent (A1nicus C11riae).f\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave and the four associated'. speCial lea'e petitions question the dismissal by the. High Court of Allahabad of five revision petitions filed under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedu1e, en the ground that they are not maintainable.\n\nAlthough the five cases before us must be considered . in the context of their individual facts, it is ' desirable to appreciate the relevant jurisdictional structure of revisional power. njoyed by the High Com t fr cm time to time. In 1970, the prov1S1ons of s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, read :\n\n\"115 Revision : The High Court may call for the record of any cas~ which has been decided by any court subordin.ate to such High Court, and in which no appeal lies thereto, ! and 1f such court\n\nsubordinate appears :\n\n(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law. or\n\n(b) to have exercised a jurisdiction so vested, or\n\n(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally with material irregularity,\n\nthe High Court may make such order in the case as it deems fit.\"\n\nA schematic analysis of the judicial hierarchy within a State indicates that the High Court, as the apex court in the hierarchy, has been entrusted, not only with the supreme appellate power exercised within the State but also, by virtue of s. J15, the power to remove, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate court in those cases where the error cannot be corrected by resort to its appellate jurisdiction. The two salient features cf revisicnal jurisdiction under s. Jl5 are, on the one hand, the closely limited grounds on which the court is permitted to interfere and on the other, the wide expanse of discretion available to the c0urt, when it decides to interfere, in making an appropriate order. The intent is that so serious an error as one of jurisdiction, if committed by a subordinate court, should not remain uncorrected, and should be removed and the record healed of the infirmity by an order shaped to re-instate the proceeding within the proper jurisdictional confines of the subordinate court. It is a power of superintendence, and fittingly it has been conferred in terms enabling the High Court to exercise it, not only when moved by art aggrieved person, but also suo motu. While considering the nature and scope of the revisional jurisdiction, it is necessary however, to advert to prime circumstance that in civil cases the jurisdiction has been entrusted to the highest court of the State, demonstrating that broadly the order under s. 115 is to be regarded, in the absence of anything else, as a final order within the State judiciary.\n\nFrom its inception there was increasing resort to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115. Over the years the volume of litigation reached an insupportable point in the pending docket of the Court. To alleviate the burdrn, a pattern of decentralisation of revisional power was adopted and s. 115 was amended by successive State amendments, each attempting to close the gap left by its predecessor. In its meandering course from stage to stage, this is hows. 115 read :\n\n1. From 7th April, 1970 : By virtue of s. 3, U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, s. 115 was amended and the result was that :\n\n(i) The High Court had exclusive jurisdiction under ff; s. 115 in a case arising out of an original suit of the value of Rs. 20,000 and above; and •\n\n-A\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\n(ii) The High Court and the District Court had jurisdiction under s. 115 concurrently in other cases.\n\n2. From 20th September, 1972:\n\nS. 6, U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 amended s. 115 further with effect from 20th September, 1972. Later, s. 115 was amended by s. 2, U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 in its application to Uttar Pradesh, retrospectively with effect from 20th September, 1972. In consequence :\n\n(i) The High Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction under s. 115 in cases arising out of original suits of the value of Rs. 20,000 and above, including such suits instituted before 20th September, 1972:\n\n(ii) Th~ District Court possessed exclusive jurisdition under s. 115 in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit instituted before 20th September, 1972.\n\nProvided that in respect of cases decided before 20th September, 1972 and also all cases arising out of original suits of any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone was competent to exercise revisional power under s. 115.\n\nS. 2 (e), U.P. President's Acts (Re-enactment with Modifications) Act, 1974 repealed the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973, and re-enacted it with certain modifications which, however, for the purposes of the present case are immaterial.\n\n3. From !st February, 1977 : S. 43, Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 was enacted by Parliament and amended s. 115 with effect from !st February, 1977 making substantial changes therein. Section 97 (I) of the Amendment Act provided that any amendment made, or provision inserted, in the Code of Civil Procedure by a . State Legislature before the !st February, 1978 would stand repealed except insofar as such amendment or provision was consistent with the Code as [ amended by the said Amendment Act.· As the Code now amended provided for revisional jurisdiction in the High Court alone, the .scheme embodied in s. 115 by the successive U.P. Amendment Acts was plainly inconsistent with the Code as now amended, and -therefore stood repealed, the position reverting to what it was under 1he original s. 115 before its amendment by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970. Buts. 97(2) provided that s. 115 as now amended by the Amendment Act, 1976 would not apply to nor affect any proceeding for revision which had been admitted, after\n\nVJSHESH KUMAR v. SHANTI PRASAD (Pathak,].) 37\n\npreliminary hearing, before !st February, 1977 and every such pro\n\nceeding for revision would be disposed of as if s. 43 had not come in\n\nto force. The proviso was without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of s. 6, General Clauses Act, 1897. In the result :\n\n(i) The High Court had exclusive jurisdiction under s. 115 in a revision petition filed on and after that date, irrespective of the valua tion of the suit out of which the case arose :\n\n(ii) A revision petition under s. 115 which had been admitted, after preliminary hearing, before !st February, 1977 would continue to be governed by s. 115 as it stood before that date.\n\n4. From !st August, 1978 : Finally s. 3, Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment), Act, 1978, which was deemed to have come into force on !st August, 1978, amended s. 115 again and restored the bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court.\n\nAccordingly now :\n\n(i) The High Court alone had jurisdiction under s. 115 in cases arising out of original suits. or other proceedings of the value of Rs. 20,000 and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before !st August, 1978;\n\n(ii) The District Court alone has jurisdiction under. s. 115 in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted before !st August, 1978 ;\n\n(iii) The High Court has jurisdiction under s. 115 in respect of cases, arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court.\n\nA-.\n\n))..\n\n(iv) A revision proceeding pending immediately before !st August, F. 1978 of the nature in which a District Court would exercise revisional power under s. 115 as amended by the Amendment Act, 1978 if pending :\n\n(a) in the District Court, would be decided by that court as if the Amendment Act of 1978 were in force at all material times ;\n\n(b) in the High Court, would be decided by the High Court as if the Amendment Act of 1978 had not come into force .\n\nThe submissions made by learned counsel before us cover a wide field, but in the main, two questions arise :\n\n(!) Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction a. 'lmder s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under s. 115 disposing of a revision petition ?\n\nA '\n\n.. G\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ>OH~ [1980]\n\n-~ S.G.R.\n\n(2) Whether the High Court possesses 1evi; ional jurisdicti<>n under s. 115 against an order of the District Cou1t under s. 25, Prn vincial Small Cause Courts Act disposing of a revision petition ?\n\nAs regards the first question, it will be noticed that a revisional power was formerly entrusted exclusively to the highest court in the state, the High Court. The State amendments now divided it between the High Court and the District Court. The amendment effect by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970 conferred exclusive jurisdiction under s. 115 in the High Court in cases arising out of original suits of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above, and in other cases the revisional jurisdiction was concurrently shared between the High Court and the District Court. It was apparently supposed that the average litigant would prefer the less expensive and more convenient forum of the District Court. The measure, it seems, did not bring the relief expected, and the State Legislature found it necessary, by enacting the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 to make a clearcut division of jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court, resulting in exclusive revisional jurisdiction to the High Court in cases arising out of original suits of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above, and exclusive jurisdiction under s. 115 to the District Court in other cases. There was a sharp bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court and District Court now enjoyed mutually exclusive revisional powers. A controversy arose whether a revisional order under s. 115 made by the District Court was final or was itself amendable to the revisional power of the High Court under the same section. The point was considered by a full Bench of the High Court in Har Parasad Singh and others v.\n\nRam Swarup and others(l) and it was held that no such revision petition was maintainable before tile High Court. Further State amendments were made to s. 115 without materially disturbing the division of power. But a proviso added to s. 115 by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973, followed by the U.P. President's Acts (Re-enactment with Modifications) Act, 1974 stated :\n\n\"Provided that in respect of cases decided before the 20th day of September,-1972, and also all cases arising out of original suits of any valuation decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section.\"\n\nThe proviso reopened the controversy whether a rev1s1on petition lay to the High Conrt against a revisional order passed by the Dis-\n\n- (I) A. L R. 1973, Allahabad, 390.\n\nVJSHESH KUMAR v. SHANTI PRASAD (Pathak, J.)\n\nt!rict Court, and on a difference of opinion between two learned\n\njudges a third learned judge of the Allahabad High Court now held inPhool Wati and othersv. Gur Sahai (I) that a revision petition would lie.\n\nThe Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, however, superseded the scheme of bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction with -effect from !st February, 1977 and, with certain modification the position reverted to what it was under the original s. 115.\n\nIn otr.er words, the entire sphere of revisional jurisdiction was restored to the High Court, no such 1 power being now vested in the District Court.\n\nAn exception was made where a revision petition ·.under s. 115 hadi been admitted, after preliminary hearing, before Ist February, 1977; it would continue to be governed bys. 115 as it stood -before that date. The situation lasted only briefly, for on !st August, 1978 the Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978 substantially restored the status quo ante.\n\nThe controversy whether it is open to the High Court to exercise revisional power in respect of a revisional order under s. 115 of the District Court presents little difficulty. The basis for determining that question flows from the principle incorporated in the bifurcation of the revisional jurisdiction, And legislative history comes to our aid. The consistent object behind the successive amendments was to divide the work load of revision petitions between the High Court and the District Court aP.d decentralise that jurisdiction. That purpose was s0ught to be achieved by classifying all cases into two mutually exclusive categories depending on the valuation of the suit out of which they arose. In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. it seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Jur!ge would plainly defeat the. object of the legislative scheme. The fr.tent behind the bifurcation -of jurisdiction-to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court-would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large measure, lose its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Courtagainst the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs. 20,000/-, a fundamental -contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the District Court, for\n\n(!) A.l.R. 1975 Allahabad 262.\n\n40 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/-.\n\nThat was never intended at all.\n\nIn Phoolwati (supra), considerable importance was attached to the proviso introduced in s. 115 by the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1973. The proviso declared that \"in respect of. ....... aO cases arising out of original suils of any valuation decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section\". What it said was that no matter what the valuation of the original suit, be it Rs. 20,000/- and above or below Rs. 20,000/-, if a case arising out of such suit was decided by the District Court, the case would be amenable to the revisional power of the High Court We are already familiar with the category of case~ where the High Court wields revisional jurisdiction over cases arising out of original suits of a value of Rs. 20,000/- or more. That is the category already covered by the substantive provision in s. 115. The other category covered by the proviso would include those instances, for example where an original suit although of a value making it triable by a court subordinate is transferred to the District Court for trial. Orders passed by the District Court in such a suit could constitute a case decided by it and amenable to the revisional power of the High Court. What must be noted is that the test incorporated in the proviso is the fact that the case has been decided by the District Court. The valuation of the suit is irrelevant. But the proviso cannot be construed to include the case of a revisional order passed by the District Court for that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental structure itself of s. 115 evidencing that a mutually exclusive jurisdiction has been assigned to the High Court and the District Court within its terms. A proviso cannot be permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in the substantive provision. Har Prasad Singh (supra) and Phoolwati (supra) were considered by a Full Bench of the High Court in M/s Jupiter Funt! (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Dlesh Dayal and others (1) and in our judgment the High Court rightly laid down there that the phrase \"case arising out of an original suit\" occurring in s. 115 does not cover orders passed in revision.\n\nWe are of opinion on the first question that the High Court is not vested with revisional jurisdiction under s. 115, Code of Civil Procedureover a revisional order made by the District Court unde•\n\nthat section.\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1979 All. 218.\n\n..,\n\nWe shall now advert to the second question, whether a revisional A order of the District Court under s. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Co urt under s. 1!5, Code of Civil Procedure. Section 25 originally provided :\n\n\"25. The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with:respect thereto as it thinks fit.\"\n\nSection 25 was amended in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nfrom time to time. The first amendment substituted the District Judge for the High Court, so that the District Judge became the repository of revisional power instead of the High Court. A further amendment, made in 1972, added a proviso, which declared that in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising the jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes the power of revision under s. 25 would vest in the High Court.\n\nThe question before us arises in those cases only where the District Judge has exercised revisional power under s. 25. Is an order so made open to revision by the High Court under s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure ? An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act indicates that it is a self-sufficient\n\ncode so far as the present enquiry is concerned. For the purpose of correcting decrees or orders made by a Court of Small Causes the Act provides for an appeal and a revision in cases falling under s. 24 ands. 25 respectively, Cases in which the District Judge and the High Court respectively exercise revisional power, revisional powers are specifically mentioned. A complete set of superior remedies has been incorporated in the Act. Moreover, s. 27 of the Act provides :\n\n\"27. Finality of decrees and orde•s.-Save as provided by this Act, a decree or order made under the foregoing provisions of this Act by a Court of Small Causes shall be final.\"\n\nThe Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order made by a Court of Small Causes should be final subject only to correction by the remedies provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is a point for consideration that had s. 25, in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh' continued in its original form the I:Iigh Court would have exercised the revisional power under s. 25, and no question could have arisen of invoking the revisional power of the High Court under s. 115 of the Code.\n\nAll the indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within the\n\n1 4-189SC!/80\n\n.,..\n\n42 SUPREME COUl>.T REPORTS\n\n\nProvincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, By way of abundant caution s. 7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of ss. 96 to 112 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, Section 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle against resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause CourtsAct. Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues to take effect. No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional power under s. 25, before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the District Judge. It must be remembered that the legislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the burdea of excercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. We are of firm opinion that the central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in s. 25, that the hierarchy of 1emedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Court Act represents a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another statute.\n\nThese considerations were apparently not present before the High Court of Allahabad when it held in Bimla Rani Kohli v. M/s. Bandu Motor Finance (P) Ltd.(l) tha(a revisional order of the District Judge under s. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act could be revised by the High Court under s. 115, Code.of Civil Procedure. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is not correct.\n\nAccordingly, we hold that an order passed under s. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by a District Court is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Com t under s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 1979, S.L.P. No. 9104 of 1979, S.L.P. No. 9142 of 1979 and S.L.P. No. 9752 of 1979, the High Court has rejected revision petitions f.led under s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, against the revisional orders of the District Court under s. 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. On the opinion reached by us that a revision petition under s. 115 is not maintainable against a revisional order under s. 25, the appeal and the associated special leave petitions must be dismissed.\n\n(1) A.J.R. 1972 All. 242.\n\nf )__\n\nS.L.P. No. 9031 of 1979 arises out of an application for an ad interim injunction made in a pending suit. Since then the suit has been dismissed, and an appeal against the decree is pending. As the suit itself has been disposed of, all proceedings for grant of interim relief must be regarded as having lapsed. The Special Leave Petition has become infructuous and must be dismissed accordingly.\n\nIt has been urged by the appellant in Vishesh r<:umar v. Shanti Prasad (Civil Appeal No. 2844of1979) that in case this Court is of the opinion that a revision petition under s. 115, Code of Civil Proceurde, is not maintainable, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under tArticle 227 of the Constitution.\n\nWe are unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under s.115 is a separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 -Of the Constitution, and one cannot be idnetified with the other.\n\nIn the result, the appeal and the special leave petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.\n\nP.B .. R.\n\nAppeal and Petition~ dismissed.\n\nB .,1", "total_entities": 176, "entities": [{"text": "VISHESH KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHESH KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHANTI PRASAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHANTI PRASAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 12, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 44, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VISHESH KUMAR\n\nSHANTI PRASAD\n\nMarch 12, 1980\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nCode of Civil Procedure-S. 115-State amend1nents bifurcated revisional jurisdiction between High Court and District Court-High Court-ff possessea revisional jurisdiction from an order of District Judge disposing of revision C pelitiou."}}, {"text": "V. R. 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'The first amendment substituted the District Judge for the High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2703, "end_char": 2708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VISHESH KUMAR V. SHANTI PRASAD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2747, "end_char": 2777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "._.L.\n\nVISHESH KUMAR V. SHANTI PRASAD 33\n\nThe two questions that fell' for consideration were : (il whether the High .\\ <:wrt possesses the revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 of the Code of CTvil tl'rocedv.re in respect of an oro'r of the District Court under s. 115 disposin1\n\nof a revision petition and (ii) whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 against an order of District Court under s. 25 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act disposing of a revision petition,\n\nHEID : The High Court is not vested with revisional jurisdiction under 8\n\n1."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3002, "end_char": 3008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3115, "end_char": 3121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", 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false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6370, "end_char": 6397, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6429, "end_char": 6433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "ss. 96 to 112 and 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6496, "end_char": 6517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Provincial Small Cause Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6595, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6598, "end_char": 6607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Provincial Small Cause Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6697, "end_char": 6730, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6732, "end_char": 6813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act", "statute": "Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7325, "end_char": 7330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act", "statute": "Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the 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{"document_id": "1980_3_331_363_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "THE ISHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS (P.) LTD.\n\n& ANOTHER ETC.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. ETC .\n\nApril 2, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, S, MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, D. A. DESAI, 8\n\nR. S. PA<HAK AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ;]\n\nU, P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act 1971. States kgislatur;, if comp•· ient to enact a law on declared industry. •.\n\nConstitution of India Entry 51 List I, Entry 14, List II and Entry 42 of\n\nill~~ c\n\nBy the U, P, Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Ordinanre, 1971 (which later be<:ame an Act) twelve sngar undertakings stood transferred and veslfd in a\n\nGovernment undertaking named the U.P. State' SUgar Corporation Limited. Tho appellants' writ petitions before ther High Court impugning the constitutional validity of the Act were dismissed.\n\nIn appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants thal since sugar is a declared industry under the Industries (Development and Regnlation) Act, 1951 in view of entry 52 in Union List read with entry 24 in state list further read with Art. 246. Parliament alone is. competent to pass the law on the subject and not the State Legislature and, therefore, the impugned\n\nlegislation is void.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : Industry being a matier enumerated in entry 24 of List JI. only the State legislature has the excIUSive power to legislate in respect of it, but\n\n.thisr power is subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 o; f List I. While under entry 7, if a declaration is made by Parliament that a particular industry is necessary for defence or for the prosecution of war, Parliament, to the exclusion of the State legislature, would be entitled to legislate in respect of that industry, a declaration by Parliament by law to assume control over any particular industry in public interest in a sine qua non to clothe Parliament with power under entry 52, List I to legislate in respect of that industry. The declaration t; ontemplated by this entry is , a declaration by law.\n\nA merei declaration unaccompanied by law is ineompalible with entry 52 of List l But that doe. not mean that once a declaration is made in respect of anl industry that industry as a whole is taken out of entry 24, List IL [337 F-H; 338 D, F; 339 E]\n\nBaiinath Kedia v. State of Bihm~ & Ors. [1970] 2 100 at 113 and State of Haryana & Anr. v, Chanan Mal, etc, [1976] 3 SCR 688 at 700 referred to.\n\nThe control under section 2 of the 1951 Act was assumed for a specific\n\nand avowed object namely' development and regulation of certain industri<s.\n\nB . TbJs control has to be exercised in the manner provided under the statuk:. \"Therefore, Parliament, has made a declaration for assuming control in respect\n\nSUPREME COURT REPCTRTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.-\n\nA of tho declared industries set out in the schedule of the Act only to the extont\n\nprovided in tho Act.\n\nA conspectUs of tho provisions of tho impugned Act shows that in pith an~· substance it is one for acquisition of scheduled undertakings and such acquisition by transfer Of ownership of those undertakings to the Corporation would in n~· way come in conftict with any of tho provisions of the Central Act of 19 5 I.\n\nB Tho Central Act is primarily concerned with development and regulation of\n\ndeclared indnstries and is not concerned with ownership of industrial undertakingsin declared industries, except to the extC.Ut of control over management of. tho undertaking by tho owner.\n\nBy the acquisition under the impugned Act ruuf vesting of the undertakings in the Corporation they would still be' under the c<>ntrol of tho Central Government because the Corporation wonld be amenable co the authority and jurisdiction of the Central Government. Therefore, the.:a C i• no conJlict between the impugned legislation and the control exercised hy the Central Government under the provisions of the Central Act.\n\n[340 H-341 A;.\n\n344 C-G, 345 DJ\n\nThere is no force in the argument that thlj power of acquisition under Entry 42, List ill is incidental to tho power to legilJlate in respect of various\n\ntopic; in the lists and, therefore, when the Union assumed control over the declared industry such control comprehends the power to acquire and henco the power of tho State Legislature to enact legislation for acquisition of property of scheduled undertakings would be denuded. By the Constitution (Seventh Amemmeni) Act, Entzy 33 in List I and Entry 36 in List II were deleted and a single comprehensive Entry 42 in List IIll (acquisition and requisitioninir of property) was added. The power to acquire property can now be exercised concurrently by tho Union aud the States. After the substitution of Entzy 42 in List III it cannot be said that the power of acquisition and requisitioning of prOperty is incidental to the other power. It is an independent power provided foc in a specific entry. Therefore, both the Union and the State would have\n\npower of acquisition and requisition of property. [345 E-F; 346 B-EJ\n\nThero is a long line of decisions whicll clearly establishes the proposition that power to legislate for acquisition of property is an independent and separa.t<J power end is exercisable only under Entry 42, List IIT and not as an incid.ent <I the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lislli. This power of the State legislature tc:> legislate for acquisition of property remains intact and untramelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of an industzy by a decla1Jttion .. envisaged in Entry 52, list I a further power of aajuisition is taken over by a specific legislation.\n\n[353 H-\n\n354 A] .\n\nRu.rtom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 at 567, Rajamundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. State of Andlira Pradesh [1954] SCR 779.\n\nState of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshlvar Singh [1952) S.C.R. 88?, State of West Bengal v. Union of !11dia [1964] I S.C.R. 371, refe17ed to.\n\nThe argument that the State legislature tackd con1petence to enact the impugned legislation is without force.\n\nLegislative power of tho State under Entcy 24, List II is eroded only to the extent control -is assumed by the UniOn pursuant to a declaration made by the Parliament in respect of a declared.\n\n\" •\n\nISHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS V. U-P. STATE 333\n\nindustry as spelt out by the legislative .,., actment and the field occupied by •uch A. enactment is the measure of erosion. Subject to such erosion, on the remainder\n\ntre Slate legislature will have power, to legislate in respect of \" declared industry\n\nwi1hout in any way trenching upon the occupied field. State legislature, which is otherwi!ie competent to deal with industry under Entry 24, List II, can du{ with that industry in exarcise of other powers enabling it to legislate under .till'\"ent heads set out in Llsts II and Ill a<1d this power cannot be denied to the.State. [354 C, 352 E-F] S\n\nThe contention. that the impugned Act is in violation of section 20 of the Central Act ha~ no merit. 'fhc impugned legislation was not enacted for taking ovel\" tho management or control of any industrial undertaking by the Slate\n\nGovernment.\n\nIn pith and substance it was enacted to acquire the 6cheduled undertakings. If an attempt was made to take over the management or control of any industrial undertaking in a declared industry the bar oll section 20 would C inhiltit exercise of such executive power.\n\nThe inhibition of section 20 is on tlie M:ecutive pOWet\" but if as a sequel tol an acquisition of an industrial under~ taking the management or control of the industrial undertakinlll stands transfe~ to the acquiring authority section 20 is not attracted. It does not preclude or fori>ld a State legislature rocercising legislative power under an entry other than Enl1l' 24 of List II and if in exercise of that legislative power the consequential :transfer of management or conttol over the industry or undertaking follows M: D an incident of acquisition such taking over of management or control pursuant to an exercise of legislative power is not within the inhibition of section 20.\n\n[355 F, AEl\n\nThe challenge to the validity of the impugned legislation on the .gronnd of viQlation of Article 31 (2) must fail. At the time of acquisition the scheduled nnderiakings had a1 heavy backlog of carry forward losses, they failed I<> pay the J& growers the price of cane purchased, the labour was not paid as a result of which there was labour unrest. The situation did not improve etven when some\n\nof !he undertakings were taken over under the Central Act acd a drastic remedy was called for in public interest and while applying that drastic remedy of acquisition tho principles which are valid foc determining the value of machinery wero adopted. The adequacy or otherwise of compensation on thei calculus\n\nmade by applying the principles is beyond iudicial review.\n\n[360 C, 359 H p 360 Bl\n\nRustom Cavasjee, Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 at 567, Vajra, velll Mudafiar v. Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition West Madras [19651 1 SCll 614, Union of India v. Metal Corpoiaticn of India Ltd. & Anr. [1967] 1 sat 256, State of Guiarat v. Shanti/at Manga/das & Ors. [1969] 3 SCR 341 and His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati 'Sripadagaivaru v .. State of Kerala [1973] Suppl. SCR 1 referred to.\n\nrathak & Koshal II (concurring in the result)\n\nIt is not necessMy in' this case to express any opinion 1 on the question whether the declaration made by Parliament in section 2 of the Industries (Development arui Regulation) Act, 1951 in respect of the industies specified in the Firsq iclteduie to that Act can be regarded as limited to removing from the scope of Enli:v 24 of List II of tho Seventh Schedule to the Constitution only so much of tire legislative field as is covered. by the subject matter and content of thlit\n\nAct or it can be reg&rded as effecting the removal from that entry of the\n\nA entire legislature field embracing all matters pertaining to the industries specified\n\nin the declaration.. The controversy in the prese1n.t case can be adeqUately disposed of on the ground that .the legislation falls within Entry 42 of rm m\n\nand cannot be related to Entj 52 of List I or Entry 24 of List n. [362 E-F,\n\n363 BJ ·\n\nThe Hingir Rar.zpur Coal Co. Ltd. and Others v. The State of Oris.ra and Other. [1961] 2 SCR 537, State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and'Co. [1964] -4 SCR 461, Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar & Ors. and Stale of Haryana &: Anr~\n\nv. Chanan Mal, etc. [1976] 3 SCR 688 held inapplicable.\n\nCivrr. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1614, 1652 and 1637 of 1979.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-5-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc .. Writ Nos. 4170/71, ~130171 and 4193/71.\n\nAND PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) Nos. 6246, 6252, 6373 & 8050/79.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 3-5-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Nos. 4150, 4173, 4793 and 4422/71.\n\n F. S. Nariman, Bhaskar Gupta, Rajesh Khaitan, Rohington Nariman and P. R. Seethrama for the Appellants in CA 1614/79.\n\nA. K. Sen, Manoj Swarup, Miss I, alita Kohli and S. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA No. 1652/79 and SLPS. 6146 and 6373/79. .\"\" E R. A. Gupta for the Petitioner in SLP No. 6252/79.\n\nN. N. Sharma and N. N. Kacker for the Petitioner in SLP No. 8050/79.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. GenL in C.A. 1614.\n\nRishi Ram Adv. General, U.P. in C.A. 1652.\n\nRaju. Ramchandran and 0. P. Rana for the RespondentS in All the Appeals.\n\nTh~ Judgment of V. R. KriShna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D. A. Desai, JJ. was delivered by Desai, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate Opinion on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himsel[\n\nDESAI, J.-Acquisition of industrial undertakings involved in .manufacturing sugar, a commodity satisfying the basic necessity, in larger public interest and the attempt of the owners of the undertakin~ to thwart the same, paints the famili_ar landscape in this group of appeals.\n\nAs a sequel to the serious problems created by the owners of certain sugar mills in the State of Uttar. Pradesh for cane growers and labour employed in sugar mills, having an adverse impact on the general economy of tbe areas where these sugar mills were-situated and with a view to ameliorating the situation posing a threat to tlie economy,\n\nISHWARI Kl!ETAN SUGAR MILLS v. U.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 335\n\nthe Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance on July 3, 1971, styled as U.P. Sugar Undertaking (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1971 (13 of 1971) ('Ordinance' ot short), with a view to transferring and vesting sugar undertakings set out in the Schedule to the Ordinance in the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. ('Corporation' for short), a Government Company within the meaning of s. 671 of the Companies Act, 1956.\n\nSubsequently, by U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971, (U.P. Act 23 of 1971) ('Act' for short), the Ordinance was repealed and was replaced. Schedule to the Act enumerates 12 sugar undertakings (referred to as 'scheduled undertakings') and by the operation of s. 3, these scheduled undertakings stood transferred to and vested in the Corporation from the appointed day, i.e. July 3, 1971, the date on which the Ordinance was issued. On .the promulgation of the Ordinance 11 writ petitions were filed in the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Ordinance and when the Act replaced the Ordinance effective from August 27, 1971, the writ petitions were amended incorporating the challeng(\\ to the Act also.\n\nThe Ordinance and the Act were challenged in the High Court on the following grounds :\n\n( 1) The State legislature had no legislative competence to enact it;\n\n(2) The Act violated Art. 31 of the Constitution because the acquisition was not for a public purpose and the compensation proposed in the Act was illusory;\n\n(3) The Act was in breach of Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) of the Constitution;\n\n( 4) The Act infringed the gurantee of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nA Division Bench of the High Court by a common judgment dated May 3, 1979, repelled the contentions on behalf of the petitioners and upheld the constitutional validity of the Act.\n\nHence these appeals by the original petitioners, the owners , of the scheduled undertakings .\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, learned counsel who led on behalf of the G appellants, confined his attack to two grounds : (a) U.P. State legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the impugned Act; and (b) compensation awarded f.or acquisition in violative of Art. 31 (2) as it stood prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Twentyfifth Amendment) Act, 1971, which came in.to force on April 20, 1972. Mr. R. A.\n\nGupta who appeared in SLP. 6252/79, canvassed an additional con- H tention that the impugned Act is viplative of Art. 14 inasmnch as those similarly situated and similarly circum9tanced sugar undertakings have\n\n336 SUPRE)'dE COURT. REPO)lTS\n\n11980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nnot been acquired and the petitioners' scheduled undertakings hav•\n\n~=~ single~. d out for a drastic treatment of take-over by way of acqtlfsi-\n\nThe m n thrust of the attack was that the U.P. Legislature Jack, ed legislative . ompetence to enact the impugned Act. There were two distinct limbs of this submission which would be examined separately.\n\nThe first limb of the submission was that in exercise of legislative power flowing frr: Entry 52 Llst I the Parliament made the requisite declara~ tion ins. of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 ('IDR Ac for short), and in view of placitum 25 of the first schedule to the ID . Act sugar being a declared industry, that industry goes out pf Entry 24 List II, and hence U. P. State legislature was denuded of all legislative power to legislate in respect of sugar industry and as the impugned legislation is in respect of industrial undertaking in sugar industry, thel impugned legislation is void on account of legislative incompetence. 'Ij:e learned Attorney General countered it by saying that the power to acquire property derived from entry 42 in List III is an independent wwer and the impugned Act being in pith and substance an Act to acquire scheduled undertakings, meaning thereby the properties of the scheduled undertakings, the power of the State legislature to legislate ins behalf is referable to entry 42 and remains intact irrespective of the act that sugar is a declared industry, control of which is taken over by th, Union Government pursuant to the declaration made under s. 42 of the IDR Act. This necessitates an analytical examination of the relevant entries keeping in view legislative perspective and the historical background through which these entries have passed.\n\nEntry i in the Union List reads as under :\n\n\"7.1 Industries declared by parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war.\"\n\nEntry f 2 in the same List reads : \" 2. Indusries, the control of which by the Union is decla\n\n1 d by parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.\"\n\nEntry 24 in List II (State List) reads as under :\n\n\"24. Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and - 52 o~ List I.\" H It may be noted here that entry 33 in List I, entry 36 in Llst II and entry 42 Llst III were amended bys. 26 of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act by which entry 33 of List I and entry 36 of List II\n\n• '\n\nwere deleted and entry 42 in List Ill was. amended to read as set out\n\nliereinabove. Entry 33 in List I and entry 36 in List II conferred legislative power on the Union and the States respectively for acquisition or requisitioning of property for its own purpose. Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act. 1956, which made the aforementioned amendment -was designed to clear the ambiguity about the power of acquisition and requisitioning of property being not a power incidental to any of the logislative powers but an independent power by itself. The object be- hind the amendment has been thus explained. \"The existence of three entries in the legislative lists (33 of List I, 36 of List II and 42 of List III) relating to the essentially single subject of acquisition and requisitioning of property by the Government gives rise to unnecessary technical difficulties in legislation. In order to avoid these difficulties and simplify the constitutional position, it is propo'sed to omit the entries in the Union and State Lists and replace the entry in the concurrent list by a comprehensive entry covering the whole subject\" (see Statement of Objects and Reasons in respect of Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956).\n\nHaving set out the historical background, attention may now be turned t_o the scope and content of legislative power of Union and the -States flowing from entry 52 in List I and entry 24 in List II in respect\n\n-0f the topic of 'industry.'\n\nThe scope and content of entry 52, List I and entry 24, Llst II has to be demarcated with precision to avoid a possible confusion likely to emanate from an inter-dependence and interaction of the two entries. 'Industry' as a head of legislation is to be found in entry 24, List II with this limitation that it is subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52, List I. The difference in the language in which entries 7 and 52 are couched has a bearing on the interruption of entry 52. In the former -case if a declaration is made by the Parliament that the particular industry is necessary for the purpose of defence or for prosecution of the war, parliament would be exclusively entitled to legislate in respect of\n\nthat industry to the exclusion of State legislatures because the requisite .declaration will have the effect of taldng out that industry from entry 24, List 11 A declaration by the parliament by Jaw to assume control over any particular industry in public interest is a sine qua 1Wn to clothe Parliament with power under entry 52, List I to legisiate in respect of that industry because otherwise industry as a general head of Jegislation is in the exclusive sphere of State legislative activity pursuant to entry 24, List II. Distribution of legislative powers as enacted in .Part XI and Art. 246 clearly demarcate the field of legislative activity J'eserved for parliament and for State legislatures and also the concur-\n\nI!'\n\nrent list in respect of which both can legislate subject to other provisions. of part XI. Sub-art. (3) of Art. 246 provides that the State legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule. A fortiori, industry being the matter enumerated in List II the State legislature has exolni; ive power to legislate in respect of it and keeping aside for the time being the words 'subject Ip the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List\n\nI', the State legislature alone can legislate in respect of the legislative head 'industry.' Ipso fqcto, parliament would not have power to legislate in respect of industry as a legislative head.\n\nNow, entry 52 , List I on its own language does not provide a field of legislative activity for the Union Parliament unless and until a declaration is made by parliament by law to assume control over specified industries. The embargo on the power of Parliament to legislate in respect of industry which is in List II would be lifted once a declaration is made by Parliam<:nt by lw as envisaged by entry 52, List I. In the absence of a declaration as envisaged by entry 52, List I, it is incontrovertible that Parliament has no power to legislate on the t; opic of industry. Etitry 52, List I on its own language does not contemplate a bald declaration for assuming control over specified industries, but the declaration has to be by faw to assume control of specified industries in public interest. The legislation enacted pursuant to the power to legislate acquired by declaration must be for assuming control over the industry and the declaration has to be made by law enacted, of which declaration would be an integral part. Legislation for assuming control containing the declaration will spell out the limit of control so assumed by the declaration.\n\nTherefore, the degree and extent of c:ontrol that would be acquired by Parliament pursuant to the declaration would necessarily depend upon the legislation enactect spelling out the degree of control assumed. A mere declaration unaccompanied by law is incompatible with entry 52, List I. A declaration for assuming control of specific industries coupled with Jaw assuming control is a pre-requisite for takllig legislative action under entry 52, List I. The declaration and the legislation pursuant to declaration to, that extent denude the power of State legislature to legislate under entry 24, List II. Thereilore, the erosion of the power of the State legislature to legislate in respect of declared industry would not occur merely by declaration but by the enactment consequent on the declaration prescribing the extent and scope of control. When a declaration is made as contemplated by entry 52, List I in respect Of any particular industry. it is contended that, that industry as a topic of legislation would be removed from the legislative sphere of the state.\n\nWhat is the effect of. a declaration made in respect of mines and minerals as contemplated by entry 54 has been succinctly laid down by a Constitution Bench of this\n\n• )\n\n.. ,.....\n\nCourt in Baij11ath Kedia v. State of Bihar & Ors.,(') in the following A terms:\n\n\"Once this declaration is made and the extent laid down, the subject of legislation to the extent laid down becomes an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament. Any legislation by the .State after such declaration and trenching upon the field disclosed in the declaration must necessarily be unconstitutional because that field is abstracted from the legislative competence of the State Legislature .... The only dispute, therefore, can be to what extent the declaration by Parliament leaves any scope for legislation by the State legislai!ure. If the impugned legislation falls within the ambit of such scope it will be valid, if outside it, then it must be declared invalid.\"\n\nSugar is a declared industry. Is it, however, correct to say that once a declaration is made as envisaged by entry 52 List I, that industry as a whole is taken out of entry 24, List II? In respect of an identical entry 54, List I in the passage extracted above it is said that to the extent declaration. is made and extent of control laid, that much and that much alone is abstracted from the legislative competence of the State legislature. It is, therefore, not correct to say that once a declaration is made in respect of an industry that industry as a whole is taken out of entry 24, List II. Similarly, in State of Haryana & Anr. o/.\n\nChanan Mal, etc.(') while upholding the constitutional validity of the Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973, after noticing the cleclaration made in s. 2 of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, ('Mines & Minerals Act' for short), as envisaged by entry 54, List I it was held :\n\n\"Moreover, power to acquire for purposes of development and regulation has not been exercised by Act 67 of\n\n1957. The existence of power of Parliament to legislate on this topic as an incident of legislative power on another subject is one thing. Its actual exercise is another. It is difficult to see how the field of acquisition could become occupied\n\nhy a central Act in the same way as it had been in the West Bengal case even before Parliament legislates to acquire land in a State.\"\n\nThese pronouncements demonstrably show that before State legislature\n\nis denuded of power to legislate under entry 24, List II in respect of H\n\n(I) [1970] 2S.C.R.1001tllJ.\n\n(2) [19761 J S. C. R. 688 at 700.\n\n2-289SCI/80\n\na declared industry, the scope of declaration and consequent control assumed by the Union must be demarcated with precision and. then proceed to ascertain whether the impugned legislation trenches upon the excepted field.\n\nThe declaration made in s. 2 of IDR Act reads as under :\n\n\"It is hereby declared that it in expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule.\"\n\nThe contention is that as there are no words of limitation to be found in s. '2 in respect of the control assumed by the declaration by the Union, the necessary concomitant of such declaration is that the State legislature is totally denuded of any power to deal with such declared industry. To buttress this argument reference was made to the declaration made by the Union pursuant to entry 54, List I, as set out in s. 2 of the Mines & Minerals Act which reads as under :\n\n\"It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided.\"\n\nAbsence of the expression \"to the extent hereinafter provided\" was pressed into service to point out that while in respect of mines and minerals the Union has assumed control to the extent provided in the Mines & Minerals Act, in the case of declared industries the control is absolute, unlimited, unfettered or unabridged and, therefore, everything that would fall within the connotation of the word 'control' would be within the competence of the Union and to the same extent and degree the State legislature would be denuded of its power to legislate in respect of that industry. It was said that in respect of declared industries total control is assumed by the Union and, therefore, entry 24, List II on its import must be read industry minus the declared industry because entry 24, List II is subject to entries 7 and 52, List I. Undoubtedly the Union is authorised to assume control in respect of any industry if parliament by Jaw considers it expedient in the public interest.\n\nThe declaration has to be made by the Parliament, but the declaration has to be by law not a declaration simpliciter. The words of limitation on the power to make declaration are 'by law'.\n\nDeclaration must be an integral part of law enacted pursuant to declaration. The declaration in this case is made in an Act enacted to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries. Therefore, the control was assumed not in abstract but for a specific and avowed object, viz., development\n\n-.f\n\n.. r\n\n• '\n\nand regulation of certain industries.\n\nThe industries in respect of which contro1 was assumed for the purpose of their development and regulation have been set out in the Schedule.\n\nThis control is to be exercised in the manner provided in the statute, viz., IDR Act. The declaration for assuming control is to be found in the same Act which provides for the limit of control. The deducible inference is that Parliament made the declaration for assuming control in respect of declared industries set out in the Schedule to the Act to the extent mentioned in the Act.\n\nIt is difficult to accept the submission that s. 2 has to be read dehors the Act and not forming part of the Act.\n\nThis would be doing violence to the art of legislative draftmanship.\n\nIt is open to Parliament in view of entry 52, List I, to make a declaration in respect of industry or industries to the effect that the Union will assume its control in public interest. It is not to be some abstract control. The control has to be concrete and specific and the manner of its exercise has to be laid down in view of the well-established proposition that executive authority must have the support of law for its action.\n\nIn a country governed by rule of Jaw, if the Union, an instrumentality for the governance of the country, has to exercise control over industries by virtue of a declaration made by Parliament, it must be exercised by law.\n\nSuch law must prescribe the extent of control, the manner of its exercise and enforcement and consequence of breach. There is no such concept as abstract contro1.\n\nThe control has to be concrete and the mode and method of its exercise must be regulated by law.\n\nNow, Parliament made the declaration not in abstract but as part of the IDR Act and the control was in respect of industries specified in the First Schedule appended to the Act itself. Sections 3 to 30 set out various modes and methodology, procedure and power, to effectuate the control which the Union acquired by virtue of the declaration contained in s.\n\n2. Industry as a legislative head finds its place in entry 24, List II.\n\nThe State legislature can be denied legislative power under entry 24 to the extent Parliament makes declaration under entry 52 and by such declaration Parliament acquires power to legislate only in respect of those industries in respect of which declaration is made and to the extent as manifested by legislation incorporating the declaration and no more. The Act prescribes the extent of control and specified it. As the declaration trenches upon the State legislative power it has to be construed strictly. Therefore, even though the Act enacted under entry 54 which is to some extent in pari materi'a with entry 52 and in a parallel and cognate statute while making the declaration the Parliament did use the further expression \"to the extent herein provided\" while assuming control, the absence of such words in the declaration in s. 2 would not lead to the conclusion that the control assumed was to be something in abstract, total and unfettered and not as per various\n\n342 SUPREME COURT REPO; ns\n\n\nprp'Visions of the IDR Act. The lacuna, if any, is made good by hedging the power of making declaration to be made by Jaw.\n\nLegislative intention has to be gathered from the Act as a whole and not by piecemeal examination of its provisions. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that to the extent Union acquired control by virtue of declaration in s. 2 of the IPR Act as amended from time to time, the power of the State legislature under entry 24, List II to enact any legislation in respect of declared industry so as to encroach upon the field of control occupied by IDR Act would be taken away. This is clearly borne out not only by the decision in Baijnath Kedia's case (supra) where undoubtedly while referring to the control assumed by the Union by a declaration made in s. 2 of the Mines & Minerals Act, it was said that to what extent such a declaration would go is for Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with public interest, and once this declaration is made and the extent laid down, the subject of legislation to the extent laid down becomes an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament. It is not merely some abstract control but the extent of the control assumed by the Union by the provisions of IDR Act pursuant to declaration made by Parliament that the State Legislature to that extent, that is, to the extent the provisions of IDR Act occupies this field, is denuded of its power to legislate in respect of such declared industry.\n\nThe respondents assert the validity of the impugned legislation contending that up.on its true construction and proper ascertainment of its object, it is a legislation for acquisition of scheduled undertakings and the power to acquire by legislation such scheduled undertakings by the State is derived from entry 42, List III. The controversy, therefore, centres round the question whether the impugned legislation is in respect of a declared industry referable to entry 24 or one for acquition of scheduled undertakings in exercise of the power of acquisition and requisitioning of property derived from entry 42, List III. Appellants contend that a reference to Objects and Reasons for enacting the impugned legislation would show that the owners of scheduled undertakings had created serious problems for the cane growers and labour which created an adverse impact on the general economy of the areas where these undertakings were situated, the legislation was enacted to acquire the undertaking and pay compensation and also pay cane growers and labour on high priority and to restart undertakings for crushing season. It was said that these are purely managerial functions discharged by owners of undertakings and if the impugned Act was ff devised and enacted primarily to assume these managerial functions, the Act would be beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature a8 it trenches upon the field occupied by IDR Act specifically\n\n~ r\n\nenacted to empower Union Government to provide effective control A over industrial undertakings in declared industry to prevent mismanagement, or to rectify the same by taking over management.\n\nWhen validity of a legislation i~ challenged on the ground of want of legislative competence and it becomes necessary to ascertain to which entry in the three lists the legislation is referable to, the Court has evolv- 8 ed the theory pf pith and substance. If in pith and substance a legislation falls within one entry or the other but some portion of the subjectmatter of the legislation incidentally trenches upon and might enter a field under another List, the Act as a whole would be valid not with standing such incidental trenching. This is well established by a catena of decisions [see Union of India v.\n\nH. S. Dhilkm,(I) and Kerala c State Electricity Board v. lndian Aluminium Co.(2 )]. After referring to these decisions in State of Karnataka & Anr. etc. v. Ranganatha Reddy & Anr. etc.(3) Untwalia, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench has in terms stated that the pith and substance of the Act has to be looked into and an incidental trespass would not invalidate the law. The challenge in that case was to the Nationalisation of contract carriages by D the Karnataka State, inter alia, on the ground that the statute was invalid as it was a legislation on the subject of interstate trade and commerce. Repelling this contention the Court unanimously held that in pith and substance the impugned legislation was for acquisition of contract carriages and not an Act which deals wiih intet-State trade and commerce.\n\nTo start with, it is necessary first to ascertain in pith and substance to what entry in a particular list the impugned legislation is referable.\n\nIf it is referable to entry other than 24, List II, such as entry 42, List III, it would be necessary to precisely ascertain whether it in any way trenches upon the field occupied by the declaration made by Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act.\n\nSection 3 of the Act provides for vesting of scheduled undertakings from the appointed day in the Corp, otation. Section 4 provides for consequences of vesting. Section 5 makes it obligatory on every person in whose possession or custody or under wh, ose control any ro perty or asset, book of account, register or other document comprised in that undertaking may be, to forthwith deliver the same to the Collector. Section 7 provides for determination and mode of payment of <::ompensation for acquisition of scheduled undertakings. Section 8 provide6 for claims to be satisfied ont of compensation payable to the\n\n(I) [1972] 2 S. C.R. 33.\n\n(2) [1976] 1 S. C.R. 552.\n\n(3) [1978] 1. S. C. R. 641.\n\nB '\n\n' G\n\nowners of the undertakings. Section 9 provides for avoidance of certain secnred debts consequent upon acquisition. Section 11 provides for appeal and s. 12 provides for constitution of a Tribunal to perform the functions assigned to it by the Act. Section 13 provides for powers and procedure of the Tribunal. Section 14 provides for ouster of jurisdication of civil conrts in respect of any dispute arising from the implementation of the Act. Section 16 confers protection on the employees of the scheduled undertaking. The rest are only consequential sections. A comprehensive examination of all the provisions of the Act indisputably shows that in pith and substance the impugned Act is one Act for acquisition of scheduled undertakings and such acqaisition by transfer of ownership of the scheduled undertakings to the Corporation would in no way come in conflict with any of the provisions of the IDR Act or would not trench upon any control exercised by the Unipn under the various provisions of the IDR .Act. In fact the IDR Act, generally speaking, does not deal with the ownership of industrial undertakings in declared industries. The Act is primarily concerned with development and regulation of the declared industries. The Central Government has power under ss. 18A and 18AA of the IDR Act to assume direct management or control of industrial undertakings in certain cases and even after acquisition of scheduled undertakings under the impugned legislation the power of the Central Government under ss. ! SA and l SAA would remain intact. Even s. 1 SFA provides for taking over management or control of a company which is being wound up with the permission of the High Conrt and in such a situation the authorised perso'n appointed by the Central Government would be deemed to be Official Liquidator under sub-s. (4) of s. !SFA. Provision contained in Chapter IIIAC of IDR Act enables Central Goyt. to direct sale of the industrial undertaking under certain circnrnstances and in the situation as set out ins. 18FE(7) to pnrchase the same. But these powers can be exercise irrespective of the fact who at the relevant time, the owner of the undertaking is. The IDR Act is not at all concerned with the ownership of industrial undertakings in declared industries, except to the extent of control over management of the undertaking by the owner. Owner is defined in s. 3(f) in relation td an industrial undertaking, to mean the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of the undertaking, and, where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director pr managing agents, such manager, managing director or managing agent shall be deemed to be the owner of the undertaking. This deeming fiction enacted in respect of the concept of ownership clearly manifest the legislative intention that IDR Act treats that person to be the owner who has the ultimate control over the affairs of the under-\n\ntaking and if that ultimate control is entrusted to even a manager, for the purposes of the IDR Act the manager would be the owner. This must be so in the very nature of things because the IDR Act is essentially concerned with the control over the management of the industrial undertakings in declared industries. By the acquisition under the impugned Act and vesting of the scheduled undertakings in the Corporation the scheduled undertakings will never the less be under the control of the Central Government as exercised by the provisions of the IDR Act because the Corporation would be the owner and would be amenahle to the authority and jurisdiction of the Central Government as the provisions of the IDR Act would continue to apply to the scheduleJ undertakings, sugar being a declared industry, and ,; cheduled undertakings are industrial undertakings within the meaning of the !DR Act. Nu provision from IDR Act was pointed out to us to show that in impkmcnting or enforcing such a provision the impugned legislation would be an impediment. Therefore, there is no conflict between the impc:gned legislation and the control exercised by the Central Government under the provisions of the IDR Act and there is not even a remote encroachment on the field occupied by IDR Act.\n\nThe main thrust of the submission was that the power of acquisition under entry 42, List III is not an independent power but it is incidental to the power to legislate in respect of the various topics in various lists and. therefore, when by a declaration made by the parliament enacted in s. 2 of the IDR Act the cpntrol over declared industry is assumed by the Union, such control will also comprehend the power to acquire and hence the power of the State legislature to enact legislation for acquisition of property of scheduled undertakings would be denuded as that power as an intergral element of control would vest in the Union Government. The focal point of controversy, therefore, is whether ihe power of acquisition and requisitioning of property under entry 42. List III is an independent power by itself or it is an integral and in, eparahle element of the power of contrcl over industry.\n\nCcmstitution amending process bearing on the three relevant entries may he noticed.\n\nBefore the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,\n\n1956. which came into force gn November l. 1956. Entry 33 in List I read:\n\n\"Acquisition or requisitioning of propcrlv for the purpose of the LTnion.\"\n\nSimilarly. Entry 36 in List II read :\n\n\"Acquisition or requisitioning of property except for the H purpose of the Union subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III.''\n\nA At that time entry 42 in List III read :\n\n\"Principles on which compensati, on for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given\".\n\nBy the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, the three entries were repealed.\n\nEntry 33 in List I and entry 36 in List II were deleted and a single comprehensive entry 42 in List III was substituted to read : 'Acquisition and requisitioning of property'.\n\nAccordingly, the power to acquire property could be exercised concurrently by the Union and C the States.\n\nEven if prior to the deletion of Entry 33 in List I and entry 3 6 in List II an argument could possibly have been advanced , that as power of acquisition of property was conferred both on Union\n\nand the States to be exercised either for the purpose of the Union or for the State it was incidental to any other legislative power flowini: from various entries in the three Lists and not an independent power, D but since the deletion of entry 33 in List I and entry 36 in List II and substitution of a comprehensive entry in List III, it could hardly be urged with confidence that the power of acquisition and requisitioning of property was incidental to other power. It is an independent power pcovided for in a specific entry. Therefore, both the Union and the State would have power of acquisition and requisitioning of property.\n\nE This position is unquestionably established by the majority decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India(') where Shah, J. speaking for the majority of 10 Judges held as under :\n\n\"power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under entry 42 of List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists.\" In reaching this conclusion reliance was placed on Rajamundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh.(') It was, however, urged that the proposition culled out from Rajamundry Electric Supply Corporation case by Shah, J. in R. C. Cooper's(') case is not borne out by the observation 'in the first mentioned case. In Rajamundry Electric Supply Corporation( 2 ) case the challenge was to the Madras Electric Supply Undertakings (Acquisitipn) Act, 1949, on the ground that the Madras legislature was not competent to enact the legislation because at the relevant time there was no entry in the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to compulsory acquisition of any commercial or industrial undertaking. This challenge failed in the High Court\n\n(1) [19701 3 S. C.R. 530 at 567.\n\n(2) [1954] S. C. R. 779.\n\nbut on appeal the challenge was accepted by a Constitution Bench of this Court. Now, it must be remembered that the impugned legislation in that case was a pre-Constitution legislation then governed by the Government of India Act, 1935. The challenge was that the State\n\nlegislature had no power td enact a legislation for acquisition of an electrical undertaking. On behalf of the State the Act was sought to be sustained on the ground that the Act was in pith and substance a law with respect to electricity under entry 31 of the Concurrent List and, therefore, the State legislature was competent to enact the same. After scrutinising the Act this Court came to the conclusion that in pith and substance the Act was one to provide for acquisition of electrical undertaking and, therefore the State legislature lacked competence to enact the same. Now, in that case the Advocate-General , of Madras in his effort to save the impugned legislation advanced an argument before the Constitution Bench that : 'There was implicit in every entry in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, an inherent power to make a law with respect to a matter ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry.' His further argument was that each entry in the l\\st carried with it an inherent power to provide for the compulsory acquisition of any property, land or any commercial or industrial undertaking, while making a law under suoh entry. This argument was in terms repelled relying upon an earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh('): Repelling this contention of the Advocate-General of Madras would mean that the power of acquisition of property is not ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry but in substance it is an independent power by itself.\n\nThis also becomes clear from Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's case (supra)wherein Das, J. in his concurring judgment repelled the argument of the learned Attorney-General appearing for the State contending that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a law made with respect to matters mentioned in entry 18, List II and not in entry 36, List IT.\n\nEntry 18 in List II read : 'Land and Land tenures, etc.' and it was contended that the impugned legislation was on the subject of land and tenures and would cover acquisition of land also.\n\nNegativing this contention it was held that in that event entry 36 in List II would become redundant. The pertinent observation is as under :\n\n\"In my opinion, to give a meaning and content to each of the two legislative heads under entry 18 and entry 36 in\n\nList II the former should be read as a legislative category or H head comprising land and land tenures and all matters\n\n(ll [1952] S. C. R. 889.\n\n, connected therewith other than acquisition of land which should be read as covered by entry 36 in List l l.\"\n\nIt thus clearly transpires that the observation in Cooper\"s case supra extracted above that power to legislate. for acquisition of property is exercisable only under entry 42 oI list III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three Lists, is borne out from Raiamundary Electric Supply Corporation case and Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's cases (supra).\n\nIt was, however, urged that this propos1t10n runs counter to the decision of a Constitution Bench of six judges in State of West Bengal\n\nv. Union of India. (1) In that case the State of West Bengal filed a suit against the Union of India challenging the constitutional validity of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, on the ground that the Act to the extent it applied to the lands vested in or owned by the State was beyond legislative competence of Parliament. Power to acquire coal bearing land owned iir possessed by the State of West Bengal was amongst others claimed as an integral element of control acquired by the Union pursuant to a declaration made in s. 2 of the IDR Act and Mines and Minerals Act enacted in exercise of the legislative power under entries 52 and 54 respectively as coal was both a declared industry and a specified mineral. This contention was partly accepted to repel! the contention that the Union has no . power to acquire the property vested in the State since the State itself is also a sovereign awhority. The contention that the p; npcrty of State cannot be acquired by the Union under entry 42 of List III was repelled. In reaching this conclusion, another contention was rejected w])ich was also advanced before us. viz., that if power of acquisition is treated as an independent power both of the Union and the State and could be exercised by the Union and the State with respect to the same property it would lead to such a confusion that there would be no end to it. A picture of fearful constitutional impasse was drawn urging that the State may acquire_ property of nn Industrial undertaking of a declared industry in exercise of the power under entry 42, List III, and the Union -may exercise the same power after control is acquired pursuant to declaration made as envisaged in entry 52 in respect of an ir, dustry and this merry-go-round needs to be averted by harmonious construction and reconciliation of power be!wcen the Union and the States. Such a situation is beyond the realm of practical possi-\n\nII) [1964J I S. C. R. 371.\n\nbility. His ;\\ild apprehension stands so effectively •answered by West A Bengal case (supra) that we cannot improve upon it. Pertinent observation may be extracted :\n\n\"Power to acquiic or requisition property may since the amendment, be exercised concurrently by the Union and the States.\n\nBut on that account confticting exercise of the p,1wer cannot be cnvihagcd. Article 31 (2) which deals with acquisition of all property requires two conditions to be fulfilled : (1) acquisition or requisitioning must be for a public purpo'se, (2) the law under which the property is acquired or requisitioned must provide for payment of compensation either fixed thereby, or on principles specified thereby.\n\ncl. (3) of Art. 31 no such law as is referred to' in cl. (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have efficacy unless such law has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.\n\nAs the President.exercises his authority with the advice of the Union Ministry, conflict by the effective exercise of power of acquisition in respect of the same subject-matter simultaneously by the Union, and the State, or by the S-tate following upon legislation by the Union cannot in practice be envisaged even as a possibility.\n\nArticle• 254, also negatives the possibility of such conflicting legislation.\n\nBy cl. (I) of that Article if a law made by the legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law competently made by Parliament, the State law is, subject to\n\ncl. 12) void. clause (2) recognizes limited validity of a State law on matters in the Concurrent List if that law is repugnant to an existing or earlier law made by Parliament, only if such law has been reserved for the consideration of the President. and has received his assent.\n\nBy the proviso authority is reserved to the Parbment to repeal a law having even this limited validity. Assent of the President to State legislation intended to nullify a !aw enacted by Parliament for acquisition pf State property for the purposes of the Union lies outside the realm of practical possibility.\"\n\n1berefcire, the contention that power of acquisition or requisitionin& of property in entry 42, List TU, if held to be an independent power wholly falling outside the control assumed by foe Union pur- II suant to the declaration envisaged by entry 52, List II, would lead to a sort of a constitutional impasse, is more imaginary than real.\n\nA Further, in the minority judgment, Subba Rao, J. has in this context said\n\n\"A declaration under entry 52 of List I would no doubt enable Parliament to make a law in respect of an industry, that is to say Parliament may mak;~ a law in respect of an existing industry or an industry that may be started subsequently.\n\nSo too. before the declaration a State Jegislatnre cou:d have made a law in respect of an industry by virtue of entry 24 of List II. But neither entry 24 of List II nor entry 52 of List I empowers the State legislature before the said declaration or the Parliament after such a declaration to make a law for acquisition of lands. If the State legislatnre before the declaration or the Parliament after the declaration wanted to acquire the land it can only proceed to make a law by virtue of entry 42 of List III.\"\n\nReliance was, however, placed on the following passage in West D Bengal case (supra) to urge that power of acquisition is an integral and inseparable concomitant of control assumed by the Union :\n\n\"By making the requisite decliµations under entry 54 of List I, the Union Parliament assumed power to regulate\n\nmims and minerals and thereby to deny to all agencies not under the control of the Union, authority to work the mines.\n\nIt could scarcely be imagined that the Constitution makers while intending to confer an exclusive power to work mines and minerals under the control of the Unio'n, still prevented effective exercise of that power by making it impossible compulsorily to acquire the land vested in the State containing minerals. The effective exercise of the power would depend-if such an argument is acceptednot upon the exercise of the power to undertake regulation\n\narid control by issuing a notification under entry 54, but upon the will of the State in the territory. of which mineral bearing land is situated.\n\nPower to legislate for regulation and devdopment of mines and minerals under the control of the Union would, by necessary implication include the power to acquire mines and minerals.\n\nPower to legislate for acquisition of property vested in the States cannot therefom be denied to the Parliament if it be exercised consistently with the protection afforded by Art. 31.\"\n\nThis observation, if properly understood. is in the context of the contention that State property could not be subjected to power of\n\neminent domain and, hence,· Union has no power to compulsorily acqnire the same.\n\nTherefore, there is no inner co\"nflict between Cooper case (supra) and West Bengal case (supra) on the point that power of acquisition is an independent power referable to entry 42, List III. However, even if there is a conflict between West Bengal case (supra) and Cooper case on this point, a later larger constitution Bench judgment in Cooper case would impliedly overrule the former to the extent of conflict.\n\nThre is on the contrary a good volume of authority for the proposition tha: the control assumed by the Union pursuant to declaration to the extent indicated in the statute making the declaration does not comprehend the power of acquisition if it is not so specifically spelt out.\n\nIn Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd. v.\n\nThe Stalt of Kera/a & Another,(') constitutional validity of Kannan Devan Hills (Resnmption of Lands) Act, 1971, was challenged on the ground of legislative competence of Kerala State legislature to enact the legislation.\n\nIt was urged that in view of the declaration made rn s. 2 of the Tea Act, 1853, Tea was a controlled industry and, therefore, the State legislature was denuded of any power to deal with the industry. It was further contended that tea plantation required extensive land and that resumption of land by the impugned legislation would directly and adversely affect the control taken over by the Union and, therefore, the State legislature was incompetent to enact the impugned legislation. This contention was repelled holding that the impugned legislation was in pith and substance one under entry 18 of List II read with entry 42, List III. In reaching this conclusion the Court held as under :\n\n\"It seems to us clear that the State has legislative competence to legisla'.e on entry 18, List II and entry 42 List III. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under entry 52 List I.\n\nEffect is not the same thing as subject-macter. If a State\n\nAct, oth•crwisc valid, has effect on a matter in List I it does not cease to be a legislation with respect to an entry in List II or List III.\n\nThe object of ss. 4 and 5 seems to be to enable the State to acquire all the .lands which do not fall within the categories (a), (b) and (c) of s. 4(1).\n\nThese provisions are really incidental to the exercise of the power of acquisition.\n\nThe State cannot be denied a power to ascertain what land should be acquired by it in the public\n\ninterest\".\n\n(I) (1973) J SCR 356.\n\nThis conclusion was sought to be buttressed bv reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Campany\n\nv. Attorney General,(') wherein it is observed as under :\n\n\"The appellant, the Candian Pacific R:y. Co., which\n\nownd and managed the Empress Ho:c; in Victoria, Ilritish Columbia, while not denying that the regulation of hours of work was ordinarily a matter of \"property and civil rights in the province\" under head 13 of s. 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, and accordingly within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature, contended, inter alia, that the company's activities had become snch an extensive and important element in the natio'nal economy of Canada that the dominion Parliament was entitled under the general powers conferred by the first part of s. 91 of the Act of 1867 to regulate all the affairs of the company, even where that involved legislating in relation to matters exclusively reserved to the provincial legislatures by s. 92\".\n\nIt can, therefore, be said with a _measure of confid!nce that legis lative power of the States under entry 24, List Il is eroded only to the extent control is assumed by the Union pursuant to a ckclaratio'n made by the Parliament in respect of declared industry as spelt out by legislative enactment and the field occupied by such enactment is the measure of erosion.\n\nSubject to such erosion, on the remainder the State legislature will have power to legislate in respect of declared industry without in any way trenching upon the occupied field.\n\nState legislature which is otherwise competent to deal with industry under entry 24, List II, can deal with that industry in exercise of other powern enabling it to legislate under different heads set out in Lists II and III and this power cannot be denied to the State.\n\nIn this connection it would be advantageous to refer to Chanarl. Mal case (supra). In that case constitution validity of Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973, and tho two notifications issued thereunder was challenged on the ground that the Act and the notifications issued thereunder were repugnant to the Mines & Minerals Act made by Parliament after making a declaration as co'n'.emp1ated by Entry 54, List I. The challenge was that the State legislature was incompetent to legislate on the topic of mines and minerals under entry 23, List II in view of the declaration made under entry 54, List I and the enactment of Act 67 of 1957 (Mines & Minerals Act)\n\nfl) [19501 A. C. 122.\n\nby the Parliament.\n\nBy the impugned Act and the notifications issued thereunder the State Government of Haryana purported to acquire rights to salt petre, a minor mineral in the land described in the Schedule appended to the notificcrtion and by the second impugned notification the State Government announced to the gneral public that certain salt petre bearing areas in the State of Haryana mentioned therein would k auctiond on the dates given there.\n\nRepelling the con:ention regarding legislative incompe'.ence it was observed that it is difficult to see how the field of acquisition could become\n\n' occupied by a Central Act in the same way as it had been i'n the West Bengal case (supra) even before Parliament legislates to acquire land in a State.\n\nAt least until Parliament has so legislated as it was shown to have done by the statut~ considered by this Court in the case from West Bengal, the field is free for State legislation fall- . ing under the express provisions of e'ntry 42 of List III. It was further ob•rved as under :\n\n\"It seems difficult to sustain the case that the provisions of the Central Act would be really unworkable by mere change of ownership of land in which mineral deposits are found.\n\nWe have :o judg:> the character of the Haryana Act by the substance and effect of its provisions and not merely by the purpose given in the statement of reasons and objects behind it.\n\nSuch statements of reasons are relevant when the object or purpose of an enaC:ment is in dispute or uncertain. They can never override the effect which follows logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its substantive provisions.\n\nSuch effect is the . best evidence of intention.\n\nA statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the statute, and, therefore, not even relevant in a case in which the language of the operative parts of the Act leaves no room whatsoever as it does not in the Haryana Act, to donbt what was meant by the legislators : It is not disputed here that the object and effect of the Haryana Act was to acquire proprietary right to mineral deposits in 'land\"' .\n\nThere is thus a long line of decisions which clearly establishes the proposition that power to legislate for acqnisition of property is an independent and separate power and is exercisable only under entry 42, List III and not as a'n incident of th~ power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists.\n\nThis power of the State legislature to legislate for acquisition of property remains intact and untramdled except to the extent where on\n\nassumptiou of control of an industry by a declaration as envisaged in entry 52, List I, a further power of acquisition is taken over by a specific legislation.\n\nAs already pointed ou', in pith and substance the impugned legislation is one for acquisition of scheduled undertakrngs and that field of acquisition is not occupied by the IDR Act which deals with coutrol of management, regulation and development of a declared industry and there is no repugnancy between the impugned legislation and the IDR Act.\n\nBoth can co-exist because the power acquired by the Union under the IDR Act can as well effectively be exercised after the acquisition of the scheduled undertakings as it could be exercised before the acquisition.\n\nTherefore. the contention that the State legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the impugned legislation must be negatived.\n\nA faint submission was made that nationalisation of industry as a national policy will have to be determined and enforced by the Union keeping in view i'.s Indmtrial Policy Resolntioh and such piece-meal nationalisation would certainly encroach upon the control assumed by the Union.\n\nImpugned legislation does not purport . to nationalise sugar industry in Uttar Pradesh.\n\nAnd th::re is no bar to a Government owned company or Corporation to set up sugar rnanufacturing undertaking under an appropriate licence.\n\nTherefore, the impugned legislatio'n on this account does not encroach upon the occupied field.\n\nThe second limb of the submission was that in any event the impugned legislation was designed and enacted to prevent mismanagement and to take over management of the scheduled undertakings as a seqnel to acquisition and it trenches into the field occupied by the IDR Act, a Central legislation, and to the extent acquisition enables the Corporation by vesting of the scheduled undertakings in it to take over control and manag::ment of the scheduled u'ndertakingl', the impugned legislation is void and umnforceable.\n\nScc'.ion 20 of the IDR Act was pressed into service to substantiate the submission.\n\nSection 20 of the IDR Act reads as under :-\n\n\"20. After the commencement of this Act, it shall not be competent for. any State Government or a local anthority to take over the management or control of any industrial undertaking under any law for the time being in force which authorises any such Govrnment or local authority so te> do\".\n\n~ •\n\n(J I\n\n< '\n\n.__\n\nIll I\n\n~· ;;) I\n\n'~ Cl.\n\n.. ,.\n\n-\"'\n\n\"'f ~\n\nSection 20 forbids a State Government or local authority from taki'ng over the management or control of any industrial undertaking in declared industry. On a correct interpretation, s. 20 precludes any State Government or local authority from taking over the control or management of any industrial undertaking under any law for the time beiilg in farce which authorises any such Government or local authority so to do.\n\nThe impugned legislation was not enacted for taking over management or control of any industrial undertaking by the State Government.\n\nIn pith and substance it was enacted to auire the scheduled undertakings. If an attempt was made to take over management or control of any industrial undertaking in a declared industry indisputably the bar of s. 20 would inhibit exercise of such executive power.\n\nHowever, if pursuant to a valid legislation for acquisition of scheduled undertaking the management stands transferred to the acquiring body it cannot be said .that this would be in violatien ef s. 20. Section 20 forbids. eJfecutive action of taking over management oF contrnl of any industrial undertaking under any law in force.,\n\nwhich authorises State Government or a local authority so to do .. The. inhibition of s. 20 is on exercise of executive power but if as a sequel to an-. acquisition of an industrial undertaking the management or. conti; ol of .the industrial undertaikng stands transferred to the acquir-. ing ; mthority s. 20 is not attracted at all.\n\nSection 20 does not precludeor forbid a State legislature exercising legislative power under an ent.ry other than .entry 24 of List II, and if in exercise of that legislative power\" to wit,. acquisition of an industrial .undertaking in a declared industry the consequential transfer of management or control over the industry or undertaking follows as an incident of acquisition, such taking over of management or control pursuant to ail exercise of legislative power is not within the inhibition of s . .20.\n\nTherefore, the contention that the impugned legislation violates s. 20 has no merit\n\nAnd now t9 the . oft J;>eaten track of Jegislatjon Qeiiig ; id as being in contravention of Art. 31 (2) as it stood at the relevant time.\n\nThe impugned legislation was put on the statute book on August 27, 1971.\n\nTherefore, Art. 31 (2) as it stood on. the relevant date may be noticed.\n\nThe Article as amended by Constitution (Twentyfifth Amendment) Act, 1971, will, therefore, not be attracted.\n\nArt. 31 (2) as it stood at the relevant time reads as under .:\n\n\"31 ( 2) . No property shall be compulsorily acquired\n\nH ' or requisitioned save for a public purpooe and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the 3.:.,.289SCl/80\n\nproperty so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes Im amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be detem1ined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court, on the ground that the compensatio)l provided by that law is n_(lt adequate.\"\n\nEmphasis was placed on the word 'compensation' retained in Art. 31 (2) after_ its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, and a reference, was made to Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, West Madras,(')wherein it was held by this Court that even after the amendment of Art. 31 (2) by the Constitution (Fourth Ame'ndment) Act, 1955, it still retains the expression 'compensation' after its judicial interpretation by this Court in several decisions, viz., to mean just equivalent to the expropriated owner.\n\nReference was then made to Union of India v.\n\nMetal Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr.,( 2) in which this Court affirmed the interpretation of the word 'compensation' to mean just equivalent. Approaching the matter from this angle the Court struck down the Metal Corporation of India (Acquisition) Act, 1965, holding that as the Act has laid down different principles for ascertaining the value of different parts of the undertaking and as all the principles so laid down do not provide for the just equivalent of all parts of the undertaking mentioned therein, the sum total also cannot obviously be a just equivalent of the undertaking. In reaching this conclusion exception was taken to assessing the value of the used machinery on the basis of written down value arrived at as per the provisions of the Income Tax Act.\n\nThis observation cannot be said to be any more good law in view of the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mangaldas & Ors., (S) wherein Shall, J ., speaking for the Court specifically overruled the Metal Corporation case (supra) observing as under:\n\n\"The Court then proceeded to hold that the two principles laid down in cl. (b) of Paragraph II of the Schedule to the Act-(i) that compensation was to be equal to the cost price in the case of unused machinery in good condi.- tion, and (ii) written down value as understood in the Income-tax law was to be the value of the used machinery were irrelevant to the fixation of the value of the machinery as on the date of acquisition.\"\n\n(I) [19651 1 S. C. R. 614.\n\n(2) [19671 1 S. c. R. 256\n\n(3) [19691 3 S. C.R. 341.\n\nISHWARI KHETAN SUC!AR MILLS v. U.P. STATE (Desai,!.) 3 5 7\n\n\"We are unable to agree with that part of the judgment.\n\nThe P.arliament had specified the principles for determining compensation of the undertaking of the company.\n\nThe principles expressly related to the determination of compensation payable in respxt of unused machinery in good condition and used machinery. The principles were set out avowedly for determination of compensation. The principles were not irrelevant to the determination of compensation and the compensation was not illusory.'\"\n\nIt thus appears well settled that if a legislation provides principles for determining compensation, to wit, written down value as understood in Income-tax law to be the value of the used machinery, that principle could neither be said to be irrelevant for determining the compensation nor the compensation so awarded could be styled as illusory.. It was, however, said that this decision in Shanti/al Manga/das is overruled in Cooper's case and, therefore, the wheel has moved the full circle and the expression 'compensation' and principle for determining the compensation as interpreted in Vajravelu Mudaliar's case (supra) is restored.\n\nThis is not borne out by the pertinent observation i'n Cooper's case (supra) which may be extracted :\n\n\"Both the lines of thought which converge in the ultimate result, support the view that the principle specified by the law for determination of compensation is beyond the pale of challenge, if it is relevant to the determination of compensation and is a recognized principle applicable in the determination of compensation for property compulsorily acquired and the principle is appropriate in determining the value of the class of property sought to be acquired.\n\nOn the application of the view expressed in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar's case or in Shanti/al Mangaldas's case the Act, in our judgment, is liab:e to be struck down as it fails to provide to the expropriated banks compensation determined according to relevant principles. Section 4 of the Act transfers the undertaking of ev~ named bank to and vests it in the corresponding new bank. Section 6 ( 1) provides for payment of compensation for acquisition of the undertaking and the compensation is to be determined, in accordance with the principles specified in the Second Schedule.\n\nSection 6(2) then provides that though separa!e valuations are made in respect of the several matter specified in Sch. II of the Act, the amount of compensation shall be deemed to be a single compensation. Compensation being the equivalent in terms\n\nof money of the property compulsorily acquired, the principle for determination of compensation is intended to award to the expropriated owner the value of the property acquired. The science of valuation of property recognizes several principles or methods for determining the value to be paid as compensation to the owner for loss of his prope1ty : there are different methods applicable to different classes of property in the dterminatio'n of the value to be paid as recompense for loss of his property.\n\nA method appropriate to the determination of value of one class of property may be wholly inappropriate in determining the value of another class of property. If an appropriate method or principle for determination of compensation is applied, the fact that by the application of another pri'nciple which is also appropriate, a different value is reached, the Court will not be justified in entertaining the contention that ont of the two appropriate methods, one more generons to the owner should have been applied by the legislature.\" However, it was pointed ont that Shela!, J. speaking for hintself and Grover, J. in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru\n\nv. State of Kerala,(') in terms observed as under :\n\n\"in State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mangaldas & Ors. the decision in Metal Corporation of India was overruled which itself was overruled by R. C. Cooper v. Union of India.\"\n\nThe question is whether the statement of law in ShantilaJ Mangaldas (supra) that the principle of awarding compensation on the basis of written down value for used machinery is a valid principle for determining compensation and whether the compensation so awarded was illusory is not overruled by any observation in Cooper's case.\n\nUndoubtedly, in Kesavananda Bharati case (supra) it is reiterated by Hegde, J. speaking for hintself and Mukherjeao, J. that it will be for the aggrieved party to clearly satisfy the Court that the basis adopted by the legislature has no reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired or that the amount to be paid has been arbitrarily fixed or that the same is illusory return for the property taken.\n\nChandrachud, J. (as he then was), while interpreting the expression 'amount' in the amended Art. 31 (2) observed as under :\n\n\"The specific obligation to pay an \"amount\" and i'n the alternative the use of the word \"principles\" for determination Qf that amount must mean that the amount fixed or\n\n(1) [1973] Suppl: S. CR. 1\n\n·~\n\ndetermined to be paid cannot be illusory. If the right to property still finds a place in the Constitution, you cannot mock at the man and ridicule hi~ right.\n\nYou cannot tell him 'I will take your fortune for a farthing'.\"\n\nBut in the next breath it has been observed that \"the amount fixed for being paid to the owner is wholly beyond the paie of cha!· lenge that it is i'nadecjuate. The concept of adequacy is directly co-related to the market value of the property and therefore, such\n\nvalue cannot constitute an element of that challenge.\" But this was the situation after amendment of Art. 31 (2) by the Constitution (Tvrentyfifth Amendment) Act.\n\nEven as the article stood at the relevant time it was open to the legislature to fix pri'nciple for determining compensation and unless it is shown that the principles are irrelevant to the determination of the value of the property or by working out the compensation according to the principles so specified the compensation becomes illusory, the principles themselves are beyond the pale of challenge before a court of law on the ground that they do not provide adequate compensation. Now, here the compensation is worked out and specified in the schedule to the impugned Act. The compensation is determined in rou'nd figure.\n\nThis Court has in terms accepted that payment of compensation on the basis of written down value calculated according to the Incometax law for used machinery is not irrelevant as a principle for determining compensation.\n\nThat principle appears to haw been adopted for valuing used machinery though the Jegis!atfon fixes compensation payable to each undertaking in round sum.\n\nAnd that was the only part challenged.\n\nIt was, however, said that no principle is discernible because not only none was stated on the floor 'Of the House but to a specific question the reply was that principle is not to be disclosed.\n\nDebate , in legislature cannot conclude the point.\n\nHere the principle is discernible and that appears to be valid. It represents the collective will of the House. To reject it would tantamount to saying that the majority members voted without understanding and appreciating the principles.\n\nHowever, the principle is extracted in court room debate and it i§ a valid principle.\n\nA peep into the background leading to the acquisition of the scheuled undertakings would reveal that these scheduled undertakings had a heavy back-load of carried forward loss, that even though they were taking sugar cane from cane growers, i.e. the farmers, they failed to pay them the price of sugar cane. There was labour unrest as labour was not paid.\n\nGenerally speaking, they can be styled as\n\nsick undertakings and become a drag on the economy of the area.\n\nThere was no scope for ploughing back the profits to rejuvenate the\n\nmachill!ry because there was no profit.\n\nThe situation had not improV'oo even when managements of some of the undertakings were taken over under the IDR Act and, therefore, this desparate situation called for a drastic remedy in public interest and while applying that drastic remedy of acquisition principles which are valid for determining the value of machinery were adopted. The adequacy or otherwise of compensation on the calculus made by applying the principle is beyond the judicial review. It would be a day time hallucination to call such principle irrelevant or compensation illusory.\n\nThe challenge to the validity of the impugned legislation on the ground of violation of Art. 31 (2) niust accordingly fail.\n\nThere remain two minor and incidental points mentioned ill passing.\n\nThe submissions themselves lacked emphasis.\n\nThey are, that ( 1) no compensation is provided for the agricultural land taken over by the State; (2) good-will of the scheduled undertakings was not evaluated as a component of compensation.\n\nWith reference to Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., it was said that 36 acres of agricultural land belonging to the company owning too scheduled undertaking was taken over without compensation. It was countered by saying that agricultural land is not taken over. It is not clear from the pleadings and record whether agricultural land outside the structures of scheduled undertaking has been acquired and has at all ben taken over by the Corporation. It may be that between various structures of scheduled undertakings there might be some open land but that is part and parcel of scheduled uncfortakings because any other co'nstruction would show that a passage or road between two constructions could not be acquired.\n\nUnless, therefore, it is specifically shown that while acquiring scheduled undertakings agricultural land belonging to the company or the owner owning scheduled undertaking was either acquired or taken over as part of the acquisition it is not possible to accept the submission that there was acquisition of agricultural land without providing compensation for the same.\n\nAnd as for the good-will, less said the better. The scheduled undertakings were sick units and the sickness was chronic. A manufacturing unit with heavy carried forward loss and defaulting in payments, possibly facing appointment of Receivers for realising tax arrears, asks compensation for the good-will generated by it.\n\nThis good-will appears to be more imaginary than real or an argument to support an untenable submission.\n\nBut the better answer is that there\n\nJSHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS v. U.P. STATE (Desai, l.) 361\n\ncannot be a good-will of a manufacturing undertaking but it can be of a company, a partnership, or a proprietor owning scheduled under\n\ntaking and neither the company nor the partnership nor the proprietory unit, if any, has been acquired under the impugned legislation .\n\nTherefore, i'n evaluating compensation of the scheduled undertakings there is no question of evaluating the good-will.\n\nMr. R. A. Gupta appearing in SLP. 6252/79 raised an additional contention that the impugned Act is violative of Art. 14 in. that selection of petitioners' scheduled undertakings for acquisition is wholly arbitrary and there is no difference between those selected for acquisition and those left out through all such sugar, undertakings in the State of Uttar Pradesh were similarly situated and similarly circumstanced. Sustenance was largely sought to be drawn from the Report of Justice Bhargava styled as Sugar Industry Inquiry Commission, 1974, which inter alia, specified 17 sugar undertakings in Uttar Pradesh as prima facie sick sugar mills.\n\nAfter reading out a portion of the Report it was said that classifying the 12 sugar undertakings for acquisition is not based on any intelligible differentia between those included in the group for acquisitiou aud those left out and that this differential treatment has no rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislation.\n\nOn behalf of respondents learned Advocate-General for the State of Uttar Pradesh countered this contention by pointing out that, before acquiring the scheduled undertakings the Government had a close review of the condition of the sugar undertakings done for certain specific period set out in the affidavit and ascertained whether the situation had become desperate on acconnt of the persistent default in paymen_t of cane price, purchase tax, labour dues, etc. The situation in Uttar Pradesh appears to be peculiar in that cane growers go on selling their cane to sugar undertakings probably having little or no option in this behalf because it is a perishable commodity and must be disposed of as early as possible and they have to await payment at the sweet will, whim and caprice of the sugar barons.\n\nIts unhealthy effect on marginal farmers wo'uld be intolerable because the cash crop would not fetch any cash and destitution may be the inevitable outcome. And this phenomenon was repeated yar after year. It was pointed out that a close scrutiny was applied to' this persistent default and where the situation in respect of sugar undertakings was desj:l\\lrate they were classified together and they were sought to be acquired.\n\nCan it be said , that this classification is not based on any intelligible differentia. Economic situation of an industrial undertaking may be very good, good, average, bad, intolerable and uneconomic in larger national perspective.\n\nIt would. have been difficult for the Gove=ent to group all sugar undertakings with such as were living on coramine doses.\n\nThere does appar to be the intelligible differentia by which this c!assificatioa of those in an intolerable condition has been grouped together. Acquisition was for an avowed object of rejuvenating these undertakings\n\nand thereby improving the economy of the area by providing priority in payment to cane growers, labour, in respect of whom there is no ct1Shio11 for sufferance.\n\nThus, this differentia undoubtedly has a rational relationship to the obj-xt sought to be achieved by the Act. The challenge of Art. 14 was an argument of despair and must be repelled.\n\nThese were all the contentions in these appeals and SlJ\"..Cial leave petitions and as there is no merit in any of them, the appeals and the special leave petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in o\"nO set.\n\nPATHAK, J.-We have had the benefit of reading the judgment prepared by our brother Desai.\n\nWhile we broadly agree with the final conclusions reached by him on the several points debated before us, we would prefer to refrain from expressing any opinion on the question whether the declaration made by Parliament in S. 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 in respect of the industries specified in the First Schedule to that Act caa be regarded as limited to removing from the scope of Entry 24 of List ll of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution only so much of the legislative field as is covered by the subject matter and content of that Act or it can be regarded as effecting the removal from that Entry of the entire legislative field embracing all matters pertaining to the industries specified in the declaration. It seems to ns that the observations made by this court in The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co., Ltd. and Others v. The St'ate of Orissa and Others,(') State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and Co.,( 2 ) Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar & Ors.(') and State of Haryana & Anr. v. Chanan Mal, etc.(4 ) cannot be of assistance in this behalf.\n\nIn each of those cases, the declaration made by Parliament in the concerned enactment limited the control of the regulation of tlie mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided in the enactment.\n\nWhether the terms in which the declaration has been framed in s. 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act-a tlu:laration not expressly limiting control of the specific indus-\n\n(1) [1961] 2 s. c. R. 537.\n\n(2) [1964) 4 s. c. R. 461.\n\n(3) [1970] 2 S. C.R. 100.\n\n(4) [1976] 3 S. C.R. 688.\n\nISHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS v. U.P. STATE (Pathak, !.) 363\n\ntries to the extent provided by the Act---<:an be construed s being so limited is a matter which, we think, we should deal with m some more appropriate case.\n\nThe range of considerations encompassed within the field of enquiry to which the point is amenable has not, to our mind, been sufficiently covered before us.\n\nAnd for good reason.\n\nThe provocation was limited.\n\nFor the controversy tn the present cases concerning the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the U.P. Sugar_ Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 can be adoquate!y disposed of on the ground that the legislation falls within Entry 42 of List III and cannot be related to Entry 52 of List I or Entry 24 of List II. When the impugned enactment tmly falls within Entry 42 of List III-\"acquisition and requisitioning of property\"-there is a reluctance to enter upon an examination of the - mutually competing claims of Entry 52 of List I and Entry 24 of List II-entries which deal with \"industries\", an entirely different subject matter.\n\nWith this reservation, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the _ D ultimate conclusions reached by our learned brother on the remaining\n\npoints ol controversy and in concurring with the order proposed by him cli>posing of these appeals and special leave petitions.\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppealo< dismissed.", "total_entities": 213, "entities": [{"text": "THE ISHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS (P.) LTD.\n\n& ANOTHER ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ISHWARI KHETAN SUGAR MILLS (P.) LTD. & ANOTHER ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. 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State' SUgar Corporation Limited."}}, {"text": "High Court impugning the constitutional validity of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 684, "end_char": 743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1015, "end_char": 1023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Court impugning the constitutional validity of the Act", "statute": "High Court impugning the constitutional validity of the Act"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliament alone is."}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 SCR 688", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2327, "end_char": 2343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2383, "end_char": 2392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPCTRTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.-", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2673, "end_char": 2713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, Parliament, has made a declaration for assuming control in respect\n\nSUPREME COURT REPCTRTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.-\n\nA of tho declared industries set out in the schedule of the Act only to the extont\n\nprovided in tho Act."}}, {"text": "Tho Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3139, "end_char": 3154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the acquisition under the impugned Act ruuf vesting of the undertakings in the Corporation they would still be' under the c<>ntrol of tho Central Government because the Corporation wonld be amenable co the authority and jurisdiction of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6916, "end_char": 6926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7305, "end_char": 7315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7386, "end_char": 7396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7595, "end_char": 7605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8158, "end_char": 8168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rustom Cavasjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8860, "end_char": 8875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[360 C, 359 H p 360 Bl\n\nRustom Cavasjee, Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530 at 567, Vajra, velll Mudafiar v. Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition West Madras [19651 1 SCll 614, Union of India v. Metal Corpoiaticn of India Ltd. & Anr. ["}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8902, "end_char": 8918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 341", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9150, "end_char": 9166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "rathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9275, "end_char": 9281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rathak & Koshal II (concurring in the result)\n\nIt is not necessMy in' this case to express any opinion 1 on the question whether the declaration made by Parliament in section 2 of the Industries (Development arui Regulation) Act, 1951 in respect of the industies specified in the Firsq iclteduie to that Act can be regarded as limited to removing from the scope of Enli:v 24 of List II of tho Seventh Schedule to the Constitution only so much of tire legislative field as is covered."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9442, "end_char": 9451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9668, "end_char": 9684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1961] 2 SCR 537", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10290, "end_char": 10306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 SCR 688", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10458, "end_char": 10474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10940, "end_char": 10953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bhaskar Gupta, Rajesh Khaitan, Rohington Nariman and P. R. Seethrama for the Appellants in CA 1614/79."}}, {"text": "Bhaskar Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10955, "end_char": 10968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bhaskar Gupta, Rajesh Khaitan, Rohington Nariman and P. R. Seethrama for the Appellants in CA 1614/79."}}, {"text": "Rajesh Khaitan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10970, "end_char": 10984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bhaskar Gupta, Rajesh Khaitan, Rohington Nariman and P. R. Seethrama for the Appellants in CA 1614/79."}}, {"text": "Rohington Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10986, "end_char": 11003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bhaskar Gupta, Rajesh Khaitan, Rohington Nariman and P. R. Seethrama for the Appellants in CA 1614/79."}}, {"text": "P. R. Seethrama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11008, "end_char": 11023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F. S. Nariman, Bhaskar Gupta, Rajesh Khaitan, Rohington Nariman and P. R. Seethrama for the Appellants in CA 1614/79."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11059, "end_char": 11068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Manoj Swarup, Miss I, alita Kohli and S. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA No."}}, {"text": "Manoj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11070, "end_char": 11082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Manoj Swarup, Miss I, alita Kohli and S. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA No."}}, {"text": "I,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11089, "end_char": 11091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Manoj Swarup, Miss I, alita Kohli and S. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA No."}}, {"text": "alita Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11092, "end_char": 11103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Manoj Swarup, Miss I, alita Kohli and S. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11108, "end_char": 11124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, Manoj Swarup, Miss I, alita Kohli and S. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in CA No."}}, {"text": "E R. A. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11194, "end_char": 11207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E R. A. Gupta for the Petitioner in SLP No."}}, {"text": "N. N. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11248, "end_char": 11260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Sharma and N. N. Kacker for the Petitioner in SLP No."}}, {"text": "N. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11265, "end_char": 11277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Sharma and N. N. Kacker for the Petitioner in SLP No."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11318, "end_char": 11334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Att."}}, {"text": "Rishi Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11360, "end_char": 11369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rishi Ram Adv."}}, {"text": "Raju. Ramchandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11404, "end_char": 11421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raju."}}, {"text": "0. P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11426, "end_char": 11436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramchandran and 0."}}, {"text": "V. R. KriShna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11494, "end_char": 11512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Judgment of V. R. KriShna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D. A. Desai, JJ.", "canonical_name": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "S. Murtaza Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11514, "end_char": 11534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Judgment of V. R. KriShna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D. A. Desai, JJ."}}, {"text": "D. A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11539, "end_char": 11550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Judgment of V. R. KriShna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D. A. Desai, JJ.", "canonical_name": "D. A. DESAI"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11573, "end_char": 11578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Desai, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate Opinion on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himsel[\n\nDESAI, J.-Acquisition of industrial undertakings involved in .manufacturing sugar, a commodity satisfying the basic necessity, in larger public interest and the attempt of the owners of the undertakin~ to thwart the same, paints the famili_ar landscape in this group of appeals.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "R. S. Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11584, "end_char": 11596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Desai, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate Opinion on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himsel[\n\nDESAI, J.-Acquisition of industrial undertakings involved in .manufacturing sugar, a commodity satisfying the basic necessity, in larger public interest and the attempt of the owners of the undertakin~ to thwart the same, paints the famili_ar landscape in this group of appeals.", "canonical_name": "R. S. Pathak"}}, {"text": "A. D. Koshal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11638, "end_char": 11650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Desai, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate Opinion on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himsel[\n\nDESAI, J.-Acquisition of industrial undertakings involved in .manufacturing sugar, a commodity satisfying the basic necessity, in larger public interest and the attempt of the owners of the undertakin~ to thwart the same, paints the famili_ar landscape in this group of appeals.", "canonical_name": "A. D. KOSHAL, JJ"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11668, "end_char": 11673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Desai, J., R. S. Pathak, J. gave a separate Opinion on behalf of A. D. Koshal, J. and himsel[\n\nDESAI, J.-Acquisition of industrial undertakings involved in .manufacturing sugar, a commodity satisfying the basic necessity, in larger public interest and the attempt of the owners of the undertakin~ to thwart the same, paints the famili_ar landscape in this group of appeals.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Uttar.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12045, "end_char": 12051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a sequel to the serious problems created by the owners of certain sugar mills in the State of Uttar."}}, {"text": "Governor of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12355, "end_char": 12380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh for cane growers and labour employed in sugar mills, having an adverse impact on the general economy of tbe areas where these sugar mills were-situated and with a view to ameliorating the situation posing a threat to tlie economy,\n\nISHWARI Kl!ETAN SUGAR MILLS v. U.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 335\n\nthe Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance on July 3, 1971, styled as U.P. Sugar Undertaking (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1971 (13 of 1971) ('Ordinance' ot short), with a view to transferring and vesting sugar undertakings set out in the Schedule to the Ordinance in the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. ('Corporation' for short), a Government Company within the meaning of s. 671 of the Companies Act, 1956."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12409, "end_char": 12421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh for cane growers and labour employed in sugar mills, having an adverse impact on the general economy of tbe areas where these sugar mills were-situated and with a view to ameliorating the situation posing a threat to tlie economy,\n\nISHWARI Kl!ETAN SUGAR MILLS v. U.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 335\n\nthe Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance on July 3, 1971, styled as U.P. Sugar Undertaking (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1971 (13 of 1971) ('Ordinance' ot short), with a view to transferring and vesting sugar undertakings set out in the Schedule to the Ordinance in the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. ('Corporation' for short), a Government Company within the meaning of s. 671 of the Companies Act, 1956."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12630, "end_char": 12663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh for cane growers and labour employed in sugar mills, having an adverse impact on the general economy of tbe areas where these sugar mills were-situated and with a view to ameliorating the situation posing a threat to tlie economy,\n\nISHWARI Kl!ETAN SUGAR MILLS v. U.P. STATE (Desai, J.) 335\n\nthe Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance on July 3, 1971, styled as U.P. Sugar Undertaking (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1971 (13 of 1971) ('Ordinance' ot short), with a view to transferring and vesting sugar undertakings set out in the Schedule to the Ordinance in the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. ('Corporation' for short), a Government Company within the meaning of s. 671 of the Companies Act, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 671", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12734, "end_char": 12740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12748, "end_char": 12767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13041, "end_char": 13045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13288, "end_char": 13308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .the promulgation of the Ordinance 11 writ petitions were filed in the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Ordinance and when the Act replaced the Ordinance effective from August 27, 1971, the writ petitions were amended incorporating the challeng(\\ to the Act also."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13315, "end_char": 13326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "August 27, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13459, "end_char": 13474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .the promulgation of the Ordinance 11 writ petitions were filed in the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Ordinance and when the Act replaced the Ordinance effective from August 27, 1971, the writ petitions were amended incorporating the challeng(\\ to the Act also."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13735, "end_char": 13742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13901, "end_char": 13914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14006, "end_char": 14013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14098, "end_char": 14109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the High Court by a common judgment dated May 3, 1979, repelled the contentions on behalf of the petitioners and upheld the constitutional validity of the Act."}}, {"text": "U.P. State legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14427, "end_char": 14449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. F. S. Nariman, learned counsel who led on behalf of the G appellants, confined his attack to two grounds : (a) U.P. State legislature lacked legislative competence to enact the impugned Act; and (b) compensation awarded f.or acquisition in violative of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14569, "end_char": 14576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "R. A.\n\nGupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14717, "end_char": 14729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. A.\n\nGupta who appeared in SLP.", "canonical_name": "R. A.\n\nGupta"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14837, "end_char": 14844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15497, "end_char": 15546, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "U. P. State legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15720, "end_char": 15743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act sugar being a declared industry, that industry goes out pf Entry 24 List II, and hence U. P. State legislature was denuded of all legislative power to legislate in respect of sugar industry and as the impugned legislation is in respect of industrial undertaking in sugar industry, thel impugned legislation is void on account of legislative incompetence. '"}}, {"text": "List III is an independent wwer and the impugned Act being in pith and substance an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16102, "end_char": 16189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16543, "end_char": 16548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III is an independent wwer and the impugned Act being in pith and substance an Act", "statute": "List III is an independent wwer and the impugned Act being in pith and substance an Act"}}, {"text": "Indusries", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16951, "end_char": 16960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indusries, the control of which by the Union is decla\n\n1 d by parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.\""}}, {"text": "parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19522, "end_char": 19532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the former -case if a declaration is made by the Parliament that the particular industry is necessary for the purpose of defence or for prosecution of the war, parliament would be exclusively entitled to legislate in respect of\n\nthat industry to the exclusion of State legislatures because the requisite .declaration will have the effect of taldng out that industry from entry 24, List 11 A declaration by the parliament by Jaw to assume control over any particular industry in public interest is a sine qua 1Wn to clothe Parliament with power under entry 52, List I to legisiate in respect of that industry because otherwise industry as a general head of Jegislation is in the exclusive sphere of State legislative activity pursuant to entry 24, List II."}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20180, "end_char": 20188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20426, "end_char": 20434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20568, "end_char": 20584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21120, "end_char": 21136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, entry 52 , List I on its own language does not provide a field of legislative activity for the Union Parliament unless and until a declaration is made by parliament by law to assume control over specified industries."}}, {"text": "Chanan Mal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24836, "end_char": 24846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o/.\n\nChanan Mal, etc.(')"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24995, "end_char": 24999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25557, "end_char": 25568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is difficult to see how the field of acquisition could become occupied\n\nhy a central Act in the same way as it had been in the West Bengal case even before Parliament legislates to acquire land in a State.\""}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26106, "end_char": 26110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26284, "end_char": 26298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26720, "end_char": 26724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29098, "end_char": 29102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30299, "end_char": 30313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 3 to 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30342, "end_char": 30358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30512, "end_char": 30517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31424, "end_char": 31428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Visions of the IDR Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31598, "end_char": 31620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31948, "end_char": 31952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Visions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Visions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Baijnath Kedia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32253, "end_char": 32267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is clearly borne out not only by the decision in Baijnath Kedia's case (supra) where undoubtedly while referring to the control assumed by the Union by a declaration made in s. 2 of the Mines & Minerals Act, it was said that to what extent such a declaration would go is for Parliament to determine and this must be commensurate with public interest, and once this declaration is made and the extent laid down, the subject of legislation to the extent laid down becomes an exclusive subject for legislation by Parliament."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32378, "end_char": 32382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II to enact any legislation in respect of declared industry so as to encroach upon the field of control occupied by IDR Act", "statute": "List II to enact any legislation in respect of declared industry so as to encroach upon the field of control occupied by IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35532, "end_char": 35540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "etc.(3) Untwalia, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench has in terms stated that the pith and substance of the Act has to be looked into and an incidental trespass would not invalidate the law."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36621, "end_char": 36630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36734, "end_char": 36743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36782, "end_char": 36791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37037, "end_char": 37046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37155, "end_char": 37164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 S. C.R. 33", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37241, "end_char": 37260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 1 S. C.R. 552", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37267, "end_char": 37287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37357, "end_char": 37366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37444, "end_char": 37454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37479, "end_char": 37484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37577, "end_char": 37587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act", "statute": "Parliament to assume control over sugar industry as manifested by the various provisions of the IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37639, "end_char": 37649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37773, "end_char": 37783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Unipn", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38293, "end_char": 38298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A comprehensive examination of all the provisions of the Act indisputably shows that in pith and substance the impugned Act is one Act for acquisition of scheduled undertakings and such acqaisition by transfer of ownership of the scheduled undertakings to the Corporation would in no way come in conflict with any of the provisions of the IDR Act or would not trench upon any control exercised by the Unipn under the various provisions of the IDR .Act."}}, {"text": "ss. 18A and 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38600, "end_char": 38615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38886, "end_char": 38890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provision contained in Chapter IIIAC of IDR Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39171, "end_char": 39218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Goyt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39227, "end_char": 39239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provision contained in Chapter IIIAC of IDR Act enables Central Goyt."}}, {"text": "s. 3(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39706, "end_char": 39713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provision contained in Chapter IIIAC of IDR Act", "statute": "Provision contained in Chapter IIIAC of IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Nu provision from IDR Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41177, "end_char": 41202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41855, "end_char": 41859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nu provision from IDR Act", "statute": "Nu provision from IDR Act"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44535, "end_char": 44539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E This position is unquestionably established by the majority decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India(') where Shah, J. speaking for the majority of 10 Judges held as under :\n\n\"power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under entry 42 of List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists.\""}}, {"text": "Rajamundry Electric Supply Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45003, "end_char": 45041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged that the proposition culled out from Rajamundry Electric Supply Corporation case by Shah, J. in R. C. Cooper's(') case is not borne out by the observation 'in the first mentioned case."}}, {"text": "R. C. Cooper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45062, "end_char": 45074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged that the proposition culled out from Rajamundry Electric Supply Corporation case by Shah, J. in R. C. Cooper's(') case is not borne out by the observation 'in the first mentioned case."}}, {"text": "High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45569, "end_char": 45579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This challenge failed in the High Court\n\n(1) [19701 3 S. C.R. 530 at 567."}}, {"text": "Constitution legislation then governed by the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45801, "end_char": 45876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "On behalf of the State the Act was sought to be sustained on the ground that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46006, "end_char": 46090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "After scrutinising the Act this Court came to the conclusion that in pith and substance the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46260, "end_char": 46355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46535, "end_char": 46541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, in that case the Advocate-General , of Madras in his effort to save the impugned legislation advanced an argument before the Constitution Bench that : 'There was implicit in every entry in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, an inherent power to make a law with respect to a matter ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry.'"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46621, "end_char": 46639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, in that case the Advocate-General , of Madras in his effort to save the impugned legislation advanced an argument before the Constitution Bench that : 'There was implicit in every entry in the legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, an inherent power to make a law with respect to a matter ancillary or incidental to the subject-matter of each entry.'"}}, {"text": "Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47546, "end_char": 47581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This also becomes clear from Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's case (supra)wherein Das, J. in his concurring judgment repelled the argument of the learned Attorney-General appearing for the State contending that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a law made with respect to matters mentioned in entry 18, List II and not in entry 36, List IT.", "canonical_name": "Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47604, "end_char": 47607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This also becomes clear from Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's case (supra)wherein Das, J. in his concurring judgment repelled the argument of the learned Attorney-General appearing for the State contending that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a law made with respect to matters mentioned in entry 18, List II and not in entry 36, List IT."}}, {"text": "Attorney-General appearing for the State contending that the Bihar Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47676, "end_char": 47759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raiamundary Electric Supply Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48893, "end_char": 48932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for acquisition of property is exercisable only under entry 42 oI list III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three Lists, is borne out from Raiamundary Electric Supply Corporation case and Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's cases (supra)."}}, {"text": "Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48942, "end_char": 48979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for acquisition of property is exercisable only under entry 42 oI list III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three Lists, is borne out from Raiamundary Electric Supply Corporation case and Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's cases (supra).", "canonical_name": "Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh's"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49136, "end_char": 49150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Union of India. ("}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49173, "end_char": 49193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) In that case the State of West Bengal filed a suit against the Union of India challenging the constitutional validity of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, on the ground that the Act to the extent it applied to the lands vested in or owned by the State was beyond legislative competence of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49219, "end_char": 49233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) In that case the State of West Bengal filed a suit against the Union of India challenging the constitutional validity of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, on the ground that the Act to the extent it applied to the lands vested in or owned by the State was beyond legislative competence of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49281, "end_char": 49339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49687, "end_char": 49691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51470, "end_char": 51480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51814, "end_char": 51821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52607, "end_char": 52613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53579, "end_char": 53588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Further, in the minority judgment, Subba Rao, J. has in this context said\n\n\"A declaration under entry 52 of List I would no doubt enable Parliament to make a law in respect of an industry, that is to say Parliament may mak;~ a law in respect of an existing industry or an industry that may be started subsequently."}}, {"text": "West D Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54434, "end_char": 54447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was, however, placed on the following passage in West D Bengal case (supra) to urge that power of acquisition is an integral and inseparable concomitant of control assumed by the Union :\n\n\"By making the requisite decliµations under entry 54 of List I, the Union Parliament assumed power to regulate\n\nmims and minerals and thereby to deny to all agencies not under the control of the Union, authority to work the mines."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55764, "end_char": 55771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57010, "end_char": 57014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tea Act, 1853", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57022, "end_char": 57035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58107, "end_char": 58118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58237, "end_char": 58244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Candian Pacific R:y. Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58675, "end_char": 58699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This conclusion was sought to be buttressed bv reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Campany\n\nv. Attorney General,(') wherein it is observed as under :\n\n\"The appellant, the Candian Pacific R:y. Co., which\n\nownd and managed the Empress Ho:c; in Victoria, Ilritish Columbia, while not denying that the regulation of hours of work was ordinarily a matter of \"property and civil rights in the province\" under head 13 of s. 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, and accordingly within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature, contended, inter alia, that the company's activities had become snch an extensive and important element in the natio'nal economy of Canada that the dominion Parliament was entitled under the general powers conferred by the first part of s. 91 of the Act of 1867 to regulate all the affairs of the company, even where that involved legislating in relation to matters exclusively reserved to the provincial legislatures by s. 92\"."}}, {"text": "Victoria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58746, "end_char": 58754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This conclusion was sought to be buttressed bv reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Campany\n\nv. Attorney General,(') wherein it is observed as under :\n\n\"The appellant, the Candian Pacific R:y. Co., which\n\nownd and managed the Empress Ho:c; in Victoria, Ilritish Columbia, while not denying that the regulation of hours of work was ordinarily a matter of \"property and civil rights in the province\" under head 13 of s. 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, and accordingly within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature, contended, inter alia, that the company's activities had become snch an extensive and important element in the natio'nal economy of Canada that the dominion Parliament was entitled under the general powers conferred by the first part of s. 91 of the Act of 1867 to regulate all the affairs of the company, even where that involved legislating in relation to matters exclusively reserved to the provincial legislatures by s. 92\"."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58918, "end_char": 58923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British North America Act, 1867", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58931, "end_char": 58962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59177, "end_char": 59183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This conclusion was sought to be buttressed bv reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Campany\n\nv. Attorney General,(') wherein it is observed as under :\n\n\"The appellant, the Candian Pacific R:y. Co., which\n\nownd and managed the Empress Ho:c; in Victoria, Ilritish Columbia, while not denying that the regulation of hours of work was ordinarily a matter of \"property and civil rights in the province\" under head 13 of s. 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, and accordingly within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature, contended, inter alia, that the company's activities had become snch an extensive and important element in the natio'nal economy of Canada that the dominion Parliament was entitled under the general powers conferred by the first part of s. 91 of the Act of 1867 to regulate all the affairs of the company, even where that involved legislating in relation to matters exclusively reserved to the provincial legislatures by s. 92\"."}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59282, "end_char": 59287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59466, "end_char": 59471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the British North America Act, 1867", "statute": "the British North America Act, 1867"}}, {"text": "Chanarl. Mal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60352, "end_char": 60364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it would be advantageous to refer to Chanarl."}}, {"text": "List I and the enactment of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60900, "end_char": 60931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Both can co-exist because the power acquired by the Union under the IDR Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64092, "end_char": 64167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64802, "end_char": 64815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to nationalise sugar industry in Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65658, "end_char": 65668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66061, "end_char": 66071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66243, "end_char": 66248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66826, "end_char": 66831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67076, "end_char": 67081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67083, "end_char": 67093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67300, "end_char": 67305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67518, "end_char": 67523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67550, "end_char": 67560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68125, "end_char": 68130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68237, "end_char": 68244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68369, "end_char": 68376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68542, "end_char": 68549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69188, "end_char": 69195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69450, "end_char": 69457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70691, "end_char": 70696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S) wherein Shall, J .,"}}, {"text": "Metal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 70753, "end_char": 70770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for the Court specifically overruled the Metal Corporation case (supra) observing as under:\n\n\"The Court then proceeded to hold that the two principles laid down in cl. ("}}, {"text": "Paragraph II of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70887, "end_char": 70926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cooper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72307, "end_char": 72313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It thus appears well settled that if a legislation provides principles for determining compensation, to wit, written down value as understood in Income-tax law to be the value of the used machinery, that principle could neither be said to be irrelevant for determining the compensation nor the compensation so awarded could be styled as illusory.. It was, however, said that this decision in Shanti/al Manga/das is overruled in Cooper's case and, therefore, the wheel has moved the full circle and the expression 'compensation' and principle for determining the compensation as interpreted in Vajravelu Mudaliar's case (supra) is restored."}}, {"text": "Vajravelu Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72472, "end_char": 72490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It thus appears well settled that if a legislation provides principles for determining compensation, to wit, written down value as understood in Income-tax law to be the value of the used machinery, that principle could neither be said to be irrelevant for determining the compensation nor the compensation so awarded could be styled as illusory.. It was, however, said that this decision in Shanti/al Manga/das is overruled in Cooper's case and, therefore, the wheel has moved the full circle and the expression 'compensation' and principle for determining the compensation as interpreted in Vajravelu Mudaliar's case (supra) is restored."}}, {"text": "P. Vajravelu Mudaliar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73132, "end_char": 73153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the view expressed in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar's case or in Shanti/al Mangaldas's case the Act, in our judgment, is liab:e to be struck down as it fails to provide to the expropriated banks compensation determined according to relevant principles."}}, {"text": "Shanti/al Mangaldas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73167, "end_char": 73186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the view expressed in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar's case or in Shanti/al Mangaldas's case the Act, in our judgment, is liab:e to be struck down as it fails to provide to the expropriated banks compensation determined according to relevant principles.", "canonical_name": "Shanti/al Mangaldas"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73355, "end_char": 73364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73467, "end_char": 73476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73647, "end_char": 73662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73665, "end_char": 73677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74992, "end_char": 74997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, it was pointed ont that Shela!,"}}, {"text": "Grover", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75029, "end_char": 75035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. speaking for hintself and Grover, J. in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru\n\nv. State of Kerala,(') in terms observed as under :\n\n\"in State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mangaldas & Ors."}}, {"text": "Metal Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 75213, "end_char": 75239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the decision in Metal Corporation of India was overruled which itself was overruled by R. C. Cooper v. Union of India.\""}}, {"text": "ShantilaJ Mangaldas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75366, "end_char": 75385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question is whether the statement of law in ShantilaJ Mangaldas (supra) that the principle of awarding compensation on the basis of written down value for used machinery is a valid principle for determining compensation and whether the compensation so awarded was illusory is not overruled by any observation in Cooper's case.", "canonical_name": "Shanti/al Mangaldas"}}, {"text": "Kesavananda Bharati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75666, "end_char": 75685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Undoubtedly, in Kesavananda Bharati case (supra) it is reiterated by Hegde, J. speaking for hintself and Mukherjeao, J. that it will be for the aggrieved party to clearly satisfy the Court that the basis adopted by the legislature has no reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired or that the amount to be paid has been arbitrarily fixed or that the same is illusory return for the property taken."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75719, "end_char": 75724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Undoubtedly, in Kesavananda Bharati case (supra) it is reiterated by Hegde, J. speaking for hintself and Mukherjeao, J. that it will be for the aggrieved party to clearly satisfy the Court that the basis adopted by the legislature has no reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired or that the amount to be paid has been arbitrarily fixed or that the same is illusory return for the property taken."}}, {"text": "Mukherjeao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75755, "end_char": 75765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Undoubtedly, in Kesavananda Bharati case (supra) it is reiterated by Hegde, J. speaking for hintself and Mukherjeao, J. that it will be for the aggrieved party to clearly satisfy the Court that the basis adopted by the legislature has no reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired or that the amount to be paid has been arbitrarily fixed or that the same is illusory return for the property taken."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76068, "end_char": 76079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrachud, J. (as he then was), while interpreting the expression 'amount' in the amended Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76160, "end_char": 76167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76986, "end_char": 76993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79889, "end_char": 79896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 80252, "end_char": 80287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., it was said that 36 acres of agricultural land belonging to the company owning too scheduled undertaking was taken over without compensation."}}, {"text": "R. A. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82251, "end_char": 82262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. R. A. Gupta appearing in SLP.", "canonical_name": "R. A.\n\nGupta"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82359, "end_char": 82366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82735, "end_char": 82743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sustenance was largely sought to be drawn from the Report of Justice Bhargava styled as Sugar Industry Inquiry Commission, 1974, which inter alia, specified 17 sugar undertakings in Uttar Pradesh as prima facie sick sugar mills."}}, {"text": "Sugar Industry Inquiry Commission, 1974", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 82754, "end_char": 82793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sustenance was largely sought to be drawn from the Report of Justice Bhargava styled as Sugar Industry Inquiry Commission, 1974, which inter alia, specified 17 sugar undertakings in Uttar Pradesh as prima facie sick sugar mills."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 83315, "end_char": 83337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of respondents learned Advocate-General for the State of Uttar Pradesh countered this contention by pointing out that, before acquiring the scheduled undertakings the Government had a close review of the condition of the sugar undertakings done for certain specific period set out in the affidavit and ascertained whether the situation had become desperate on acconnt of the persistent default in paymen_t of cane price, purchase tax, labour dues, etc."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85359, "end_char": 85366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85629, "end_char": 85635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J.-We have had the benefit of reading the judgment prepared by our brother Desai."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85712, "end_char": 85717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J.-We have had the benefit of reading the judgment prepared by our brother Desai.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85943, "end_char": 85947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85955, "end_char": 86004, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86051, "end_char": 86065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87072, "end_char": 87076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List ll of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution only so much of the legislative field as is covered by the subject matter and content of that Act", "statute": "List ll of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution only so much of the legislative field as is covered by the subject matter and content of that Act"}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87084, "end_char": 87127, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S. C.R. 100", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 87258, "end_char": 87278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 S. C.R. 688", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 87285, "end_char": 87305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_364_382_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "HAR! DATT KAINTHLA & ANR. v.\n\nSTATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.\n\nApril 9, 1980\n\n[D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\nPromotion claim for-Appellants admittedly juniors in the gradation list of Subordinate Judges in the State of Himachal Pradesh to Respondents 3, 4 and 5- Whether apj, ellants could question the legality and validity of the promotion of respondents 3, 4 and 5 to the cadre of District/ Additional District & Sessions Judges and also the promotion of respondents 6 & 7 to the selection grade post subordinate Judges in accordance lvith Chapter VI of Part VT of Constitution- Constitution of India Article 16, whether offended-Constitution of India Articles 233, 235 and 236.\n\nNecessary parties to the proceedings-Whether Govern111§nt and H1'gh Court, should necessarily appear before the High Court, 1vhen they are made parties challenging their action.\n\nHimachal Pradesh was a Union Territory till January 25, 1971, when at the apex of the Judicial hierarchy there was a court of Judicial Commissioner.\n\nOn the introduction of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 effective from November 1, 1966, certain. territories were transferred and added to the Union Territory of Himacbal Pradesh simultaneously extending the jurisdiction of the Court of Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh to the transfeITed tenitories.\n\nConsequently provision was made for allocation of persons belonging to different services in pre-reorganized State of Punjab (Respondent 4 to 7 being such officers) to Union Tenitory of Himachal Pradesh. On May 2, 1967, the judiciary of Unioru Territory of Himachal Pradesh was placed under the jurisdiction of Delhi J!igh C'ourt which continued till January 25, 1971, when state-hocxl was conferred on the Union Territory and a full fledged High Court of Himachal Pradesh was set up.\n\nPromotional avenues in Himachal Pradesh Subordinate Judicial servicei moved vertically from the grass root entry as subordinate judge promoted as senior sub-Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge. and when the further prontotional avenue is DSJ /ADSJ. They \\'Vere initially governed by the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 issued by the Union Government in exercise of the power cenferred by sections 3 and 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947. This ordet remained in force till it was replaced by the1 Himachnl Pradesh Subordinate Judicial Service Rules, 1962. Rule 16(2) of the 1948 Order provided for the appointment of District and Sessions Judges,, The Chief Commissioner had power to appoint as many parsons as he considered necessary to be District Judges. In the 1962 Rules, there was no change in this regard. Effective from January 25, 1971 when statehood was conferred on the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, the Chief Commisisoner was replaced by the Governor and the Judicial Commissioner by High Court.\n\nB Both the appellants were working as Senior Sub-Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge and they questioned the validity and legality of promotion of respondents 3, 4 and 5 given on May 18, 1971 as DSJ/ADSJ on the ground that the-\n\nHAR! DATT V. HIMACHAL PRADESH 365\n\npost of DSJ I ADSJ is a selection post and the criterion for selection must be merit alone, seniority being treated as thoroughly irreilevant and therefore, all those who were within the zone of eligibility should have been considered before selecting respondents 3, 4 and 5 and this having not been done the promotion having been purely as the basis of seniority, their promotion: is inv&lid .\n\nSimultaneously they contended that same. criterion would 1nutatis-muta11di~ apply while giving promotion to senior sub-Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge tD selection grade post and that having not been done and the promotion having been given only on the basis of seniority, the, same is invalid, as per the rnemorandum dated June 15, 1957 issued by the Himachal Administration.\n\nThe High Court through its Registrar did not appear and participate in the proceedings, though made a party. Noc did the Bench hearing the rna<ter call for the relevant files from the office' of the High Court though a prayer was made to that effect in the writ petition.\n\nThe State of Himachal Pradesh, Respondent No. 1 contended that appointment to the post of D.S.J. was governed by Art. 233 of the Constitution under v.1hich appointments were to be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court and since respondents 3, 4 and 5 were promoted and appointed as DSJ I ADSJ on the recommendation of the High Court, the appointments\n\nwere not open to challenge. The High Court accepted this plea of the State D Government and dismissed the v.rrit petitions. Hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nDismiS$ing thet appeail the Court,\n\nHELD : ( 1) Article 309 of the Constitution confers power on the legislature by appropriate legislation to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service E of persons appointed to public services nd posts in connection with the affairs\n\nof the Union or of a State and till such legislation is enacted the power is conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the President and the Governor, as the case may be, to make rules in that behalf. Undoubtedly such rules will have to be in conformity with other provisions of the Constitution such as Article 16 and the provisions included in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution. No rules have been enacted under Article 309 proviso regulating the P recruitment and conditions of service of DSJ I ADSJ till such rules are framed appointment to the post of DSJ I ADSJ will have to be made in accordance with the provisions of Articles 233 and 235 of the Constitution.\n\n[371 F-H, 372 A]\n\nArticle 233 confers power on the Governor of the State to appoint persons either by direct recruitment or by promotion from amongst those in the judicial G service as Dhtrict Judges but this power is hedged in with the condition that it can be exercised by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. In order to inake this consultation meaningful and purposive the Governor has to consult High Cou1t in respect of appointment of each person as District Judge which includes an Additional District Judge amd the opinion expressed by the lligh Court must be given full weight.\n\nArticle 235 invests control over subordinate courts including the officers manning subordinate courts as v.'ell as thei H ministerial staff attached to such courts in the High Court. Therefore, when promotion is to be given to the post of District Judge from amongst these\n\nbelonging to subordinate judicial service, the High Court unquestioniibly will be competent to decide \"'hether a person is fit for promotion and consistent with its decision to recommend or not to recommend such person. The Governor who would be acting on the• advice of the Minister would hardly be in a position to have intimate knowledge about the quality and qualification of such person for promotion. Similarly, when a person is to be directly recruited as District Judge from the Bar the reasons for attaching full weight to the opinion of the High Court for its recommendation in the case of sub:. ordinaite judicial service would niutatis n1uta11dis apply because the performance of a member of thei Bar is better known to the High Court than the' }; finister or the Governor. [372 A-FJ '\n\nChandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1967] SCR 77 at 83. Chandrarnou!e.shwar Prasad v. Patna lligh Court & Ors. [1970] 2 S.C.R. 666 and A. Pa•1duranga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1976] I S.C.R. 620; followed.\n\n2. Right to be considered for selection is distinct from an assertion that if considered the person so considered would of necessity be selected and then -\n\nalone his grievance that he was not considered even though eligible could be examined by the court. And it is impossible, to expect a person to aver that if along with others eligible he was considered he \\VOuld have, been selected.\n\n[376 B-C]\n\nIn the instant casei as the situation stood not the time of the impugned rec01nmendations for promotion and the consequent appointment made by\n\n- Governor lhere was no such rule providing merit alone as the criterion for promotion and the High Cburt, though it does .not reveal its 1nind, appears to have proceeded on the criterion of seniority.cum-merit which is a valid criterion under Article 16 and not violative of Art. 233 and the appellants, therefore, who were juniors to respond.ents 3, 4 and 5 cannot be. heard to make al grievance about the promotion of respondents 3, 4 and 5 who as and when their turn canle \\\\'ere considered and on being found fit were recon1n1ended for promotion ond the Govern;, r appointed them.\n\n[376 C-E]\n\n3. It is true that the.Office Memorandum No. F.1/4/55/RPS dated May 16, 1957, issued by the Govennent of Indra I\\1inistry of Home Affairs did contain certain guidelines laying down criterion in giving promotions to selection posts.\n\nIn the absence of any material as to whether the Memorandum was endorsed to the High Court or whether the High Court adopted or acted upon the same or not it is difficult to accept that it was binding on the High Court and any recommendation for promotion made1 in breac.h of contravention thereof would render the promotion invalid. Even apart from this, the impugned promotions T\"v'ere made on May 18, 1971, after Himachal Pradesh became a full fledged\n\nState \\Vith a High Court at the apex of judiciary and. the memora.ndum ould cease to have any force or binding effect.\n\n[377 G, 378 CEJ\n\n4.· Promotion from the post of subordinate Judge to the selection! grade post of subordinate Judge is a promotion from one post in subordinate judici:il service to another post in the same service. This promotion V.'ould definitely be under the control of the High Court as provided in Art. 235 of the COn.stitution. In the absence of a sta-tutory rule, the High Court would be the sole authority to decide the question of promotion in exercise of its control .Under Art. 235.\n\nBy Art. 235 the Jfigh Court has been vested with complete\n\n-~·\n\nHARI DA TT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH 367\n\ncontrol over the subordinates courts and this exercise of control comprehends the power to decide eligibility for promotion from one post! in the subordinate judicial service to higher post in the samej service except where one reaohes the stage of giving promotion as DSJ /ADSJ when Art. 233 would be attracted and the power to give promotion would be in Governor hedged in with the: cvndition that the Governor can act a.fter consultation with the High Court which has been understood to mean on the recommendation of the High Court.\n\nBut when it comes to promotion in the judicial service under the Distt. Judge the High Court would be the sole authority to decide the question Of promotion.\n\n[378 F-H, 379 A-BJ\n\nWhile promotion to the post of Distt. Judge which includes various posts as set out in Art 236, is with the Governor, the High Court would be competent to decide the promotion from one post in subordinate judicial service to any higher po5t in subordinate judicial service under the District Judge. In the present case promotions of respondents 6 and 7 from the rank of subordinate\n\nJudge to the selection grade post of subonlinate fudge is also valid.\n\n[379 G-H, 380 A]\n\nHigh Court of Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Ray [1963] I S.C.R. 437 al 454;\n\nState of Assam & Anr. v. Kuseswar Saikia & Ors. [1970] 2 SCR 923 applied.\n\n5. The power to confirm any one in the sµbordllmte judicial service vests in tho High Court in exercise of the colltrol vest_ed in .the High Court under Art. 235; in fact the power to promote to va~_ious poSts in the1 sllbordina-te judicial\\ service under the District Judge comprehends. also the power to confirm arid that veet<> in the High Court.\n\n[3SO-D-E]\n\nThe in1pugncd appoint_ments \\Vere µiade by promoti_on as\n\nDS~/ ADSJ ot\" those belonging to subordinate judicial service by the Governor on the recommendation of the I-ligh Court as envisaged by Arf. 2\"33 and in the absence of any other valid rule promotion made on the generally well accepted principle of seniority-cum-merit is valid.\n\nTherefore the promotion of respondents 3, 4 and 5 to the post of DSJ I ADSJ and promotions of respondents 6 and 7 to the selection grade post are valid.\n\n[381 A-CJ\n\n\n6. Where the Governn1ent acts on the recommendation of the High Court and the action of the Government j_s challenged by way of a writ petition, ill order to facilitate appreciation of issues raised, the administratiVe side of thei High Court, if joined as a P\"rty, must appear and place bef6re the Court !lie entire record for a fair and judicial adjudication of the issues on the judicial side of the High Court. In this case the appellants in their writ petition requested the High Court to produce the proceedings which . culminated.in the recommendation of the High Court to the Governor for -appointme:Dt of respondents 3, 4 and 5 as DSJ/ADSJ. No action appears to have been taken on this request because no such record appears to have been produced before the High Court. Such silence militates against fair adjudication of. t.he iss:ues. Just and fair adjudication must not only inform the administrative side oJ\\ the High Court\n\nA but in order to put its record beyond the slightest pale of controversy it musi:\n\navoid any secrecy in this behalf consistent with public interest.\n\n[381 CF]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No., 991 of 1975.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25-9-1973 of the Hirnachal Pradesh High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 158/71.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad, A. K. Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant\n\nDr. S. Chitale, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dhingra for Respondent ,.\n\nNo. 1.\n\nS. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and EME Anam for Respondent No. 4.\n\nK. R. Nagaraja, for Respondent No. 6.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-Would Article 16 of the Constitution come to the rescue and be successfully invoked by appellants, admittedly juniors in th0 gradation list of Subordinate Judg_es in the State of Him.achal Pradesh to respondents 3, 4 and 5, questioning the legality and validity of their promotion to the cadre of District/ Additional District & Sessions Judges ('DSJ/ ADSJ' for short), as also questioning the legality and validity of promotion of respondents 6 nnd 7 to the selection grade post of Subordinate Judge?\n\nUncontroverted facts are that Himachal Pradesh was a Union Territory till January 25, 1971, when at the apex of judicial hierarchy there was a Court of Judicial Commissioner.\n\nOn the introduction of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966, ('Re-organisation Act' for short) effective from November 1, 1966, certain territories were transferred and added to the Union Territory of Himachal i'radesh simultaneously extending the jurisdiction of the Court of Judicial Com.- missioner of Himachal Pradesh to the transferred territories. Consequently, provision was made for allocation of persons belonging to different services in pre-reorganised State of Punjab (Respendents 4 to 7 being such allocated officers) to Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh.\n\nOn May 2, 1967, the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh was placed under the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court which continued till January 25, 1971, when statehood was conferred on the Union Territory and a full-fledged High Court of Himachal Pradesh was set up.\n\ntB Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, ('1948 Order' for short), 'Was issued by the Union Government in exercise of the power conferred by sections 3 and 4 of the Extra. Provincial Jurisdiction\n\n·~\n\nHARi DATT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Desai, J.) 369\n\nAct, 1947, and this Order remained in force till it was replaced by the Himachal Pradesh Subordinate Judicial Service Rules, 1962 ('1962 Rules' for short). Para 16 (2) Of the 1948 Order provided for the appointment of District & Sessions Judges.\n\nThe Chief Commissioner had power to appoint as many persons as he considered necessary\n\nto be District Judges. 1962 Rules appear not to have made any B departure in this behalf.\n\nPromotional avenue in Himachal Pradesh Subordinate Judicial Service moves vertically from the grass-root entry as Subordinat~, Judge promotable as Senior Sub-Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge and then the further promotional avenue is DSJ I ADSJ. c\n\nBoth U1e appellants were working as Senior Sub-Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge and they questioned the validity and legality of promotion of respondents 3, 4 and 5 given on May 18, 1971, as DSJ j ADSJ on the ground that the post of DSJ / ADSJ Is a selection post and ilie criterion for selection must be merit alone, seniority being treated as thoronghly irrelevant and, therefore, all those , who were within the zone of eligibility should have been considered before selecting respondents 3, 4 and 5 and this having not been done, the promotion having been given purely on the basis of seniority, their promotion is invalid. Simultneously they contended that same criterion would mutatis mutandis apply while giving promotion to Senior-sub-\n\nJudge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge to selection grade post and that having not been done and the promotion having been given only on the basis of seniority, the same is invalid. In support of the contention reliance has been placed amongst other thing on a Memorandum dated June 15, 1957, issued by the Himachal Pradesh Ad ministration.\n\nThere is a serious controversy whether this memorandum was effective and in force on the date of impugned promotions and whether the same would apply to the case of judicial officers.\n\nAppellts inlpleaded the State of Himachal Pradesh as respondent l and the High Court of Himachal Pradesh as respondent 2.\n\nThough the High Court would be the most competent to throw light on the vexed question as to by what criterion it selected respoi!dents\n\n3. 4 and S for promotion to the post of DSJ / ADSJ and recommended their names for appointment to the Governor, surprisingly the IDgh\n\nCourt through its Registrar did not appear and participate in the proceedings.\n\nNor did the Bench hearing the matter call for the relevant files from the office of the High Curt though a prayer to that effect was made in the writ petition.\n\nRespondent 1 State of Himachal Pradesh filed the return to the wrii as per the affidavit of Shri A. K. Goswami, Joint Secretary to the .Goiernment, Department of Personnel, Simla.\n\nState Law Dcpartwent also appears to have scrupulously kept out from the arena of\n\nControversy.\n\nIn the return it was admitted that appointments to the post of Subordinate Judges were made in accordance with the provisions of para 18 of the 1948 Order till the 1962 Rules were e•acted !Ind brought into force on April 10, 1962.\n\nIt was averu.d that the appointment to the post of Dist!.\n\nJudge used to be made under the provisions of para 16 (2) of the 1948 Order which conferred power on the Grief Commissioner after consultation with the Judicial Com- (! missioner to appoint as many pen>ons as he thought necessary to be j District Judges. It was furth, er contended that since Himachal Pra- desh attained full statehood on January 25, 1971,. appointment to the\n\npost of DSJ was governed by Art. 233 of the Constitution and, therec fore, the appointments were to be made by the Governor in consultation with the Iligh Court and accordingly respondents 3, 4 and 5 D were. promoted and appointed as DSJ / ADSJ on the recommendation of the High Court.\n\nThe averment to that effect in para 12 of the writ petition was admitted in the return.\n\nIdentical position was iidopted §Upporting the promotion to selection grade give~ to respondents 6\n\nIii\n\nand 7.\n\nThe return leaves no roor:i for doubt that the promotions to the post of DSJ I ADSJ were given by the Governor on the recommendayon: made by the High Court to the Governor and the Governor acted upbn °thti'' recoilllilenctaticln. It was, therefore, absolntely incuri1benl upon t11e High Court to' have pointed out what criterion if adopted in selecting 'respondents 3, 4 and.$ for promotion before fr went hi searcli\n\nof what principle ought to be adopted in selecting persons from Suborclinate Juclicial Service for promotion to the post of DSJ / ADSJ.\n\nThere is not even a whinlper as to what criterion was adopted by:the High Court in formulating its recommendations both for promotion as'DSJ I ADSJ and to selection grade in the seal~ of Sµb0; djnate _j adge cum=Alisistant Sessions Judge, the latter having :Qee!l given~ by the High coW:t itself evidenced by the notifiati0n dated MarJ:h 19, 1971. . . . .. -- ~-\n\nRele!'ant provisions_of the Constitution bearing on the questiQU of appointment of District Judges and control of the High Court over the snbordini\\te courts may be noticed.\n\nArticle 233 reads as under :\n\n\"233, Appointment of i:lisfrict' judgeS---(1) Appointments of pen>ons to be, and the ; pqstfng and promotion of,-\n\n.,.\n\nII ..\n\nIii\n\n\\I!\n\n1 '\n\n' \" \"\n\nHAR! DATT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Desai, J.) 3 71\n\ndistrict judges in any State shall be made by the Governo~·\n\nof the State in consultation with the High Court exercising\n\njuri5diction in relation to such State.\n\n(2) A person not already in the service Of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be' appointed a District Judge if he has been for not Jess than seven years an advoate 0r a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment\".\n\nArticle 235 reads as under :\n\n\"235. Control over subordinate courts-The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to. persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he my have under the Jaw regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordl!_nce with conditions of hi> service prescribed under such Jaw\".\n\nArticle 236 provides that in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution the expression 'District Judge' includes a judge of city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, cbiet judge of a small cause court, chief presidency magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge.\n\nThe expression 'Judicial Service' in the chapter means a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district judge.\n\nArticle 309 confers power on the legislature by appropriate legislation to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public ,; ervices and posts in connection with the affairs of the union or of a State and till such legislation is enacted the power is conferred by the proviso to Article 309 on the President and the Governor, as the case may be, to make rules in that behalf.\n\nAt the outset it must be noticed that no Rules appear to have\n\nbeen enacted under Art. 309 proviso regulating recruitment and con\n\nditions of service of DSJ/ADSJ. Undoubtedly such rules will have H to be in conformity with other provisions of the Constitution such as Art. 16, and the provisions included in Chapter VI of Part VI of the\n\n4-289SCI/80\n\nConstitutio'n.\n\nTill such rules are framed appointment to the post of DSJ./ ADSJ will have to be made in accordajice with the provisions of Arts. 233 and 235 of the Constitution.\n\nArticle 233 confers power on the Governor of the State to appoint persons either by direct recruitment or by promotion front amongst those in the judicial service as District Judges but this power is hedged in with the condition that it can be exercised by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.\n\nIn order to make this consultation iµeaningful and purposive the Governor has to consult High Conrt in respect of appointment of each person as District Judge which ir1cludes an Additional District Judge and the opinion expressed by the High Court must be given full weight.\n\nArticle 235 invests control over subordinate courts including the officers manning subordinate courts\n\nas well as the ministerial staff attached to such courts in the High Court.\n\nTherefore, when promotion is to b~ given to the poot of District Judge from amongst those belonging to subordinate judicial service, tne High Conrt unquestionably will be competent to decide whether a person is fit for promotion and consistent with its decision to recommend or not to rc_tommend such person.\n\nThe Governor who would be acting on the advice of the Minister would hardly be in a position to have intimate knowledge about the quality and qualification of such person for promotion.\n\nSimilarly when a person is to be directly recruited as District Judge from the Bar the reasons for attaching full weight to the opinion of the High Court for its recommendation in case of subordinate judicial service would mutatis mutandis apply because the performance of a member of the Bar is better known to the High Court than the Minister or the Governor.\n\nIn Chandra Mo/zan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,(') a Constitution Bench of this Conrt observed as under :\n\n\"The constitutional mandate is clear.\n\nThe exercise of the power of appointment by the Governor is conditioned by his ccnsultation with the High Court, that is to say, he can only appoint a person to the post of District Judge in con. sultation with the High Court.\n\nThe obiect of consultation is apparent. Tho High Court is expected to know better than the Governor in regard to the suitability or otherwise of a person, belonging either to the 'judicial service' or to the Bar, to be appointed as a district judge, Therefore, a dutv is enioined on the Governor to make the apoointment in consultation with a body which is the appropriate authority to cive advice to him\".\n\n(1) [1967] ls. c. R. 77 at 83.\n\nHAR! DATT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Desai, !.) 3 7 3\n\nThis view was reaffirmed in Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors.(') observing:\n\n\"The High Court is the body which is intimately familiar with the efficiency and quality of officers who are fit to be promoted as District Judges.\n\nThe High Court alone knows their merits as also demerits\".\n\nIn A. Panduranga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.(') this Court observed that there are two sources of recruitment to the post of District Judge, viz., judicial service in subordinate rank and members of the Bar. In either case the consultation would assume the form of recommendation made by the High Court.\n\nIt is thus incontrovertible that appointment to the post of DSJ/ ADSJ in Himachal Pradesh will have to be made in accordance with the provisions contained in Art. 233. If any rules are enacted under\n\nArt. 309 for regulating recruitment and conditions of service of DSJ I ADSJ, the rules will have to be in conformity with Art. 233 and if D they violate the constitutional mandate of Art. 233 of the rules will be held ultra vires as succinctly laid dow in Chandra Mohan's case (supra). To be precise so as to leave no ambiguity, in that case rule 13 of U .P. Higher Judicial Services Rules' provided for procedure for selection by promotion to the post of District Judge from thei subordinate judicial service and amongst others, the procedure provided for E selection to be made by a Committee consisting of two judges of the: High Court and the Judicial Secretary to Government.\n\nThis rulc was held to be ultra vires as being violative of Art. 233 inasmuch as the High Court could be said to have abdicated its constitutional function of making recommendation to au outside authority not known to Constitution.\n\nTurning to the facts of the case, save and except the 1948 Orde~ no rules' appear to have been enacted regulating recruitment and conditions of service DSJ I ADSJ in Himachal Pradesh.\n\nTherefore, appointment to the post of DSJ I ASDJ in Himachal Pradesh will have to be made in conformity with Art. 233.\n\nEven if para 16(2) of the G 1948 Order held the field it merely provided for appointment by the Chief Commissioner (now replacect by the Governor) in consultation with the Judicial Commissioner (now replaced by the High Court).\n\nThat provision would be in confonnity with Art. 233.\n\nThe High Court in this case recommended the names of respondents 3, 4 and\n\n5 for promotion to the post Of DSJ I ADSJ as averred by appellants H\n\n(I) [1970] 2 S. C.R. 666.\n\n(2) [1976] I S C. R. 620.\n\n374 SUPREME COURT REPOlUS\n\n\nthelllSelves and the Governor accepted the recommendation and the appointments were made consistent with the recommendation. It cannot be gainsaid that this is in conformity with Art. 233 and the constitutional mandate is complied with and no statutory rule in the\n\nabence. of any c?uld be said to have been violated by promotion' betng given m this manner. In our opinion the matter should have ended there.\n\nThe High Court, however, completely oblitera_ting from its mind the criterion it mnst have followed in making the recommendation which prima facie appears to be one of the seniority-cum-merit, undertook an exercise of a search of what ought to be the criterion for promotion from the subordinate jndicial s_ervice to the responsible post of District Judge.\n\nThe High Court framed the question thus :\n\n\"The first question is whether in law appointment to the post of District Judge/ Addl District Judge must be made by selection of most meritorious officer upon an D appraisal of the comparative merit of eligible subordinate judges or is it sufficient that it is made on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness ?\"\n\nWe find it a bit difficult to follow and appreciate how the High Cour~ could proceed on such a fruitless and bizarre enquiry unconnected with and wholly unnecessary in the fact of the case before it. The same High Court on its admicistrative side must have known its own mind when while maldng recommendation for promotion, the principle or criterion it adopted.\n\nThe High Court must be presumably aware even while making recommendation for promotion to the post of DSJ / ADSJ that it was a responsible post and merit alone must guide it in making recommendation.\n\nPresumably the full court made the recommendation.\n\nThe High Court took notice of the fact that there were no rules at the relevant time in Himachal Pradesh formulating the principle or criterion on which such promotion as Distt. Judge was to be recommended. If thus there was no rule and the High Court pnxeeded to adopt merit-cum-seniority, or seniority-cum-fitness as a criterion for recommending promotions from subordinate judges to the post of district judge neither of which appears to violate either Art. 233 or Art. 16 or any other constitutional mandate or any statutory rule, it would be futile to proceed to examine what ought or possible criterion should really govern the decision for recommending persons from subordinate judicial service for promotion to the post of DSJ / ADSJ. If the High Court felt that the post of district judge is a very responsible post and merit alone should govern promotion from subordinate judicial service to the post of district judge it was\n\nHAR! DATT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Desai,!.) 375\n\nincumbent upou the High Conrt to propose necessary rules and get\n\nth~ en'icted under Art. 309. That appears not to have been done.\n\nAlternatively, High Court should while making recommendation for promotion put the principle of merit-cum-seniority iq the forefront and act accordingly.\n\nThe High Court and the Governor appear to be agreed that the recommendation for promotion made was proper and the same was accepted without a demur.\n\nIn our opinion it is then futile to examine what ought to be the criterion for such promotion, unless there is no discrenible principle on which recommendation can be justified or the recommendation is attacked as arbitrary, ma/afide or vitiated by bias.\n\nThere is no such allegation.\n\nThe High Court after referring to some books on public administrati:Qn and public services and keeping in view the status and responsibility attaching to the post al'. District Judge, concluded as under :\n\n\"I would therefore hold that having regard to the duties and responsibilities attaching to the post of District Judge and the position occupied by the District Judge in the judicial hierarchy, appointment to that post must be made by selection of the most meritorious officer upon an appraisal of the comparative merit of eligible Subordinate Judges. In my opinion, the principle of seniority-cum-fitnesg would not be a valid principle\".\n\nIt is difficult to appreciate how such a principle can be enunciated in abstract. If for regulating recruittnent and conditions of service of district judges it was considered essential by the High Court that promotion to the post of District Judge from the subordinate judicial service shall be on merit alone and seniority having no place in the consideration unless two are considered equally meritorious, it was incumbent upon the High Court to have proposed such a rule to be enacted under Art. 309.\n\nNeither the High Court nor the Governmcnfl have propooed such rules. And 6urprisingly, after reaching thi~ conclusion the High Court rejected the writ petition, frankly, on an untenable ground that the petitioners have failed to show that if they had been considered at the time when the impugned promotions were made they would have stood ru fair choice of being preferred over\n\nrei; pondents 3, 4 and 5.\n\nThis is an unsiistainable conclusion. If the High Court is otherwise right that when promotion is to be given on the criterion of merit alone, all those in the zone of selection or field' of eligibility must be simultaneously considered and the best among them dlould be selected and recommended for promotion. The silence of the High Court on the most important question as to whati\n\ncriterion it adopted while formulating its recommendation coupled with the fact that those at the top of gradation list according to their seniority were recommended is eloquent enough to conclude that principle of seniority-cum-merit was adopted by the High Court.\n\nWha~ the High Court appears to have done is as and when the vacancy occurred the seniormost in the cadre of subordinate judges was considered and if found fit was recommended.\n\nThe present grievance is by persons junior to respondents 3, 4 and 5 whose promotion is questioned and the grievance is that they were not considered along with other eligible.\n\nIt is impossible to expect a person to aver that if along with others eligible he was considered he would bavc been\\ s'electcd.\n\nRight to be considered for selection is distinct from an 'assertion that if considered the person so considered would of necessity be selected and then alone his grievance that he was not considered even though eligible could be examined by the Court.\n\nIt is, however, not necessary to dilate on this point because in our opinion as the situation stood at the time of the impugned recommendation for promotion and the consequent appointments made by Governor there was no such rule providing merit alone as the criterion for promotion and the High Court, though it does not reveal its mind, appears to have proceeded on the criterion of seniority-cum-merit which is a valid criterion under Art. 16 and not violative of Art. 233 a!'d the appellants, therefore, who were junior to respondents' 3, 4 and 5, cannot be heard to make a grievance about the promotion of respondents 3, 4 and 5 who as and when their turn came were considered, and on being found fit were recommended for promotion and the Governor appointed them.\n\nIt was', however, said that Office Memorandum No. F.1/4/55-RPS dated May 16, 1957, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, was applicable to the services including subordinate judicial service nuder the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh before it attained statehood and that even if an office memorandum of the Government of India may not be directly applicable, it appears to have been adopted by the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh because the same was issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Himachal Pradesh Administration as per his Memorandum No. Apptt.1/350/ 57, dated June 15, 1957, with a request that the contents of the Memorandum may also be brought to the notice of each member of the Departmental Promotion Committee for Class I, II and III posts constituted for each Department under the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. This Memorandum, appellants say, prescribes gudielines and lays down criterion in giving promotions to posts which are styled as 'selection posts' as also to selection grades. Broadly\n\nHARI DATT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Desai, J.) 377\n\nsfated, the guidelines are that appointments to selection post and selection grade shonld be made on the basis of merit with regard to seniority only to the extent indicated in the memorandum.\n\nIt further provided that Departmental Promotion Committee or other selecting authority should first decide the field of choice, i.e., the number of eligible officers awaiting promotion who should be considered for inclusion in the selection list provided, however, that an officer of outstanding merit may be included in the list of eligible candidates even if he is outside the normal field of choice.\n\nField of choice was to be confined to five or six times the number of vacancies expected within a year.\n\nIt was indicated that those found unfit should be excluded.\n\nEven in respect of those who are included in the field of choice each officer should be classified as outstanding, very' good, good, on the basis of merit as determined by the respective records of service and thereafter a select list should be drawu up by placing the names in the order of merit as indicated earlier without disturbing the seniorityinter se within each cadre.\n\nPromotion should thereafter be confined, it was suggested, to the select list and by following the order in which the names are finally arranged. It was considered desirable to periodically revise the select list.\n\nAppellants contend that the memorandum laying these guidelines was issued, no doubt, by the Government of India when Himachal Pradesh was a Union Territory and, therefore, Government of India was competent to issue such directions in respect of services under the\n\nUnion Territory of Himachal Pradesh but even if there is any doubt, once the same was adopted by Himachal Pradesh Administration, in the absence of any statutory rule it is binding and any promotion made in breach or violation of the prescribed guidelines would be invalid.\n\nThere is nothing to show that that office memorandum was endorsed 1o the High Court and that the Administration suggested tht the High Court should adopt it while making recommendations for promotion to the post of DSJ / ADSJ.\n\nJn the absence of a return by the High Court to writ petition it is difficult to say whether the Administration desired that the guidelines prescribed in the memorandum should also be accepted or adopted by the High Court. In the return filed on behalf of the Himachal Pradesh Government it has been staled that the memorandum was received from the Government of India and that the memorandum did contain some guiding principles for appointment to selection posts and selection grade but they were merely directory in nature and were only issued for the sake of guidance implying that if the facts and circumstances of any particular case so warranted, the concerned authority could make deviation therefrom. It was, further stated that after Himachal Pradesh attained statehood on\n\nJanuary 25, 1971, the memorandum ceased to have any force and in the absence of any other statutory rule promotions and appointments to the posts of DSJ / ADSJ can only be made in conformity with Art. 233 of the Constitution and any other direction to the contrary would be void and of no effect.\n\nThe High Court disposed of the memorandum by a cryptic observation that there has been a serious debate before the Court on the question whether the direction contained in the aforesaid memorandum had to be complied with by the High Court and the State Government when the impugned appointments were made.\n\nAfter noting this debate the High Court did not proceed to dispose of the contention and did not record a finding whether the memorandum was or was not required to be complied with QY the High Court while making recommendations for promotion to the posts of DSJ/ ADSJ.\n\nIn the absence of any material as to whether the memorandum was endorsed to the High Court or whether the High Court adopted or acted upon the same or not it .is difficult to accept that it was binding on the High Court and any recommendation for promotion made in breach or contravention thereof would render the promotion invalid.\n\nEven apart from this, the impugned promotions were made on May 18, 1971, after Himachal Pradesh became a full fledged State with a High Court at the apex of\n\njdicial and the memorandt1m would cease to have any force or binding effect.\n\nThe same memorandum was relied on in support of the contention that in giving promotion to selection grade to respondents 6 and 7 the guidelines in the memorandum of 1957 were not only not followed but the promotions were made completely overlooking the guidelines or in contravention of the guidelines.\n\nReasons for rejecting the efficacy of memorandum in relation to promotion to the post of DSJ / ADSJ will mutatis mutandis apply and the contention will have to be negatived.\n\nThis contention must also be negatived for the additional reason that promotion from the post of subordinate judge to the selection grade post of subordinate judge is a promotion from one post in subordinate judicial service to another post in the same service.\n\nThis promotion would definitely be under the control of the High Court as provided in Art. 235 of the Constitution.\n\nNo statutory rule was pointed out as to how such promotion was to be given. . In the absence of a statutory rule the High Court would be the sole authority to decide the question of promotion in exercise of its control under Art 235.\n\nBy Art. 235 the High Court has been; vested with complete control over the subordinate courts and this exercise of control comprehends the power to decide eligibility for promotion\n\nHAR! DATT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Desai, J.) 379\n\nfrom one post in the subordinate judicial service to higher post in the same ilervice except where one reaches the stage of giving promotion as DSJ/ ADSJ when Art. 233 would be attracted/ and the power to give promotion would be in Governor hedged in with the condition that the Governor can act after consultation with the High Court which ha• been understood to mean on the recommendation of the High Court. But when it comes to promotion in the judicial service unde~ the Distt. Judge the High Court would be the sole authority to decide the question of promotion (see The High Court, Calcutta v.\n\nAmal Kumar Roy) ( ') . This becomes manifestly clear from State of Assam & Anr. v. Kuseswar Saikia & Ors.('). Jn that case one Upendra Nath Rajkhowa was promoted by the Governor as Addi. District Judge purporting to act under Art. 233 a; id a writ of\n\n<JUO warranto waSi sought challenging the appointment on the ground that the promotion as Addi. District Judge could only be made by the High Court acting undoc Art. 235.\n\nIt was also contended that his further appointment as District Judge by the Governor would be void.\n\nIt was so held by the High Court. On appeal when the matter came to this Court, analysing Art. 233 this Court held as under:\n\n\"It means that appointment as well as promotion of persons to be District Judges is a matter for the Governor in consultation with the High Court and the expression 'District Judge' includes an additional district judge and an additional sessions judge. It must be remembered that District Judges may be directly appointed or may be promoted from the subordinate ranks of the judiciary.\n\nThe article is intended to take care of both. It concerns initial appointment and initial promotion of persons to be either District Judges or any or the categories included in it.\n\nFurther promotion of District Judges is a matter of control of the High Court. What is said of District Judges here applies equally to additional District Judges and Additional Sessions Judges.\"\n\nThis Court accordingly held that the promotion of Rajkhowa as\n\nAddl. District Judge by the Governor was made under Art. 233 and G that it was a valid appointment.\n\nAccordingly the appeal was allowed.\n\nIt thus becomes crystal clear that while promotion to the post cf District Judge which includes various posts as set out in Art. 236, is with the Governor, the High Court alone would be competent to decide the promotion from one post in subordinate judicial service to any hij!her post in subordinate judicial service under the District H\n\n(I) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 437 at 454.\n\n(2) [1970] 2 S. C. R. 928.\n\nJudge.\n\nAppellants contend that promotion of respondents 6 and 7 from the rank of subordinate judge to the selection grade post of subordinate judge is invalid as being in contravention first of ihe memorandum and secondly such promotion must only be on the basis of merit and not seniority.\n\nThis contention must fail because no statutory rule is pointed out as to how the promotion was to be given and the High Court having given the promotion it was most competent to do so.\n\nThe challenge must accordingly fail.\n\nAppellants also contended that e, ven if the criterion for recommendation for promotion to the post of DSJ / ADSJ is senior; ty-cnmmerit, respondents 3, 4 and 5 did not deserve to be promo led because their unfitness stares in the face inasmuch as they were not considered suitable for confirmation as subordinate judge as and when their turn came for confirmation and that would show that they W'etc not men of merits. It was pointed out that respondents 4 and 5 were not confirmed due to their unsatisfactory perfonnance in discharge of duties while their colleagues in the same batch were confirmed earlier.\n\nIt was further pointed out that respondent 4 was not even allowed to cross the efficiency bar for a period of about 10 years and that he was allowed to cross it for the first time in 1970.\n\nThese averments have hardly any relevance.\n\nThe power to confirm any one in the subordinate judicial service vests in the High Court in exercise of the control vested in the High Court under Art. 235.\n\nIn fact, the power to promote to various posts in the subordinate judicial service under the Distritt Judge comprehends also the power to confirm and that vests in the High Court. It is not necessary to dilate on this point because it is concluded by a decision of this Court in State vf Assam & Anr. v. S. N. Sen & Anr., (') wherein this Court held that under Art. 235 of the Constitution the powerc of promotion of personsholdin1r\n\nposts inferior to that of the District Judge being in the High Court, the power to confirm such promotees is also in the High Court and any rule in conflict with Art. 235 must be held to be invalid. This view was affirmed in State of B:hal' v.\n\nMadan Mohan Prasad & Ors.(2 } This Court held that since1 Art. 235 of the Co\"stitution vests the power of confirmation in the High Court, the power of determining the seniority in the service is also with the f!igh Court.\n\nOf course, in doing so the High Court is bound to act in conformity with any rules made by the Governor under the provisions of Art. 309 of the Constitution, if there be a rule.\n\n(I) [1972] 2 S. C.R. 251.\n\n(2) [1976] 3 S. C. R. 110.\n\nHARi DATT v. HIMACHAL PRADESH (Desai, J.) 381\n\nThe administrative side of the High Court having chosen not to participate in the proceedings this Court must dispose of the appeal on the scanty material available on record. On the available material the appellants failed to establish violation of any existing rule, statutory or otherwise, governing promotion of persons to the pst of DSJ/ ADSJ as there is no such rule.\n\nThe impugned appointments appear to have been made by promotion of those belonging to suJ>. ordinate judicial service by the Governor on the recommendation of the High Court as envisaged by Art. 233 and in the absence of any other valid rule, promotions made on the generally well accepted principle of seniority-cum-merit appear to be valid.\n\nThere is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the promotion of respaHdents\n\n3, 4 and 5 to the post of DSJ I ADSJ and th~ promotion of respondents 6 and 7 to the selection grade post were in ; iny manner invalid.\n\nBefore we conclude it must be pointed out that where the Government acts on the recommendation of the High Court and the action of the Government is challenged by way of a writ petition, in order to facilitate appreciation of issue~ raised, the administrative side of tht: High Court, if joined as a party, must appear and place before the Court the entire record for a fair and judicial adjudication of the issues on the judicial side of the High Court. In this case the appellants in their writ petition requested the High Court to produce the proceedings which culminated in the reconnnendation of the High Court to the Governor for appointment of respondents 3, 4 and 5 as\n\nDSJ/ ADSJ.\n\nNo action appears to have been taken on this request because no such record appears to have been produced before the High Court.\n\nSuch silence militates against fair adjudication of the issue•.\n\nJust and fair adjudication must not only inform the admiitis trative side of the High Court but in order to put its record beyond the slightest pale of controversy it must avoid any secrecy in this behalf consistent with public interest.\n\nIf the High Court felt that the criterion for promotion to the p-Ost\n\nof District Judge being a post of status and responsibility in the judi- G cial hierarchy must only he merit, seniority having no or very litile place, it was incumbent upon the High Court to propose such a rule to be made under Art. 309 or adopt to itself such a rule and conform to it.\n\nBut if the High Court on th!\" one hand recommended respondents 3, 4 and 5 according to their seniority as it appears to be the case, when the vacancies occurred and accepted their appointment B and on the other hand when such appointments were challenged it went in search of a principle on the basis of which promotion to the\n\npost of DSJ / ADSJ should be given, it is rather difficult to reconcile these diametrically opposite actions.\n\nThe High Court also was in error in proceeding to reject the appellants petition without recording a finding regarding the basis on which recommendations were made by it.\n\nWe have, however, on the basis of the material before us tried to resolve the said question.\n\nHaving examined the matter in all its ramifications we are no substance in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "HAR! DATT KAINTHLA & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARI DATT KAINTHLA & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 618, "end_char": 628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 647, "end_char": 668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 233, 235 and 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 876, "end_char": 892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Himachal Pradesh was a Union Territory till January 25, 1971, when at the apex of the Judicial hierarchy there was a court of Judicial Commissioner."}}, {"text": "January 25, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 920, "end_char": 936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Himachal Pradesh was a Union Territory till January 25, 1971, when at the apex of the Judicial hierarchy there was a court of Judicial Commissioner."}}, {"text": "On the introduction of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1026, "end_char": 1084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the introduction of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 effective from November 1, 1966, certain."}}, {"text": "May 2, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1548, "end_char": 1559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 2, 1967, the judiciary of Unioru Territory of Himachal Pradesh was placed under the jurisdiction of Delhi J!igh C'ourt which continued till January 25, 1971, when state-hocxl was conferred on the Union Territory and a full fledged High Court of Himachal Pradesh was set up."}}, {"text": "High Court of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1783, "end_char": 1813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 2, 1967, the judiciary of Unioru Territory of Himachal Pradesh was placed under the jurisdiction of Delhi J!igh C'ourt which continued till January 25, 1971, when state-hocxl was conferred on the Union Territory and a full fledged High Court of Himachal Pradesh was set up."}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2220, "end_char": 2236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2244, "end_char": 2283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Himachnl Pradesh Subordinate Judicial Service Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2343, "end_char": 2400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 15, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3848, "end_char": 3861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "criterion would 1nutatis-muta11di~ apply while giving promotion to senior sub-Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge tD selection grade post and that having not been done and the promotion having been given only on the basis of seniority, the, same is invalid, as per the rnemorandum dated June 15, 1957 issued by the Himachal Administration."}}, {"text": "Himachal Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3876, "end_char": 3899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "criterion would 1nutatis-muta11di~ apply while giving promotion to senior sub-Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge tD selection grade post and that having not been done and the promotion having been given only on the basis of seniority, the, same is invalid, as per the rnemorandum dated June 15, 1957 issued by the Himachal Administration."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4179, "end_char": 4204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Himachal Pradesh, Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF IDMACHAL PRADESH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4288, "end_char": 4296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4754, "end_char": 4765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5088, "end_char": 5099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5288, "end_char": 5298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5406, "end_char": 5417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 233 and 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5679, "end_char": 5690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6262, "end_char": 6273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S.C.R. 666", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8375, "end_char": 8383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 16, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.1/4/55/RPS dated May 16, 1957, issued by the Govennent of Indra I\\1inistry of Home Affairs did contain certain guidelines laying down criterion in giving promotions to selection posts."}}, {"text": "May 18, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9326, "end_char": 9338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even apart from this, the impugned promotions T\"v'ere made on May 18, 1971, after Himachal Pradesh became a full fledged\n\nState \\Vith a High Court at the apex of judiciary and."}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9809, "end_char": 9817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9990, "end_char": 9998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10004, "end_char": 10012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10385, "end_char": 10393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10904, "end_char": 10911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Ray [1963] I S.C.R. 437 al 454", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11289, "end_char": 11356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[379 G-H, 380 A]\n\nHigh Court of Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Ray [1963] I S.C.R. 437 al 454;\n\nState of Assam & Anr."}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 SCR 923", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11407, "end_char": 11423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11587, "end_char": 11595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13398, "end_char": 13426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[381 CF]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.,"}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13577, "end_char": 13593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, A. K. Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant\n\nDr. S. Chitale, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dhingra for Respondent ,."}}, {"text": "A. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13595, "end_char": 13611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, A. K. Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant\n\nDr. S. Chitale, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dhingra for Respondent ,."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13621, "end_char": 13633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, A. K. Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant\n\nDr. S. Chitale, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dhingra for Respondent ,."}}, {"text": "S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13657, "end_char": 13667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, A. K. Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant\n\nDr. S. Chitale, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dhingra for Respondent ,."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13669, "end_char": 13683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, A. K. Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant\n\nDr. S. Chitale, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dhingra for Respondent ,."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13688, "end_char": 13701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, A. K. Srivastava and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellant\n\nDr. S. Chitale, R. N. Sachthey and S. K. Dhingra for Respondent ,."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13729, "end_char": 13740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and EME Anam for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. N. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13742, "end_char": 13752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and EME Anam for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "EME Anam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13757, "end_char": 13765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and EME Anam for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13789, "end_char": 13803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Nagaraja, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13872, "end_char": 13877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.-Would Article 16 of the Constitution come to the rescue and be successfully invoked by appellants, admittedly juniors in th0 gradation list of Subordinate Judg_es in the State of Him.achal Pradesh to respondents 3, 4 and 5, questioning the legality and validity of their promotion to the cadre of District/ Additional District & Sessions Judges ('DSJ/ ADSJ' for short), as also questioning the legality and validity of promotion of respondents 6 nnd 7 to the selection grade post of Subordinate Judge?"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13888, "end_char": 13898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "On the introduction of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14561, "end_char": 14620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15153, "end_char": 15188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 2, 1967, the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh was placed under the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court which continued till January 25, 1971, when statehood was conferred on the Union Territory and a full-fledged High Court of Himachal Pradesh was set up."}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15539, "end_char": 15555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the introduction of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966", "statute": "On the introduction of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966"}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17617, "end_char": 17642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellts inlpleaded the State of Himachal Pradesh as respondent l and the High Court of Himachal Pradesh as respondent 2."}}, {"text": "A. K. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18326, "end_char": 18339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondent 1 State of Himachal Pradesh filed the return to the wrii as per the affidavit of Shri A. K. Goswami, Joint Secretary to the .Goiernment, Department of Personnel, Simla."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pra-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19091, "end_char": 19104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was furth, er contended that since Himachal Pra- desh attained full statehood on January 25, 1971,."}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19204, "end_char": 19212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20759, "end_char": 20770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21400, "end_char": 21411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22063, "end_char": 22074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22672, "end_char": 22683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22986, "end_char": 22997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23166, "end_char": 23174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23352, "end_char": 23359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 233 and 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23575, "end_char": 23592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23615, "end_char": 23626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24199, "end_char": 24210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26883, "end_char": 26891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26925, "end_char": 26933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27047, "end_char": 27055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27108, "end_char": 27116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandra Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27181, "end_char": 27194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "233 of the rules will be held ultra vires as succinctly laid dow in Chandra Mohan's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Higher Judicial Services Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27284, "end_char": 27314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27666, "end_char": 27674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Higher Judicial Services Rules", "statute": "Higher Judicial Services Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28133, "end_char": 28141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Higher Judicial Services Rules", "statute": "Higher Judicial Services Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28416, "end_char": 28424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1970] 2 S. C.R. 666", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 28576, "end_char": 28596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28833, "end_char": 28841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30847, "end_char": 30855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30859, "end_char": 30866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31459, "end_char": 31467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33237, "end_char": 33245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Governmcnfl", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33279, "end_char": 33290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Neither the High Court nor the Governmcnfl have propooed such rules."}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35481, "end_char": 35488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35510, "end_char": 35518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35911, "end_char": 35930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.1/4/55-RPS dated May 16, 1957, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, was applicable to the services including subordinate judicial service nuder the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh before it attained statehood and that even if an office memorandum of the Government of India may not be directly applicable, it appears to have been adopted by the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh because the same was issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Himachal Pradesh Administration as per his Memorandum No."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36337, "end_char": 36368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.1/4/55-RPS dated May 16, 1957, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, was applicable to the services including subordinate judicial service nuder the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh before it attained statehood and that even if an office memorandum of the Government of India may not be directly applicable, it appears to have been adopted by the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh because the same was issued by the Assistant Secretary to the Himachal Pradesh Administration as per his Memorandum No."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39300, "end_char": 39327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the return filed on behalf of the Himachal Pradesh Government it has been staled that the memorandum was received from the Government of India and that the memorandum did contain some guiding principles for appointment to selection posts and selection grade but they were merely directory in nature and were only issued for the sake of guidance implying that if the facts and circumstances of any particular case so warranted, the concerned authority could make deviation therefrom."}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40019, "end_char": 40027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42097, "end_char": 42105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42353, "end_char": 42360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42366, "end_char": 42374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42751, "end_char": 42759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Upendra Nath Rajkhowa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43320, "end_char": 43341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn that case one Upendra Nath Rajkhowa was promoted by the Governor as Addi."}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43419, "end_char": 43427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43606, "end_char": 43614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43808, "end_char": 43816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rajkhowa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44660, "end_char": 44668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court accordingly held that the promotion of Rajkhowa as\n\nAddl."}}, {"text": "Art. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44725, "end_char": 44733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44935, "end_char": 44943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1963] 1 S. 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{"document_id": "1980_3_383_420_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "GURBAKSH: SINGH SIBBIA ETC .\n\nA • v.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nApril 9, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CllANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA, 8\n\nR. S. PATHAK AND 0. CIUNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nBail-Anticipatory Bail-Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1913 (Act 2 of 1974), Scope of-Judicial balancing of personal lib<rly and the investigarional powers of the Police, explained.\n\nThe appellant here.in, Sri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia was a Minister of Irriga..J C tion and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab. Grave allegations of political corruption were made against him and others whereupon applications were filed in the High Court of Puujab and Haryaua under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, praying that the appellauts be directed to be relea1!ed. on bail, in the event of their arrest on the aforesaid charges.\n\nConw sidering the importance of the matter, a learned single Judge referred the applications to a Full Bench, which by its judgment dated September, 13, 1977 dis- D missed them, after summarising, what according to it is the true legal position, of s. 438 of the Code.of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) thus:\n\n(l) The power uuder Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, is of an extra-ordinary character and must be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases only.\n\n(2) Neither Section 438 nor any other provision of the Code authorises the grant of blanket anticipatory bail for offences not yet committed or with regard to accusations not so far levelled.\n\n( 3) The said power is not unguided or uncanalised but all the limitations imposed in the preceding Section 437, are implicit\n\ntherein and must be read into Section 438.\n\n( 4) In addition to the limitations mentioned in Section 437, the petitioner must make out a special case for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail.\n\n(5)\n\n(6)\n\nWhere a legitimate case for the remand of the offender to the police custody under Section 167 (2) cau be made out by the\n\ninvestigating agency or a reasonable claim to secure incriminating material from information likely to be received from the offender under Section 27 of the Evidence Act can be made\n\nout, the power under Section 438 should not be exercised.\n\nThe discretion under Section 438 cannot be exercised with regard to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless the Court at that very stage is satisfied that such a charge appears to be false or groundless.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [! 980] 3 S.C.Rj\n\n(7) The larger interest of the public and State demand that in serious cases like economic offens involving blatant corrup tion at the higher rungs of the executive and political power, the discretion under Section 438 of the Code should not be exercised; and\n\n(8) Mere general allegations of mala fides in the petition are inadequate. The court must be satisfied on materials before it that the allegations of mala fides are substantial and the accusation appears to be false and groundless.\n\nThe argument that the appellants were men of substance and position who \\Vere hardly likely to abscond and would be prepared willingly to face trial was rejected by the Full Bench with the observation that to accord differential treatment to the appellants on account of their status will amount to negation of the concept of equality before the law and that it could hardly be contended that every man of status, who was intended to be charged with serious crimes including the one under section 409 was punishable with life imprisonment, \"was entitled to knock at the door of the Court for anticipatory bail\". The possession of high status, according to the Full Bench, is not only an irrelevant consideration for granting anticipatory bail, but is, if anything, an aggravating circumstance. Hence the appeals by special leave.\n\nThe appellants contended : (a) The power conferred by section 438 to grant anticipatory bail is \"not limited to the contigencies\" summarised by the High Court; (b) The power to grant anticipatory bail ought to be left to the discretion of the Court concerned, depending on the facts and circumstances of each particular case; ( c) Since the denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty; Courts should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, when no such restrictions are ih:iposed by the legislature in the terms of that section (d) Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who has not been convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail and who must be presumed to be innocent. The validity of that section must accordingly be examined by the test of fairness and which is implicit in Article 21. If the legislature itself were to impose an unreasonable restriction could have been struck down as being violative of Article 21. Therefore, while determining the scope of section 438, the Court should not impose any unfair or unreasonable limitation on the individual's right to obtain an order of anticipatory bail.\n\nImposition of an unfair or unreasonable limitation would be violative of Article 21 irrespective of whether it is imposed by legislation or by judicial decision.\n\nAllowing the appeals in part, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The society has a vital stake in both of these interests namely, personal liberty and the investigational power of the police, though their relative importance at any given time depends upon the complexion and restraints of political conditions. The Court's task is how best to balance these interests while determining the scope of section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n1973. [393 C-D]\n\n2. The High Court and the Court of Session should he left to exercise their jurisdiction under section 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion\n\n( ..\n\nC:l1RBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB 385\n\nVlhich by their long training and experience, they are ideally suited to do. The A ends of justice will be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consonance with principles governing the grant of bail whlch an: recognised over the years, than by divesting them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. It is customary, almost chronic, to take a statute as one finds it on the ground that, after all, \"the legislature in its , visdom\" has thought it fit to use a .particular expression.\n\nA convention may u<; efully grow whereby the High Court B nnd the Court of Session may be trusted to e:xercise their discretionary powers in their wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted to their care by the\n\nlegislature in its \\visdom.\n\nIf they err, they are liable to be corrected.\n\n[417 B-D]\n\n3. Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satis~ fie.cl before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he C , has 11reason to believe\" that he may be arrested for a nonbailable offence. The\n\nuse of the expression \"reason to believe'' shows that the belief that the applicant -may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere 'fear' is not 'belier, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has -some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusa~\n\ntiOn against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non~ D bailable effence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest.\n\nOtherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large, as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual's liberty; it is neither a pass~ E port to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of nccusation, likely or unlikely. [417 E-H, 418 A]\n\nSecondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind to the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the (i' Code, as and when an occasion arises. Such a course will defeat the very object of Section 438. [418 A-Bl\n\nThirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise Of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.l.R. is not yet filed.\n\n[418 B-C] G\n\nFourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.l.R. is filed, so long as the applicant ha-s not been arrested.\n\n[418 CJ\n\nFifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of ''anticipatory bail\" to an accused who is undP:r arrest involves a contradiction in terms. in so far as the off., nce or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest. the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 o.f the Code, if he wllnts to be relea\"ed on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested. [418 C-E]\n\n4. However, a \"blanket order\" of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed.\n\nThis flows from the very language of the section which requires the appellant to show that he has \"reason to believe\" that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. That is why, normally, a direction should not issue under Section 438(1) to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail \"whenever arrested for which ever offence whatsoever\".\n\nThat is what is meant by a 'blanket order' of anticipatory bail, an order which t1erves as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity, in fact any eventuality, likely or unlikely regarding which, no concrtte information can possibly be bad. The rationale of a direction under Section 438(1) is the belief of the applicant founded on reasonable grounds that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. It is unrealistic to expect the applicant to draw up his aplication with the meticulousness of a pleading in a civil case and such is not requirement of the section.\n\nBut specific events and facts must be disclosed by the applicant in order to enable the court to judgt: of the reasonableness of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua non of the exercise of power conferred by the section.\n\n[418 E-H, 419 A]\n\nApart from the fact that the very language of the statute compels iliis cons- D traction, there is an important principle involved in the insistence that facts, on the basis of which a direction under Section 438(1) is sought, must be clear and specific, not vague and general. It is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to then1 can be avoided.\n\n[419 AC]\n\nA blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of invei;; tigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been conunitted by the applicant and when, an order of bail which comprehends allegedly unlawfu] activity of any description V.'batsoever, will prevent the police. from arresting the applicant even if the commits, say, a murder in the presence of the public.\n\nSuch an order can then become a charter of lawlessness and weapon to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicated 'When the order was passed. Therefore, the court which grants anticipatory bail mut take care to specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The power should not be exercised in a vacuum. [419 C-El\n\nS. An order of bail can be passed under section 438(1) of the Code without notice to the Public Prosecutor.\n\nBut notice should issue to the public prosecutor or the Government Advocate forthwith and the question of bail should be re-examined in the light of the respective contentions of the parties. The ad-interim order too must conform to the requirements of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant even at that stage. [419 E-Fl\n\n6. Equally the operation of an order passed under section 438 ( 1) need not necessarily be limited in point of time. The Court may, if there are reaon~ for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.l.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R.\n\nI I\n\nGUI.BAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB 387\n\nas aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal A rule should be. not to limit the operation of, the order in relation to a period of time. [419 F-H]\n\n7. Bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly release from the custody of the police. The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial.\n\nPersonal recognizance suretyship bonds and such other modalities B are the means by which an assurance is secured from the accused that though he has been released on bail, he will present himself as the trial of ofience or offences of which he is charged and for which he. was arrested. [397 ErG! 'fhe distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of C arrest and is therefore effective at the very mqment of arrest. Police custocly is an inevitable concomitant of arrest for non-bailable offences.\n\nAn order of anticipatory bail constitutes, so to say, an insurance against police custody following upon arrest for offence or offences in respect of which the order is Issued. ht other words, unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the, person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall D be released on bail. Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals \\Vith how arrests are to be made, provides that in making the arrest the police officer or other person making the arrest \"shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or <tction\".\n\nA <lire-ction under section 438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from this 'touch' or confinement. [397 G-H, 398 A-BJ\n\n8. No one can accuse the police of possessing a healing touch nor indeed does anyone have misgivings in regard to constraints consequent upon confinement in polic.e custody. But, society has come to accept and acquiesce in all that follows upon a police arrest with a certain amount of sang-froid, in so far as the ordinary rut of criminal investigation is concerned. It is the normal day-to-day business of the police to investigate into charges brought before them and, broadly and generally, they have nothing to gain, not favours at any rate, by subjecting ordinary criminal to needless harassment.\n\nBut the crinlt's, the criminals and even the complaints can occasionally pm; sess extra- 01dinary features.\n\nWhen the even fl.ow of life becomes turbid, the police can be called upon to inquire into charges arising out of political antagonism. The\n\npO\\verful processes of criminal law can then be perverted for achieving extraneous ends. Attendant upon such investigations, when the police are not free agents within their sphere of duty, is a great amount of inconvenince, har:issment and humiliation. That can even take the form of the paradmg of a respectable person in hand-cuffs, apparently on way to a court of justice. The foul deed is done lNhen an adversary is exposed to social ridicule and obloquy, no matter when and whether a conviction is secured or is at all possible. It is in order to meet such situations, though not limited to these contingencies, that the pov.1e~ to grant anticipatory bail was introduced into the Code of 1973.\n\n[398 C-F]\n\n9. Clause (!) of Section 438 is couched in terms, broad and unqualified.\n\nBy any known canon of construction, words of width and amplitude ought not\n\n5-289'SC!f80\n\n388 SUPREME COURT Rlll>O'RTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\ngenerally to be cut down so as to read into the language of the statute restraints and conditions which the legislature itself did not think it proper or necessary to impose. 'This is especially true when the statutory provision \\Vhich falls for i:e; nsideration is designed to secure a valuable right like the right to personal freedom and involves the application of a presumption as salutary and deepgrained in our Criminal Jurisprudence as the presumption of innocence.\n\n[401 A-CJ\n\nThe legislature conferred a wide djscretion on the High Court and the Court ot Session to grant anticipatory bail because it evidently felt, firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the conditions under which anticipatory bail should or should not be granted and secondly; because the intention was to allow the higher courts in the echelon a somewhat free hand in the grant of relief in the nature Of anticipatory bail. That is why, departing from the terms Of Sections 437 and 439, Section 438 (1) uses the language that the High Court or the Court of Session \"may, if it thinks fit\" direct thn.t the applicant be released on bail. SUb-section (2) of Section 438 is a further and clearer manifestation of the same legislative intent to confer a wide discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. It provides that the High Court or the Court of Session, while issuing a direction for the grant of anticipatory bail, \"may include such conditions in such directions. in the light of the facts of the particular case. as it may think fi.C' including the conditions which are set out in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (2). The proof of legisla•tive intent can best be found in the language which the legislature use.<;.\n\nAmbiguities can undoubtedly be resolved by resort to extraneous aids but words, as wide and e; xplicit as have1 been used in Section 438, must be given their full effect, especially when to refuse to do so will result in undue impairment of the freedom of the indivk1ual and the presumption of innocence. It has to b.e borne in mind that anticipatory bail is sought when there isa mere apprehension of arrest on thei accusation that the applicant has committed a non-bailable offence. A person who has yet to lose his freedom by being arrested asks for freedom in the event of arrest That is the stage at which it is imperative to protect his freedom? in so far as one may, and to give tull play to the presumption that he is innocent. In fact. the stage at which anticipatory bail is generally sought brings about its striking dissimilarity with the situatiori in which a person who is arrested for the commission of a nonbailable offences asks for bail. In the latter situation, adequate data is avaiable to the Court, or can be called for by it, in the light of which it can grant or . refuse relief and while granting it, modify it by the imposition of an or any of the conditions mentioned in SectionJ 437. [404 A-G]\n\n10. The amplitude of judicial discretion which is given to the High Court and the Court of Sessions, to impose such conditions as they may think fit while granting anticiptory bail, should not be cut down, by a process of construction, by reading irito the statute conditions which are not to be found therein like those evolved by the High Court. The High Court and the Court of Session to whom the application for anticipatory bail is made ought to be left free in the exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it flt so to do on the particular facts and circumstances of the case and on such coil.ditioris as the case may warrant. Similarly, they must be left free to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warrant, on considerations similar to those mentioned in Section 437 or which are generally collJSidered to be relevant under Section 439 of the Code. [405 B-D]\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH V. PUNJAB 389\n\nGeneralisations on matters which rest on discretion and the attempt to discover formulae of universal application when facts are bound to differ from case to case frustrate the very purpose of conferring discretion. No t\\\\'o cases are alike on facts and therefore, Conrts have to be allowed a little free play iii tho joints if the conferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful. There is no risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court of Session and the High Court in granting anticipatory bail because, firstly these are higher courts manned by experienced persons, secondly their order are not final but are open to appellate or revisional scrutiny and above all because, discretion has always to be exercised by courts judicially and not according to whim, caprice or fancy.\n\nOn the other band, there is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up unforeseen possibilities and offers new challenges. Judicial discretion has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride and to meet these challenges.\n\n[405 D-G]\n\nHyman and Anr. v. Rose, 1912 A.C. 623; referred to\n\n11. Judges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions. And it will be strange if, by employing judicial artifices and techniques, this Court cuts down the discretion so wisely conferred upon the Courts, by devising a formula which\n\nwill confine the power to grant anticipatory bail within a strait-jacket. While B laying down cast-iron rules in a matter like granting anticipatory bail, as the High Court has done, it is apt to be overlooked that even Judges can have but an imperfect awareness of the needs of new situations. Life is never static and CVery situation has to be assessed in the context of emerging concerns as and when it arises. Therefore, even if this Court were to frame a 'Code for the grant of anticipatory bail', which really is the business of the legislatun~, it can at best furnish broad guidelines and cannot compel blind adherence. Jn which E case to grant bail and in which to refuse it is, in the very nature of things, a matter of discretion. But apart from the fact that the question Is inherently of a kind which calls for the use of discretion from case to case, the legislature has, in terms express, relegated the decision of that question to the discretion of the Court, by providing that it may grant ball \"if it thinks fit\". The concern ef the Collrts generally is to preserve their discretion without meaning to abuse it. It will be strange if the Court exhibits concern to stultify the discretion con- F ferred upon the Courts by law. [406 D-H]\n\n_l.\n\nDiscretion, therefore, ought to be permitted to remain in the domain of discretion, to be execrised objectively and open to correction by the higher courts.\n\nThe safety of discretionary power lies in this twin protection which provides a safeguard against its abuse. [ 407 F-G]\n\n12. It is true that the functions of judiciary and the police are in a s\"nse complementary and not overlapping. An order of anticipatory bail does not in any way, directly or indirectly, take away from the police their right to investigate into charges made or to be made against the person released on bail.\n\nIn fact, two of the usual conditions incorporated in a direction issued under section 438(1) are those recommended in Sub-section (2)(i) and (ii) which require the applicant to co-operate with the police and to assure that he shall not tamper with the witnesses during and after the investigation. While granting relief under Section 438(1), appropriate conditions can be imposed uuder Section 438(2), so as to ensure an uninterrupted investigation. One of\n\nsuch conditions can even be that in the event of the police making out a case of a likely discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the person released on bail shall be liable to be taken in police custody for facilitating the discovery. Besides, if and when the occasion arises, it may be possible for the prosecution to claim the be-nefit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a discovery of facts made in pursuance of information supplied by a peraon released on bail.\n\n[409 D, 41() A-DJ\n\nKing Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, 71 I.A., 203, State of U.P. v.\n\n\n13. In Balchand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1977] 2 SCR 52, this Court was considering whether the provisions of Section 438 relating to antici~\n\npatory bail stand overruled or repealed by virtue of Rule 184 of the Defence C and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 or whether both the provisions can by rule of harmonious interpretion, exist side by side. It was in that context that it was observed that \"As section 438 immediately fo11ows Section 437 which is the main provision for bail in respect of non-bailable offences, it is manifest that the conditions imposed by s. 437 ( 1) are implicitly contained in Section 438 of the Code\"~ These observations regarding the nature of the power conferred by section 438 and regarding the question whether the condi- D tions mentioned in Section 437 should be read into section 438 cannot, therefore be treated as the ratio of the decision.\n\n[413 C-D, E]\n\n'_ B\n\nThe power conferred by section 438 is of an \"extra ordinary\" character only in the sense that it is not ordinarily resorted to like the power conferred by sections 437 and 439.\n\n[413 E-FJ\n\nBal Chand Jain v. State of M.P., 11977] 2 S.C.R. 52, distinguished .\n\n14. Since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty. the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the Jegislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An over-generous infllsion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally \"ulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions.\n\n[413 F-H, 414 A]\n\nManeka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 1 S.C.C. 248; applied.\n\n15. In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior inotive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally, be made.\n\nOn the other hand, if it appears likely considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. :Sut the con.verse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides;\n\n-~ I\n\n_\\ I\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH V. PUNJAB 391\n\nand, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the A applicant will abscond.\n\nThere are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail. The nature and seriousness of the pro-- posed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and \"the larger interests of the public or the state\" are some of the considerations which B the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.\n\n[415 G-H, 416 AC]\n\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 346, 347, 350, 351, 352, 365, 366, 367, 383, c 396, 397, 398, 399, 406, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420,430, 431, 438, 439, 440, 4d7, 448, 449, 463, 473, 474, 477, 498, 506, 508, 512, 511 of 1977, 1, 15, 16, 38, 53, 69, 70 of 1978, 4691499 of 1977, 40, 41, 81, 82, 98, 109, 130, 141, 142, 145, 149, 153 and 154 of 1978.\n\nAND\n\nSpecial Leave Petitions (Criminal) Nos. 260, 272, 273, 274, 383, 388 & 479 of 1978.\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the Judgment~ and Orders dated 13-9-77, 13-9-77, 13-9-77, 15-9-77, 13-9-77, 21-9-77, 19-9-77, 23-9-77, 23-9-77, 23-9-77, 26-9-77, 26-9-77, 30-9-77, 7-10-77, 16-9-77\n\n9-9-77, 20-9-77, 5-10-77, 20-10-77, 26-9-77, 20-10-77, 20-10-77, 19-10-77, 24-10-77, 25-10-77, 14-9-77, 24-10-77, 2-11-77, 2-11-77, 3-11-77, 2-9-77, 7-9-77, 2-9-77, 9-11-77, 22-11-77, 23-11-77, 24-11-77, 13-12-77, 11-11-77, 23-11-77, 14-12-77, 13-12-77, 20-12-77, 3-1-78, 4-1-78, 5-1-78, 16-1-78, 18-1-78, 30-1-78, 25-1-78, 18-11-77, 13-12-77, 10-1-78, 13-1-78, 1-2-78, 1-2-78, 8-2-78, 21-12-77, 1-3-78, 3-3-78, 3-3-78, 10-3-78, 8-3-78, 20-3-78,\n\n17-3-78, 15-2-78, 17-2-78, 17-2-78, 24-1-78, 14-3-78, 14-3-78 and 27-3-78 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Cr!. Misc. Nos.\n\n3753 M, 3719 M, 3720 M, 3916 M, 3718 M, 3793 M, 3565 M,\n\n3892 M, 3595 M, 3596 M, 4359 M, 3563 M, 3484 M, 4627 M,\n\n3893 M, 3894 M, 3587 M, 4540 M, 4908 M, 3031 M, 4934 M,\n\n4916 M, 4888 M, 4964 M, 4992 M, 3688 M, 4907 M, 5176 M,\n\n5177 M, 5197 M, 3564 M, 3716 M, 3717 M, 5344 M, 5558 M,\n\n50\"9 M, 5613 M, 5905 M, 5254 M, 5253 M, 5919 M, 5907 M, 6005 M of 1977, 45 M, 68 M, 102 M, 246 M of 1978, 6114 M of 1977, 462 M, 248 M of 1978, 5240 M, 5892 M of 1977, 19/78,\n\n956/77, 104 M/78, 104 M/178, 605/78, 5995 M/77, 941 M/78, 904\n\nMl78, 1005 M/78, 1137 M/78, 819 M/78, 1260 M/78, 866 M/78\n\n& 541 M/78, 4897 M/77, 4758 M/77, 364 M/78, 1167/78, 1168 M/78 and 1381 M/78.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!. A. No$. 335, 365, 430, 431, 506, 508, B 499i77, 150, 141, 142, 153, 154 and for the Petitioners in SLPs 272-274 of 1978.\n\nFrank Anthony, V. C. Mahajan, 0. P. Sharma and R. C. Bhatia for the Appellants in Cr!. A. Nos. 336, 337, 338, 350, 396, 397-399, 473, 474/77 and 1, 15, 16, 17, 69, 70, 81, 82, 98 and 149 and 109 C of 1978.\n\nHarjinder Singh for the Appellant in Cr!. A. 339 of 1977.\n\nB. S. Bindra, S. M. Ashri and Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind for the Appellants in Crl. AJ;. Nos. 348, 366, 415, 420, 477, 511, 512, 469/77 and 145 of 1978.\n\nP. R. Mridul, H. K. Puri, Aruneshwar Prasad and Vivek Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!. A No. 346 of 1977.\n\nL. N. Sinha, R. P. Singh, L. R. Singh, Suman Kapoor, Sukumar Sahu and M. C. Bhandare, P. P. Singh and R. K. Jain for tho Appellants in Cr!. A. Nos. 351, 352, 406, 438-40, 463/77.\n\nS. K. Jain for the Appellant in Crl. A. No. 53/78.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, M. M. L. Srivastava, R. Satish and E. C. Agrawa/a for the Appellant in Crl. A. Nos. 367 /77 and SLP 383/78.\n\nV. C. Mahajan, Harbhagwan Singh, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and P. N. Purl for the Appellant in Cr!. A. Nos. 383/78 and 498177.\n\nK. K. Mohan for the Petitioner in SLP 260/78.\n\nA. K. Sen and Rathin Dass for the Appellant in Crl. A. Nos. 40, 41/78.\n\nM. M. L. Srivastava for the Petitioner in SLP 388/78.\n\nG L. M. Singhvi and N. S. Das Behl for the Appellants in Cd. A. No. 38/78 and for the Petitioner in SLP 479178.\n\nSoli. J. Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. Genl. Bishamber Lal Khanna, liardev Singh, R. s. Sodhi and B. B. Sinf!h for the Appellants in Cr!. As. Nos. 477-449/77 and respondents in Cr!. A. Nos. 335-339, 347, 350, 352 •• H 366, 367, 388, 396-398, 406, 415-420, 438-440, 463, 473, 474, 477, 498, 511/77, 1, 15-17/78, 469, 510/77, 109/78 and for the Petitioners in SLP Nos. 388/78, Cr!. A. No. 98 /78 & SLP 260/78.\n\nGURBAKSF! SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 393\n\nSol1. J. Sorabjee Add!. Sol. Genl., Thakur Naubat Singh Adv.\n\nGenl. Haryana, S. N. Anand and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent~\n\nin Cr!. A. Nos. 365, 430, & 431/77, 508, 499/78 and 38, 141 and 142/78.\n\nM. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chat1erjee for Respondents in Cr!. A.\n\nNos. 40 and 41 of 1978.\n\nM. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondents in Cr!. A. 346/77.\n\nJ. K. Gupta, B. R. Agarwala and Janendra Lal for the Vice-\n\nChancellor, Pwijab University in Cr!. A. No. 346 /77. c\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.-These appeals by Special Leave involve a question of great public importance bearing, at once, on personal liberty and the investigational powers of the police. The society.. has a vital stake in both of these interests, though their relative importance at any given time depeni:ls upon the complexion and restraints of political conditions.\n\nOur task in these appeals is how best to balance these interests while detennining the scope of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974).\n\nSection 438 provides for the issuance of direction for the grant of bail to a person who apprehends arrest. It reads thus :\n\n\"438. (1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having connnitted a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session liar a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail.\n\n(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1 ) , it maY include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including-\n\n( i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;\n\n(ii) a condition that the person ihall not, directly or in- H directly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so\n\nas to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;\n\n(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;\n\n(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under subsection (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section.\n\n(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, C and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall) issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub- D section ( 1) . \"\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 335 of 1975 which is the first of the many appeals before us, arises out of a judgment dated September 13, 1977 of a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.\n\nThe appellant herein, Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, was a Min:,.:er of Irrigation and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab. Grave allegations of political corruption were made against him and others whereupon, applications were filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Section 438, praying that the appellants be directed to be released on bail, in the event of their arrest on the\n\naforesaid charges. Considering the importance of the matter, a learned\n\nSingle Judge referred the applications to a Full Bench, which by its judgment dated September 13, 1977 dismissed them.\n\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 did not contain any specific provision corresponding to the present Section 438.\n\nUnder. the old Code, there was a sharp difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts on the question as to whether courts had the inherent power to pass an order of bail_in anticipation of arrest, the preponderance of view being that it did not bave such power. The need for extensive amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure was felt for a long time and various suggestions were made in different quarters in order to make the Code more effective and comprehensive_ The Law Commission of India, in its 4lst Report dated September 24, 1969 pointed out the necessity of introducing a provision in the Code en-\n\n--i-\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 395\n\nabling the High Court and the Court of Session to grant \"anticipatory\n\nbail\". It observed in paragraph 39.9 of its report (Volume I) :\n\n\"39 .9. The suggestion for directing the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest (commonly known as \"anticipatory bail\") was carefully 'considered by us. Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a Court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no such power under the existing provisions of the Code.\n\nThe necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false cases for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days, In recent times, with the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase.\n\nApart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail.\n\nWe recommend the acceptance of this suggestion.\n\nWe are further of the view that this special power should be conferred only oo the High Court and the Court of Session,\n\nand that the order should take effect at the time of arrest or thereafter.\n\nIn order to settle the details of this suggestion, the following draft of a. new section is placed for consideration :\n\n\"497 A. (1) When any person has a reasonable apprehension that he would be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section.\n\nThat Court may, in its discretion, direct that in the event of his arrest, he shall be ieleazd on bail.\n\n( 2) A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against that person shall, while taking steps under section 204 ( 1), either issue summons or a bailable warrant as indicated in the direction of the Court under sub-section (1).\n\n(3) if any person in respect of whom such a direc- D tion is made is arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on an accusation of having committed that offence, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.\"\n\nWe considered carefully the question of laying down in the statute certain conditions under which alone anticipatory\n\nil could be granted.\n\nBut we found that it may not be practicable to exhaustively ennmerate those conditions; and moreover, the laying down of such conditions may be construed as prejndging (partially at any rate) the whole case. Hence we would leave it to the discretion of thei court and prefer not to fetter such discretion in the. statutory provision! itself.\n\nSuperior Courts will, undoubtedly, exercise their discretion properly, and not make any c':Jservations in the order granting antidpatorY bail which will have a tendency to prejudice the fair trial of the accused.\"\n\nThe suggestion made by the Law Commission was, in principle, D accepted by the Central Government which introduced Olanse 447 in the Draft Bill of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970 with a view to conferring an express power on the High Court and the C<>urt of\n\nSession to grant anticipatory bail. That Clause read thus :\n\n\"447. (1) When any person has reason to believe that he would be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Conrt may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail.\n\n(2) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be\n\nreleased on bail; and if a Magistrate1 takingj cognizance ~\n\nsuch offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against thau person, he shall issue a baiiablel warrant in conformity with the direction of the Conrt under subsection (1) . \"\n\nThe Law Commission, in paragraph 31 of its 48th Report (1972), made the following comments on the aforesaid Clause.\n\nII \"31. The Bill introduces a provision for the grant of anticipatory bail.\n\nThis is substantially in accordance with the recommendation made by the previous CQ!llIIlission.\n\n.l.\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 397\n\nagree that this would be a useful addition, though we must add that it is in very exceptional cases that such a power should be exercised.\n\nWe are further of the view that in order to ensure that the provision is not put to abuse at the instance of unscrupulous petitioners, the final order should be made only after notice to the Public Prosecutor.\n\nThe initial order should only be an interim one.\n\nFurther, the relevant section should make it clear that the direction can be issued only for reasons to be recorded, and if the court is satisfied that such a direction is necessary in the interests of justice.\n\nIt will also be convenient to provide that notice of the interim order as well as of the final orders will be given to the Supedntendent of Police forthwith.''\n\nClause 44 7 of the Draft Bill of 1970 was enacted with certain modifications and became Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which we have extracted at the outset of this judgment.\n\nThe facility which Section 438 affords is generally referred to as 'anticipatory bail', an expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41st report.\n\nNeither the section nor its marginal note so describes it but, the expression 'anticipatory bail' is a convenient mode of conveying that it is possible to apply for bail in anticipation of arrest.\n\nAny order of bail can, of coure, be effective only from the time of arrest because, to grant bail, as stated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, is to 'set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance'.\n\nThus, bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly, release from the custody of the police.\n\nThe act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gi<ves back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial.\n\nPersonal recognisance, suretyship bonds and such other modalities are the means by which an assurance is secured from the accused that though he has been released on bail, he will present himself at the trial of offence or offences of which he is charged and for which he was arrested.\n\nThe distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former iS granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effecti<ve at the very moment of arrest.\n\nPolice custody is an inevitable concomitant of arrest for non-bailable offences.\n\nAn order of anticipatory bail constitutes, so to say, an insurance agains~ police custody follawing upon arrest for offence or offences in respect of which the order is\n\nA issued. In other words, unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-\n\narrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour '~ it i~ issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail.\n\nSection 46 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making the arrest, the police officer or other person making the arrest \"shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arr_ested,\" unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action\".\n\nA direction under section 438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from this 'touch' or confinement.\n\nNo one can accuse the police of possessing a healing touch nor indeed does anyone have misgivings in regard to constraints consequent upon confinement in police custody. But, society has come to accept and acquiesce in all that follows upon a police arrest with a certain amount of sang-froid, in so far as the odinary rut of criminal investic\n\ngation is concrned. It is the normal day-to-day business of the police to investigate into charges brought before them and, broadly and generally, they have nothing to gain, not favours at any rate, by subjectmg ordinary criminals to needless harassment.\n\nBut the crimes, the criminals and even the complainants can occasionally possess extra-ordinary features.\n\nWhen the even flow of life becomes turbid, the police can \"be called upon to inquire into charges arising out of political antagonism.\n\nThe powerful processes of criminal law can then be perverted for achieving extraneous ends.\n\nAttendant upon such investigations, when the police are not free agents within their sphere of duty, is a great amount of inconvenience, 11arassment and humiliation.\n\nThat can even take the form of the parading of a respectable person in handcuffs, apparently on way to a court of justice.\n\nThe fonl deed is dooe when an adversary is exposed to social ridicule and obloquy, no matter when and whether a conviction is secured or is at all possible. It is in order to meet such situations, though not limited to these contingencies, that the power to grant anticipatory bail was introduced into the Code of 1973.\n\nG Are we right in saying that the power conferred by section 438 to grant anticipatory bail is \"not limited to these contingencies\"? , In fact that is one of the main points of controversy between the parties.\n\nWhereas it is argued by Shri M. C. Bhandare, Shri 0. P. Sharma and the other learned counsel who appear for the appellants that the power to grant anticipatory bail ought to be left to the discretion of the court H concerned, depending on the facts and circumstances of each particufar case, it is argued by th~ learned Additional Solicitor Genera1 on behalf of the State Government that the grant of anticipatory bail shonld\n\nGURBAKSI! SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 399\n\nat least be conditional upon the applicant showing that he is likely to be arrested for an ulterior motive, that is to say, that the proposed charge or charges are evidently baseless and are actuated by ma/a: fide~ It is argued tht anticipatory bail is an extra-ordinary remedy and therefore, whenever it appears that the proposed accusations are prim!i.\n\nfacie plausible, the applicant should be left to the ordinary remedy of applying for bail under Section 437 or Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, after he is arrested.\n\nShri V. Ill. Tarkunde, appearing on behalf of some of the appellants, while supporting the contentions of the other appellants, said that since the denial of bail amounts to deprivatio'n of personal liberty, court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of .Section 438, when no snch restrictions are imposed by the legislature in the terms of that Section.\n\nThe learned counsel added a new dimension to the argument by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution.\n\nHe urged that Section 438 is a procedural rorovision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who has not been convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail and who must therefore be presumed to be innocent. The volidity of that section must accordingly be examined by the test of fairness and reasonableness which is implicit in Article\n\n21. If the Icgislnture itself were to impose an unreasonable 'restriction on the grant of anticipatory bail, such a restriction wuld have been struck down as being violative of Article 21. Thereiore, while determining the scope of Section 438, the court should not impose any unfair or U'nreasonable limitation on the individual's right to obtaiu an order of anticipatory bail.\n\nImposition of an unfair or unreasonable limitation, according To the learned counsel, \\'iould bC violative of Article 21, irrespective of whether it is imposed by legislation or by iudicial decision.\n\nThe Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected the appellants' applications for bail after summarising, what according to it i1s the true legal position, thus:\n\n(I) The power under Section 43 8, Criminal Procedure Code, is of an extra-ordinary character and must be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases only;\n\n(2) Neither Section 438 nor any other provision of the Code authorises the grant of blanket anticipatory bail for offences not yet committed or with regard to accusations not so far levelled.\n\n(3) The said power is not unguided or uncanalised but all the limitations imposed in the preceding Section\n\n437, are implicit therein and must be read into Section 438.\n\n( 4) In addition to the limitations mentioned in Section 43 7, the petitioner must make out a special case for the exercise of the. power to grant anticipatory bail.\n\n( 5) Where a legitimate case for the remand of the offender to the police custody nnder Section 167 (2) can be made out by the investigating agency or a reasonable claim to secure incriminating material from information likely to be received from the offender under Section 27 of the Evidence Act can be made out, the power under Section 438 should not be ex_rcised.\n\n(6) The discretion under Section 438 cannot be exercised with regard to offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless the court at that very stage is satisfied that such a charge appears to be false or groundless.\n\n(7) The larger interest of the public and State demand that in serious cases like economic offences involving blatant corruption at the higher rungs of the executive and political power, the discretion under Section 438 of the Code should not be exercised; and\n\n(8) Mere general allegation of ma/a fides in the petition are inadequate. The court must be satisfied on materials before it that the allegations of mala fides are substantial and the accusation appears to be false and groundless.\n\nIt was urged before the Full Bench that the appellants were men of\n\nsubstance ar; d position who were hardly likely to abscond and wonld be prepared willingly to face trial.\n\nThis argument was rejected with the observation that to accord differential treatment to thei appellants on account of their status will amount to negation of the concept of equality before the law and that it could hardly be contended that every man of status, who was intended to be charged with serious crimes, including the one under Section 409 which was punishable with life imprisonment, \"was entitled to knock at the door _of the court for anticipatory bail\". The possession of high status, according to the Full Bench, is not only an irrelevant consideration for granting anticipatory bail but is, if anything, an aggravating circumstance.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to accept, in their totality, the submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General or the constraints which the\n\n-~.\n\n.J..\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 401\n\nFull Bench of the High Court has engrafted on the power conferred by Section 438. Clause (I) of Section 438 is couched in terms, broad and unqualified. By any known canon of construction, words of width and amplitude ought not generally to be cut down so as to read into the language of the statute restraints and conditions which the legislature itself did not think it proper or necessary to impose.\n\nThis is especially true when the statutory provisions which falls for consideration is designed to secure a valuable right like the right to personal freedom and involves the application of a presumption as salutary and deepgrained in our Criminal Jurisprudence as the presumption of innocence.\n\nThough the right to apply for anticipatory bail was conferred for the first time by Section 438, while enacting that provision the legislature\n\nwas not writing on a clean slate in the sense of taking an unprecedented step, in so far as the right to apply for bail is concerned. It had before it two cognate provisions of the Code : Section 437 which deals with the power of courts other than the Court of Session and the High Court to grant bail in non-bailable cases and Section 439 which deals with the \"special powers\" of the High Court and the Court of Session regarding bail.\n\nThe whole of Section 437 is riddled and hedged in by restrictions on the power of certain courts to grant bail. That section reads thus :\n\n\"437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. ( 1) When any person accused of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High ('., curt or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life :\n\nProvided that the Court may direct that any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail:\n\nProvided further that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by wi1nesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with snch directions as may be given by the Court.\n\n(2) If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial as the case may be,\n\nII'\n\nthat there are not reasonabl!' grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall, pending such inquiry, be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such officer or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided.\n\n(3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under subsection (1), the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary-\n\n(a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, or\n\n(b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he 1s accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or\n\n( c) otherwise in the interests of juicc.\n\n( 4) An officer or a . Court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall record in writing his or its reasons for so doing.\n\n(5) Any Court which has released a person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), niay, if it considers it necessary so to do, direct that such per<Jn be arrested and commit him to custody.\n\n(6) If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fiJ>cd .for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.\n\n(7) If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of an non-bailable offence and before judgment is delivered, the Court isl of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not\n\nI '\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.1.) 403\n\nguilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered.\"\n\nSection 439 ( 1) (a) incorporates the conditions mentioned in Section 437 (3) if the offence in respect of which the bail is sought is of the nature specified in that sub-section.\n\nSection 439 reads thus : \"439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.\n\n(1) A High Court or Court of Session n1ay direct- ·\n\n(a) That auy person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the\n\npurposes mentioned in that sub-section;\n\n(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified: Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session\n\nur which, though not so triable, is punishtble with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give notice.\n\n(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.\" The provisions of Section 437 and 439 furnished a convenient model for the legislature to copy while enacting Section 438. If it has not done so and has departed from a pattern which could easily be adopted with the necessary modifications, it would be wro'ng to refu5e to give to the departure its full effect by assuming that it was not intended to serve any particular or specific purpose. The departure, in our opinion, was made advisedly and purposefully : Advisedly, at least in part, because of the 41st Report of the Law Commission which, while pointing out the necessity of introducing a provision tn the Code enabling the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail, said in paragraph 29 .9 that it had \"considered\" carefully the question of laying down in the statute certain conditions under which alone anticipatory bail could be granted\" but had come to the conclusion that the question of granting such bail should b\" left \"to the discretion of the court\" and ought not to 6-289 SCl/80\n\nbe fettered by the statutory provision itself, since the discretion was being conferred npon superior courts which were expected to exercise it judicially.\n\nThe legislature conferred a wide discretion on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail because it evidehtly felt, firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the conditions under which anticipatory bail should or should not be granted and secondly, because the intention was to allow the higher courts i'n the echelon a somewhat free hand in the grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail. That is why, departing from the terms of Sections 437 and 439, Section 438(1) uses the language that the High Court or the Court of Session \"may, if it thinks fit\" direct that the applicant be released on bail. Sub-sedan (2) of Section 438 is a further and clearer manifestation of the same legislative intent to confer a wide discretionary power to gra'nt anticipatory bail.\n\nIt provides that the High Court or the Court of Session, while issuing a direction for the grant of anticipatory bail, \"may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit\", including the conditions which are set out in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (2). The proof of :egislative intent can best be found in the language which the legislature uses.\n\nAmbiguities can undoubtedly be resolved by resort to extraneous aids but words, as wide and explicit as have been used in Section 438, must be given their full effect, especially when to refuse to do so will result in undue impairement of the freedom of the ihdividual and the presumption of innocence. It has to be borne in mind that anticipatory bail is sought when there is a mere apprehension of arrest on the accusation that the applicant has committed a no'n-bailable offence.\n\nA person who has yet to lose his freedom by being arrested asks for freedom in the event of arrest.\n\nThat is the stage at which it is imperative to protect his freedom, in so far as one may, and to give full play to the presumption that he is innocent.\n\nIn fact, the stage at which anticipatory bail is geherally sought brings about its striking dissimilarity with the situation in which a person who is arrested for the commission of a non-bailable offence asks for bail. In the latter situation, adequate data is available to the Court, or can be G called for hy it, in the light of which it can grant or refuse relief and while grc:atihg it, modify it by the imposition of all or any of the conditio'ns mentioned in Section 437.\n\nThis is not to say that anticipatory bail, if granted, must be granted without the imposition of any conditions.\n\nThat will be plainly H contrary to the very terms of Section 438.\n\nThough sub-section (1) of that sectio'n says that the Court \"may, if it thinks fit\" issue the necessary direction for bail, sub-section (2) confers on the Court the\n\nGURBAKSH SJNGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 405\n\npower to include such condi'.ions in the direction as it may think fit in the light of the facts of the particular case, including the conditions\n\nmcntionoed in clauses (i) to (iv) of that sub-section.\n\nThe controversy therefore is not whether 'he Court has the power to impose conditions while granting anticipatory bail.\n\nIt clearly and expressly has that power.\n\nThe true question is whether by a process of construction, the amp1itude of judicial discretion which is given to the High Court and the Court of Session, to impose such conditions as they may thi'nk fit while granting anticipatory bail, should be cut down by reading into the statute conditions which are not to be found therein, like those evolved by the High Court or canvassed by the learned Additional Solicitor General.\n\nOur answer, clearly and emphatically, is in the negative.\n\nThe High Court and the Court of Session to whom the application for anticipatory bail is made ought to be left free in the exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it fit so to do on the particular facts and circumstances of tli.-. c':'.lcp and on such conditions as th~ case rnav warrant.\n\nSimilarly, they must be left free to refuse bail if the circumstances of the case so warran', on consideratio'ns similar to those mentioned in sc tion 437 or which are generally considered to be relevant under Section 439 of the Code.\n\nGeneralisations on matters which rest on discretion and the attempt to discover formulae of universal application whe'n facts are bound to differ from case to case frustrate the very purpose of conferring discretion. No two cases are alike on facts and therefore, Courts have to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the con• ferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful.\n\nThere is no risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court of Session and the High Court in granting anticipatory bail because, firstly, these are higher courts manned by experienced persons, secondly, their orders are not final but are open to appellate or r'visional scrutiny and above all b'cause, discretion has always to be exercised by conrts judicially and not accordiM to whim, caprice or fancy, On the other hand, there is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up unforeseen possibillities and offers new challenges.\n\nJudicial discretion has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride and to meet these challenges.\n\nWhi1e dealing with the necessity for preserving judicial discretion unhampered by rules of general application, Earl Loreburn L. C. said in Hyman and Anr. v. Rose(') :\n\n\"T desire in the first instance to point out that the dis- H cretion given by the section is very wide ........ Now it\n\n(!) [19121 A. c. 623.\n\nseems to me that when the Act is so express to provide a wide discretion, ..... .it is not advisable to lay down any rigid rules for guiding that discretion.\n\nI do not doubt that the rules enunciated by the Master of the Rolls in the present case are useful maxims in general, and that in general they reflect the point of view from which judges would regard an application for relief.\n\nBut I think it ought to be distinctly understood that there may be cases in which any or all of them may be disregarded. If it were otherwise, the free discretion given by the statute would be fettered by limitations which have nowhere been enacted.\n\nIt is one thing to decide what is the trnc meaning of the language contained in an Act of Parliament.\n\nIt is quite a different thing to place conditions upon a free discretion entrusted by statute to the Court where the conditions are not based upon statutory enactment at all. It is not safe, I think, to say tha:t the Court must and will always insist upon certain things whe'n the Act does not require them, and the facts of some unforseen case may make the Cour: wish it had kept a free hand.\"\n\nJudges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions.\n\nAnd it will be strange if, by employing judicial artifices and techniques, we cut down the discretion so wisely conferred upon the Courts, by devising a formula which will confine th•e power to grant anticipatory bail within a strait-jacket. While laying down cast-iron rules in a matter like granting anticipatory bail, as the High Court has done, it is apt to be overlooked that even Judges can have but an imperfect awareness of the needs of new situations. Life is never static and every situation has to be assessed in th;, context of emerging concerns as and when it arises.\n\nTherefore, even if we were to frame a 'Code for the garnt of anticipatory bail', which really is the business of the legislature, it can at best furnish broad guide-lines and cannot compel blind adherence. In which case to grant bail and in which to refuse it is, rn the very nature of things, a matter of discretion.\n\nBut apart from the fact that the. question is inherently of a kind which calls for the use of discretion from case to case, the legislature has, in terms express, relegated the decision of that question to the discretion of the court, by providing that it may grant bail \"if it thmks fit\".\n\nThe concern of the courts generally is to preserve their discretion without meaning to abuse it. It will be strange if we exhibit concern to stultify the discretion conferred upon the Courts by law.\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 407\n\nA close look at some of the rules in the eight-point code formu- A lated by he High Court will show how difficult it is to apply them in practice.\n\nThe seventh proposition says :\n\n\"The larger interest of the public and State demand that in' serious cases like economic offences involving blatant corruption at the higher rungs of the executive and B political power, the discretion under Section 438 of the Code should not be exercised.\"\n\nHow can the Court, even if it had a third eye, assess the blatantness of corruption at the stage of anticipatory bail ? And will it be correct to say that blatantness of the accusation will suffice for reject c ing bail, even if the applicant's conduct is painted in colours too\n\nlurid to be true? The ·ighth proposition rule framed by the High Court says :\n\n\"Mere general allegations of ma/a {ides in the petition are inadequate. The court must be satisfied on materials D before it that the allegations of ma/a fide are substantial and the accusation appears to be false and groundless.\"\n\nDoes fais rule mean, and that is the argument of the learned Additional Solicitor-General, that the anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless it is alleged (and naturally, also shown, because mere\n\naliegation 's ne.vcr enough) that the proposed accusations are mala fide ? It is understandable that if mala {ides are shown anticipatory bail should be granted in the generality of cases.\n\nBut it i\" not easy to appreciate why an application for anticipatory bail must be rejected unless the accusation is shown to be mala fide.\n\nThis, truly, is the risk involwd in framing rules by judicial construction. Discretion, therefore, ought to be permitted to remain in the domain of discretion, to be exercised objectively and open to correction by the higher courts. The safety of discretionary power lies in this twin protection which provides a safeguard against its abuse.\n\nAccording to the sixth proposition framed by the High Court, the discretion under Section 438 cannot be exercised in regard to offences punishable with death or impriionment for life uuless, the court at the stage of granting anticipatory bail, is satisfied that such a charge appears to be false or groundless.\n\nNow, Section 438 confers on the High Court and the Court of Session the power to grant anticipatory bail if the applicant has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed \"a uon-bailable offence\". We see no warrant for reading into this provision the conditions subject to\n\nwhich bail can be granted under Section 437 (1) of the Code.\n\nThat section, while conferring the power to grant bail in cases of nonbailable offences, provides by way of an exception that a person accused or suspected of the commission of a non-bailable offence \"shall not be so released\" if there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. If it was intended that lhe e)fception contained in Section 437(1) should govern the grant of relief under Section 438(1), nothing would have been easier for the legislature than to introduce into the latter section a similar provision.\n\nWe have already pointed out the basic distinction between these two sections.\n\nSection 437 applies only after a person, who is alleged to have committed a nonbailable offence, is arrested or detained without warrant or appears or is brought before a court.\n\nSection 438 applies before the arrest is made and, in fact, one pf the pre-conditions of its application is that the person, who applies for relief under it, must be able to show that he has reason to believe that \"he may be arrested'', which plainly means that i)e is not yet arrested.\n\nThe nexus which this distinction bears with the grant or refusal of bail is that in cases falling under Section 43 7, there is some concrete data on the basis of which it is possible to show that there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.\n\nIn cases falling under Section 438 that stage is still to arrive and, in the generality of cases thereunder, it would be premature and indeed difficult to predicate that there are or are not reasonable grounds for so believing.\n\nThe foundation pf the belief spo'ken of in Section 437 ( 1), by reason of which the court cannot release the applicant on bail is, normally, the credibility of the allegations contained in the First Information Report.\n\nIn the majority of cases falling under Section 438, that data will be lacking for forming the requisite belief. If at all the conditions mentioned in Section 437 are to be read into the provisions of Section 438, the transplantation shall have to be done without amputation.\n\nThat is to say, on the reasoning of the High Court, Section 438(1) 5hall have to be read as containing the clause that the applicant \"shall not\" be released on bail \"if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life\". In this process one shall have overlooked that whereas, the power under Section 43 8 ( 1) can be exercised if the High Court or the Court of Session \"thinks fits to do so, Section 437(1) does not confer the power to grant bail in the same wide terms.\n\nThe expression \"if it thinks fit\", which occurs in Section 438 (1) in relation to the power of tht1 High Court or the Court of Session, is conspicuously absent in Section 437(1).\n\nWe see no valid reason for re-writing Section 438 with a\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 409\n\nview, not to expanding the scope and ambit of the discretion conferred on the High Court and the Court of Session but, for the purpose of limiting it.\n\nAccordingly, we are unable to endorse the view of the High Court that ancipatory bail cannot be granted in respect of offences like criminal breach of trust for the mere reason that the punishment provided therefor is imprisc; mment for life.\n\nCircumstances may broadly justify the grant of baH in such cases too, though of course, the Court is free to refuse anticipatory bail in any case if there is material before it .iustifying such refusal.\n\nA great deal has been said by the High Court on the fifth proposition fn, rned by it, according to which, inter alia, the power under Section 438 should not be exercised if the investigating agency can make a reasonable claim that it can secure incriminating material from information likely to be received from the offender under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.\n\nAccordmg to the High Court, it is the right and the duty of the police to investigate into offences brought to their notice and therefore, courts should be careful not to exercise their powers in a manner which is calculated to cause interference therewith.\n\nIt is true that the functions of the Judic; ary and the police are in a sense complementary and no~ overlapping.\n\nAnd, as. observed by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaia Nasir Alzmed : ('}\n\n\"Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access ID a court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is chareed, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry.\n\nThe functions of 'he Judiciary and the Police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of the individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise it& own function: .... \"\n\nBut, these remarks, may it be remembered, were made by the Privy Council while rejecting the view of the Lahore High Court that it had inherent jurisdiction under the old Section 561A, Criminal Procedure Code, to quash all proceedings taken by the police in pursuance of two First Information Reports made to them. An order quashing such proceedings puts an end to the proceedings with the\n\n(1) 71 Indian Appeals 203.\n\ninevitable result that all iuvestigation into the accusation comes to a halt Therefore, it was held that the Court cannot, in the exercise of its inherent powers, virtually direct that the police shall not inevstigate into the charges contained in the F .LR. We are concerned here with a situation of an altogether different kind.\n\nAn order of anticipatory bail does not in a_ny way, directly or indirectly, take away from the police their right to inestigate into charges made or to be _!!IJlde against the person released on bail. In fact, two of the usual conditions incorporated in a direction issued under Section 438 (1) are those recommended in Sub-section (2) (i) and (ii) which require the applicant to co-operate with the police and to assure that he shall not tamper with the witnesses during a:nd after the investigation.\n\nWhile granting relief under Section 438 (1), appropriate conditions can be imposed under Section 438 (2) so as to ensure an uninterrupted investigation. One of such conditions can even be that in the event of the police making out a case of a likely discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the person released on bail shall be liable to be taken in police custody for facilitating_ the discovery.\n\nBesides, if and when the occasion a:rises, it may be possible for the prosecution to claim the benefit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a discovery of facts made in pursuance of information\n\nupplied by a person released on bail by invoking the principle stated by this Court in State of U.P. v. Deoma11 Upadhyaya(') to the effect that when a person not in custody approaches a police officer investigating an offence and offers to give information leading to the discovery of a fact, having a bea:ring on the charge which may be made against him, he niay appropriately be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police.\n\nThe broad foundation of this rule is stated to be that Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate any formality before a person can be said to be taken in custody : submission to the custody by word or action by a person is sufficient.\n\nFor similar reasons, we are unable to agree that a:nticipatory bail should be refused if a legitimate case for the remand of the offender to the police custody under Section 167 (2) of the Code is made out by the investigating agency.\n\nIt is unnecessary to consider the third propos1t1on of the High Court in any great details because we have already indicated that there is no justification for reading into Section 438 the limitations mentioned in Section 437. The High Court says that such limitations are implicit in Section 438 but, with respect, no such implications arise or can be\n\n(1) [1961]· I S. C.R. 14 at page 26.\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB ( Chandrachud, C.J.) 411\n\nread into that seqtion. The planitude of the section must be given its full play.\n\nThe High Court says in its fourth proposition that in addition to the limitations mentioned in Section 437, the petitioner must make out a \"special case\" for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail.\n\nThis, virtually, reduces the salutary power conferred by Section 438 to a dead letter.\n\nIn its anxiety, otherwise just, to show that the power conferred by Section 438 is not \"unguided or uncanalised\",\n\nthe High Court has subjected that power to a restraint which will have the effect of making the power utterly unguided.\n\nTo say that the applicant must make out a \"special case\" for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail is really to say nothing.\n\nThe applicant has undoubtedly to make out a case for the grant of anticipatory bail. llut one cannot go further and say that he must make out a \"special case\". We do not see why the provisions of Section 438, should be suspected as containing somethiqg volatile or incendiary, which needs to be handled with th_e greatest care and caution im&ginable.\n\nA wise exercise of judicial power inevitably takes care of the evil consequences which are likely to flow out of its intemperate use.\n\nEvery '<ind of judicial discretion, whatever may be the nature of the matter in regard to which it is required to be exercised, has to be\n\nused w1 th due care and caution. In fact, an awareness of the context in which the discretion is required to be exercised and of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its use, is the hall mark of a prudent exercise of judicial discretion, One ought not to make a bugbear of the power to grant anticipatory bail.\n\nBy proposition No. 1 the High Court says that the power conferred by Section 438 is \"of an extraordinary character and must be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases only\". It may perhaps be right to describe the power as of an extraordinary charac!er because\n\nordinarily the bail is applied for under Section 437 or Section 439.\n\nThese Sections deal with the power to grant or refuse bail to a person who is in the custody of the police and that is the ordinary situation in which bail is generally applied for.\n\nBut this does not justify the conclusion that the power must be exercised in exceptional cases only, because it is of an extra-ordinary character.\n\nWe will really be saying once too often that all discretion has to be exercised with care and circumspection depending on circumstances justifying its exercise.\n\nIt is unnecessary to travel beyond it and subject the wide power conferred by the legislature to a rigorous code of self-imposed Jimitatio'ns.\n\nIt remains only to consider the second proposition formulated by the High Court, which is the only one with which we arc disposed to agree but we will say more about it a little later.\n\nIt will be appropriate at this stage to refer to a decision of this Court in Balchand Jain v. State' of Madhya Pradesh(') on which the\n\nHigh Conrt has leaned heavily in formulating its propositions.\n\nOne of us, Bhagwati J. who spoke for himself and A. C. Gupta, J. observed in that case that :\n\n\"the power of granting 'anticipatory bail' is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears that a person might be falsely implicated, or a frivolous case might be launched against him, or \"there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail\" that such power is to be exercised.\"\n\nFazal Ali, J. who delivered a separate judgment of concurrence also observed that :\n\n\"an order for anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy available in special cases\". and proceeded to say :\n\n\"As Sectoin 438 immediately follows s. 437 which is the main provision for bail in respect of non-bailable offences, it is manifest that the conditions imposed by s. 437 (1) are implicitly contained in s. 438 of the Code. Otherwise the result would be that a person who is accused of murder can get away under s. 438 by obtaining an order for anticipatory bail without the neq\"sity of proving that there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was not guilty of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Such a course would render the provisions of s. 437 nugatory and will give a free licence to the accused persons charged with nonbailable offences to get easy bail by approaching the Court under s. 438 and by-passing s. 437 of the Code. This, we feel, could never have been the intention of the Legislatnre.\n\nSection 438 does not contain unguided or unca'.nalised powers to pass an order for anticipatory bail, but such an order being of an exceptional type can only be passed if,\n\n(!) [1977] 2 S. C. R. 52.\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 413\n\napurt from the conditians mentioned in s. 43 7, there is a A special case made out for passing the order. The words \"for a direction under this section\" and \"Court may, if it thinks fit, direct\" clearly show that the Court has to be guided by a large number of considerations inc:uding those montioned i'n s. 437 of the Code.\"\n\nWhile stating his conclusions Fazal Ali, J. reiterated in conclusion no.3 that \"Section 43 8 of the Code is an extraordinary remedy and should\n\nb<e. resorted to only in special cases.\"\n\nWe hold the decision in Balchand Jain (supra) in great respect but\n\n11 is necessary to remember that the question as regards the int•; rpretation o( Section 438 did not at all arise in that case. Fazal Ali, J. has staled in parngraph 3 of his judgment that 'the only point\" which arose for c-0nsideration before the Court was whether the provisions of Section 438 relating to anticipatory bail stand overruled and repealed by virtue of Rule 184 of the Defence and Internal Security of Ind; a Rules, ]071 or whether both the provisions can, by the rule of harmonious interpretation, exist side by side. Bhagwati, J. has also stated in his judgment, after adverting to Section 438 that Rule 184 is what the Court was concerned with in the appeal. The observations made in Balchand Jain\n\n(supra) regarding the nature of the power conferred by Section 438 and regarding the question whether the conditions mentioned in Section 437 should be read into Section 438 cannot therefore be treated as concluding the points which arise directly for our consideration. We agree, with respect, that the power conferred by Section 438 is of an extraordinary character in the sense indicated above, namely, that it is not ordinarily\n\nrosorted to like the power confrrred by Sections 437 and 439. We also agree that the power to grant anticipatory bail should be exercised with due care and circumspection but beyond that, it is not possible to agree with the observations made in Balchand Jain (supra) in an altogether different context on an altogether different point.\n\nWe find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438. especially when no such restrictions have been impcsed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An overgenerous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable>\n\nsince the right to personal freedom cannot be made ta depend on com-\n\n414 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS\n\n(1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\npliance with unreasonable restrictions.\n\nThe beneficient provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned.\n\nNo doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi(') thaG in order to mcef the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable.\n\nSection 438, in the form in which i~ is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on: thei ground that it prescribes; a procedure which is unjust or unfair.\n\nWe, ought, at all costs, to avoid thrcwmg it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in i l which are not be found therein.\n\nIt is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail bec_ause that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra\n\nv. King Emperor(') that the object of bail is to secure the attendance ot the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the 'Meerut Conspiracy cases' observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which doserve a special mention.\n\nIn K. N. Jog/ekar v. Emperor(') it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions iu the preceding Section 497 which correspond~ to the present Section 437. It was observed by the Court that there was'. no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise> o~ the discretion conferred by Section 498 aud that the qnly principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously.\n\nIn Emperor v. If. L. Hutchinson(') it was, said that it was very unwise to make an attemp~ to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact tllat the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court unfettered.\n\nAccording to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be sa!fely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not iu other classes.\n\nIt was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sectionsi in the Criminal Procedure\n\n(I) (1978] I S. C. C. 248.\n\n(2) A. LR. 1924 Cal. 476, 479, 480\n\n(3) A. LR. 1931 All. 504 •.\n\n(4) A.LR. 1931 All. 356, 358.\n\n' f\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 415\n\nCode was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An\n\naccused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody.\n\nAs a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled. to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case.\n\nA presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.\n\nComing nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of AIUlhra Pradesh(') that \"the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety\n\nand burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process.\n\nC After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, sufforing lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by aw.\n\nThe last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right.\"\n\nIn Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Adm11.) (') it wns observed by Goswami, J. who spoke for the Court, that \"there cannot be an inexorable forn:mla in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail.\"\n\nIn American Jurisprudence (2d, Volume 8, page 806, para 39) it is stated :\n\n''Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the c\"urt, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end.\"\n\nIt is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer npon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.\n\nIn regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on hail in the event of his arrest would generally be made.\n\nOn the other\n\n(I) [1978] 1 s. c. c. 240.\n\n(2) [1978] 1 s. c. c. 118.\n\nhand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from jnstice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala {ides; and, equally, that anticip_atory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enmnerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and \"the larger interests of the public or the state\" are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.\n\nThe relevance of these considerations was pointed out in The State v.\n\nCaptain Jagjit Singh,(') which, though, was a case under the old Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code.\n\nW is of paramount consideration to remember that the freedom of the individual is as necessary for the survival of the society as it is for the egoistic purposes of the individual. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may think fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail.\n\nA word of caution may perhaps be necessary in the evaluation ot the consideration whether the applicant is likely to abscond. There can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely td commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it. In his charge to the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899 (to which Krishna Iyer, J. has referred in Gudikanti), Lord Russel of Killowen said :\n\n\". . . . . ... it was the duty of magistrates to admit accused persons to bail, wherever practicable, unless there were strong grounds for supposing that such persons would not appear to take their trial. Tt w\"s not the poorer classes who did not appear, for their circumstances were such as to tie them to the place where they carried on their work. They had not the golden wings with which to fly fro'm justice.\"\n\n(ll [1962] 3 S. C. R. 622.\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUN.TAB (Chaqdrachud, C.l.) 417\n\nThis, incidentally, will serve to show how no hard and fast rules can be laid down in discretionary matters like the grant or refusal of bail, whether anticipatory or otherwise.\n\nNo such rules can be laid down for the simple reason that a circumstance which, in a given case, turns out to be conclusive, may have no more than ordinary signification in another case.\n\nWe would, therefore, prefer to leave the High Court and the Court of Session to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion which, by their long training and experience, they are ideally suited to do.\n\nThe ends of jnstice will be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consonance with principles governing the grant of bail which are recognised over the years, than by divesting them of their discret on which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general appfication. It is customary, almost chronic, to take a statute as one finds it on the grounds that. after all \"the leg; sJa•11r0 in its wisdom\" has thought it fit to use a particular expression. A convention may usefully grow whereby the High Court and the Court of Session may be trusted to exercise their discretionary powers in their wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted to their care by the legislature in its wisdom. If they err,- they are liable to be corrected.\n\nThis should be the end of the matter, bnt it is necessary to clarify E ii few points which have given rise to certain misgivings.\n\nSection 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant mus~\n\nshow that he has \"reason to believe\" that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence.\n\nThe use of the expression \"reason to believe\"\n\nI!' shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must h1:1 founded on reasonable grounds. Mere 'fear' is not 'belief', for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for G a non-bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested.\n\nSection 438(1 ), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a oossible arrest. Otherwise, the number of ann:ications for a'ntic; natNv bail H will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a deYice to secure the individual's liberty; it is neither a passport to\n\nA the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusatiqns, likely or unlikely.\n\nSecondly, if an application for anticipatory bail is made to the High Court or the Court of Session it must apply its own mind tO' the question and decide whether a case has been made out for granting such relief. It cannot leave the question for the decision of the Magistrate concerned under Section 437 of the Code, as and when an occasion arises.\n\nSuch a course will defeat the very objec~ of Section 438.\n\nThirdly, the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. The imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed.\n\nFourthly, anticipatory bail can be granted even after an F.I.R. is - filed, so long as the applicant bas not been. arrested. ,•,\n\nFifthly, the provisions of Section 43 8 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of \"anticipatory bail\" to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, in so far a~ the offence dr offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section .439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested.\n\nWe have said that there is one proposition formulated by the High Court with which we are inclined to agree. That is preposition No. (2).\n\nWe agree that a 'blanket order' of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed. This flows from the very language of the section which, as discussed above, requires the applicant to show that he has \"reason to believe\" that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. That is why, normally, a direction should not issue under Section 438(1) to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail \"whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever.\" That is what is meant by a 'blanket order' of anticipatory bail, an order which serves as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity, in fact any eventuality, likely or unlikely regarding which, no concrete information can possibly be had. The rationale of a direction under Section 438 (1) is the belief of the applicant founded on reasonable grounds that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. It is unrealistic to expect the applicant to drctw up his application with the meticulousness of a pleading in a civil case and such is not requirement of the section. But specific event~ and fact&\n\n' •\n\nGURDAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.); 419\n\n11)-Ust be disclosed by the applicant in order to enable the court to judge A of the reasonableness of his belief, the existence of which is the sine qua oon of the exercise of power conferred by the section.\n\n' Apart from the fact that the very language of the statute compels this construction. there is an important principle involved in the insistence that facts, .on the basis of which a direction under Section 438 ( 1) is sought, must be clear and specific, not vague and general.\n\nI~ is only by the observance of that principle that a possible conflict between the right of an individual to his liberty and the right of the police to investigate into crimes reported to. them can be avoided.\n\nA blanket order of anticipatory bail is bound to cause serious interference with both the right and the duty of the police in the matter of investigation because, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have. been committed by the 11pplicant and when, an order of bail which comprehends allegedly unlawfnl activity of any description whatsoever, will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits, say, a murder in the presence of the public. Such an order can then become a charter of lawlessn£SS and a weapon to stifle prompt investigtltion into offences which could not possibly be predicated when the order was passed. Therefore, the court which grants anticipatory bail niust take care to specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will be effective. The power should not be exercised in a vacuum.\n\n/ There was some discussion before us on certain minor modalities regarding the passing of bail orders under Section 438(1). Can an order of bail be pilssed under 1bat section without notice to the public prosecutor? It can be. But notice should issue to the public prosecutor or the Government Advocate forthwith and the question of bail should be re-examined in the light of the respective contentions of the parties. 'The ad-interim order too must conform to the requirements of the section and suitable conditions should be imposed on the applicant even at that stage. Should the operation of an order passed under Section 438(1) be limited in point of time? Not necessarily. The Court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F.I.R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be direct~ !°\n\nobtain an order of bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code within\n\na reasonably short period after the filing of the F.I.R. as aforesaid. But this need not be followed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be ii, ot to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time.\n\n7-289 , SCI/80\n\n During the last couple of years this Court, while dealing with appeals against orders J:1115sed by various High Courts, has granted anticipatory bail to many a person by imposing conditions set out in Section 438(2)(i), (ii) and (iii). The Court has, in addition, directed in most of those cases that (a) the applicant should surrender himself to the police for a brief period if a discovery is to be made under Sectioa 27 of the Evidence Act or that he should be deemed to have surrendered himself if such a discovery is to be made. In certain exceptional cases, the Court has, in view of the material placed before it, directed that the order of anticipatory bail will remain in operation only for a week or so until after the filing of the F.I.R. in respect of matters covered by the order. These .orders, on the whole, have worked satisfatorily, causing the least inconvenience to the individuals concerned and least interference with the investigational ri1#s of the police. The Court has attempted through those orders to strike a balance between the individual's right to personal freedom and the investigational rights of the police.\n\nThe appellants who were refused anticipatory bail by various courts have long since been released by this Court under Section 438(1) of the Code.\n\nThe various appeals and Special Leave petitions before us will stand disposed of in terms of this Judgment. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryruia High Court, which was treated as the main case under appeal, is substantially set aside as indicated during the course of this Judgment.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals allowed in part.", "total_entities": 328, "entities": [{"text": "GURBAKSH: SINGH SIBBIA ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GURBAKSH: SINGH SIBBIA ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 68, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A • v.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\nApril 9, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CllANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L. UNTWALIA, 8\n\nR. S. PATHAK AND 0."}}, {"text": "P. N. 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CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198, "end_char": 209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 217, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant here.in, Sri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia was a Minister of Irriga..J C tion and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab.", "canonical_name": "GURBAKSH: SINGH SIBBIA ETC"}}, {"text": "High Court of Puujab and Haryaua", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grave allegations of political corruption were made against him and others whereupon applications were filed in the High Court of Puujab and Haryaua under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, praying that the appellauts be directed to be relea1!ed."}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 681, "end_char": 692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1913", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1913"}}, {"text": "September, 13, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 985, "end_char": 1004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conw sidering the importance of the matter, a learned single Judge referred the applications to a Full Bench, which by its judgment dated September, 13, 1977 dis- D missed them, after summarising, what according to it is the true legal position, of s. 438 of the Code.of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) thus:\n\n(l) The power uuder Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, is of an extra-ordinary character and must be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases only."}}, {"text": "s. 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 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3-3-78, 3-3-78, 10-3-78, 8-3-78, 20-3-78,\n\n17-3-78, 15-2-78, 17-2-78, 17-2-78, 24-1-78, 14-3-78, 14-3-78 and 27-3-78 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Gobind Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31020, "end_char": 31030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "K. S. Thapar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31032, "end_char": 31044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Dilip Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31046, "end_char": 31057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Sunanda Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31065, "end_char": 31081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "A. N. Karkhanis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31083, "end_char": 31098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Deepak Thapar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31100, "end_char": 31113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Malini for", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31123, "end_char": 31133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Gobind Das, K. S. Thapar, Dilip Singh, Mrs.\n\nSunanda Bhandare, A. N. Karkhanis, Deepak Thapar and Miss Malini for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31279, "end_char": 31292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, V. C. Mahajan, 0."}}, {"text": "V. C. Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31294, "end_char": 31307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, V. C. Mahajan, 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31309, "end_char": 31321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony, V. C. Mahajan, 0.", "canonical_name": "0. P. Sharma"}}, {"text": "R. C. Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31326, "end_char": 31338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and R. C. Bhatia for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31486, "end_char": 31501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harjinder Singh for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "B. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31545, "end_char": 31557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. S. Bindra, S. M. Ashri and Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind for the Appellants in Crl."}}, {"text": "S. M. Ashri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31559, "end_char": 31570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. S. Bindra, S. M. Ashri and Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind for the Appellants in Crl."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Arvind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31580, "end_char": 31594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. S. Bindra, S. M. Ashri and Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind for the Appellants in Crl."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31692, "end_char": 31704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, H. K. Puri, Aruneshwar Prasad and Vivek Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31706, "end_char": 31716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, H. K. Puri, Aruneshwar Prasad and Vivek Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Aruneshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31718, "end_char": 31735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, H. K. Puri, Aruneshwar Prasad and Vivek Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Vivek Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31740, "end_char": 31751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, H. K. Puri, Aruneshwar Prasad and Vivek Sethi for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "L. N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31798, "end_char": 31809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, R. P. Singh, L. R. Singh, Suman Kapoor, Sukumar Sahu and M. C. Bhandare, P. P. Singh and R. K. 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Jain for tho Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Sahu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31851, "end_char": 31863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, R. P. Singh, L. R. Singh, Suman Kapoor, Sukumar Sahu and M. C. Bhandare, P. P. Singh and R. K. Jain for tho Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31868, "end_char": 31882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, R. P. Singh, L. R. Singh, Suman Kapoor, Sukumar Sahu and M. C. Bhandare, P. P. Singh and R. K. Jain for tho Appellants in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "P. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31884, "end_char": 31895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, R. P. Singh, L. R. Singh, Suman Kapoor, Sukumar Sahu and M. C. Bhandare, P. P. Singh and R. K. Jain for tho Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31900, "end_char": 31910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. N. Sinha, R. P. Singh, L. R. Singh, Suman Kapoor, Sukumar Sahu and M. C. Bhandare, P. P. Singh and R. K. Jain for tho Appellants in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "S. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31978, "end_char": 31988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Jain for the Appellant in Crl.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Jain"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32030, "end_char": 32044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, M. M. L. Srivastava, R. Satish and E. C. Agrawa/a for the Appellant in Crl.", "canonical_name": "V. Ill. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "M. M. L. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32046, "end_char": 32065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, M. M. L. Srivastava, R. Satish and E. C. 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Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32201, "end_char": 32215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, Harbhagwan Singh, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and P. N. Purl for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "P. N. Purl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32220, "end_char": 32230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. Mahajan, Harbhagwan Singh, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and P. N. Purl for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "K. K. Mohan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32285, "end_char": 32296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Mohan for the Petitioner in SLP 260/78."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32332, "end_char": 32341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Rathin Dass for the Appellant in Crl."}}, {"text": "Rathin Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32346, "end_char": 32357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Rathin Dass for the Appellant in Crl."}}, {"text": "G L. M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32459, "end_char": 32474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G L. M. Singhvi and N. S. Das Behl for the Appellants in Cd."}}, {"text": "N. S. Das Behl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32479, "end_char": 32493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G L. M. Singhvi and N. S. Das Behl for the Appellants in Cd."}}, {"text": "J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32578, "end_char": 32589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Sorabjee, Addi.", "canonical_name": "J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32608, "end_char": 32628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishamber Lal Khanna, liardev Singh, R. s. Sodhi and B. B. Sinf!h for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "liardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32630, "end_char": 32643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishamber Lal Khanna, liardev Singh, R. s. Sodhi and B. B. Sinf!h for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "R. s. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32645, "end_char": 32656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishamber Lal Khanna, liardev Singh, R. s. Sodhi and B. B. Sinf!h for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "B. B. Sinf!h", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32661, "end_char": 32673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bishamber Lal Khanna, liardev Singh, R. s. Sodhi and B. B. Sinf!h for the Appellants in Cr!."}}, {"text": "J. Sorabjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33029, "end_char": 33040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Sorabjee Add!.", "canonical_name": "J. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Thakur Naubat Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33059, "end_char": 33078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thakur Naubat Singh Adv."}}, {"text": "S. N. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33100, "end_char": 33111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haryana, S. N. Anand and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent~\n\nin Cr!."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33116, "end_char": 33130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haryana, S. N. Anand and R. N. Sachthey for the Respondent~\n\nin Cr!."}}, {"text": "M. M. Kshatriya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33225, "end_char": 33240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chat1erjee for Respondents in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "M. M. Kshatriya"}}, {"text": "G. S. Chat1erjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33245, "end_char": 33261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chat1erjee for Respondents in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "G. S. Chat1erjee"}}, {"text": "M. Kshatriya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33318, "end_char": 33330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondents in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "M. M. Kshatriya"}}, {"text": "G. S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33335, "end_char": 33351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondents in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "G. S. Chat1erjee"}}, {"text": "J. K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33388, "end_char": 33399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. K. Gupta, B. R. Agarwala and Janendra Lal for the Vice-\n\nChancellor, Pwijab University in Cr!."}}, {"text": "B. R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33401, "end_char": 33415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. K. Gupta, B. R. Agarwala and Janendra Lal for the Vice-\n\nChancellor, Pwijab University in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Janendra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33420, "end_char": 33432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. K. Gupta, B. R. Agarwala and Janendra Lal for the Vice-\n\nChancellor, Pwijab University in Cr!."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33549, "end_char": 33560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C.J.-These appeals by Special Leave involve a question of great public importance bearing, at once, on personal liberty and the investigational powers of the police."}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34006, "end_char": 34017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34025, "end_char": 34057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34080, "end_char": 34091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35191, "end_char": 35196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1 ) , it maY include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including-\n\n( i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;\n\n(ii) a condition that the person ihall not, directly or in- H directly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so\n\nas to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;\n\n(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;\n\n(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under subsection (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section."}}, {"text": "section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35312, "end_char": 35323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 13, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35997, "end_char": 36015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "335 of 1975 which is the first of the many appeals before us, arises out of a judgment dated September 13, 1977 of a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana."}}, {"text": "Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36101, "end_char": 36122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant herein, Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, was a Min:,.:er of Irrigation and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab.", "canonical_name": "GURBAKSH: SINGH SIBBIA ETC"}}, {"text": "Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36171, "end_char": 36216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant herein, Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, was a Min:,.:er of Irrigation and Power in the Congress Ministry of the Government of Punjab."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36335, "end_char": 36367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grave allegations of political corruption were made against him and others whereupon, applications were filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Section 438, praying that the appellants be directed to be released on bail, in the event of their arrest on the\n\naforesaid charges."}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36374, "end_char": 36385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36684, "end_char": 36716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36785, "end_char": 36796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37110, "end_char": 37136, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Law Commission of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37282, "end_char": 37305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The need for extensive amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure was felt for a long time and various suggestions were made in different quarters in order to make the Code more effective and comprehensive The Law Commission of India, in its 4lst Report dated September 24, 1969 pointed out the necessity of introducing a provision in the Code en-\ni-\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 395\n\nabling the High Court and the Court of Session to grant \"anticipatory\n\nbail\"."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37332, "end_char": 37350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The need for extensive amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure was felt for a long time and various suggestions were made in different quarters in order to make the Code more effective and comprehensive The Law Commission of India, in its 4lst Report dated September 24, 1969 pointed out the necessity of introducing a provision in the Code en-\ni-\n\nGURBAKSH SINGH v. PUNJAB (Chandrachud, C.J.) 395\n\nabling the High Court and the Court of Session to grant \"anticipatory\n\nbail\"."}}, {"text": "section 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39449, "end_char": 39460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40695, "end_char": 40713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suggestion made by the Law Commission was, in principle, D accepted by the Central Government which introduced Olanse 447 in the Draft Bill of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970 with a view to conferring an express power on the High Court and the C<>urt of\n\nSession to grant anticipatory bail."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40767, "end_char": 40799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Clause 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42904, "end_char": 42913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42992, "end_char": 43003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43011, "end_char": 43043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43120, "end_char": 43131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Wharton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43571, "end_char": 43578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any order of bail can, of coure, be effective only from the time of arrest because, to grant bail, as stated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, is to 'set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance'."}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45150, "end_char": 45160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45172, "end_char": 45198, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45490, "end_char": 45501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47182, "end_char": 47193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47369, "end_char": 47383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas it is argued by Shri M. C. Bhandare, Shri 0.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Bhandare"}}, {"text": ". P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47391, "end_char": 47402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas it is argued by Shri M. C. Bhandare, Shri 0.", "canonical_name": "0. P. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48270, "end_char": 48281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48285, "end_char": 48296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48298, "end_char": 48321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. Ill. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48351, "end_char": 48367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri V. Ill. Tarkunde, appearing on behalf of some of the appellants, while supporting the contentions of the other appellants, said that since the denial of bail amounts to deprivatio'n of personal liberty, court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of .Section 438, when no snch restrictions are imposed by the legislature in the terms of that Section.", "canonical_name": "V. Ill. 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"start_char": 62817, "end_char": 62828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64428, "end_char": 64439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66613, "end_char": 66623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is one thing to decide what is the trnc meaning of the language contained in an Act of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68983, "end_char": 68994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70579, "end_char": 70590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70815, "end_char": 70826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71150, "end_char": 71161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": 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"start_char": 74120, "end_char": 74134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74175, "end_char": 74186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74979, "end_char": 74990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75176, "end_char": 75186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 76409, "end_char": 76426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The functions of 'he Judiciary and the Police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of the individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise it& own function: .... \"\n\nBut, these remarks, may it be remembered, were made by the Privy Council while rejecting the view of the Lahore High Court that it had inherent jurisdiction under the old Section 561A, Criminal Procedure Code, to quash all proceedings taken by the police in pursuance of two First Information Reports made to them."}}, {"text": "Section 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76475, "end_char": 76487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76489, "end_char": 76512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77334, "end_char": 77345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77586, "end_char": 77597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77647, "end_char": 77658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", 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"end_char": 81575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82612, "end_char": 82620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of us, Bhagwati J. who spoke for himself and A. C. Gupta, J. observed in that case that :\n\n\"the power of granting 'anticipatory bail' is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears that a person might be falsely implicated, or a frivolous case might be launched against him, or \"there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail\" that such power is to be exercised.\""}}, {"text": "A. C. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82650, "end_char": 82661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of us, Bhagwati J. who spoke for himself and A. C. Gupta, J. observed in that case that :\n\n\"the power of granting 'anticipatory bail' is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears that a person might be falsely implicated, or a frivolous case might be launched against him, or \"there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail\" that such power is to be exercised.\""}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83117, "end_char": 83126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali, J. who delivered a separate judgment of concurrence also observed that :\n\n\"an order for anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy available in special cases\"."}}, {"text": "s. 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83350, "end_char": 83356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83477, "end_char": 83483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83516, "end_char": 83522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83624, "end_char": 83630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83883, "end_char": 83889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84033, "end_char": 84039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84055, "end_char": 84061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84147, "end_char": 84158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 S. C. R. 52", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 84324, "end_char": 84344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84436, "end_char": 84441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84703, "end_char": 84709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84805, "end_char": 84815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balchand Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84935, "end_char": 84948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We hold the decision in Balchand Jain (supra) in great respect but\n\n11 is necessary to remember that the question as regards the int•; rpretation o( Section 438 did not at all arise in that case."}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85060, "end_char": 85071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85263, "end_char": 85274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85578, "end_char": 85589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85751, "end_char": 85762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85826, "end_char": 85837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85858, "end_char": 85869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86019, "end_char": 86030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 437 and 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86169, "end_char": 86189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86508, "end_char": 86516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438."}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86689, "end_char": 86700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86806, "end_char": 86817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87186, "end_char": 87197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87447, "end_char": 87458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87533, "end_char": 87546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi(') thaG in order to mcef the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87589, "end_char": 87599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87728, "end_char": 87739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 88286, "end_char": 88308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra\n\nv. King Emperor(') that the object of bail is to secure the attendance ot the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment."}}, {"text": "Section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88913, "end_char": 88924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88958, "end_char": 88969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 497", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89133, "end_char": 89144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89178, "end_char": 89189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89342, "end_char": 89353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90734, "end_char": 90746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of AIUlhra Pradesh(') that \"the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety\n\nand burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91215, "end_char": 91225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91328, "end_char": 91335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it wns observed by Goswami, J. who spoke for the Court, that \"there cannot be an inexorable forn:mla in the matter of granting bail."}}, {"text": "Section 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94076, "end_char": 94087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 439", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94121, "end_char": 94132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gudikanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95165, "end_char": 95174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his charge to the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899 (to which Krishna Iyer, J. has referred in Gudikanti), Lord Russel of Killowen said :\n\n\". . . . . ..."}}, {"text": "Russel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95182, "end_char": 95188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his charge to the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899 (to which Krishna Iyer, J. has referred in Gudikanti), Lord Russel of Killowen said :\n\n\". . . . . ..."}}, {"text": "Killowen", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 95192, "end_char": 95200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his charge to the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899 (to which Krishna Iyer, J. has referred in Gudikanti), Lord Russel of Killowen said :\n\n\". . . . . ..."}}, {"text": "[1962] 3 S. C. R. 622", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 95629, "end_char": 95650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96185, "end_char": 96196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97256, "end_char": 97270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98168, "end_char": 98183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98932, "end_char": 98943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99035, "end_char": 99046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99163, "end_char": 99174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99456, "end_char": 99466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99753, "end_char": 99764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100549, "end_char": 100563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100989, "end_char": 101000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101782, "end_char": 101793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103042, "end_char": 103056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103552, "end_char": 103566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 437", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103874, "end_char": 103885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438(2)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104358, "end_char": 104375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 438(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105418, "end_char": 105432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryruia High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 105593, "end_char": 105623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryruia High Court, which was treated as the main case under appeal, is substantially set aside as indicated during the course of this Judgment."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_421_427_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "MAHALAXMI SUGAR MILLS CO. LTD. v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELID, NEW DELHI\n\n• April 9, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] a\n\n\" Indian Income Tax Act 1922-Section 10(2) (xv)-Inter\"\"t paid on arrears\n\nof mgarcane cess-Whether penalty-Interest if a permissible deduction.\n\nSection 3(2) of the U.P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 provides that the owner of a sugar factory shall pay cess on sugaroone coming into the premises of a factory for use therein, on mch date and at such place as may be prescribed.\n\nSub-section (3) provides that if the cess is not paid by the specified date, interest at six per cent per annum is payable on the arrears from the specified date to the date of payment. Where a person is in default in making the payment of the cess, sub-section (5) provides that in addition to tbC amount of the arrears and interest a sum not exceeding ten per cent shall be recoverable by way of penalty from the person liable to pay the cess.\n\nIn respect of three assessment years the appellant-assessee, a manufacturer of sugar, in its income tax returns claimed deduction of certain sums paid by it by way of interest on arrears of cess due under the U.P. Sugarcane cess Act, 1956. The Income Tax Officer disallowed the clain1.\n\nThe Appellant Assistant Commissioner, whose view was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal, held that the payment of interest constituted a permissible deduc--\n\ntion.\n\nOn reference the High Court held that , the interest paid on the arrears did not fall within the scope of s. 10(2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 for the reason that it was paid by way of penalty for an infringement of the law.\n\nAllowina the appeal,\n\nHEID : The interest paid under s. 3 (3) of the Cess Act cannot be de .. cribed as a penalty paid for an infringement of the law.\n\nThe assessee is entitled to claim the sum as a deduction uoder section 10(2) (xv) of the 1922 Act es expenditure laid out wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the business.\n\n[427E]\n\n(a) The interest payable on arrears of cess under s. 3(3) is in reality part and parcel of the liability to pay cess.\n\nIt is an accretion to the cess.\n\nUnder s. 3 (3) this enlargement of the cess liability is automatic and no specific order is necessary in order that the obligation to pay interest under this sub-section should accrue. The liability to pay interest is as certain as the liability to pay the cess. The interest payable is in the nature of com pensation paid to the Government for delay in the payment of cess. It is not by way of penalty. [425GHl\n\n A\n\n(b) Interest on arrears of cess is t; tot a penalty because provision for\n\nimposing penalty has been made separately by s. 3(5).\n\nIt is also not a penalty within the meaning of s. 4 which provides for criminal liability and criminal prosecution. The penalty payable under s. 3 ( 5) lies in the discretion of the collecting officer or authority. For imposing penalty under s. 4 no prosecution oon be instituted unless a complaint is made by or under the authority of the Cane Commissioner under s. 5(1) of the Cess Act.\n\n[426A-BJ\n\n(c) The procedure for collecting interest on arrears is different from the procedure for recovering penalty imposed under s. 3(5). The Collector proceeds to recover the arrear of cess as if it were an arrear of land revenue on receipt from the authority concerned of a certificate under s. 3 (6) specifying the aIDDunt of arrears including interest due.\n\nThe words \"specifying the amount of arrears including interest\" show that the interest is part of the arrears of cess.\n\nIn the case of penalty imposed under s. '3(5) a separate provision for recovery has been made under s. 3(7). Although the manner of recovery of penalty provided by s. 3 (7) is the same as the manner fpr recovery provided by s. 3(6) the Legislature has dealt with it aS some thin& diitinct from the recovery of arrears of cess including interest.\n\n[426C-EJ\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2440-2442 o~ D 1972.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25-10-1971 of the Delhi High.\n\nCourt in Income Tax Reference N06. 40 & 41 of 1970.\n\nA. K. Sen and Mr. Bishamber Lal for tl]_e Appellant.\n\nP. G. Ghokhale a\"nd Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-This appeal by certificate granted by the Delhi High Court raises the question whether interest paid on arrears of cess under s. 3 (3) of the U.P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 is a permissible deduction under s. 10 (2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe assessee is a public limited company engaged in the business of the manufacture and sale of sugar. In its income-tax return for the assessment year 1959-60 (the previous year being the period ending 30th June,\n\n1958) the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 1,20,859/- paid as interest on arrears of cess due under the U.P.\n\nSugarcane Cess Act, 1956. The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim, but the Appellate Assitant Commissioner held that the pay- . ment of interest constitute a permissible deduction and this view was affirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.\n\nFor the next assessment year 1960-61, (the previous year ending 30th June, 1959), the assessee claimed a sum of Rs. 1,83,731/- paid by way of interest\n\non the arrears of cess.\n\nThe claim met with the same fortune, disallowed by the Income Tax Officer but upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal.\n\nAt the instance of\n\nthe Revenue, the Appellate Tribunal referred the following question of law to the Delhi High Court in respect of the assessment years 1959tiO and 1960-61 :\n\n\"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the interest of Rs. 1,20,859/- and Rs. l,83,731/-, paid by the assessee on the arrears of cess in the assessmen_! years 1959-60 and 1960-61 respectively, as revenue expenditure?\"\n\nFor the assessment year 1961-62 also the previous year of which ended 30th June, 1960 the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 2,00,439 /- on account of interest paid by it on arrears of cess. This claim also was rejected by the Income Tax Officer but allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. The Revenue obtained a reference to the High Court on the question:\n\n\"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the interest of Rs. 2,00,439 /-, paid by .the assessee on the arrears of cess,\n\nj!S revenue expenditure?\"\n\nThe references were disposed of by the High Court by its judgment dated 25th October 1971.\n\nThe questi.ons were answered in the negative.\n\nThe High Court took the view that .the claim of the B assessee did not satisfy the provisions of s. 10 (2) (iii) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 because it was not interest paid on borrowed capital, and it did not fall within the scope of s. 10 (2) (xv) of the Act beca1l5!' it was paid by way of penalty for an infringement of the Act.\n\nThe High Court than certified under s. 66 (A) (2) of the Act that the cases were fit for appeal to this Court.\n\nLearned couns.el for the asse~_e has made no attempt to justify the claim under s. 10 (2) (iii) and we are, therefore, relieved of the necessity of examining the validity of the claim by reference to that provision.\n\nThe case has been argued before us on the basis that it falls under s. 10 (2) (xv).\n\nThe validity of the U. P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 (the \"CeSB Act\") was challenged by the assessee and several other sugar manufacturing companies by petitions under Article 226 of the Constitutien in the Allahabad High Court.\n\nThe High Court admitted the writ petitions and granted an order suspending the operation of the Act. The R High Court, on final hearing, dismissed the writ petitions.\n\nBut subsequently on appeal this Court declared the Cess Act ultra vires on\n\n. A the ground that the Act fell beyond the competence of the State Legislature.\n\nThereafter, on 31st January, 1961, the President promulgated tjle U.P. Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Ordinance, 1961 validating the cess imposed, assessed or collected by the Government of Uttar Pradesh during the period 26th January, 1950 to the date of the commencement of the Ordinance (3rd February, 1961). The ordinance was replaced by the U.P. Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 (the \"Validation Act\").\n\nThe question whether the interest paid by the assessee under s. 3(3) of the Sugarcane Ces Act, 1956 can be allowed under s. 10(2)\n\n(xv) of the Income Tax Act requires us to examine the relevant pro visions of the Cess Act.\n\nThe Act, as its long title states, is \"an Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to the imposition of cess on sugarcane i'nrended for use, consumption in or sale to a factory\".\n\nThe relevant provisions of s.3 declare :\n\n\"3. Imposition of cess-(1) The State Government may by notification in the official Gazette impose a cess not exceeding four annas per maund on the entry of the caJne fnto the premises of a factory for use, consumption or sale therein. ( 2) The cess imposed under sub-section ( 1) shall be payable by the owner of the factory and shall be paid on such date and at such place as may be prescribed.\n\n(3) Any arrear of cess not paid on the date prescribed under sub-section (2) shall carry interest at 6 per cent per annum from such date to date of payment. ( 4) The State Government may, for the purpose of\n\nassessment and collection of the cess, appoint officers and l:, authorities and may also prescribe the manner in which the - cess shall be assessed and collected. ( 5) Where any person is in default in making the payment of the cess, the officer or authority empowered to collect the cess may direct that in addition to the amount of the arrears and interest a sum not exceeding 10 per cent thereof shall by way of penalty be recovered from the person liable to pay the cess. ·\n\n( 6) The officer or authority empowered to collect the cess may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears including interest due from any person, and on receipt ef such certificate the Collector shall proceed to recover the amount specified from such person as if it were an arrear of land revenue.\n\n(7) Any sum imposed by way of penalty under subsection ( 5) shall be JT'., coverable in the mauner provided in sub-section (6) for the recovery of the arrear of cess\".\n\nThen follows s.4 and it provides :\n\n\"4. Penalties-If any person defaults in the payment of cess imposed under sub-section (1) of See.3, or, contravenes any provision of any rule made under this Act, he shall without prejudice to his liability therefor u'nder sub-section ( 5) of Sec.3 be liable to imprisonment up to six months or to a fine \"not exceeding rupees five thousand or both and in the, case of continuing contra vent ion to a further fine not exceeding rupees one thousand for each day during which the contravention continues\".\n\nIt is apparent that section 3 (2) requires the payment of cess on the date prescribed under the rules.\n\nRule 4 of the U.P. Sugarcane Cess Rules, 1956 provides that the cess due on the sui:arcane entering into the premises during the first fortnight of each calendar year must be deposited in the Government treasury by the twenty second day of that month and the cess due for the remainder of the month must be deposited before the seventh day of the next following month.\n\nIf the cess is not paid by the specified date, then by virtue of s.3 (3) the arrear of cess will carry interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the specified date to the date of payment. Section 3 ( 5) is a very different provision. It does not deal with the interest paid on the arrears of cess but provides for an additional sum recoverable by way of penalty from a person who defaults in making payment of cess.\n\nIt is a thing apart from an arrear of cess and the interest due thereon.\n\nNow the interest payable on an arrear of cess under s. 3(3) is G in reality part and parcel of the liability to pay cess.\n\nIt is an accretion to the cess.\n\nThe arrear of cess \"carries\" interest; if the cess ,';. is not paid within the prescribed peri!xl a larger sum will become payable as cess. The enlargement of the cess liability is automatic under s. 3 ( 3) . No specific order is necessary in order that the obligation to pay interest should accrue. The liability to pay interest 6 is as certain as the liability to pay cess. As soon as the prescribed date is crossed without payment of the cess, interest begins to accrue.\n\nIt is not a nalty, for which provisions has been separately made by s.3 ( 5). Nor is it a penalty within the meaning of s.4, which provides for a criminal liability and a criminal prosecution.\n\nThe penalty payable uhder s.3(5) lies in the discretion of the collecting officer or authority. In the case of the penalty under s.4, no prosecution can be instituted nnless, under s.5 ( 1), a complaint is made by or under the authority of the Cane Commissioner or the District Magistrate.\n\nThere is another consideration distinguishing the interest payable under s.3(3) from the penalty imposed under s.3(5). Section 3 ( 6) provides that the officer or authority empowered to collect the cess may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears including interest due from any person, and on receipt of such certificate the Collector is required to proceed to recover the amount specified from such person as if it were an arrear of land revenue. The words used in s.3 ( 6) are \"specifying the amount of arrears including interest\", that is to say that the interest is part of the arrear of cess.\n\nIn the case of a penalty imposed under s.3(5), a separate provision for recovery has been made under s.3 (7). Although the manner of recovery of a penalty provided by s.3(7) is the same as the manner for recovery provided by s.3(6) of the arrears of cess, the Legislature dealt with it as something diBtinct from the recovery of the arrears of cess including interest. l'tt truth, the interest provided for under s.3 (3) is in the nature of compensation paid to the Government for delay in the payment of cess.\n\nIt is riot by way of penalty. The provision for penalty as a civil liability has been made nnder s.3 ( 5) and for penalty as a criminal offence under s.4. The Delhi High Court proceeded ehtirely on the basis that the interest bore the character of a penalty.\n\nIt was, according to the learned Jndges \"penal interest\".\n\nThe learned Judges failed to notice s.3(5) and s.4 and the other proVisions of the Cess Act.\n\nWe have been referred by the Revenue to Mahabir Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P.(') and Commissioner o{ Income-Tax West Bengal v. A. K. Das,(2 ) but in those two cases the Delhi High Court and the Calcutta High Court respectively were concerned with a claim to deduction on account of. penalty paid under s.3(5) of the Cess Act.\n\nReliance was also placed on Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) P. Ltd.(') In that case, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana laid down that\n\n(I) (1969) 71 I. T. R. 87.\n\n(2) (1970) 77 J. T. R. 31.\n\n(3) (1973) 90 I. T. R. 373.\n\ninterest paid by an assessee on account of delay in payment of the provisional demand of tax is not a permissible deduction under s.36\n\n(1) (iii) and s.37 of the Income Tax Act. The learned Judges observed that the liability to tax, although arising out of a business activity, could not be said to be a liability related to the assessee'~ business. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the decil; ion.\n\nThe case is distinguishable because we are concerned with a particular statutory scheme enacted in ss.3 and 4 of the Cess Act before us.\n\nOur attention has also been invited to Suraya Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax,(') where a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that the payment of interest under s.3(3) of the U.P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 is a penal liability which accrues on an infraction of the law.\n\nSection 3(3) of the U.P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 does seem to be in pari materia with s. 3 (3) of the Cess Act.\n\nBut we think! we. should resist the blandishment to sit in judgment over that decision when it is not in appeal before us. We are concerned solely with the nature of the liability to pay interest under s.3 ( 3) of the ss Act.\n\nA court should be slow to succumb to the temptation of deciding questions on the construction of a statute not directly before it.\n\nIn our opinion, the interest paid under s.3(3) of the Cess Act cannot be described as a penalty paid for an infringement of the Jaw.\n\nAs that is the only grO\\Jnd on which the Revenue resists the claim of the assessee to a deduction of the interest under s.10(2)(xv) of the Income-Tax Act, the assessee is entitled to sncceed.\n\nThere is no dispute that the payment of interest represents expenditure laid out wholly or exclusively for the purpose of the business. There is also\n\nll-0 dispute that it is i'n the nature of revenue expenditure.\n\nIn the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment dated 25th October, 1971 of the Delhi High Court is set aside and the question referred by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.\n\nThe .assessee will be entitled to its costs of these appeals .\n\nP.B.R..\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(1) (1979) 116 ( T. R. 367.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "MAHALAXMI SUGAR MILLS CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHALAXMI SUGAR MILLS CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELID, NEW DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI, NEW DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. 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VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190, "end_char": 203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 331, "end_char": 355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sugarcane cess Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1196, "end_char": 1220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1538, "end_char": 1546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane cess Act, 1956", "statute": "Sugarcane cess Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1559, "end_char": 1586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1723, "end_char": 1727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1885, "end_char": 1898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2166, "end_char": 2170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2697, "end_char": 2704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2754, "end_char": 2758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2849, "end_char": 2853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2949, "end_char": 2953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3071, "end_char": 3078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3229, "end_char": 3236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3394, "end_char": 3398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3682, "end_char": 3689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4126, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Mr. Bishamber Lal for tl]_e Appellant."}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4144, "end_char": 4157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen and Mr. Bishamber Lal for tl]_e Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Ghokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4180, "end_char": 4194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. G. Ghokhale a\"nd Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4205, "end_char": 4218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. G. Ghokhale a\"nd Miss A. 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Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 is a permissible deduction under s. 10 (2) (xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4421, "end_char": 4425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4442, "end_char": 4466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4500, "end_char": 4505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956", "statute": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4522, "end_char": 4549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4880, "end_char": 4904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5563, "end_char": 5579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of\n\nthe Revenue, the Appellate Tribunal referred the following question of law to the Delhi High Court in respect of the assessment years 1959tiO and 1960-61 :\n\n\"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the interest of Rs."}}, {"text": "25th October 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6593, "end_char": 6610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The references were disposed of by the High Court by its judgment dated 25th October 1971."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6757, "end_char": 6762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6780, "end_char": 6807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6902, "end_char": 6907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7037, "end_char": 7042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7193, "end_char": 7198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7398, "end_char": 7403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7441, "end_char": 7465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7581, "end_char": 7592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956", "statute": "Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7620, "end_char": 7640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of the U. P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 (the \"CeSB Act\") was challenged by the assessee and several other sugar manufacturing companies by petitions under Article 226 of the Constitutien in the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "subsequently on appeal this Court declared the Cess Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7815, "end_char": 7870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8441, "end_char": 8448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But subsequently on appeal this Court declared the Cess Act", "statute": "But subsequently on appeal this Court declared the Cess Act"}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Ces Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8501, "end_char": 8509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sugarcane Ces Act, 1956", "statute": "the Sugarcane Ces Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s.3", 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"end_char": 11657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Cess Rules, 1956", "statute": "Sugarcane Cess Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12003, "end_char": 12010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Cess Rules, 1956", "statute": "Sugarcane Cess Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12304, "end_char": 12308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12650, "end_char": 12653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12702, "end_char": 12705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12802, "end_char": 12808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12905, "end_char": 12908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12957, "end_char": 12960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13140, "end_char": 13146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13178, "end_char": 13184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13186, "end_char": 13195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13586, "end_char": 13589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13758, "end_char": 13764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13820, "end_char": 13823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13886, "end_char": 13892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13944, "end_char": 13950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14132, "end_char": 14135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14328, "end_char": 14331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14381, "end_char": 14384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14586, "end_char": 14592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14597, "end_char": 14600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Visions of the Cess Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14618, "end_char": 14641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14865, "end_char": 14884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have been referred by the Revenue to Mahabir Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P.(') and Commissioner o{ Income-Tax West Bengal v. A. K. Das,(2 ) but in those two cases the Delhi High Court and the Calcutta High Court respectively were concerned with a claim to deduction on account of."}}, {"text": "s.3(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14973, "end_char": 14979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Visions of the Cess Act", "statute": "Visions of the Cess Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15123, "end_char": 15155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was also placed on Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (India) P. Ltd.(') In that case, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana laid down that\n\n(I) (1969) 71 I. T. R. 87."}}, {"text": "s.36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15387, "end_char": 15391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Visions of the Cess Act", "statute": "Visions of the Cess Act"}}, {"text": "s.37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15407, "end_char": 15411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Visions of the Cess Act", "statute": "Visions of the Cess Act"}}, {"text": "ss.3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15776, "end_char": 15786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16007, "end_char": 16013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16026, "end_char": 16058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16124, "end_char": 16136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16149, "end_char": 16181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16219, "end_char": 16223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16448, "end_char": 16451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16645, "end_char": 16651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "s.10(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16859, "end_char": 16870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16878, "end_char": 16892, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "25th October, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17204, "end_char": 17222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment dated 25th October, 1971 of the Delhi High Court is set aside and the question referred by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_428_438_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "• A\n\nLIQUIDATOR OF MAHAMUDABAD PROPERTIES (P) LTD.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL II,\n\nCALCUTTA April 9, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1961, Sections 22 and 23-Computation of Income frotn house property-Building not in a habita/Jle condition after it was released by Golcrnment consequent to derequisitioning-Assessee claiming remission in the computation of income of the entire annual value and also deductions on account of insurance premium and municipal taxes relating to the property- Permissibility of re1nission and deductions claimed-Competency of the High Court to give a direction to tile Appellate Tribunal, enabling the Revenue to tax income from the property, when the Revenue jailed to ask for a refertnce against Appellate Tribunal's decision-Nature of High Court's polver in a reference case.\n\nThe appellant-assessee, in his income tax return for the assesssment year 1962-63 (for which the previous year was the calendar year 1961) r'cited D that the annual value of the building derequisitioned by the Govt. on 26-12-1960 was Rs. 1,23,672/-. However on the ground that the building had remained: vacant throughout the previous year, the assessee claimed a remission in the computation of the income of the entire annual value. The assessee als0t cJairned a deduction on account of insurance premium and municipal taxes relating to the property.\n\nThe lncame Tax Officer took the view that e property was not in a habitable condition and did not admit of letting and therefore no question e.rose of applying the provisions of the Income Tax Act relating to the computation of income from property.\n\nAccordingly, be held that the annual valueas well as the vacancy claim had to be ignored. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who held that although the property ha<L remained vacant, it possessed an aunue.l value and should be considered for assessment.\n\nOn that view, he a1lo\\.ved the deductions claimed by the assessee.\n\nIn second appeal, the Incon1e Tax Appellate Tribunal favoured the view taken by the Income Tax Officer and e.ccordingly held that the claim to deductions made by the assessee must fail.\n\nThe Tribunal, in other words, affirmed that the property fell outside the scope of s. 22 of the Act and, consequently, denied the deductions.\n\nThe Revenue appeared satisfied with the order Of Appellate Tribunal.\n\nBut, at the instance of the assessee a reference was. made to the High Court. The High Court was of the opinion that the Appellate Tribunal had misconceived the la\\v in holding that because the property was in a state of disrepair it did not possess an annual value.\n\nAs regards the assessee's claim to the specified deduction, it held that while the insurance premium paid by it could be allowed, there was no merit in the claim on account of vacancy remission and payments of municipal taxes, Hence the appeal by special leave to this Court.\n\nH Dismissing the appeal, the Court,\n\nHELD : I. Whether the High Court was right in including a direction to the Appellate Tribunal to take into account the annual value of the property\n\nLIQUIDATOR MAHAMUDABAO PROPERTIES V. C.I.T. 429\n\nwill depend on the appreciation of the true scope of the reference taken to A the High Court. The question referred to the High Court was rooted In the fundamental submission of the assessee that the property possessed an annual value for the purpose of Section 22 and it was, therefore, entitled to the vacancy remission end other deductions claimed by it. The frame of the question indicates that it has two parts, whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that in computing the income from property the premises 3, Gun Foundry, possessed an annual value and whether the Appellate Tria bunal '\\\\'as right in disallowing the vacancy remission and other deductions in resoect of that property.\n\n[434C-E]\n\nUnless the property fall within the scope of Section 22 there was no occasion for considering the assessec's claim to the deductions.\n\nThe. High Court also, when considering the reference, examined the question in its bifurcated character. But although bifurcated. the thrust of the question was directed C to the consideration of the deductions claimed by the e.ssessee. Whether the property possessed an annual value was necessary to determine solely for the purpose of considering the claim to deductions. Unless the assessee was in- •terested in those deductions it. would not have asked for a finding that the property possessed an annual value. The High Court. wes, therefore, right in examining both parts of the question and in determining whether the property had an annual value and the deductions claimed were permissible.\n\n[434E-G]\n\nThe High Court had to consider the first part of the question because that was the very case of the assessee throughout from the earliest stage of the proceeding. The need for the determination whether the property has an annual value arises only if it is found that on the tern1s of the statute the assessee is otherwise entitled to the deductions clairned by him. If those deductions are not permissible under the relevant section, no question arises of examin- E ing whether the property has 0n annual value. Viewed in that light, the determination of the question whether the property has an annual value faJLq_ into its proper place. [434G-H, 435A]\n\n2. It is not open to the Revenue to contend that even though the claim to deduction must otherwise fail, the question whether the property has an annual value must still be considered.\n\nIf the Revenue intended that the High F Court should determine whether Qli property had an annual value as a ques~ tion iOOependent of its finding on the admissibility of the deductions, the Revenue should have applied to the Appellate Tribunal for a reference to the High Court accordingly.\n\nIt did not ask for a reference and, therefore it is not entitled to raise that contention now. [435A-C]\n\nHowever, the only way of looking o.t the case, is whether on the assump- G . tion that the property has an annual value >1nd falls within the scope ot Section 22, the assessee is entitled to the deductions under Sections 23 and 24.\n\nIf he is entitled to any of those deductions, then in order to establish the foundation in which the deductions can be rooted it will be necessary to determine whether the property possesses an annual value.\n\nThat is what the High Court did, and the observations made by it must be construed accordingly. It may be that the deduction to which the assessee is found entitled H runs to a far smaller figure than the annual value property attributable to the property.\n\nIn that event the consequence will be a net annual value of some significance. ~-\\nd this will be the consequence notwithstanding that\n\nthe reference is at the assessee.'s instance and no reference at all has been brought by the Revenue. The result appears anomalous, but aft.er all it is for the assessee to choose whether or not he wishes to take a reference to the High Court, and if he is found entitled to even one of the 4eductions claimed by him and effect cannot be given to that claim without the annual value of the property being computed he has only to thank himself.\n\n[435C, F]\n\n3. The High Court, on a reference before it, does not act as a court of appeal. The jurisdiction is advisory and no more. The High Court is empowered to decide the question of law referred to it, and to return its answer to the Appellate Tribunal. .The Appellate Tribunal then takes up the appeal\n\nand disposes it of conform.ably with the answer returned by the High Court.\n\nIt is not part of the jurisdiction of the High Court to interlere and modify or set aside the appellate order of the Tribunal. [435F-H]\n\n4. The proviso to Section 23(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 can be availed of only if the property is in the occupation of a tenant. It would seem so on the language of the proviso. The assessee does not rest his claim on any other provision of law. Jn the circumstances, the High Court is right in denying the claim in respect of municipal taxes. [436G-H]\n\n5. The provisions of the Income-Tax Act relating to the charge on income apply in relation to a specific assessment year end the provisions of the Act providing for the computation of the chargeable income (which includes taking into account permissible deductions in the computation of the income chargeable under different heads) apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary, in relation to the relevant previous year.\n\nThe tolal incon1e of the previous year needs to the con1puted, and the different provisions relating to the com putation o.f income must be read and applied in the context of the facts and circumstances obtaining during that year, unless the context suggests the contrary. Consequently, \\Vhen reading s.24(2)(ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961\n\nwhich speaks of property which is let and which \\\\'as vac;:ant during a part of the year, the Court must read it to mean property which was Jet during the previous year and was vacant during a part of the year.\n\nIt cannot refer to property which was not let at all during the previous year. [437D\"E] F In the present case, there is no evidence to show that it was ever given out by the assessee that the property was available for letting. The e.ssessee is not entitled to the deductions claimed by it in respect of municipal taxes and a vacancy remission.\n\n[437F]\n\nMaharajadhiraja of Darbhanga. v. Com1nissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa, A.I.R. 1931 Patna 223; distinguished.\n\nG CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No._ 2183 of 1972.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 28-7-1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 45 of 1969. e F. S. Nariman and M. M. Kshatriya for the Appellant.\n\naind S. T. Desai, K. C. Dua, Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent\n\nS. Chaudhary. D. N.\" Gupta and T. A. Ramachandran for the A.\n\nRespo'ndent Intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court on a question concerning the computation of income from house property under the Income-tax a !\n\nAct, 1961.\n\nThe assessee, a private limited company, is !he owner of the property described as 3, Gun Foundry Road.\n\nOriginally it housed a jute baling press. The property was requisitioned by the West Bengal Government in 19 51. It was released to the asses see on December 26, 1960, after being used for housing refugees.\n\nEvidently, the building had not received the care it deserved, for when the assessee resumed possession he found it in a sorry state.\n\nThe assessee filed an income-tax return for the assessment year 1962-63 (for which the previous year was the calendar year 1961), and the return recited that the aunual value of the building was Rs. 1,23,672. However, on the ground that the building had remained vacant throughout the previous year, the assessee claimed a remission in the computation of the iilcome of the entire annual value. The\n\nassesisee also claimed a deduction on account of insurance premium and municipal taxes relating to the property.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer took the view that the property . was not in a habitable condition and did not admit of letting and therefore ilo question arose of applying the provisions of the Income Tax Act relating to the computation of income from property.\n\nAccordingly, he held that the aunual value as well as the vacancy claim had to be ignored.\n\nThe assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who held that although the property had remained vacant, it possessed an annual value and should h~ considered for assessment.\n\nOn that view, he allowed the deductions claimed by the assessee. In second appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal favoured the view taken by the Inoome Tax Officer and accordingly held that the claim to deductions made by the assessee must fail.\n\nThe Tribunal, in other words, affirmed that the property fell outside the scope of S. 22 of the Act and, consequently, denied the deductions.\n\nThe Revenue appeared satisfied with the order of the Appellate Tribunal.\n\nBut, at the instailce of the assessee, a reference was made to the High Court at Calcutta on the following question :-\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the . case and on the interpretation of sections 22 and 23 of the\n\n' A\n\nIncome-tax Act, 1961 the Tribunal was right in holding that iu computing the income from property the l; lonafide annual value of the property at 3, Gun Foundry Road, Calcutta has not to be taken and in disallowing the vacancy remission and other deductions in respect of the aforesaid property ?\"\n\nThe High Court was of opinion that the Appellate Tribunal had misconceived the law in holding that because the property was in a state of disrepair it did not possess an annual value.\n\nAs regards the assessee's claim to the specified deductions, it held that while the insurance premium paid by it could be allowed, there was no merit in the claim on account of vacancy remission and payment of . municipal taxes.\n\nAccordingly, the High Court recorded :-\n\n\"On the first part of the question we hold that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that there was no annual value of this property No. 3, Gun Foundary Road and that it was o.utside the scope of section 22 of the Income-tax Act,\n\n1961. We hold and we are of the opinion that this property has an annual value in the facts and circumstan~ of the case and it should be taken into account in the light of the principles and observations we have made above.\n\nWe therefore set aside that part of the order of the Tribunal and answer the question accordin&Jy.\n\nThe answer to this first part of the question is in the negative.\n\nThe answer to the second part of the question folloWIS from the answer to the first part of the question and is that the only deduction in the facts and circumstances of the present reference which the assessee can get is the deduction for insurance premium paid.\n\nWe hold further on this part of the question that the other deductions, namely, (a) vacancy remission and (b) municipal taxes are not permissible and the assessee is not entitled to claim them in the present reference. We answer the second part of the question accordingly.\n\nThe Tribunal, therefore, will dispose of the case conformably to this judgment and the interpretation of the principles enunciated herein under section 260 of the Incometax Act, 1961.\"\n\nH At the outset a serious controversy arose before us on the point whether the High Court was right in including a direction in its judgment that the Appellate Tribunal should take into account its finding\n\nthat th\" property possessed an annual value.\n\nThe assessee says that when the Appellate Tribunal had held that the property did not fall within the scope of s. 22, it was for the Revenue, in case it desired\n\ntci charge the assessee on income from this property, to apply for a\n\n~\"forence to the High Court. It is urged that the Revenne having omi'ted to do so, it was not open to the High Court to make an order enabling the Revenue to tax any income from that property. On behalf of the Revenue, the submission is that inasmuch as the assessee had taken the case in reference to the High Court for an adjudication on the deductions claimed by it the point whether the property possessed an annual value and its income was chargeable was directly raised by the assessee itself, and therefore, the High Court was right in rendering a decision on this point.\n\n\"Income from house property\" is one of the heads into which different categories of income included in the total income have been classified.\n\nFor the purpose of computing \"income from house property\", a code of provisions is incorporated in ss. 22 to 26 of the Act.\n\nS. 22 declares that the annual value of property consisting of buildings or lands appurtenant thereto in the ownership of the assessee, excepting such portions of the property occupied for any business or profession carried on by him of which the profits are chargeable to income tax, shall bo chargeable to income tax as \"income from house property\".\n\nThe annual value is determined after making a deduction on account of municipal taxes.\n\nThe income from house property is then subject to the deductions set forth in Sec. 24. The deductions are made for th~ purpose of computing the net figure of the income from property.\n\nIn order to decide whether the High Court was right in including a direction to the Appellate Tribunal to take into account the annual value of the property, it is necessary to apprechtte the true scope of the reference taken to the High Court. The Income Tax Officer bad fo\\Jnd that the property, having regard to its condition, was not capable of being let to tenants and therefore the gross value and the deductions claimed had to b~ iguored.\n\nThe assessee was aggrieved by that finding.\n\nIt must be remembred that in its return the assessee had indicated that the property possessed an annual value of Rs. 1,23,672 unless the property had an annual value, it believed, it could not be entitled to the deductions claimed by it. In appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, its case was that the property could not be ignored for the purposes of the Income-tax Act.\n\nThe contention was accepted by Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who held that the annual value of the property could not be\n\nA ignored. and forther that the vacancy remission and other deductions claimed by the assessee were admissible.\n\nWhen the Revenue proceeded in appeal to the Appellate Tribunal it urged that the assessee was not entitled to the deduction claimed in respect of the property.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal considered the evidence relating to the conditfon of the building, and was of opinion that the building was not i'n a habitable condition and it could not be said that the property could be reasonably Jet out at any particular annual value.\n\nIn its opinion, the property fell outside the scope of Section 22 and, therefore, the Income Tax Officer was right in ignoring the property altqgether and in not computing any profit or loss in respect of it. The Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and restored the order of the Income Tax iOlficer.\n\nIt was m the context of this train of proceedings that the assesse now took the case in reference to the High Court.\n\nThe question referred to the High Court was rooted in the fundamental submission of the assessec that the property possessed an annual value for l!he purpose of Section 22 and it was, t!rerefore, entitled to the vacancy remission and other deductions claiimd by it.\n\nThe frame of the question indicates that it has two parts, whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that in computing the income from property the premises 3, Gun Foundry, posses9d an annual value and whether the Appellate Tribunal was right in disallowing the vacancy remission and other deductions in respect of that property.\n\nPlainly, unless the property fell within the scope of Section 22 there was no occasion for consideri'ng the assessee's claim to the deductions.\n\nThe High Court also. when considering the reference, examined the question in its bifurcated character. But although, bifurcated, the thrust of the question was directed to the consideration of the deductions claimed by the assessre.\n\nWhether the property possessed an annual value was necessary to determine solely for the purpose of considering the claim to deductions. Unless the assessee was interested in those deductions it would not have asked for a finding that the property possessed an annual value.\n\nThe High Court was, thevfore, right in examining both parts of the question and in determining whether the property had an annual value and the deductions claimed were permissible. The assessee can have no quarrel with the High Court considering the first part of the question, becaure that was the very case of the assessee throughout from the earliest stage of the proceeding. From what has gone before it is apparent that the determination whether the property has an annual value arises only if it is found that on the terms of the statute the assessee is otherwise entitled to the deductiom; claimed by him. If those deductions are not permissible under\n\nthe relevant section, no question arises of examining whether the property has an annual value.\n\nViewed in that light, the determination of the question whether the property has an annual value falls into its proper p\\ace.\n\nIt cannot be contended that even though the claim to deductions must otherwise fail, the questiou whether the property has an annual value must still be considered.\n\nSuch a contention is not pen to the Re\\•nue. If the Revenue intended that the High Court should determine whether the property had an annual value as a question independent of its finding on the admissibility of the deductions, the Revenue should have applied to the Appellate Tribunal for a reference to the High Court accordingly.\n\nIt did not ask for a reference and, therefore it is not entitled to raise that contention now.\n\nIt seems to us that there is ol:ily one way of looking at the case, and that is Whether on the assumption that the property has an annual value and falls within the scope of Section 22, the assessee is ntitled to the deductions under Sections 23 and 24. If he is entitled to anyof those deductions, then in order to establish the foundation in which the deductions can be rooted it will be necessary to determine whether the property possesses an annual value.\n\nThat is what the High Court did, and the observations made by it must be construed accordingly.\n\nIt may' be that the deduction to which the assessee is found entitled runs to a far smaller figure than the annual value property attributable to the p, roperty. In that event the consequence will be a net annual value of some significance.\n\nAnd this will be the consequence notwithstanding that the reference is at the ass>;:s.see's instance and no reference at all has been brought by the Revenue.\n\nTheresult appears a, nomalous, but after all it is for the assessee to choose whether or not he wishes to take a reference to the High Court, and if he is found entitled to even one of 1he deductions claimed by him and effect cannot be given to 1hat clainl without the annual value of the property being computed he ba8 only to thank himself.\n\nAt the same time, we must point out that the High Court, after holding that the property has an annual value, bas erred in stating that it sets aside that part of the order of the Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe High Court, on a reference before it, does not act as a court of appeal.\n\nThe jurisdiction is advisory and no more.\n\nThe High .Court is empowered to decide the question of law referred to it, and to\n\nreturn its answer to the Appellate Tribunal. . The AppeHate Tribunal then takes up the appeal and disposes it of confurmably with the answer returned by the High Court. It is not part of the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere and modify or set aside the appellate order of the Tribunal. _\n\n8-289SCI/80\n\n436 SUPREME COURT REPOllTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA~ has been said earlier, the High Court considered both parts of the question referred to it, whether the property possessed an a'nnual value and whether the deductions claimed by the assessee were admissible.\n\nIt examined first whether the deductions were admissible. It found that the amount of Rs. 689 paid on account of fire insurance premium in respect of the property was deductible from the annual value under s. 24(1)(ii). Regarding the claim under s. 24( 1 )(ix) on account of vacancy remission, it disallowed the deduction on the ground that the property was not let during the previous year. The claim to deduction under s. 23 of the municipal taxes paid in respect of the property was also rejected in the view that the muni cipal taxes could be deducted only if the property was in the occupation of a tenant.\n\nThe High Court then turned to the fundamntal question whether the property possessed an annual value for the purpose of s. 22, and held that merely because the building was in a state of disrepair it could not be predicated that it had no annual value.\n\nIn the result, on the question referred by the Apllate Tribunal it returned the opinion that the property possessed an annual value and that the assessee was entitled to a deduction in respect of insurance premium only.\n\nIn this appeal, the only question is whether the High Court is right in holding that the assessee is not entitled to any deduction on account of municipal taxes and the vacancy remission claimed by it.\n\nThe claim to the deduction of municipal taxes is made under the proviso to s. 23 (1). The proviso reads :\n\n\"Provided that where the property is in the occupation of a tenant, the taxes levied by any local authority in respect of the property are under the Jaw authorising such levy, payable wholly by the owner, or partly by the owner and partly by the tenant, a deduction shall be made equal to the part, if any, of the tenant's liability borne by the owner.\"\n\nIt is immediately apparent that the proviso to s. 23(1) can be availed of only if the property is in the occupation of a tenant. It would seem so on the language of the proviso.\n\nThe assessee does 'not rest his claim on any other provision of law. In the circumstances, the High Court is right in denying the claim in respect of municipal taxes.\n\nThe next deduction claimed requires the consideration of s. 24( 1) {ix) of the Act.\n\nS. 24(1) (ix) reads:\n\n\"24(1) Income chargeable under the head 'Income from house property' shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), be computed after making the following deduc- • tions, namely\n\ncl\n\nxx xx xx xx xx\n\n(ix) Where the property is let and was vacant during a part of the year, that part of the annual value which is proportionate to the period during which the property is wholly unoccupied or, where the property is let out i'n parts, that portion of the annual value appropriate to any vacant part, which is proportionate to the perlod during which such part is wholly unoccupied ...... \"\n\nThe question is whether the property, 3 Gun Foundry Road, which admittedly has remained vacant since December 26, 1960 can attract s. 24(2) (ix). It is plain that it cannot. The provisions of the Income-tax Act relating to the charge on income apply in relation to a specific assessment year and the provisions of the Act providing for the computation of the chargeable income (which includes taking into account permissible deductions in the computation. of the income chargeable under different heads) apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary in relation to the relevant previous year.\n\nThe total income of the previous )'ar needs to be computed, aod the different provisions relating to the computation of income must be read and applied in the context of the facts and circumstances obtaining during that year, unless the context suggests the contrary.\n\nConsequently, when readings. 24(2) (ix) which speaks of property which is let and which was vacant during a part of the year, we must read it to mean property which was let durin: the previous year and was vacant during a part of the year.\n\nIt cannot refer to property which was not let at all during the previous year. In the presenti case, there is no evidence to show that it was ever even given out by the assessee that the property was available for letting.\n\nWe were referred to Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar und Orissa, (') where it was observed by the Patna Hi~ Court that s. 9\n\n(1) .paragraph 7 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 could be invoked i'n a case where a house not in the occupation of the owner was habitually let to tenants and the vacancies referred to are vacancies between the different tenancies, or a house thou&Ji not let is dismantled and shut up by the owner.\n\nWe have carefully read the judgmeht\n\n(I) A.T. R. 1931 Patna 223.\n\ndelivered by that High Court, and it appears that the observation is a mere obiter.\n\nThe actual point for decision was in fact quite different. It was a case where the assessee, who owned several houses kept them furnished and open for his residence and never let them to any tenant, and he did not occupy some of them during the relevant previous year.\n\nHe claimed a vacancy remission in respect of them.\n\nThe High Court, in our opinion, rightly rejected the claim. It may also be pointed out that the statutory provision cousidered there was materially different from the one before us.\n\nIn our judgment, the assessee is not entitled to the deductions claimed by it in respect of municipal taxes and a vacancy remission.\n\nThe gh Court is right in its view in respect of this part of the case.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\nThere is no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nLIQUIDATOR OF MAHAMUDABAD PROPERTIES (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LIQUIDATOR OF MAHAMUDABAD PROPERTIES (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL II,\n\nCALCUTTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL II, CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, WEST BENGAL II,\n\nCALCUTTA April 9, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 136, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "26-12-1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1072, "end_char": 1082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 26-12-1960 was Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2278, "end_char": 2283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3442, "end_char": 3452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3948, "end_char": 3958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6138, "end_char": 6148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6199, "end_char": 6217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7830, "end_char": 7850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8174, "end_char": 8188, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.24(2)(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8877, "end_char": 8888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8896, "end_char": 8916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9743, "end_char": 9762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 28-7-1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "e F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9803, "end_char": 9818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e F. S. Nariman and M. M. Kshatriya for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. M. Kshatriya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9823, "end_char": 9838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e F. S. Nariman and M. M. Kshatriya for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "aind S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9859, "end_char": 9875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aind S. T. Desai, K. C. Dua, Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent\n\nS. Chaudhary."}}, {"text": "K. C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9877, "end_char": 9886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aind S. T. Desai, K. C. Dua, Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent\n\nS. Chaudhary."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9893, "end_char": 9906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aind S. T. Desai, K. C. Dua, Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent\n\nS. Chaudhary."}}, {"text": "S. Chaudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9927, "end_char": 9939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aind S. T. Desai, K. C. Dua, Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent\n\nS. Chaudhary."}}, {"text": "D. N.\" Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9941, "end_char": 9953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N.\" Gupta and T. A. Ramachandran for the A.\n\nRespo'ndent Intervener."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9958, "end_char": 9976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N.\" Gupta and T. A. Ramachandran for the A.\n\nRespo'ndent Intervener."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10057, "end_char": 10063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Coun was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court on a question concerning the computation of income from house property under the Income-tax a !"}}, {"text": "West Bengal Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10451, "end_char": 10473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The property was requisitioned by the West Bengal Government in 19 51."}}, {"text": "December 26, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10520, "end_char": 10537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was released to the asses see on December 26, 1960, after being used for housing refugees."}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12099, "end_char": 12104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12300, "end_char": 12322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, at the instailce of the assessee, a reference was made to the High Court at Calcutta on the following question :-\n\n\"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the ."}}, {"text": "sections 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12443, "end_char": 12461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12475, "end_char": 12495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12642, "end_char": 12650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case and on the interpretation of sections 22 and 23 of the\n\n' A\n\nIncome-tax Act, 1961 the Tribunal was right in holding that iu computing the income from property the l; lonafide annual value of the property at 3, Gun Foundry Road, Calcutta has not to be taken and in disallowing the vacancy remission and other deductions in respect of the aforesaid property ?\""}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13423, "end_char": 13433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13441, "end_char": 13455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 260", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14534, "end_char": 14545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Incometax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14553, "end_char": 14572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14940, "end_char": 14945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Incometax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Incometax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "ss. 22 to 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15883, "end_char": 15895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15909, "end_char": 15914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16428, "end_char": 16435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17397, "end_char": 17411, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18134, "end_char": 18144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18702, "end_char": 18712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19203, "end_char": 19213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21459, "end_char": 21469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21519, "end_char": 21537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24(1)(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23768, "end_char": 23780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24( 1 )(ix)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23808, "end_char": 23822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23983, "end_char": 23988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24295, "end_char": 24300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24928, "end_char": 24933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25362, "end_char": 25370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25719, "end_char": 25728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25747, "end_char": 25755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26492, "end_char": 26500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26557, "end_char": 26571, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna Hi~ Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27824, "end_char": 27839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We were referred to Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar und Orissa, (') where it was observed by the Patna Hi~ Court that s. 9\n\n(1) .paragraph 7 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 could be invoked i'n a case where a house not in the occupation of the owner was habitually let to tenants and the vacancies referred to are vacancies between the different tenancies, or a house thou&Ji not let is dismantled and shut up by the owner."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27845, "end_char": 27849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27875, "end_char": 27895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_439_443_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SULTAN AHMD. OWASI\n\nMOHD. OSMAN SHAHEED AND ORS.\n\nApril 10, 1980\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAJLASAM, JJ:J\n\nElection Petition-Applications for summoning of witnesses and amend ment of counter-Practice and Procedure under the Repr, esentatiOn of People Act-Sections 87 and 116 of the Representation of the People Act read with Order VIII Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code.\n\nIn the two election petitions E. P. No. 18178 and E. P. No. 20178 filed by the defeated candidates, allegation of corrupt practice, namely \"indulgence in C promoting hatred rousing religious sentiments by speeches made at certain places\" was made against the appellant, a succesSful candidate.\n\nAfter the election petitioner closed his evidence and the High Court directed tho appellant to file the list of his witnesses, the appellant filed two applications before the High Court namely, one for summoning witnesses Nos. 6, 8, 15 and 16 and another for amendment of his counter. The High Court however refused to D summon these witnesses on the ground that no foundation for the facts on the basis of which these witnesses were sought to be cited or for the points on which they were to be, examined was laid in the counfer. Similarly, the fligh Court rejected the application for amendment of the counter on the same grounds. The High Court was of the view that in the absence of any specific .plea of alibi, having been taken in the counter. the appellant could not be allowed to examine the witnesses or amend the counter. Hence the two B appeals, by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeals the Court,\n\n. HELD : 1. Under the provisions of the Representation of People Act, the onus Jies entirely on the petitioner to prove the corrupt practices alleged against the elected, candidate. The. necessary facts and particulars and the statements of facts etc. are to be pleaded by the election petitioner with exactitude and precision. It is now well settled by a large catena of the authorities of this Court tha~ a charge of corrupt practice must be proved to the hilt, the standard of proof of such a11egation is the same as a charge of fraud in a criminal case. f442B-Cl\n\n~ D. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan and Ors., [19761 2 S. C. C. followed.\n\n' ,.l\n\n2. So far as the elected candidate is concerned, he is merely to rebut the allegations made by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as far as practicable. In the instant case, the appellant had taken an express plea in his counter that he did not make any 9peech at the places alleged by the election petitioner. He also stated that tape records or the cassets alleged to contain his speech were fabricated.\n\nOne of the ways of proving this plea could be by showing that the appellant was not physically present at the places where the speeches are alleged. to. have been made as he was present at that time, at some other place. This is what the appellant sought to do through the proposed amendment and by summoning\n\nthe witnesses. Thus it was. clearly open to the appellant to have proved facts in order to rebut the allegations made by the petitioner that he was not present at the places where he is said to have made speeches. [442E-G]\n\n3. Under s. 116 of the Representation of the People Act an election petition has to be tried as nearly as possible according to the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code to the trial of suits. Under O.VIII R. 2 the defendant must raise by his pleading all ritatters which show that the suit is not maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, and all such. grounds of defence, as, if not raised, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the pjaint. Having expressly denied the allegation of having made the speech, the appellant was fully justified in raising this defence. [442G-H, 443A]\n\nIn the instant case, it cannot be said that the witnesses sought to be examined by the appellant or the plea which he claimed in his counter by virtue of the amendment would spring surprise on the election petitioner because the appellant had already denied in clear terms that he never made any speeches at the places mentioned in the election petition. There was no corres ponding duty on the appellant to give full particulars or detailed statemrnt of fact which the petitioner had to do in order to set at naught the electoral pro cess which resulted in the election of the appellant. [443A-CJ\n\n4. So far as the discretion vested on the HigQ Court by Section 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to refuse to summon any witness lies onJy when it is of the opinion that the evidence of the witness is not material or that the party tendering such witness is doing so on frivolous ground or with a view to delay the proceedings.\n\n[443.D-EJ\n\nIn the instant case none of these conditions are present. In order to repet the plea of the election petitioner, the appellant was entitled to lead evidence to show that he did not make any speech as he was physically incapable in doing so at the time and place as alleged by the petitioner.\n\nBy virtue of the amendment the appellant sought to insert a plea that he could not have madethe speeches as alleged by the election petitioner because he was at that time out of station and was present in Adoni-180 miles from the places where he is said to have delivered speeches. In fact, witnesses Nos. 6, 8, 15, 16 and 1.7 were summoned to prove the fact that this appellant was in Adoni. [4410-H.\n\n442A, 443E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2036- 2039/79.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Orders dated 27-4-1979, and 25-6-1979 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in U.R.S. Nos. 4039 and 4040 in W.P. Nos. 18 & 20 of 1978 and application Nos. 75 .& 76 in WP Nos. 18 & 20 of 1978 respectively.\n\nM. A. Abdul Khader, Mukramuddin and G. Narayana Rao for the Appellants.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, K. Ram Kumar and T. A. Ramcha; idran for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.. , t-..\n\nJ A\n\ns. A. OWASI V. OSMANSHAHBBD (Fazal Ali, J.) 441\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave have been filed by the appellant who was respondent No. 1 (before the High Court), the elected candidate from the Charminar Assembly Constituency No. 218 in the State of Andhra Pradesh.\n\nThe election petitioner Mohd. Osman Shaheed filed election petition for setting aside the election of the appdlant being E.P. No. 18/78 in the High Court.\n\nAhmed Hosain, a candidate who was defeated also filed another electio'n peti:ion No. 20/78 on the same grounds assailing the elec tion of the appellant. In the aforesaid election petitions before the High Court two applications were filed in each of tlie petition by the appellant, one for summoning witnesses Nos. 6, 8, 15 and 16 and the other for amendment of the counter. These applications were filed after the petitioner closed the evidence and the High Court directed the appellant to file the list of witnesses.\n\nThe High Court, however, refused to summon these witnesses on the ground that no foundation for the facts on the basis of which these witnesses were sought to be cited or for the points on which they were to be examined was laid in the counter. Similarly the HiVi Court rejected the application for amendment of the counter on the same grounds. The High Court was of the view that in the absence of any specific plea of alibi having been taken in the counter, the appellant could not be allowed to examine the witnesses or amend the counter.\n\nAppeal Nos. 2036-37 /79 are direcetd against the order striking out the witnesses nos. 6, 8, 15, 16 and 17 and Appeal Nos. 2038-39/79\n\nare directed against the order rejecting the application for amendment of the counter.\n\nWe have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the Judgment of the High Court.\n\nWe have also perused the application for amending the written statement. It appears that one of the main allegations made against the appellant was that he had delivered speeches at Khilawat, Chowk and Baragalll on 17-2-78 and 21-2-78 respectively in which he indulged in promoting hatred rousing religious sentiments. It was further alleged in Election Petition No. 20/78 that he made another speech at Baragalli where also he indulged in preaching religions hatred against the election petitioner. In his counter the appellant stoutly denied the allegation that he ever made any speech at these places at all.\n\nThe respondent denied having made speech at all at Khilawat or Chowk or Baragalli.\n\nBy virtue of the amendment, the appellant sought to insert a plea that he could not have made the speeches as alleged by the election peti tioner because he was at that time out of station and was presell.t in Adoni-180 miles from the places where he is said to have delivered\n\nA , speeches. In fact, witnesses nos. 6, 8, 15, 16 and 17 were summoned to prove the fact that this appellant was in Adoni.\n\nWith due respect, we may observe that in refusing the amendment of the Counter or summoning the witnesses, the High Court seems. to have over-looked the fact that U:Uder the provisions of the B Representation of People Act, the onus lies entirely on the petitioner to prove the corrupt practices alleged against the elected candidate.\n\nThe necessary facts and particulars and the siatements of facts etc. are to be pleded by the election petitioner with exectitude and precision.\n\nIt is now well settled by a large catena of the authorities of this Court that a charge of corrupt practice must be proved to C the hilt, the standard of proof of such allegation is the same as a charge of fraud in a criminal case.\n\nIn the case of D. Venkata Reddy\n\nv. R. Sultan & Ors.,(') this Court observed as follows :-\n\n• D\n\n\"Anoth•er principle that is equally well settled is that election petitioner in order to succeed must plead all material particulars and prove them by clear and cogent evidence.\n\nThe allegations of corrupt practices hoeing in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge the same must be proved beyond any shadow of doubt.\"\n\nSo far as the elected candidate is concerned, he is merely to rebut the allegations made by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, as far as practicable.\n\nIn the instant case the appellant had taken an express plea in his counter that he did not make any speech at the places alleged by the election petitioner. He also stated that tape records or . the cassete alleged to contain his speech were fabricated.\n\nOne of the ways of proving this plea could be by showing that the appellant was not physically present at the places where the speeches are alleged to have been . made as he was present at that time, at some other place.\n\nThis is what the appellant sought to do through the proposed amendment and by summoning the witnesses.\n\nThus it was clearly open to the appellant to have proved these facts i\\1 order to rebut the allegations made by the petitioner that he was present at the places where he is said to have made speeches. Under s. 116 of the Representation of the\n\nPeople Act an election petition has to be tried as nearly as possible according to the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code to the trial of suits.\n\nUnder 0. VIII R. 2 the defendant must raise by his pleading all matters which show that the suit is not maintainable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, and all such grounds of defence, as, if not raised, would be likely\n\n(I) [1976] 2 s. c. c. 455\n\n.. -1 .\n\ns. A. OWASI v. OSMANSHAHEED (Fazal Ali, J.) 443\n\nto take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the plaint.\n\nHaving expressly denied the allegation of having made the speech, the appellant was fully justified in raising this defence.\n\nThus in the instant case it cannot be said that the witnesses sought to be examined by the appellant or the plea which he claimed in his counter by virtue of the amendment would spring surprise on the election petitioner because the appellant had already denied in clear terms that he never made any speeches at the places mentioned in the election petition.\n\nThere was no corresponding duty on the appellant to give full particulars or detailed statement of fact which the petitioner had to do in order to set at naught the electoral process which resulted in the election of the appellant. In fact proviso to s. 87 of the Representation of the People Act which may be extracted thus provides : \"Provided that the High Court shall have the discretion to refuse, for reasons to b~ recorded in writing, to examine . any witness or witnesses is not material for the decision of the petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so oh frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the proceedings.\" So far as the discretion on the High Court to refuse to summon any witness lies only when it is of the opinion that the evidence of the witness is not material or that the party tendering such witness is doing so oh frivolous ground or with a view to delay the proceedings.\n\nNohe of these conditions appear to be present in the instant case nor did the High Court dismiss the application for amendment of the counter or refused to examine the witnesses on the grounds mentioned above.\n\nIt is, therefore, manifest that in order to repel the plea of the election petitioner the appellant was entitled to lead evidence to show that he did not make any speech as he was physically\n\nincapab:e in doing so at the time and place as alleged by the election petitioner. For these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the High Courr was wrong in disallowing the prayer made by the appellant for examining the witnesses and for allowing amendment of the counter.\n\nThe appeals are accordingly allowed, the Judgment of the High Court is se.t aside and the High Court is directed to allow the appellant to examine witnesses Nos. 6, 8, 15, 16 & 17 and the amendment prayed for by the appellant is also hereby allowed.\n\nThe High Court will dispose of the election petition now as expeditiously as possible.\n\nThe costs of these appeals will abide the result of the election petition.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "SULTAN AHMD. OWASI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SULTAN AHMD. OWASI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MOHD. OSMAN SHAHEED AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHD. OSMAN SHAHEED AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 10, 1980\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAJLASAM, JJ:J\n\nElection Petition-Applications for summoning of witnesses and amend ment of counter-Practice and Procedure under the Repr, esentatiOn of People Act-Sections 87 and 116 of the Representation of the People Act read with Order VIII Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "On of People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 87 and 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262, "end_char": 281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On of People Act", "statute": "On of People Act"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 289, "end_char": 321, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 353, "end_char": 373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3218, "end_char": 3224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3232, "end_char": 3264, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4569, "end_char": 4579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Adoni-180", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5367, "end_char": 5376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of the amendment the appellant sought to insert a plea that he could not have madethe speeches as alleged by the election petitioner because he was at that time out of station and was present in Adoni-180 miles from the places where he is said to have delivered speeches."}}, {"text": "Adoni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6, 8, 15, 16 and 1.7 were summoned to prove the fact that this appellant was in Adoni. ["}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5578, "end_char": 5606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4410-H.\n\n442A, 443E]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "M. A. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5890, "end_char": 5908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. A. Abdul Khader, Mukramuddin and G. Narayana Rao for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Mukramuddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5910, "end_char": 5921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. A. Abdul Khader, Mukramuddin and G. Narayana Rao for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "G. Narayana Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5926, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. A. Abdul Khader, Mukramuddin and G. Narayana Rao for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K. Ram Kumar and T. A. Ramcha; idran for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. Ram Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5982, "end_char": 5994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K. Ram Kumar and T. A. Ramcha; idran for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramcha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5999, "end_char": 6011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, K. Ram Kumar and T. A. Ramcha; idran for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. OWASI V. OSMANSHAHBBD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6103, "end_char": 6127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.. , t-..\n\nJ A\n\ns. A. OWASI V. OSMANSHAHBBD (Fazal Ali, J.) 441\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave have been filed by the appellant who was respondent No."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6129, "end_char": 6138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.. , t-..\n\nJ A\n\ns. A. OWASI V. OSMANSHAHBBD (Fazal Ali, J.) 441\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave have been filed by the appellant who was respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.. , t-..\n\nJ A\n\ns. A. OWASI V. OSMANSHAHBBD (Fazal Ali, J.) 441\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave have been filed by the appellant who was respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Mohd. Osman Shaheed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6405, "end_char": 6424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The election petitioner Mohd.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. OSMAN SHAHEED AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Ahmed Hosain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6537, "end_char": 6549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ahmed Hosain, a candidate who was defeated also filed another electio'n peti:ion No."}}, {"text": "Khilawat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8098, "end_char": 8106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one of the main allegations made against the appellant was that he had delivered speeches at Khilawat, Chowk and Baragalll on 17-2-78 and 21-2-78 respectively in which he indulged in promoting hatred rousing religious sentiments."}}, {"text": "Baragalll", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8118, "end_char": 8127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one of the main allegations made against the appellant was that he had delivered speeches at Khilawat, Chowk and Baragalll on 17-2-78 and 21-2-78 respectively in which he indulged in promoting hatred rousing religious sentiments."}}, {"text": "17-2-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8131, "end_char": 8138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one of the main allegations made against the appellant was that he had delivered speeches at Khilawat, Chowk and Baragalll on 17-2-78 and 21-2-78 respectively in which he indulged in promoting hatred rousing religious sentiments."}}, {"text": "21-2-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8143, "end_char": 8150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one of the main allegations made against the appellant was that he had delivered speeches at Khilawat, Chowk and Baragalll on 17-2-78 and 21-2-78 respectively in which he indulged in promoting hatred rousing religious sentiments."}}, {"text": "Baragalli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8320, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20/78 that he made another speech at Baragalli where also he indulged in preaching religions hatred against the election petitioner."}}, {"text": "Uder the provisions of the B Representation of People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9181, "end_char": 9238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11127, "end_char": 11133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12506, "end_char": 12511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12519, "end_char": 12551, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_444_449_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "PARASRAM HARNAND RAO\n\nSHANTI PRASAD NARINDER KUMAR JAIN & ANR.\n\nApril 10, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FA.ZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\nDelhi Rent Control Act, Section 25 read with Order IX Rule 9 C. P. C., scope of-Whether the dismissal of the earlier suit of respondent-tenant for default of appearance under Ordex IX Rule 9 C. P. C. a bar for an application under section 25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.\n\nC Transfer of tenancy rights by the Official Liquidator, whether voluntary and _l__ did not come under the mischief of section 14(1) (b) of the D<lhi Rent Control Act.\n\nThe appellant landlord executed a .lease in respect of the disputed premises in favour of respondent 2 for three years as far back as 1-4-1942. In 1948, a suit was brought by the appellant for eviction of the tenant for non payment, D of rent on the ground of conversion of the user of the premises. The suit for possession was however dimissed but a decree dated 31-11-1948 for arrears of rent was passed and it was held that Laxmi Bank was the real tenant. Subsequently, the Bombay High .Court ordered the Bank to be wound up and in the winding up proceedings, the High Court appointed an Official Liquidator who on 16-2-1961 sold the tenancy rights to respondent No. 1. The sale was confirmed by the High Court on the same dte and as a result thereof respondent E No. 1 took possession pf the premises on 24-2-1961. On 5-4-1961, the landlord appellant filed ao application under the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of Laxmi Bank. On 31-7-1961, a decree for eviction was passed in favour of the appellant.\n\nOn 22-1-1963, respondent No. 1 filed a suit for declaration that he , was a ten'.lnt Of the landlord appellant. The suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 5-5-1964 and an application to set aside the ex parte order was also dismissed and the appeal against that order also failed.\n\nThereafter F respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 25 Oil' the Delhi Rent Control Act for recalling the warrant of possession issued by the Court in pursuance of the decree dated 31-7-1961 in favour of the appellant. The Rent Controller allowed it on 20-12-1966.\n\nAn appeal to the Rent Controller Tribunal was ., f_ ordered by order dfited 25-11-1968 in favour of the appellant A second appeal filed by respondent No. 1 to the High Court was allowed in his favour and the Rent Controller's order allowing recalling of the warrant of possession was -4 G restored. Hence the appeal by special leave by the landlord.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHEID : 1. The application of respondent No. 1 under Section 25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act is clearly barred by the principle contained in order IX Rule 9 Civil Procedure Code. It was the appellant who brought the previous suit which resulted in a decree for eviction of the tenant on 31-7-1961-a date when the Ist respondent had already taken possessicin of the premises by virtue of transfer made by the Official Llquidator. There is nothing to show that respondent No. 1 was a tenant within the meaning of Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct so as to maintain an application under section 2S of the Act, when in A fact he was an unlawful sub-lessee.\n\n[447A, E, F-G]\n\nSuraj Ratan Thirani and Ors. v.\n\nAza1nabad Tea Co. and Ors. {1964) 6 S. C. R. 192; applied,\n\n2. The language of section 14(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is wide enough not only to include any sub-lease but even an assignment or any other B mode by which possession of the tenanted premises is parted. In view of the wide amplitude of s, 14 (b), it does not exclude even in involuntary sale,\n\n[4480-EJ\n\nIn the instant case, the official Liquidator had merely stepped into the shoes of Laxmi Bank which was the original tenant and even if the official liquidator had transferred the tenancy interest to respondent No. 1 under the C order of the Court, it was on behalf of the original tenant. It was undoubtedly a voluntary sale which clearly fell within the mischief of s. 14 (1\\ (b) of the De1hi Rent Control Act.\n\nAssuming that the sale by the Official Liquidator was an involuntary sale, then it undoubted\\ y beCame an assignment as provided for by s. 14 (b) of Delhi Rent Control Act.\n\n[448A-C]\n\nKrishna Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 181) Over• D rnled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1085 of 1970.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n17. 3. 1969 of the Delhi High Court in SAD No. 2/69.\n\nP. R. Mridul and 0. P. Sharma for the Appellant.\n\nS. K. Bisaria for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nF AZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a\n\n(I' judgment of the Delhi Court and arises out of , an application filed by Respondent No. 1 who claimed to be the .te)J.ant of the appellant, recalling the warrant of possession issued by the Controller in pursuance of a decree dated 31-7-1961 passed against the 1st resrondent.\n\nThe case had a rather chequered career having passed through G several phases. To begin with the landlord-appellant executed a lease in respect of the disputed premises in favour of Respondent No. 2 for three years as far back as 1.4.1942. In 1948, a suit was brought by the appellant for eviction of the tenant for non-payment of rent on the ground of conversion of the user of the premises.\n\nThe suit for possession was however dismissed buta decree dated 31. 11. 1948 B for arrears of rent was passed and it was held that Laxmi Bank was the real tenant.\n\nSubsequently, the Bombay High Court ordered the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) 3 s.c.it.\n\nBank to be wound up and in the winding up proceedings, the said High Court appointed an Official Liquidator who on 16. 2. 1961 sold the tenancy rights to Respondent No. 1-S. N. Jain. This sale was confirmed by the High Court on the same date and as a result 'thereof\n\nrespondent No. 1 took possession of the premises on 24.2.1961. On\n\n5. 4. 1961, the land-lord-appellant filed an application under the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of Laxmi Bank. On 31. 7. 1961, a decree for eviction was passed in favour of the landlord-appellant. On\n\n23-1-1963. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for a declaration that he was a tenant of the landlord-appellant.\n\nThis suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 5.5.1964 and an application to set aside the exparte decree was also dismissed and the appeal against that order also failed. Thereafter Respondent No. 1 filed an application under s. 25 of Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for recalling the warrant of possession issued by the Court in pursuance of the decree dated 31. 7. 1961 in favour of the landlord.\n\nThe present appeal arises out of these proceedings.\n\nThe Rent Controller allowed the application and recalled the warrant of possession by its Order dated 20. 12. 1966. The matter was then taken up by the landlord in appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal which _by its Order dated 25. 11. 1968 reversed the order of the Rent Controller and dismissed the tenant's application. A second appeal against the order of Tribunal was then filed by the tenant to the High Court which reversed the order of the Rent Control Tribunal and restored the order of the Rent Controller, hence this appeal by special leave.\n\nMr. Mridul appearing for the appellant challenged before us the findings of the High Court on point nos. 1 & 3 which are formulated at page 91 of the judgment of the Delhi High Court. These points may be extracted thus :-\n\n\"(!) The application made by the appellant before the High Court under section 25 was not barred by reason of the dismissal of the appllant's suit for default of appearance under Order IX Rule 9, C.P.C.\n\n(3) The transfer to the appellant by th~ Official Liquidator of the tenancy rights being voluntary did not come within the mischief of section 14(1 )(b) of the Act.\n\nIn the first place it was argued that so far as point Ne. 1 is concerned, the High , Court was wrong in holding that the application of ti Respondent No. 1 was not barred by the reason of the dismissal of the appellant's suit for setting aside the ex-parte decree by the principle of 'Res Judicata or Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C.\n\nIt was contended tha-\n\n_..__\n\neven if. the previous suit filed by respondent No. ,1 for declaration of his status as a tenant was dismissed for default but as the application for setting aside the decree also failed, there was an adjudication against the then plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and therefore the present\n\nsuit was clearly barred by the principles pf Res Judicata or Order IX Rule 9.\n\nAt any rate there can be no escape from the posiliP'n that the application of respondent No. 1 would be clearly barred by the principle contained in Order IX Rule 9. C.P.C. In case of Suraj Ratan Thirani & Ors. v. The Azamabad Tea Co. & Ors.(') this Court held thus:\n\n\"We are not however impressed by the argument that the ban imposed by 0. IX, r. 9 creates merely p. personal bar or estoppel against the particular plaintiff suing on the same cause of action and leaves the matter at large for those claiming under him.\n\nBeyond the absence in 0. IX, r. 9 of the words referring \"to those claiming nnder the , plaintiff\" there is nothing to warrant this argument. It has neither principle, nor logic to commend it • . . . . . . . The rule would obviously have no value and the bar imposed by it would be rendered meaningless if the plaintiff whose suit was dismissed for default had only to transfer the property to another and the latter was able to agitate rights which his vendor was precluded by law from putting forward.\"\n\nIn the instant case it was appellant who brought the previous suit which resulted in a decree fpr eviction of the tenant on 31-7-1961a date when the 1st respondent had already taken possession of the premises by virtue of transfer tnade by the Official Liquidator. Thus the identity of the subiect matter being substantially the same, this case clearly falls within the ambit of the ratio in the case supra. On this ground alone therefore the appellant is entitled to succeed because the High Court with due respect does opt appear to have properly construed the scope of Order IX Rule 9 C.P .C. There is however nothing to show that respondent No.1 was tenant within the meaning of Rent Control Act so as to maintain an application under s. 25 of the Act when in fact he was an unlawful sub-lessee. As regards point No. 3, the High Court relying on a decision of Calcutta High Court in Krishna Das Nandy vs. Bidhan Chandra Roy(') has found that as the transfer in favour of respondent No. 1 by the Official Liquidator was confirmed by the Court, the status of the tenant by respondent No. 1 was acquired by operation of law and therefore the transfer\n\n(I) [1964] 6 S. C. R. 192.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1959 Cal. 181.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwas an involuntary transfer and the provisions of Rent Control Act would not be attracted.\n\nAfter careful perusal of Calcutta case, in 1be first place it appears that the section concerned bas not been ex\n\ntracted and we are not in a position to know what was the actual language of the section of the Bengal Act. Secondly, in our opinion, the official liquidator had merely stepped into the shoes of Laxm£\n\nBank which was the original tenant and even if the official liquida tor had transferred the tenancy interest to respondent No. 1 under the orders of the Court, it was on behalf of the original tenant. It was undoubtedly a voluntary sale which clearly fell within the mischief of s.14(1) (b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.\n\nAssuming that the sale by the official Liquidator was an involuntary sale, then it undoubtedly became an assignment as provided for by s. 14(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act.\n\nS. 14(b) runs thus :-\n\n\"14(b )-that the renant has; on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises with out obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord.\"\n\nThe language of s. 14(b) is wide enou1; h not only to include any sub-lease but even an assignment or auy other mode by which possession of the tenanted premises is parted. In view of the wide amplitude of s.14(b) we are clearly of the opinion that it does not exclude even an involuntary sale.\n\nFore these reasons therefore we a, re unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court.\n\nThe appeal is accordin:ly allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the plaintiff's application under s. 25> of the Delhi Rent Control Act is dismissed.\n\nMr. Bisaria, learned counsel appearin1; for the respondent submitted that 31\\ the tenant has been in the premises for a period of 19 years and is conducting business therein, he may be permitted sufficient time to make alternative arrangements.\n\nMr. Mridul appearing for the' appellant fairly conceded that he would have no objection if one year's time is allowed to the respondent provided be gives an undertaking for banding over peaceful and vacant possession at the expiry of the time.\n\nWe therefore allow time to the respondent to vacate the premises on or before 15th April, 1981 on the condition that he files an undertaking within two weeks to the :effect ( 1) that he shall hand-over vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord on or before 15th April, 1981; (2) that be shall not induct any person on the premises; (3) that be shall go on paying the compensation for wrongful use of premises equivalent to the rent.\n\nI ,.ll,\n\nP. H. RAO v. SHANTI PRA~AD (Fazal Ali,/.) 449\n\nThe ulldertaking must be filed supported by an affidavit within A two weeks from today failing which the order granting time shall stand revoked.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "RAO\n\nSHANTI PRASAD NARINDER KUMAR JAIN & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHANTI PRASAD NARINDER KUMAR JAIN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 78, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 10, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FA.ZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FA.ZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Order IX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360, "end_char": 370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the dismissal of the earlier suit of respondent-tenant for default of appearance under Ordex IX Rule", "statute": "Whether the dismissal of the earlier suit of respondent-tenant for default of appearance under Ordex IX Rule"}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 522, "end_char": 535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the dismissal of the earlier suit of respondent-tenant for default of appearance under Ordex IX Rule", "statute": "Whether the dismissal of the earlier suit of respondent-tenant for default of appearance under Ordex IX Rule"}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1-4-1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 706, "end_char": 714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant landlord executed a .lease in respect of the disputed premises in favour of respondent 2 for three years as far back as 1-4-1942."}}, {"text": "31-11-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 936, "end_char": 946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit for possession was however dimissed but a decree dated 31-11-1948 for arrears of rent was passed and it was held that Laxmi Bank was the real tenant."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit for possession was however dimissed but a decree dated 31-11-1948 for arrears of rent was passed and it was held that Laxmi Bank was the real tenant."}}, {"text": "Bombay High .Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1049, "end_char": 1067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the Bombay High .Court ordered the Bank to be wound up and in the winding up proceedings, the High Court appointed an Official Liquidator who on 16-2-1961 sold the tenancy rights to respondent No."}}, {"text": "16-2-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1190, "end_char": 1199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the Bombay High .Court ordered the Bank to be wound up and in the winding up proceedings, the High Court appointed an Official Liquidator who on 16-2-1961 sold the tenancy rights to respondent No."}}, {"text": "24-2-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1380, "end_char": 1389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 took possession pf the premises on 24-2-1961."}}, {"text": "5-4-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1394, "end_char": 1402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5-4-1961, the landlord appellant filed ao application under the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of Laxmi Bank."}}, {"text": "31-7-1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1512, "end_char": 1521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31-7-1961, a decree for eviction was passed in favour of the appellant."}}, {"text": "22-1-1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1588, "end_char": 1597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22-1-1963, respondent No."}}, {"text": "5-5-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1743, "end_char": 1751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 5-5-1964 and an application to set aside the ex parte order was also dismissed and the appeal against that order also failed."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1927, "end_char": 1937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20-12-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2135, "end_char": 2145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rent Controller allowed it on 20-12-1966."}}, {"text": "25-11-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2224, "end_char": 2234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f_ ordered by order dfited 25-11-1968 in favour of the appellant A second appeal filed by respondent No."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2688, "end_char": 2708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3105, "end_char": 3115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "1964) 6 S. C. R. 192", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3252, "end_char": 3272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 14(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3303, "end_char": 3316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3963, "end_char": 3968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control\n\nAct"}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3990, "end_char": 4006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4145, "end_char": 4150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4158, "end_char": 4180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4448, "end_char": 4460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4465, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and 0."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bisaria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4498, "end_char": 4511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Bisaria for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "F AZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4577, "end_char": 4586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nF AZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a\n\n(I' judgment of the Delhi Court and arises out of , an application filed by Respondent No."}}, {"text": "1.4.1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5155, "end_char": 5163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 for three years as far back as 1.4.1942."}}, {"text": "31. 11. 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5383, "end_char": 5395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit for possession was however dismissed buta decree dated 31."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5501, "end_char": 5518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the Bombay High Court ordered the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) 3 s.c.it."}}, {"text": "16. 2. 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5687, "end_char": 5698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bank to be wound up and in the winding up proceedings, the said High Court appointed an Official Liquidator who on 16."}}, {"text": "S. N. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5743, "end_char": 5753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1-S. N. Jain."}}, {"text": "31. 7. 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6028, "end_char": 6039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31."}}, {"text": "5.5.1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6270, "end_char": 6278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This suit was dismissed for non-prosecution on 5.5.1964 and an application to set aside the exparte decree was also dismissed and the appeal against that order also failed."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6451, "end_char": 6456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6460, "end_char": 6482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20. 12. 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6808, "end_char": 6820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rent Controller allowed the application and recalled the warrant of possession by its Order dated 20."}}, {"text": "25. 11. 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6932, "end_char": 6944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was then taken up by the landlord in appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal which _by its Order dated 25."}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7262, "end_char": 7268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mridul appearing for the appellant challenged before us the findings of the High Court on point nos."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7424, "end_char": 7440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 & 3 which are formulated at page 91 of the judgment of the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7552, "end_char": 7562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order IX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7660, "end_char": 7673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7677, "end_char": 7682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 14(1 )(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7820, "end_char": 7837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Res Judicata or Order IX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8168, "end_char": 8173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Res Judicata or Order IX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8535, "end_char": 8564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order IX Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8718, "end_char": 8731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8735, "end_char": 8740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "31-7-1961a", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9721, "end_char": 9731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case it was appellant who brought the previous suit which resulted in a decree fpr eviction of the tenant on 31-7-1961a date when the 1st respondent had already taken possession of the premises by virtue of transfer tnade by the Official Liquidator."}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10280, "end_char": 10296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10336, "end_char": 10341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10461, "end_char": 10480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, the High Court relying on a decision of Calcutta High Court in Krishna Das Nandy vs. Bidhan Chandra Roy(') has found that as the transfer in favour of respondent No."}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S. C. R. 192", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10754, "end_char": 10775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10897, "end_char": 10913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10964, "end_char": 10972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After careful perusal of Calcutta case, in 1be first place it appears that the section concerned bas not been ex\n\ntracted and we are not in a position to know what was the actual language of the section of the Bengal Act."}}, {"text": "s.14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11534, "end_char": 11541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11713, "end_char": 11721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Control Act", "statute": "Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11725, "end_char": 11747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 14(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11750, "end_char": 11758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "9th day of June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. 14(b) runs thus :-\n\n\"14(b )-that the renant has; on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises with out obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord.\""}}, {"text": "s. 14(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12016, "end_char": 12024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s.14(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12206, "end_char": 12213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12519, "end_char": 12524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Bisaria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12575, "end_char": 12582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bisaria, learned counsel appearin1; for the respondent submitted that 31\\ the tenant has been in the premises for a period of 19 years and is conducting business therein, he may be permitted sufficient time to make alternative arrangements."}}, {"text": "15th April, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13140, "end_char": 13156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore allow time to the respondent to vacate the premises on or before 15th April, 1981 on the condition that he files an undertaking within two weeks to the :effect ( 1) that he shall hand-over vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord on or before 15th April, 1981; (2) that be shall not induct any person on the premises; (3) that be shall go on paying the compensation for wrongful use of premises equivalent to the rent."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_44_70_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "N. C. SHINGHAL\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nMarch 19, 1980\n\nLD. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIA!I, JJ.]\n\nCentral Health Services Rules, 1963 as amended by Central Health Service (Amendment) Rules, 19.66,-Rule 8(3), Scope of-Promotions to Supertime Grade 11 posts, whether made in accoriance with Rule 8 (3 )-Whether transfers in posts which are in the same grade or cne considered equivalent can be effected on administrative exigencie3--Ref, usg[ tu accept the promotion by an employee. lVhether the employer can offer to next junior to the offeree-Adverse inference agairut partles remaining ex-parte and tkrefore not served, whether can be drawn.\n\nThe Union of India ha1 enacted Ceutral Government Health Scheme and ID implementation thereof has set up various institutions for medical relief and medical education. A Central Health Service became a necessity for effectively impleme11ting the scheme.\n\nWith a view to constituting the service, Central Health Service Rules, 1963 were framed aDd brought into operation on May 15, 1963, The Rules envisaged categorisation of rsonnel manning the service into five different categories, to wit, category 'A' supertime scale Rs. 1600-2000;\n\nCtegory 'B' supertime scale Rs. 1300-1600; Category 'C' Senior scale Rs. 675-1300, Category 'D' Junior scale Rs. 425-950; and Category 'E' class II s\"'1e Rs. 325-800. On account of various imponderables the service could not be constituted and 1963 Rules were amended by Central Health Service (Amendment) Rules, 1966. Initial constitution of service was to be on and from September 9, 1966. 1966 Ruleo contemplated again the division of service into four cafegories, namely, Category I comprising supertime scale Grade I Rs. 1800- 22:'0; supertimc scale grade II Rs. 1300-1800, Category II consists of Specialists' grade Rs. 600-1300; Category ill include• General Duty Officers Grade I Rs. 450-1250; and Category f.V comprises General Duty Officers Grade JI Rs. 350-900. 1966 Rules provided the method for initial constitution of the service. Rules 7A(l) and 7A(2) provided for absorbing departmental candidates holding posts in categories 'A' and 'B' under 1963 Rules in supertime Grade I and supertime Grade II respectively of reorganized serviee under the 1966 Rules. Those in service on September 9, 1966 and holding posts in Categories 'C', 'D' a.nd 'E' were either absorbed in specialists' grade or General Duty\n\nOfficers Grade as the case may be.\n\nFor the purposes of selection and absorp t'ion of departmental candidates on the date of initial constitution of reorganised servic'e, a Selection Committee was set up and absorption was made in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee. This process of absorption was over in March 1967, but the constitution of the service was deemed to be effective from September 9. 1966.\n\nRule. 2 ( c) defines category to mean a group of posts specified in column 2 of the table under Rule 4. Rule 4 provides for classification categories and scales of pay. Rule 5 of, Rules 1966 provides for authorised strength of the service.\n\nRule 8 prescribes the manner in which future vaca.nc\\e.ci,, after appointments have been made to ilie Service under Rule 7 and 7 A shall be filled in Supertime Grade Il. i '\n\n' y\n\n\\ ~.\n\nN. C. SHINGHAL V. UNION 45\n\nThe authorised strength of the various categories of the service on the date\n\nA ' of commentement of 1966 Rules shall be as specified in the First Sch\"edule. The ve1tical promotional channel is from Specialists' grade and General Duty ofli\n\ncers Grade I to supertime Grade II and from thereon to Supertirne Grade I. On the date of initial constitution of seivice there were 27 S permanent and 102 temporary, in all 377 posts in Specialists' grade. Out of this strength of posts in specialists' grade 28 posts were upgraded to supertime Grade II, 19 being classified as unspecified specialists' posts and 9 unspecified posts.\n\nThe Central Government converted one post from amongst the 19 unspecified specialists' grade posts in Supertirne Grade II in Opthalmology speciality in Willingdon Hospital and transferred one Dr. B. S, Jain, respondent 3, who was then working as Chief opthalmoJogist-cum-Associate Professor of Opthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, end offered the vacancy to in Super time Grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3 to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad hoc basis as per Memorandum dated December 7, 1970. As the appellant was prepared to accept only if 1he posting was at Delhi and not in Simla, one Dr. G. C. Sood was promoted to supertime Grade 11 post and was appointed at Simla.\n\nTh'e appellant, thereafter filed a writ petition praying for Mandamus that be may be deemed to h<!ive been promoted from February 18, 1971, the date when Dr. Jain was posted at Willingdon Hospital. The appellant also questionedthe promotions of r'espondents 4 to 24 to supertime grade II on various dates after February 18, 1971 and before July 17, 1978 when he was actually promoted on a certain interpreta.tion of Rule 8(3) of the Central Health Service Rules 1963.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the writ petition. A Letters Patent Appeal was partly alJowed. Hence the appeal by spec'ial leave.\n\nThe appellant contended that: (a) the promotions of Respondents 4 to 24 are in contravention of Rule 8 of 1966 Rules; and (b) when a post in opthalmology at Willingdon Hospital was created on February I, J,971, by conversion of ono post\n\nfrom amongst unspecified specialists' grade posts in supertim.e Grade II, the post could only have been filled in by promotion from amont those holding the post in specialists' grade in opthalmology speciality and he being the senior most and otherwise qualified, he should have n promoted from that date; ( c) filling in the post at Willingdon Hospital by transfer oe respondent 3 was in violation of fie statutory rnle and hen\"' invalid; ( d) the offer of the post to him at Simla was an eye wash and malafide as he latked teaching experience and the post is a teaching post; ( e) \"service in that category\" means service in that category which was constituted under th.c 1966 amcdment Rules and (f) rule 8(3) does not permit inter se transfers in posts which are in the same category.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : I. Unlike other professions, medical profession has developed\n\nrancwise expert specialised knowledge referable generally to number of parts in which human a!latomy is divisible. General medicine and general-surgecy are two broad genus but under 'each one of them there are numerous specialities H and .thre is intensive study and research in speciality for being qualified for the spec1al1ty.\n\nBemg en expert in any one speciality simultaneously results in being\n\nA excluded from other specialities even though the specialities m<'llY be species of a g'enus like general medicine or general surgery.\n\nAgain, in each spiality there will be a post of a Lecturer, an Assistant Profess.or, an Associate Professor 'and a Professor with a vertical movement by way of promotion.\n\nIn a non teaching hospital there will be posts like Junior Surgeon, Senior Surgeon, Head of the Department and so on. In a profession so compartmentalised speciality* wise ex hypothesi it is difficult to provide for promotional avenue by way of a B gGneral seniority list integrating different specialities categorywise, cadrewise or gradewise. If such a general seniority list including persons belonging to different specialities albeit in the same grade is drawn up for purposes of promotion it might lead to a startling result because the need may be of a promotional post in a speciality and the man at top of the seniority list may not belong to that speciaJity and the man at top of the seniority list may not belong to that speciality but may belong to a different speciality and if any promotion was to be given C to him to a post in a speciality for which he is neither qualified nor eligible it \\Vould be impossible to give vertical promotions by referring to such general seniority list. If the promotion is to a post generally called administrative post in a hospital a general seniority list including experts belonging to different specialities may be helpful but when promotions are to be given to posts in different spLcialities a general seniority list is not only unhelpful but may really impede the process of promotion.\n\nAgain, demands of different specialities for additional D strength may differ from hospital to hospital, from area to area and even from time to time.\n\nIn order to nleet such unforeseen eventualities the rules provide for an addition to the strength of supertime grade II by keeping 19 posts designated as unspecified Sp'ecialists' grade! posts and 9 unspecified posts in a pool.\n\nWhenver a demand came for providing a higher post in supertime grade II in any particular specia1ity ordinarily where the strength of the serviee is prescribed a post v1ill have to be created which any. one familiar with bureaucratic jaggomot would E immediately realise how time consuming it is.\n\nAnticipating such a situation and to meet with the demands of spC\":i, alities within a reasonable time it was provided th& the; e wcuJd be a paol of 19 unspecified sp'ecialists' post:i in supertime grade II Mid 9 unspecified posts also in supertime grade II . This would facilitate conversion from the pool of unspecified Specialists' posts of an unspecified Spec\\a .. tistsi post to a specified specialist post in a speciality whre :1. need has been felt.\n\nOnce the need is felt and a post is converted from an unspecified post to a F specified post in supertime grade II it becomes an addition to the str'ength of that speciality a.nd the post can be filled in, in accordance with the relevant ntle.\n\nBut it is implicit in this arrangement that the person oi be ap_1:lOinred to such a post would be one who is eligible to be appointed to that speciality and not some one who is on top of the general seniority list in Specialists' grade or general duty offic'ers' grade from which promotion is to be made. If promotion has to be made from a general seniority list which includes all Specialists in the Speci4 G a.lists' grade the one at the top may be Cardiologist and the post may be convert ed into Anaesthesiology. Certainly a CnTdiologist cannot be appointed as an Anaestheatic. Therefore. when a post from amongst unspecified Specialists' posts is converted to a specified post which means specified in the speciality in which a need has been felt from amongst those in the Specialists' grade belonging. to that speciality OOd in order of their inter se seniority a promotion could be given. [54 FH, 55A-H 56A-B] H Union of India and Ors. v. D. B. Kohli and Anr., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 117; followed.\n\nN. C. SHINGHAL V. UNION 47\n\n2. Merely because all 28 posts were deducted from the strength of posts in Specialists' grade it could not be said that all 28 posts would be available for promotion to those belonging to Specialists' grade only. The language employed in rule 5 als0 points in this direction. All the 28 posts ueeJ not necessarily be filled in by promotion from amongst those who belong to Specialists grade only.\n\nHence with the division of 28 posts in two different designations and dividing the 28 posts in two different nomenclatures. 28 posts are made up of 19 posts designated as unspecified Specialists posts and 9 unspecified posts. Undoubtedly 19 posts \\Vhich were designated as unspecified Sfecialists' post must be filled in frcm amongst those belonging to the Specialists' grade but that itself also shows that the remaining 9 unspecified posts can be filled in from amongst those who uiay be promoted from General Duty Officers grade I because General Duty Officers grade I are also promotable to supertime grade II. The nomenclature uru..pecified Specialists' post and unspecified post provides an effective ans\"'er ana indicates that while in the case of the former promotion must be given from Specialists in respect of the latter General Duty officers Grade I v-•ould equally be eligible for promotion. [56 D~H]\n\n3. To interpret that 19 unspecified Specialists' posts could only be filled in by promotion would run counter to th'e express provision contained in Rule 8(3) which is statutory.\n\nRule 8 of the Central Health Service Rules, provides for future maintenance of the service. Rule 8(3) provides for 50% of th'e vacancies in supertirne grade II to be filled in by promotion of General Duty Officers Grade I and Sp'ecialists' grade officers in the ratio of 2 : 3 and the remaining 50% of the vacancies to be filled in by direct recruitment in the manner specitl.!d in the second &ehedule.\n\nNow, once an unsp'ecified Specialists' grade post in supertime grade II is converted and made a specified post in a speciality it is an addition to the strength of the speciality and the filling in of such post ·.shall be governed by rule 8(3). Undoubtedly if it is to be filled in by promotion, that would only be from amongst those belonging to Specialists' grade officers as the converted post was unsp'ecified Specialists' post. But to say that it can b.::: filled in only by promotion is to ignore the mandate of statutory rule 8 (3) \\vhich provides for filling in posts in supertime grade II by either promotion or nomi~ nation. in the ratio therein prescribed.\n\nOnce there is a post in supertirne grade 11 whtch is to be filled in subsequent to the initial constitution of the service, rule 8(3) \\vill be attracted in all its rigour. [57 B-E]\n\nFuher Rul'e 8 (3) provides for filling in posts in supertirne grade II by\n\nromotton. as well as by direct recruitment in the ratio of 1 : 1. On a true\n\n1nterpreta.ton .of the 1966 Rules in general and rule 8(3) in particular it could not b:':- ga1nsa1d that w.he!fever an unsp'ecified Speci, alists' post is converted into a spec1fid post an~ assigned to a speciality it can be filled in either by promution or by lfect recruitment as the situation warrants according to the rule and as determmed by the quota rule. [57 E-G]\n\no airgument. can be foned or. any relief c:an be claimed merely on a Jtand taken by the, Uton o.f India in their cou.nter-affidavit in an earlier writ petition, unless estoppl l~ claimed or urged. Even _if such be the stand of the Centr3.l Government t will have to be negatived and was in fact negativd in the case of Dr. R S. Jam. [58C-DJ\n\n\n4. Wh'en a post is created, it is an addition to the strength of that particular category and the additional strength has to be filled in the manner prescribed in the rule and that no sanctity attaches to the place where the post is created but the sanctity attaches to the number of posts and the manner of fi1ling ihem. [59 B-Cl\n\nTransters in posts which a' in th'e same grade or are coidered equivalent can be effected on administrative exigencies.\n\nOnce a new post is created and it is an increase in the strength of th'e cadre in which the post is created, every one in that cadre is eligible to fill in that post and transfer is permissible. There\n\nis no violation of Rule 8 (3) and traruifer of Dr. B. S. Jain was valid. [59 E-FJ\n\n\n5. If an employe'e eligible for promotion is offered a higher post by way of promotion, his refusal to accept the same would enable the employer, the Ce-Qtral Government in this case, to fill in the post by offering it to a jU.nior to the Government servant refusing to accept the post and in so acting there will be no violation of Art. 16. Further, the Government servant 'vbo refuses to nccept the promotiona1 post offered to him 1 for his own reason cannot then be h'eard to complain that he must be given promotional post from the date on which the\n\nz.venue for promotion opened to him. [60 B-C]\n\nUndoubtedly, it may be that under the Medical Council Regulations stricto sensu, the appellant may not be qualified for the post of Associate Professor because he did not poss'ess the requisite teaching experience.\n\nBut an c; d ltoc arrangement could have been made and it was open to the Central Goveroment, if the appellaot had accepted the post, to mov'e the Meditfil Council of India to permit the Central Government to appoint the appellaot at Simla.\n\nSome way could have been found but the door was bolted by the appellant himself declining the offer for reasons other than his qualification which he may have found compelling. The offer made to him by the Govenumnt was not eye wash or make believe.\n\nHis refusal to accept the offer of promotion would postpone his pro motion. Further, •ince his refusal to l!Ceept the promotion al Simla and till July 1978, the appellant was never superseded by any one junior to him in his speciality it is difficult to entertain the contention that in refusing promotion to him when some posts were converted from unspecified Specialists' posts into different specialities and were filled in by lh<lle who were qualified to be promoted in !he respective speciality in which the post was created he could be said ID have been superseded in violation of Art. 16. [62 D-HJ\n\n6. Remote chances of promotion could hardly be said to be condition pf service which if impaired. would b'o violative of Art. 16. Even assuming thal a remote chance of promotion in adversely affected would give a cause of action, in view of appellants' impending retirement on superannuation the argument\n\nwe>uld be of no avail to him. [63 F-01\n\n7. The word 'category' used in Rule 8(3) has to be understood to mean the post included in that category a~ consequently service in that category would\n\nn1tan service in a post included 1n that category. [66 B-C]\n\nN. C, SHINGHAL V. UNION 49\n\nIt is a well recognised canon of construction that the construction which makes A the Rule otiose or unworkable should be avoided where two constructions are possible ans the Court should lean in favour of the construction which \\\\'ould 1nake the rule workable_ and further the purpose for which the rule is intended. \\Vhile prescribing experience qualification in 1966 Amendment Rul'es, the framers of the Rules could not have intended to ignore wholly the past service. A Specialist who wtas in category 'C' was included in category IT with the designation Specialists' grade officer. Similarly, General Duty Officer grade I in cate- II gory 'D' acquired the same nomenclature General Duty Officer grade I in category Ill. There was an upward revision of pa.y scales of both the categ:1ries.\n\nThe change in d'esignation should not be understood to mean that the service rendered as specialist or as General Duty Officer is wholly wiped out for any future promotion. Even after change of designation the duties nev'er underwent any change. Same duty was performed ai day prior to September 9, 1956 and the day thereafter by both the categories in the respectiv~ po.:ils.\n\nFurth'er this C change was with a purpos~ in as much as when certain qualifying servl~ is prescribed for being eligible for promotion in a category the emphasis is on service rendered in a post irrespective of the grade. A Specialists' grade officer belonging to category II was a Specialists' grade officer in category C. He was even then eligible for promotion to supertime grade II. It was never intended that a Specialists grade officer belonging to category 'C' under 1963 Rules who had put in more than 8 years of service but who was not promoted prior to Sep.\n\nD tember 9, 1966, the date of initial constitution of service, or on the date of initial constitution of service, would be ineligible for promotion for a period of 8 years simply because the designation of the category changed. It was never intended that there should be a complete hiatus for a period of 8 years in pr°\" rooting Specialists' grade officers to supertime grade Il and for a period of 10 years in case of General Duty Officers grade I. There is no warrant for such an inference from the Rules. [65 A-H, 66 A-CJ E\n\n8. The contention that ex'ecutive instruction cannot run counter to the statu tory rule is untenable in the facts of this case. Service rendered in equivalent post prior to the date of initial constitution of servic'e could be taken into account in calculating qualifying service for next promotion. [66 E-F]\n\n9. The need for the post or the requirements of the hospital or the neeJ for an ad hoc or additional appointment is a matter which the Government is com\n\npetent to decide and in the absence of requisite material the Court cannot inter pose its own de.cision on the necessity of creation or abolition of posts. Wheth'er a particular post is nece&Sary is a matter depending upon the exigencies of the situation and administrative n'ecessity. The Government is a better judge of the interests of the general public for whose service the hospitable are set up. And whether a hospital catering to the nc'eds of general public providing mr.dical relief in different specialities has need for a particular post in a particuiar speciality would be better judged by th'e Government running the hospitol.\n\nIf Government is a better judge it must have the power to create or abJlish the posts depending upon th'e needs of the hospital and the requirements of gene:al\n\npublic. [67 C.E]\n\nCreation and abolition of posts is a matter of Government policy and every sovereign Government has this power in the interest and necessity of internal administration. The creation or abolition of post is dictated by policy decision,\n\nexigencies of circumstances and administrativ'e necessity. The creation, the continuance and the abolition of post are all decided by the Government in the interest of administration and general public: The Court would b'e the least competent in the face of scanty material to decide whether the Government acted honestly in creating a post or refusing to create a post or its decision suffers from niala fide, legal or factual. In this background it is difficult to entertain the contention of the appellant that posts were created to accommodate sonre specific individuals ignoring the requir'ements of the hospital or the interests of the general public at large. [67 F-H] ·\n\n\n10. No adverse inferenc'e could be drawn against a patty unles~ they appear before the Court and they are served with necessary papers. [68 C-D]\n\nIn the present case, Respondents 9 and 23 had not appeared in the High. Court and there fa no evidence that the subsequent 2fil.davit of the appe11ant was served on them. It may be that the Government may not be interested in either d.enying or admitting this averment which directly and adversely affects respondents 9 and 23. However, in view of the fact that they were !l; elected by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the promotion WaB approved by the U.P.S.C. it is difficult to enfertain the contention at the hand of the appellant who is not in any way going to be benefited by the invalidation of their promotion. (68 B, D, El\n\n11. Once the challenge on merits fails in a case, the second string to the bow need not \\:'e examined. The appellant here, is least competent to challenge th'c p10motions of Respondents 4 to 24. [69 BC]\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISIJICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2057 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 11-1-1979 of the Delhi High Court i11 L.P. A. No. 46/73.\n\nS.R. Srivastava for the Appellant and Dr. N.C. Shinghal (in person)\n\nP.P. Rao, nd Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents I & 2.\n\nB.R. Aggarwal for Respondent No. 15.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nG DESAI,).-A highly qualified ophth''lmic surgeon feeling aggrieved that he has not been justly treated in the matter of promotion to a post in Supertime Grade JI seeks redress of his grievance praying for a mandamus that he may be deemed to have been promoted from February 18, 1971, failing which more out of frustration and less by any justification he seeks quashing cf the promotion of res- B pondents 4 to 24 though convinced that even if the Court were to accede to his request he is in no way likely to be bnefited by tliis. bizarre exercise.\n\nFirst to the fact situation. The Union of India has framed Central Government Health Scheme and in implementation thereof has set up various institutions for medical relief and medical education.\n\nA Central Health Service became a necessity for effectively implementing the scheme. With a view to constituting the Service, Central Health Service Rules 1963 ('1963 Rules' for short), were framed and brought into operation on May 15, 1963. The Rules envisaged categorisation of personnel manning the Service into five different categories, to wit, category 'A' supertime scale Rs. 1600-2000, category 'B' supertime scale Rs. 1300-1600, category 'C' senior scale Rs. 675-1300, category 'D' junior scale Rs. 425-950 and catego1y E' class II scale Rs. 325-800. On account of various imponderables the Service could not be constituted and 1963 Rules were amended by Central Health Service (Amendment) Rules, 1966, ('1966 Rules for short). Initial constitution of Service was to be on and from September, 9, 1966. 1966 Rules contemplated again the division of Service into four categories, namely, category I comprising supertime grade I Rs. 1800-2250; supertime grade II Rs. 1300-1800; category II consists of Specialists' grade Rs. 600-1300; category III includes General Duty Officers grade I Rs. 450-1250; and category IV comprises General Duty Officers grade II Rs. 350-900. 1966 Rules provided the method of initial constitution of the Service. Rules 7A(l) and 7A(2) provided for absorbing departmental candidates holding posts in categories 'A' and 'B' under 1963 Rules in posts in supertime grade I and supertime grade II respectively of reorganised Service under the 1966 Rules. Those in service on September 9, 1966, and holding post in categories 'C', 'D' and 'E' were absorbed either in the the Specialits' grade or General Duty Officers, grade as the case may be. For the purposes of constitution and absorption of departmental candidates on the date of initial constitution of re-organised service a Selection Committee was set up and absorption was made in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee This process of absorption was over in March 1967, but the constitution of the Service was deemd to be effective from September 9, 1966. There were some promotions to supertime grade II up w 1971 but as they are not the subject-matter of dispute in this app.,:il th:y may be ignored. There was also direct recruitment to the Service between 1966 and 1971.\n\nBetween February 1971 to July 17, 1978, when the appellant came\n\nto be promoted to supertime grade II, respondents 4 to 24 were pro- moted on different dates to supertime grade II, The promotion of respondents 4 to 24 is challenged by the appellant on diverse grounds\n\nbut the principal contention is that their promotions are in contravention of rule 8 of1966 Rules. Rule 8 provides for future'maintenanceof the Service. Relevant for the present appeal is rule 8(3) which provides for recruitment to supertime grade II both by promotion and nomination by direct recruitment. As the appellant claims promotion to supertime grade II from February 18, 1971, and simultaneously questions promotion of respondants 4 to 24 to supertime grade II.on various dates after February 18, 1971, and before July 17, 1978, when he was actually promoted, on a certain interpretation of the relevant rule, it may be here extracted : xx xx xx \"8.\n\nFuture maintenance of the service-After appointments have been made to the Service under rule 7 and rule 7 A, future vacancies shall be filled in the following manner, namely:- xx xx xx\n\n(3) Supertime Grade I -\n\n(a) Fifty percent of the vacancies in Supertime Grade II\n\nshall be filled by promotion of :\n\n(i) General Duty officers, Grade I, with not less than ten years of service in that ca ta gory; or\n\n(ii) Specialists' Grade officers with not less than eight years of service in that category;\n\nin the ratio of 2 :3 on the recommendation of a Departmental Promotion Committee on the basis of merit and seniority of the officer's concerned;\n\nProvided that no person shall be eligible for appointment to any such post unless he possesses the qualifications and experience requisite for appointment to such post.\n\nProvided that where the case of an officer appointed to any post in the grade of Genenal Duty Officer, Grade I or the Specialists' Grade, as the case may be, is considered for the purposes of promotion to any posts in Supertime Grade II under this sub-rule, the cases of all persons senior to such officer in the grades of General Duty Officer, Grade I or Specialists' Grade, as the case may be, shall also be considered, notwithstanding that they may not have. rendered 10 years or 8 years of service, respectively, in those grades\".\n\nTo appreciate the contention of the appellant as to how he claims promotion to supertime grade II on February 8, 1971, it may be noted\n\nthat effective from that date the Central Government converted one post from amongst unspecified specialists' Grade posts in supertime l Grade II in Ophthalmology Speciality at Willingdon Hospital and transferred}Dr. B.S.'Jain, responden(3, jwhowas then ; working as Chief Ophthalmologist-cum-Associate Professor of Ophthalmology,[Himachal Pradesh:Medical; College,_Simla, and offerred the vacancy in)rnper-time grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3, to appellant who was next in seniority bylway of promotion on ad hoc basis as per memoran dum dated December 7, 1970. Appellant responded to this offer as per his letter dated December 9, 1970, wherein after putting forward various personal inconveniences and a possible loss in emoluments even on promotion, he concluded his response to the offer as under :\n\n\"In view of my personal problems and in the public interest I most humbly request that this promotion may kindly be granted to me while in Delhi.\"\n\nfhereafter the Government offered the post to Dr. Radha Natarajan\n\nbut she declined the offer. Subsequently the Government offered D Oie post to Dr. M. C. Sharma who accepted the same but he was not appointed and ultimately Dr. G.C. Sood was promoted to supertime grade II post and was appointed at Simla.\n\nAppellant contends that when a post in Opthalmology at Willingdvn Hospital was created on February I, 1971, by conversion of one B post from amongst unspecified Specialists' grade posts in supertime grade II that post could only have been filled in by promotion from amongst those holding the post in Specialists' grade in ophthalmology specialit) and he being the seniormost and otherwise qualified, he should ba ve been promoted from that date. Simultaneously he contends that filling in the post so created in supertime grade II at p Willingdon Hospital by transfer of respondent 3 Dr. B. S. Jain was in violation of the statutory rule and hence invalid.\n\nHe also contends that as he was not qualified to hold the post of Chief Ophthalmologistcum-Associate Professor of Ophthalmology, Himacbal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, because it was a teaching post and he lacked teaching experience which was an essential qualification, the offer of G that post to him was merely an eye wash and he could not have accepted the same. It is necessary to examine three different limbs of the submission separately.\n\nRule 5 of 1966 Rules provides for authorised strength of the Service.\n\nThe authorised strength of the various categories of the H service on the date of commencement of 1966 Rules shall be as specified in the first schedule. Part A of the first schedule deals with supertime\n\nSUPREME COURT REPCYRTS\n\n\ngrade I and Part B deals with supertime grade II. Part C deals with Specialists' grade. The vertical promotional channel is from specialists' grade and General Duty Officers Grade I to supertime grade II and from thereon to supertime grade I. On the date of initial constitution of Service there were 275 permanent and 102 temporary, in all 377 posts in specialists' grade. Out of this strength of posts in specialists' grade, 28 posts were upgraded to supertime gradeH, 19 being classified as unspecified specialists' posts and 9 unspecified posK To that extent the permanent strength of posts in specialists' grade was reduced by 28 so as to leave it at 247.\n\nThere is no dispute that 19 unspecified Specialists' posts and 9 unspecified posts were upgraded to supertime grade II. The controversy is how these posts were to be filled in, Appellant contends that as these 28 posts were in Specialists' grade and the strength of Specialists' grade posts was reduced by 28, whenever any post out of these 28 posts added to supertime grade II is required to be filled in, it can only be filled in by promotion from amongst those originally belonging to specialists' grade, i.e. category 'C' under 1%3 Rules. Simultaneously he contends that as these unspecified specia• lists' grade posts and unspecified posts, 28 in number, can:be filled in from those belonging to specialists' grade, ipso facto they can only be filled in by promotion and not either by direct nomination or by transfer. In support of this submission reliance is also placed on an affidavit filed on behalf of Union of India in a petition filed by Dr. B.S.\n\nJain wherein it was in terms stated that these 28 posts could only be filled in by promotion and in no other manner.\n\nThe raison d'etre for upgrading the 28 posts from specialists' grade to supertime grade II yet dividing them in two separate categories each having its own nomenclature, viz., 19 posts designated as unspecified Specialists' grade posts and 9 designated as unspecified posts is not difficult to discern.\n\nUnlike other professions, medical profession has developed branchwise expert specialised knowledge referrable generally to number of parts in which human anatomy is divisible. General medicine and general surgery are two broad genus but under each one of them there are numerous specialities and there is intensive study and research in speciality for being qualified for the speciality. Being an expert in any one speciality simultaneously results in being excluded from other specialities even though the specialities may be species of a genus like ' general medicine or general surgery. Again, in each speciality there will be a post of a Lecturer, an Assistant Professor, an Associate Professor and a Professor with a vertical movement by way of promotion.\n\nIn a non-teachipg hospital there will be posts like Junior Surgeon,\n\nSenior Surgeon, Head of the Department and so on. In a profession so compartmentalised specialitywise, ex hypothesi it is difficult to provide for promotional avenue by way of a general seniority list integrating different specialities categorywise, cadrewise or gradewise. If such a general seniority list including persons belonging to different specialities albeit in the same grade is drawn up for purposes of promotion it might lead to a startling result because the need may be of a promotional post in a speciality and the man at top of the seniority list may not belong to that speciality but may belong to a different speciality ap.d if any promotion was to be given to him to a post in a speciality for which he is neither qualified nor eligible it would be impossible to give vertiCiii promotions by referring to such general seniority list. If the promotion is to a post generaffy called administrative post in a hospital a general seniority list including experts belonging to different specialities may be helpful but when promotions are to be given to posts in different specialities a •general seniority list is not only unhelpful but may really impede the process of promotion. Again, demands of different specia\n\nlities for additional strength may differ from hospitaI; to hospital, from area to area and even from time to time. In order to meet such un - foreseen eventualities the rules provide for an addition to the strength of supertime grade II by keeping 19 posts designated as unspecified Specialists' grade posts and 9 unspecified posts in a pool. Whenever a demand came for providing a higher post in supertime grade II in any particular speciality ordinarily where the strength of the service is prescribed a post will have to be created which any one familiar with bureaucratic jagornot would immediately realise how time consuming it is. Anticipating such a situation and to meet with the demands of sipecialities within a reasonable time it was provided that there would be a pool of 19 unspecified Specialists' posts in supertime grade II and 9 unspecified posts also in supertime grade II. This would facilitate conversion from the pool of unspecified Specialists' posts of an un specified Specialists' post to a specified Specialist post in a speciality where a need has been felt. Once the need is felt and a post is con\n\nverted from an unspecified post to a specified post in supertime grade II it becomes an addition to the strength of that speciality and the post can be filled in, in accordance with the relevant rule.\n\nBut it is im plicit in this arrangement that the person to be appointed to such a post would be one who is eligible to be appointed to that speciality and not some one who is on top of the general seniority list in Specialists' grade or general duty officers' grade from which promotion is to be made.\n\nIf promotion has to be made from a general seniority list which includes all Specialists in the Specialists' grade the one at the top may be a Cardiologist and the post may be converted into Anaesthesiology and it\n\ndoes not require long persuasive argument to hold that a Cardiologist cannot be appointed as an Anaesthetic. It is, therefore, crystal clear that when a post from amongst unspecified Specialists' posts is converted to a specified post which means specified in the speciality in which a need has been felt from amongst those in the specialists' grade belonging to that speciality and in order of their interse seniority a promotion could be given. This position is inescapable and it is difficult to comprehend a position contrary to this. In fact, this situation has been exprssly recognised by this Court in Union of India & Ors.\n\nv. S. B. Kohli & Another (1), wherein it was held that for being appointed as a Professor n a particular speciality in that case ~Orthopaedics, the condition that a person must have a post-graduate degree in Orthopaedics would not result in any .classification without reference to the objectives sought to be achieved and this would not' result in any dis- 'crimination nor would it be violative of Article I 6. .\n\nIn passing a contention of the appellant that all 28 posts which were deducted frcm the strength of permanentrposts in Specialists' grade and ac'ded to supertime grade II must' on that account alone be filled in by promotion from those belonging to the specialists' grade only may be examined. There is no merit in this rrntrnticn. If there was any substance in this contention there was no reason to provide for twe different designations and divide the 28 posts in two different nomencla tures. 28 posts are made up of 19 posts designated as unspecified Specialists' posts and 9 umpccified ipots. Undoul:tedly 19 posts which were designated as m1specifkd ,.Specialists' post must be filled in from amongst those belonging to: the Specialists' grade but that itself also shows th ct the rewaining 9 unspecified posts can be: filled in from amongst those who may be promoted from~ General Duty_Officers grade I because General Duty Officers grade-I are also promotable to super- Ume grade-II. The :nomenclature umpccififd Specialists' post and unspecified postprovides an effective anower and indicates that while in the case of the former promotion rr.t''t te given frcm Specialists in respect of the latter General Duty Officers Grade-I would be eligible for promotion. Merely because all 28 posts' were deducted from the\n\nstrength of pnts in Spcciaifrts' grfde it ccu'd rct ce mid that all 28 posts would te available for promotion to tbos(belcngingto Specialists' grade only.\n\nThe language employ rd in iule 5 aim points in this\n\ndiretJon. Tbere is, therefore, no substance in the contention that all 28 posts must be filled in by promotion from amongst those who belong to Specialists' grade only.\n\n(I) (1973) 3 S.C.R. 117.\n\nN. c. SH!NGHAL v. UNION (Desai, J.) 57\n\nThe last limb of the argument is that the 19 unspecified Specialists' posts in supertime grade II cau only be filled in by promotion and not in any other manner and particularly not by transfer. The provocation for this submission is posting of Dr. B. S. Jain in supertime grade II post created at Willingdon Hospital in February 1971. Undoubtedly one unspecified Specialists' grade post was converted and was designated as specified post in supertime grade II in Ophthalmology speciality at Willingdon Hospital in February 1971. Appellant says that once an unspecified Specialists' grade post was converted into a specified post and that as it was assigned to Ophthalmology speciality, he being the seniormost Ophthalmologist and qualified for the post, that post could only be filled in by promotion and. he should have been promoted and the posting of Dr. B. S. Jain:by transfer to that post was illegal and invalid. Rule 8 provides for future maintenance of the Service. Rule 8(3) provides for 50% of the vacancies in supertime grade II to be filled in by promotion of General Duty Officers Grade I and Specialists' grade officers in the ratio of2:3 and the remaining 50% of the vacancies to be filled in by direct recruitment in the manner specified in the second schedule. Now, once an unspecified specialists' grade post in supertime grade II is converted and made a specified post in a speciality it is an addition to the strength of the speciality and the filling in of such post shall be governed by rule 8 (3). Undoubtedly if it is to be filled in by promotion, that would only be from amongst those belonging to Specialists' grade officers as the converted post was unspecified Specialists' post. But to say that it can be filled in only by promotion is to ignore the mandate of statutory rule 8(3) which provides for filling in posts in supertime grade II by either promotion or nomination in the ratio therein prescribed. Once there is a post in supertime grade II which is to be filled in subsequent to the initial constitution of the Service, rule 8 (3) will be attracted in all its rigour. And it should not be overlooked that rule 8 (3) provides for filling in of posts in supertime grade II by promotion as:well as by direct recruitment in the ratio of 1 :I.\n\nOn a true interpretation of the 1966 Rules in general and rule 8 (3) in particular it could not be, gainsaid that whenever an unspecified Specialists' post is converted into a specified post and assigned to a speciality it can be filled in either by promotion or by direct recruitment as the 'ituaticn wurrnts 2crcrding to the rule and as determined by the quota rule.\n\nBut it was very strenuously contended that the Central Government in implementing the rule has understood and in fact implemented the rule to this effect that whenever an unspecified Specialist's post is converted as a specified post and assigned to a speciality it can only be filled in by promotion. Reliance was placed upon an affidavit made on behalf of the Central Government in a writ\n\n5-189 SCI/80\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOus\n\n\nA petition filed by Dr. B. S. Jain in Delhi High Court. In the counlet\n\naffidavit on behalf of the Central Government a stand was taken that -. the 19 unspecified Specialists' posts were meant only for promoting category 'C' clinical Specialists to supettime grade IT. In Union of India v. Bhim Singh & Ors., (1) the Court refers to the stand taken on behalf of the Union of India in that case as under :\n\n\"Learned counsel for the appellant (Union of India) submits that these posts were included in supertime grade II not with reference to the actual number of officers who had completed 8 years of service or more on a particular date but only with a view to providing opportunities of promotion to the , former Category 'C' officers holding clinical Specialist posts''.\n\nIt does appear that such a stand was taken on behalf of the Union of India but simultaneously it may be noted that the Court has not accepted the stand. And it would be too late in the day to say that on such a stand of the Union of lndia, if it runs counter to the rule explicit in meaning, any argument can be founded or any relief can be claimed unless estoppel is urged. And no such estoppel is claimed InP. C. Sethi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2) the petitioners urged that the view put forward on their behalf had been admitted by the Government in its affidavit filed in connection [with certain earlier proceedings of similar nature and other admissions in Parliament on behalf of the Government. Negativing this contention this Court held that such admissions, if any, which are mere expression of opinion limited to the context and not specific assurances, are not binding on the Government to create any estoppel. Similar view was also ex, pressed in J. K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India(>) where following the earlier decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income.' tax, Madras v. K. Srinivasan and K. Gopalan, (4) it was observed that the interpretation placed by the Department on various sub-sections in the instructions issued by the Department cannot be considered to be proper guide in a matter wherein the construction of a statute is involved. Therefore, it cannot be said that 19 unspecified Specialists' posts could only be filled in by promotion and such an interpretation or stand would run counter to the express provision contained in rule 8(3) which is statutory.\n\nEven if such be the stand of the Central Government it will have to be negatived and was in fact negatived in the case of Dr. B.\n\nS. Jain.\n\n(I) [1971] 2 S.L.R. 111 at p. 124.\n\n\n(3) [1969[ 2 S.C.R. 481at498.\n\n(4) [1953] S.C.R. 486.\n\nIncidentally it would be incongruous to hold that when a post is created in a certain grade, category or cadre and it is to be filled in, some one who is already in that grade, category or cadre cannot be transferred to that post and the post so vacated by him can be filled in, in the manner prescribed.\n\nEven if there was some substance, though there is none, in the contention on behalf of the appellant that whenever unspecified Specialists• post is converted into a specified post it can only be filled in by promotion yet when some one who is already in that grade is transferred to the newly created post and the post vacated by such transferred employee is offered by way of promotion which in fact was done in this case there is any violation of the rule.\n\nAs pointed out earlier, when a post is created it is an addition to the strength of that particular category and the additional strength has to be filled in in the manner prescribed in the rule and that no sanctity attached to the place where the post is created but the sanctity attaches to the number of posts and the manner of filling them. Now, Dr. B. S. Jain was already holding the post in supertime grade II at Simla when a post in supertime grade II in Opthalmology was created at Willingdon Hospital from amongst unspecified Specialists' posts. Even if this additional post has to be filled in by promotion as contended by the appellant, it is not open to him to urge that the post at Willingdon Hospital alone must have been filled in by Promotion.\n\nDr. B. S. Jain was transferred to the post created at Willingdon Hospital and the post vacated by him which was in supertime grade II was offered to the appellant as and by way of promotion.\n\nTherefore, even if the contention of appellant is to be accepted, there is no violation of rule 8(3). Equally it is also not correct to contend that Dr. B. S. Jain could not have been transferred to the post created at Willingdon Hospital. Transfers in posts which are in the same grade or are considered equivalent can be affected on administrative exigencies. Once a new post is created and it is an increase in the strength of the Cadre in which the post is created, every one in that cadre is eligible to fill in that post and transfer is permissible. Transfer of Dr. B. S. Jain is, therefore, beyond question. In E. P. Royappa v.\n\nState of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (1) it is observed that the services of cadre officers are utilised in different posts of equal status and responsibility because of exigencies of administration and employing the best available talent in suitable post. There is no hostile discrimination in\n\ntrnnsfer from one post to other when the posts are of equal status and lesponsibility. Therefore, it is futile to urge that filling in the post created at Willingdon Hospital in supertime grade II by transfer of Dr.\n\nB. S. Jain, a person already promoted to supertime grade II was invalid\n\n(1) [1974) 2 S.C.R. 348 at 363.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR'I;;\n\n\ninasumuch as the post was not filled in by promotion or direct recruitment but by transfer.\n\nThe next contention is that the refusal of the appellant to accept the post at Simla offered to him will not debar him from promotion because the appellant was not qualified for the post at Simla.\n\nIf an employee eligible for promotion is offered a higher post by way of promotion, his refusal to accept the same would enable the employer, the Central Government in this case, to fill in the post by offering it to a junior to the Government servant refusing!to accept the post and in so acting there will be no violation of Art. 16.\n\nFurther, the Government servant who refuses to accept the promotional post offered to him for his own reasons: cannot then be heard to complain that he must he given promotional post from the date on which the avenue for promotion opened to him. Appellant being\"conscious of this position tried to circumvent it by saying that the Post. at Simla offered to him by way of promotion in super time grade II was a teaching post for which he was not qualified and, therefore, his refusal to accept the same cannot come in his way from claiming promotion from the very date on which he refused to accept the promotion to a post for which he was not qualified. Appellant went so far as to suggest that the Government action in offering him the post at Simla was . actuated by malice in that while making a show of offering him a promotional post it so deliberately acted as would impel the appellant to refuse the same.\n\nSays the appellant that one post from the pool of unspecified specialists, posts was converted to a specified post in Ophthalmology and was sanctioned at Willingdon Hospital which is not a teaching hospital and, therefore, the appellant was fully qualified for being promoted to that post. Instead of acting in this straightforward manner the Government transferred Dr. B. S. Jain from Simla to the post newly created at Willingdon Hospital and purported to offer the Simla post to the appellant for which appellant was not qualified and thus deliberately thwarted the promotional opportunity of the appellant and that this smacks of malice. To substantiate this submission the appellant points out that the designation of the post at Simla was Chief Ophthalmoligist-cum-Associate Professor of Opthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla. This:according to the appellate was a teaching post and the qualification prescribed by the regulation framed by the Medical Council of India requires as an essential qualification a teaching experience as Reader or Assistant Professor in Ophthalmology for five years in a Medical College after requisite post-graduate qualification. It was further stated that the appellant had no teaching qualification though he started teaching at the Safdarjang Hospital when he was recognised as a post-graduate teacher in Ophthalmology but\n\n. .-k\n\nhis teaching experience extended to barely two weeks. It was also said that essential teaching experience prescribed by the Medical Council of India under its regulation is not relaxable and that, therefore, appellant was not qualified for the post of Associate-Professor which was offered to him. In S.B. Koh/i's case (Supra) this Court did observe that a discretion to relax teaching experience qualification is conferred only on the U. P. S. C. in cases of direct recruitment and not to the Departmental Promotion Committee in case of promotion. That being the intent of the law it is to be given effect to. This observation is in a slightly different context but one may safely proceed on the assumption that essential teaching qualification for the post of an Associate Professor prescribed by Medical Council of India is not relaxable.\n\nTherefore it can be said with some justification that the appellant who did not have the requisite teaching experience was not qualified for the post of Associate Professor. But this want of qualification impelling refusal to accept promotion appears to be an afterthought on his part.\n\nWhen the promotional post was offered to him as per letter dated December 7, 1970, appellant did not reply by saying that he was not qualified for the post. In his reply dated December 9, 1970, to the offer made by the Government appellant pointed out that he was involved in some litigation with regard to his house and that his stand for eviction would be weakened by his transfer. He then proceeded to point out that he was suffering from chronic bronchitis and that the climate at Simla may not suit him. He also pointed out the adverse effect of climate on the health of his wife. He then proceeded to point out that apart from his personal problems he was engaged in the Safdarjang Hospital for teaching of post-graduate students and, therefore, he requested the Government \"the post of Chief Ophthalmologistcum-Associate Professor of Ophthalmology may kindly be bestowed on me at Safdarjang Hospital where there is essential need for such a post\". Could this be the stand of a person offered a promotional post honestly believing that he was not qualified for [the same? The post offered to him was of Chief Ophthalmologist-cum-Associate Professor. Appellant believes and now says that he was nofqualified for the same if the post was at Simla but if the same post was created at Delhi with the same designation with the same responsibility for teaching and that too at the post-graduate level he considered himself to be fully qualified for the same and requested the Government to bestow that post on him. He then proceeds to point out his merits and puts forth his disinclination for being promoted to the post at Simla. In the face of his bold statement that he is prepared to be appointed as Chief Ophthalmologist continuing to do teaching work at the post-graduate level at the Safdarjang Hospital, he now wants to assert that he was no: ualiticd for the post. This convenient after\n\nthought cauuol decry the fact that the appellant declined to accept the post at Simla not because he believed he was not qualified for the post but because he was not inclined to leave Delhi, may be for reasons which may be true and compelling for him. This becomes explicit from a further averment in paragraph 7 of his reply wherein he pointed out to the Central Government that even though he was selected by the U. P. Government for the post of Chief Medical Officer, Gandhi Memorial Eye Hospital, Aligarh, on a fabulous salary of Rs. 3,000/- p. m. and which offer was transmitted to him through the Government\n\n40 as to enableithe Government to release him and although the Government was considering his release on deputation for the post but he himself declined the offer because of domestic problems. There is thus no room for doubt that the appellant considers himself qualified for any post in Delhi and was under no circumstances willing to leave Delhi and his disinclination to accept any post at Simla stemmed not from his honest belief that he was not qualified for the post but because he was not inclined to leave Delhi. Undoubtedly it may be that under the regulation stricto sansu he may not be qualified for the post of Associate Professor because he did not possess the requisite teaching experience. But an ad hoc arrangement could have been made and it was open to the central Government, if the appellant had accepted the post, to move the Medical Council of India to permit the Central Govenment to appoint the appellant at Simla. Some way could have been found but the door was bolted by the appellant himself declining . i the offer for reasons other than his qualification which he may have found compelling. In this background it is difficult to accept the submission of the appellant that the offer made by the Government was an eye wash or a make-believe and, therefore, his refusal to accept the offer of promotion would not postpone his promotion.\n\nIncidentally it would be advantageous to take note of the fact at this stage that the appellant was promoted to supertime grade II on July 17, 1978 and between February 1971 when he declined to accept promotion and July 1978 when he was in fact promoted, no one junior to him in the speciality to which he belongs was ever promoted overriding his claim to supertime grade II. Therefore, if since his refusal to accept promotion at Simla appe1lant was never superseded by any one junior to him in his speciality it is difficult to entertain the contention that in refusing promotion to him when some posts were converted from unspecified Specialists' posts into different specialities and were filled in by those who were qualified to be promoted in the respective speciality in which the post was created he could be said to have been superseded in violation of Art. 16. And in this view of the matter nothing more need be examined but as certain other contentions were advanced\n\n---(\n\n--~\n\nwhich even if accepted would not in any case benefit the appellant, it A appears to us an exercise in futility but we would rather dispose them of than gloss over them.\n\nIn the High Court appellant canvassed twofold contention that between 1966 and 1971, i.e. after the initial constitution of service and before the proposal offering promotion to the appellant at Simla was made 25 promotions were given to supertime grade II to persons who were ineligible for the same and secondly after February 1971 and before July 1978 when he was actually promoted to supertime grade II, 29 promotions were given to supertime grade II some of whom are respondents 4 to 24 and that their promotion was in contraven_!iq.n_.- , of rule 8(3) of the Rules and, therefore, invalid. Before tlrll:\"'COurt C the first limb of the argument, namely, invalidating pnimotions between 1966 and 1971 to supertime grade II was not canvassed. It was the second limb of the argument that was pressed into service. None\n\nof those who were promoted between February 1971 and July 1978 belonged to the speciality to which appellant belongs. Each of them belonged to a different speciality and admittedly appellant was not qualified for being promoted to any supertime grade II post in the speciality in which each one of them was promoted. When this aspect became clear a question was posed to the appellant how he would be benefited even if his contention were to prevail that none of them was eligible for promotion to supertime grade II and, therefore, the promotion of each of them deserved to be quashed. The answer was that E there is a common seniority list of persons belonging to supertime grade II and promotion to supertime grade I is by seniority and that promotion of respondents 4 to 24, if quashed, would push the appellant higher up in seniority above them and would enhance his chances of promotion to supertime grade I. Remote chances of promotion could hardly be said to be condition of service which if impaired would be violative of Art. 16. Even assuming that a remote chance of promotion if adversely affected would give a cause of action, it was made clear that the appellant is retiring on superannuation in the last quarter of this year and that even if he is assigned a deemed date of promotion somewhere in February 1971 yet there are number of persons above him in supertime grade II who were promoted between 1966 and 1971 and appellant has not even a remote chance of promotion. Appellant at that stage reacted by saying that even if it be true, yet the promotions of respondents 4 to 24 ought to be quashed because when he with respondents 4 to 24 and others belonging to supertime grade II attend a meeting convened to discuss some administrative matter or for holding charge of higher post temporarily vacant they claim seniority over him and his dignity is impaired.. This calls for no comment save\n\nand except saying that the approach appears to be more emotional rather than realistic. However, the contention may be examined on merit.\n\nPromotion of respondents 4 to 24 was questioned on the ground that each of them was ineligible for promotion to supertime grade II on the date on which each of them was promoted in view of the provision contained in rule 8(3). Rule 8(3) has been extracted herein before. The contention is that since the initial constitution of service on September 9, 1966, any future promotion to supertime grade II ·\"' . from departmental candidates could be from amongst those who qualify ·same as provided for in rule 8(3). Apart from academic quali- C fication;'the experience qualification prescribed is that, the General Duty Officers grade I and Specialists' grade officers should have put in IO years and 8 years of service respectively in that category. Appellant contents that service in the category means service in that category which was constituted under the 1966 amendment (rules. Rule\n\nD 2(c) defines category to mean a group of posts specified in column 2 of the table under rule 4. Rule 4 provides for classification, categories and scales of pay. It provides that there shall be four categories in the service and each category shall consist of the grade specified in column 2 of the table appended to the rule. The four categories are: first category which includes supertime grade I and supertime grade If posts: Category two is Specialists' grade posts, category three comprises General Duty officers, grade I and category four includes General Duty Officers grade II. It was contended that the service to be rendered for the qualifying period must be in the category and, therefore, a general Duty Officer grade I can only become eligible for promotion after he renders IO years of service in that category which came F into existence on September 9, 1966, and this would apply mutatis mutandis to the Specialists' grade officers who must put in 8 years of service in the category which came into existence on September 9, 1966. If this contention were to prevail, apart from anything else, appellant himself would not have been qualified for promotion to supertime\n\ngrade II in February 1971 from which date he claims.as being eligible for promotion to supertime grade II because he had not put in 8 years of service in the category of specialists' grade officers formed on September 9, 1966. That apart, it is impossible to overlook the history of the Service. The rules were initially framed in 1963. Afthat time the service was.sought to be classified in 5 categories styled categrry 'A' to category 'E'. Expression 'category' in 1963 Rules was defined to mean a group of posts carrying the same scale of pay. Another salient feature of which notice should be taken is that save and except upward revision in scale, category I under the 1966 amendment Rules includes categories 'A' and 'B' under 1963 Rules. Category 'C' has been designated as Specialists' grade, i.e. category II under the 1966 Rules.\n\nCategory 'D' is equated with General Duty Officers grade I styled category III and category 'E' is equated with General Duty officers grade II, i. e. category IV. Expression 'service in the category' has to be understood in this historical backgrouP.d. It is difficult to entertain the contention that the past service of Specialists' category 'C' officers got wholly wiped out merely because the nomenclature of category 'C' Specialists officers was changed to Specialists' grade officers replacing the expression 'category C' by category II.\n\nAnd that would apply mutatis mutandis to General Duty Officers grade I and grade II.\n\nThe change in the definition of the expression 'category' appears to be instructive in that by the change service in the post is emphasised and the question of the grade of pay is relegated into background. And this change appears to be with a purpose inasmuch as when certain qualifying service is prescribed for being eligible for promotion in a category the emphasis is on service rendered in a post irrespective of the grade.\n\nA specialists' grade officer belonging to category II was a specialists' grade officer in category C. He was even then eligible for promotion to supertime grade II. Was it ever intended that a Specialists' grade officer belonging to category 'C' under 1963 Rules who had put in more than 8 years of service but who was not promoted prior to September 9, 1966, the date ofinitial'.constitution of service, or on thdate of initial constitution of service, would be ineligible for promotion for a period of 8 years simply because the designation of the category changed?\n\nWas it intended that there should be a complete hiatus for a period of 8 years in promoting Specialists' grade officers to supertime grade II and for a period of 10 years in case of General Duty Officers grade I.\n\nThere is no warrant for such an inference from the Rules. Such an intention cannot be attributed to the framers of the Rules nor is it possible to accept the submission of the appellant that the posts could have been filled in by direct recuritment because where candidates eligible for promotion were not available it was open to resort to direct recruitment as provided in the Rules. It is a well recognised canon of construction that the construction which makes the Rules otiose or unworkable should be avoided where two constructions are possible and the Court should lean in favour of the construction which would make the rule workable and further the purpose for which the rule is intended. While prescribing experience qualification in 1966 Amendment Rules, the framers of the Rules could not have intended to ignore wholly the past service. A specialist who was in category 'C' was included in category II with the designation specialists' grade officer. Similarly, General Duty Officer grade I in category 'D' -acquired the same nomenclature General Duty o; licer grade I in category III. There was an upward revision of pay scales of both the categories. Should the change in designation be understood to mean that the past service rendered as Specialist or as General Duty Officer is wholly wiped out for any future promotion ? Even after change of designation it is not suggested that the duties underwent any change.\n\nSame duty was performed a day prior to September 9, 1966, and the day thereafter by both the categories in the respective posts. In this background the High Court was right in holdingthat the word 'category' used in rule 8(3)(a) has to be understood to mean the post included in that category and consequently service in that category would mean service in a post included in that category.\n\nThe appellant contended that this construction would run counter to the posting of former categories 'D' and 'E' officers on probation on September 9, 1966, in specialists' grade and General Duty Officers grade I.\n\nIn this connection it must be recalled that on initial constitution of Service some persons who were in the category of General Duty Officers were absorbed and appointed in Specialists' grade and vice versa was true of some persons. It is equally true that Officers belonging to categories 'D' and E' were considered in a category lower to category 'C'. It is equally possible, therefore, that on September 9, 1966, i.e. the date of initial constitution of Service some of the officers belonging to categories 'D' and 'E' who were absorbed in categories II and III respectively may have been put on probation but for qualifying service for upward promotion service rendered as probationer is not to be ignored. Viewed from either angle it is crystal clear that service rendered in equivalent post prior to the date of initial constitution of Service could be taken into account in calculating qualifying service for next promotion. This was the stand taken by the Government in the affidavit filed in Civil Writ No. 1155/71 filed by Dr. Chandra Mohan in the High Court of Delhi and that appears to be consistent with the construction of rule 8(3). The contention, therefore, that executive instruction cannot run 'counter to the statutory rule must be rejected as untenable in the facts of this case.\n\nIt was next contended that the Government was guilty (of legal malice in that in February 1971 on a need being felt, a post in supertime grade II in Ophthalmology speciality was sanctioned at Willingdon Hospital and filled in by transfer of Dr. B.S. Jain overlooking and ignoring the rightful claim of appellant and on transfer of Dr.\n\nB.S. Jain on March 7, 1972, to Safdarjang Hospital, the post was also transferred to Safdarjang Hospital. In this connection appellant also pointed out that there is material on record to show that the Superintenden(of Willingdon Hospital felt an acute need for a post in supertime grade II in Ophthalmology speciality and yet it was not created while on the other hand in order to accommodate some favourites like respondents, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 15 some posts in different specialities where they could be accommodated were created without the need for the same. There is evidence to the effect that appellant had sent a proposal duly recommended by Medical Superintendent Of Safdarjang Hospital to the authorities for creating a supertime grade II post in Eye Department in May 1971 as per letter dated May 3, 1971. There is also material to show that some ad hoc appointments were made in supertime grade II. It is, however, not possible to strike down those appointments on the ground that some posts were created in supertime grade II though not needed wherein some of the respondents were promoted or that there was no justification for creation of posts or for making ad hoc appointments. It should be distinctly understood that not a single post was created in Ophthalmology speciality to which appellant could have been appointed The need for the post of the requirements of the hospital, or the need for an ad hoc or additional appointment is a matter which the Government is competent to decide and in the absence of requisite material the Court cannot interpose its own decision on the necessity of creation or abolition of posts. Whether a particular post is necessary is a matter depending upon the exigencies of the situation and administrative necessity.\n\nThe Government is a better Judge of the interests of the general public for whose service the hospitals are set up. And whether a hospital catering to the needs of general public providing medical relief in different specialities has need for a particular post in a particular speciality would be better judged by the Government running the hospital.\n\nIf Government is a better judge it must have the power to create or abolish the posts depending upon the needs of the hospital and the requirements of general public. Creation and abolition of posts is a matter of Government policy and every sovereign Government has this power in the interest and necessity of internal administration. The creation or abolition of post is dictated by policy decision, exigencies of circumstances and administrative necessity. The creation, the continuance and the abolition of post are all decided by the Government in the interest of administration and general public (see M. Ramanatha Pillai v. The State of Kera/a and Anr )(1 ). The Court would be the least competent in the face of scanty material to decide whether the Government acted honestly in creating a post or refusing to create a post or its decision suffers from ma/a fide, legal or factual. In this background it is difficult to entertain the contention of the appeliant that posts were created to accommodak some specific individuals ignoring the requirements of the hospital or the interests of the general public at forge.\n\n(I) [1974] I S.C.R. 515 at 520.\n\nIt was Pext contended that respondent 9, Dr. K.P. Mathur and respondent 23, Dr. A. R. Majumdar should have been considered ineligible for promotion because both of them were adversely commented upon by the Madras High Court as being negligent in discharge of duties and the Government had to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as compensation by way of damages for their negligence. He sought inspection of some files to substantiate this allegation. Unfortunately though respondents 9 and 23 were made parties they did not appear to controvert this fact.\n\nBut it appears from the record that they were promoted after they were selected by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the promotion was approved by U.P.S.C. Appellant contended that this averment on his part has remained uncontroverted and it must be taken as having been admitted and proved. It may be mentioned that in the petition filed by the appellant in the Delhi High Court this allegation was not specifically averred. In a subsequent affidavit filed by him this allegation was put forth. If respondents 9 and 23 had not appeorcd in the High Court the appellant should have shown that this subsequent affidavit was served upon them, and in that event alone some adverse inference may be drawn against them. It may be that the Government may not be interested in either denying or admitting this averment which directly and adversely affects respondents 9 and 23.\n\nHowever, in view of the fact that they were selected by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the promotion was approved by the U.P.S.C. it is difficult to entertain the contention at the hand of the appellant who is not in any way going to be benefited by the inva lidation of their promotion\n\nIt was incidentally urged that promotions given to respondents 9, 12, 13 and 15 must be set aside because they belonged to former category 'D' and were given promotions against 19 unspecified posts in contravention of the affidavit of the Government. As stated earlier, there were some specialists in category 'D' also; At the time of initial constitution of service those who qualified for being appointed General Duty Officers from category 'D' were absorbed in category III and those who were eligible for being absorbed in Specialists' grade were so absorbed. After absorption they belonged to the respective category.\n\nThereafter on conversion of posts from the pool of 19 unspecified specialists' posts they were promoted as being found qualified for the same and for the post to whic~-each one of them was promoted appellant was not qualified and, therefore, the contention that the promotion of the aforementioned four respondents should be set aside has no merit in it.\n\nHaving examined the challenge to the promotion of respondents 4 to 24 on merits, it must be made clear that the appellant is least\n\nN. c. SH!NGHAL I'. UNION (Desai,!.) 69\n\nqualified to question their promotions.\n\nEach one of them was promot A ed to a post in supertime grade II in a speciality other than ophthal\n\nmology and appellant admittedly was not qualified for any of these posts. Even if their promotions are struck down appellant will not get any post vacated by them. Incidentally High Court also upheld their promotions observi>tg that by the time the petition was heard each one of them had requisite service qualification and, therefore, the.\n\nB promotions could not be struck down. Once the challenge on merits fails the second string to the bow need not be examined. Having said all this, appellant is least competent to challenge their promotions. In a slightly comparable situation this Court in Chitra Ghosh and Anr. v.\n\nUnion of India and Or<. (1) observed as under:\n\n\"The other question which was canvassed before the High Court and which has been pressed before us relates to the merits of the nominations made to the reserved seats. lt seems to us that the appellants do not have any right to challenge the nominations made by the Central Govern ment. They do not compete for the reserved seats and have no locus standi in the matter of nomination to such seats.\n\nThe assumption that if nominations to reserved seats are not in accordance with the rules all such seats as have not been properly filled up would be thrown open to the general pool is wholly unfounded.\" It was last urged that the High Court has set aside the promotion of respondent 18, Dr. P. C. Sen who was promoted in 1971 and, therefore, there was an opening in supertime grade II in September 1971 and appellant should be considered eligible for promotion to the post from that date and that this Court should consider appellant's eligibility for promotion from September 1971 and if found eligible, should grant the same. Dr. P.C. Sen was General Duty Officer grade I and he was posted as Director of.Health Services, Manipur. Appellant contends that he was in Specialists' grade and was senior to Dr. Sen and was not unqualified for the post of Director of Health Services, Manipur, but the post was not offered to him and, therefore, he must be considered eligible for promotion from the date on which Dr. P .. C. Sen was promoted. The High Court in L.P.A. 46/74 filed by the appellant has set aside the promotion of Dr. P.C. Sen as also of Dr. Jasbir Kaur but the High Court has not thought fit to direct the Government by a mandamus to consider eligibillity of the appellant forthe post of Director of Health Services, Manipur. There is no material before us whether the appellant was qualified for the post. If he was eligible it would be for the Government to consider how it should deal with the post. We\n\n(1) (1970) 1 S.C.R. 413 at 420.\n\nare, however, surprised that the appellant who was not prepared to go to Simla in February 1971 would have been willing to go to Manipur in September 1971. In our opinion it would be giving him an unfair advantage now by giving a technical benefit of a situation whereby promotion of Dr. Sen has been invalidated by the High Court. Neither Dr. Sen nor the Government have preferred appeal against the judg- .ment by which the promotions of Dr. P.C. Sen and Dr. Jasbir Kaur were invalidated by the High Court. But the matter must remain at that stage and there is no justification for giving a direction that the appellant should be considered for the post which is deemed to have fallen vacant in September 1971 on the invalidation of promotion of Dr.P.C. Sen. In this connectionitmaybepointedout that sometime after the hearing was over in this Court learned counsel for the appellant has circulated a letter that the High Court has set aside the promotion ofrespondent 7, Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh as also of respondent 21, Dr. Brij Gopll Misra. It is undoubtedly true that the learned single Judge who heard the petition initially had set aside the promotion of Dr. Brij Gopal Misra to the post of Regional Deputy Director, N.M.E.P., Hyderabad.\n\nBut neither from the judgment of the learned single Judge nor from the judgment of the Division Bench it is possible to ascertain that the promotion of Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh has been invalidated. No direction in that behalf can be given.\n\nBefore we conclude it may be pointed out that on the conclusion of hearing of this appeal in order to heal the wound caused by impaired dignity of the appellant as herein before mentioned, a suggestion was made to the Governmentto see if the present appellant could be accommodated in some way where he may not feel the humiliation which he claims he suffers. Mr. P. Parameswara Rao, learned counsel for the Government promised to discuss the matter with the Government and ultimately on March7, 1980, the Central Government offered the post of Director and Head of the Department for a prograwme concerned with vision impairment and amelioration thereof. Jo that post the appeJJant would be the Head of the Department ancl would continue to be in supertime grade IL This offer did not appeal to the appellant and the matter was left at that.\n\nThere is no substance in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant and, therefore, this appeal fails and it is dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nv.n Apoea/ dismissed.\n\n, ..", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "N. C. SHINGHAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. C. SHINGHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 19, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 46, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. SHINGHAL\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nMarch 19, 1980\n\nLD."}}, {"text": "LD. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Central Health Services Rules, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 643, "end_char": 657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India ha1 enacted Ceutral Government Health Scheme and ID implementation thereof has set up various institutions for medical relief and medical education."}}, {"text": "Central Health Service Rules, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 935, "end_char": 969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 15, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1012, "end_char": 1024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With a view to constituting the service, Central Health Service Rules, 1963 were framed aDd brought into operation on May 15, 1963, The Rules envisaged categorisation of rsonnel manning the service into five different categories, to wit, category 'A' supertime scale Rs."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1550, "end_char": 1567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Initial constitution of service was to be on and from September 9, 1966."}}, {"text": "September 9. 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This process of absorption was over in March 1967, but the constitution of the service was deemed to be effective from September 9."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3906, "end_char": 3924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government converted one post from amongst the 19 unspecified specialists' grade posts in Supertirne Grade II in Opthalmology speciality in Willingdon Hospital and transferred one Dr. B. S, Jain, respondent 3, who was then working as Chief opthalmoJogist-cum-Associate Professor of Opthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, end offered the vacancy to in Super time Grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3 to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad hoc basis as per Memorandum dated December 7, 1970."}}, {"text": "Willingdon Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4054, "end_char": 4073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government converted one post from amongst the 19 unspecified specialists' grade posts in Supertirne Grade II in Opthalmology speciality in Willingdon Hospital and transferred one Dr. B. S, Jain, respondent 3, who was then working as Chief opthalmoJogist-cum-Associate Professor of Opthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, end offered the vacancy to in Super time Grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3 to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad hoc basis as per Memorandum dated December 7, 1970."}}, {"text": "B. S, Jain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4098, "end_char": 4108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government converted one post from amongst the 19 unspecified specialists' grade posts in Supertirne Grade II in Opthalmology speciality in Willingdon Hospital and transferred one Dr. B. S, Jain, respondent 3, who was then working as Chief opthalmoJogist-cum-Associate Professor of Opthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, end offered the vacancy to in Super time Grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3 to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad hoc basis as per Memorandum dated December 7, 1970."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4210, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government converted one post from amongst the 19 unspecified specialists' grade posts in Supertirne Grade II in Opthalmology speciality in Willingdon Hospital and transferred one Dr. B. S, Jain, respondent 3, who was then working as Chief opthalmoJogist-cum-Associate Professor of Opthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, end offered the vacancy to in Super time Grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3 to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad hoc basis as per Memorandum dated December 7, 1970."}}, {"text": "December 7, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4439, "end_char": 4455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government converted one post from amongst the 19 unspecified specialists' grade posts in Supertirne Grade II in Opthalmology speciality in Willingdon Hospital and transferred one Dr. B. S, Jain, respondent 3, who was then working as Chief opthalmoJogist-cum-Associate Professor of Opthalmology, Himachal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, end offered the vacancy to in Super time Grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3 to appellant who was next in seniority by way of promotion on ad hoc basis as per Memorandum dated December 7, 1970."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appellant was prepared to accept only if 1he posting was at Delhi and not in Simla, one Dr. G. C. Sood was promoted to supertime Grade 11 post and was appointed at Simla."}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4541, "end_char": 4546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appellant was prepared to accept only if 1he posting was at Delhi and not in Simla, one Dr. G. C. Sood was promoted to supertime Grade 11 post and was appointed at Simla."}}, {"text": "G. C. Sood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4556, "end_char": 4566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appellant was prepared to accept only if 1he posting was at Delhi and not in Simla, one Dr. G. C. Sood was promoted to supertime Grade 11 post and was appointed at Simla.", "canonical_name": "G. C. Sood"}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4794, "end_char": 4798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th'e appellant, thereafter filed a writ petition praying for Mandamus that be may be deemed to h<!ive been promoted from February 18, 1971, the date when Dr. Jain was posted at Willingdon Hospital."}}, {"text": "July 17, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4976, "end_char": 4989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also questionedthe promotions of r'espondents 4 to 24 to supertime grade II on various dates after February 18, 1971 and before July 17, 1978 when he was actually promoted on a certain interpreta.tion of Rule 8(3) of the Central Health Service Rules 1963."}}, {"text": "Central Health Service Rules 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5069, "end_char": 5102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 S.C.R. 117", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10763, "end_char": 10782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14195, "end_char": 14200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "any relief c:an be claimed merely on a Jtand taken by the, Uton o.f India in their cou.nter-affidavit in an earlier writ petition, unless estoppl l~ claimed or urged."}}, {"text": "R S. Jam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14420, "end_char": 14428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even _if such be the stand of the Centr3.l Government t will have to be negatived and was in fact negativd in the case of Dr. R S. Jam. ["}}, {"text": "B. S. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15146, "end_char": 15156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There\n\nis no violation of Rule 8 (3) and traruifer of Dr. B. S. Jain was valid. [", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nS. Jain"}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15512, "end_char": 15519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Goveroment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16070, "end_char": 16088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But an c; d ltoc arrangement could have been made and it was open to the Central Goveroment, if the appellaot had accepted the post, to mov'e the Meditfil Council of India to permit the Central Government to appoint the appellaot at Simla."}}, {"text": "Meditfil Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16143, "end_char": 16168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But an c; d ltoc arrangement could have been made and it was open to the Central Goveroment, if the appellaot had accepted the post, to mov'e the Meditfil Council of India to permit the Central Government to appoint the appellaot at Simla."}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17076, "end_char": 17083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17216, "end_char": 17223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 9, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18764, "end_char": 18781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Same duty was performed ai day prior to September 9, 1956 and the day thereafter by both the categories in the respectiv~ po.:ils."}}, {"text": "Sep.\n\nD tember 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19418, "end_char": 19440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was never intended that a Specialists grade officer belonging to category 'C' under 1963 Rules who had put in more than 8 years of service but who was not promoted prior to Sep.\n\nD tember 9, 1966, the date of initial constitution of service, or on the date of initial constitution of service, would be ineligible for promotion for a period of 8 years simply because the designation of the category changed."}}, {"text": "U.P.S.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22761, "end_char": 22769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l; elected by the Departmental Promotion Committee and the promotion WaB approved by the U.P.S.C. it is difficult to enfertain the contention at the hand of the appellant who is not in any way going to be benefited by the invalidation of their promotion. ("}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIJICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23146, "end_char": 23175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "69 BC]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISIJICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "N.C. Shinghal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23368, "end_char": 23381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R. Srivastava for the Appellant and Dr. N.C. Shinghal (in person)\n\nP.P. Rao, nd Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents I & 2.", "canonical_name": "N. C. SHINGHAL"}}, {"text": "P.P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23395, "end_char": 23403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R. Srivastava for the Appellant and Dr. N.C. Shinghal (in person)\n\nP.P. Rao, nd Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents I & 2."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23413, "end_char": 23426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R. Srivastava for the Appellant and Dr. N.C. Shinghal (in person)\n\nP.P. Rao, nd Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents I & 2."}}, {"text": "B.R. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23451, "end_char": 23464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.R. Aggarwal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "G DESAI,).-A", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23533, "end_char": 23545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nG DESAI,).-A highly qualified ophth''lmic surgeon feeling aggrieved that he has not been justly treated in the matter of promotion to a post in Supertime Grade JI seeks redress of his grievance praying for a mandamus that he may be deemed to have been promoted from February 18, 1971, failing which more out of frustration and less by any justification he seeks quashing cf the promotion of res- B pondents 4 to 24 though convinced that even if the Court were to accede to his request he is in no way likely to be bnefited by tliis."}}, {"text": "February 18, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23799, "end_char": 23816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nG DESAI,).-A highly qualified ophth''lmic surgeon feeling aggrieved that he has not been justly treated in the matter of promotion to a post in Supertime Grade JI seeks redress of his grievance praying for a mandamus that he may be deemed to have been promoted from February 18, 1971, failing which more out of frustration and less by any justification he seeks quashing cf the promotion of res- B pondents 4 to 24 though convinced that even if the Court were to accede to his request he is in no way likely to be bnefited by tliis."}}, {"text": "Central Health Service Rules 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24408, "end_char": 24441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September, 9, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25073, "end_char": 25091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Initial constitution of Service was to be on and from September, 9, 1966."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28943, "end_char": 28959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To appreciate the contention of the appellant as to how he claims promotion to supertime grade II on February 8, 1971, it may be noted\n\nthat effective from that date the Central Government converted one post from amongst unspecified specialists' Grade posts in supertime l Grade II in Ophthalmology Speciality at Willingdon Hospital and transferred}Dr."}}, {"text": "B.S.'Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29195, "end_char": 29204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.S.'Jain, responden(3, jwhowas then ; working as Chief Ophthalmologist-cum-Associate Professor of Ophthalmology,[Himachal Pradesh:Medical; College,_Simla, and offerred the vacancy in)rnper-time grade II caused by the transfer of respondent 3, to appellant who was next in seniority bylway of promotion on ad hoc basis as per memoran dum dated December 7, 1970.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nS. Jain"}}, {"text": "Radha Natarajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29997, "end_char": 30012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhereafter the Government offered the post to Dr. Radha Natarajan\n\nbut she declined the offer."}}, {"text": "M. C. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30096, "end_char": 30108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently the Government offered D Oie post to Dr. M. C. Sharma who accepted the same but he was not appointed and ultimately Dr. G.C. Sood was promoted to supertime grade II post and was appointed at Simla."}}, {"text": "G.C. Sood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30175, "end_char": 30184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently the Government offered D Oie post to Dr. M. C. Sharma who accepted the same but he was not appointed and ultimately Dr. G.C. Sood was promoted to supertime grade II post and was appointed at Simla.", "canonical_name": "G. C. Sood"}}, {"text": "Willingdvn Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30309, "end_char": 30328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant contends that when a post in Opthalmology at Willingdvn Hospital was created on February I, 1971, by conversion of one B post from amongst unspecified Specialists' grade posts in supertime grade II that post could only have been filled in by promotion from amongst those holding the post in Specialists' grade in ophthalmology specialit) and he being the seniormost and otherwise qualified, he should ba ve been promoted from that date."}}, {"text": "B. S. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30843, "end_char": 30853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Simultaneously he contends that filling in the post so created in supertime grade II at p Willingdon Hospital by transfer of respondent 3 Dr. B. S. Jain was in violation of the statutory rule and hence invalid.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nS. Jain"}}, {"text": "Himacbal Pradesh Medical College, Simla", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31042, "end_char": 31081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also contends that as he was not qualified to hold the post of Chief Ophthalmologistcum-Associate Professor of Ophthalmology, Himacbal Pradesh Medical College, Simla, because it was a teaching post and he lacked teaching experience which was an essential qualification, the offer of G that post to him was merely an eye wash and he could not have accepted the same."}}, {"text": "B.S.\n\nJain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33280, "end_char": 33290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this submission reliance is also placed on an affidavit filed on behalf of Union of India in a petition filed by Dr. B.S.\n\nJain wherein it was in terms stated that these 28 posts could only be filled in by promotion and in no other manner.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nS. Jain"}}, {"text": "(1973) 3 S.C.R. 117", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 40373, "end_char": 40392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 43551, "end_char": 43567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed upon an affidavit made on behalf of the Central Government in a writ\n\n5-189 SCI/80\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOus\n\nA petition filed by Dr. B. S. Jain in Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "Union of lndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44511, "end_char": 44525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And it would be too late in the day to say that on such a stand of the Union of lndia, if it runs counter to the rule explicit in meaning, any argument can be founded or any relief can be claimed unless estoppel is urged."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44958, "end_char": 44968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) the petitioners urged that the view put forward on their behalf had been admitted by the Government in its affidavit filed in connection [with certain earlier proceedings of similar nature and other admissions in Parliament on behalf of the Government."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nS. Jain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46012, "end_char": 46023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if such be the stand of the Central Government it will have to be negatived and was in fact negatived in the case of Dr. B.\n\nS. Jain.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nS. Jain"}}, {"text": "[1974) 2 S.C.R. 348", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 49053, "end_char": 49072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49726, "end_char": 49733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Medical Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51616, "end_char": 51640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This:according to the appellate was a teaching post and the qualification prescribed by the regulation framed by the Medical Council of India requires as an essential qualification a teaching experience as Reader or Assistant Professor in Ophthalmology for five years in a Medical College after requisite post-graduate qualification."}}, {"text": "Safdarjang Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51938, "end_char": 51957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further stated that the appellant had no teaching qualification though he started teaching at the Safdarjang Hospital when he was recognised as a post-graduate teacher in Ophthalmology but\n\n."}}, {"text": "S.B. Koh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52338, "end_char": 52346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In S.B. Koh/i's case (Supra) this Court did observe that a discretion to relax teaching experience qualification is conferred only on the U. P. S. C. in cases of direct recruitment and not to the Departmental Promotion Committee in case of promotion."}}, {"text": "U. P. S. C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52473, "end_char": 52484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In S.B. Koh/i's case (Supra) this Court did observe that a discretion to relax teaching experience qualification is conferred only on the U. P. S. C. in cases of direct recruitment and not to the Departmental Promotion Committee in case of promotion."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53343, "end_char": 53359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his reply dated December 9, 1970, to the offer made by the Government appellant pointed out that he was involved in some litigation with regard to his house and that his stand for eviction would be weakened by his transfer."}}, {"text": "U. P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55480, "end_char": 55496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This becomes explicit from a further averment in paragraph 7 of his reply wherein he pointed out to the Central Government that even though he was selected by the U. P. Government for the post of Chief Medical Officer, Gandhi Memorial Eye Hospital, Aligarh, on a fabulous salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "Gandhi Memorial Eye Hospital, Aligarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55536, "end_char": 55573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This becomes explicit from a further averment in paragraph 7 of his reply wherein he pointed out to the Central Government that even though he was selected by the U. P. Government for the post of Chief Medical Officer, Gandhi Memorial Eye Hospital, Aligarh, on a fabulous salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56455, "end_char": 56473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But an ad hoc arrangement could have been made and it was open to the central Government, if the appellant had accepted the post, to move the Medical Council of India to permit the Central Govenment to appoint the appellant at Simla."}}, {"text": "Central Govenment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56566, "end_char": 56583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But an ad hoc arrangement could have been made and it was open to the central Government, if the appellant had accepted the post, to move the Medical Council of India to permit the Central Govenment to appoint the appellant at Simla."}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57907, "end_char": 57914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60059, "end_char": 60066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chandra Mohan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68918, "end_char": 68931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1155/71 filed by Dr. Chandra Mohan in the High Court of Delhi and that appears to be consistent with the construction of rule 8(3)."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 68939, "end_char": 68958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1155/71 filed by Dr. Chandra Mohan in the High Court of Delhi and that appears to be consistent with the construction of rule 8(3)."}}, {"text": "B.S. Jain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69428, "end_char": 69437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next contended that the Government was guilty (of legal malice in that in February 1971 on a need being felt, a post in supertime grade II in Ophthalmology speciality was sanctioned at Willingdon Hospital and filled in by transfer of Dr. B.S. Jain overlooking and ignoring the rightful claim of appellant and on transfer of Dr.\n\nB.S. Jain on March 7, 1972, to Safdarjang Hospital, the post was also transferred to Safdarjang Hospital.", "canonical_name": "B.\n\nS. Jain"}}, {"text": "March 7, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69532, "end_char": 69545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was next contended that the Government was guilty (of legal malice in that in February 1971 on a need being felt, a post in supertime grade II in Ophthalmology speciality was sanctioned at Willingdon Hospital and filled in by transfer of Dr. B.S. Jain overlooking and ignoring the rightful claim of appellant and on transfer of Dr.\n\nB.S. Jain on March 7, 1972, to Safdarjang Hospital, the post was also transferred to Safdarjang Hospital."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70328, "end_char": 70339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is evidence to the effect that appellant had sent a proposal duly recommended by Medical Superintendent Of Safdarjang Hospital to the authorities for creating a supertime grade II post in Eye Department in May 1971 as per letter dated May 3, 1971."}}, {"text": "K.P. Mathur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72851, "end_char": 72862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was Pext contended that respondent 9, Dr. K.P. Mathur and respondent 23, Dr. A. R. Majumdar should have been considered ineligible for promotion because both of them were adversely commented upon by the Madras High Court as being negligent in discharge of duties and the Government had to pay a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "A. R. Majumdar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72886, "end_char": 72900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was Pext contended that respondent 9, Dr. K.P. Mathur and respondent 23, Dr. A. R. Majumdar should have been considered ineligible for promotion because both of them were adversely commented upon by the Madras High Court as being negligent in discharge of duties and the Government had to pay a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 73012, "end_char": 73029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was Pext contended that respondent 9, Dr. K.P. Mathur and respondent 23, Dr. A. R. Majumdar should have been considered ineligible for promotion because both of them were adversely commented upon by the Madras High Court as being negligent in discharge of duties and the Government had to pay a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "P. C. Sen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77188, "end_char": 77197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was last urged that the High Court has set aside the promotion of respondent 18, Dr. P. C. Sen who was promoted in 1971 and, therefore, there was an opening in supertime grade II in September 1971 and appellant should be considered eligible for promotion to the post from that date and that this Court should consider appellant's eligibility for promotion from September 1971 and if found eligible, should grant the same.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Sen"}}, {"text": "P.C. Sen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 77529, "end_char": 77537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. P.C. Sen was General Duty Officer grade I and he was posted as Director of.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Sen"}}, {"text": "Manipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77621, "end_char": 77628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Health Services, Manipur."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77705, "end_char": 77708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant contends that he was in Specialists' grade and was senior to Dr. Sen and was not unqualified for the post of Director of Health Services, Manipur, but the post was not offered to him and, therefore, he must be considered eligible for promotion from the date on which Dr. P .. C. Sen was promoted."}}, {"text": "P .. C. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77911, "end_char": 77922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellant contends that he was in Specialists' grade and was senior to Dr. Sen and was not unqualified for the post of Director of Health Services, Manipur, but the post was not offered to him and, therefore, he must be considered eligible for promotion from the date on which Dr. P .. C. Sen was promoted."}}, {"text": "P.C. Sen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78026, "end_char": 78034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court in L.P.A. 46/74 filed by the appellant has set aside the promotion of Dr. P.C. Sen as also of Dr. Jasbir Kaur but the High Court has not thought fit to direct the Government by a mandamus to consider eligibillity of the appellant forthe post of Director of Health Services, Manipur.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Sen"}}, {"text": "Jasbir Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78050, "end_char": 78061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court in L.P.A. 46/74 filed by the appellant has set aside the promotion of Dr. P.C. Sen as also of Dr. Jasbir Kaur but the High Court has not thought fit to direct the Government by a mandamus to consider eligibillity of the appellant forthe post of Director of Health Services, Manipur."}}, {"text": "(1970) 1 S.C.R. 413", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 78420, "end_char": 78439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P.C. Sen.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79200, "end_char": 79209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the matter must remain at that stage and there is no justification for giving a direction that the appellant should be considered for the post which is deemed to have fallen vacant in September 1971 on the invalidation of promotion of Dr.P.C. Sen. In this connectionitmaybepointedout that sometime after the hearing was over in this Court learned counsel for the appellant has circulated a letter that the High Court has set aside the promotion ofrespondent 7, Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh as also of respondent 21, Dr. Brij Gopll Misra.", "canonical_name": "P. C. Sen"}}, {"text": "connectionitmaybepointedout", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 79218, "end_char": 79245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the matter must remain at that stage and there is no justification for giving a direction that the appellant should be considered for the post which is deemed to have fallen vacant in September 1971 on the invalidation of promotion of Dr.P.C. Sen. In this connectionitmaybepointedout that sometime after the hearing was over in this Court learned counsel for the appellant has circulated a letter that the High Court has set aside the promotion ofrespondent 7, Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh as also of respondent 21, Dr. Brij Gopll Misra."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Prasad Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79427, "end_char": 79446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the matter must remain at that stage and there is no justification for giving a direction that the appellant should be considered for the post which is deemed to have fallen vacant in September 1971 on the invalidation of promotion of Dr.P.C. Sen. In this connectionitmaybepointedout that sometime after the hearing was over in this Court learned counsel for the appellant has circulated a letter that the High Court has set aside the promotion ofrespondent 7, Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh as also of respondent 21, Dr. Brij Gopll Misra.", "canonical_name": "Ramesh Prasad Singh"}}, {"text": "Brij Gopll Misra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79477, "end_char": 79493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the matter must remain at that stage and there is no justification for giving a direction that the appellant should be considered for the post which is deemed to have fallen vacant in September 1971 on the invalidation of promotion of Dr.P.C. Sen. In this connectionitmaybepointedout that sometime after the hearing was over in this Court learned counsel for the appellant has circulated a letter that the High Court has set aside the promotion ofrespondent 7, Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh as also of respondent 21, Dr. Brij Gopll Misra.", "canonical_name": "Brij Gopll Misra"}}, {"text": "Brij Gopal Misra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79616, "end_char": 79632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undoubtedly true that the learned single Judge who heard the petition initially had set aside the promotion of Dr. Brij Gopal Misra to the post of Regional Deputy Director, N.M.E.P., Hyderabad.", "canonical_name": "Brij Gopll Misra"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 79684, "end_char": 79693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undoubtedly true that the learned single Judge who heard the petition initially had set aside the promotion of Dr. Brij Gopal Misra to the post of Regional Deputy Director, N.M.E.P., Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Prasad Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79852, "end_char": 79871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But neither from the judgment of the learned single Judge nor from the judgment of the Division Bench it is possible to ascertain that the promotion of Dr. Ramesh Prasad Singh has been invalidated.", "canonical_name": "Ramesh Prasad Singh"}}, {"text": "P. Parameswara Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80301, "end_char": 80319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. Parameswara Rao, learned counsel for the Government promised to discuss the matter with the Government and ultimately on March7, 1980, the Central Government offered the post of Director and Head of the Department for a prograwme concerned with vision impairment and amelioration thereof."}}, {"text": "March7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80425, "end_char": 80437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P. Parameswara Rao, learned counsel for the Government promised to discuss the matter with the Government and ultimately on March7, 1980, the Central Government offered the post of Director and Head of the Department for a prograwme concerned with vision impairment and amelioration thereof."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_450_458_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\n(A. C. GUPTA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nCc, nstitution of India 1950--Art 309 Proviso State Government whetht!r can negulate its public ervice in exercise of its executive power.\n\nBihar Police Service (Recruitment) Rules 1~53-Scope of.\n\nFixing of inter-se seniority of promotees and direct recruits on basis of continuous officiation by promotees-Whether valid.\n\nThe appellants were appointed Inspectors of Police in 1953. After working as Inspectors for about 12 years, they were promoted by notification dated June 16, 1965 to officiate as Deputy Superintendents of Police. Before promotion they were subjected to the scrutinies prescribed by rules 22, 23 and 24 of the Bihar Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1953.\n\nRule 648-B of the Bjhar and Orissa Police 1{anual (Volume I) requires a promoted Deputy Superintendent of Police to pass an examination in accounts. The appellants passed the examination and satisfied all the requirements for confirmation: However, the posts in which they were officiating \\Vere temporary posts.' Thereafter the Government by a notification dated August 22, 1974, confirmed the appellants and other similarly situated officers as Deputy Super~ intendents of Police with effect from the dates which according to tJ; tese officers were arbitrarily chosen.\n\nOn September 1, 1974 the Government published a combined gradation list in which these promotees were placed even below the direct recruits who were appointed in 1974.\n\nThe appellants challengeJ this gradation list in the High Court by a Writ Petition and during the pendency of the said Writ, the State Government constituted \"Saran Singh Committee\", F \\ to assess the promotional prospects of different State services, examine the problem of \"stagnation\", and suggest remedial measures. The recommenda~ tions of the committee were accepted by the State Government by Resolution dated April 11, 1977. In the Writ Petiti9n, the High Court directed the State\n\n Government to re-examine the matter and prepare a fresh gradation list on the basis of 1he statement made by the Government in the light of the committees' recommendations.\n\nNone of the parties appealed against this order.\n\nBy notification dated January '7, 1978 the State Government appointed on probation the Officers who had been officiating in' those posts with effect from tbe dates mentioned against their names in the notification and the notification issued previously promoting these officers on officiating basis was cancelled.\n\nThe dates from 1which these officers were said to have been appointed on pf'Ow bation were the dates of their promotion as officiating Deputy Superintendents of Police. The names of the appellants figured against serial numbers 23, 24 and 25 in the list given in the notification dated January 7, 1978. The revised gradation list which is under challenge was thereafter issued.\n\n• ••\n\n• I\n\n' JL\n\nR. N. SINGH V. BIHAR 451\n\nThe a,>pcllants questioned the correctness of the Judgment of the High A Court which allowed the two Writ Petitions made by two different groups of direct recruits challenging the gradation 1ists of permanent Deputy Superintendents of Police on February 24, 1978.\n\nAccepting the appea1,\n\nHELD: 1. The appellants were promoted to officiate as Deputy Superin- B tendents of Police in the year 1965 (other promotees like the appellants had also been officiating as Deputy Superintendents of Police from different dates between 1948 and 1970), and by the 'Government order dated December 30.\n\n1977 fifty-four temporary posts of Deputy Superintendent of Police created bet\\\\een 1948 and 1970 were made permanent from the dates these posts were created. [4560-G]\n\n2. It is well settled that in the absence of any legislation on the subject, C or a mle framed under the Proviso to Articl~ 309 of the Constitution, the State Government can regulate its public services in the exercise of its executive power. [456 F-G]\n\nB. iV. 1Vagarajan v. State of Mysore [1966] 3 SCR 682, Sant Rani Shanna\n\nv. State of Raiasthan [1968] I SCR 111, referred, to.\n\n3. There i~ no statute or any role framed under the Proviso to Article 309 to determine the seniority as between the direct recruits and the promotees.\n\nThe determination of seniority on the basis of continuous officiation bas been held valid in S. B. Patwardhan's case [1977] 3 S. C. R. 775.\n\nThe graJation list cannot therefore be challenged on the ground that an arbitrary date was\n\ntaken as its basis or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\n[456G-H.\n\n4571\\ I\n\n4. In the year 1977 exigencies of the situation prompted the Government to convert the temporary posts created between 1948 and 1970 into permannt posts with effect from the dates on which the temporary posts had been created.\n\nThe appellants were promoted in 1965 to officiate as Deputy Super~ intendents of Police in posts which 'vere then temporary. The Governor \\vhile exercising his powers under rule 3 in the year 1965 could not naturally take into account the number of posts made permanent in 1977 with effct from 1965. Whatever was done subsequently to increase the strength of the cadre in 1965 under compulsion of the situation cannot be said to have effected the validity of the action taken by the Governor in 1965. [457-Fl\n\nS. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors. [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703; referred to .\n\n5. Rule ::; of the Bihar Police Service (Recruitn1ent) Rules. 1953 iS not reaUy a quota rule, it does not Jay down a fixed _proportion, all it does is to insist th.at the number of vacancies to be filled by promotion should not be less than half of the total number of vacancies to be :filJed in any year.\n\nAdding: to the number of vacancies and filling them by promotees does not certainly vi61ate the nlie rcqliiring, that no less than half of the vacancies n1ust be filled by promottecs. ¥/hat the Governor had done in a previous year in ex,, rci<:<' of his power under rule 3, if it was valid then, is not invalidated by the suh .. equent\n\nconversion of some posts \\1.:hich were temporary at the time into permflnf'nt Tlm; ts vvith rffect from. the earlier year.\n\nIf for administraHvc rrasons\n\n9-289 SCT /80\n\nA snch a measure was considered necessary, there' is nothing in rule 3 to sugge6t a bar.\n\nRule 3, as already mentioned, does not prescribe a fixed pr0p0rtion of promotees and direct recruits for the vacancies to be filled in any year buj: only ensures not less than half of the vacancies for the promottees, that being so, filling more than half of the vacancies by promottees, cannot be an infringement of that rule. [457G-H, 458A-B]\n\n6. The gradqtion list contains certain mistakes, and these shall b~ corrected by the concerned authority. [458F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1309-1310 of 1978.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated C 29-6-1978 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. Nos. 204-205 of 1978.\n\nL. M. Singhvi, and S. K. Verma for the Appellants.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, S. K. Sharma, R. K. Jain, R. A. P. Si11gh, R. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the Respondent Nos. 3-10, 12, and 13 in CA 1309/78.\n\nD R. K. Jain and R. A. P. Singh for RR 4, 6, 7 & 9 in CA 1310/78.\n\nR. K. Garg, R. A. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the RR 8 in both the appeals.\n\nD. Goverdhan for the R 1 in both the appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered. by\n\nGUPTA J.\n\nThe controversy in these two appeals by special leave relates to the question of seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees in the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Bihar Police Service.\n\nThe appellants-the same persons in both appeals--are promotees who question the correctness of the jndgment of the Patna High Court by which the High Court allowed the two writ petitions made by two different groups of direct recruits challenging the gradation list of permanent Deputy Superintendents of Police published on February 24, 1978.\n\nFifty-four temporary posts of Deputy Superintendent of Police created between 1948 and 1970 were made perm.rnent ''from the dates of their creation\" by the Government of Bihar in December, 1977.\n\nEarlier, the Government had decided that continuous officiating service of the promoted Deputy Superintendents of Polio~ in the.e posts should be the basis of their seniority.\n\nFollowing this decision, after the temporary posts had been made permanent, the gradation list in question was prepared and published.\n\nAdmittedly there is no statutory rnle governing seniority inter-se of direct recruits and promotees.\n\nIn the absence of any such rule\n\n.-l.\n\n.. •\n\nprescribing a different criterion, it cannot be disputed after Patwardhan's case(') that continuous officiation is a reasonable basis for fixation of seniority.\n\nThe High Court, however, allowed the writ petitions filed by the direct reci:uits on the view that the gradation list was invalid as it infringed rule 3 of the Bihar Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1953 framed under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 3 is In these terms :\n\n\"The Governor shall decide in each year to number of vacancies to be filled in that year.\n\nProvided that the nnmber of vacancies to be filled by promotion in the service in any one year shall not, unless the Governor is satisfied that there is not a sufficient number of officers fit for promotion, be less than half the total number of vacancies to be filled in any such year.\"\n\nBefore we proceed to consider the scope of this rule and its effect on the question of seniority in this case, it would be .necessary to refer to a few more provisions of the Bihar Police Service (Recruitment) Rules and some facts forming the background to the controversy.\n\nIt is the Governor's duty. under Rule 3 to decide \"in each year\" the numlnr of vacancies in the Bihar Police Service required to be filled \"in that year\".\n\nThe proviso to the rule states that the promotees to be appointed in any particular year shall not be less than half of the total number of vacancies to be filled in that year unless sufficient number of officers fit for promotion is not available.\n\nIt is important to remember that rule 3 does not prescribe a fixed quota for each of the two ca~<gories, direct recruits and promotees, but ouly insists that at least half the vacancies in any year should be reserved for the promotees. Rule 2 of these Rules states that recruitment to Bihar Police Service shall be made by direct recruitment and by promotion.\n\nA third source of recruitment was later added in the Rules in 197 5 with which we are not concerned in this c?se.\n\nThe mies as regards direct appointment are included in part II of the Rules.\n\nRules 22, 23 and 24, occurring in part III of the Rules lay down the method of recruitment by promotion.\n\nUnder rule 22 a preliminary selection of officers for promotion is made in each Range by Range Selection Board. Those selected by the Range Selection Board have to appear before the Inspector General's Selection Board.\n\nThe Inspector General's Selection Board has to nominate for appointment twice as many candidates as there are vacancies to be filled by\n\ni (I) [1977] 3 S. C. R. 775,\n\npromotion and to send all relevant papers relating to the candidates nominated by it to the Bihar Public Service Commission and, at the same time, submit a list of such candidates to the Governor. The Public Service Commission after exrul)ination of the Papers is required to submit its recommendations to the Governor.\n\nRule 24 says that the final selection of officers to be promoted shall be made by the Gowrnor after considering the recommendations made by the Public Service Commission.\n\nThe appellants iu both these appeals were appointed as Inspectors of Police in 1953.\n\nAfter working as Inspectors for about 12 years, they were promoed by notification issued on June 16, 1965 to officiate as Deputy Superintendents of Police.\n\nBefore promotion they were subjected to the scrutinies prescribed by rules 22, 23 and 24 of the Bihar Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1953. Rule 648-B of the Bihar and Orissa Police Manual (Volume I) requires a promoted Deputy Superintendent of Police to pass an examination in accounts.\n\nThis rule further says that a promotee shall be on probation for one year and at the end of the period, if he has passed the said examination and is found fit, he will be confirmed.\n\nThe rule adds that if he has officiated as Deputy Superi'ntendent for one year or more he may be confirmed without further probation on his passing the examination in accounts.\n\nThe appellants passed the examination and thus satisfied all the requirements for confirmation.\n\nHowever the posts in which they were officiating were temporary posts.\n\nIt appears from a memorandum issued by the State Government on December 28, 1955 that the Government considered it \"desirable that all temporary posts of all categories, gazetted as well as non-Gazetted, which are iu existence at present and which will be necessary for an indc; finite period should be made permanent with effect from 1st April, 1956\". This was followed by another memorandum on September 9, 1967 addressed to \"All Departments of Govt.\" and \"All Heads of Departments\" on the \"Policy regarding making temporary posts under Govt. in existence from a long period, permanent\" which said that the Government had taken a decisidn that \"steps should immediately be taken . . . . to make all those posts permanent which are in existence for more than three years and are likely to continue in future.\" A third memorandum on the subject issued on November 19, 1971 expressed dissatisfaction that \"no\n\neffective step\" had been ta.ken to make the temporary posts permanent and requested all heads of departments to take \"necessary steps\"\n\n\"immediately\" to implement the Government decision.\n\nApparently even the third memorandum failed to haw any effect.\n\nBy a notification dated August 22, 1974 the State Government confirmed appellants and other similarly situated officen• as Deputy Superintendents of Police with effect from dates which according to\n\nthese officers were arbitrarily chosen.\n\nOn September l, 1974 the Government published a combined gradation list in which these promotees were placed even below the direct recruits who were appointed in 1974. The appellants challenged this gradation list in the Patna High Court by a writ petition (C.W.J.C.2011 of 1976). While that writ petition was pending, the Government of Bihar constituted a high power committee, known as the Saran Singh Committee, to assess the promotional prospects of different State services, examine the problem of \"stagnation\", ai1d suggest remedial measura<;.\n\nThe recommendations made by the Committee were accepted by the Government by resolution dated April 11, 1977. One of the decisions taken by the Government upon the recommendations of the Committee, which were set out in the schedule annexed to the resolution, was as follows :\n\n\"The seniority of promoted officers vis-a-vis direct recruits should be determined by taking into account the continuous officiating service instead of on the basis of the length of substantive service in the cadre.\"\n\nOn behalf of the State Government it was submitted before the High Court at th~ hearing of the aforesaid writ petition (C.W.J.C. 2011 of 1976) that the Government proposed to re-examine the gradation list in the light of the Committee's recommendations.\n\nOn this statement the High Court directed the State Government to re-examine the matter and prepare a fresh gradation list.\n\nNon~ of the parties appealed against this order.\n\nThereafter, on December 30, 1977, the State Govermnent wrote to the Accountant General, Bihar, saying that on the basis of the Government decision that continuous officiating service of the promoted Deputy Superintendents of Police was to be the basis of their seniority, the Government had decided that \"the temporary posts created in the Home (Police) Department would be made permanent from the dates of their creation.\" Accordingly 54 temporary posts brought into existence between 1948 and 1970 were converted into permanent posts by Government order No. 16161 also dated December 30, 1977. By notification dated January 7, 1978 the State Government appointed on probation the officers who had been officiating in those posts with effect from the dates mentioned against their names in the notification and the notification issued previously promoting these officers on officiating basis was cancelled.\n\nThe dates from which these officers were said to have been appointed\n\nt.:\n\non probation were the dates of their promotion as officiating Deputy Superintendents of Police.\n\nThe names of the appellants figure against serial numbers 23, 24 and 25 in the list given in the notification dated January 7, 1978.\n\nIt is difficult to see why this method of converting the officiating appointment into one on probation was thought necessary.\n\nRule 648-B of the Bihar and Orissa Police Manual (Volume I) to which reference has been made earlier in this judgment provides that if a promotec has officiated as Deputy Superintendent for one year or more, he may be confirmed without further probation on his passing the examination in accounts. It has ken already stated that all the appellants had passed the examination.\n\nHowever, the revised gradation list which is under challenge was thereafter issued.\n\nThis list, it was stated in a letter dated January 31, 1978/February 24, 1978 addressed by a Joint Secretary of the State Government to the Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna, had been \"prepared on the basis of the date of appointment, officiating or peramannt, whichever is earlier, in the Bihar Police in the liglit of Finance Department Resolution No. 3521 dated 11-4-77 and judgment of tlie High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2011/76 ..... \"\n\nIn the context of the present controversy two important facts which have to be kept in mind are : (i) the appellants were promoted to officiate as Deputy Superintendents of Police in the year 1965 (other promotees like the appellants had also been officiating as Deputy Superintendents of Police from different dates between 1948 and 1970) and (ii) by Government order dated December 30, 1977 fifty-four temporary po•ts of Deputy Superintendent of Police created between 1948 and 1970 were made permanent from the dates these posts were created.\n\nThe only question here is whether there was anything wrong in fixing the inter-se seniority of the promotees and the direct recruits on the basis of continuous officiation by the promotees. It is well settled that in the absence of any legislation on the subject, or a rule framed under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the State Government can regulate its public services in the exercise of its executive power. (sec B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore(') 1\\lld Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan ('). In the case before us there is no statute or any rule framed under .the Proviso to Article 309 to determine the seniority as between the direct recruits and the promotees.\n\nThe determination of seniority on the basis of continuous officiation has been held valid in S. B. Patwardhan's case\n\n(I) [1966J 3 S. C.R. 682\n\n(2) [1968] I S. C. R. 111\n\n(supra).\n\nThe gradation list cannot therefore be challenged on the ground that an arbitrary date was taken as its basis or that it offends Artic\\e 14 of the Constitution .\n\nIt is however conte'nded on behalf of the respondents who were the writ petitioners in th-e High Court that rule 3 of the Bihar Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, J 953 framed under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, though it is not a seniority rule, does\n\nnot permit the course adopted in this case by the Government, namely, converting the temporary posts created between 1948 and 1970 into permanent post{ in the year 1977 with effect from the dates on which the temporary posts had been created.\n\nUnder rule 3 the Governor has to decide in each year the number of vacancies to be filled in that year and to secur<J not less than half of the total vacancies for the promotc•os.\n\nThe argument is that for the year 1965 or for that matter for any year prior to 1977 when the notification under challenge was issued, the Governor had duly exercised his power under rule 3 in that very year, and adding to the number of existing permanent posts by an order made in a subsequent year after the Gove1~ nor had ascertained the number of vacancies required to be filled and had them filled according to the ratio prescribed by rule 3, would disturb that ratio and contravene rule 3.\n\nWe are unabb to accept this contention as correct. In the year 1977 exigencies of the situation prompted the Government to convert the cmporary posts created between 1948 and 1970 into permanent posts with effect from the dates on which the temporary posts had been created. The appel\" !ants were promoted in 1965 to officiate as Deputy Superintendents of Police in posts which were then temporary.\n\nThe Governor while exercising his powers under rule 3 in the year 1965 could not naturally take into account the number of posts made permanent in 1977 with •effect from 1965.\n\nWhatev'er was done subsequently to increase the strength of the cadre in 1965 under compulsion of the situation cannot be said to have affected the validity of the action taken by the Governor in 1965. In S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors.(') this Court held that whcn the quota was fixed for tho : wo sources of recruitment. it could not be altered according to exigencies of the situation.\n\nBut JUie 3 is not really a quota rule, it does not lay down a fixed proportion, all it does is to insist that tho number of vacancies to be filled by promotion should not be less than half of. the total number of vacancies to be filled in any year.\n\nAdding to the number of vacancies and filling them by promotees does not certainly violate the rule requiring that not less than half of the vacancies must be\n\n(1) [1967] 2 S. C.R. 703\n\nfilled by promotees.\n\nWhat the Governor had done in a previous year in exercise of hi~ powers under rule 3, if it was valid then, is not invalidated by the subsequent conversion of some posts which were temporary at the time into permanent posts with effect from the earlier year. If for administrative reasons such a measure was considered necessary, there is nothing in rule 3 to suggest a bar. Rule 3, as already mentioned, does not prescribe a fiJ'ed propo1tion of promotees and direct recruits for the vacancies to be filled in any year but only ensures not less than half of the vacancies for the promotees; that being so, filling more than half of the vacancies by promotees, cannot be an infringement of that rule.\n\nIn the view we have taken, it is unnecessary to consider two other subsidiary questions raised : (i) whether the cadre consisted only of permanent posts or included both permanent and temporary posts : according to the appellants the cadre should include both temporary and permanent officers in the absence of any rule to the contrary. In this Judgmenf in reaching the conclusion stated above we have assumed that the cadre consisted of permaiient officers only; (ii) Whether rule 3 has ever been followed since the Rules were franied in 1953; according to the appellants rule 3 has really not been observed in any of those years and that no question of controventioh of the rule can therefore be raised in this case.\n\nE In the result we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions C.W.J.C. 204 of 1978 and C.W.J.C. 205 of 1978 filed in the High Court. It appears from an affidavit sworn by Shri Ashok Kumar Sinha, Under Secretary, Home\n\n(Police) Department, on behalf of the State of Bihar on August 31, 1979 and filed in this Court on the same day that the gradation list\n\nF in qustion contains certain mistakes; these shall be corrected by the concerned authority.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case we make no ~-- order as to costs.\n\nN.K.A.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n; A", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "RAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\n(A. C. GUPTA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 22, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Government by a notification dated August 22, 1974, confirmed the appellants and other similarly situated officers as Deputy Super~ intendents of Police with effect from the dates which according to tJ; tese officers were arbitrarily chosen."}}, {"text": "September 1, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1377, "end_char": 1394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 1, 1974 the Government published a combined gradation list in which these promotees were placed even below the direct recruits who were appointed in 1974."}}, {"text": "April 11, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The recommenda~ tions of the committee were accepted by the State Government by Resolution dated April 11, 1977."}}, {"text": "January '7, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By notification dated January '7, 1978 the State Government appointed on probation the Officers who had been officiating in' those posts with effect from tbe dates mentioned against their names in the notification and the notification issued previously promoting these officers on officiating basis was cancelled."}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 682", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4044, "end_char": 4060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4198, "end_char": 4209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. B. Patwardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4381, "end_char": 4397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The determination of seniority on the basis of continuous officiation bas been held valid in S. B. Patwardhan's case [1977] 3 S. C. R. 775."}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 S. C. R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4405, "end_char": 4426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4559, "end_char": 4569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 703", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5392, "end_char": 5411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6791, "end_char": 6819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "458F]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "L. M. Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6991, "end_char": 7004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, and S. K. Verma for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "S. K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7010, "end_char": 7021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. M. Singhvi, and S. K. Verma for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7047, "end_char": 7060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, S. K. Sharma, R. K. Jain, R. A. P. Si11gh, R. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7062, "end_char": 7074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, S. K. Sharma, R. K. Jain, R. A. P. Si11gh, R. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7076, "end_char": 7086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, S. K. Sharma, R. K. Jain, R. A. P. Si11gh, R. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "R. A. P. Si11gh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7088, "end_char": 7103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, S. K. Sharma, R. K. Jain, R. A. P. Si11gh, R. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the Respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "R. A. P. Si11gh"}}, {"text": "R. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7105, "end_char": 7116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, S. K. Sharma, R. K. Jain, R. A. P. Si11gh, R. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the Respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "R. A. P. Si11gh"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7121, "end_char": 7132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, S. K. Sharma, R. K. Jain, R. A. P. Si11gh, R. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the Respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "R. A. P. Si11gh"}}, {"text": "D R. K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7190, "end_char": 7202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D R. K. Jain and R. A. P. Singh for RR 4, 6, 7 & 9 in CA 1310/78."}}, {"text": "R. A. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7207, "end_char": 7221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D R. K. Jain and R. A. P. Singh for RR 4, 6, 7 & 9 in CA 1310/78.", "canonical_name": "R. A. P. Si11gh"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7257, "end_char": 7267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, R. A. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the RR 8 in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, R. A. P. Singh and B. P. Singh for the RR 8 in both the appeals.", "canonical_name": "R. A. P. Si11gh"}}, {"text": "D. Goverdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7335, "end_char": 7347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Goverdhan for the R 1 in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by\n\nGUPTA J.\n\nThe controversy in these two appeals by special leave relates to the question of seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees in the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Bihar Police Service."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7766, "end_char": 7782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants-the same persons in both appeals--are promotees who question the correctness of the jndgment of the Patna High Court by which the High Court allowed the two writ petitions made by two different groups of direct recruits challenging the gradation list of permanent Deputy Superintendents of Police published on February 24, 1978."}}, {"text": "February 24, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7976, "end_char": 7993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants-the same persons in both appeals--are promotees who question the correctness of the jndgment of the Patna High Court by which the High Court allowed the two writ petitions made by two different groups of direct recruits challenging the gradation list of permanent Deputy Superintendents of Police published on February 24, 1978."}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8152, "end_char": 8171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fifty-four temporary posts of Deputy Superintendent of Police created between 1948 and 1970 were made perm.rnent ''from the dates of their creation\" by the Government of Bihar in December, 1977."}}, {"text": "Patwardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8715, "end_char": 8725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. •\n\nprescribing a different criterion, it cannot be disputed after Patwardhan's case(') that continuous officiation is a reasonable basis for fixation of seniority."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9049, "end_char": 9060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9068, "end_char": 9089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9870, "end_char": 9890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under Rule 3 to decide \"in each year\" the numlnr of vacancies in the Bihar Police Service required to be filled \"in that year\"."}}, {"text": "[1977] 3 S. C. R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11203, "end_char": 11224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11319, "end_char": 11350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inspector General's Selection Board has to nominate for appointment twice as many candidates as there are vacancies to be filled by\n\ni (I) [1977] 3 S. C. R. 775,\n\npromotion and to send all relevant papers relating to the candidates nominated by it to the Bihar Public Service Commission and, at the same time, submit a list of such candidates to the Governor."}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11428, "end_char": 11453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Public Service Commission after exrul)ination of the Papers is required to submit its recommendations to the Governor."}}, {"text": "June 16, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11898, "end_char": 11911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After working as Inspectors for about 12 years, they were promoed by notification issued on June 16, 1965 to officiate as Deputy Superintendents of Police."}}, {"text": "December 28, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12849, "end_char": 12866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from a memorandum issued by the State Government on December 28, 1955 that the Government considered it \"desirable that all temporary posts of all categories, gazetted as well as non-Gazetted, which are iu existence at present and which will be necessary for an indc; finite period should be made permanent with effect from 1st April, 1956\"."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13121, "end_char": 13136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from a memorandum issued by the State Government on December 28, 1955 that the Government considered it \"desirable that all temporary posts of all categories, gazetted as well as non-Gazetted, which are iu existence at present and which will be necessary for an indc; finite period should be made permanent with effect from 1st April, 1956\"."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13182, "end_char": 13199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by another memorandum on September 9, 1967 addressed to \"All Departments of Govt.\""}}, {"text": "November 19, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13641, "end_char": 13658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A third memorandum on the subject issued on November 19, 1971 expressed dissatisfaction that \"no\n\neffective step\" had been ta.ken to make the temporary posts permanent and requested all heads of departments to take \"necessary steps\"\n\n\"immediately\" to implement the Government decision."}}, {"text": "September l, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14191, "end_char": 14208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September l, 1974 the Government published a combined gradation list in which these promotees were placed even below the direct recruits who were appointed in 1974."}}, {"text": "Saran Singh Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14580, "end_char": 14601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While that writ petition was pending, the Government of Bihar constituted a high power committee, known as the Saran Singh Committee, to assess the promotional prospects of different State services, examine the problem of \"stagnation\", ai1d suggest remedial measura<;."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15680, "end_char": 15697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on December 30, 1977, the State Govermnent wrote to the Accountant General, Bihar, saying that on the basis of the Government decision that continuous officiating service of the promoted Deputy Superintendents of Police was to be the basis of their seniority, the Government had decided that \"the temporary posts created in the Home (Police) Department would be made permanent from the dates of their creation.\""}}, {"text": "January 7, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16283, "end_char": 16298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By notification dated January 7, 1978 the State Government appointed on probation the officers who had been officiating in those posts with effect from the dates mentioned against their names in the notification and the notification issued previously promoting these officers on officiating basis was cancelled."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1978/February 24, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17512, "end_char": 17546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This list, it was stated in a letter dated January 31, 1978/February 24, 1978 addressed by a Joint Secretary of the State Government to the Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna, had been \"prepared on the basis of the date of appointment, officiating or peramannt, whichever is earlier, in the Bihar Police in the liglit of Finance Department Resolution No."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17638, "end_char": 17643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This list, it was stated in a letter dated January 31, 1978/February 24, 1978 addressed by a Joint Secretary of the State Government to the Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna, had been \"prepared on the basis of the date of appointment, officiating or peramannt, whichever is earlier, in the Bihar Police in the liglit of Finance Department Resolution No."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17645, "end_char": 17650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This list, it was stated in a letter dated January 31, 1978/February 24, 1978 addressed by a Joint Secretary of the State Government to the Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna, had been \"prepared on the basis of the date of appointment, officiating or peramannt, whichever is earlier, in the Bihar Police in the liglit of Finance Department Resolution No."}}, {"text": "Bihar Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17767, "end_char": 17779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This list, it was stated in a letter dated January 31, 1978/February 24, 1978 addressed by a Joint Secretary of the State Government to the Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna, had been \"prepared on the basis of the date of appointment, officiating or peramannt, whichever is earlier, in the Bihar Police in the liglit of Finance Department Resolution No."}}, {"text": "11-4-77", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17842, "end_char": 17849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3521 dated 11-4-77 and judgment of tlie High Court in C.W.J.C. No."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18764, "end_char": 18775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19066, "end_char": 19077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19698, "end_char": 19709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S. C.R. 703", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22086, "end_char": 22106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23776, "end_char": 23793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from an affidavit sworn by Shri Ashok Kumar Sinha, Under Secretary, Home\n\n(Police) Department, on behalf of the State of Bihar on August 31, 1979 and filed in this Court on the same day that the gradation list\n\nF in qustion contains certain mistakes; these shall be corrected by the concerned authority."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_459_477_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "HARJEET SINGH ETC.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA ]YER AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nIndian Police Servtce (Regulation of Seniority) Rules-Rule 3 (3) (b )- Validity of\n\nIndian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Srength) Regulations, 1955- Regulations 7 to 9-Year oj allotment service in non-cadre posts not considered\n\n-Whether such a service would constitute a break for fixing te year of allotment-JVhether over-utilisation of deputation und Central reserve quota relevant C (joft fixing tlie year of allotment, when once the officer has continuously officiated in a Senior Post-Whether offends Articles 14 and 16 of the Con~ stitution.\n\nIndian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations-Regulutions 7 to 9 of 1955 and Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, µule 4(1), Scope\n\n~ D\n\nOn seleciion by the Punjab Public Service Commission B. R. Kapur (appellant in CA 2413178) and Harjeet Singh (Appellant in CA 2526177) were directly recruited in 1951, as Deputy Superintendents of Police in the Punj.lb Police Service.\n\nB. R. Kapur \\Vas senior to Harjeet Singh as Deputy Superintendent of Police.\n\nIn 1960, both of them were included in the Select List prepared under Regulation 7 of the Indian Police Service, (Appointment by E Promotion) Regulations, 1955.\n\nOn November 24, 1960, B~ R. Kapur was appointed as A'Ssista.I1t Inspector General of Police which post was a cadre post In May 1961 he was appointed to a non-cadre post as Director of Sports and Youth Programme and Deputy Secretary to Government, Sports Department.\n\nHe held this post upto November 18, 1962, and thereafter he was appQinted as Additional Controller of Stores, Punjab which was also a non<.Odre post.\n\nHe continued to hold the post of Additional Controller of F Stores till 1965, loom July 19, 1965 he was Commandant, 40th Battalion PAP, J & K which was a cadre post.\n\nHe held the post till July 11, 1966 when he took over as Commandant of 25th Battalion PAP. On the reorganisation of the State of Punjab, he was appointed as Assistsant General of Police, State of Punjab from November l, 1966.\n\nThereafter he continuously held cadre posts and was finally appcinted to. the Indian Police Sen'ice with effect from September 3, 1969.\n\nShri Harjeet Singh was appointed to officiate IS G Superintendent of Police in December 1960. 1'he post was a cadre post.\n\nHe continued to hold a cadre post till he \\Vas appointed to the Indian Police Servicewith effect from September 3, 1969.\n\nP...ftec the l\\\\'O officers were appointed to the Indian Police Service the question of assignment of year of allotment and fixation of seniority arQ6C for the consideration of the Government of India.\n\nShri B. R. Kapur was allotted the year 1963 and placed below Sube Singh and above S. R. Sharma (direcl recruits) in the Jndian Police Service, counting his continuoUs officiating service from 1-11-66 only, as service in a senior cadre post and not his service in the\n\nA non-cadre post.\n\nIn the case of Harject Singh, though he admittedly officiated continuously in a senior cadre post from December 1960, he was also allotted to the year 1963 and placed below Sri Kapur on the ground that he ranked\n\nelo¥/ Sri Kapur in the select list.\n\nKapur and Harjeet Singh filed \\\\Tit petitions in the High Court of PlUljab and Haryana quelltioning the allotment of the year 1963.\n\nThe Writ Petitions B were accepted.\n\nThe Court directed the Union and Punjab Government& to redetermine the year of allotment and seniority of J-Jarjeet Singh and Kapur taking December 17, 1960 and July 29, 1965 respectively as the dates of their continuous officiation in '-!. senior post.\n\nA further direction was issued that before redetcrn1ining the seniority of the two officials, the respondents to the Writ Petitions \\.Vho were direct recruits should be afforded an opp0rtunity to make their representation. c\n\nAppeals under clause 10 of the Letters Patent were filed by the affected direct recruits as also by B. R. Kapur. The direct recruits contended that neither B. R. Kapur nor Harjeet Singh would have ever started officiating in the senior post on the daks from V.'hich they officiated or claimed to have officiated in senior posts, if the State Governments had not created artificial vacancies by excesive utilisation of the \"deputation and central reserve\" quota in contravention of the cadre Rules and the Cadrestrength Regulations. The arguments before the Division Bench therefore was that the period of service attributable to over utilisation of 'deputation and central reserve' quota should not be treated as service in a senior post for the purpose of determining the year of allotment of officers promoted to the I.ru.lian Police Service.\n\nThe argument was accepted by the Division Bench and a direction was issued to ithe Central Government to reconsider the question of year of allotment after taking into consideration the question of over utilisation and its effect.\n\nThe finding of the learned Single Judge that B. R. Kapur was entitled to have his service as Commandant 25th Battalion as officiation in a senior post was however affirmed. . Hence the appeals by special leave by Harjeet Singh and Kapnr.\n\nAllowing the appeals and dismissing the Petitions, the Court.\n\nHELD : 1. Rule 3 (3) (b) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954 is valid. [476E]\n\nA. P. Sharma v. Union of India, [1968] S.L.R. 582; followed.\n\n2. Rule 3(3)(b) as well as Rule 4(4) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority Rules 1954 throw up the date of continuous officiation of an officer in a cadre post as the most , important factor both for the pul\"'- pose of assignment of year Of allotment and for the purpose of assignment of seniority.\n\nFor the. purpose of assignment of year of ailotment the date of continuous officiation in a senior post is the only relevant factor while for the purpose of assignment of seniority, first, the date of continuous officiation in a senior post, then the date of appointment to the Service if the date of comnrencement of continuous officiation in a Senior post of more than one officer is the same and, finally, the order in the Select List if the date of appointment is also the same arc the several relevant factors in that order.\n\nThus the order in the Select List is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the year o.f allotment\n\n.. _.._\n\nHARJEET SINGH V. UNION 461\n\nand is relevant in detennining the seniority, only if the year of allotinent of the officers is also the same, and their date of appointment is also the same.\n\nSince the order in the Select List is dependent on the seniority in the State Service, it follows that seniority in the State Police Service is irrelevant for\n\nthe purpose of determining the year o'f allotment and is relevant for the purpose of deter111iningthe eniority only if the year of allotment and the date of appointn1ent of two or more officers are the same.\n\nTherefore an officer who is junior to another in the State Police Service but, who starts continuous officiation in a Senior post fro1n a date earlier than the other, may frog-leap and gain seniority by the consequential assignn1ent of an earlier year of allotment.\n\nNeither the Indian Police Serrice (Regulation of Seniority) Rules n_or any other rule in the irmumcrablc Rules and Regulations governing the recruitment, appoint1nent and Regulation of seniority of officers of the Indian Police Sen1ice is designed to deprive an officer, the benefit of continuous officiation in a senior post.\n\n[471G-H, 472A-E]\n\n3. Though under the Indian Police Service (/\\.ppointment by Pro1notion) Regulations, the Select l, ist is prepared on the basis of merit and ability, the . order in which officers are placed in the Select List is accorditig to seniority in the State Police Service and not according to merit and ability. Merit and ability arc considered for the purpose of inclusion in the Select List but there-\n\n<ifter s(:nior1ty in th~ State Police Service takes over and the nan1~ of Officers & :ire aJranged in the order of that seniority, Therefore the benefit of continuow officiation in a Senior post cannot be denied to an officer appointed to the Indian Police Service merely on the ground that an officer senior to hitn in the State Police Service did not so continuously officiate.\n\n[472FH]\n\n4. It is true that under Regulation 8 of the Indian Police Service (i\\.ppointment by Promotion) Regulation & Appointments to cadre posts from among E non-cadre officers should be n1ade according to the order in which the names o.f such officers appear in the Select Li..<>t. .A. dcviatio11 from the order is permissible if administrative exigencies require it and if the vacancy is not likely to last for more than three months.\n\nOf course, the Regulation does not license uninhibited deviation to favour individunl non-cadre officers. If that\n\nis done the deYiatiot1 is liable to cha11enge.\n\nBut where there is no such allegation, there is no reason why a junior non-cadre officer should lose the benefit F of his conti11uo~1s officiation in a. cadre post merely because a non-cadre officer senior to him in the Select I.ist did not continuously officiate likewise.\n\nIn such a situation, it \\vould be for the Government of India to consider whether the relevant rules may not be so relaxed as to enable such non-caJ.rc officer to add hi~ officiation in a non-cadre post to his officiation in a cadre -post, regard being had to the circumstances under which the officer had 'i.o work in a non-cadre rost \\vhilc his junior in the Select List \\Vas inade to fill the G cadre post.\n\nBut. surely, it cannot \\Vork to the prejudice of the junior officer in the Select Li\"\\ so as to nuilify the actual, continuous, officiating service rendered by hin1.\n\nIn the present case there is no allegation that B. R. Kapur was appointed to lhc non-cadre posts of Director of Sports and Additional Controller of Stores \\vith a vie\\v to favour Harjeet Singh. [472 H, 473A-Dl\n\n5. Non-ca<lre officers if they arc appointed to cadre posts in accordance .ft with Rule 9 of the Cadre Rules should not be denied the benefit of continuous officiation in senior post merely because cadre officers were appointed on deputation elsewhere in excess of the number of posts specified against a\n\nDeputation Reserve in the schedule to the Cadre Fixation of Strength Regu- . Jation.\n\n[473E-FJ\n\nFixation of Cadre Strength Regulations are made in exercise of the power conferred on the Central Government by Rule 4 ( 1) of the Cadre Rules and are, therefore, subordinate to the Cadre rules even as rules made in exercise of powers confem:d by a Statute are necessarily subordinate to the Statute. Rule 6 of the Cadre Rules provides for the deputation of Cadre officers and Rule 9 of the same rules provides for the temporary appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre posts. In making appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre posts the rule prescribes the fulfilment of certain conditions.\n\nIn the instant case. that the conditions prescribed by rule 9 of the Cad re Rules were fulfilled is clear from the impugned order.\n\n[473F-H]\n\n6. Rule 4(1) o; f the Cadre Rules enables the Central Government to make Regulations determining the strength and composition of the Cadre of each State. A definite number of posts is also specified against \"Deputation Reserve'\"\n\nin the schedule to the fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations.\n\nBut if owing t<> the situational demands and exigencies of the <!dministration, the number is exceeded and the State Government is compelled to utilise the services of experienced non-cadre officers to fill cadre posts in strict compliance with the D Cadre Rules, the Service rendered by the non--cadre officers in such posts should not be ignored.\n\nJn the instant case, the deputation of cadre officers was in accordance with Rule 6 of the Cadre Rules.\n\n[474A-C]\n\n7. Fixation of cadre strength Regulations made under Rule 4 of the Cadre Rules do not over-ride the Recruitment Rule, the remaining Cadre Rules and the Seniority Rules so as to render invalid any service rendered by a non-cadre officer in a cadre post on the mere ground of breach of the Fixation of cadre\n\nStrength Regulations, when there has been strict compliance with Rule 9 of the Cadre Rules.\n\nFixation of Cadre Strength is the exclusive concern of the Central and the State Governments and the Regulations are made for their convenience and better relationship.\n\nExcessive utilisation of 'Deputation or Central Reserye' is a matter for adjustment and controversy between the Central and the State Governments and is of no concern to any member of the service.\n\nFor example no cadre officer who is asked to fill a deputation post can refuse to join the post on the ground that the 'Deputation Reserve' has already been exceeded. The Regulations are not intended to and do not confer any right on any member of the Service, unlike some other Rules which do confer or create rights in the members of the Services.\n\nA mere breach of the mle furnishes no cause of action on the ground that his seniority is affected in son1e round-about way. [474C-G and 475A]\n\n8. Under Rule 6(A){2) of the Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules a direct recruit in the junior time scale of pay can be appointed to a post in the Senior time seale of pay if having regard to his length of service, experience and performance he is found to 1 be suitable for appointment to post in the Senior time scale of pay.\n\nSince at that time in Punjab, there was no direct recruit in the junior time scale of pay \\Vho possessed experience of at least four years who could be thought of for appaintment in the Senior post, the State Government had no option except to apPoint experienced and suitable non-cadre officers to cadre posts. Further no cadre officer who had been so deputed suffered in any manner in the matter of his career.\n\n[475B-D]\n\nHARJEET SINGH V. UNION 463\n\nFurther, the appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre post. is subject to A the directions of the Central Government, who may terminate such appointment.\n\nThe C'.entral Government too is bound to obtain the advice of the Union Public Service Commission if the appointment is to extent beyond six months. 1\\foreover non-cadre officers of proven merit only are appointed to cadre posts. 111ey are appointed to cadre posts if they are already in the Select List and the appointments are made in accordance with the order in which they are placed in the Sekel List which is prepared under the Indian Police B Service Recruitment Rules after following an elaborate procedure involving a thorough examination at various levels. of the merit of the officers of the State Police Service.\n\nA State Officer whose name appears on the Select List may expect to be appointed to a cadre post and lo be promoted to the Indian Police Service at any time thereafter according to vacancy position.\n\nA direct recruit who ordinnrily comes into the picture year:i after a State Officer's name\n\nappears on the Select List cannot have any real grievance that the promoted C officer is given fin anterior date for the purpose of seniority since such <late can never be earlier than the date from which the junior most direct recruit continuously officiated in a Senior post prior to the commencement of the continuous officiation of !he promoted officer.\n\n[475E-H, 476A-B]\n\n9. Every departure from a rule which departure gives certain advantages to one group of Civil servants as against another does not necessarily involve D an encroachment of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations cannot be interpreted as comprising any \"Quota\" n1le.\n\nThere is no allegation of breach of \"quota\" rule embodied in Rule 9(2) of the Recruitment Rules either. [476B-E]\n\nN. K. Chauhan nnd Ors. v. State of Gujarat, [1977] 1 SCR 1037, distinguished.\n\n10. \"The overutilisation\" of 1'Deputation and Central Reserve\" does not affect the questions of assignment of the year of allotment and the seniority of the appellants.\n\n[476F-G]\n\nC!viL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2526/77 and 2413/78.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 17-5-1975 of the Pnnjab and Haryana High Court in LPA Nos. 633, 671; 694/73 and 609173.\n\nAND\n\nWrit Petition Nos. 520-524 af 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nJawahar Lal Gupta and S. Ghose for the Appellant in CA 2526/ 77.\n\nP. R. Mridul, M. R. Agnihotri and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellant\n\nin CA 2413/78.\n\n0. P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the State of Punjab in both the appeals. _\n\nA Lal Narain Sinha Att. Genl. Abdul Khader and Miss S. Subhashini for the Union of India in all the appeals.\n\nH. L. Sibal, R. K. Garg and R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No. 10 in CA 2526 and RRll in CA 2413.\n\nR. K. Garg and R. S. Sodhi for the Petitioners in WP Nos. 520- B 524 of 1980.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. In these appeals we have once again to consider career conscious competing claims to seniority which appear so much to dominate the lives and careers of our Civil Servants that a large bulk of the cases in this Court relate to the resolution of problems arising out of such claims.\n\nSo much of our time is taken up' in discovering the precise facts of these intricate problems that we wonder whether the constitution of a fact-finding administrative tribunal who should invariably be approached in the first instance will not better serve the cause of successful administration. An administrative tribunal possessing the necessary expertise and familiarity with administrative procedures and rules may be able to deal with the problems in a satisfactory way. At least the facts wil1 be found and the relevant rules will be !mown.\n\nThereafter aggrieved parties may approach the Courts for further relief within the confines of Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution.\n\nOn selection by the Punjab Public Service Commission, B. R.\n\nKapur and Harjeet Singh were directly recruited, in 1951, as Deputy Superintendents of Police in the Punjab Police Service. They are the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 2413 of 1978 and 2526 of 1977 respectively. B. R. Kapur was senior to Harjeet Singh as Deputy Superintendent of Police. In 1960 both of them were included in the Select List prepared under Regulation 7 of the Indian Police Service ( Appointment by Promotion) Regulations 1955. On November 24, 1960, B. R. Kapur was appointed as Assistant Inspector General of Police which post was a cadre post. In May, 1961, B. R. Kapur was appointed as Director of Sports and Youth Programme and Deputy Secretary to Government, Sports Department.\n\nThe post was a noncadre post.\n\nHe held this post upto November 18, 1962 and thereafter he was appointed as Additional Controller of Stores, Punjab which was also a non-cadre post. He continued to hold the post of Additional Controller of Stores till 1965. From July 19, 1965, he was Commandant, 40th Battalion, PAP, J & K, which was a cadre post. He held the post till July 11, 1966, when he took over as Commandant of 25th Battalion, PAP.\n\nOn the reorganisation of the State of Punjab, he\n\n' ..\n\nwa, s appointed as Assist.ant Inspector General of Police, State of Punjab from November 1, 1966. Thereafter he continuously held cadre posts and was finally appointed to the Indian Police Service with effect from September 3, 1969.\n\nShri Harjeet Singh was appointed to officiate as Superintendent of Police in Decmber, 1960. The post was a cadre pool.\n\nHe continued to hold a cadre post till he was appointed to the Indian Police Service with effect from September 3, 1969.\n\nAfter the two officers were appointed to the Indian Police Service the question of assignment of year of allotment and fixation of se'niority arose for the consideration of the Government of India.\n\nShri B. R. Kapur was allotted to the year 1963 and placed below Sube Singh and above Shri S. R. Sharma (direct recruits) in the Indian Police Service Gradation List of Punjab.\n\nThe period of his service as Director of sports and Yonth Programme and as Additional Controller of Stores was not taken into consideration as both the posts were non-cadre posts. His service as Commandant of 25th Battalion was also not taken into account on the gronnd that the 25th Bttalion had been taken over by the Government of India and therefore the post of Commandant of the 25th Batl'alion was a non-cadre post. He was, therefore, treated as having continuously officiated in a senior coore post from November 1, 1966 o'nly.\n\nOn that basis he was allotted to the year 1963. In the case of Harjeet Singh, though admittedly he officiated continuously in a senior cadre post from December, 1960 he was also allotted to the year 1963 and placed below Shri B. R Kapur on the ground that he ranked below Shri B. R. Kapur in the select list.\n\nB. R. Kapur. and Harjeet Singh filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana questioning the allotment of the year 1963 to them for the purpose of seniority in the Indian Police Service.\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the High Court who heard the petitions in the first instance held that there was no reason at all why Harjeet Singh should not be given the full benefit of his continuous officiation in a senior post.\n\nHe, therefore, directed the Union and Punjab Governments to redetermine the year of allotment of Harjeet Singh, taking December 17, 1960, as the date from which he continuously officiated in a senior post. It was also directed that proper seniority should be assigned to him in accordance with the year of allotment so determined.\n\nIn the case of B. R. Kapur it was held that Ju:y 29, 1965, should be treated as th,~ date of. his continuous officiation in a senior post. It was held that the Government of India and the Gov- , ernment of Pnnjab boo all the time treated the post of Commandant,\n\n25th Battalion as a cadre post and therefore, B. R. Kapur was entitled to have his service in the post. of Co=andant, 25th Battalion as officiation in a Senior post.\n\nA direction was issued that the year of allotment and seniority should be redetermined.\n\nIt was further directed that before redeterminihg the seniority of the two officers, the respondents to the Writ Petitions who were direct recruits, should be afforded an opportunity to make their representations.\n\nAppeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent were filed by the affected direct recruits as also by B. R. Kapur. Before the Di\\ision Bench the case took a new turn. It was argued before the Division Bench on behalf of the direct recruits that neither B. R. Kapur nor Harjeet Sihgh would have ever started officiating in the senior post on the dates from which they officiated or claimed to have officiated in senior posts, if the State Government had not created artificial vacancies by excessive utilisation of 'the deputation and central reserve' quota in contravention of the Cadre Rules and the Cadre-strength Regulations. It was apparently sought to be argued before the Divisioh Bench that th•e period of service attributable to over utilisation of 'deputation and central reserve' quota should not be treated as service in a senior post for the purpose of determining the year of allotment of officers promoted to the Indian Police Service. The argument was accepted by the Division Bench and a direction was issued to the Central Government to reconsider the question of year of allotment after taking into consideration the question of over utilisation and its effect.\n\nThe finding of the learned Single Judge that B. R. Kapur was entitled to have his service as Commandant 25th Battalion as officiation ih a senior post was however affirmed.\n\nShri Jawahar Lal Gupta, learned counsel for Harjeet Singh argued that the service of Harjeet Singh in a senior cadre post was approved by the Government of India and once it was so approved the question whether there was over utilisation of deputation and central reserve quota was irrelevant for the purpose of determihing the year of allotment.. The only relevant question was whether the appellant bad continuously officiated in a senior post and, from what date. Thereafter the year of allotment was to be determined by the simple and mechanical application of rule 3(3) (b) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Sehiority) Rules.\n\nHe further submitted that the 'circumstance that B. R. Kapur was senior to Harjeet Singh in the Select List was also irrelevant in considering the question of year of allotment. It was only if both of them were given the same year of allotment that their inter-se seniority in the Select List would become relevant.\n\nShri Mridul, learned counsel for B. R. Kapur, argued that\n\n' •\n\n• ' ·,\n\nthe single Judge of the High Court was wrong in excluding the period of service of B. R. Kapur as Director of Sports and as Additional Controller of Stores in determining the year of allotment.\n\nHe further contended that in any event the case of B. R. K.apnr was an .appropriate one for the exercise by the Central Government of its\n\npawer to reLix the rules and that this Court should give a direction to the Central Government to relax the rules so as to enable that part of Kapur's service to be treated as service in a &<nior pool.\n\nShri H. L. Sibal, learned counsel for one of the respondents argued that the number of cadre officers who could be deputed by the Central and State Governments for servie>< elsewhere was limited and fixed by the fndian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations.\n\nBy deputing more cadre officers than authorised by thoo\" Regulations and appointing non-cadre officens to artificial vacancies so created in cadre posts, the State Government had adopted a device to enable the officers of the State Police Service to continuously officiate in Senior posts longer than justified.\n\nThe Cadre Strength Regulations were thereby' contraened and the Cadre Rules which provide for the temporary appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre posts circumvented. He submitted that officiating service rendered by a noncadre officer in a Senior post where the vacancy in the cadre post was the result of over utilisation of the deputation quota could not be taken into account under the Indian Police Service Regulation of Seniority Rules.\n\nShri R. K. Garg, who appeared for the remaining respondents urged that to permit promoted officers to take advantage of the deviation from the Cadre Rules and the Cadre Fixation of\n\nStrength Regulations for the purpose of gaining an advantage under the Seniority Rules would be a denial of the equal protection of the\n\nlaws to the direct rcruits who would be affected by such procedure.\n\nHe also urged that Rule 3 of the Seniority Rules if so interpreted as to take into account officiation against the rules must be held to contrave1w A:rticb 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nIn order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to G examine the relevant statutory provisions, rules and regulations.\n\nArticle 312 ( 1) empomrs Parliament to provide, by law, for the\n\ncration of All India Services common to the Union ahd the States.\n\nArticle 312(2) dclares that the services known at the commencement of th~ Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services created by Parliament under Art. 312(1).\n\n10-289 SC!/80\n\nS. 2 of the All India Services Act, 1951 defines an \"All India Service\" as meaning the service known as the Indian Administrative Service or the service known as the Indian Police Service or any other service specified in S. 2(A). Sec. 3 enables the Central Government after consultation with the Government of the States concerned to make rules for the regnlation of recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service.\n\nThe Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, made in exercise of the pomrs conferred by S. 3 (1) of the All India Services Act, provide for the constitution of Cadres and certain connected matters.\n\nA Cadre Officer is defined as a member cf the Indian C Police Service and a Cadre post is defined as any of the posts specified under item 1 of each cadre in the schedule to the Indian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regnlations, 1955. Rule 4(1) provides that the strength and composition of a cadre constituted for each State or group of States shall be as determined by Regulations made by the Central Government in consultation with the State D Governments. Rule 4(2) requires the Central Government to re-examine the strength and composition of each such cadre at intervals of iovery three years in consultation with the State Government conorned and to make such alterations as it deems fit.\n\nThe first proviso to Rule 4(2) expressly stipulates that the power of the Central\n\nGovernment to alter the strength and composition of any cadre at any other time is not affected by rule 4(2). The second proviso to r. 4(2) enables the State Government to add, for 'a period not exceeding one year,. and iwth the approval of the Central Government for a further period not exceeding two years, to a State cadre one or more ppsts carrying duties or responsibilities of a like nature to a cadre post. Rule 6 authorises the deputation of cadre officers for service under the Central Government or another State Government or under a Company, Association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Central Government or a State Government, a Municipal Corporation or a Local body or an international organisation etc. etc. Rule 8 prescribes \"save as otherwise provided in these rules, every cadre post shall be filled by a cadre officer\". Rule 9(1) provides for the temporary appointment of a non-cadre officer to a cadre post if the State Government is satisfied that the vacancy is not likely to last for more than three months or if there is no suitable cadre officer available for filling the vacancy.\n\nWhere a non-cadre officer is appointed to a cadre post for a period exceeding three months the State Government is required forthwith to report the fact to the Central Government together with their reasons for making the\n\n.•.. _.\\.-\n\nappointment. The Central Government may then.direct the State Government to terminate the appointment of such person and to appoint a cadre officer to the post, in which ca9~ the State Govertunent iS bound to give effect to the directian.\n\nWhere a cadre post is likely to be filled by a non-cadre officer for a period exceeding six months the Central Government is required to report the full facts to the.\n\nUnion Public Service Commission and may thereafter give appropriate directions to the State Government in the light of the advice given by the. union Public Service Commission.\n\nPursuant to the powers conferred by R. 4(1) of the Indian Police Service Cadre Rules, the Central Government has made the Indian Police Service (Fixatian of Cadre Strength) Regulations 1955, determining the strength and compooition of the cadres of each of the States.\n\nIn the schedule the total anthorised cadre strength for the State of Punjab is mentioned as 70 consisting of 34 Senior Posts w:der the State Government, 14 Senior posts under the Central Government, 7 Deputation Reserve posts, 6 Leave Reserve posts and 7 Junior posts and 4 Training Reserve posts.\n\nThe thirty four senior posts under the State Govertunent are also particularly specified.\n\nThirty six out of the total of forty eight Senior posts under the Central and State Gavernments, the deputation Reserve posts, the Leave Reserve posts, the Junior posts and the Training Reserve posts are all stated to be 'direct recruitment posts' while the remaining 12 Senior posts m; ider the Central and State Governments are stated to be \"promotion pqsts\". It is necessary to mention here that the thirty four posts specified as \"Senior posts under the State Government\" are shown as item 1 of the schedule and the fourteen Senior posts under the Central Government are shown as item 2 of the schedule.\n\nThe Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rnles, 1954 provide for recruitment to the Service (a) by a competitive service and (b) by promotion of substantive members of a State Police Service.\n\nRule 9 ( 1) empowers the Central Government to recruit to the Indian Police\n\nService persons by promotion from amongst the substantive members of the State Police Service in accordance with Regulations made by the Central Government. The recruitment is required to be made on the recommendation of the State Government concerned and in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission. Rule 9(2) provides that the total number of persons recruited by promotion shall not at any time exceed 25% of the number of posts shown against item No. , 1 and 2 of the cadre in the schedule to the Indian Police Service\n\n(Fixatfon of Cadre Strength) Regulation.\n\nItems 1 and 2, we have already mentioned are Senior posts nnder the State and the Central Govertunents.\n\nThe Indian Police Service (Appointment 'by Promotion) Regulations 1955, made pursnaJ1t to Rule 9(1) of the Indian Police Service\n\nRecrnitment Rules 1954 prescribes a very elaborate procedure for making appointments by promotion to the Indian Police Service.\n\nA Selection Committee is required to be constituted for each State consisting of the Chairman or any other member of the Union Public Service Commission and other members specified in the schedule. In the case of Punjab the other members are the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, the Secretary to the Government of Punjab in the Home Department, the Inspector General of Police and a nominee of the Government of India not below the rank of Joint Secretary. The Selection Committee is required to meet at intervals ordinarily not exceeding one year and to consider the cases of all eligible substantive members of the State Police Service. The Committee is required to prepare a list of such eligible members of the State Police Service who are suitable for promotion to the Indian Police Service The selection for inclusion in the list is to be based on merit and suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority but the names of the officers included in the list are required to be arranged in order of seniority in. the State Police Service.\n\nThe list prepared by the Selection Committee is then to be forwarded to the Union Public Service Commission by the State Govermnent with all relevant records, the reasons recorded by the Committee for any _proposed supersession of any member E of the State Police Service and the observation of the State Government on the recommendation of the Committee. Thereafter the Union Public Service Commission is to consider the list prepared by the Committee and to make any changes considered by them, to be necessary, after informing the State Government of the proposed changes. The list as finally approved by the Commission is to form 'the Select List of the members of the State Police Service.' All appointments of members of the State Police Service from the Select List to posts borne on the State cadre are to be made in accordance with the provisions of R. 9 of the Cadre Rules. In making the appointments the State Government is to follow the order in which the 'names of such officers appear in the Select List except where administrative exigencies require otherwise and the vacancy is not likely to last for more than thre_e months. Appointments of members to the Indian Police Service are to be made by the Central Government on the recommendation of the State Government in the order in wliich the names of the members of the , State Police Service appear in the\n\nSelect List for ths time being in force.\n\nWe arrive :finally at the Indian Police Service (Regulation cf Seniority) Rules 1954. Rules 3 provides that every officer shall be assigned\n\n... , t(\n\na year of allotment in accordance with the provisions of that rule.\n\nRule 3(3)(b) prescribes that the year of allotment of an. officer who is appointed to the service by promotion in accordance with rule 9 of the Recruitment rules, shall be the year of allotment of the junior most among the officers recruited by competitive examination who officiated continuously in a Senior post from a date earlier than the date of commencement of such officiation by the officer 'lippoi'nted to the service by promotion. 'Senior post' was originally defined as a post included and specified :under item 1 of the cadre of each State in the Schedule to the Indian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulation and as including posts declared by the State Government as equivalent to such posts.\n\nThe definition was amended with effect from April 22, 1967 and the present definition does not include posts declared equivalent by the State Government to cadre posts.\n\nRule 4 ( 1) provides that the seniority of officers inter-se shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the rules. Rule 4( 4) provides that the Seniority of officers who are assigned the same year\n\n<if allotment shall be in the order of the dates on which they started officiating continuously in the Senior post, but in the case of Officers appointed to the service by promotion, the dates of officiation shall be the same as the _dates taken into account for the purpose of assignment of year of allotment under rule 3 ( 3). Where the dates of commencement of continuous officiation in a Senior post of more than one Officer appointed to the service by promotion is the same their seniority inter-se shall be in the order of their dates of appointment to the service and where the date of appointment is also the same it shall be in the order in which their names are arranged on the date of their appointment to the service in the Select List.\n\nThese are the Statutory provisions, Rules and Regulations with which we are concerned in the present appeals. What are primarily in question are the year of allotment and the Seniority of the two officers, Harjeet Singh and B: R. Kapur.\n\nSo, therefore, our primary concern is with the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954- Rule 3(3)(b) as well as rule 4(4) throw up the date of continuous officiation of an officer in a -cadre post as the most important factor both for the purpose of assignment of yoor of allotment and for the purpose of assignment of seniority.\n\nFor the purpose of a1; signment of year of allotment the date of continuous officiation in a senior post Is the only relevant factor while for th\" purpose of assignment of seniority, first, the date of continuous officiation in a senior post is the only relevant factor while for the if the date of commencement of continuous officiation in a Senior\n\npost of more than one officer is the same and, finally, the order in the Select List if the date of appointment is also the same, are the several relevant factors in thi!_t order. Thus the order in the Select List is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the year of allotment and is relevant in determining the seniority, only if the year of allotment of the Officers is the same and their date of appoi\"ntment is also the same. Since th~ order in the Slect List is dependent on the seniority in the State Service, it follows that seniority in the State Police Service is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the year of allotment and is relevant for the purpose of determining the se\"niority only if the year of allotment and the date of appointment of two or more officers are the same. It must, therefore, necessarily follow that an officer who is junior to another in the State Police .Service but, who starts continuous officiation in a Senior post from a date earlier than the other, may frog-leap and gain Seniority by the 'consequential assignment of an earlier year of allotment.\n\nThere is nothing in the Indian Police Servi¢ (Regulatiorn of Senidrity) Rules, which has the effect of depriving an officer the benefit of continuous officiation on the ground that some one senior to him in the State Police Service did not so continuously officiate.\n\nNor are we able to discover any other rule in the innumerable Rules and Regulations governing the recruitment, appointment and Regulation of Seniority of officers of the Indian Police Service which is designed to deprive an officer, the benefit of continuous officiation in a Senior post.\n\nOne of the submissions made to us by the respondents was that the Select List having been prepared on grounds of merit and ability, the order in which officers were ranked in the Select List should not be disturbed after they wer.e actually promoted to the Indian Police Service. This submission is without substance. Though under the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, th\" Select\n\nList is prepared on the basis of merit and ability, the order in which officers are placed in the Select List is according to seniority in the State Police Service and not according to merit and ability. Merit and ability are considered for the purpose of inclusion in the Select List but thereafter seniority in the State Police Service takes ctver and the names of Officers are arranged in the order of that seniority. We, are, therefore, satisfied that the benefit of continuous officiation in a Senior post cannot be denied to an officer appointed to the Indian Police Service merely on the ground that an officer senior to him in the State Police Service did not so conthmously officiate.\n\nIt is, however, true that under Regulation 8 of the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, appointments to\n\n... Ai\n\ncadre posts from among non-cadre officers should be made according to the order in which the names of such officers appear in the Select List.\n\nA deviation from the order is permissible if administrative exigencies require it and if the vacancy is not likely to last for more than three months. Of course, the Regulation does not license nninhibited deviation to favour individnal non-cadre officers. If that is done the deviation is liable to challenge. But where there is no such allegation, there is no reason why a junior non-cadre officer should lose the benefit of his continnous officiation in a cadre post merely because a non-cadre officer senior to him in the Select List did not continuously officiate likewise.\n\nIn such a situation, it would be for the Government of India to consider whether the relevant rules may not be so relaxed as to enable such non-cadre officer to add his officiation in a non-cadre post to his officiation in a cadre post, regard being had to the circumstances under which the officer had to work in a non-cadre post while his junior in the Select List was made to fill the cadre post.\n\nBut, surely, it caµnot work to the prejudice of the junior officer in the Select List so as to nullify the actual, continuous, officiating service rendered by him. In the present case there is no allegation that B. R. Kapur was appointed to tbe non-cadre posts of Director of Sports and Additional Controller of Stores with a view to favour Harjeet Singh.\n\nNow, the question for consideration is whether non-cadre officers are to be denied the benefit of continuous officiation in senior post merely because cadre officers were appointed on deputation elsewhere in excess of the number of posts specified against 'Deputation Reserve' in the schedule to the Cadre Fixation of Strength Regulation.\n\nWe are unable to discover any provision in the Seniority Rules, Recruitment Rules, Cadre Rules or the Cadre Regulations which would lead to such a consequence.\n\nTo begin with it has to be borne in mind that the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations are made in exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by Rule 4 (1) of the Cadre Rules and are, therefore, subordinate to the Cadre rules even as rules made in exercise of powers conferred by a Statute are necessarily subordinate to the Statute.\n\nRule 6 of the Cadre Rules provides for th'e deputation of Cadre Officers and Rule 9 of the same rules provides for the temporary appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre posts. In making appointments of non-cadre officers to cadre posts the rule prescribes the fulfilment of certain condition~. It is not disputed that the conditions prescribed by Rule 9 of the Cadre Rules were fulfilled. That the conditions were fulfilled is also apparent from the very impugned order. If non-cadre officers are appointed to cadre posts in accordance with Rule 9 of the Cadre Rules, is there\n\nany justification for denying the non-cadre officer the benefit of officiation in the cadre post on the ground that more cadre officers than the number specified in the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations had been deputed for service elsewhere ? It is not disputed that the deputation of cadre officers was in accordance with' Rule 6 of the Cadre Rules. True, Rule 4(1) of the Cadre Rule enables. the Central Govern~ ment to make Regulations determining the strength and composition of the Cadre of each State. It is also true that a definite number of posts is specified against 'Deputation Reserve' in the schedule to the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations. But if owing to the situational demands and exigencies of the administration the number is exceeded and the State Government is compelled to utilise the services of experienced non-cadre oflicers to fill cadre posts in strict compliance with the Cadre Rules, we see no reason to hold that the service render- ' ed by the non-cadre officers in such posts should be ignored.\n\nOn the other hand we think that the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regufations made under Rule 4 of the Cadre Rules do not over-ride D the Recruitment Rule, the remaining Cadre Rules and the Seniority Rules so as to render invalid any service rendered by a non-cadre officer in a cadre post on the mere ground of breach of the Fixation. of Cadre Strength Regulations, when there has been strict 'compliance with Rule 9 of the Cadre Rufos.\n\nWe think that fixation of Cadre\n\nstrength is the exclusive concern of the Central and the State Governments and the Regulations are made for their convenience and better relationship.\n\nExcessive utilisation of 'Deputation or Central Reserve' is a matter for adjustment an:d controversy between the Central and the State Governments and is of no concern to any member of the Service.\n\nFor example no cadre officer who is asked to fill a deputation post can refuse to join the post on the ground that the 'Deputation Reserve' has already been exceeded.\n\nThe Regulations are not intended to and do not confer any right on any member of the Service, unlike some other Rules which do confer or create rights in the members of the Services.\n\nAmong other Rules, for instance, Rule 9(2) of the Recruitment Rules stipulates that the total number of persons recruited by promotion shall not at any time exceed 25 % of the posts shown against item Nos. 1 and 2 of the cadre in the schedule to the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations. Now, if at a point of time this limit is exceeded, direct recruits may have a just cause for complaint and it may perhaps be held that to the extent of the excess the appointments by promotion are invalid and confer no rights of seniority over direct recruits.\n\nBut, as we said, the Fixation of Strength Regulation confer no rights on members of the Service and a mere breach of the Regulation furnishes no cause of action to any member of the service\n\n\\ -~\n\non the ground that his sniority is affected in some round abou1 way<\n\nA 1\n\nWe may add that there is no suggestion that Rule 9(2) of the Recruitment Rules was contravened.\n\nIt was brought to our notice that several Senior cadre officers had to be deputed to organise Battalions of the Punjab Armed Police which came to be formed after the Chinese, aggression in 1962 and at the time of the Inda-Pakistan War in 1965.\n\nIt was in the vacancies caused by their deputation that Senior officers of the State Police Services were appointed to cadre posts. Under Rule 6(A) (2) of the Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules a direct recruit in the junior time scare of pay C'an be appointed to a post in the Senior ti.Jne scale of pay if having regard to his length of service, experience and performance he is found to be suitable for appointment to a post in the Senior time scale of pay. It appears that, at that time, in Punjab, there was no direct recruit in tl1e Junior tinJe scaile of pay who possessed experience of atleast four years who could be thought of for appointment in the Senior post.\n\nThe State Government, therefore, had no option except to appoint experienced and suitable non-cadre officers to cadre posts. It was also brought to our notice that no cadre officer who had been so deputed suffered in any manner in the matter of his career.\n\nIt was repeatedly suggested that the State Governments were generally in the habit of adopting stratagem of sending cadre officer on deputation in excess of the Deputation Reserve in order to enable Officers of the State Services to officiate in cadre posts so as to further enable them to get the benefit of such continuous officiation when finally appointed to an All India Service.\n\nWhatever truth tl1ere may be in the suggestion it has to be remembered firstly that the appointment of noncadre officers to cadre posts is subject to the directions of the Central Government who may terminate such appointment. The Central Government too is bound to obtain the advice of the, Union Public Service Commission if the appointment is to extend beyond six months. Next, it bas also to be borne in mind that non-cadre officers of proven merit only are appointed to cadre posts. They are appointed to cadre posts if they are already in the Select List and the appointments lso are made in accordance wth the order in which they are placed in the Select List.\n\nWe have earlier mentioned how the Select List itself if prepared under the Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules after following an elaborate procedure involving a thorough examination of various levels, of the merit of the officers of the State Police Service. A State officer whose name _appears on the Select List may expect to be appointed to a Cadre post and to be promoted to the Indian Police Service at any time thereafter according to vacancy position.\n\nA direct recruit who ordinarily comes into the picture years after a State Officer's uame appears on the Select List cannot have any real grievance that the promoted officer is given an ante.rior date for the purpose of seniority since such date can never be earlier than the date from which the junior most direct recruit continuously officiated in a Senior post prior to the commencement of the conti1; mous officiation of the promoted officer .\n\nWe are also unable to appreciate the submission of Shri R. K. Garg that every departure from a rule, which departure gives certain advantages to one group of civil servants as against another necessarily involves an encroachment of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitutiop. The proposition is widely stated, far fetched in relation to the facts of the instant case and not supported by N. K. Chauhan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat(') on which Shri Garg relied.\n\nIn Chauhan's case the Court was considering the effect of the breach of a 'Quota' rule fixing the proportion of 'direct recruits' and 'promotees'.\n\nIn the present case, as already noticed by us, there is no allegation of breach of the 'quota' rule embodied in Rule 9 (2) of the Recruitment Rules.\n\nThe Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations cannot be interpreted as comprising any 'Quota' rule.\n\nThe consequential submission of Shri Garg that rule 3 (3 )(b), if so interpreted as to take into account officiation in contravention of the rules, offends Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, therefore, lose& all force particularly in view of what we have said about the true nature of the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regulations.\n\nWe also notice that the vires of Rule 3(3)(b) of the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules which is in similar terms as rule 3 ( 3 )(b) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A. P. Sharma v. Union of Indid. (')\n\nIn the light of our foregoing discussion we hold that the 'over utilisation' of 'Deputation and Central Reserve' does not affect the questions of assignment of the year of allotment and the seniority of the appellants. The concurrent finding of the learned single judge and the Division Bench that Kapur's service as Commandant, P.A.P.\n\nBattalion No. 25 was service in a Senior post was not challenged before us.\n\nShri Mridul argued that the records reveal that Kapur's appointment to the posts of Director of Sports and Adrlitional Controller of Stores was because of his exceptional ability and, therefore, those posts must be treated as cadre posts.\n\nIn any event, he suggested that we should invite the Government of India to suitably\n\n(I) [1977] I S. C.R. 1037\n\n(2) 1968 Service Law Reporter 582 ,\n\n-~·\n\nrelax the rules so as to enable Kapur's service as Director of Sports and Additional Controller of Stores to be reckoned as service in cadre posts.\n\nWe cannot of course hold Kapur's service in noncadre posts as service in cadre posts. Nor can we give the direction sought by Shri Mridul. It is of course open to Kapur to invoke the power of the Government of India to relax the rules and it is for the Government to take a just decision in the matter. We have no advice to offer.\n\nBoth the Civil Appeals are allowed, the Judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the judgment of the Single Judge is restored.\n\nWrit Petition Nos. 520-524 have been filed by some of the direct recruits questioning the vires of rule 3 ( 3 )(b) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules and Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matter) Rules, 1960 which vests in the Government. of India the power to relax.\n\nWe have upheld the validity of Rule 3 (3 )(b) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules and the question of the vires of Rule 3 of the All India Service (Conditions of Service residuary matters) rules does not arise at present.\n\nThe Writ Petitions are also dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals allowed and Petitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "HARJEET SINGH ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARJEET SINGH ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA ]YER AND 0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 622, "end_char": 640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. R. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. Kapur \\Vas senior to Harjeet Singh as Deputy Superintendent of Police.", "canonical_name": "B. R.\n\nKapur"}}, {"text": "Harjeet Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. Kapur \\Vas senior to Harjeet Singh as Deputy Superintendent of Police.", "canonical_name": "HARJEET SINGH ETC"}}, {"text": "November 24, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1960, B~ R. Kapur was appointed as A'Ssista."}}, {"text": "B~ R. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1323, "end_char": 1334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1960, B~ R. Kapur was appointed as A'Ssista.", "canonical_name": "B. R.\n\nKapur"}}, {"text": "November 18, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1591, "end_char": 1608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He held this post upto November 18, 1962, and thereafter he was appQinted as Additional Controller of Stores, Punjab which was also a non<.Odre post."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1678, "end_char": 1684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He held this post upto November 18, 1962, and thereafter he was appQinted as Additional Controller of Stores, Punjab which was also a non<.Odre post."}}, {"text": "July 11, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He held the post till July 11, 1966 when he took over as Commandant of 25th Battalion PAP."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2006, "end_char": 2021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the reorganisation of the State of Punjab, he was appointed as Assistsant General of Police, State of Punjab from November l, 1966."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2676, "end_char": 2695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P...ftec the l\\\\'O officers were appointed to the Indian Police Service the question of assignment of year of allotment and fixation of seniority arQ6C for the consideration of the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Sube Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2759, "end_char": 2769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri B. R. Kapur was allotted the year 1963 and placed below Sube Singh and above S. R. Sharma (direcl recruits) in the Jndian Police Service, counting his continuoUs officiating service from 1-11-66 only, as service in a senior cadre post and not his service in the\n\nA non-cadre post."}}, {"text": "S. R. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2780, "end_char": 2792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri B. R. Kapur was allotted the year 1963 and placed below Sube Singh and above S. R. Sharma (direcl recruits) in the Jndian Police Service, counting his continuoUs officiating service from 1-11-66 only, as service in a senior cadre post and not his service in the\n\nA non-cadre post."}}, {"text": "1-11-66", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2890, "end_char": 2897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri B. R. Kapur was allotted the year 1963 and placed below Sube Singh and above S. R. Sharma (direcl recruits) in the Jndian Police Service, counting his continuoUs officiating service from 1-11-66 only, as service in a senior cadre post and not his service in the\n\nA non-cadre post."}}, {"text": "Harject Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3000, "end_char": 3013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Harject Singh, though he admittedly officiated continuously in a senior cadre post from December 1960, he was also allotted to the year 1963 and placed below Sri Kapur on the ground that he ranked\n\nelo¥/ Sri Kapur in the select list.", "canonical_name": "HARJEET SINGH ETC"}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3162, "end_char": 3167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Harject Singh, though he admittedly officiated continuously in a senior cadre post from December 1960, he was also allotted to the year 1963 and placed below Sri Kapur on the ground that he ranked\n\nelo¥/ Sri Kapur in the select list.", "canonical_name": "Kapur"}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3235, "end_char": 3240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapur and Harjeet Singh filed \\\\Tit petitions in the High Court of PlUljab and Haryana quelltioning the allotment of the year 1963.", "canonical_name": "Kapur"}}, {"text": "High Court of PlUljab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3288, "end_char": 3321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapur and Harjeet Singh filed \\\\Tit petitions in the High Court of PlUljab and Haryana quelltioning the allotment of the year 1963."}}, {"text": "J-Jarjeet Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3511, "end_char": 3526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court directed the Union and Punjab Government& to redetermine the year of allotment and seniority of J-Jarjeet Singh and Kapur taking December 17, 1960 and July 29, 1965 respectively as the dates of their continuous officiation in '-!."}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.ru.lian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4705, "end_char": 4729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arguments before the Division Bench therefore was that the period of service attributable to over utilisation of 'deputation and central reserve' quota should not be treated as service in a senior post for the purpose of determining the year of allotment of officers promoted to the I.ru.lian Police Service."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4815, "end_char": 4833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument was accepted by the Division Bench and a direction was issued to ithe Central Government to reconsider the question of year of allotment after taking into consideration the question of over utilisation and its effect."}}, {"text": "Regulation of Seniority Rules 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5505, "end_char": 5539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cadre Strength Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11418, "end_char": 11444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fixation of cadre strength Regulations made under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11915, "end_char": 11969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "HARJEET SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13933, "end_char": 13946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[475B-D]\n\nHARJEET SINGH V. UNION 463\n\nFurther, the appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre post.", "canonical_name": "HARJEET SINGH ETC"}}, {"text": "C'.entral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14122, "end_char": 14142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C'.entral Government too is bound to obtain the advice of the Union Public Service Commission if the appointment is to extent beyond six months."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14184, "end_char": 14215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C'.entral Government too is bound to obtain the advice of the Union Public Service Commission if the appointment is to extent beyond six months."}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14867, "end_char": 14888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A State Officer whose name appears on the Select List may expect to be appointed to a cadre post and lo be promoted to the Indian Police Service at any time thereafter according to vacancy position."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15622, "end_char": 15640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 SCR 1037", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15919, "end_char": 15936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C!viL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16134, "end_char": 16162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[476F-G]\n\nC!viL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16377, "end_char": 16387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jawahar Lal Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16410, "end_char": 16427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nJawahar Lal Gupta and S. Ghose for the Appellant in CA 2526/ 77.", "canonical_name": "Jawahar Lal Gupta"}}, {"text": "S. Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16432, "end_char": 16440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nJawahar Lal Gupta and S. Ghose for the Appellant in CA 2526/ 77."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16476, "end_char": 16488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, M. R. Agnihotri and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellant\n\nin CA 2413/78."}}, {"text": "M. R. Agnihotri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16490, "end_char": 16505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, M. R. Agnihotri and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellant\n\nin CA 2413/78."}}, {"text": "P. C. Bhartari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16510, "end_char": 16524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, M. R. Agnihotri and P. C. Bhartari for the Appellant\n\nin CA 2413/78."}}, {"text": "P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16563, "end_char": 16572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the State of Punjab in both the appeals. _"}}, {"text": "M. S. Dhillon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16577, "end_char": 16590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma and M. S. Dhillon for the State of Punjab in both the appeals. _"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16641, "end_char": 16657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Lal Narain Sinha Att."}}, {"text": "S. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16691, "end_char": 16704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader and Miss S. Subhashini for the Union of India in all the appeals."}}, {"text": "H. L. Sibal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16749, "end_char": 16760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Sibal, R. K. Garg and R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "H. L. Sibal"}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16762, "end_char": 16772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Sibal, R. K. Garg and R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "R. S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16777, "end_char": 16788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. L. Sibal, R. K. Garg and R. S. Sodhi for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Articles 226 and 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17913, "end_char": 17932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17975, "end_char": 18007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On selection by the Punjab Public Service Commission, B. R.\n\nKapur and Harjeet Singh were directly recruited, in 1951, as Deputy Superintendents of Police in the Punjab Police Service."}}, {"text": "B. R.\n\nKapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18009, "end_char": 18021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On selection by the Punjab Public Service Commission, B. R.\n\nKapur and Harjeet Singh were directly recruited, in 1951, as Deputy Superintendents of Police in the Punjab Police Service.", "canonical_name": "B. R.\n\nKapur"}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18117, "end_char": 18138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On selection by the Punjab Public Service Commission, B. R.\n\nKapur and Harjeet Singh were directly recruited, in 1951, as Deputy Superintendents of Police in the Punjab Police Service."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18979, "end_char": 18992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From July 19, 1965, he was Commandant, 40th Battalion, PAP, J & K, which was a cadre post."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19188, "end_char": 19203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the reorganisation of the State of Punjab, he\n\n' ..\n\nwa, s appointed as Assist.ant Inspector General of Police, State of Punjab from November 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19429, "end_char": 19446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter he continuously held cadre posts and was finally appointed to the Indian Police Service with effect from September 3, 1969."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20578, "end_char": 20594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was, therefore, treated as having continuously officiated in a senior coore post from November 1, 1966 o'nly."}}, {"text": "B. R Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20829, "end_char": 20839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Harjeet Singh, though admittedly he officiated continuously in a senior cadre post from December, 1960 he was also allotted to the year 1963 and placed below Shri B. R Kapur on the ground that he ranked below Shri B. R. Kapur in the select list.", "canonical_name": "B. R.\n\nKapur"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20972, "end_char": 21004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Harjeet Singh filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana questioning the allotment of the year 1963 to them for the purpose of seniority in the Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22426, "end_char": 22435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harjeet Sihgh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22679, "end_char": 22692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued before the Division Bench on behalf of the direct recruits that neither B. R. Kapur nor Harjeet Sihgh would have ever started officiating in the senior post on the dates from which they officiated or claimed to have officiated in senior posts, if the State Government had not created artificial vacancies by excessive utilisation of 'the deputation and central reserve' quota in contravention of the Cadre Rules and the Cadre-strength Regulations.", "canonical_name": "HARJEET SINGH ETC"}}, {"text": "Jawahar Lal Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23770, "end_char": 23787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Jawahar Lal Gupta, learned counsel for Harjeet Singh argued that the service of Harjeet Singh in a senior cadre post was approved by the Government of India and once it was so approved the question whether there was over utilisation of deputation and central reserve quota was irrelevant for the purpose of determihing the year of allotment.. The only relevant question was whether the appellant bad continuously officiated in a senior post and, from what date.", "canonical_name": "Jawahar Lal Gupta"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24729, "end_char": 24735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mridul, learned counsel for B. R. Kapur, argued that\n\n' •\n\n• ' ·,\n\nthe single Judge of the High Court was wrong in excluding the period of service of B. R. Kapur as Director of Sports and as Additional Controller of Stores in determining the year of allotment."}}, {"text": "B. R. K.apnr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25042, "end_char": 25054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further contended that in any event the case of B. R. K.apnr was an .appropriate one for the exercise by the Central Government of its\n\npawer to reLix the rules and that this Court should give a direction to the Central Government to relax the rules so as to enable that part of Kapur's service to be treated as service in a &<nior pool.", "canonical_name": "B. R.\n\nKapur"}}, {"text": "H. L. Sibal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25338, "end_char": 25349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri H. L. Sibal, learned counsel for one of the respondents argued that the number of cadre officers who could be deputed by the Central and State Governments for servie>< elsewhere was limited and fixed by the fndian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations.", "canonical_name": "H. L. Sibal"}}, {"text": "Central and State Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25463, "end_char": 25492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri H. L. Sibal, learned counsel for one of the respondents argued that the number of cadre officers who could be deputed by the Central and State Governments for servie>< elsewhere was limited and fixed by the fndian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26376, "end_char": 26386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri R. K. Garg, who appeared for the remaining respondents urged that to permit promoted officers to take advantage of the deviation from the Cadre Rules and the Cadre Fixation of\n\nStrength Regulations for the purpose of gaining an advantage under the Seniority Rules would be a denial of the equal protection of the\n\nlaws to the direct rcruits who would be affected by such procedure.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "Article 312", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27080, "end_char": 27091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27105, "end_char": 27115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 312 ( 1) empomrs Parliament to provide, by law, for the\n\ncration of All India Services common to the Union ahd the States."}}, {"text": "Article 312(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27212, "end_char": 27226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 312(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27425, "end_char": 27436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27454, "end_char": 27458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27466, "end_char": 27494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 2(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27676, "end_char": 27683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the All India Services Act, 1951", "statute": "the All India Services Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27685, "end_char": 27691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the All India Services Act, 1951", "statute": "the All India Services Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28002, "end_char": 28006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the All India Services Act, 1951", "statute": "the All India Services Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Indian C Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28159, "end_char": 28182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Cadre Officer is defined as a member cf the Indian C Police Service and a Cadre post is defined as any of the posts specified under item 1 of each cadre in the schedule to the Indian Police Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regnlations, 1955."}}, {"text": "State or group of States shall be as determined by Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28446, "end_char": 28508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28897, "end_char": 28916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first proviso to Rule 4(2) expressly stipulates that the power of the Central\n\nGovernment to alter the strength and composition of any cadre at any other time is not affected by rule 4(2)."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30738, "end_char": 30769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union Public Service Commission and may thereafter give appropriate directions to the State Government in the light of the advice given by the."}}, {"text": "Recrnitment Rules 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33268, "end_char": 33290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33666, "end_char": 33686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Punjab the other members are the Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, the Secretary to the Government of Punjab in the Home Department, the Inspector General of Police and a nominee of the Government of India not below the rank of Joint Secretary."}}, {"text": "April 22, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36866, "end_char": 36880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The definition was amended with effect from April 22, 1967 and the present definition does not include posts declared equivalent by the State Government to cadre posts."}}, {"text": "R. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38181, "end_char": 38189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What are primarily in question are the year of allotment and the Seniority of the two officers, Harjeet Singh and B: R. Kapur."}}, {"text": "are unable to discover any provision in the Seniority Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43620, "end_char": 43679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cadre Officers and Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44189, "end_char": 44212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "On the other hand we think that the Fixation of Cadre Strength Regufations made under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45753, "end_char": 45843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cadre Rules and the Seniority Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45920, "end_char": 45955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cadre Strength Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46089, "end_char": 46115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Armed Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47958, "end_char": 47977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was brought to our notice that several Senior cadre officers had to be deputed to organise Battalions of the Punjab Armed Police which came to be formed after the Chinese, aggression in 1962 and at the time of the Inda-Pakistan War in 1965."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51266, "end_char": 51284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51476, "end_char": 51480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of Gujarat(') on which Shri Garg relied."}}, {"text": "Chauhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51493, "end_char": 51500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Chauhan's case the Court was considering the effect of the breach of a 'Quota' rule fixing the proportion of 'direct recruits' and 'promotees'."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52042, "end_char": 52060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53238, "end_char": 53257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In any event, he suggested that we should invite the Government of India to suitably\n\n(I) [1977] I S. C.R. 1037\n\n(2) 1968 Service Law Reporter 582 ,\n~·\n\nrelax the rules so as to enable Kapur's service as Director of Sports and Additional Controller of Stores to be reckoned as service in cadre posts."}}, {"text": "Government. of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54241, "end_char": 54261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "520-524 have been filed by some of the direct recruits questioning the vires of rule 3 ( 3 )(b) of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules and Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matter) Rules, 1960 which vests in the Government."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_478_484_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "R. R. VERMA AND ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India, 1950, Article 133-Writ Petition dismissed as infruc .. tuous-Grant of Certificate of fitness, propriety of.\n\nAll India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary nuuters) Rules, 1960, whether offends Article 14 of Constitution, as conferring arbitrary and un .. canalised power upon the Central Government to grant Y![laxation wheneverit pleased to do so.\n\nPower to I'..eview its earlier orders by the Central G'overnment when such a power of revielt.' is not expressly conferred by the rules.\n\nOne Sri Ahluv.1alia a senior_ n1ember of the Indian Police 8ervice sought to quash the decision of the Union of India dated 26·6-1976 whereby his year D of allotment was fixed as 1965. When the Writ Petition of Sri Ahluwalia was pending in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, some of the respondents in that Writ Petition and one R. R. \\ 7erma-all direct recruits, choose to file a \\Vrit Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1973 calling upon them to subn1it representations against the year of allotmenb proposed to be allotted to M/s. Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia.\n\nAfter the \\Vrit Petition of Ahluw; ili; i wits allowed, and after the Central Government E passed the. order dated July 27, 1979, pursuant to the direction issued by the High Court of lfimachal Pradesh to .Union of India tG refix the seniority and year of allotment to Sri Ahluwalia, the Delhi High Court dismissed the \\'\\'rit Petition filed by the direct recruits as infructuous. The High Court, however granted -a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court under Article 133 of the Constitutiori.\n\nF Dismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The Writ Petition having been dismissed as iafroctuous it is not proper on the part of the High Court to grant a certificate of fitness under Article 133 Df the Constitution.\n\n[480G-HJ\n\n2. Rule 3 of the AH. Jndb Services. (Conditions of Service-residuary matters) Rules., 1960 is couched in a language suggestive of near-aut.ocratic G power reminiscent of \"bad old days\" of the Imperial Raj but, the rule is not ment to vest the Central Government with power to pass any order they like \\V.ith a view to promote the interests of a favoured Civil servant.\n\nIt ls really meant to relax. In approprate cases, the relentless rigour of a mecbanicai application of the rules,. so that civil servants may not be subjected to undue and undeserved hardship.\n\nSufficient guidance can be had from the very role and from the scheme of the various statutory provisions dealing with the con.- ff ditions of service of Members of the AU India Service.\n\n[481G-H, 482A-B]\n\n3. Rule 3 is not unconstitutional on the ground that it vests an unfettered discretion in the Government. Section 3 of the All India Services Act enables.\n\nR. R. VERMA V. UNION 479\n\nthe Central Government in consultation with the Governments of the tes:\n\nconcerned to make rules for the regulation of. recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All Indra' Service. Pursuant to the power given by Section 3 of the All India Services Act the Central Government bas made innumerable sets of rules, some common to all the All India Services and some applicable separately to each of the All India Services.\n\nThe All India Services (Leave) Rules, the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, the all India Services Cfravelling Allowance) Rules, and the All ladia Services (Conditions of Servite-residuary matters) Rules are examples of rules made under Section 3 of the All India Services ~>\\.ct which are common to all the All India Services.\n\nThe Indian Police: Service (Cadre) Rules, the Indian Police Service (R.ecruitment) Rules~ the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules are examples of rules made under section 3 of the All India Services Act applicable to a single All India Service. namely, the Indian Police Service.\n\nThe rules deal with countless matters ¥.'hich concern a civil servant, such as creation of cadre, fixation of Cadre Strength, recruitment, seniority, promotion, leave, allowances, conduct, discipline and appeal, and a host of such other matters.\n\nThe golden thread, which runsthrough the entire complex fabric or rules is the securing of honest and com petent civil servants.\n\nIntegrity and efficiency are the hall marks of any Civil service anywhere and they are what are contemplated and aimed at by the wide range of rules.\n\nThe interest to be served is always the public interest and not individual interest.\n\nPublic interest, in the matter of the conditions of serviae of civil srvants, is best served by rules which are directed towards efficiency and integrity. [482B-G & 483D]\n\nNow very wide as the range covered by the rules is, the rules can never be exhaustive. Unforeseen and complex situations often arise.\n\nVery often it is found that all too strict application -of a rule works undue hardship on a civil servant, resuhing in injustice and inequity, causing disappointment and frustration to the civil servant and finally leading to the defeat of the verv objects aimed at by the rules namely efficiency and integrity of civil servants.\n\nHence it is that the Central Government is vested with a reserve Power under ntle 3 tv deal with unforeseen and unpredicatable situations, and to relieve the civil servants from the infliction cl undue hardship and to do justice and equity. It does not mean that the Central Government is free to do wha_t they like, regardless of right or wrong; nor does it n1ean that the Courts are powerless to correct them.\n\nThe Central Government is. b-Ound to exercise the powe.r in the public inte 1rest with a view to secure civil servants of efficiency and integrity, and when and only when undue hardship is caused by the application of the rules, the power to relax is to exercised in a just and equitable manner but, again, only to the extent necessary for so dealing with the case\n\nforeovcr, the exercise of the power of relaxation like all other administrative action affecting rights of parties is subject to judicial review on grounds no\\\\• well known.\n\n[482G-H, 483A-C]\n\n4. It is not correct to say that the principle that the power to review 1nust be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication iS applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature.\n\nTo extend the principle to pure administrative decisions .wduld indeed lead to untoward and startling resu1ts. Surely, any Government must 'be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters, If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hide-bound by the rnles and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Again, if administrative decisions\" are reviewed, the decisions taken after revie\\v are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a Court.\n\n[483F-H, 484A]\n\nPatel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v.\n\nPradvaniunsinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273; D. N. Roy and S. K. Banerjee and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 522 and State of Assam and Anr. v. !. N. Roy Biswas [1976t 2 S.C.R. 128, distinguished. c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2686 of 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 27-8-1979 of the Dell1i High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 844/78.\n\nR. K. Garg and C. M. Nair for the Appellant.\n\nH. S. Marwah for the Respondent No. 6.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde .and P. P. Juneja for Respomient No. 7.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl., Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Union of India.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAl'PA REDDY, J.-The judgment in this appeal is really an appendix to the judgment pronounced by us in Civil Appeal No. 2112 of 1979.\n\nThe relevant facts may be gathered from that judgment.\n\nThe further events requiring to be mentioned are these : While the Writ Petition filed by Ahluwalia in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was pending, some of the respondents to the Writ Petition and one R. R. Verma all direct recruits, chose to file a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1979, calling upon them to submit representations against the year of allotment proposed to be allotted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia.\n\nAfter the Writ Petition of Ahluwalia was allowed, and after the Central Government passed the order dated July 27, 1979, pursuant to the direction issued by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, the Delhi High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the direct recruits as infructuous. The High Court, however, granted a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court under Article 133 of the Constitution. Therefore, this appeal. The Writ Petition having been dismissed as infructuous we do not see how a certificate under Article 133 could have been granted.\n\nBut, we do not want to dismiss the appeal on that preliminary ground. Sbri R. K. Garg, led coonsel for the appeli\n\n!ants challenged the order of the Central Government dated July 27, 1979 on three grounds : ( 1) Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-residuary matters) Rules, offended Articte14 of the Constitution and was ultra-vires as it conferred arbitrary and uncanalised power upon the Central Government to grant relaxation whenever it pleased it to do so. (2) The discretion to relax the rules was wrongly exercised in the present case.\n\n(3) The Central Government wa~ powerless to review its earlier orders as such a power of review was not expressly conferred by the rules.\n\nThe second question has already been considered by us in Civil Appeal No. 2112 of 1979 and we have held that this was a fit case for the exercise of the power of the Central Government to relax the rules.\n\nThe first question is about the Constitutional validity of rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-residuary matters) Rules\n\n1960. Rule 3 is as follows :\n\n\"3. Power to relax rules and regulations in certain cases.-Wherc the Central Government is satisfied that the operation of-\n\n(i) any rule made or deemed lO have been made under\n\nthe All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951), E or\n\n(ii) any regulation made under any such rule,\n\nregulating the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, by order, dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule or regulation, as the case may be, to such extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions, as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a jUst iind\n\nequitable manner\".\n\nThe submission of Shri Garg was that the rule conferred upon the Central Government absolute and arbitrary discretion, a discretion left entirely to the satisfaction of. the Government, Government with\n\nno prescribed objective standards or guidelines. It is true that the rule is couched in a language suggestive of near-autocratic power reminiscent of \"bad old days\" of the Imperial Raj but, we have no H doubt that the rule is not meant to vest the Central Government with power to pass any order they like with a view to promote the interests\n\nof a favoured Civil servant.\n\nIt is really meant to relax, in appropriate cases, the relentless rigour of a mechanical application of the rules, so that civil servants may not be subjected to undue and undeserved hardship. Sufficient guidance can be had from the very rule and from the scheme of the various statutory provisions dealing with the conditions of service of Members of the All India Service.\n\nSection 3 of the All India Services Act enables the Central Government in consultation with the Governments. of the States concerned to make rules for the regulation of recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service.\n\nPursuant to the power given by Section 3 of the All India Services Act the Central Government has made innumerable sets of rules, some common to all the All India Services and some applicable separately to each. of the All India Services. The All India Services (Leave) Rules, the All India Services (Conduct)· Rules, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, the All India Services (Travelling Allowance) Rules, and the All India Services (Conditions of Service-residuary matters) Rules are examples of rules made under Section 3 of the All India Services Act which are common to all. the All India Services. The Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rule8 are examples\n\nof rules made under section 3 of the All Indi'a Services Act appli- . cable to a single AIL India Service namely, the Indian Police Service.\n\nThe rules, as may be seen, deal with countless matters which concern a civH servant, such as creation of cadres, fixation of Cadre Strength~ recruitment, seniority, promotion, leave, allowances, conduct, discipline and appeal, and a host of such other matters.\n\nThe golden thread, if we may so cal! it, which runs through the entire complex fabric m rules is the securing of honest and competent civil servants. Integrity and efficiency are the hall marks of any civil service anywhere and they are what are contemplated and aimed at by the wide range of rules.\n\nThe interest to be served is always the public interest and not indiviliual interest.\n\nPublic interest, in the matter of the conditions of service of civil servants, is best served by rules which are directed towards efficiency and integrity. Now, very wide .as the range covered by the rules is, the rules can never be exhaustive. Unforeseen and complex situations often arise as will be obvious even from a bare perusal of the cases reported in the Law Journals arising out of \"service B controversies''. Very often it is found that an all too strict application of a rule works undue hardship on a civil servant, resulting in injustice and inequity, causing disappointment and frustration. to the civil\n\nservant and finally leading to the defeat of the very object aimed at by the rules namely efficiency and integrity of civil servants. Hence it is that the Central Government is vested with a reserve power under rule 3 to deal with unforeseen and unpredictable ai.tuations, and to relieve the civil servants from the infliction of undue hardship and to do justice and equity. It does not mean that the Central Government is free to do what they like, regardless of right or wrong; nor does it mean that the Courts are powerless to correct them. The Central Government is bound to exercise the power in the public interest with a view to secure civil servants of efficiency and integrity, and when and only when undue hardship is caused by the application of the rules, the power to relax is to be exercised in a just and equitable manner but, again, only to the extent necessary for so dealing with the case.\n\nWe do not have to add that the exercise of the power of relaxation like all other administrative action affecting rights of parties is subject to judicial review on grounds now well known.\n\nViewed in this light we do not think that Rule 3 is unconstitutional on the ground that it vests an unfettered discretion in the Government.\n\nThe last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the Government with any such power. Shri Garg relied_ on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission : Patel Narshi Thakerslli\n\n& Ors. v. Pradvamunsinghii Ariunsinghii,(') D. N. Roy and S. K.\n\nBannerjee & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,(') and State of Assam & Anr. v. J. N. Roy Biswas(•). All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the Government was exercising quasi judicial powers vested in them by statute.\n\nWe do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specillcally or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature.\n\nTo extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any\n\nGoernment must be free to alter policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on its their daily administration they cannot be hide-bound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected.\n\nHere again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1273.\n\n(2) [1971] 2 S. C. R. 522.\n\n(3) [1976] 2 S. C. R. 128. l 1-289SCl/80\n\nA taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a Court.\n\nWe see no force in this_ submission of the learned counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed. •", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "R. R. VERMA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. R. 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CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 335, "end_char": 345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ahluv.1alia a senior_ n1ember of", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 638, "end_char": 670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Sri Ahluv.1alia a senior_ n1ember of the Indian Police 8ervice sought to quash the decision of the Union of India dated 26·6-1976 whereby his year D of allotment was fixed as 1965."}}, {"text": "High Court of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 874, "end_char": 904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Writ Petition of Sri Ahluwalia was pending in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, some of the respondents in that Writ Petition and one R. R. \\ 7erma-all direct recruits, choose to file a \\Vrit Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1973 calling upon them to subn1it representations against the year of allotmenb proposed to be allotted to M/s. Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the \\Vrit Petition of Ahluw; ili; i wits allowed, and after the Central Government E passed the."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1703, "end_char": 1714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1926, "end_char": 1937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AU India Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2703, "end_char": 2719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sufficient guidance can be had from the very role and from the scheme of the various statutory provisions dealing with the con.- ff ditions of service of Members of the AU India Service."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2846, "end_char": 2855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3163, "end_char": 3172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3664, "end_char": 3673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3982, "end_char": 3991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "namely, the Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "AIR 1970 SC 1273", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7318, "end_char": 7334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 S.C.R. 522", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7402, "end_char": 7421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7676, "end_char": 7686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and C. M. Nair for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C. M. Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7691, "end_char": 7701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg and C. M. Nair for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H. S. Marwah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. S. Marwah for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7762, "end_char": 7776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde .and P. P. Juneja for Respomient No."}}, {"text": "P. P. Juneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7782, "end_char": 7794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde .and P. P. Juneja for Respomient No."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7818, "end_char": 7834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Att."}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7847, "end_char": 7859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7869, "end_char": 7882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Union of India."}}, {"text": "CHINNAl'PA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7952, "end_char": 7968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAl'PA REDDY, J.-The judgment in this appeal is really an appendix to the judgment pronounced by us in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "R. R. Verma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8351, "end_char": 8362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further events requiring to be mentioned are these : While the Writ Petition filed by Ahluwalia in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was pending, some of the respondents to the Writ Petition and one R. R. Verma all direct recruits, chose to file a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1979, calling upon them to submit representations against the year of allotment proposed to be allotted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia.", "canonical_name": "R. R. VERMA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further events requiring to be mentioned are these : While the Writ Petition filed by Ahluwalia in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was pending, some of the respondents to the Writ Petition and one R. R. Verma all direct recruits, chose to file a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1979, calling upon them to submit representations against the year of allotment proposed to be allotted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia."}}, {"text": "Sahney", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8583, "end_char": 8589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further events requiring to be mentioned are these : While the Writ Petition filed by Ahluwalia in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was pending, some of the respondents to the Writ Petition and one R. R. Verma all direct recruits, chose to file a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1979, calling upon them to submit representations against the year of allotment proposed to be allotted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia."}}, {"text": "Dhaliwal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8591, "end_char": 8599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further events requiring to be mentioned are these : While the Writ Petition filed by Ahluwalia in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was pending, some of the respondents to the Writ Petition and one R. R. Verma all direct recruits, chose to file a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1979, calling upon them to submit representations against the year of allotment proposed to be allotted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia."}}, {"text": "Ahluwalia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The further events requiring to be mentioned are these : While the Writ Petition filed by Ahluwalia in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was pending, some of the respondents to the Writ Petition and one R. R. Verma all direct recruits, chose to file a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the notice dated June 29, 1979, calling upon them to submit representations against the year of allotment proposed to be allotted to Sahney, Dhaliwal and Ahluwalia."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8991, "end_char": 9002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9141, "end_char": 9152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sbri R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9249, "end_char": 9264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri R. K. Garg, led coonsel for the appeli\n\n!"}}, {"text": "July 27, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9353, "end_char": 9366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ants challenged the order of the Central Government dated July 27, 1979 on three grounds : ( 1) Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-residuary matters) Rules, offended Articte14 of the Constitution and was ultra-vires as it conferred arbitrary and uncanalised power upon the Central Government to grant relaxation whenever it pleased it to do so. ("}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10441, "end_char": 10469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10947, "end_char": 10951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission of Shri Garg was that the rule conferred upon the Central Government absolute and arbitrary discretion, a discretion left entirely to the satisfaction of."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11877, "end_char": 11886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12167, "end_char": 12176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12669, "end_char": 12678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12983, "end_char": 12992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 S. C. R. 522", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17006, "end_char": 17027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 S. C. R. 128", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17034, "end_char": 17055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_485_499_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "AMRIK SINGH AND ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND 0. ClIINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nSeniority, clailn for-Indian Police Service Officers-Counting officiating\n\n~<; ervice i11 a Cadre pcJt of a junior officer in the Select List while lzis senior in the list was officiating in another ex-cadre post for the purposes of fixing year of allotment-Whether illegal-Whether continuation of a non-cadre officer\n\nin a cadre post beyond 3 months by the State Government without a report to the Central Govern1nent and the Central Governnzent non reporting after six months C to U.P.S.C. is illegal-Indian Police Service Rules RPgulation of Seniority Rules 1954 r/w Regulation 7-9 of Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations 1955 Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules 1954-All India Services (Conditions of Sen•icr.. Residuary matters) Rules, 1960.\n\nOne Sri Ahluwalia, 4th respondent herein became a Deputy Superintendent of Police in Hirnachal Pradesh (which was then a Union Territory) .bY the D end of 1956.\n\nIn 1962, the Central Government constituted a common police service for the Union Territory of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh called the Delhi and l-Iin1acha1. Pradesh Police Service, and later, in 1964, respondent No. 4 was absorbed into that service on a regular basis.\n\nThe usucl avenue of promotion for a Deputy Superintendent of Police is the post of Superintendent of Police, but Superintendents of Police are borne on the cadre of the Indian Police Service and the exercise which results in the inclusion in the E Indian Police Sen'icc is governed by the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations. 1955 framed under section 3(4) of the All India Sefvices Act, 1951. The first step is to prepare a select list from among eligible officers of the State concerned, in the present case the lJnion Territories of Delhi and Himac-hal Pradesh.\n\nSometimes, it happens that although the post of a Superinendent of Police is a cadre po.st, if no hands are readily available for being posted from the I.P.S., Deputy Superintendent of Police from the Select List is promoted provisionally subject to certain formalities. 'The 4th respondent (Ahluwalia) was brought into the Select 'list in 1965 and later appointed SUperintendent of Police in October 1965 and he worked. as Superintendent of Police in one place or the other, until December 25, 1967, when he \\Vent on Earned Leave from 26-12-67 to 25-3-68 and, even thereafter i.e. from 26-3-68 onwards, he coninued as Superintendent of Police right down to January 1971, when on January 30, 1971, he was appointed to the I.P.S. and confirmed as such. The year of a1lotn1ent was fixed as 1965. For ascertainin~ the period of allotment under rule 3 (3) (b) of the Regulation of Seniority Rules. i954, the period of his officiating service in the cadre post from 1-8-68 to 12-10-69 was not' taken into account under Regulations 7 to 9 of the Tnd:an Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, in view of the fact that one Mr. Sahney who was senior to him in the Select I.ist happened to be posted in an ex-cadre post.\n\nThe 4th respondent who had a ca1; e that the law 2nd justice \"?f his case entitled him to 1961 as year of ; allotment, challenged the order of the Central Government allotting him the\n\nyear 1965.\n\nThe High Court considered the matter with reference to the relevant rules and allowed the writ petitions with a direction to the Union of India to refix his seniority after assigning him the year of allotment as 1961.\n\nThe Central Government reconsidered the matter even earlier, and, by its order dated 27-7-1979, refued the seniority of the 4th respondent by assigning 1961 as his year of allotment. Aggrieved by this development the appellants have come up in appeal.\n\nDismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHEW : I. The Officer Sri Ahluwalia was rightly assigned 1961 as the year oil allotment.\n\nThere was continuous officiation by him in a cadre post right down to 1971. There was no fault on his part. There was no illegality.\n\nThere was no outwitting at the instance of Ahlu\\valia, of the claims of any C other candidate.\n\n[494H, 495A]\n\n2. The real line of distinction between a State and the Union of India might well be blurred a little when it is a Union Territory. Moreover, there is the circumstance that the entire. Service was in the melting pot for a few years because the All India Services were being switched from Himachal Pradesh and Delhi into all the Union Territories. Even more; since1 uncertainty prevailed D while the question of a part of Punjab being tacked on to Himachal Pradesh came to engage the Administration. Amidstl these fluctuating factors, the solecism committed by the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh in not haviog reported to the Central Government about continuing Ahluwalia, beyond 3 months, in a cadre post, wae ai venial sin for which the candidate was free\n\nfrom blame. [495CE]\n\n3. The argument, based on Sahney, a senior to Ahluwalia, being in a cadre post and therefore, Ahluwalia's service during that period not being regular, also cannot be exa•ggerated out of proportion. Tci:hnical1y, the C.B.I. posts are ex-cadre posts, but it is a Central Government Department and nothing is suggested that there was something suspicious in Sahney being kept in the C.B.I. to facilitate AhluwaJia's continuance in Cadre post. Everything in this cooe is straightforward and, therefore, if there was any admin.istrati\\e ' ]apse, Ahluwalia could not bei victimized.\n\nIndeed, an unwitting hanlshlp inflicted on a member of the Service under such circumstances can 00 relieved by exercise of the residuary power of Central Government under Rulei 3 of the All India &rvices (Conditions of Service Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960.\n\nAfter full and second consideration, the Central Government passed Annexure 'Y' dated 1-12-71Y whereby Ahluwalia was given the benefit of 1961 as the year of the allotment. The period of officiation of Ahluwalia betwe'en 1-8-1968 ood 19-10-1969 was approved by the central Government after consultation with the U.P.S.C. This retrospectively cured the infirmity that existed in Ahluwalia's officiationi beyond 3 months or 6 months, in a: cadre post without consultartion with the U.P.S.C. The contravention of Regulation 8 was, thus, relieved against.\n\n[495E-H, 497F-G]\n\n4. In substance the exercise prescribed by Rule 9 of the India Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 is that, when the: cadre post is vacant and no Cadre Officer is available, a non-cadre officer may fill the vacancy for a period beyond three months if the State Government reports to the Central Government the re0sons therefor and it is not !ordered to be termi1nated. The C.entral\n\nJ..\n\n_ . ..__\n\nAMRIK HNGH V. UNION 487\n\nGove1nment may permit a non-cadre officer to fill a Cadre post for a, priod.\n\nA exceeding six months provided it reports the full facts to the U.P.S.C. and acts responsibly in the light of the advicer of the Commission. In the present case, no such report by the State Governn1ent to the Cenrtal Government was sent, no consultation by the Central Government with the Commission was done.\n\nBypassing the Public Service Commission bespeaks prima facie impropriety, but it is not destructive of the officiatiori of AhluwaUa in the special conspectus.\n\nof facts present here.\n\nFor one thing, Ahluwalia has nothing to do with the B error; for another, no senior of Ahluwalia suffered, thirdly, the Centrnl Government, in exercise of its power to relax the Rules, in good faith and, indeed in equity, did relieve the officer against this violatio_n.\n\n[498A-EJ\n\n5. Under Rule 3 (iii) (b) of the Indian Police Service Regulation of Senio rity Rules, 1954 continuous officiation is the decisive factor. Assuming that what i<i needed is regular officiation and not physical officiation, it i'3 perfectly C open for the Central Governn1ent to relax any irre, gularity by relaxing any particular rule or regulation. That power under All Jndia Services (Conditions of Service Residuary Matters) Rules 1960, to relax is not arbitrary because the Rule contains guidelines. Government 1nust be satisfied, not sub ..\n\njectively but objectively, that any rule or regulation affecting the conditions of service of a member of the All India Services causes undue hardship,. then the iniquitous consequence thereof may be relived against by relaxation of ih~ D concerned Rule or Regulation; There must be undue hardship and, furth.:-r the relaxation must promote the dealing with the case \"in a! just and equitable manner\". These are perfectly sensible guidelines. What is more, tlicrc is implicit in the Rule, the compliance with natural justice so that nobody may be adversely affected even by administrative action \\Vitbout a hearing. Thefe is nothing unreasonable, capricious or deprivatory of the rights of anyone in this residuary power vested in the Central Government.\n\nIndeed, the presefit E case is an excel1ant illustration of the proper exercise of the power.\n\n[498E-H,\n\n499A]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2112 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-3-1979 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Civil Writ Petition F No. 398 of 1976.\n\nR. K. Garg, and B. P. Singh for the Appellants.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde and P. P. Juneja for the Respondent No. 4.\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Union of • India.\n\nMukul Mudgal for the Respondent No. 13.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by, KRISHNA IYER, J.-Competitive claims to seniority, dependent on the year of allotment in the Indian Police Service, fall for consideration in this appeal by special leave.\n\nWe have expedited the hearing of II the case since keeping officers in an unsettled state may be a factor which impairs their efficiency.\n\nOne Shri Ahluwalia, a senior member of the Indian Police Service, sought to quash the decision of the Union of India dated 26-6-1976, whereby his year of allotment was fixed as 1965. According to his case, the correct year of allotment should have been 1961. If his plea were granted, the present appellants would be affected by being made junior to him.\n\nThe rival contentions revolve round a few facts, which we will set out, and a few rules framed under the All India Services Act, 1951, which we will construe.\n\nFirst a rush through the relevant calendar of dates.\n\nConcerned, as we are, with the year of allotment of Shri Ahluwalia (respomlent No. 4), let us focus on the chronology of events wHh special reference to him. If his claim were untenable, the appeal must be allowed and vice-versa.\n\nThe 4th respandent (Ahluwalia) became a Deputy Superintendent of Police in Himachal Pradesh (which was then a Union Territory) by the end of 1956.\n\nIn 1962, the Central Government constituted a common police service for the Union Territory of Delhi and Himacha] Praded1 called the Delhi and Himachal Pradesh Police Service; and later, in 1964, respondent No. 4 was absorbed into that service on a regular basis.\n\nThe usual avenue of promotion for a Deputy Superintendent of Police is the post of Superintendent of Police, but Superitendents of Police are borne on the cadre of the Indian Police Service and the exercise which results in the inclusion in the Indian Police Service is governed by the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 framed under Sec. 3(4) of the All India Services Act, 1951. The first step is to prepare a Select List from among eligible officers of the State concerned, in the present case, the Union Territories of. Delhi and Himachal Pradesh.\n\nSometimes, it happens that although the post of a Superintendent of Police is a cadre post, if no hands are readily available for being posted from the LP .S.\n\nDeputy Superintendent of Police from the Select List is promoted provisionally subject to certain fornialities which we will presently consider.\n\nThe 4th respondent (Ahluwalia) was brought into the Select List in 1965 and later appointed Superintendent of Police in October, 1965 and he worked as Superintendent of Police in one place or other, until December, 1967, and, even thereafter, he continued as Superintendent of Police right down to January 1971 when on January 30, 1971, he was appointed to the I.P.S. and confirmed as such.\n\nThe year of allotment was fixed as 1965 bnt the 4th respandent had a case that the law and justice of the case entitled him to 196 l as year of allotment.\n\nSo he challenged the Order of the Central Government allotting 'him the year 1965. The High Court considered the matter with reference to the relevant rules and came to the conclusion that there was merit in the 4th respondent's cont ention. (He was the petitioner before the High Court).\n\nThe learned Judges wound up thus :\n\n\"It is, therefore, evident that the period of officiation of the petitioner during 1-8-1968 to 12-10-1969 could not be considered to be invalid or irreg\\llar on any such ground.\n\nWe, therefore, conclude that the Government of Ind.iia wrongly decided that the officiation of the petitioner between the period 1-1-1%8 and 12-1-1971 or during the period 1-8-1968 to 12-10-69 could not be considered valid officiation.\n\nRather he was continuously holding a cadre post throughout this period, and the benefit regarding C seniority wiU have to be given for the entire period.\n\nThe decision being wrong and invalid under the very Rules and Regulations applied by the Government, was subsequently set right by them under Annexure-Y.\n\nThe upshort of all that we have stated above is that the pelltioner D shall be given the benefit of his continuous officiation against a senior post of the entire period from 11-11-1965 to the date of his appointment in the Indian Police Service his year of allotment shall be determined under Rule 3(3) (b) of the Seniority Rules keeping in view that he started his continuous officiation from 11-11-1965. In consequence, Annexure-N is quashed to the extent the said Annexure held a view contrary to our decision. It is declared that the petitioner continued and should be deemed to have continued to officiate on ii senior duty post of the Indian Police Service with effect from 11-11-65 without any break up to his confirmation in the Indian Police Service.\n\nThe petitioner's seniority shall be determined accordingly and all consequential benefits of seniority shall be granted to him by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe respondent No. 1 shall determine the seniority of the Petitioner in accordance with our observations made above within three months\".\n\nThe Central Government reconsidered the matter even earlier, and, by its Order dated 27-7-1979, refixed the seniority of the 4th respondent by assigning 1961 as his year of allotment.\n\nAggrieved by this development, the appellants have come to this court and contested the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court.\n\nA few more facts about the career of the 4th respondent and the II developments in the Indian Police service may be natrated before we set out and consider Rules and Regulations and their implications.\n\nThe 4th respondent Ahlnwalia, as stated earlier, was Superintendent of Police from 1965 to 1967, followed by a short perrod of earned leave, which ended on 25-3-68. From March 26, 1968 he again continned as Superintendent of Police. Meanwhile, an event beyond the control of the parties took place which has a bearing on the ultimate view we take, although only indirectly. On November 1, 1966, the re-organisation of the Punjab State took place which resulted in some areas of Punjab being transferred to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh.\n\nConsequently, certain officers, including one Shri P. C. Sahney and Shri K. S. Dhaliwal, were brought over from Punjab to Himachal Pradesh.\n\nAdmittedly, both these officers, Sahney and Dhaliwal, were senior to Ahluwalia, but a key circumstance which, in the submission of the appellants is decisive in their favour deserves mention. It is this Shri Sahney, a senior of Ahluwalia, was holding an Ex-cadre post of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. under the Ministry of Home Affairs between 7-12-1964 and 6-10-1969.\n\nThe Joint Select List of the Union Territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh Police Service, prepared on 29-4-1967, included D the names of Ahluwalia, Sahney and Dhaliwal, the last two being above Ahluwalia.\n\nOn January 1, 1968, the Central Government created single cadre for all the Union Territories in India and, as a follow-up action, prepared a common Select List for the IPS Cadre on 13-1-1971.\n\nAhluwalia was in the Select List of the Union Territories Cadre so pre-\n\npared.\n\nThe story of the Cadre continued in the sense that on 25-1-1971, when Himachal Pradesh acquired full-fledged State-hood, Ahluwalia was allocated, alongwith others, to that State. The Himachal Pradesh State came to have its own Cadre of I.P.S. Officers, in which Ahluwalia became a Member. Thereafter, the question was mooted before Government as to what should be the year of allotment for the 4th respondent (Ahluwalia).\n\nTwo factors having relevancy to the determination of the issue before us, were highlighted by Shri R. K. Garg, appearing for the appellant. He stated that so long as Shri Sahney was holding an ex-cadre post and was senior to Ahluwalia, the officiation of the latter was not legal and regular and therefore had to be ignored for the purpose of continuity of officiating service. This break was material in fixing the year of allotment. Secondly, he urged that the continuation of a noncadre officer in a Cadre post beyond 3 months required the State concerned to report to the Central Government this fact and the Central Government in return had to consult and go by the opinion of the\n\nUnion Pnblic Service Commission. In the present case, Ahluwalia bad\n\ncotinued in the Cadre post of Superintendent of Police, without\n\n).-..\n\n• .._\n\nthis necessary exercise by the State and the Central Government and without the approval of the Union Public Service Commission. Thus, the two reasons, briefly, s.tated above, were lethal to the claims of Ahluwalia and he was bound to be pushed to the year 1965 and could not claim the earlier year of allotment of 1961 awarded to him by the Central Government and the High Court. If the contention put forward by Shri Garg were sound, the conclusion would be inevitable and the appeal must inescapably be allowed.\n\nThus we are thrown back to an examination of the relevant rules in their application to the facts present in this case.\n\nOf course, before launching on that essay, we must also mention that the Central Government has a residuary power, in cases of equity and justice. to exempt an officer from the rigour of any rule or regulation.\n\nThe Rules may now be reproduced before scanning the submissions of either side. It may be treated as common case that not only was Sahney (now retired) senior to Ahluwalia but he wa~ holding an ex-cadre post during the period 1-8-1968 to 12-10-1969. If this period were to be excluded from Ahluwalia's officiation he must fail. It is also beyond dispute that there was no consultation with the U.P.S.C. for the period of officiation beyond 6 months of Shri\n\nAhluwalia in a cadre post. The Union of India had, on one stage, agreed tentatively with Ahluwalia's case but changed its mind and came to the conclusion that there was a break in service between 1-8-1968 and 12-10-1969 for Ahluwalia and, therefore, the benefit of officiation during that period could not be given in fixing the year of allotment under Rule 3 ( 3) (b) of the Regnlation of seniority Rules, 1954. Again Government veered round to the view that 1961 was the correct year of allotment.\n\nNow the Statntory Provisions:\n\n''7. Select List\n\n(1) The Commission shall consider the list prepared by the committee alongwith the other documents rec ceived from the State Government and, unless it considers any change necessary, approve the list.\n\n(2)\n\n(3) ....................\n\nThe list as finally approved by the Commission shall form the Select List of the members of the State Police Service.\"\n\nUnder this Rule a Select List was prepared where Ahluwalia was appointed against a Cadre post with effect from 11-11-1965.\n\nRegulation 8 may also be read : I\n\n\"8. Appointments to Cadre post from Select List\n\nAppointments of members of the State Police Service from the Select List to posts borne on the State Cadre on the joint Cadre of a group of States, as the case may be, shall be made in accordance with the provisions of rule 9 of the Cadre Rules.\n\nIn making such appointments, the State Government shall follow the order in which the names of such officers appear in the Select List.\n\nFrom this, it i~ clear, Rule 9 of the Cadre Rules has governing force and so we must excerpt Rule 9 also :\n\n\"9. Temporary appointment of non-cadre officers to cadre posts\n\n(I) A cadre post in a state may be filled by a person who is not a cadre officer if the State Government is satisfied.\n\n(a) that the vacancy is not likely to last for more than three months, or\n\n(b) that there is no suitable cadre officer available\n\nfor filling the vacancy.\n\n(2) where in any state, a person other than a cadre officer is appointed to a cadre post for a period exceed-. ing three months the State government shall forthwith report the fact to the Central Government together with the reasons for making the appointment.\n\n(3) On receipt of a report under sub-rule (2) or otherwise, the Central Government may direct that the\n\nState Government shall terminate the appointment of such person and appoint thereto a cadre officer and where any direction is so issued, the state Government shall accordingly give effect thereto.\n\n( 4) Where a cadre post is likely to be filled by 11 person who is not a cadre officer for a PERIOD exceeding\n\n..;_ ..\n\nsix months, the Central Government shall report the full facts to the Union Public Service Commission with the REASONS for holding that no suitable officer is available for filling the post and may in the light of the advice given by the Union Public Service Commission give sui1able directions to the State Government concerned.,,\n\nI The critical rule regarding the assignment of year of allotment is Rule 3, which we may now reproduce;\n\n\"3. Assignment of year of allotment :\n\n(1) Every officer shall be assigned a year of allotment in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained in this rule.\n\n(2)\n\n(3) The. year of allotment of an officer appointed to the service after the commencement of these rules, shall be:\n\n(a)\n\n(b) Where the Officer is appointed to the Service by Promotion in accordance with Rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules, the year of allotment of the E Juniormost among the officers recruited to the service in accordance with Rule 7 of these Rules who officiated continuously in a senior post from a date earlier than the date of commencement of such officiati'On by the former;\n\nExplnnation : L In respect of an officer appointed to the Service by promotion in accordance with sub-rule (1) of rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules, the period of his continuous officiation in a senior post shall, for the purpose of determination of his seniority, count only from the date of the inclusion of his name in tl1e Select List, or from the date of his officiating appointment to such senior post whichever is later.\n\nProvided that where the name of a State Police R Service Officer was included in the Select List in force immediately before the reorganisation of a State and is also ineluded in the first Select List prepared subsequent to the date of snch reorganisation, the name of such officer shall be deemed to have been continuonsly in the Select List with effect from the date of inclusion in the first mentioned Select List.\n\nExplanation 4 : An officer appointed to the Service in accordance with sub-rule (i) of rule 9 of the Recruitment Rules shall be treated as having officiated in a senior post during any period of appointment to a non-cadre post if the State Government has certified within three months of his appointment to the non-cadre post that he would have so officiated but for his appointment, for a period not exceeding one year, and, with the approval of the Central Government, for a further period not exceeding two years, to a non-cadre post under a State Government or the Central Government in a time-scale identical to the time-scale in a senivr post.\n\nE There is one more Rule which can play a heroic role in a crisis between equity and legalism.\n\nThat is, contained in Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matters) Rules 1960 :\n\n\"3. Power to relax rules and regulations in certain cases:-\n\nWhere the Central Government is satisfied that the operation of:-\n\n(i) any rule made or deemed to have been made under the All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951), or\n\n(ii) any regulation made under any such rule, regubting the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, by order, dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule or regulation, as\n\nthe case may be, to such extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions as may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner.''\n\n._ __ _\n\n• j.\n\n' .\n\n. \"\"\n\nIa the perspective of tl1e Act and Rules, we may proceed to analyse the submissions and assess their worth.\n\nWe are not disposed to launch on a prolix investigation or delve into minute details be<; ause\n\nwe are impressed with the justice of the conclusion reached by the High Court and the Central Government in giving to Ahluwalia 1961 as the year of his allotment. It is indubitable that, as a fact, there was continuous officiation by him in a cadre post right down to 1971.\n\nThere was no fault on his part. There was no illegality so far as we can gather.\n\nThere was no outwitting at the instance of Ahluwalia, of the claims of any other candidate. The two technical infirmities powerfully pressed, with characteristic vigour, by Shri R. K. Garg do not in the least detract from the effective officiation as Superintendent of Police by Shri Ahluwalia.\n\nLet us assume for a moment that the State Government had not reported to the Central Government and that the consultation with the Union Public Service Commission had not been made by the Central Government. Let us further assume that, in a strict view, that was needed. Even so, the Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh and Delhi should have formally told the Home Ministry about the officiation beyond three months by Ahluwalia in a cadre post. This was not done. The real line of distinction between a State and the Union\n\nof India might well be blurred a little when it is a Union Territory.\n\nMoreover, there is the circumstance that the entire Service was in the melting pot for a few years because the All India Services were being switched from Himachal Pradesh and Delhi into all the Union Territories. Even more; since uncertainty prevailed while the question of a part of Punjab being tacked on to Himachal Pradesh came to engage the Administration.\n\nAmidst these fluctuating factors, the solecism committed by the Union erritory of Himachal Pradesh in not having reported to the Central Government about continuing Ahluwalia, \\Jfyond 3 months, in a cadre post, was a venial sin for which the candidate was free from blame. Secondly, the argument, based on Sahney, a senior to Ahluwalia, being in a ex-cadre post and therefore, Ahluwalia's service during that period not being regular, also cannot be exaggerated out of proportion.· Technically, the CB.I. posts are ex-cadre posts, but it is a Central Government Department and nothing is suggested that there was something suspicious in\n\nSahney being kept in the CB.I. to facilitate Ah:uwalia's continuance in a Cadre post.\n\nEverything in this case is straight-forward and, therefore, if there was any administrative lapse, Ahluwalia could not be victimized.\n\nIndeed, an unwitting hardship inflicted on a membet of the Service under such circumstances can be relieved against by . exercise of the residuary power of Central Government under Rule 3\n\nA extracted above.\n\nThey passed the Order (Annexure X) which we reproduce:\n\n\"Annexure-'X' No. 24116/71-Pers. II (IPS)\n\nGovernment of India/Bharat Sarkar\n\nMinistry of Home Affairs/Grih Mantralaya\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nS/Shri P. C. Sahney, K. S. Dhaliwal and V. K. Ahluwalia were appointed the Indian Police Service by Promotion from the State Po'.ice Service o'n 30th January, 1971 and allocated to the Himachal Pradesh Cadre of Service.\n\n2. Prior to their appointment to the Indian Police Service, these officers were holding the following posts.\n\nIn accordance with Regulation 8 of IPS (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 the Select List officers are to be appointed to the Cadre Post in the order in which their names appear in the Select List As such in cases where a senior select list officer was 'not holding a cadre post, the officiation in a. cadre post of a junior officer in the Select List was not approved by the Central Government because the appointment of Junior Select List officer to a cadre post was violative of the provisions of Regulation 8 of the Promotion Regulations.\n\nAccordingly, it was decided that the rules may be relaxed to count the period of officiation against ex-cadre posts so as to\n\ngive benefit of the service rendered by the junior officers in the cadre post for the purpose of seniority. Applying the ratio of the case of U. T. Cadre, the Government of India has come to the conclusion that the appointment of Shri P. C.\n\nSahney in the C. B. I. on depntatio'n basis from 7-12-1964 to 6-10-1969 was made by the Central Government in public interest since Shri Sahney belonged to the U. T. Cadre which was managed by the Central Government. It can, therefore, be said that the question of misuse of provisions of\n\n• ---t\n\nrules a\"nd regulations by the State Government in this case does not arise. The certificates that but for his appointment to ex-cadre post in the C.B.I., Shri Sahney would have continued against a cadre post, was to be issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the fault, if any, lies with the Central Government and nat with any State Government. It has, therefore, been tentatively decided to count the ex-cadre officiations of Shri P. C. Sahney from 7-12-1964 to 6-10-1969 for the purpose of seniority in relaxation of the provisions of the l.P.S. (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954.\n\nIn view of the counting of ex-cadre officiation of Shri P. C. Sahney for the period 7-12-64 to 6-10-1969, the Cadre officiation of S/Shri K. S. Dhaliwal and V. K. Ahluwalia prior to 13-10-1969 will not be violative of the provisions of regulation 8 of J.P.S. (Appointment by Promotional Regulations, 1955). It is, therefore, prepared to count the entire cadre officiation of S/Shri K. S.\n\nDhaliwal and\n\nV. K.\n\nAhluwalia for the purpose of their seniority.\n\nAccordingly, the crucial date in respect of S/Shri K. S. Dhaliwal ano V. K. Ahluwalia shall be 28-3-1965 and 11-11-1965 respectively.\n\nSd/- A. J ayaraman Under Secretary to the Government of India.\n\nAfter full and second consideratian, the Central Government passed Annexure 'Y' dated 1-12-1978, whereby Ahluwalia was given\n\nthe be\"nefit of 1961 as the year of the allotment.\n\nThe period of officiation of Ah'.uwalia between 1-8-1968 and 19-10-1969 was approved by the Central Government after consultation with the\n\nU.P.S.C.\n\nThis retrospectively cured the infirmity that existed in Ahluwalia's officiation, beyond 3 months or 6 months, in a cadre post B without consultation with the U.P.S.C. The contravention of Regulation 8 was, thns, relieved against.\n\nRegulation 7, earlier reproduced, has reference to the Select Llst, reeeived from the State, being approved by the Commission. Ahluwalia was in this list and by virtue of that inclusion in the Select List, was posted agaiµst a Cadre post with effect from 11-11-1965. Regulation 8 authorises such appointment of the members of the State Police Service.\n\nHowever, Rule 9 of the I'ndian Police Service (Cadre) Rules 1954 has a crucial impact in regard to temporary appointments of non-cadre officers to Cadre posts.\n\nWe have earlier extracted the Rule, but in snbstance, the exercise prescribed by the Rule is that, when the Cadre post is vacant and no Cadre Officer is available. A non-cadre officer may fill the vacancy for a period beyond three months if the State Government reports to the Central Government the reasons therefor and it is not ordered to be terminated.\n\nThe Central Government may permit a non-Cadre Officer to fill a Cadre post for a period exceeding six months provided it reports the full facts to the U.P.S.C. and acts responsibly in the light of the advice of the Commission.\n\nI'n the present case, no such report by the State Government to the Central Government was sent, no consnltation by the Central Government with the Commission was done. We are . agreed that by-passing the Public Service Commission bespeaks prima facie impropriety, but we are not inclined to consider this grievance as destructive of the officiation of Ahluwalia in the special conspectus of facts present here. For one thing, Ahluwalia has nothing to do with the error; for another, no senior of Ahluwalia suffered, thirdly, the Central Government, in exercise of its power to relax the Rl!les, in good faith and, i'ndeed in equity, did relieve the officer against this violation.\n\nThat power to relax exists is admitted, although a feeble ' challenge to its vires was made in passing. When we consider the year of allotment what looms large is Rule 3 (iii) (b). Continuous officiation is the decisive factor.\n\nAssuming that what is needed is regular officiation and not physical officiation, it is perfectly open for the Central Government to relax any irregularity by relaxing any particular rule or regulation.\n\nWe have earlier indicated the scope of this power and reproduced the Rule itself. It is not arbitrary because the Rule contains guidelines.\n\nGovernment must be satisfied,· not subjectively but objectively, that any rule or regulation affecting tho conditions of service of a member of the All India Service cause,; undue hardship, then the inequitous consequence thereof may be relieved against by relaxation of the concerned Ru:e or Regulation; There must be undue hardthip and, further the relaxation must promote the dealing with the case \"in a just and equitable manner\". These are perfectly sensible guidelines.\n\nWhat is more, there is implicit i'n the Rule, the compliance with natural justice so that nobody may be\n\n• )..._ ..\n\n...\n\nI .• k\n\nadversely affected even by administrative action without hearing. We lit are unable to see anything unreasonable, capricious or depfivatory of the fights of anyone in this residuary p0wer vested ih the Central Government.\n\nIndeed, the present case is an excellent illustration oi the proper exercise of the power.\n\nWe are therefore, satisfied that the Central Government was right in invoking its power to relax and regularize the spell of officiation, which was impugned as irregular a\n\nor illegal.\n\nThe consequence inevitably follows that the officer Ahluwalia was rightly assigned 1961 as the year of allotment.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n12 -289SCI/80", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "AMRIK SINGH AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMRIK SINGH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "0. ClIINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "U.P.S.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 597, "end_char": 605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seniority, clailn for-Indian Police Service Officers-Counting officiating\n\n~<; ervice i11 a Cadre pcJt of a junior officer in the Select List while lzis senior in the list was officiating in another ex-cadre post for the purposes of fixing year of allotment-Whether illegal-Whether continuation of a non-cadre officer\n\nin a cadre post beyond 3 months by the State Government without a report to the Central Govern1nent and the Central Governnzent non reporting after six months C to U.P.S.C. is illegal-Indian Police Service Rules RPgulation of Seniority Rules 1954 r/w Regulation 7-9 of Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations 1955 Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules 1954-All India Services (Conditions of Sen•icr.. Residuary matters) Rules, 1960."}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service Rules RPgulation of Seniority Rules 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 617, "end_char": 679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1962, the Central Government constituted a common police service for the Union Territory of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh called the Delhi and l-Iin1acha1."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1143, "end_char": 1148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1962, the Central Government constituted a common police service for the Union Territory of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh called the Delhi and l-Iin1acha1."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1962, the Central Government constituted a common police service for the Union Territory of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh called the Delhi and l-Iin1acha1."}}, {"text": "section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1686, "end_char": 1698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All India Sefvices Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Himac-hal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1888, "end_char": 1905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first step is to prepare a select list from among eligible officers of the State concerned, in the present case the lJnion Territories of Delhi and Himac-hal Pradesh."}}, {"text": "I.P.S.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2060, "end_char": 2066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometimes, it happens that although the post of a Superinendent of Police is a cadre po.st, if no hands are readily available for being posted from the I.P.S., Deputy Superintendent of Police from the Select List is promoted provisionally subject to certain formalities. '"}}, {"text": "December 25, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2390, "end_char": 2407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Superintendent of Police in one place or the other, until December 25, 1967, when he \\Vent on Earned Leave from 26-12-67 to 25-3-68 and, even thereafter i.e. from 26-3-68 onwards, he coninued as Superintendent of Police right down to January 1971, when on January 30, 1971, he was appointed to the I.P.S. and confirmed as such."}}, {"text": "25-3-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2456, "end_char": 2463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Superintendent of Police in one place or the other, until December 25, 1967, when he \\Vent on Earned Leave from 26-12-67 to 25-3-68 and, even thereafter i.e. from 26-3-68 onwards, he coninued as Superintendent of Police right down to January 1971, when on January 30, 1971, he was appointed to the I.P.S. and confirmed as such."}}, {"text": "26-3-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2495, "end_char": 2502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Superintendent of Police in one place or the other, until December 25, 1967, when he \\Vent on Earned Leave from 26-12-67 to 25-3-68 and, even thereafter i.e. from 26-3-68 onwards, he coninued as Superintendent of Police right down to January 1971, when on January 30, 1971, he was appointed to the I.P.S. and confirmed as such."}}, {"text": "January 30, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2588, "end_char": 2604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as Superintendent of Police in one place or the other, until December 25, 1967, when he \\Vent on Earned Leave from 26-12-67 to 25-3-68 and, even thereafter i.e. from 26-3-68 onwards, he coninued as Superintendent of Police right down to January 1971, when on January 30, 1971, he was appointed to the I.P.S. and confirmed as such."}}, {"text": "1-8-68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2869, "end_char": 2875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i954, the period of his officiating service in the cadre post from 1-8-68 to 12-10-69 was not' taken into account under Regulations 7 to 9 of the Tnd:an Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, in view of the fact that one Mr. Sahney who was senior to him in the Select I.ist happened to be posted in an ex-cadre post."}}, {"text": "12-10-69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2879, "end_char": 2887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i954, the period of his officiating service in the cadre post from 1-8-68 to 12-10-69 was not' taken into account under Regulations 7 to 9 of the Tnd:an Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, in view of the fact that one Mr. Sahney who was senior to him in the Select I.ist happened to be posted in an ex-cadre post."}}, {"text": "Sahney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3049, "end_char": 3055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i954, the period of his officiating service in the cadre post from 1-8-68 to 12-10-69 was not' taken into account under Regulations 7 to 9 of the Tnd:an Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, in view of the fact that one Mr. Sahney who was senior to him in the Select I.ist happened to be posted in an ex-cadre post."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court considered the matter with reference to the relevant rules and allowed the writ petitions with a direction to the Union of India to refix his seniority after assigning him the year of allotment as 1961."}}, {"text": "27-7-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government reconsidered the matter even earlier, and, by its order dated 27-7-1979, refued the seniority of the 4th respondent by assigning 1961 as his year of allotment."}}, {"text": "Ahluwalia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHEW : I. The Officer Sri Ahluwalia was rightly assigned 1961 as the year oil allotment.", "canonical_name": "Ahlu\\valia"}}, {"text": "Ahlu\\valia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4128, "end_char": 4138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no outwitting at the instance of Ahlu\\valia, of the claims of any C other candidate.", "canonical_name": "Ahlu\\valia"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4251, "end_char": 4265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The real line of distinction between a State and the Union of India might well be blurred a little when it is a Union Territory.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even more; since1 uncertainty prevailed D while the question of a part of Punjab being tacked on to Himachal Pradesh came to engage the Administration."}}, {"text": "AhluwaJia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tci:hnical1y, the C.B.I. posts are ex-cadre posts, but it is a Central Government Department and nothing is suggested that there was something suspicious in Sahney being kept in the C.B.I. to facilitate AhluwaJia's continuance in Cadre post.", "canonical_name": "Ahlu\\valia"}}, {"text": "Central Government under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5704, "end_char": 5733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1-12-71Y", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5904, "end_char": 5912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After full and second consideration, the Central Government passed Annexure 'Y' dated 1-12-71Y whereby Ahluwalia was given the benefit of 1961 as the year of the allotment."}}, {"text": "1-8-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6039, "end_char": 6047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period of officiation of Ahluwalia betwe'en 1-8-1968 ood 19-10-1969 was approved by the central Government after consultation with the U.P.S.C. This retrospectively cured the infirmity that existed in Ahluwalia's officiationi beyond 3 months or 6 months, in a: cadre post without consultartion with the U.P.S.C. The contravention of Regulation 8 was, thus, relieved against."}}, {"text": "19-10-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6052, "end_char": 6062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period of officiation of Ahluwalia betwe'en 1-8-1968 ood 19-10-1969 was approved by the central Government after consultation with the U.P.S.C. This retrospectively cured the infirmity that existed in Ahluwalia's officiationi beyond 3 months or 6 months, in a: cadre post without consultartion with the U.P.S.C. The contravention of Regulation 8 was, thus, relieved against."}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7215, "end_char": 7240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bypassing the Public Service Commission bespeaks prima facie impropriety, but it is not destructive of the officiatiori of AhluwaUa in the special conspectus."}}, {"text": "Centrnl Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7505, "end_char": 7523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For one thing, Ahluwalia has nothing to do with the B error; for another, no senior of Ahluwalia suffered, thirdly, the Centrnl Government, in exercise of its power to relax the Rules, in good faith and, indeed in equity, did relieve the officer against this violatio_n."}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service Regulation of Senio rity Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7700, "end_char": 7758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23-3-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-3-1979 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Civil Writ Petition F No."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9289, "end_char": 9299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, and B. P. Singh for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9305, "end_char": 9316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Garg, and B. P. Singh for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9338, "end_char": 9352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde and P. P. Juneja for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. P. Juneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9357, "end_char": 9369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde and P. P. Juneja for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9397, "end_char": 9415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Union of • India."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9425, "end_char": 9438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Union of • India."}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9466, "end_char": 9478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukul Mudgal for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9551, "end_char": 9563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by, KRISHNA IYER, J.-Competitive claims to seniority, dependent on the year of allotment in the Indian Police Service, fall for consideration in this appeal by special leave."}}, {"text": "Indian Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9905, "end_char": 9926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Shri Ahluwalia, a senior member of the Indian Police Service, sought to quash the decision of the Union of India dated 26-6-1976, whereby his year of allotment was fixed as 1965."}}, {"text": "26-6-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9985, "end_char": 9994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Shri Ahluwalia, a senior member of the Indian Police Service, sought to quash the decision of the Union of India dated 26-6-1976, whereby his year of allotment was fixed as 1965."}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10323, "end_char": 10351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ahluwalia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10683, "end_char": 10692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respandent (Ahluwalia) became a Deputy Superintendent of Police in Himachal Pradesh (which was then a Union Territory) by the end of 1956.", "canonical_name": "Ahlu\\valia"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11442, "end_char": 11451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11459, "end_char": 11487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12-10-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12936, "end_char": 12946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges wound up thus :\n\n\"It is, therefore, evident that the period of officiation of the petitioner during 1-8-1968 to 12-10-1969 could not be considered to be invalid or irreg\\llar on any such ground."}}, {"text": "Government of Ind.iia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13053, "end_char": 13074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, conclude that the Government of Ind.iia wrongly decided that the officiation of the petitioner between the period 1-1-1%8 and 12-1-1971 or during the period 1-8-1968 to 12-10-69 could not be considered valid officiation."}}, {"text": "1-1-1%8 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13149, "end_char": 13160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, conclude that the Government of Ind.iia wrongly decided that the officiation of the petitioner between the period 1-1-1%8 and 12-1-1971 or during the period 1-8-1968 to 12-10-69 could not be considered valid officiation."}}, {"text": "12-1-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13161, "end_char": 13170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, conclude that the Government of Ind.iia wrongly decided that the officiation of the petitioner between the period 1-1-1%8 and 12-1-1971 or during the period 1-8-1968 to 12-10-69 could not be considered valid officiation."}}, {"text": "11-11-65", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14248, "end_char": 14256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is declared that the petitioner continued and should be deemed to have continued to officiate on ii senior duty post of the Indian Police Service with effect from 11-11-65 without any break up to his confirmation in the Indian Police Service."}}, {"text": "Ahlnwalia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15169, "end_char": 15178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 4th respondent Ahlnwalia, as stated earlier, was Superintendent of Police from 1965 to 1967, followed by a short perrod of earned leave, which ended on 25-3-68.", "canonical_name": "Ahlu\\valia"}}, {"text": "March 26, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15320, "end_char": 15334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From March 26, 1968 he again continned as Superintendent of Police."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15527, "end_char": 15543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1966, the re-organisation of the Punjab State took place which resulted in some areas of Punjab being transferred to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Punjab State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15572, "end_char": 15584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1966, the re-organisation of the Punjab State took place which resulted in some areas of Punjab being transferred to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh."}}, {"text": "P. C. Sahney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15749, "end_char": 15761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, certain officers, including one Shri P. C. Sahney and Shri K. S. Dhaliwal, were brought over from Punjab to Himachal Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "P. C.\n\nSahney"}}, {"text": "K. S. Dhaliwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15771, "end_char": 15785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, certain officers, including one Shri P. C. Sahney and Shri K. S. Dhaliwal, were brought over from Punjab to Himachal Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "K. S.\n\nDhaliwal"}}, {"text": "Dhaliwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15883, "end_char": 15891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, both these officers, Sahney and Dhaliwal, were senior to Ahluwalia, but a key circumstance which, in the submission of the appellants is decisive in their favour deserves mention."}}, {"text": "C.B.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16136, "end_char": 16142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this Shri Sahney, a senior of Ahluwalia, was holding an Ex-cadre post of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. under the Ministry of Home Affairs between 7-12-1964 and 6-10-1969."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16153, "end_char": 16177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this Shri Sahney, a senior of Ahluwalia, was holding an Ex-cadre post of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. under the Ministry of Home Affairs between 7-12-1964 and 6-10-1969."}}, {"text": "7-12-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16186, "end_char": 16195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this Shri Sahney, a senior of Ahluwalia, was holding an Ex-cadre post of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. under the Ministry of Home Affairs between 7-12-1964 and 6-10-1969."}}, {"text": "6-10-1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16200, "end_char": 16209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this Shri Sahney, a senior of Ahluwalia, was holding an Ex-cadre post of Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. under the Ministry of Home Affairs between 7-12-1964 and 6-10-1969."}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh Police Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16272, "end_char": 16303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Joint Select List of the Union Territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh Police Service, prepared on 29-4-1967, included D the names of Ahluwalia, Sahney and Dhaliwal, the last two being above Ahluwalia."}}, {"text": "29-4-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16317, "end_char": 16326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Joint Select List of the Union Territories of Delhi and Himachal Pradesh Police Service, prepared on 29-4-1967, included D the names of Ahluwalia, Sahney and Dhaliwal, the last two being above Ahluwalia."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16424, "end_char": 16439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 1, 1968, the Central Government created single cadre for all the Union Territories in India and, as a follow-up action, prepared a common Select List for the IPS Cadre on 13-1-1971."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16518, "end_char": 16523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 1, 1968, the Central Government created single cadre for all the Union Territories in India and, as a follow-up action, prepared a common Select List for the IPS Cadre on 13-1-1971."}}, {"text": "IPS Cadre", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16590, "end_char": 16599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 1, 1968, the Central Government created single cadre for all the Union Territories in India and, as a follow-up action, prepared a common Select List for the IPS Cadre on 13-1-1971."}}, {"text": "13-1-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16603, "end_char": 16612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 1, 1968, the Central Government created single cadre for all the Union Territories in India and, as a follow-up action, prepared a common Select List for the IPS Cadre on 13-1-1971."}}, {"text": "25-1-1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16750, "end_char": 16759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The story of the Cadre continued in the sense that on 25-1-1971, when Himachal Pradesh acquired full-fledged State-hood, Ahluwalia was allocated, alongwith others, to that State."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17218, "end_char": 17228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two factors having relevancy to the determination of the issue before us, were highlighted by Shri R. K. Garg, appearing for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "R. K. Garg"}}, {"text": "Union Pnblic Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17806, "end_char": 17837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, he urged that the continuation of a noncadre officer in a Cadre post beyond 3 months required the State concerned to report to the Central Government this fact and the Central Government in return had to consult and go by the opinion of the\n\nUnion Pnblic Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18050, "end_char": 18081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, Ahluwalia bad\n\ncotinued in the Cadre post of Superintendent of Police, without\n\n).-..\n\n• .._\n\nthis necessary exercise by the State and the Central Government and without the approval of the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18373, "end_char": 18377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the contention put forward by Shri Garg were sound, the conclusion would be inevitable and the appeal must inescapably be allowed."}}, {"text": "Regnlation of seniority Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19637, "end_char": 19672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "11-11-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20275, "end_char": 20285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this Rule a Select List was prepared where Ahluwalia was appointed against a Cadre post with effect from 11-11-1965."}}, {"text": "All India Services Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24882, "end_char": 24910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26525, "end_char": 26562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, the Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh and Delhi should have formally told the Home Ministry about the officiation beyond three months by Ahluwalia in a cadre post."}}, {"text": "Ah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27886, "end_char": 27888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Technically, the CB.I. posts are ex-cadre posts, but it is a Central Government Department and nothing is suggested that there was something suspicious in\n\nSahney being kept in the CB.I. to facilitate Ah:uwalia's continuance in a Cadre post."}}, {"text": "uwalia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27889, "end_char": 27895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Technically, the CB.I. posts are ex-cadre posts, but it is a Central Government Department and nothing is suggested that there was something suspicious in\n\nSahney being kept in the CB.I. to facilitate Ah:uwalia's continuance in a Cadre post."}}, {"text": "Central Government under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28219, "end_char": 28248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28371, "end_char": 28390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II (IPS)\n\nGovernment of India/Bharat Sarkar\n\nMinistry of Home Affairs/Grih Mantralaya\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nS/Shri P. C. Sahney, K. S. Dhaliwal and V. K. Ahluwalia were appointed the Indian Police Service by Promotion from the State Po'.ice Service o'n 30th January, 1971 and allocated to the Himachal Pradesh Cadre of Service."}}, {"text": "P. C. Sahney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28467, "end_char": 28479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II (IPS)\n\nGovernment of India/Bharat Sarkar\n\nMinistry of Home Affairs/Grih Mantralaya\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nS/Shri P. C. Sahney, K. S. Dhaliwal and V. K. Ahluwalia were appointed the Indian Police Service by Promotion from the State Po'.ice Service o'n 30th January, 1971 and allocated to the Himachal Pradesh Cadre of Service.", "canonical_name": "P. C.\n\nSahney"}}, {"text": "V. K. Ahluwalia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28500, "end_char": 28515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II (IPS)\n\nGovernment of India/Bharat Sarkar\n\nMinistry of Home Affairs/Grih Mantralaya\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nS/Shri P. C. Sahney, K. S. Dhaliwal and V. K. Ahluwalia were appointed the Indian Police Service by Promotion from the State Po'.ice Service o'n 30th January, 1971 and allocated to the Himachal Pradesh Cadre of Service.", "canonical_name": "V. K.\n\nAhluwalia"}}, {"text": "U. T. Cadre", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29613, "end_char": 29624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applying the ratio of the case of U. T. Cadre, the Government of India has come to the conclusion that the appointment of Shri P. C.\n\nSahney in the C. B. I. on depntatio'n basis from 7-12-1964 to 6-10-1969 was made by the Central Government in public interest since Shri Sahney belonged to the U. T. Cadre which was managed by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "P. C.\n\nSahney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29706, "end_char": 29719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applying the ratio of the case of U. T. Cadre, the Government of India has come to the conclusion that the appointment of Shri P. C.\n\nSahney in the C. B. I. on depntatio'n basis from 7-12-1964 to 6-10-1969 was made by the Central Government in public interest since Shri Sahney belonged to the U. T. Cadre which was managed by the Central Government.", "canonical_name": "P. C.\n\nSahney"}}, {"text": "K. S. Dhaliwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30741, "end_char": 30755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the counting of ex-cadre officiation of Shri P. C. Sahney for the period 7-12-64 to 6-10-1969, the Cadre officiation of S/Shri K. S. Dhaliwal and V. K. Ahluwalia prior to 13-10-1969 will not be violative of the provisions of regulation 8 of J.P.S. (Appointment by Promotional Regulations, 1955).", "canonical_name": "K. S.\n\nDhaliwal"}}, {"text": "V. K. Ahluwalia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30760, "end_char": 30775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the counting of ex-cadre officiation of Shri P. C. Sahney for the period 7-12-64 to 6-10-1969, the Cadre officiation of S/Shri K. S. Dhaliwal and V. K. Ahluwalia prior to 13-10-1969 will not be violative of the provisions of regulation 8 of J.P.S. (Appointment by Promotional Regulations, 1955).", "canonical_name": "V. K.\n\nAhluwalia"}}, {"text": "Appointment by Promotional Regulations, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30863, "end_char": 30907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. S.\n\nDhaliwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30985, "end_char": 31000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, prepared to count the entire cadre officiation of S/Shri K. S.\n\nDhaliwal and\n\nV. K.\n\nAhluwalia for the purpose of their seniority.", "canonical_name": "K. S.\n\nDhaliwal"}}, {"text": "V. K.\n\nAhluwalia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31006, "end_char": 31022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, therefore, prepared to count the entire cadre officiation of S/Shri K. S.\n\nDhaliwal and\n\nV. K.\n\nAhluwalia for the purpose of their seniority.", "canonical_name": "V. K.\n\nAhluwalia"}}, {"text": "A. J ayaraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31200, "end_char": 31213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- A. J ayaraman Under Secretary to the Government of India."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_500_585_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "V. C. SHUKLA\n\nSTATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\nB [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nCriminal Conspiracy, inf; redients of-Section 1201J of the Indian Pena{ Code, evidence required to prove criminal conspiracy explained-Approve; s ei•idcnce, value of.\n\nWords and Phrases-\"High Public or political (JjJices''-Meaning of.\n\nSpecial Court's Act 1979, ss. 5, 7, 9 & 11-Constitutional validity nf.\n\nSri Amrit Nahata PW 1 was a member of Parliament and had produced & film titled \"Kissa Kursi Ka\" ur..der the banner of Dhwani Prakash.\n\nThe, film ' according to the prosecution was a grotesque satire containing a scathing criticism of the functioning of the Central Government and was open to serious objections which were taken even by the Ceia.tral Board of Film Censors. After the film was ready for release, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, applied for certification of the film on the 19th of April 1975 before the Boord.\n\nThe film, was viewed on April 24, 1975 by an Examining Committee of the Board and whil.::· three members were of the opinion that certificate for exhihition, with drastic cuts. should b~ given, another member and Mr. N. S. Thapa, Chairman, disngreed with the opinion of their colleagues a-nd accordingly referred the matter to the Revising Committee. The Revising Committee after viewing the film agreed by a majority of 6 :1 for certification of the film, the dissent having been voiced by Mr. Thapa, the Chairman and accordingly under Rule 25 (ii) of the Cinematograph (Censorship) Rules, 1958, a reference waB made to the Centrit.l Government on 8-5~1975. In this connection, a letter was addressed to PW 6, Mr. S. M. Murshed, who, was at the relevant reriod Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In charge of film and- T. V. Projects and was appointed, Joint Secretary on 1st of May 1975. Before making his comments PW 6 saw the film some time in the middle of May, 1975. Meanwhile, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, was directed to deposit the positive print of the film comprising 14 reels of 35 mm with the Film Division Auditorium, situate at! 1, Mahadev Road, New Delhi. In pursuance of these directions PW 1 depOsited the positive print and an entry thereof (Ext. 17A) was made by the Librarian-cum-Projectionist of the Auditorium. PW 17, K. P. Sreedharan, who \\Vas a Technical Officer incharge also inspected the reels and found them iit order.\n\nAlthough Murshed, PW 6, after seeing tho film aj!reed with the opinion of the Chairman of the Board that the film may be1 open to objection on tho ground that it was full of sarcasm and contained criticim of the political functioning of the Governmental machinery yet he was pe!('Sonally of the opinion that certification for exhibition should not be refused.\n\nPW 6 accordingly recorded a note and submitted it to Mr. A. J. Kidwai, the then Secretary, !\\iinistry of Information and Broadcasting. The matter \\Vas then examined by Mr. I. K. GujraJ, the then Minister of Information and Broadcasting but\n\n''\n\n-A\"\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 501\n\nno final decision was taken. Meanwhile PW J, Amrit Nahat,., filed a writ petition (Ex. PW I /D) in the Supreme Court. On the 23rd of the June 1975, a notice was issued by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to PW 1, Amrit Nahata, to show cause why, certification to the film be riot' refused. 1he notice was made returnable by 9-7-75. Thus the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting had taken a tentative decision to refusecertification to the film because of its objectionable and offensive. nature.\n\nEmergency was proclaimed on the night of between 25th and 26th of June, 19i 5 and soon thereafter A 1 took charge as the Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting and he was of thei opinion that the film should be banned.\n\nOn July 5, 1975, in pursuance of the decision taken by the Central Government, the Coordination Committee directed seizure of the film and that its negatives, positives and all other materi<l!ls relating to it be takeru in the custody of the Central Government vide Ex. PW 6/0. On July 10, 1975 A 1 directed that the film be banned for screening under the Defence of India Rules, vide Ext. PW 6/E-4. Finally, on the 11th of July 1975 PW 6 ?vlurshed, passed an order that no certificatiOOI was to be given to the film for public exhibition which was followed by a letter dated July 14, 1975, forfeiting the fi]m, to the Government. In pursuance' of the decision taken hy the Central Government PW 39, S. Ghosh Deputy Secretary, incharge of the films\n\nand T. V. Division wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary Goveir:ninent of Maharashtra for seizure of all the positives and negatives of the film as also other related materials.\n\nIn pursuance of this order, the Bombay police seized the entire film on l-8-1975 and depooited in the godown of the Board. As, however, a final order had been passed by the Government banning the film.\n\nPW, 1, Arnr:it Nahata filed a petition for special leave in the Supreme Couert OOI 6-9-1975. This petition was heard on 29-10-75 and the Court directed the Government to screen the film on 17-11-75 in the Auditorium for being shown to the Judges constituting the Bench.\n\nJn pursuance of the order of the Court, intimation was sent to the Ministry concerned and PW 62, Mr.\n\nBurney who was then Secretary l\\finistry of Information and Broadcasting directed that immediate action be taken to implement the orders of the Supreme Court and that arrangements should be made to book the Auditorium for 17-11-75. By a letter dated 5-11-75 (Ext. PW 2/A2) the Supreme Court was also informed regarding the steps taken. Sometime thereafter PW 2, L.\n\nDayal took over as Joint Sd:retary (Films Division) in place of Mr. f\\.furshed.\n\nThe film, however, was not shown to the Judges of the Supreme Court on the ground that the films v, rere not traceable.\n\nAfter the general elections of March 1977, the new Government directed the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate into the matter of disappearance of the films.\n\nThe C.B.I. accordingly investigated the matter and found that A l, V. C. Shukla and A 2 Sanj&y Gandhi conspired together and ultimately burnt them in Man1ti Complex. Therefore C.B.I~ filed charge sheets against V. C. Shukla A 1 and Sanjay Gandhi A 2 under several provisions of Penal Code. The prosecution examined several ~.vitnesses to prove criminal conspirocy of A 1 and A 2 more paricularly under three stages, namely, (i) the deposit of the ix>sitive print in the Auditorium and its alleged transfer to the personal custody of A 1; (ii) the arrival of thirteen trunks containing negatives and other material related to the film at New. Delhi from Bombay in pursuance of the orders of A 1 and thelir transfer to I, Safdarjung Road, then to the Maruti Comp1ex: and (iii) the actual orders alleged to have been given\n\n.l by A 2 for burning the film in the premises of Maruti Complex which operation according to thei prosecution V.'as carried out by the approver PW 3, Khedkar and other witnesses between the 10th and 24th of November 1975.\n\nThe Sessions Judge, Delhi convicted V. C. Shukla\n\n(A-1) appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 494179 under section 120B rend with Ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 Indian Penal Code and also under section 409 Indian Penal Code in respect of the positive ptint and negative and other materia-1 of the film ''Kissa Kursi Ka' under section 411 read with S. 109 l.P.C.; under section 414 read with section 109 LP.C.; oo.d under section 201 read with section 109\n\nI.P.C. The appellant, &tnjay Gandhi (A 1) in Criminal Appeal No. 493/79 was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Delhi under section 120B read with Ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201, Penal Ccx!e and further convicted under S.. 435, 411, 414 and 201 Penal Code in regard to the negative and other matcria.J.s of th& film, as aJso under section 409 read with section 109 of the Penal Code.\n\nAccused No. I was sentenced under s. 120B read with Ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 to two years rigorous imprisonment; under s. 409 regarding the negative and other materials to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000 and in default further 6 months rigorous imprisonment, under s. 409 regarding the positive print of the film to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 5000 and in case of default further rigorous imprisonment fer three months; under s~ 411 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment fot one year; under s. 414 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonlnent for one year; under s. 201 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; and under s. 435 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for one, year and six months. Accused No. 2 was sentenced under s. 120 B read with ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 to rigorous imprisonment for two years; under s. 435 to rigorous imprisonment for one year and six months and a fine of Rs. 10,000 . and in case of default further rigorous imprisonment for four months; under s. 411 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; under s. 414 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; unde.r s. 201 in regard to the negaotive, etc., to rigorous imprisonment for one year; under s. 201 in regard to 13 trunks, etc., to rigorous imprisonment for one year and under s. 409 read with s., 109 to rigorous imprisonment for two years. The aforesaid sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently in the case of both the accused.\n\nOn being convicted by the Sessions Judge, Delhi, both the accused filed appeals before the Delhi High Court against their convictions and sentences, and wet-e released on bail pending the hearing of the appeals.\n\nMeanwhile~ the Special Courts Act of 1979' came into force and by virtue of a declaration G made under section 7 of the said Act, the appeals stood transferred to the Supreme Court.\n\nThe appellants raised the following preliminary objections as to the constitutional validity of Sections 5, 7, 9 and 11 of the Act, apart from the plea that their conviction and sentence were not based on any evidence, legal or otberwile.\n\nA. Even having regard to the principles laid down the Supreme Court in the Reference case, the Act fails to pass the tests laid down for a valid classifica-\n\n...\n\n' . '.k.\n\n• '\n\nV. C. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. 503\n\ntion under Art. 14. 1he decision given in the Reference case upheld the Bill A and rejected the challenge that the Bill violated Art. 14 main1y on the ground that the Bill sought to put a certa'in class of persons, namely, persons holding high public or political offices who had committed offences only during the period of E1nergency.\n\nIn other \\vords, the constitutionality of the Bill was upheld on the ground that the legislation was confined to select offences committed by a particular class of persons during the Emergency period. The impugned Act transgressed the li1nits imposed by the judgment in the Refer- B ence ca..\"e by bringing within its fold offences rommitted prior and subsequent to the Emergency and thus was in direct conflict with the opinion of this Court rendered in the Reference case. In other words this Court struck down that part of the Bill \\Vhicb related to the period bet\\veen February and June 1975 on the ground that persons having committed offences during that period could not be clubbed \\vith those who had committed offences during the period of Emergency. Thus the Act, by clubbing together persons accused of offences C committed during the Emergency with those alleged to be guilty of crimes per. taining to periods before and after the Emergency (i.e. by dealing with offences committed at any point of time whatsoever), has violated the guarantee under Art. 14 and the. classification . made by the Act is in direct contravention of the opinion given by this Court in the Reference Case.\n\nB. Even if the classification was valid, as the procedure prescribed by the Act is extremely harsh and prejudicial to the accused, Articles 14 and 21 are clearly violted.\n\n(a) Section 7 depdves a valuable right of af)peal;\n\n(b) Section 11 (I) takes away the valuabL.! right of revision against in\n\nterlocutory orders; E\n\n(c) Section 9(3) of the Act prescribes the procedure for the trial of \\\\'arrant cases before the Magistrate in Sections 238 to 243 a.ad 248 Crl. P.C., while treating the special Court as Court of Sessions.\n\nC. Assuming the classification of persons holding high public or political offices to be 1ustified, it suffers from a serious infirmity in that neither the terms \"high public or political office\" has been defined nor have the offences been deli~ F vered or defined so as to make the prosecution of such offenders a practical . reality.\n\nD. Even the nature and character of the offences have not been defined in the Act which introduces an element of vagueness in the classification.\n\nE. Parliament was not competent to pass a special Act and create Special Courts for a particular set of offenders .\n\nF. The Act seeks to change the situs of the Court and virtually abrogate9 \"Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nG. The Act creates an inviQious distinction in as much as persons holding high public or political offices Would have the benefit of trial by such an experi4 enced officer as a sitting judge of a High Court. while the appellants have been deprived of (bat right and were tried by a Special Judge who was only a Sessions Judge.\n\nH. Section 5 of the Act suffers from several constitutional and legal infirmi~ ties, namely, (a) Section 5 (1) suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers so as to violate Article 14 in as much as the discretion conferred on the Central Government is absolute, naked and arbitrary and is clearly discriminatory as it is open to the Central Government to pick and choose persons to n1ake declarations in respect of them while excluding others.\n\n(b) The issuance of a declaration ilnder section 5 (1) of the Act depends purely on the subjective satisfaction of the Central Governn1ent and under sub~\n\nsection (2) of section 5 such a declaration cannot be called into question by any court so that there would be an element of inherent bias or malice• ! in an order which the Central Government may pass, for prosecuting persons who are political opponents and that the section is therefore invalid.\n\n(c) As the Central Government in a democracy consists of the political party which has the majority in Parliament, declarations under section 5 ( 1) Of the Act could be used as an engine of oppression against members of parties who are opposed to !he ideologies of the ruling party.\n\n(d) the provisions about declaration contained in Section 5(1) are violative of the principle of natural justice in as much as they do not provide for any bearing being given to the accused before a declaration is made.\n\n(e) in an instant case, the declaration dated June 22, 1979 made under sec-- tion 5( I) of the Act per se shows that it had not resulted from any real application of the mind by the Central Government. Once the prosecution of the appellants had culminated in a conviction and an appeal therefrom there was no question of the existence of any \"prima facie case\" and that the use of such an expression could be intelligible only if the accused were facing criminal pr~ ceedings which had not culminated in a conviction; and\n\n(f) the declaration made under section 5 of the Act is non est beca\\ise it has not been laid before each House of Parliament as required by section 13 of the Act. ·\n\nJ. The appellant not having held any high public or political office ha• been drawn into this case by virtue of a declaration and has therefore been singled p out for a discriminatory treatment.\n\nK. Section 5(1) of the Act has no application to the fact,; of the present case because under section 5 ( 1) a declaration has to be made on the basis of the source indicated in the section, namely, inquiries conducted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act or investigations which become otiose and would have relance only if the appellant had not been convicted.\n\nL Conviction being a finding of1: guilt cannot be said to fall within the situation contemplated by section 5 ( 1) of the Act. Section 6 is an extension of the scheme contained in section 5, the former does not overrule the entire code of Criminal Procedure but in fact takes in only those cases which are pending at the trial stage when the declaration is made. Once the case ends in a. conviction, section 5 spends itself out and there is no room for the application of section 5.\n\nM. Section 7 would not apply to this case because its language embraces only those appeals which arise out of a prosecution which itself is pending at the time when a declaration is made.\n\nV. C. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. 505\n\nN. By providing in section 7 for an automatic transfer of appeals from the A High Court to the Supreme Court, the Legislature has exercised a judicial power which is vested in the Supreme Court alone under stion 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the section is invalid as it conflicts with section 406 Cr!. P .C.\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD: (Regarding Constitutional validity of the Act)\n\n1. In a diverse. society and a large democracy such as ours when: lhe ex panding needs of the nation change with the temper of the times, it is extremely difficult for any legislature to make laws applicable to all persons alike. Some amount of classification is, therefore, necessary to administer various spheres of the activities of the State. [522 D-Ei\n\n2. It is well settled that in applying Art. 14 mathematical precision or nicety or perfect equaRimity are not required. Similarity rather than identity of treatment is enough. The court<; should not make a doctrinaire approach in construing Art. 14 so as to destroi or frustrate any beneficial legislation. What Art. 14 prohibits is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification for\n\nthe purpose of legislation. Furthermore, the Legislature which is in the best position to understand the needs and requirements of the people must be given D sufficient latitude for making selection or differentiation and so long as such a selection is not arbitrary and has a rational basis having regard to the object of the Act, Art. 14 would not be attracted. That is why this Court has laid down that presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the onus lies upofi the person who attacks the statute to fihow that there has been an infraction of the constitutional concept of equality. It has also been held that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court is E entitled to take into consideration matters of common knowledge, common report, the history of the times and all other facts which may be existing at the time of the legislation. Similarly, it cannot be presumed that the administration of a particular law would be done with an \"evil eye and an unequaJ hand\".\n\nFinally, any person invoking Art. 14 of the C.Onstitution must show that there has been discrimination against a person who is similarly situate or equally cir cumstanced. [522 E-H, 523 Al P'\n\nState cif U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, [1961] 1 SCR 14, followed.\n\n3. The classical tests laid down for the application of Art. 14 are the following:\n\n1. The classification must be founded on an intelligible dif[erentia which\n\ndistinguishes persons who are placed in a group fro.ni others who are G left out of the group .\n\n2. Such differentiation must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\n3. There must b~ a nexus between the differentiation which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act. [523 D-F]\n\n4. It cannot be gainsaid that this Court while dealing with the Reference case was not at all concerned with the provisions of the Act which is of much\n\nA wider application than the Bill considered by the Court in the Reference. It is no doubt true that the Bill contained provisions for punishing only those offen~ ders who, were accused of offences committed during a particular period, namely, the period of Emergency. It is also true that the period of Emergency was an\n\nextraordinary one in the history of our country a.nd its features have been spelt out in the preamble of the Bill as also in the judgment given by this Court in the aforesaid case.\n\nBut that by itself does not debar Parliament from passing B a permanent Act to deal with a specified class of persons who occupy high public or political offices (\\vhich are offices of trust) and misuse or abuse: the, m.\n\nIt cannot be doubted that for the estabJishment and continuance. of a Parliamentary\n\ndemocracy and to secure efficiency and purity of administration it is necessary that when such persons commit serious abuse of power and. are guilty of a breach of the trust reposed in them, they would form a special class of offen .. c\n\nders. [525 F-H, 526 A]\n\n5. That Purity of life is a desired goal at all times itself is a sufficient justification for the classification made by the Act which widens its scope to include offenders of a particular type, whether before, during or after the Emergency.\n\nIn fact, such persons would undoubtedly form a special class of offenders which would justify the legislative measure singling them out for an expeditious trial.\n\nTo hold otherwise would be to say that persons bearing the aforesaid attributes would be immune from prosecution unqer any Special Act.\n\nPassing of such a Special Act is within the Legislative competence of Parliament.\n\n[526 D-E, 527 G-H, 528 BJ\n\n6. The Act does not suffer from any infirmity and the circumstance that it applies to offences committed at any time by a particular set of persons pos~ sessing special characteristics does not render it unconstitutional; for, when it puts into a class a particular set of personS having special characteristics which distinguish them from others who are left out of that class and who are to be tried under the ordinary law,. the classification is eminently reasonable.\n\nThe classification made has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved.\n\nSeparate grouping of holders of high offices for purposes of expedition~ crimi .. nal action to be taken by superior courts is a reasonable and v<i.Jid classification because it enhances confidence in the rule of law, strengthens the democratic system and ensures purity of public life and political conduct.\n\n[528 E-G, 529 G-H, 531) A]\n\n7. The opinion of the Supreme Court in Re. Special Act, in no way amounted to disapproval .or condemnation of a permanent law in futuro bringing within its scope all holders of high public or political office.\n\n[531) G-H]\n\nThe Bill was chaJTenged before the1 Supreme Court on the touch stone of Art. 14 on several groups. In the first place, it was argued that no rational basis for separately classifying Emergency offenders existed.\n\nThe second ground of challenge was that assuming that rthere was a valid classification, the same 'Was bad because it suffered from the vice of underinclusion inasmuch as holders of high public or political offices were 'ieft out. This Court, however, repe11ed the argument of rational basis on the ground that the Emergency period, because of its special characteristics, afforded adequate basis for separate classificatien of Emergency offences. The Cotirt was not at all at that time concerned expressly with the question as to whether classification of high public or political dignitaries without reference to any period during which they were alleged to have committed offences would be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. On\n\n~··\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. \\\n\nthe other hand, this Court made dear obse!fvations that an Act p1oviding for A such a classification would be not only valid but also highly welcome.\n\nIt is trUe that the provision Iegarding a particular period before the Emergency was then struck down but that was so because the Bill was confined to offences committed only during the period of Emergenc)r and the inclusion of another period meant bad classification for the reason that the pe1 iod last n1entioned could nOt be distinguished from either pre-or post-Emergency periods on any reasonable basis. This view of the Court could not be interpreted as laying down a B la\\\\' of universal application th&t no Special Act on a permanent basis classifying offenders possessing particulai: characteristics or attributes and providiilg for their prosecution under a spcial procedure would be invalid or violative of Art. 14. [530 A-G]\n\n8. 'fhe expression \"high public or political offices\" is of well kno\\vn significance and bears a clear connotation which admits of no vagueness or ambiguity.\n\nPersons holding high public or political offices mean persons holding .top positions wielding large powers.\n\n[531 C-D, F]\n\nPolitical office is an office which forms part of a Political Department of the Government or the Political Executive. This, therefore, clearly includes Cabinet Ministers, Ministers, Deputy Ministers ; lnd Parliamentary Secretaries\n\nwho are running the Department formulating policies and are responsible to D the Parliament. The word 'high' is indication of a top position and enabling the holders thereof to take major poiicy decisions.\n\nThus, the term 'high public or p0litical office' used in the Act contemplates only a speci'al class of officers -0r politicians who may be categorised as follows :-\n\n1. Officials wielding extraordinary powers entitling them to take major policy decisions and holding positions of trust and answerable and E accountable for their wrongs.\n\n2. Persons responsible for giving to the State a clean, stable and honest administration;\n\n3. Persons occupying a very elevated status in whose hands lies the destiny <>f the nation.\n\n[534 C-E]\n\nThe rationale behind, the classification of persons possessing the aforesaid , characteristics is that they wield wide powers which, if exercised improperly by reason of corruption, nepotism or breach of trust, may mar or adversely mould the future of the country and tarnish its image. It cannot be said, therefore, with any conviction that persons who possess special attributes could be equated with ordinary criminals who have neither the power nor the resources to comp\n\nmit offences of the type described above.\n\nThe term 'persons holding high pub- G ]ic or political offices~ is self-explanatory and admits of no difficulty and that mere absence of definition of the expression would not vitiate the classification\n\nmade by the Act. Such persons are in a position to take major decisions regarding social, economic, fii:tancial aspects of the life of the community and other far-reaching decisions On the home front as also regarding external affairs and if their actions are tainted by breach of trust, corruption or other extraneous consideration, they would damage the interest<; of the country. It is, therefore, H not only proper but essential to bring such offenders to book at the earliest poSFible opportunity. [534 F-H, 535 Al\n\n9. Clause 4 of the preamble to the Special Courts Act clearly indicates the\n\nnature of the oll'ences that would be tried under the Act. [535 BJ\n\nThe \\Vords 'power being a Trust' clearly indicate that any act which amounts. to a breach of the trust or of the powers conferred on -the person concerned would be an offence triable nnder the Act. Clause ( 4) is wide enough to include any offence committed by holders of high public or political offices which amounts to breach of trust or for which they are accountable in law and does not leave any room for doubt.\n\nSection 5 which confers powers on the Central Goverµment to make a declaration clearly refers tO the guidelines laid down in the preambie and no Central Government would evei think of prosecuting holders of high public or political offices for petty offences. [535 o-.GJ\n\n10. Sections 7 and 11 of the Special Courts Act are within the legislative competence of the Parliament. That is to say Parliament has the competence: C to provide for the creation of Special Courts and to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court by providing that an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of Special Court to the Supreme COUrt both on fact and on law.\n\n[536 A-DJ\n\nIn re. Special Courts Bill [1979] 2 SCR 476; applied.\n\n11. The Act neither seeks to change the situs of the Court nor virtually D abrogates Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n[536 E]\n\nIn re. Special Court Bill, (1979] 3 SCR; followed.\n\n12. The question of the appellants beiag tried by the Special Judge appointed under the Special Courts Act could not arise because the said Special Court did not exist at all even whet the trial of the appellant was concluded. The First Information report against the appellants was lodged on 13th April 1977 and the chargesheet was submitted before the Special Judge who convicted the appellants by his order dated February 27, 1979. The Act, however, came into force on May 16, 1979, that is to say, three months after the conViction and about two months afte\"r the appellants bad filed their appeals before the High Court. The existence of such fortuitous circumstances cannot attract Article 14. [536 G-H, 537 A-Bl\n\nKhandige Sham Bhatt and Ors. v. The Agricultural Income Tax (1963] 3 SCR 809; Dantuluri Ram Raiu and Ors, v. State of Andhra and Anr., [1972] l SCR 421; applied.\n\n(l{ficer, Pradesh\n\n13. Section 5(1) does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of powers so as to violate Article 14. No unguided or uncanalised power has been conferred on the Central Government. A basic condition imposed on, the Cettitral Government is that there must be a proper application of mind regarding the existence of prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence.\n\nSecondly, the discretion has to be exercised in accordance with the\" guidelines contained in the preamble. The various clauses of the preamble lay down clear guidelines and provide sufficient safe-guards against any abuse of power. Thirdly, clause ( 4) of the preamble' clearly lays down that the power under s. 5 is exercisable only after the Commission of an offence by the holder of a high public or political office: ha6 been disclosed as a result of an inquiry conducted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act or of an investigation conducted by the Government through its agencies. It is well settled: that discretionary power is not the same thing as power to discriminate nor\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 509\n\ncan the constitutional validity of a law tested on the assumption that wherei A a discretion&ry power is conferred on a high authority, the same may or would be exercised in a discriminatory manner.\n\n[538 &H, 539 A]\n\nThe pO\\·\\rer conferred on the Central Government is controlled by the guidelines contained in the preamble which by virtue of the provisions. of s. 5(1) hecomes a part of that section.\n\nAs th& po\\\\•er has been conferred on the Central Government \\Vhich is to make a declaration in accordance with the conditions laid down in s. 5 ( 1) and, therefore, in conformity with the guidelines mentioned in the preamble, the attack based on discrimination is unfounded.\n\n[541 B-C]\n\nDr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, [1950] SCR 519, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra, [1952] SCR 435; Matajog Dubey v. H. C.\n\nBhari, [1955] 2 SCR 925 In Re. The Kera/a Education Bl'll, 1957, [1959] SCR 995 Jyoti Par.shad v. The Administrator for the Union Trritory of Delhi, [1968] 2 SCR 125; Moti Ram Dekha etc. v. General Manager, N.E.F., R7iil ... ways, Maligaon, Panda etc. [1964] 5 SCR 683; V. C. Shukla v.\n\nThe State through C.B.I .. f19801 I SCR 380; followed.\n\n14. The power of the Central Go.-ernment to issue a declaration is a statutory power circumscribed by certain conditions. Furthermore, as the power is vested in a very high authority, it cannot be assumed that it is likely D to be abused.\n\nOn the other hand, where the power is conferred on such a high authority as the Central Government, the presumption will be that the power will be exercised in a bona fide manner a.nd according to law.\n\n[541 D-F]\n\nChinta Lingam and Ors. v. Governmt.'nt of India and Ors., [1971]\n\n2 SCR 871; Budhan Chaudhary and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, [1955] I SCR 1045; referred to. ·\n\n15. The contention that declarations under s. 5(1) of the Act could be1 used as a.n engine of oppression against members of rarties who are opposed to the ideologies of the ruling party is one arising out of fear and mistrust which. if accepted would invalidate practically all Jaws of the land; for, then\n\neven a prosecution under the ordinary law may be considered as politically motivated, which is absurd. Furtheirmore, prejudice. malice or taint is not a\n\nmatter for presumption in the absence of evidence supporting it. It is well p settled that burden lies on the parties allegingi bias or malice to prove its existence. and if malice or bias is proved in a particular case, the courts would strike down the act vitiated by it, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226, 227 or 136. [542 AD]\n\nIn Re. Special Courts Bill, [1979] 2 SCR 476 referred to.\n\n16. At the stage when the declaration is sought to 6e made there is no list G pending no'r has any prosecution been 1aunched against the accused. Section 5 deals only with the decision taken by the Central Goveirnment to prosecute and until th<)t decision is notified, the prosecution does not start, and the questioit of Ml accused being heard at that stage~ therefore, does not arise at all.\n\n[542 F-GJ\n\nCozons v. N•rth Devon Hospital Management Committee and Anr., [1966) 2 Q.B. 330: quoted with approval.\n\n17. Undei' section 5(1) of the Act the Government has to be satisfied on two counts bef1 .. re it could issue a decla.ration. It must be satisfied in the first\n\ninstance that there is prima facie ervidence of the comm1ss1on of au offence.\n\nSecondly, it must form the opinion in accordance \\Vith the. guidelines contained in the preamble that such offence ought to be dealt with under the Act. l'he condition of the existence of prima facie evidence. is fulfilled in the case of the pre.Bent declaration though the trial in the first Couit had ended in a conviction and an appeal therefrom, the reason being that if conviction is construed as evidence of the existence of something more than a mere pri1na facie. case, that would not mean that aprin1a facie case cease to exist.\n\nThat a prima facie case must be found to exist is only the mininuon requirement for the satisfaction of the Central Government and it would be doubly made out if the evidence available is stronger than is needed to make out only a prinia facie case.\n\nA conviction of an accused person cannot mean that there is. no prilna facie evidence against him.\n\nAH that it spells out is that not only: a prima facie case is made out against him but that the evidence available is even stronger and is sufficient for a conviction. However, as the Government, while acting under the section, is to satisfy itself only with the existence of pri1na facie evidence, the assertion by it in the declaration that such evidence was available to its satisfaction cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be1 inapplicable to a case in which a conviction: has been: recorded. In this view of the matter the use of the expression 'prin1a facic' evidence in the decJaration is fully justified even though the tri<!!l had ended. in a conviction which was under appeal on the date of the declaration.\n\n[544 A-G}\n\nA perusal of the declaration reveals that it gives the history of the case from beginning to end which demonstra.te3 that the Central Government was fully awMe Of the various stages through \\vhich the trial of the appc1lants passed.\n\nThus, the formation of the opinion by the Government of the existence of a\n\npritna facie case cannot be held to be perfunctory or ilJusory. It has not bee:ti shown that the dedai:ation was in any way irrational or mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.\n\n[546 FG]\n\n18. The provisions of Section 13 of the Special Courts Act are purely directory and not mandatory so that if the conditions\\ mentioned in i11 are not fulfilled the declaratiori, would not be vitiated. It is to be noted that the section does not say that until a declaration. is placed before the two Houses cf Parlia~ :F ment it shaH not be dee1ned to be effective, nor does the1 section intend that ally consequences would result from its non-compliance. On a true interpretatiofi' of section 13 of the Act, it is. clear that it is a case of a c; irnple laying of the declaration before each House of Parliament. [547 A-B, 548 Bl\n\nl1.1/s Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. o.nd Ors. v. State of flaryana, [1979] 2 SCC 196; applied.\n\n19. The doctrine of the violation of basic. structure of the Constitution or its fundamental features applies not to the provisions of a law made by a State legislature or Parliament but comes into operation: \\vb.ere an amendment made in the Constitution itself is said to affect its baic features like fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 14, 19. 31 or the power of amendn1ent of the Constitution under Art. 368 and so on.\n\nThei doctrine has no application to the provisions of a Central or State lav,; because if the statute is violative of any\n\nprovision of the Constitution it can be struck do\\vn on that ground and it is not necessary to enter into the: question of basic structure: of the Constitution at all.\n\n[548 C-EJ\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 511\n\n20. It is true that section 6 of the Act does not contemplate a prosecution At which is relatable to the declaration under section 5 but that'does not debar the application of section 5 to other stages of a criminal case; especially thoSe specifically dealt with under section 7 of the Act which fully covers the situltion in hand. The limited field in1 which section 6 operates does not therefore exhaust the consequences flowing from the issuance of a declaration undetr section 5 of the Act. [549 AB]\n\n 21. The words \"whether pending or disposed of\" are significant an<l qualify the immediately preceding clause \"a prosecution in respect of such offences\".\n\nThe legislature has thus taken care to expressly provide that an appeal or revision would be covered by section 7 and transferable to the Supreme Court for disposal if it is directed against a judgment or order made in prosecution which is either pending or has bcenr disposed of, the only other requirement' of the section being that suoh appeal or revision must itself be pending at the date of the declaration. Therefore to interpret section 7 in such a way a3 its applicability is limited to appeals or revisions ari5ing from prosecutions pending at the trial stage at the date of the relevant declara.tions is possible only if the words \"or dispod of' are treated as absent from section-a course which is not open to this Court in vieiw of the express language used.\n\n[549 E-GJ\n\n22. There is no question of the exercise of any judicial power by the legis- D lature in enacting section 7 of the Act which covers a well known legislative process.\n\nBy enacting section 7, Parliament has merely provided a new forum for the appeals which were pending inthe High Court and in respect -of which a valid declaration, fully consistent with the provisions of the Act, was madea course which involved no interference with the judicial functions of the court\n\nand was fully open to the legislature. [550 A, E-F] E Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Sri Raj Narain, [19'76] 2 SCR 347; distinguished.\n\n23. Since the classification made by the Act complies with the, dual test laid down by the Supreme Court and .. therefore held to bei a reasonable classifications, Article 14 would not be attracted even if the procedure is held to be bafsher than that available undett\" the ordinary law.\n\nApart from that, the procedure prescribed by the Act is not harsh or onerous but is more liberal and aJv; intageous to the accused who is assured of an expeditious and fair trial there.arider.\n\n[550 G-H, 551 A]\n\n24. An appeal being a creature of statute, an accused has no inherent right to appeal to a particular tribunal.\n\nThe legislature may choose any tribunal for the purpose Of giving a right of appeal. Moreover. an appea.l to the High Court is less advantageoos than an appealto the Supreme Court for the following reason : G\n\n\"The right of appeal given to an accused from the order of a Session Judge or Special Judge to the High Court is not totally unrestricted.\n\nSection 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers an Appellate Court to dismi~ an appeal sun1marily if it is satisfied that there iS' no sufficient ground for interference.''\n\nWhile an appeal to the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure is B attooded witb the risk of being summarily dismissed under section 384, an appeal under seotion II (1) of the Act wbk:h runs tbns :\n\n\"11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment sentence or order, not being interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the Supre.; me Court both on facts and on law.\" is not so.\n\nAn appeal under s. 11( I) lies as of right and both on facts and on law.\n\nThus, the right conferred on a convict by s. 11 ( 1) is wider and less restricted than the right of appeal given by the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n(2) If the appeal is filed before the Supreme Court or is transferred thereto, the accused becomes entitled to a hearing of his case by the highest court in the country both on facts and on la.w and thus gets a far greater advantage than a right to move the Court for grant of special leave \\Vhich may or may not be granted, it being a matter of discretion to be exercised by the Supreme Court.\n\nTherefore the procedure regarding the appeals under the Act is not harsher than that prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n[552 i>H, 553 E-H, 554 CJ\n\nSyed Quasirn Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad and Ors. [19531 SCR 589; applied.\n\n25. Even the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for any revision against an interlocutory order. Section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly bars revision against interlocutory orders. Inasmuch as there is no right of revision either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the ACt, it cannot be said that section 11(1) of the Act creates a definite procedural disadvantage to the accused. In fact under the Act, the Special Court is presided over by no less a person who is a sitting judge .of a High Court and the possibility of miscarriage of jutice is reduced to the barest minimum. [555 CD]\n\nV. C. Shukla v. The State, through C.B.l., [1980] I SCR 380; lagannath Sonu Parker v. State of Maharashtra, [1963] Suppl. I SCR 573; followed.\n\n26. The procedure for trial of warrant cases gives a full opportuBity to the accused to participate in the trial at all its stages and to rebut the case for the prosecution in every possible manner and it has not been pointed out how the adoption thereof for trials under the Act would be to the disadvantage of the accused.\n\nThere.fore the provisions of sections 9(1) a-a.cl (3) of the Act cannot be said to be harsh.\n\n[556 E-G]\n\nState of West Bengal v. Anwal Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284 explained and distinguished.\n\n27.\n\nNone of the sections of the Act are violative of Article 14 or Article 21 or any other provision of the Constitution. The classification made in the Act is valid and reasonable a.nd bas a rational nexus with the object of the Act and that the procedure prescribed is fair and advantageous to the accused. [561 E-F]\n\n28. The appellant in Cr!. Appeal 493 /79 has not been singled out for a discriminatory treatment. It is true that he has never been the holder of any high public or political office but the first clause of the preamble\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 513\n\nclearly includes within its ambit not only persons holding high public or _... A political offices but also others. Section 8 thus incorporates the well known concept of joint trial of accused persons in respect of offences forming part of th~ same transaction.\n\n[551 C-E]\n\nFurther Held (on merits) :\n\n29. Jn order to prove a criminal conspiracy which is punishable under -section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, there must be direct or circlllll&- B tantial evidence 1 to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. This clearly envisages that there must be a meeting of the n1inds resulting in an ultirnate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the ommission of an offence.\n\n[565 H, 566 J\\]\n\n30. It is true that in most cases, it will be difficult to get direct evidence of an agreement to conspire but a conspiracy can be inferred even from C circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement two or more persons to con1mit an olTence.\n\n[566 A-B]\n\nIn the instant case, there is no acceptable evidence connecting either of the appelJants with the existence of any conspiracy. Even taking the main part of the prosecution case at their face value, no connection has been proved with the destruction of the film 'Kissa. Kursi Ka' and the two appel- D _ lants. The evidence produced by the prosecution falls short of the standard of proof required in a, criminal case. The prosecution failed to prove either there was any existence of any conspiracy between A I and A 2 to destroy the film 'Kissa Kursi Ka by burning it or to commit any other offence in respect of the film.\n\nThere is evidence to show that there was . any meeting of minds between A 1 and A 2.\n\nEven on the first two parts of the prosecution case, the allegation of the prosecution that the E positive prints were removed at the instance or to the knowledge of A 1 m:- 1hat the negatives and other materials of the film were sent for by A 1 and kept in his personal custody has not been proved. The mere fact that A I decided to show the film and refused certification for public exhibition and passed orders for seizure of the film and its tranfer to the custody of the Ministry of Information does not disclose any offence.\n\nThe decision to ban the .film was not taken by A I secretly or clandestinely but after a full F fledged discussion in the coordination Committee meeting attended by senior officers of various ministries as deposed by Prasad PW 63. Further that part of the case which relates to the burning of film material rests solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the approver and is negatived insofar as the role therein of A I is concerned.\n\n[566 C-D. 583 F-H, 584 A-BJ\n\n(i) TUI 9-7-75 i.e. the date by which the notice to show cause why certi- G fication of the film 'Kissa Kursi Ka' was made returnable, neither A 1 nor A. 2 was anywhere in the picture. The facts disclosed by the prosecu tion ex facie show that objection to certification of the film had been taken at the very initial stage and the ultimate order was passed during the time when A I, Mr. Shukla had taken over as Minister, which was merely the final scene of a drama long in process; [564 C-EJ\n\n(ii) Even at the stage of proposed exhibition of the film to the Judges of the Supreme Court who constituted the Bench and heard the Special Leave Petition i.e. 17-11-75 there was absolutely no evidence to show that there\n\nA was any meeting of minds of A 1 and A 2 nor is there any material to indicate that A 2 played any; role in the burning of the film.\n\nThe decision to ban the film was taken by the Ministry headed by A 1, on the merits of the case. No motive is attributable to A 1 at this stage because even the Chairman of the Board, PW 8 Mr. Thapa who was an independent witness wa9 of the view that the film should not be certificated rfor public exhibition ..\n\nSimilarly, the steps taken by the. officers of the Ministry in persuance of the B filn1 at Bombay a11d its transfer to Delhi ¥/as in the nature of routine to see\n\nthat the decision taken by the Government was implemented.\n\nAs soon as the Ministry received the orders of the Supreme Court for screening the film on 17-11-1975, immediate steps were taken to comply with the orders of the Court. Admittedly behveen 17, th November 1975 to 23rd November 1975, .1\\ 2 was either away to Hyderabad or Sikkim as proved by DW 3.\n\nThis negatives the story of the approver connecting A 2 with the burning of C the film.\n\n[565 E-H, 581 C-D. 582 A]\n\n.A. lot of evidence has been produced by the prosecution to show :\n\n(a) that the positive print of the film found its way into the luggage compartment of the car in which A 1 then travelled to the Prime Minister's house where the print was unloaded by someone in the absence of A 1; and\n\n(b) that the negatives and other material relating to the film were taken in a tempo or two to the Prime Minister's residence and from there to the Maruti Complex where they were stored before their destruction.\n\n[584 BD]\n\nBut the connection of A 1 or A 2 therewith remains unproved. Had these factors provided circumstantial evidence on the basis of which alone the F, charge against either A I or A 2 could be held established it would have been necessary for the Court to sift the evidence produced in sui)port thereof.\n\nBut that is definitely not the case, for, if either or both of the factors are proved, the inference of guilt of either A 1 or A 2 does not necessarily follow. For circumstantial evidence to furnish evidence of guilt it has to be such as it cannot be explained on any other reasonable hypothesis except the guilt orthe accused which is not the ca-5e here because appellants A 1 and A 2 could JP not be said to be the only persons interested in the destruction of the film if it was as abnoxious to the then Prime1 Minister or as critical of the function~\n\ning of the then Union Government as the prosecution would have the Court believe.\n\nThe film and all the material relating to it no doubt appear to have vanished into thin air but then neither A 1 nor A 2 can be held responsible therefor, in the absence of proof in that behalf proof which would exclude all reasonable doubt. [594 DG] G\n\n(iii) A mere identification by a witness of a person in the Court for the first time who was not known: to the witness and who had only caught a'. glimpse: of the person; long time before is valueless, in the absence of the operative witness being tested by a pretviously held Test Identification does not exclude possibility of mistakes in identification.\n\n[576 B-D]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.\n\n492. 493 and 494 of 1979.\n\nAppeals under section 7 of tbe Special Courts Act, 1979 on transfer from the Delhi High Court at New Delhi from the Judgment an<l\n\n••·\n\nv. c. SHUKLA v. DELill ADMN. (Fazal Ali, !.) 515\n\nOrder dated 27-2-1979 of the Selll'lions Court at Delhi in Sessions A Case No. 340/1978.\n\n!. S. Wasu, M. L. Nanda and M. N. Shroff for the Appellnt in Crl. A. 492/79.\n\nK. L. Arora, K. G. Bhagat, Harish Gulati, Madan Bhatia and ..\n\nD. Goburdhan for the Appellant in Cr!. A. 493/79. a\n\nP. R. Mridul, Rajinder Singh, 0. P. Sharma, R. C.\n\nBhatia: and Vivek Tankha for the Appellant in Cr!. A. 494/79.\n\nK. L. Arora, K. G. Bhatat, Harish Gulati and D. Gobur(!han; for the Respondent No. 1 in Crl. A. 492/79.\n\nRajinder Singh B. R. Handa and 0. P. Sharma for the Respondent C No. 2 in Crl. A. 492/79.\n\nSoli !. Sorabjee, Sol. Genl. Ram Jethmalani, Grish Chandra, s.\n\nMarkandeya and S. B. Jaisinghani for the Respondent in Cr!. As. 493-494/79.\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThese two criminal appeals are directed against a judgment dated 27th February 1979 of the Sessions Judge, Delhi by which the accused (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) have been convicted under various sections of the Penal Code and awarded sentenC'os of various terms of imprisonment not e11; ceeding two years (which have been ordered to run concurrently) in addition to fines.\n\nBoth the appeals were originally filed before the Delhi High Court and were admitt>d by ii on the 21st March 1979 when the sentences of the appellants were suspended and they were released Qni bail.\n\nOn the 17th May. 1979, the State also filed an appeal to Jhe Delhi High Court for enhancement of the sentences.\n\nThe Special Courts Act (No. 22 of 1979 and hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Act') was passed by Parliament and received the assent of the President on 16th May 1979. On the 27th June 1979, the Central Government made a declaration under s.5 (1) of the Act as a consequence of which the appeals stood transferred to this Court.\n\nThe appellants have raised a number of preliminary objections relating to the constitutional validity of the Act and various provisions thereof on several grounds includihg the contravention of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.\n\nAlternatively, it was argued that some of th~ provisions of the Act did not at all apply to the appellants and the transfer of the appeals from the High Court to\n\n13-289SCl/80\n\nthis Court was not legal. The State has appeared through Shri Soli J. Sorabjee who )las countered all the objections raised by the appellants and has submitted that the Act is a valid piece of legislation ahd that there is no illegality in the transfer of the appeals from the High Court to this Court.\n\nIn vew of the nature of the preliminary objections raised by the appellants we decided to dispose them of before entering into the merit5 of the appeals.\n\nAfter bearing the parties at great length, by an order dated December 5, 1979 we overruled all the said objections and proceeded to hear the appeals on merits.\n\nWe now proceed to set out the reasons given for the order rejecting those objections.\n\nfn order to understand the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties it will be necessary to state o; ortain undisputed facts.\n\nThe Act was preceded by a Bill (introduced by a Member of the Lok Sabha) which was adopted by the Government but in view of certain Constitutional objections the President made a reference to this Court for its opinion regarding the validity of the Bill and its provisions.\n\nThe matter was \"\"ard by a Bench of seven Judges and i11 its report dated December 1, 1978, this Court upheld the validity of the Bill generally by a majority of six to one.\n\nCertain clauses of the Bill, however, were held to be violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution.\n\nThis Court further held that Parliament had legislative competence to create Special Courts and to provide for appeals agai.)lst judgments and orders of such Courts to the Supreme Court.\n\nThis Court also upheld the classification provided in clause 4(1) of the Bill which conferred power on the Central Government to make a declaration in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed during the operation of the Proclamation of Emergency dated 25th June 1975 by a person who bdd high public or political office in India.\n\nTo the extent that the claus•e brought within the purview of the Act persons who had committed offences between February 27, 1975 and June 25, 1975 it was, however, held to be invalid.\n\nSimilarly, the provisions of clause 7 of the Bill laying down that a retired Judge of a High Court could be appointed as a Judge of the Special Court and that this could be done by the Central Govermnent in consultation with but without the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India were held to be bad.\n\nFurthermore, the Court observed that the absence of a provision for the transfer of a case from one Special Court to another affected the fairness of the trial and, therefore, was violative of Art. 21 of th~ Constitution.\n\nBarring these infirmities, the constitutional validity of the Bill was upheld by this Court. I! may be mentioned here that during the course of arguments learned counsel for the Union gave an expss undertaking tha( the defec!s\n\npointed out in the Bill would be suitably removed so as to bring the Bill in accord with the opinion expressed by the Court. Consequently, a fresh Bill was prepared and was introduced in the Lok Sabha on the 21st February 1979. This Bill incorporated the suggestions of this Court, deleted reference to the period prior to the 25th June 1975 in the preamble, made a provision for transfer of a cas~\n\nfrom one Special Judge to another by the Supreme Court and provided that a Special Court would consist of a sitting Judge of a High Court nominated by the Central Government with the concurrence of . the Chief Justice of India.\n\nAfter some debate the Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha dn the 9th March 1979. It was then sent to the Rajya Sabha where its various provisions were fully debated and certain important suggestions were made by the Members of the Rajya Sabha as a result of which the Bill w<is returned by the Rajya Sabha with certain amendments on 21st March 1979.\n\nThereafter the Government accepted the amendments suwsted by the Rajya Sabha and incorporated the same in the Bill which was then passed a'nd ultimately received the assent of the President on 16th May, 1979.\n\nSome of the substantial changes; which have been incorporated in the Act may be summarised thus :\n\nThe Act is now a permanent Act and does not deal only with offences committed during the period of Emergency. Secondly, in the preamble an additional clause has been added to indicate the nature of the offences committed by persons holding high public or political office.\n\nThirdly, it has been provided that a Special Court would consist of a sitting Judge of a High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned with the concurrence of\n\nthe Chief Justice of Tndia.\n\nThus, the Government has absolutely no hand either in the appointment of or any control over the Special Judge.\n\nThis provision appears to ensure complete independence of the Special Judge who is to be appointed to decide cases of highly placed public or political offioors, so that they may have complete confidence in the Judge who tries !_heir case.\n\nAnother special feature of the Act is that the preamble and its various clauses are not mev2ly intended to spell out the object of the Act but contain important .guidelines and essential safeguards and by virtue of s. 5 (1) of the Act the clauses of the preamble become a part of the Act itself.\n\nAs the Act has thus assumed a new complexion, it is necessary H to analyse briefly its scheme before we deal with the contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties.\n\nThe heading of the Act\n\nA shows that its main object is to provide for the S[J_eedy trial of _a certain class of offences (emphasi!; ours). There al!e as many as nine clauses of the preamble which run thus :\n\n\"AN ACT\n\nto provide for the speedy trial of a certain class of offences.\n\n( 1) WHEREAS Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 have rendered reports disclosing the existence of prima facie evidence of olfunces committed by persons who held high public or political offices in the country and others connected with the commission of such offences1 during the operation of the proclamation of Emergency dated the 25th June, 1975, issued under clause (I) of article 352 of the Constitution;\n\n(2) AND WHEREAS inve& 'igations conducted by the Goverqplent through it~ agencies have also disclosed similar offences committed during the period aforesaid;\n\n(3) AND WHEREAS the offences referred to in the recitals aforesaid were committed during the operation of the said Proclamation of Emergency, during which a grave emergency_ was clamped on the whole country, civil liberties were curtailed to a great extent, important fundamental rights of the people were suspended, strict censorship was imposed on the press, judicial powers were severely crippled and the parliamentary democratic system was emasculated;\n\n( 4) AND WHEREAS all powers being a trust, and holders of high public or political offices are accountable for the exercise Qlf their powers in all cases where Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 or investigations conducted by Government through its agencies disclose offences committed by such holders; ( 5) AND WHEREAS it is the constitutional, legal and moral obligation of the State to prosecute persons involved in the said offences; ( 6) AND WHEREAS the ordinary criminal courts due to congestion of work and other reasons cannot reasonably be expected to bring those prosecutions to a speedy termination;\n\n)---\n\n(7) AND WHEREAS it is imperative for the efficient functioning of parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by or under the Constitution of India that the commission of offences referred to in the recitals aforesaid should be judicially determined with the utmost dispatch;\n\n( 8) AND WHEREAS it is necessary for the said purpose to establish additional courts presided over b\" sitting Judges of High Courts;\n\n(9) AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make some procedural changes whereby avoidable delay in the final determination of the innocence or guilt of the persons to be tried is eliminated without interfering with' the right to a fnir trial.\"\n\n(Numbering of the clauses by us to facilitate discussion)\n\nSo far as clause ( 1 ) is concerned it refers to Commissions of Inquiry and the reports given by them disclosing the existence of prima fade evidence oJl offenceS committed by persons holding high public or political offices in the country and others connected with the commission of such offences during the operation of the Proclamation of Emergency dated June 25, 1975. Clauses (2) and (3) give the history of the special features of the Emergency and the result of the investigation conducted by the Gowrnment regarding offences committed during the Emergency.\n\nClause ( 4) makes the Act a permanent one.\n\nAccording to this clause, persons holding high public or political offices are actually trustees in regard to the powers vested in them and offences committed by them in breach of the trust or confidence reposed in them would also fall within the ambit of the Act, if either by the Commissions of Inquiry or inwstigations conducted by the Government such offences are disclosed.\n\nClause\n\n(5) makes it clear that it is the constitutional, legal and moral obli gation of the State to prosecute persons involved in the offences mentioned in the foregoing clauses. Clauses (6)and(7) deal with the main object of the Act which is to bring the prosecution of the offenders falling within the ambit of the Act to a speedy termination and to bring about a judici, al determination of the offences said to1 have been' committed by them with the utmost dispatch.\n\nClause (3) provides for the establishment of additional courts presided over 'by sitting Judges of High Courts. Clause (9) refers to ceratin procedural changes brought about by the Act in the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and intended to avoid delay in the final determination of the innocence or guilt of the persons to be tried. To sum\n\nup from the object of the various clauses of the preamble it is man, ifes_t that particular type of persons, namely, those who are holding high public or political offices by way of a trust have been put in a separate class along with those who have committed offences during the Emergency and who also bear the same characteristics as those indicated in clause ( 4). Section 2 of the Act defines \"Code\", \"declaration\" and \"Special Court\" anii the residuary clause ( d) thereof says that words and expressions not defined in the Act would have the same meaning as in the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nSection 3 (1) gi\\'.es power to tbs: Central Government to establish an adequate number of Special Courts by notification in the Official Gazette.\n\nSection 3(2) enacts that a Special Court shall consist of a sitting Judge of a High court nominated by the Chie; f Justice thereof with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nSection 4 empowers the Special Court to take cognizance and try such cases as are instituted before it or transferred to it in accordance with the manner provided by the Act.\n\nSection 5 (1) is the pivotal provision which lays down the conditions under which the Central Governmentj is empowered to make a declaration which is the starting point of the prosecution of ; the offenders falling within the ambit of the Act. It may be noticed that s.5(1) clearly states that the guidelines contained in the preamble are to be followed by the Central Government in determining whether an offence is to be dealt with under the Act. . Section 5 (2) provides that a declaration made by the Central Government shall not be called in question in any court.\n\nSection 6 provides that on a declaration made under section 5 (1) in respect of any offence, any prosecution: in respect of such offence shall , be instituted only in a special Court designated by the Central Government and that where a prosecution is pending in any other court, the same shall stand transferred to the special Court.\n\nThis would be in derogation of anything contained in the code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nSection 'J deals with the automatic transfer to the, Supreme Court of appeals or revisions pending in any court of appeal or revision at the date of the declaration. Section 8 embodies the well-known provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to a joint trial of a number of accused persons who are charged with the offence ofl abetment or conspiracy. Section 9 ( 1) provides that the Special Court would follow the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases before a Magistrate, that is to say It makes applicable the provisions of ss. 238 to 243 and 248 of\n\nthe Code to trials by a Special Court.\n\nSub-section (3) of s.9 lays down that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply, in so far as \\(hey are not inconsistent with those of the Act, no proceedings before a Special Court which shall be deemed to' be a\n\nCourt of Session and would have all the powers thereof, and that a person conducting a prosecution before a special Court shall be de:_med to be a public prosecutor.\n\nSub-secti® ( 4) of s. 9 empowers a Special Court to pass upon '!!'Y person convicted by it any sentence authorised by Jaw for the punishment of the offence of which such person Ts convicted.\n\nSection 10(1) contains a provision for the transfer by the Supreme Court of a case from one Special Cort to (another where\n\nsuch an order is expedient in the ends of justice.\n\nIn fact, in the opinion given by this Court on the Presidential Reference this aspect of the matter was particularly highlighted.\n\nSub-section (2) of s. 10, however, Jays down the norms under which an application for transfer could be made.\n\nSub-section (3) of s.10 empowers the Supreme Court to grant comperisation to any person who has opposed the application for thei transfer of a case if the Court finds that such an appli• cation was frivolous or vexatious.\n\nSectioo 11 (I) prescribes the forum of an appeal to the Supreme Court against a judgment, order or sentence passed by a Special Court but excludes1 interlocutory order, from its ambit.\n\nIt may be noted that! interlocutory orders have beeu excluded from the purview of s. 11 ( 1) so as to eliminate unnecessary delays in the trial of a case by a Special Court.\n\nEven the code' of Criminal Procedure has barred any revision against an interlocutory order by virtue of the provisions of s. 397 (2) of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Sub-section (2) ofl s. 11 provides that no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court except as provided for under section 11 ( 1) . Subsection ( 3) provides the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Supreme Court and the proviso thereto confers power on the Supreme Court to condone any delay if sufficient cause is shown, it may be noticed here that under s. 11 an appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of the Special Judge lies as a matter of right.\n\nSection1 12 empowers the Supi:.eme Court to fran1e rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act.\n\nSection 13 provides that every notification made under sub-section (1) of s. 3 and every declaration made under subsection (1) of S. 5 shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament.\n\nThus, by and large, the Act contains almost the same provisions as were contained in the Bill which was sent to this Court for its opinion by the President. Clause ( 1) of the Bill is now s.1 ( 1) of the Act. Clause (2) is now s.3 of the Act. Clause (3) o~ the Bill is now s.4 of the Act. Clause (4) of he Bill is now section 5 of the Act. Clause (5) of the Bill is now s.6 of the Act. Clause 6 of the Bill is now s.7 of the Act. Clause (7) of the Bill is now s.3(2) of the Act, with an explanation added to it. Clause 8 of the Bill is now\n\ns.8 of the Act. Clause (9) of the Bill is now s.9(1) of the Act with sub-sections (2)(3) and (4) added to it. Clause (10) of the Bill is now s.11 ( 1) of the Act. Thus, in so far as the arguments advanced before this Court in the Reference case are concerned, they are concluded by the decision given thereoo and we do not propose to go behind the opinion given by this Court in that case or the: reasons thereof with which we are in respectful agreement.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants having realised the force of this; position, confined their arguments to certain points which either did not arise at the Reference stage or were not argued before the Court and on which no decisiO'n was given, and in fact, relied on some of the findings given and the propositions oflaw adumbrated by this Court in the Reference case.\n\nThe main ground of attack regarding the constitutional validity of the Act is based on Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Before dealing with the arguments we might mention certain important principles laid down by this Court in the Reference case.\n\nIn a diverse society and a large democracy such as ours where the expanding needs of the nation change with the temper of the times, it is extremely difficult for any legislature to make laws applicable to all persons alike.\n\nSome amount of classification is, therefore, necessary to administer various spheres of the activities of the State. lt is well settled that in applying Art.14 mathematical precision or nicety or perfect equanimity are not required. Similarity rather than identify of treatment is enough.\n\nThe courts should not make a doctrinaire approach in construing Art. 14 so as to destroy or frustrate any beneficial legislation.\n\nWhat Art.14 prohibits is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. Furthermore, the Legislature whlch is in the best position to understand the needs and requirements of the people must be given sufficient latitude for making selection or differentiation and so long as such a selection is not arbitrary and has a rational basis having regard to the object of the Act, Art. 14 would not be attracted.\n\nThat is why this Court has laid dciwn that presumption is always in favour of the\n\nconstitutionality of an enactment and the onus lies upon the person who attacks the statute to show that there has been an infraction o~ the constitutional concept of equality. It has also been held that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court is entitled to take into consideration matters of common knowledge, common H report, the history of the times and all other facts which may be existing at the time of the legislation. Similarly, it cannot be presumed\n\nthat the administration of a particular law would be don~ with an\n\n\"evil eye and an unequal hand\". Finally, any person invoking ;\\rt.14 A of the Constitution must show that there has been discrimination against a person who is similarly situate or equally circumstanced, In the case of State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya,(') Subba Rao, J., observed as follows :-\n\n\"No discriminatian can be made either in the privileges conferred or in the liabilities imposed. But these propositions conceived in the interests of the public, if logically stretched too far, may not achieve the high purpose behind them. In a society of unequal basic structure, it is well nigh impossible to make laws suitable in their application to all the persons alike.\n\nSo, reasonable classification is not only permitted but is necessary if society should progress.\"\n\nWith this brief introduction, we now proceed to deal with the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants.\n\nIn the first place, Mr. Bhatia, appearing for appellant Sanjay Gandhi ubmitted that even having regard to the principles laid down by this Court in the Reference case, the Act fails to pass the test laid down for a valid classification under Art. 14. Therefore, we might mention here that the classical tests laid dow111 for the application of Art. 14 are the fo!lowing :- ( 1) The classification must be founded on an intelligible\n\ndifferentia which distinguishe~ persons who are placed E in a group from others who are left out of the group.\n\n(2) Such differentiation must have a rational relationi to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.\n\n( 3) There must be a nexus between the differentiation which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act.\n\nIn applying the aforesaid tests, Mr. Bhatia contended that the decision given in the Reference Case upheld the Bill and rejected the challenge that the Bill violated Art. 14 mainly on the ground that the Bill sought to put a certain class of persons, namely, persons holding high public or political offices who had committed offences only during the period of Emergency. In other words, he argued that the constitntiorutlity of the Bill was upheld on the ground that it was legisla-.\n\ntion confined to selected offences committed by a particular class of persons during the Emergency period. It was contended that the impugned Act transgressed the limits imposed by the judgment in the Reference case by bringing within its fold offences committed prior\n\n{I) [1961] 1S.C.R.14.\n\nand subsequent to the Emergency p.nd thus was in direct conflict with the opinion of this Court rendered in the Reference case. In ampli- , fication of this argument it was contended that this Court struck down that part of the Bill which related to the period between February and June 1975 on the ground that persons having committed offences during that period could not be clubbed with those who had committed offences during the period of Emergency.\n\nIn other words,. the argument , was that the Act, by clubbing together persons accused! of offences committed during the Emergency with those alleged to bd\n\nguilty of crimes pertaining to periods before and after the Emergency (i.e., by dealing with offences committed ; at any point of time whatsoever), has violated the guarantee under Art. 14 and the classification made by the Act is n direct contravention of the opinion given by thls Court in the Reference case.\n\nIn support pf his contention Mr. Bhatia relied on the following observations of this Court in the Reference case(') :- -\\\n\n\"The classification which section 4 ( 1) thus makes is both of offences and offenders, the former in relation to the periad mentioned in the preamble, that is to say, from February 27, 1975 until the expiry of the proclamation of emergency dated June 25, 1975 and in elation to the objective mentioned in the sixth paragraph of the preamble that it is imperative for the functioning of parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by or under the Constitution of India that the commission of such offences should be judicially determined with the utmost dispatch, and the latter in relation to their status, that is to say, in relation to the high public or political office held by them in India. It is only if both of these factors co-exist that the prqsecution in respect of the offences committed by the particular offenders can be inst, ituted in the Special Court.. , .. , , , , .... , .\n\nW c are not concerned with tl), e truth or otherwise of the allegations, the , narrow question before us being whether, in the first instance, the classification is based on some qualities or characteristics whlch are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in pthers who are left ont. The answer to that question can be one and one only, namely, that offences alleged to hav<:i been committed during the emergency by !Persons holding high public or political offices in India stand in a class apart. The cover of emergency, so it is alleged, provided a unique opportunity to the holders\n\n(I) [1979] 2 S, C. R. 476.\n\n·-·\n\nof such offices to subvert the rule of law and perpetrate political crimes on the society. Others left out of that group had neither the means nor the opportunity to do so, since they lacked the authority which comes from official position.\n\nThus, persons who are singled out by the Bill for trial before Special Courts possess common characteristics and those who fall outside that group do not possess them ......... .\n\nThe suppression of people's liberties facilitates easy commission of crimes. Public criticism is a potent deterrent to misbehaviour aud when that is suppressed, there is no fear of detection.\n\nSecondly, crimes which are alleged to have been committed during extraordinary periods like the period of emergency are oblique in their design and selective in their object . . . . . ... But those crimes are not woven out of the warp and woof of political motivations. Equal laws have to be applied to all in the same situation and legislature is free to recognise the degree of harm or evil.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours) D\n\n. Special stress was laid on the observations of this Court that the offences alleged 10 have been committed during the Emergency by persons holding high public or political offices were a class: apart be~ cause such offences were committed under the cover of Emergency which provided a uniqe opportunity to the holders of the said offices E to subvert the rule of law. It was urged that this cannot be said of the period either before or after the emergency rwhen no such cover or opportunity was available to the offenders concerned to misuse or abuse their powers and commit offences. We find this argument to be without any substance. To begin with, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court while dealing with the Reference case was not at all F concerned with the provisions of the Act which is of much wider application than the Bill considered by the Court in the Reference.\n\nIt is no doubt true that the Bill contained provisions for punishing only those offenders who were accused pf offences committed during a particular period namely the period 0£ Emergency.\n\nIt is also true that the period of Emergency was an extraordinary one in , the history G of our country and its features have been spelt out in the preamble of the Bill as , also in the judgment given by this Court in the aforesaid case.\n\nBut that by itself does not debar Parliament from passing a permanent Act to deal witb a specified class of persons who occupy high public or political offices (which are offices of trust) and misuse or abuse them.\n\nIt cannot be doubted that for the establishment and R continuance o[ a Parliamentary democracy and to secure efficiency\n\nand purity of administration it is necessary that when such person~\n\ncommit serious abuse pf power and are guilty of a breach of the trust reposed in them, they would form a special class of offenders. The simple answer to the argument of Mr. Bhatia is that tbis Court was not at all concerned with the broader aspect of the matter as envisaged by the , Act at the time when the BilE was being considered. That this is so, is clear from the observations made by Chandrachud, C.J., and Krishna Iyer, J. The former observed :-\n\n\"Parliament'ary democracy will see its halycon days in India when law will provide for a speedy trial of all offenders who misuse the public offices held by them. Purity in public is a desired goal at all times and in all situations, emergency or no emergency. But, we cannot sit as a super legislature and strike down the instant classification on the ground of under-inclusion on the score that those others are left untouched, so long as there is no violation of constitutional restraints.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nThe observation that purity in public life is a desired goal at all times is a sufficient justification for the classification made by the Act which widens its scope to include offenders of a particular type to be punished for offences i:ommitted at any time, whether before, during or after the Emergency.\n\nSimilar observations were made by .Krishna Iyer J. in his concurring Judgment :-\n\nThe pathology of our public law, with its class slant, is that an µnmincing ombudsman or sentinel on the qui vive with power to act against those in power, now or before, and offering legal access to the informed citizen to complain with immunity does not exist. . . . . ... And so, to track down and give short shrift to ............. . x x x x x Wheroj the proposed Jaw excludes the pre-and postemergency crime-doers in the higher brackets and picks out only 'emergency' offenders, its benign purpose perhaps! becomes a crypto cover-up of like criminals before and after.\n\nAn 'ephemeral' measure to meet a perennial menace is neither a logical step nor national fulfilment.\n\nThe classification, if I may anticipate my conclusion, is on the brink of constitutional break-down at that point and becomes almost vulnerable to the attack of Art. 14.\n\nx x x x x\n\n.J.--,\n\nThe .crucial test is 'All power is a trust', its holders are 'acccuntable for its exercise', for 'from the people and for the people, all springs, and all must exist'. By this high and only standard the Bill must ifail morally 'if it exempts non-Emergency criminals about whom prior Commission Reports, now asleep in official pigeon holes, bear witness and future Commission Reports (who knows?) may, in time, testify ......... ..\n\nNothing about ; Emergency period is adverted to there as a distinguishing mark. If at all, the clear clue is that all abuse df , public authority by exalted public men, whatever the time of Commission, shall be punished without the tedious delay which ordinarily defeats justice in the case of top echelons whose crimes affect the credentials of democmtic regimes.\n\nAssuming civil liberty was a casualty during the emergency, as it was, how did it obstruct trials of super-political D criminals? if faith in democratic institutions is the victim in case there is undue delay 1 in punishing high public and political offenders, that holds good, regardless Emergency . . . . . ... The question, then, is whether there is constitutional rationale for keeping out of the reach of speedy justice non-emergency criminals in high public E Political Offices. Such a Bill, were it a permanent addition to the corpus juris and available as a jurisdiction for the public to compel government, if a prima facie case were made out even against a minister in office, to launch a prosecution before a sitting High Court Judge, would be a wholesome corrective to the spreading evil of corruption, in power F pyramids.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nIt would thus appear from the observations quoted above that the majority judgment , never meant to indicate that the passing of an Act covering all persons holding high public or political offices without G reference to any period during which they are alleged to have commited the offences sought to be made the subject matter cl their indictnient, would be beyond the legislative competence of Parliament.\n\nIn fact, such persons would undoubtedly form a specfal class of offenders which would justify the legislative measure singling them out for an expeditious trial. To hold otherwise would be to say that per- H sons bearing the aforesaid attributes would be immune from prooecution under any Special Act.\n\nReading the opinion rendered in the\n\n\\ ' .\n\nReferance case carefully we are unable to agree with Mr. Bhatia that this Court held that only Emergency offenders could be puished under a special Act and .that any Act seeking to punish offenders of a special type unrelated to the Emergency would be hit by Art. 14.\n\nIt is true that some of the observations made by the learned Chief Justice, if read put of context, may apparently lend some support to the arguments of Mr. Bhatia but taken as a whole (as they must be) they clearly indicate that the passing of a permanent legislation classifying the type of offenders mentioned in the Act, namely, persons holding high public or political offices would be valid and, in fact, would be an ideal achievement. ·\n\nWe may mention here that the various obser\\lations made by Chandrachud, C.J., and Krishna Iyer, J. in the Reference case were highlighted during the debates which followed the introduction of the bill in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha after the opinion of this Court was given.\n\nThe Bill was returned to the Lok Sabha .on March 21, 1979 with suggestions for its amendment so as to make it embrace offences without reference to a particular period, namely, the pe.riod of Emergency.\n\nThe Lok Sabha accepted the suggestions and passed the Bill in the form of the Act which received the assent of the President on the 16th May ,1979. Thus, th<> Act incorporates not only the above-extracted observations made by Chandrachud, C.J., and Krishnal Iyer, J. but also the views expressed by the Hon'ble Members of the two Houses of Parliament.\n\nIn view of the; factors mentioned above, we are fully satisfied that the Act does not suffer from the infirmities pointed out by Mr. Bhatia and the circumstance that it applies to offences committed at any time by a particular set of persons possessing special characteristics doe81 non\n\nrender it unconstitut.ional, for, when it puts into a class a particular set of persons having special characteristics which distinguish them from .others who are left out of that class and who are to be tried under the ordinary law, the classification is eminently reasonable. It may\n\nalso be stated here that the classification made has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, quick despatch and speedy trials. In this connection, some observations of Chandrachud, C.J., in the Reference case may be adverted to:\n\n\"If prosecutions which the Bill envisages are allowed to have their normal, leisurely span of anything between 5 to 10 H years, no fruitful purpose will be served by launching them.\n\nSpeedy termination of prosecutions under the Bill is the heart and soul of the Bill ....... .\n\nThus, both the tests are fulfilled in the instant case name- A ly, that ( 1) the classification is fonnded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those which are grouped together from others who are left out and (2) the said differentia has a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the Bill, namely, speedy termination of prosecutions initiated in pursuance of the declaration made under clause B 4(1) of the Bill.\"\n\nThe same, we hold, is true of the Act.\n\nIt was_ then submitted by Mr. Bhatia that even if the dassificatiollj was valid, as the procedure prescribed by the Act is extreme!}\".\n\nC harsh and prejudicial to the accused, Articles 14 and 21 are clearly violated.\n\nThis aspect of the matter also has been expressly dealt with by Chandrachud, C.J., in the Reference case where he has pointed out that once the classification is held to be vaild even if the procedure is harsher or disadvantageous that will not attract Art. 14. In this connection, he observed:- D\n\nIf the classification is valid and its basis bears a reasonable relationship with the object of the Bill, no grievance can be entertained under article 14 that the procedure prescribed by the Bill for the trial of offences which fall within its terms is harsher or more onerous as compared with the procedure which governs ordinary trials.· Classification necessarily entails the subjection of those who fall within it to a different set of rules and procedure, which may conceivably be more disadvantageous than the procedure which generally applies to ordinary trials .... But once a classification i~ upheld by the application of the dual test, subjection: to harsher treatment or disadvantageous procedure loses, its relevance, the, reason being that for the purposes of article 14, nnequals cannot complain of unequal treatment.\"\n\nWe shall, however, deal with the question whether or not the procedure is disadvantageons when we examine the argument of the learned connse] regarding sections 5, 6, 7 and 11 of the Act.\n\nThus, to sum np, the position so far as this part of the argument is concerned is as follows:-\n\n( l) Separate grouping of holders of high offices for purposes of expeditious criminal action to be taken by H superior conrts is a reasonable and valid classification because it enhances confidence on the rule of Jaw,\n\nstrengthens the. democratic system and ensures purity of public life and political conduct.\n\n(2) The Bill was challenged before the Supreme Court on the touchstone of Art. 14 on several grounds.\n\nIn the first place, it was argued that no rational basis for separately classifying Emergency offenders existed.\n\nThe second ground of challenge was that assuming that there was a valid classification, the same was\n\nbad becanse it suffered from the vice of under-inclusion inasmuch as holders of high public or political offices were left out. This Court, however, repelled the argument of rational basis on the ground that the Emergency period, because of its special characteristics, afforded adequate basis foc separate classification of Emergency offences.\n\nThe Court was not at all at that time concerned expressly with the question as to whether classification of high public or political digniiaries without reference to any period during which they were alleged to have committed offences would be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. On the other hand, this Court made clear observations that an Act providing for such a classification would be not only valid but also highly welcome. It is true that the provision regarding a particular period before the Emergency was .then struck down but that was so because the Bill was confined to offences committed only during the period of Emergency and the inclusion of that period meant bad classification for the reason that the period last mentioned could not be distinguished from other pre-or post-Emergency periods on any reasonable basis.\n\nThis view of the Court could not be interpreted as laying down a law of universal application that no Special Act on a permanent basis classifying offenders possessing particular characteristics or attributes and providing for their prosecution under a special procedure would be invalid or violative of Art. 14. Thus, we do not think that the opinion of the Supreme Court in any way amounted to disapproval or condemnation of a pernianent law in futuro bringing within its scope all holders of. high public or political office.\n\nIt was then argued by Mr. Bhatia that assuming the classification of persons holding high public or political offices to be justified, it suff-\n\n,..\n\n;..._,,\n\n~ ,..\n\n• li\n\nI '\n\ners from a serious infirmity in that neither the term 'high public or political office' has been defined nor have the offences been delineated or defin\"<l so as to make the prosecution of such offenders a practical reality. Dealing with this argument, the learned Solicitor General pointed out that it was specifically raised when the Court was hearing the Reference and written submissions were filed by the parties but that. unfortunately, the opi[]ion did not give any finding on it and urged that even in absence of any finding, the argument must be deemed to hav~ been rejected. We find sufficient. force in wliat the learned Solicitor General says but as we are hearing the appeals of persons who have been convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment so that their liberty is involved, we feel that we should go into Mr.\n\nBhatia's argument.\n\nAs regards the definition of 'high public or political offices' the expression is of well-known significance and bears a clear connotation which admits of no vagueness or ambiguity. Even during the debate in Parliament, it was not suggested that the expression suffered 'from any vagueness. Apart from that even in the Reference case, Krishna Iyer, J., referred to holders of such offices thus:-\n\n\"heavy-weight criminaloids who often mislead the people by public moral weight-lifting and multipoint manifestoes ....\n\n. . . . such super-offenders in top positions. . . .\n\nE .... No erudite pedantry can stand in the way of prag- \"1atic grouping of high-placed office holders separately, for purposes of high-speed criminal action invested with early conclusiveness and inquired into . by high-level courts.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours) F\n\nil i' manifest from the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. that pcr><ons, holding high public or political offices mean persons holding top P\"'itions wielding large powers.\n\nIn American Jurisprudence 2d (Vol. 63, PP, 626, 627 & 637) the author describes persons holding public or political offices thus:\n\n\"Public offices are cheated for the purpose of effecting the end for which government has been instituted, which is the common good, and not for the profit, honour, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men .... The powers and functions attached to a position manifest its cha racier, and there is implied in every public office an authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power of the\n\n14'--289 SCI/80\n\nA state in making, executing, or administering the law ..... .\n\nVarious positions, on the other hand, hav& been held not to be public offices, as, for examine, auditor of accounts appointed by railroad Commissioners .... \"\n\nSimilarly, Ferris ill his thesis on 'Extraordinary Legal Remedies defineS B p1!J>lic or political offices thus :\n\n\"A public office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by which an individual is vested with some portion of the overeign functions of the Government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public, for the term and by the tenure prescnbed by law. It implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power. It is trust conferred by public authority for a public purpose, embracing the ideas of tenure, duration, emoluments and duties ...... The determining factor, the test, is whether the office involves a delegation of some of the solemn functi~ of Govermnent, either executive, legislative or judicial, to be exercised by the holder for the public benefit.\"\n\n(72 Calcutta Weekly Notes, ; p.64, Vol.72)\n\nSimilarly, Wade and Phillips in 'Constitutional Law' defines politlcal offices thus:-\n\n\"The Cabinet is the body of principal Miilisten with whom rests the real direction of policy.\n\nWe speak of the Ministry or the Administration of a particular Prime Minister with reference to the full body of political office holders who from time to time hold the reins of Govermnent, i.e., the Ministers of the Crown and their Parliamentary Secre- 1' taries.\"\n\nO. Hood Phillips in 'Constitutional and Administrative Law' (4th Edition, p. 312 & 314) defines the hierarchy of Govermnent Deportments thus:\n\n\"Ministers-At the head of each Department--except the \"non-political\" Departments, which are not important for present purposes-is the Minister, whether he is called Minister or Secretary of State or President of the Board.\n\nHe is a member of the Government and changes with the Ministry of the day; and he may also be a member of the Cabinet.\n\nParliamentary Secretaries-Under the Minister will be one or more Parliamentary Secretaries, or Parliamentary\n\n>-··\n\n~.\n\nUnder-Secretaries of State if the Minister himself is a Secre- A tary of State.\n\nAs their nrune implies, Parliamentary Secretaries are members of one or other of the Houses of Parliament, they are Junior Ministers who change with the Government of the day.\n\nThey assist their Chief in the Parliamentary or political side of his work, as well as in the administration of his Department ....\n\nTbe det'ailed administration of the work of a Government Department is carried out by \"permanent\" civil servants. Although, like Ministt>rs, they are servants of the Crown, civil servants are called \"permanent\" since their appointment is non-political and in practice lasts during good behaviour, as opposed to Ministers, Parliamenmry Secretaries, etc., who are responsible to Parliament and change office with the Government.\"\n\nSo also, Ramsay Muir in his book 'How Britain is Governed' (3rd Ed. p. 81) states as follows :-\n\n\"In this chapter we have to discuss the second element in the Government-that which changes with every change in the balance of power between parties in the country, which consists not of experts, but of politicians, and which works under the limelight of publicity . . . . This changing element is known as 'the Ministry'.\"\n\nAsirvatham in his book 'Political Theory' (9th Ed p. 352) defines Political Executive thus :-\n\n\"Turning from the nominal to the political executive, we find at least four distinct forms, viz., the English, the American, the Swiss, and the French. In England, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet constitute the political executive.\n\nThey can remain in office only so long as they\n\n1 command the confidence of Parliament.\n\nThey are members of one or the other house of the legislature and play a\n\nleading part in initiating legislation.\n\nThey are also administrative heads of departments and, in that capacity, are responsible to Parliament not only for policy but also for the details of administration.\n\nThey work together as a team and, in their relation to Parliament, stand or fall together.\"\n\nIn words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, Vol. 32 [(Suppl.) P. 226]\n\nthe word 'Political' has been defined thns :- H \"The word \"political\" is defined as of or pertaining to p01icy, p01itics, or conduct of government. ... or pertaining\n\nto, or incidental to, exercise of functions vested in those charged with conduct of government, and relating to management of affairs of State\".\n\n\"The word 'political' is defined by Bouvier to be pertaining to policy or the administration of government. People\n\nv. Morgan, 90 III 558, 563.\n\nThe word \"political\" means that which pcrtaim to gov ernment of a nation ........ \"(P. 802)\n\nA perusal of the observations made in the various textbooks referred to above clearly shows that 'political office' is an office which forms part of a Political Department of the Government or the Political Executive.\n\nThis, therefore, clearly includes Cabinet Ministers, Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries who are running the Department formulating policies and are responsible to the Parliament.\n\nThe word 'high' is indication of a top position and enabling the holder thereof to take major policy decisions.\n\nThus, the term 'high public or political office' used in the Act contemplates only a special class of officers or politicians who may be categorised as follows :-\n\n(1) officials wielding .extraordinary powers entitling them\n\nto take major policy decisions and holding positions of trust and answerable and accountable for their wrongs:\n\n(2) persons responsible for giving to the State a clean, stable and honest administration;\n\n( 3) persons occupying a very elevated status in whose hands lies the destiny of the nation.\n\nThe rationale behind the classification of persons possessing the aforesaid characteristics is that they wield wide powers which, if exercised improperly by reason of corruption, nepotism or breach of trust, may mar. or adversely mould the future of the country and tarnish its image. It cannot be said, therefore, with any conviction that\n\n G persons who possess special attributes could be equated with ordinary\n\ncriminals who have neither t11e power nor the resources to commit offences of the type described above.\n\nWe are, therefor('. satisfied that tlm terms 'persons holding high public or political offices' is selfexplanatory and admits of no difficulty and that mere absence of definition of the expression would not vitiate the classification made by H the Act.\n\nSuch persons are in a position to take major decisions regarding social, economic financial aspects of the life of the community and other far-reaching decisions cm the home front ; is. also\n\nv. c. SHUKLA v. DELiil ADMN. (Fazal Ali,!.) 535\n\nregarding external affairs and if their actions are tainted by breach of trust, corruption or other extraneous considerations, they would damage the interests of the country. It is, therefore, not only proper but essential to bring such offenders to book at the earliest possible opportunity.\n\nIt was then contended that even the nature and character of the B offences have not been defined in the Act which introduces an clement of vagueness in the classification.\n\nWe are, however, unable to ogree with this contention because clause (4) of the preamble clearly ind1cates the nature of the offences that could be tried under the Act.\n\nClause ( 4) of the preamble to the Act ; runs thus :\n\n\"AND WHEREAS all powers being a trust, and holders of high public or political offices are accountable for the exercise of their powers in all cases where Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 or investigations conducted hy Government\n\nthrough its agencies disc'lose offences committed by such D holders.\"\n\nThe words 'powers being a trust' clearly indicate that any act which amounts to a breach of the trust or of the powers conferred on the person concerned would bt; an offence triable under the Act.\n\nClause ( 4) is wide enough to include any offence committed by holders of high public or political offices which amounts to breach of trust\n\nor for which they are accountable in law and does not leave any room for doubt.\n\nMr. Bhatia, however, submitted that even if the pcr><:rn concerned commits a petty offence like violation of municipal byelaws or traffic rules he would have to be prosecuted under the Act\n\nV{hich will be seriously prejudicial to him.\n\nIn our opinion, this argument is purely illusory and based on a misconception of the provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 5 which confers powers on the Central Government to make a declaration clearly refers to the guidelines bid down in the preamble and no Central Government would ever think of prosecuting holders of high public or political offices for petty offences and the doubt expressed by the counsel for the appellant is, therefore, totally unfounded.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the appellants that Parliament was not competent to pass a Special Act and create Special Courts for\n\na particular set of offenders.\n\nThis argument need not detain us because it has been effectively answered in the reference case which has H held clearly that Parliament was fully competent to pass the Bill creating Special Courts.\n\nRegarding the validity of sections 7 and 11 of the Act which correspond to clauses 6 and 10 of the Bill, Chandrachud, C.J., observed as follows :-\n\n\"In view of our conclusion that Parliament has the legislative competence to enact clauses 6 and 10 ( 1) of the Bill, it is unnecessary to consider the argument of the learned Solicitor General that, everything else failing, Parliament would have the competence to legislate upon the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court by virtue of article 248 ( 1) read wi1h entry 97 of List L ...\n\nTo sum up, we are of the opinion that clauses 2, 6 and 10(1) of the Bill are within the legislative competence of the Parliament. That is to say, Parliament has the competence to provide for the creation of Special Courts as clause 2 of the Bill provides, to empower the Supreme Court to dispose of pending appeals and revisions as provided for by clause 6 of the Bill and to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court by providing, as is done by clause 10(1), that an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment or order of . a Special Court to the Supreme Court both on fact and on law.\"\n\nIt was also contended for the appellants that the Act seeks to change the situs of the Court and virtually abrogates s. 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThis argument also does not merit any consideration because it was raised in the Reference case and rejected.\n\nDealing with this aspect of the matter, Chandrachud, C.J ... observed:-\n\n\"As regards situs of trial, it is unfair to make an assumption of mala fides and say that an inconvenient forum will be chosen deliberately.\n\nBesides, the provisions of chapter XII of the Code containing section 177 to 189, which deal with \"Jurisdiction of the criminal courts in Inquiries and Trials\", are not excluded by the Bill.\n\nThose provisions will govern the question as to the situs of trial.\"\n\nMr. Bhatia further submitted that the Act creates an invidious distinction inasmuch as persons. holding high public or political offices would have the benefit of trial by such an experienced officer as a sitting Judge of a High Court while the appellants have been deprived of that right and were tried by a Special Judge who was only a Sessions Judge.\n\nThis argument, in our opinion, i~ c0mpletely devoid of substance. The first information report against the appel-\n\n'----4(\n\n!ants was lodged on 13th April 1977 and ths chargesheet was submitted before the Special Judge who convicted the appellants by the order dated February 27, 1979.\n\nThe Act, however, came into force on May 16, 1979, that is to say, three months after the conviction and about two months after the appellants had file<l their appeals1 before the High Court.\n\nIn these circumstances, the question of the appellants being tried by the Special Judge appointe<l under the Act could not arise because the said Special Court did not exist at all when the trial of the appellants was conclude<l.\n\nThe existence of such fortuitous circumstances cannot attract Art. 14.\n\nThis matter was considered in two decisions of this Court. In the case of Khandige Sham Bhat & Ors. v. The Agricultural Income Tax Officer('), Subba Rao J., observed as follows:-\n\n\"If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law will no! be condemned as discriminative, though to some fortuitous circumstance arising out of a peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over ' others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment.\" / The same view was expressed thus in a later decision of this Court reported as Dantuluri Ram Raju & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.(');\n\n\"The facts that on account of topographical situation some landowners get greater benefit of the drainage scheme because of thei~ lands being more prone to damage by floods is a fortuitous circumstance and the same would not be a valid ground for striking down the impugned legislation. It is weil established that if there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law will not be condemned as discriminative though due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar situation, some 'included in a class get an advantage over others so long as they are not singled out for special treatment.\"\n\nIn view of these decisions, the argument of Mr. Bhatia must be overruled.\n\nThis, therefore, concludes the submissions made by Mr. Bhatia generally regarding the constitutionality of the Act.\n\n(I) [1963] 3 S. C. R. 809\n\n(2) [\\972] I S. C. C. 421.\n\nA Mr.· Mridual adopted the above-noted arguments, advanced by\n\nMr. Bhatia, but put forward contentions with respect to other aspocts1 which we shall deal with at a later stage of the jusfgment.\n\nIt was next contended by Mr. Bhatia that s. 5 of the Act suffers from •several constitutional and legal infirmities.\n\nSub-sections (1) and (2) thereof may be extracted here :\n\n\"Declaration by Central Government of cases to be dealt with under this Act;\n\n5.(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that there. is prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence alleged to have been committed by a person whp held high public or political office in India and that in accordance with the guidelines contained in the preamble hereto the said offence ought to be dealt with under this Act, the Central Government shall make a declaration to that effect in every case in which it is of the Jlforesaid opinion.\n\n(2) Such declaration shall '!lot be called in question in any court.\"\n\nIn the first place, it was contended that s. 5 (I) suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers so as to violate Art. 14 inasmuch as the discretion conferred on the Central Government is absolute, naked and arbitrary and is clearly discriminatory as it is open to the Central Government to pick and choose persons and make declarations in respect of them while excluding others. In our opinion, this contention is based on a serious misconception of the provisions of the Act.\n\nFor one thing, no unguided or uncanalised power has been conferred on the Central Government.\n\nA basic condition imposed on the Central Government is t there must be a proper application of mind regarding the existence of prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence.\n\nSecondly, the discretion has to be excrci:sed in accordance witl1 the guidelines contnined in the[ preamble.\n\nThe various clauses of the preamble which have been set out in an earlier part of this judgment, lay down clear guidelines and provide sufficient safeguards against any abuse of power. Thirdly, clause ( 4) of the preamble clearly lays down that the power under s. 5 is exercisable only aftr the commission of an offence by the holder of a high public or political office has been discloed as a result of an inquiry conducted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act or of an investigativn conducted by the Government through its agencies. It is well settled that discretionary power is, not the same thing\n\nas power to discriminate nor can the constitutional validity of a law be tested on the assumption that where a discretionary power is conferred on a high authori1y, the same may or would be exercised in a discriminatory manner. In the case of Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi('), Kania, C. J ., dealing with the same aspect of the matter observed as follows :\n\n\"Moreover, this whoie argument is based on the assumption that the Provincial Government when making the order will not perform its duty and may abuse the provisio!Js. of the section.\n\nIn my opinion, it is improper to start with such an assumption and decide ihe legality of an Act on that basis.\n\nAbuse of power given by a law sometimes occurs; but the validity of the law cannot be conte~_d because of such an apprehension.\n\nIn my opinion, therefore, this contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted.\"\n\nIn the case of Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra(') this Court observed :\n\n\"The di•cretion that is conferred on official agencies in , such cirumstances is not an unguided discretion, it has to be exercised in conformity with the policy to effectuate which the direction is given and it is in relation to that objecfrve that the propriety of .the classification would have to be testd.\"\n\nThe same view was taken in a later decision of this Court in the case of Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhart(\") where the court observed asl follows:-\n\n\"It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the Government and not in a minor official.\"\n\nIn the case of In Re The Kera/a Education Bill, 1957,(4) this Court said :\n\n\"But all that we need say is that apart from laying down a policy for the guidance of the Government in the matter of theexercise of powers conferred on it under the different provisions of the Bill including cl. 36, the Kerala Legislature; has, by cl. 15 and cl. 37 provided further safeguards.\n\n(1) [19501 S. C.R. 519.\n\n(2) (19521 S. C. R. 435.\n\n(3) [1955] 2 S. C. R- 925.\n\n(4) [1959] S. C.R. >95.\n\nIn this connection, we must bear in mind what has been laid down by this Court in more decisions than one, namely, that discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and the abuse of power by the Government will not be lightly assumed.\"\n\nSimilarly, in the case of Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the\n\nUnion Territory of Delhi('), Ayyangar J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"So long therefore as the Legislature indicates, in the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is left to those. entrusted with administering the law, affords no basis either for the contention that there has been an excessive delegation of legislative power as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as to amount to a carte blanche! to discriminate.\"\n\nIn the case of Mali Ram Deka etc. v. General Manager, N. E. F.\n\nRailways, Maligaon, Pandu, etc.('), Shah J., speaking for the Court remarked:-\n\n\"Power to exercise discretion is not necessarily to be assumed to be a power to discriminate unlawfully, and possibility of abuse of power will not invalidate the conferment of power. Conferment of power has necessarily to be coupled with the duty to exercise it bona fide and for effectuating the purpose and policy underlying the rules which provide for the exercise of the power. If in the scheme of the rules, a clear policy relating to the circumstances in which the power, is to be exercised is discernible, the conferment of power must be regarded as made in furtherance of the scheme, and is not open to attack as infringing the equa, Jity clause.\" r In the case of V. C. Shukla v. The State through C.B.l.(3), this . .- Court pointed out that where a discretion is conferred on a high. authority such as the Central Government it must be presumed that\n\nH (1} [1962] 2 s. c. R. 125\n\n(2) [1964] 5 S. C.R. 683.\n\n(3) [1980] 1 S. C. R. 380.\n\nthe Government would act in accordance with law and in a bona fide A. manner, .and said :\n\n\"In fact, this Court has held in a number of cases that where a power is vested in a very high authority, the abuse of the power is reduced to the minimum.\"\n\nIn view of these decisions, it must be held that the power conferred on the Central Government is controlled by the guidelines contained in the preamble which by virtue of the provisions of s. 5 (1) becomes a part of that section. As the power h; ts been conferred on the Central Government which is to make a declaration in accordance with the conditions laid down in s. 5 (1) and, therefore, in conformity will\n\nthe guidelines mentioned in the preamble, the attack based on discrimination is unfounded and is hereby repelled.\n\nAnother ll!llied argument advanced by Mr. Bhatia was that the issuance of a declaration under s. 5 ( 1) depends purely on the subjective satisfaction of the Central Government and under sub-section\n\n(2) of s. 5 such a declaration cannot be called into question by any court so that there would be an elemenb of inherent bia~ or malice; in an order which the Central Government may pass, for prosecuting persons who are political opponents and that the section is therefore. invalid. We are unable to agree with this argument. As already pointed out, the power of the Central Government to issue a declaration is a statutory power circumscribed by certain conditions.\n\nFurthermore, as the power is vested in a very high authority, it cannot be assumed that it is likely to be abused. On the other hand, where the power is conferred on such a high authority as the Central Government, the presumption will be that the power will be exercised in a bona fide manner and according to law. In the case of Chinta Lingam & Ors. v. Government of India & Ors.,(') this Court observed:\n\n\"At any rate, it has been pointed ont in more than one decision of this Court that when the power has to be exercised by one of the highest officers the fact that no appeal has been provided for is a matter of no moment .... It was said that though the power was discretionary but it was not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could not be easily assumed.\n\nThere was moreover a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly anti in accordance with rules of law..\"\n\n(I) [1971] 2 S. C.R. 871.\n\nTo the same effect is the -decision of this Court in Budhan Ch0:, dJ?'J' & Ors. v. The State of Bihar(').\n\nIt was however suggested that as the Central Government in a democracy consists of the political party which has the majority in Parliament, declarations under s. 5 ( J ) nt 'no\n\nAct . could be used as an engine of oppression against members of parties who are opposed to the ideologies of the ruling party. This is really an argument of fear and mistrust which, if accepted. would invalidate prudically all laws oi the land; for, tlien even a prosccut; oo\n\nunder the ordinary law may be considered as politically motivated, which is absurd.\n\nFurthermore, prejudice, malice or taint is not a matter for presumption in the absence of evidence supporting it. It is well settled that burden lies on the parties alleging bias or malice to prove its existence. and if malice or bias is proved in a particular\n\ncase, the courts would strike down the act vitiated by it,· in exercise of its powers under Arts. 226, 227 or 136. This aspect of the matter was dealt with in the reference case thus :-\n\n\"Though the opinion which the Central Government has to form under clause 4(1) is subjective, we have no doubt that despite the provisions of sub-clause (2) it will be open to judicial review at least within the limits indicated by thi:> Court in Khudaran Das Deo v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (1975, 2, SCR 832, 845). It was observed in that case by one of us, Bhagwati J., while speaking for the Court. that in a Government of laws \"there is nothing like unfettered c.li:-:.cretion re1nove fron1 judlcial reversibility'~. 1-he: opinion has to be formed by the Gcvcrnment, to set the least, rationally and in a bona fide manner.\"\n\nAnother limb of the argument of Mr. Bhatia regarding the provisions about declaration contained in s. 5 (1) was that' they are \\iolative;\n\nof the principles of natural justice inasmuch as they do not provide for any hearing being given to the accused before a declaration is made.\n\nThis argument, in our opinion, is also without substance. It is to be borne in mind that at the stage when the declaration is sought to be made there is no list pending nor has any prosecution been launched against the accused. Section 5 deals only with the decision taken by the Central Government to prosecute and, until that decision is notified, the prosecution dpes not start, and the question of an accused being , heard at that stage, therefore, does not arise at all.\n\nA couple of instances in point may be cited here with advantage. In cases where law requires sanction to be given by the appointing authority before a prosecution can be launched against a Government servant, it has\n\nJI) [1955] I S. C.R. !045,\n\n....\n\nv. c. SHUKLA v. DELHI AOMN. (Fazal Ali, J.) 543\n\nnever been suggested that the accused must be heard before sanction is accorded. The question of sanction arises at a point of time when there is no danger to the liberty of the subject and the accused at that stage is not in the picture at all. It is only after sanction is accorded that an accused is brought to trial or proceedings are started against\n\nhim when he is to be heard and can challenge the validity of the sanction.\n\nSimilarly, when a first information report is filed before\n\na police officer, the law docs not require that the officer must hear the accused before recording it or submitting a charge-sheet to the Court.\n\nAnother instance is to be found where a complaint is filed before a Magistrate who chooses to hold an inquiry under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before issuing process or summons to the accused. It has been held in several cases that at that stage the accused has got no locus to appear and fi1e his objections to the inquiry. The right of the accused to be heard comes into existence only when au order summoning the accused is passed by the Magistrate under s. 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of Cozens v. North Devon Hospital Mangement Committee & Anr,(') Lord Salmon pithilv observed :\n\n\"No one suggests that it is unfair to launch a criminal prosecution without first hearing the accused.\"\n\nThe argument of Mr. Bhatia which is under examination is thus also found to be wholly untenable.\n\nI! was then contended that in the instant case the declaration elated June 22, 1979 made under s. 5 (I) of the Act per se shows that it had not resulted from any real application of mind by the Central Government.\n\nThe declaration is based,. it is pointed out, on the existence of prima facie evidence of the commission of certain offences by Mr. Shukla and Mr. Sanjay Gandhi and proceeds to state that the said offences ought to be dealt with under the Act. It was vehemently argued that at the time when the declaration was made the appellants had already been convicted and had filed appeals in the High Court and that therefore for the C.entral . Government to say that 'a prima\n\nfacie case' was made out was to close its eyes to the realities of the situation.\n\nThe argument, in other words, is that once the prosecution of the appellants had culminated in a conviction and an appeal therefrom, there was no question of the existence of any 'prima facie case', and that the use of such an expression could be intelligible only if the accused were facing criminal proceedings which had not culminated in a conviction. The assertion about the existence of a prima facie case clearly shows, according to learned counsel, that the Central\n\n(I) [1966] 2 Q. B. 330.\n\nGove.rnment did not apply its mind at all to the factors relevant to the issuance of the declaration or that, at any rate, the application of its mind was perfunctory.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to accept.tbi' argument which fails to consider certain fundamental aspects of the scope and ambit of s. 5 (1) of the Act and is based on a misconstruction of the nature of the declaration which is to be made.\n\nUnder the section the Government has to be satisfied on two counts before it could issue a declaration. It must be satisfied in the first instance that there is prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence.\n\nSecondly, it must form the opinion in accordance with the guidelines contained in the preamble that such offence ought to be dealt with nuder the Act.\n\nThe argument under examination relates to the first limb of the satisfaction of the Central Government.\n\nSo, the question arises whether the condition of the existence of prima facie evidence is not fulfilled in the case of the present declaration merely because the trial in the first court had ended in a conviction and an appeal therefrom. The answer to the question has to be an emphatic 'no', the reason being that if conviction is construed as evidence of the existence of soro~ thing more than a mere prima facie case, that would uot mean that a prima facie case ceases to exist.\n\nThat a prima facie case must be found to exist is only the minimum requirement for the satisfaction of the Central Government and it would be doubly made out if the evidence available is stronger than is needed to make out only a prima facie case. A conviction of an accused person cannot mean that there is no prima facie evidence against him. All that it spells out is that not only a prima facie case is made out against him but that the evidence available is even stronger and is sufficient for a conviction.\n\nHowever, as the Government, while acting under the section, is to satisfy itself only with the existence of prima facie evidence, the assertion by it in the declaration that such evidence was available to i1Js satisfaction cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be held to be inapplicable to a case in which a conviction has been recorded.\n\nIn this view of the mattet we find the use of the expression 'prima facie'' evidence in the declaration to be fully justified even though the trial had ended in a conviction which was under appeal on the date of the declaration.\n\nIn this context, the contents of the declaration also deserve scrutiny. It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n\n---~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos. 71/79 and 72/79 respectively under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the High Court of Delhi on 20-3-79 against the aforesaid conviction and that the said appeals were admitted by Delhi High Court on 21-3-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS the State has also filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court on 18-5-79 under section 377, Code of Criminal Procedure (No. 2 of 1974) for enhancement of the sentence with respect to the aforesaid accused persons :\n\nA AND WHEREAS the above-mentioned appeals are now\n\npending hi the High Court of Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the Central Government after fully and carefully examining the material placed before it in regard to the aforesaid offences is of opinion that there is pr!ma fade evidence of the commissiol) of the said offences by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, at the relevant, period and as such a person who held high public and political office, Shri Sanjay Gandhi and others and that in accordance with the guidelines contained in the preamble to the Special Courts Act, 1979 (22 of 1979) the said offences ought t<;> be dealt with under that Act.\n\nNOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 1) of Section 5 of the Special Courts Act, 1979 (22 of 1979), the Central Government hereby declares that there is prima facie evidence of the commission of the aforesaid offences alleged to have been committed by Shri Vidya1 Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, during the relevant period, and as such held a high public and political office in India during the relevant period, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, and that in accordance with the guidelines contained in the Preamble to that Act, the said offences ought to be dealt with under that Act.\"\n\nA perusal of the declaration reveals that it gives the history of the case from beginning to el)d which demonstrates that the Central Government was fully aware of the various stages through which the trial of the appellantsi passed. Thus, the formation of the opinion by the Government of the existence of a prima facie case cannot be held to be perfunctory or illusory. It has not been shown that the deolaration was in any way irrational or mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.\n\nThe argument advanced by Mr. Bhatia, therefore, must be overruled.\n\nThe last plank of attack on s 5 of the Act is that the declaration is non est because it has not been laid before each House of Parliament as required hy s. 13 of the Act. This argument merits some consideration. Section 13 runs thus :\n\n\"13. Every notification made under sub-section (!) of section 3 and every declaration made under sub-section (1)\n\n• ', --\n\n' - \" r.\n\nv. c. SHUKLA v. DEi.HI ADMN. (Fazal Ali, !.) 5 4 7\n\nof section 5 shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, A before each House of Parliament.\"\n\nAs we read the section, we are clearly of the opinion that its provisions are purely directory and not mandatory so that if the conditions mentioned in it are not fulfilled the declaration would not be vitiated. It is to be noted that the section does not say that until a declaration is placed before the two Houses of Parliament it shall not be deemed to be effective, nor does the section intend that any consequence would result from its non-compliance. Moreover, the matter is no longer res integra and is concluded by several decisions of this Court, the most recent of them being M/s. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. & Ors. v. The, State of Haryana(') where this Court observed:\n\n\"Thus two considerations for regarding a provision as directory are : (1) absence of any provision for the contingency of a particular provision not being complied with or followed, and (2) serious general inconvenience and prejudice that would result to the general public if the act of the D Government or an instrumentality is declared invalid for noncompliance with the particular provision ....\n\n*** *** In the instant case, it would be noticed that sub-section\n\n(6) of Section 3 of the Act merely provides that every order made under Section 3 by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government sha!l be laid, before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made. It does not provide that it shall be subject to the negative or the affirmative resolution by either House of Parliament. It also does not provide that it shall be open to the Parliament to approve or disapprove the order made under Section 3 of the Act. It does not even say that it shall be subject to any modification which either House of Parliament may in its wisdom think it necessary to provide .\n\nIt does not even specify the period for which the order is to be laid before both Houses of Parliament nor does it provide any penalty for non-observance of or non-compliance with the direction as to the laying of the order before both Houses of Parliament. It would also be noticed that the requirement as to the laying of the order before both the Houses of Parliament is not a condition precedent but subsequent to the making of the order.\n\nIn other words, there is no prohi-\n\n(1) [1979] 2 s. c. c. 196.\n\n15-289 SCI/80\n\nbition to the making of the orders without the approval of both Houses of Parliament. In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that the requirement as to laying contamed in sub-section ( 6) of Section 3 of the Act falls within the first category, i.e., \"simple laying\" and is directory, not mandatory.\"\n\nWe fully agree with this view and hold that on a true interpretation of section 13 of the Act, it is a case of a simple laying of the dec:-- laration before each House of Parliament and the declaration cannot be struck down on he grounds suggested by the counsel.\n\nC It was then submitted that as the declaration is based on the iesult of an investigation held by a Central agency even though the offences were alleged to have been committed in a State, it affects the basic structure of the Constitution and is, therefore, void.\n\nThis argument, in our opinion, is also misconceived. The doctrine of the violation of basic structure of the Constitution or its fundamental features D applies not to the provisions of a law made by a State legislature or Parliament but comes into operation where an amendment made in the Constitution itself is said to affect its basic features like fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 14, 19, 31, or the power of amendment of the Constitution under Art. 368 and so on.\n\nThe doctrine has no application to the provisions of a Central or State law because if the statute is violative of any provision of the Constitution it can be struck down on that ground and it is not necessary to enter into the question of basic structure of the Constitution at all.\n\nMr. Mridul, appearing for Mr. Shukla, apart from adopting the arguments of Mr. Bhatia, as discussed above, raised two additional points. In the first place, he submitted that s. 5(1) of the Act has no application to the facts of the present case because under s.5 (1) a declaration has to be made on the basis of the sources indicated in the section, namely, inquiries conducted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act or investigations which become otiose and would have relevance only if Iris client had not been convicted.\n\nThis argument, in our opinion, appears to be the same as was put forward by Mr. Bhatia which we have already rejected.\n\nIt was next argued that conviction being a finding of guilt cannot be said to fall within the situation contemplated by section 5(1) of the Act.\n\nMr. Mridul contended that as section 6 H is an extension of the scheme contained in section 5 the former does not overrule the entire Code of Criminal Procedure but in fact takes in only those cases which are pending at the trial stage\n\nwhen the declaration is made.\n\nOnce the case ends in a conviction, section 6 spends itself out and there is no room for the npplication of section 5, according to learned counsel. It is. true that section 6 does contemplate a prosecution which is relatable to the declaration under section 5 but that does not debar the application of section 5 to olher stages of a criminal case, especially those specifically dealt with under section 7 of the Act which, as we shall presently show, fully covers the situation in hand.\n\nThe limited field in which section 6 operates does not therefore exhaust the consequences flowing from the issuance of a declaration under section 5.\n\nMr. Mridul however contended that section 7 would not apply to this case because its language embraces only those appeals which arise out of a prosecution which itself is pending at the time when a declaration is made.\n\nThe argument is devoid of force as, to accept it, would be to ignore an important part of section 7 which runs thus :\n\n\"7. If at the date <if the declaration in respect of any offence any appeal or revision against any judgment or order in a prosecution in respect of such offence, whether pending or disposed of, is itself pending in any court of appeal or revision, the same sliall stand transferred for disposal to the Supreme Court.\"\n\nThe words \"whether pending or disposed of\" are significant and qualify the immediately preceding clause \"a prosecution in respect of such offence\".\n\nThe legislature has thus taken care to expressly provide that an appeal or revision would be covered by section 7 and transferable to the Supreme Court for disposal if it is directed against a judgment or order made in a prosecution which is either pending or has been disposed of, the only other requirement of the section being that such appeal or revision must itsel'f be pending at the date of the declaration. To interpret section 7 in such a way that its applicability is limited to appeals or revisions arising from prosecutions pending at the trial stage at the date of the relevant declarations is possible only if tl1e words \"or disposed of\" are treated as absent from the section-a comse which is not open to this Court in view of the express language used. ')'he argument is therefore repealled.\n\nFinally, it was argued that by providing in s. 7 for an automatic transfer of appeals from the High Court to the Supreme Court the legislature has exercised a judicial power which is vested in the H Supreme Court alone under s. 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the section is invalid as it conflicts with the said s. 406.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this argument.\n\nThere is no question of the exercise of any judicial power by the legislature in enacting s. 7 which covers a well-kuown legislative process.\n\nThe decision of this Court in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi\n\nv. Shri Raj Narain(') relied upon by .Mr. Mridul deals with quite a different situation and is wholly inapplicable to the present case. There what the legislature did was to dispose of two appeals on merits through an amendment to , deprive the court of the oportunity to decide the appeals which are pending befor.e it. The amendment was struck down by this Court in a judgment during the course of which Mathew, J., observed :\n\n\"At the time when the Amendment was passed, the appeal filed by the appellant and the cross appeal of the respondent were pending before the Supreme Court. Clause ( 4) was legislation ad hominem directed against the course of the hearing of the appeals on merits as the appeal and the cross appeal were to he disposed o( in accordance with that clause and not by tiflplying the law to the facts as ascertained by the court. This was a direct interference with the decision of these appeals by the Supreme Court on their merits by a legislative judgment.\"\n\nThus, in that case the legislation was ad hominem and was directed against the course of the hearing of the appeals on merits.\n\nIn the instant case, however, the Parliament has done nothing of the sort.\n\nBy enacting s. 7, it has merely provided a new forum for the> appeals which were pending in the High Court and in respect of which a valid declaration, fully consistent with the provisions of the Act, was made-a course which involved no interference with the judicial functions of the court and was fully open to the legislature.\n\nWe are thus clearly of the opinion that the decision relied upon• by\n\nMr. Mridul is of no assistance to him and that his argument is 'l\\ithout merit.\n\nWe now pass on to the next phase , of the argument of Mr. Bhatia and Mr. Mridul which relates to the>- nature of the procedure provided for by the Act.\n\nAccording to the contention of learned counsel for the appellants, the procedure prescribed by the Act is harsher and more rigorous than that provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure and causes serious prejudice to the accused and is, therefore. violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. We mieht mention here that in view of our finding that the classification made by the Act complies with the dual test laid down by this Court and is a reasonable\n\n(1) [1976] 2 S. C.R. 347\n\nclassification, Art. 14 would not be attracted even if the procedure is h<:ld to be harshar than that available under the ordinary law.\n\nApart from that, however, we find that the procedure prescribed by the Act is not harsh or onerous as contended but is more liberal and\n\nadvantageaus to the accused who is assured of an expeditious and fair trial thereunder.\n\nBefore, however, dealing with this aspect of the ma.tter, we might dispose of an argµment advanced by Mr. Bhatia that his client 11ot having held any high public or political office has been drawn into this case by virtue of the declaration and has, there--\n\nfore, been singled out for a discriminatory treatment. We are unable to accept this argument. It is true that Mr. Sanjay Gandhi has never been the holder of any high public or political office but the first clause\n\nof the preamble clearly includes within its ambit not only persons holding high public or political offices, but also others as sc.ction 8 states :\n\n\"8. A Special Court shall have jurisdiction to try any person concerned in the offence in respect of which a declaration ha.s been made, either as principal, conspirator or abettor and all other offences and accused persons as can be jointly tried therewith at one trial in accordance with the\n\nCode.\"\n\nSection 8 thus incorporates the well-known concept of joint trial of accused persons. in respect of offences forming part of !he samq\n\ntransaction. In these circumstances no discrimination, as complained of by the appellants, results.\n\nCorning now to the procedure prescribed by the Act, reliance was placed by learned counsel for both the appellants on a few cases decided by tl)is Court to show that the procedure prescribed by the Act is llarsh and unfavourable to the accused.\n\nAs suggested by Mr.\n\nBhatia we have tried to judge the harshness or otherwise of the procedure from the _vision of an accused person but find ourselves unable to agree with the contention. We might mention here that in the Reference case, Chandrachud, C.J. pointed out the undernoted three infinnities appearing in the Bill which were violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution :\n\n( 1) that there as no provision for transfer of a case;\n\n( 2) that a retired Judge could be appointed as a special Judge; and\n\n(3) that the appointment of a Special Judge was controlled by the Government. .\n\n. IC\n\nShingha), J., in his dissenting note observed that if jurisdiction in the matter of appointing a Special Judge was given to the High Court concerned leaving its Chief Justice to designate one of the Judges of his Court as a Special Judge, the procedure may become very fair and unexceptionable.\n\nThis view, however, was not shared by the majority of Judges though they did agree that if such a course was adopted that would be undoubtedly laudable. But then it is for the' legislature to decide upon the procedure to be followed in the matter and it is significant for our purpose that the aforesaid infirmities have been removed by the Act, wherunder not only , is the appointment of a Special Judge made free of control by the Government as it now rests with the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned subject to the only condition that he must obtain the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India therefor. A provision for transfer of cases from one Special Court to another Special Qlurt has also been inserted in s.10(1). The challenge on the ground of violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution fails.\n\nWe shall now deal with the contention that the procedure prescribed by the Act is harsh. In the first place, it was submitted that under s. 7 an appeal pending in the High Court stands transferred to the Supreme Court and that thus the appellant is deprived of a valuable right of having the appeal heard and decided by the High Court which is vested in him the moment he is convicted. Secondly, it was urged that if the appeal in the High Court was decided against the appellant, he would still have a right to move ti)e Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution against conviction but that by reason of the appeal having been transferred to the Supreme Court, that right also has been taken away.\n\nIn onr opinion, there is no substance in this grievanC(O.\n\nTo .begin with, an appeal being a .creature of statute, an accused has no inherent right to appeal to a particular tribunal. The legislature may choose any, tribunal for the purpose of giving a right of appeal.\n\nMorover, an appeal to the High Court is less advantageous than an appeal to the Supreme Court for the following reasons :\n\n(1) The right of appeal given to an accused from the order of a Session Judge ()r Special Judge to the High Court is not totally unrestricted. Section 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers an Appellate Court to dismiss an appeal sulll)11arily if it is satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for interference.\n\nThe relevant portion of s. 384 runs thus :\n\n\"384. (1) If upon examining the petition of appeal and copy of the judgn1ent received J!nder section 382 or section\n\n.__\n\n383, the Appellate Court considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it may dismiss the appeal summarily;\n\nProvided that -\n\n(a) no appeal presented under section 382 shall be dist\n\nmissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same,\n\n(b) no appeal presented under section 383 shall be dismissed except after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same, unless the Appellate Court considers that the appeal is frivolous or that the production of the accused in custody before the Court would involve such inconvenience as would be. disproportionate in the circumstances of the case;\n\n(c) no appeal presented under section 383 shall be dismissed summarily until the period allowed for preferring such appeal has expired.\n\n(2) Before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may call for the record of the case.\"\n\nThus, an appeal to the High Court under the Code of Criminal E Procedure is attended with the risk of being summarily dismissed under s. 384. On the other hand, an appeal to the Supreme Court is governed by s. 11 (1) of the Act which runs thus :-\n\n\"11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code, an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the\n\nSupreme Court both on facts and on law.\"\n\nAn appeal under s. 11 (1) lies as of right and both on facts and on law. Thus, the right conferred on a convict by s. 11 (1) is wider and less restricted than the right of appeal given 15y the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n(2) If the appeal is filed before the Supreme Court or is transferred thereto, the accused becomes entitled to a hearing of his case by the highest court in the country both on facts and on law and thus gets a far greater advantage than a right to move the Court for grant of special leave which may or may not be granted, it being a matter of discretion to be exercised by the Supreme Court.\n\nA similar view-was expressed in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad & Ors.(\") where this Court made the following observations:-\n\n\"But i.n this present case the original trial was by the Special Tribunal which was invested with the powers of a B sessions court and consequently only one appeal would lie to the High Court. It is said that the case could have been tried by the District Magistrate and in that case the accused could have one appeal to the Sessions Judge and a second one to the High Court under the Hyderabad law.\n\nThis contention rests on a pure speculation aud is hardly tenable.\" c\n\nIn the above view of the matter, we are unable t\\) agree with learned counsel for the appellants that the procedure regarding appeals is harsher than that prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThere is yet another aspect of the matter which wa$ stressedi by the learned Solicitor General. Under the provisions of s. 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no appeal by a convicted person would lie in any of the following cases :-\n\n(1) where a High Court passes only a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or of fine not exceeding one thousand rupees;\n\n( 2) where a Court of session or a Metropolitan Magistrate passes only a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or of fine not exceeding two hundred rupees;\n\n(3) where a Magistrate of the first class passes only a sentence F . of fine not exceeding one hundred rupees;\n\n( 4) where, in a case tried summarily, a Magistrate empowered ,. __ to act under section 260 passes only a sentence of fine not ,, exceeding two hundred rupees.\n\nThus if the Sessions Judge were to try an accused and sentence him to fine or to_ imprisonment not exceeding three months, he would havei no right of appeal at all. On the other hand, if a Special Judge imposes the same sentence, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court as of right both on facts and on law. Could it be reasonably argued in such circumstances that the right of appeal provided by the Act was harsher or Jess advantageous to the accused ? For the reasons given above, our answer to this question is in the negative.\n\n(!) [1953]\n\nS. C. R. 589.\n\nIt was then pointed out that the right of having matters decided in revision by the High Court has been taken away from the accused by the procedure prescribed by the Act, under s. 11 (1) under which no appeal also lies against an interlocutory order and it was contended that the section therefore entailed a definite procedural disadvantage to the accused. This argument also is based on a misconception of the provisions of the Act and those of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 397 (2) of which runs thus :-\n\n\"397. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (I) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.\"\n\nThus, even the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for\n\nany revision against an interlocutory order.\n\nAs to what is the connotation <if an interlocutory order is a matter with which we are not concerned in this case.\n\nWhat is material is that so far as interlocutory orders are. concerned, there is no right of revision either under the code D of Criminal Procedure or under the Act.\n\nIn considering this aspect of the matter one must also bear in mind the fact that under the Act the Special Court is presided over by no less a person who is a sitting Judge of a High Court and the possibility of miscarriage of justice is reduced to the bare minimum. While adverting to this aspect of the case, this Court observed in the case of V. C. Shukla v. The State through C.B.l.\n\n(supra) :\n\nThat the Act makes a distinct departure from the trial of ordinary offences by criminal courts in that the trial of the offences is entrusted to a very high judical dignitary who is a sitting Judge of the High Court to be appointed by the Chief Justiee concerned on the recommendations of the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis contains a built-in safeguard and a safety valve for ensuring the independence of judiciary on the cine hand and a complete fairness of trial on the other. In appointing the Special Judge, the Government has absolutely no hand or control so that the Special Judge is appointed on the re-- commendations of the highest judicial authority in the country, viz., the Chief Justice of India.\n\nThis would naturally instil great confidence of the people in the Special Judge who is given a very elevated status.\"\n\nWe may mention here that in the case of Jagannath Sonu Parkar v.\n\nState af Mahlirashtra('), the right of appeal from an order of a Special\n\n(I) (1963) Supp. I S. C. R. 573.\n\nA Magistrate directly to the High Court (bypassing 1he Sessions Judge) was held to be more advantageous from the point of view of the accused.\n\nIn this connection, this Court said :\n\n\"It is true that if the complaint was filed in the Court of Magistrate having jurisdiction over Deogad alone, as it could B lawfully be filed, an appeal would against an order of conviction, lie to the Court of Session, Ratnagiri and an application in the exercise of revisional jmisdiction to the High Court from the order of the Court of Session. But it is difficult to hold that this amounts to any discrimination. Apart from the fact that the trial by a special Magistrate and an appeal directly to the C High Court against the order of the Magistrate may be regarded normally as more advantageous to the accused persons, the distinction between Courts to which the appeal may lie arises out of the constitution of the Special Magistrate and not any special procedure evolved by the Notification.\" D What is true of an appeal to the High Court from the order of a Special Magistrate equally applies to an appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of a Special Court constituted under the Act. Thus, viewed from any angle, the procedure prescribed by the Act cannot be said to be prejudicial or less advantageous, to the accused, much Jes~ E harsher or more rigorous than the one provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nIt was then argued that though the Special Court has been given the status of a Court of Session under s. 9 ( 3) of the Act, yet it has to follow, under s. 9(1) the_reof the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases before a Magistrate in sections 23 8 to 243 and 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nWe cannot conceive how any grievance can be made on this score that the provision is harsh. The procedure for trial of warrant cases gives a full opportunity to the accused to participate in the trial at all its stages and to rebut the case for the prosecution in every possible manner and it has not been pointed out how the adoption thereof for trials under the Act would be to the disadvantage of the accused. We find that the grievance put forward is unfounded.\n\nGreat reliance was placed by !'earned counsel on the judgment in The Slate of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar(') in support of the H proposition that the procedure prescribed by the Act was harsh and disadvantageous to the accused. Before referring to cert.in passages ill!\n\n(I) [1952] S. C. R. 284\n\nthat judgment (which has been fully considered in the Reference case) we consider it necessary to give the background and the special facts in the light of which the Judges of this Court made the relevant observations.\n\nThe West Bengal legislature passed the West Bengal Special Courts Act (hereinafter to be referred to as tbe 'West Bengal Act') constituting Special Courts and empowering the State Government to refer cases or offences or classes of cases or classes of offences to such Courts but did not at all indicate any guidelines as to tbe nature of the cases to be so referred which was thus a matter left entirely to tbe discretion of the Government. In other words, the Government was given a blanket power to refer any case of whatsoever nature to the Special Courts. Sub-sections {1) and (2) of s. 5 of the West Bengal Act are e>tracted below:-\n\n\"5 ( 1) A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as tbe State Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.\n\n(2) No direction shall be made under sub-section (1) for the trial of an offence for which an accused person was being tried at the commencement of this Act before any court, but, save as aforesaid, such direction may be made in respect of an offence, whether such offence was committed before or after the commencement of this Act.\"\n\nA perusal of these provisions would show that the State Government was given an uncontrolled power to refer for trial offences or cases by a general or special order. Under s. 3, the Government was empowered by a notification in the Official Gazette to constitute Special Courts and s. 4 provided for the appointment of Special Judges to preside over such Courts. Even though no conditions regulating the exercise of discretion by the State Government were laid, Sastri, CJ., upheW the validity of the law on the ground tbat the State in the exercise of its governmental\n\npower was entitled to make laws operating differently to different groups or classes of persons. Elaborating tbe point, Sastri, C.J., observed :\n\n\"In the face of all these considerations, it seems to me difficult to condemn section 5(1) as violative of Article 14, 1f the discretion given to the State Government should be exercised improperly or arbitrarily, tbe administrative action may be challenged as discriminatory, but it cannot affect the constitutionality of the law. Whether a law conferring discretionary powers on an administrative authority is constitntionally valid or not should not be determined on the assumption that such authority will act in an arbitrary manner in exercising the discretion committed to it .... On the contrary,\n\n...\n\nit is to be presumed that a public authority will act honestly and reasonably in the exercise of its statutory powers, and that the State Government in the present case will, before directing a case to be tried by a Special Court, consider whether there are special features and circumstances which might unduly protract its trial under the ordinary procedure and mark it off for speedier trial under the Act.\n\nEven from the point of vrew of reasonable classification, I can see no reason why the validity of the Act should not be sustamed.\n\nAs already pointed out, wide latitude must be allowed to a legislature in classifying persons and things to be brought under the operation of a special law, and such classification need not be based on an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion.\"\n\nIt might be noticed, therefore, that even though no guidelines ar. all were provided by the statute, yet Sastri, C.J., held that the classification was a reasonable one and sustained the validity of the law. The other Judges, however, did not agree with the view of Sastri, C.J., and struck down the provisions of section 5 of the West Bengal Act.\n\nHowever, the judgment is wholly inapplicable to the present case in which the Act not only lays down clear, explicit and exhaustive guidelines but further requires the State Government to act only on the basis of certain specific conditions and after being satisfied on a fully application of the mind that a prima facie case was mac'.e O'Jl. We ha>() already indicated that.by enacting s. 5, the Act makes the various clauses of the preamble\n\nas a part of that section. Thus, any possibility of discrimination or absolute or arbitrary exercise of powers is ei<cluded by the Act. The case of Anwar Ali Sarkai: (supra) , therefore cannot furnish any criterion for judging the validity of any of the provisions of the Act. It is in the light of this background that we have to examine Anwar Ali Sarkar's case. It may be mentioned that one of the grounds which appealed to Sastri, C.J., was that the obje<:t of the West Bengal Act was to provide for speedier trial by instituting a system of Special Courts with a simplified procedure which was sufficient, in his opinion, to justify the validity of that Act. Fazal Ali, J., (as he then was) laid stress on the fact that although a procedure ensuring a speedy trial was prescribed by the West Bengal Act yet that Act had not set out any principle of classification while laying down the new procedure.\n\nHe held that in the absence of a reasonable classification a procedure which catered to a speedier trial was itself not sufficient to justify the cc, nstitutionality of the West Bengal Act. In the instant case, we have already pointed out\n\n.....\n\nthat a reasonable classification of a particular set of persons or class of persons, viz., those holding high public and political offices, has already been mad0 and that this classification is consistent with the object of the statute which is a rational one, viz., expeditious trial. This was not true of the West Bengal Act, s. 5 of which was held to be violative of Art. 14 by Mahajan, J., also on the ground that there was no basis for the differential treatment prescribed in the West Bengal Act. He observed :\n\n\"Section 5. of the West Bengal Special Courts Act is hit by article 14 of the constitution inasmuch as it mentions no basis for the differential treatment prescribed in the Act for trial of criminals in certain cases and for certain offences ....\n\nBy the process of classification the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.\"\n\nThese observations can obviously have no application to the present case because, as already held by us, the Act makes not only a classification but a classification which fulfils the dual test laid down by this Court in several cases.\n\nReliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant on the following observations of Mahajan, J. :\n\n\"The present statute suggests no reasonable basis or classification, either in respect of offences or in respect of cases.\n\nIt has laid down no yardstick or measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offences by which measure these groups could be distinguished from those who are outside the purview of the Special Act. The Act has left this matter entirely to the unregulated discretion of the provincial government.\"\n\nThese observations also do not apply to the facts of the present case because the Act in the pr0sent case has provided a rational basis for the classification and laid down specific yardsticks for grouping of special class of persons and has provided a different procedure which is not harsh (the 'position being different in the West Bengal Act) and which is undoubtedly favourabk and advantageous to the accused.\n\nReliance was also placed on a few observations of Mukherjea, J., H where he has pointed out that in making the classification the legislature cannot certainly be expected to provide absolute symmetr~ and ha</ held\n\nthat while recognising the degree of evil, the classification should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.\n\nHe has stated :\n\n\"It must rest always upon real and substantial distinction hearing a reasonable and just relation fo the thing in respect to which the classification is made.\"\n\nThere can be no doubt that the present Act fulfils all the condition laid down by Mukherjea, J., who found that certain provisions of the West Bengal Act curtailed the rights of the accused in a substantial manner, thereby resulting in discrimination.\n\nHerc we have! already pointed out that no rights of the accused have been curtailed and that on the other hand, the procedure prescribed is more advantageous and fair to him than that available under the ordinary law of the land, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nFinally, Mukherjea, J., pointed out that the language of s. 5(1) of the West Bengal Act vested an unrestricted discretion in the State Government in cases or classes of cases to be tried by the Special Court in accordance with the procedure laid down by that Act.\n\nThis infirmity is not present in the provisions of the present Act which treats equally all persons who form part of the classification made by the Act, the same procedure being applicable to all. The ordinary law governs only those persons who are left out of the classification and do not fulfil the conditions of the persons constituting the class, namely, holders of high public and political offices.\n\nThus, the observations of Mukherjea, J., are of no help to the appellants which is also true of passages appearing in the judgment of Das, J., (as he then was) and cited before us.\n\nIn the first place, Das, J., deals with the conditions necessary for a valid classification, which have already been spelt ant by us.\n\nThere the learned Judge held that if the 'State Government classified offences arbitrarily, without any reasonable or rational basis having relation to the object of the Act, its action will amount to an abuse of its powers.\n\nWe have already pointed out that there is no question of the classification made by the Act being arbitrary or nnreasonable because the basis for the classification is undoubtedly a reasonable one and has a rational nexus with the object of the Act, namely, expeditious trial.\n\nWe have pointed out that it will be in the public interest that the offenders sought to be tried under the Act are either convicted or acquitted within the shortest possible time.\n\nBose, J., conceded that though the procedure prescribed by the West Bengal Act may pramote the ends of justice and would be\n\n, I.-----\n\nwelcome, yet he took serious exception to the differential treatment resulting therefrom. He observed :\n\n\"What I have to determine is whether the differentiation made offends what I may call the social c:Onscience of a sovere'gn democratic republic ...... It is the differentiation which matters; the singling out of cases or groups of cases or even of offences or classes pf offences, of a kind fraught with the most serious consequences to the individuals con-' cerned, for special, and what some would regard as peculiar, treatment.\"\n\nAll these observations have however, to be read in the light .of the pecuilar provisions of the West Bengal Act which contained no guidelines, no conditions, no safeguards but conferred uncontrolled and arbitrary powers, on the Government to make the classification as it liked. This, however, is not the case here.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to agree with learned counsel that the observations of the Judges constituting the Bench in Anwar AU Sarkat's case (supra) can be called into aid for the purpose of striking down the Act in the present case.\n\nThus, after a consideration of the prov1s1ons of the Act, the guidelines contained in the preamble, the procedural part of the Act and the classification made we are clearly of the opinion that none of the sections of the Act are violative of Art. 14 or Art. 21 or any other provision of the Constitution.\n\nWe hold that the classification is valid and reasonable and has a rational nexus with the object of the Act and that the procedure prescribed is fair and advantageous to the accused.\n\nAccordingly, we declare that the Act and its provisions are constitutionally valid and over-rule preliminary objection~ taken on behalf of the appellants.\n\nFAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThe appellant, V. C. Shukla (hereinafter referred to as 'A-1') in criminal appeal No. 494 of 1979 has been coovicted\n\nby the Sessions Judge, Delhi under s. 120 B read with ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201, Indian Penal Code and also under s. 409, Indian Penal Code in respect of the positive print and negative and other material of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa; under s. 411 read with s. 109, Indian Penal Code; under s. 414 read withs. 109, Indian Penal Code; under s. 435 read with s. 109 I.P.C. and under s. 201 read with s. 109,\n\nI.P.C.\n\nThe appellant, Sanjay Gandhi (hereinafter referred to as 'A-2') in Crimirnl appeal No. 493 of 1979 has been convicted by the Sessions Judge, Delhi under s. 120 B read with ss 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and\n\nhas been further convicted under ss. 435, 411 and 201, I.P.C. in regard to the negative and other material of the film 'Kissa Kllrsi Kaa' as also under s. 409 read with s. 109 of the Indian Penah Code. Accused No.1 was seutenced under s.120 Bread with ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 to two years rigorous imprisonment; under s. 409' regarding the negative and other materials to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 20,000/- and in default further 6 months rigorous imprisonment; under s.409 regarding the positive print of the film to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/-\n\nand in case of default further rigorous iinprisonment for three w.onths; . under s, 411 read with s. 109 to r!gcrous i1nprisonment for one year; under s. 414 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for on' year; under si'201 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; and under s. 435 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for one year and six months.\n\nAccused No. 2 was sentenced under '' 120 B read with ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 to rigorous imprisonment for two years; under s. 435 to rigorous imprisonment for one year and six months and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in case of default further rigorous imprisonment for four months; under s. 411 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; under s. 414 to rigorous imprisonment for one year; under s. 201 in regard to the negative, etc., to rigorous imprisonment for one year; under s. 201 in regard W 13 trunks, etc., to rigorous imprisonment for one year and under s. 409 read with s. 109 to rigorous imprisonment for two years. The aforesaid sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently in the case of both the accused.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge has given full and complete details of the prosecution case against the appellants and has divided the allegations against them in several parts.\n\nOn being convicted by the Sessions Judge, Delhi, the accused filed appeals before the Delhi H)gh Court against their convictions and sentences, indicated above, and were released on bail pending the hearing of the appeals.\n\nMeanwhile, the Special Courts Act of 1979 came into force and by virtue of a declaration made under s.' 7 of the said Act., the appeals stoad transferred to this Court and were placed for hearing before us.\n\nAs the learned Sessions Judge has give11 all the necessary details of the prosecution case against the appellants, it is not necessary for us to give all the facts but we propose to give a bird's eye view of the sub-stratum oi the allegations on the hns; s of which the ap;:ie\\lants have been convicted, dwelling particularly on those aspects which merit serious consideration. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great length both on the constitutional points involved in appeals and the facts.\n\nBy an order dated December 5, 1979, we\n\nV. c. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Faza~ Ali, J.) 563\n\ndisposed of the constitutional points which were in the nature of preliminary objection to the maintainability of these appeals and overruled these objections. The reasons for the said order have been given by us which would form part of this judgment.\n\nComing now to the facts, shorn of unnecessary details, the story begins with the production of a film called Kissa Kursi Kaa by Shri\n\nAmrir Nahata, PW 1, under the banner of Dhwaqi Prakash.\n\nPW l was a member of Parliament and had produced the film in the year 1975.\n\nThe film, according to the prosecution, was a grotesque satire containing a scathing criticism of the functioning of the Central Government and was open to serious objections which were taken, even by the Central Board , of film Censors (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Board'). After the film was ready for release, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, applied for certification of the film on the 19th of April 1975 before the Board.\n\nThe film was viewed on April 24, 1975 by an Examining Committee of the Board and while 1hree Members\n\nwere of the opinion that certificate for exhibition, with drastic cuts, should be given, another Member and Mr. N. S. Thapa, the Chairman D disagreed with the opinion of their colleagues and accordingly referred\n\nthe matter to the Revising Committee.\n\nThe Revising Committee after viewing the film agreed by a majority of 6 : 1 for certification of the film, the dissent having been voiced by Mr. Thapa, the Chairman and accordingly under rule 25 (ii) of the Cinematograph (Cenrorship) Rules, 1958, a reference was made to the Central Government on 8-5-75. In this connection, a letter was iiddressed\n\nto PW 6, Mr! S.M. Murshed, who was at the relevant period Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Incharge of film and T.V. Projects ancl was appointe.d Joint Secretary on 1st May 1975.\n\nThe correspondence in this regard is to be found in the file Ext. PW /6A. Before making his comments PW 6 saw the film sometime in the middle of May 1975. Meanwhile, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, was directed to deposit the positive print of the film comprising 14reels of 35 mm with the Films Division Auditorium, .situate at 1, Mlµ!adev Road, New Delhi (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Auditorium'). In pursuance of these directions,. PW 1 deposited the positive print and an entry !hereof was made by the Librariancum-Projectionist of the Auditorium which is Ext. PW 17/ A.\n\nPW 17 K.P. Sreedharan, who was a Technical Officer Ir, oharge also inspected the reels and found them in order.\n\nAlthough Murshed, PW 6, after seeing the film agreed with the opinion of the Chairman of the Board that film may be 0pen to R objection on the j!l'ound that it was full of sarcasm and contained criticism of the political functioning of the government machinery\n\nl 6-2S9CI/80\n\nyet he was personally of the opinion that certification for exhibition should not be refused.\n\nThe witness accordingly recorded a note and submitted it to• , Mr. A. J. Kidwai, the then Secretary,, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The matter was then examined by Mr. I. K. Gujarat, the then Minister of Information & Broadcasting but no final decision was taken.\n\nMeanwhile, PW 1, Amrit Nahata filed a writ petition in this Court which is Ext. PW 1/D. On the 23rd of June 1975., a notice was issued by the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting to PW 1, Amrit Nahata, to show cause why certification to the film be not refused.\n\nThe notice was made returnable by 9-7-75.\n\nThus, it appears that the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting had taken a tentative decision to refuse certification to the film !Jccause of its objectionable and offensive nature. We might state here that so far, neither A-1 nor A-2 was anywhere in the picture.\n\nIn fact, the position is that the film faced rough weather even at the initial stage of consiMration hy the Board as a result of which the matter was referred to the Central Government where the question of refusal of certification was seriously considered and ultimately a notice was issued under the directions of the Ministry. We have particularly\n\nhighlighted this aspect of the matter because the learned Sessions Judge was largely swayed _by the consideration that A-1 took a very prominent part in banning the film and in getting the positive print and other material in his personal custody in order to destroy the same with the aid of A-2.\n\nOn the other hand, the facts disclosed by the prosecution ex facie show that objections to certification of the film had been taken at the very initial stage and the ultimate order was passed during the time when A-1, Mr. Shukla had taken over as Minister, which was merely. the final scene of a drama long in process.\n\nContinuing the thread from where we left it, Emergency was proclimed on the night between 25th and 26th of June 1975 and soon thereafter A-1 took charge as the Union Minister of Information & Broadcasting and he was of the opinion that the film should be banned.\n\nOn July 5, 1975, in pursuance of the decision taken by .the Central Government, the Coordination Committee directed &eizure of the film and that its negatives, positives and all other materials relatino to it be taken in the custody 01 tne Ct; nCrai oovernn1ent v1ot; Cxt. PW\n\n6/D.\n\nOn July 10, 1975, A-1 directed that the film be banned from screening under the Defence of India Rules, vide Ext. PW 6/E-4.\n\nFinally, on the 11th of Juiy 1975, PW 6. Murshed, passed an order that no certification was to be given to the film for public exhibition which was followed by a letter dated July 14, 1975, forfeiting the film to the Government. 1n pursuance of the decision taken by the Central\n\n .. __..\n\nGovernment, PW 39, S. Ghose, Deputy Secretary, Incharge of the Films Division, wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra for seizure of all the positives and negatives of the film as also other related materials. In pursuance of this order, the Bombay police seized the entire film on 1~8-1975 and deposited the same in the godown of the Board. As, however, a final order had been passed by the Government banning the fihn, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, filed a petition for special leave in the Supreme Court on 6-9-1975. This petition was heard on 29-10-75 and this Court directed the Government to screen the film on 17-11-1975 in the Auditorium for being shown to the Judges constituting the Bench. In pursuance of the order of this Court, intimation was sent to the Ministry concerned and PW\n\n62, Mr. S. M. H. Burney, who was then Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, directed that immediate action be taken to implement the anders of the Supreme Court, and that arrangements should be made to bock the Auditorium for 17-11-1975. By a let:er dated 5-11-1975, Ext. PW 2/A-2, the Supreme Court was also informed regarding the steps taken which, 1ccording to the prosecution were the prelude to the conspiracy between the two appellants leading to the seizure, disposal and destmction of the fihn.\n\nSometime thereafter, PW 2, L. Dayal, took over as Joint Secretary (Films Division) in place of Mr. Murshcd.\n\nWe might emphasise at this stage that there is absolutely no evidence to show that there was any meeting of minds between A-I nnd\n\nA-2 nor is there any material to indicate that A-2 played any role in the banning of the film.\n\nThe decision to ban the film appears to have been taken by the Ministry headed by A-1, on the merits of the case.\n\nNo motive is attributable to A-1 at this stage because even the -Chairman of the Board, PW 8, Mr. Thapa, who was an independent witness, was of the view that the film should not be certificated for public exhibition.\n\nSimilarly, the steps taken by the officers of the Ministry in pursuance of the banning of the film, namely, the seizure of the film at Bombay and its transfer to Deihl appear to be in the nature of routine to see that the decision taken by the Government was implemented.\n\nAs no stay had been obtained by PW I, Amrit Nahata, from the Supreme Court, the Government was not hound to stay its hands.\n\nOn the other hand, as soon as the Ministry received the orders of this Court for screening the film on 17-11-1975, immediate steps were taken to comply with the orders of this Court.\n\nBefore we proceed further, we might indicate that it is well settled 'that in order to prove a criminal conspiracy which is punishable under\n\ns. 120 B of the Indian Penal Code, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence.\n\nThis clearly envisages that there must be a meeting of minds resulting in an ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an offence. It is true that in most case it will be difficult to get direct evidence of an agreement to conspire but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence.\n\nAfter having gone through the entire evidence, with the able assistance of Mr. Rajinder Singh, learned counsel for A-1 and of learned counsel for the State, we are unable to find any acceptable evidence connecting either of the appellants with the existence of any conspiracy.\n\nWe are further of the opinion that even taking the main parts of the prosecution case at their face value, no connection has been proved with the destruction of the film and the two appellants. The prosecution has, of course, produced some witnesses to show the existence of the alleged conspiracy or some sort of connection of the appellants with the destruction, of the film but that evidence, as we shall show, falls short of the standard of proof required in a criminal case.\n\nWe realise that the prosecution was seriously handicapped because the investigation started only after the J anata Government came into power in March 1977, that is to say, about a year and a half after the offences in question were allegedly committed, by when naturally much of t11e evidence would have been lost and even some of the important witnesses exaniined by the prosecution had turned hostile and refused to support its case.\n\nDespite these difficulties, the prosecution, has to discharge its onus of providing the case, against the accnsed beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nWe, therefore, propose to deal only with that part of the evidence led by the prosecution which has been relied upo11 to prove some sort of a connection of the appellants with the alleged destruction of the film.\n\nIn this connection, we propose to deal with the evidence in three separate parts-\n\n(1) the deposit of the positive print in the Auditorium and its alleged transfer to the personal custody of\n\nA-1;\n\n(2) the arrival af thirteen trunks, containing negative and other material related to the film at New Delhi from Bombay in pursuance of the orders of A-1 and their transfer to 1, Safdarjuog Road, then to the Maruti Complex; and\n\n\\._ ..\n\n.·\"\"-.\n\n(3) the actual orders alleged to have been given by A-2\n\nfor burning the film in the premises of the Marnti Complex which operation, according to the prosecution was carried out by the approver, PW 3, Kherkar, and other witnesses between the 10th and '.!4th of November 1975.\n\nAlthough there are other elements on which prosecution has adduced evidence which is by no mean~ very convincing or consistent but even if we assume those elements to be proved, if the three aspects indicated above, are not proved the prosecution is bound to fail.\n\nWe now proceed to deal with the first part of the case.\n\n(1) The deposit of the prints at the Auditorium and its alleged transfer to the personal custody of A-1.\n\nIn the Auditorium, PW 17, Sreedharan screened the film in order to show the same to PW 6, Murshed, on the 22nd May 1975 and again on the next day at the instance of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. Some private shows were also screened at 1, he instance of PW 1, Amrit Nahata, though this was not permissible under the Rules. It was also the prosecution case that PW 39, Ghose and PW 61, C. K. Sharma met PW 1 7, Sreedharan and PW\n\n18, Bhawani Singh and examined the prints whicjl were then lcept in the green room. Ghose then rang up Sreedharan and told him that he was coming to the Auditorium to take delivery of the prints.\n\nAccordingly, PW 39, Ghose is said to have arrived at the Auditorium and the fourteen reels contained in cans were put on the back seat of his car. PW 39, Ghose then went to Shastri Bhavn and put the cans in the dicky of the staff car of A-1 in the presence of the driver, Babu Ram, PW 33.\n\nThereafter, when A-1 came, Babu Ram took the car to 1, Safdarjung Road where the cans were unloaded and kept in the office of R. K. Dhavan, Additional Private Secretary to the !Jien Prime Minister. In support of this part of the cac. the prosecution examined PW 18, Bhawani _Singh, PW 33, Babu Ram;\n\nPW 61, C. K. Sharma; PW 57, V. S. Tripathi, PW 60, R. L. Bandlish and PW 39, Ghose.\n\nSo far as PWs 39, 57, 60 and 61 are concerned, they did not upport the prosecution case regarding the transfer of the prints to the custody of A-1 as alleged by the prosecution.\n\nSo the only witnesses to prove the factum of transfer were PWs 17 and 33.\n\nThe prosecution also examined some other witnesses PW 1, Amrit Nahata, PW 2, L. Dayal and PW 62, Burney to show that the transfer\n\nI ·•\n\n( A of the positives of the film to the custody of A-1 was carried out at the oral instruction of A-1.\n\nPW 62, however, did not support the prosecution and thus, on this point, the only witnesses worth considering are Ps 1 and 2.\n\n. H\n\nWe would first refer to the evidence of PW I, Amrit Nahata.\n\nHe stated that he was directed to deposit the positive print of the Films to Films Division Auditorium at Mahadev Road and consequently he complied with the direction on 17-5-1975, and obtained a receipt.\n\nThe witness goes on to state that one of the factors which weighed with him in withdrawing the writ petition he, had filed in the Supreme Court was that he was persuaded and pressurised and threatened by A-1 to withdraw the writ petition.\n\nHe, however, admitted in his cross-examination that the process of persuasion and pl'essurisation and threats was carried out not on one but on several occasions. He then went to the extent of saying that the Minister (A-1) used to talk to him in this connection in Parliament, in his office and sometimes even at Shastri Bhavan.\n\nHe further stated that even in the Central Hall of Parliament be did not hesitate from threatening him.\n\nThe witness admitted that he never filed any written application before the Supreme Court alleging the threats given to him 1>y A-1. He further admits that after the Janata Government took over in March 1977 while be had written to Mr. L. K. Advani, who succeeded A-1, regarding the film, he made no mention of any such conversation between him and A-1 about the threats, etc.\n\nFinally, he admitted that no one was present in the office when he talked to Mr. Shukla.\n\nIn view of these statements, we find it difficult to believe the witness.\n\nThe entire version given by him is inherently imprnbabk, firstly, because of his failure to draw the attention of the Supreme Court to the threats, etc.\n\nSecondly, it is impossible to believe that after the Janata Government came to power and he wrote a letter to Mr.\n\nAdvani regarding the film, he would not mention that he had been pressurised or threatened by A-1 when he was undoubtc<lly very much interested in bis film being exhibited and bore a serious grouse and animus against A-1 because he had refused certification for exhibition of his film.\n\nIn these circumstances, we arc unable to place any reliance of the testimony of this witness so far as the allegation of threats, pressurisation, etc., made by A-1 is concerned.\n\nThus, if his evidence is rejected on this point, then excepting the testimony of PWs 2 and 63, there is no evidence to how that A-1 had any connection or link with the transfer of the positive print of the film .\n\nThis brings us to the consideration of an important witness PW 2, L. Dayal, on whom great reliance has been placed by the learned\n\nSessions Judge.\n\nSo far as PW 2 is concerned, he states that sometime in the first week of November, A-1 called him and said that he ha<l decided to keep .all material relating to the film in his personal custody and that detailed arrangements for the delivery of the material would be made by his personal staff and the work would be done by a respectable officer.\n\nThe witness further states that PW 57, V. S.\n\nTripathi, was also present at the time when this conversation between the witness and A-1 took place.\n\nHe further states that he had apprised .PW 62, Burney, the Secretary, of the talk tie had with A-1.\n\nBoth PW 57 and PW 62 have not supported the witness on these points and have denied the same.\n\nThe witness had also stated that he had called PW 39, Ghose and apprised him of the instmctions of the Minister for carefully and confidentially putting all material in the personal custody of the Minister.\n\nGhose, however, in his evidence does not support the story of instructions by the Minister and denies having been told anything of the kind by the witness.\n\nOf course, all the three witnesses, namely, Tripathi, Burney and Ghose, had been dedared hostile.\n\nThe witness further goes on to state that he had called PW 4. Khandpur, who happened to be in Delhi and had told him that all the film material pertaining to the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' lying at Bombay had to be carefuJly and confidentially collected and sent to Delhi.\n\nPW 4, however, clearly admits in his evidence that the instruction which he had received was to send the material to the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting.\n\nAs we shall show, PW 2 appears to be deeply interested in the prosecution.\n\nJn these circumstances, even Mr. Jethmalani, appearing for the State, frankly conceded that he would not ask the Court to rely on this witness unless) he was corroborated by some other independent evidence.\n\nIn fact, far from there being any independent evidence to corroborate the version of the witness in regard to the instruction given by A-1, the persons to whom the witness mentioned these facts, viz., Tripathi, Burney and Ghose, have not supported him.\n\nThus, so far as the role played by A-1 on the first part of the case is concerned, this is all the evidence produced by the pro, ecution and if this evidence is rejected, then it is not proved at whose instruction the film cans were transferred from the Auditorium to l, Safdarjung Road nor ha' it been established that this was done with the knowledge of A-I.\n\nComing back now to the evidence of the transfer of the pos; tive print from the Auditorium into the car of Ghose and therefrom to\n\n.I'\n\nthe staff car of A-I at Shastri Bhavan and finally to l, Safdar.iung H Road, the evidence led by the prosecution consists of PWs 17 and 33.\n\nThe other witnesses examined on this point have not supported\n\nthe prosecution case.\n\nFrom the evidence of PW 1 7, it appears that PWs Ghose, C. K. Sharma and Bhawani Singh met him and examined the prints and then the prints were kept in the green room. Later, the same day Ghose rang up the witness to inform him that he was coming to take the positive print of the film which should be kept ready.\n\nThereafter, Ghose arrived and the prints were brought from the green room and placed in the back seat of car of Ghose.\n\nGhose thereafter drove the car but gave no receipt for taking the film.\n\nHalf an hour later, according to the witness, there was a telephone call from Tripathi to enquire if the film had been delivered to Ghose.\n\nThe witness informed him that this had been done. It was also stated by the witness that a letter (Ext. PW 17 /E and E-1) was got written by Ghose before he took the film in his car.\n\nIt may be noticed here that prior to the filing of the FIR an inquiry had been held by PW 40, Narayanan, into the manner how the prints of the film were missing and in that inquiry PW_ 17, Sreedharan, did not say at all that Ghose had taken away the film.\n\nIn this connection, the witne8' deposed as follows:-\n\n\"Q. You did not tell Shri Narayanan that S. Ghose had come to you in his car and you had delivered the film to him in his car and he had taken it away?\n\nAns. No. I did not tell him like this (Voltd :-It was so as S. Ghose had asked me to say differently to Shri Narayanan and I stated as advised by S. Ghose.)\n\nYou know that enquiry had been ordered by Shri L. K. Advani, Minister for Information & Broadcasting ?\n\nAns. Yes.\n\nQ. And yet you deliberately told a lie before Shri Narayanan?\n\nAns. Yes, because of S. Ghose.\"\n\nThus, the witness admitted that he spoke a lie before Narayanan G merely because of Ghose.\n\nFurther, even in his statement before the police, the witness did not state that Ghose had come to him for taking away the film on the same day, i.e., the' day on which Ghose had telephoned that he would be coming to take the film.\n\nSo far as PW 39, Ghose is concerned, he has totally denied , having told the witness to keep the positive prints ready or that he ever took delivery H of the prints from the witness and put the same in his car.\n\nThus, everi the prosecution case relating to the transfer of the positive prints through PW 39, Ghose, to, I, Safdarjung Road becomes doubtful.\n\nEvoo so, assuming that Ghose did take delivery of the positive prints that does not conclude the matter because the prosecution has further to prove that the prints were taken away from the Auditorium at the instruction of A-1 and then kept in the staff c~ of A-1 and taken to 1, Safdarjung Road with the knowledge of A-1.\n\nOn this point, the evidence of PW 17 is absolutely silent and he says nothing about it nor was he competent to say the same.\n\nThe only other witness PW 33, Babu Ram, states that sometimes in. thee winter of 1975 PW 61, C. K. Sharma, called him and told him that there was some luggage ( saaman) of Minister Saheb which was to be kept in his car and asked him to bring the Minister's car close to where Ghose's car was parked.\n\nThe witness found 10 to 12 round boxes which were transferred to the dicky of the staff car.\n\nThereafter, accordnig to the witness, PW 60, Bandlish, had a talk with Ghose and after, the Minister had come, the car was driven to 1, Safdarjung Road.\n\nOn reaching I, Safdarjung Road, the Minister went out of the car and a person came and took, away the saaman.\n\nThereafter, the witness drove A-1 to other places.\n\nIn. his statement before the police, the witness did not state that PW 61, C. K. Sharma had told him that the saaman of Minister Saheb (emphasis being on Minister Saheb) was to be transferred to the dicky of the staff car.\n\nBoth Bandlish and C. K. Sharma have not supported the versiol} !Jf this witness and have denied everything.\n\nEven taking the version of this witness at itr face value, there is nothing to show that when A-1 boarded the staff car at Shastri Bhavan he ws told either by the driver or by anybody that the film cans had been placed in the dicky and were to be taken to 1, Safdarjung Road or that they had been brought from the Auditorium.\n\nEven when the car reached 1, Safdarjung Road, Babu Ram never informed the Minister about the boxes having been, kept in\n\nthe dicky nor is there any evidence to show that the boxes, were un- , F loaded from the dicky of the Minister's car, either in his presence, or to his knowledge.\n\nThus, all that has been proved is that the cans wern transferred from the Auditorium to 1, Safdarjung Road.\n\nTakirig thei evidence of PW 17 and PW 33 as also PW 18, Bhawani Singh at its' face value, no connection between A-1 and the transfer of the fihn has, been established.\n\nThus, the prosecution has failed to prove that the positive prints of the film were transferred from the Auditorium to the personal custody of A-1 or that the said transfer was done in accor- dance with his instruction or to his knowledge.\n\n(2) The tramfer of negatives and other material reh1ted H to the film from Bombay to Delhi and to 1, Safdarjung Road and from there to Maruti Complex at the order of A-1\n\nSo far as this part of the prosecution case is concerned, the evidence is wholly insufficient to attribute any knowledge or ulterior motive to A-1 in directing the negatives to be sent from Bombay to Delhi.\n\nSome evidence has no doubt been adduced by the prosecution to show some amount of criminality on the part of A-1 but that evidence, as we shall show, is not very reliable.\n\nTo begin with, according to PW 6, Murshed, A-1 said that there was some sort of an informal discussion between A-1, Mr. A. J.\n\nKidwai, the then Secretary in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting and the witness when A-1 directed that the film be banned and seized, but that no action was taken by the witness until the file reached him.\n\nThe witness added that on July 7, 1975 there wa~ another meeting attended by Sarin and other officers which was presided over by A-1 and in this meeting a final decision was taken that the film should be taken over and mention was made that the Defence of India Rules should be pressed into service.\n\nThe witness further stated that nltimately in the Coordination Committee meeting which was held on July 10, 1975, and was also presided over by A-l, the earlier decision taken by the Government was reiterated.\n\nThe witness then goes on to state that he passed the order Ext. PW 6/ A-9 on July 11, 1975 which directed that the certificate for public exhibition was refused and the said order was communicated to PW l, Amrit Nahata.\n\nThis was followed by another order Ext. PW 6/ A-10 which forfeited the film Kissa Kursi Kaa.\n\nBoth these orders were approved by the Minister which had to be done in consequence of the decision taken by the Government.\n\nAfter the film had been banned and forfeited, the seizure of the film material at Bombay became a necessary consequence and accordingly a letter dated July J 4, 1975 was issued under the signatures of PW 39, Ghose to thei Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra for seizure of the film material relating to the film and requiring him to deposit the same with the Board.\n\nThe next questi6n that arises is as to why the negatives and other material of the film were directed to be sent to Delhi.\n\nIt is obvious that once the film was banned and forfeited and action under the Defence of India Rules had to be taken, it was in the nature of a routine operation that the negatives and other material of the film should be placed in the custody of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting.\n\nThis appears to us to be the main reason why A-1 directed that these materials may be sent from Bombay to Delhi. In order to incriminate the Minister the prosecution urges that this was done by A-1 to get the negatives, etc., in his personal custody so that\n\nhe would be in a position tQ destroy the same.\n\nOn this, there does not appear to be any clear evidence and even the Sessions Judge has based his findings largely on speculation.\n\nTo begin with, L. Dayal, PW 2, who was then attached to A-1 as Joint Secretary (Films) states that on 6-11-1975 A-1 tc;>ld him in the presence of Tripathi, PW 57, that A-1 had decided to keep all material relating to the film in his (A-l's) personal custody, that detailed arrangements for the delivery of the material 1would be made by A-1 \"s personal staff and that the work had. to be done by a responsible officer.\n\nThe witness adds that he conveyed the decision to the Secretary and to S. Ghose, PW 39, and then called PW 4, Khandpur, Chief Producer, Films Division, Bombay who happened to be in Delhi and asked him that all the material pertaining to the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' lying at Bombay had to be carefully and confidentially collected and sent to Delhi.\n\nAt the time when this talk took place Ghose and Tripathi were present, according to PW 2, who then rang up Vya~ (Chairman of the Board) and gave him similar instructions in the presence of Ghose and. Tripathi.\n\nHowever, neither Tripathi nor Ghose supports PW 2 on the point that he had asked Khandpur to collect the material of the film 'carefully and confidentally' which particular words were attributed to A-1 to show his crimiual intent.\n\nIn this connection, Ghose, PW 39, wbo was declared hostile to the prosecution, stated:\n\n\"As I was coming out of the room of Shri Burney, I dropped in Shri Dayal's room which was in the same corridor with a view to inform him that I had gone to the Auditorium and checked the film and had found the film intact.\n\nI also told him that I had informed Shri Burney accordingly.\n\nI found Shri K. L. Khandpur also sitting in the room of Shri Dayal.\n\nShri Dayal asked me to take my seat.\n\nAfter _a few moments I found Shri V. S. Tripathi walking into the room of Shri Dayal.\n\nHe also took his scat.\n\nWhen I entered the room Shri Dayal was already conversing with Shri Khandpur. Looking at us, namely, myself and V. S. Tripathi and Shri Khandpur. Shri Dayal generally enquired where filmic material was lying at Bombay.\n\nShri Dayal also gave direction to Shri Khandpur for collecting the filmic material at Bombay with a view to transporting it from Bombay to Delhi.\n\nI do not recall Shri Dayal taking the name of the Minister or the Secretary at the time of the discussion.\n\nI also do not recall whether he mentioned word secretly during this discussion.\n\nMy feeling was that the entire\n\n. 574\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.It.\n\nresponsibility for the collection and transportation of the filmic material from Bombay to Delhi was left with Shri . K. L. Khandpur.\"\n\nThe stand of Tripathi, PW 57, who was also allowed to be crossexamined by the prosecution was as follows:-\n\n\"Shri Dayal gave instructions to Shri K. L. Khandpur in my presence and that of Shri S. Ghose to shift the nega.- tive material of\" film Kissa Kursi Kaa from Bombay to Delhi.\n\nAt the request of Shri Khandpur, Shri Dayal also spoke to late Shri V. D. Vyas. about this matter and told him on telephone that the negative material was to be shifted from Bombay to Delhi and that the transportation arrangement would be explained by Shri Khandpur to him on hls return to Bombay.\n\nRoughly this is all that I remember and in addition that if was early in the afternoon.\"\n\nThe witness was specifically asked whether in his presence A-1 gave instructions to L. Dayal, PW 2, that he ( A-1) wanted the positives and negatives of the film in his own custody immediately and confidentially.\n\nHe denied the correctness of the assertion and was confronted with the following portion ('E' to 'E') of his statement made on the 25th April 1977, to K. N. Gupta, Deputy Superintendent of Police, CJ.A., New Delhi :\n\n\"Later, some time in the afternoon, the Minister called me inside his room.\n\nShri Dayal was also inside and I noted that discussion was going on about the film 'Kissa Kurs\\ Kaa'.\n\nThe then Minister of I & B, gave instructions to Shri L.\n\nDayal, Jt. Secy. (Information) in my presence that hf( wanted the positives & negatives etc. of the film, \"Kissa Kursi Kaa\" to be handed over to him, in hls custody immediately & confidentially.\n\nThe Minister also said that the arrangements for trnnsportation will be made by him and Shri Dayal should get in touch with the personal staff for this.\"\n\nThe witness also de!lied the cOJ[rectness of the assertion that in bis presence later on Shri Dayal, PW 2,1 had told Shri Kbandpur, PW 4 that the film should be brought from Bombay to Delhi \"very carefully without telling anybody about it\".\n\nHe was confronted with portion 'F to F' of hls said statement to the police where the assertion appears.\n\nEven Khandpur, PW 4, who has fully supported the prosecution; has not said anything in his evidence to indicate that PW2 had said that\n\nthe materials should be 'carefully and confidentially\" collectf'<l and sent to Delhi. On the other hand, PW 4 says thus :-\n\n\"I was called by L. Dayal, the Joint Secretary (ill his office.\n\nI was asked to make arrangements for collecting all material pertaining to film Kissa Kursi Kaa available. af Bombay and to send the same to Delhi.\n\nI have seen file CFD/51 shown to me, Ex. PW 4/E. It is named \"Confidential Material Received from\n\nC.B.F.C. and sent to Mi11istry of I & B' in November 1975\".\n\nThis file pertains to Films Division Bombay.\n\nThis Jile pertains1 to the film materials of Kissa Kursi Kaa.\n\nAnother file pertaining to this film is the one: which contains Exts. PW 4/ A to PW\n\n4/C.\" The file Ext. PW 4 /E was labelled as 'Confidential' and showiO that the film material was sent to the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting in November 1975.\n\nBut there1 was nothing to indicate in the file! or in the evidence al' PW 4 that the materials and negatives, etc., were to be sent to the pers011al custody of the Minister.\n\nAs the film was banned and forfeited, there was nothing incongruous about the transfer of the materials to Delhi being treated as an official and confidential matter and even if PW2 had told PW 4 that the film material shonld be dis.- patched \"carefully and confidentially'\" that would not show any criminal intent on the part of A-1.\n\nIn order to show that A-1 took a somewhat unusual interes~ in the dispatch of the negatives. and other material of t11e film from Bombay to Delhi,. it is further the easel of the prorecutiolli that Tripathi who was Special Assistant to A-1 was sent expressly to receive the materials at New Delhi Railway Station and make arrangements for their transpcit.\n\nBut Tripathi categorically stated that he never went ta the Railway: Station for the purpose of receiving the film material, etc.\n\nOn the other hand, PW 2 states that on 9-11-1975 PW4, Khandpur informed him on telephone from Bombay that the film material was being sent from Bombay to Delhi by Western Express and would be reaching\n\nDelhi on the next day and that two officers, one of them being Kane, PW 5, were accompanying the material.\n\nPW 2 adds that he then{ rang up Ghose and asked him to get in touch with Tripathi for making the necessary arrangements for transport and delivery of the material. The witness goes on to state that on the 10th November 1975, PW 39, Ghose, came to him and reported that the film material had arrived and had been brought in tempos arranged by A-1.\n\nGhose, however, hii.% not supported this witness on this aspect of the matter, Reliance was,\n\ntherefore, placed on the evidence of PW 5, Kane, to show that when he reached Delhi along with the film material, Tripathi was there to receive the same.\n\nIt is not disputed that Tripathi was not known lo PW 5, Kane, before the 10th and that by the time the witness '\"W' him at the New Delhi Railway Station he had see11 him only once i11 Bombay.\n\nThe witness does state that his• pointed attention was drawn to Tripathi because he had asked him to settlo the payment of charges to the coolies and that but for this his attention would not h\" v~ been drawn to Tripathi.\n\nHe, however, admits that in his statement before the Central Burean of Investigation, he did not mention the fact that Tripathi had asked him to settle the matter of the payment of charges to the coolies.\n\nThus, the existence of the only circumstance on the basis of which the witness could have identified Tripathi becomes doubtful and in view of the categorical statement of Tripathi that; he never went to New Delhi Railway Station on the 10th of November to receive the film, it is difficult to accept the evidence of , PW 5 that Tripathi was the person present at the station.\n\nThe possibility that the witness committed some mistake in identifying cannoli be ruled out.\n\nMoreover, the identification of Tripathi by the witness for !he first time in the court withont being tested by a prior test identification parade was valueless.\n\nBesides, the witness, admits that in the note Ext. PW 4/E-2 he did not mention Tripathi or ny other person along with Ghose to have been present at the New Delhi Railway Station.\n\nThus, even on the question of the arrival of the material of the film at New Delhi no direct coll1leclion with A-1 has been established by the prosecution.\n\nIn fine, it is' not prayed by the prosecution that Tripathi wa> present at the Railway Station to receive the film and hence it cannot be said that A-1 took an unusua~ interest in seeing that the film is properly brought from Bombay to Delhi and placed in his custody.\n\nComing back to the evidence of PW2, there is yet another circumstance which he proves and which merits some consideration., According to the witness, in t11e special leave petition filed by PW 1, 12th March 1976 was fixed for screening the film.\n\nThe witness adds that he tock instructiqn, from A-1 as to what should be done when A-1 asked him to inform the Supreme Court through an affidavit that efforts had been made to trace the prints of the film at Bombay as also at Delhi but that there were no chances of their becoming available. The witness says that he was also directed to mention in the affidavit that such misplacements had. often occurred in the past, and that he passed on this information to the Secretary, Mr. Burney who suggested that the orders of the Minister should be carri5'd out.\n\nIn consonance with the instruction, Ghose filed an affidavit before the Supreme Court on the 22nd March 1976 but the Hon'ble Chief Justice emphasised the\n\nimportance of making the, film available for viewing by the Judges. The\n\nwitness recorded a note Ext. PW 2/A-17 to bring the matter to the notice of the Minister.\n\nUltimately, however, as PW 1, Amrit Nahafa, withdrew the petition nothing further happened.\n\nIt appears that while the petition was pending in the Supreme Court, contempt proceedings were taken aginst some, of the oJlicers including PW 2 who also filed four affidavits, one of them on the 28th November 1977 and the other three on the 28th February 1978.\n\nThese a!lidavits are ; Ext.\n\nPW 2/B-1 to B-4. In these affidavits he wanted to prove that as the film had been mixed up with lot other films received in connection with Fifth International Film Festival, the material of the film Kissa Kursi Kaa was misplaced, and that is a stand which comes into direct conflict with the testimony of the witness in court in which the entire blame is shifted to A-1 but which again runs counter to a11 assertion made earlier by the witness in his own hand.\n\nThat assertion appears in the form of an amendment to a draft of a letter (Ext. PW 2/DE) to be sent to Mr. V. P. Raman, Additional Solicitor General and reads : 'In spite of efforts the film has not been found'.\n\nTh<i witness admits clearly that this statement was false to his knowledge.\n\nA witness who could go to the extent of making intentionally false statement cannotl be relied upon for the purpose of convicting the appellant. On his own showing, he was fully collaborating with A-1 in a criminal design and was therefore, no better than an accomplice whose testimony cannot be accepted, in any material particular in the absence of corroboration from rdiuble sources.\n\nEven Mr. Jethma\"lani, the erstwhile senior counsel for the pm; ecution conceded the correctness of this proposition.\n\nOn n appreciation of the evidence of PW 2 and other factors discussed above, his evidence has not only not been corroborated but definite! y contradicted by other witnesses, circumstances and documents.\n\nPW 63, K. N. Prasad was the Additional Secretary in the Ministry\n\nof Information & Broadcasting.\n\nHe stated that in ~.1arch 1977, A. K.\n\nVerma, the then Joint Secretary wanted to know whether the Government had any inherent power to destroy property which had beeri seized or forfeited, and also disclosed that the enquiry was made in G connection with the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa'.\n\nThe witness further stated that after two or three days Verma and PW 39, Ghosc came to his room and asked the same question.\n\nThe witness further goes on to state that he was infonned by his P.A. that he was required to attend a meeting at the residence of the Minister (A-1), that when he entered the office at the residence of A-1, he found PW 62, Mr. Burney, R Secretary to the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, sitting there .and that Mr. Burney (PW 62) asked the witness what the legal\n\nposition was about the right of the Government to destroy forfeited property. At that time, according to the witness, Tripathi, Mr. Burney and A-1 were present.\n\nHe, however, admits that A-1 did not ask any particular question.\n\nFrom the testimony of PW 63 the prosecution seeks to draw an inference that it Was A-1 at whose instance Verma,.Ghose and Burney had asked for the advice1 of the former (PW 63). Now, A. K. Verma has not been examined as a witness and his statement ( seekingi the advice of PW ( 63) is not, therefore, admissible in' evidence, while both Gl10se and Burney have denied that any such conversation as has been deposed to by PW 63 took place between the: latter and the witnesses in the presence Oil' A-1 . In fact, a' specific suggestion was put to Burney (PW 62) in: the following terms :\n\n\"Q. :When Shri Nahata asked for the return of the film material, did it happen that you discussed the matter regarding availability and return of the film material with Shri B Shukla at his official residence and during that discussion\n\nShri K. N. Prasad and Shri A. K. Verma had also come there and Shri V. S. Tripathi, Special Asstt. to thel Minister was also present ?\"\n\nHis answer was an emphatic no.\n\nI: Besides, the story given out by the witness does not appear to be very plausible, for it does nou stand to reason that A-1 would depute no less than three officers (Verma, Ghose and Burney), one after the other, to obtain advice of PW 63 when A-l could have had no difficulty in obtaining the advice himself.\n\nAnd then how was PW 63 selected as a Specialist in the concerned branch of law ov, lll\" the' head\n\n F of superior officers, even if it was considered hazardous to enlist the services of a competent lawyer? We are, therefore, unable to place reliance on the evidence of this witness on this point. From a discussion of the circumstances mentioned alxwe', wi:J conclude that the prosecution has failed to prove that the film materials brought frolll Bombay to Delhi were placed in the personal custody of A-1 or that A-1 had G them transferred to No. 1,, Safdarjung Road or to the Maruti Complex.\n\nAnother link in the. chain ofl prosecution evidence (the existence. of which seems to have been accepted by the learned Sess; ons Judge) was that two temp06 belonging to the Maruti Company were sent to the New Delhi Railway Station where the thirteen trunks which arrived by H the Western Express were loaded therein and were taken to 1, Safilarjung Road before being transported to Maruti Complex where tliey were unloaded, kept and later on. destroyed. It was also alleged by\n\n...\n\n'+-- ,_ .,\n\nI 1\n\n.. •\n\n.J \\ I\n\nthe prosecution that a raid oUhe Maruti Complex carried out in 1977 Jed to the recovery of the lid of a trunk, an empty can v&ich earlier\n\ncontained part of the film material and a gunny bag to the inside o~ which were found sticking scraps of paper.\n\nThe investigators also claimed Jhat a few miles away from the Maruti Complex some round cans were recovered from a nal/ah.\n\nThe learned counsel for the defence submitted that the allegations about the trunks being taken to Maruti Complex and the recoveries being made were false and addressed to the court lengthy arguments in this behalf. It is, however, not ne.:essary for us to go into these details at this stage because assuming for the purpose or argument that the trunks were brought to the Maruti Complex, and that the film material was destroyed unless A-r Oil\" A-2 were shown to be connected with the transport or destruction of the material, the char~ against the appellants cannot bd held to be proved.\n\n(3) The burning of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' in, November fCJ15, at Maruti Complex at the orders/instructions. of A-2\n\nIn support of this part of the prosecution story, reliance was placed mainly on the testimony of Khedkar (PW 3) who is thei approver., The effort of the prosecution was to establish that on instruction& given by A-2 the film material was burnt inside the Maruti Complex on two consecutive nights and that the fact was reported to A-2 qn each of the two following mornings.\n\nThe approver was the Security Officer in/ tbe Maruti Limited at the relevanU time and the assertions made by him in this behalf may be. split\\ up as follows :-\n\n(a) In the middle of November 1975, A-2 senv for the approver and told him that some boxes containing films were lying ht the stores, thai the films were to be destroyed when the workers were away and: that the approver would get the keys of the locks on t!ie\n\nboxes on the next day.\n\n(b) On the next day one of the security guards who used to accompany A-2 handed over a sealed packet\n\nof paper wrapped in cloth to the approver.\n\nOn, the same day the appr01Ver directed his assistant named\n\nKnwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 to meet the approver (in the Maruti Complex) at 9.00 p.m. along with watchman Om Prakash,\n\nPW 31.\n\nKanwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 met the approver at 9.30 p.m. They reached the factory gate where watchman: Om PralCash PW 31 was waiting for them.\n\nThe approver signed th.e key register and obtained, the key of the General Store.\n\nThe party of three opened the store and\n\n17-289SC1180\n\nfound lying therein the thirteen boxes containing the film material.\n\nThe boxes were opend with the keys which were taken out of the sealed packet mentioned earlier.\n\nEach box was found to contain l 0 or 12 cans having film spools inside them.\n\nEach can bore 'a\n\nB , label with the legend 'Kissa Kursi Kaa'.\n\nThe, first lot of the films was removed to a nearby pit and was\n\nburnt there, the operation lasting from 10.30 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. watchman Om Parkash PW 31 however left the place at about 11.00 p.m. becausei he felt giddy. c\n\n{c) Next morning the approver reported to A-2 that the\n\nwork had been carried out in part only and that it would be completed on the night foalowing, which wasdone from 10.00 p.m. to 2.00 a.m.\n\n( d) Ne:itt morning the approver again made a report to A-2 telling him that the job had been completed.\n\n-Learned counsel for the defence contended that the stand taken by the approver could not be accepted at its face value and had to be rejected lock stock and barrel.\n\nOn a thorough consideration of the evidence we find that the contention well-based as we shall preser:Hy show.\n\nThe film material, according to the case of the prosecution, is said' to have reached Maruti Complex on the 10th of November 1975. After the 23rd November,. 1975, Khedkar PW 3, on his showing, went away on leave. The period during which the film is said to have been burnt thus lies between the 10th and the 23rd of November 1975. Further- F more Khedkar, PW 3 has firmly asserted that on the first of the two nights on which the burning operations were carried. out, watchman Om Prakash, PW 31 was on duty from 2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. He was e:itamined at length in relation to duty rosters P~22 and PW 32/2 which were admittedly prepared by him. Duty roster exhibit P-22\n\nG covers the entire month of November 1975, and according to the entries appearing therein watchman Om Prakash, PW 31 was to be on duty during the whole of that month in the third shift only, i.e., dally from 10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m.\n\nThe approver however explained that the roster could be changed from time to time according to the exigencies of the situation. He averred that on the 15th of November 1975, which was a Saturday and therefore an off-day for watchman Om B Prakash, PW 31, the latter took over duty from 2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. as a substitute for watchman Tarachand. A similar arrangement was made on the 18th of November 1975, when watchman Om Prakash,\n\n,,____\n\nl I\n\n.~ .\n\nv. c. SHUKLA v. DELH! ADMN. (Faza! Ali, J.) 581\n\nPW 31 changed places with watchman Ramdular and went over from the 3rd to the 2nil shill (2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m.). As it is, tire\n\n15th and the 18th of November 1975, were the only two days in the month on which watchman Om Prakash, PW 31 was on duty during the second shift as a special arrangement. For the rest of the days during the month he was admittedly never on duty in that shift. The period during which the film was destroyed is thus further narrowed down so that the first operation of burning could have taken place on the night of the 15th of November or on that of the 18th of November 1975, and on no other date.\n\nHere we may refer to another aspect of the matter. Evidence has been produced to show that A-2 Mt I?elhi by air at 7.50 a:m. on the 17th of November 1975 for Hyderabad, and arrived back at Delhi at 8.30 p.m. the same day.\n\nHe again took off at 6.40 a.m. on the 19th of November 1975, for Sikkim and returned to Delhi not earlier than\n\n11.10 a.m. on the 23rd of November 1975. On both occasions he travelled as a member of the party of the then Prime Minister, his own mother,, namely, Shrimati Indira Gandhi. The evidence of Dr. K. P.\n\nMathur, DW 3, is categorical in this behalf and is supported by the\n\npassnger manifests (Ext. DW-3/ A and DW-5/ A) prepared in relation to the journeys which contain the name of A-2, and other documents which need not be mentioned here. We regard his testimony as conclusive as was done not only by the learned Sessions Judge but also by the Special Public Prosecutor who made a statement at the trial that that testimony be accepted by the prosecution in toto. In this view of the matter the prosecution has to prove that a period of four days in between the 14th aru! the 18th of November 1975, was such as A-2 was available in Delhi during day time on the first, third and fourth of such days.\n\nNow, as pointed out already, the burning could have taken place oll'!y on the 15th or the 18th of November 1975, if the approver and the duty rosters prepared by him are to be believed. The 18th of November 1975, has to be excluded for the reason that on the two days following A-2 had to be shown to have been in Delhi (for receiving the report about the destruction of the material from the approver) which he definitely was not. The 15th of November 1975, as the first night of the burning operation also does not click with the prosecution case because, although the report about it could have been made to A-2 on the next morning (inspite of the fact that it was a Sunday and therefore a closed day for the factory), A-2 was not in Delhi or anywhere near it throughout the 17th so that the story of the report made to him by the approver about the second part of the burning operations loses\n\nweight. No other dates being in point, the story propounded by the approver is negatived by reference to unimpeachable documentary and circumstantial evidence,. although it may be further noted that neither Kanwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 nor watchman Om Prakash, PW 31 supports the approver's version and each one of . them was declared hostile to the prosecution.\n\nThe recoveries said to have been made during investigation have also not impressed us. As stated earlier the incriminating articles said to have been seized are a lid of a trunk, an empty can, a gunny bagall from inside the Maruti Complex-and a few cans from inside a nala lying a few miles away. These recoveries are sought to be connected with the destruction of the film on the basis of the following averments forming part of the testimony of the approver :\n\n\"It was after the elections held in March 1977, that Sanjay Gandhi who was, then Director met me in the factory hall.\n\nKanwar Singh Y adav was also there.\n\nVijay Sharma,, Bus Body Manager, was called there. Sanjay Gandhi asked us to collect all the damaged trunks with the contractors and to deposit them in Bus Body Store. We cculd collect 12 out of 13 trunks mentioned above along with four or five other big trunks. These were deposited in Bus Body Store. Later on I found them shifted to Press shop store. A couple of days thereafter, Kanwar Singh Yadav, Sanjay Gandhi and I went inside the General Store. We walked down to Bus Body Store.\n\nThere Sanjay Gandhi asked Panna Lal, Bus Body Supervisor and in charge Bus Body Store, to ccllect all the damaged locks available with them. Panna Lal passed on the order to Om Prakash who was Bus Body Clerk Incharge Stores. About 25 damaged locks were collected. These included Harrison, Tiger and Godrej Locks. Godrej locks were 4 or 5 . Sanjay Gandhi asked me to get all those collected locks melted in a foundry and I got them melted . . . . Ram Lakhan was Incharge of the foundry and I handed over the collected locks to him .... Thereafter, scrapping of the trunks and their removal was performed by my Asstt. Kanwar Singh Yadav and he told me about that. Kanwar Singh Yadav told me that Sanjay Gandhi had asked him to scrap the trunks and cans and to dispose them off. He told me that he cut the trunks into pieces. and threw them into the iron scraps which •were sold to different contractors.\n\nAs regards the cans, he told me that he had damaged the cans and thrown them at different places on Rajasthan Highway and Rajasthan Byef\n\npass .... He told me that the trunks had been cut into pieces and cans had been damaged in the Press Shop.\"\n\nThis story is inherently improbable. The thirteen trunks which admittedly had no marks of identification on them and were of the ordinary type available in any market are said to have been shredded and the locks-which again are available in plenty everywhere-are alleged to have been melted in the foundry but, strangely enough, the cans which had on them labels carrying the legend 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' were subjected to a much milder treatment and were merely pressed and then thrown away at various places on the Rajasthan Highway and Rajasthan Byepass to which Kanwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 had to make journeys off and on. It is not disputed that if the cans were to be shredded or melted the operation would not have presented any difficulty whatsoever in view of the facilities available at the Maruti factory.\n\nAnd, if that be so, surely any persou who wanted to obliterate evidence of the commission of a serious offence would see to it that the material of the cans was so transformed as to be impossible of identification.\n\nThere is no reason why all of them should not have been melted into lumps, or in any case shredded beyond recognition. And we also do not see how just one can would be left intact when so much care was bestowed on Operations Oblitration. In fact, it may have been much easier for the cans to be shredded or melted than for them to be first pressed and then transported to far off places and throw'n away there.\n\nIn this view of the matter we need not pursue this part of the case any further.\n\nThus, on a complete and careful examination of the circumstances and the evidence, mentioned above, even taking the sub-stratum of thei prosecution case at its face value, the prosecution has not been abl(1 to prove either that there was any existence of any conspiracy between A-1 and A-2 to destroy the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' by burning it or to commit any other offence in respect of the film. There is no evidence to show that there was any meeting of minds between A-1 and A-2.\n\nWe have also found that1 even on the first two parts of the prosecution case, the allegation of the prosecution that the positive prints were removed at the instance or to the knowledge of A-1 or that the negatives and other materials of the film were sent for by A-1 and kept in his personal c; ustody has not been proved. The mere fact that A-1 decided to ban the film and refused certification for public exhibition and passed orders for seizure of the film and its transfer to the custody of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting does not disclose any offence. We have already shown that the decision to ban the film was not taken by A-1 secretely or clandestinely but after a full-fledged\n\ntJj\n\ndiscussion in the Coordination Committee meeting and it is proved that such meetings are usually attended by senior officers of various Ministries, as deposed to by K. N. Prasad, PW 63. Fmther, that part of the case which relates to the burning of film material rests solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the approver and is negatived in so far as the role therein of A-1 is .concerned.\n\n' We may mention here that a lot of evidence has been produced by the prosecution to show :-\n\n(a) that the positive print of the film found its way into\n\nthe luggage compartment of the car in which A-1 then travelled to the Prime Minister's house where the print was unloaded by someone in the absence of A-1; a'nd\n\n(b) thatthe negatives and other material relating to the film were taken in a tempo or two to the Prime Minister's residence and from there to the Maruti Complex where they were stored beforii their destruction.\n\nWe have considered it purposeless to go into these factors for the reasons that the connection of A-1 or A-2 therewith remains unproved as discussed above. Had these factors provided circumstantial evidence o'n the basis of which alone the charge against either A-1 or A-2 could be held established it would have been necessary for the court to sift the evidence produced in support thereof. But that' is definitely not the case, for, if either or both of the factors are proved, the inference of guilt of either A-1 or A-2 does not necessarily follow.\n\nFor circwustantial evidence to furnish evidence of guilt it has to be such as it cannot be explained on a'ny other reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the accused whlch is not the case here because appellants A-1 and A-2 coulq not be said to be the only persons interested in the destruction of the film if it was as abnoxious kl the then Prime Minister or as critical of the: functioning of the then Union Government as the prosecution would have us believe.\n\nThe film and all the material relating to it no doubt appear to have vanished into thln air but then neither A-1 nor A-2 can be held responsible therefor, in the absence of proof in that behalf-proof which would exclude all reasonable doubt.\n\nThe prosecution having thus failed to prove the case against the a appellants, their appeals are allowed, the convictions recorded against and the se:ntences imposed on the appellants are set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges framed against them. Both the appelf\n\n!ants who are on bail shall now be discharged from their bail-bonds.\n\nIn view of the acquittal of appellant No. 1, Shukla in Criminal appeal No. 494 of 1979 and appellant No. 2, Sanjay Gandhi in Criminal appeal No. 493 of 1979, Criminal appeal No. 492 of 1979, filed by the Slate is dismissed. In view of the fact that we have made no com• ments on the conduct of the investigation or on Mr. N. K. Singh, no order need be passed on the application filed by him.\n\nS.R.\n\nCvl. App. 493 & 494/79 allowed.\n\nCvl. App. 492/79 dismissed.\n\n' .", "total_entities": 710, "entities": [{"text": "SHUKLA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B Shukla", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. C. SHUKLA\n\nSTATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\nB [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. s. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 1201J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 5, 7, 9 & 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 386, "end_char": 402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amrit Nahata", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 436, "end_char": 448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Amrit Nahata PW 1 was a member of Parliament and had produced & film titled \"Kissa Kursi Ka\" ur..der the banner of Dhwani Prakash."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The, film ' according to the prosecution was a grotesque satire containing a scathing criticism of the functioning of the Central Government and was open to serious objections which were taken even by the Ceia.tral Board of Film Censors."}}, {"text": "Ceia.tral Board of Film Censors", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 773, "end_char": 804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The, film ' according to the prosecution was a grotesque satire containing a scathing criticism of the functioning of the Central Government and was open to serious objections which were taken even by the Ceia.tral Board of Film Censors."}}, {"text": "19th of April 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 909, "end_char": 927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the film was ready for release, PW 1, Amrit Nahata, applied for certification of the film on the 19th of April 1975 before the Boord."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 971, "end_char": 985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The film, was viewed on April 24, 1975 by an Examining Committee of the Board and whil.::·"}}, {"text": "N. S. Thapa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1164, "end_char": 1175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "should b~ given, another member and Mr. N. S. Thapa, Chairman, disngreed with the opinion of their colleagues a-nd accordingly referred the matter to the Revising Committee."}}, {"text": "Thapa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1442, "end_char": 1447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revising Committee after viewing the film agreed by a majority of 6 :1 for certification of the film, the dissent having been voiced by Mr. Thapa, the Chairman and accordingly under Rule 25 (ii) of the Cinematograph (Censorship) Rules, 1958, a reference waB made to the Centrit.l Government on 8-5~1975."}}, {"text": "Centrit.l Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1572, "end_char": 1592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revising Committee after viewing the film agreed by a majority of 6 :1 for certification of the film, the dissent having been voiced by Mr. Thapa, the Chairman and accordingly under Rule 25 (ii) of the Cinematograph (Censorship) Rules, 1958, a reference waB made to the Centrit.l Government on 8-5~1975."}}, {"text": "8-5~1975.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1596, "end_char": 1605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revising Committee after viewing the film agreed by a majority of 6 :1 for certification of the film, the dissent having been voiced by Mr. Thapa, the Chairman and accordingly under Rule 25 (ii) of the Cinematograph (Censorship) Rules, 1958, a reference waB made to the Centrit.l Government on 8-5~1975."}}, {"text": "S. M. Murshed", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1662, "end_char": 1675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, a letter was addressed to PW 6, Mr. S. M. Murshed, who, was at the relevant reriod Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In charge of film and- T. V. Projects and was appointed, Joint Secretary on 1st of May 1975."}}, {"text": "1st of May 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1841, "end_char": 1856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, a letter was addressed to PW 6, Mr. S. M. Murshed, who, was at the relevant reriod Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In charge of film and- T. V. Projects and was appointed, Joint Secretary on 1st of May 1975."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2120, "end_char": 2129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Mahadev Road, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "K. P. Sreedharan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2300, "end_char": 2316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 17, K. P. Sreedharan, who \\Vas a Technical Officer incharge also inspected the reels and found them iit order."}}, {"text": "A. J. Kidwai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 6 accordingly recorded a note and submitted it to Mr. A. J. Kidwai, the then Secretary, !", "canonical_name": "A. J.\n\nKidwai"}}, {"text": "I. K. GujraJ", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2941, "end_char": 2953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter \\Vas then examined by Mr. I. K. GujraJ, the then Minister of Information and Broadcasting but\n\n''\nA\"\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN.", "canonical_name": "I. K. Gujarat"}}, {"text": "V. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3019, "end_char": 3040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter \\Vas then examined by Mr. I. K. GujraJ, the then Minister of Information and Broadcasting but\n\n''\nA\"\n\nV. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN.", "canonical_name": "V. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI"}}, {"text": "Amrit Nahat", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3097, "end_char": 3108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile PW J, Amrit Nahat,.,"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3155, "end_char": 3168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW I /D) in the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "9-7-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1he notice was made returnable by 9-7-75."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Information and Broadcasting", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3405, "end_char": 3445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting had taken a tentative decision to refusecertification to the film because of its objectionable and offensive."}}, {"text": "25th and 26th of June, 19i", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emergency was proclaimed on the night of between 25th and 26th of June, 19i 5 and soon thereafter A 1 took charge as the Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting and he was of thei opinion that the film should be banned."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 5, 1975, in pursuance of the decision taken by the Central Government, the Coordination Committee directed seizure of the film and that its negatives, positives and all other materi<l!ls relating to it be takeru in the custody of the Central Government vide Ex."}}, {"text": "July 10, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4074, "end_char": 4087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 10, 1975 A 1 directed that the film be banned for screening under the Defence of India Rules, vide Ext."}}, {"text": "11th of July 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4209, "end_char": 4226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, on the 11th of July 1975 PW 6 ?"}}, {"text": "vlurshed", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vlurshed, passed an order that no certificatiOOI was to be given to the film for public exhibition which was followed by a letter dated July 14, 1975, forfeiting the fi]m, to the Government."}}, {"text": "July 14, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vlurshed, passed an order that no certificatiOOI was to be given to the film for public exhibition which was followed by a letter dated July 14, 1975, forfeiting the fi]m, to the Government."}}, {"text": "S. Ghosh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4493, "end_char": 4501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance' of the decision taken hy the Central Government PW 39, S. Ghosh Deputy Secretary, incharge of the films\n\nand T. V. Division wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary Goveir:ninent of Maharashtra for seizure of all the positives and negatives of the film as also other related materials."}}, {"text": "l-8-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4794, "end_char": 4802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this order, the Bombay police seized the entire film on l-8-1975 and depooited in the godown of the Board."}}, {"text": "it Nahata", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4937, "end_char": 4946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW, 1, Arnr:it Nahata filed a petition for special leave in the Supreme Couert OOI 6-9-1975."}}, {"text": "Supreme Couert", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4989, "end_char": 5003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW, 1, Arnr:it Nahata filed a petition for special leave in the Supreme Couert OOI 6-9-1975."}}, {"text": "6-9-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5008, "end_char": 5016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW, 1, Arnr:it Nahata filed a petition for special leave in the Supreme Couert OOI 6-9-1975."}}, {"text": "29-10-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was heard on 29-10-75 and the Court directed the Government to screen the film on 17-11-75 in the Auditorium for being shown to the Judges constituting the Bench."}}, {"text": "17-11-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5114, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition was heard on 29-10-75 and the Court directed the Government to screen the film on 17-11-75 in the Auditorium for being shown to the Judges constituting the Bench."}}, {"text": "Burney", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5298, "end_char": 5304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn pursuance of the order of the Court, intimation was sent to the Ministry concerned and PW 62, Mr.\n\nBurney who was then Secretary l\\finistry of Information and Broadcasting directed that immediate action be taken to implement the orders of the Supreme Court and that arrangements should be made to book the Auditorium for 17-11-75."}}, {"text": "5-11-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a letter dated 5-11-75 (Ext."}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5664, "end_char": 5669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime thereafter PW 2, L.\n\nDayal took over as Joint Sd:retary (Films Division) in place of Mr. f\\.furshed."}}, {"text": "Central Bureau of Investigation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the general elections of March 1977, the new Government directed the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate into the matter of disappearance of the films."}}, {"text": "C.B.I.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6040, "end_char": 6046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C.B.I. accordingly investigated the matter and found that A l, V. C. Shukla and A 2 Sanj&y Gandhi conspired together and ultimately burnt them in Man1ti Complex."}}, {"text": "V. C. Shukla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6103, "end_char": 6115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The C.B.I. accordingly investigated the matter and found that A l, V. C. Shukla and A 2 Sanj&y Gandhi conspired together and ultimately burnt them in Man1ti Complex.", "canonical_name": "V. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI"}}, {"text": "C.B.I~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore C.B.I~ filed charge sheets against V. C. Shukla A 1 and Sanjay Gandhi A 2 under several provisions of Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Sanjay Gandhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6268, "end_char": 6281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore C.B.I~ filed charge sheets against V. C. Shukla A 1 and Sanjay Gandhi A 2 under several provisions of Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Sanjay Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6314, "end_char": 6324, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "New. Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution examined several ~.vitnesses to prove criminal conspirocy of A 1 and A 2 more paricularly under three stages, namely, (i) the deposit of the ix>sitive print in the Auditorium and its alleged transfer to the personal custody of A 1; (ii) the arrival of thirteen trunks containing negatives and other material related to the film at New."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6689, "end_char": 6695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi from Bombay in pursuance of the orders of A 1 and thelir transfer to I, Safdarjung Road, then to the Maruti Comp1ex: and (iii) the actual orders alleged to have been given\n\n.l by A 2 for burning the film in the premises of Maruti Complex which operation according to thei prosecution V.'as carried out by the approver PW 3, Khedkar and other witnesses between the 10th and 24th of November 1975."}}, {"text": "Khedkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi from Bombay in pursuance of the orders of A 1 and thelir transfer to I, Safdarjung Road, then to the Maruti Comp1ex: and (iii) the actual orders alleged to have been given\n\n.l by A 2 for burning the film in the premises of Maruti Complex which operation according to thei prosecution V.'as carried out by the approver PW 3, Khedkar and other witnesses between the 10th and 24th of November 1975."}}, {"text": "10th and 24th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi from Bombay in pursuance of the orders of A 1 and thelir transfer to I, Safdarjung Road, then to the Maruti Comp1ex: and (iii) the actual orders alleged to have been given\n\n.l by A 2 for burning the film in the premises of Maruti Complex which operation according to thei prosecution V.'as carried out by the approver PW 3, Khedkar and other witnesses between the 10th and 24th of November 1975."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7085, "end_char": 7106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge, Delhi convicted V. C. Shukla\n\n(A-1) appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "V. C. Shukla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7117, "end_char": 7129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sessions Judge, Delhi convicted V. C. Shukla\n\n(A-1) appellant in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "V. C. SHUKLA V. 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"regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37871, "end_char": 37880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37962, "end_char": 37971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38075, "end_char": 38084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38367, "end_char": 38376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38700, "end_char": 38709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39145, "end_char": 39154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39226, "end_char": 39235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39809, "end_char": 39819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40609, "end_char": 40620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40628, "end_char": 40654, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "While an appeal to the High Court under the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40790, "end_char": 40838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40924, "end_char": 40935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While an appeal to the High Court under the Code", "statute": "While an appeal to the High Court under the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 11( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41242, "end_char": 41251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While an appeal to the High Court under the Code", "statute": "While an appeal to the High Court under the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41342, "end_char": 41347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "While an appeal to the High Court under the Code", "statute": "While an appeal to the High Court under the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41420, "end_char": 41446, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41948, "end_char": 41974, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42097, "end_char": 42123, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 397(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42190, "end_char": 42204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42349, "end_char": 42375, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42417, "end_char": 42430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43207, "end_char": 43220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43424, "end_char": 43434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43438, "end_char": 43448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44060, "end_char": 44069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44317, "end_char": 44329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44337, "end_char": 44354, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ministry of Information", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46160, "end_char": 46183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mere fact that A I decided to show the film and refused certification for public exhibition and passed orders for seizure of the film and its tranfer to the custody of the Ministry of Information does not disclose any offence."}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46433, "end_char": 46439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision to ban the .film was not taken by A I secretly or clandestinely but after a full F fledged discussion in the coordination Committee meeting attended by senior officers of various ministries as deposed by Prasad PW 63."}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47068, "end_char": 47074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts disclosed by the prosecu tion ex facie show that objection to certification of the film had been taken at the very initial stage and the ultimate order was passed during the time when A I, Mr. Shukla had taken over as Minister, which was merely the final scene of a drama long in process; [564 C-EJ\n\n(ii) Even at the stage of proposed exhibition of the film to the Judges of the Supreme Court who constituted the Bench and heard the Special Leave Petition i.e. 17-11-75 there was absolutely no evidence to show that there\n\nA was any meeting of minds of A 1 and A 2 nor is there any material to indicate that A 2 played any; role in the burning of the film.", "canonical_name": "B Shukla"}}, {"text": "Thapa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 47726, "end_char": 47731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No motive is attributable to A 1 at this stage because even the Chairman of the Board, PW 8 Mr. Thapa who was an independent witness wa9 of the view that the film should not be certificated rfor public exhibition ..\n\nSimilarly, the steps taken by the."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47966, "end_char": 47971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "officers of the Ministry in persuance of the B filn1 at Bombay a11d its transfer to Delhi ¥/as in the nature of routine to see\n\nthat the decision taken by the Government was implemented."}}, {"text": "17-11-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48161, "end_char": 48171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As soon as the Ministry received the orders of the Supreme Court for screening the film on 17-11-1975, immediate steps were taken to comply with the orders of the Court."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48328, "end_char": 48337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly behveen 17, th November 1975 to 23rd November 1975, .1\\ 2 was either away to Hyderabad or Sikkim as proved by DW 3."}}, {"text": "Sikkim", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48341, "end_char": 48347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly behveen 17, th November 1975 to 23rd November 1975, .1\\ 2 was either away to Hyderabad or Sikkim as proved by DW 3."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50655, "end_char": 50664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Special Courts Act, 1979", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50672, "end_char": 50696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. L. Nanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50929, "end_char": 50940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Wasu, M. L. Nanda and M. N. Shroff for the Appellnt in Crl."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50945, "end_char": 50957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Wasu, M. L. Nanda and M. N. Shroff for the Appellnt in Crl."}}, {"text": "K. L. Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50995, "end_char": 51006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Arora, K. G. Bhagat, Harish Gulati, Madan Bhatia and ..\n\nD. Goburdhan for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "K. G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51008, "end_char": 51020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Arora, K. G. Bhagat, Harish Gulati, Madan Bhatia and ..\n\nD. Goburdhan for the Appellant in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "K. G. Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Harish Gulati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51022, "end_char": 51035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Arora, K. G. Bhagat, Harish Gulati, Madan Bhatia and ..\n\nD. Goburdhan for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Madan Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51037, "end_char": 51049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Arora, K. G. Bhagat, Harish Gulati, Madan Bhatia and ..\n\nD. Goburdhan for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51058, "end_char": 51070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Arora, K. G. Bhagat, Harish Gulati, Madan Bhatia and ..\n\nD. Goburdhan for the Appellant in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "D. Gobur(!han"}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51111, "end_char": 51123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a\n\nP. R. Mridul, Rajinder Singh, 0."}}, {"text": "Rajinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51125, "end_char": 51139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a\n\nP. R. Mridul, Rajinder Singh, 0.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder Singh B. R. Handa"}}, {"text": "0. P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51141, "end_char": 51153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a\n\nP. R. Mridul, Rajinder Singh, 0."}}, {"text": "R. C.\n\nBhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51155, "end_char": 51168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma, R. C.\n\nBhatia: and Vivek Tankha for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Vivek Tankha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51174, "end_char": 51186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Sharma, R. C.\n\nBhatia: and Vivek Tankha for the Appellant in Cr!."}}, {"text": "K. G. Bhatat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51238, "end_char": 51250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Arora, K. G. Bhatat, Harish Gulati and D. Gobur(!han; for the Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "K. G. Bhagat"}}, {"text": "D. Gobur(!han", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51270, "end_char": 51283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Arora, K. G. Bhatat, Harish Gulati and D. Gobur(!han; for the Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "D. Gobur(!han"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Singh B. R. Handa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51330, "end_char": 51356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajinder Singh B. R. Handa and 0.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder Singh B. R. Handa"}}, {"text": "Soli !. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51421, "end_char": 51437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli !.", "canonical_name": "Soli !. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51450, "end_char": 51464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Grish Chandra, s.\n\nMarkandeya and S. B. Jaisinghani for the Respondent in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Grish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51466, "end_char": 51479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Grish Chandra, s.\n\nMarkandeya and S. B. Jaisinghani for the Respondent in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51485, "end_char": 51495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Grish Chandra, s.\n\nMarkandeya and S. B. Jaisinghani for the Respondent in Cr!."}}, {"text": "S. B. Jaisinghani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51500, "end_char": 51517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethmalani, Grish Chandra, s.\n\nMarkandeya and S. B. Jaisinghani for the Respondent in Cr!."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51602, "end_char": 51610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delivered\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThese two criminal appeals are directed against a judgment dated 27th February 1979 of the Sessions Judge, Delhi by which the accused (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) have been convicted under various sections of the Penal Code and awarded sentenC'os of various terms of imprisonment not e11; ceeding two years (which have been ordered to run concurrently) in addition to fines.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51844, "end_char": 51854, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "17th May. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52214, "end_char": 52228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 17th May. 1979, the State also filed an appeal to Jhe Delhi High Court for enhancement of the sentences."}}, {"text": "27th June 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52498, "end_char": 52512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 27th June 1979, the Central Government made a declaration under s.5 (1) of the Act as a consequence of which the appeals stood transferred to this Court."}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52562, "end_char": 52565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52847, "end_char": 52865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52873, "end_char": 52894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 53136, "end_char": 53152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State has appeared through Shri Soli J. Sorabjee who )las countered all the objections raised by the appellants and has submitted that the Act is a valid piece of legislation ahd that there is no illegality in the transfer of the appeals from the High Court to this Court.", "canonical_name": "Soli !. Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "December 5, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53594, "end_char": 53610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After bearing the parties at great length, by an order dated December 5, 1979 we overruled all the said objections and proceeded to hear the appeals on merits."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54269, "end_char": 54285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was \"\"ard by a Bench of seven Judges and i11 its report dated December 1, 1978, this Court upheld the validity of the Bill generally by a majority of six to one."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54437, "end_char": 54444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54709, "end_char": 54720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54989, "end_char": 54994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court also upheld the classification provided in clause 4(1) of the Bill which conferred power on the Central Government to make a declaration in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed during the operation of the Proclamation of Emergency dated 25th June 1975 by a person who bdd high public or political office in India."}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55212, "end_char": 55220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55681, "end_char": 55688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "25th June 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56266, "end_char": 56280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Bill incorporated the suggestions of this Court, deleted reference to the period prior to the 25th June 1975 in the preamble, made a provision for transfer of a cas~\n\nfrom one Special Judge to another by the Supreme Court and provided that a Special Court would consist of a sitting Judge of a High Court nominated by the Central Government with the concurrence of ."}}, {"text": "9th March 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56630, "end_char": 56644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some debate the Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha dn the 9th March 1979."}}, {"text": "21st March 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56898, "end_char": 56913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then sent to the Rajya Sabha where its various provisions were fully debated and certain important suggestions were made by the Members of the Rajya Sabha as a result of which the Bill w<is returned by the Rajya Sabha with certain amendments on 21st March 1979."}}, {"text": "16th May, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57109, "end_char": 57123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Government accepted the amendments suwsted by the Rajya Sabha and incorporated the same in the Bill which was then passed a'nd ultimately received the assent of the President on 16th May, 1979."}}, {"text": "Tndia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57704, "end_char": 57709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thirdly, it has been provided that a Special Court would consist of a sitting Judge of a High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned with the concurrence of\n\nthe Chief Justice of Tndia."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58281, "end_char": 58285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "WHEREAS Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58825, "end_char": 58908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "25th June, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59193, "end_char": 59208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 1) WHEREAS Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 have rendered reports disclosing the existence of prima facie evidence of olfunces committed by persons who held high public or political offices in the country and others connected with the commission of such offences1 during the operation of the proclamation of Emergency dated the 25th June, 1975, issued under clause (I) of article 352 of the Constitution;\n\n(2) AND WHEREAS inve& 'igations conducted by the Goverqplent through it~ agencies have also disclosed similar offences committed during the period aforesaid;\n\n(3) AND WHEREAS the offences referred to in the recitals aforesaid were committed during the operation of the said Proclamation of Emergency, during which a grave emergency_ was clamped on the whole country, civil liberties were curtailed to a great extent, important fundamental rights of the people were suspended, strict censorship was imposed on the press, judicial powers were severely crippled and the parliamentary democratic system was emasculated;\n\n( 4) AND WHEREAS all powers being a trust, and holders of high public or political offices are accountable for the exercise Qlf their powers in all cases where Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 or investigations conducted by Government through its agencies disclose offences committed by such holders; ( 5) AND WHEREAS it is the constitutional, legal and moral obligation of the State to prosecute persons involved in the said offences; ( 6) AND WHEREAS the ordinary criminal courts due to congestion of work and other reasons cannot reasonably be expected to bring those prosecutions to a speedy termination;\n\n)---\n\n(7) AND WHEREAS it is imperative for the efficient functioning of parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by or under the Constitution of India that the commission of offences referred to in the recitals aforesaid should be judicially determined with the utmost dispatch;\n\n( 8) AND WHEREAS it is necessary for the said purpose to establish additional courts presided over b\" sitting Judges of High Courts;\n\n(9) AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make some procedural changes whereby avoidable delay in the final determination of the innocence or guilt of the persons to be tried is eliminated without interfering with' the right to a fnir trial.\""}}, {"text": "article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59237, "end_char": 59248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "WHEREAS Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "statute": "WHEREAS Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60091, "end_char": 60123, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60682, "end_char": 60703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 25, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61621, "end_char": 61634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Numbering of the clauses by us to facilitate discussion)\n\nSo far as clause ( 1 ) is concerned it refers to Commissions of Inquiry and the reports given by them disclosing the existence of prima fade evidence oJl offenceS committed by persons holding high public or political offices in the country and others connected with the commission of such offences during the operation of the Proclamation of Emergency dated June 25, 1975."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62937, "end_char": 62963, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63449, "end_char": 63458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63652, "end_char": 63678, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63681, "end_char": 63690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63828, "end_char": 63840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64012, "end_char": 64021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64188, "end_char": 64197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Governmentj", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 64274, "end_char": 64293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5 (1) is the pivotal provision which lays down the conditions under which 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"start_char": 67752, "end_char": 67762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68010, "end_char": 68015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68210, "end_char": 68220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68284, "end_char": 68288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68340, "end_char": 68344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68618, "end_char": 68621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68657, "end_char": 68660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68703, "end_char": 68706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68748, "end_char": 68757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68800, "end_char": 68803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68816, "end_char": 68824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68844, "end_char": 68847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68890, "end_char": 68896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68942, "end_char": 68950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68971, "end_char": 68974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69017, "end_char": 69023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69112, "end_char": 69116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69887, "end_char": 69905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70434, "end_char": 70440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70635, "end_char": 70642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70707, "end_char": 70713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71118, "end_char": 71125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72048, "end_char": 72057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, any person invoking ;\\rt.14 A of the Constitution must show that there has been discrimination against a person who is similarly situate or equally circumstanced, In the case of State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya,(') Subba Rao, J., observed as follows :-\n\n\"No discriminatian can be made either in the privileges conferred or in the liabilities imposed."}}, {"text": "Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 72700, "end_char": 72706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, Mr. Bhatia, appearing for appellant Sanjay Gandhi ubmitted that even having regard to the principles laid down by this Court in the Reference case, the Act fails to pass the test laid down for a valid classification under Art.", "canonical_name": "Bhatia"}}, {"text": "Sanjay Gandhi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 72732, "end_char": 72745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, Mr. Bhatia, appearing for appellant Sanjay Gandhi ubmitted that even having regard to the principles laid down by this Court in the Reference case, the Act fails to pass the test laid down for a valid classification under Art.", "canonical_name": "Sanjay Gandhi"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72918, "end_char": 72925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73020, "end_char": 73027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73616, "end_char": 73623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75023, "end_char": 75030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75304, "end_char": 75313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 27, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75450, "end_char": 75467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support pf his contention Mr. Bhatia relied on the following observations of this Court in the Reference case(') :- -\\\n\n\"The classification which section 4 ( 1) thus makes is both of offences and offenders, the former in relation to the periad mentioned in the preamble, that is to say, from February 27, 1975 until the expiry of the proclamation of emergency dated June 25, 1975 and in elation to the objective mentioned in the sixth paragraph of the preamble that it is imperative for the functioning of parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by or under the Constitution of India that the commission of such offences should be judicially determined with the utmost dispatch, and the latter in relation to their status, that is to say, in relation to the high public or political office held by them in India."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75733, "end_char": 75754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "that by itself does not debar Parliament from passing a permanent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79161, "end_char": 79230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79956, "end_char": 79967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this is so, is clear from the observations made by Chandrachud, C.J., and Krishna Iyer, J. The former observed :-\n\n\"Parliament'ary democracy will see its halycon days in India when law will provide for a speedy trial of all offenders who misuse the public offices held by them."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79979, "end_char": 79991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That this is so, is clear from the observations made by Chandrachud, C.J., and Krishna Iyer, J. The former observed :-\n\n\"Parliament'ary democracy will see its halycon days in India when law will provide for a speedy trial of all offenders who misuse the public offices held by them.", "canonical_name": ".Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": ".Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80874, "end_char": 80887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar observations were made by .Krishna Iyer J. in his concurring Judgment :-\n\nThe pathology of our public law, with its class slant, is that an µnmincing ombudsman or sentinel on the qui vive with power to act against those in power, now or before, and offering legal access to the informed citizen to complain with immunity does not exist. . . . . ...", "canonical_name": ".Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81760, "end_char": 81767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhatia that this Court held that only Emergency offenders could be puished under a special Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84256, "end_char": 84350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84458, "end_char": 84465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bhatia that this Court held that only Emergency offenders could be puished under a special Act", "statute": "Bhatia that this Court held that only Emergency offenders could be puished under a special Act"}}, {"text": "March 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85238, "end_char": 85252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bill was returned to the Lok Sabha .on March 21, 1979 with suggestions for its amendment so as to make it embrace offences without reference to a particular period, namely, the pe.riod of Emergency."}}, {"text": "16th May ,1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85531, "end_char": 85545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Lok Sabha accepted the suggestions and passed the Bill in the form of the Act which received the assent of the President on the 16th May ,1979."}}, {"text": "Krishnal Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85648, "end_char": 85661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, th<> Act incorporates not only the above-extracted observations made by Chandrachud, C.J., and Krishnal Iyer, J. but also the views expressed by the Hon'ble Members of the two Houses of Parliament.", "canonical_name": ".Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87525, "end_char": 87543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87820, "end_char": 87827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88010, "end_char": 88020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88641, "end_char": 88651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "sections 5, 6, 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88854, "end_char": 88877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89374, "end_char": 89381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90222, "end_char": 90229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91111, "end_char": 91118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ferris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94173, "end_char": 94179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various positions, on the other hand, hav& been held not to be public offices, as, for examine, auditor of accounts appointed by railroad Commissioners .... \"\n\nSimilarly, Ferris ill his thesis on 'Extraordinary Legal Remedies defineS B p1!J>lic or political offices thus :\n\n\"A public office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by which an individual is vested with some portion of the overeign functions of the Government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public, for the term and by the tenure prescnbed by law."}}, {"text": "Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95026, "end_char": 95030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(72 Calcutta Weekly Notes, ; p.64, Vol.72)\n\nSimilarly, Wade and Phillips in 'Constitutional Law' defines politlcal offices thus:-\n\n\"The Cabinet is the body of principal Miilisten with whom rests the real direction of policy."}}, {"text": "Phillips", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95035, "end_char": 95043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(72 Calcutta Weekly Notes, ; p.64, Vol.72)\n\nSimilarly, Wade and Phillips in 'Constitutional Law' defines politlcal offices thus:-\n\n\"The Cabinet is the body of principal Miilisten with whom rests the real direction of policy."}}, {"text": "O. Hood Phillips", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95464, "end_char": 95480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O. Hood Phillips in 'Constitutional and Administrative Law' (4th Edition, p. 312 & 314) defines the hierarchy of Govermnent Deportments thus:\n\n\"Ministers-At the head of each Department--except the \"non-political\" Departments, which are not important for present purposes-is the Minister, whether he is called Minister or Secretary of State or President of the Board."}}, {"text": "Ramsay Muir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96901, "end_char": 96912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also, Ramsay Muir in his book 'How Britain is Governed' (3rd Ed."}}, {"text": "Britain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 96930, "end_char": 96937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also, Ramsay Muir in his book 'How Britain is Governed' (3rd Ed."}}, {"text": "Asirvatham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97315, "end_char": 97325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asirvatham in his book 'Political Theory' (9th Ed p. 352) defines Political Executive thus :-\n\n\"Turning from the nominal to the political executive, we find at least four distinct forms, viz.,"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 97565, "end_char": 97572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet constitute the political executive."}}, {"text": "Cabinet", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 97601, "end_char": 97608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet constitute the political executive."}}, {"text": "Bouvier", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98528, "end_char": 98535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The word 'political' is defined by Bouvier to be pertaining to policy or the administration of government."}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101649, "end_char": 101724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102604, "end_char": 102613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952", "statute": "Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "sections 7 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103344, "end_char": 103361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103808, "end_char": 103819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104084, "end_char": 104092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104207, "end_char": 104215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104304, "end_char": 104316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104568, "end_char": 104574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104582, "end_char": 104608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 177 to 189", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104999, "end_char": 105017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106327, "end_char": 106334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1963] 3 S. C. R. 809", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 107771, "end_char": 107792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mridual", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 107829, "end_char": 107836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Mr.· Mridual adopted the above-noted arguments, advanced by\n\nMr. Bhatia, but put forward contentions with respect to other aspocts1 which we shall deal with at a later stage of the jusfgment.", "canonical_name": "Mridual"}}, {"text": "Bhatia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 107889, "end_char": 107895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Mr.· Mridual adopted the above-noted arguments, advanced by\n\nMr. Bhatia, but put forward contentions with respect to other aspocts1 which we shall deal with at a later stage of the jusfgment.", "canonical_name": "Bhatia"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108058, "end_char": 108062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Declaration by Central Government of cases to be dealt with under this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108194, "end_char": 108268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108843, "end_char": 108847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Declaration by Central Government of cases to be dealt with under this Act", "statute": "Declaration by Central Government of cases to be dealt with under this Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108925, "end_char": 108932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Declaration by Central Government of cases to be dealt with under this Act", "statute": "Declaration by Central Government of cases to be dealt with under this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109938, "end_char": 109942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110112, "end_char": 110138, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110565, "end_char": 110570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi('), Kania, C. J .,"}}, {"text": "cl. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112214, "end_char": 112220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112254, "end_char": 112260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112265, "end_char": 112271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112759, "end_char": 112767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, in the case of Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the\n\nUnion Territory of Delhi('), Ayyangar J., speaking for the Court, observed:\n\n\"So long therefore as the Legislature indicates, in the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the policy and purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is left to those."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113456, "end_char": 113460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J., speaking for the Court remarked:-\n\n\"Power to exercise discretion is not necessarily to be assumed to be a power to discriminate unlawfully, and possibility of abuse of power will not invalidate the conferment of power."}}, {"text": "[1964] 5 S. C.R. 683", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 114395, "end_char": 114415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 1 S. C. R. 380", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 114422, "end_char": 114443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114885, "end_char": 114889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115064, "end_char": 115068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115318, "end_char": 115322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115430, "end_char": 115434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 S. C.R. 871", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 116806, "end_char": 116826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117096, "end_char": 117100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 226, 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117833, "end_char": 117847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117995, "end_char": 118006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118295, "end_char": 118303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed in that case by one of us, Bhagwati J., while speaking for the Court."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118664, "end_char": 118668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119075, "end_char": 119084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120378, "end_char": 120384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120392, "end_char": 120418, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 204", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120734, "end_char": 120740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120748, "end_char": 120774, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Salmon pithilv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 120857, "end_char": 120871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Cozens v. North Devon Hospital Mangement Committee & Anr,(') Lord Salmon pithilv observed :\n\n\"No one suggests that it is unfair to launch a criminal prosecution without first hearing the accused.\""}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121182, "end_char": 121186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sanjay Gandhi and proceeds to state that the said offences ought to be dealt with under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121449, "end_char": 121544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.entral . Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 121727, "end_char": 121748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was vehemently argued that at the time when the declaration was made the appellants had already been convicted and had filed appeals in the High Court and that therefore for the C.entral ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122649, "end_char": 122653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 154", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124943, "end_char": 124954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124962, "end_char": 124988, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Amrit Nahata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 125251, "end_char": 125263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125562, "end_char": 125573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "14th July 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 125719, "end_char": 125733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 125754, "end_char": 125790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Vidya Charan Shukla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125899, "end_char": 125918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Vidya1 Charan Shukla"}}, {"text": "Feroz Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 126036, "end_char": 126048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126056, "end_char": 126067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126077, "end_char": 126100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126124, "end_char": 126159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126167, "end_char": 126172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126212, "end_char": 126246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126298, "end_char": 126309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126317, "end_char": 126322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "22-2-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 126560, "end_char": 126567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "17-2-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 126662, "end_char": 126669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Vidya Charan Shukla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126685, "end_char": 126704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Vidya1 Charan Shukla"}}, {"text": "Sanjay Gandhi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126714, "end_char": 126727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos.", "canonical_name": "Sanjay Gandhi"}}, {"text": "27-2-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 126814, "end_char": 126821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It reads :\n\n\"WHEREAS the Central Bureau of Investigation recorded under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2 of 1974) on the 13th April 1977, a first information report and registered a case being RC-2177-CIU ( 1) for suspected offences of a conspiracy to commit theft and actual theft of the film materials of the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' pro-\n~\n\nduced by one Shr~ Amrit Nahata from the custody of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting :\n\nAND WHEREAS investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation disolosed offences committed during the period while the proclamation of emergency dated the 25th June 1975, issued by the President under clause\n\n(i) of Article 352 of the Constitution was in force :\n\nAND WHEREAS after completion of investigation the Central Bureau of Investigation filed a chargesheet on the 14th July 1977 in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi :\n\nAND WHEREAS the facts mentioned in the said chargesheet disclosed offences having been committed by Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) read with sections 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201 of the I.P.C. as well as substantive offences under section 409, 411, 414, 435 and 201 of the I.P .C. as also the said offences read with section 109 of the I.P.C.:\n\nAND WHEREAS a case (RC/2177-CIA-I) was filed in\n\nthe court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, with E respect to the said offences and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session for trial on 22-2-78:\n\nAND WHEREAS the District and Sessions Judge having convicted the accused by his order dated 17-2-79 sentenced Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi with imprisonment and also imposed fines on them as specified in the said order dated 27-2-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS Shri Vidya Charan Shukla and Shri Sanjay Gandhi filed appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Section 374(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126939, "end_char": 126953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126961, "end_char": 126993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 127013, "end_char": 127032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "71/79 and 72/79 respectively under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the High Court of Delhi on 20-3-79 against the aforesaid conviction and that the said appeals were admitted by Delhi High Court on 21-3-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS the State has also filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court on 18-5-79 under section 377, Code of Criminal Procedure (No."}}, {"text": "20-3-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 127036, "end_char": 127043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "71/79 and 72/79 respectively under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the High Court of Delhi on 20-3-79 against the aforesaid conviction and that the said appeals were admitted by Delhi High Court on 21-3-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS the State has also filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court on 18-5-79 under section 377, Code of Criminal Procedure (No."}}, {"text": "21-3-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 127140, "end_char": 127147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "71/79 and 72/79 respectively under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the High Court of Delhi on 20-3-79 against the aforesaid conviction and that the said appeals were admitted by Delhi High Court on 21-3-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS the State has also filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court on 18-5-79 under section 377, Code of Criminal Procedure (No."}}, {"text": "18-5-79", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 127225, "end_char": 127232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "71/79 and 72/79 respectively under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the High Court of Delhi on 20-3-79 against the aforesaid conviction and that the said appeals were admitted by Delhi High Court on 21-3-79 :\n\nAND WHEREAS the State has also filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court on 18-5-79 under section 377, Code of Criminal Procedure (No."}}, {"text": "section 377", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127239, "end_char": 127250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127252, "end_char": 127278, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128161, "end_char": 128170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shri Sanjay Gandhi and others and that in accordance with the guidelines contained in the preamble to the Special Courts Act, 1979", "statute": "Shri Sanjay Gandhi and others and that in accordance with the guidelines contained in the preamble to the Special Courts Act, 1979"}}, {"text": "Special Courts Act, 1979", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128178, "end_char": 128202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vidya1 Charan Shukla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128374, "end_char": 128394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 1) of Section 5 of the Special Courts Act, 1979 (22 of 1979), the Central Government hereby declares that there is prima facie evidence of the commission of the aforesaid offences alleged to have been committed by Shri Vidya1 Charan Shukla, who was the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, during the relevant period, and as such held a high public and political office in India during the relevant period, and Shri Sanjay Gandhi, son of late Shri Feroz Gandhi, and that in accordance with the guidelines contained in the Preamble to that Act, the said offences ought to be dealt with under that Act.\"", "canonical_name": "Vidya1 Charan Shukla"}}, {"text": "s 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129374, "end_char": 129377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129500, "end_char": 129505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129559, "end_char": 129569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129637, "end_char": 129646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129771, "end_char": 129780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 130844, "end_char": 130856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The, State of Haryana(') where this Court observed:\n\n\"Thus two considerations for regarding a provision as directory are : (1) absence of any provision for the contingency of a particular provision not being complied with or followed, and (2) serious general inconvenience and prejudice that would result to the general public if the act of the D Government or an instrumentality is declared invalid for noncompliance with the particular provision ....\n\n  In the instant case, it would be noticed that sub-section\n\n(6) of Section 3 of the Act merely provides that every order made under Section 3 by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government sha!l be laid, before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131027, "end_char": 131036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131092, "end_char": 131101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131504, "end_char": 131513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132402, "end_char": 132411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132585, "end_char": 132595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19, 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133430, "end_char": 133449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 368", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133503, "end_char": 133511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 133813, "end_char": 133819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mridul, appearing for Mr. Shukla, apart from adopting the arguments of Mr. Bhatia, as discussed above, raised two additional points.", "canonical_name": "Mridual"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133984, "end_char": 133991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134069, "end_char": 134072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissions of Inquiry Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134198, "end_char": 134224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134573, "end_char": 134585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134628, "end_char": 134637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134683, "end_char": 134692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134733, "end_char": 134759, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134903, "end_char": 134912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134975, "end_char": 134984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135033, "end_char": 135042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135118, "end_char": 135127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135171, "end_char": 135180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135264, "end_char": 135273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135384, "end_char": 135393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135496, "end_char": 135505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135542, "end_char": 135551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135818, "end_char": 135827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136420, "end_char": 136429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136744, "end_char": 136753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137169, "end_char": 137173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137350, "end_char": 137356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137364, "end_char": 137390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 406", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137453, "end_char": 137459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137606, "end_char": 137610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138121, "end_char": 138127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment was struck down by this Court in a judgment during the course of which Mathew, J., observed :\n\n\"At the time when the Amendment was passed, the appeal filed by the appellant and the cross appeal of the respondent were pending before the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138917, "end_char": 138921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 139702, "end_char": 139728, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139805, "end_char": 139812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 S. C.R. 347", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 140001, "end_char": 140021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140039, "end_char": 140046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141312, "end_char": 141321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142142, "end_char": 142149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "IC\n\nShingha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142383, "end_char": 142394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IC\n\nShingha), J., in his dissenting note observed that if jurisdiction in the matter of appointing a Special Judge was given to the High Court concerned leaving its Chief Justice to designate one of the Judges of his Court as a Special Judge, the procedure may become very fair and unexceptionable."}}, {"text": "s.10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143408, "end_char": 143415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143461, "end_char": 143468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143634, "end_char": 143638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144039, "end_char": 144047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144741, "end_char": 144752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 144760, "end_char": 144786, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144947, "end_char": 144953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 382", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145060, "end_char": 145071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 382", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145261, "end_char": 145272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 383", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145434, "end_char": 145445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 383", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145823, "end_char": 145834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 384", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146165, "end_char": 146171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146238, "end_char": 146243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146512, "end_char": 146517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 146611, "end_char": 146616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 146689, "end_char": 146715, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147894, "end_char": 147920, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 376", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148043, "end_char": 148049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148057, "end_char": 148083, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 260", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148680, "end_char": 148691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149495, "end_char": 149500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 149769, "end_char": 149795, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149797, "end_char": 149808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150035, "end_char": 150061, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure or under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150375, "end_char": 150410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Deogad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 152096, "end_char": 152102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, this Court said :\n\n\"It is true that if the complaint was filed in the Court of Magistrate having jurisdiction over Deogad alone, as it could B lawfully be filed, an appeal would against an order of conviction, lie to the Court of Session, Ratnagiri and an application in the exercise of revisional jmisdiction to the High Court from the order of the Court of Session."}}, {"text": "Court of Session, Ratnagiri", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 152202, "end_char": 152229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, this Court said :\n\n\"It is true that if the complaint was filed in the Court of Magistrate having jurisdiction over Deogad alone, as it could B lawfully be filed, an appeal would against an order of conviction, lie to the Court of Session, Ratnagiri and an application in the exercise of revisional jmisdiction to the High Court from the order of the Court of Session."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153200, "end_char": 153226, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153332, "end_char": 153336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153382, "end_char": 153389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153478, "end_char": 153489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153514, "end_char": 153540, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "West Bengal legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 154534, "end_char": 154557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The West Bengal legislature passed the West Bengal Special Courts Act (hereinafter to be referred to as tbe 'West Bengal Act') constituting Special Courts and empowering the State Government to refer cases or offences or classes of cases or classes of offences to such Courts but did not at all indicate any guidelines as to tbe nature of the cases to be so referred which was thus a matter left entirely to tbe discretion of the Government."}}, {"text": "West Bengal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 154639, "end_char": 154654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155119, "end_char": 155123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "West Bengal Act", "statute": "West Bengal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155856, "end_char": 155860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155966, "end_char": 155970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156146, "end_char": 156152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even though no conditions regulating the exercise of discretion by the State Government were laid, Sastri, CJ.,"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156479, "end_char": 156491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14, 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156508, "end_char": 156521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158118, "end_char": 158127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158540, "end_char": 158544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sarkai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 158745, "end_char": 158761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of Anwar Ali Sarkai: (supra) , therefore cannot furnish any criterion for judging the validity of any of the provisions of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali Sarkai"}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 158936, "end_char": 158952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the light of this background that we have to examine Anwar Ali Sarkar's case.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali Sarkai"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159260, "end_char": 159269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali, J., (as he then was) laid stress on the fact that although a procedure ensuring a speedy trial was prescribed by the West Bengal Act yet that Act had not set out any principle of classification while laying down the new procedure.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160078, "end_char": 160082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160120, "end_char": 160127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160131, "end_char": 160138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 by Mahajan, J., also on the ground that there was no basis for the differential treatment prescribed in the West Bengal Act."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160269, "end_char": 160278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160328, "end_char": 160338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161953, "end_char": 161962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was also placed on a few observations of Mukherjea, J., H where he has pointed out that in making the classification the legislature cannot certainly be expected to provide absolute symmetr~ and ha</ held\n\nthat while recognising the degree of evil, the classification should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162902, "end_char": 162928, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162988, "end_char": 162995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163737, "end_char": 163740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the observations of Mukherjea, J., are of no help to the appellants which is also true of passages appearing in the judgment of Das, J., (as he then was) and cited before us."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164605, "end_char": 164609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose, J., conceded that though the procedure prescribed by the West Bengal Act may pramote the ends of justice and would be\n\n, I.-----\n\nwelcome, yet he took serious exception to the differential treatment resulting therefrom."}}, {"text": "Anwar AU Sarkat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 165714, "end_char": 165729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, therefore, unable to agree with learned counsel that the observations of the Judges constituting the Bench in Anwar AU Sarkat's case (supra) can be called into aid for the purpose of striking down the Act in the present case.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali Sarkai"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166074, "end_char": 166081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166085, "end_char": 166092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 166478, "end_char": 166487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThe appellant, V. C. Shukla (hereinafter referred to as 'A-1') in criminal appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "V. C. Shukla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 166508, "end_char": 166520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZAL ALI, J.\n\nThe appellant, V. C. Shukla (hereinafter referred to as 'A-1') in criminal appeal No.", "canonical_name": "V. C. SHUKLA V. DELHI"}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166646, "end_char": 166652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166665, "end_char": 166695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166697, "end_char": 166714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166730, "end_char": 166736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166738, "end_char": 166755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166857, "end_char": 166863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166874, "end_char": 166880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166882, "end_char": 166899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 414", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166907, "end_char": 166913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166931, "end_char": 166948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166956, "end_char": 166962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166973, "end_char": 166979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166980, "end_char": 166985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166997, "end_char": 167003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167014, "end_char": 167020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167023, "end_char": 167028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167184, "end_char": 167190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167203, "end_char": 167232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167240, "end_char": 167257, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 435, 411 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167296, "end_char": 167316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167318, "end_char": 167323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167415, "end_char": 167421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167432, "end_char": 167438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167498, "end_char": 167503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167515, "end_char": 167545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167588, "end_char": 167594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167762, "end_char": 167767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167967, "end_char": 167973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 414", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168020, "end_char": 168026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168037, "end_char": 168043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168106, "end_char": 168112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168162, "end_char": 168168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168179, "end_char": 168185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 409, 435, 411, 414 and 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168294, "end_char": 168324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 435", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168371, "end_char": 168377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168534, "end_char": 168540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 414", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168586, "end_char": 168592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168638, "end_char": 168644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168723, "end_char": 168729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168807, "end_char": 168813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168824, "end_char": 168830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi H)gh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 169238, "end_char": 169254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On being convicted by the Sessions Judge, Delhi, the accused filed appeals before the Delhi H)gh Court against their convictions and sentences, indicated above, and were released on bail pending the hearing of the appeals."}}, {"text": "Amrir Nahata", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 170571, "end_char": 170583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming now to the facts, shorn of unnecessary details, the story begins with the production of a film called Kissa Kursi Kaa by Shri\n\nAmrir Nahata, PW 1, under the banner of Dhwaqi Prakash."}}, {"text": "Dhwaqi Prakash", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 170611, "end_char": 170625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming now to the facts, shorn of unnecessary details, the story begins with the production of a film called Kissa Kursi Kaa by Shri\n\nAmrir Nahata, PW 1, under the banner of Dhwaqi Prakash."}}, {"text": "8-5-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 171782, "end_char": 171788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revising Committee after viewing the film agreed by a majority of 6 : 1 for certification of the film, the dissent having been voiced by Mr. Thapa, the Chairman and accordingly under rule 25 (ii) of the Cinematograph (Cenrorship) Rules, 1958, a reference was made to the Central Government on 8-5-75."}}, {"text": "S.M. Murshed", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 171848, "end_char": 171860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.M. Murshed, who was at the relevant period Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Incharge of film and T.V. Projects ancl was appointe.d Joint Secretary on 1st May 1975."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Information & Broadcasting", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 171909, "end_char": 171947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.M. Murshed, who was at the relevant period Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Incharge of film and T.V. Projects ancl was appointe.d Joint Secretary on 1st May 1975."}}, {"text": "1st May 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 172023, "end_char": 172035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.M. Murshed, who was at the relevant period Director in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Incharge of film and T.V. Projects ancl was appointe.d Joint Secretary on 1st May 1975."}}, {"text": "K.P. Sreedharan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 172618, "end_char": 172633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 17/ A.\n\nPW 17 K.P. Sreedharan, who was a Technical Officer Ir, oharge also inspected the reels and found them in order."}}, {"text": "I. K. Gujarat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 173276, "end_char": 173289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was then examined by Mr. I. K. Gujarat, the then Minister of Information & Broadcasting but no final decision was taken.", "canonical_name": "I. K. Gujarat"}}, {"text": "23rd of June 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 173468, "end_char": 173485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 1/D. On the 23rd of June 1975.,"}}, {"text": "25th and 26th of June 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 175008, "end_char": 175034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Continuing the thread from where we left it, Emergency was proclimed on the night between 25th and 26th of June 1975 and soon thereafter A-1 took charge as the Union Minister of Information & Broadcasting and he was of the opinion that the film should be banned."}}, {"text": "11th of Juiy 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 175606, "end_char": 175623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally, on the 11th of Juiy 1975, PW 6."}}, {"text": "Murshed", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 175631, "end_char": 175638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Murshed, passed an order that no certification was to be given to the film for public exhibition which was followed by a letter dated July 14, 1975, forfeiting the film to the Government."}}, {"text": "S. Ghose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 175899, "end_char": 175907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1n pursuance of the decision taken by the Central\n\n .. ..\n\nGovernment, PW 39, S. Ghose, Deputy Secretary, Incharge of the Films Division, wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra for seizure of all the positives and negatives of the film as also other related materials."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 175998, "end_char": 176023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1n pursuance of the decision taken by the Central\n\n .. ..\n\nGovernment, PW 39, S. Ghose, Deputy Secretary, Incharge of the Films Division, wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra for seizure of all the positives and negatives of the film as also other related materials."}}, {"text": "1~8-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 176188, "end_char": 176196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this order, the Bombay police seized the entire film on 1~8-1975 and deposited the same in the godown of the Board."}}, {"text": "S. M. H. Burney", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 176699, "end_char": 176714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the order of this Court, intimation was sent to the Ministry concerned and PW\n\n62, Mr. S. M. H. Burney, who was then Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, directed that immediate action be taken to implement the anders of the Supreme Court, and that arrangements should be made to bock the Auditorium for 17-11-1975."}}, {"text": "5-11-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 176960, "end_char": 176969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a let:er dated 5-11-1975, Ext."}}, {"text": "L. Dayal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 177235, "end_char": 177243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime thereafter, PW 2, L. Dayal, took over as Joint Secretary (Films Division) in place of Mr. Murshcd."}}, {"text": "Murshcd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 177307, "end_char": 177314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime thereafter, PW 2, L. Dayal, took over as Joint Secretary (Films Division) in place of Mr. Murshcd."}}, {"text": "Deihl", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 178039, "end_char": 178044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, the steps taken by the officers of the Ministry in pursuance of the banning of the film, namely, the seizure of the film at Bombay and its transfer to Deihl appear to be in the nature of routine to see that the decision taken by the Government was implemented."}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178601, "end_char": 178607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 178617, "end_char": 178634, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rajinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 179290, "end_char": 179304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After having gone through the entire evidence, with the able assistance of Mr. Rajinder Singh, learned counsel for A-1 and of learned counsel for the State, we are unable to find any acceptable evidence connecting either of the appellants with the existence of any conspiracy.", "canonical_name": "Rajinder Singh B. R. Handa"}}, {"text": "J anata Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 180077, "end_char": 180095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We realise that the prosecution was seriously handicapped because the investigation started only after the J anata Government came into power in March 1977, that is to say, about a year and a half after the offences in question were allegedly committed, by when naturally much of t11e evidence would have been lost and even some of the important witnesses exaniined by the prosecution had turned hostile and refused to support its case."}}, {"text": "Kherkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 181406, "end_char": 181413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) the actual orders alleged to have been given by A-2\n\nfor burning the film in the premises of the Marnti Complex which operation, according to the prosecution was carried out by the approver, PW 3, Kherkar, and other witnesses between the 10th and '.!4th of November 1975."}}, {"text": "10th and '.!4th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 181447, "end_char": 181479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) the actual orders alleged to have been given by A-2\n\nfor burning the film in the premises of the Marnti Complex which operation, according to the prosecution was carried out by the approver, PW 3, Kherkar, and other witnesses between the 10th and '.!4th of November 1975."}}, {"text": "Sreedharan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 181937, "end_char": 181947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Auditorium, PW 17, Sreedharan screened the film in order to show the same to PW 6, Murshed, on the 22nd May 1975 and again on the next day at the instance of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting."}}, {"text": "22nd May 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 182017, "end_char": 182030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Auditorium, PW 17, Sreedharan screened the film in order to show the same to PW 6, Murshed, on the 22nd May 1975 and again on the next day at the instance of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting."}}, {"text": "Ghose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 182293, "end_char": 182298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also the prosecution case that PW 39, Ghose and PW 61, C. K. Sharma met PW 1 7, Sreedharan and PW\n\n18, Bhawani Singh and examined the prints whicjl were then lcept in the green room."}}, {"text": "C. K. Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 182310, "end_char": 182322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also the prosecution case that PW 39, Ghose and PW 61, C. K. Sharma met PW 1 7, Sreedharan and PW\n\n18, Bhawani Singh and examined the prints whicjl were then lcept in the green room."}}, {"text": "Bhawani Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 182358, "end_char": 182371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also the prosecution case that PW 39, Ghose and PW 61, C. K. Sharma met PW 1 7, Sreedharan and PW\n\n18, Bhawani Singh and examined the prints whicjl were then lcept in the green room."}}, {"text": "Sreedharan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182457, "end_char": 182467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghose then rang up Sreedharan and told him that he was coming to the Auditorium to take delivery of the prints."}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 182823, "end_char": 182831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 39, Ghose then went to Shastri Bhavn and put the cans in the dicky of the staff car of A-1 in the presence of the driver, Babu Ram, PW 33."}}, {"text": "R. K. Dhavan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182967, "end_char": 182979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, when A-1 came, Babu Ram took the car to 1, Safdarjung Road where the cans were unloaded and kept in the office of R. K. Dhavan, Additional Private Secretary to the !"}}, {"text": "Jien", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 183018, "end_char": 183022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jien Prime Minister."}}, {"text": "Bhawani _Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 183107, "end_char": 183121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the prosecution examined PW 18, Bhawani _Singh, PW 33, Babu Ram;\n\nPW 61, C. K. Sharma; PW 57, V. S. Tripathi, PW 60, R. L. Bandlish and PW 39, Ghose."}}, {"text": "V. S. Tripathi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 183169, "end_char": 183183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the prosecution examined PW 18, Bhawani _Singh, PW 33, Babu Ram;\n\nPW 61, C. K. Sharma; PW 57, V. S. Tripathi, PW 60, R. L. Bandlish and PW 39, Ghose."}}, {"text": "R. L. Bandlish", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 183192, "end_char": 183206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the prosecution examined PW 18, Bhawani _Singh, PW 33, Babu Ram;\n\nPW 61, C. K. Sharma; PW 57, V. S. Tripathi, PW 60, R. L. Bandlish and PW 39, Ghose."}}, {"text": "17-5-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 184084, "end_char": 184093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that he was directed to deposit the positive print of the Films to Films Division Auditorium at Mahadev Road and consequently he complied with the direction on 17-5-1975, and obtained a receipt."}}, {"text": "Janata Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 184962, "end_char": 184979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further admits that after the Janata Government took over in March 1977 while be had written to Mr. L. K. Advani, who succeeded A-1, regarding the film, he made no mention of any such conversation between him and A-1 about the threats, etc."}}, {"text": "L. K. Advani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 185032, "end_char": 185044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further admits that after the Janata Government took over in March 1977 while be had written to Mr. L. K. Advani, who succeeded A-1, regarding the film, he made no mention of any such conversation between him and A-1 about the threats, etc."}}, {"text": "Advani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 185608, "end_char": 185614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, it is impossible to believe that after the Janata Government came to power and he wrote a letter to Mr.\n\nAdvani regarding the film, he would not mention that he had been pressurised or threatened by A-1 when he was undoubtc<lly very much interested in bis film being exhibited and bore a serious grouse and animus against A-1 because he had refused certification for exhibition of his film."}}, {"text": "V. S.\n\nTripathi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 186825, "end_char": 186840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness further states that PW 57, V. S.\n\nTripathi, was also present at the time when this conversation between the witness and A-1 took place."}}, {"text": "Tripathi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 187540, "end_char": 187548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, all the three witnesses, namely, Tripathi, Burney and Ghose, had been dedared hostile."}}, {"text": "Khandpur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 187657, "end_char": 187665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khandpur, who happened to be in Delhi and had told him that all the film material pertaining to the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' lying at Bombay had to be carefuJly and confidentially collected and sent to Delhi."}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 188136, "end_char": 188146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn these circumstances, even Mr. Jethmalani, appearing for the State, frankly conceded that he would not ask the Court to rely on this witness unless) he was corroborated by some other independent evidence."}}, {"text": "Burney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 188522, "end_char": 188528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tripathi, Burney and Ghose, have not supported him."}}, {"text": "Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 188533, "end_char": 188538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tripathi, Burney and Ghose, have not supported him."}}, {"text": "Tripathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 189876, "end_char": 189884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Half an hour later, according to the witness, there was a telephone call from Tripathi to enquire if the film had been delivered to Ghose."}}, {"text": "Narayanan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 190216, "end_char": 190225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed here that prior to the filing of the FIR an inquiry had been held by PW 40, Narayanan, into the manner how the prints of the film were missing and in that inquiry PW_ 17, Sreedharan, did not say at all that Ghose had taken away the film."}}, {"text": "Narayanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190459, "end_char": 190468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, the witne8' deposed as follows:-\n\n\"Q. You did not tell Shri Narayanan that S. Ghose had come to you in his car and you had delivered the film to him in his car and he had taken it away?", "canonical_name": "Narayanan G"}}, {"text": "S. Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 190474, "end_char": 190482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, the witne8' deposed as follows:-\n\n\"Q. You did not tell Shri Narayanan that S. Ghose had come to you in his car and you had delivered the film to him in his car and he had taken it away?"}}, {"text": "Narayanan G", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 191009, "end_char": 191020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the witness admitted that he spoke a lie before Narayanan G merely because of Ghose.", "canonical_name": "Narayanan G"}}, {"text": "Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 192268, "end_char": 192273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "thee winter of 1975 PW 61, C. K. Sharma, called him and told him that there was some luggage ( saaman) of Minister Saheb which was to be kept in his car and asked him to bring the Minister's car close to where Ghose's car was parked."}}, {"text": "Bandlish", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 192527, "end_char": 192535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, accordnig to the witness, PW 60, Bandlish, had a talk with Ghose and after, the Minister had come, the car was driven to 1, Safdarjung Road."}}, {"text": "C. K. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 192874, "end_char": 192886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his statement before the police, the witness did not state that PW 61, C. K. Sharma had told him that the saaman of Minister Saheb (emphasis being on Minister Saheb) was to be transferred to the dicky of the staff car."}}, {"text": "Bandlish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 193028, "end_char": 193036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Bandlish and C. K. Sharma have not supported the versiol} !"}}, {"text": "Babu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 193505, "end_char": 193513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even when the car reached 1, Safdarjung Road, Babu Ram never informed the Minister about the boxes having been, kept in\n\nthe dicky nor is there any evidence to show that the boxes, were un- , F loaded from the dicky of the Minister's car, either in his presence, or to his knowledge."}}, {"text": "A. J.\n\nKidwai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 194935, "end_char": 194948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To begin with, according to PW 6, Murshed, A-1 said that there was some sort of an informal discussion between A-1, Mr. A. J.\n\nKidwai, the then Secretary in the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting and the witness when A-1 directed that the film be banned and seized, but that no action was taken by the witness until the file reached him.", "canonical_name": "A. J.\n\nKidwai"}}, {"text": "July 7, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 195184, "end_char": 195196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness added that on July 7, 1975 there wa~ another meeting attended by Sarin and other officers which was presided over by A-1 and in this meeting a final decision was taken that the film should be taken over and mention was made that the Defence of India Rules should be pressed into service."}}, {"text": "Sarin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 195235, "end_char": 195240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness added that on July 7, 1975 there wa~ another meeting attended by Sarin and other officers which was presided over by A-1 and in this meeting a final decision was taken that the film should be taken over and mention was made that the Defence of India Rules should be pressed into service."}}, {"text": "July 11, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 195747, "end_char": 195760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 6/ A-9 on July 11, 1975 which directed that the certificate for public exhibition was refused and the said order was communicated to PW l, Amrit Nahata."}}, {"text": "July J 4, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 196262, "end_char": 196276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the film had been banned and forfeited, the seizure of the film material at Bombay became a necessary consequence and accordingly a letter dated July J 4, 1975 was issued under the signatures of PW 39, Ghose to thei Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra for seizure of the film material relating to the film and requiring him to deposit the same with the Board."}}, {"text": "6-11-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 197443, "end_char": 197452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To begin with, L. Dayal, PW 2, who was then attached to A-1 as Joint Secretary (Films) states that on 6-11-1975 A-1 tc;>ld him in the presence of Tripathi, PW 57, that A-1 had decided to keep all material relating to the film in his (A-l's) personal custody, that detailed arrangements for the delivery of the material 1would be made by A-1 \"s personal staff and that the work had."}}, {"text": "Khandpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 197871, "end_char": 197879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness adds that he conveyed the decision to the Secretary and to S. Ghose, PW 39, and then called PW 4, Khandpur, Chief Producer, Films Division, Bombay who happened to be in Delhi and asked him that all the material pertaining to the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa' lying at Bombay had to be carefully and confidentially collected and sent to Delhi."}}, {"text": "Vya~", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 198217, "end_char": 198221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when this talk took place Ghose and Tripathi were present, according to PW 2, who then rang up Vya~ (Chairman of the Board) and gave him similar instructions in the presence of Ghose and."}}, {"text": "Khandpur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 198402, "end_char": 198410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, neither Tripathi nor Ghose supports PW 2 on the point that he had asked Khandpur to collect the material of the film 'carefully and confidentally' which particular words were attributed to A-1 to show his crimiual intent."}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 198708, "end_char": 198713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, Ghose, PW 39, wbo was declared hostile to the prosecution, stated:\n\n\"As I was coming out of the room of Shri Burney, I dropped in Shri Dayal's room which was in the same corridor with a view to inform him that I had gone to the Auditorium and checked the film and had found the film intact."}}, {"text": "K. L. Khandpur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 198940, "end_char": 198954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I found Shri K. L. Khandpur also sitting in the room of Shri Dayal.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Khandpur"}}, {"text": "V. S. Tripathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 199068, "end_char": 199082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After _a few moments I found Shri V. S. Tripathi walking into the room of Shri Dayal."}}, {"text": "K. L. Khandpur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 200062, "end_char": 200076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The stand of Tripathi, PW 57, who was also allowed to be crossexamined by the prosecution was as follows:-\n\n\"Shri Dayal gave instructions to Shri K. L. Khandpur in my presence and that of Shri S. Ghose to shift the nega.- tive material of\" film Kissa Kursi Kaa from Bombay to Delhi.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Khandpur"}}, {"text": "V. D. Vyas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 200268, "end_char": 200278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the request of Shri Khandpur, Shri Dayal also spoke to late Shri V. D. Vyas."}}, {"text": "K. N. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 200954, "end_char": 200965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He denied the correctness of the assertion and was confronted with the following portion ('E' to 'E') of his statement made on the 25th April 1977, to K. N. Gupta, Deputy Superintendent of Police, CJ.A., New Delhi :\n\n\"Later, some time in the afternoon, the Minister called me inside his room."}}, {"text": "L.\n\nDayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 201254, "end_char": 201263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The then Minister of I & B, gave instructions to Shri L.\n\nDayal, Jt.", "canonical_name": "L.\n\nDayal"}}, {"text": "Kbandpur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 201731, "end_char": 201739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness also de!lied the cOJ[rectness of the assertion that in bis presence later on Shri Dayal, PW 2,1 had told Shri Kbandpur, PW 4 that the film should be brought from Bombay to Delhi \"very carefully without telling anybody about it\"."}}, {"text": "L. Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 202234, "end_char": 202242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, PW 4 says thus :-\n\n\"I was called by L. Dayal, the Joint Secretary (ill his office.", "canonical_name": "L.\n\nDayal"}}, {"text": "Kissa Kursi Kaa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 202682, "end_char": 202697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Jile pertains1 to the film materials of Kissa Kursi Kaa."}}, {"text": "9-11-1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 203990, "end_char": 203999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, PW 2 states that on 9-11-1975 PW4, Khandpur informed him on telephone from Bombay that the film material was being sent from Bombay to Delhi by Western Express and would be reaching\n\nDelhi on the next day and that two officers, one of them being Kane, PW 5, were accompanying the material."}}, {"text": "Kane", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 204216, "end_char": 204220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, PW 2 states that on 9-11-1975 PW4, Khandpur informed him on telephone from Bombay that the film material was being sent from Bombay to Delhi by Western Express and would be reaching\n\nDelhi on the next day and that two officers, one of them being Kane, PW 5, were accompanying the material."}}, {"text": "10th November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 204466, "end_char": 204484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness goes on to state that on the 10th November 1975, PW 39, Ghose, came to him and reported that the film material had arrived and had been brought in tempos arranged by A-1."}}, {"text": "10th of November", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 205716, "end_char": 205732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the existence of the only circumstance on the basis of which the witness could have identified Tripathi becomes doubtful and in view of the categorical statement of Tripathi that; he never went to New Delhi Railway Station on the 10th of November to receive the film, it is difficult to accept the evidence of , PW 5 that Tripathi was the person present at the station."}}, {"text": "12th March 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 206917, "end_char": 206932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the witness, in t11e special leave petition filed by PW 1, 12th March 1976 was fixed for screening the film."}}, {"text": "22nd March 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 207620, "end_char": 207635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In consonance with the instruction, Ghose filed an affidavit before the Supreme Court on the 22nd March 1976 but the Hon'ble Chief Justice emphasised the\n\nimportance of making the, film available for viewing by the Judges."}}, {"text": "Amrit Nahafa", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 207876, "end_char": 207888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, however, as PW 1, Amrit Nahafa, withdrew the petition nothing further happened."}}, {"text": "28th November 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 208135, "end_char": 208153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that while the petition was pending in the Supreme Court, contempt proceedings were taken aginst some, of the oJlicers including PW 2 who also filed four affidavits, one of them on the 28th November 1977 and the other three on the 28th February 1978."}}, {"text": "28th February 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 208181, "end_char": 208199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that while the petition was pending in the Supreme Court, contempt proceedings were taken aginst some, of the oJlicers including PW 2 who also filed four affidavits, one of them on the 28th November 1977 and the other three on the 28th February 1978."}}, {"text": "V. P. Raman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 208801, "end_char": 208812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 2/DE) to be sent to Mr. V. P. Raman, Additional Solicitor General and reads : 'In spite of efforts the film has not been found'."}}, {"text": "Jethma\"lani,", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 209381, "end_char": 209393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even Mr. Jethma\"lani, the erstwhile senior counsel for the pm; ecution conceded the correctness of this proposition."}}, {"text": "K. N. Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 209701, "end_char": 209713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 63, K. N. Prasad was the Additional Secretary in the Ministry\n\nof Information & Broadcasting."}}, {"text": "A. K.\n\nVerma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 209824, "end_char": 209836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that in ~.1arch 1977, A. K.\n\nVerma, the then Joint Secretary wanted to know whether the Government had any inherent power to destroy property which had beeri seized or forfeited, and also disclosed that the enquiry was made in G connection with the film 'Kissa Kursi Kaa'.", "canonical_name": "A. K.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 210132, "end_char": 210137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness further stated that after two or three days Verma and PW 39, Ghosc came to his room and asked the same question."}}, {"text": "Ghosc", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 210149, "end_char": 210154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness further stated that after two or three days Verma and PW 39, Ghosc came to his room and asked the same question."}}, {"text": "Verma,", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 210908, "end_char": 210914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the testimony of PW 63 the prosecution seeks to draw an inference that it Was A-1 at whose instance Verma,."}}, {"text": "A. K. Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 210986, "end_char": 210997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, A. K. Verma has not been examined as a witness and his statement ( seekingi the advice of PW ( 63) is not, therefore, admissible in' evidence, while both Gl10se and Burney have denied that any such conversation as has been deposed to by PW 63 took place between the: latter and the witnesses in the presence Oil' A-1 .", "canonical_name": "A. K.\n\nVerma"}}, {"text": "Gl10se", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 211140, "end_char": 211146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, A. K. Verma has not been examined as a witness and his statement ( seekingi the advice of PW ( 63) is not, therefore, admissible in' evidence, while both Gl10se and Burney have denied that any such conversation as has been deposed to by PW 63 took place between the: latter and the witnesses in the presence Oil' A-1 ."}}, {"text": "Nahata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 211405, "end_char": 211411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, a' specific suggestion was put to Burney (PW 62) in: the following terms :\n\n\"Q. :When Shri Nahata asked for the return of the film material, did it happen that you discussed the matter regarding availability and return of the film material with Shri B Shukla at his official residence and during that discussion\n\nShri K. N. Prasad and Shri A. K. Verma had also come there and Shri V. S. Tripathi, Special Asstt."}}, {"text": "B Shukla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 211564, "end_char": 211572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, a' specific suggestion was put to Burney (PW 62) in: the following terms :\n\n\"Q. :When Shri Nahata asked for the return of the film material, did it happen that you discussed the matter regarding availability and return of the film material with Shri B Shukla at his official residence and during that discussion\n\nShri K. N. Prasad and Shri A. K. Verma had also come there and Shri V. S. Tripathi, Special Asstt.", "canonical_name": "B Shukla"}}, {"text": "K. N. Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 211632, "end_char": 211644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, a' specific suggestion was put to Burney (PW 62) in: the following terms :\n\n\"Q. :When Shri Nahata asked for the return of the film material, did it happen that you discussed the matter regarding availability and return of the film material with Shri B Shukla at his official residence and during that discussion\n\nShri K. N. Prasad and Shri A. K. Verma had also come there and Shri V. S. Tripathi, Special Asstt."}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 211964, "end_char": 211969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I: Besides, the story given out by the witness does not appear to be very plausible, for it does nou stand to reason that A-1 would depute no less than three officers (Verma, Ghose and Burney), one after the other, to obtain advice of PW 63 when A-l could have had no difficulty in obtaining the advice himself."}}, {"text": "Jhat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 213503, "end_char": 213507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The investigators also claimed Jhat a few miles away from the Maruti Complex some round cans were recovered from a nal/ah."}}, {"text": "Maruti Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 214728, "end_char": 214742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The approver was the Security Officer in/ tbe Maruti Limited at the relevanU time and the assertions made by him in this behalf may be."}}, {"text": "Knwar Singh Yadav", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 215335, "end_char": 215352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On, the same day the appr01Ver directed his assistant named\n\nKnwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 to meet the approver (in the Maruti Complex) at 9.00 p.m. along with watchman Om Prakash,\n\nPW 31."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 215438, "end_char": 215448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On, the same day the appr01Ver directed his assistant named\n\nKnwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 to meet the approver (in the Maruti Complex) at 9.00 p.m. along with watchman Om Prakash,\n\nPW 31."}}, {"text": "Kanwar Singh Yadav", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 215459, "end_char": 215477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 met the approver at 9.30 p.m. They reached the factory gate where watchman: Om PralCash PW 31 was waiting for them."}}, {"text": "Om PralCash", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 215561, "end_char": 215572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanwar Singh Yadav, PW 32 met the approver at 9.30 p.m. They reached the factory gate where watchman: Om PralCash PW 31 was waiting for them."}}, {"text": "Om Parkash", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 216187, "end_char": 216197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The, first lot of the films was removed to a nearby pit and was\n\nburnt there, the operation lasting from 10.30 p.m. to 2.30 p.m. watchman Om Parkash PW 31 however left the place at about 11.00 p.m. becausei he felt giddy."}}, {"text": "10th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 216961, "end_char": 216982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The film material, according to the case of the prosecution, is said' to have reached Maruti Complex on the 10th of November 1975."}}, {"text": "23rd November,. 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 216994, "end_char": 217014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the 23rd November,."}}, {"text": "23rd of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 217161, "end_char": 217182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period during which the film is said to have been burnt thus lies between the 10th and the 23rd of November 1975."}}, {"text": "15th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 217912, "end_char": 217933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He averred that on the 15th of November 1975, which was a Saturday and therefore an off-day for watchman Om B Prakash, PW 31, the latter took over duty from 2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. as a substitute for watchman Tarachand."}}, {"text": "Om B Prakash", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 217994, "end_char": 218006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He averred that on the 15th of November 1975, which was a Saturday and therefore an off-day for watchman Om B Prakash, PW 31, the latter took over duty from 2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. as a substitute for watchman Tarachand."}}, {"text": "Tarachand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 218099, "end_char": 218108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He averred that on the 15th of November 1975, which was a Saturday and therefore an off-day for watchman Om B Prakash, PW 31, the latter took over duty from 2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. as a substitute for watchman Tarachand."}}, {"text": "18th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 218148, "end_char": 218169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar arrangement was made on the 18th of November 1975, when watchman Om Prakash,\n\n,,\n\nl I\n\n.~ ."}}, {"text": "Faza! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 218246, "end_char": 218255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faza!", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Ramdular", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 218301, "end_char": 218309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ali, J.) 581\n\nPW 31 changed places with watchman Ramdular and went over from the 3rd to the 2nil shill (2.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m.)."}}, {"text": "15th of November", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 218816, "end_char": 218832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period during which the film was destroyed is thus further narrowed down so that the first operation of burning could have taken place on the night of the 15th of November or on that of the 18th of November 1975, and on no other date."}}, {"text": "17th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 219029, "end_char": 219050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidence has been produced to show that A-2 Mt I?elhi by air at 7.50 a:m. on the 17th of November 1975 for Hyderabad, and arrived back at Delhi at 8.30 p.m. the same day."}}, {"text": "19th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 219158, "end_char": 219179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He again took off at 6.40 a.m. on the 19th of November 1975, for Sikkim and returned to Delhi not earlier than\n\n11.10 a.m. on the 23rd of November 1975."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Indira Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 219382, "end_char": 219404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On both occasions he travelled as a member of the party of the then Prime Minister, his own mother,, namely, Shrimati Indira Gandhi."}}, {"text": "K. P.\n\nMathur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 219426, "end_char": 219439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Dr. K. P.\n\nMathur, DW 3, is categorical in this behalf and is supported by the\n\npassnger manifests (Ext."}}, {"text": "15th or the 18th of November 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 220209, "end_char": 220242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, as pointed out already, the burning could have taken place oll'!y on the 15th or the 18th of November 1975, if the approver and the duty rosters prepared by him are to be believed."}}, {"text": "Kanwar Singh Y adav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 221972, "end_char": 221991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kanwar Singh Y adav was also there.", "canonical_name": "Kanwar Singh Y adav"}}, {"text": "Vijay Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 222009, "end_char": 222021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vijay Sharma,, Bus Body Manager, was called there."}}, {"text": "Kanwar Singh Yadav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 222392, "end_char": 222410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A couple of days thereafter, Kanwar Singh Yadav, Sanjay Gandhi and I went inside the General Store.", "canonical_name": "Kanwar Singh Y adav"}}, {"text": "Panna Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 222524, "end_char": 222533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There Sanjay Gandhi asked Panna Lal, Bus Body Supervisor and in charge Bus Body Store, to ccllect all the damaged locks available with them."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 222672, "end_char": 222682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Panna Lal passed on the order to Om Prakash who was Bus Body Clerk Incharge Stores."}}, {"text": "Tiger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 222787, "end_char": 222792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These included Harrison, Tiger and Godrej Locks."}}, {"text": "Ram Lakhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 222944, "end_char": 222954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lakhan was Incharge of the foundry and I handed over the collected locks to him .... Thereafter, scrapping of the trunks and their removal was performed by my Asstt."}}, {"text": "Fmther", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 226545, "end_char": 226551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fmther, that part of the case which relates to the burning of film material rests solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the approver and is negatived in so far as the role therein of A-1 is .concerned."}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 228938, "end_char": 228944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, Shukla in Criminal appeal No.", "canonical_name": "B Shukla"}}, {"text": "N. K. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 229215, "end_char": 229226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the fact that we have made no com• ments on the conduct of the investigation or on Mr. N. K. Singh, no order need be passed on the application filed by him."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_586_594_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "DBJAPADA DAS AND ANR\n\nUNION° OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, 0. C!IINNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nCoal Mines (IValionalisation Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. LXVll of 1976), Sections 3 (3) and 4, scope of-Whether Section 3 (3) offends Article 14 of the Cons; itution, inasmuch as in regard to Coal Mines, lVhere nlinuzg is prohibited by that provision, the work1nen are left in the cold, while in regard to nationalised coal n1ines the workmen are taken care of and benefits assured C -Private managements whether \"deenzed custodians\" under Section 5 of the Coal Mines Nationalist; itions Act, 1973.\n\nDismissing the Writ Petitions, the Court,\n\nHELD : I. The provision contained in Section 3 ( 3) of Act LXVIl of 1976 is peremptory and the prohibition is mandatory because there is punishment provided for contravention of that provision. Breach of Section 3 (3) is made punishable with impriso!1lll<nt.\n\nThe 1976 Act totally prohibits w<>rking of any coal mines by any agency other than those which have been set out in Section 3 ( 3). Surely, there is no authority for the managements under whom the present petitioners are alleged to be workmen to operate coal mines in the face of the prohibition of the 1976 Act. Even for granting looses and their renewal by ; the State itself, the frown and force of the law stand four square between the mines and traction of coal by any but the agencies specified in section 3 (3) of the 1976 Act. [589F-G, 591A, B & CJ\n\n2. Investigation of the Sta.te or . intimation by the private managements are obligatory under the appropriate legislation and in the absence of any iittima.. tion the presumption is that there are no such coal mines as are set up before the Court. What apparently has been done, if at all, is to d<> what has been described as 'scratching' that is sudace mining of coal bearing areas, destmctive of 1the natural resources of the nation without any thought for the morrow and without any reference to the pla.nned, phased programme of exploitation of coal for the benefit of the country in the public sector. The mines, if any, are illicitly being operated, there being no sanction of the law. It is precisely Ito prevent this mischief of slaugter mining that s.3 (3) was introduced and s.4 was enacted to make the activity punishable. 'I'he proscription is comprehen\n\nsive and the penalty makes it imperative. When it is accepted that it is not permissible to operate these mines save by those specified in the 1976 stah1te, it necessarily follows that workmen, genuine or other, cannot claim any fundamental right to work these mines,,\n\n[5910-G]\n\n3. The prohibition of mining as under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act, is in the public interest and indeed, the scheme shows that wherever public interest requires exploitation of coal mines it has been permitted in the public sector and even in the priva.te sector so far as certain specified industries, such as iron and steel industries, are concerned. The ban is part of a national policy, conceived for conservation of a vital national resource and the wisdom of the regulation of\n\nfl..\n\nDEJAPADA DAS v. UNION 587\n\nfuel spurces and their planned user is beyond argument. Therefore, the language of s. 3 (3) is express, explicit and admits. of no exception. An aware Court will not relax when the language is peremptory, the legislation is charged with a critical purpose and even the commiserative cause of workmen-not wolves in sheep's clothing,-cannot override ithe larger cause of the nation.\n\nNo nation, no workmen.\n\n[59!G-H, 592A]\n\n4. It is audacious for the dubious managements under whom the petitioners are supposed to be innocent workmen to represent to the Court that they are \"deemed custodians\" working on behalf of the Central Government. [592D-E]\n\nUnder section 5, notifications are a sine qua non fori custodianship, actual or deemed and absent such notification taking over management no private agency can self-style. itself as \"deemed custOOian\".\n\nTherefore, the manage ments.other than those specified in section 3(3) of the 1976 Act, can not claim to extract coal from any coal mines.\n\nIf this be so, no one can . cla.im as a workman. although in public interest, although it is imperative that such operation 'should stop.\n\n[593E-F]\n\n S. There is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution visavis the workmen concerned assuming them to be real workmen.\n\nAfter the dismissal of the management's \\\\'rit petitions, the argument that the Act impugned is ultra vires vis a vis workmen is a daring legal workmanship. If a larger Bench of this Court has already upheld the vires of a statute the discovery of a new argument cannot invalidate that decision. That pr6position will make the binding effect of precedents, read in the light of Art. 141 a vanishing cream once a novel thought strikes a legal brain.\n\n[593FH]\n\nThe question of discrimination between two classes of workmen hardly arises because one set of mines has been closed down validly.\n\nIf the closure is valid, no oneemployed there has a right to force it open on the score of discrimination.\n\nDenial of lay.off or other benefits belong to a different jurisdiction. If any \\VOrkmen are really aggrieved that their interests are not pro tected and that their future is in jeopardy, it is certainly open to them to make represep.tation to the Central Government for consideration of their lot. and certainly a welfare State will give due consideration for such representation if it is satisfied that the grievance is genuine.\n\n[594A-B]\n\n6. Section 3 (3) of the 1976 Act being mandatory and having been held constitutional by this Court, it is no longer permissible for any court in India to appoint a receiver or otherwise permit extraction of coal or coking ooal. [594D-El\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 1311, 11269-70, 1113, 1109, 1479-1480, 924-925, 1478, 1250-1251, 1219, 926-927, 1072-1076, 1565, 1652-1654, 1434-1435, 1648, 1306-1310, 1312 1314, 1590-1591, 1588-1589 of 1979 and 400, 192, 448 and 462 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of t11e Constitution)\n\nA. K. Sen and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in WP Nos. 1306- H 1314/79, 1434, il 13, 1109, 1250-1251, 1219, 1072-1076, 1565, 1652-1654, 1435/79 and 192/80.\n\n5-_UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA K. N. Choubey and A. K. Srivastava for the Petitioners in WP\n\nNos. 1269-1270, 1590-1591, 1588-1589, 924-925, 926-927 /79.\n\nM. P. !ha for the Petitioners in W.P. 1648'/79.\n\nA. K. Ganguli, for the Petitioner in W.P. Nos. 1479~1480/79.\n\nArun Madan' for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 400/80.\n\nS. N. !ha for the Petitioners in W.P. No. 488/80.\n\nK. N. Choubey and Mukul Mudgal for the Petitioners in W.P. 462180.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl., M. K. Banerjee Addl. Sdl. Genl., and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent Union of India, Central Coal Fields, Easter Coal Field in WP. Nos. 1307, 1310, 1312, 1314 and Respondent 3 in W.P. Nos. 1308, 1588, 1589, 1434, 1072-1076/79.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl. and U. p. Singh for the Respondents, State of Bihar and Its officials in W.P. Nos. 1588-89, 1434, 1109, 924-925, 1250-1251, 926-927, 1219, 1250-1251, 1072, 1290-91, 1648, 1479-80, 1073-1074, 1565/79 and 400, 192, 488 and 462/80.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl. and Rathin Dass for the Respondents (West of Bengal) in W.P. Nos. 1306-1314, 1073-1074179.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee for the State of West Bengal in W.P. 1072/79.\n\nA. K. Srivastava for. the Caveator/Respondent No. 4 in W.P.\n\nNos. 1652-1654 of 1979.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. 'Survival after death' is the expression that aptly describes these writ petitions relating to coal mining by private agencies long after a prohibitory legislation and an order by this Court repelling the challenges to the vires of that Act. Parliament by the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976 (Act No.\n\nLXVII of 1976) (For short, the 1976 Act) totally prohibited all mining of coal save by instrumentalities set out in s. 3, sub-s. (3) which we may excerpt here :\n\n(3) On and from the commenc, ement of Section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976.-\n\n(a) no person, other than- 8\n\n(i) the Central Governmerrt or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or\n\n' 1\n\n(ii) -a person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the .\n\nproviso to cl. ( c), has been granted by any such Government, compariy or corporation, or\n\n(iii) a company engaged in the production of iron and. steel shall carry on coal mining operation, in India.; in any form;\n\n(b) excepting the mining leases granted before such commencement in favour of the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause (a), and any sub-lease granted by any such Government, company or corporation, all other mining leases and sub-leases in fo.:rce immediately before such commencement, shall, in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated;\n\n( c) no lease for winning or mini'ng coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause (a). /\n\nProvided that the Government, company or corporation to whom a lease for winning or mining coal has been granted may &rant a sublease to any person in any area on such terms and conditions as may\n\nbe eipecifiaj in the instrument granting the sub-lease, if the Govern- E ment, company or corporation is satisfied that-\n\n(i) the reserves of coal in the area are in isolated small pockets or are not sufficient for scientific and economical development in a co-ordinated and integrated manner, and\n\n(ii) the coal produced by the sub-lease will not be required to be transported by rail.\n\nIt is obvious that the provision is peremptory and the prohibition is mandatory because there is punishment provided for contravention of that provision. Section 4(1) of the 1976 Act makes a breach of s. 3 (3) punishable with imprisonment.\n\nThis broad spectrum ban in law arrested the extraction of coal and was naturally assailed as ultra vires by the managements themselves in writ petitions under !\\rt. 32. A bench of seven judges of this court heard erudite and elaborate arguments, at the e'nd of which the writ petitions were dismissed. But it is not unusual for many litigants 'even though vanquished, to argue still'. Here, however, the challenge and challenger are. of different colour. For, the petitioners before us\n\n11'\n\nclaim to be workmen who are. thrown out of employment on account of the 197 6 Act and lament in this Court that they are discriminated. against and on that score the law is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The plea put for, ward is that in regard to nationalised coal mines the workmen are taken care of and their benefits assured, while in regard to coal mines where milling is prohibited by s. 3 (3) of the 1976 Act the workmen are left in the cold. This is stated to be discrimination between workmen and workmeri, thus contraveniug the mandate of equality before the law. Maybe, the writ missiles of the managements proved damp squibs but the workers undaunted by that rebuff, want to try a new weapon of ultra vires. The coal will go to the employers and the wages to the workers.\n\nThe Union of India resists this relief and contends that the writ petitioners are mere reincarnations of the old managements which have fought and lost and are masquerading as workmen so as to facilitate a second challenge. The State asserts that clandestine coal mining mafia having been stopped, these racketeers are playing the maricha game through bogus workers in tears. Without going into the merits of this avernment we may state that every other conceivable objection to the validity of the 1976 Act and other sister enactments had been urged in vain before the seven judges' bench. Now the alleged workmen are complaining of discriminatory denial of benefits to one class of workers. The Union df India counters this plea as factually a ruse for clandestine mining operations by management and legaUy a second battle after the legal Waterloo, hoping against hope that there is nothing to lose in a gamble. Even if a spell of stay were got the gain will outweigh possible losses in litigation. Indeed, the State's contention is that considerable losses to Government and traumatic consequences on the nation are being daily inflicted by such clandestine operations. The whole mischief contemplated by the 1976 Act is being continued under the guise of invalidity of the legislation and, alternatively, by going to court and getting receivers appointed so that a legal colour is imparted to lawless depradations.\n\nIt is true that nationalisation of coal, as a policy, has been evolved over the seventies. In the beginning, the management of coal mines\n\nwas taken over and at a later stage ownership itself vested in the Union of India by virtue of ownership of all coal mines is the simple and incontrovertible fact emerging from the bunch of legislation we have' been taken through. We are not going into the catena of enactments and their Gequence covering this question, because they are bei'ng discussed in greater detail and fuller depth in the comprehensive judgment where , reasons have yet to be given but the result, by way\n\n:....--.\n\nof brief order, has already been announced. Suffice it to say that the 1976 Act totally prohibits working of any coal mines by any agency other than those which have been set out in s. 3(3). Surely, there is oo authority for the managements under whom the present petitioners are alleged to be workmen to operate coal mines in the face of the prohibition in the, 1976 Act. There is a point of dispute raised by the Union of India that the managements which have come up before this Court do not have even leases under the Mines a'nd Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. This is controverted by the other side but we may side-step that issue because it is not essential for the decision of this case. For one thing, no such lease is before us. For another, what is relied on i'n some cases is hukumnamas which cannot do duty for leases. Even granting leases and their renewal by the State itself as is asserted in a few cases, the grown and force of the Jaw stand four square between the mines and extraction of coal by any but the agencies specified in s.3(3) of the 1976 Act.\n\nIt is common ground that there is no specification of the coal mines in question i'n the schedule to the nationalisation legislation of 1973, nor is there any specific notification relating thereto. Investigation by the State or intimation by the private managements are obligatory under the appropriate legislation and in the absence of any intimation-none has been produced before us-we have to presume that these are no such coal mines as are set up before us. What apparently has been done, it at all, is to do what has been described as 'scratching that is surface mining of coal bearing areas, destructive of thei\n\nnatural resonrces of the nation without any thought for the morrow and without any reference to the planned, phased programme of exploitation of coal for the benefit of the country in the public sector.\n\nWe are satisfied that on the materials placed before us in all these cases, the mines, if a'ny, are illicitly being operated, there being no sanction of the Jaw. It is precisely to prevent this mischief of slaughter mining that s. 3 (3) was introduced and s. 4 was enacted to make the activity punishable. The proscription is comprehensive and the penalty makes it imperative. Once we' accept the position that it is not permissible to operate these mines save by those specified in the 1976 statute, it necessarily follows that wor);:men, genuine or other, cannot claim any fundamental right to work these mines. The prohibition of mining coal except as under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act, is in the public interest and indeed, the scheme shows that wherever public interest requires exploitation of coal mines it has been permitted in the public sector and even in the private sector so far as certai.n specified industries~ such as iron and steel industries, are concerned. The ban is part of a\n\nnational policy, conceived for conservation of a vital national resource and the wisdom of the regulation of fuel sources and their planned user is beyond argument. Therefore, the language of s. 3(3) is express, explicit and admits of no exception. An aware court will not relax when the language is peremptory, the legislation is charged with a critical purpose and even the commiserative cause of workmen-not wolves in heep's clothing. as is asserted,-cannot override the larger cause of the nation. No nation no workmen;\n\nAssuming for a moment that the private managements are, as Dr. Chitale and Shri A. K. Sen urged, deemed custodians within the c scheme of the legislative take-over, they are necessarily to operate oil behalf and under the direction of the Central Government. Here is the Central Government protesting, as stridently as it can, against the mining operations by the alleged mine-owners. Both the State and Central Governments are making common cause and demand that no\n\ndeemed custodian need work any mine on their behalf. How can a surrogate custodian exceed the command of the principal to stop mi_ning? The whole case of the Union of India is that a clandestine cluster a sort of coal mafia which may even have got sham registers of workmen-is defying Government and extracting coal on the sly. It is audacious for the dubious managements, under whom the petitioners are supposed to be innocent workmen, to represent to the court that they are 'deemed custodians', working on behalf of the Central Government.\n\n Nor are we prepared to accept the naive case that the petitioners' employers can be regarded as deemed custodians under s. 5. We may read s. 5 of the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973.\n\n5. Power of Central Government to direct vesting of rights in a Government company :-\n\n(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 and 4, the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that a Government company is willing to comply, or has complied, wrth such terms and conditions as that Gover'.nmeut may think fit to impose, direct, by an order in writing, the right, title and interest of an owner in relation to a coal mine referred to in Section 3, shall; instead of continuing vest in the Central Government, vest in the Government company either on the date of publication of the direction or on such earlier or later date (not being a date earlier tnan the appointed day), as may be specified in the direction.\n\n' .1 :ff.\n\n. ··~\n\n) •\n\n(2) Where the right, title and i11terest of an owner in relating to a coal mines vest in a Government company under sub-section ( 1), the Government company shall on\n\nand from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the lessee in relation to such coal mine as if a mining lease in relation to the coal mine had been granted to the Government company and the period of such lease shall be the entire period for which such lease could have been granted under the Mineral Concession Rules; and all the rights and liabilities of the Central Government in relation to such coal mine shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the rights and liabilities, respectively, of the Governme\"nt company.\n\n(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 4 shall apply to a lease which vests in a Government company as they apply to a lease vested in the Central Government and references therein to the \"Central Government\" shall be construed as references to the Government company.\n\nThe notification required under s. 5 authorising the mine to be worked, is admittedly absent. No such notification exists or has been hinted at or is existing. In the absence of the relevant notification contemplated by s. 5, it is impossible to postulate 'deemed custodianship'.\n\nThere are scheduled mines or notified mines, under the scheme of statutory management in the Management Take-over\n\nAct.\n\nNotifications a.re a sine qua non for custodian-ship, actual or deemed and absent such notification taking over management no private agency can self-style itself as deemed custodian. It follows that on any view of the matter the managements other than those specified under s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act can claim to extract coal from any coal mines. If this conclusion is sound, as we have demonstrated it is, the inference is irresistible that no one can claim to extract coal as a workman, although in public interest, it is imperative that such operation should stop. We hold that there is no violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, vis-a-vis the workmen concerned assuming them to be real workmen.\n\nWe have grave doubts about the varacity of this p.iece of workmanship that the petitio'ners and others of their ilk are actual, not imaginary. Anyway, after the dismissal of the managements' writ petitions, the argument that the Act impugned is ultra vires vis a vis\n\nworkmen is a daring legal workmanship. If a larger bench of this Court has already upheld the vires of a. statute the discovery of a new argument cannot invalidate that decision.\n\nThat proposition will make the binding effect of precedents, read i'n the light of Art. 141, a vanishing cream once a novel thought strikes a legal brain.\n\nThe question of discrimination between two classes of workmen hardly arises because one set of mines has been closed down validly.\n\nIf the closure is valid, no' one employed there has a right to force it open on the score of discrimination, Denial of lay\"off or other benefits belong to a different jurisdiction, If any workmen are really aggrieved that their interests are not protected and that their future is in jeopardy, it is certainly open to them t_o make representation to the Central Government for consideration of their lot, and certainly a welfare State will give due consideration for such representation if it is satisfied tlrat !he grievance is genuine.\n\nWe dismiss the Writ Petition with costs.\n\nIt has been mentioned on more than one occasion in this court that interlocutory orders have been passed, that Receivers have been appointed by civil courts, including High Courts, and that working of mines is licitly going on. In the face of the all-pervasive statutory prohibition which is peremptory in language and punishable in consequence, it is surprising that any Receiver could at all dare to work mines.\n\nWhile we disapprove of that conduct we make it perfectly plain that there will be no more _sauction for any receiver or other officer of court to extract coal or coking coal from any mine in India.\n\nSection 3 (3) of the 1976 Act being mandatory and having been held constitutional by this Court, it is no longer permissible for any court in India to appoint ll receiver or otherwise permit extraction of coal or cokiug.coal.\n\nWe vacate all interim orders forthwith.\n\nIt may be fair to the learned Attorney General, whose hunch we share to state that this wealth of \"workers\" writ petitions is a kind of litigative puppetry, the illicit mine exploiters being the puppetteers and those who figiire as worker petitioners being the puppets.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n( • __.__\n\n• '\n\n~- -", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "ANR\n\nUNION° OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 62, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, 0."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. C!IINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 240, "end_char": 249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262, "end_char": 272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 568, "end_char": 577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 708, "end_char": 717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 875, "end_char": 884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2249, "end_char": 2252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2276, "end_char": 2279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2676, "end_char": 2683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3768, "end_char": 3786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is audacious for the dubious managements under whom the petitioners are supposed to be innocent workmen to represent to the Court that they are \"deemed custodians\" working on behalf of the Central Government. ["}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3804, "end_char": 3813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4320, "end_char": 4330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4794, "end_char": 4802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5559, "end_char": 5568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5701, "end_char": 5706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3 (3) of the 1976 Act being mandatory and having been held constitutional by this Court, it is no longer permissible for any court in India to appoint a receiver or otherwise permit extraction of coal or coking ooal. ["}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6089, "end_char": 6098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of t11e Constitution)\n\nA. K. Sen and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6103, "end_char": 6114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of t11e Constitution)\n\nA. K. Sen and S. K. Sinha for the Petitioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "A K. N. Choubey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6290, "end_char": 6305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5-_UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA K. N. Choubey and A. K. Srivastava for the Petitioners in WP\n\nNos."}}, {"text": "A. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6310, "end_char": 6326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5-_UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA K. N. Choubey and A. K. Srivastava for the Petitioners in WP\n\nNos."}}, {"text": "M. P. !", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6415, "end_char": 6422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. P. !"}}, {"text": "A. K. Ganguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6464, "end_char": 6477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Ganguli, for the Petitioner in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Arun Madan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arun Madan' for the Petitioners in W.P. No."}}, {"text": "S. N. !", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6579, "end_char": 6586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. !"}}, {"text": "K. N. Choubey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Choubey and Mukul Mudgal for the Petitioners in W.P. 462180."}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6648, "end_char": 6660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Choubey and Mukul Mudgal for the Petitioners in W.P. 462180."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6698, "end_char": 6714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Att.", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha"}}, {"text": "M. K. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6727, "end_char": 6741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Banerjee Addl."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6769, "end_char": 6782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent Union of India, Central Coal Fields, Easter Coal Field in WP."}}, {"text": "U. p. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 7004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and U. p. Singh for the Respondents, State of Bihar and Its officials in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7026, "end_char": 7040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and U. p. Singh for the Respondents, State of Bihar and Its officials in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7219, "end_char": 7235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Att.", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha"}}, {"text": "Rathin Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7251, "end_char": 7262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Rathin Dass for the Respondents (West of Bengal) in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7339, "end_char": 7355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee for the State of West Bengal in W.P. 1072/79."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. 'Survival after death' is the expression that aptly describes these writ petitions relating to coal mining by private agencies long after a prohibitory legislation and an order by this Court repelling the challenges to the vires of that Act."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7839, "end_char": 7858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7985, "end_char": 7989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8069, "end_char": 8078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8115, "end_char": 8134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Governmerrt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8176, "end_char": 8195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LXVII of 1976) (For short, the 1976 Act) totally prohibited all mining of coal save by instrumentalities set out in s. 3, sub-s. (3) which we may excerpt here :\n\n(3) On and from the commenc, ement of Section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976.-\n\n(a) no person, other than- 8\n\n(i) the Central Governmerrt or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or\n\n' 1\n\n(ii) -a person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the ."}}, {"text": "Section 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9870, "end_char": 9882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9917, "end_char": 9921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10635, "end_char": 10642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10851, "end_char": 10855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11249, "end_char": 11263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India resists this relief and contends that the writ petitioners are mere reincarnations of the old managements which have fought and lost and are masquerading as workmen so as to facilitate a second challenge."}}, {"text": "Union df India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11942, "end_char": 11956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union df India counters this plea as factually a ruse for clandestine mining operations by management and legaUy a second battle after the legal Waterloo, hoping against hope that there is nothing to lose in a gamble."}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13478, "end_char": 13485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14361, "end_char": 14367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15439, "end_char": 15443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15467, "end_char": 15471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15872, "end_char": 15879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16397, "end_char": 16404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16793, "end_char": 16800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No nation no workmen;\n\nAssuming for a moment that the private managements are, as Dr. Chitale and Shri A. K. Sen urged, deemed custodians within the c scheme of the legislative take-over, they are necessarily to operate oil behalf and under the direction of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17134, "end_char": 17153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the State and Central Governments are making common cause and demand that no\n\ndeemed custodian need work any mine on their behalf."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17863, "end_char": 17867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17881, "end_char": 17885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17893, "end_char": 17929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18061, "end_char": 18077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973", "statute": "the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18384, "end_char": 18393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973", "statute": "the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19455, "end_char": 19464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19726, "end_char": 19730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19914, "end_char": 19918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20371, "end_char": 20378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20701, "end_char": 20708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21328, "end_char": 21336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22728, "end_char": 22737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_595_602_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "MAHJ.Nl)RA NATII SHUKLA AND ORS.\n\nSTATE OFI BIHAR AND ORS. ETC.\n\nApril 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY AND A. p, SEN, JI.] a\n\nCoal Mines (Natio1ialisatiQn) ACI, 1973 (Act 26 of 1973) as am<nded by Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976, Section 3(3)-Whether the andment relates only to Coal Mines and not to Coking Coal Mines-\n\nWorda 'Ind Phrases-MfQmng of \"no person, other than the Central Govern ment ot a Govern111ent Compiiny or a , Corporation owned, managed or controll\n\ned iy. 1h1 CBntrql Governnient . .. , . , , ... shall carry on coal mining operatiom C, in lndla, In any form\".\n\nDiuni..n.1 the petitions, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. \"Coal Mine\" in the 1976 Act includes coking coal mine and section 3 ( 3) of that Act clamps down the ban on extraction of Coking Cail\n\nalso\n\n[601BCJ\n\nHiatory may illumine but cannot imprison interpretation.\n\nIt is true that in 1971 when Parliament was faced with a crisis regarding need for Coking coal in iron and steel industries, on an emergency footing was made solely confined to coking coal mines. The plan of the nation in regard to these natural resources was then embryonic and later final and there was step-by-step legislation to implement the policy on a phased programme. The culmmalion came in the blanket ban of 1976. [5991>-EJ\n\nThe expression in Section 3(3) is semantically sweeping and is wide in meaning so as to spare no class of coal, including even coking coal, because coking coal is a species of coal, coal itself being the genus.\n\nSection 2(b) of the 1973 Act defines coal mine to mean \"a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal\", Even a coking coal mine is a coal mine because the definition ii broa4 and this is clear from the definition of coldng coal mine in Section 3(c) of the Cokins Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, [600E-G]\n\nGo1'iwi is QlDre precious, strategically speaking, than other forms of coal and it would be an error, qay a blunder, to prevent private extraction of common coal and to permit removal of coking coal. It would be pathetic llnd bathetic for any policy-maker to be so egregious. Parliament may err but not bo abJitrd! So cotllltUtd, it is obvious that coking coal, which is more im portantly ne<ded for th• nation than other supplies of coal, muat be the last to be squandered away by permitting it to be privately exploited.\n\n[601ABJ\n\n3. Even OSlluming there is a fire clay or other layer somewhere in the bowels ol the earth the statutory mandate is that once you come up on a coal seam you shall stop •xll'N:ting it to proceed beyond. May be some injury may be caused, fancied or real, but it is permissible for Parliament to make provision\n\n11'\n\nto prevent evasion of the PQrpoae of the statnte by prohibition of mining H other inincra!a wllic1' Jl!iY iJlci4entally \\!cfeat the co.i IUltioisation lllWUll. [601l>-l')\n\n18-289 SCJ/80\n\n59B\n\nSUPRIME COURT !\\!!PORTS\n\n(1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\n4. Section 3(3) of the 1976 Act, being all.ino!usivoimdhhing been con stitutionally upheld it is no longer permissible for any Court in India to ~- appoint a receiver for or Qtherwise pe'rmit extraction of coal or coking coal.\n\nThe Court cannot :sanction the com-mission of a Crime:-\n\n__ [6910, H1 602A]\n\nORIGINAL JuRismcnoN: Writ Petition Nos. 112-115, 175, 297, 194-198, 489-90, 459, 215, 2-3 and 432/80, 1477 of 19.79, 1516- B 1517/79.\n\n(Un<ler Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nAND\n\nSPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2746 of 1980.\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated the 11th February, 1980 of the High Court of Calcutta in Appeal from an Order No. Nil of 1980.\n\nA. K. Srivastava for the Petitioners in WP Nos. 213 and 175/80 . . H.K. Puri for the Petitioners in. WP Nos. 1516, 1517,.1477/79 and 2-3 of 1980. M. P. !ha for the Petitioners in WP No. 297 /80.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, B. P. Singh and Naresh K. Sharma for the Petitioners in WPs Nos. 112-115/80.\n\nP. R. Mridul and D. P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners in WPs 489 490 and 432 of 1980.\n\nE A. K. Sen, S. K. Sinha and C. K. Ratnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs. 194-198/80.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, G. S. Chatterjee, and D. P. Mukherjee. for the Petitioners in SLP No. 2746 of 1980.\n\nS. K. Jain for the Petitioners in WP No. 439/80.\n\nM. K. Banerjee Addi. Sol. Genl. and Miss A. Subhashlni for the Respondent No. 3 in WP Nos. 112-115, 175/80.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl. and U. P. Singh for the Respondent State of Bihar and Its Official in WP Nos. 112-115/80, 1477/79, 175, 213, 2-3, 459, 489-90/80 and SLP No. 2746/80.\n\nM. K. Banerjee, Addi. Sol. Genl. and S. B. Sinha and D. P.\n\nMukherjee for the Respondent No. 9 in WPs 112-115 of 1980.\n\nRathi11 Das for the Respondents (State of West Bengal) in WPs.\n\nNos. 1516-1517/79.\n\nS. S. Jauhar for the Interveners in WP No. 175/80.\n\nff The Judgment of the Court was delivered by~\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J.-We have a hunch-we leave -it -at .that~ that these \"Workers\" writ petitions are a kind of litigatie pnppe:try,.\n\n• +\n\n·----e..\n\n• I\n\nthe illicit mine exploiters being the puppeteers. This set of writ peti- A tions, where some private managements claim to have the right to extract coking coal on the score that prohibition enacted in the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976 does 'not affect or operate on coking coal mines, must be dismissed as devoid of deserts.\n\nThe short point sharply focussed by Dr. Chitale and echoed with B some variant notes by other counsel, in support of these writ petitions may be briefly stated thus.\n\nAccording to him,. the history of coal nationalisation legislation in this country in the seventies of this cehtury shows that Parliament has treated coal and coking coal separately for legislative purposes in regard to taking over of management, nationalisation of onwership and the like. It all began with the year C 1971 when Parliament enacted the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the 1971 Act, for short).\n\nH took over management of coking coal mines.\n\nIron and Steel are key industries requiring, importantly, coking coal for their very survival.\n\nWhen Parliament found that coking coal was not being made available properly to the Industry on account of the unsatisfactory con- D duct of the private sector operating in this field, the entire management of coking coal mines was taken over on an emergency footing in the public interest by the 1971 Act.\n\nThereafter, with more deliberation and detailed investigation, the management of coking coal mines (and of other coal mines) was taken over by appropriate legislation.\n\nStill E later, after mature planning and understanding of implications, Parliament enacted legislation for vesting of ownership of coking coal mines and eventually of all coal mines. The Management of coking coal was taken over by the Central Government under Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971. The management of all other coal mines was taken over by the Central Government under the Coal F Mines (Taking over of Management) Act, 1973.\n\nThe second step after management came under the control of the Central Government was the actual nationalisation of ownership itself. This state of planning led to Parliamentary enactments of Coking Coal Mines (N ationa-\n\nIisation) Act, 1972 (36 of 1972) and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 (26 of 1973). The sequence of events shows the G evolution of national policy in this regard. Coking coal, being abs<>- lutely essential, was first taken over urgently.\n\nLater on, the entire coal industry came under Parliamentary consideration and management thereof was taken over.\n\nFinally, the ownership of all coal mines, including coking coal mines, was vested in the Central Government and in certain instrumentalities created by Central Government. Thus H we see that the comprehensive plan behind coal nationil!isation did not permit of private agencies operating in the field.\n\nCoking coal was\n\n19-289 SCI/80\n\nmore strategic than ordinary coal having regard to its use for iron and steel industries. Nevertheless, it was found as a fact that on account of these mines being located in remote places and in jungles, especially in the State of Bihar and Bengal, the Central Government wanted to take effective steps to put an end to clandestine mining by any private agency. The jungle of laws haphzardly enacted partly helped the privateers get round the law and clandestinely or eveu through court receivers extract coal as there was big money in it.\n\nTherefore, the 1976 Act was, enacted to plug all loopholes, virtually banish the private sector and to ensure legal success for Project Public Sector in the field of coal mining. Section 3(3) of the 1976 Act reads thus:\n\n3.(3) On and from the commencement of section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976 :-\n\n( i) the Central Government or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or\n\n(ii) a person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the proviso to clause ( c) has been granted by any such Government, company or Corporation, or\n\n(iii) a company engaged in the production of iron and steel, shall carry on coal mining operation in India, in any form;\n\n(b) excepting the mining leases granted before such commencement in favour of the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause(a), and any sub-lease granted by any such Government, company or corporation, all other mining leases and sub-leases in force immediately before such commencement, shall, in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated;\n\n( c) no lease for winning or mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause(a) :\n\nSection 4 of the same Act super-adds severe punishment for contravention of the prohibition contained in s. 3(3). The total effect\n\nthus is clear. The Parliament wanted to prevent the mischief of coal R mining and other illicit extraction of coal to the national detriment.\n\nScratching, slaughter mining and such like activities on the sly were regarded as defeating the nationalisation scheme.\n\n( • ....__\n\nCounsel for the petitioners contended that the legislative history was relevant to the interpretatioo of s. 3(3) of the 1976 Act. In his submission, the amendment brought about in 1976 incorporating total interdict of mining applied only in relation to coal mines and not in relation to coking coal mines. For this argument he sought sustenance from the existence of two sets of legislation dealing with coal mines and coking coal mines throughout the 1970s. He further pointed out that even as late as 1978 when amendments were contemplated in regard to coal mines' and coking coal mines' nationalisation there were separate provisions separately inserted in both the nationalisation measures. He cited the 1978 Act as illustrative, even decisive. The absence of any mention of coking coal mines in the 1976 Act, was, in his submission, conclusive of the parliamentary intent in his favour, especially when read in the light of the history of the package of nationalisation legislations.\n\nWe are far from satisfied that there is substance in this submission.\n\nHistory may illumine but cannot imprison interpretation. It is true that in 1971 when Parliament was faced with a crisis regarding need\n\nfor coking coal in iron and steel industries a legislation, on an emergency footing, was made solely confined to coking coal mines.\n\nAs we have earlier explained, the plan of the nation in regard to these natural resources was then embryonic and later final and there was step-by-step legislation to implement the policy on a phased programme. The culmination came in the blanket ban of 1976. We are concerned here with the interpretation of s. 3(3) which we reproduce again for facility of reference at this stage :\n\n3. ( 3 ) On and from the commencement of section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976,-\n\n(a) no person, other than-\n\n(i) the Central Government or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or\n\n(ii) a person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the proviso to clause ( c) has been granted by any such Government, company or corporation, or\n\n(iii) a company engaged in the production of iron and H steel, shall carry on coal mining operation, in India, in any form;\n\n(b) excepting the mining leases granted before snch commencement in favour of the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause (a), and any sub-lease granted by any such Government, company or corporation, all other mining leases and sub-leases in force immediately before such commencement, shall, in so far as they relate to B the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated;\n\n( c) no lease for winning or mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause (a) :\n\nProvided that the Government, company or corporation to whom a lease for wjnning or mining coal has been granted may grant a sub-lease to any person in any area on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the instrument granting the sub-lease, if the Government, company or corporation is satisfied that-\n\n( i) the reserves of coal in the area are in isolated small pockets or are not sufficient for scientific and economical development in a co-ordinated and integrated manner, and\n\n(ii) the coal produced by sub-lessee will not be required to be tran_sported by rail.\n\nThe_ short question of statutory construction turns on the meaning to be assigned to the expression \"no person, other than the Central Government or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government. ......... shall carry on coal mining operations in India, in any form\". The; expression F is semantically sweeping and is wide in meaning so as to spare no class of coa•J, including even coking coal, because coking coal is a species of coal, coal itself being the genus. What is more, there is a definition of 'coal mine' in the Coal mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973.\n\nSection 2(b) of the 1973 Act defines coal mine to mean \"a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal\". It is apparent that G even a coking coal mine is a coal mine because the definition is broad.\n\nIt is inarguable that coking coal is not coal. This conclusion is reinforced by looking at the definition of coking coal mine in s. 3 ( c) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972.\n\nSection 3(c) reads thus :\n\nH \"coking coal mine\" means a coal mine in which there exists one or more seams of coking coal, whether exclusively or in addition to any seam of other coal.\n\nIndeed, it is irrefutable, viewed literally, lexically, semantically, teleologically or applying the rule in Heydon's case(') that coking coal mine is a coal mine. If it is a coal mine it is covered by the 1976 Act.\n\nCoking coal is more precious,, strategically speaking, than other forms of coal and it would be an error, nay a blunder, to preve'nt private extraction of common coal and to permit removal of coking coal. It would be pathetic and bathetic for any policy-maker to be so egregious.\n\nParliament may err but not be absurd ! So constrned, it is obvious that coking coal, which is more importantly needed for the nation than other supplies of coal, must be the last to be squandered away by permitting it to be privately exploited.\n\nWe have no hesitation in holding that 'coal mine' in the 1976 Act includes coking coal mine ands. 3(3) of that Act clamps down the ban on extraction of coking coal also.\n\nIt was feebly submitted that some of the mines may have fire-clay layers to reach which the mining operation may hve to pass through coal seams; and, therefore, such operation cannot be prohibited. We are not impressed with this argument at all. Even assuming there is fire clay or other layer somewhere in the bowels of the earth the statutory mandate is that once you come up on a coal seam you shall stop extracting it to proceed beyond.\n\nMaybe, some injury may be caused, fancied or real, but it is permissible for Parliament to make provision to prevent evasion of the purpose of the statute by prohibition of mining other minerals which may incidentally defeat the coal nationalisation measure.\n\nIn this view we find no merit in any of the writ petitions and dismiss them all with costs.\n\nIt has been mentioned on more than one occasion in this court that interlocutory orders have been sought and obtained, that Receivers have been appointed by other courts and that they have been working these mines.\n\nIn the face of the statutory prohibition which is imperative in tone and all-embracing in language, even punishable for violation, it is surprising that any Receiver could at all dare to work mines without running a grave risk. The court cannot sanction the commission of a crime.\n\nWe make it perfectly plain that there will be no more authorisation for any receiver or other officer of court to extract coal or coking coal from any mine in India. Section 3 (3) of the 1976 Act, being all-inclusive and having been constitutionally upheld by this Court, it is no longer permissible for any court in India\n\n(!) [1584] 3 Rep. 7b.\n\n20-289 SCI/80\n\nto appoint a receiver for or otherwise permit extraction of coal or coking coal.\n\nThese observations and reasonings must converge to only one conclnsion that the crowd of writ petitions deserve to be and are hereby dismissed-of course, with costs.\n\nWe would conclude with a conscientious query-will the State keep the coal mafia out, break the coal racket where government agencies are suspect and demonstrate that, the court having come to the aid of the Executive, nationalisation will fulfil the targets and tide over the crisis ? Caesar's wife must be above suspicion.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OFI BIHAR AND ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 11, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 11, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, 0."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CllINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 266, "end_char": 278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 725, "end_char": 734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1523, "end_char": 1535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1768, "end_char": 1780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2121, "end_char": 2131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliament may err but not bo abJitrd!"}}, {"text": "(1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\n4", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2909, "end_char": 2927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2929, "end_char": 2941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3062, "end_char": 3067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(3) of the 1976 Act, being all.ino!usivoimdhhing been con stitutionally upheld it is no longer permissible for any Court in India to ~- appoint a receiver for or Qtherwise pe'rmit extraction of coal or coking coal."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3374, "end_char": 3384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Srivastava for the Petitioners in WP Nos."}}, {"text": "H.K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3659, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.K. Puri for the Petitioners in."}}, {"text": "M. P. !", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3738, "end_char": 3745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. P. !"}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3792, "end_char": 3805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, B. P. Singh and Naresh K. Sharma for the Petitioners in WPs Nos."}}, {"text": "B. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3807, "end_char": 3818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, B. P. Singh and Naresh K. Sharma for the Petitioners in WPs Nos.", "canonical_name": "B. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "Naresh K. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, B. P. Singh and Naresh K. Sharma for the Petitioners in WPs Nos."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and D. P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners in WPs 489 490 and 432 of 1980."}}, {"text": "D. P. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3902, "end_char": 3917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and D. P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners in WPs 489 490 and 432 of 1980.", "canonical_name": "D. P.\n\nMukherjee"}}, {"text": "E A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3971, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E A. K. Sen, S. K. Sinha and C. K. Ratnaparkhi for the Petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "S. K. 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Banerjee Addi."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashlni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Miss A. Subhashlni for the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4322, "end_char": 4338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Att."}}, {"text": "U. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and U. P. Singh for the Respondent State of Bihar and Its Official in WP Nos.", "canonical_name": "B. P. Singh"}}, {"text": "S. B. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4538, "end_char": 4549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and S. B. Sinha and D. P.\n\nMukherjee for the Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Sinha"}}, {"text": "D. P.\n\nMukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4554, "end_char": 4570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and S. B. Sinha and D. 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8713, "end_char": 8722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8759, "end_char": 8778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8792, "end_char": 8810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 3(3) of the 1976 Act reads thus:\n\n3.(3) On and from the commencement of section 3 of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1976 :-\n\n( i) the Central Government or a Government company or a corporation owned, managed or controlled by the Central Government, or\n\n(ii) a person to whom a sub-lease, referred to in the proviso to clause ( c) has been granted by any such Government, company or Corporation, or\n\n(iii) a company engaged in the production of iron and steel, shall carry on coal mining operation in India, in any form;\n\n(b) excepting the mining leases granted before such commencement in favour of the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause(a), and any sub-lease granted by any such Government, company or corporation, all other mining leases and sub-leases in force immediately before such commencement, shall, in so far as they relate to the winning or mining of coal, stand terminated;\n\n( c) no lease for winning or mining coal shall be granted in favour of any person other than the Government, company or corporation, referred to in clause(a) :\n\nSection 4 of the same Act super-adds severe punishment for contravention of the prohibition contained in s. 3(3)."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9730, "end_char": 9739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9835, "end_char": 9842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10243, "end_char": 10250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11778, "end_char": 11785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11895, "end_char": 11904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11941, "end_char": 11960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14137, "end_char": 14149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14474, "end_char": 14478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14539, "end_char": 14551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14833, "end_char": 14839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, it is irrefutable, viewed literally, lexically, semantically, teleologically or applying the rule in Heydon's case(') that coking coal mine is a coal mine."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17098, "end_char": 17107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_603_612_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION AND ORS.\n\nDR. MOHD. S. !SKENDER ALI\n\nApril 14. 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA, S. MURTAZA FAZAI. Au AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.J B\n\nTennination of Services-Tern1ination Si111pliciter-Services of a probationer terminated without further proceeding against the departmental enquiry- Whether offends Art. 311 (2) of the- Constitution and attaches any stigma.\n\nThe respondent was appointed on a purely temporary basis to the post of a medical ofl:cer in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. Under the terms and C conditions of service. he was to remain on probation for a period of one y1e'ar \\V1iich could be extended -at the disi;; retion of the appointing authority He was appointed on Ottober 15, 1965. During the period of his probation. on a repart ag<iinst him for negligence and dereliction of duty, a departn1ental enquiry was held against him but that was not proceeded with, nor was any punishment imposed on him.\n\nHis period of probation was extend 4 ed for six months from 15-10-1966 and before his services were tenninated, there D was no express order either confirming hin1 or extending the period of probation.\n\nHis services were terminti.tcd with effect fron1 28th July 1967.\n\nT11e respondent filed a \\vdt petition in the High Court on the ground that the order tenninating his services was n1afa(idc and was in fact passed by way of penalty entailing evil consequenc.!S.\n\nThe plea taken by the respondent forind favour with the High Court which aJlowed the petition and quashed the E order of the appellant terminating the services of the respondent.\n\nHence the appeal by special leave by the State.\n\nAI!owing the appea.1 the Court\n\nHELD : 1. A temporary employee is <lppointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test' whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he niay he retained.\n\nThe remarks, in the assessment roll merely indicate the nature of the perfonnancc put in by the officer for the limited pilrpose of detern1ining \"\"hrther or not his probation should be extended.\n\nThese remarks were not intended to cnst any stigmn. f607G-H. 608A]\n\nR. L. Butail v. [Inion of India, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 55, followed.\n\n2. The contention thrit the real motive behind the termination of the service G .of the respondent \\V'as to inflict a punishn1cnt on him and as the appellants did nt, t comply with the requirements of Article 3 I 1 of the Constitution, the order in1pugned \\Vas illegal is not correct. Jn the first place, it was clearly pleaded by the Ciover11n1ent in its counter-affidavit thnt talthough an enquiry was held it was not continued and no punishment was in1poscd on the respondent.\n\nAs the respondent was merely a probationer the appointing authority did not consider it necessary to continue the enquiry but decided to terminate the services of the H respondent a~ he was not found suitable for the job.\n\nIn the case of Q probationer or a temporary employee. who has no right to 1he post, such a terrnina-\n\nA tion of his service is valid and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. [608C-E, G-H, 609A]\n\nEven if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the tctrms of appointment of the respondent such a power flo\\ved from the B contract of service it could not b~ termed as penalty or punishment. [61 lC-D]\n\nShamsher Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, [1975] 1 SCR 814; Purshotta.'n Lal Dhbzgra v. Union of Indi.a, [19581 SCR 828; Sta.te of U.P. v. Rc11n Chand Trivedi, [1977] 1 SCR 462; State of Maharaslit1'll v. J7eerappa R. Saboji end Anr. [1980] I SCR 551, followed.\n\n3. The order i'mpugned is prhna facie an order of termination simpliciter C without invohr:ing any stigma. The order does not in any way involve any evil consequences and is an order of discharge simpliciter of the respondent who was a probati.oner and had no right to the service. The respondent has not been able to make out any strong case for this Court to delve into the documents, materials in order to determine a case of victimisation or one of punishment. The short history of the service of the respondent clearly showed that his work had nfi.vcr been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being D retained in service and that is v.hy even though some sort of an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him.\n\nIn these circumstances therefore. if the appointing authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of th'e respondent-a probationer-it cannot. b~ said that the order of termination attracted the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Thus, if the appellant found that the respondent was not suitable for being retained in service that will not vitiate the order impugned. [61 lG-H.\n\n612B-DJ\n\nState of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Parsad, A.I.R. 1960, 689; distin.uished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuR1smcnoN : Civil Appeal No. 1385 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave (rom the Judgment and Order dated F 10-7-1969 of the Assam & Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule No. 249\n\n-1j_\n\nof 1967. ---.~.\n\n B. D(ltta for the Appellant.\n\nA. R. Barthakur, S. K. Nandy and P. Bhanlwkur for the Respon- ( dent.\n\nG The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against! a judgment and. order dated 10th July 1969 of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland. The facts giving rise to the appeal lie within a very narrow compass. lbe respondent, Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali, was H appointed on a purely temporary basis to the p-0st of a medical officer in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission: Under the tenns and conditions of his service, he was to remain on probation for a period of\n\nO.N.G. COMMISSION v. !SKENDER ALI (Fazcil Ali, J.) 605\n\none year which could be extended at the .discretion of the appointing authority. The respondent was appointed on October I 5, 1965 and the order of his appointment may be extracted thus :\n\n''No. 52 '~S/65-ENT Dated the 15th October 1965\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nWith re; ferencc to his interview on the 18th August 1965 held at Sibsagar, Shri Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali is hereby inturmed that he/she has been selected for a temporary post of l\\Iedical Officer in the Oil & Natural Gas Commission on an initial pay of Rs. 325/- p.m. in the scale of pay of }{s. 325-25-500-30-EB-30-800 (plus non practising allowance @ 25% of basic pay subject to m; nimum of Rs. 150/-).\n\nHe will be entitled to draw dearness and other allowances at such rates and subject to such condit:ons as may be laid dovm in the rules and orders governing the grant of such allowances from time to tilne.\"\n\nThe order of appointment was accompanied by conditions regulating his appointment and two of them may be extracted below, as they appear to be very relevant for the purpose of deciding the question at issue:-\n\n\"(ii) The appointment may be terminated at any time by one 1nonth's notice to be given by either side, viz., the appointee or the appointil1g authority, without ass1gmng any reasons.\n\nThe appointing authority, however, reserves the right of terminating the services of the appointee without notice or before exp'ration of the stipulated period of notice by making payment to him of a sum equivalent to the pay and allowances for the period of notice or the unexpireid portion thereof;\n\n\\iii) He will be on probation for a period of one year from\n\ntlm date of appointment.\n\nThis period may be extended at the, discretion of the appointing authority, if necessary.\n\nDuring the period of probation, the\n\nervices are liable to be terminated at any time without notice, and/pr assigning any re, sons whatsoever.\"\n\n It appears that during the period of his probation there were some reports agaimt the respondent as a result of which a departmenlJ 1 H enquiry was held against him but which does not appear to have been prO<:eeded with nor, was 'any punishment imposed on him.\n\nAfter he\n\nhad completed the period of one year on 15-10-1966 his probation was\n\nxtended for c.nother six months :rnd before his services were terminated, there w; is no express order either confirming him or extending the period of probation.\n\nUltimately, by an order dated 28th July 1967 the services of the respondent were terminated with effect from 28th July 1967. The order of termination runs thus :-\n\n\"No. 57/191/67-ENT Dated July 28, 1.967\n\nOFFICE ORDER\n\nUnder para 2!iii) of offer of appointment No. 52/;35/65- ENT dated October 16, 1965 the service of Dr. Md. Iskender Ali, Medical Officer (still on probation), is hereby tenninated with effect from the date of the service of this order on hinL\"\n\nThe respcndent felt aggrieved by the termination of his services and filed a writ petition in the High Court on the ground that the order terminating his services was mala fide and was in fact passed by way of penalty entailing evil consequences.\n\nThe plea taken by the respondent found favour with the High Court which allowed the peti- , tion and quashed the order of the appellant terminating the services of the respondent.\n\nThe appellant obtained special leave to appeal from this Court; hence the appeal has now been posted before us for hearing.\n\nThe only point raised before us by the appellants was that as the respondent wa5 a mere probationer and the order temunating his services was an order of termination simpliciter without ilil.volving any stigma or penalty, the High Court was in error in quashing the order of tennination and directing the reinstatement of the respondent. The counsel for the appellants submitted that reading the order per se there is nothing to indicate that it was passed by way of punishment.\n\nAs the respondent was a temporary employee on probation, it was open to the employer to terminate his services at any time be.fore he was confirmed. If the employer was sa'isfied that he was not suitable for being retained in service.\n\nThe cot1nsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the o'der, tl1ough per se innocuous, was really a cloak to conceal the real mischief which the order purported to perpetuate as the order of termination was preceded by a full-fledged departmental inquiry and a regular chargesheet was submitted against the respondent, it was because the respondent ':'as found guilty that he was punished by way of c!ilsmissal from service. In other words, the argument of the respondent was that the order of termination of the\n\nservices passed by the appellant was an order which amounted to A dismissal from service involving a clear stigma and would, therefore, attract the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution and was rightly quashed by the High Court,\n\nBefore examining the respective contentions of the parties it may be necessary to mention a few admitted facts : B\n\n( 1) It is not disputed that the respondent was appointed in a temporary post of Medical Officer and on probation of one year.\n\n(2) Being a probationer, the respondent had no right to the service.\n\n(3) Under the tenns of his appointment particularly clauses (ii) and (iii), extracted above, the appointing authority could terminate the services without assigning any reasons.\n\n(4) Under clause (iii) of the conditions of appointment, the appointing authority had a discretion to extend the period of probation and to terminate the services of the respondent without any notice and without giving any reasons whatsoever.\n\n(5) After the respondent had put in one year's probation, his period of probation was extended for a further period of six months which is a clear pointer to the fact that the appointing authority was not convinced that the respondent !tad satisfactorily completed the pe_riod of his probation.\n\nThe conliden, tial roll reflecting the assessment of the work of the respondent during the period 31-12-1965 to 30-12-1966 clearly shows that the officer was careless and lacking in sense of respqnsibility. The report also shows that the reporting officer recommended that the period of probation should be extended. In accordance with the recommendation, the period of probation was further extended by six months.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the remarks made in the assessment roll went to show that the intention of the appointing authority was to proceed against the respondent by way of punishment.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this submission. It is obvious that a temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained.\n\nThe remarks, in the assessment roll, merely indicate the nature of the perfonnance put in by the officer\n\nA for the limited purpose of Jetermining whether or not his probation\n\nshould be extegded.\n\nThese remarks were not intended to cai; t any stigma.\n\nIn the case of R. L. Butail v. Union of India & Ors.,(') this Court while indicating the nature of assessment made by the reporting officer observed as follows :-\n\n\"These rules abundantly show that a confidential report is intended to be a general assessment of work performed by a Government servant subordinate to the reporting authority, that such reports are maintained for the purpose of serving as data of comperative merit when questions of promotion, confirmation, etc., arise.\"\n\nIt was then vehemently contended by the respondent that as the appointing authority chose to institute a departmental inquiry against the respondent for dereliction of duty and negligence in not attending to a baby who died due to his carelessness, the enquiry should have been carried to its logical end and charge-sheet having been framed, the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution were clearly attracted and therefore it was not open to the appellants to have terminakd the services by giving the order a cover of termination simpliciter.\n\nIn other words, the contention was that the real motive behind the termination of the service of the respondent was to inflict a punishment on him and as the appellants did not comply with the requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution, the order impugned was illegal.\n\nWe are, however, unable to agree with this argument.\n\nJn the first place, it has been clearly pleaded by the Government in its counter-affidavit that although an enquiry was held yet it was not continued and no punishment was imposed on the respondent. In this connection, relevant portion of paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit before the High Court may be extracted :-\n\n\"A preliminary enquiry was made before the charge. was framed and on the enquiry report a prirna facie case having been found against the petitioner due charge was framed against him. No punishment under Regulation 28 of Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Regulation was inflicted on the petitioner.\"\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that as the respondent was merely a probationer, the appointing authority did not consider it necessary to continue the enquiry but decided to terminate the services of the respondent as he was not found suitable for the job. It is well settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that\n\n(I) [19711 2 S. C. R. 55.\n\n~--\n\n/ (---~\n\n' '\n\nin the case of a probationer or a temporary employee, who has no right to the post, such a termination of his services is valid and does not attract the provisions of Art. 311 of tbe Constitution. In the\n\ncase of Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab,( 1) the matter was considered in all its aspects by a Constitution Bench comprising seven Judges of this Court and the Court adumbrated the following pro- . 8 positions :-\n\n\"Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any tempermenta! or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. . . . . . The fact of holding an inquiry is not always conclusive.\n\nWhat is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment. .... A probationer whose temis of service provided that it could be terminated without any notice and without any cause being assigned could 'not claim the protection of Article 311(2) ....\n\nAn order terminating the services of a temporary servant or probationer under the Rules of Employment and withont anything more will not attract Article 311.\n\nWhere a departmental enquiry is contemplated and if an enquiry is not in fuct proceeded with Aricle 311 will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable in form is made following a report based on misconduct.\"\n\nSimilarly, the matter was previously considered in Parshotam Lal Dhingm i. Union of lndia(2) where the following observations were made:-\n\n\"Shortly put, the principle is that when a servarit has right to a post or to a rank either under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the termination of the service of such a servant or ms reduction to a .lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to\n\n\"1) [1975] 1 S. C.R. 814.\n\n(2) [1958] S. C., R. 828.\n\nget the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto. But if the servant has no right to the post, as where he is appointed to a post, permanent or temporary either on pr<>- bation or on an officiating basis and whose temporary service il'as not ripened into a quasi permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, the termination of his employment does not deprive him of any right and cannot, therefore, by itself be a punishment.\n\nOne test for determining whether the termination of the service of a Governmen servant is by way of punishment is to ascerta.in whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. If he had a right to the post as in the three oases hereinbefore mentioned, the termination of his service will by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the protection of Article 311. In other words and broadly speaking Art. 311 (2) will apply to those cases where the Government servant, had he been employed by a private employer, will be entitled to maintain an action for wrongful dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.\n\nTo put it in another way, if the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or, under the rules, the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the manner provided by the contract or the rules, is, prima facie and per se, not a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Art. 311.\"\n\nAll these decisions were reviewed in the case of State of U.P. v.\n\nRam Chandra Trivedi(') where this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Keeping in view the principles extracted above, the respondent's suit could not be decreed in his favour.\n\nHe was F a temporary ha'nd and bad no right to post. It is a'.so not denied that both under the contract of service and the service rules governing the respondent, the State bad a right to terminate his services by giving him one month's notice.\n\nThe order to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of ter-\n\nG mination of service simpliciter. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor is it founded on misconduct.\n\nIn the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order and claim the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution.\n\nB We, therefore, agree with the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was in error in arriv- ,,\n\n(I) [1977] I S. C. R. 462.\n\n~·\n\n.... ..\n\ning at the finding that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental corespondence that passed between the superiors of the respondent overlooking the observations made by this Court in I. N.\n\nSaksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1967 (2) S.C.R. 496) that when there are no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant, the Conrt would not delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred on such rese<arch.\"\n\nThe facts of the present case appear to be on all fours with those c of the aforesaid decision.\n\nFrom the undisputed facts detailed by us in an earlier part of the judgment, it is manifest that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of appointment of the respondent such a power flowed D from the contract of service it could not be termed as penalty or punishment.\n\nThe matter was again considered at great length by a recent decision of' this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v.\n\nVeerappa R. Saboji & Anr.,(') where Untwalia, J., observed thus :\n\n\"Ordinarily and generally the rule laid down in most of the cases by this Court is that you have to look to the order on the face of it and find whether it casts any stigma on the Government servant. In such a case there is no presumption that the order is arbitrary or mala fide unless a very strong case is made out and proved by the Government servant who challenges such an order.\"\n\nApplying the principles enunciated by this Court in various cases to the facts of the present case, the position is that the order impugned is prima facie an order of termination simpliciter without involving any stigma.\n\nThe order does not in any way involve any evil consequences and is an order of discharge simpliciter of the respondent who was a probationer and had no right to the service.\n\nThe respondent has not been able to make out any strong case for this Court to delve into the documents, materials in order to determine a case of victimisation or one of punishment.\n\n(1) A. I. R.\n\n1980 S. C. 42 .\n\nReliance was, however, placed by the respondent on a decision of this Court in the case of The State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad('), where it was held that although termination of the service of a person holding the p06t on probation cannot be said to deprive him of any right to the post and is no punishment but where instead of terminating a person's service the employer choose to hold an enquiry into his alleged misconduct and proceeds by way of a punishment, such a course involves a stigma and an order of termination is bad. Such, however, is not the case here. The short history of the service of the respondent clearly shows that his work had never been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in service and that is why even C though some sort of an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him. In these circumstances, therefore, if the appointing authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of the respondent-a probationer-it cannot be said that the order of termination attracted the provisions of Art. 311 of the\n\nConstitution.\n\nThus, if the appellant found that the respondent was not suitable for being retained in service that will not vitiate the order impugned as held and observed by this Court in the cases cited above.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the order termi nating the services of the respondent was valid and did not involve any stigma and was fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The' High Court, therefore, erred in law in quashing the impugned order. For these reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and hold that the order terminating the services of the respondent was valid in law. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed~\n\n(!) A. I .R. 1960 S. C. 689.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DR. MOHD. S. !SKENDER ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 14. 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 82, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SKENDER ALI\n\nApril 14."}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 312, "end_char": 320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oil and Natural Gas Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 469, "end_char": 499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was appointed on a purely temporary basis to the post of a medical ofl:cer in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission."}}, {"text": "Ottober 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 699, "end_char": 715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he was to remain on probation for a period of one y1e'ar \\V1iich could be extended -at the disi;; retion of the appointing authority He was appointed on Ottober 15, 1965."}}, {"text": "15-10-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His period of probation was extend 4 ed for six months from 15-10-1966 and before his services were tenninated, there D was no express order either confirming hin1 or extending the period of probation."}}, {"text": "28th July 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His services were terminti.tcd with effect fron1 28th July 1967."}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 S.C.R. 55", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2139, "end_char": 2157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3046, "end_char": 3057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975] 1 SCR 814", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3528, "end_char": 3544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 SCR 462", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3646, "end_char": 3662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5148, "end_char": 5181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. D(ltta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "---.~.\n\n B. D(ltta for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. R. Barthakur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5245, "end_char": 5260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Barthakur, S. K. Nandy and P. Bhanlwkur for the Respon- ( dent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Nandy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5262, "end_char": 5273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Barthakur, S. K. Nandy and P. Bhanlwkur for the Respon- ( dent."}}, {"text": "P. Bhanlwkur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. R. Barthakur, S. K. Nandy and P. Bhanlwkur for the Respon- ( dent."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5362, "end_char": 5370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against!"}}, {"text": "Md. S. Iskender Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5600, "end_char": 5619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lbe respondent, Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali, was H appointed on a purely temporary basis to the p-0st of a medical officer in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission: Under the tenns and conditions of his service, he was to remain on probation for a period of\n\nO.N.G. COMMISSION v. !", "canonical_name": "MOHD. S. !SKENDER ALI\n"}}, {"text": "Sibsagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6204, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 '~S/65-ENT Dated the 15th October 1965\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nWith re; ferencc to his interview on the 18th August 1965 held at Sibsagar, Shri Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali is hereby inturmed that he/she has been selected for a temporary post of l\\Iedical Officer in the Oil & Natural Gas Commission on an initial pay of Rs."}}, {"text": "Md. S. Iskender Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52 '~S/65-ENT Dated the 15th October 1965\n\nMEMORANDUM\n\nWith re; ferencc to his interview on the 18th August 1965 held at Sibsagar, Shri Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali is hereby inturmed that he/she has been selected for a temporary post of l\\Iedical Officer in the Oil & Natural Gas Commission on an initial pay of Rs.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. S. !SKENDER ALI\n"}}, {"text": "s. 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6431, "end_char": 6437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Md. Iskender Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8600, "end_char": 8616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "52/;35/65- ENT dated October 16, 1965 the service of Dr. Md. Iskender Ali, Medical Officer (still on probation), is hereby tenninated with effect from the date of the service of this order on hinL\"\n\nThe respcndent felt aggrieved by the termination of his services and filed a writ petition in the High Court on the ground that the order terminating his services was mala fide and was in fact passed by way of penalty entailing evil consequences.", "canonical_name": "MOHD. S. !SKENDER ALI\n"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10705, "end_char": 10713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31-12-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11909, "end_char": 11919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conliden, tial roll reflecting the assessment of the work of the respondent during the period 31-12-1965 to 30-12-1966 clearly shows that the officer was careless and lacking in sense of respqnsibility."}}, {"text": "30-12-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11923, "end_char": 11933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conliden, tial roll reflecting the assessment of the work of the respondent during the period 31-12-1965 to 30-12-1966 clearly shows that the officer was careless and lacking in sense of respqnsibility."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13785, "end_char": 13793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14182, "end_char": 14190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15507, "end_char": 15515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16590, "end_char": 16604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16756, "end_char": 16767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1975] 1 S. C.R. 814", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17586, "end_char": 17606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18475, "end_char": 18486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18524, "end_char": 18532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19044, "end_char": 19052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19902, "end_char": 19913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21360, "end_char": 21368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Untwalia, J., observed thus :\n\n\"Ordinarily and generally the rule laid down in most of the cases by this Court is that you have to look to the order on the face of it and find whether it casts any stigma on the Government servant."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23486, "end_char": 23494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_613_617_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "i i\n\n' ~\n\nNEPAL SINGH\n\nSTATE OF UP. AND ORS.\n\nApril 15, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nTermination Sinzpliciter-An order tetminating the services of a te1nporary .Government servant and ex-facie innocuous in that it does not cast any\n\nstignuz on tile Government servant or visits him with penal consequences a1nounts to termination simpliciter-Order does not contravene Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India 1950.\n\nThe appellant was a temporary sub-inspector of Police. While he v.•as posted at Shahjahanpur the SuperintenUent of Police, Shahjahanpur con1menced disciplinary proceedings against him on the charge that he had violated Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 in as n1uch as without prior permission of the Government he had contracted a second marriage in November, 1964, while his first wife was alive. At the stage\n\nof evidence, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bareilly made an order on March 12, 1970 quashing the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the offence has been committed at Pithoragarh, situated in a different police\n\nroang~, and therefore, the proceeding_s ta.ken against the appellant were ..... incompetcnt.\n\n1\\-feanwhile, on March 8, 1970, the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, had issued a letter to all Superintendents of Police in the State directing them to submit a list of Sub-inspectors whose reputation and integrity \\\\'ere very low or who were generally involved in scandalous conduct, drinking, immorality or other acts injurious to the reputation of the Police Service or who were involved encouraging crime. The Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur included the name of the appellant in the list submitted by him. On April 27, 1970, the Dy. Inspector General of Police made an order terminating the services of the appellant, reciting that the services of the appellant ''are no more required and that he will be considered to have ceased to be in service .... ''\n\nThe appell•ant filed a Writ Petition against the order tern1inating his services and claimed that the order contravened .A.rticle 311(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it was an order in1posing the punishment of dismissal or rem9val from service without satisfying the conditions prescribed therein. Allegations of fnala/i<Je were also iµade. The Writ Petition was dismissed. An appeal to the Division Bench was also dismissed. Hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court.\n\n}J.ELD : 1. It is now settied law that an order terminating the services of a temporary Government servant and ex facie innocuous in that it does not -cast any stigma on the Government ser\\ant or visits him with penal conse- B quences must be regarded as effecting a termination simpliciter, but if it is diseovered on the basis of material adduced that although innocent in its\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nterms the order was passed in fact 'vith a view to punishing the Government servant, it is a punitive order which can be passed only after complying with Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.\n\n[615H, 616AB]\n\n2. The question which calls for determination in all such cases is whether the facts satisfy the criterion repeatedly laid down by this Court that an order is not passed by wa.y of punishment, and is merely an order of termination simpliciter, if the material against the Government servant on which the superior authority has acted constitutes the motive and not the foundation for the order. The application of the test is not always easy. In each case it is necessary to examine the entire range of facts carefully and consider whether in the light of those facts the superior authority intended to punish the Government servant or, having regard to his character, conduct and suitability in ; elation to the post held by him it was intended simply to terminate his services. The function of the Court is to discover the nature of the order by attempting to ascertain \\.Vhat was the motivating consideration in thf; mind of the authority which prompted !he order.\n\n[616B-E]\n\nIn the instant case: (a) the appellant was a temporary Government servant, and the question whether he should be retained in service was u matter which arose directly during the drive instituted by the Inspector General of Police in March 1970 for weeding out Police Officers who were unsuitable or unfit to be continued in ser\\ice; (b) the material which the Superintendant of Police considered \\Vas sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant, who \\Vas a tempofary Government seryant, was not suitable for being retained in service-his general character and conduct led to that impression and there was nothing to show that the impugned order was made by way of punishment; ( c) the circumstance that a disciplinary proceeding had been instituted against him earlier does not in itself lead to the inference that the impugned order was by way of punishment, and (d) the impugned order was not intended by way of punishment.\n\n[616£-G]\n\nState of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboii and Anr. [1980] 1 S.C.R. 551 A.I.R. 1980 SC 42; applied.\n\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JurusDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 621 of 1973.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 13-3-1973 of the Allahabad ; High Court in Sp!. Appeal No. 9 /73). ~\n\nV. l. Francis for the Appellant.\n\n0. P. Rana for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deHvered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a writ petition H filed by a police officer aggrieved by the termination of his services.\n\nThe appellant was a temporary Sub-Inspector of Police.\n\nHe was posted at Sliahajahanpur in 1969. The Superintendent of Police,\n\nNEPAL S!NGHV. U.P. STATE (Pathak, J.) 615\n\nShahjahanpur commenced disciplinary proceedings against the appellant on the charge that he had violated Rule 29 of the U .P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 ; nasmuch as without prior permission of the Government he had contracted a second marriage in November, 1964, while his first wife was alive.\n\nThe charge was denied by the appellant. The Superintendent of Police recorded evidence. But at this stage the Deputy Inspector General of Police Bareilly made an order ou March 12, 1970 quashing the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the offence had been committed at Pithoragarh, s; tuated in a different police range, and therefore the proceedings taken against the appellant were incompetent.\n\nMeanwhile, on March 8, 1970, the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, had issued a letter to all Superintendents of Police in the State directing them to submit a list of Sub-Inspectors whose reputation and integrity were very low or who were generally involved in scandalous conduct, drinking, immorality or other acts injurious to the reputation of the Police service or who were involved in encouraging crime.\n\nThe Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur included the name of the appellant in the list submitted by him.\n\nOn April 27, 1970, the Deputy Inspector General of Police made an order terminating the services of the appellant. The order recites that the services of the appellant, \"are no more required and that he will be considered to have ceased to be in service ........ \"\n\nThe appellant filed a writ petition against the order terminating his services, and claimed that the order contravened Article 311 (2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it was an order imposing the punishment of dismissal or removal from serrice without satisfying the conditions prescribed in that provision. It was also alleged that the order wa5 passed mala fide.\n\nThe writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court.\n\nAn appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on March 13, 1973.\n\nIn the appeal before us, it is urged for the appellant that the High Court was wrong in holding that the order terminating the appellant's G services was , not an order imposing a punishment.\n\nWe are referred\n\n_.._ to the disciplinary proceedings instituted against the appellant in 1969 and it is submitted that although the order of termination does not refer to those proceedings and the charge on which they were commenced, the appellant's services were terminated with a view _to punish him for contracting a second marriage without prior permis- H sion of the Government. We are satisfied that the contention is without substance. It is now settled law that an order terminating the\n\n6i6\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) 3 S.C.It.\n\nservices of a temporary Government servant and ex facie inriocnous in that it does not cast my stigma on the Government servant or visits him with penal consequences must be regarded as effecting a termination simpliciter, but if it is discovered on the basis of material adduced that although innocent in its terms the order was passed in fact with a view to punishing the Government servant, it is a punitive order which can be passed only after complying 'vith Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The scope of the enquiry called foi: in such a case has been outlined by one of us in State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R.\n\nSaboji and another.(') But the question which calls for determination in all such cases is whether the facts satisfy the criterion repeatedly laid down by this Court that an order is not passed by way of punishment, and is merely an order of termination simpliciter; if the material against the Government servant on which the superior authority has acted constitutes the motive and not the foundation for the order.\n\nThe application of the test is not always easy.\n\nIn each case it is necessary to examine the. entire range of facts carefully and consider whether in the light of those facts the superior authority intended to punish the Government servant or, having regard to his character, conduct and suitability in relation to the post held by him it was intended simply to terminate his services.\n\nThe function of the court is to discover the nature of the order by attempting to ascertain what was the motivating consideration in the mind of the authority which prompted the order.\n\nIn the present appeal, the appellant was a temporary Government servant.\n\nThe question whether he should be retained in service was a matter which arose directly during the drive instituted by the Inspector General of Police in March, 1970 for weeding out police officers who were unsuitable or unfit to be continued in service. The Superintendent of Poliee prepared a list of Sub-Inspectors functioning within his jurisdiction, and included the name of the appellant in that list.\n\nThe material which he considered was sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant, who was a temporary Government servant, was not suitable for being retained in service.\n\nHis general character and conduct led to that impression.\n\nThere is nothing to show that the impugned order was made by way of puniShment. The circumstance that a disciplinary proceeding had been instituted against him earlier does not in itself lead to the inference that the impugned order was by way of punishment.\n\nAs we have observed, that is a conclusion which must follow from the nature of the intent behind the order. That intention can be discovered and proved, like any other\n\n(I) [1980] I S. C.R. 551-A.I.R. 1980 S. C. 42.\n\nNEPAL SINGH v. U.P. STATE (Pathak, J.) 61 7\n\nfact, from the evidence on the record. ln this case, it is not proved A that the impugned order was intended by way of punishment.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant relies on Stale of B ihar & Ors.\n\nv. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra(') and State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v.\n\nSugher Singh.( 2 ) Both were cases of permanent Government servants. And as regards Regional Manager & Anr. v. Pawan Kumar Dubey,(') to which also reference has been made, that was a case where on the facts the Court found that there were no administrative reasons for the impugned reversion.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.\n\nS. R.\n\n(I) [1971] 2 S. C.R. 191.\n\n(2) [1974] 2 S. C. R. 335 •\n\n• (3) [19761 3 S. C: R. 540.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 29, "entities": [{"text": "NEPAL SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEPAL SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UP. AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UP. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 15, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 15, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 385, "end_char": 396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 676, "end_char": 715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bareilly", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the stage\n\nof evidence, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bareilly made an order on March 12, 1970 quashing the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the offence has been committed at Pithoragarh, situated in a different police\n\nroang~, and therefore, the proceeding_s ta.ken against the appellant were ..... incompetcnt."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 954, "end_char": 968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the stage\n\nof evidence, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bareilly made an order on March 12, 1970 quashing the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the offence has been committed at Pithoragarh, situated in a different police\n\nroang~, and therefore, the proceeding_s ta.ken against the appellant were ..... incompetcnt."}}, {"text": "Pithoragarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the stage\n\nof evidence, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bareilly made an order on March 12, 1970 quashing the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the offence has been committed at Pithoragarh, situated in a different police\n\nroang~, and therefore, the proceeding_s ta.ken against the appellant were ..... incompetcnt."}}, {"text": "March 8, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1216, "end_char": 1229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\\-feanwhile, on March 8, 1970, the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, had issued a letter to all Superintendents of Police in the State directing them to submit a list of Sub-inspectors whose reputation and integrity \\\\'ere very low or who were generally involved in scandalous conduct, drinking, immorality or other acts injurious to the reputation of the Police Service or who were involved encouraging crime."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1264, "end_char": 1277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1\\-feanwhile, on March 8, 1970, the Inspector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, had issued a letter to all Superintendents of Police in the State directing them to submit a list of Sub-inspectors whose reputation and integrity \\\\'ere very low or who were generally involved in scandalous conduct, drinking, immorality or other acts injurious to the reputation of the Police Service or who were involved encouraging crime."}}, {"text": "Shahjahanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1651, "end_char": 1663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintendent of Police, Shahjahanpur included the name of the appellant in the list submitted by him."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1732, "end_char": 1746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 27, 1970, the Dy."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3053, "end_char": 3064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1980] 1 S.C.R. 551", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5081, "end_char": 5100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. l. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5297, "end_char": 5310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nV. l. Francis for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5334, "end_char": 5341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Rana for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5406, "end_char": 5412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deHvered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a writ petition H filed by a police officer aggrieved by the termination of his services."}}, {"text": "Sliahajahanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5624, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was posted at Sliahajahanpur in 1969."}}, {"text": "Shahjahanpur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5722, "end_char": 5734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATE (Pathak, J.) 615\n\nShahjahanpur commenced disciplinary proceedings against the appellant on the charge that he had violated Rule 29 of the U .P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 ; nasmuch as without prior permission of the Government he had contracted a second marriage in November, 1964, while his first wife was alive."}}, {"text": "Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7353, "end_char": 7364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7665, "end_char": 7685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7753, "end_char": 7767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on March 13, 1973."}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8969, "end_char": 8983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 S. C.R. 191", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12029, "end_char": 12049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 S. C. R. 335", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12056, "end_char": 12077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_618_624_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "ANANTHARAM VEERASINGAIAH & CO.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, A.P.\n\nApril 15, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, R. S. PATHAK AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nII'\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1961, Section 271(1)(c), scope of Penalty Proceedings irt quasi judicial and Burden of proof is on Revenue-Secret Profits or undisclosed income and their actual availability for application by the ass.esSfe-Power of the High Court in a Tax Reference case, explained.\n\nThe appellant, assessee is an Abkari contractor. It -filed a return of its income for the assessm1e-nt year 1959-60, disclosing a total turnover of Rs. 10,92,132/- and an income of Rs. 7,704/-. The Income Tax Officer did not accept the correctness of the return.\n\nHe found that on 12th December, l95'i and 16th January, 1958 the excess of expenditure over the disclosed available cash was Rs. 17,726/- and Rs. 65,066 respectively. He also noticed seve-· rat deposits, totalling Rs. 28,200, entered in the names of certain Sendhi shop~ keeP'ers. The Income Tax Officer rejected the account books of the asscssee and his explanations for the discrepancies thereof and estimated the assessee's income on an overall figure of Rs. 5,00,018. In appeal before. the. Appellate Assistant Commissioner and thereafter before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal the assessee succeeded in getting the assessed income reduced to Rs. 1,30,00Ct in addition to the books profits. Penalty proceedings were taken against the assessee and the case, was referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, who imposed a penalty of Rs. 75,000 under s. 27l(l)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. On appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Tribunal held that there was no positive material to establish that the cash deposits represented con~ cealed inccime.\n\nIn regard to the cash deficits, the' Appellate Tn\"bunar noticed that for the assessment year 1957-58 an addition of Rs. 2,00,000 had been made to the book profits, and it observed that some part of that amount could havebeen ploughed back into tho business. It held that an amount of Rs. 90,000' representing unledgerised cash credits of that year could be said to have been introduced in that year. Allowing the appeal, the. Appellate Tribunal set aside the penalty order made by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.\n\nOn a reference to the High Court, at the instance of the Commfssioner of Income Tax, the High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal was not justi~ ficd, in holding that no -penalty was 1eviable. Hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nDirecting the Appellate Tribunal to take up the appeal under s:ection 260(1)'\n\ni ' ,\n\nof the Income Tax Act, the Court >--\n\nHELD : An order imp-0sing a penalty is the result of quasi criminal proceedings. The burden of proof Ji; es on the Revenue to establish that the disputed amount represents income and that the assessee has consciously concealed the particulars of his income or has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars. It is for the Revenue to prove these ingredients before a penalty caru be imposed.\n\n[622B-C]\n\nVEERASINGAIAH V. C.l.T 619\n\nSince the burden of proof in a penalty proceeding varies from that in vol ved in an assessment procedings a finding in an assessment proceeding that a particular receipt is income cannot automatically be .adopted as a finding to that effect in the penalty proceeding. In the penalty proceeding the taxing authority is bound to consider the matter afresh on the material before it and, in the light of th{i burden to prove resting on the Revenue, to ascertain whether a particular amount is a revenue receipt. No doubt, the fact that the assessment order contained a finding that the disputed amount represents income constitutes good evidence in the penalty proceeding but the finding in the assessment proceeding cannot be regarded as conclusive for the purposes of the penalty proceeding.\n\nBefore a penalty can be imposed the entirety of the circumstances must be taken into account and must point to the conclusion that the disputed amount represents income and that the assessee has consciously concealed particulars of his income. or deliberately furnished ioaccurate particulars. The mere falsity o.f the explanation given by the asse.ssee is insufficient without there being in additiun cogent material Or evidence from which the ncessary conclusion attracting a penalty could be drawn.\n\n(622C-G]\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, W&st Bengal and Anr. v. Anwar Ali [ 1970] 76 J.T.R. 696; Commiioner of lncome Tax, Madras v. Khoday Eswarsa and Sons, [1972] 83 I.T.R. 369; applied.\n\n2. Vlhen an 'intangible' addition is made to the book profits during an assessment proceeding, it is on the basis that the amount represented by that addition constitutes the undisclosed income of the assessee. That income although commonly described as 'intangible', is as much a part of his real income as that disclosed by his account books. It has the same concrete. existence. It could be available to the assessee as the book profits could be. [623A-B]\n\n3. Secret profits or undisclosed incon1e of an assessee earned in an earlier asses.sment year may constitl'lte a fund, even though concealed, from which the assessee may draw subsequently for meeting expenditure or introducing amounts in his account books. Any part of that fund need not necessarily be regarded as the source of unexplained expenditure incurred or of cash credits recorded during a subsequent assessment year.\n\nThe mere availability of such a fund cannot, in all cases, imply that the assessee has not earned further secret profits during the relevant assessn1ent year It is' a matter for consideration by the taxing authority, in each case, whether the unexplained cash d.eficits and the cash credits can be reasonably attributed to a pre-existing fund of concealed profits or they are reasonably exPJained by reference to concealed. income earned in that very year.\n\nIn each case the true nature of the cash deficit and the cash credit must be ascertained from an overall consideration of the particular facts and circumstances of the caSie.\n\nEvidence may exist to Show that reliance cannot be placed completely on the availability of a previously earned undisclosed. income. A number of circumstances of vital significance may point to the conclusion that the cash d.eficit or cash credit cannot reasonably be related to the amount covered by the intangibte: addition but must be regarded as pointing to the receipt of undisclosed inrome earned during the assessment year under consideration. It is open to -the Re1'enue to rely on all the circuDtances pointing to that conclusion. What those seVeral circurmtanoes can be is difficult to enumerate and indeed, from the nature of the enquiry, it is alm0st impossible\n\nto do so.\n\nHowever, they must be such as can lead to the firm conclusion that\n\nA th: assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars.\n\n[64.JCH, 624AJ\n\nLagadapn Subha Ramiah v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Madras, [1956] 30 I.T.R. 593; S. Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, [1964] 51 I.T.R. 757; approved.\n\nti In .an income tax reference, a High Court should co'nfine itself to deciding the question of law referred to it on facts found by the Appellate Tribunal. It is the Ap-pelJate Tribunal which has been entrusted with the authority to find facts. [624D-E]\n\n( CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2592 of 1972.\n\nC Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 9-11-1971 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Case Referred No. 4 of 1970. .\n\nS. T. Desai, T. A. Ramachandran, Mrs. !. Ramachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant.\n\nD S. C. Manchanda, Miss A. Subashini and D. B. Ahuja for the\n\nRespondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, concerning the scope of s. 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.\n\nThe assessee is an Abkari contractor.\n\nIt filed a return of its income for the assessment year 1959-60, disclosing a total turnover of Rs. 10,92,132 and an income of Rs. 7,704. The Income Tax Officer did not accept the correctness of the return. He found tlmt on 12th December, 1957 and 16th January 1958 the excess of expenditure over the disclosed available cash as Rs. 17, 720 and Rs. 650,66 respectively. He also noticed several deposits, totalling Rs. 28,200, entered in the names of certain Sendhi shop-keeper;.\n\nThe assessee's explanation that the excess \"expenditure was met from amounts deposited with him by some shop-keepers but not entered in his books was not accepted. The alternative explanation that expenditure incurred earlier had possibly been recorded later was also rejected.\n\nIn regard to the cash deposits of Rs. 28,200 the assessee explained that they represented amounts deposited with it as seeurity.\n\nThat explanation was rejected insofar as deposits totalling Rs. 21,000 were concerned.\n\nThe Income Tax , Officer rejected the account books of the assessee and estimated the assessee's income on an overall figure of Rs. 5,00,018. In appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and thereafter before the Income Tax\n\nVEERASINGAIAR V. C.I.T. (Pathak, J.) 621\n\nAppellate Tribunal, .the assessee succeeded in getting the assessed income reduced to Rs. 1,30,000 in addition to the book profits.\n\nPenalty proceeding were taken against the assessee and the case was referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.\n\nThe assessee reiterated the explanation which it had offered in the assessment proceedings.\n\nPredictably, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner rejected the explanation and held that the items of cash deficit and cash deposits represented concealed income resulting from the suppressed yield and low selling rates mentioned in the books. He observed that the assessee had c:oncealed the particulars of his income and furnished inaccurate of it, and therefore imposed a penalty of Rs. 75,000 under s.271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. On\n\nappeai by the assessee, the Appellate Tribunal held that there was no positive material to establish that the cash deposits represented concealed income.\n\nIn regard to the cash deficits, the Appellate Tribunal noticed that for the assessment year 1957-58 an addition of Rs. 2,00,000 had been made to the book profits and it observed that some part of that amount could have been ploughed back into the business. It held that an amount of Rs. 90,000 representing un!edgerised cash credits of that year cO\\Jld be said to have been introduced in this year.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the penaty order made by the Inspecting Assistant Conunissioner.\n\nAt tbe instance of the Commissioner of Income Tax, the following E question was referred to the High Court:-\n\n\"Whether 011 the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in holding that no penalty is leviable ?\"\n\nThe High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal was not justified p in holding that no penalty W3.s leviable.\n\nIn this appeal, it is nrged by learned counsel for the assessee that the High Court erred in interfering with a finding of fact, that the penalty proceedi'ngs being quasi-criminal the bnrden of proof lay on the Revenue to establish that a penalty was attracted and that the intangible addition of Rs. 2,00,000 represented real income and the Appelfate Tribunal was right in considering that an amount of Rs. 90,000 was available to cover. the cash deficits.\n\nSection 271(1) (c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides:-\n\n\"271(1). If the Income Tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in the course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person-\n\n( a) * • * •\n\n(b) • * * *\n\n(c) has concealed the particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such income he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty,\n\n\" This is the provision as it stood at the relevant time, It is now settled law that an order impoing a penalty is the result of quasicriminal proceeding and that the burden lies on the Revenue to establ.ish that the disputed amount represents income and that the assessee has consciously concealed the particulars of his income or has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal and Another v. Anwar Ali.(!) It is for the Revenue to prove those ingredients before a penalty can be imposed.\n\nSince the burden of proof in a penalty proceeding varies from that involved in an assessment proceeding, a finding in an assessment proceeding that a particular receipt is income cannot automatically be D, adopted as a finding to that effect in the penalty proceeding. In the penalty proceeding the taxing authority is bound to consider the matter afresh on the material before it and, in the light of the burden to prove resting on the Revenue, to ascertain whether a particular amount is a revenue receipt.\n\nNo doubt, the fact that the assessment order\n\ncontains a finding that the disputed amount represents income constitutes good evidence in the penalty proceeding but the finding in the assessment proceeding cannot be regarded as conclusive for the purposes of the penalty proceeding, That is how the law has been understood by this Court in Anwar Ali (supra), and we believed '!hat to be the law still. It was also laid down that before a penalty\n\nan be imposed the entirety of the circumstan.ces must be taken into account and must point to the conclusion that the disputed amount represents income and that the assessee has conciously concealed particulars of his income or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars.\n\nThe mere falsity of the explanation given by the assessee, it was observed, was insufficient without there being in addition cogent material of evidence from which the necessary conclusion attracting a penalty could be drawn. These principles were reiterated by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Khoday Eswarsa and sons, (2) In the present case, the Appellate Tribunal has relied entirely on the basic that an intangible addition of Rs. 2,00,000 had been made •e to the book profits of the assessee for the assessment year 1957-58\n\n(1) (1970) 76 I. T. R. 696,\n\n(2) (1972) 83 I. T. R. 369\n\nVEERASINGAJAH v. C.I.T. (Pathak, J.) 623\n\nand it inferred that an amount of Rs. 90,000 was available for being\n\nput to use in the year with which we are concerned. Now it can hardly be denied that when an \"intangible' additio\"n is made to the book profits during an assessment proceeding, it is on the basis that the amount represented by that addition constitutes the undisclosed income of the assessee That income, although commonly described as \"intangible\", is as much a part of his real income as that disclosed by his account books. It has the same concrete existence. It could be available to the assessee as the book profits could be. In Lagadapati Subha Ramiah v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras(!) the Andhra Pradesh High Court adverted to this aspect of secret profits and their actual availability for application by the assessee.\n\nThat view was affirmed by the Madras High Court in S. Kuppuswami Mudliar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras.(2 )\n\nThere can be no escape from the proposition that the secret profits or undisclosed income of an assessee earned in an earlier assessment year may constitute a rnd, even though concealed, from which the assessee may draw sufficient for meeting expenditure or introducing amounts in his account books.\n\nBut it is quite another thing to say that any part of that fund must necessarily be regarded as the source of unexplained expenditure incurred or of cash credits regarded during a subsequent assessment year. The mere availability of such a fund cannot, in all cases, imply that the assessee has not earned further secret profits during the relevant assessment year.\n\nNeither law nor human experiences guarantees that an assessee who has been dishonest in one assessment year is bound to be honest in a subsequent assessment year. It is a matter for consideration by the taxing authority in each case whether the unexplained cash deficits and the cash credits can be reasonably attributed to a pre-existing fund of concealed profits or they are reasonably explained by reference to concealed income earned in that very year. In each case the true nature of the cash deficit and the cash credit must be ascertained from an overall consideration of the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Evidence may exist to show that reliance cannot be placed completely on the availability of a pre\\<iously earned undisclosed income.\n\nA number of circumstances of vital significance may point to the conclusion that the cash deficit or cash credit cannot reasonably be related to the amount covered by the intangible addition but must be regarded as pointing to the receipt of undisclosed\n\nincome earned during the assessment year under consideration. It is open to the Revenue to rely on al! the circumstances pointing to\n\n(I) [1956] 30 !.T.R. 593.\n\n(2) [1964] 58 I.T.R. 757.\n\nthat conclusion. What those several circumstances can be is di:llicult to enumerate and indeed, from the nature of the enquiry, it is almost impossible to do so.\n\nIn the end, they must be such as can lead to the firm conclusion that the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or has deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars. It is needless to reiterate that in a penalty proceeding the burden remains on the Revenue of proving the existing of material leading to that conclusion.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal erred in law in confining itself to the fact that an intangible addition had been added to the assessee's book profits two years before and that a part of that amount remained available to the assessee thereafter, the High Court is right in departing from that limited approach and in insisting on a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances' of the case relied on by the, Revenue for purpose of determining whether the Revenue has succeeded in discharging its burden.\n\nBut while considering the legal principles involved in the application of s. 271 (1) (c) the High Court, in our opinion, has erred in entering into the facts of the case and determining in point of fact that the assessee earned income during the relevant previous year and that he ws guilty of 'concealing such income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of it Having found that the legal basis underlying the order of the Appellate Tribunal was not sustainable, the High Court should have limited itself to answering the question raised by the reference in the negative, leaving it to the Appellate Tribunal to take up the appeal again and redetermine 'it in the light of the law laid down by the High Court. It is the Appellate Tribunal which has been entrusted with the authority to find facts.\n\nA High Conrt is confined to deciding the question of law referred to it on facts found by the Appellate Tribunal. That is the kind of order we now propose to make.\n\nBecause the findi1ig of the Appellate Tribunal that no penalty leviable rests on an erroneous legal basis, we endorse the opinion of the High Court that the question referred must be answered in the negative, But as the High Court should not have rendered fi'ndings of fact, we vacate the finding of fact reached by the High Court, without expressing any opinion o'n their correctness, leaving it to the Appellate Tribunal in exercise of its duty under s. 260(1) of the Income Tax Act to take up the appeal and to redetermine it conformably to this judgment and in the light of the principle laid down in it.\n\nThe appeal is disposed of accordingly. There is no order as to costs-\n\nS.R.\n\nMGIPF-289 SCl/80-2500-6-1-81\n\nCase remitted to Tribunal.", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "ANANTHARAM VEERASINGAIAH & CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANANTHARAM VEERASINGAIAH & CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, A", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, A.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 271(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "12th December, l95'i and 16th January, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 713, "end_char": 756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He found that on 12th December, l95'i and 16th January, 1958 the excess of expenditure over the disclosed available cash was Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1556, "end_char": 1561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1576, "end_char": 1596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vlhen", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4555, "end_char": 4560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vlhen an 'intangible' addition is made to the book profits during an assessment proceeding, it is on the basis that the amount represented by that addition constitutes the undisclosed income of the assessee."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, T. A. Ramachandran, Mrs. !."}}, {"text": "T. A. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7609, "end_char": 7627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, T. A. Ramachandran, Mrs. !."}}, {"text": "Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7637, "end_char": 7649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. N. Tandon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7654, "end_char": 7666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramachandran and M. N. Tandon for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "D S. C. Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7687, "end_char": 7704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D S. C. Manchanda, Miss A. Subashini and D. B. Ahuja for the\n\nRespondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7711, "end_char": 7723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D S. C. Manchanda, Miss A. Subashini and D. B. Ahuja for the\n\nRespondent."}}, {"text": "D. B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D S. C. Manchanda, Miss A. Subashini and D. B. Ahuja for the\n\nRespondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7806, "end_char": 7812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, concerning the scope of s. 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7886, "end_char": 7911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, concerning the scope of s. 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961."}}, {"text": "s. 271(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7937, "end_char": 7949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7957, "end_char": 7977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "12th December, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8243, "end_char": 8262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He found tlmt on 12th December, 1957 and 16th January 1958 the excess of expenditure over the disclosed available cash as Rs."}}, {"text": "16th January 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8267, "end_char": 8284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He found tlmt on 12th December, 1957 and 16th January 1958 the excess of expenditure over the disclosed available cash as Rs."}}, {"text": "VEERASINGAIAR V. C.I.T. (Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9230, "end_char": 9261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and thereafter before the Income Tax\n\nVEERASINGAIAR V. C.I.T. (Pathak, J.) 621\n\nAppellate Tribunal, .the assessee succeeded in getting the assessed income reduced to Rs."}}, {"text": "s.271(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10022, "end_char": 10033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10041, "end_char": 10061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 271(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11552, "end_char": 11566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11578, "end_char": 11598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13350, "end_char": 13359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, the fact that the assessment order\n\ncontains a finding that the disputed amount represents income constitutes good evidence in the penalty proceeding but the finding in the assessment proceeding cannot be regarded as conclusive for the purposes of the penalty proceeding, That is how the law has been understood by this Court in Anwar Ali (supra), and we believed '!"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15217, "end_char": 15234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That view was affirmed by the Madras High Court in S. Kuppuswami Mudliar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras.(2 )\n\nThere can be no escape from the proposition that the secret profits or undisclosed income of an assessee earned in an earlier assessment year may constitute a rnd, even though concealed, from which the assessee may draw sufficient for meeting expenditure or introducing amounts in his account books."}}, {"text": "s. 271", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 260(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19606, "end_char": 19615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_625_675_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "' . .,\n\n~ .r\\\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE LTD. AND ANR. ETC.\n\nCOFFEE BOARD, BANGALORE ETC. ETC.\n\nApril 15, 1980\n\n[V. D. TULZAPURKAR, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\ncentral Sales Tax Act, 1956, as amended by Amending Act 103 of1966, Section 5(3) read with section 5(1) and 6(1), interpretation of-Whether Section 5(3) is beyond. the power of authority of Article 286(2) of the Constitution and therefore ultra vires.\n\nWords and Phrases-\"the.agreement or order for or in relation to such export,\" in Section 5(3) of the Central Safes Tax Act, meaning and interpretation of-Whether the agreement referred to means only .the agreement with a foreign buyer or would include any binding or enforceable agree111ent to export even with a local party to implement which penultimate sale should have taken place.\n\nSale-Whether the word 'sale' in the phrase \"if such last sale or-purchase takes place after\" in section 5(3) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, includes\"agreement to\n\nsell\" as defined in Section 4 of the sale of Goods Act 1930.\n\nSale of Goods Act, 1930 Sections 25, 64(2) scope of-Auction sales--When does the property in the Coffee sold at the export auctions conducted hy the Co,,__'ffee Board pass:--Clauses 19, 26 and 31 of the Auction conditions.\n\nThe Coffee Board, Bangalore is a statutory Corporation incorporated under section 5 of the Coffee Act, I 942, an enactment passed to provide for the development of the Coffee industry under the Control of the Union. The Coffee Board under various sections of the Coffee Act, exercises complete control-almost monopolistic-over the coffee trade in exercises of its statutory powers.\n\nExport of coffee outside India is particularly controlled under the Act and the Rules by the Coffee Board. Coffee can , be exported either by the Coffee Board directly to parties outside India or the Coffee Board authorises other exporters to\n\neft'eCt such exports. For effecting exports through other exporters the Coffee Board periodically conducts auctions known as 'export auctions' and it follows a procedure in that behalf. To be able to bid at these auctions, exporters have to get themselves registered with the Board. The Board maintains a 1ist of Registered Exporters and grants to each one of them a permit. which authorises him to take part in the •export auctiQn', The conditions which are imposed by the permit require, inter alia, a security deposit and a standing deposit (which may be in cash or in the form of bank guarantee) from the Registered Exporters; such permit is is liable to be withdrawn or cancelled by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, an executive appointed by the Central Government on the Board, at any time if it is found that a permit-holder has sold or has attempted to sell coffee bought by him at the 'export auction' within the internil market without his written permission or if any of the other permit conditions are contravened. The actual 'export auctions' are conducted on the basis of the \"the Terms and Conditions of Sale of Coffee in the course of Export'' framed by it and the Registered Exporters participate in such auctions on those terms and conditions. Clause 3 of the \"Auction\n\nConditions\" declares that all auctions and sales made thereat are subject to (i) the Auction conditions, (ii) the Permit conditions and (iii) such other rules or conditions as may be prescribed by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer. Under Cl. 4 only dealers who have registered themsev1es as Exporters of coffee with the Coffee Board and who hold a permit from the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer in that behalf are permitted to participate in th~ auctions. Under Cl. 11 no one is allowed to retract his bid when once the same has been entered in the Register of Bids. The highest bid is ordinarily accepted but the Sale Conducting Officer may not accept such bid if he has reason to belie.Ye that the name is not bona fide or genuine or the same is the outcome of concerted action on the part of the dealers or a section of them for the purpose of controlling or manipulating prices, etc. subject to hiS recording the reasons for such rejection in the Register of Bids. Clause 19 deals with weighment, delivery and payment of price and contains a.n overriding pro visions to the effect that the \"property in the coffee sold shall not pass to the buyer until after he has paid the ful1 price and the coffee sold to him is weighed and set apart for delivery to him.\" Clause 26 declares that it is an essential condition of the auction that the coffee sold thereat shall be exported to the destination stipu lated in the catalogue of lots or to any other foreign country outside India as may be approved by the Chief Coffee Marketing Offioer within three months or within such extended period as shall not exceed one year from the Notice of Tender issued to the auction buyer (Registered Exporter) and that under no circumstances the coffee purchased at such auction shall be diverted to other destinations or sold or be disposed of or otherwise released in India. Clauses 30 and 31 provide for the consequences of default on the part of the buyer to export the coffee or to produce evidence thereof; he is liable to pay penalty at the rates specified in Cl. 30and under Cl. 31 Chief Coffee Marketing Officer is entitled to seize and take possession of the unexported coffee and deal with it as if were part and parcel of the Board's coffee in its surplus pool. Under Cl. 32 it is provided that in the event of the buyer committing any default in respect of any of the terms and conditions of the cexport auction\" he sha11 be liable; (i) to be removed from the list of the Registered Ex,. porters, the permit granted to him being cancelled; (ii) to forfeit the deposit made by him at the time of obtaining the permit and (iii) to forfeit the deposit of any covered by the conditions contained in Cl. 14 (ii).\n\nPrior to the enactment of sub section (3) of section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which has inserted on September,?, 1976 with retrospective effect from April 1, 1976 by the Amending Act (103 of 1976), the exemption from liability to tax under the Act in i:egard to a sale in the course of the export was and continues to be governed by s. 5(1) of the Act. The said provision was examined by the Supreme Court in f\\vo leading cases, namely, Coffee Board Bangalore v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras and Anr., and Mohd. Serajuddli1 etc. v. State of\n\nOrissa, and a certain interpretation had been accorded by this Court to the ex,. pression \"in the course of export\", and, according to these decisions the last sale, immediately preceding the sale occasioning the export of goods oUt of India, (the penultimate sale), however closely related to the final export, was held not to be in the course of export but only for export and hence liable to tax, it was with a view to remove the difficulties caused by these and other similar decisions that the Par liarnent enacted the new subs. (3) of s.• 5 and added a proviso to s. 6(1) by the Amending Act (103 of 1976).\n\nThe Coffee Board issued a circular dated February 7, 1977 to the Registered Exporters o~ Coffee, by which it took the view that in order to avail of the benefit\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE V. COFFEE BOARD 627\n\nof section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax as amended by Amendment Act 103of1976, in respect of the coffee sold by it at the export auctions the Registered Exporters\n\n(bidders) should satisfy three conditions; (a) he must have an expoit contract (i.e. either agreement or order) from a foreign buyer, (b) he must have it on hand at the time when he participates in the export auction and (c) he should give proof of the export of the coffee purchased at the auction. By way of compliance with the conditions (a) and (b) above the said Circular requires the Registered Exporters to deposit with the Board before the commencement of each auction copies of the export orders or agreements from their foreign buyers. As the Coffee Board could not be certain as to how the Sales Tax Authorities would treat the penultimate sales in the matter of granting exemption the said Circu1ar requires the . bidders to make a contingency deposit in cash equivalent to the sale tax liabiJity or furnish bank guarantee in lieu thereof, each of such deposit or guarantee being \"required to be kept in force for a period of four years. In other words, even in cases where the Registered Exporters (auction bidders) shall have satified aJl the aforesaid conditions, the Coffee Board has insisted upon such Exporters making contingency deposits or furnish bank guarantees for amount equivalent to the sales tax chargeable on such sales inspite of the enactment of s. 5(3) and this has been done ostensibly for the protection of the Coffee Board in the event of Sale Tax Authorities holding that even in such cases the benefit of s. 5(3) would not be available. Since retrospective effect was given to the amendments introduced by Act 103 of 1976 the Coffee Board collected and the Petitioners paid sales tax on these export auctions during the period of the retrospectivity and for few months more and thereafter the Coffee Board has, in tenns of the said Circular, obtained from the petitioners bank guarantees to secure payment of sales tax which but for the enactment of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 might have been payable on Ca.ch such sale.\n\nThe petitioners, who are Registered Exporters of Coffee, therefore have filed under Art.32 .of the Constitution raising an important question of proper construction of section 5(3), of the Central Sales Tax Act as amended by Amending Act (103\n\nof 1976) and also challenging the constitutional validity of the circular dated February 7, 1977, issued by the Coffee Board, whereby it required the petitioners and other Registered Exporters. of Coffee to furnish contingency deposits or bank guarantees equal to the amount of sales tax in respect of the exempted sales under the said section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax and praying for its cancellation or withdrawal and consequential reliefs.\n\nAllowing the petitions in part, the Court\n\nHELD 1. Section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act as amended by the Amendment Act 103 of t 976 is not ultra vi res Article 286(2) of the Constitution and the said provision neither creates any legal fiction nor is it beyond the po\\ver or authority conferred on Parliament by Article 286(2) of the Constitution. [645ADJ\n\nIt is true that the word \"deemed\" has been used in Section 5(3) but the same word has been used not merely in s. 5(1) but also in the other two sections 3 and 4 of Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act which has the heading \"Formulations\n\nof Principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of interstate trade or commerce or outside a State or in the course of export or import'', the heading of Chapter J[ on the face of it suggests that what is done under ss. 3, 4 and 5 including sub-s. (3) is formulation of principles. Secondly\n\nthe word \"deemed'' is used a great deal in modern legislation in different senses and it is not that a deeming provision is every time made for the purpose of creating a fiction. A deeming provision might be made to include for the purpose of a statute an artificial construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail but in each case it would be a question as to with what object the Legislature has made such a deeming provision. Whensub-section (3) of the section 5 used the word \"deemed\" and says that the penultimate sale \"shall also be deemed to be in the course of export\" what is intended to be conveyed is that the penultimate sale shaH also be regarded as being in the course of such export. In other words, no legal fiction is created. Moreover, it was conceded by counsel that the word \"deemed\" in sections 3, 4 and 5(1) laid down general principles and did not create any fiction; if that be so, it is difficult to accept the contention that i.n subs. (3) the same word should be construed as creating a fiction. Thirdly, suSscction (3) of section 5 formulates a principle in as much as it Jays down a general guiding rule applicable to all penultimate sales that satisfy the two conditions specified therein and not any scific direction governing any particular or specific transaction of a penultimate sale. In other words the content of the provision shows that it lays down a principle. [645 EH, 646C-E, G-H] On a proper construction of section 5(3), it cannot be said that the said pro~ vision is applicable only to the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board and D the terms and conditions governing them because it applies to v; triety of parties including the small manufacturers who seek a foreign market for their goods through private export houses or canalised agencies like State Trading Corporation. [646H,\n\n647AJ\n\nSt. Aubyn and Ors, v. Attorney Generel, [1952] A. C. 15 at p. 53 ; referred to.\n\n2. Section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act has been enacted to extend the exemption from tax liability under the Act not to any kind of penultimate sale but only to such penultimate sale as satisfies the two conditions specified therein, namely, (a) that such penultimate sale must take place (i. e. become complete) after the agreement or order under which the goods are to be exported and (b) it must be for the purpose of complying with such agreen1ent. or order and it is , only then that such penultimate sale is deemed to be a sale in the course of export.\n\n[647DEJ It is true that the language employed in section 5(3) is a little ambiguous or equivocal and there is no indication in express terms whether the ''agreement\" mentioned therein necessarily refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer or would include any biding or enforceable agreement to export with a local party. The material words which prescribe the two conditions on satisfying which the penultimate sale is to be regarded as a sale in the course of export are : \"If such last sale or purchase (meaning the penultimate sale or purchase) tgok place after, nd was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export\". It is true that Parliament has not said \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such sale occasioning the export\", but has used the phrase \"the agree.. ment or order for or in relation to such export\". But, two aspects emerge very clearly on a close scrutiny of this phrase which by implication show that the '\"agreement\" spoken of there refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer and not an 3greement with a local party containing a covenant to export. [~90, 650B~D]\n\nIn the first place, the concerned phrase speaks of two things in disjunctive : \"agreement\" or order. The word \"order\" which appears in a statute dealing with sales tax must be understood in a commercial snse, that is, in the sense in\n\n) '\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE V. COFFEE BOARD 629\n\nwhich traders and commercial men will understand it.- In commercial sense an order means a firm request for supply of definite goods emanating from a buyer an indent placed by a purchaser and, therefore, an order for or in relation to export would mean an indent from a foreign buyer. The word .. order\" in section 5(3) cannot mean or refer to an order or direction, mandate, command or authorisation to export that may be issued by a statutory body like the Coffee Board foi' two reasons : first, occurring in a sales tax statute the word must be given its commercial meaning and secondly, while enacting the provision Parliament could not be said to have only statutory b, dies, like Coffee board or S.T.C. in mind. If, therefore, an order for export in the concerned Phrase means an indent. from a foreign buyer, the Preceding word \"agreement\" in the phrase would take colour from the word \"order\" and would on the principle of noscitur a sociie mean an agreement with a foreign buyer and not the agreement \\\\'ith a local party containing the CO\"' venant to export; and\n\n(ii) Secondly and more importantly, the user of the definite artide \"the\" before the word .. agreement\", is very significant. Parffament has. not said \"an agreement\" or \"any agreement\" for or in relation to !lUch export and in the c:onte'tt\n\nthe exPres!-ion \"the agreement\" would refer to that agreement which is implicit in the sale occasioning -the export. Between the two sales (the penultimate and the final) spoken of in the earlier part of the sub section ordinarily it is the final sale that would be connected with the export, and, therefore, the expression \"the agreement\" for export must refer to that agreement which is implicit in the sale that asions the\n\nexport~ The user of the definite article, \"the\", therefore, cJearly suggests that the agreement spoken of must be the agreement with a foreign buyer. As a matter of Pure construction, by necessan implication the expression ''the agreement ' occurringin the relevant Phrase means or refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer and not an agreement with a local party containing the covenant to export.\n\n[650E-H, 651A-EJ\n\n3. Prior to the enactment of Section 5 (1) there was no Jegisiative guidance as to what transactions of sale or purchase could be said to be \"in the c0urse of export\" and the said exPression occurring in Art. 286 (1) (b) of the Constitution was conScrued by this Court in what have come to be known as the first and the second Travancore-Cochin cases, namely, The State ofTravancore-Cochin and Ors. v. The Bombay Company Ltd., (1952) 3 S.T.C. 434, and The State of Travancore-Cochin and Ors. v. The Shanmugha Vilas Cashew J1lut Factory and Ors., (1953) 4 STC\n\n205; to include two types of sales or purchases (a) a sale or purchase which itself occasions, the export and (b) a sale or purchase affected by a transfer of do euments of title to the goods after the goods are put in the export stream (i. e. after they have crossed the customs frontiers of India). Then came the Constitution (Sixth Amendtrtent) Act, 1956 introducing a new clause being cJ. (2) in Art. 286 whereby Parliament was empowered by Jaw to fonnulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase took pJace in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export or is affected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods if the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India••·. In other words, this was legislative recognition of what was said by this Court in the two Travancore cases about the true meaning of the exprt:Ssion \"in the course of export\" occurring in Art. 286 (1) (b). [651G-H,\n\n65~, D-F]\n\nSection 5 (1) was construed by this Court in the context of two sales (though both were closely connected with the ultimate expol'tation of the goods out of India) rather very strictly in the two case, Coffee Board, Bangalore,, v. Joint Commercia/ Tax Officer, Madras and Ors., [1970] 3 SCR 147; and Mohd. Serajt\"kl/n etc. v. State of Orissa, [1975] Supp S.C.R. 169. In the former case, this Court laid down the test that there must be a single sale which itself caused the exPort and there was no room for two or more sales being •m the course of exPort\". In other words , notwithstanding the compulsion to export arising from clauses 26, 30 and 31 Qf the Auction Conditions, the Penultimate sale was held to be not in the cause of ex.Ports. In the latter case. this court took the view that the crucial wards in Section 5 (I) showed that only if a sale occasioned the export, it would be in the course of export and that the• two sets of contracts were separate and indepit and Mohd. Serajuddin was under no contractual obligation to the foreign yer either directly 0 r indirectly and that his rights and obligations were only aga st the S.T.C. Even when the S.T.C. had with it foreign buyers contracts and Mohd, Serajuddin's contracts with S.T.C. had been entered into for the purpose of implementing such foreign buyer's contracts, thIB Court hcld that the sales between Mohd. Serajuddin and S.T.C. were not sales in the c..;,.e of exPort.\n\nIt was at this stage i.e. when s. 5 (l) was interpreted so by this Court that the Parliament felt the necessity of enacting s. 5 (3) for the purpose of giving relief in resPect of penultimate sales that immediately precede the final (export) sales Provided the former satisfy the conditions specified therein. [652F-H, 653A-B, E-G]\n\n4. Two things become clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the Amendment Act 103 of 1966; first Mohd. Serajuddin's decision is specifically referred to as necessitating the amendment and secondly penultimate sales made by small and medium scale mannfacturers to an export, canalising agency or private export house to enable the latter to exPort these goods in compliance with existing contracts or orders are regarded as inextricably connected with the export of the goods and hence earmarked for conferal of the benefit of exemption. But the existing contract with whom is not clarified. The Statement being silent on this crucial point whether the existiog contract should be with a foreign buyer or will include an agreement with a local party containing a covenant to export, by n~ irrplication \"the agreentent\" spoken ofby section 5 (3) refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer. [654F-H]\n\nI It is true that the benefit of the exemption was intended to be extended to small and medium scale manufacturers desirous of exPorting their goods but the requirement of the new Provision is not that they must Procure or have with them a foreign buyer's contract but the requirement is that before they complete the sale of their goods to the canalising agency or the private export house there must be in existence a foreign buyer's contract to implement which Ibey should have sold their goods to such agency or export house. In the nature of things such manufacturers who have no expertise of exPort trade are not expected to have a foreign buyer's contract with them and it would be sufficient compliance of the provision of the canalising agency or the export house has with it the foreign buyer's contract. It would, therefore, be incorrect to say that the benefit of the exemption depends upon the fortuitous circumstance of a foreign buyer's contract being available with such mannfacturer when he sells his product to the agency or the export house. Neither any hardship is involved nor would the small or medium >Cale mannfacturers be depriv<d of the. benefit of the exemption, by the construction of the expression as \"the agreement'' in Section 5 (3), namely, that it means an agreement with a foreign buyer and not with a local party containing a covenant to ex.Port. In fact it is in consonance with the trade practice obtaining in export trade, namely, that normally the export activity commences with securing or\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEll V. COFFEE BOARD 631\n\nobtaining an ex.Port contract or a firm order from a foreign buyer as the first step A towards the ultimate export. [655A-F]\n\nState of Mysore v. The Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 9 S.T.C. 188@ 189 SC; folJowed.\n\nIt is difficult to say that the Parliament intended to prefer one and sacrifice the other, among the two public H:iterests involved, namely, promotion of the exports of the country and augmentation of the States' revenues through sales while enacting section 5 (3). Jn fact the granting of exemption to penu1timate sales was obviously with a view to Promote the ex Ports but limiting the exemption to certain types of penultimate sales that satify the two specified conditions display an anxiety not to diminish the States• revenues beyond a certain limiL\n\nThe section in any case not giving any indication that one public interest is to be prefered to the other, by necessary implication \"the agreement\" occurring in section 5(3) refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer. [656A-C]\n\n5. In Ben Gorm Ni/giri Plantations Company, Coonoor and Ors. v. Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle Ernaku/am. {1964] 7 S.C.R. 706 at p. 711-12, this Court held that. even in the case of a single sale which ultimately resulted in the export, the sale was not in the course of export, because there was no obligation to\n\nexport which afforded the inextricable link between the sale and the export. [657A-B] D\n\nIt is true that if the obligation to export affording the inextricable link between the sale and the export is necessary in the case of a single sale even though it results in export, then all the more such obligation will be necessary in the case of a penuJtimate sale if such penultimate sale is to constitute a sale\n\n0 in the course of export\" but even if Ben Gorm Ni/giri Plantations Company's case is regarded as laying down a general proposition that what is required is an obligation which inextricably connects the sale with the export and that such obligation may, in the absence of legislative guidance, arise by reason of statute, contract, mutual understanding or the nature of transaction which links the sale to exp0 rt, stiJl the question would be what type of obligation and arising from what circumS<- tances would be necessary or enough in the case of a penultimate sale must depend upon the language of the statute concerned and, therefore, the question will again be what type of obligation and arising from what circumstances has been Prescribed by the Parliament by enacting s. 5 (3) and that would dePend upon the Proper construction of the phrase \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such export\" occurring therein. Since on Proper construction the exPression \"the agreement or order\" means the agreement with or an order from a foreign\n\nbuyer, it is clear that the Parliament intended to prescribe that the obligation to export arising only from such agreement or order that would affofd the inextricable link so as to constitute the penultimate sale a sale in the course of export. [65'ffi..F]\n\n6. The word 'sale' occurring in the phrase \"if such last sale or purchase talces place after\" in section 5(3) of the Central Sale Tax Act 1956 does not mean the \"agreement to sell\" but only sale in the sense of a transfer of proPerty in the goods by one person to another. Section 5(3) cannot be construed otherwise for more than one reason. In the first pJilce the definitions of 'sale' and \"agreement to sell\" in the sale of Goods Act 1930 would not apply to the expression\n\n'sale' occurring in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 wherein the expression 'sale' has been defined in s. 2 (g) for the purpose of that Act and under s. 2 (g) of the Central Sales Tax Act 'sale' means \"any transfer of property in goods by one\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nperson to another for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration, and includes a transfer of goods on the hire-Purchase or other system of payment by instalments, but does not include a mortgage or hypothecation of or a charge or pledge on goods\". in other words, wherever the word 'sale' occurs in the Central Sales Tax Act, i956 it is this definition given in s. 2 (g) ihat will be applicable and therefore the word 'sale' in s. 5(3) must mean transfer of the goods by one person to another for cah or for deferred payment or for any other valuable considerations; it cannot mean \"agreement to sell\". Moreover, there is nothing in the context of s. 5 (3) to suggest that the word 'sale' occurring therein should be understood differently. On the contrary, the context suggests that the word 'sale' in the Phrase \"if such last sale or purchase takes place after \"refers to a completed sale i.e. a sale as defined in section 2(g) of the Act.\n\n[658EH, 659ACJ\n\nBalabhagas Hu/aschandv. State ofOrissa. [1976] 2 SCR 939; distinguished.\n\n7. Section 64(2} of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, being in pan' materia with Section 58(2) of the English sale of Goods Act, 1893 does not deal with the question of passing pf the property at auction sale but merely deals with completion of the contract of sale which takes place at the fall of the hammer or at the announcement of the close of the sale in other customary manner by the auctioneer.\n\nIf the auction sale of chattels is unconditional and is in respect of specific ascer~ D tained goods and nothing remains to be done\n\n0to the good~ for Pttttin2 theni in a condition rfady for delivry, the Prope:rty in the good, \\Vould pas<; to the purchaser upon the accePtance of the bid but that would not be because of s. 64 (2) but because of s. 20 and such would not be the case if the goods sold there at are non~ specific or unascertained goods or the auction sale is conditional.\n\nAnd, Sectio.q. 64(2) has nothing to do with the aspect of the passing of the property at an auction sale and it is by virtue of goods being specific and in a deliverable state that E under section 20 the Property in such good passess to the buyer at the completion of the contract at the fall of the hammer at such sale. [667F-H, 669C-D]\n\nMc Entire & Anr. v. Crossley Bros Ltd., [1895-99] All. E.R. (Reprint) 829@ 832, Dennant v, Skinner and Collom, [1948] 2 All. E.R. 29; quoted with approval.\n\nA. V. Thomas & Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural I1:1come tax, F [1963] Supp, 3 SCR, 608; followed •.\n\n8. Section 64 of the Sale of Goods Act could be subject to a contract to the contrary and would be subject to section 62. In the first place section 64 occurs in Chapter VII which contains \"Miscellaneous\" provisions and s. 62 whiCh occurs in the same Ch.1pter clearly provides that where any right, duty or 1i2bility would arise under a contract of sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties or by usage. If the usage is such as to bind both the parties. to the contract. Ordinarily, the rights, duties and liabilities arising under a contract of sale by implication of law spoken of in s. 62 refer to the rights, duties and obligations referred to in Chapter III containing provisions which lay down rules as to transfer of property as between seller and buyer and transfer of title but there is no reason by s. 62 should not apply to rights, duties and obligations arising under s. 64 in regard to auction sale. Sub section (1) of [section 64 provides that where goods are put up for sale in lots then each lot is prima facie deemed to be the subject of' a separate contract for sale, which means terms between the parties may Proville to the contrary or circumstances may indicate to the c\"ntrary. Again sub s. (S)\n\n• ' +\n\n• • •\n\n·\"( •\n\nCONSOLIDATED CE>FFEil V. COFFEE BOARD 633\n\nProvides that the sale may be notified to be subject to a reserved or up set price A Which means that the auctioneer may not fix a reserved price; further, it is well , settled that if such a reserved price baa been fixed then notwithstanding the fact the highest bid has been accepted by the auctioneer and the sale relates to specific\n\nor identifiable goods no concluded contract comes into existence if the bigb.est\n\nbid so accepted falls short of the reserved price and the ProPer!Y in the goods will not pass. Sub-ss (3) and ( 4) if carefully scrutinised also indicate that there cduld be a contract to the contrary. Moreover, once it is accepted that auction sales B to Which s. 64 applies could be unconditional or conditional and that tho auctioneer can prescribe his own terms and conditions on the basis of which the Property is ex.Posed to sale by auction it must be held that the acceptance of any bid as well as the passing of the Proper!Y in the goods sold thereat would be governed by those terms and conditions. [669D-H, 670A.C]\n\n9. In the instant case:\n\n(a) The export auctions of Coffee conducted by the Coffee Board are ad mittedly conducted on terms and conditions prescribed by it called \"Auction Conditions\". [n the absence of a suggestion in the case that a statutory body like the .Coffee Board while prescribing the auction conditions has acted not in good faith or that the said terms and coriditions do not tru1y govern the rights and obligations of the parties, thereto it is clear. that the question at what point of time the property in the Coffee sold thereat passes to the auction purchaser (Registered Exporter) mu&t depend upon the intention of the partiCs to be derived from the aforesaid terms and conditions. The property in coffee sold thereat does not pass to the buyer at the fall of the hammer under section 64 (2) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act. 1930. All that happens 't the fall of the hammer is that a completed contract of sale comes into existence creating a relationship of promiser and promisee between the pilrties in an executory contract, which is very clear from clause 13 (a) of the Auction conditions. [670C-F]\n\n(b) Clause 19 principally deals with aspects of delivery, weighment and payment of price and to\\vards the end it contains an overriding provision to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in these conditions. the property in the Coffee sold shall not pass to the buyer until after he has paid the full price and the coffee sold to him is weighed and set apart for delivery to him. In other words, it is clear that parties intended that the passing of the property shall not take place till the full price is paid and the coffee sold is weighed and set apart for delivery. Now there is nothing in any of the other privisiolls Of these Auction Con. ditions wliich indicates that ihe property in coffee sold. should pass either at the fall of the hammer or at any point of time prior to the payment of price and weighment and setting apart of coffee for delivery to the buyer. [670R, 67lA-B]\n\n'Mc Entire and Anr. v. Crossley Bros. Ltd., [1895-99) All. E.R. (Reprint) 829 @ 832; distinguished.\n\n(c) It is true that the over-riding prov1s1on contained in clause 19 is negative in character, that is to say, the parties are agreed that the property'ShaII not pass to the buyer until after the payment of the price, weighment and setting apart of the coffee for delivery to the buyer. But there are two provisions contained in clause 20 (d) and (0 which show that positively upon payment of price and weighment and setting apart the coffee sold for delivery to the buyer, the property in the coffee sold passes to the buyer at that point of time. Under clause 19, after the payment of full price the buyer has to apply for and take delivery within\n\n2-463 SCI/80\n\na certain time but in case h.e fails to take delivery, as provided in clause 20, the coffee is first stored by the Pool Agent in the 'Pool Warehouse pending its exportation by the buyer by the 15th May and if it is not exported by that date the Curer or Depot Manager removes it from the West Coast to inland countries for safe storage during the onsoon season but at the risk and cost of the buyer.\n\nHaving regard to clauses~ 19 and 20 of the Auction conditions, therefore, it is clear that in these penultimate sales i. e. sales of coffee at the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board; to property in coffee sold thereat passes to the buyer upon payments of price, weighn1ent and setting apart of the coffee sold for delivery to the buyer. [671C-F, 672C-D]\n\n(d) Passing of the property in such coffee cannot be said to be further postponed till actual shipment by reason of clause 31 of the Auction conditions, for,\n\nif the title has already passed under clauses 19 and 20 of the Auction Conditions immediately upon payment of price, weighment and setting apart of the coffee for delivery to the buyer, it cannot pass again. [672D-F]\n\n(e) It is not correct to say that in view of clause 31 a resrvation of the right of disposal over the goods in favour of the Coffee Board within the meaning of section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act is made. Section 25 (I) provides that where there is a contract for sale •of specific goods or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller may by terms of the contract or appropriation, reserve the riSht of disposal of the goods until certain conditions are ful filled and if he does so, the legal consequence Inentioned in the section flows, namely, that in such case notwithstanding the delivery of goods to a buyer or to a carrier or bailee for transaction to the buyer, the property in the goods does not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the seller are fulfilled. It is true that Cl. 26 declares that it is an essential condition of the auction that coffee sold thereat shall .be exported to stipulated destinations orto any other foreign country outside India as may be approved by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer within 3 months or within the extended period but s_uch essential condition is applied to thecoffee which has already become the property of the buyer under Cls. 19 and 20 oftbe Auction Conditions and all that Cl. 34 provides is that if default is made by buyer in exporting coffee within the prescribed time or extended time it shall be lawful for the Coffee Board without reference to the buyer to seize the unexported coffee and take possession thereof and deal with it as if it were the part and parcel bf the Board's Coffee held by them in their Pool Stock.\n\nFar from amounting to a reservation of the right of disposal over the unexported coffee to the Coffee Board, Cl. 31 is in the nature of a defeasance clause in the sense that what is vested in the buyer under the earlier conditions, the same shall revert back to the Coffee Board if the buyer commits a default in fulfilling the ess_ential condition. Such a reading of Cl. 31 would be consistent with a further provision which is to be found in the latter portion of that clause. The latter part of CI. 31 provides that after the coffee is seized and it becomes part and parcel of Board's Coffee beld by it in its pool stock, the Board shall re-sell the same but after such re-sale the CWef Coffee Marketing Oflioor shall pay to the defaulting buyer only the balance of the sale proceeds after deducting godown charges, insurance premium, selling commission payable to agents and all other expenses\n\nof.sale together with the penalty due under Cl. 30. In other words the proviso clearly suggests that the seized coffee becomes Coffee Board's property and is resold as such, otherwise the surplus should go to the buyer (Registered Exporter).\n\nThe fact that the payment to the defaulting buyer is limited to the actual sal•\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE V. COFFEE BOARD 635\n\nprice paid by him and that the surplus if any reverts to the Coffee Board clearly }.. shows that under Cl. 31 upon seizure the property reverts back to the Coffee Board. ClaUse 31 properly read amounts to a defeasance clause and nothing more, especially when it is clear that property in the coffee sold at auction passes to the buyer under Cls. 19 and 20 immediately upon payment of price, weighment and setting apart of the coffee for delivery to the buyer. Once the property has\n\npassed there would be no question of reserving any right of disposal over the same to the Coffee Board within the meaning of s. 25 (I) of the Sale of Goods Act.\n\nB\n\n[662FH, 673A-H]\n\n(g) In the penultimate sales (sales of coffee effected to Registered Exporters at export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board) the property in the Coffee sold thereat passes to the buyer immediately upon payment of full price, weighment and setting apart of coffee for delivery to the buyer under Cls. 19 and 20 of the Auction Conditions and it would be at this stage i.e. just before this stage is reached that the agreement with or order from a foreign buyer must be available or produc..\n\nC ed in order to attracts. 5 (3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. [674C-D]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 3130/78, 4238-4239/ 78, 8/79 and 1458/79.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, C. N. Murthy, K. P. Kumar, H. K. Dutt, T. Subba Rao and D. N. Gupta for the petitioners in WP No. 3130/78.\n\nA.K. Sen, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, K. P. Kumar, R. Vasudevan, C. N.\n\nMurthy, Ajay Mehta and T. Subba Rao for the petitioners in W. P.\n\nNos. 4238-4239/78.\n\nF.S. Nariman, K. P. Kumar, R. Vasudevan, C. N. MurthJ, Ajay Mehta and T. Subba Rao for the petitioner in WP 8/79.\n\nDr. Y.S. Chita/e, K. P. Kumar, R. Vasudevan, C.N. Murthy, AJaY Mehta and T. Subba Rao for the petitioner in WP No. 1458/79. . f\n\nL. M. Sinha, Att. Genl. K. J. Chandran, J.B. Dadachanji, K. J.\n\nJohn and Sri Narain for the Respondent in WP No. 3130/78.\n\nP. G. Nair, K. J. Chandran, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John and ri Narain for RR. 1 in WP Nos. 4238-4239/78.\n\nN. Nettar, fo~ RR. 2 in WP 4238-39/78.\n\nS.T. Desai and A. V. Rangam for RR 3 in WP 4238-39/78.'\n\nP. A. Francis, & V. J. Francis for RR 4 in WPs 4238-39/78.\n\nK. K. Venugopal. Addi. Sol. Genl. and N. Nettar for RR. 1 in WP No. 8/79.\n\nS. T. Desai and A. V. Rangam for the RR 2 in WP 8/79.\n\nV. J. Francis for RR 3 in WP No. 8/79.\n\nK. J. Chandran, J. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John and Sri Narain for RR 4 in WP No. 8/79.\n\nN. Nettar for RR in WP No. 1458/79.\n\nB V. J. Francis for the RR in WP No. 1458/79.\n\nK. J. Chandran, J.B. Dadachanji K. J. John, Sri Narain for the RR in WP No. 1458/79.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTur.zAPURKAR, J. These writ petitions filed by Registered Exporters of co.ffee under Art. 32 of the Constitution raise an important question of proper construction of s. 5(3), a provision newly inserted in the Central Sales Tax Act 1956 by an Amending Act\n\n(103of1976) and the petitioners also seek to challenge the constitutio nal validity ofa Circular dated February 7, 1977 issued by the Coffee Board, whereby it requires the Registerd Exporters of coffee to fur . nish contingency deposits or bank guarantees equal to the amount of sales tax in respect of the exempted sales under the said s. 5(3) and pray for its cancellation or withdrawal and consequential reliefs.\n\n' The facts giving rise to the writ petitions being common and almost identical may be stated. The Coffee Board, Bangalore is a statutory corporation incorporated under s. 5 of the Coffee Act, 1942, an enactment passed to provide for the development of the Coffee Industry under the control of the Union., Sections 4 to 10 of the Act deal with the setting µp of the coffee Board on which all interests are represented and some Members Of Parliament and Go verriment officers are nominated. The Board exercises powers and discharges functions assigned to it under the Act and the Coffee Rules framed thereunder. The Act compels the registration of all owners of coffee estates and licensing of curers and dealers and it also iiuposes cciht'rol on the sate, export and re-import of coffee into India. In regard to sale it fixes prices for sale of coffee either whole sale or retail by regist€red owners and licensed curers for the purpose of sale in the Indian Market and the Coffee Board fixes internal sale quota for each estate owner and the owner has to observe this quota and also the price fixed under s. 25 all coffee produced by a registered estate in excess of the quantities specified in the internal sale quota allotteed to that estate, or when no internal sale quotas have been allotted to the estates, all the coffee produced by the estate has to be delivered to the Board for inclusion in the surplus pool by the owner of the estate or by the cilring\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BO.').llD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 637\n\nestablishment receiving the coffee from the estate and under sub- A s. (6) in respect of coffee so delivered for inclusion in the surplus pool the registered owner retains no right except his right to receive payments referred to in s.\n\n34. Section 26(1) enjoins upon the Coffee Board to take all practical measures to market the coffee included in the suplus pool and all sales thereof have to be conducted by or through the Board. These sales include internal ' sales in India and outside India. We are concerned in these petitions with sales outside India. Under s. 20 of the Act no coffee (barring certain exceptions specified in the proviso) can be exported from India otherwise than by the Board or otherwise than under an authorisation granted by the Board in the prescribed manner C and , in the prescribed cases, while under s. 21 no coffee which has been exported from India shall be re-imported; into India except under and in accordance with a permit granted by the Board. Section 47 provides that all contracts for the sale of coffee in so far as they are at variance with the provisions of this Act shall be void. It will\n\nthus, appear clear that the Coffee Board exercises complete control- Q almost monopolistic-over the coffee trade in exercise of its statutory powers.\n\nExport of coffee outside India is particularly controlled under the Act and the Rules by the Coffee Board. As stated earlier coffee can be exported either by the Coffee Board directly to parties outside India or the Coffee Board authorises other exporters to effect such exports. For effecting exports through other exporters the Coffee Board periodically conducts auctions known as \"export auctions\" and it follows a procedure in that behalf. To be able to bid at these auctions, exporters have to get themselves registered with the Board. 1'The Board maintains a list of Registered Exporters and grants to each one of them a permit, which authorises him to take part in the \"export auction\". The conditions which are imposed by th.e permit (hereinafter called the permit conditions') require, inter alia, a security deposit and a standing deposit (which may be in cash or in the form of bank guarantee) from the Registered Exporters; such permit is liable to be withdrawn or cancelled by the Chief Coffee\n\nMarketing Officer, an executive appointed by the Central Government on the Board, at any time if it is found that a permit-holder has sold or has attempted to sell coffee bought by him at the \"export auction\" within the internal market without his written permission or if any of the other permit conditions are contravened). A specimen of the permit together with the conditions attaching to it has been annexed to each petition. (The aCtual \"export auctions\"\n\nare conducted on the basis of \"the Term and Conditions of Sale\n\n' . '\n\nof Coffee in the course of Export\" framed by it and the Registered Exporters participate in such auctions on those terms aud conditions.) A specimen copy of these Auction Conditions has been annexed to each petition. Clause 3 thereof declares that all auctions and sales made thereat are subject to (i) the Auction conditions, (ii) the Permit conditions and (iii) such other rules or conditions as may be prescribed by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer. Under Cl. 4 only dealers who have registered themselves as Exporters of coffee with the Coffee Board and who hold a permit from the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer in that behalf are pemitted to participate in the auctions. Under Cl. 11 no one is allowed to retract his bid when once the same has been entered in the Register of Bids. The highest bid is ordinarily accepted but the sale Conducting Officer may not accept such bid if he has reason to believe that the same is not bona fide or genuine or the same is that outcome of concerted action on the part of the dealers or a section of them for the purpose of controlling or manipulating prices, etc. subject to his recording the reasons for such rejection in the Register of Bids. Clause 19 deals with weighment, delivery and payment of price and contains an over-riding provision the effect that the \"property in the coffee sold shall not pass to the buyer until after he has paid the full price and the coffee sold to him is weighed and set apart for delivery to him\".\n\nClause 26 declares that it is an essential condition of the auction that the coffee sold thereat shall be exported to the destination stipulated in the catalogue of lots or to any other foreign country outside India as may be approved by the Chief Coffee Marketing Offi~ cer within three months or within such extended period as shall not exceed one year from the Notice of Tender issued to the auction buyer (Registered Exporter) and that under uo circumstances the coffee purchased at such auction shall be diverted to other destinations or sold or be disposed of or otherwise released in India, Clauses 30 and 31 provide for the consequences of default on the part of the buyer to export the coffee or to produce evidence thereof; he is liable to pay a penalty at the rate specified in Cl. 30 aud what is more under Cl. 31 Chief Coffee Marketing Officer is entitled to seize and take possession of the unexported coffee and deal with it as it were part and parcel of the Board's coffee in it surplus pool. Under Cl. 32 it is provided that in the event of the buyer committing any default in respect of any of the terms and conditions of the\n\n\"export auction\" he shall be liable\n\n(i) to be removed from the list of the Registered Exporters, the permit granted to him being cancelled; (ii) to forfeit the deposit made by him at the time of obtaining the permit and (iii) to forfeit the deposit if any covered by the conditions contained in Cl. 14(ii),\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzap_urkar, /.) 639\n\nAccording to the petitioners prior to the enactment of sub-s.\n\n(3) of s. 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which was inserted on September 7, 1976 with retrospective effect from April I, 1976 by the Amending Act (103 of 1976), the exemption from liability to tax under the Act in regard to a sale in the course of the export was and continues to be governed by s. 5(1) of the Act which runs thus\n\n\"5(1) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such export or is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed the customs frontiers oflndia\".\n\nThe aforesaid provision was examined by this Court in two leading cases, namely, Coffee Board Bangalore v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras & Anr. (')and Mohd. Serajuddin etc. v. State of Orissa (2) and a certain interpretation had been accorded by this Court to the expression \"in the course of export\" and according to these decisions the last sale, immediately preceding the sale occasioning the export of goods out oflndia (hereinafter called the \"penultimate sale\"), however closely related to the final export, was held not to be the course of export but only for export and hence liable to tax and according to the petitioners it was with a view to temove the difficulties caused by these and other similar decisions that the Parliament enacted the new sub-s. (3) of s.5 and added a proviso to s.6(1) by the Amending Act (103 of 1976). The newly enacted provisions run thus\n\n\"5(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the last sale or purchase of any goods preceding the sale or purchase occasioning the export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export, if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.\" '\"'6(1) ..••....•.•.......••....•...•.•••.....\n\nProvided that a dealer shall not be liable to pay tax under this Act on any sale of goods which, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 5, is a sale in the course of export of these goods out of the territory of India.\" The petitioners have strongly relied upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the relevant Bill in this behalf. In other words, according to the petitioners under sub-section (3) of s.5 even the 'penultimate sale' is to be regarded as a sale 'in the course of ex-\n\n' (I) [1970] 3 SCR 147=25 STC 258.\n\n(2) [1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 169 =36 S.T.C. 136.\n\n640 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nport' and will under the proviso to s.6(1) be entitled to claim exemption from the liability to tax under the Act provided such penultimate sale-(i) took place after, and (ii) was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export. According to the petitioners the. sales of coffee made to the Registered Exporters at the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board constitute 'penultimate sales' falling within s.5(3) and qualify for the exemption from the tax liability under the Act in as much as both the conditions mentioned above are satisfied.\n\nThe petitioners' case is that !notwithstanding the aforesaid position the Coffee Board by its Circular dated February 7, -1977 issued to the Registered Exporters of coffee has taken the view that in order to avail of the benefit of sec. 5(3) (in respect of the coffee sold by it at the export auctions. the Registered Exporters (bidders) should satisfy three conditions (a) he must have an export contract (i. e. either agreement or order) from a foreign buyer, (b) he must have it on hand at the time when he partiCipates in the export auon and (c) he should give proof of the export of the coffee purchad at the auction. By way of compliance with the conditions (a) and (b) above the said Circular requires the Registered Exporters to deposit with the Board before the commencement of each auction copies of the export orders or agreements from their foreign buyers). Obviously the Coffee Board proceeds op. the basis thats. 5(3) requires an agreement with or an order from a foreign buyer and that too it must exist at .the time of participation in the auction inasmuch as in its view the property in the coffee sold at such auction passes and the penultimate sale takes place at the fall of the-hammer under s.64(2) of the Sale of Goods Act. Further as the Coffee Board conld not be certain as to how the Sales Tax Authorities would treat the penultimate sales in the matter of granting exemption the said Circular requires the bidders to make a contingency deposit in cash equivalent to the sales tax liability or furnish bank guarantee in lieu thereof, each of such deposit or guarantee being required to be kept in force for a period of four years. In other words, according to the petitioners even in cases where the Registered Exporters (auction bidders) shall have satisfied all the aforesaid conditions, the Coffee Board has insisted upon such Exporters making contingency deposits or furnish bank guarantees for amounts equivalep.t to the sales tax chargeable on such sales inspite of the enactment of s.5(3) and this has been done ostensibly for the protection of the Coffee Board in the event of Sales Tax Authorities holding that even in such cases the benefit of s. 5(3) would not be availal;>le.\n\nThe petitioners contend that the words \"the agreement\" for or' 'in relation to such export\" in s. 5(3) do not necessarily refer to the 11gree\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE ¥· qJFFEE BOARD (T11lzapurkar, !.) 641\n\nment with a foreign buyer but would include any binding or enforce.·\n\nable agreement to export even with a local party to implement which the penultimate sale must have taken place and; since here:the penulti mate sales (sales of coffee to Reigistered Exporters by the Coffee Board) take place on the express and essential condition that the said coffee shall be exported and the same shall not be diverted to any other desti~ nation or sold or disposed of or released in India ( vide Clause 26) and which condition is enforced on pain of imposition of penalty and seizure of the unexported coffee (vide: Clauses 30 and 31) these must be regarded as having been made for the purpose of complying with agreement for or in relation to export and secondly, these penul- . tim.ate sales invariably take place (i.e. become complete after the agreement to export is entered into inasmuch as the latter comes into existence invariably before the property in the coffee passes to the Registered Exporters (auction purchasers). Alternatively the petitioners contend that even if the words \"the agreement for or in relation to such export\" mean only the agreement with a foreign buyer all that is required is that such agreement with the foreign [buyer must exist before the penultimate sale becomes omplete, i.e. before the property in the coffee sold thereat passes to the auction purchaser and according to the petitioners the property in the coffee sold at such penultimate sales passes to the auction purchaser after the same is shipped or sent to the custom station for shipment because till then the Coffee Board has a right of disposal over the same within the imeaning of s.25 of the Sale of Goods Act under Cl. 31 and in any event [not until the same is weighed and set apart and price paid. therefor under Cl. I 9 and hence if the agreement with the foreign buyer is available before that it would be sufficient compliance of s.'5'(3). The Board's view that the property in the coffee sold at the auctins passes to the bidders at the fall of hammer is clearly unsustainable. The petitioners thus contend that the aforesaid action on the part of the Coffee Board in forcing the Registered Exporters of coffee, including the petitioners, to make contingency deposits or to furnish bank guarantees to secure payment of sales tax on transactfons which have been specifically exempted from sales tax by s. 5(3) and the proviso to s. 6(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 read withArt. 286(1) of the Constitution of India is without authority of law and the Board's Circular dated February 7, 1977 is unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, without authority of law and violative of their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 .and 31 of the Constitution.\n\nThe. petitioners, therefore, seek issuance of writs of certiorari and ff prohibition quashing the said circular and restraining further action thereunder in future. It seems that since retrospective effect was given\n\nA..\n\n• m the amendments introduced by Act 103 of 1976 the Coffee Board collected and the petitioners paid sales tax on these export auctions during the period of the retrospectivity and for few.months more and thereafter the Coffee Board has, in terms of the said Circular, obtained from the petitioners bank guarantees to secure payment of sales tax which but for the enactment of sub-s. (3) of s. 5 might have been payable on each such sale. To obtain appropriate reliefs in this behalf in two of the three writ petitions, the petitioners therein have also impleaded the concerned States, namely, State of Karnataka, State of Tamil Nadn and the State of Kerala as party respondents to their petitions. The petitioners have sought appropriate orders or directions against these State Governments directing them to make refunds to the Coffee Board of the amounts collected by them from the Coffee Board as and by way of sales tax and further restraining them from collecting or threatening to collect from the Coffee Board any amount as and by way of sales tax on the transactions in question or subjecting such transactions to sales tax. The petitioners have also sought the consequential reliefs of directing the Coffee Board to pay over to the petitioners the refunds which it may receive from the State Governments pursuant to the Court's order and further directing the Coffee Board to release the bank guarantees or contingency deposits obtained by it under the impugned Circular.\n\nIn the returns filed on behalf of the the Coffee Board by way of reply to the writ petitions two or three contentions have been raised.\n\nFirst, by way of preliminary objection it is contended that no writ would lie against it challenging its Circular dated February 7, 1977 inasmuch as though the Coffee Board is constituted under a Central enactment and has monopolistic control over the coffee trade, when it exposes coffee in export auctions it is merely engaged in a commercial activity in exercise of its power to make contracts and while so engaged it cannot be denied its legitimate rjght, like any other trader• to lay down the terms and conditions for snch sales a.nd the Circular dated February 7, 1977 is one such communication addressed to the Registered Exporters containing additional terms or conditions concerning sales tax in the matter of such auctions and neither the auction conditions nor the Circular stem from any statute but are matters falling within the realm of contract and therefore no writ petition challenging the Circular is maintainable. Secondly, the Coffee Board is eatitled to protect its interest and since it has an apprehension that exemption provided for by s. 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 may not be made available by the Assessing Authorities under the sales Tax Law, the Coffee Board decided to safeguard its interest by taking contingency deposits or bank guarantees equivalent to the\n\n. -\n\n.~.\n\n, CONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 643\n\namount of sales tax th&t would be payable in repect of the export auctions. It is pointed out in this behalf that all kinds of penultimate sales or purchases are not exempt under s.5(3) but the exemption is hedged in with conditions specified therein and only when those con ditions are proved to the satisfaction of the Assessing Authority the exemption will arise and until then there is a risk of the Coffee Board being visited with the sales tax and so to protect itsel( against any possible levy of sales tax it is obliged to insist upon furnishing of con tingency deposits or bank guarantees. By doing it the Coffee Board is not exacting any sales tax as such and, therefore, a protective measure of the type adopted by it cannot be said to be illegal _or unconstitutional or violative of any of the petitioners' fundamental rights. Thirdly, on merits it is contended that its interpretation of section 5(3) that what is required the.1eunder is an agreement with or an order from a foreign buyeF is correct as also its conclusion that in the export auctions conducted by it property in the coffee sold thereat passes to the Registered Exporter (bidder) at the fall of hammer and, therefore, the conditions imposed by the Circular on the Registered Exporters before they can claim exemption from the tax liability are justified. The States of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala in their respective counteraffidavits have supported the stand taken by the CoffeeBoard on both the points. It may, however, be stated that all the three States are desirous of having an authoritative pronouncement from this Court on the question of proper construction of the words \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such export\" occurring in s. 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956 but on the second point counsel for States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have urged that since the question of passing of property does not depend merely upon proper construction bf the auction conditions read in the context of the relevent provisions of the Sale of Goods Act but will need investigation into all the relevant facts and circumstances of each auction sale including the conduct of the parties as also the correctness and true nature of the dealings between them any expression of opinion by this Court on that question would not be proper and may bar such investigation into all the relevant facts at the hands of their Sales Tax Authorities as and when exemption is claimed in assessment proceedings. Counsel for the State of Kerala was, however, not in agreement with this submission and statfd that even that question was a pure question of fa'N dtprnding upon the pre per constn1cticn of the auction conditicns nr.d with the relvant provisicns cf the Sale of Gccds Act on the basis that the auction conditions truly govern the rights and obligations of the parties to such sale. We may also state that during\n\n644 SUPREME COURT jlJlP9RTS\n\n\nthe hearing counsel for the State of Tami.I Nadu also raised the question of the vires of s. 5(3), apart from its construction; he contended that the provision itself was u/tra vires Art. 286(2) on the ground that instead of formulating any principle for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of export outside the territory of India-for which alone power to make law has been conferred on Parliament-the Parliament has created a legal fiction to the effect that a penultimate sale of purchase, in certain circumstances, shall be deemed to be in the course of export when in truth and realit it is not and the creation of such legal fiction is beyond the power or outside the authority conferred by Art. 286(2).\n\nFrom the rival contentions which have been summarised above it will appear clear that principally four questions arise for our dedision in these Petitions. The first relates to the maintainability cf the writ petitions against the Coffee Board; the second is whether the amendment introduced by insertion of sub-s. (3) in s. 5 of the Cnetral Sales Tax Act is ultra vires Art. 286(2) of the Constitution, the third relates to the proper construction of s. 5(3) of the said Act and the fourth is at what point of time the property in the coffee sold at export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board passes to the Registered Exporters (auction purchasers). We may, however, state that during the course of the hearing the learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of the Coffee Board fairly stated that since the question of proper construction of s. 5(3) would affect a large number of dealers in expo_rt trade, including the Coffee Board (which was concerned with export trade in coffee). the Board was interested in having an authoritative decision of this Court on the point, that such authoritative decision would also facilitate the issuance of a proper Circular in regard to its future transactions and, therefore, he was not pressing the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ peti!lons against the Coffee Board. We would, therefore, deal with the remaining three questions one after the other.\n\nDealing first with the question whether s. 5(3) of the Act which has been introduced by the Amending Act 103 of 1976 is u!tra vires Art. 286(2) of the Constitution, the precise contention Of Mr. S. T Desai appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu has been that the said provision merely enacts an artificial rule or fiction that a penultimate sale which in fact is not in the course of the export of goods out of the ' territory of India, shall be \"deemed to be in the course of such export' if it satisfies the conditions specified therein, it does not lay down or\n\nCONSoLIDAtED COFFEil v. ciJFFEE BOARD (Tu/zapurkar, !.) 645\n\nformulate any principle for determining when a sale takes place in the course of export of the gocds out of the territory of India and, therefore, it is beyond the power or authority conferred on Parliament by Art. 286(2J. We pointed out that prior to the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1956 this Court in its decisions while interpreting the expression \"sale in the course of export\" occurring in Art. 286 (!) (b) laid down two principles as to when a sale could be said to be a sale in the course of export and it held that two types of sales, viz.\n\n(a) sale which occasions the expert ai:d (b) sale which is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods have crossed customs frontiers of India, would be sales in the course of export.\n\nSection 5(1) which was enacted in Central Sales Tax Act 1956 pursuant to the power conferred on Parliament by Art. 286(2) which was introduced by the Constitution (Sixth Amer.dment) Act 1956 mP.rely gave legislative recognition to the aforesaid two principles which had been formulated by this Court while interpretir.g Art. 286(2) (b) hut while adding sub-s. (3) to f. 5 of the Act Parliament had created a legal fiction to the effect that a penultimate sale satisfying certain specified conditions shall also be deemed to be a sale in the courSe of export when in truth and reality it is not. According to him, C:reation of such fiction is ot formulaticn cf any principle and as such the provision is beyord the pcwer or authority conferred on Parliament by Art. 286(2).\n\nIt is not possible to accept the aforesaid contention for the reasons we shall presently indicate. It is true that the word \"deemed\" hits\n\nbeen used in s. 5(3) buuhe same word has been used not merly in s.5(1) but also in the other two sections 3 and 4 of Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act which has the heading \"Formulations of {Principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or outside a State or in the course of export or import\", the heading of Cha:Pter II on the face of it suggests that what is done under ss. 3, 4 and 5 inchidirtg sub-s (3) is formulation of.principles. Secondly, the wotd \"deemed\" is used a great deal in modern legislation, different senSes and it is not that a\n\ndeeming provision is every time made for the purpose of .creatirtll a fiction. A deeming provision might be made to ihclude what is obvioUs\n\nor what is uncertain or to impose for the purpose of a stat11te art artificial construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise pre-\n\nvail but in each case it would be a question as to with what object the 'Legislature has made such a deeming provision. In St. Aub)'n <ind II!\n\nOrs. v. Attorney General,(') Lord Radcliffe observed thus:\n\n(!) [1952] A. C. 15 at p. 53.\n\n\"The word 'deemed' is used a great deal in modern legislation.\n\nSometimes it is used to impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial construction of a word or phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what is in the ordinary sense impossible.\"\n\nAfter making these observations the learned Law Lord went on to hold that it was in the last of the three ways (indicated in the observations) that the deeming provision was made in s. 58(2) of the Finance Act, 1940, which came for interpretation before the House of Lords. Similarly in Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 1 lA at page 181 it is explained that the word 1'deemed\" is also used to mean \"regarded as being\", it is equivalent to \"shall be taken to be\" (at page 185). In our view when sub-s. (3) of s. 5 uses the word \"deemed\" and says that the penultimate sale \"shall also be deemed to be in the course of export\" what is intended to be conveyed is that the penultimate sale shall also be regarded as being in the course of such export. In other words, no legal fiction is created. Moreover, it was concieded by counsel that the word \"deemed\" in sections 3, 4 and 5(1) laid down general principles and did not create any fiction; if that be so, it is difficult to accept the contention that in sub-s. (3) the same word should be construed as creating a fiction. Thirdly, a principle has been explained in Butterworths' Words and Phrases, Second Edition, Vol. 4 at page 177 thus :\n\n\"A 'principle' means a general guiding rule, and does not include specific directions, which vary according to the subject matter.\" (per Shearman J., in M' Creagh v. Frearson 1922 W. N. 37)\n\nSimilarly in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 33A at page 327 it is explained that \"principle means a general law or rule adopted or professed as a guide to action\". In other words, as opposed to any specific direction governing any particular or specific instance, G transaction or situation a principle would be a guiding rule applicable generally to cases or class or cases. Looked at from this angle it will be clear that sub-s. (3) of s. 5 formulates a principle inasmuch as it lays down a general guiding rule applicable to all penultimate sales that satisfy the two conditions specified therein and not any specific direction governing any particular or specific transaction of a penulti- B mate sale. In other words the content of the provision shows that i( lays down a principle. In fact, while addressing arguments on proper construction of the s. 5 _ (3) counsel for the three States strenuously\n\n' CONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 647\n\ncontended that the said provision should not be construed as being applicable only to the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board and the terms and conditions governing them because it applies to variety of parties including the small manufacturers who seek a foreign market for their goods through private export houses or cana- . lised agencies like State Trading Corporation. It is thus clear to us that s. 5(3) formulates a principle of general applicability in regard to all penultimate sales provided they satisfy the specified conditions mentioned therein and there is no question of the said provision creating a legal fiction as has been contended for by counsel. The contention, therefore, that s. 5(3) is beyond the power or authority of Art. 286(2) and, therefore, ultra vires, must be rejected.\n\nTurning next to the main issue regarding the proper construction to be placed on the words \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such export\" occurring in s. 5(3) of the Act, the question is whether the agreement referred to therein means only the agreement with a . foreign buyer or would include any binding or enforceable agreement to export even with a local party to implement which penultimate sale should have taken place. Section 5(3), quoted above in extenso, has .-Obviously been enacted to extend tbe exemption from tax liability under the Act not to any kind of penultimate sale but only to such penultimate sale as satisfies the two conditions specified therein, name ly, (a) that such penultimate sale must take place{i. e. become complete) after the agreement or order under which the goods are to be exported and (b) it must be for the purpose of complying with such agreement or order and it is only then that such penultimate sale is deemed to be a sale in the course of export. Counsel for the petitioners contended that all that the section requires is that before the penulti. mate sale becomes complete by passing of property in the goods, there must be in existence an agreement for or in relation to the export of those goods outside India and the language does not suggest that such agreement must necessarily be with a foreign buyer. In other words, the phrase ''the agreement for or in relation to such export\" is wide enough to include any binding or enforceable agreement to export even with a local party to implement which the penultimate sale should have taken place. According to counsel the words \"such export\" occurring at the end of the sub-section mean the physical export of the goods outside India and it is significant that Parliament has linked\n\n\"the agreement or order\" with \"such export\" (meaning the physical export outside India) and not with \"the sale occasioning the export\" The argument is had Parliam!nt intended that the agreement with -0r order from a foreign bu e1 was essential it would have said \"the\n\nA.-\n\nagreement or order for or in relation to such sale occasioning tbeexport.\" Further, relying upon the Statement of Objects and Reason&\n\nappended to the relevant Bill it is contended that the benefit of this .new provision was intended to be extended to even small manufacttirera\n\nwho produce goods for a foreign market but have to depend np6n private export houses possessing the . requisite expertise of eitport trade or a statutory canalising agency like the State Trading Corporation for the export of their goods and if while selling his produdt 'to such export house or canalising agency the small manufacturer enter& info a binding covenant or agreement with the export house or the agency that the latter shall export the product that should be enough to satisfy the condition mentioned in the sub-section and the exemption from tax liability under the Act cannot be made to depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of a foreign buyer's contract or foreign buyer's order being available with him when he sells his product to the export house or the agency. Moreover, counsel contended that according to the decisions of this Court what is required to constitute a sale in the course of export is that the sale should be so inextrica'b1y bound with the ultimate export that the link between the two cannot be voluntarily interrupted without a breach of, the contract. In other words, an inextricable bond or obligation must subsist between saleon the one hand and the final export on the other and such obligation can arise by reason of statute, contract or mutual understanding between the parties arising from the nature of the transaction and in this. behalf strong reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners on the following observations of Justice Shah in the case of Ben Gorm- Nilgiri Plantations Company, Coonoor and Ors. v. Sales Tax Officer,.\n\nSpecial Circle, Ernakulam and Ors.(1)\n\n\"A sale in the course of export predicates a connection between the sale and export, the two activities being so integrated that the\n\nconnection between the two cannot be voluntarily interrupted, without a breach of the contract or the compulsion arising from the nature of the transaction. In this sense to constitute a sale in. the course of export it maybe said that there must be an interltilln on the part of both the buyer and the seller to export, there niust be obligation to export, and there must be an actual export. The\n\nobligation may arise by reason of statute, contract between '(heparties, or .from mutual understanding or agreement between. them, or even from the nature of the transaction which links the\n\nsale to export ........ In general where the sale is effected 'by 0ilie seller, and he is not connected with the export which actually tllkes.\n\n(!) [1964] 7 s.c.'R. 706 at pp. 711 and 712.\n\nj:O~SQLll>ATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 649\n\nplace, it is a sale for export. Where the export is the result of sale, the export being inextricably linked up with the sale so that the bond cannot be dissociated without a breach of the obligation arising by statute, contract or mutual understanding between the parties arising from the nature of the transaction, the sale is in the course of export.\"\n\nCounsel urged that securing a foreign buyer's contract or a foreign buyer's order is not the only mode in which the requisite obligation to export, affording the inextricable link between the sale and export,\n\ncan arise; such obligation can arise by reason of a binding or enforceable covenant to export being incorporated in the contract of the penultimate sale entered into with a local party as is the case in the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board where under Cl. 26 it is obligatory on the part of the Registered Exporters to export the coffee sold to them and perhaps with the Coffee Board possessing statutory powers to enforce the condition on pain of imposition of penalty and seizure of an exported coffee the obligation to export will have greater sanctity that the obligation arising from a foreign buyer's contract or a foreign buyer's order. Counsel, therefore, contended that the penultimate sales herein, namely, the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board since they satisfy the two conditions specified in s. 5(3) must be regarded as sales in the course of export and insistence on production of an agreement with or order from a foreign buyer in terms of the impugned Circular is clearly uncalled for.\n\nIt may be stated that though initially· the learned Attorney General appearing for the Coffee supported the construction that the words \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such export\" occurring in s.5 (3) necessarily referred to the agreement with or an order from a foreign buyer, at a later stage during the course of his submissions he did not stick to that stand but submitted that the construction sought to be placed on those words by counsel for the petitioners would be proper as it would promote the export trade in coffee by making Indian coffee available at competitive rates in the international market, an objective sought to be achieved by enacting the new provision in s. 5 of the Act.\n\nIt is true that the language employed in s.5 (3) is a little!ambiguous or equivocal and there is no indication in express terms whether the\n\n\"agreement\" mentioned therein necessarily refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer or would include any binding or enforceable agreement to export with a local party and that is why counsel on either side have heavily relied upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the relevant Bill to show what was the legal po-\n\n3-46JSCl/80\n\nsition under s. 5(1) as interpreted by this Court in the Coffee Board's case and Mohd. Serajuddin's case (supra) before the proposed amendment and what was the lacuna or mischief that was sought to be remedied as also the object with which this provision came to be enacted.\n\nHowever, before applying the mischief rule initially enunciated in Heydon's case(!) for arriving at the true construction we propose to examine the new provision rather closely with a view to see whether 1Jy implication any indication one way or the other is available from the language thereof. The material words which prescribe the two conditions on satisfying which the penultimate sale is to be regarded as a sale in the course of export are: \"If such last sale or purchase (meaning the penultimate sale or purchase) took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.\" It is true that Parliament has not said \"the ; igreement or order for or in relation to such sale occasioning the export\", but has used the phrase \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such export.\" But in our view two aspects emerge very clearly on a close scrutiny of this phrase which by implication show that the \"agreement\" spoken of there refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer and not an agreement with a local party containing a covenant to export.\n\nIn the first place the concerned phrase speaks of two things in disjunctive: 'agreement' or 'order'. The word 'order' which appears in a statute dealing with sales tax must be understood in a commercial sense, that is, in the sense in which traders and commercial men will understand it. In commercial sense an order means; a firm request for supply of definite goods emanating from a buyer, an indent placed by a purchaser and, therefore, an order for or in relation to export would mean an indent from a foreign buyer. It is not possible to accept the contention urged by counsel for the petitioners that the word 'order' in this phrase can mean or refer to an order, direction, mandate, command or authorisation to export that may be issued by a statutory body like the Coffee Board for two reasons; first, occurring in a sales tax statute the word must be given its commercial meaning and, secondly, while enacting the provision Parliament could not be said to have only statutory bodies like Coffee Board or S. T. C. in mind. If, therefore, an order for export in the concerned phrase means an indent from a foreign buyer, the preceding word \"agreement\" in the phrase would take colour from the word \"order\" and wouldon the principle of noscitur a sociis mean an agreement with a foreign buyer. In Max- \\; eilon: the Interpretation of Statutes (at p. 289 12th Edn.) the rule\n\n(I) [1584]3 Co. Rep. 79.:\n\nCONSoLmATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 6 51\n\nof noscitur a sociis is explained thus: \"where two or more words, which are susceptible of analogous meaning, are coupled together they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that!of the less general.\" Applying this rule of construction it becomes clear that \"the agreement\" occurring in the phrase must mean the agreement with a foreign buyer and not the agreement with a local party containing a covenant to export. Secondly and more importantly, the user of the definite article \"the\" before the word \"agreement\" is, in our view, very significant.\n\nParliament has not said 'an agreement' or 'any agreement' for or in relation to such export and in!the context the expression \"the agreement\" would refer to that agreement whichs implicit in the sale occasioning the export. Between thetwo sales (the penultimate and the final) spoken of in the earlier part of the sub-section ordinarily it is the final sale that would be connected with the export, and, therefore, the expression \"the agreement\" for export must refer to that agreement which is implicit in the sale that occasions the export. The user of the definite article \"the\", therefore, clearly suggests that the agreement spoken of must be the agreement with a foreign buyer. As a matter of pure construction it appears to us clear, therefore, that by necessary implication the expression \"the agreement\" occurring in the relevant phrase means or refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer and not an agreement or any agreement with a local party containing the covenant to export.\n\nComing to the mischief rule, in Re Mayfair Property Co.,(I) Lindley M. R. re-enunciated it thus: \"In order properly to interpret any statute it is necessary to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief.\" Looked at from this angle it will be desirable to indicate in brief the position that obtained prior to the enactment of s. 5(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956, hows. 5(1) after its enactment had been interpreted by this Court and why the enactment of the new provision contained in s. 5(3) was felt necessary. Prior to the enactment of s. 5(1) there was no legislative guidance as to what transactions of sale or purchase could be said to:be \"in the course of export\" and the said expression occurring in Art. 286(1) (b) of the Constitution was construed by this Court in what have come to be known as the first and the second Travancore-Cochin cases, namely, The State of Travancore-Cochin and; Ors.)'v. The:Bombay, Company_Ltd.(2) and The\n\n(I) [1898] 2 Ch. 28 at p. 35.\n\n(2) [I952J 2 STC 434.\n\n\"' ,\\\n\nState of Travancore-Cochin and Ors. v. The Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory and Ors.,(1) to include two types of sales or purchases (a) a sale of purchase which itself occasions the export and (b) a sale or purchase effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods after the goods are put in the export stream (i.e. after they have crossed the customs frontiers of India). Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed in the first case that \"a sale by export involved a seriet of integrated activities commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and ending with the delivery of the goods. to a commor, carrier for transport out of the country by land or sea. Such a 3ale cannot be dissociated from the export without which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and resultant export form parts of a single transaction\". In the second case this Court held that a sale or purchase for the purpose of export, like production or manufacture for export, being merely an act preparatory to export could not be regarded as an act clone \"in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India\" because etymologically the expression \"in the course of export\" denoted an integral relation between the sale and the export. Then came the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956 introducing a new clause being cl. (2) in Art. 286 whereby Parliament was empowered by law to formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase took place in the course of export and pursuant to this power Parliament enacted s. 5(1) in the Act which provides that a \"sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of the export of the goods out of the territory of India only if the sale or purchase either occasions such. export or is effected by a transfer of documents1of title to the goods if the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India\". In other . words, this was legislative recognition of what was said by this Court in the two Travancore .cases (supra) about the true meaning of the expression \"in the course of export\" occurring in Art. 286 (!) (b).\n\nSection 5(1) was construed by this Court in the context of two sales (though both were closely connected with the ultimate exportation of the goods out of India) rather very strictly in two cases, namely, the Coffee Board's case (supra) and Mohd. Serajuddin's case (supra).\n\nIn the former case in regard to the very export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board for the avowed purpose of exporting the coffee through Registered Exporters (which are the subject-matter of the instant writ petitions) this Court negatived the claim that the sales of coffee at such auctions were made \"in the course of export\" within the meaning of s. 5(1) on the ground there were two sales, one by the Coffee Board to the intermediary (Registered Exporter) and the other by the intermediary to the importer and that the first sale was not\n\n(1) [19531 4 S. T. C. 205.\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 653\n\n\"in the course of export\" for the export began from the intermediary and ended with the importer and that the introduction of the intermediary (Registered Exporter) between the seller (Coffee Board) and the importing buyer broke the link. This Court laid down the test that there must be a single sale which itself caused the export and there was no room for two or more sales being \"in the course of export\".\n\nIn other words, notwithstanding the compulsion to export arising from Cls. 26, 30 and 31 of the Auction Conditions the penultimate sale was held to be not in the course of export. The latter case (Mohd.\n\nSerajuddin's case (supra) was stronger than Coffee Board's case (supra) inasmuch as the penultimate sales (two contracts for sale of mineral ore entered into by Mohd. Serajuddin with State Trading Corporation) were so inextricably connected with the final sales (two corresponding contracts for sale of the identical goods entered into by S.T.C. with foreign buyers) that the former were to stand cancelled if the latter 'Jbr any reason fell through and vice versa and further the penultimate sales were effected to implement the contracts with the foreign buyers and even then following the ratio of Coffee Board's case (supra) this Court held that. the penultimate sales (Mohd. Serajuddin's contracts with S.T.C.) were not sales in the course of export. Negativing the contention that the contracts between Mohd. Serajuddin and the S. T. C. and the contracts between the S. T. C. and the foreign buyer fbrmed integrated activities in the course of export, this Court took the view that the crucial words in s. 5(1) showed that only if a sale occasioned the export, it would be in the course of export and that the two sets of contracts were separate and independent and Mohd.\n\nSerajuddin was under no contractual obligation to the foreign buyer either directly or indirectly and that his rights and obligations were only against the S. T. C. It will thus appear clear that even when the S. T. C. had with it foreign buyer's contracts and!Mohd. Serajuddin's contracts with S. T C. had been entered into for the purpose of implementing rnch foreign buyer's contracts, this Court held that the sales between Mohd. Serajuddin and S. T. C. were not sales in the course of export. It was at this stage i.e. whens. 5(1) was interpreted by this Court in the aforesaid manner that the Parliament felt the necessity of enacting s. 5(3) for the purpose of giving relief in respect of penultimate sales that immediately precede the final (export) sales provided the former satisfy the conditions specified therein. The Statement of Objects and Reasons in this behalf runs thus:\n\n\"According to Section 5(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, a sale\n\nof purchase of goods can qualify as a sale in the course of export H of the goods out of the territory of India only if the sale or purchase has either occasioned such export or is by a transfer of docu-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nments of title to the goods after goods have crossed the customs frontiers ofindia. The Supreme Court has held (vide: Mohd. Sera juddin v. State of Orissa, 36 STC 136) that the sale by an Indian exporter from India to the foreign importer alone qualifies as a sale which bas occasioned the export of the goods. According to the Export Control Orders, exports of certain goods can be made only by specified agencies such as the State Trading Cor porations. In other cases also, manufacturers of goods, particular ly in the small scale and medium sectors, have to depend upon some experienced export house for exporting the goods because special expertise is needed for carrying on export trade. A sale of goods made to an export canalising agency such as; the State Trading Corporation or to an export house to enable such agency or export house to export those goods in compliance with an existing contract or order is inextricably connected with the export of the goods. Further, if such sales do not qualify as sales in the course of export, they would be liable to State sales tax and there would be a correspond ing increase in the price of the goods. This would make our exports uncompetitive in the fiercely competitive international markets.\n\nIt is, therefore, proposed to amend, with effect from the beginning of the current financial year, Section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act to provide that the last sale or purchase of any goods preced ing the sale or purchase occasioning export of those goods out of the territory of India shall also be deemed to be in the course of such export if such last sale or purchase took place after, and was for the purpose of complying with, the agreement or order, for, or in relation to, such export.\" (Emphasis supplied).\n\nTwo things become clear from this Statement; first, Mohd. Sera juddin's decision (supra) is specifically referred to as necessitating the amendment and secondly, penultimate sales made by small and me dium scale manufacturers to an export canalising agency or private export house to enable the latter to export those goods in compliance with existing contracts or orders are regarded as inextricably con nected with the export of the goods and hence ear-marked for conferal of the benefit of the exemption. But here again, 'existing contract' with whom is not clarified. In other words, on this crucial point the Statement is silent and does not throw light on whether the existing contract should be with a foreign buyer or will include any agreement with a local party containing a covenant to export. Therefore, the question will again depend upon pr0per construction and, as we have said above, in the matter of construction the two aspects discussed earlier show that by necessary implication 'the agreement' spoken of by s. 5(3) refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer.\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 655\n\nHowever, in support of his construction counsel for the petitioners pressed into service two aspects arising from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, namely, (a) that the exemption was intended to be extended even to small and medium scale manufacturers who manufacture goods for foreign market but have to depend upon a canalising agency or private export house for the export of their goods and (b) that the object of granting the exemption was to promote our exports in fiercely competitive international markets and, according to counsel, both these objectives would be frustrated if the narrow construction was placed on the expression 'the agreement as meaning the agreement with a foreign buyer and that the construction suggested by him would carry out the objectives. It is true that the benefit of the exemption was intended to be extended to small and medium scale manufacturers desirous of exporting their goods but the requirement of the new provision is not that they must procure or have with them a foreign buyer's contract but the requirement is that before they complete the sale of their goods to the canalising agency of the private export house there must be in existence a foreign buyer's contract to implement which they should have sold their goods to such agency or export house. In the nature of things such manufacturers who have no expertise of export trade are not expected to have a foreign buyer's contract with them and it would be sufficient compliance of the provision if the canalising agency or the export house has with it the foreign buyer's contract. It would, therefore, be incorrect to say that the benefit of the exemption depends upon the fortuitous circumstance of a foreign buyer's contract being available with such manufacturer when he sells his product to the agency or the export house. No hardship as is sought to be suggested is involved and we do not agree that by the construction which we are inclined to place on the expression 'the agreement' occurring in s. 5(3) the small or medium scale manufacturers would be deprived of the benefit of the exemption. In fact, the construction which we are inclined to accept would be in consonance with the trade practice obtaining in export trade, namely, that normally the export activity commences with securing or obtaining an export contract or a firm order from a foreign buyer as the first step towards the ultimate export [vide: observations of this Court in State of Mysore\n\nv. The Mysore Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd.(1) where obtaining\"'a firm order froin overseas buyer is described the first out of nine steps enumerated in the entire procedure for export]. As regards the other aspect it is clear to us that two public interests are involved; promotion of the exports of the country is one public interest while augmentation of the States' revenues through sales tax is the other and it is obvious\n\n(!) 9 S. T. C 188 at 190.\n\nSUPRI:MF. COURT REPORTS\n\n\nA that if the libral construction, as suggested by the counsel for the petitioner, is accepted the former public interest will undoubtedly be served while the latter will greatly suffer and ifthe narrow construction is accepted the latter public interest will be served and the former will suffer. It is difficult to say that the Parliament intended to prefer one and sacrifice the other. In fact the granting of exemption to penultimate sales was obviously with a view to promote the exports but limiting the exemption to certain types of penultimate sales that satisfy the two specified conditions displays an anxiety not to diminish the States' revenues beyond a certain limit. The section in any case gives no indication that one public interest is to be preferred to the other and therefore, in our view, the matter must again depend upon the proper construction of the language employed. On construction we are of the view that by implication the expression 'th~ agreement' occurring ins. 5(3).refers to the agreement with a foreign buyer.\n\nCounsel for the petitioners lastly urged that the penultimate sales by the Coffee Board to the Registered Exporters include in them a covenant to export and having regard to Cls. 26, 30 and 31 there is a compulsion on the Registered Exporters to export the coffee on pain of imposition of a penalty and seizure of unexported coffee and reliance in that behalf was placed upon the observations of Shah, J., in Ben Gorm Nilgiri Plantations Company's case (supra). In our view, the\n\nE observations '(quoted in extenso in the earlier part of the judgment) will have to be read in the context of the facts which obtained in that case. It has a case of only one sale which had resulted in the export and the question was whether transactions of sale of tea chests by the manufacturer at public auctions held at Port Cochin to the local agents of foreign buyers were exempt from levy of sales tax under Art. 286(1)\n\n(b) and though it was common ground that the purchases by the local agents of foreign buyers were with a view to export the goods to their principals abroad and that the goods were in fact exported out of India this Court found nothing in the transactions from which a bond or obligation could be said to spring between the sale and the intended export linking them as part of the same transaction and though the seller (manufacturer) could be said to have knowledge that the tea sold to the local agents of foreign buyers was meant for the export and would be exported, the seller had no concern with the export, that the sale imposed or involved no obligation to export and there was possibility that the goods might be diverted for internal consumption.\n\nIt was in that context that Shah, J., observed in that case that there\n\nmust be an intention on the part of both the buyer and the seller to export, that there must be obligation to export, and that there must be an actual export, and further that the obligation may arise by reason\n\n~· .,\n\n..,_.\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 657\n\nof statute, contract between the parties, or mutual understanding or agreement between them or even from the nature of tbe transaction which links the sale to export. In other words, even in the case of a single sale 'which ultimately resulted in the exoort it was held that the sale was not in the course of export because there was no obligation to export which afforded the inextricable link between the sale and the export. It is true that if the obligation to export affording the inextricable link between the sale and the export is necessary in the case of a single sale even though it results in export, then all the more such obligation will be necessary in the case of a penultimate sale if such penultimate sale is to comtitute a sale \"in the course of export\" but even if Ben Gorm Nilgiri Plantations Company's case (supra) is regarded as laying down a general proposition that what is required is an obligation which inextricably connects the sale with the export and that such obligation may, in the absence of legislative guidance, arise by 'reason of statute, contract, mutual understanding, or the nature of transaction which Jinks the sale to export, still the question would be what type of obligation and arising from what circumstances.would be necessary. or enough in the case of a penultimate sale must depend upon the language of the statute concerned and, therefore, the.question will again be what type of obligation and arising from what circumstances has been prescribed by the .Parliament by enacting s.5 (3) and that would depend upon the proper construction of the phrase \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such export\" occurring therein and, as we have said above, since on proper construction the expression \"the agreement or order\" means the agreement with or an order from a foreign buyer it must be held that the Parliament intended to prescribe that the obligation to export arising only from such agreement or order that would afford the inextricable link so as to constitute the penultimate sale a sale in the course of export .\n\nHaving come to the conclusion that on proper construction the expression \"the agreement\" occurring in s.5 (3) refers to the agreement . with a foreign buyer and does not include any agreement with a local party containing a covenant to export, the next question that arises for our consideration is as to when does the penultimate sale (the sale of coffee at export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board to Registered Exporters) takes place, i.e. becomes complete by the passing of the property in the coffee sold thereat to the Registered Exporters?\n\nThe determination of the point of time at which the property in the coffee passes to the Registered Exporters becomes necessary because before that the agreement with or order from a foreign buyer in respect of those goods must come into existence to implement which the penultimate sale must have taken place. We have indicated earlier\n\nthe rival contentions of the parties on this issue. But before addressing ourselves to these rival contentions we shall dispose of a small contention that was put forward by Mr. Venugopal counsel for the State of Karnataka that the word 'sale' occurring in the phrase \"if such last sale or purchase takes place after\" in s.5 (3) means the agreement to sell and not sale in the sense of a transfer of property in goods by one person to another and the argument has been that since the word 'sale' in the aforesaid phrase means an agreement to sell such agreement to sell in the case of export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board takes place or becomes complete at the fall of the hammer when the bid of the highest bidder gets accepted and the regular contract containing the covenant to export is invariably entered into by the Registered Exporter with the Coffee Board at a later stage and, therefore, even the covenant to export to be found in the contract with the Coffee Board can never be regarded as having come into existence before the agreement to sell becomes complete and consequently the penultimate sale to the Registered Exporter would not qualify for the exemption. In support of the contention that the word 'sale' means an agreement to sell counsel relied upon s.~4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 wherein a contract of sale of goods is defined as contract wherein the seller either transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price and also upon a decision of this Court in Balabhagas Hulaschand v. State of Orissa,(1) atcase under Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, where this Court has taken the view that for purposes of s.p:(a) ands. 4(2) (a) and (b) the word 'sale' includes an agreement to sell and, therefore, in s. 5(3) also the word 'sale' should be constrJJed as agreement to sell. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one reason. In the first place the definitions of 'sale' and \"agreement to sell' in the Sale of Goods Act 1930 would not apply to the expression 'sale' occurring in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 wherein the expression 'sale' has been defined in s. 2(g) for the purpose of that Act and under s. 2 (g) of the Central Sales Tax Act 'sale' means \"any transfer of property in goods by one person to another for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration, and includes a transfer of goods on the hire-purchase or other system of payment by instalments, but does not include a mortgage or hypothecation of or a charge or pledge on goods.\" In other words, wherever the word 'sale' occurs in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 it is this definition given in s. 2(g) that will be applicable and therefore the word 'sale' in s. 5(3) must mean transfer of the goods by one person to another for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable considerations; it cannot mean \"agreement to sell\".\n\n(I} (1976] 2 S.C-R. 939.\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, ].) 659\n\nMoreover, there is nothing in the context of s. 5(3) to suggest that the word 'sale' occurring therein should be understood differently. In Balabhagas Hulaschand's case (supra) this Court in the context of the question as to when a sale could be said to take place in the course of inter State trade or commerce gave an extended meaning to the word 'sale' as defined ins. 2(g) and as used in ss. 3(a) and 4(2) and (b) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and what was said by this Court was that the word 'sale' as used in s. 3 (a) and s.\"4 (2) (a) and (b) was wide enough to include not only a concluded contract of sale but also an agreement of sale provided that the latter stipulated that there was a transfer of property or movement of goods; the ratio of that decision will be inapplicable to s. 5(3) which deals with the question as to when a penultimate sale shall also be deemed to be in the course of export and there is nothing therein to suggest that the word 'sale' should have any such extended meaning; on the contrary, the context suggests that the word 'sale' in the phrase \"if such last sale or purchase takes place after\" refers to a completed sale i. e. a sale as defined in s. 2(g) of the Act. The contention urged by counsel must, therefore, be rejected.\n\nDealing next with the three stages at which the property in the coffee sold at the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board is said to pass to the highest bidder (Registered Exporter) three questions arise that need our close examination. Does it pass at the fall of the hammer when his bid is entered in the Register of Bids under his signature under s. 64(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 as contended for by counsel for the States of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala? Does it pass after the coffee sold is weighed and set apart for delivery and price is paid therefor by the auction purchaser in view of Cl. 19 (particularly the over-riding provision contained therein) and other clauses of Auction Conditions (this being the alternative plea of the petitioners) ? or Does it pass only after the coffee sold is shipped or is sent to the customs station for shipment because till then the Coffee Board has a right of disposal under Cls. 26 and 31 read with s. 25'of the Sale of Goods Act (this being the principal plea of the petitioners) ? It will be desirable to set out the concerned provisions in order to appreciate properly the rival submissions of counsel based thereon. Sub-s. (2) of s. 64 of the Sale of Goods Act, which deals with auction sales, runs thus :\n\n\"64. In the case of a sale by auction :-\n\n(I) x x x x x x x\n\n(2) the sale is complete; when the auctioneer announces its eompletion by the fall of the hammer or in other customary manner;\n\nand, until such announcement is made, any bidder may retract his bid.\"\n\nClause 19 of the Auction Conditions which deals with weighment, delivery and payment of price contains an over-riding provision to this effect :\n\n\"Notwithstanding anything contained in these conditions, the property in the coffee sold shall not pass to the buyer until after he has paid the full price and the coffee sold to him is weighed and set apart for delivery to him.\" c C:ause 26 declares that it is an essential conditions of the Auction that the coffee sold thereat shall be exported to stipulated destinations in the catalogue of lots or to such foreign country as may be approved by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer within three months or such extended time as may be allowed (which extension shall not exceed one year) and the same shall not, under any circumstances, be divert- D ed to any other destination or sold or be disposed of, or otherwise released in India, while this condition is enforced by seizure of the unexported coffee under Cl. 31 which runs thus :\n\n\"31. On default by the Buyer to export the coffee aforesaid within the prescribed time or such extension, thereof as may be E granted, it shall be lawful for the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, without reference to the Buyer, to seize the unexported coffee a.nd for that purpose to make entry into any building, godown, or warehouse where the said coffee may be stored, and take possession of the same and deal with it as if, it were part and parcel of\n\nF Board's coffee held by them in their Pool Stock.\n\nOut of the net sale proceeds of such coffee sold in persuance of conditions prescribed in Clause 15, the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer shall pay to the defaulting Buyer only the balance of the amount remaining over after deducting therefrom godown charges and Insurance premia, and selling commission payable to the Agents, and all other expenses of sale, togetherwith the penalty due under Clause 30.\n\n.,.\n\n-- .c\n\n--A\n\nProvided however that if such balance is in excess of the sale + i:irice by the Buyer, the payment shall be limited to the actual sale pnce.\n\nH Provided further that such payment shall not affect or prejudice the right of the Board to levy the penalties under clause 32 hereunder.\"\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 661\n\nAccording to counsel for the three States s. 64 is a special provision in the sale of Goods Act which deals wilh Auction Sales and under sub-s.(2) thereof the sale is complete no sooner the auctioneer makes an announcement in that behalf either by fall of the hammer or in other customary manner and, therefore, the property in the goods sold thereat passes at the fall of the hammer or immediately after the announcement of completion is made in other customary manner and since in the instant case the Coffee Board conducts export auctions of coffee in lots which are specified in catalogues supplied to theauction purchasers before-hand, the property in the coffee sold thereat must be regarded as having passed to the buyer at the fall of the hammer when the successful bid is entered in the Register of Bids under the signature of the bidder as per Cls. 10 and 11 of Auction Conditions. As regards Cl. 19 a two-fold argument was urged : in the first place it was contended that s. 64 is not subject to any contract to the contrary and, therefore, s. 64(2) must prevail under which the property will pass at the fall of the hammer or at the close of the sale in the customary manner; secondly, Cl. 19 containing the over-riding provision may bind the parties to the contract but will not have the effect of creating an estoppel against a third party like a State Govern ment or its Sales Tax Authorities from contending or showing that the property at such auctions passes at the fall of the hammer and if under the other terms of the auction it is clear that the property has passed or does pass to the auction purchaser at the fall of the hammer a mere declaration of the intention on the part of the contracting parties deferring or postponing the passing of the property will not affect the question and in that behalf reliance was placed upon observations of Lord Chancellor Herschell in Mc Entire And Anothe\n\nv. Crossley Bros., Ltd.(I) where observations run thus:\n\n\"Upon an agreement to sell, it depends upon the intention of the parties whether the property passes or does not pass. Here the parties have in terms expressed their intention, and said that the property shall not pass until the full purchase money is paid. I know no reason to prevent that being a perfectly lawful agreement.\n\nIf that was really the intention of the parties, I know of no rule or principle of law which prevents it from being given effect to.\n\nI quite agree that if, although the parties have inserted a provision to that effect, they have shown in other parts of the agreement, by the language which they have used, or the provivions which they have made, that they intended the property to pass, one must look at the transaction as a whole, and it might be\n\n(1) [1895-1899] All England Reports (Reprint) 829 at 832.\n\nnecessary to hold that the property has passed,' a/though the parti2< have said that their intention was that it •should not, because they have provided that it shall. No doubt any provisions which were inconsistent with the intention that the property should not pass would be given effect to in preference to a mere expression of intention in word<.\"\n\nAs regards Cl. 31 Counsel contended that it does not amount to any reservation of the right of disposal over the goods to the Coffee Board within the meaning of s. 25 of the Sale of Goods Act.\n\nOn the other hand co.unsel for the petitioners contended that s. 64(2) of the Sale of Goods Act does not deal with the question of passing of the propert)' at auction sale but mere!Y deals with the completion of the contract of sale, that is. to say, upon the fall of hammer or announcement of the close of sale in[ other customerY manner the agre- • :ment to sell becomes: complete; in other words an executory contract comes into existence between a promissor and a promisee. Secondly, even if the. said provision is regarded as one relating to completion of sale in the sense of passing of property from one hand to the other such result will ocC'iir only if the auction sale is in respect of specific or ascertained and identifiable goods and unconditional; in other words, it is only in an unconditional sale by auction the property in the good.; passes on the fall of hammer. Thirdly, s. 64 is subject to a contract to the contrary and the auctioneer holding the auction could fix the terms and conditions on the basis of which he would be accepting the bids and in the terms and conditions so set forth by him he could provide for passing of the property at a point of time later than the fall of the hammer or the closure of the auction in the customary manner or on fulfilment of certain conditions (like Cl. 19 in the instant case) and such terms would hind the parties and the property will pass in accordance with those terms. As far as the instant case is concerned counsel for the petitioners urged thats. 64(2) was not attracted.for two reasons : (a) the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board are not unconaitional but subject to certain conditions, particularly con di ti on expressly relating to the r passing of property as contained iu Cl. 19 and (b) factually the sale is never in respect of lots of specific or ascertained goods inasmuch as it is abundantly clear from the affidavit of Shri Meenaxi Sunderam, the Chief Coffee Marketing Offi cer of the Coffee Board dated 20th February, 1980 that every lot put up for auction invariably contains 5 % of coffee mor e than the quantity indicated in the catalogues and the coffee sold from only particular lot is required to be weighed and set apart and appropriated\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, 1.) 663\n\nto the contract before delivery is given. Apart from the factual ground, counsel urged that the position in law that s. 64 is subject to a contract to the contrary is very clear and under Cl.19 the passing of property in the coffee sold at the Export Auctions has been deferred until after the coffee sold is weighed, set apart for delivery and price is paid therefor and according to him Lord Chancellor Herschell's observations cannot avail the States of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala for the simple reason that there is nothing contra indicated in other conditions so that the declared intention in Cl. 19 should n; n prevail. He urged that a statutory body like the Coffee Board must be presumed to act in a bona fide manner and has prescribed terms and conditions of auction genuine\\)' intended to bind the parties to the auction and those terms and conditions must be regarded as truly governing the rights and obligations of the parties and a third\n\npar(!y like a State Government or its Sales Tax Authorities must apply\n\ntheir taxing measures by having regard to those terms and conditions.\n\nHe, therefore, pointed out that if the Court would be inclined to take the view that the property passes to the auction purchaser under CL 19 then the agreement with or order from a foreign buyer mu'st be available or come into existence just before such passing of the property. However, he contended that Cl. 19 makes a negative provision, namely, that the property shall not pass until after the coffee sold is weighed, set apart for delivery and price is paid therefor which would mean it passes not till then but some time later and, therefore, strong .reliance has placed by counsel on Cl. 31 which empowers the Coffee\n\nBoard to seize the unexported coffee and deal with it as if it were part and parcel of Board's coffee held by it in its pool stock if default is committed by the buyer to export the coffee within the prescribed time or such extension thereof as may be granted and such provision Constitutes a reservation of the right of disposal to the Coffee Board within the meaning of s. 25 of the Sale of Goods Act. He, therefore, urged that under Cls. 26 and 31 read with s. 25 of the Sale of Goods Act the property would pass after the coffee is shipped or sent to the customs station for shipment by the auction purchaser and production of the agreement with or order from a foreign buyer before such shipment or despatch to customs station would satisfy the requirement of s. 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.\n\nIn view of the aforesaid rival submissions two questions arise for -determination : what is the true import of s. 64(2) and whether s. 64 is subject to a contract to the contrary? On both these we find c?nsiderable force in the submissions made by counsel for the petitioners. Regarding s. 64(2) of the Sale of Goods Act it seems to-us\n\nthat that provision does not deal with question of the passing ofthe property; in\"1be goods sold at auction' sale but inste2d it c!els witr t1'e. completion of the contrct of sale. It is true that sub-s.(2) mys that \"the sale is complete\" when the auctioneer announces its comple· tion by the fall of hammer or in other customary manner, but, the nex1 following provision which says : \"and until such announcement is made any bidder may retract his bid\" suggests that what is complete at the fall of the hammer or the announcement of closure in other customary manner is that the contract for sale is co1,11plete. It is wellknown that our Sale of Goods Act 1930 is based:upon and is largely a reproduction of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893 andin principle as well as in most details the law of sale of goods in both the countries is now the same and, therefore, English authorities on interpretation of different sections, although not technically binding in India, would have great pursuasive value. It wiil be pertinent to observe that our s. 64 is based upon s. 58 of the English Act, though it is somewhat differently arranged;\n\n0 but sub-s. (2) of s. 64 is particularly in identical . terms as s. 58(2) of the English Act. Section 58(2) of the English Act runs as follows :\n\n\"58. In the case of a sale by auction-\n\n(1) x x x x x x x\n\n(2) A sale by auction is compkte whrn the Ol'Cticneer announces its completion by the fall of the hammer, er in other customary manner. Until such announcement is made any bidder may retract his bid.\"\n\nJn Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 2) at pege 380 Para 742 runs thus :\n\n\"742. Bidding. The method of bidding and the amctmt of the bids are usually regulated by the ccnditicns cf sale (!).\n\nUntil the property is actually knocked down thae is no complete contract of sale.\n\nA bid is a mere offer, and can be retracted by' the bidder at any time before the auctioneer announces the completion of the safe by the fall of the hammer, for in other customary man ner (2)\" (Emphasis supplied).\n\nAt foot-note (2), s. 58(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 is the provision indicated in support of the aforesaid statement of law and it is further stated : \"In an unconditional sale the property in the gocds passes on the fall of the hammer\" Sale of Goods Act 1893, s. 18 r. 1 [Dennant\n\nv. Skinner and Collom (1). This would show that under s. 58(2) of\n\n(I) (19481 2 Aii. E. R. 29.\n\nCO>ISOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 665 :, ~; '.\n\nthe, English Sale of Goods Act 1893 normally in an auction sale at the fall of the hammer a completion of the contract of sale takes place and until such time the bidder may retract his bid but if the auction sale happens to be an unconditional sale in respect of specific and ascertained goods, the title to the property passes simultaneously at the fall of the hammer not by virtue of s. 58(2) but by reason of the operation ofs.18 r. 1 of the English Act which is equivalent to s. 20 of our Act].\n\nIn Dennant v. Skinner and Co/'om (supra) D, the auctioneer knocked down five vehicles including a Stand1rd motor car to King After the sales, king said that he would like to pay by cheque, but D replied that it was not his practice to accept cheques from people he did not know. King represented that he was the.son of the proprietors of King's Motors of Oxford, a well-known firm and produced counterfoils in his cheque books, according to which he had been paying large amounts to well-known auctioneers. D thus accepted the cheque King signing a form which stated : \"I hereby certify that my cheque No ..... will be met on presentation at my bank. Furthermore, I agree that the ownership of the vehicles will not pass to me until such time as the proceeds of my cheques have been credited to South London Motor Auction account at Lloyds Bank.\" King was permitted to remove the vehciles and he sold the Standard Car to a third party C, who sold it to the defendant, S. The cheque was dishonoured on presentation and it transpired that King had no connections with King's Motors. D sought from S return of the car or payment of it value. Negativing the claim, the Court held that the contract for sat was unconditional and, therefore, the property in the car passed oe the fall of the hammer under the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. J8(l)n and D's right under s. 39(1) (b) of that Act to retain the car until payment was made was relinquished when he gave possession to King.\n\nOn the question of the passing of the property the Court at page 34 observed thus :\n\n\"The second point on which the plaintiff relies is that the property in the circumstances of this case did not pass until the price was paid by the cheque being in order or cash substituted for it. A contract of sale is concluded in an auction sale on the fall of the hammer, and indeed, the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 58(2) so provides. Section 18 provides : -Rule I : \"Where there is a~ unconditional contract for the sale or specific goods, in a deliverable state._ihe property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment\n\n4-463 SCI/90 or\n\nthe time of delivery or both be postponed. Accordingly on the'(all\n\nof the hammer the property of this car passed to King ..... ·.•.,\" As regards the undertaking obtained from King the Court oflserved.\n\n\"Since the property had already passed a document subsequently e!tecuted by the bidder acknowledging that the ownership of t'he vehicle would not pass to him till the cheque was encashed could not have any effect on what had already taken place.\"\n\nIt will thus appear clear that because the auction sale was unconditional and' it related to specific goods that it was held that the property in the car had passed to King at the completion of the contract wllich occurred at the fall of the hammer under s. 58(2) but the proJierty had passed under s. 18(1). This case also shows that to an auction sale normally governed by s. 58 the implied rule pertaining to the passing of property contained ins. 18(1) applied; if so, it stands to reason that the auctioneer could incorporate an express term pertaining to the passing of property, different from the implied rule, in his auction conditions and if he were to do so it will be operath'e.\n\nIn American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 7, it is clarified that sale by auction may be conditional or unconditional and what happens when a bid is accepted is explained in Para 20 under the heading \"Offer and Acceptance: Bidding\" at page 237 thus :\n\n\"20. Generally.\n\nA sale at auction, like every other sale, must have the assent, express or implied, of both seller and buyer . An announcement of an auction or the act of putting property up for sale thereat does not constitute an offer to sell capable of acceptance by the making of a bid .... It is mere invitation to those attending the sale to make offers by bids. The contract becomes complete only when the bid is accepted, this being ordinarily denoted' by the fall of the hammer. These common-law pinciples are aopted by both the Uniform Sales Act and the Umform Commercial Code.\n\nWhere the seller reserves the right to refuse to accept any bid +· made a binding sale is not consummated between the seller and the bidder until the seller accepts the bid ....\n\nOnce a bid has been accepted the parties occupy the same relation towards each other as exists between promisor and promise In an executory contract of sale conventionally made.\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFtEE.BOA1!:0 '(Tulzapurkar, !.) 667\n\nAgain in Para 48 at page 260 on the question of passing of title the folf6wing statement of law o.ccurs :\n\n\"48. Passing of title; risk of toss of property.\n\nThe acceptance of the bid upon the fall of the hammer gives rise to contract rights which may be enforced, but does not necessarily convey or transfer the title to the property. As in the case sales generally, the intention of the parties derived from the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case primarily detennines the question as to when title passes.\n\n; Many cases hold that in an auction sale of chattels, when the sale is without condition and where nothing remains to be done to the property before its delivery, either to separate it from other property or to put it in condition ready for delivery, the title, as between the parties, passes to the purchaser upon the acceptance of his bid, without payment of the Price, even though the right to possession does not pass until the price is paid or arranged for to the satisfaction of the seller. Under this view, title oridinarily passes to the successful bidder when the auctioneer announces the completion of the sale.\" (Emphasis supplied).\n\nTwo things appear very clear from what we have stated above. At an auction sale all that happens at the fall of hammer or atthe announcement of the closure of the sale in other customary manner is that a contract of sale comes into existence and parties get into the relationship of a promiser and a promisee in an executory contract. Secondly, auction sales could be conditional or unconditional and if it is latter then by virtue of the goods being specific and in a deliverable state tile property in the goods knocked down passes at the fall of hammer by reason of the concerned provision relating to the passing of the property.\n\nSection 64(2) of our Sale of Goods Act, being in pari materia with s. 58(2) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893, will have to be interpreted in the same manner and we are therefore, of the view that it does not deal with the question of passing of the property at auction sale but merely deals with completion of the contract of sale which . takes place at the fall of the hammer or at the announcement of the dose of the sale in other customary manner by the auctioneer. It would also be correct to say that if the auction sale of chattels is uncondi_tional and is in respect of specific acertained goods and nothing remams to be done to the goods for puttmg them in a condition ready for delivery,_ the property in the goods would pass to the purchaser\n\nupon the acceptance of the hid but that would. not be because of s. 64(2) but because of s. 20 and such would not be the case if the goods sold thereat are non-specific or nnascertained goods or the auction sale is conditional. In this context it will be useful to refer to a decision of this Court in A. V. Thomas & Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax.(1) where this Court recognised a distinction between auction sales pertaining to specific or identifiable goods and auction sales in regard to unascertained goods and held that in regard to the former the property in the goods passed when the contract was accepted at the fall of hammer and not in the latter case.\n\nThat was a case where the teas were stored in the godowns in the Willingdon Island which was'in the State of Travancore Cochin and samples of those teas were taken to Fort Cochin which at the relevant time was in the State of Madras. At Fort Cochin by the samples the teas were sold by public auction in lots, some of the lots were purchased in their entirety and others in parts and after the consideration money was paid at Fort Cochin delivery orders were given to the buyers addressed to the godown keepers at Willingdon Islands and actual delivery of tea was taken there. These teas were then sent out from willingdon Island in Travancore Cochin for consumption either in oth6r parts of India or were exported out of India. The taxability of the sales of teas in the manner mentioned above under the Travancore Cochin General Sales Tax Act depended upon whether the sales could be held to have taken place at Willingdon Island. i.e., within the territory of Travancore Cochin State and were liable to sales tax under the Act or whether the sales were 'outside sales' and, therefore, not subject to sales tax in the State of Travancore Cochin in view of Article 286(1) (a) read with the Explanation. This Court after referring to s. 64(2) and the definition of 'specific goods' in s. 2(14) of our Sale of Goods Act, took the view that ou the fall of the hammer the offer would get accepted and if the goods were specific goods the title would pass to the buyer. The distinction that was made by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal between goods which were sold in \"full lots\" and those which were sold \"in portions\" and its view that in regard to the former title had passed as soon as the hammer fall and not in regard to the latter was referred to by this Court with approval. At page 612 this Court observed thus :\n\n\"In the present case as soon as the hammer fall the title in the goods passed to the buyer as the goods were specific goods i.e. goods which were auctioned in full lots and this event took place at Fort Cochin which was in the State of Madras. But in the\n\n(!) [1963] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 608.\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, J.) 669\n\ncase of unascertained goods the title in the goods does not pass to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. It was for this reason that a distinction was drawn by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal between goods which were sold in full lots and those which were sold in portions. In regard to the former it was held that the title passed as soon as the hammer fell but not rn in regard to the latter and therefore the sale of 'full lots' was held to have taken place outside the State of Travancore Cochin and of portions of lots inside that State.\"\n\nApproving the disti1tction this Court ultimately held that the sales of 'full lots' being outside sales were not liable to the levy of sales tax.\n\nThus s. 64(2) has nothing to do with the aspect of the passing of the property at an auction sale and it is by virtue of goods being specific and in a deliverable state that under s. 20 the property in such goods passes to the buyer at the completion of the contract at the fall of hammer at such sale.\n\nOn the other question there is no \"difficulty in coming to the conclusion that s. 64 is subject to a contract to the contrary, especially in light of the above discussion. Jn the first places. 64 occurs in Chapter VII which contains \"Miscellaneous\" provisions and s. 62 which occurs in the same Chapter clearly provides that where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract of sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the\n\ncourse of dealing between the parties or.by usage, if.the usage is such as to bind both the parties to the contract. Ordinarily, the rights, duties and liabilities arising under a contract of sale by implication of law spoken of in. s. 62 refer to the rights, duties and_ obligations referred to in Chapter III containing provisions which lay down rules as to transfer of property as between seller and buyer!and transfer; of title but there is no reason why s. 62 should not apply to rights, duties; and obligations arising under s. 64 in regard to auction sales. In other words, s. 64 would be subject to s. 62. Moreover, there is intrinsic material in s. 64 itself which shows that the provisions thereof could be subject to a contract to the contrary.\n\nFor instance, sub-s. (I) thereof provides that where goods are put up for sale in lots than each lot is prima facie deemed, o be the)subjectlofa separate contract for sale, which means terms between the parties may provide to the contrary or circumstances may indicate to the contrary. Again, sub-s. (5) provides that the sale may be notified to be subject to!a reserved or up set price which means that the auctioneer may not fix a reserved price; further, it is well settled that if such a reserved price has been fixed than not withstanding the fact that the highest bid has\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19801 3 s.c.li.\n\nbeen accepted by the auctioneer and that the sale relates to specific or identifiable goods no concluded contract comes into existence if the highest, bid so accepted falls short of the reserve price and .the property in the goods will not pass. Sub-ss. (3) and ( 4), if carefully scrutinised, also indicate that t!iere could be a contract to the contrary. Moreover, once it is accepted that auction sales to which s. 64 applies could be unconditional or conditional and that the auctioneer can prescribe b.is own terms and conditions on the basis of which the property is exposed to sale by <1uction it must be held that the acceptance of any bid as well as the passing of the property in the goods sold thereat would be governed by those terms and conditions.\n\nHaving clarified the legal position as above we shall now deal with the export auctions of coffee conducted by the Coffee Board in the instant case. Such auction sales are admittedly conducted by the Coffee Board on terms and conditions prescribed, by it called 'Auction Conditions'. Further, there is no suggestion in the case that a statutory body like the Coffee Board while prescribing the Auction Conditions has acted not in good faith or that the said terms and conditio.ns do not truly govern the rights and obligatipns of the parties theeto.\n\nIt will, therefore, be clear that the question at what point of time the property in the coffe.e sold thereat passes to the auction purchaser (Registered E:&porter) must depend upon the intention.ofthe parties to b~ derived from the aforesaid terms and conditions. The contention that the property in coffee sold thereat passes to the buyer at the fall of the hammer under s. 64(2) of our Sale,, of Goods Act has simply to be rejected, for, as we have indicated above, all that happens at the fall of the hammer is that a completed contract of salelcomes into existence creating a relationship of promisor and promisee hetwq:n .the parties in an executory contract. This is also made clear e; i:pressly by Cl. 13(a) of the Auction Conditions which runs thus :\n\n\"13(a) After the bidding has come to a close on each lot, the Sale Conducting Officer shall declare the bid accepted by him and make entry accordingly in the Register of Bids.\n\nThereupon the Contract between the Registered Dealer by or on whose behalf the bid was tendered 4nd the Coffee Board becomes complete.\"\n\nThe aforesaid clause suggests that the parties to the auction sale also understood s. 64(2) of the Sale of Goods Act in the manner in which we have interpreted it. On the question of the passing of the property the specific provision is to be found in Cl. 19 of the Auction Conditions. As stated earlier Cl. 19 principally deals with aspects of delivery, weighment and payment of price and towards the end it\n\nCON!iOLIDATED COFFEil v. roFl'EE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, J.) 671\n\ncont11.ins an over-riding provision to the effect that notwithstandin.g anything contained in these conditions, the property in the coffee sold shall not pass to the buyer until after he has paid the full price and the coffee sold to him is weighed and set apart for delivery to him.\n\nIn .other words, it is clear that parties intended that the passing of the\n\nproprty shall not take place till the full price is paid and the coffee sold is weighed and set apart for delivery. Now there is nothing in any of the other provisions of these Auction Conditions which indicates that the property in coffee sold should pass either at the fall of the .hammer or at any point of time prior to the payment of price and weighment and setting apart of coffee for delivery to the buyer.\n\nTherefore, the observations of Lord Chancellor Herschell in Mc Entire And Al!Other v. Crossley Bros. Ltd. (supra) relied upon by counsel of three States cannot avail them. Further, it is true that the overridinip, rovision contained at the end of Cl.19 is negative ia character, that is to 6lly, the parties are agreed that the property shal! not pass to fie buyer until after the payment of the price, weighment and setting 8, ll4rt of the coffee for delivery to the buyer. But, does it positively follow that upon payment of price and weighment and setting apal'.1 the coffee sold for delivery to the buyer, the property passes to the buyer? On this aspect, in our view, there are two provisions coatained in Cl. 20(d) and (f) which show that positively the property in tlae coffee sold passes to the buyer at that point of time. Under CJ. ill after the payment offull price the buyer has to apply for and take delivery within a certain time but in case he fails to take delivery what shai happen to the coffee sold is provided for in Cl. 20. On the buyer's failure to take delivery, the coffee is first stored by the P-00! Agent in the Pool Warehouse pending its exportation by the buyer by the 15th May and if it is not exported by that date the Curer or Depot Maaa1er removes it from the West Coast to inland centres for safe\n\nstorage during the monsoon season but at the risk and cost of the buyer. Clause 20(d) provides : \"Duriag the interval the coffee so remains with the Board or the Pool Agent, it shall be held at the risk and on account of the Buyer\" and Cl. 20(e) proVides : \"Gain or loss in weijht of Coffee, as the case may be, during the period when the coffee (Boid, weighed and paid for) remains in the godown of the Pool Agenl as above, shall be to the benefit of detriment of the Buyer himself and he shall be at liberty to export the quantity gained in weight.\" The aforesaid provisions contained in CJ. 20 clearly go to show that after price is fully paid and the coffee sold is weighed and set apart for delivery to the buyer the same lies with the Coffee Board at the risk of the buyer and if during the interval if there be any gain or loss in weight the same will be credited and debited to his account.\n\nThis provision clearly indicates in positive terms that the property\n\nin coffee sold at the export auction passes to the buyer not before payment of full price, weighment and setting apart thereof for delivery to the buyer but immediately after such payment, weighment and setting apart for delivery. We might refer to another clause, namely, Cl. 23 which contains another special over-riding provision providing for non-liability @f the Coffee Board in case damage to the coffee sold or to the warehouse wherein the coffee was stored occurs by fire, flood, strike, riot, civil commotion, etc. etc. and it is provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the Auction Conditions in regard to the payment of prices, insurance/warehouse charges, delivery or other conditions and notwithstanding the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act in regard to passing of property, the Boarid or its Agents shall not be liable to deliver the coffee in specie, in the event of loss or damage caused to the coffee sold by any of the aforesaid causes.\n\nBut this clause has no bearing on the question of passing of the property. Having regard to C!s. 19 and 20 of the Auction Conditions, therefore, it is clear to us that in these penultimate sales (i.e. sales of coffee at the export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board) the property in coffee sold there at passes to the buyer upon payment of price, weighment and setting apart of the coffee mid for delivery to the buyer:\n\nIf once it is held that the property in coffee sold at such export auctions passes under Cls. 19 and 20 of the Auction Conditions immediately upon payment of prke, weighment and setting apart of the coffee for delivery to the buyer, it will be'difficult to accept the petitioners' contention that passing of the property in such Coffee is further postponed till actual shipment by reason of Cl. 31 of the Auction Conditions, for, if the title has already passed it cannot pass again.\n\nCounsel for the petitioners contended that in view of cl. 31 a reser- . vation of the right of disposal over the goods in favour of the Coffee Board )Vithin the meaning of s. 25 of the Sale of Goods Act is made.\n\nIt is difficult to accept this contention. Section 25(1) which deals with the reservation of the right of disposal provides that where there is a contract for sale of specific goods or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the contract, the seller may by terms of the co•tract or appropriation, reserve the right of disposal of the goods until certain conditions are fulfilled and if he does so, the legal consequence mentioned in the section flows, namely, that in such case notwithstanding the delivery of goods to a buyer or to a carrier or bailee for transaction to the buyer, the property in the goods does not pass to the buyer until the conditions imposed by the seller are fulfilled. In the instant case it is true that Cl. 26 declares that it is an essential condition of the auction that the coffee sold thereat sha\n\n• •\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 673\n\nbe exported to stipulated destinations or to any other foreign country outside India as may be approved by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer within 3 months or within the extended period but such essen•\n\ntial condition is applied to the coffee which has already become the property of the buyer under Cls. 19 and 20 of the Auction Conditions\n\nand all that Cl. 31 provides is that if default is made by Buyer in exporting coffee within the prescribed time or extended time it shall be lawful for the Coffee Board without reference to the buyer to seize the unexported coffee and take possession thereof and deal with it as if it were the part and parcel of the Board's Coffee held by them in their Pool Stock. Far from amounting to a reservation of the right of dis•\n\nposal over the unexported coffee to the Coffee Board, Cl. 31 is in the nature ofa defeasance clause in the sense that what is vested in the buyer under the earlier conditions, the same shall revert back to the Coffee Board if the buyer commits a default in fulfilling theJessential condition, Such a reading of Cl. 31 would be consistent with a further provision which is to be found in the latter portion of that clause. The latter part of Cl. 31 provides that after the coffee is seized and it becomes part and parcel of Board's coffee held by it in its pool stock, the Board shaU re-sell the same but after such re-sale the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer shall pay to the defaulting buyer only the balance of the sale proceeds after deducting godown charges, insurance premium, selling commission payable to agents and all other expenses of sale together with the penalty due under Cl. 30. But under the proviso it is provided thus:\n\n\"Provided, however, that if such balance is in excess of the sale price paid by the buyer, the payment shall be limited to the a.ctua/ sale price.\"\n\nIn other words the proviso dearly suggests that the seized coffee becomes Coffee Board's property and is re-sold as such, otherwise the suqilus should go to the buyer (Registered Exporter). The fact that the payment to the defaulting buyer is limited to the actual sale price paid by him and that the surplus if any reverts to the Coffee Board clearly shows that under Cl. 31 upon seizure the property reverts back to the Coffee Board. In our view, Cl. 31 properly read amounts to a defeasance clause and nothing more, especially when it is clear that property in the coffee sold at auction passes to the buyer under Cls. 19 and 20 immediately upon payment of price, weighment and setting apart of the coffee for delivery to the buyer. Once the property has passed there would be no question of reserving any right of disposal over the same to the Coffee Board within the meaning of s. 25(1) of the Sale of Goods Act.\n\n' E\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19&o] 3 .scc.R.\n\nIt will be noticed that though on the question of the passing of the property facutal material in the form of affidavit of the Chief\n\nCoffee Marketing Officer (on the point whether the lots exposeci at the auctions are specific and ascertained goods .or not) and siweral documents executed by the Registered Exporters in favour of their bankers to obtain packing and other credit facilities was placed before us we have not gone into the factual aspects at all and we have reached our conclusion on the point purely on the basis of construction of the relevant Auction Conditions from which primarily the intention oC the parties is to be gathered. It is only when a clear-intention in that behalf is not deducible from the terms and conditions that other factors such as the c0urse of dealings and the conduct of the parties assume relevance.\n\nHaving regard to the above discussion it is clear to us that in the penultimate sales (sales of coffee effected to Registered Exporter$ at export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board) the property in the Coffee sold thereat passes to the buyer immediately upon paynt of full price, weighment and setting apart of coffee for delivery to 'the buyer under Cls. 19 and 20 of the Auction Conditions and it wo, uld be at this stage i.e. just before this stage is reached that the agreement with or order from a foreign buyer must be available or prodU<:ed in order to attract s. 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.\n\nIn the result the writ petitiQns are partly allowed.. The impugned Circular dated 7th February, 1977 to the extent to which it i.usists .on production of an agreement with or an order from a foreigµ buyer from the Registered Exporters before participating in export auctions is quashed; it is also quashed hereafter to the extent to which it requires Registered Exporters to make contingency deposits or furnish bank guarantees out of abundant caution inasmuch as such requirement would be unnecessary in view of our authoritative pronouncemeµt.\n\nThe Coffee Board may, if so advised, modify its Circular or iss11e an appropriate Circular .requiring the production of an agreement with or an order from a foreign buyer from the Registered Exporters j1'St before the property in the Coffee sold at such auctions passes under Cls. 19 and 20 of the Auction Conditions.\n\nAs regards past dealings and transactions, final assessment, if any, made by the Taxing Authorities as well as recoveries if made thereunder contrary to the view expressed by us above deserve to be set aside and reassessments made and the concerned State H Governments will direct their Taxing Authorities to do the needful and further direct the refund of recoveries made to the Coffee Board which in its turn will refund the same to the concerned Registered\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, !.) 675\n\nExporters. Assessments or recoveries if made in conformity with our judgment need not be disturbed. Siiajlarly contingency deposits or bank guarantees already obtained by the Coffee Board from the Registered Exporters, if they are contrary to our judgment, these will be refunded or released forthwith, as the case may be, by the Coffee Board.\n\n In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to <; O.Sts.\n\nWRIT PETITION NO. 1458 OF 1979\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J .-In view of our Judgment just delivered in W .P Nos. 3130/78, 4238-39/78 and 8/79, this Writ Petition will have also to be allowed partly and the same order would follow.\n\nS. R.\n\nPetitions allowed in part.", "total_entities": 474, "entities": [{"text": "CONSOLIDATED COFFEE LTD. AND ANR. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CONSOLIDATED COFFEE LTD. AND ANR. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COFFEE BOARD, BANGALORE ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COFFEE BOARD, BANGALORE ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167, "end_char": 186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227, "end_char": 239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 5(1) and 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 250, "end_char": 271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299, "end_char": 311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 349, "end_char": 363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 895, "end_char": 907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 911, "end_char": 938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 983, "end_char": 992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Goods Act 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1008, "end_char": 1022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1025, "end_char": 1048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 25, 64(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1049, "end_char": 1067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Coffee Board, Bangalore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1253, "end_char": 1276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Coffee Board, Bangalore is a statutory Corporation incorporated under section 5 of the Coffee Act, I 942, an enactment passed to provide for the development of the Coffee industry under the Control of the Union."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1323, "end_char": 1332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Coffee Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1340, "end_char": 1350, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Coffee Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1512, "end_char": 1522, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Export of coffee outside India is particularly controlled under the Act and the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1632, "end_char": 1717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Coffee Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1725, "end_char": 1737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Export of coffee outside India is particularly controlled under the Act and the Rules by the Coffee Board."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2630, "end_char": 2648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which authorises him to take part in the •export auctiQn', The conditions which are imposed by the permit require, inter alia, a security deposit and a standing deposit (which may be in cash or in the form of bank guarantee) from the Registered Exporters; such permit is is liable to be withdrawn or cancelled by the Chief Coffee Marketing Officer, an executive appointed by the Central Government on the Board, at any time if it is found that a permit-holder has sold or has attempted to sell coffee bought by him at the 'export auction' within the internil market without his written permission or if any of the other permit conditions are contravened."}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3406, "end_char": 3411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3630, "end_char": 3636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4432, "end_char": 4441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5219, "end_char": 5225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5235, "end_char": 5241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5432, "end_char": 5438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5860, "end_char": 5866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5919, "end_char": 5928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5936, "end_char": 5963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "September,?, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5987, "end_char": 6004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to the enactment of sub section (3) of section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which has inserted on September,?,"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1976 with retrospective effect from April 1, 1976 by the Amending Act (103 of 1976), the exemption from liability to tax under the Act in i:egard to a sale in the course of the export was and continues to be governed by s. 5(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6220, "end_char": 6227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6279, "end_char": 6292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said provision was examined by the Supreme Court in f\\vo leading cases, namely, Coffee Board Bangalore v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras and Anr.,"}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 7, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Coffee Board issued a circular dated February 7, 1977 to the Registered Exporters o~ Coffee, by which it took the view that in order to avail of the benefit\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE V. COFFEE BOARD 627\n\nof section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax as amended by Amendment Act 103of1976, in respect of the coffee sold by it at the export auctions the Registered Exporters\n\n(bidders) should satisfy three conditions; (a) he must have an expoit contract (i.e. either agreement or order) from a foreign buyer, (b) he must have it on hand at the time when he participates in the export auction and (c) he should give proof of the export of the coffee purchased at the auction."}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7257, "end_char": 7269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8695, "end_char": 8702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8860, "end_char": 8867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9319, "end_char": 9323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9453, "end_char": 9459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9537, "end_char": 9549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9558, "end_char": 9579, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9949, "end_char": 9961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10113, "end_char": 10125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10133, "end_char": 10154, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10220, "end_char": 10234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10366, "end_char": 10376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act as amended by the Amendment Act 103 of t 976 is not ultra vi res Article 286(2) of the Constitution and the said provision neither creates any legal fiction nor is it beyond the po\\ver or authority conferred on Parliament by Article 286(2) of the Constitution. ["}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10380, "end_char": 10394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10476, "end_char": 10488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10535, "end_char": 10542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10569, "end_char": 10585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10589, "end_char": 10628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10923, "end_char": 10937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11473, "end_char": 11482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "sections 3, 4 and 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11824, "end_char": 11846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12067, "end_char": 12076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12468, "end_char": 12480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12946, "end_char": 12958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12966, "end_char": 12987, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13558, "end_char": 13570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15244, "end_char": 15256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17130, "end_char": 17139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17305, "end_char": 17313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18061, "end_char": 18069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18530, "end_char": 18540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, this was legislative recognition of what was said by this Court in the two Travancore cases about the true meaning of the exprt:Ssion \"in the course of export\" occurring in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18628, "end_char": 18636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18667, "end_char": 18676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 147", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18945, "end_char": 18961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19481, "end_char": 19490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mohd. Serajuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19647, "end_char": 19663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this court took the view that the crucial wards in Section 5 (I) showed that only if a sale occasioned the export, it would be in the course of export and that the• two sets of contracts were separate and indepit and Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nSerajuddin"}}, {"text": "S.T.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19807, "end_char": 19813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Serajuddin was under no contractual obligation to the foreign yer either directly 0 r indirectly and that his rights and obligations were only aga st the S.T.C. Even when the S.T.C. had with it foreign buyers contracts and Mohd, Serajuddin's contracts with S.T.C. had been entered into for the purpose of implementing such foreign buyer's contracts, thIB Court hcld that the sales between Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd, Serajuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19876, "end_char": 19892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Serajuddin was under no contractual obligation to the foreign yer either directly 0 r indirectly and that his rights and obligations were only aga st the S.T.C. Even when the S.T.C. had with it foreign buyers contracts and Mohd, Serajuddin's contracts with S.T.C. had been entered into for the purpose of implementing such foreign buyer's contracts, thIB Court hcld that the sales between Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nSerajuddin"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20143, "end_char": 20147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20236, "end_char": 20240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Two things become clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20448, "end_char": 20534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21287, "end_char": 21296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Two things become clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the Amendment Act", "statute": "Two things become clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22608, "end_char": 22617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23407, "end_char": 23416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23874, "end_char": 23886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1964] 7 S.C.R. 706", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24053, "end_char": 24071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ben Gorm Ni/giri Plantations Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24709, "end_char": 24745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "657A-B] D\n\nIt is true that if the obligation to export affording the inextricable link between the sale and the export is necessary in the case of a single sale even though it results in export, then all the more such obligation will be necessary in the case of a penuJtimate sale if such penultimate sale is to constitute a sale\n\n0 in the course of export\" but even if Ben Gorm Ni/giri Plantations Company's case is regarded as laying down a general proposition that what is required is an obligation which inextricably connects the sale with the export and that such obligation may, in the absence of legislative guidance, arise by reason of statute, contract, mutual understanding or the nature of transaction which links the sale to exp0 rt, stiJl the question would be what type of obligation and arising from what circumS<- tances would be necessary or enough in the case of a penultimate sale must depend upon the language of the statute concerned and, therefore, the question will again be what type of obligation and arising from what circumstances has been Prescribed by the Parliament by enacting s. 5 (3) and that would dePend upon the Proper construction of the phrase \"the agreement or order for or in relation to such export\" occurring therein."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25447, "end_char": 25451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26077, "end_char": 26089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sale Tax Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26097, "end_char": 26122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26253, "end_char": 26265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sale Tax Act 1956", "statute": "the Central Sale Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Goods Act 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26407, "end_char": 26421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26481, "end_char": 26508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26559, "end_char": 26563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26606, "end_char": 26610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26622, "end_char": 26643, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27069, "end_char": 27090, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27128, "end_char": 27132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27194, "end_char": 27201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27414, "end_char": 27418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27683, "end_char": 27695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 SCR 939", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27765, "end_char": 27781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27823, "end_char": 27846, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "English sale of Goods Act, 1893", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27896, "end_char": 27927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28519, "end_char": 28524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the English sale of Goods Act, 1893", "statute": "the English sale of Goods Act, 1893"}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28544, "end_char": 28549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the English sale of Goods Act, 1893", "statute": "the English sale of Goods Act, 1893"}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28875, "end_char": 28885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the English sale of Goods Act, 1893", "statute": "the English sale of Goods Act, 1893"}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29302, "end_char": 29312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29320, "end_char": 29337, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29409, "end_char": 29419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29440, "end_char": 29450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29519, "end_char": 29524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29970, "end_char": 29975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30193, "end_char": 30198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30264, "end_char": 30269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30317, "end_char": 30327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31348, "end_char": 31353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32507, "end_char": 32517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32536, "end_char": 32553, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32783, "end_char": 32792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32838, "end_char": 32847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33896, "end_char": 33905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34166, "end_char": 34175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34392, "end_char": 34401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34572, "end_char": 34581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35385, "end_char": 35394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35691, "end_char": 35700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35806, "end_char": 35816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35824, "end_char": 35841, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35851, "end_char": 35861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36469, "end_char": 36475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36917, "end_char": 36923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37380, "end_char": 37386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37639, "end_char": 37645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CWef Coffee Marketing Oflioor", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37956, "end_char": 37985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 provides that after the coffee is seized and it becomes part and parcel of Board's Coffee beld by it in its pool stock, the Board shall re-sell the same but after such re-sale the CWef Coffee Marketing Oflioor shall pay to the defaulting buyer only the balance of the sale proceeds after deducting godown charges, insurance premium, selling commission payable to agents and all other expenses\n\nof.sale together with the penalty due under Cl."}}, {"text": "Cl. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38214, "end_char": 38220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38638, "end_char": 38644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39143, "end_char": 39148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39160, "end_char": 39177, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39734, "end_char": 39761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39866, "end_char": 39876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39903, "end_char": 39916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, C. N. Murthy, K. P. Kumar, H. K. Dutt, T. Subba Rao and D. N. Gupta for the petitioners in WP No.", "canonical_name": "F. S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "C. N. Murthy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39918, "end_char": 39930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, C. N. Murthy, K. P. Kumar, H. K. Dutt, T. Subba Rao and D. N. Gupta for the petitioners in WP No.", "canonical_name": "C. N.\n\nMurthy"}}, {"text": "K. P. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39932, "end_char": 39943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, C. N. Murthy, K. P. Kumar, H. K. Dutt, T. Subba Rao and D. N. Gupta for the petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "H. K. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39945, "end_char": 39955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, C. N. Murthy, K. P. Kumar, H. K. Dutt, T. Subba Rao and D. N. Gupta for the petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "T. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39957, "end_char": 39969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, C. N. Murthy, K. P. Kumar, H. K. Dutt, T. Subba Rao and D. N. Gupta for the petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "D. N. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39974, "end_char": 39985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nMr. F. S. Nariman, C. N. Murthy, K. P. Kumar, H. K. Dutt, T. Subba Rao and D. N. Gupta for the petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40026, "end_char": 40034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 64992, "end_char": 64996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65041, "end_char": 65052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65122, "end_char": 65129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65518, "end_char": 65525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66132, "end_char": 66139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66224, "end_char": 66235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. T Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 66287, "end_char": 66297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286(2) of the Constitution, the precise contention Of Mr. S. T Desai appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu has been that the said provision merely enacts an artificial rule or fiction that a penultimate sale which in fact is not in the course of the export of goods out of the ' territory of India, shall be \"deemed to be in the course of such export' if it satisfies the conditions specified therein, it does not lay down or\n\nCONSoLIDAtED COFFEil v. ciJFFEE BOARD (Tu/zapurkar, !.)", "canonical_name": "S. T. Desai"}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66316, "end_char": 66335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286(2) of the Constitution, the precise contention Of Mr. S. T Desai appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu has been that the said provision merely enacts an artificial rule or fiction that a penultimate sale which in fact is not in the course of the export of goods out of the ' territory of India, shall be \"deemed to be in the course of such export' if it satisfies the conditions specified therein, it does not lay down or\n\nCONSoLIDAtED COFFEil v. ciJFFEE BOARD (Tu/zapurkar, !.)"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67119, "end_char": 67127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67488, "end_char": 67500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67522, "end_char": 67548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67598, "end_char": 67609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67808, "end_char": 67819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68248, "end_char": 68259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68414, "end_char": 68421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "s.5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68465, "end_char": 68471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "sections 3 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68498, "end_char": 68514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68518, "end_char": 68557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68853, "end_char": 68867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Central Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 58(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70193, "end_char": 70201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70209, "end_char": 70226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70527, "end_char": 70531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1940", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "sections 3, 4 and 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70875, "end_char": 70897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Finance Act, 1940", "statute": "the Finance Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Shearman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71347, "end_char": 71355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per Shearman J., in M' Creagh v. Frearson 1922 W. N. 37)\n\nSimilarly in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71851, "end_char": 71855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72267, "end_char": 72271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72794, "end_char": 72801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73092, "end_char": 73099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73136, "end_char": 73147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73359, "end_char": 73366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73634, "end_char": 73646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77030, "end_char": 77034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf strong reliance was placed by counsel for the petitioners on the following observations of Justice Shah in the case of Ben Gorm- Nilgiri Plantations Company, Coonoor and Ors."}}, {"text": "Cl. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78975, "end_char": 78981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79541, "end_char": 79548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79947, "end_char": 79950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80434, "end_char": 80438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80493, "end_char": 80496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80952, "end_char": 80959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Heydon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81282, "end_char": 81288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, before applying the mischief rule initially enunciated in Heydon's case(!)"}}, {"text": "S. T. C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83342, "end_char": 83350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not possible to accept the contention urged by counsel for the petitioners that the word 'order' in this phrase can mean or refer to an order, direction, mandate, command or authorisation to export that may be issued by a statutory body like the Coffee Board for two reasons; first, occurring in a sales tax statute the word must be given its commercial meaning and, secondly, while enacting the provision Parliament could not be said to have only statutory bodies like Coffee Board or S. T. C. in mind."}}, {"text": "Mayfair Property Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85513, "end_char": 85533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming to the mischief rule, in Re Mayfair Property Co.,(I) Lindley M. R. re-enunciated it thus: \"In order properly to interpret any statute it is necessary to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief.\""}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85538, "end_char": 85545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming to the mischief rule, in Re Mayfair Property Co.,(I) Lindley M. R. re-enunciated it thus: \"In order properly to interpret any statute it is necessary to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief.\""}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85955, "end_char": 85962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85970, "end_char": 85996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86120, "end_char": 86127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86174, "end_char": 86181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86343, "end_char": 86354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act 1956"}}, {"text": "Bombay, Company_Ltd.(2) and The\n\n(I) [1898] 2 Ch. 28", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 86547, "end_char": 86599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The:Bombay, Company_Ltd.(2) and The\n\n(I) [1898] 2 Ch."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87024, "end_char": 87040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed in the first case that \"a sale by export involved a seriet of integrated activities commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and ending with the delivery of the goods."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87978, "end_char": 87986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88172, "end_char": 88179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88722, "end_char": 88730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88741, "end_char": 88753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89371, "end_char": 89378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mohd.\n\nSerajuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90259, "end_char": 90276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter case (Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nSerajuddin"}}, {"text": "State Trading Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 90449, "end_char": 90474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Serajuddin with State Trading Corporation) were so inextricably connected with the final sales (two corresponding contracts for sale of the identical goods entered into by S.T.C. with foreign buyers) that the former were to stand cancelled if the latter 'Jbr any reason fell through and vice versa and further the penultimate sales were effected to implement the contracts with the foreign buyers and even then following the ratio of Coffee Board's case (supra) this Court held that."}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91275, "end_char": 91282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "and!Mohd. Serajuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 91702, "end_char": 91722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Serajuddin was under no contractual obligation to the foreign buyer either directly or indirectly and that his rights and obligations were only against the S. T. C. It will thus appear clear that even when the S. T. C. had with it foreign buyer's contracts and!Mohd."}}, {"text": "S. T C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91740, "end_char": 91747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Serajuddin's contracts with S. T C. had been entered into for the purpose of implementing rnch foreign buyer's contracts, this Court held that the sales between Mohd."}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92086, "end_char": 92093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92349, "end_char": 92361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92369, "end_char": 92390, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93994, "end_char": 94003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94011, "end_char": 94032, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohd. Sera juddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 94467, "end_char": 94484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two things become clear from this Statement; first, Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd.\n\nSerajuddin"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95443, "end_char": 95450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97571, "end_char": 97578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ben Gorm Nilgiri Plantations Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99968, "end_char": 100004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26, 30 and 31 there is a compulsion on the Registered Exporters to export the coffee on pain of imposition of a penalty and seizure of unexported coffee and reliance in that behalf was placed upon the observations of Shah, J., in Ben Gorm Nilgiri Plantations Company's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 100369, "end_char": 100375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has a case of only one sale which had resulted in the export and the question was whether transactions of sale of tea chests by the manufacturer at public auctions held at Port Cochin to the local agents of foreign buyers were exempt from levy of sales tax under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100455, "end_char": 100466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103113, "end_char": 103116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103765, "end_char": 103768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venugopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 104732, "end_char": 104741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before addressing ourselves to these rival contentions we shall dispose of a small contention that was put forward by Mr. Venugopal counsel for the State of Karnataka that the word 'sale' occurring in the phrase \"if such last sale or purchase takes place after\" in s.5 (3) means the agreement to sell and not sale in the sense of a transfer of property in goods by one person to another and the argument has been that since the word 'sale' in the aforesaid phrase means an agreement to sell such agreement to sell in the case of export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board takes place or becomes complete at the fall of the hammer when the bid of the highest bidder gets accepted and the regular contract containing the covenant to export is invariably entered into by the Registered Exporter with the Coffee Board at a later stage and, therefore, even the covenant to export to be found in the contract with the Coffee Board can never be regarded as having come into existence before the agreement to sell becomes complete and consequently the penultimate sale to the Registered Exporter would not qualify for the exemption."}}, {"text": "State of Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 104758, "end_char": 104776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before addressing ourselves to these rival contentions we shall dispose of a small contention that was put forward by Mr. Venugopal counsel for the State of Karnataka that the word 'sale' occurring in the phrase \"if such last sale or purchase takes place after\" in s.5 (3) means the agreement to sell and not sale in the sense of a transfer of property in goods by one person to another and the argument has been that since the word 'sale' in the aforesaid phrase means an agreement to sell such agreement to sell in the case of export auctions conducted by the Coffee Board takes place or becomes complete at the fall of the hammer when the bid of the highest bidder gets accepted and the regular contract containing the covenant to export is invariably entered into by the Registered Exporter with the Coffee Board at a later stage and, therefore, even the covenant to export to be found in the contract with the Coffee Board can never be regarded as having come into existence before the agreement to sell becomes complete and consequently the penultimate sale to the Registered Exporter would not qualify for the exemption."}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104875, "end_char": 104878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 105847, "end_char": 105870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106135, "end_char": 106162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106317, "end_char": 106324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106536, "end_char": 106558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106617, "end_char": 106644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106695, "end_char": 106702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106741, "end_char": 106745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106757, "end_char": 106778, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107163, "end_char": 107190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107222, "end_char": 107229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107287, "end_char": 107294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107594, "end_char": 107601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Balabhagas Hulaschand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107689, "end_char": 107710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Balabhagas Hulaschand's case (supra) this Court in the context of the question as to when a sale could be said to take place in the course of inter State trade or commerce gave an extended meaning to the word 'sale' as defined ins."}}, {"text": "ss. 3(a) and 4(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107941, "end_char": 107958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 107970, "end_char": 107997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108066, "end_char": 108070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108342, "end_char": 108349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108738, "end_char": 108745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 64(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109178, "end_char": 109186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109194, "end_char": 109217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109434, "end_char": 109440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109786, "end_char": 109791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109799, "end_char": 109816, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110021, "end_char": 110026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110034, "end_char": 110051, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Clause 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110359, "end_char": 110368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111317, "end_char": 111323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111939, "end_char": 111948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112241, "end_char": 112250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112530, "end_char": 112539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112654, "end_char": 112659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112690, "end_char": 112707, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113515, "end_char": 113521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113595, "end_char": 113600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113664, "end_char": 113672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113810, "end_char": 113816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 114496, "end_char": 114505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 containing the over-riding provision may bind the parties to the contract but will not have the effect of creating an estoppel against a third party like a State Govern ment or its Sales Tax Authorities from contending or showing that the property at such auctions passes at the fall of the hammer and if under the other terms of the auction it is clear that the property has passed or does pass to the auction purchaser at the fall of the hammer a mere declaration of the intention on the part of the contracting parties deferring or postponing the passing of the property will not affect the question and in that behalf reliance was placed upon observations of Lord Chancellor Herschell in Mc Entire And Anothe\n\nv. Crossley Bros., Ltd.(I) where observations run thus:\n\n\"Upon an agreement to sell, it depends upon the intention of the parties whether the property passes or does not pass."}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115790, "end_char": 115796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115940, "end_char": 115945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115953, "end_char": 115970, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 64(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116035, "end_char": 116043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116051, "end_char": 116068, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116864, "end_char": 116869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117287, "end_char": 117293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117736, "end_char": 117742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Meenaxi Sunderam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 117893, "end_char": 117909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 and (b) factually the sale is never in respect of lots of specific or ascertained goods inasmuch as it is abundantly clear from the affidavit of Shri Meenaxi Sunderam, the Chief Coffee Marketing Offi cer of the Coffee Board dated 20th February, 1980 that every lot put up for auction invariably contains 5 % of coffee mor e than the quantity indicated in the catalogues and the coffee sold from only particular lot is required to be weighed and set apart and appropriated\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, 1.)"}}, {"text": "20th February, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 117973, "end_char": 117992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 and (b) factually the sale is never in respect of lots of specific or ascertained goods inasmuch as it is abundantly clear from the affidavit of Shri Meenaxi Sunderam, the Chief Coffee Marketing Offi cer of the Coffee Board dated 20th February, 1980 that every lot put up for auction invariably contains 5 % of coffee mor e than the quantity indicated in the catalogues and the coffee sold from only particular lot is required to be weighed and set apart and appropriated\n\nCONSOLIDATED COFFEE v. COFFEE BOARD (Tulzapurkar, 1.)"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118392, "end_char": 118397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl.19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118463, "end_char": 118468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118880, "end_char": 118886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119685, "end_char": 119691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119970, "end_char": 119976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120376, "end_char": 120381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120389, "end_char": 120406, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, 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{"in_sentence": "Furthermore, I agree that the ownership of the vehicles will not pass to me until such time as the proceeds of my cheques have been credited to South London Motor Auction account at Lloyds Bank.\""}}, {"text": "Lloyds Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 124981, "end_char": 124992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, I agree that the ownership of the vehicles will not pass to me until such time as the proceeds of my cheques have been credited to South London Motor Auction account at Lloyds Bank.\""}}, {"text": "King", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124995, "end_char": 124999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "King was permitted to remove the vehciles and he sold the Standard Car to a third party C, who sold it to the defendant, S. The cheque was dishonoured on presentation and it transpired that King had no connections with King's Motors."}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1893", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125451, "end_char": 125474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125506, "end_char": 125514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1893", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1893"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1893", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126000, "end_char": 126023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 58(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126025, "end_char": 126033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1893", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1893"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126047, "end_char": 126057, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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was in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 132202, "end_char": 132208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was a case where the teas were stored in the godowns in the Willingdon Island which was'in the State of Travancore Cochin and samples of those teas were taken to Fort Cochin which at the relevant time was in the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "Willingdon Islands", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 132490, "end_char": 132508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At Fort Cochin by the samples the teas were sold by public auction in lots, some of the lots were purchased in their entirety and others in parts and after the consideration money was paid at Fort Cochin delivery orders were given to the buyers addressed to the godown keepers at Willingdon Islands and actual delivery of tea was taken there."}}, {"text": "willingdon Island", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 132588, "end_char": 132605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These teas were then sent out from willingdon Island in Travancore Cochin for consumption either in oth6r parts of India or were exported out of India."}}, {"text": "Travancore Cochin State and were liable to sales tax under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 132939, "end_char": 133005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133134, "end_char": 133148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Cochin State and were liable to sales tax under the Act", "statute": "Travancore Cochin State and were liable to sales tax under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 64(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133210, "end_char": 133218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Travancore Cochin State and were liable to sales tax under the Act", "statute": "Travancore Cochin State and were liable to sales tax under the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(14)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 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null}}, {"text": "Cl. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148249, "end_char": 148255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148683, "end_char": 148691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148699, "end_char": 148716, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150181, "end_char": 150188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150196, "end_char": 150223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "7th February, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 150308, "end_char": 150326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result the writ petitiQns are partly allowed.. The impugned Circular dated 7th February, 1977 to the extent to which it i.usists .on production of an agreement with or an order from a foreigµ buyer from the Registered Exporters before participating in export auctions is quashed; it is also quashed hereafter to the extent to which it requires Registered Exporters to make contingency deposits or furnish bank guarantees out of abundant caution inasmuch as such requirement would be unnecessary in view of our authoritative pronouncemeµt."}}, {"text": "Coffee Board", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 150777, "end_char": 150789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Coffee Board may, if so advised, modify its Circular or iss11e an appropriate Circular .requiring the production of an agreement with or an order from a foreign buyer from the Registered Exporters j1'St before the property in the Coffee sold at such auctions passes under Cls."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152063, "end_char": 152074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1458 OF 1979\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J .-In view of our Judgment just delivered in W .P Nos."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_676_688_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "MAIMOONA KHATUN AND ANR. v.\n\nSTATE OF U.P. AND ANR.\n\nApril 16, 1980\n\nB [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JI.]\n\nArrears of pay and allowances consequent to reinstatement in service-Period of Limitation-The date from which the period should be computed whether date of reinstatement or when the salary become due-Limitation Act 1908 (Act IX o/1908}-\n\nArticle 102 (now Article 7 of the Act, 1963}-Scope of.\n\nAPPe11ants are the widow and daughter of one Zamirul Hassan who was employed as a tttbewell technician in the Irrigation Department of U. P Govern .. men!. In the year 1954, Zamirul Hassan was posted at Lucknow and was drawing a salary of Rs. !10/- per month plus Rs. 30/- as Dearness Allowance.\n\nHe was granted medical leave from 15th Feb. 1954 to 24th April 1954 after which lie applied for extension of his leave which \\Vas however, refused. As directed by the authorities, he reported for duty on 20th April, 1954.\n\nInstead of giving any charge of office, on that day, he was served with notice dated 27th March 1954 terminating bis services with immediate effect on the ground that he had reached the age of superannuation. Sri Hassan challen ged the said order by a representation to the Chief Engineer Irrigation department. The Superintending Engineer accepted the plea of the employee by his order dated 31st December, 1955 and ordered his reinstatement direct ing that the intervening period may be treated as leave admissible to him.\n\nHassan was then po<ted to Mathura on 15·2-1956. On January 7, !957, however, Hassan suddenly fell ill at Budaun and died on January 12, 1957.\n\nEven in spite of his reinstatement, the employee did not receive his salary from 15th February 1954 to 14th February 1956 amounting to Rs. 3360/·\n\nas also from 1·1·57 to 12-1-57 which amounted to Rs. 53/·. Despite the claim the arrears of salary were not paid and hence the appellants plaintiffs after giving notice under section 80 C.P.C., to the Government brought a suit for the recovery of Rs. 3035-5-0. The plea of bar of limitation taken by the respondent Government was disallowed and the suit was decreed. The trial eourt decreed the plaintiff's suit after coming to a clear finding that the employee, Zamirul Ha:1, an, should have been treated to be on duty during the entire period because he was illegaUy pervented from doing his duty. As a logical conclusion of this finding, the trial court also held that the employee was entitled to bis pay at the rate claimed by him for the period mentioned in the plaint. It was further held by the trial court that on the representation of the employee, his services were ful1y restored and he ,..as tbereforo entitled to his full salary. The First Appellate Court confirmed it. The High Court in second appeal accepted the plea of bar of limitation under Art. 102 of Limitation Act, 1908; but affirmed the finding of fact that Hassan was illegally prevented from duty.\n\nAllowing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. In cases, where an employee is dismissed or removed from service aa::l is reiostate::l either by the appointing authority or by virtue of tl\\e order of\n\nM. M. KHATUN V U.P. STATE 677\n\ndismissS:l or removal being set aside by a civil court, the starting Potnt of limitation would be not the date of the order of dismissal or removal but the date when the right actually accrues, that is to say, the date of the reinstatement, by the appointing authority where no suit is filed or the date of the decree where a suit is filed and\n\ndecrood.\n\n2. The right to sue under Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (now Art. 7 of 1963 AC!) would accrue only after the order of dismissal of the employee is set aside or he is reinstated by the appointing authority concerned. Until this stage is\n\nreached the right to recover arrears of salary does not accrue at all and there is no question of suing for the arrears of salary when no order of reinstatement had been passed or the order of dismissal has not been held by a court of law to be void.\n\n[683 B-D]\n\nThe tern1inusquo for the suit under Article 102 is the accrual of the salary which by reason of F. R. 52 cases the moment an order of dismissal or removal is made, Thus until a decree holding the order of dismissal or removal to be void is passed by the Court, it is not open to the employee to take any steps for recovering his salary.\n\nIn other words~ the right to recover arrears of salary would accrue only after an order of dismissal has been set aside either in a departmental appeal or by a decree in a civil court. [683 G-H, 684 A]\n\nState of Madras v, A. v. Anantharaman, A.I.R.1963. Madras 425 ; State of D Bombay v. Dr, Sarjoo Prasad, GumrJstha, I. L. R. 1968 Born. 1024 ; Union of India\n\nv. Giaa Singh, A.LR. 1970, Delhi 185; approved.\n\nSri Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore, [1962] l S.C.R. 886; P1.n; ab Province v. Pandit Tara Chand, [1947J F.C.ll. 89, distingui5hed.\n\n3. The principle contained in F.R. 54 would, however, apply in any case and the Position would be that until a Government servant is reinstated, he cannot E claim any arrears of salary or pay.\n\nMoreover in the instant case, Rule 54 applies in terms because the employee was serving in the State of U.P. and was governed by Rule 54 and was reinstated by the Superintending Engineer, after his rePresentation was accepted. It is, therefore, manifest that the employee : could not have claimed any arrears of his salary until he was reinstated. The right to !IUP. for arrP.ar<i of .; alary accrued only aftei the employee was reinstated. Once the civil court held that the direction given by the Superintending Engineer to F treat the period of suspension as on leave being non est. the position would be that the employee continued to remain in service and the effect of the adjudi~\n\ncatio~ was to declare that he was rongfully Prevented from attending his duties as Public servant. In other words the right to emoluments accrued on the_date when the suit was decreed and the starting point of limitation will be that date because at no time Prior there was any accrual of the right and hence the starting Point of limitation would not be the date of reinstatement G but the date when the Court held that the direction given by the Superintending Engineer was bad because until such a declaration was made, it was not open to the employee to have claimed the arrears of his i; alary. [684E-F,685AC]\n\n4. The view that the right to sue for the arrears of salary accrues from the date when the salary would have been payable but for the order of dismissal and not from the date when the order of dismissal is set aside by the civil B court. will cause gross and substap, tial injustice to the employee concerned who having been found by a court of law to have been wrongly dismissed\n\n678 SUPREME 'coURl' R!lPOR'fS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R,\n\nA and who in the eye of law would have been deemed to be in service; Wll'uld still be deprived for no fault of his, of the arrears of his salary beyort<f three years of the suit which, in spite of his best efforls he could not have ct.riitted. + until the order of dismissal was declared to be void. Such a course \"\"\"11d in fact place the Government employ~ in a strange predicaJneRt attd give an undeserving benefit to the emPJoyers who by wrongfu!Iy dismissing the employees would be left only with the responsibility of paying them for a 8 period of three years Prior to the suit and swallow the entire arrears beyOnd this period with., ut any legal or moral justification. [687 G-H, 688 A-BJ\n\nState of Madhya Pl'<\"desh v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 2 S.C.C. 288, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No 1523 (N) of 1970.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgement and Order dated 11-2-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in SA No. 1631of1963.\n\nS. S. Hussain for the Appellant.\n\nG. N. Dixit and 0. P.'Rana for the Respondent.\n\nD The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment and decree dated February 11, 1969 passed by the Allahabad High Court modifying the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and decreeing the plaintiff's claim for arrears of salary, etc., for a period of three years from the date of the suit adding two months to this period.\n\nThe facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may be summarised thus.\n\nZamirul Hassan (hereinafter referred to as the 'employee') Was employed as a tubewell technician in the Irrigation Department of tJ.P.\n\nGovernment (hereinafter referred to as the 'Government'). In the year 1954, Zamirul Hassan was posted at Lucknow and was drawing a salary of Rs. 110/- per month plus Rs. 30/- as Dearnes's Allowattce.\n\nHe was granted medical leave from 15th February 1954 to 24th April 1954 after which he applied for extension of his leave which was, Ii.owever, refused. Accordingly, the employee reported for duty on 20th April 1954 but he was not given charge of office on that date. Instead the employee was served with notice dated 27th March 1954 terminating his services with immediate effect on the ground that he had reached the age of superannuation. The employee challenged the validity of the notice through a representation given to the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, contending that as he was below 55 years of age, he could not be superannuated. Ultimately, the Superintending Engineer upheld the contention of the employee by his order dated 31st Decem ber 1955 and ordered his reinstatement directing that the intcrve11fng\n\n-,.\n\n• ..\n\n'-r •\n\nM. M. KHATUN v. V.P. STNI'E (Fazaf Ali, J.) 679\n\nperiod may be treated as leave admissible to him. The employee was then posted at Mathura on the 15th of February 1956.\n\nOn January, 7, 1957, however, the employee suddenly fell ill at Budaun and died on January 12, 1957. Even in spite of his reinstatement the employee did not receive his salary from 15th February 1954 to 14th February 1956 amounting to Rs. 3360 as also from 1-1-1957 to 12-1-1957 which amounted to Rs~ 53. Thus, the total amount which was claimed to be due to the employee up to the time of his death came to Rs. 3413 which remained unpaid. On the death of the employee, his widow, the present appellant, alongwith her daughters, obtained a succession certificate and made a claim to the respondent-Govern_ ment. Despite the claim the arrears of the salary of the employee were not paid and hence the present plaintiffs after giving notice, under s.80 of tlie Code of Civil Procedure, to the Government brought the present suit for recovery of Rs. 3035-5-0. The Civil Judge held that the suit was not barred by time and decreed the suit. Thereafter, the Government went up in appeal to Appellate court which confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. The Appellate court, however, directed the plaintiff to produce a succession certificate from the District Judge before receiving the amount. Having lost in the courts below, the Government filed a second appeal in the High Court and contended that the Order dated December 31, 1955 was a valid one and the direction that the intervening period may be treated as leave was in accordance with law and hence the plaintiff could not claim the amount during this period. The High Court overruled the plea taken by the Government on this point. It was then contended before the High\n\nCourt that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 102 of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908), as it then stood. The central dispute between the parties in the High Court was as to what should be the starting point of limitation in this particular case. According to the appellant, the starting point of limitation would be the date when the employee was reinstated and restored to service and therefore he wa&entitled to the entire salary which became due. The etand taken by the Government was that the period of limitation was to be computed not from the date of his reinstatement but from the date when the salary became due and therefore the claim for salary which was due for any• period beyond three years of the filing of the suit was barred by limitation. The High Court partially accepted this argument and held that the suit was undoubtedly barred for any claim preferred by the plaintiff beyond three years from the date.of the filing of the suit except for a further period of two months from the <late of the institution of the suit. The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal and modified the decree of the courts below. We might mention here that the trial\n\ncourt decreed the plaintiff's suit after coming to a clear finding that the employee, Zamirul Hassan, should have been treated to be on duty during the entire period because he was illegally prevented from doing his duty. As a logical conclusion of this finding, the trial court also held that the employee was entitled to his pay at the rate claimed by him for the period mentioned in the plaint. It was further held by the trial court that on the representation of the employee, his services were fully restored and he was therefore entitled to his full salary. The Appellate court and the High Court affirmed this finding of fact given by the trial court. Thus, the admitted position before us appears to be that the employee having been reinstated would be deemed to have continued in service right from the date when he was superannuated to the date when he died as the Department itself reinstated and restored his service. There was thus no justification for the Superintending Engineer to have given a direction that the period of his suspension would be treated as leave. The trial court had held that the suit was not barred by limitation for any part of the claim of the plaintiff. The High Court, however, differed only on this limited question of law.\n\nWe have heard learned counsel for the parties and although we find that the question is not free from difficulty, the decisions of this Ccurt show that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous. The High Court mainly relied on a decision of this Court in Shri M adhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. The State of Mysore (1) as also a pervious decision of the Federal Court in The Punjab Province v. Pandit Tarachand. (2).\n\nArticle 102 (now Article 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963) may be extracted thus :\n\n 7. •For wages in the case~ Three y a s When the wages of any other person ) e r j accrue due\"\n\nTb, e Federal Court in The Punjab Province's case (supra) had clearly laid down that the term •wages' appearing in Article 102 of the Limitation!Act of 1908 included salary and in this connection observed thus:\n\n\"Article 102 applies to suits for wages not otherwise provided for by the Schedule and covers in our judgmeut a suit to recover arrears of pay ...... In Article 102 it is intended in our judgment to cover all claims for wages, pay or slary, not otherewise expressly provided for in any other Article of the Schedule.\"\n\n(1) [1962) 1 S.C.R. 886.\n\n(2) [1947] F.C.R, 89,\n\nIt further held that a servant of the Crown in India had the right to maintain a snit for recovery of arrears of pay which had become due to him. This decision was given because there was some controversy on the question as to whether or not a suit for arrerrs of salary could be brought in a court oflaw. The controversy appears to have been sei at rest by the Federal Court in the aforesaid decision. Furthermore, the Court held that where an order of dismissal is invalid the position is that the employee was never dismissed in the eye of law and would be deemed to have continued in service until retirement. In this connection the Court observed :\n\n\"The order of 19th March 1938, purporting to dismiss the respondent having been made by an authority that had been expressly debarred by s. 240(2) of the Constitution Act from making it, was utterly void of all effect. It was in the eye of the law no more than a piece of waste-paper. The position is that the respondent was never legally dismissed from service and continued m law to be a Sub-Inspector of Police till the date on which he was under the conditions of his service due to retire, He was thus entitled to draw his salary for the period of his service after 19th March, 1938.\"\n\nThe question as to what should be the starting point of limitation under Article 102 was neither raised nor decided. It seems to have been assumed or admitted by the parties that as Article 102 applied, the period of limitation would be three years from the date when the right to sue accrued. The Federal Court, however, did not decide as to when the right under Article 102 would actually accrue.\n\nThis matter came up for consideration again in Shri M adhm Laxman Vaikunthe's case (supra), a case on which the High Court has heavily relied, where it was held that the suit of the plaintiff would be governed by Article 102 of the Limitation Act of 1908 which provided a period of three years from the date when the right to salary would accure.\n\nIn this case also, the question as to when the right to sue for the salary actually accrued was neithter raised nor decided and the only controversy which was before the Court rested on the question as to whether Article 102 or some other Article would apply to the suit. Another question that was argued before this Court was whether a Government servant had a right to recover the arrears of pay by an action in a civil court, it was decided by the Supreme Court that an employee had a right to bring a suit for recovery of arrears of pay in a civil court as held by the Federal Court in The Punjab Province's case (supra). In this c nnection, this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"On the question of limitation, he held that the suit would be H g verned by Art. 102 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908)\n\n5-463SCI/80 ,\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nas laid down by the Federal Court in the case of the PU!ljab Province v. Pandit Tarachand (1947 F. C. R. 89). In that view of the matter, the learned Judge held that adding the pe_riod of two months of the statutory notice under s. 80 of the Code of pvil Procedure given to Government, the claim would be in time from June 2, 1951 .... The appellant contended that his suit for arrears of salary would not be governed by the three years rule laid down in Art. 102 of the Limitation Act and that the decision of the Federal Court in Tarachand's case (1947 F.C.R. 89) was not correct. The sole ground on which this contention was based was that \"salary\" was not included within the term \"wages\". In our opinion, no good reasons have been adduced before us for not following the aforesaid decision of the Federal Court. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part, that is to say, the declaration granted by the Trial Court that the Order of the Government impugned in this case is void, is rGstored, in disagreement with the decision of the High Court. The claim as regards arrears of salary and allowance is allowed in part only from the 2nd of June 1951, until the date ofthe plaintiff's retirement from Government service\".\n\nThis Court disagreed with the High Court and restored the declaration granted by the trial court that the impugned order of the Government was void. The Court also allowed the claim as regards arrears of salary only from the 2nd of June 1951 until the date of the plaintiff's retirement from Government service. Another important aspect of this decision is that the Court in that case came to a clear finding that as a result of the order of reversion, the appellant had been punished but the order of the Government punishing him was not whollJt irregular though the requirements of Art. 311 of the Constitution were not fully complied with.\n\nThus, a careful perusal of the decision would clearly' reveal that the actual question at issue in the present appeal was neither raisednor involved in the aforesaid decision. This decision was noticed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of State '\"f Madras v. A. V. Anantharaman (I) where the Court distinguished the case referred to above on the ground that the question' of the starting point of limitation was neither raised nor decided by tl)is Court. In this connection, the Madras High Court observed as follows :\n\n'.'As we said, the terms ofF. R. 52 are clear and no public servant who had been dismissed albeit only by an invalid order can ask B the Government to pay him his salary. His right to it will flow\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1963 Madras 425.\n\n' - 1\n\nonly when the order of dismissal has been set aside ...... AIR 1962\n\nSC 8 was not a case in which F. R. 52 prevented the accrual of salary, there the Government servant had been reverted from an officiating post to his substantive post resulting in loss of senoirity in that post. Such reversion was later held to be one by way of punishment and the procedure under Article 311 of the Constitution not having been followed it was held to be invalid. The only point argued in that case was whether the salary due to the Government servant would come within Article 102 of the Limitation Act and that question was answered in the affirmative.\"\n\nOn the other hand, this point was specifically raised before the Madras High Court which fully went into it and held that the right to sue nuder Article 102 of the Limitation Act would accrue only after the order of dismissal of the employee is set aside or he is reinstated by the appointing authority concerned. Until this stage is reached the right to recover arrears of salary does not accrue at all and there is no question of suing for the arrears of salary when no order of reinstatement, as indicated above, had been passed or the order of dismissal has not been held by a court oflaw to be void. In this connection, the Madras High Court observed as follows (supra) :-\n\n\"But where a public servant had been dismissed or removed, his pay and allowance would cease from the date of such dismissal or removal. That is what is provided in F. R. 52. The \"question then will arise as to when in such cases, that is, where there has been a dismissal or removal which has been later on set aside as a result of subsequent proceedings the right to recover arrears of salary will accrue or arise.\n\nIn neither of the two cases cited above was that question raised or considered ...... The terminus a quo for a suit under that provision is the accrual of the salary. In other words, the cause of action is not any fixed point of time (e.g., on the !st of the succeeding month) but when it accrues. By reason of F. R. 52 the right to salary ceases the moment an order for dismissal or removal is made.\"\n\nThe High Court has rightly pointed out that the terminus quo for the suit under Article 102 is the accrual of the salary which by reason of F R. 52 ceases the moment an order of dismissal or removal is made. Thus, until a decree boding the order of dismissal or removal to be void is passed by the court, it is not open to the employee to take any steps for recovering his salary. The Madras High Court then concluded by holding that the right to recover arrears of salary would accrue only after an order of dismissal has been set aside either in a\n\nA departmental appeal or. by a decree in a civil court. In this connection, the High Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"We are therefore of opinion that in the case of the dismissal of a public servant which has been subsequently set aside as in the present case, the right to recover arrears of salary would accrue only when that order of dismissal has been set aside either in departmental appeal or by a Civil Court. Viewed in that light, the instant claim must be held to be in time.\"\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreement with all the observations. made by the Madras High Court in the aforesaid case. The counsel for the respondent submitted that the Madras High Court erred in relying on Fundamental Rule 52 which would apply only to a case where the employee had been removed and then reinstated by the appointing or the departmental authority. In support of his argument, he relied on the case of Dcvendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1) where after extracting Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh under Art. 309 of the Constitution, this Court held thus :\n\n\"This rule has no application to cases like the present in which the dismissal of a public servant is declared invalid by a civil court and he.is reinstated.\"\n\nAssuming that this was so, the principle contained in Rule 54 would however; apply in any case and the position would be that until a Government servant is reinstated, he cannot claim any arrears of salary or pay. Moreover, in the instant case, Rule 54 applies in terms because the employee was serving in the State of U. P. and was governed by Rule 54 and was reinstated by the Superintending Enigneer, after his representation was accepted. It is, therefore, manifest that the employee could not have claimedlany arrears of his salary until he wa& reinstated. Thus, even according to the decision relied upon by the respondent, it is clear that the right to sue for arrears of salary accrued only after the employee was reinstated. This Court further observed. in the aforesaid case :-\n\nG \"The effect of the decree of the civil suit was that the appellant was never to be deemed to have been lawfully dimissed from service and the order of reinstatement was superfluous. The effect of the adjudication of the civil court is to declare that the appellant had been wrongfully prevented from attending to his duties as a public servant. It would not in such a contingency be open to the H authority to deprive the public servant of the remuneration whicn he would have earned bad he been permitted to work.\"\n\n(I) [1962] Supp, 1 S.C.R. 315.\n\n•• I\n\nIn view of this observation once the civil court held that the direction\n\nA . given by the Superintending Engineer to treat the period of suspension as on leave being non est, the position would be that the employee continued to remain in service and the effect of the adjudication was to declare that he was wrongfully prevented from attending his duties as a public servant. In other words, the right to emoluments accrued on the date when the suit was decreed and the starting point of limi- B talion will be that date because at no time prior there was any accrual of the right and hence the starting point of limitation would not be the date ofreinstatement but the date when the Court held that the directitin given by the Superintending Engineer was bad because until such a declaration was made, it was not open •O the employee to have claimed the arrears of his salary.\n\nSo far as the question when the right would accrue and whether the period of three years was to be counted from the date of the suit or the date of the reinstatement was a point that was neither raised nor answered even in this decision. In the case of State of Bonbay v. Dr.\n\nSarjoo Prasad Gumasta (I) the view taken by the Madras High Court was fully endorsed and it was pointed out that under Fundamental Rules 53 and 52 the Government servant's salary ceased upon his suspension and he becomes entitled only to subsistence allowance. It was held that so long as the order of suspension or dismissal stands, the Government servant cannot obviously claim his salary because no salary as such accrues due. The court observed thus(!) :-\n\n\"That date would be the starting point of limitation for a suit by the Government servant and the date when the order is quashed would be the terminus a quo for a suit by the Government servant of claim for the arrears of salary and allowances for the period\n\nfrom the date of his suspension and/or dismissal.\" F\n\nA Division Beneh of the Delhi High Court has also taken a similar view and while dwelling on the starting point of limitation under Article\n\n102, in the case of Union of India v. Gian Singh's(2) case observed as follows :-\n\n\"Article 102 of the said Limitation Act undoubtedly provides that a suit for wages has to be filed within three years of the time when they accrue due. The question, therefore, is whether the respondent did have a cause of action for claiming his full pay and allowances for the period 19-11-1953 to 18-7-1956 in the presen suit which he filed on September 10, 1959 ...... It was only on the\n\n(1) I. L. R. 1968 Bombay 1024.\n\n(2) A.T.R. 1970 Delhi 185\n\ndate of the receipt of the notice of termination of services, that is, 26-1-1958 that the order of suspension stood revoked, and it would be only on and after 26-1-1958 that the respondent could be entitled to claim full pay and allowances for the period of suspension.\n\nFull wages for the period of suspension would, therefore, accru to him by reason of Fundamental Rule 53 only when the order of suspension is revoked or could be deemed to have been revoked.\n\nPrior to that the wages would not accrue and he would have no cause of action.\"\n\nSo far as this Court is concerned, the matter stands conclu()ed by a decision of this Court in case of The State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nv. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.(1) where a Bench of three 1u4ges considered this specific question and distinguished the earlier decisions of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhney v. Union of India(2) and Sakal Deep Sahai Srivastava v. Union of India.(> )While expounding the law regarding as to when the right to sue actually accrues, this Court observed as follows(l) :-\n\n\"Three features are to be borne in mind in appreciating the plaintiff's case from the point of view of limitation. First the plaintiff became entitled to salary for the period September 16, 1943 upto the date of reinstatement on December 12, 1953, only when pursuant to the decree dated August 30, 1953 there was actual reinstatement of the plaintiff on December 12, 1953 ..... .\n\nOn these facts two consequences arise in the present appeal.\n\nFirst, since the plaintiff was under suspension from September 16, 1943 till December 12, 1953 when he was reinstated and again suspended from January 19, 1954 till February 23, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on October 6, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on December 12,\n\n1953. Second, during the period of suspension he was not entitled to salary under Fundamental Rule 53. Further decision to that effect was taken by the Madhya Pradesh Government on January 28, 1956 under Fundamental Rule 54. Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action for salary for the period of suspension did not accrue until he was reinstated on December 12, 1953. The plaintiff's salary accrued only when he was reinstated as a result of the decree setting aside the orders of suspension and not of dismissal. ...\n\nThe rulings of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhney's case and Sakal Deep's case do not apply to the present appeal because there was\n\n(1) [1977] 2 s.c.c. 288.\n\n\nno 11spect of any suspension order remaining operative Ull.til the fact of reinstatement pursuant to the decree ...... Therefore, there\n\nwould be no question of salary accruing or accruing due so long .as prder of suspension and dismissal stands. The High Court was\n\n!)<lrrect in the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim for salary acqrµed due only on the order of dismissal dated February 23, 1956\n\nbng set aside.\" II is, therefore, ma.nifest from a perusal of the observations made by thi$ Court in the aforesaid case that the plaintiff's salary accrued only Wlten the employee Was reinstated as a result of the decree settiRg aside the order of suspension or dismissal.\n\nIn that case, the employee was suspended as far back as 16th September 1943 and after an enquiry, the employee was removed from service' on 7th November 1945. The employee filed a suit on the 6th of J; lnlljlry 1949 and claimed his salary from 16th September 1943, the date when he was suspended, up to the date of his reinstatement on December 12, 1953 when the decree was passed. Indeed, if the view taken by the High Court in the instant case was correct, the suit of the employee would have been hopelessly barred by limitation and he could not have got a decree for more than three years from 1949, the date when he filed the suit. This Court, however, held that s the starting point of limitation was not the date of the suit but the date when the removal of the employee was held to be void and he was reinstated, Uie suit was not barred by limitation. We might also mention that this Cpurt also held that under Fundamental Rule 52 of the U, P.\n\nRules, the pay and allowances of a Government servant ceased from the date of dismissal and therefore there was no question of his claiming aey arrears so long as his dismissal or removal stood. The facts of the present case seem to us to be directly covered by the decision rendered by this Court in the aforesaid case.\n\nTl111s, this Court has fully endorsed the view taken by the Madras and the Bombay High Court, referred to above.\n\nIt 1'j:ems to us that if we take the view that the right to sue for the arrears of salary accrues from the date when the salary would have been payable but for the order of dismissal and not from the date when the order of dismissal is set aside by the civil court, it will cause gross and substantial injustice to the employee concerned who having been found by a court of law to have been wrongly dismissed and who in the eye oflaw would have been deemed to be in service, would still be deprived for no fault of his, of the arrears of his salary beyond three years of the suit which, in spite of his best efforts he could not\n\nhave claimed, until the order of dismissal was declared to be void.\n\nSuch a course would in fact place the Government employees in a strange predicament and give an undeserving benefit to the employers who by wrongfully dismissing the employees would be left only with the responsibility of paying them for a period of three years prior to the suit and swallow the entire arrears beyond this period without any legal or moral justification. This aspect does not appear to have been noticed by the courts which have taken the view that the starting point of limitation would be three years from the date of the suit and was for the first time noticed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh\n\nv. State of Maharashtra & ors. (supra) which seems to us to have righted a wrong which was long overdue.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the. opinion that in cases where an employee is dismissed or removed from servico and is reinstated either by the appointing authority or by virtue of the order of dismissal or removal being set aside by a civil court, the starting point of limitation would be not the date of the order of dismissal or removal but the date when the right actually accrues, that is to say, the date of the reinstatement, by the appointing authority where no suit is filed or the date of the decree where a suit is filed and decreed.\n\nIn this view of the matter, the High Court was in error in modifying .the decree of the trial court and the lower Appellate Court and limiting the claim of the appellant to a period of only three years prior to the suit. In view of the findings given by the courts on facts, which have not been reversed by the High Court, it is manifest that the appellants are entitled to the entire decretal amount claimed by them and for which a decree was granted by the trial court and the lower appellate court. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court. The appellant will be entitled to costs throughout and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the decretal amount from the date of the termination of his service to the date of payment.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "MAIMOONA KHATUN AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAIMOONA KHATUN AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 16, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 16, 1980\n\nB [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JI.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. s. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 347, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 371, "end_char": 382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 388, "end_char": 397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Zamirul Hassan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 472, "end_char": 486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPe11ants are the widow and daughter of one Zamirul Hassan who was employed as a tttbewell technician in the Irrigation Department of U. P Govern .. men!.", "canonical_name": "Zamirul Hassan"}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 630, "end_char": 637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1954, Zamirul Hassan was posted at Lucknow and was drawing a salary of Rs. !"}}, {"text": "15th Feb. 1954 to 24th April 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 758, "end_char": 791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was granted medical leave from 15th Feb. 1954 to 24th April 1954 after which lie applied for extension of his leave which \\Vas however, refused."}}, {"text": "20th April, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As directed by the authorities, he reported for duty on 20th April, 1954."}}, {"text": "27th March 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1032, "end_char": 1047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Instead of giving any charge of office, on that day, he was served with notice dated 27th March 1954 terminating bis services with immediate effect on the ground that he had reached the age of superannuation."}}, {"text": "Hassan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1160, "end_char": 1166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Hassan challen ged the said order by a representation to the Chief Engineer Irrigation department."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1340, "end_char": 1359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintending Engineer accepted the plea of the employee by his order dated 31st December, 1955 and ordered his reinstatement direct ing that the intervening period may be treated as leave admissible to him."}}, {"text": "Mathura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1499, "end_char": 1506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hassan was then po<ted to Mathura on 15·2-1956."}}, {"text": "15·2-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1510, "end_char": 1519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hassan was then po<ted to Mathura on 15·2-1956."}}, {"text": "January 7, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1524, "end_char": 1536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 7, !"}}, {"text": "Budaun", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1578, "end_char": 1584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "957, however, Hassan suddenly fell ill at Budaun and died on January 12, 1957."}}, {"text": "January 12, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1597, "end_char": 1613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "957, however, Hassan suddenly fell ill at Budaun and died on January 12, 1957."}}, {"text": "12-1-57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3360/·\n\nas also from 1·1·57 to 12-1-57 which amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1938, "end_char": 1948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1949, "end_char": 1954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Zamirul Ha:1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2226, "end_char": 2238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial eourt decreed the plaintiff's suit after coming to a clear finding that the employee, Zamirul Ha:1, an, should have been treated to be on duty during the entire period because he was illegaUy pervented from doing his duty.", "canonical_name": "Zamirul Hassan"}}, {"text": "Art. 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2824, "end_char": 2832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2836, "end_char": 2856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3563, "end_char": 3574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3608, "end_char": 3614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4083, "end_char": 4094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5237, "end_char": 5241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover in the instant case, Rule 54 applies in terms because the employee was serving in the State of U.P. and was governed by Rule 54 and was reinstated by the Superintending Engineer, after his rePresentation was accepted."}}, {"text": "S. S. Hussain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7832, "end_char": 7845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. S. Hussain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dixit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7866, "end_char": 7877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dixit and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P.'Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7882, "end_char": 7892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N. Dixit and 0."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7962, "end_char": 7970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment and decree dated February 11, 1969 passed by the Allahabad High Court modifying the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and decreeing the plaintiff's claim for arrears of salary, etc.,"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8085, "end_char": 8105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nFAZAL Au, J.\n\nThis appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment and decree dated February 11, 1969 passed by the Allahabad High Court modifying the decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and decreeing the plaintiff's claim for arrears of salary, etc.,"}}, {"text": "31st Decem ber 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9480, "end_char": 9499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, the Superintending Engineer upheld the contention of the employee by his order dated 31st Decem ber 1955 and ordered his reinstatement directing that the intcrve11fng\n,."}}, {"text": "Fazaf Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9610, "end_char": 9619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ..\n\n'-r •\n\nM. M. KHATUN v. V.P. STNI'E (Fazaf Ali, J.) 679\n\nperiod may be treated as leave admissible to him."}}, {"text": "January, 7, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9754, "end_char": 9770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January, 7, 1957, however, the employee suddenly fell ill at Budaun and died on January 12, 1957."}}, {"text": "15th February 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9932, "end_char": 9950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in spite of his reinstatement the employee did not receive his salary from 15th February 1954 to 14th February 1956 amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "14th February 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9954, "end_char": 9972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in spite of his reinstatement the employee did not receive his salary from 15th February 1954 to 14th February 1956 amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "1-1-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10008, "end_char": 10016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3360 as also from 1-1-1957 to 12-1-1957 which amounted to Rs~ 53."}}, {"text": "12-1-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10020, "end_char": 10029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3360 as also from 1-1-1957 to 12-1-1957 which amounted to Rs~ 53."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10497, "end_char": 10501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10510, "end_char": 10533, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11077, "end_char": 11094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having lost in the courts below, the Government filed a second appeal in the High Court and contended that the Order dated December 31, 1955 was a valid one and the direction that the intervening period may be treated as leave was in accordance with law and hence the plaintiff could not claim the amount during this period."}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11442, "end_char": 11453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11468, "end_char": 11482, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14272, "end_char": 14283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14289, "end_char": 14298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14306, "end_char": 14326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Punjab Province", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14476, "end_char": 14491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•For wages in the case~ Three y a s When the wages of any other person ) e r j accrue due\"\n\nTb, e Federal Court in The Punjab Province's case (supra) had clearly laid down that the term •wages' appearing in Article 102 of the Limitation!Act of 1908 included salary and in this connection observed thus:\n\n\"Article 102 applies to suits for wages not otherwise provided for by the Schedule and covers in our judgmeut a suit to recover arrears of pay ...... In Article 102 it is intended in our judgment to cover all claims for wages, pay or slary, not otherewise expressly provided for in any other Article of the Schedule.\""}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14564, "end_char": 14575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14662, "end_char": 14673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14814, "end_char": 14825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "[1962) 1 S.C.R. 886", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14984, "end_char": 15003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15076, "end_char": 15081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) [1947] F.C.R, 89,\n\nIt further held that a servant of the Crown in India had the right to maintain a snit for recovery of arrears of pay which had become due to him."}}, {"text": "19th March 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15698, "end_char": 15713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection the Court observed :\n\n\"The order of 19th March 1938, purporting to dismiss the respondent having been made by an authority that had been expressly debarred by s. 240(2) of the Constitution Act from making it, was utterly void of all effect."}}, {"text": "s. 240(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15821, "end_char": 15830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th March, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16255, "end_char": 16271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position is that the respondent was never legally dismissed from service and continued m law to be a Sub-Inspector of Police till the date on which he was under the conditions of his service due to retire, He was thus entitled to draw his salary for the period of his service after 19th March, 1938.\""}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16348, "end_char": 16359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16457, "end_char": 16468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16639, "end_char": 16650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M adhm Laxman Vaikunthe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16727, "end_char": 16750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This matter came up for consideration again in Shri M adhm Laxman Vaikunthe's case (supra), a case on which the High Court has heavily relied, where it was held that the suit of the plaintiff would be governed by Article 102 of the Limitation Act of 1908 which provided a period of three years from the date when the right to salary would accure."}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16888, "end_char": 16899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16907, "end_char": 16921, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17236, "end_char": 17247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17474, "end_char": 17487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another question that was argued before this Court was whether a Government servant had a right to recover the arrears of pay by an action in a civil court, it was decided by the Supreme Court that an employee had a right to bring a suit for recovery of arrears of pay in a civil court as held by the Federal Court in The Punjab Province's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Art. 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17781, "end_char": 17789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17804, "end_char": 17818, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1947 F. C. R. 89", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17978, "end_char": 17995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18117, "end_char": 18122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18206, "end_char": 18218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that view of the matter, the learned Judge held that adding the pe_riod of two months of the statutory notice under s. 80 of the Code of pvil Procedure given to Government, the claim would be in time from June 2, 1951 .... The appellant contended that his suit for arrears of salary would not be governed by the three years rule laid down in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18343, "end_char": 18351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18359, "end_char": 18373, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tarachand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18420, "end_char": 18429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "102 of the Limitation Act and that the decision of the Federal Court in Tarachand's case (1947 F.C.R. 89) was not correct."}}, {"text": "(1947 F.C.R. 89", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18437, "end_char": 18452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd of June 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19340, "end_char": 19356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court also allowed the claim as regards arrears of salary only from the 2nd of June 1951 until the date of the plaintiff's retirement from Government service."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19699, "end_char": 19707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19988, "end_char": 20005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was noticed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of State '\"f Madras v. A. V. Anantharaman (I) where the Court distinguished the case referred to above on the ground that the question' of the starting point of limitation was neither raised nor decided by tl)is Court."}}, {"text": "AIR 1962\n\nSC 8", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20595, "end_char": 20609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20902, "end_char": 20913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21092, "end_char": 21103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21111, "end_char": 21125, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21324, "end_char": 21335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21343, "end_char": 21357, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22759, "end_char": 22770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24172, "end_char": 24194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of his argument, he relied on the case of Dcvendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1) where after extracting Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24298, "end_char": 24306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U. P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24831, "end_char": 24836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, in the instant case, Rule 54 applies in terms because the employee was serving in the State of U. P. and was governed by Rule 54 and was reinstated by the Superintending Enigneer, after his representation was accepted."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27814, "end_char": 27830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F\n\nA Division Beneh of the Delhi High Court has also taken a similar view and while dwelling on the starting point of limitation under Article\n\n102, in the case of Union of India v. Gian Singh's(2) case observed as follows :-\n\n\"Article 102 of the said Limitation Act undoubtedly provides that a suit for wages has to be filed within three years of the time when they accrue due."}}, {"text": "Article\n\n102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27922, "end_char": 27934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28015, "end_char": 28026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28039, "end_char": 28053, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "26-1-1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28537, "end_char": 28546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) A.T.R. 1970 Delhi 185\n\ndate of the receipt of the notice of termination of services, that is, 26-1-1958 that the order of suspension stood revoked, and it would be only on and after 26-1-1958 that the respondent could be entitled to claim full pay and allowances for the period of suspension."}}, {"text": "December 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30032, "end_char": 30049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from September 16, 1943 till December 12, 1953 when he was reinstated and again suspended from January 19, 1954 till February 23, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on October 6, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on December 12,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "January 19, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30098, "end_char": 30114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from September 16, 1943 till December 12, 1953 when he was reinstated and again suspended from January 19, 1954 till February 23, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on October 6, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on December 12,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30120, "end_char": 30137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from September 16, 1943 till December 12, 1953 when he was reinstated and again suspended from January 19, 1954 till February 23, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on October 6, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on December 12,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30173, "end_char": 30188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from September 16, 1943 till December 12, 1953 when he was reinstated and again suspended from January 19, 1954 till February 23, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on October 6, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on December 12,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "December 12,\n\n1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30261, "end_char": 30279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from September 16, 1943 till December 12, 1953 when he was reinstated and again suspended from January 19, 1954 till February 23, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on October 6, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on December 12,\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30427, "end_char": 30452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further decision to that effect was taken by the Madhya Pradesh Government on January 28, 1956 under Fundamental Rule 54."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30456, "end_char": 30472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further decision to that effect was taken by the Madhya Pradesh Government on January 28, 1956 under Fundamental Rule 54."}}, {"text": "Jai Chand Sawhney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30823, "end_char": 30840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulings of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhney's case and Sakal Deep's case do not apply to the present appeal because there was\n\n(1) [1977] 2 s.c.c."}}, {"text": "Sakal Deep", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30852, "end_char": 30862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rulings of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhney's case and Sakal Deep's case do not apply to the present appeal because there was\n\n(1) [1977] 2 s.c.c."}}, {"text": "6th of J; lnlljlry 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31818, "end_char": 31841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The employee filed a suit on the 6th of J; lnlljlry 1949 and claimed his salary from 16th September 1943, the date when he was suspended, up to the date of his reinstatement on December 12, 1953 when the decree was passed."}}, {"text": "might also mention that this Cpurt also held that under Fundamental Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32489, "end_char": 32561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras and the", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32961, "end_char": 32975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl111s, this Court has fully endorsed the view taken by the Madras and the Bombay High Court, referred to above."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32976, "end_char": 32993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl111s, this Court has fully endorsed the view taken by the Madras and the Bombay High Court, referred to above."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_689_729_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "JIT RAM SHIV KUMAR AND ORS. ETC.\n\nSTA~ OF HARYANA AND ANR. ETC.\n\nApril 16, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.J B\n\nP1'11}11b M1111icipal Act, 1911 as amended by Punjab Act 48 of 1951, Section 62.A-Power of State Government to di'rect the ,\\lunicipality to impose any tax ulllkr ction 61-Exemption from payment of octroi duty not within the com\n\npelence of the Municipality and ultra vires of its powers-.Whet/1er any suc/1\n\nlllCI whidi is void ab initio, enforceable-Principle of Promissory Estoppel, ingrt• dienll of-Applicability to the instant case.\n\nThe Municipal Committee of Bahadurgarh, respondent No. 2 established Maadi Fateh in Bahadurgarh Town with a view to improve trade in the area.\n\nThe Municipal Committ<e decided that the purchasers of the plots for sale in the Mandi would not be required to pay octroi duty 01> goods imported within the said Mandi. A resolution (No. 8) dated 2().12-1916 was passed by the Mllllicipality to this effect. Hand bills wore issued for tho sale of the plots on the basis of tpe resolution and it was proclaimed that Fateh. Mandi would remain exempt from payment of octroi. Subsequently by resolution No. 4 dated 20-5-1917, the Municipal Committee decided that the term No. 14 to the\n\nconditions of sale, namely, that tho purchasers of plots would not be required to pay octroi, be amended to the effect that the Mandi shall remain intmuno from payment of octroi duty for ever. When the resolution was received by the Commissioner of Ambala, in paragraph 3 of his letter datod 26-6·1917, he minuted that the undertaking by the Municipal Commissioner never to in1pose octroi duty in the Mandi was ultra vires and therefore the purchasers of the p)Qla should be informed so that they may withdraw from the purchases. on receipt of this letter the President of the Municipal Committee made representations that if octroi duty was to be levied, tha-e would be no purchasers for the plota end the entire scheme would fall tllrough. On this, the Commissioner reviled his earlier view and withdrew his objection by further observing tha~ \"as l!OOn es the market is established it will be necessary to consider what form of taxation is best to cover the market share of municipal expelnses\". The Muni cipal COmmittee on I().3-1919 imposed house-tax of Rs. 3·14·6 per cent per alinum on the shopkeepers to cover the ell<penditure of tho market.\n\nThis state of affairs continued till 4-9-1953 when the MunicipaJ Committee by nolification No. 9697-C.53163830 dated 4·9-1953 included Fateh Mand~ Bahadurgarh, within the Cktroi limits. The Examiner of Local Funds pointed out that the h.funicipal Committeeis under obligation to charge octroi on goods imported into Fateh Ma'1di. The President of the Municipal Committee made a repr0oentation to the Deputy Comm:ssioner on 24-2-1954. The Municipal Committee again passed another resolution No. I dated 2-3·1954 that the Fateh Mandi will remain free from octroi duty according to the terms of the proclamation of the sale relating to the sale of plots. The matter was referred to Punjab State which after thoroughly examining the whole matter, confirmed Resolution No. I passed by the Municipal Committee on 2·3-1954. Subs'equently, the Municipal Committee changed its mind and by its resolution dated S-5-1954, resolved .that octroi duty should also be levied on the goods imported into Fateh Mandi.\n\nBut this resolution was annulled by the Punjab Government under s. 236 of the Punjab Municipal Act. The Examiner of Local Funds Accounts in the meantime insisted on the levy of octroi duty on the goods imr-orted into Fateh Mondi and the Punjab Govermnent after discussing the issue on 9-4-19 56 informed the President of the Municipal Committee that the Government's action in confirming me resolution No. 1 of 2-3-1954 of the Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh exempting goods imported into Fateh Mandi from levy of ocroi duty under s. 70(2)(c) of the Municipal Act, 1911, is lluite in order ood that no separate notification to this effect was necessary under -the rules. Again on 21-7-1965, the Municipal Committee Bahadurgarh resolved that the Govemment be requested to cancel Resolution No. 1 dated 2-3-1954. The State of Haryanai Respondent No. 1 which came into existence on 1-11-64, wtaer the Punjab Reorganisation Act, by its memo dated 13-10-1967 approv.4 tile resolution No. 6 dated 21-7-65 of the Municipa~ Committee and cancelled the Municipal Resolution No. 1 of 2-3-1964.\n\nAs a result of the deci9ioo <It the Government, the Municipal Committee startetl charging octroi duty on ·.-the goods imported into the Mandi. On these facts, the petitioner• subml!Ml that the resolution No. 6 of the Municipal Committee dated 21-7-1965 (~ 6) and approval granted by the Haryana State as per its order dated 30-19'1%7 (Ann. H) were illegal and ultra vires and without jurisdiction.\n\nA Full Bench of the High Court rejei:ted the petition mainly Oil three grounds. Firstly, it found that the State Government is entitled under S. 112-A of Punjab Act, 48/1953 to direct the Municipal Committee to impose oettt>i 1duty and as such even if the municipality is found to have erred in impOBing lfle Octroi Duty, the legislative powers of the State cannot be questioned. Seconilly, it found, that it was not within the competeru:e of the Municipality to grant any exemption from payment of octroi duty and this act '\"as ultra vfrts t1tits power< and cannot be enforced. Thirdly, it found that the Court canndt gn into the question as to whether the petitioners' plea based on equity fhat the Municipality is bound, cannot be gorre into far waint of adequate faclB. 'i'lle High Court however granted certificates to the appellants.\n\nDismissing the appeal,. the Court\n\nHELD : l. Under section 62-A of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 as amended by Punjab Act 43/1958 'the State G1>vemmen! is empowered to Im~ octroi duty and under sub clause (b) if the committee fails to canY cat the order of the Government, the State Government\n\n1may impose Octroi Duty.\n\nUnder S. 70{2) (c), :l Municipal Comn1ittee by a resolution pa£sed at a special meeting and confirmed by the State Government may exempt in whole or in part from payment of any such tax any person or class of persons or any property or description of property, Jn exercise of those powers, the State Government had by its order dated 4-5-1954 confirmed resolution No. I passed by the Municipal Committee in its specia1 meeting held on 2-3-1954 regarding the eittription of goods imported into Fateh Mandi from levy of Octroi Duty. So\"-'equently, in reply to the objection raised 'by the Examiner of Local Funds, the Government pointed out by its letter dated 9-4-1956 (Ann. F) that the Government's action confirming the resolution No. I dated 2-3-1954 of the Municipal Comn1ittee exempting Goods imported into Fateh Mandi, under s. 70(2)(c) of\n\nJIT RAM V. HARYANA 691\n\nthe Punjab. :rviunii:ipJl Act, 1911, was quite in order.\n\nBy the impugned order dated 20-10-1967 the Government approved the resolution No. 6 ofthe Municipal Co1nmittte dated 21-7-1965 and permitted the Municipality to levy the Octroi Duty. Therefore, the action taken by the State Government is strictly in conformity with the powers conferred on it under s. '70(2) (c) of the Act. lt exempted the petitioners from payment of Octroi Duty for a particar period and ultimately withdrew the exemption. The action of th~ Government cannot be q;1estione<l as it is in exercise of its statutory functions. The plea of estoppel is not:· available against the State in the exercise of its legislative or statutory functions.\n\nThe Governn1ent have powers to direct the Municipality to collecl the Octroi Tax if the Municipality fails to take action by itself under s. 60(A)-\n\n(3). Further, even on facts, this plea is' not available as against the Government as it is .not the case of the petitioners that they acted on the representation of the Government. [698 E-H, 699 A-CJ\n\n2. The Municipality is not estopped from levying or recommending the levy of the tax to the Government even though in the proclan1ation of sale it was notified that no octroi duty would be. levied and it was only in pursuance cf such\n\nrepsentation. the appt.Jlants purchased the property because the Municipal Committee had uo authority to exempt the Fateh Market from the levy ot Octroi .Duty. If the l\\funicipaI Committee had passed a reSolution or issued a notification that no Octroi duty will ber levied, it will be ultra vires of the powers of the Municipal Committee. When a public authority acts beyond the scope of its authority the plea of estoppel is not available. to prevent the authority from acting according to law. It is in public interes, t that no such plea should be allowed.\n\nFurther, in the instant case, the appellants are not entitled to any enforceable legal right under the terms of the tvlunicipal Act, since non production of any sale deed executed by the Municipal Connnittee in fa,•our of the purchasers raises the only presumption that the; contract between the parties have not been proved to have been reduced in writing and exocuted in the manner prescribed under section 47 of the Municipality Act, 1911 (Act 3 of 1911).\n\n[699 C-E, 700 B-D]\n\n3. Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India corresponding to Section\n\n17.5(~) of t-he Government of India Act, 1935 provides that all contracts made\n\nin the exercise of the executive powers of the Union or of a State shall be\n\nexpetl to he made by the President or by the Governor of the State, as the F case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exe~ of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the GOYemor by such persons and in such manner as, he 'may direct or authorise.\n\nThe provisions of this Article is mandatory and not directory, is enacted as a. matter . of public policy that the State should not be saddled with liability for unauthorised contracts wid is enacted in the public interest. The provisions are e.Qlbodied on the ground of public1 policy-on the ground of protection of G general public.\n\n[700 F-H, 701 A-BJ\n\nSeth Bhikraj Jaipu1i'a v. Union of India, [1962] 2 SCR 880; ¥ulam Chand\n\nv. State of M.P., [1968] 2 SCR 214, Karan1shi Jethabfial Sa1nrayya v. Stat~ of Bombay. r19641 6 SCR 984; referred to.\n\n4. The scope of the plea of doctrine of pron1issory estoppel against the Government is as follows :\n\n(a). Th~ plea o.f promissory estoppel is not available against thei exeifcise of the legislative or executive functions of the State. There could not be est?ppel .\n\nA against express provisiom of the Jaw nor could the State by its action waiive its\n\nrights to exerc:se powers entrusted to it for the public good. [721 F]\n\nAntonio Buttigieg v. Captain Stepheti H. Cross and Ors. AIR 1907\n\nPC; Adants v. London Improved Motor Coach Builders, [1821) 1 K.B. 495, York Corporation v. Henry Lcethani ant! Sons Ltd., [1924] 1 Ch. 551; 1¥illiatn Cory and Sons Ltd. v. London Corporation, [1951] 2 K.B. 476; Howell v. Faln1outh Boat Consttuctiou Co. Ltd., [19511 A.C. 837; Comrnissioner of Crown liznds v.\n\nPage, [1960] 2 K.B. 274; South-e11d-01t-Sea Corporation v. H0<lgson (Wickford) Ltd., [1962] 1 Q.B. 416; Federal rnsurance Corpn. v. Morril, 382 U.S. 380; quoted with approval. ·\n\nRobt?rtson v. Minister of Pensions, [1949] 1 K.B., 227 dissented from.\n\nAssistant Custodian of E.P. and Ors;,,_ v. Brij Kishore Agarwala, (1975] 2 SCR 359; Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fi.tltermen Cooperative Society v. Sipuhl Sing1i & Ors. AIR 1977 SC 2149; applied.\n\nUnion of India v. lndo Afghan Agencies, [1968] 2 SCR 366; Ce111ury Spinning cl Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Ulhas Nagar Municipa~ Council and\n\nAnr., [1970] 3 SCR 854; Turner Morrison Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd., [1972] 3 SCR 711; explained and distinguished.\n\nCollector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of tire City of Bombay and Ors., [1952] SCR p. 43; E.xcise Commr. U.P., Allahabad v. Ram Ku111111', (1976] Supp. SCR 532; M. Ramanatlra Pillai v. State of Kera/a, [1974] 1 SOR 515;\n\nStQte of Kerala and Anr. v. Tire Gwalior Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co.\n\nLtd., [1974] 1 SCR 671; followed.\n\n(b) The doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from discharging its functions under .the law. (721 G]\n\n( c) When an officer of the Government acts outside the scope of bis au1hority, the plea of promissory estoppel is not available. The doctrine of ultra vires will come into operation and the Government cannot be held bound bt' the unauthorised acts of its officers. [721 G-HJ\n\n(d) When the officer acts within the scope of his authority under a scheme and enters into an agreement and makes a representation and a person aCtigg on that representation puts himself in a disadvantageous position, the Court is entitled to require the officer to act according to the scheme artd the agreement or representation. The officer cannot arbitrarily act on his mere whim: and ignore his promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or change the conditions to the prejudice of the person who had acted upon auch G representation and put himself in a disadvantageous position. [721 G-H, 122\n\nAB]\n\n Union of .fndia v. lndo Afghan Agrncies Ltd., [1968] 2 SCR 366; diScussed \"!\"' and followed.\n\n(e) The officer would be justified in changing'the tertns of the agreement to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations such as difficult! foreign H exchange position or other rnattdrS \\Vhich have a bearing on general interest of the State. [722 B-Cl\n\nUnion of Indio v. Mis lndo Afgl1an Agencies Ltd., [1968] 2 SCR 366 applied.\n\n, JIT RAM V. HARYANA 693\n\n5. It is only in public interest that it is recognised that an authority acting A on behalf of the Government or by virtue of statutory pow'ers cannot exceed his uthority. Rule of ultra vires \"Will become applicable when he. exceeds his authority an<l the Government would not 'be bound by such action. Any person who enters into an arrangement \\Vith the Government has to aticertain and satisfy himself that the authority who purports to :ict for the Government, acts within the scope of h'.s authority and cannot urge that thp Government iS in the\n\nposiiion of any other litigant liable to be charged with liability. [705 G-H, B\n\n706 A]\n\n6. The doctrine of estoppel which burst out into sudden blaze in 1946 and ever since continuing to smoulder due to the consistent maintenance of the original author's interest in its further development, now in this direction and nov;\n\nin that; though interesting is not relevant in administering: Indian Law. Section 63 of the Contract Act which provides that when a creditor accepts a lesser sum'.-in -satisfaction of the whole debt, the whole1 debt becomes discharged is <11 wide departure from the E.nglish law as laid down in Jordan v. Mor1e:i.\n\nThe doctrine of estoppel referred to in lligh Trees case is tO' some extent taken care of by section 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract. Section 65 provic:)es that when a contract becmes void, any person who has. received ainy advantage undc~ such\n\nngreenent or contract is bound to restore it or to _make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. Under section iO of the Contract Act. an ob!igation is cast' on the person enjoyi!ng benefit of a nongmtutious act to com pe!l!iafe the person Who lawfully performed the Act. [707 A, 708 B, D-F]\n\nFqake.s v. Beer, [1884] 9 A.C. 605; Jordan v. Money, [18541 5 H.L.\n\nCas IRS; Fenner v. Blake, [1900] 1 Q.B. 426; Woodhouse Ltd. v. Nigerian Produce Ltd., [1932] A.C. 431, IN Re. Wick/lam Will/am Porter and Co. Ltd., [1937) 2 All E.R. 361; Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., fl9S6l I All. E.R. 256; referred to.\n\n7. 1\"he provisions of-Section 70 of the Indian Contrac~ Act are applicable to contract '\"'hich is not according to Section 175 of the Goverrunent of Iildia Act,\n\nand Article 299 of the Constitution of India.\n\n[708 G-H]\n\nState of West Bengal v. B. K. Monda/ and Ors., [1962] Supp. SCR p. 876; New Marine Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of illdia, [1964] 2 SCR 859; referred to.\n\n8._ All that the lndo-Afghan Agencies case laid down was that a public authority acting on behalf of the Government cannot on its own whim and in an arbitrary manner seek to a1ter the conditions accepted by him to the prejudice of the other side. The decision in temlS. accepts that after taking into considera .. tion the exigencies and change of circumstances the authority can modify the conditions in exercise of his powers as a public: policy. Apart from not notic ..\n\ning Howell's Case, the Court in lndo Afghan's case did not say that the 1aw as extracted from the judizrnent in Robertson's case by Denning J. was applica.ble to India. [719 D-E, 721 Al\n\n9. The Judgment in Mis Moti/al Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd. y, Star,,· of TJt(ar Pradesh, [1979] 2 SCR p. 641 is not in accordance with the view consistantly taken by the Supreme Court in following respects : [722 F]\n\n. n: The decision in the case-of Union of lnia v. Mis lndo Afvlian APP'1 ciea Ltd., (1968] 2 SCR 366 cannot be constructed in the manner in which it was\n\nA done. All that the Inda Afghan case, purports to lay down is that the Court can enforce an obligation 1ncurred by an authority on which another has acted upon and put himself in ai disadvantageous position. when the authority re6iles arbitrarily or on mer'e whim or on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity. [722 F-G]\n\n(ii) 'fhe decision of this Court in Century Spinning and 1lfa1111fac:uring Co. s: Ltd and Anr. v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Anr., [1970] 3 SCR 854 was understood as refusing to make a distinction bet\\Veen the private lli.dividuaJ and public body so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned. !723 F]\n\n(iii) The three decisions of this Court, two by constitution Benches M.\n\nJ Ranianatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, State of Kera/ti v. The Gwalior Ril, yi; n -jl C Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. and th~ third by a Bench of four judges in Eici5'' Conzmissioner, [T.P. Allahabad v. Ram Kumar cannot be ignored on the ground that the observations are in the nature of obiter dicta and that it cainnot be insisted as intending to have la-id down any proposition of law different from that enunciated in the lndo Afghan Agencies case. It was not necessary for this Court in the three cases to refer to Union of India & others v. Inda-Afghan Agencies. If properly understood it only held that the authority cannct go back D on the agreement arbitrarily or on its own whim. [723 H, 724 AB]\n\n(iv) The. case of the House of Lords in Howell v. Faflnouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. canont be read as not having overruled the view of Denning J. and as not having expressed its disapproval of the doctrine of promissory< estoppel against the crown in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions. [724 B.C]\n\nE '. ( v) Tue Indian Constitution as a matter of high policy in public interest has enacted Article 299 so as to save the Government from liability arising out of unauthorised acts of its officers and contracts not duly executed. Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act provide for certain reliefs in void contracts and in unenforceable contracts where a person relying on a representation has acted upon it and put himself in a disadvantageous position. The activist jurisprudence and the wide implications thereof, propounded in the F Motilal Padampat, Sugar case doubted. [724 E, F, G]\n\n(vii) Tue Indian Contract Act regulates the right of parties and expressly ---, ins'ists on the necessity for lawful consideration which cannot be diSpe:naed with by invoking some new equitable doctrine. Under Section 10 of the Contract Act, for a contract to be valid, it should be for a lawful COD!lid'eration and Section 25 of the Contract Act provides that an agreement made withont G consideration is, void unless it satisfies one of the conditions mentioned in fhat section. [725 B-C, DJ\n\n(viii) Sankaranarayan v. State of Kerala, [1971] 2 S.C.C. 361; Narendra chand I/em Ram and Ors. v. Lt. Governor Administration, Union Te\"itory of Himac/wl Pradesh, [1972] 1 SCR 940; State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. etc. v.\n\nS. K. Kr;,; hnamurthi etc., [1972] 3 SCR 104; and M /s Andhra Industri•i Works v. Chief Controller of Imports and Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 327 indicate that the Rule of estoppel against Government cannot be invoked against the Government. [725 Fl\n\n.JlT RAM v. HARYANA (Kai/asam, !.) 695\n\n10. What are the moral values of the society is a c.omplex question becauae the cencept of moral values amongst different persons and classes of persons is not always the same. Being not a static one, it differs from time to time and from society to society.\n\nIt is hazardous for a Court to attempt to enforce what\" according to it is the moral value.\n\nBefore embarking on the mission of\n\n11closing the gap between the law and morality and bring about as near an .approximation between the two as possible\", it is necessary for the Court to understand clearly its limitations. The powers of the Court to legislate is strictly limited. \"Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere and not ju.r 4are to interpret fhc law, and not to make lw ori give law\". [727 F, G,\n\n728 A-CJ\n\nThe courts by its very nature are most ill suited to undertake the task of legislating. There is no machinery for the Court to ascertain the conditions of the people and their requirements and to make Jaws that would be mot apprQPriate. Further two judges may think that a particular law would be deSirable to meet the requirements whereas another two judges may most profoundly differ from the conclusions arrived at by two judges. 1728 G-H, 729 A]\n\nShri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. State of U.P., [1908) 3 SCR p. 383 followed.\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1237-1238/1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 15-12-1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Appeal Nos. 444/68 and 2975/ 67.\n\nHardayal Hardy, Mahinder Narain and Rameshwar Nath for the Appellants in both the Appeals.\n\nS. M. Ashri and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents in both the Appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J. These two appeals are by certificate granted by the Pu, njab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in C. W. No.444/1968 F and C. W. No. 2975 of 1967 respectively. The petitions were disposed of by a full Bench of the High Court on 15-12-1969.\n\nThe appellants who were the petitioners before the High Court prayed for a writ of certiorari or mandamus or any other appropriate writ for quashing the resolution No. 6 dated 21st July, 1965 of the G Municipality and letter of the Government of Haryana to the President of the Municipal Committee Bahadurgarh dated 30-10-1967. The facts of the case briefly are as follows :-\n\nThe Municipal Committee of Bahadurgarh, Respondent No. 2, established Mandi Fateh in Bahadurgarh Town, with a view to H improve trade in the area. The Municipal Committee decided that the purchasers of the plots for sale in the Mandi would not be required\n\nto pay octroi duty on goods imported within the said Mandi. In pur-. suance of this decision, resolution No. 8 dated 20-12-1916 was passed by the Municipality. Handbills were issued for the sale of the plots on the basis of the resolution and it was proclaimed that Fateh Mandi would remain exempt from payment of octroi. Subsequently by resolution No. 4 dated 20-5-1917, the Municipal Committee decided that the term No. 14 to the conditions of sale, namely, that the plots would not be required to pay octroi, be amended to the effect that the Mandi shall remain immune from payment of Octroi Duty for ever.\n\nWhen the resolution was received by the Commissioner of Ambala, in paragraph 3 of his letter dated 26-6-1917 marked as Annexure A in the writ petition, he noted :-\n\n\"I note that by its resolution No. 4 of 20-5-1917, the Municipal Committee has undertaken that Octroi shall never be imposed in the Mandi. This is ultra vires, the Municipal Committee cannot make such an undertaking and this should be explained to the purchasers of sites before they begin building so that if they wish D they may withdraw from the purchase\".\n\nOf course, it is unlikely that Octroi will be imposed.\"\n\nOn receipt of this letter, the Presidnt of the Municipal Committee made representations that if octroi duty was to be levied, there will be no purchasers for the plots and the entire scheme will fall through.\n\nOn receipt of this representation on 20-9-1917 (Annexure B), the Commissioner revised his view and stated that he was cancelling para 3 of his letter dated 26-6-1917, that is to say, \"that in deference to the strong views of the Municipal Committee and to your own opini0n that the market will collapse if I insist upon it, I withdraw my objection to the undertaking made by the Municipal Committee that Octroi will not be imposed on the market. As soon as the market is established it will be necessary to conside1 what form of taxation is best to cover the market share of Municipal expenses\". The Municipal Committee on 10-3-1919 imposed house-tax of Rs. 3-14-6 per cent per annum on the shopkeepers to cover the expenditure of the market.\n\nThis state of affairs continued till 4-9-1953 when the Municipal Committee by notification No. 9697-C-53/63830 dated 4-9-1953 included Fateh Mandi, Bahadurgarh, within the Octroi limits. The Examiner of Local Funds pointed out that the Municipal Committee is under obligation to charge octroi on goods imported into Fateh Mandi. The President of the Municipal Committee made a representation to the Dep11ty Commissioner on 24-2-1954. The Municipal Committee again passed another resolution No. I dated 2-3-1954 that the\n\n--..\n\nle r .\n\n,. i\n\n. ,,.,.\n\nFateh Mandi will remain free from octroi duty according to the terms of the proclamation of the sale relating to the sale of plots. The matter. was referred to the Punjab State which after thoroughly examining the whole matter, confirmed Resolution No. I passed by the Municipal Committee on 2-3-1954. Subsequently, the Municipal Committee changed its mind and by its resolution dated 8-5-1954, resolved that octroi duty should also be levied on the goods imported into Fateh Mandi. But this resolution was annulled by the Punjab Government under S. 236 of the Punjab Municipal Act. The Examiner of Local Funds Accounts in the meantime insisted on the levy of octroi duty on the goods imported into Fateh Mandi and the Punjab Government after discussing the issue on 94-1956 informed the President of the Municipal Committee that the Government's action in confirming the resolution No. I of 2-3-1954 of the Municipal Committee, Baha durgarh exempting goods imported into Fateh Mandi from levy of octroi duty under S. 70(2) (c) of the Municipal Act, 1911, is quite in order and that no separate notification to this effect was necessary under the rules. Again on 21-7-1965, the Municipal Committee Bahadurgarh resolved that the Government be requested to cancel Resolution No.\n\nI dated 2-3-1954. The State of Haryana Respondent No. I which came into exi•tence on 1-11-1964 under the Punjab Reorganisation Act, by its memo dated 13-10-1967 approved the resolution No. 6 dated 21-7-1965 of Municipal Committee and cancelled the Municipal Resolution No. I of 2-3-1954. As a result of the decision of the Government, tbe Municipal Committee started charging octroi duty on the goods imported into the Mandi. On these facts, the petitioners sub milted that the resolution No. 6 of the Municipal Committee dated 21-7-1965 (Annexure G) and the approval granted by the Haryana\n\nState as per its order dated 30-10-1967 (Ann. H) are illegal and ultra vires and without jurisdiction.\n\nA Fu!l Bench of the High Court rejected the petition mainly on three grounds, Firstly, it found that the State Government is entitled under S. 62-A of Punjab Act, 48/1953 to direct the Municipal Committee to impose octroi duty and as such even if the municipality is found to have erred in imposing the Octroi Duty, the legislative powers of the State cannot be questioned. Secondly, it found, that it was not within the competence of the Municipality to grant any exemption from payment of octroi duty and this act is ultra vires of its powers and cannot be enforced. Thirdly, it found that the Court cannot go into the question as to whether the petitioners' plea based on equity that the Municipality is bound, cannot be gone into for want of ade quate facts.\n\n6-463SCI/80\n\nDealing with the first contention, relating to the legislative powers of the State, it will be seen that Punjab Act 48/1953, introduced s.62A which runs as follows\n\n\"62-A.\n\n(l) The State Government may, by special or general order notified in the official Gazette, require a Committee to impose any tax mentioned in S.61, not already imposed at such rate and within such period as may be specified in the notification and the Committee shall thereupon act accordingly.\n\n(2) The State Government may require a Committee to modify the rate of any tax already imposed and thereon the committee shall modify the tax as required within such period as the State Government may direct.\n\n(3) If the Committee fails to carry out any order passed under Sub-section (1) or (2) the State Government, may by a suitable order notified in the official gazette, impose or modify the tax.\n\nThe order so passed shall operate as if it were a resolution duly passed by the Committee and as if the proposal was sanctioned in accordance with the procedure contained in S.62.\"\n\nIt is admitted that the State Government is empowered under S. 62A to require the , Municipal Committee to impose Octroi Duty and under sub-s. (3) if the Committee fails to carry out the order of the Government, the State Government may impose Octroi Duty.\n\nUnder S. 70(2) (c), a Municipal Committee by a resolution passed at a special meeting and confirmed by the State Government may exempt in whole or in part from the payment of any such tax any person or class of persons or any property or description of property. In exercise of these powers, the State Government had by its order dated 4-5-1954 confirmed resolution No. 1 passed by the , Municipal Committee in its special meeting held on 2-3-1954 regarding the exemption of goods imported into Fateh ; Mandi from levy of Octroi Duty.\n\nSubsequently, in reply to the objection raised by the Examiner of Local Funds, the Government pointed out by it' letter dated 9-4-1956 (Ann. F) that the Government's action confirming the resolution No.\n\nI dated 2-3-1954 of the Municipal Committee exempting Goods imported into Patch Mandi, under S. 70(2) (c) of the Punjab , Municipal Act, 1911, is quite in order. By the impugned order dated 20-10-1967 the Government approved the re.solution No. 6 of the Municipal Committee dated 21-7-1965 and permitted the Municipality to levy the Octroi Duty. The action taken by the State Government is strictly in conformity with the powers conferred on it under S. 70(2) (c) of the\n\n' y-\n\n. '\n\nAct. It exempted the petitioners from payment of Octroi Duty for a particular period and ultimatelyjwithdrew the exemption. The action of the Goverment cannot be questioned as it is in exercise of its statutory functions. The plea of estoppel is not available against the State in the exercise of its legislative or statutory functions. The Government have powers to direct the Municipality to,· collect the Octroi Tax if the Municipality fails to take action by itself under S. 60(A) (3).\n\nFurther, even on facts, this plea is not available as against the Government as it is not the case of the petitioners tha*hey acted on the representation of the Government. We, 'therefore, agree with the view of the Full Bench that the plea of estoppel is not available against the Government for questioning the validity of the impugned Government order.\n\nThe second contention is that the Municipality is estopped from levying or recommending the levy of the tax to the Government as in the proclamation of sale it was notified that no Octroi Duty will be\n\nlevied and it was [only in pursuance of such representation, the petitioners purchased the property. We feel this plea should also fail . o because the Municipal Committee had no authority to exempt the Fateh Market from the levy of Octroi Duty. If the Municipal Committee had passed a resolution or issued a notification that no Octroi Duty will be levied, it will be ultra vires of the powers of the Municipal Committee. When a public authority acts beyond the scope of its authority the plea of estoppel is not available to prevent the E authority from acting according to law. It is in public interest that no such plea should be allowed.\n\nThe third contention that was raised by the learned counsel for the appellants before the High Court and reiterated before us, is that the Municipality and its successors are bound by the doctrine of pro- F missory estoppel and as such are estopped from levying the Octroi Duty. The High Court rejected the plea on the following grounds :-\n\n1. The Petitioners are not the original purchasers of the plots in Fateh Mandi. They are either descendants of or transferees from the original purchasers of the plots.\n\n2. No sale-deed was executed by the Municipal Committee in favour of the original purchasers undertaking that no octroi duty will be levied.\n\n3. No allegation has been made that the original purchasers would not have purchased the plots, if condition no. 14 about immunity from payment of Octroi had not been there.\n\nThe learned counsel by reference to the names of the list of the purchasers was able to satisfy us that some of the appellants are the\n\noriginal purchasers and as such the first objection raised before the •High Court is not sustainable. Again, regarding the third objection, that there is no allegation that the original purchasers would not have: purchased the plots if condition 14 about immunity from payment of Octroi had not been there, it was .submitted as erroneous as in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioners had pleaded in paragraph 2 that on the faith of the representation, the petitioners purchased the plots and constructed establishments. The learned counsel is, therefore, right in his submission that the third objection raised before the High Court is without substance. But the High Court was right in pointing out that none of the sale deeds executed by the Municipal Committee in favour of the purchasers was produced before the Court. These circumstances would show that the contract between the parties have not been proved to have been reduced in writing and executed in the manner prescribed under S. 47 of the Act. Strictly, therefore, under the terms of the Municipal Act, the appellants are not entitled to any enforceable legal right. But it was submitted that even though the contract had not been executed in due form, the appellants would be entitled to relief under, the doctrine of promissory estoppel.\n\nThe question that arises for consideration'.in these cases is whether the proclamation of sale which notified that there would be''no octroi levy in the market relying on which statement the petitioners bid at the auction, would estop the Municipality by operation of the doctrine of promiss9ry estoppel from recommending to the Government and the Government levying octroi duty under S. 61 of the Punjab Municipal Act.\n\nTo answer this question it is necessary to examine at some length the rights and liabilities of the State upder a contract entered into by it with third parties and in transactions carried on by it in exercise of its executive and statutory, functions.\n\nArt. 299 (1) of the Constitution of India provides that all contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President tor the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise.\n\nThis Article in the Constitution corresponds to S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. In cases, that arose out of S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, this Court starting from Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union of India,(I) has\n\n(!) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 880.\n\nrepeatedly held that the provision is mandatory and not directory, that the provision is enacted as a matter of public policy, that the State should not be saddled with liability for unauthorised contracts and that the provision is enacted in the public interest. In Mulamchand v.\n\nState of M. P.,(1) the earlier decisions of this; court were relied on and it was held that the reasons for enacting the provision is not for the sake of some form but for safeguarding the Government against unauthorised contracts. The provisions are embodied on the ground of public policy-on the ground of protection \\)f general public-and these formalities cannot be waived or dispensed with. The Court clearly observed that if the plea of the respondent regarding estoppel or ratification is admitted that would mean, in effect, the repeal of an important constitutional provision intended for the protection of the general public. That is why the plea of estoppel or ratification cannot be permitted in such a case.\" (emphasis Ours)\n\nIt was contended before this Court in Karamshi Jethabhai Somayya\n\nv. State of Bombay,(2) that in an agreement entered into:under the Act by statutory authority in pursuance of a statutory power, that consequences provided under the statute would follow and would uot fall within the ambit of S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act. ), This Court after examining the terms of the contract found that it did not fall within the provisions of the Act and, found it unnecessary to deal with the contention.\n\nThe scope of the doctrine of equitable estoppel arose for consideration before this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay and Ors.(l) In 1865, the Government of Bombay called upon the predecessor in title of the Corporation of Bombay to remove some markets from a certain'.site andlvacate it, and on the application of the then Municipal Commissioner the Government passed a resolution approving and authorising the grant of another site to the Municipality. The resolution rtated further that\n\n\"the Government do not consider that any rent should be charged to the Municipality as the markets will be, like other public buildings, for the benefit of the whole community\". The Corporation gave up the sites on which the old markets were situated and speut a sum of over 17 lacs. in erecting and maintaining markets on the new site. In 1940, the Collector of Bombay, overruling the objection of the Corporation, assessed the new site under S.8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act to land revenue rising from Rs. 7,500/- to Rs. 30,000/-\n\n\n(3) [1952] S.C.R. 43.\n\nin 50 years. The Corporation sued for a declaration that the order of assessment was ultra vires and that it was entitled to hold the land for ever without payment of assessment. The Supreme Court held by a majority of four Judges to one that the Government was not entitled to assess land revenue for the land in question. Three of the Judges who were parties to the majority judgment found that the Corporation had taken possession of the land in terms of the Government resolution and continued in such possession openly, uninterruptedly and as of right for over 70 years and acquired limited title it had been prescribing for during the period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent, but only for the purpose of a market and for no other purposes. The right acquired included as part of it an immunity from payment of rent which constituted a right in limitation of the Government's right to assess in excess of the specific limit established and preserved by the Government Resolution within the meaning of S.8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act. Before the Court there was considerable discussion as to the scope and effect of the principle of equity enunciated in Ramsden v.\n\nDyson,(l)f as to whether such principle should be extended to the facts of the case and as to whet)l.er the facts of the case attract the application of the equity established in Ramsden v. Dyson or attract the equity established in Maddison v. Alderson,(2) and Walsh v. Lonsdale, (l) and finally as to whether the decision of the Privy Council in Arif} v. Jadunath(4) the equity in Ramsden v.\n\nDyson can prevail against t)le requirement of formalities laid down in the Victorian Statute referred to above any more than the equity in Maddison v. Alderson can do against the requirements of the Transfer of Property Act. The majority of the judges did not express any opinion on this question but decided the appeal on a narrower and shorter ground stated above. One of the judges, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. constituting the majority expressed his view thus :-\n\n\"Whether it is the equity recognised in Ramsden's case, or it is some other form of equity, is not of much importance.\n\nCourts must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good faith so far as it lies in their power. As pointed out by Jenkins C. J. in Dadoba Janardhan's case a different conclusion would be opposed to what is reasonable, to what is probable and what is fair.''\n\nThe other judges of the Court who spoke for the Court refrained from going into this question. The view of Chandrasekhara Aiyer, J.\n\n(I) [1866] L. R. I. H. L. 129.\n\n(2) [1883] L. R. 8 App, Cas. 417.\n\n(3) [1882[ L. R. 21 Ch. D. 9.\n\n(4) [1931] L. R. 58 I. A. 91.\n\n• ... ,..\n\nbeing the view of one of the judges of the majority, cannot be taken as the view of the Court. Patanjali Sastri, J. as he then was, dissented with the majority and stated :-\n\n\"The principle of Ramsden v. Dyson cannot prevail against statutory requirements regarding disposition of property or making of contract by Government * • *The right to levy land revenue is no part of the Government's right to property but a prerogative of the Crown and adverse possession of the land could not destroy the Crown's prerogative to impose assessment on the land.\"\n\nA Bench of four judges of this Court in a decision Excise Commissioner. U. P. Allahabadv. Rarn)Kumar(!), after examining the case law on the subject observed that \"it is now well-settled by a catena of decisions that there can be no question of estoppel against the Government in exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers.\" The earlier decisions of this Court in M. Ramanathan Pillai v. State of Kera/a('), and State of Kera/a and Anr. v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.(3) were followed. It may, thci'efore,\n\nbe stated that the view of this Court has been that the principle of estoppel is not available against the Government in exercise of legislative, sovereign or executive power.\n\nOn behalf of the petitioners, it was submitted that a liberal view was taken by this Court in the decision Union of India v. M/s. lndo- Afghan Agencies Ltd.(4)which recognised the principle of promissory estoppel and held that whether the agreement is executive or administrative in character, the courts have power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the schemes upon the departmental authorities. At this decision is relied on as the sheet anchor of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the facts of the case and the decision rendered therein, have to be examined carefully.\n\nMfs. lndo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., the respondents before this Court\n\nexported woollen goods to Afghanistan and were issued an Import Entitlement Certificate by the Textile Commissions not for the full F. 0. B. value of the goods exported, but for a reduced amount. By virtue of the powers conferred under S.3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, the Central Government issued the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 setting out the policy governing the grant of import and export licence. During the relevant period, it provided for the grant to an exporter, certificates to import raw materials of a\n\n(I) [1976] Suppl. S.C.R . .532.\n\n(2) !1974] 1 S.C.R. 515.\n\n\n704 SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS\n\n\ntotal amount equal to 100 % of the F. 0. B. value of his exports. Cl.\n\n10 of the Scheme provided that the Textile Commissioner could grant an import certificate for a lesser amount if he is satisfied after holding an enquiry that the declared value of the goods is higher than the real value of the goods. It was contended, amongst other grounds, that the Government on grounds of executive necessity was the sole judge of the validity of its action in matters relating to import and export policy, because the policy depended upon the economic climate and other related matters and had to be in its very nature flexible with power in the Government to modify or adjust it as the altered circumstances necessitate. It was pleaded that if the Government was held bound by every representation made by it regarding its intentions, it would amount to holding the Government as being bound by contractual obligations even though no formal contract iu the manner required by Art. 299 of the Constitution was executed. Regarding the objection on the ground of rontravention of Art. 299 of the Constitution, the Court held that the respondents were not seeking to enforce any contractual right but were seeking to enforce compliance of the obligation which is laid 11pon the Textile Commissioner by the terms of the Scheme and the claim of the respondents was founded upon the equity which arose in their favour as a result of the repesentation made on behalf of the Government in the Export Promotion Scheme. (emphasis supplied). It may be noted that no finding was recorded by the Textile Commissioner, that there was any infringement which entitled him to reduce the quota under Cl. 10 of the scheme.\n\nThe facts of the case disclose that the defence of the executive necessity was not relied upon in the affidavit filed on hehalf of the Union of India. It was also not pleaded that the representation in the Scheme was subject to an implied term that the Union of India will not be bound to grant the import certificate for the full value of the goods if they deem it inexpedient to grant the certificate. The Court after referring to earlier decisions of this Court accepted the view expressed in those decisions that reduction in the amount of import certificate may be justified on the ground of misconduct of the exporters in relation to goods exported or on such considerations as the difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on the general interest of the State (emphasis supplied). Summing up the law laid down by the earlier cases, the Court found that in each of the three cases this Court held that it was competent to grant reli9f in appropriate cases, if, contrary to the Scheme, the authority declined to grant a licence or import certificate or the authority acted arbitrarily and that the Union Bf India and its Officers are not entitled at their mere whim to ignore the promises made by the Government (emphasis\n\n' ·.~\n\nJIT RAM v. HARYANA (Kai/asam, J.) 705\n\nsupplied). It rejected the plea on behalf of the Government that the Textile Commissioner is the sole judge of the quantum of the import licence to be granted to an exporter and that the Courts were powerless to grant relief if the promised import licence is not given to an exporter who has acted in his prejudice relying upon therepresentation. The decision is, therefore, an authority for the.proposition that in the absence of a plea of executive necessity, the Court in appropriate cases is entitled to compel performance of the obligationsimposed by the Scheme on the departmental authority. The right of the Government on relevant considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on the general interest of the State, to reduce the amount of import certificate was recognised.\n\nBut the authorities have to act according to the terms of the scheme and not arbitrarily or at their mere whim to ignore the promises made by the Government (emphasis supplied). On the facts of the case, the Court gave relief as the authorities declined to act according to the terms of the Scheme and acted arbitrarily and at their mere whim ignoring the promises made by the Government. The question as to the applicability of the 1doctrine of promissory estoppel against the legislative or executive acts of the Government did not strictly arise in the case. The decision was thus generally understood as stated above is seen from the view expressed by Mr. H.M. Seervai on Constitution .of India, 2nd Edn. Vol. I, paragraph 11 at para 146-B, p. 433 :\n\n\"The authorities considered by the Supreme Court, andthe conclusions drawn from them, by Shah, J. in the present case, merely affirm the proposition that the Government could not go back upon promises made in the exercise of discretionary power as embodied in a scheme,'merely ona whim (emphasis by Mr. Seervai)\n\nx x x x x\n\nA promissory estoppel cannot stand on a higher footing than a contract entered into between a citizen or subject and a public authority and it is settled by numerous decisions that no public authority entrusted with discretionary power to be exercised for G the public can bind itself by a contract not to exercise that discretion when the public good demands its exercise\".\n\nIt is only in public interest that it is recognised that an authority acting on behalf of the Government or by virtue of statutory powers cannot exceed his authority. Rule of ultra vires will become applicable II wihen he exceeds his authority and the Government would uot be bound by such action. Any person who enters into a\" arrangement\n\nA with the Government has to ascertain and satisfy himself that the authority who purports to act for the Government, acts within the scope of his authority and cannot urge that the Government is in the position of any other litigant liable to be charged with liability.\n\nIn refuting the contention that the contract is nnenforceable on the ground that there had been no strict compliance of the requirement of Art. 299 of the Constitution, the Court observed that the respondents were not seeking to enforce any contractual rights but were seeking to enforce compliance with the obligation which was laid upon the Textile Commissioner by the terms of the Scheme. Thus, the relief that was granted by the Court was by enforcing the compliance of the obligation which was laid npon the Textile Commissioner by the terms of the Scheme. The Court proceeded to state that the claim of the respondents is appropriately founded upon the equity (em phasis ours) which arises in their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the Union oflndia in the Export Promotion Scheme, and the action taken by the respondents acting upon that representation under the belief that the Government would carry out the representation made by it. Thus the equity which the Court was enforcing was to direct compliance of the obligation which is laid upon the Textile Commissioner by the terms of the scheme. The equitylcannot be understood as barring tbe authority from modifying the scheme on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on the general interest of the\n\nState (vide p. 380). The purport of the judgment is made clear by its own observation:-\n\n\"Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot be .some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex: parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen.\"\n\nG The observations of the Court that the claim of the respondents is properly founded on the equity should be understood on the facts and findings of the Court in the case. The Court relying on the observations of Chief Justice Jenkins, observed that even though the case does not fall within the terms of S.115 of the Evidence Act, it is still open to a party who has acted on a representation made by the Govern- H ment to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise is not recorded iil'he form of a formal contract as required by the Constitution. The Ctiilrt\n\nJIT RAM 1. llARYANA (Kailasam, !.) 707\n\nwould be bound when the officer made the promise within the scope of his authority and failed to act upon it at his mere whim and acted arbitrarily on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity.\n\nBefore proceeding further with the case, we will refer briefly to the purport of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel burst into sudden blaze in 1946 when Denning.\n\nJ. sitting in the Court of Kings Bench delivered the judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd.( I) which has now become famous as the High Trees Case. The facts of the case are: During the war many people left London owing to bombing. Flats were empty. In one block, where the flats were let on 99 years leases at £ 2,500/- a year, the landlord agreed to reduce it by half and to accept £ 1,250/- a year. When the bombing was over, and the tenants came back, the landlord sought to recover the full rent at £ 2,500/- a year.\n\nDenning, J. held that the landlord could not recover the full amount for the time when the flats were empty. The lease was a !_ease under seal which according to English Common Law, could not be varied by an agreement by parol, but only by deed. The learned judge invoked equity to his aid and said that if there has been a variation of a deed by simple contract the courts may give effect to it. The counsel for the lessee pleaded that the lessor had agreed though without consideration to accept the rent at a reduced rate, and set up a plea of estoppel by way of defence io the claim for arrears of rental calculated at the full rate. Faced with Foakes v. Beer,(2) if the defence was raised as a matter of contract and Jorden v. Money,(3) if it was raised as estoppel, Denning. J. held that the estoppel sustained although based on an assurance as to the future, because the prornisor intended to be legally bound and intended his promise to be acted upon, with the result that it was so acted upon. In Jordan v. Money (supra), the House of Lords held that a promise to pay a smalicr sum of money in discharge of larger amount which was due, was void since such a promise was without consideration. Denning, J. relying on Fenner v. Blake, (4)Re: Wickhem William Porter & Co. Ltd. (')and Buttery v. Pickard(6) observed that they were cases of estoppel in the strict sense. Theyiare really promises-promises intended to; be binding-intended to be acted upon, aad_in fact acted on and in the circumstances the plaintiff company will be bound by the arrangement in its letter. Though the observations of\n\n(I) [1956] l All. E. R. 256.\n\n(2) [1884] 9 A. C. 605.\n\n(3) [1854] 5 H. L. Cas. 185.\n\n(4) [1900] 1 Q. B. 426.\n\n(5) [1937] 2 All. E. R. 361.\n\n(6) 11946] W. N. 25.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nDenning, J. in High Trees case were in the nature of obiter dicta, the decision became the starting point of the several shades of opinion regarding the scope of promissory estoppel. It is unnecessary for our purpose to go into the development of law of promissory estoppel starting from High Trees case. It is sufficient to state that since the High Trees decision was rendered, many elaborations and glosses have appeared in the reports. Turner in his book Estoppel by Re presentation, has a separate chapter dealing with promissory estoppel.\n\nThe doctrine, as observed by the author at the conclusion of the chapter, \"burst out into sudden blaze in 1946 has ever since continued to smoulder, and that its original author has constantly maintained his interest in its further development, now in this direction, now in that''.\n\nBut there has been high places counselling conservatism *** Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, has expressed his views in Woodhouse Ltd. v. Nigerian Produce Ltd.(I) as follows :-\n\n\"I desire to add that the time may soon come when the whole sequence of cases basec\\ on promissory estoppel since the war*** systematically explored\",\n\nThis subject though interesting may uot be relevant in administer ing Indian Law. S. 63 of the Contract Act provides that wheu a creditor accepts a lesser sum in satisfaction of the whole debt, the whole debt become discharged. This provision is a wide departure from the English Law and the discussion about Jordan v. Money wherein it was held that a promise to accept a smaller sum is devoid of consideration, becomes pointless. So also the doctrine of estoppel referred to in the High Trees case is, to some extent taken care of by Ss. 65 and 70 of the Indian contract Act. S.65 provides that when a contract becomes void, any person who bas received any advantage under such agree ment or contract is bound to restore it or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom be received it. Under S. 70 oftbe Contract Act, an obligation is cast on the person enjoying benefit of a nongratuitous act to compensate the person who lawfully performed the act. As to whether the provisions of S. 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act, are applicable to contract which is not according to S. 175 of the Government of India Act and Art. 299 of the Constitution of India, there is a difference of opinion. Sir Maurice Gwyer expressed his view that when a contract is void, recourse to S.70 cannot be had.\n\nLater, the Supreme Court held in State of West Bengal v. B. K. Monda! & Sons,(2) that S.70 was applicable to; such a case. This decision was\n\n(I) [1932] A C. 431.\n\n(2) [1962] Suppl I S.C.R. 876.\n\nJIT RAM v. HARYASA (Kailasam, J.) 709\n\nfollowed in New Marine Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union(I), and in later cases by the Supreme Court.\n\nIn discussing the scope of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and its applicability against the Government and Government Officers in their dealings with the subject, Lord Denning J. in Robertson v.\n\nMinister of Pensions(2) observed :-\n\n\"The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action. That doctrine was propounded by Rowlett J., in Redariaktiebolaget Amphtrite\n\nv. The King but it was uunecessary for the decision because the statement there was not a promise which was intended to be binding but only an expression of intention. Rowlett, J., seems c have been influenced by the cases on the right of the Crown c dismiss its servants at pleasure, but those cases must uow all be read in the light of the judgment of Lord Atkin in Reilly v.\n\nThe King-(1954) A. C. 176, 179) ••• In my opinion the defence of executive necessity is of limited scope. It only avails the Crown where there is an implied term to that effect or that is the true meaning of the contract.\"\n\nLord Denning was dealing with a case of a serving army officer who wrote to the War Office regarding a disability and received a reply that his disability had been accepted as attributable to \"military service\". Relying on that assurance, he forebore to obtain an independent medical opinion. The Minister of Pensions took the view that appellant's disability could not be attributed to war services. Lord F Denning held that between the subjects such an assurance would be enforceable because it was intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and it was in fact acted upon; and the assurance was also binding on the Crown because no term could be implied that the Crown was at liberty to revoke it.\n\nThe decision in Robertson's case is quoted with approval in the Jndo-Afghan case but before we revert to the lndo-Afghan case, we will follow the course which Robertson's case took. The correctness of the case came up for consideration before the House of Lords in Howell v.\n\nFalmouth Boat Constructi01i Co. Ltd.(l) The appeal_was'.preferred)o the\n\n\n(2) [194911 K. B. 227.\n\n(3) [1951] A. C. 837.\n\nA House of Lords from the Court of Appeal against the judgment of Bucknil, Singhleton and Denning, L.JJ. In his judgment in the Court of Appeal, Denning L. JJ. pressed the principle in the following terms:-\n\n\"Whenever Government Officers, in their dealings with a sub ject, take c n themselves to assume authority in a matter with which he is concerned, the subject is entitled to rely on their having the authority which they assume. He does not know and cannot be expected to know the limits of their authority, and he ought not to suffer if they exceed it. That was the principle which I applied to Robertson v. Minister of' Pensions, and it is applicable in this case also.\"\n\nCommenting on the view taken by Denning, L. J. Lord Simonds observed :-\n\n\"My Lords, I know of no such principle in our law nor was any authority for it cited. The illegality of act is the same whether or not the actor has been misled by an assumption of authority on the part of a government officer however high or low in the hierarchy.*** The question is whether the character of an act done in face of statutory prohibition is affected by the fact that it has been induced by a misleading assumption of authority.\n\nIn my opinion.the answer is clearly \"no\". Such an answer may make more difficult the task of the citizen who is anxious to walk in the narrow way, but that does not justify a different answer being given.\"\n\nLord Normand referred to the principle laid down by Denning L. J. and observed :-\n\n\"As J understand this statement, the respondents were in the opinion of the learned Lord Justice, entitled to say that the Crown was barred by representations made by Mr. Thompson and acted on by them from alleging against them a breach of the s'.atutory order, and further that the respondents were equally entitled to say in a question with the appellant that there had been no breach. But it is certain that neither a Minister nor any subordinate officer of the Crown cm by any conduct or representation bar the crown enforcing a statutory prohibition or entitle the subject to maintain that there has been no breach of the contract.\"\n\nThe view expressed by the House of Lords and the Privy Counoil has been followed in English cases. ·\n\nJIT RAM v. HARYANA (Kai/asam, !.) 711\n\nThe Privy Council in Antonio Buttigieg v. Captain Stephen H. Cross .11nd Ors,(1) has ruled that it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which must necessarily be determined\n\nb)i tl:e needs of the community when the quesrion arises, that it cann-0t by contract hamper its freedom of action in matters which concern the welfare of the State. The ccrnretent Military Authority approached the appellant for opening a club for officers serving in his Majesty's\n\nforces. The <JHelknt stated his willingness to take on lease certain premises and asked tt.e Military authcrities to procure him a licence to continue the club after the termination of the war. The military authorities failed to obtain a licence and the appellant was informed of their inability to obtain the licence '-nd an officer on behalf of the military authorities stated that the appellant should have a guarantee seeing that the war was not likely to come to an end quickly and that the club would be kept open throughout the war. The rules for the conduct of the club were drawn up and were approved by the Military Authorities. Rule 18 provided that the club should endure during the time when the said hostilities existed. The club was placed out of bounds fox service members by order of the Military Authorities because the club was being mismanaged by the sale of liquor long after permitted h-Onrs. As the club was a purely Service Club, it\" was subsequently wound up. The appellant complained of the loss to which he had been put by placing the club out of bounds and sought to hold the Military Authorities responsible for such loss\" The Court of Appeal while giving judgment in favou, r of the Military Authorities observed :-\n\n\"It is a 'ettled principle and it has been constantly held by this Court and in local case-law, that those two functions of the civil or the military Government are totally distinct. The Military Authorities could not have renounced those rights, inasmuch as it would have been immoral and against every fundamental principle of Constitutional Law if the Authorities, in order to open a club, which is \"a purely administrative actwere to sacrifice interests whiclare far more important and therefore of a much higher order, whether political, moral or affecting public order. Consequently when, within the administrative sphere, the Government enters into a contract with a private individual, the Government is bound to respect that contract, but it does not thereby deprive itself of its political power to issue orders that may become necessary by reason of public order, jure imperii-even though, in consequence of such orders, the contract itself becomes impossible of fulftlment.\"\n\n(1) .\\LR. 1947 P. C. 29.\n\nDuring the arguments before the Privy Council, it was conceded on behalf of the appellant taking into consideration the decision iii Adams v.'London'.Jmproved~Motor, Coach.Builders(lXand Redariaktiebolaget Amphtrite v .. The King, (2) that it was not open to the Crown to bind itself not to close the club if that course became necessary in the public interest and the order placing the club out of bounds was justified in the circumstances which existed. Havini thus observd the Privy Council quoted the following passage from the Judgment of Rowlatt, J. in Rederiaktiebolaget Amphtrite case that \"it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises. It cannot by contract hamper the freedoin of action in matters which concern the welfare of the State\" and stated that these words appear to their Lordships to cover that aspect of the present case. While House of Lords in Howell's case disagreed with the observations of Lord Denning J. in Robertson's case, the Privy Council approved the law laid down by Rowlatt, J. in Rederiaktiebo/aget 'Amphtrite case which was dissented to by Denning, J. in Roberston's case. It may be noted that in Indo-Afghan case, the Court quoted the passage from.Denning's judgment which did not approve the view of Rowlatt, J. The Privy Council approved the view taken\n\nby Rowlatt, J. in Rederiaktiabolaget Amphtrita case.\n\nIn W11/iam Cory & Son\"Ltd. v. London Corporation,(3) London Corporation acting as sanitary authority under the Public Health (London) Act, 1936 made a contract with the claimants, barge and lighter owners, for the removal of refuse from a wharf in:the City of Hornchurch, Essex, where it was to be dumped. In April, 1948, the Corporation acting as port health authority for the Port of London, sealed by-laws concerning the disposal of refuse in the area of the port one of which relating to co-amings and coveringsof barges, was far more onerous on the claimants than the requirements in the contract of\n\n1936. It was'.provided that this by-law was not to come into effect until November I, 1950. It was contended by the'claimants that by the provisions of the contract of 1936, there was an implied or an express term that the corporation should not impose more onerous burden on the claimants as to the coamings and coverings of their barges than those contained in the contract of 1936. The plea of the claimants was rejected and the Court held relying on a, decision'.in York' Corporation\n\nv. Henry Leethem & Sons Ltd.(4) that the Corporation peingundera\n\n(I) [1921] 1 K. B. 495.\n\n(2) (1921] 3 K. B. 500.\n\n(3) [1951] 2 K. B. 476.\n\n(4) [19241 1 Ch. 557.\n\n. '\n\nf •\n\n.• •\n\ndtt;' under the Act of 1936, expressed in imperative language, to make by-laws for the disposal of refuse within the area of the port, the term for which the claimants contended, whether express or implied was ultra vit'es the corporation.\n\nIn York Corporationv. Henry Leetham & Sons (supra), the Corporation made two contracts with the defendants to which they agreed to accept, in consideration of the right to navigate the Oues, a regular annual payment of£ 600/- per annum, in place of the authorised tolls.\n\nIt was held that the contracts were ultra vires and void because under them the corporation had disabled itself whatever emergency might arise, from exercising its statutory powers to increase tolls as from time to time might be necessary. The decision was based on the incapacity of a body charged with statutory powers for public purpose to divest itself of such powers or to fetter itself in the use of such powers.\n\nIn Commissioner of Crown Lands v. Page,(!) in 1945, the Minister of'Works, acting on behalf of the Crown and in exercise of powers conferred by the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 requisitioned premises which had been demised in 1937 by the Commissioners of\n\nCrown Lands for a term ofl25 years. The premises were derequisitioned on September 5, 1945 until July 5, 1955 and the landlord brought proceedings claiming arrears of rent. The lessee alleged that she had been evicted by the requisitioning and that, accordingly, payment of rent has been suspended. It was conceded that the: Crown was orie \"and indivisible as lessor and requisitioning authority. I( was held that\n\nsince the entry was by the Crown in the proper exercise of its executive\n\na11thority, it did not amount to an eviction and rent, accordingly, continued to be payable. ~The view expressed by Lord Denning, J. in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions (supra) that in the present day age no distinction should be drawn as to the legal effect of its or their actions between the Crown and the ordinary subjects, so that the effect ofa representation made by the Crown could no longer be qualified so\n\na11 to be subject to the future exercise by the Crown of its Executive authorily, was relied on. Lord Evershet M. R. while observing that the facts of the case were different held that the general proposition laid down by Denning L. J. was not accepted by the House of Lords in [{owe// v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. (supra). Devlin, J. stakd the principle in the following terms :-\n\n\"When the Crown, or any other person, is entrusted, whether . by virtue of the prerogative or by statute, with discretionary powers to be exercised for the public good, it does not when ; making a private contract in general terms, undertake (and\n\n(I) [1960]2 KB. 274. t-463 SC!/80\n\n714 IL\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 s.c.Jt.\n\nit may be that it could not even with the use of specific language validly undertake) to fetter itself in the use of those powers, and , in the exercise of the discretion.\"\n\nI Referring to the view of Denning, L. J. in Robertson v. Minister of Pension (supra), the learned Judge observed :-\n\n\"The observations of Denning, L. J. in Robertson v. MinisJer of Pensions on the doctrine of 'executive necessity', were I think, directed to a case of that sort. Here we are dealing with an act done for a general executive purpose, and not done for the purpose of achieving a partkular result under the contract in question.\"\n\nIn Southend-on-Sea Corporation v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd.(I) a company wished to establish a builder's yard and found suitable premises. They wrote to the borough engineer, a Chief Official emplo- , yed by the local planning authority asking for a lease of the premises !'for 20 years for the purpose of establishing a builders yard. The en-\n\n, gineer replied that the premises had an existing user right as a builders' . yard and that no planning permission was, therefore, necessary. Relying on the borough engineer's letter, the company bought the premises and started to use them as builder's yard. They would not have ·.done so if, as a consequence of the letter, they had not thought that no further planning permission was required. Later, the local planning authority notified the company that a considerable amount of evidence had been presented to them showing that the premises had not been used as a builder's yard and had no existing user as such; that . they had decided that the premises could not be used without planning , permission, The Court on the above facts held that assuming that the statement that the premises had an existing user right as a builder's yard was a pure representation of fact, estoppel could not operate to 'hinder or prevent the exercise by the local planning authority of their statutory discretion under S. 23 of the Act in deciding whether to serve an enforcement notice, since this discretion was intended to be 'exercised for the benefit of the public or section thereof.\n\n'The decisions of the English Courts referred to above clearly indicate that the English Courts did not accept the view of Denning, J. in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions (supra). The house of Lords in Howe//\n\nv. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. disagreed with the view of Lord Denning, J holding that there could not be an estoppel against express provisions of the law nor could the State by its action waive its rights to exerise powers entrusted to it for the public good. The\n\n(2) [1962] 1 Q. B. 416.\n\nf •• .\n\n~ I\n\nI •\n\nI;'µ\n\nPrivy Council in Antonio Buttigieg's case approved the view of Rowlatt. J. in Raderiaktiabo/aget Amphtrits's case with which Denning, J. did not agree.\n\nWe may noV( revert back to Indo-Afghan Agencies case. The Court after quoting a passage from Rowlatt, J. in Rederiakiabo/aget Amphtrite v. The King (supra) agreed that the view expressed by Anson's English Law of Contract 22nd Ed. p. 174 that the observation is clearly very wide and it is difficult to determine its proper scope.\n\nThe Court quotec,1 the , passage of Denning, J. at p. 231 wherein the learned Judge expressed the disagreement with the view of Rowlatt, J :-\n\n\"The Crown cannot escape by saying tjiat estoppel do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action. The doctrine was propounded by Rowlatt, J. in ederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King but it was unnecessary for the decision because the statement there was not a promise which was intended to be binding but only an expression of intention. Rowlatt, J., seems to have been influenced by the cases on the right of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure, but those cases must now all be read in the light of the judgment of Lord Atkin in Reilly v. The King- (1954) A. C. 176, 179). . . . In my opinion the defence of executive necessity is oflimited scope. It only avails the Crown where there is an implied term to that effect or that is the true meaning of the contract.\"\n\nAfter quoting the above passage, the Court summarised the facts and decision render.ed by Denning, J. The decision of the House of Lords in Howell's case or that of the Privy Council was not brought to the notice of the Court .\n\nThe law laid down by the House of Lords in Howell's case has been accepted as correct by this Court in recent decision of this Court by a Bench of four Judges in Excise Commissioner, U. P. Allahabad\n\nv. Ram Kumar.(1) The respondents before this Court were the highest\n\n?idders in an auction for exclusive manufacture and selling of liquor m the State of U. P. Before boding the auction, the rates of excise duty and prices of different varieties of country liquor and also the eonditions of licence were announced. No announcement was made\n\ns to whether the exemption from sales tax in respect of sale of country liquor granted by the notification dated 6-4-1959 was or was not likely\n\n(I) .[1976] Suppl. S.C. R. 532.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) 3 S.C.lt.\n\nto be withdrawn. On the day following the day when the licences were granted, the Government of U. P. issued a notification under S. 3A and 4 of U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 superceding the earlier notification exempting the payment of sales tax and imposing sales tax on the turnover in respect of country liquor at the rate of 10 paise per rupee.\n\nThe respondents challenged the validity of the notification issued under the Sales Tax Act on the ground that the State Government did not announce at the time of the earlier auction that the earlier notification was likely to be withdrawn. This Court on a consideration of the question whether the State Government is estopped from levying the Sales Tax, after referring to the earlier decisions of this Court held. that the State Government is not estopped or precluded from subjecting the sales of liquor to tax if it felt impelled to do so in the interest of revenue of the State. The Court followed two earlier decisions of this Court viz. M. Ramanathan Pillai v. State of Kera/a (supra) and State of Kera/a v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co.\n\nLtd. (supra). In Ramanathan Pillai's case, Ray, Chief Justice while dealing with the question whether the Government has a right to abolish a post in the service, observed tha(the power to create or abolish a post is not related to the doctrine of pleasure. It is a matter of governmental policy. Every sovereign Government has this power in the interest and necessity or internal adminiStration. The creation or abolition of a post is dictated by policy decision, exigencies of circum stances and administrative necessity. The creation, the continuance and the abolition of post are all decided by the Government in the interest of administration and general public. The learned Chief Justice after quoting a passage in American Jurisprudence 2d. at p. 783, paragraph 123, observed that the estoppel alleged by the appellant Ramanathan Pillai was on the ground that he entered into an agreement. and thereby changed his position to his detriment. The High Court rightly held that the Courts exclude the operation of the doctrine of. e&toppel, when it is found that the authority against whom estoppel is pleaded has owed a duty to the public against whom the estoppel cannot fairly operate.\n\nIn State of Kera/a v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. (supra), Palekar, J. who delivered the opinion with which Krishna Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. agreed, rejected the contention that. an agreement entered into by the Government with the parties, exclud- ed the leg_islation on the subject .. The plea of equitable estoppel was. put forward on the ground that the company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material. Later Government was unable to supply the raw material and by an\n\nagreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private A forests for a period of 60 years if the company purchased forest lands jfor the purpose of its supply of raw-materials. Accordingly, the company purchased 30,000/- acres of private forests from the Nilabhuri Kovila Kanna Estate for Rs. 75 lacs and, therefore, it was argued that the agreement would operate as equitable estoppel against the B • State. This Court agreed with the High Court that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for public good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as • equitable estoppel.\n\n~ In Assistant Custodian of E. P. and Ors. v. Brjj Kishore Agarwala, (1) c it was pleaded that the first respondent made an enquiry from the Assistant Custodian whether the property was evacuee property and was told that it was not. As the first respondent acted on this representation, it was pleaded that the Assistant Custodian was estopped from contending that the property was evacuee property. Thus, dismissing this plea, the Court observed : D • , d \"We do not consider that the fact that the !st respondent had. made an enquiry from the Assistant Custodian whether the property in question was an evacuee property and was told that it would not make any difference to the question.\"\n\n\")I- Reliance was placed on the observations of Denning L. J. in Robert- I: son v. Minister of Pensions (supra), holding that the letter by the war\n\noffice which assured that the appellant's disability had been accepted as attributable to the military service, was binding on the Crown and through the Crown the Minister of Pensions. The Court pointed out that the decision in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions had been disapproved by the House of Lords in Howell's case. After referring to\n\nII' ,- the passage from the judgment of Lord Denning, Lord Simonds and\n\nLord Normand which have been extracted earlier, this Court expressed its opinion that the view taken by the House of Lords it correct and not that is taken by Lord Denning.\n\nIn Excise Commissioner U. P., Allahabad v. Ram Kumar (supra), G the Court after consideration of the case law on the subject, held that \"f it was settled by a catena of cases that there could be no question Of estoppel against the legislative and sovereign functions.\n\nA passage in American Jurisprudence 2d. at page 783 paragraph 123 was extracted by Ray C. J, in Ramanathan Pil/ai's case and Jaswant R '\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nA Siagh J. in:Excise Commissioner's c~;: The passage at p. 123 is as follows :-\n\n\"Generally, a State is not subject to an estoppel to the same extent as an individual or a private corporation. Otherwise, it might be rendered helpless to assert its powers in Government.\n\nTherefore, as a general rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the State in its Governmental, Public or sovereign capacity. An exception however arises in the application of estoppel to the State where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice.\"\n\nBut the learned Judges did not include the last sentence :\n\n\"An exception however arises in the application of estoppel to the State where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice.\"\n\nIn Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fisherman Co-operative Society Ltd.,\n\nv. Sipahi Singh & Ors.(l)Jthis'.Courtlheldfthalfthe respondent could not invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel because he was unable to show that relying on the representation of the Government, he ha<l altered his position to his prejudice. The Court accepted the view of this Court expressed in Ram Kumar's case and held that there cannot be any estoppel against the Government in the exercise of its sovereiga, legislative or executive functions.\n\nThe leading case of the Supreme Court of the United States citeci and relied upon in Ram Kumar's case (supra), is Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Marril,(~ in which the United States Supreme Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just another private litigant, for the purposes of charging it with liability, whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprises or engages in competition with private ventures • * • Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority;• • *And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his , authority** • 'Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government' does not reflect a callous outlook. It merely\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1977 S.C. 2149.\n\n(2) 332 u. s. 380.\n\nexpresses the duty of all courts to: observe the conditions defined by congress for charging the public treasury\".\n\nThe Court also relied on the views of the tet book writer Melville M. Bigelow and concluded that the plea of estoppel does not operate against therGovemment or its assignees.\n\nThe extract from the American Jurisprudence which summarises the American Law, and[the decision in Federal Crop Insurance Cor- -poration case, make it clear that the plea of estoppel is not available\n\nagainsf the Government and its legislative or executive functions except for preventing fraud or manifest injustice.\n\nIt was submitted that the cases cited above cannot be relied on as an authority for the proposition tthat the do_ctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable agains(the Government in the\"exercise of its legislative and statutory functions as they were in the nature of obiter dicta and that on the facts the present case could be distinguished.\n\nThe Inda-Afghan Agencies, Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. and Turner Morisson Co.'Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment/Trust Ltd.(1), were strongly relied on. We have pointed out that all that the Indo- Afghan Agencies case laid down was, that a public authority acting an behalf of the Gove=ent cannot on its own whim and in an arbitrary manner seek to alter the conditions accepted by him to the prejudice of the other side. : The decision in terms accepts the view expressed in earlier cases that after taking into consideration the exigencies and change of circumstances, the authority can modify t.Jte conditions in exercise of his powers as a public \"thority.\n\nJn Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. und Anr. v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Anr.(2), the facts of the case is set out in the head note and may be briefly stated. The State of Maharashtra on the representation made by certain manufacturers proclaimed th~ exclusion of the Industrial Area from the Municipal Jurisdiction. The Municipality made representations to the State requesting that the proclamation be withdrawn, agreeing to exempt the factories in the industrial area from payment of octroi from the date of levy. The State . acceded to the request of the' Municipality. The appellants expanded their activities relying on the Municipality's assurance. The Maharashtra Municipalities Act was enacted and the municipality took over the administration. Thereafter, the Municipality sought to levy octroi duty on the appellant amounting to about Rs. 15 lacs per\n\n\n(2) [1970] 3 S.CR. 854.\n\nI f'\n\n.., •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 s.e.It.\n\nannum. The High Court dismissed the petition in limini filed by the Industrialists against the levy of octroi. In an appeal to this Cotirt it was held that the High Court had not given any reason for dismissing the petition in limini and that on a consideration of the averments in the petition and the materials placed before the High Court,. the appellants were entitled to have its grievance heard against the action of the Municipality which was prima facie unjust. In remanding the matter to the High Court, this Court observed :-\n\n\"A representation that something will be done in future may involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. If the representation is acted upon by another per<nn it may, unless the statute governing the person making the representation provides otherwise, result in an agreement enforceable at law; if the statute requires that the agreement shall be in a certain form, no contract may result from the representation and acting thereupon but the law is not powerless to rnise in appropriate cases an enquiry against him to compel performance of the obligation arising out of his representation\".\n\nIn dealing with the question as to how far the public bodies are bOilnd by representation made by them on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice, the Court held that the obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to a promise may be enforced ex contractu by a person 'who acts upon the promise; when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation may be if the contract be not in that form be enforced against it in appropriate case in equity. The Court read the decision in Union of India and Ors. v. Indo- Afghan Agencies (supra) as holding that the Government is not exempt from the equity arising out of the acts done by citizens to their prejudices, relying upon the representations as to its future coduct made by the Government. This observation will have to be read alongwith the conditions that were laid down in the Jndo-Afghan case and cannot be read as holding that the rule of estoppel will be applicable against the Government in the exercise of its legislative and statutory powers.\n\nThe Court quoted the following passage from Denning J. :-\n\n\"Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppel do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the\n\nH ' Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action\".\n\n(' '-\n\n- '\n\nJIT RAM v. HARYANA (Kai/asam, J.) 721\n\nan.d observed that the Court in Indo-Afghan case held that it was applicable to India. It may be noted that apart from not noticing Howell's case, the Court in Indo-Afghan case did not say that the law as extracted from Denning J's. judgment was applicable to llndia.\n\nTlle Court after considering the Indo-Afghan case and Howell's case, expressed thus :-\n\n\"If our nascent democracy is to thrive diffrent standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is, in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising 04t of representation made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice\".\n\nThe third decision on which reliance was placed, for the propositi.in that doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the\n\nState acting in exercise of its legislative or executive function is Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. t(supra).\n\nThe case related to the payment of tax due from Hungerford by Turner Morrison. The Court observed that if for any reason Turner Morrison had not undertaken any responsibility to discharge the liability of Hungerford, the latter could have taken recourse to voluntary liquidation. Hence there could be no doubt that acting on the basis of the representation made by Turner Morrison, Hungerford placed itself jn a disadvantageous position. Hungerford raised the plea that the resolution was of the company, afforded a good basis for raising a plea of promissory estoppel. This plea was accepted by the Court\n\nrelying on the observations of Denning J. in High Trees case (supra) . . The later decision of the House of Lords in Howell's case which disapproved Lord Denning's judgment was not brought to its notice.\n\nY The scope of the plea of doctrine of promissory estoppel against • the Government may be summed up as follows :-\n\n(1) The plea of promissory estoppel is not available against the exercise of the legislative functions of the State .\n\n(2) The doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from discharging its functions under the law.\n\n(3) When the officer of the Government acts outside the scope of his authority, the plea of promissory estoppel is not available. The <tloctrine of ultra vires will come into operation and the Government\n\n<:annot be held bound by the unauthorised acts of its officers.\n\n(4) When the officer acts within the scope of his authority under\n\n~ scheme and enters into an agreement and makes a representation\n\n-- ;; r'\n\n• I\n\nand a person acting on that representation puts himself in a disadvantageous position, the Court is entitled to require the officer to act according _to the scheme and the agreement or representation. The Officer cannot arbitrarily act on his mere whim and ignore his promise on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of necessity or change the conditions to the prejudice of the person who had acted upon such representation and put himself in a disadvantageous position.\n\n(5) The officer would be justified in changing the terms of the agree ment to the prejudice of the other party on special considerations. such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on general interest of the State.\n\nBefore we conclude, we would rfer to a recent decision of this Court in M/s. Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.(1). It has beenlheld that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power and the legislature cannot be precluded from exercising its legislative functions by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It has also held that when the Government owes a duty to the public to act differently, promissory estoppel could not be invoked to prevent the Government from d<Jing so. The doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government would not be bound by the acts of its officers and agents, who act beyond the scope of their aµthority. A person dealing with an agent of the Government must be held to have noticed all the limitations. of his authority.\n\nWith respect, we are in complete agreement with the law as stated above but we find the judgment is not in accordance with the view consistently taken by this Court in some respects. We have read the Judgment of Bhagwati, J. with considerable care and attention which jt deserves. Firstly, . with great respect we are unable to construe 'the decision in Union of India & Ors, v. Mfs. IndoAfghan Agew:ies\n\nLtd. case in the manner. in which it has been done. As pointed out by us, all that the case purports to Jay down is that the court can enforce an obligation incurred by an authority on which another has acted npon and put himself in a disadvantageous position, when the authority resiles arbitrarily or on mere whim or on some un-defined and un-disclosed grounds of necessity.\n\nWith respect, we feel we are unable to agre<withthenterpretation. put by Bhagwati, J. Bhagwati, J. states \"The defence of executive necessity was thus clearly negatived by this Court and it was pointed\n\n(I) 11979] 2 S.C.R. 641.\n\nout that it did; not release the Government from its obligation tojhonour the promise made by it, ifthe citizen acting in reliance on the promise,\n\nhad altered his position. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was in 1uch a case applicable agaimt the Government and it could not be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity.\" The same view has again been reiterated at page 682 where it is stated\" The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision tb.at where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promises and in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Goverrurent would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the premise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution.\" These observations would be right if they are read with the qualifications, laid down in the Indo Afghan-Agencies case and other cases.\n\nThe further observations of the learned Judge that: \"Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride'.of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned, the former is equally bound as the latter.\" Again \"but if the Govern ment makes such a promise and the promises acts in relience upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the 'Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual do not appear to convey the true effect of the decision.\" The decision of this Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Ce. Ltd. and Anr. v. The Ulhashagar Municipal Council and Anr. (supra) was understood by Justice Bhagwati as refusing to make a distinction between the private individual and public body so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned. These observations would be correct only if they are read with the exceptions recognised by Justice Bbagwati himself elsewhere in his judgment along with other restrictions imposed by Judgments of this Court.\n\nWe find ourselves unable to ignore the three decisions of this Court, two by Constitution Benches M. Ramanatha Pillai v. The State of Kera/a and Anr. (supra) and State of Kera/a and Anr. v. The Gwafior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc. (supra) and the third by a Bench of four Judges of this Court in Excise Commissioner, U. P. H.\n\nAllahabad v. Ram Kumar (Supra) on the ground that the observations are in the nature of obiter dicta and that it cannot be insisted as intendng, to have laid down any proposition of law different from that enunciated in the lndo Afghan Agencies case. It was not necessary for this Court in the cases referred to above to refer to Union of India and Ors. v. M/s. lndo Afghan Agencies Ltd., or if properly ; understood it only held that the authority cannot go back on the agreement arbitrarily or on its mere whim. We feel we are bound to follow the decisions of the three Benches of this Court which in our respectful opinion have correctly stated the law. We are also unable to read the case of the House of Lords in Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd.\n\n(supra) as not having overruled the view of Denning, J and as not having expressed its disapproval of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Crown nor overruled the view taken by Denning, J in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions that \"the Crown cannot escape the obligation under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.\"\n\nWe find ourselves unable to share the view of the learned Judge that the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramanathan Pil/ai's case\n\n(supra) heavily relied upon the quotation from the American jurisprudence para 123 p. 873 of Vol. 28. Again we feel to remark that \"unfortunately this quotation was incomplete and had overlooked perhaps inadvertantly\" is unjustified (emphasis supplied).\n\nWe feel we are in duty bound to express our reservations regarding the \"activist\" jurisprudence and the wide implications thereof which E the learned Judge has propounded in his judgment. The first part of the judgment relates to the development of law relating to promissory estoppel in England following the High Trees case. As pointed out by us earlier tbe doftrine of promissory estoppel is not very helpful as we are governed by the various provisions of the Indian Contract Act Sections 65 and 70 provide for certain reliefs in void contracts and in F . unenforceable contracts where a person relying on a representation has acted upon it and put himself in a disadvantageous position . . Apart from the case in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, the House of Lords in Howell's case and the Privy Council in Antonio Buttigieg's case and the other English Authorities do not agree with the view that . the plea of promissory estoppel is available against the Government.\n\nG Further we have to bear in mind that the Indian Constitution as a matter of high policy in public interest, has enacted Article 299 so as to save the Government liability arising out of unathorised acts of its officers and contracts not duly executed.\n\nThe learned Judge has considered at some length the doctrine of H consideration and how it has thwarted the full development of the new equitable principle of promissory estoppel. After discussing the American Law on the subject, he has observed that the leading text book\n\nwriters view with disfavour the importance giveu to \"consideration\".\n\nThe leamed Judge proceeds to observe that : \"having regard to the general opprobrium to which the doctrine of consideration has been subjected to by eminent jurists, we need not he unduly anxious to project this doctrine against assault of erosion nor allow it to dwarf or stultify the full development of the equity of promissory estoppel or illhibit or curtail its operational efficacy as a justice device for preventing injustice.\" Here again we have to bear in mind that the Indian Contract Act regulates the right of parties, an.d expressly insists on the necessity for lawful consideration which cannot be dispensed with by invoking some equitable doctrine. Section 10 of the Contract Act provides :-\n\n\"All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.\"\n\nIt will be seen that for a contract to be valid, it should be for a D lawful consideration. Section 25 of the Contract Act provides that an agreement made without consideration is void unless it satisfies one of the conditions mentioned in this section.\n\nThe learned Judge has held that if the Government is to resist its liability it will have to disclose to the Court what are the facts and circumstances on account of which the Government claims to be exemp. ted from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether these facts and circumstances are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. This statement will have to be read with the exceptions stated by the Learned Judge himself and those recognised by the:decisions of this Court. In C. Sankaranarayanan; v. State of Kera/a(') it was held that the-power of the Government under Article 309 to make rules regulating the conditions of service of Government employees or of teachers of aided schools cannot in any way be effected by any agreement. Rule of estoppel against Government cannot be iIJ, VOked in such cases. In Narendra Chand Hem Ram and Ors. v. Lt. Governor Administrator Union Territory, Himachal Pradesh and Ors.,(2) this Court has laid down that the power to impose tax is undoubtedly a legislative power and that no Court can issue mandate to a legislature to enact a particular law and similarly no Court can direct a subordinate:legislative; body to enact or not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact. Again in State of Tamil\n\n(I) [1971] 2 s.c.c. 361.\n\n(2) [1972] I S.C.R. 940.\n\nNadu and Ors. etc. v. S. K. Krishnamurthi etc. etc.(lfthis Court held tllat the policy of State to nationalise text books cannot be challenged bY the publishers on the ground that the rules were in derogation of their rights. It was held that the rules were in the nature of Departmental instructions and do not confer any right on the publishers nor are they designed to safeguard the interest of publishers and that the poliey of nationalisation was conceived in public interest and as the Government is at liberty to change the text books and delete from and add to the list of approved text books and the publishers can have no grievance. In M/s. Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Control/er of Imports and Ors.,(2) alfourtiudges Bench of this Court)held that an applicant for a permit under Import Trade Policy has no absolute right to the grant of import licence and that the applicant cannot complain that the existing instructions or orders made in pursuance of the Import and Export Control Act place \"unreasonable restrictions\" on the petitioners' right to carry on trade or business. These restrictions obviously have been imposed in. the interests of the general public and national economy and with the development of imports, regulating foreign exchange have necessarily to be appropriately controlled and:regulated.\n\nProfessor S. A. De Smith in his Judicial Review on Administrative Action, 3rd Edn. p. 279 sums up the position thus: \"Contracts and Covenants entered into by the Crown are not to be construed as being subject to implied terms that would exclude the exercise of general discretionary powers for the public good: On the contrary they are to be construed as incorporating an implied term that such powers remain exercisable. This is broadly true of other public authorities also.\n\nBut the status and functions of the Crown in this regard are of a higher order. The Crown cannot be allowed to tie its hands completely by prior undertakings is as clear as the proposition that the Courts cannot allow the Crown to evade compliance with ostensibly binding obligations whenever it thinks fit: If a public authority lawfully repudiates or departs from the terms of a binding contract in order to exercise its overriding discretionary powers, or if it is held never to have been bound in law by an ostensibly binding contract because the undertakings would improperly fetter its general discretionary powers, the other party to the agreement has no right whatsoever to damages or compensation under the general law, no matter how serious the damages that party may have suffered.\" Professor H. W. R. Wade in Administrative Law Fourth Edn. pp. 329-330 has pointed out that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be allowed to impede the proper exercise\n\n\n(2) [1975] I S.C.R. 327.\n\nI ,,,,\n\neJ public and statutory functions by the State and public authorities.\n\nIn Public Law the most obvious limitation on the doctrine of estoppel is that it cannot be invoked so as to give an authority powers which it does not in law possess. In other words, no estoppel can legitimate action which is ultra vires. As has been amply illustrated the Court is normally extremely careful to prevent any legal doctrine from impeding the exercise of statutory discretion in the public interest.\n\nOn a consideration of the decisions of this Court it is clear that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative\n\npower of the State. So also the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority and a person dealing with the agent of the Government must be held to have notice ()f the limitations of his authority. The Court can enforce compliance .by a public authorityoftheobligationlaid on him if he arbitrarily or\n\n()D his mere whim ignores the promises made by him on behalf of the 6overnment. It would be open to the authority to plead and prove that there were special considerations which necessitated his not being able to comply with his obligations in public interest.\n\nIn a fervent plea for the doctrine to speak in all its activ isl magnitude the learned Judge observes \"that is no reason why this new principle, which is a child of equity brought into the world with a view to promoting honesty and good faith and bringing law closer to justice should be held in fetters and not allowed to operate in all the activist magnitude, so. that it may fulfil the purpose for which it was conceived and born\". It is no doubt desirable that in a civilised society man's word should be as good as his bond and his fellow men should be able to rely on his promise. It may be an improvement if a cause of action would be based on a mere promise without consideration.\n\nJhe law should as far as possible accord with the moral values of the society, and efforts should be made to bring the law in conformity with the moral values. What are the moral values of the Society?\n\nThis is a very complex question because the concept of moral values .amongst different persons and classes of persons is not always the same.\n\nThe concept of moral values is not static one. It differs from time to .time and from society to society. It is hazardous for a Court to attempt to, enforce what according to it is the moral value. As pointed out by Roscoe Pound ; \"It leads to an attempt to enforce overhigh ethi- .cal standards and to make legal duties out of moral duties which are not sufficiently, tangible to be made effective by the. machinery of the legal order. A more serious.difficulty is that the attempt to identify\n\nlaw and morals gives too wide a scope to judicial discretion\". Thr question is how should it be brought about. The learned Judge says that it should be the constant endeavour of the Courts and the\n\n~ ' legislature to close the gap between the law and morality and bnng about as near an approximation between the two as possible. LOrd Denning might have exhorted the Judges not to be timorous sours but to be bold spirits, ready to. allow a new cause of action if justice so requires. These are lofty ideals which one should steadfastly pursue.\n\nBut before embarking on this mission, it is necessary for the Court t!) understand clearly its limitations. The powers of the Court to legislate is strictly limited. \"Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere and not jus dare to interpret law, and not to make law or give law.\" Chandrachud, C. J. Speaking for a Constitution Bench. in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. v. State of Punjab,(1) has clearly pointed out the limited powers of the Courts to make laws in construingthe provisions of the statutes. The Learned Chief Justicj! has observed :- ' \"The true question is whether by a process'.of constructiom, the amplitude of judicial discretion which is given' to the High\n\nCourt and the Court of Session, to impose such'.conditions as they may think fit while granting anticipatory bail, should be cnt down by reading into the statute coilditiotls which ate not to be found therein ***Our answer, clearly and emphatically ·\n\nis in the negative.\"\n\nAgain the Learned Chief Justice warned \"Judges'.have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful:of the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions. AndJi(will be strange if, by en, iployiug judicial artifices and techniques, we cut down the'.discretion. so wisely conferred upon the Courts, by devising a formula which will confine the power to grant anticipatory bail within a strait-jacket.'.'- \"Therefore, even if we were to frame a 'code fof, thegrant'.of anticipl!7 tory bail', which really is the business of the:legislature, it can at best furnish broad guide-lines and cannot compel blind adherence\".\n\nThe Courts by its very nature are most ill-snited to undertake the task of legislating. There is no:machiuery for the Court to ascertain tli'.e conditions of the people and their requirements and to make law~ that would be most appropriate. Further two Judges may think that :a particular law would be desirable to meet the requirements whel-eas another two Judges may most profoundly differ from the conclusios arrived at by two Judges. Conscious of these handicaps, the law re~' quires that even an amendment of the Supreme Court Rule.s wltich\n\n(I) [1980! 3 S.C.R. 383.\n\n)-· •\n\n• -.\n\n• .,\n\n~ .. r\n\ngovern the proced11r~ to l;>e adopted by it fo~ re~Iating its work, can -0nly be effected bythe whole Court sitting and deciding.\n\nThe result is that so far as !]le recommendation of the Municipal Committee to the Government to levy octroi duty, is concerned though H is contrary to the. representation it made to the buyers of the sites in the Mundi, the Municipality is not estopped as the representation made by it was beyond the scope of its authority. The levy of tax being for a public purpose i.e. for augmenting the revenues of the Municipality as laid down in Ram Kumar's case, the plea of estoppel is not available. The order of the Government directing the levy of octroi in pursuance of the resolution elf the Municipality cannot also be challenged as it is in the exercise of its statutory duty.\n\nThe result is both the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs of one set to be borne equally by the two appellants .\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed. .Q\n\n8-463SCI/80", "total_entities": 238, "entities": [{"text": "ETC.\n\nSTA~ OF HARYANA AND ANR. ETC.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 16, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 16, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.J B\n\nP1'11}11b M1111icipal Act, 1911 as amended by Punjab Act 48 of 1951, Section 62.A-Power of State Government to di'rect the ,\\lunicipality to impose any tax ulllkr ction 61-Exemption from payment of octroi duty not within the com\n\npelence of the Municipality and ultra vires of its powers-.Whet/1er any suc/1\n\nlllCI whidi is void ab initio, enforceable-Principle of Promissory Estoppel, ingrt• dienll of-Applicability to the instant case."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. KAILASAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bahadurgarh Town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 654, "end_char": 670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 established Maadi Fateh in Bahadurgarh Town with a view to improve trade in the area."}}, {"text": "20-5-1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1175, "end_char": 1184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 dated 20-5-1917, the Municipal Committee decided that the term No."}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the resolution was received by the Commissioner of Ambala, in paragraph 3 of his letter datod 26-6·1917, he minuted that the undertaking by the Municipal Commissioner never to in1pose octroi duty in the Mandi was ultra vires and therefore the purchasers of the p)Qla should be informed so that they may withdraw from the purchases."}}, {"text": "26-6·1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1539, "end_char": 1548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the resolution was received by the Commissioner of Ambala, in paragraph 3 of his letter datod 26-6·1917, he minuted that the undertaking by the Municipal Commissioner never to in1pose octroi duty in the Mandi was ultra vires and therefore the purchasers of the p)Qla should be informed so that they may withdraw from the purchases."}}, {"text": "4-9-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This state of affairs continued till 4-9-1953 when the MunicipaJ Committee by nolification No."}}, {"text": "4·9-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9697-C.53163830 dated 4·9-1953 included Fateh Mand~ Bahadurgarh, within the Cktroi limits."}}, {"text": "Fateh Ma'1di", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2715, "end_char": 2727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Examiner of Local Funds pointed out that the h.funicipal Committeeis under obligation to charge octroi on goods imported into Fateh Ma'1di."}}, {"text": "24-2-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2822, "end_char": 2831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President of the Municipal Committee made a repr0oentation to the Deputy Comm:ssioner on 24-2-1954."}}, {"text": "3·1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2903, "end_char": 2909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I dated 2-3·1954 that the Fateh Mandi will remain free from octroi duty according to the terms of the proclamation of the sale relating to the sale of plots."}}, {"text": "Punjab State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3078, "end_char": 3090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was referred to Punjab State which after thoroughly examining the whole matter, confirmed Resolution No."}}, {"text": "2·3-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3206, "end_char": 3214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I passed by the Municipal Committee on 2·3-1954."}}, {"text": "S-5-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3300, "end_char": 3308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subs'equently, the Municipal Committee changed its mind and by its resolution dated S-5-1954, resolved .that octroi duty should also be levied on the goods imported into Fateh Mandi."}}, {"text": "Fateh Mandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3386, "end_char": 3397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subs'equently, the Municipal Committee changed its mind and by its resolution dated S-5-1954, resolved .that octroi duty should also be levied on the goods imported into Fateh Mandi."}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3440, "end_char": 3457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this resolution was annulled by the Punjab Government under s. 236 of the Punjab Municipal Act."}}, {"text": "s. 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3464, "end_char": 3470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fateh Mondi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Examiner of Local Funds Accounts in the meantime insisted on the levy of octroi duty on the goods imr-orted into Fateh Mondi and the Punjab Govermnent after discussing the issue on 9-4-19 56 informed the President of the Municipal Committee that the Government's action in confirming me resolution No."}}, {"text": "9-4-19", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3685, "end_char": 3691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Examiner of Local Funds Accounts in the meantime insisted on the levy of octroi duty on the goods imr-orted into Fateh Mondi and the Punjab Govermnent after discussing the issue on 9-4-19 56 informed the President of the Municipal Committee that the Government's action in confirming me resolution No."}}, {"text": "2-3-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3811, "end_char": 3819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 2-3-1954 of the Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh exempting goods imported into Fateh Mandi from levy of ocroi duty under s. 70(2)(c) of the Municipal Act, 1911, is lluite in order ood that no separate notification to this effect was necessary under -the rules."}}, {"text": "s. 70(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3951, "end_char": 3970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21-7-1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4081, "end_char": 4090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again on 21-7-1965, the Municipal Committee Bahadurgarh resolved that the Govemment be requested to cancel Resolution No."}}, {"text": "Municipal Committee Bahadurgarh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4096, "end_char": 4127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again on 21-7-1965, the Municipal Committee Bahadurgarh resolved that the Govemment be requested to cancel Resolution No."}}, {"text": "State of Haryanai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Haryanai Respondent No."}}, {"text": "1-11-64", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4280, "end_char": 4287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 which came into existence on 1-11-64, wtaer the Punjab Reorganisation Act, by its memo dated 13-10-1967 approv.4 tile resolution No."}}, {"text": "Punjab Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4299, "end_char": 4324, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "13-10-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4344, "end_char": 4354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 which came into existence on 1-11-64, wtaer the Punjab Reorganisation Act, by its memo dated 13-10-1967 approv.4 tile resolution No."}}, {"text": "30-19'1%7 (Ann. H)", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4810, "end_char": 4828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of the Municipal Committee dated 21-7-1965 (~ 6) and approval granted by the Haryana State as per its order dated 30-19'1%7 (Ann."}}, {"text": "S. 112", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6054, "end_char": 6059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "4-5-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6382, "end_char": 6390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under S. 70{2) (c), :l Municipal Comn1ittee by a resolution pa£sed at a special meeting and confirmed by the State Government may exempt in whole or in part from payment of any such tax any person or class of persons or any property or description of property, Jn exercise of those powers, the State Government had by its order dated 4-5-1954 confirmed resolution No."}}, {"text": "9-4-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6707, "end_char": 6715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So\"-'equently, in reply to the objection raised 'by the Examiner of Local Funds, the Government pointed out by its letter dated 9-4-1956 (Ann."}}, {"text": "s. 70(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6878, "end_char": 6889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jl Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6941, "end_char": 6953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20-10-1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7004, "end_char": 7014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By 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{"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9354, "end_char": 9383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 SCR 880", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10197, "end_char": 10213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 214", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 380", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11292, "end_char": 11298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1975] 2 SCR 359", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11463, "end_char": 11479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1977 SC 2149", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11560, "end_char": 11576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 366", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11628, "end_char": 11644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 SCR 854", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11743, "end_char": 11759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1972] 3 SCR 711", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11823, "end_char": 11839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974] 1 SCR 671", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12171, "end_char": 12187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 366", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13272, "end_char": 13288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1968] 2 SCR 366", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13639, "end_char": 13655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14642, "end_char": 14652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 65 and 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14976, "end_char": 14993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 65", "label": "PROVISION", 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M. Ashri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22126, "end_char": 22137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Ashri and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents in both the Appeals."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22142, "end_char": 22154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Ashri and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents in both the Appeals."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22241, "end_char": 22249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J. These two appeals are by certificate granted by the Pu, njab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in C. W. No.444/1968 F and C. W. 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cancelling para 3 of his letter dated 26-6-1917, that is to say, \"that in deference to the strong views of the Municipal Committee and to your own opini0n that the market will collapse if I insist upon it, I withdraw my objection to the undertaking made by the Municipal Committee that Octroi will not be imposed on the market."}}, {"text": "10-3-1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25158, "end_char": 25167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipal Committee on 10-3-1919 imposed house-tax of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bahadurgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25427, "end_char": 25438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9697-C-53/63830 dated 4-9-1953 included Fateh Mandi, Bahadurgarh, within the Octroi limits."}}, {"text": "8-5-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26214, "end_char": 26222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the Municipal Committee changed its mind and by its resolution dated 8-5-1954, resolved that octroi duty should also 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of Haryana Respondent No."}}, {"text": "-11-1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27193, "end_char": 27201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I which came into exi•tence on 1-11-1964 under the Punjab Reorganisation Act, by its memo dated 13-10-1967 approved the resolution No."}}, {"text": "Punjab Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27212, "end_char": 27237, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27943, "end_char": 27948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.62A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28716, "end_char": 28721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28896, "end_char": 28900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29627, "end_char": 29631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 62A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29695, "end_char": 29701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 70(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29899, "end_char": 29907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fateh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30388, "end_char": 30393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 passed by the , Municipal Committee in its special meeting held on 2-3-1954 regarding the exemption of goods imported into Fateh ; Mandi from levy of Octroi Duty."}}, {"text": "Patch Mandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30707, "end_char": 30718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I dated 2-3-1954 of the Municipal Committee exempting Goods imported into Patch Mandi, under S. 70(2) (c) of the Punjab , Municipal Act, 1911, is quite in order."}}, {"text": "S. 70(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30726, "end_char": 30734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipal Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30755, "end_char": 30774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 70(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31084, "end_char": 31092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "S. 60(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31592, "end_char": 31600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act, 1911", "statute": "Municipal Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "S. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34792, "end_char": 34797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35492, "end_char": 35497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35782, "end_char": 35790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35802, "end_char": 35823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36290, "end_char": 36299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36307, "end_char": 36336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36366, "end_char": 36375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36383, "end_char": 36412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seth Bikhraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36439, "end_char": 36451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cases, that arose out of S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, this Court starting from Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union of India,(I) has\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "[1962] 2 S.C.R. 880", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 36492, "end_char": 36511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37827, "end_char": 37836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38226, "end_char": 38246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scope of the doctrine of equitable estoppel arose for consideration before this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay and Ors.(l) In 1865, the Government of Bombay called upon the predecessor in title of the Corporation of Bombay to remove some markets from a certain'.site andlvacate it, and on the application of the then Municipal Commissioner the Government passed a resolution approving and authorising the grant of another site to the Municipality."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38937, "end_char": 38943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1940, the Collector of Bombay, overruling the objection of the Corporation, assessed the new site under S.8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act to land revenue rising from Rs."}}, {"text": "S.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39018, "end_char": 39021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40183, "end_char": 40186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alderson can do against the requirements of the Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40901, "end_char": 40973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41136, "end_char": 41156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the judges, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. constituting the majority expressed his view thus :-\n\n\"Whether it is the equity recognised in Ramsden's case, or it is some other form of equity, is not of much importance.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Ramsden", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41255, "end_char": 41262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the judges, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. constituting the majority expressed his view thus :-\n\n\"Whether it is the equity recognised in Ramsden's case, or it is some other form of equity, is not of much importance."}}, {"text": "Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41453, "end_char": 41460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Jenkins C. J. in Dadoba Janardhan's case a different conclusion would be opposed to what is reasonable, to what is probable and what is fair.''"}}, {"text": "Dadoba Janardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41470, "end_char": 41486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Jenkins C. J. in Dadoba Janardhan's case a different conclusion would be opposed to what is reasonable, to what is probable and what is fair.''"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara Aiyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41705, "end_char": 41725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view of Chandrasekhara Aiyer, J.\n\n(I) [1866] L. R. I. H. L. 129.", "canonical_name": "Chandrasekhara Aiyar"}}, {"text": "L. R. 58 I. A. 91", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41840, "end_char": 41857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41966, "end_char": 41982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, J. as he then was, dissented with the majority and stated :-\n\n\"The principle of Ramsden v. Dyson cannot prevail against statutory requirements regarding disposition of property or making of contract by Government  • The right to levy land revenue is no part of the Government's right to property but a prerogative of the Crown and adverse possession of the land could not destroy the Crown's prerogative to impose assessment on the land.\""}}, {"text": "U. P. Allahabadv. Rarn)Kumar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42498, "end_char": 42526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. P. Allahabadv."}}, {"text": "Afghan Agencies Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43776, "end_char": 43796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lndo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., the respondents before this Court\n\nexported woollen goods to Afghanistan and were issued an Import Entitlement Certificate by the Textile Commissions not for the full F. 0."}}, {"text": "Afghanistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 43859, "end_char": 43870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lndo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., the respondents before this Court\n\nexported woollen goods to Afghanistan and were issued an Import Entitlement Certificate by the Textile Commissions not for the full F. 0."}}, {"text": "S.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44069, "end_char": 44072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44125, "end_char": 44143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of the powers conferred under S.3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, the Central Government issued the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 setting out the policy governing the grant of import and export licence."}}, {"text": "1974] 1 S.C.R. 515", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 44409, "end_char": 44427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cl.\n\n10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44526, "end_char": 44533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45430, "end_char": 45438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45531, "end_char": 45539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cl. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46135, "end_char": 46141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46293, "end_char": 46307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case disclose that the defence of the executive necessity was not relied upon in the affidavit filed on hehalf of the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Union Bf India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47293, "end_char": 47307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Summing up the law laid down by the earlier cases, the Court found that in each of the three cases this Court held that it was competent to grant reli9f in appropriate cases, if, contrary to the Scheme, the authority declined to grant a licence or import certificate or the authority acted arbitrarily and that the Union Bf India and its Officers are not entitled at their mere whim to ignore the promises made by the Government (emphasis\n\n' ·.~\n\nJIT RAM v. HARYANA (Kai/asam, J.) 705\n\nsupplied)."}}, {"text": "H.M. Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48957, "end_char": 48969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision was thus generally understood as stated above is seen from the view expressed by Mr. H.M. Seervai on Constitution .of India, 2nd Edn."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49141, "end_char": 49145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, paragraph 11 at para 146-B, p. 433 :\n\n\"The authorities considered by the Supreme Court, andthe conclusions drawn from them, by Shah, J. in the present case, merely affirm the proposition that the Government could not go back upon promises made in the exercise of discretionary power as embodied in a scheme,'merely ona whim (emphasis by Mr. Seervai)\n\nx x x x x\n\nA promissory estoppel cannot stand on a higher footing than a contract entered into between a citizen or subject and a public authority and it is settled by numerous decisions that no public authority entrusted with discretionary power to be exercised for G the public can bind itself by a contract not to exercise that discretion when the public good demands its exercise\"."}}, {"text": "Seervai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49355, "end_char": 49362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, paragraph 11 at para 146-B, p. 433 :\n\n\"The authorities considered by the Supreme Court, andthe conclusions drawn from them, by Shah, J. in the present case, merely affirm the proposition that the Government could not go back upon promises made in the exercise of discretionary power as embodied in a scheme,'merely ona whim (emphasis by Mr. Seervai)\n\nx x x x x\n\nA promissory estoppel cannot stand on a higher footing than a contract entered into between a citizen or subject and a public authority and it is settled by numerous decisions that no public authority entrusted with discretionary power to be exercised for G the public can bind itself by a contract not to exercise that discretion when the public good demands its exercise\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50504, "end_char": 50512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52536, "end_char": 52541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53538, "end_char": 53544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts of the case are: During the war many people left London owing to bombing."}}, {"text": "Turner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56100, "end_char": 56106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turner in his book Estoppel by Re presentation, has a separate chapter dealing with promissory estoppel."}}, {"text": "Hailsham", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56555, "end_char": 56563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But there has been high places counselling conservatism  Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, has expressed his views in Woodhouse Ltd. v. Nigerian Produce Ltd.(I) as follows :-\n\n\"I desire to add that the time may soon come when the whole sequence of cases basec\\ on promissory estoppel since the war systematically explored\",\n\nThis subject though interesting may uot be relevant in administer ing Indian Law."}}, {"text": "S. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56902, "end_char": 56907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 65 and 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57355, "end_char": 57368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57376, "end_char": 57395, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57397, "end_char": 57401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57623, "end_char": 57628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 65 and 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57814, "end_char": 57826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57834, "end_char": 57853, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 175", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57908, "end_char": 57914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57950, "end_char": 57958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57966, "end_char": 57987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maurice Gwyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58027, "end_char": 58040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir Maurice Gwyer expressed his view that when a contract is void, recourse to S.70 cannot be had."}}, {"text": "S.70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58102, "end_char": 58106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58209, "end_char": 58213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rowlett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59016, "end_char": 59023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That doctrine was propounded by Rowlett J., in Redariaktiebolaget Amphtrite\n\nv. The King but it was uunecessary for the decision because the statement there was not a promise which was intended to be binding but only an expression of intention.", "canonical_name": "Rowlett"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59420, "end_char": 59425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rowlett, J., seems c have been influenced by the cases on the right of the Crown c dismiss its servants at pleasure, but those cases must uow all be read in the light of the judgment of Lord Atkin in Reilly v.\n\nThe King-(1954) A. C. 176, 179) ••• In my opinion the defence of executive necessity is of limited scope.", "canonical_name": "Atkin"}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59669, "end_char": 59676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning was dealing with a case of a serving army officer who wrote to the War Office regarding a disability and received a reply that his disability had been accepted as attributable to \"military service\".", "canonical_name": "F Denning"}}, {"text": "F Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60070, "end_char": 60079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord F Denning held that between the subjects such an assurance would be enforceable because it was intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and it was in fact acted upon; and the assurance was also binding on the Crown because no term could be implied that the Crown was at liberty to revoke it.", "canonical_name": "F Denning"}}, {"text": "Bucknil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60836, "end_char": 60843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A House of Lords from the Court of Appeal against the judgment of Bucknil, Singhleton and Denning, L.JJ."}}, {"text": "Singhleton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60845, "end_char": 60855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A House of Lords from the Court of Appeal against the judgment of Bucknil, Singhleton and Denning, L.JJ."}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61502, "end_char": 61509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commenting on the view taken by Denning, L. J. Lord Simonds observed :-\n\n\"My Lords, I know of no such principle in our law nor was any authority for it cited."}}, {"text": "Normand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62180, "end_char": 62187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Normand referred to the principle laid down by Denning L. J. and observed :-\n\n\"As J understand this statement, the respondents were in the opinion of the learned Lord Justice, entitled to say that the Crown was barred by representations made by Mr. Thompson and acted on by them from alleging against them a breach of the s'.atutory order, and further that the respondents were equally entitled to say in a question with the appellant that there had been no breach."}}, {"text": "Thompson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62429, "end_char": 62437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Normand referred to the principle laid down by Denning L. J. and observed :-\n\n\"As J understand this statement, the respondents were in the opinion of the learned Lord Justice, entitled to say that the Crown was barred by representations made by Mr. Thompson and acted on by them from alleging against them a breach of the s'.atutory order, and further that the respondents were equally entitled to say in a question with the appellant that there had been no breach."}}, {"text": "Havini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66250, "end_char": 66256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Havini thus observd the Privy Council quoted the following passage from the Judgment of Rowlatt, J. in Rederiaktiebolaget Amphtrite case that \"it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises."}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66338, "end_char": 66345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Havini thus observd the Privy Council quoted the following passage from the Judgment of Rowlatt, J. in Rederiaktiebolaget Amphtrite case that \"it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises.", "canonical_name": "Rowlett"}}, {"text": "Roberston", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67012, "end_char": 67021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While House of Lords in Howell's case disagreed with the observations of Lord Denning J. in Robertson's case, the Privy Council approved the law laid down by Rowlatt, J. in Rederiaktiebo/aget 'Amphtrite case which was dissented to by Denning, J. in Roberston's case.", "canonical_name": "Robertson"}}, {"text": "Rederiaktiabolaget Amphtrita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67232, "end_char": 67260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Denning's judgment which did not approve the view of Rowlatt, J. The Privy Council approved the view taken\n\nby Rowlatt, J. in Rederiaktiabolaget Amphtrita case."}}, {"text": "Hornchurch", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 67528, "end_char": 67538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. London Corporation,(3) London Corporation acting as sanitary authority under the Public Health (London) Act, 1936 made a contract with the claimants, barge and lighter owners, for the removal of refuse from a wharf in:the City of Hornchurch, Essex, where it was to be dumped."}}, {"text": "Essex", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 67540, "end_char": 67545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. London Corporation,(3) London Corporation acting as sanitary authority under the Public Health (London) Act, 1936 made a contract with the claimants, barge and lighter owners, for the removal of refuse from a wharf in:the City of Hornchurch, Essex, where it was to be dumped."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69812, "end_char": 69829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The premises were derequisitioned on September 5, 1945 until July 5, 1955 and the landlord brought proceedings claiming arrears of rent."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69836, "end_char": 69848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The premises were derequisitioned on September 5, 1945 until July 5, 1955 and the landlord brought proceedings claiming arrears of rent."}}, {"text": "Evershet", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70748, "end_char": 70756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Evershet M. R. while observing that the facts of the case were different held that the general proposition laid down by Denning L. J. was not accepted by the House of Lords in [{owe// v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. (supra)."}}, {"text": "Devlin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70980, "end_char": 70986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devlin, J. stakd the principle in the following terms :-\n\n\"When the Crown, or any other person, is entrusted, whether ."}}, {"text": "S. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73337, "end_char": 73342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Antonio Buttigieg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74061, "end_char": 74078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ I\n\nI •\n\nI;'µ\n\nPrivy Council in Antonio Buttigieg's case approved the view of Rowlatt."}}, {"text": "Anson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74387, "end_char": 74392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court after quoting a passage from Rowlatt, J. in Rederiakiabo/aget Amphtrite v. The King (supra) agreed that the view expressed by Anson's English Law of Contract 22nd Ed."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75402, "end_char": 75407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rowlatt, J., seems to have been influenced by the cases on the right of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure, but those cases must now all be read in the light of the judgment of Lord Atkin in Reilly v. The King- (1954) A. C. 176, 179). . . .", "canonical_name": "Atkin"}}, {"text": "6-4-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76531, "end_char": 76539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No announcement was made\n\ns to whether the exemption from sales tax in respect of sale of country liquor granted by the notification dated 6-4-1959 was or was not likely\n\n(I) .[1976] Suppl."}}, {"text": "Government of U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76718, "end_char": 76737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the day following the day when the licences were granted, the Government of U. P. issued a notification under S. 3A and 4 of U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 superceding the earlier notification exempting the payment of sales tax and imposing sales tax on the turnover in respect of country liquor at the rate of 10 paise per rupee."}}, {"text": "S. 3A and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76766, "end_char": 76777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76787, "end_char": 76806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramanathan Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 77765, "end_char": 77782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramanathan Pillai's case, Ray, Chief Justice while dealing with the question whether the Government has a right to abolish a post in the service, observed tha(the power to create or abolish a post is not related to the doctrine of pleasure.", "canonical_name": "Ramanathan Pillai"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77791, "end_char": 77794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramanathan Pillai's case, Ray, Chief Justice while dealing with the question whether the Government has a right to abolish a post in the service, observed tha(the power to create or abolish a post is not related to the doctrine of pleasure."}}, {"text": "Ramanathan Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78574, "end_char": 78591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at p. 783, paragraph 123, observed that the estoppel alleged by the appellant Ramanathan Pillai was on the ground that he entered into an agreement.", "canonical_name": "Ramanathan Pillai"}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79021, "end_char": 79028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. Ltd. (supra), Palekar, J. who delivered the opinion with which Krishna Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. agreed, rejected the contention that."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79070, "end_char": 79082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. Ltd. (supra), Palekar, J. who delivered the opinion with which Krishna Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. agreed, rejected the contention that."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79091, "end_char": 79099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. Ltd. (supra), Palekar, J. who delivered the opinion with which Krishna Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. agreed, rejected the contention that.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 79351, "end_char": 79357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "put forward on the ground that the company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material."}}, {"text": "Ramanathan Pil", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 81979, "end_char": 81993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at page 783 paragraph 123 was extracted by Ray C. J, in Ramanathan Pil/ai's case and Jaswant R '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.", "canonical_name": "Ramanathan Pillai"}}, {"text": "Jaswant R", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82008, "end_char": 82017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at page 783 paragraph 123 was extracted by Ray C. J, in Ramanathan Pil/ai's case and Jaswant R '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 82022, "end_char": 82060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at page 783 paragraph 123 was extracted by Ray C. J, in Ramanathan Pil/ai's case and Jaswant R '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.lt."}}, {"text": "A Siagh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82062, "end_char": 82069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Siagh J. in:Excise Commissioner's c~;: The passage at p. 123 is as follows :-\n\n\"Generally, a State is not subject to an estoppel to the same extent as an individual or a private corporation."}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83175, "end_char": 83184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court accepted the view of this Court expressed in Ram Kumar's case and held that there cannot be any estoppel against the Government in the exercise of its sovereiga, legislative or executive functions."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 83353, "end_char": 83387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leading case of the Supreme Court of the United States citeci and relied upon in Ram Kumar's case (supra), is Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Marril,(~ in which the United States Supreme Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just another private litigant, for the purposes of charging it with liability, whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprises or engages in competition with private ventures •  • Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority;• • And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his , authority • 'Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government' does not reflect a callous outlook."}}, {"text": "United States Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 83504, "end_char": 83531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leading case of the Supreme Court of the United States citeci and relied upon in Ram Kumar's case (supra), is Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Marril,(~ in which the United States Supreme Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just another private litigant, for the purposes of charging it with liability, whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprises or engages in competition with private ventures •  • Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority;• • And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his , authority • 'Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government' does not reflect a callous outlook."}}, {"text": "s. 380", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84351, "end_char": 84357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Melville M. Bigelow", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84534, "end_char": 84553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court also relied on the views of the tet book writer Melville M. Bigelow and concluded that the plea of estoppel does not operate against therGovemment or its assignees."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86173, "end_char": 86193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Maharashtra on the representation made by certain manufacturers proclaimed th~ exclusion of the Industrial Area from the Municipal Jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.CR. 854", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 86878, "end_char": 86896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Turner Morrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90739, "end_char": 90754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case related to the payment of tax due from Hungerford by Turner Morrison."}}, {"text": "Hungerford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90882, "end_char": 90892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court observed that if for any reason Turner Morrison had not undertaken any responsibility to discharge the liability of Hungerford, the latter could have taken recourse to voluntary liquidation."}}, {"text": "1979] 2 S.C.R. 641", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 94887, "end_char": 94905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95867, "end_char": 95878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bbagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 97140, "end_char": 97148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations would be correct only if they are read with the exceptions recognised by Justice Bbagwati himself elsewhere in his judgment along with other restrictions imposed by Judgments of this Court.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwati"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 99363, "end_char": 99370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first part of the judgment relates to the development of law relating to promissory estoppel in England following the High Trees case."}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99539, "end_char": 99558, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 65 and 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99559, "end_char": 99577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100174, "end_char": 100185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Here again we have to bear in mind that the Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101086, "end_char": 101149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101315, "end_char": 101325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here again we have to bear in mind that the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Here again we have to bear in mind that the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101657, "end_char": 101667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Here again we have to bear in mind that the Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Here again we have to bear in mind that the Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102456, "end_char": 102467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "De Smith in his Judicial Review on Administrative Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 104532, "end_char": 104585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H. W. R. Wade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105798, "end_char": 105811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Professor H. W. R. Wade in Administrative Law Fourth Edn."}}, {"text": "Roscoe Pound", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 108610, "end_char": 108622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out by Roscoe Pound ; \"It leads to an attempt to enforce overhigh ethi- .cal standards and to make legal duties out of moral duties which are not sufficiently, tangible to be made effective by the."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109728, "end_char": 109739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrachud, C. J. Speaking for a Constitution Bench."}}, {"text": "Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109790, "end_char": 109811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_71_92_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "• '\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v.\n\nDR. C. MATHEW March 19, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Articles 14 and IS-Admission to Post Gradu- B ate degree and diploma course in medicine-Reservation Quota of 2% of total number of seats for candidates from entire country minus Kera/a-Such reservation-Whether valid.\n\nThe Kerala State runs three medical colleges with post-graduate degree and diploma courses in two of its Universities (Trivandrum and Calicut). The selection is made from among candidates guided by the prospectus issued in this behalf and the Selection Committee makes the selection. The principal of the C.\n\nMedical College, Trivandrum., being the convener thereof. A notification inviting applications was published in the Gazette dated 27-2-1979 wherein the last date for receipt of application for the post graduate course in ophthalmology was set down as March 31, 1979. Candidates were considered on the basis of their merit, marks being allotted for various attributes including military service, membership of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and holding of medical diplomas. The competitive marks provided for 10% to diploma holders in the D selection of candidates to M.S. and M.D. courses in the respective subjects or sub-specialities.\n\nThe Kerala State provided a quota of 2 % of the total number of seats for candidates from the entire country minus Kerala.\n\nWhile clause 12 of the prospectus fro\\Vned upon late and/ or defective applications, clause 13 provided that attested copies of the statement of marks E at each professional examination and those of other documents should be attached with every application.\n\nThe Special Secretary to the State Government in a communication to the Selection Committee informed that as the result of the Diploma Course conducted by the Medical College, Trivandrum would not be available before the\n\nla~ date for the receipt of applications, 10% weightage may be given to the concerned applicants, subject 'to the condition of production of the Diploma Certificate before finalisation of the selection to the post-graduate course.\n\nThe number of seats for the post-graduate degree course in Ophthalmology available for the year 1979-80 was six of which one belonged to Schedule Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidate, another to a tutor working in a medical college. The State was left with four seats.\n\nIn the Writ Petition, the High Court held that one of the students, Dr.\n\nGopinathan Nair, was so meritorious that none challenged his admission, and that there was no inherent lacuna or illegality in the communication Ex P 3 of the Special Secretary to the Selection Committee. Jn appeal, the Full Bench of the High Court, allowed the appeal holding that Ex P 3 cannot have the effect of over-riding the effect of clauses 12 and 13 of the prospectus and quashed the selections made on the basis of the rank list for admission.\n\nIn the appeals to this Court on the question whether the 2% reservation for the entire country's candidate population from outside Kerala in the \"Open Merit Pool\", was valid,\n\nHELD : l. Principled policy, consistent with constitutional imperatives (Articles 14 and 15) must guide admissions to courses in higher professional education but Governments and Universities, not infrequently take liberties with this larger obligation under provincial pressures and institutional compulsions and seek asylum in reluctant pragmatism mindless of hostility to oonstitution a1ity.\n\nNothing is more harrowing for the Court, with increasing litigation and thereby forced in to slow motion and unwilling to intervene in an administrative area than to hamper the stategic stages of educational prcr..ess like admission andexaminations, but the Justice System cannot runaway from hea.ring and deciding questions of unconstitutionality, especially when educational authorities shape policies, change rules and make peace with the crisis of the hour, ignoring the parameters of the National Charter.\n\nMistrust of Government, is viola tive of comity between instrumentalities and is not permissil,)le unless substanti!:lted by facts.\n\nSuspicion is the upas tree under whose shade reason fails and justice dies. High Court has thrown the academic year in post-graduate Opthalmology into disarray and even wastage. [74 F-H, 77 G-H]\n\n2. Welfare-oriented judicial process must be constructive in its objective, must be geared to order as its goal and must pave the way for resultant contentment, avoiding negative writs which, in practice, prove to be congealing commands. [78 D-E}\n\n3. In the instant case, the High Court, on the crucial question, has correctly stated the law regard denial of opportunity for 'outsiders' and consequ.ently found the admission to the courses all wrong, but through its judgment, has jettisoned students who are half-way through their courses and directed fresh admission.,. on new policies yet to be evolved, with little chance of any one geU.ing through the examinations or even admissions during this acaden1ic year.\n\n[78 E-F] F.\n\n3. Whatever might be the passion for correct law and provocation on account of governmental indifference, the Court must use its power to correct error and promo_te order and not strike down an illegal error Without going forward to affirmative action which may minimise injury generally.\n\nThe judicial process, in its creative impulse, must hesitate to scuttle, salvage wherever possible and destroy only when the situation is beyond retrieval.\n\n[79 D-E] .\n\n4. The scheme of reservation or a Paltry 2% for candidates in the whole country outside the two universities of the State has not been substantiated as a sufficient fulfilment of Articles 14 and 15. Fundamental rights of candidates do not depend on the grace of governments and Indians are not, aliens in their own motherland when asking for seats on the score of equal opportunity. A host of goCKi reasons may weigh with the state in formulating prefences, reservations and other cases of choice provided they do not outrage Arts. 14 G and 15, or promote the process of equalisation as a dynamic phase of equality.\n\nWhat is paramount is equal opportunity for each. [81 D-F]\n\nState of Kera/a v. V. M. Thomas, [1976] 2 S.C.C. 310 referred to.\n\n5. Law in action being a healing art, the Court must strive to avoid driving out the students half-way through their course and to see that no costly seat for advanced studies in which the community as a whole has a stake is wasted.\n\nH 'fhe Court should not give up the search for alternatives. {82 E-F]\n\n6. There is nothing unreaonable nor arbitrary in adding 10 marks for holders of a diploma. But to earn this extra 10 marks, the diploma must be\n\n• y .\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA V. C. MATHEW 73\n\nobtained at least on or before the last date for application, nor later. Proof of having obtained a diploma is different from the factum of having got it.\n\nIt is prudent to produce evidence of the diploma alongwith the application, but that is secondary. Relaxation of the date on the first is illegal, not so on the secord. .A.cademic excellence, through a diploma for which extra marks is granted, cannot be denuded because proof is produced only later, yet before the date of acrual selection. The emphasis is on the diploma, the proof thereof subserves lhe factum of possession of the diploma and is not an independent factor. [84 D-F]\n\n7. When a statute vests a public power and conditions the manner of exer. cise of that power then the law insists on that mode of exercise alone. It is unconcerned with that rule. A method of convenience for proving possession of a qualification is merely directory. Moreover, The prospectus itself permits government to modify the method. There is nothing objectionable with the government directive to the selection committee, nor in the communication to the selection committee by the university, nor even in their taking into consideration and giving credit for diplomas although the authentic copies of the diplomas \\Ver~ not. attached to the application for admission._ [86 A-CJ\n\n8. Much of hardship and harassment in Administration flows from overempha>; is on the external rather than the essential. The government and the selection committee rightly treated as directory (not mandatory) the mode of proving the holding of diplomas and as mandatory the actual possession of the diploma. The frustrating delay in getting copies of degree was by-passed by the State Government by two steps. Government informed the selection committee that even if they got proof or marks only after the last date for application:9 bnt before the date for selections they could be taken note of and secondly the Registrars of the Universities informed officially which of the candidates had passed in the diploma course. The selection committee did not violate any mandatory rule nor act arbitrarily by accepting and acting upon these step\" £86 D-GJ\n\n9. The three candidates who had been eventually admitted by the selection committee could not be ousted merely for the reason that the certificate of diploma had not been produced together with the application for admission.\n\nNor, indeed, could government be faulted for issuing a directive to the selection committee that applications from students of the diploma Course could be considered sub-ject to the condition that they would \"produce the. diploma certi\n\nftcate bef•re finalising the selection to post-graduate course\". [87 AB]\n\n10. Though appellant No. 1 bas no legal claim to a seat, the overall circum- !tances. merit compassionate consideration and the Court directed. The Kerala University and the Indian Medical Council directed to permit hin1 to complete\n\nhis ceur::e by adding one more seat, for this year only, to the ophthalmic degree course.\n\nMarginal adustments by increasing one seat more is possible without G injury to academic efficiency. [88 F-H]\n\n11. Directed that the State of Kerala and the Principal of the Trivandrum Medical College, who is the convener of the Selection Committee, as \\.V'ell as the two universities concerned,. admit into the post-graduate ophthalmology cemse Dr. Naomi and Dr. Gopal Krishnan for this year. The two applicants will be accorded admission on their reporting within ten days. [91 E-D J H\n\n-Stote of Kera/a v. Kum. T. P. Roshana [1972] 2 SCR 974 : A. Pcriakaruppan v. State of Tamilnadu [1971] 3 SCR 449 referred to.\n\n6-189 SCl/80\n\n12. The 2% open seats for the candidates from all the Universities of India\n\noutside- Kerala runs counter to the constitutional directive of equal opportunity and the preambuler emphasis on national integrity.\n\nThe State will do well to fashion a formula in terms of the idelines given by this Court in Dr. lagdish Saran's v. Union of India and others, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 831 [91A-G]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 641-644of 1980.\n\nAppeals by Special !Leave from the Judgment and order dated 10-12-1979 of the Kerala High Conrt No. W.A. No. 22/79, W.A. No. 245/79 and O.P. No. 1586/79.\n\nP. Govindan Nair and:A. S. Nambiar for the App, llants in C. A. No. 641 to 643/80.\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and V.J. Francis for the App, Uant in C.A.\n\nNo. 644/80.;\n\nT.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent No.1 in C.As. Nos. 641 to 644/80.)\n\nTne Judgment of the C JUrt was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J., Tiie universities in the country are often among the contributaries to the flood of litigation in the higher courts Of the country. rais pathological condition, to Which the healing attention of the nation's educational leadership. Toe above appeals before us present cb.lllen; is to tlu solum: of a1. mission to post graduate courses in m:dicine in th, CJlleg'; of the Kerala State. But since that State is not alone in the tendency to temporarian with constitutional valu!s and writ p'titioas for college'\" admissions are almost a hardly annual, we d, em it our duty to p'rmit ourselves a few preliminary observations before proceeding to the fact-situation and conflict-resolution.\n\nPrincipled policy, consistent with constitutional imp, ratives (Arts. 14 and 15) must guide admissions to courses in higher professio nal education but Government and Universities, not infrequently take liberties with this larger obligation under provincial pressures and iustitutional compulsions and seek asylum in reluctant pragmatism miudless of hostility to constitutionality. Nothing is more harrowing for the Court, over-burdened with increasing litigation and thereby forced into slow motion, and. unwilling to intervene in an administrative area, than to hamper the strategic stages of educational processes like admissions and examinations, but the Justice system cannot run away from hearing and deciding questions of unconstitutionality, especially !when educationalauthorities shape policies, change rules and make peace with the crisis of the hour, ignoring the parameters of the National Charter. We make these\n\n.~ ..\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v. c. MATHEW(Krishn{l Iyer, J.) 75\n\n-0bservations driven by the painful experience of facing this situation year after year, from State after State. If higher education bids farewell to national vision and equal opportunity-the two fundamental criticisms levelled before us in these cases-what hope is there for constitutionalism save surrender to provincialism and lobby power leaving the fortunes of students of advanced learning to litigative astrology annually ? A national consensus on this issue is long over-due and we venture to suggest that the Union of India will actively involve the academic community and the States, and put the problem on the urgent national agenda and reach solutions constitutionally permissible and agreeable to the genius of the States vis-a-vis post-graduate courses. No State nor University can despise the Constitution nor leave in 'inglorious uncertainty' or myopic ad hocism the career of its talented human resources.\n\nBack to the facts. The Kerala State runs three medical colleges with post-graduate degree and diploma courses in two of its universities Trivandrum and Calicut. The selection is made from among candidates guided by the prospectus issued in this behalf and the Selection Committee makes the selection, the principal of the Medi cal College, Trivandrum, being the convener hereof. A notification inviting applications was published in the Gazette dated 27-2-1979 wherein the last date for receipt of applications was set down as March, 31, 1979. Candidates were considered on the basis of their merit, but the concept of merit was broadened in such manner that marks were allotted for various attributes including mill tary service, membership of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and, were relevant to the point raised in the present case, holding of medi cal diploma. One of the post-graduate courses offered by two of the colleges is in opthalmology and we are concerned directly with the competitive claims among the candidates for this course only. Right at the outset, we wish to make it clear that we con fined ourselves to the comparative merits of the candidates for the post graduate degree course in Opthalmology and do not wish to disturb any other course lest there should be upsets beyond what we intend.\n\nThe competitive marks admittedly provided for 10% to dip Joma-holders in the selection of candidates to M.S. and M.D. courses in the respective subjects or subspecialities. We are not concerned with the other aspects of the selection process such as percentages in favour of candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and tribes (10 %). Again, 20 % of the seats were set apart for the teaching staff in the medical colleges.\n\nOne of the bones of contention between the parties in the High Court related to candidates from universities outside Kerala.\n\nArticles 14 and 15 do not recognise state frontiers or the cult of 'the \"sons of the soil', if we may speak generally ar.d ever-simplistically. The necessary implication of the constitutional mandate is that every basic degree-holder who fills the bill can apply for admission for post-graduate courses. But t)le Kerala State, in its wisdom, provided a niggardly quota of 2 % of the total number of seats for candidates from the entire countcy. minus Kerala-not a catholic approach informed by nationalist generosity, if we may say so with ; some trepedition. By way of aside we may ob\n\nserve that other States, observed with provincial impulses, are equally parsimonious is no validation of a violation of law, if it be so. Anyway, the prospectus provided that \"instead of open competition, 2 % of the seats under general merit are set apart for candidates coming from out side Univerities other than Kerala and\n\nCalicut.\"\n\nAnother facet of the forensic right before the High Court needs to be mentioned before we proceed to a formulation of the issues debated in thls Court. While clause 12 of the prospectus frowns upcn late ard/cr cldccti\\e £tplicaticm, clrnfe 13 ftatcs : Certificates to be prcdtcrd :-In all ca<es true copies of the following documents have to beprcduced :- xx xx xx]\n\n(k) Any other certifcates required along with the application.\n\nClause 13 in the form of application for admission contains an explanation which deserves mention in this context : NB : Attested copies of the statement of marks at each professional examination and those of othe1: documents should be attached with every application.\n\nHere also specify whether a diploma holder or having Military service or Rural service and also whether certificates to this effect have been produced. (emphasis added)\n\nWhile the prospectus is a fairly comprehensive repository of of the directions issued by the State Government in regard to the selection of candidates, the opening passage in paragraph 4 thereof contains the following statement :\n\n\"The selection of candidates will be made according to G.O. Ms. 280/76/HD dated 14-7-1976 as modified from time to time which shall be deemed to have incorporated ibid\"\n\nCHARLES K. SKAR!A v. c. MATHEW(Krishna Iyer, J.) 77\n\n(This power to modify is not arbitrary and can be exercised only reasonably). Apparently in exercise tof this power and making a realistic appraisal of the examination-situation in the Calicut and Kerala universities, the Special Secretary to Government issued a communication to the Selection Committee, the operative portion whereof has relevance to the discussion that is to follow : It is noted that the result of the Diploma Course. conducted in Medical College, Calicut will be published before the last date for the receipt of application to the post-graduate course, while the result of the students of Medical College, Trivandrum wiU not be available before the last date for receipt of appliation to post-graudate course.\n\nThus the students of Medical College Trivandrum are placed at a disadvantage, I am therefore to inform you that it has been decided that applications from the students of the Diploma Course, Trivandrum may also be considered and that [10% weightage may be given to the post graduate students of Diploma course in Medical College Trivandrum, subject to the condition that they will [produce the [Diploma Certificate before finalising the selection to post-graduate course.\n\nThe learned single Judge who had specially examined the Government file in this connection, with an eye on the legitimacy of the processes involved and the sufficiency of the notings and consultations made, came to the conclusion that the r communication never represented the decision of the Government and was in conformity with Secretariat practice. The learned single Judge summed up his view thus : There is thus no inherent lacuna or illegality in the proceedings which led to Ext. P3. I hold that Ext. P3 was validly issued.\n\nNothing presented to us persuades to a contrary view although we may presently advert to what, with a slant, the Full Bench of the High Court had to say, in appeal, on this aspect of the matter Mistrust of Government, implicit in the judgment of the Full Bench in appeal, is violative of comity between instrumentalities and is not permissible unless substantiated by facts, It has been well said that susp1c1on is ; the upas tree under whose shade reason fails and justice dies. We permit ourselves these ob; ervatio:i.; oJ.ly biau; e th: lem1:i C!iief '.Justic: wil.o spJke for j the Full B:nch did use words which did not indict but did suspect:\n\n_ B\n\nWe wish to record lthat it was stated for Respondents 4 and 5 in W.A. No, 222 and 245 of 1979 [that the marks of the Diploma Test were communicated to the principals on J before the last date for receipt of applications and received by them on :31-3-1979, There\n\nwa~ nothing to show whether [the communication was an open or an authenticated one and we are _doubtful to say no more whether at acquisition of qualification for eligibility and weightage, ![subsequent to the last date for application can save an [applicant who did not have these on_the said date. We ; are clear that Ext. P3 :cannot have the effect of overriding [the effect of clauses 12 and 13\n\n(k) of the Prospectus.]\n\n,(emphasis supplied)' We will scan the soundness of this criticism in due course.~\n\nIt is fair to state now that we have sketched the backdrop, what the further facts are and what the High Court's verdict is.\n\nWe may abbreviate the narration because we substantially agree with the main legal point decided by the High Court. Regrettably, its ultimate direction has thrown the academic year in post-gradute Opthalmology into disarray and even wastage, Welfare-oriented judicial process must be constructive in its objective, must be geared to: order as its goal and must pave the way for resultant contentment, avoiding negative writs which, in practice, prove to be congealing commands, Indeed, the High Court, on the crucial question, has more or less correctly stated the law regarding denial of opportunity for 'outsiders' and consequently found the admission to the courses all wrong, but through its judgment, has jettisoned students who are half-way through their courses and directed fresh admissions on new policies yet to be evolved, with little chance of any one getting through the examinations or even admissions during this academic year consistently with the university regulations and governmental tardiness. We cannot countenance such negativity without some effort at rescue through the court writ since a whole year of opthalmology study at the post•\n\ngraduate level may well be lost to the State, what with the enormous investment in running such courses that the universities have laid out and the people's need for such specialists, The ~Full Bench decision of the High Court, in its '.ultimate effect, has left behind it a fallout of demolition : As a result of our above discussion and conclusion _ we allow N.A. No, 222 of 1979 and set aside the judgment of the learned Judge and the rank list for admission to\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v. c. MATHEW(Krishna Iyer, !.) 79\n\nthe post-graduate courses in Opthalmology, and quash the selections made on the basis of the said list.\n\nWe were rather distressed at having to quash the selections of budding youngsters to the specialised courses. Such thoughts prevailed with us in the Full Bench decision in State of Kera/a and Anr. v. Rafla Rahim (1978 KLT 369). While the petitioners in those cases won the battle, they were denied the fruits of victory.\n\nWe see no ground for a repetition of the same treatment to the petitioners before us. Particularly it is so, because some of them had filed the writ petitions before the selections, and some had obtained interim orders that the selections shall be finalised only subject to the result of the\n\nwrit petitions in this court. We cannot lightly pass over these aspects.\n\nWe would accordingly quash the selections made and directly a fresh selection to the courses, in accordance with law and in the light of the observation contained\n\nin this judgment.j Whatever might be the passion for correct Jaw . and provocation on account of r governmental indifference, the court, in our view, must use its p.ower to correct error and promote order and not strike down an illegal error without going forward to affirmative action which may minimise injury generally. Indeed, the judicial process, in its creative impulse, must hesitate to scuttle, salvage wherever possible and destroy only [when the situation is be)lond retrieval-life-giving facts forgotten by the High Court when quashing the admissions for the year. This positive perspective justifies the final\n\ndincticn that we frrne in the ccrckding rara cf this jccgn:rnt, if we may anticipate the nature of the relief we have moulded.\n\nSome more facts may now be narrated merely to illumine the ground on which we are disposing of these appeals. Indeed, our anxiety to hasten the pace of justice and reduce the damage to the courses under way has persuaded us into hearing full arguments at the earliest stage conceivable. Having recently discussed a similar issue in Dr. Jagadish Saran's case (1) we desist from elaborately examining the merits of one of the major issues raised here. Abridged facts, condensed examination and brief directions will suffice, although arguments have been full and helpful.\n\nThe number of seats for the post-graduate degree course in Opthalmology available for the year 1979-80 was six, of which one belonged H\n\n(!) [198012 s.c.R. 831\n\nto a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidate, another to a tutGr working in a medical college. Tae State was left with four seats.\n\nThe High Court has clarified th1t one of the stu:bnts, Dr. Gopimthan N1ir, wis so m!ritorio1; that no,, chatleng>d his admission.\n\nThree seats and six contenders, was the musical chair !cenario.\n\nThe story thus begins with three seats for post-graduate opthalmology and the whole exercise is confined to allotment of these seats in conformity with the equal op?ortunity rule which is constitutionally inviolable. The seleCtion committee, acting on the gaidelines, had to award 10 marks extra for those who had a post-graduate diplom>-1 reasonable .recognition of an additional accomplishment relevant to the object of excellence in the pnt-graduate degree course. So, no one has attacked the propriety of this addition.\n\nOn the contrary, both sides have relied on this qualification, the battle being over the subiidiary issue of whether the appellants before us, whose admission to the courses has been undone by the High Court were entitled to reckon in their favour the possession of a diploma the certificate for which was issued to them only after the last date for applications for the post-graduate degree. We. will presently state the events which give rise to this argument. Right or wrong, the Selection C):nn'ttee did admit three students who undoubtedly p)mssed diplo:nll ani, if th' m1rks eligible on that score were to be tacked on, the selections were unassailable except at. the instance of candidates from univmities outside Kerala and\n\n- one of wJ.o:n did .suoce>sfully ch1\\lenge the selections b>fore the High\n\nCourt.'\n\nHad the final shape of the High Court's order been left int'.\\ct it would have meant tbt all those doing their course would be out and the elaborate process of framing fresh rules would iuvolve discussion and debate, consultation and formulation, and then invitation for ap; ilications, only to fild that, at the end of this e'\\cunion, everybody has missed the bus since time does nJt stand sti'l until government implements the High Court's will.\n\nThe major target of attack before the High Court was the 2 % reservation for the entire country's candidate pJp'.llation from outside Kerala in what w1s c11ie; i the \"op:n mJrit pJol\". TO.: r01.sQn for the nullilication of the pmimo'1ious 'percentage for '0·1t;1de' candidates in the op!n m erifpool has p:en stated by the High Court\n\nthus : Despite our anxiety, we are afraid we cannot salvage the principle of selection introduced by the. GJVern m; it\n\nunder clause 5(c) as a'llounting to a rat10nal clasS1fi\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA-v. c. MATHEW(Krishna Iyer,!.) 81\n\ncation based on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be served. Whether intentionally or otherwise, it strikes us as clever device to oust the 'outside' University Graduates from the general merit pool and to confine them to an illusory scheme of reservations.\n\nWe have dealt with the policy of institutional reservations paring down the availability of seats for candidates from other universities, in Dr. Jagadish Saran's case (supra).\n\nAlthough in that decision we 1tltimately desisted from striking down the formula adopted by the Delhi University with a view to avoiding a stalemate for the year, we did direct that University to reconsider the whole problem of admissions and reservations in terms of Arts. 14 and 15 and concretise the constitutional guidelines in that behalf. Having regara to the ratio in the above case, we are not inclined to reverse the view of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the judg ment under appeal in so far as it has taken the view extracted above.\n\nEven so, we feel the need to pursue the matter further because we must design the relief with the least disturbance and not annul the ccurse for the year as a legal consequence.\n\nThe scheme of reservation of a paltry 2 % for candidates in the w role country outside the two universities of the State has not been substantiated as sufficient fulfilment of Arts. 14 and 15. Fundamental rights of candidates do not depend on -the grace of goverii::' ments and Indians are not aliens in their own motherland when asking for seats on the score of equal opportunity. A host of good reasons may weigh with the State in formulating preferences, reservations and other cases of choice provided they do not outrage Arts'.'14' and 15, or, indeed, as suggested by this Court in the Thomas case(J.) may promote the process of equalisation as a dynamic phase of equality. What is paramount is equal opportunity for each.\n\nThe Government, in its wisdom, made provision !for scheduled castes/tribes, backward classes, students from the colleges of Kerala and other categories and, after working out these enclaves of exclusivism and immunity from national competition on sheer merit, wound up with a magnificent 2 % of the total seats by way of homage to \"equal opportunity\" open to all Indian candidates put together (less Kerala candidates).\n\nCan it be that, while sloganising against the parochial doctrine of \"sons of the soil\", States policy in higher education does not .concede'.more than 2% to Indian candidates qua Indians who are\n\n(I) Kera/av. N. M. Thomas, [1976] 2 S.C. C. JJO.\n\nnot otherwise sheltered by the dykes of reservations ? The High Court was obviously dissatisfied twith the governmental policy\n\nof 2% for \"open\"' seats which was more a mockery of national integrity, read with equal opportunity, than a sincere respect for the foundational faith enshrined in Arts. 14 and 15. You cannot lay wreath and claim to garland if we may put the point in poignant imagery. Therefore, the High Court struck down the formula for selection because it regarded that a higher proportion of seats for all in \"open competition\" was a constitutional necessity. We do not delve into this aspect at greater length or scan the pros and cons of the point canvassed because we have already decided in Dr. Jagadish Saran and Ors. v. Union of India (Supra) what guidelines should govern admissions to medical colleges at the higher levels. We, therefore, do not propose to interfere with the holding of the High Court that 2 % for \"outsiders\" is not sustainable in law. But, we must, even here, caution the Kerala State that an enlightened policy of admission to institutions of higher studies in harmony with the constitution must be formulated if it is not to be guilty of contributing to the confusion in college campuses and \"student litigation\" which paralyse educational life.\n\nEven though we desist from demolishing the reasoning of the High Court on the trivial 2 %, we cannot appreciate the negative stance or note of nullity adopted in the final relief. Remedial jurisprudence is benign judge power. Law in action being a healing art, we must strive to avoid driving out the students half-way through their course and to see that no costly seat for advanced studies in which the community as a whole has a stake is wasted. We do not think the court should give up the search for alternatives. Actually, we persuaded counsel on both sides to make a constructive approach. So viewed, it became feasible for us to reach a reasonable and viable solution to the problem, as will be presently explained. ___..l In conclusion, we agree with the High Court that 2 % in the 'merit pool' for 'outside' candidates is not shown to be rational and so the 'outsider candidates (to use the High Court's expression) should have been considered even beyond 2 %. But how far and under what conditions is for the State to consider. (see Dr. Jagdish Saran, supra).\n\nNow we come up against the other limb of the argument which appealed to the High Court. The three candidates already admitted to the Opthalmology course secured their. seats on the basis of 'diploma marks'. Had they no diplomas they would have been screened out.\n\nH The High Court.has taken the view that the diplomas of the appellants should have been excluded from consideration by the Selection Committee. Why? The ground is given by the Full Bench in appeal thus:\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v. c. MATHEW(Krishna Iyer, J.) 83\n\nUnder clause 13(k) of the application form, which we have extracted earlier, all certificates required had to be produced with the application. Clause 12 enjoins summary rejection for non-compliance. All of which, only\n\neem to indicate that the diploma certificate of weightage must accompany the application. Where it did not, as in this case, accompany the application, there was no right in the Government or special Secretary to over look the defect and direct the weightage to be given even to those who did not have the diploma as was attempted to be done by Ext. P3 letter referred to earlier. Assuming, without deciding that the 'Prospectus' and the notification ware a 'law' we would remind ourselves of the caution administered by the Supreme Court that an unannounced law like Ext. P3 cannot bind, and that it is against the principles of natural justice to penalise a citizen on such 'law vide Har/a v. State of Rajasthan (AIR\n\n1951) SC 467.\n\nIf acquisition of qualification for eligibility or weightage were to be looked into subsequent to the last date, we should think that only an open and official or authentic declaration of result by the university, or perhaps on official intimation of declaration of result alone can serve the purpose. The direction in Ext. P3 to give weightage to the Kerala University graduates would certainly not serve the purpose, and was wrong and illegal and has vitiated the selection.\n\nBluntly expressed, the comt took the rather pharisaic view that \"the diploma certificate for weightage must accompany the application. Where h did not, as in this case, accompany the application there was no right in the government or Special Secretary to overlook the defect and direct the weightage to be given even to those who did not have the diploma as was accepted to be done by Ext. P3 letter referred to earlier\". An oblique suggesfoi; that the Government Secretary's communication was not authentic and, therefore, invalid is also part of the reasoning of the learned judges. With great deference, we express our difference~ It is common case that the diploma holding students who had been given admission to. post-graduate opthalmology by the selection committee had secured higher marks than the diploma-holding students who had been refused admission by that committee. But the High Court cancelled the marks awarded to the three students who had been granted admission by the selection committee on round that their diploma certificates were not obtained before\n\nthe last date of application, the intimation to the selection committee by the Secretary to Government was 'unlaw', and. there- -fore, the special marks added to their score had to be deleted. If this stand of the High Court were right, the three students who were currently doing their course would have to get out and since the entire selection had formally been set aside, no one also w@uld be able to get any admission until revised rules were made. The upshot would be that the three seats available for higher opthalmology would be wholly wasted and the 'losers would be the students and the State. Should this be ? We think not.\n\nThe real reason, apart from' some suspicion, which weighed with the High Court in disregarding the diplomas was that the prospectus and the prescriptions there in were law and could not be deviated from even a wee-bit and, therefore, the non-production of the certified copies of the diplomas along with the applications for admission excluded the candidates from eligibility to the addition of 10 marks. Even if it were not law,\n\nan official declaration of university results, not official communication to the selection . committee would be essential. In our view, this over-stress on literality undermines the substantiality of the guidelines in the prospectus. Here the learned single Judge was right. ...\n\nThere is nothing unreasonable nor arbitrary in adding 10 marks for holders of a diploma. But to earn this extra IO marks, the diploma mnst be obtained at least on\"or before the last date for application, not later.\n\nProof of having obtainedia diploma is different from the factum of having got it. Has the candidate, in fact, secured a diploma before the final date of application for admission t0 i'he degree course ? That is the primary qnestion. It is prudent to produce evidence of the diploma along with the application, but that is secondary. Relaxation of the date on the first is illegal, not so on the second. Academic excellence, through a diploma for whic1' extra mark is granted, cannot be denuded because proof is produced only later, yet before the date of actual se/ection. The emphasis is 011 the diploma, the proof thereof subsetves the factum of possession of the diploma and is not an independent factor.\n\nThe prospectus does say: (4)(b) : 10% to Diploma holders in the selection of candidates to M.S., and M.D., courses in the respective subjects or sub-specialities.\n\n13. Certificates to be produced :--:- In all cases true copies of the following documents have to be produced :- xx xx\n\n(k) Any other cetificates required along with application.\n\nxx the\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v. c. MATHEW(Krishna Iyer, !.) 85\n\nThis composite statement cannot be read formalistic fashion. Mode of proof is geared to the goal of the qualification in question. It is su bYersive of sound interpretation and realistic decoding of the JO!escription to telescope the two and make both mandatory in point of time. What is essential in the possession of a diploma before the gi•ien date; what is ancillary is the safe mode of proof of the qualification. To confuse between fact and its proof is blurred perspicacity. To make mandatory .the date of acquiring the additional qualification before the last date for application makes sense. But if it is unshakeably shown that the qualification has been acquired before the relevant date, as is the case here, to invalidate)his merit factor because proof, though indubitable, was adduced a few days later but before the selection.\" or Un a manner not mentioned in the prospectus, but still above board, is to make procedure not the hand made but the mistress and form not as subservient to substance but as superior to the essence.\n\nBefore the selection committee adds special marks to a candidate based on a prescribed ground it asks itself the primary question : has he the requisite qualification? If he has the marks must be added.\n\nThe manner of proving the qualification is indicated and should ordinarily be adopted. But, if the candidate convincingly establishes the ground, though through a method different from the specified one, he cannot be denied the benefit. The end cannot be nndermined by the means. Actual excellence cannot be obliterated by the choice of an incontestable but unorthodox probative process. Equity shall overpower technicality where human justice is at stake.\n\nThe present case is a capital illustration of nominalism battling with realism for judicial success. Both sides admit that the appellants before us had secured diplomas. They further admit (ignoring for a moment the submission on 2% for outsiders) that if the diploma scores were added1 the applicants, by the measure of marks; deserve to be selected. provided the diploma obtained in the examination held in 1979 is within time. Then, why did the High Court upset their selection? Because the certificates of diploma were not attached to the applications and communication by the Registrar of the University to the selection committee was an unauthorised mode of proof, deviating from the, prospectus, though authentic in fact. Two flaws vitiate this , erbally virtuous approach. True the prospectus directs that certificates shall be produced along with the applications for admission. The purpose obviously is to have instant proof of the qualificat10n.\n\nI We are aware that when a statute vests a pubhc power and conditions the manner of exercise of that power than the law insists on that mode of exercise alone. We are here unconcerned with that rnle. A method of convenience for proving possession of a qualification is merely directory. Moreover, the prospectus itself permits government to modify the method, as the leanred single Judge, has pointed out. In this view, we see nothing objectionable with the government directive to the' selection committee, no( in the communication to the selection committee by; the university, nor even in their taking)nto consideration and giving credit for diplomas although the authentic copies of the diplomas were not attached to the application for admission. A hundred examples of absurd consequences can be given if the]substance of the matter was to be sacrificed for mere form and prescriptions regarding procedures.\n\nIt is notorious that this formalistic, ritualistic, approach is un realistic and is unwittingly; traumatic, unjust and subversive\"'of the purpose of the exercise. This way of viewing problems dehumanise& the \"administrative, judicial and even legislative processes in the wider perspective'of law for man andnot)man for law. Much of hardship and harassmant in~Administration flows from over-emphasis on the external rther than' the essential. We'thinkjth(governmentand the selection committee rightly treated as directory (not mandatory) the mode of proving the holding of diplomas?and an mandatory the actual possession of the diploma. In actual life, we know how exasperatingly dilatory it is to get copies of degrees, decrees and deeds, not to speak of other authenticated documents like mark-lists from universities, why, even bail orders from courts and government orders from public offices. This frnstrating delay was by-passed by the State Government in the present case by two steps. Government in formed the selection committee that even if they got proof of marks only after the last date for applications but before the date for selections they could be taken note of and secondly the Registrars of the Universities informed officia!y which of the candidates had passed in the diploma course. The selection committee did not violate any mandatory rnle nor act arbitrarily by accepting and act ing upon these steps. Had there been anything dubious, shady or unfair abont the procedure or any ma/a fide move in the official exercises we would never have tolerated deviations. But a prospectus is not scripture and commonsense is not inimical to inter preting and applying the guidelines therein. Once this position is plain the addition of special marks was basic justice to proficiency measured by marks.\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v. c. MATHEW (Krishna Iyer, J.) 87\n\nWe thus reach the conclusion that the three candidates who had been eventually admitted by the selection committee could not be ousted merely for the reason that the certificate of diploma had not been produced together with the application for admission. Nor, indeed, could government be faulted for issuing a directive to the selection committee . that applications from students of the diploma course could be considered subject to the condition that they would \"pro.duce the diploma certificates before finalising the selection to post-graduate courses\". The equity of this instruction of the government comes into bold relief when we realise that no party in this Court has a case that the candidates admitted by the selection committee did not secure a diploma in opthalmology.\n\nEven so, there is a snag. Who are the diploma-holders eligible .for 10 extra marks ? Only those who, at least by the final date for making applications for admissions possess the diploma. Acquisition of a diploma later may qualify him later, not this year. Otherwise, the dateline makes no sense. So, the short question is when can a candidate claim to have got a diploma? When he has done all that he has to do and the result of it is officially made known by the .concerned authority. An examinee for a degree or diploma must\n\ncomp/et; his examination-written, oral or practical-before he can tell the selection committee or the court that he has done his part.\n\nEven this is not enough. If all goes well after that, he cannot be credited with the title to the degree if the results are announced only .after the last date for applications but before selection. The second condition precedent must also be fulfilled, viz., the official communication of the result before the selection and its being brought to the ken of the committee in an authentic manner. May be, the eimmination is cancelled or the marks of the candidates are withheld. He acquires the degree or diploma only when the results are officially made known.\n\nUntil then his qualification is inchoate.\n\nBut once these events happen his qualification can be taken into account in evaluation of equal opportunity ; provided the selection committee has the result before it at the time of-not after-the selection is over. To sum up, the applicant for post-graduate degree course earns the right to the added advantage of diploma only if (a) he has completed the diploma examination on or before the last date for the application, (b) the result of the examination is also published before that date, and (c) the candidate's success in the diploma course is brought to the knowledge of the selection committee before completion of selection in an authentic or acceptable manner. The prescription in the prospectus that a certificate of the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\ncious or unveracious touch about th(process.\n\nJudged by the above tests it is conceded that while the Calicut University's diploma-holders had completed their examination before the last date for M.D. applications and produced the certificate before the selection, the Kerala University diploma-holder completed his diploma examination including public action of results only after the last date for applications and,'. produced the certificate before the selection. By this token he is ineligible for admission because his diploma result was published only after the last date for applications. The accident of time has cheated him even as in human affairs generally, be it individual or collective, fortune ebbS:and flows, influenced critically by happenstances of time and circumstances of life. That is the relativity of Life, if one may look at problems philosophically. We, therefore, hold that appellant Nos. 2 & 3 are entitled to admission and their appeal must succeed. By the same token the appeal of appellant No. one must be dismissed.\n\nTo dismiss an appeal is merely to declare that judicial remedy will not issue and not that by other processes justice should not be sought or granted. From the humane perspective and with a view to helping appellant No. one and to pursue his relief through the University or other appropriate State agency, we directed the impleadment of the Indian Medical Council which is the statutory body concerned, at the national level, with higher medical degrees and courses.\n\nThe Medical Council has not appeared before the court though its presence would have helped the forensic process to heal the fractured academic course. But we cannot wait longer. It behoves the State to give academic justice-not legal remedy-to appellant No. 1 if circumstances permit, having regard to the fact that, with diploma qualification, he has spent months iu doing liis\n\nopthalmology degree course. In law he fails, in justice he need not, if marginal adjustments:by increasing one seat more were possible without injury to academic efficiency. What we mean is that though\n\n• •\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v. c. MATHEW (Krishna Iyer, J.) 89\n\nappellant No. I has no legal claim to a seat, the overall circumstances A will merit compassionate consideration, and we direct the Kerala University and the Indian Medical Council to permit him to complete his course by adding one more seat, for this year only, to the Opthalmic degree course.\n\nOn this basis there is one seat vacant in the Trivandrum Medical a College. To whom should it be allotted? There are three 'outsiders' and there is one seat available.\n\nOrdinarily, the best applicant is one who bas the highest marks and the seat must be awarded to her i.e.\n\nDr. Naomi J. Vettath.\n\nShe has not filed any writ petition although denied admission. Among the three only Dr. Gopalakrishnan has chosen to challenge the rejection of admission. So Sri T.S. Klishna- C murthy Iyer contends that the only seat available for allotment should be confirmed to the only applicant who has cared to challenge by writ petition and those who have not cared to impugn the admission scheme in c0urt should be ignored as having given up the pursuit.\n\nShri T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer relies on the ruling in A. Periakaruppan v. State ofTami!nadu (1) to support his special plea to award the seat to Dr. Goppala Krishnan, who has got less marks than the non-litigant Dr Naomi. Hegde, J in the above case did observe ;\n\nThere are about 80 persons, who, we are told, are in the waiting list. Some of the unsuccessful applicants\n\nhad moved the High Court of Madras for relief similar to E that sought by the petitioners herein. But it appears, their writ petiti0ns have been dismissed. Some out of them have intervened in the petitions. Other non-selected candidates have evinced no interest in challenging the selections made. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that they have abandoned their claim and it is too late for them to press their claim. ·\n\nCertainly, this limited approach strengthens the submission of Shri Krishnamurthy Iyer. The force of the reasoning in Periakaruppan'e case ('upra) consists in the probability that a party who does not litigate manifests apathy for the enforcement of his G rights. The logic is simple. He who . does not promptly pursue his remedy may reasonably be assumed to have lost interest in gaining admission to the course. If this were a universal prop0sition, Dr.\n\nGopalo krisbnan could be allotted the only vacant seat. But, on a suggestion from tli.e court, the Principal of the Medical College, Trivandrum ascertained the wishes of Dr. Naomi J. Vettath and Dr.\n\n\n7-189SCI/80\n\nJoggy Joseph who are diploma-holders from universities outside Kerala and are currently working as doctors in hospitals. Dr.\n\nGopalakrishnan unlike the two others, is working as an opthalmologist in a private hospital. All the three have indicated their wish to continue in the post-graduate degree course in opthalmology when the Principal enquired of them, although only Dr. Gopalokrishnan has chosen to assert his rights in court.\n\nIn this dilemma, we consider that while the observations inPeriakaruppan's~ case (supra) are entitled to great weight, it is conceivable that Dr. Naomi who has out-distanced the other two in marks and is desirous of joining the post-graduates course might have been prevented by indigence from litigating for her right. Such a bright ---{ student who has much more merit than the other two should not suffer for the sole reason that she has not come to court. This ground does not operate in favour of Dr. Joggy Joseph who has a slight edge over Dr. Gopalakrishnan and is in general practice, not in opthalmology, nor has he chosen to challenge the selection, in short, while we should be guided by the observations in Periakaruppan's case (supra) we are reluctant to overlook the superior claim of Dr. Naomi. While transfixed between these two candidates-Dr. Naomi and Dr.\n\nGopalakrishnan-for the one seat that is available, we were given to understand by Shri Abdul Khadar appearing for the State that very probably there will be facilities enough in the Medical Co!Jege, Tri- ~- vandrum and Medical College, Calicut to accommodate one extra candidate in the opthalmology course if it were to be confined to this year as a special case. The only other agency which has a voice in this matter is the Indian Medical Council which is a party before -us but even after repeated notices has not indicated its willingness to appear. We think that a practical course which will meet the ends of justice, following the reasoning in Pariakaruppan's case (supra) and the realistic approach made in State of Kerala v. j~ Kumari T.P. Roshana and Anr. (1.) will be to direct the.Principals of the two medical colleges, viz., Trivandrum and Calicut together to accommodate two more candidates in the postgraduate degree course fa opthalmology for this year ..\n\nShri Abdul Kadar, counsel for the State, after taking time to consult his client made a statement in Court that so far as the.\n\nState Government is concerned, they are willing to take in, for the post-graduate opthalmology course for this year, two more candidates in the Medical College, Trivandrum and the Medical College, Calicut together.\n\nThis means that the Government is\n\n\nCHARLES K. SKARIA v. c. MATHEW (Krishna Iyer, J.) 91\n\nsatisfied that, as a special case, sufficient facilities can be found for accommodating Dr. Naomi and Dr. Gopalakrishnan. The Tndian Medical Council appeared in Court through one of its officers after a notice was issued to it 'explaining the purpose for which that Council was being summoned, namely, to tell the Court whether, from a technical angle, it would be feasible to direct two more candidates. to be absorbed in the post-graduate opthamology course. The officer, on behalf of the Indian Medical Council stated that from the point of view of the Medical Council there was no objection to that course and it would concept to such additional accommodation of :two candidates if the Court felt it just to do so.\n\nWe, therefore, direct the State of Kerala and the Principal of the Trivandrum Medical College, who is the convener of the Selection Committee, as well as the two Universities concerned, to admit into the post-graduate opthalmology course Dr. Naomi and Dr. Go pal akrishnan for this year. The two applicants will report within 10 days from today for such admission and the admission will be accorded to them.\n\nThe Principal of the Trivandrum Medical College will inform Dr. Naomi about this direction of the\n\nCourt.\n\nLast there should b! any further confusion ; we make it ; c1ear th1t the twJ c1uid1t,3 waJ aooJrding to o:rr earlb direction will continu' th, ir cJum, will nJt b, foturb, d.\n\nDr. Skaria .who got hi' diploma frJ:n th' Trivanirrim M:dical CJlbge will be permittea' to continue in th' lig'lt of th! o:n; nnioute con; iderations we have earlier mentioned.\n\nTo conclude, we hold that the 2 % open seats for the candidates from all the Universities of India outside Kerala runs counter to the constitutional directive of equal opportunity and the preambular emphasis .on national integrity and the State will do well to fashlon a formula in:t:rmi'of theguidelines '?iven in Dr. Jagdislz Saran's Case (1).\n\nAfter all, Imes of poetry may drive home rules of constitutionality vigorously (2)\n\nPity the nation\n\nDivided into fragments\n\nEach fragment deeming itself a nation. ----- (!) Writ Petition No. 214of1979 decided on ,28-1-1980.\n\n(2) Khalil Gibran.\n\nAlthough the selection formula may be bad for violation of Art. 14, it is possible to reconstruct for this year a practical admission formula. That is precisely what we have done, overruling the High Court's approach which, in our view but with all respect, is a little too pedantic. In the result, the appellants 2 and 3 who took their diploma from the Medical College, Calicut will be entitled to continue their course. Appellant No. I will move the two universities, the Indian Medical Council and the Kerala Government for permission to continue his studies in the exigencies of the case and in the light of the observations we have made above. Dr. Naomi and Dr. Gopalakrishnan will be assigned a seat each in one or other two Medical Colleges by the Principal of the Medical College, Trivandrum who is the convener of the selection committee.\n\nFinally, we make it clear once again that the only branch which has fa1len for our examination is the degree course in Opthalmology. No other department or course is sought to be upset.\n\nThe Court is not a bull in a china shop and we restrict the order D we have made to the solitary department of Opthalmology and wish to leave undisturbed all the other studies in progress.\n\nWe must express our distress at being driven to patch-work solutions because of the academic crisis created by the State in working out its programme of selection and hope that time will not he lost '\\ £ in giving a fresh and fundamental look at the problem so that litigative history may not repeat itself.\n\nN.K.A.\n\n-~·.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "CHARLES K. SKARIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHARLES K. SKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. MATHEW", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. MATHEW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Trivandrum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 466, "end_char": 476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala State runs three medical colleges with post-graduate degree and diploma courses in two of its Universities (Trivandrum and Calicut)."}}, {"text": "Calicut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 481, "end_char": 488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala State runs three medical colleges with post-graduate degree and diploma courses in two of its Universities (Trivandrum and Calicut)."}}, {"text": "C.\n\nMedical College, Trivandrum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal of the C.\n\nMedical College, Trivandrum.,"}}, {"text": "27-2-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 786, "end_char": 795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification inviting applications was published in the Gazette dated 27-2-1979 wherein the last date for receipt of application for the post graduate course in ophthalmology was set down as March 31, 1979."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 907, "end_char": 921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification inviting applications was published in the Gazette dated 27-2-1979 wherein the last date for receipt of application for the post graduate course in ophthalmology was set down as March 31, 1979."}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1300, "end_char": 1312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala State provided a quota of 2 % of the total number of seats for candidates from the entire country minus Kerala."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1411, "end_char": 1417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala State provided a quota of 2 % of the total number of seats for candidates from the entire country minus Kerala."}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1426, "end_char": 1435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1505, "end_char": 1514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Medical College, Trivandrum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1838, "end_char": 1865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Secretary to the State Government in a communication to the Selection Committee informed that as the result of the Diploma Course conducted by the Medical College, Trivandrum would not be available before the\n\nla~ date for the receipt of applications, 10% weightage may be given to the concerned applicants, subject 'to the condition of production of the Diploma Certificate before finalisation of the selection to the post-graduate course."}}, {"text": "Schedule C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2270, "end_char": 2280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gopinathan Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2471, "end_char": 2486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Writ Petition, the High Court held that one of the students, Dr.\n\nGopinathan Nair, was so meritorious that none challenged his admission, and that there was no inherent lacuna or illegality in the communication Ex P 3 of the Special Secretary to the Selection Committee."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3175, "end_char": 3193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CHARLES K. SKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6729, "end_char": 6746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHARLES K. SKARIA V. C. MATHEW 73\n\nobtained at least on or before the last date for application, nor later.", "canonical_name": "CHARLES K. SKARIA"}}, {"text": "Kerala University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9630, "end_char": 9647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Kerala University and the Indian Medical Council directed to permit hin1 to complete\n\nhis ceur::e by adding one more seat, for this year only, to the ophthalmic degree course."}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9940, "end_char": 9955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Directed that the State of Kerala and the Principal of the Trivandrum Medical College, who is the convener of the Selection Committee, as \\.V'ell as the two universities concerned,."}}, {"text": "Trivandrum Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9981, "end_char": 10007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Directed that the State of Kerala and the Principal of the Trivandrum Medical College, who is the convener of the Selection Committee, as \\.V'ell as the two universities concerned,."}}, {"text": "Naomi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10157, "end_char": 10162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "admit into the post-graduate ophthalmology cemse Dr. Naomi and Dr. Gopal Krishnan for this year."}}, {"text": "Gopal Krishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10171, "end_char": 10185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "admit into the post-graduate ophthalmology cemse Dr. Naomi and Dr. Gopal Krishnan for this year.", "canonical_name": "Goppala Krishnan"}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 SCR 974", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10335, "end_char": 10351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 3 SCR 449", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10393, "end_char": 10409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 S.C.R. 831", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10791, "end_char": 10810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and:A. S. Nambiar for the App, llants in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "A. S. Nambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11061, "end_char": 11074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and:A. S. Nambiar for the App, llants in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "M.M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11124, "end_char": 11141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader and V.J. Francis for the App, Uant in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "V.J. Francis", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11146, "end_char": 11158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader and V.J. Francis for the App, Uant in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11200, "end_char": 11224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent No.1 in C.As.", "canonical_name": "T.S. Klishna- C murthy Iyer"}}, {"text": "N. Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11229, "end_char": 11242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondent No.1 in C.As."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11343, "end_char": 11355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tne Judgment of the C JUrt was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J., Tiie universities in the country are often among the contributaries to the flood of litigation in the higher courts Of the country."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12110, "end_char": 12125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13552, "end_char": 13566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A national consensus on this issue is long over-due and we venture to suggest that the Union of India will actively involve the academic community and the States, and put the problem on the urgent national agenda and reach solutions constitutionally permissible and agreeable to the genius of the States vis-a-vis post-graduate courses."}}, {"text": "Medi cal College, Trivandrum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14280, "end_char": 14308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The selection is made from among candidates guided by the prospectus issued in this behalf and the Selection Committee makes the selection, the principal of the Medi cal College, Trivandrum, being the convener hereof."}}, {"text": "March, 31, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14485, "end_char": 14500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification inviting applications was published in the Gazette dated 27-2-1979 wherein the last date for receipt of applications was set down as March, 31, 1979."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15829, "end_char": 15847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16142, "end_char": 16154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But t)le Kerala State, in its wisdom, provided a niggardly quota of 2 % of the total number of seats for candidates from the entire countcy."}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16912, "end_char": 16921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17185, "end_char": 17194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Medical College Trivandrum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18833, "end_char": 18859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus the students of Medical College Trivandrum are placed at a disadvantage, I am therefore to inform you that it has been decided that applications from the students of the Diploma Course, Trivandrum may also be considered and that [10% weightage may be given to the post graduate students of Diploma course in Medical College Trivandrum, subject to the condition that they will [produce the [Diploma Certificate before finalising the selection to post-graduate course."}}, {"text": "Jagadish Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25097, "end_char": 25111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having recently discussed a similar issue in Dr. Jagadish Saran's case (1) we desist from elaborately examining the merits of one of the major issues raised here.", "canonical_name": "Jagadish Saran"}}, {"text": "Gopimthan N1ir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25686, "end_char": 25700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has clarified th1t one of the stu:bnts, Dr. Gopimthan N1ir, wis so m!ritorio1; that no,, chatleng>d his admission."}}, {"text": "clause 5(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28076, "end_char": 28087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28752, "end_char": 28768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although in that decision we 1tltimately desisted from striking down the formula adopted by the Delhi University with a view to avoiding a stalemate for the year, we did direct that University to reconsider the whole problem of admissions and reservations in terms of Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28924, "end_char": 28939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29112, "end_char": 29129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regara to the ratio in the above case, we are not inclined to reverse the view of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the judg ment under appeal in so far as it has taken the view extracted above."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29568, "end_char": 29583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31080, "end_char": 31095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33129, "end_char": 33142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "see Dr. Jagdish Saran, supra).", "canonical_name": "Jagadish Saran"}}, {"text": "clause 13(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33681, "end_char": 33693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33819, "end_char": 33828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34420, "end_char": 34433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming, without deciding that the 'Prospectus' and the notification ware a 'law' we would remind ourselves of the caution administered by the Supreme Court that an unannounced law like Ext."}}, {"text": "Calicut University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47227, "end_char": 47245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged by the above tests it is conceded that while the Calicut University's diploma-holders had completed their examination before the last date for M.D. applications and produced the certificate before the selection, the Kerala University diploma-holder completed his diploma examination including public action of results only after the last date for applications and,'."}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48516, "end_char": 48538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "one and to pursue his relief through the University or other appropriate State agency, we directed the impleadment of the Indian Medical Council which is the statutory body concerned, at the national level, with higher medical degrees and courses."}}, {"text": "Trivandrum Medical a College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49628, "end_char": 49656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this basis there is one seat vacant in the Trivandrum Medical a College."}}, {"text": "Naomi J. Vettath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49861, "end_char": 49877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ordinarily, the best applicant is one who bas the highest marks and the seat must be awarded to her i.e.\n\nDr. Naomi J. Vettath."}}, {"text": "Gopalakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49968, "end_char": 49982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Among the three only Dr. Gopalakrishnan has chosen to challenge the rejection of admission.", "canonical_name": "Goppala Krishnan"}}, {"text": "T.S. Klishna- C murthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50042, "end_char": 50069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So Sri T.S. Klishna- C murthy Iyer contends that the only seat available for allotment should be confirmed to the only applicant who has cared to challenge by writ petition and those who have not cared to impugn the admission scheme in c0urt should be ignored as having given up the pursuit.", "canonical_name": "T.S. Klishna- C murthy Iyer"}}, {"text": "T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50333, "end_char": 50356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer relies on the ruling in A. Periakaruppan v. State ofTami!nadu (1) to support his special plea to award the seat to Dr. Goppala Krishnan, who has got less marks than the non-litigant Dr Naomi.", "canonical_name": "T.S. Klishna- C murthy Iyer"}}, {"text": "Goppala Krishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50476, "end_char": 50492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer relies on the ruling in A. Periakaruppan v. State ofTami!nadu (1) to support his special plea to award the seat to Dr. Goppala Krishnan, who has got less marks than the non-litigant Dr Naomi.", "canonical_name": "Goppala Krishnan"}}, {"text": "Naomi. Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50542, "end_char": 50554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer relies on the ruling in A. Periakaruppan v. State ofTami!nadu (1) to support his special plea to award the seat to Dr. Goppala Krishnan, who has got less marks than the non-litigant Dr Naomi."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50713, "end_char": 50733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the unsuccessful applicants\n\nhad moved the High Court of Madras for relief similar to E that sought by the petitioners herein."}}, {"text": "Krishnamurthy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51204, "end_char": 51222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certainly, this limited approach strengthens the submission of Shri Krishnamurthy Iyer."}}, {"text": "Periakaruppan'e", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51254, "end_char": 51269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The force of the reasoning in Periakaruppan'e case ('upra) consists in the probability that a party who does not litigate manifests apathy for the enforcement of his G rights.", "canonical_name": "Periakaruppan'e"}}, {"text": "Gopalo krisbnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51593, "end_char": 51608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this were a universal prop0sition, Dr.\n\nGopalo krisbnan could be allotted the only vacant seat.", "canonical_name": "Goppala Krishnan"}}, {"text": "Joggy Joseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51807, "end_char": 51819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, on a suggestion from tli.e court, the Principal of the Medical College, Trivandrum ascertained the wishes of Dr. Naomi J. Vettath and Dr.\n\n7-189SCI/80\n\nJoggy Joseph who are diploma-holders from universities outside Kerala and are currently working as doctors in hospitals."}}, {"text": "Gopalokrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52184, "end_char": 52198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the three have indicated their wish to continue in the post-graduate degree course in opthalmology when the Principal enquired of them, although only Dr. Gopalokrishnan has chosen to assert his rights in court.", "canonical_name": "Goppala Krishnan"}}, {"text": "inPeriakaruppan's~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52299, "end_char": 52317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this dilemma, we consider that while the observations inPeriakaruppan's~ case (supra) are entitled to great weight, it is conceivable that Dr. Naomi who has out-distanced the other two in marks and is desirous of joining the post-graduates course might have been prevented by indigence from litigating for her right."}}, {"text": "Periakaruppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52961, "end_char": 52974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ground does not operate in favour of Dr. Joggy Joseph who has a slight edge over Dr. Gopalakrishnan and is in general practice, not in opthalmology, nor has he chosen to challenge the selection, in short, while we should be guided by the observations in Periakaruppan's case (supra) we are reluctant to overlook the superior claim of Dr. Naomi.", "canonical_name": "Periakaruppan'e"}}, {"text": "Abdul Khadar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 53204, "end_char": 53216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While transfixed between these two candidates-Dr. Naomi and Dr.\n\nGopalakrishnan-for the one seat that is available, we were given to understand by Shri Abdul Khadar appearing for the State that very probably there will be facilities enough in the Medical Co!Jege, Tri- ~- vandrum and Medical College, Calicut to accommodate one extra candidate in the opthalmology course if it were to be confined to this year as a special case.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Khadar"}}, {"text": "Pariakaruppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53768, "end_char": 53781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think that a practical course which will meet the ends of justice, following the reasoning in Pariakaruppan's case (supra) and the realistic approach made in State of Kerala v. j~ Kumari T.P. Roshana and Anr. ("}}, {"text": "Abdul Kadar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 54096, "end_char": 54107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Trivandrum and Calicut together to accommodate two more candidates in the postgraduate degree course fa opthalmology for this year ..\n\nShri Abdul Kadar, counsel for the State, after taking time to consult his client made a statement in Court that so far as the.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Khadar"}}, {"text": "Medical College, Calicut", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54399, "end_char": 54423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State Government is concerned, they are willing to take in, for the post-graduate opthalmology course for this year, two more candidates in the Medical College, Trivandrum and the Medical College, Calicut together."}}, {"text": "Tndian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54651, "end_char": 54673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tndian Medical Council appeared in Court through one of its officers after a notice was issued to it 'explaining the purpose for which that Council was being summoned, namely, to tell the Court whether, from a technical angle, it would be feasible to direct two more candidates."}}, {"text": "Go pal akrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55501, "end_char": 55517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, direct the State of Kerala and the Principal of the Trivandrum Medical College, who is the convener of the Selection Committee, as well as the two Universities concerned, to admit into the post-graduate opthalmology course Dr. Naomi and Dr. Go pal akrishnan for this year.", "canonical_name": "Goppala Krishnan"}}, {"text": "Skaria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55941, "end_char": 55947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "any further confusion ; we make it ; c1ear th1t the twJ c1uid1t,3 waJ aooJrding to o:rr earlb direction will continu' th, ir cJum, will nJt b, foturb, d.\n\nDr. Skaria .who got hi' diploma frJ:n th' Trivanirrim M:dical CJlbge will be permittea' to continue in th' lig'lt of th!"}}, {"text": "Jagdislz Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56434, "end_char": 56448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iven in Dr. Jagdislz Saran's Case (1).", "canonical_name": "Jagadish Saran"}}, {"text": "Khalil Gibran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56692, "end_char": 56705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Khalil Gibran."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56767, "end_char": 56774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57213, "end_char": 57230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will move the two universities, the Indian Medical Council and the Kerala Government for permission to continue his studies in the exigencies of the case and in the light of the observations we have made above."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_730_733_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ". ,\n\n.. c\n\n7l!O\n\nUMA SHANKAR SHARMA\n\nv. '--\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nApril 17, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nTermination of service-Condition of eligibi1ity for selection as Inspector of Cent1:, al Excise viz.. \"should be a sportsman who have represented the Universities in the Inter UniVersity Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Board''-Terms and conditions of service should be construed reasonably.\n\n• The appellant was selected for and appointed in a temporary vacancy of Inspector of Central Excise, as be was found to be a \"Sportsman who has represent¢ the -Universities in the Inter University Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board\".\n\nHe joined duty and continued therein.\n\nOn 30-4-1976 the Assistant Collector (Head Quarters) Central Excise called for the' original sports certificate on the ground tpat only attested copies were furnished by the appellant earlier. The appellant furnished the original documents on 5-7-76. After a year, he was directed to supply the details of the tournament at which he had represented the University. On 27-2-78, the appellant referred to the sports certificate dated 28th Jnly 1975 issued by the Deputy Registrar of Mithila University, Darbhanga.\n\nThe appellant explained that he had qualified and_ was selected, to represent the Mithila University in the Inter-University Tournament to be held at the Banaras Hindu University, Varahasi, in the year 1972 but that a serious illness had intervened and prevented him from actually participating in the tournament. He pointed out that this had been made clear by him during the interview for selection before the Appointments Cominittee\n\nand that as he had been discharging his duties to the satisfaction of his superior officers ever since December. 1975 and had, in fact, captained the sports team on behalf of the Excise Department at Calcutta for two years, he was astonished that the question should be raised later. Another fonrteen months thereafter, on 16th June, 1979, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) made an order purporting to be under the proviso to sub-rule ( 1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civt1 Service (Temporary Service) Rnles 1965, terminating the services of the appellant. The appellmt then applied for relief under Article 226 of the ConstitQtion to the High Court against the order, but the High Court has summarily dismissed the writ petition. '\n\nAllowing the appeal on special leave, the Court\n\nHEID : The terms and conditions of seryice are intended to be construed reasonably, and too technical a view can defeat the essential sprit and intent embodied in them. The intention was to appoint meritorious sportsmen. to the posts, and that object is served if a person who had qualified and was selected for representing bis university in an Inter-University Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board is appointed, notwithstanding that he was actually prevented from participating because of reasons beyond his control. [733 A-cl\n\nIn the instant case, the respondents have proceeded on a technical view of th• matter wholly unjustified by. the intent behind the condition of eligibility.\n\n'1' .\n\n' .\n\n:--\n\n,, ' ~\n\n' ·~ )e ''\n\nUMA SHANKER v . . UNION (Pqthak, 1.) 731\n\nThe CO!ldition required that the applicant should have been a sportsman who bad A represented his Wliversity iB an Inter.Unive11ity Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board. Tile appellant did qualify, and was selected, fOr\n\nrepreaenting the Mithila University in the Inter-University Toornament at the Banaras Hindu University in the year 1972.\n\nAll that remained was that he should have participated in tho tournament.\n\nUnfortunately, for him, he fell ill and was unable to do so. The fact that he fell ill, and for that reason was unablo to represent his univ0I1ity, is not disputed. There is nothing to show B that but for that illness he would not have actually taken i>OFt in the tournament. On a reasonable view of the facts the apellant should be taken to have fulfilled the conditions of eligibility. [732 G-H, 733 Al\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2994 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated ' 11-7-1979 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Petition, No. 1936 of 1979.\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale and.P. P. Singh for the Appellant.\n\nR. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPAmAK, J : This appeal by special leave is directed againstan order of the Patna High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition against the termination of his services.\n\nThe Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Patna, invited, by an advertisement dated 30th July, 1975, applications for filling up some posts of Inspector of Central Excise.\n\nAmong those eligible for selection were \"sportsmen who have represented the Universities in the Inter-University Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board.\" The appellant, who was studying in the M. A. (Political Science) in the Mithila etJniversity, was one of the applicants and he was directed to appear for a physical test\n\nand, an interview. On 12th December, 1975 _the Collector of Central\n\n&cise and Customs issued a letter informing the appellant that he had been selected for appointment in a temporary vacancy of Inspector, and that he would be on probation for a period of two years.\n\nThe appellant joined the post and continued therein.\n\nOn 30th April, 1976 he received a letter from the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) Central Excise pointing out that he had submitted\n\natteted copies only of the sports certificates along: with his application foe appointment and he was directed to submitJthe:original certificates.\n\nThe appellant forwarded the original certificates. Nothing happened for some time, and the appe!Iant continued in the post without any objection. It was almost a year later that the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) wrote to the appellant to supply details of the tournament at\n\nI ,\n\nI!'\n\n, <)'\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPUK I> [1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\n'Yhich he had represelltOd the University. OR 27tl!. Fel!lruary, 19V8 the\n\nllf>Pltmt refet'l'etlto ttib Sp<!lrts GG!ltiftoatll dat~ 28th July, 1975 issm:d \"Y th\\! Diit!lllfy Regl!ltt!lt of the L. l'IT. Mlthllll T:Jnh•ersiry, Da!'blianga. tligi'i!al C'ettlllcatl! had bee!\\ sent by film to the Collector, along with the other cettiffcates on 5th .May, 1970. The appellant explained that he had qualified and was selected, to represent the Mithila University in the Inter-University Tournament to be held at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, in the year 1972 bllt that.a serious illness had intervened and prevented him from aotually participating in the tournam:nt. H: p)inted out that this had been made clear byhim; during the interviewfor selection before the Appointments Committee and\n\nthat as he , had beti discharging his duties to the satisfaction of his , sup:lfor officers ever since December, 1975 and had, in fact,. captained the sports team on behalf of the Excise Department at Calcutta for two years, he. was astonished that the question should be raised now.\n\nAnother fourteen months later, on 16th June, 1979, the Assistant Collector (HeadqlfarterS) made an order, purporting to be under the 'proviso to sub-rule (I) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Service (Tem-' porary Service) Rules 1965, terminating the services of the appellant.\n\nTl:te ap)l~\\tant theh applied for re1tef under Article 226 of the Consti . ttitiun to tlie Hilih C®rt against the c5rder, but the High Court has snmm1rily dismissed the writ petition. ·-\n\nIii tliis app:al, the itppellant contends that he fulfile4 the conditions of eligibility and that there was no justification for terminating his services.\n\n\"t''\n\nThe case of the respondents is that the appellant was appointed under a mistak-e inasmw:h as the oondltion of eligibility required actual representation. of a University in an Inter-University Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board and that, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to any relief against the termination of -~\n\nhis services. \\\n\nHaving given the matter our careful consideration, it seems to us that the respondents have proceeded on a technical view of the matter wholly unjustified by the intent behind the condition of eligibility.\n\nThe condition required that the applicant should have been a sportsman who had represented his university in an Inter-University Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board. There is no dispute before us that the appellant did qualify, and was selected, for representing the :Mithila University in the Inter-University Tournament at the Banaras Hindu University in the year 1972. All that remained was that he should have participated in the tournament. Unfortunately, for him, he fell ill and was unable to do so. The fact that he fell ill,\n\n;. ,..,-\n\nUMA SHANKER v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 733\n\nand for that reason w.as u11a.ble to re, pri:&ent .b, i~ university, is not dis puted. There is nothing to how that but for that illness he would not have actually taken part in the tournament. It seems to us that on a reasonable view ofthe facts the appellant shoul<l be. taken to have fulfilled the condition of eligibility. The terms and conditions of sel'Vice\n\nare intended to be constrll¢ reilsOl\\ly, and too technical a view can defeat the essential spirit and intent embodied in thenj. Tb.e intntion was to appoint meritorious sportsmen to the posts, and that object is served if a person who had qualified and was selected for representing his university in an Inter-University Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board i~ appoi)), ted, notwith\n\nsta.nding that he was actually prevented from par; ticip11ting b, eca~ of reasons beyond his control.\n\nWe have no doubt that on the interpretation which has found favour with us the appellant will he entitled .to a certificiit.e of eligibility, a requirement postulated by the terms of his appointment.\n\nThe appeal is allowed, the .order dated 16th J\\llle, 1979 made .by the D Assistant Collector (Headquarters) i~ qu11she<; I 'and .the responlllltls Me directed to treat the appellant.as oontinuing in service. The appeliant\n\nis entitled to his (; osts throughout.\n\nS . .R.\n\nJppea/ al i owed.", "total_entities": 27, "entities": [{"text": "O\n\nUMA SHANKAR SHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UMA SHANKAR SHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Inter-University Sports Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 661, "end_char": 690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• The appellant was selected for and appointed in a temporary vacancy of Inspector of Central Excise, as be was found to be a \"Sportsman who has represent¢ the -Universities in the Inter University Tournament conducted by the Inter-University Sports Board\"."}}, {"text": "30-4-1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 736, "end_char": 745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30-4-1976 the Assistant Collector (Head Quarters) Central Excise called for the' original sports certificate on the ground tpat only attested copies were furnished by the appellant earlier."}}, {"text": "5-7-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 976, "end_char": 982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant furnished the original documents on 5-7-76."}}, {"text": "27-2-78", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1101, "end_char": 1108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27-2-78, the appellant referred to the sports certificate dated 28th Jnly 1975 issued by the Deputy Registrar of Mithila University, Darbhanga."}}, {"text": "28th Jnly 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1165, "end_char": 1179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27-2-78, the appellant referred to the sports certificate dated 28th Jnly 1975 issued by the Deputy Registrar of Mithila University, Darbhanga."}}, {"text": "Mithila University, Darbhanga", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1214, "end_char": 1243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 27-2-78, the appellant referred to the sports certificate dated 28th Jnly 1975 issued by the Deputy Registrar of Mithila University, Darbhanga."}}, {"text": "Mithila University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1328, "end_char": 1346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant explained that he had qualified and_ was selected, to represent the Mithila University in the Inter-University Tournament to be held at the Banaras Hindu University, Varahasi, in the year 1972 but that a serious illness had intervened and prevented him from actually participating in the tournament."}}, {"text": "Banaras Hindu University, Varahasi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1400, "end_char": 1434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant explained that he had qualified and_ was selected, to represent the Mithila University in the Inter-University Tournament to be held at the Banaras Hindu University, Varahasi, in the year 1972 but that a serious illness had intervened and prevented him from actually participating in the tournament."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1883, "end_char": 1891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1975 and had, in fact, captained the sports team on behalf of the Excise Department at Calcutta for two years, he was astonished that the question should be raised later."}}, {"text": "16th June, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2006, "end_char": 2021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another fonrteen months thereafter, on 16th June, 1979, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) made an order purporting to be under the proviso to sub-rule ( 1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civt1 Service (Temporary Service) Rnles 1965, terminating the services of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2285, "end_char": 2296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4242, "end_char": 4258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated ' 11-7-1979 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Petition, No."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4306, "end_char": 4319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale and."}}, {"text": "P. P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4324, "end_char": 4335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4356, "end_char": 4367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4377, "end_char": 4390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PAmAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4456, "end_char": 4461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nPAmAK, J : This appeal by special leave is directed againstan order of the Patna High Court dismissing the appellant's writ petition against the termination of his services."}}, {"text": "Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Patna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4635, "end_char": 4679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Patna, invited, by an advertisement dated 30th July, 1975, applications for filling up some posts of Inspector of Central Excise."}}, {"text": "Mithila etJniversity", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5050, "end_char": 5070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, who was studying in the M. A. (Political Science) in the Mithila etJniversity, was one of the applicants and he was directed to appear for a physical test\n\nand, an interview."}}, {"text": "12th December, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5171, "end_char": 5190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12th December, 1975 _the Collector of Central\n\n&cise and Customs issued a letter informing the appellant that he had been selected for appointment in a temporary vacancy of Inspector, and that he would be on probation for a period of two years."}}, {"text": "30th April, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30th April, 1976 he received a letter from the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) Central Excise pointing out that he had submitted\n\natteted copies only of the sports certificates along: with his application foe appointment and he was directed to submitJthe:original certificates."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banaras Hindu University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8720, "end_char": 8744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute before us that the appellant did qualify, and was selected, for representing the :Mithila University in the Inter-University Tournament at the Banaras Hindu University in the year 1972."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_734_737_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "JAVED NIAZ BEG AND ANR.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ANR.\n\nApril 17, 1980\n\n[V, R. KRISHNA IYER, 0. CliINNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.J\n\nLanguage /01mula-Competition to All India Civil Services-Paper / on Indian Languagts made optional but not compulsory for candidates hailing from the North Eastern States/Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meglia/aya, Mizoram and Noga/and-Whether the Notification by the U.P.S.C. dt. 17~3·79 discrimi11atory and offends Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nDismissing the Writ Peitions, the. QJurt\n\n. ' HJ;', W; !.. Language is speech, sentiment, life, literature and other dear values rolled into one and that is why when State policy on language goes awry explosive tensions erupt and Courts cannot allow )egalism to over-ride realism when asked to quash some sensitive linguistic forniula with emotive overtones. The realisation that language is at the root of culture, that communities sometimes sacrifice their very existence for survival of their mother tongue and that tolerance and mutual accommodation on the linguistic front are integral to national integration must persuade the Court to keep its hands off the delicate strategic policy of the State relating to the people's langaage.\n\nIndeed, the rich diversity of India and the indispensable unity of the nation make it a linguistic imperative that a spirit of generosity to territorial communities especially minorities . without political pull, is of the quintessence of our Constitutiono! policy. f,35 D, B-OJ\n\n2. Equality before the law is the kernel of our constitutional order. But equality is not a static, rigid formal or pedantic concept. A sensitised social scientist will easily agree that.alleqithety is ?ynanuWc, flexible,. crea 73 tive 5\n\n, 0 anHd --( developmentally sensitive, espec1 y m Third orld conditions. [\n\n- ,\n\n736 A] /\n\n3. The integrity of India is a supreme value. The languages of India are ®arest to the, people who speak them. the North Eastern StatesfUnion Territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have handicaps in the matter of language. The Eighth Schedule to the Constitution has set out the prominent languages of India which are written and spoken by large populations between Kashmir and Kanyakumari. 11ut \"L this rich tapestry, for its very beauty, must afford equal opportunity for those F linguistically less advanced groups who are outside the Eighth schedule and\n\nmay suffer serious disabilities if forced to take examinations in those languages.\n\nLogically. an option for them to take or not to take Paper I on Indian Ulllguages is a facility which puts them on par with the rest.\n\nOnce it is understood that eqaalisation is part of the dynamics of equality, this concession is not contravention of equality but conducive to equality. It helps a handicapped groups and does not hamper those who are alread. [736 H. 737 A-Cl\n\n'y- •\n\nThe exemption iranted will encourage disabled groups into integrating themselves with the nation. More and more of successful candidates from these border areas coming into the mainstream of our Central Public Services is a tribute to national integration and democratic foundation. On the other hand, Procrustean equality by insistence on the linguistic 'have-nots' being mated on a par with the linguistic 'haves' is productive of inequality. Both equalisation as a measure of equality and national integration as a homogenisa lion of the people of the country, require the step that has been taken. There is no discriminatioi:i in this.\n\nOn the cotµrary there is a sensitive appreciation \" of . the situ_ation prevailing in those states which operates for a better egalite among unequals. [737 CE]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 660-661/1980. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution).\n\nR. K. Jain for the Petitioner.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Language is speech, sentiment, life, literature and° other dear values rolled into one and that is why when State policy on language goes awry explosive tensions erupt and courts cannot allow legalism to over-ride realism when asked tp quash some sensitive linguistic formula with el)lotive overtones. This prefatory caveat and its profoubd implications must be appreciated before we eat the forbidden fruit of policy-making by striking down the Central Government's amendatory notification bearing on language papers for Central Services Examination or the all India Services Examination. The realisation that language is at the root of culture, that communities sometimes sacrifice their very existence for survival of their mother tongue and that tolerance and mutual accommodation on the linguistic front are integral to national integration must persuade the court to keep its hands off the delicate stragetic policy of the State relating to the people's language. Indeed, the rich diversity of India and the indispensable unity of the nation make it a linguistic imperative that a spirit of generosity to territorial commuriities especially minorities infront political pull. is of the quintessence of our constitutional policy. Challenges to the language formula prescribed by the oovernment of India in the rules for the combined competitive examinations to the All India Services and the like have to be viewed against 'this back-drop. In short, the perspective which we propose to adopt has to be perceptive of the linguistic .values of India with its plurality of tongues, dialects and languages. Equality before the la~ is the kernel of our constitutional order. But equality is not a static, rigid, formal or pedantic concept. A sensitised social scientist will easily agree that equality is. dynamic, flexible, creative and developmentally sensitive, especially\n\n-·- --\"- ..\"'~\n\n/ •\n\n.- *'\n\n7:l6\n\n- . ' .. :,, - ''' - '\n\nSUPREME COOR'!' REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA in the Third World conditions like ours. Once this imaginative approach is adopted, the submission of counsel will loe all force. Indeed, it will be countei:_productive of the equality on which it is formally fo1mded as we will presently indicate:\n\nThese writ petitions are by candidates of the Hindi belt o'f India, 8 who hallenge certain amendments to the Rules for the competitive •\n\nexaminations to the All India Services and allied categories. We may extract the relevant part of the notification dated 17-3-1979 .:\n\n\"No. 13018/5/78-AIS(I) : The following amendments are hereby made in the Rules for the Combined Competitive Examination-Civil Services Examination, 1979 published in Part I\n\nSection I of the Gazette of India Extra ordinary dated 15th January 1979 vide this Department's Notification No. 13018/5/ 78-AIS(I) dated the 15th January, 1979\n\n(!)\n\n(2)\n\nx x\n\nx x\n\nx x x x\n\nx x x x\n\n(3) Note (ii) under para I of Section Il(B) Appendix I is re-numbered as Note (iii) and the following is inserted as Note\n\n(ii) :-\n\n\"The paper I on Indian Languages will not, however, be compulsory for candidates hailing from the North Eastern States/ Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh. Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland.\"\n\nThe gravamen/of the charge against this notification is that candi:. dates hailing from the North Eastern States/Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland are not obligated to take Paper I on Indian languages. Why should this discrimination be shown in their favour, nrges counsel for th~\n\nPetitioners. While favourable treatment for women and children, backward classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribe is sanctified by the Constitution, the linguistic concession shown to the Indian brethren in the remote regions we have just referred to is castigated as unconstitutional, unequal and invidiously discriminatory. In the familiar jargon, cunsel:contends that inequality among equals is .the intent and effect of the Notification and the vice of discrimination must prove lethal to its validity.\n\nWe are not impressed with this submission. u The integrity of India is a supreme value. The languages of India are dearest . to the people who speak them. It is notorious that the North Eastern States/Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh,\n\nManipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have handicaps in the matter of language. The Eighth Schedule to the Constitution has set\n\nont the prominent languages of India which are written and spoken by large populations between Kashmir and Kanyakumari. But this rich tapestry, for its very \\beauty, must afford equal opportunity for those linguistically less ac; lvanced groups who are outside the Eighth Schedule and may suffer serious disabilities if forced to take examinations in those languages. Logically, an option for them to take or not to take Paper I on Indian languages is a facility which puts them on par with the rest. Once we understand that equalisation is part of the dynamics of equality, this concession is not contravention of equality but conducive to equality.\n\nIt helps a handicapped group and does not hamper those who are ahead.\n\nA realistic appraisal of the linguistic landscape of the North Eastern States of our motherland will leave no thinking Indian on doubt that the exemption granted will encourage disabled groups into integrating themselves with the nation. More and more of successful candidates from these border areas coming into the mainstream of our Central Public Services is a tribute to national integration and democratic foundation. On the other hand, Procrustean equality by insistence on the linquistic 'have-nots' being treated on a par with the linguistic' 'haves' is productive of inequality. Both equalisation as a measure of equality and national integration as a homogenisation of the people of the country, require the step that has been taken.\n\nWe discern no discrimination.\n\nOn the contrary, we find a sensitive appreciation of the situation prevailing in thNe States and operates for a better egalite among unequals.\n\nWhile we dismiss these writ petitions, we hope that the objective of the Notification will be fulfilled in the years ahead by more and more of our brothers and sisters from the frontier States participating in national administration at the civil services level.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 25, "entities": [{"text": "JAVED NIAZ BEG AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAVED NIAZ BEG AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 17, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 17, 1980\n\n[V, R. KRISHNA IYER, 0."}}, {"text": "R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CliINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 462, "end_char": 472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1265, "end_char": 1270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed, the rich diversity of India and the indispensable unity of the nation make it a linguistic imperative that a spirit of generosity to territorial communities especially minorities ."}}, {"text": "that.alleqithety", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1697, "end_char": 1713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A sensitised social scientist will easily agree that.alleqithety is ?"}}, {"text": "integrity of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The integrity of India is a supreme value."}}, {"text": "Manipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2022, "end_char": 2029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the North Eastern StatesfUnion Territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have handicaps in the matter of language."}}, {"text": "Meghalaya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the North Eastern StatesfUnion Territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have handicaps in the matter of language."}}, {"text": "Mizoram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2042, "end_char": 2049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the North Eastern StatesfUnion Territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have handicaps in the matter of language."}}, {"text": "Nagaland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2054, "end_char": 2062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the North Eastern StatesfUnion Territories of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have handicaps in the matter of language."}}, {"text": "Eighth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2248, "end_char": 2255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Eighth Schedule to the Constitution has set out the prominent languages of India which are written and spoken by large populations between Kashmir and Kanyakumari."}}, {"text": "Kanyakumari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2260, "end_char": 2271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Eighth Schedule to the Constitution has set out the prominent languages of India which are written and spoken by large populations between Kashmir and Kanyakumari."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3776, "end_char": 3786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. K. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. Jain for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. Language is speech, sentiment, life, literature and° other dear values rolled into one and that is why when State policy on language goes awry explosive tensions erupt and courts cannot allow legalism to over-ride realism when asked tp quash some sensitive linguistic formula with el)lotive overtones."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This prefatory caveat and its profoubd implications must be appreciated before we eat the forbidden fruit of policy-making by striking down the Central Government's amendatory notification bearing on language papers for Central Services Examination or the all India Services Examination."}}, {"text": "All India Services", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5274, "end_char": 5292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Challenges to the language formula prescribed by the oovernment of India in the rules for the combined competitive examinations to the All India Services and the like have to be viewed against 'this back-drop."}}, {"text": "Arunachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8179, "end_char": 8196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is notorious that the North Eastern States/Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh,\n\nManipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland have handicaps in the matter of language."}}, {"text": "Eighth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8286, "end_char": 8301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Eighth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8596, "end_char": 8611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_738_745_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "' \\\n\nSABIR AHMED\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nApril, 18, 1980\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nConservarion of Foreign Exchange and PrevenJion of S1nuggling Activities Act, 1974, Section 11, Scope of-Whether Central Goverrunen\\ is bound ro consider the application of the detenu's representation and non-consideration thereof is illegal-Whether it is a Constitutional right of the detenue.\n\nThe pletitioner challenged the detention of his brother Dawood Hasan Sheikh Ibrahim, under, the Conservation of 'Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The detention order was passed on October 2, 1979 by the detaining authority. The representation made by e detenu on November 14, 1979 to the detaining authority in which inter alia he asked for supply of the copies of dbcuments and statements relied upon in thegrounds of detention, was rejected on December 10, 1979 by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry of State Government, by virtue of the authorisation to deal with the r:epresentations of detenus by a Standing Order made by the Chief Minister on December 3, 1979. In the meantime, the Advisory Board met and considered' the representation of the detenue and made a report to the Government on December 6, 1979. The said Minister had dealt with the representation and rejected it after the Board had made its report to the Gcivernment.\n\nOn November 19, 1979, the detenu made an application io the Central 'Govemmeht for revocation of the order of his detention under section 11 of\n\nCOFEPOSA and this has not been dealt with by that Government.\n\nThe petitioner inter alia, contended that the detenu had a right to move the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention and non consideration vitiates the . detention.\n\nAllowing the petition, the Court ,\n\nHEID: ! , Section 3(2) of COFEPOSA lll<llldates the State Government 'tO; send a . report to the Central Government.\n\nBut it does not mean that the G representation made by the detenu, if any, should also be sent along with that report, [7 42 El\n\n2. The Central Government is under a duty to consider the representation made toit by the detenu for revoking his detention, even if it s-imply repeats the same allegations, statement of facts, and arments which were contained in the representation made: to the detaining authority. .It is common experience that an argument or submission based on certain facts, which does not appeal -to a tribunal or authOfity of first instance, - may find acceptance with a higher tribunal or supetvisory authority. [742 EFJ ,\n\nSABIR AHMBD v. UNION (Sarkaria, !.) 739\n\n3. Whether or not the detenu has under Section 11 a legal right to make a representation to the Central Government is not the real question. The nub of the matter is, whether the power confrred by Section 11 on the Central ' Government, carried with it a duty to consider any representation made by the deteD.u, expeditiously. The power under Section 11 may either be exercised if on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied undor Sectio.n 3 by the State Government, or, from the detenu in the form of a petition or representation. , Whether or not the Central Govrnment on such petitioll/representation revokes the detention is a matter of discretion. But this discretion is coupled with a duty, that duty is inherent in the very nature of the jurisdiction. [742 F-H, 743 A]\n\n4. The power under s'ection 11 is a supervisory powe(. It is intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of detention by the detaining authority or the State Government. If this sta C tutory safeguard is to retain its meaning and efficacy, the Central Government must discharge its supervisory responsibility with constant 'vigilance and watchful care. The report received under section 3, or any communication or petition received from the detenu must be considered with reasonable expedition. [743 A-BJ\n\nS. What is 'reasonable expedition' is a question depending on the circums- D\n\nta~ of the particular case. No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be laid down.\n\nBut it certainly does not cover the delay d, ue to' negligence, callous. inaction, avoidable redtapism and unduly protracted procrastination. [743 B-Cl '\n\nIn the instant case, in the absence of a specific denial in the counteraffidavit , of the Central Govt., inescapable conclusion is that the Central Gov- E ernment has not at all considered the repr'esentation made by the detenu requesting for revocation of his detention under section 11 of COPE.POSA. [745 &Fl\n\nShyiun Amba/al Siroya v. Union of India, [1980] 2 SCR 1078 and Tara Chand v. State of Raiasthan and Ors., (W.P. No. 1639179) deci<fed on February 13, 1980 followed.\n\nDhana Aliklum v. State of West Bengal, [1975] Suppl S.C.R. 124; distinguished.\n\nRam BaU Rajabhar v. State of West Bengal and Ors., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 63, referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION ' Writ Petition No.. 168 of 1980. (Under Article 32 6f the Constitution)\n\nHarjinder Singh for the Petitioner.\n\nM. N. Shroff for the-Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. This is a writ petition filed by one Sabir Ahmed to challenge the detention of his brother, Dawood Hasan Sheikh\n\n74:0 SUl'REME COURT REPOil.TS\n\n\n.Ibrahim, under the Conservation of Forei&n Exchange and Preven\n\ntio11. of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to ail the\n\nCOFEPOSA).\n\nThe detenu was in the custody of the Customs whee. on September 8, 1979, he was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade Court, Bombay and was remanded to judicial custody and later on granted bail by the Sessions Judge by an order, dated September 28, 1979.\n\nOn October 2, 1979, an order of detention passed under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA by_'Shri Pradhan, the Secretary to Maharashtra Government in the Home Department, was served on him.\n\nThe grounds-0f detention were also served on him on the same date.\n\nOn November 14, 1979, the detenu made a representation to the detaining authority, in which he inter a/ia asked for supply of the copies of doc1ljllents and statements relied upon in the'grounds of detention. The representation of the detenn was not dealt with by\n\nShr~ Pradhan, but by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry of the State Government, and was rejected on December 10, 1979.\n\nThe Minister is said to .have been 'aut\\lorised to deal with the representation of detenus by a Standing Order made by the Chief Minister on December 3, 1979.\n\nIn. the mentime, the Advisory Board met and considered the representation of the detenu and tnade a report to the Government on December 6, 1979 for approval of the detention. The said Minister had dealt with the representation and rejected it after the Board had made its reports to the -Oovernment.\n\nOn November, 19, 1979, the detenu made an application to the Central Government for revo9ation of the• order :of his detention under Section 11 of COFEPOSA, and this has not been dealt with by that Government till today.\n\nMr. Jeth Malani, appearing for the detenu, has made four sub missions ·\n\ni ' .\n\n(1) The Minister of State was not competent to dispose of the representation of the detenu, because the Order dated December 3, )- 1979, made by the Chief Minister did not invest him with the neces sary authority to dispose of the representation.\n\n(2) The representation has not been dealt with expeditiously , by the State Government. On the other hand, it was mechanically sent for remarks to the customs Department on November 18, 1979, and\n\n\"; :---\n\n' SAJllR AHMED v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) Ul\n\ntnereafter the report of the Customs Department was received by the\n\nState Government on November 28, 1979.\n\n(3) The application of the detenu for oblaiui1ig copies of the relevant documents was improperly rejected, and as a result, he has been deprived of his constitutional right of making an effective representation.\n\n(4) The detenu had a right to move the Central Government for revocation of the order of his detention. For that purpose, he submitted a petition addressed to the Central Government on November 19, 1979. But, the Central Government has callously ignored it and has not dealt with it so far. This delay and inaction fo(anin.definite period, which now exceeds four months, vitiates the detention. Reliance for this contention has been placed on two recent judgments of this Court in Shyam Ambalal Siroys v. Union of India & Ors.(1) by a Bench of three learned Judges; and Tara Chand v. The State\n\nof~Rajasthan & Ors. (W. P: (Crl) No. 1639 of 1979, decided on February 13, 1980, by a Bench of two learned Judges).\n\nWe will take the last contention first, because, in the course of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner while; reserving his arguments on other points, has dealt with this point only.\n\nOn the other hand, regarding contentioU:4, IMr. Datar, appearing for the Central Government, submits that Section 11 of COFEPOSA merely confers a discretion on the Central Government to revoke or modify an order of detention made by the State Government.\n\nIt does not confer any right or privilege on the detenu to make a representation to the Central Government under that Section ..\n\nIn line with the same argument, Mr. Nain, appearing for the respondent•State, submits that Section 11 merely gives a power which is to be exercisd by the.Central Government suo motu after receiving the report from the State Government under Section 3(2). It i(conceded that the power conferred on the Central Government under\n\nSection II is a supervisory power but that, according to the learned counsel, does not mean that the. detenu has been invested with a right to move the Central Government for revoking the detention. Mr.\n\nNain further tried to distinguish~ the Syham Ambalal Siroya's case\n\n(ibid) on the ground that therein, the Eietaining authority was the Central Government, while in the instant case, the order was passed by the State Government.\n\n\n~-) .;-.; .\n\n$· H ~;4, ''*.:\" ;:{-;::'-\n\n; ~~-L ---\n\nl. : :~ -1- ·<>-~· - ·~'i'.;;\n\n74.2 I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.11:.\n\nA Both the learned counsel, appearing for the respondents, relied upon the decision of thiS Court in Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan v. State of West Benga/(I) Counsel further submitted that what has been said by . Fazal Ali, J. in Mohd. DhanaAli Khan's case, conflicts with the ratio of Shyam Ambalal Siroya's and Tarachand relied upon by the peti- •\n\ntioner. It is urged that on account of thiS conflict, the matter should be referred to a larger Bench for reconsideration. It is maintained that the last mentioned two cases have not been correctly decided.\n\nIf the ratio of these two decisions-proceeds the argument-is liberally applied, then it mean~ that the detenu has a right to vex the Central \" Government by making endless representations even where no new 1 c facts have come to light.\n\nIn the alternative, Mr. Nain contended that oniy in a case where\n\nI • the representation is based on the discovery of new matter or fac\\8, the Central Government may be required to consider it. The proper course for the Court even in such cases, according to Mr. Nain, is to issue a direction to the Central Governnient to consider the represen- D tation within a period specified by it and not to quash the detention, In this connection reference was made to Ram Bali Rajbhar v. The\n\nState of West Bengal & Ors. (2).\n\nIt is true that Section 3(2) of COFEPOSA mandates the State ..\n\nGovernment to send a report to the Central Government. But it does B not mean that the representation made by the detenu, if any, should ~- also be sent along with that report. There appears to be no substance in the contention that the Central Government is under no dnty to consider a representation made to it by the detenu for revoking his detention, if it simply repeats the same allegations, statement of facts, r\n\nand arguments which were. contained in the representation made to the detaining authority. It is common experience that an argument or submission based on certain facts, which does not appeal to a tribunal or authority of first instance, may find acceptance with a higher tribunal or supervis91'Y authority. Whether or not the detenu has under section 11 a legal right to make a representation to the Central Govci; nment\n\n'G is not the real question. The nub of the matter is, whether the power • conferred by Section 11 on the Central Government, carries with it a duty to consider any representation made by thedetenu, expcditiously.\n\nThe power under section 11 may either be exercised if on information ··rreceived by the Central Government from its own sources including that' supplied under Section 3 by the State Government, or, from the ... detenu in the form of a petition or representation. Whether or not the . , H (!) (1975] Supp. SC.R. 124.\n\n(2) [19751 3 S.C.R. 63.\n\n{1 ii !,\\ t• \"d\n\niil, h \\,,~, .. ~. ' . . ·~-! '\n\n-ll\n\njr\n\n'f:\n\n• -(\n\nI /) ,,\n\n. '\n\nn -\n\nSABIR AHMED v. UNION (Sarkar/a, J.) , 74 3\n\nCel!tral Government on such petition/representation revokes the detention is a matter of discretion. But this discretion is coupled with a duty. That duty is inherent in the very nature of the jurisdiction. The power under section II is a supervisory power. It is intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of detention by the detaining authority or the State Government.\n\nIf this statutory safeguard is to retain its meaning and efficacy, the Central Government must discharge its supervisory responsibility with constant vigilance and watchful care. The report received under Section\n\n3, or any communication or petition received from the detenu must be considered with reasonable expedition. What is 'reasonable e1 pedition' is a question depending on the circumstances of the parti cular case. No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be laid down. But it certainly does not cover the delay due to negligence, callous inaction, avoidable redtapism and undulyprotracted procrastination.\n\nThe plea specifically taken by the writ petitioner in Ground No.\n\nXXII of his affidavit, runs as under '.\n\n\"The petitioner says that he made a representation to the .\n\nCentral Government for revocation of the detention order under section 11 of the COFEPOSA. The Central Government has not considered the said representation and thus the detenu's continued. detention is illegal.\"\n\nEarlier, in paragraph 7 of his affidavit, also, he had mentioned that he had sent a communication to the Central Government, De\n\npartment of Revenue, COFEPOSA Branch, asking fer revocation of the detention order, b11t no reply had been received. In spite of.the fact that this ground was specifically taken, Mr. R.K. Thawani, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, has not in bis counter-affidavit said anything with regard to this plea or the facts alleged in the affidavit of the writ-petitioner. The conclusion is, therefore inescapable that the Central Government has not at all considered the petition made by the detenu requesting for revocation of his detention under section 11. According to the allegations in the writ petition, this written communication was sent by the detenu to the Central Government on November 19, 1979. We are now in the middle of March, 1980.\n\nContrary to the counter-affidavit filed hy Mr. S. M. Sule, Under- Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, Mr. Nain suhmitted that, in his opinion, the Central Government did not consider the representation/petition of the datenu because it\n\n, , ·•°ik~M+i\n\nSll~REMf, COuRT RBPORTS [1-980) 3 s.c.R, ·\n\n/>. might be labouring under a misappre)lension that once a writ petition for habear r.orpus has been filed on behalf of the detenu and the court .. is seised of the ca; e, anything done. by the Government thereafter might tamount to contempt of col)rt. The apologetic explanation imagined by him contrary to the stand taken in Mr. Sule's counter-affidavit,\n\nis hardly an excuse for not performing its statutory duty by the Central Government, Although, about four months have gone by since the -t despatch of the representation by the detenc, yet the Central Government has not applied its mind to it. It has just ignored it.\n\nThe ratio of Tara Chand's case and Shyam Ambalal Siroya'• case ~- 'l- -c\n\napplied with all its force to the facts of the instant case. The decision '1 i11 Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan, (sµpra) stands on its own peculiar facts. ,,\n\nIn principle, there is no conflict between the ratio of that case and the two subsequent decisions aforesaid.\n\nIn Tara Chand's case, the order of detention was passed by the\n\nGovernment of Rajasthan, and the detenu .had addressed a represen-\n\n'.D tation to the President, who forwarded it to the Finance Ministry of the Union Government for necessary action. It was common ground ;. that the representation was not considered by the Union of India, nor was any order passed on it. On these facts, :Murtaza Fazal Ali, J., speaking for the Court, held that section 11(1) of the COFEPOSA ''clearly enjoins that the Central Government may revoke or modify\n\n' ~I <E an order passed by the State Government. .. Once a representation is made to the Central Government, it is duty .bound to consider the .,\n\n$!Ifie in order to exercise its discretion either in rejecting or accepting it. If there is inordinate delay in considering •the representation that would clearly amount to violation of the provisions of Article 22(5)\n\n,.F so as to render the detention unconstitutional and void.\"\n\n,' ' The ratio of Tara Chand's case was followed in Shyam Ambala/ '-'t Siroya'• case, wherein a stand similar to the one before us was taken .\n\n. by the Central Government in the counter-affidavit filed on its behalf .. • The stand taken was that the detention order was not vitiated merely because the CentralGovernment had not considered the representa- -G tion of the detenu made to it for revocation of the detention under section _ 11 of the COFEPOSA. The Court rejected this contention ')--. with this observation; •\n\n\"The power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention implies that the detenu can make a representation JH for exercise of that power. Any petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expedition ••• It may be permissible for the Central Government to ke reson• I Ii Si!\n\n-;;..·~·· ! ,..., -·;-,,.f. ~-\n\n•' y\n\nSABIR AHMED v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) 745\n\n--able time for disposing any revocation petition. But it would not be justified in ignoring the representation for revocation of the detention as ~. statutory duty is cast upon the Central Government. It is necessary that the Government should apply its mind and either revoke the order of detention or dismiss the petition, declining to order for revocation.\"\n\nIn that case, the representation addressed to the Central Govern ment was not forwarded to the Central Government and, as such, was left unattended for nearly four months.\n\nIt is true that in Shyam Ambalal Siroya's case, the detaining autho rity was a Additional Secretary to the Central Government. But he did not derive his authority to pass the detention order from the rules of business framed by the Central Government under Article 77(3) .of the Constitution. Such authority was given to him under the statute itself. It is, therefore, not correct to say that in that case, the order passed by the detaining authority was to be deemed an order passed by the Central Government itself. In any case, so far as the ratio of that decision is concerned, this is a distinction without a difference. -\n\nShyam Amdalal Siroya's case was a decision rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges. We are bound by the ratio of the two afore said decisions. Respectfully following the same, we hold that since a repre•entation made by the detenu to the Central Government has been ignored and left unattended for a period of about four months, the detention cannot be justified as being according to procedure presiribed by law. In view of the stand taken by the respondent-Sine in the coun !er-affidavit filed on its behalf, we do not feel inclined, in the circumstances of the case, to issue a direction to the Central Go\n\nvernment to consider and dispose of the representation of the detenu, now.\n\nWe, therefore, allow this writ petition and set aside the detention and direct release of the detenu.\n\nThese, then, are the reasons which we now give in support of our order, dated March 14, 1980, by which we allowed Sabir Ahmed's writ petition and ordered the detenu's release.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\n9-403 SCI/80", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "SABIR AHMED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SABIR AHMED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April, 18, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April, 18, 1980\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J\n\nConservarion of Foreign Exchange and PrevenJion of S1nuggling Activities Act, 1974, Section 11, Scope of-Whether Central Goverrunen\\ is bound ro consider the application of the detenu's representation and non-consideration thereof is illegal-Whether it is a Constitutional right of the detenue."}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Dawood Hasan Sheikh Ibrahim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 452, "end_char": 479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pletitioner challenged the detention of his brother Dawood Hasan Sheikh Ibrahim, under, the Conservation of 'Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974.", "canonical_name": "Dawood Hasan Sheikh Ibrahim"}}, {"text": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 509, "end_char": 574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 2, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 610, "end_char": 625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The detention order was passed on October 2, 1979 by the detaining authority."}}, {"text": "November 14, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 693, "end_char": 710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation made by e detenu on November 14, 1979 to the detaining authority in which inter alia he asked for supply of the copies of dbcuments and statements relied upon in thegrounds of detention, was rejected on December 10, 1979 by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry of State Government, by virtue of the authorisation to deal with the r:epresentations of detenus by a Standing Order made by the Chief Minister on December 3, 1979."}}, {"text": "December 10, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 876, "end_char": 893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation made by e detenu on November 14, 1979 to the detaining authority in which inter alia he asked for supply of the copies of dbcuments and statements relied upon in thegrounds of detention, was rejected on December 10, 1979 by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry of State Government, by virtue of the authorisation to deal with the r:epresentations of detenus by a Standing Order made by the Chief Minister on December 3, 1979."}}, {"text": "December 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1087, "end_char": 1103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation made by e detenu on November 14, 1979 to the detaining authority in which inter alia he asked for supply of the copies of dbcuments and statements relied upon in thegrounds of detention, was rejected on December 10, 1979 by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry of State Government, by virtue of the authorisation to deal with the r:epresentations of detenus by a Standing Order made by the Chief Minister on December 3, 1979."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1234, "end_char": 1250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, the Advisory Board met and considered' the representation of the detenue and made a report to the Government on December 6, 1979."}}, {"text": "November 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1380, "end_char": 1397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 19, 1979, the detenu made an application io the Central 'Govemmeht for revocation of the order of his detention under section 11 of\n\nCOFEPOSA and this has not been dealt with by that Government."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1507, "end_char": 1517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1662, "end_char": 1680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner inter alia, contended that the detenu had a right to move the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention and non consideration vitiates the ."}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1817, "end_char": 1829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2649, "end_char": 2659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central ' Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2825, "end_char": 2845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nub of the matter is, whether the power confrred by Section 11 on the Central ' Government, carried with it a duty to consider any representation made by the deteD.u, expeditiously."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govrnment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3214, "end_char": 3231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether or not the Central Govrnment on such petitioll/representation revokes the detention is a matter of discretion."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3864, "end_char": 3873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4607, "end_char": 4617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SCR 1078", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 S.C.R. 63", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4939, "end_char": 4957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5036, "end_char": 5046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harjinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5069, "end_char": 5084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Article 32 6f the Constitution)\n\nHarjinder Singh for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Shroff for the-Respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5184, "end_char": 5192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. This is a writ petition filed by one Sabir Ahmed to challenge the detention of his brother, Dawood Hasan Sheikh\n\n74:0 SUl'REME COURT REPOil."}}, {"text": "Sabir Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5234, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. This is a writ petition filed by one Sabir Ahmed to challenge the detention of his brother, Dawood Hasan Sheikh\n\n74:0 SUl'REME COURT REPOil.", "canonical_name": "SABIR AHMED"}}, {"text": "Dawood Hasan Sheikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5289, "end_char": 5308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKARIA, J. This is a writ petition filed by one Sabir Ahmed to challenge the detention of his brother, Dawood Hasan Sheikh\n\n74:0 SUl'REME COURT REPOil.", "canonical_name": "Dawood Hasan Sheikh Ibrahim"}}, {"text": ".Ibrahim", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TS\n\n.Ibrahim, under the Conservation of Forei&n Exchange and Preven\n\ntio11."}}, {"text": "Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5417, "end_char": 5447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5594, "end_char": 5642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on September 8, 1979, he was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade Court, Bombay and was remanded to judicial custody and later on granted bail by the Sessions Judge by an order, dated September 28, 1979."}}, {"text": "September 28, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5747, "end_char": 5765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on September 8, 1979, he was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade Court, Bombay and was remanded to judicial custody and later on granted bail by the Sessions Judge by an order, dated September 28, 1979."}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Smuggling Activities Act, 1974", "statute": "Smuggling Activities Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Pradhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 2, 1979, an order of detention passed under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA by_'Shri Pradhan, the Secretary to Maharashtra Government in the Home Department, was served on him.", "canonical_name": "Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Pradhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation of the detenn was not dealt with by\n\nShr~ Pradhan, but by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry of the State Government, and was rejected on December 10, 1979.", "canonical_name": "Pradhan"}}, {"text": "November, 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6877, "end_char": 6895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November, 19, 1979, the detenu made an application to the Central Government for revo9ation of the• order :of his detention under Section 11 of COFEPOSA, and this has not been dealt with by that Government till today."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jeth Malani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7100, "end_char": 7111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Jeth Malani, appearing for the detenu, has made four sub missions ·\n\ni ' ."}}, {"text": "December 3, )- 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7292, "end_char": 7311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) The Minister of State was not competent to dispose of the representation of the detenu, because the Order dated December 3, )- 1979, made by the Chief Minister did not invest him with the neces sary authority to dispose of the representation."}}, {"text": "November 18, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7597, "end_char": 7614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, it was mechanically sent for remarks to the customs Department on November 18, 1979, and\n\n\"; :---\n\n' SAJllR AHMED v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) Ul\n\ntnereafter the report of the Customs Department was received by the\n\nState Government on November 28, 1979."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7762, "end_char": 7779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, it was mechanically sent for remarks to the customs Department on November 18, 1979, and\n\n\"; :---\n\n' SAJllR AHMED v. UNION (Sarkaria, J.) Ul\n\ntnereafter the report of the Customs Department was received by the\n\nState Government on November 28, 1979."}}, {"text": "February 13, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8652, "end_char": 8669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1639 of 1979, decided on February 13, 1980, by a Bench of two learned Judges)."}}, {"text": "Datar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Datar, appearing for the Central Government, submits that Section 11 of COFEPOSA merely confers a discretion on the Central Government to revoke or modify an order of detention made by the State Government."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9014, "end_char": 9024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9330, "end_char": 9334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It does not confer any right or privilege on the detenu to make a representation to the Central Government under that Section ..\n\nIn line with the same argument, Mr. Nain, appearing for the respondent•State, submits that Section 11 merely gives a power which is to be exercisd by the."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9385, "end_char": 9395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9535, "end_char": 9547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Syham Ambalal Siroya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nNain further tried to distinguish~ the Syham Ambalal Siroya's case\n\n(ibid) on the ground that therein, the Eietaining authority was the Central Government, while in the instant case, the order was passed by the State Government.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Ambalal Siroya'•"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10393, "end_char": 10402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali, J. in Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. DhanaAli Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10410, "end_char": 10429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali, J. in Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "Shyam Ambalal Siroya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10466, "end_char": 10486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DhanaAli Khan's case, conflicts with the ratio of Shyam Ambalal Siroya's and Tarachand relied upon by the peti- •\n\ntioner.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Ambalal Siroya'•"}}, {"text": "Tarachand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10493, "end_char": 10502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DhanaAli Khan's case, conflicts with the ratio of Shyam Ambalal Siroya's and Tarachand relied upon by the peti- •\n\ntioner.", "canonical_name": "Tara Chand"}}, {"text": "Central \" Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10872, "end_char": 10892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the ratio of these two decisions-proceeds the argument-is liberally applied, then it mean~ that the detenu has a right to vex the Central \" Government by making endless representations even where no new 1 c facts have come to light."}}, {"text": "Central Governnient", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11276, "end_char": 11295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proper course for the Court even in such cases, according to Mr. Nain, is to issue a direction to the Central Governnient to consider the represen- D tation within a period specified by it and not to quash the detention, In this connection reference was made to Ram Bali Rajbhar v. The\n\nState of West Bengal & Ors. ("}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11511, "end_char": 11523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12324, "end_char": 12334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govci", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12381, "end_char": 12394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether or not the detenu has under section 11 a legal right to make a representation to the Central Govci; nment\n\n'G is not the real question."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12491, "end_char": 12501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12634, "end_char": 12644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12777, "end_char": 12786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13719, "end_char": 13729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14385, "end_char": 14395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.K. Thawani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14848, "end_char": 14860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of.the fact that this ground was specifically taken, Mr. R.K. Thawani, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, has not in bis counter-affidavit said anything with regard to this plea or the facts alleged in the affidavit of the writ-petitioner."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14886, "end_char": 14905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of.the fact that this ground was specifically taken, Mr. R.K. Thawani, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, has not in bis counter-affidavit said anything with regard to this plea or the facts alleged in the affidavit of the writ-petitioner."}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15238, "end_char": 15248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. M. Sule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15488, "end_char": 15498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Contrary to the counter-affidavit filed hy Mr. S. M. Sule, Under- Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, Mr. Nain suhmitted that, in his opinion, the Central Government did not consider the representation/petition of the datenu because it\n\n, , ·•°ik~M+i\n\nSll~REMf, COuRT RBPORTS [1-980) 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Sule", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16094, "end_char": 16098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The apologetic explanation imagined by him contrary to the stand taken in Mr. Sule's counter-affidavit,\n\nis hardly an excuse for not performing its statutory duty by the Central Government, Although, about four months have gone by since the -t despatch of the representation by the detenc, yet the Central Government has not applied its mind to it."}}, {"text": "Tara Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16403, "end_char": 16413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of Tara Chand's case and Shyam Ambalal Siroya'• case ~- 'l- -c\n\napplied with all its force to the facts of the instant case.", "canonical_name": "Tara Chand"}}, {"text": "Shyam Ambalal Siroya'•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16425, "end_char": 16447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of Tara Chand's case and Shyam Ambalal Siroya'• case ~- 'l- -c\n\napplied with all its force to the facts of the instant case.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Ambalal Siroya'•"}}, {"text": "Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16545, "end_char": 16565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision '1 i11 Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17046, "end_char": 17060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the representation was not considered by the Union of India, nor was any order passed on it."}}, {"text": "Murtaza Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17111, "end_char": 17128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these facts, :Murtaza Fazal Ali, J., speaking for the Court, held that section 11(1) of the COFEPOSA ''clearly enjoins that the Central Government may revoke or modify\n\n' ~I <E an order passed by the State Government. .."}}, {"text": "section 11(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17168, "end_char": 17181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17617, "end_char": 17630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyam Ambala/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",' ' The ratio of Tara Chand's case was followed in Shyam Ambala/ '-'t Siroya'• case, wherein a stand similar to the one before us was taken .", "canonical_name": "Shyam Ambalal Siroya'•"}}, {"text": "CentralGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17998, "end_char": 18015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Central Government in the counter-affidavit filed on its behalf .. • The stand taken was that the detention order was not vitiated merely because the CentralGovernment had not considered the representa- -G tion of the detenu made to it for revocation of the detention under section _ 11 of the COFEPOSA."}}, {"text": "Central Govern ment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19034, "end_char": 19053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the representation addressed to the Central Govern ment was not forwarded to the Central Government and, as such, was left unattended for nearly four months."}}, {"text": "Article 77(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19414, "end_char": 19427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyam Amdalal Siroya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19786, "end_char": 19806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shyam Amdalal Siroya's case was a decision rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Ambalal Siroya'•"}}, {"text": "Sine", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20249, "end_char": 20253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the stand taken by the respondent-Sine in the coun !"}}, {"text": "Central Go", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20388, "end_char": 20398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "er-affidavit filed on its behalf, we do not feel inclined, in the circumstances of the case, to issue a direction to the Central Go\n\nvernment to consider and dispose of the representation of the detenu, now."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20657, "end_char": 20671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These, then, are the reasons which we now give in support of our order, dated March 14, 1980, by which we allowed Sabir Ahmed's writ petition and ordered the detenu's release."}}, {"text": "Sabir Ahmed", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20693, "end_char": 20704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These, then, are the reasons which we now give in support of our order, dated March 14, 1980, by which we allowed Sabir Ahmed's writ petition and ordered the detenu's release.", "canonical_name": "SABIR AHMED"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_746_761_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.\n\nJAGE RAM AND ORS.\n\nApril 21, 1980'\n\n[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P. N. SHINGHAL\n\nAND 0. CHINNAPPA ; REDDY, JJ.]\n\nWrit Jurisdiction-Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 19SOc- Petition under reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of Contract cannot _. be enforced-Excise duty, Fees, and Price for parting with the Privirege by\n\n-....J Sttile, explained-Punfab Excise Act (Act 1 of 1974) and Pun/ab Iiftlor ' O Licence Rules, 1956 as amended upto 22-3-68-Whether notice of reauction\n\nnecessary under Rule 36(3) of the Liquor Licence Rules.\n\nIn the auction for the financial year 1967-68 held on March 27, 1967 for the .retail vend known as \"Biswan Mee!\" Sooepat, the respondents offered the highest bid for a quota of Rs. 62, 100 proof litres for which they became liablo under condition 14(iii) of the auction to pay an amount calculated at the rate of Rs. 17.60 per litre that is to say, Rs. 10,92,960-00. On the bid being lrnoUed in their favour, respondents deposited a •nm of Rs. 45,527-50 being 1/24th of the total amount payable by them by way of security for the due performance of the terms of the auction, as required by conditii>n No. 15(1) 0f the auction and Rule 36 (22A) of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rule<, 1956 as amended.\n\nThey started operating the vend from April I, 1967.\n\nThe successful bidder who is granted licence for retail sale of country liquor is required by condition No. 15(ii) of the auction read with rule 26(23):(2),\n\nto pay the licence fee in 22 equal instalments, each instalment being PllY•ble before the 10th and 25th of every month, commencing on April 10. On the failure of the respondents to pay the instalments due for the periods ending with April 10 and 25 1967, the Excise and Taxation Officer, Rohtak, gave them notices dated 15th and 25th April, 1967 calling upon them to make good the short-fall of Rs. 33,827.20 and Rs. 5,898.80 respectively, before April 20 and April 30, 1967. Since the respondents did not pay the amount, the Deputy Excise and Taxation COmmissioner, Headquarters, Haryana, gave them a notice calling upon them to show cause, within two days of the receipt of the notice, why their licence should not be cancelled under section 36(c) of the Punjab Excise Act, for their failure to comply with the terms of the auction in the matter of payment 0£ the two instalments. By their reply dated May 12, 1967, the respondents stated that they were illiterate villagers, that the terms of auction were not expl-ained to them, that the district of Rohtakl was in the grip of a severe drought leading to a fall in the sale of li(J, uor, that April being a sum ... mer month, the consumption of liquor was less as compared with the consumption during winter months and that, there was in fact no default on their part as alleged in the notice sent to them. On May 17, 1967, the Collector and Deputy Excise & Taxation CommissiOner, Haryana, passed an order, after hear ing the respondents, cancelling their licence under section 36 (b) and ( c) of the Punjab Excise Act with immediate effect and stating that the vend will be resold on May 23, 1967 at 10.00 AM. in the office of the Excise and Taxatioo Officer Rohtak, at the risk of the respomfen!S.\n\n- '\n\nlli&YANA V, .JAGll MM 747\n\ntOa May 22, 1967 respondents filed a Writ Petition (No. 900 of 1967) wh A. was by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on May 26, on the i:r<lllMI lbat it was premature.\n\nJn pirsuance of the order dated May 17, the \"Biswan Meel\" vend, Sonepat, was rauctioned on May 23, 1967, the highest bid received being of 15000\n\nlitres, ..tiich in terms 0£ money comes to Rs. 2,46,000.00. The dilfen:nce between the amount which the respondents were liable to pay under their bid B and tile, amount realised in the reauction comes to Rs. 7,41,577.40.\n\nOn July 11, 1967 respondents were served with a notice dated July 7 by whi<lh they were called upon to pay the aforesaid amoont, failing which, they were warned, the amount was liable to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. On July 18, respondents filed a Writ Petition in the High Court challenging 1be legality of the aforesaid notice.\n\nC an earlier decision in Bhajan Lal Saran Singh & Co. v. State of PunjMI. '\"\"' Ors., [1967] Current Law Journal, p. 460, which was affirmed by this G>urt in CA 1042 and 1043/()8 dt. 21-8-72, the High Court allowed the\n\nwrit petition and quashed the order cancelling the respondents' licence and cajlin!l upon them to pay the difference between the amount payable by them under tlteir bid and the amount realit; ed in the reauction of the vend. It has given to the appellants a certificate to appeal to this Court under Articlel33(1)\n\n(a) of tile Constitution since the subject matter in dispute was .of the value of meie lban Rs. 20,-000 at the time when the Writ Petition was filed, as also on lhe ..,.le of the proposed appeal.\n\nAllowmg the appeal, the Court\n\nHIU:>:: I. The Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the a..stitution is not intended to facilitate aYOidance of contractual obligations W>lontarily incurred by the petitioner. (755 D]\n\nIn the instant case the High Court was in error in entertaining the writ petitions for the purpose of examining whether the respondents could avoid their contractual liability by chailenging the Rules under which the bids offered by them -were accepted and under which they became entitled to conduct their\n\nbusiiiess. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it .profi1able to do so; and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business... The occurrance of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in the pedormance of those conditions, like the sale of liquor being less in sum~ mer than in winter, can provide no justification for not complying with the terms of the -00ntract which they had accepted with open eyes.\n\n[755 F, 756 C-DJ\n\nHar Shanker and Ors. v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Con1missioner and flirs., [1975] 2 SCR 254 @ 266; Sham Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2045, fdlowed.\n\nBMjan Lal Saran. Singh & Co. v. State of Puniab, [1967] Current Law\n\nJciurnal, p. 460; Overruled.\n\n2. 'lkre is no doubt that a distinction does exist between the Rules which were im)1Ugned in Bhajan Lal, and in the instant case on one hand and the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R,\n\nRules which were impugned in Har Shanker's case on the other. Jn'' f~~ in , '' ' '. ·\"'\\. ' Har Shanker's case the impugned Rules were those as amended on Z2;:l-68 in order to meet the judgment of the High Court under appeal in the instant case.\n\nEven assuming that there is a material difference in the Rules which are im~\n\npugned in the instant case and those in Har Shanker's, ye1t the jurisdiction of the High Court is a bar to the respondents to wriggle out ~Jf their cOD.tractual obligation. [756 E-H]\n\nIn Har Shanker's case, this Court held that since rights in regard to the manufacture and sale of intoxicants are vested in the state; it is open to it to part with these rights for consideration; tha.t the amounts Which are 'Charged\n\nto the licensees who offer their bids in auction sals of vends are neither in the nature cf a tax nor in the nature of excise duty; and that, the true natur.e of the charge which the Government levies in such cases is that it is price which the State charges as a consideration for parting with its privileges in favour of licensee. Such a charge is a normal incident of a trading or business tranSaction.\n\nWhat the State could itself do in the exercise of its privilege, it. authorises ae.other to do by charging a price for parting with its privilege.\n\nA price can neither be a tax nor excise duty. Therefore, even if any concession was made in the High Court, the true legal position that the amounts whi<; h the respondents became liable to pay under the terms of the auction is not excise or stltl-head duty but is a price which the Government charged for parting with its privilege, during the cUrrennt of the period covered by the contract. 'Ihe amount which the respondents agreed to pay to the State Government under the terms -of the\n\nsuction is neither a fee properly so called which would require! the existence of a quid pro quo, nor indeed is the amount in the nature of e.xcise duty, which by reason of the constitutional constraints has to be primarily a duty on the production or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country. The requirement to multiply by a certain figure per proof-litre the quota for which the respondents gave their bid by a certain figure and the facility of paying the amount by instalments while lifting the quota from time to time, do not make such payment an excise or still-head duty. What the Government is trying to recover from the respondents is not excise duty on undrawn liquor. [757 B-D, 758 A-C, E-F, 759 A]\n\nPanna Lal v. State of Rajasthan. [1976] I SCR 219; Bimal Chandra BQllerjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1971] I SCR 844; State of Madhya l'rBdesh v. Firm Gappu Lal etc., [1976] 2 SCR 1041 and Excise Commissioner U.P., Allahabad v. Ram Kumar, [1976] Suppl. SCR 532; distinguished.\n\n[The Court remanded the case for a finding on the following two questions ; ( 1) Whether it was necessary according to the rules in force at the felevant\n\n,.G time .to give adequate publicity to the reauction and (2) if so, when such publicity was in fact given to the reauction on May 23, 1967]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTir.N : Civil Appeal No. 1507/1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 12-3-1969 ol' the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 1376/67.\n\ns, N. Kacker So!. Genl., R.arinder Rana and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants. ·\n\n...\n\nHARYANA V. JAGE Rl'\\M (Chandrachud, C.J.) 7 49\n\n.: . \"Tinath Singh Munjral. H. K. Puri and V. K. Bahl for Respondent No._.,!\n\n \"' the Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCttA1''DRACHUD, C.J.-This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Article 133(l)(a) of the C11nstitution in regard to its judgment dated March 12, 1968 in Civil Writ No. 1376 of 1967.\n\nOn March 16, 1967 the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana, appellant No. 2 herein, announced by publication of a notice that exCise auctions for the financial year 1967-68 will be held on March\n\n27,'-1967. The terins and conditions in regard to the auction of retail C vends of country spirits were set out in a pamphlet issued along with the riotice. Those terms and conditions did not accord with the rules thelt'prevailing but were evidently announced so as to comply with the requirement of the new rules which were being brought into force.\n\nThe , amended rules issued by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Financial Commissioner) were published in the Government Gazette D dated March 31, 1967 and came into effect ori April I, 1967.\n\nIn the auction held on March 27, 1967 for the retail vend known air \"Biwan Mee!\", Sonepat, respondents offered the highest bid for a quota of 62,100 proof litres for which they became liable, under conditibti\"l4(iii) of the auction, to pay an amount calculated at the rate of E Rs. '17 60 per litre, that is to say, Rs. 10,92,960 00. On the bid being kri6cked in their favour, resp•mdents deposited a sum of Rs. 45,527 50, being I/24th of the total amount payable by them, by way of security\n\nfo~, the due performance of the terms of the auction, as required by condition No. 15(1) of the auction and Rule 36(22-A) of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956 as amended. They started operating the F vend from April I, 1967.\n\nThe successful bidder who is granted licence for retail sale of country liquor isrequired by condition No. 15(ii) of the auction read with Rule\n\n36(23,(2); to pay the licence fee in 22 equal instalments, each instalment'being payable before the 10th and 25th of every month, commen- G. cing bn \"April 10. On the failure of the respondents to pay the instalments due for the periods ending with April 10 and 25, 1967, the Excise arid-Taxation Officer, Rohtak, gave them notices dated 15th and 25th\n\nApril; 1967 calling upon them to make good the short-fall of Rs. 33,827 20 and Rs. 5,898 80 respectively, before April 20 and April 30, l9fi7. Since the respondents did not pay the amount, the Deputy\n\nH !\n\nExe~: , and Taxation Commissioner, Headquarters, Haryana, gave . thew,, a. notice calling upon them to show cause, within two days of the\n\n750 E:f9illlOJ 3 rc.R.\n\nreseipt of the notice, why their liGence should not be cancelletf .Wer section 36(c) of the Punjab Excise Act, for their failure to comp!J wtih the terms of the auction in the matter of payment of the two instal. ments. By their reply dated May 12, 1967, the respondents stated that th\\:y were illiterate villagers, that the terms of auction were not explained to them, that the district of Rohtak was in the grip elf a severe drought leading to a fall in the sale of liquor, that April btiag a summer month, the consumption of liquor was less as compared with the consumption during winter months and that, there was in fact no default on their part as alleged in the notice sent to them. On May 17, 1%7, the Collector and Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner, Haryana, passed an order, after hearing the respondents, cam:efling their licence under section 36(b) and (c) of the Punjab Excise Act with immediate effect and stating that the vend will be resold on May 23, 1967 at IO 00 A.M. in the office of the Excise and Taxation Olker, Rohtak, at the risk of the respondents.\n\nOn May 22, 1967 respondents filed a Writ Petition (No. 900 of 1%7) which was dismissed by the High Court of Punjab and HttrJl'lf!lll on May 26, on the ground that it was premature.\n\nIn pursuance of the order dated May 17, the \"Biswan Mecl\" wild, Sonepat, was reauctioned on May 23, 1967, the highest bid received being of 15,000 litres, which in terms of money comes to Rs. 2,46,!XnOO The difference between the amount which the respondents were liable to pay under their bid and the amount realised in the reauction CO!llCS to Rs. 7,41,577 40.\n\nOn July 11, 1967 respondents were served with a notice dated July 7 by which they were called upon to pay the aforesaid amount, faifillg which, they were warned, the amount was liable to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. On July 18, respondents filed the present Writ Petition in the High Court challenging the legality of the afO£esaid notice. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and quasheQ the order cancelling the respondents' licence and calling upon them t1> pay\n\nthe difference between the amount payable brth.em under their bid; and the amount realised in the reauction of the vend. It has given to the appellants a certificate to appeal to this Court under Article 133(fX; I) of the Constitution since the subject matter in dispute was of the wlae of more than Rs. 20,000 at the time when the Writ Petition was •it, as also on the date of the proposed appeal.\n\nff It is no longer in dispute that the auction at which the responthls' bid was accepted is go\\terned by the Punjab Liquor Licence Re, 1956 as amended by the notification dated March 3l, 1967 isu~\n\nI }\n\nHAllWINA v. JAG!! MM (Clumdrar:hud; C.1.) 751\n\nthe Excise and Taltation Commissioner, Haryana, which came into A force on April I, 1967. The amended rules, in so for as they a~ rele- \\'ant for our purpose, read thus :\n\n36. (I) Subject to such changes as the Financial Commisioner may make each year before the annual auctions the Coffector shall, on the basis of the probable sales during the next licence year determine, in the case of country liquor vends, the minimum quota of country liquor and the licence fee calculated thereon . . . . . . . . The minimum quota and the licence fee calculated thereon .......... , for each vend shall be an- .nounced by the Presiding Officer at the time of auctions.\n\n36. (16) Bids in respect of country liquor vends shall be received in terms of quota of country spirit in proof litres to be lifted during the whole year, and the successful bidder shall be 'liable to , pay licence fee calculated by multiplying the .quota bid by Rs. 17 6.\n\n36. (22-A) A person to whom a country spirit shop has been sold shall deposit in a Government Treasury under head \"Licence fee on country spirit\" subordinate to Majo ead \"X-State Excise Duties\" by way of security an amount equivalent to one-twenty-fourth of the amount of the licence fee determined under clause (16) within a period of seven days of the date .of auction and the aforesaid amount of security shall be refundable to him at the end of the year, unless the same or any part thereof is forfeited or adjusted against any amount of fee, duty or penalty due from him in respect of his licence.\n\nIn the event of the amount of security deposit or any part thereof beinl} forfeited or adjusted as aforesaid the deficiency shall be made good by him within seven days of the happening of such .an event failing which the licence shall be liable to cancellation by the Authority by which it was granted.\n\n36. (23) (2) A person to whom a country spirit shop is ;; old shall pay the amount or licence fee as calculated nuder .clause (16) in 22 equal instalments, each instalment being payable on the 10th and 25th of each month starting from the month of April. In the event of failure to pay the instalment by the <I ue date, his licence may be cancelled.\n\n36. (23) (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subelause (2)(a) the licensee shall be entitled to deduct from the amount of the licence fee to be paid by him such amount of ;; till-head duty as may have been actually paid by him on the\n\n\n[1980) 3 S.C.R.\n\ni\\. quota of country spirit actually lifted by him not exceeding the amount of such duty payable in respect of the quota bid by him at the time of auction.\n\n36. (24) When a licence has been cancelled, the Collector or an Officer not below the rank of Excise and Taxation Officer authorised by him in this behalf may resell it by public auction or by private contract in accordance with the procedure laid down in this rule and any deficiency in the licence fee and all expenses of such rsale or attempted resale shall be recoverable from the defaulting licensee in the manner laid down in section 60 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 ...... .\n\nThe High Court has summarised correctly the position emerging out of these rules in these words :\n\n\"The auction is on the basis of the quota that has to be lifted for each. particular shop. In order to convert it in terms of money, each proof litre bid is multiplied by Rs. 17 60 and that is how, the fee for a particular shop is fixed. The licensee is required to deposit one-twenty-fourth of the amount so arrived at as security. He is then to lift the quota specified for each month in the Rules and if he fails to do so, the amount shortlifted in terms of the licence-fee for that month is deducted from his security amount and he is required to make good the defi- E ciency in the security. He may not sell even a litre of liquor; but whatever quota of liquor he has bid for, the money value of that quota by multiplying it by Rs. 17 60 per litre has to be paid by him. There is no escape from this.\"\n\nOne of the contentions raised before the High Court was that the licence fee charged to the respondents, for failure to pay' which ttei'r licence was cancelled, was not fee properly so called but'was 'stillhead' duty or excise duty; and the rule requiring the payment of such duty, even when no quota of liquor was actually lifted by the licensee, was unconstitutional for the reason that there can be no liability to pay still-head duty or excise duty unless the licensee'; takes or lifts the liquor.\n\nThe High Court compared the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules of 1956 as they existed in 1966 and the Rules as amended in 1967 and carre to the conclusion that, in substance, there was no difference in the nature of payment which the licensee was)iabl(to'.make under the two sets of rules ; what he has to pay under toth is still-head duty or, excise duty,\n\nIn M/s. Bhajan Lal Saran Singh & Co. v. The State of Punjab and others,(1-) (Civil Writs Nos. 538 and 1991 of 1966), the High Court had\n\n(l) (1967) Corren! Law Journal 460.\n\nj...\n\nHARYANA v. JAGE RAM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 763\n\nstruck down the relevant Rules of 1966 by holding tharthe levy, charge or recovery of any amount of still-head duty in respect ofliquor which had not been actually lifted by the licensee was not justified and that the demand to that extent was liable to be quashed. In the instant case, since the liability under the 1967 rules was of a similar nature as the liability under the 1966 Rules, the High Court followed the judgment in Bhajan Lal, (supra) quashed the levy and set aside the order whereby the respondents' licence was cancelled and they were called upon to pay the difference between the amount which they had agreed to pay under the terms of their auction and the amount realised in the reaiiction of the vend.\n\nThe sheet-anchor of the respondents' argument before us is that the decision of the High Court in Bhqjan Lal was affirmed by this Court in Civil Appeals 1042 and 1043 of 1968 (decided on August 21, 1972) and since, in the instant case, the High . Court has merely followed the dedsion in Bhajan Lal, the State's appeal must fail. If , the matter were to rest there, as assumed by the respondents' counsel Shri Tirath Singh ; vlunjral, the contention would be unassailable b<cauce the position would then approximate to the application of a mathematical formula: Bhajan Lal was affirmed by this Court; the judgment of the High Court in the instant case follows Bhajan Lal; the judgment under appeal must therefore be upheld. But after the decision of the High Court in Bhajan Lai (supra) was affirmed by this Court on August 21, 1972, the legal position has been further examined by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Har Shankar & Ors. v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation. Commissioner & Ors.(1). The learned Solicitor Grnual places strong reliance on that decision and contrnds that the jLdpur.1 cf t.he High Court must, in the light of that decision, be over-rukd. We must proceed to consider the decision in Har Shankar straightaway.\n\nHar Shankar was a case from Punjab and though the instant case is from Haryana, the liquor auctions in bo1h 1he cases are governed by the Punjab Excise Act, I cf 1914, and 1he Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956, as al)1ended from time to time. Har Shankar' s case has an interesting relationship with the present proceedings because it was as 'I result of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the:instant case, which was rendered on March 12,. 1968 that the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules were further amended on March 22 and the auction impugned in Har Shankar was held on March 23, 1968. The liability arising under the auction in Har Shankar was upheld by the High -Court and this Court, not t1\"dc r the Rules which are relevant in 1he instant case, but under the Rules which were amended in order\n\n(I) [1975] 3 S.C.R 254.\n\n754 SU!'llt!Ml! COURT R~PORTS [198-0J 3 i.C, ll.\n\nto meet the judgment of the High Court in the instant case. Tlli&, from the respondents' point of view, would apparently fUrnisb an imjloTtant consideration for distinguishing the decision in Har Slidar But, as we will presently point out, the Solicitor General relies upon that decision on an aspect which is altogether different and of fundamental importance .\n\nIn Har Shankar, the appellants' bid was accepted in an auction held on March 23, 1968 for the right to sell country liquor at two vends in Ludhiana. the appellants paid the security deposit but were unable to meet their obligation under the conditions of auction and fell in arrears. When the State demanded the payment, threatened to cancel the licences granted to the appellants and declared its intention to resale the vends, the appellants filed writ petitions in the High Ctmrt of Punjab and Haryana asking that the auction be quashed and the repondents be restrained from enforcing the obligation arising under its terms and conditions. The High Court having dismissed the writ petitions, the licensees filed an appeal to this Court by certifcate .\n\nWhat is important for our purpose in this appeal is that the State of Punjab, which was respondent to the appeal in Har Shankar, (supra) raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of tre \\\\rit petitions filed by the appellants and that objection was upre!d by this Court.\n\nThe preliminary objection was that such of the appellants who offer<d their bids in the auctions did so with a full knew ledge oft he terms and conditions attaching to the auctions and that they could not be permitted to wriggle out of the contractual obligations arising out of the acceptance of their bids. Holding that the preliminary objection was well-founded, this Court observed :\n\n\"Those interested in running the country liquor vends offered their bids voluntarily in the auctions held for granting licences for the sale of country liquor. The terms and conditions of auctions were announced before the auctions were held and the bidders participated in the auctions without a demur attd with full knowledge of the commitments which the bids involved.\n\nThe announcement of conditions governing the auctions were in the nature of an invitation to an offer to those who were interested in the sale of country liquor. The bids given in the auctions were offers made by prospective vendors to the Govero.- ment. The Government's acceptance of those bids was the acceptance of willing offers made to it. On such acceptance, the contract between the bidders and the Government became concluded and a binding agreement came into existence between them. The successful bidders were then granted licencelio\n\nHAll.YANA v. JAOll RAM (Chandrachud, C.l.) 755\n\ne1'idencing the terms of contract between them and the Govern- 1*111, under which they became entitled to sell liquor. The Ucellllees exploited the respective licences for a portion of the period of their currency, presumably in expectation of a profit.\n\nO!mmercial considerations may have revealed an error of judgment in the initial assessment of profitability of the adventure but that is a normal incident of trading transactions. Those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens ofthe contract along with its benefits. The powers of the Financial Commissioner to grant liquor licences by auction and to collect licence fees through the medium of auctions cannot by writ petitions be questioned by those who, had their venture succeeded', would have relied upon those very powers to found a\n\nal claim. Reciprocal rights al'd obligations arising out of coatract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract could ever have a binding force.'' (page 263),\n\nAt page 266 of the Report, the Court further observed that the writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurr<d.\n\nThe Writ Petitions filed by the respondents in the High Court in the instant case are open precisely to the same obj<ction which was upheld -by this Court in Har Shankar (supra). They entered into a contract with the State authorities with the full knowledge of conditions which they had to carry out in the conduct of their business, on which they had willingly and voluntarily embarked. The occurrence of a commercial difficulty inconvenience or hardship in the performance of those conditions, like the sale of liquor being less in summer than in winter, can provide no justification for not complying with the terms of the contract which they had accepted with open eYes.\n\nThe res- :pondents could not therefore invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to avoid the contractual obligation incurred by them voluntarily. On this ground alone, the State is entitled to succeed in this appeal.\n\nThe judgment in Har Shankar was followed in Sham Lal v. State of P:i, yab(I) wherein, appellants were the highest bidders in an auction for the sale of country liquor vends at various places in the State of Punjab. The appellants were called upon by the State to pay the amOllJlts which they were liable to pay under the terms of the auction,\n\n(tl A.I. R. 1976 S.C. 2045.\n\n.'(56\n\nSUPREME <; OURT REPORTS\n\n[198~ 3 S.C.R.\n\nwhereupon they filed writ petitions in the High Court to cb.allenge the demand. Relying upon the passage from Har Shankar {pra)' extracted above, the Court held that the licensees could not be• per milted to avoid the contractual obligations voluntarily incurr•i:l by them and that therefore the High Court was right in refusing to exer cise its jurisdiction under Article 1226 of the Constitution iu theif favour. .\n\nIn view of these decisions, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Solicitor General to the maintainability of the writ peiitions filed by the respondents has to be upheld. We hold accordingly-that the High Court was in error in entertaining the writ petitions for the purpose of examining whether the respondents could avoid theif con tractual liability by challenging the Rules under which the bids offored by them were accepted and under which they became entitled to conduct their business. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so; and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents has called our attention to the distinction, which this Court drew in Har Shankar, (supra) between the Rules which were impugned in Har Shankar on one hand, and those which were impugned in Bhajan Lal, (supra) and in the instant case on the other. There is no doubt that such a distinction exists.\n\nIn fact, the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which is impugned before us was specifically referred to at page 282 of the Report in Har Shankar but was distinguished on the ground that the rules in the two sets of cases were different. As we have already pointed out, the licensing rules were r_amended on March 22, 1968\n\nbause of the judgment which the High Court gave in this case on March 12, 1968 and the auction in Har Shankar was held in pursuance of the amended rules on March 23, 1968. But that, to our mind, is a separate matter altogether. Even if it be true that there is difference between the rules involved in the present case and those which .came up for examination in Har Shank or, the preliminary objection rests .on an entirely different basis which would remain unaffected by the <!iffer ence in the two sets of Rules.\n\nWe must therefore affirm that, even assuming that there is a material difference in the Rules which are)ele vant for our purpose and the Rules which were impugned iµ _Har Shankar, (supra 1 the w1 it petitions filed by the respondents are liable tcr fail on the narrow ground on which the preliminary objection o(the State was upheld in Har Shankar.\n\nHARYANA v. JAGE RAM (Chmulrachud, C.J.) 75.7\n\nApart from the:ract that the respondents' writ petitions are liable tB fail on the ground stated above, the State's appeal must succeed on another ground canvassed by the learned Solicitor General which\n\nwas also urged and accepted in Har Shankar. It was observed in Har Shankar that the main focus of controversy on the merits of the matter related to the power of the Government to levy and realise large licence fees either through the medium of auctions or on scales fixed under the rules. After referring to the long history of liquor licensing and after considering the various provisions of the Punjab Excise Act 1914 and the Rules framed thereunder, this Court held that since rights in regard to the manufacture and sale of intoxicants are vested in the State, it is open to it to part with those rights for consi\n\nderation; that the amounts which are charged to the licensees who offer their bids in auction sales of vends are neither in the nature of a tax nor in the nature of excise duty; and that, the true nature of the charge which the Government levies in such cases is that it is a price which the State charges as a consideration for parting with its privileges in favour of the licensee. Such a charge is a normal incident of a trad\n\ning or business transaction. What the State could itself do in theexercise of its privilege, it authorizes another to do by charging a., price for parting with its privilege. A price can neither be a tax nor .exeise duty.\n\nThe High Court has recorded in its judgment a concession said to have been made by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State -of Haryana that \"Rupees 17 60 is the still-head duty per proof litre\".\n\nIn the application dated May 2, 1968 filed by the State Government in the High Court for certificate to appeal to this Coc•rt, it was stated that\n\nia the interest of justice it was necessary that the points involved in the writ petition be decided by the Supreme Court since they affected \"lacs\n\nof rupees as excise duty\". This makes it plausible that the concession was made. But considering the tenor of the arguments advanced -0n behalf of the State Government in the High Court, it does not appear likely that any concession was made by the Advocate General regarding the nature of the charge. It is disputed before us that the Advocate General made any such concession and indeed even in the Memorandum of Appeal which was filed in this Court, it was stated specifically that the High Court was in error in saying that the Advocate General had made the particular concession and that, as a matter of fact, \"it was vehemently argued by the Advocate General that the auction was only in terms of money which was to represent the amount of\n\nfee for the privilege of selling country liquor at a particular shop; only the amount of money was to be calculated by multiplying the number of proof litres bid by Rs. 17 60 p.\". We might add that:the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nconcession, if any, made by the Advocate General in the High Court cannot affect the true legal position that the amount which the respondents became liable to pay under the terms of the auction is not excise or still-head duty but is a price which the Government charged .for parting with its privilege, during the currency of the period covered by the contract.\n\nOn this consideration also, apart from the validity of the prelimi nary objection, the respondents' writ petition is liable to fail. The amount which the respondents agreed to pay to the State Government under the terms of the auction is neither a fee properly so called which would require the existence of a quid pro quo, nor indeed is the amount in the nature of excise duty, which by reason of the constitutional constraints has to be primarily a duty on the prod8ction or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country. The res pondents cannot therefore complain that they are being asked to pay \"excise duty\" or \"still-head duty\" on quota of liquor not taken, lifted or purchased by them. The respondents agreed to pay a certain sum under the terms of the auction and the Rules only prescribe a convenient mode where by their liability was spread over the entire year by splitting it up into fortnightly instalments. The Rules might as well have provided for payment of a lump sum and the very issuance of the licence could have been made to depend on the payment of such sum.\n\nIf it could not be argued in that event that the lump sum payment re presented excise duty, it cannot be so argued in the present event merely because the quota for which the respondents gave their l>id is required to be multiplied by a certain figure per proof litre and further because the respondents were given the facility of paying the amount by instalments while lifting the quota from time to time. What the respondents agreed to pay was the price of a privilege which the State parted with in their favour. They cannot therefore avoid their liability by contending that the paymeut which they were called upon to make is truly in the nature of excise duty and thatlno such duty can be imposed on liquor not lifted or purchased by them.\n\nIn Panna Lal v. State of Rajasthan(l) it was held by this Court that the licence fee stipulated to be paid by the licensees was the price or consideration or rental which the Government charged them for parting with its privilege and that it was a normal incident of trading or business transaction. It is true that the Court also said that no excise duty could be collected on undrawn liquor but it held that while enforcing the payment of the guaranteed sum or the stipulated sum mentioued in the licences, the Government was not seeking to levy or recover e!ci.se\n\n(I) {197611 SCR. 219.\n\nHA'RYANA v. JAGE llAM (ChandrllChud, C.1.) 759\n\nduty on undrawn liquor. In the instant case too, what the Govern- 4- t is trying to recover from the respondents is in essence the price of the privilege with which it has parted in their favour and not excise dnty on undrawn liquor.\n\nStrong reliance was placed by the respondents on the decisions of .Ws Court in Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1), IJ State of Madhya Pradesh v. Firm Gappulal etc. (2) aud Excise Com\" mis4ioner, U.P., Allahabad v. Ram Kumar(3) in support of their contention that what they are called upon to pay by the Government is excise duty. In Bimal Chandra Banerjee,(!) it was held by this Court that tile levy of excise duty on undrawn liquor was beyond the power of the State Government and that therefore the rule imposing the condition C' to that effect was invalid. That decision was followed in tbe Madhya Pradesh case(2) where also, the licensees were required to pay what was described as \"Pratikar\", which was nothing but excise duty on undrawn liquor. The same situation obtained in the U.P. case(3) because, the real nature of the payment which the licensees were required to make there was excise duty on undrawn liquor.\n\nThese decisions cannot help the respondents because the true position, as stated earlier, is that the amount which the respondents are called upon to pay is not excise duty on undrawn liquor but is the price of a privilege for which they offered their bid at the auction of the vend which they wanted to conduct.\n\nThus the respondents must fail in their contention both on account of the objection to the maintainability of their writ petition and on\n\nmerits concerning the nature of the payment which they are liable to tnake.\n\nThere is however one other point which cannot be overlooked' and on which the respondents may possibly have a plausible case. It is urged by Shri Tirath Singh Munjral for the respondents that the reauction which was held on May 23, 1967 was not in accordance with the Rules and therefore, the respondents cannot be called upon to pay the difference between the amount which they had agreed to pay and the amount which was fetched in the reauction of the vend. In paragraph 14 of the writ petition, it is averred that the respondents were never informed as to where and at what time the resale of thee vend would be held on May 23, that no notice of the intended resale was give1;1 as required by Rule 36(3) of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules\n\n.~ [1971] I SCR. 844. ~\n\n{1976] 2 SCR. 1041.\n\n(3) [1976] supp], SCR. 532.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\n1956, that in fact no other notice was published or affixed at any conspicuous public place notifying the proposed resale nor indeed was the resale announced even by the beat of drum. According to the respondents, no wide publicity was given to the reauction and even the residents of the adjoining villages who would have been interested in offering bids were not aware of the reauction. All that happened on May 23, according to the respondents, was that one Lal Chand, a leadii:tg licensee of Haryana, went to the office of the Excise & Taxation Officer, Rohtak, and managed to have his bid accepted. These irregularities it is contended, resulted in the startling consequence that whereas in the auction held on March 27, 1967 the highest bid, namely, of the respondents was for a quota of 62,100 litres equivalent to Rs. 10,92,960 00. in the reauction held on May 23, 1967 the highest bid was only for a quota of 15,000 proof litres equivalent to Rs. 2,46,400 00.\n\nIn the counter-affidavit dated August 16, 1967 filed by Shri Pritam Singh,'.Deputy, Excise & Taxation Commissioner, the allegations made in paragraph 14 of the writ petition are deniecl by saying that the reauction held on May 23, 1967 \"was duly published in accordance with rules\".\n\nThe High Court has rejected the contenction of the respondents in this behalf. But it seems to us that its judgment on this' aspect of the matter suffers, with respect, from a misunderstanding of the grievance of the respondents. Their main grievance that du'e publicity was not given to the reauction, as a result of which proper bids were not received, has been overlooked by the High Court and it merely dealt with the question whether the respondents themselves had notice of the reauction and whether the date of the reauction ought to have been fixed by the Financial Commissioner himself and by no other person. The High Court is right that the respondents did have notice of the reauction, as is clear from the order dated May 17, 1967 passed by the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner, Headquarters, Haryana, while cancelling the' respondents' licence.\n\nIt also appears clear that the date of the reauction need not be fixed by the Financial Commissioner himself. But there is no discussion whatsoever in the judgment of the High Court, on the question as to whether due publicity was given to the reauction\"'as required by the Rules. In\\ paragraph 14 of their rejojnder aflidavit filed in the High Court on September 14, 1967, respondents had stated that it was incorrect that the reauction was duly published in accordance with the Rules. Along wih their rejoinder, respondents filed affidavits of three Sarpanchas, three members of the Pancha:yatsand a Lamberdar to show that no notice whatsoever was given of\n\n.. ~\n\ny '\"\n\nHARYANA v. JAGE RilM ( Chandrachud, C.1.) 761\n\nthe reauction to the people in the vicinity of Biswan Mee! village.\n\nThe High Court has not even made a reference to these affidavits, while dealing with the particular point (namely, contention No. 2 before the High Court), which bears out what we have stated above that it really misdirected itself' while examining the contention raised by the .respondents in regard to the absence of due publicity for the reauction.\n\nThis makes it necessary to remand the matter to the High Court 1n order to enable it to record its findings on two outstanding questions: (I) whether it was necessary according to the Rules which were in force at the relevant time to give adequate publicity to the reauction\n\nang, , (2) if so, whether such publicity was in fact given to the reauction. If the officers of the State have defaulted in carrying out their obligation, if any, in the matter of giving due publicity to the reauction, the consequence could be that the respondents may not be liable to pay the difference between the amount which they were liable to pay and the amount realised in the reauction.\n\nIn the result, except for the contention in regard to the two questions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the State must succeed. We shall, however, have to await the findings of the High Court on the .two points mentioned above before passing the fuial order, which can only be done after the findings of the High Court are received. we direct the High Court to decide the aforesaid questions on the material as it stands on the record and on such further material as the parties may desire to adduce. The State, especially, may like to file a further affidavit in reply to the rejoinder affidavit of the respondents along with which the affidavits of three Sarpanchas, three members of certain Panchayats and of a Lamberdar were filed. The High Court will certify its findings to this Court within three months from to-day.\n\n:S.R.\n\nAppeal allowed in part .\n\n'10-463SCI/80\n\n' 1-.\n\n}<'", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGE RAM AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGE RAM AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. 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CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punfab Excise Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 388, "end_char": 405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Licence Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 445, "end_char": 464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rohtak", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1772, "end_char": 1778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the failure of the respondents to pay the instalments due for the periods ending with April 10 and 25 1967, the Excise and Taxation Officer, Rohtak, gave them notices dated 15th and 25th April, 1967 calling upon them to make good the short-fall of Rs."}}, {"text": "15th and 25th April, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1804, "end_char": 1829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the failure of the respondents to pay the instalments due for the periods ending with April 10 and 25 1967, the Excise and Taxation Officer, Rohtak, gave them notices dated 15th and 25th April, 1967 calling upon them to make good the short-fall of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 20 and April 30, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1931, "end_char": 1958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,898.80 respectively, before April 20 and April 30, 1967."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2065, "end_char": 2072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the respondents did not pay the amount, the Deputy Excise and Taxation COmmissioner, Headquarters, Haryana, gave them a notice calling upon them to show cause, within two days of the receipt of the notice, why their licence should not be cancelled under section 36(c) of the Punjab Excise Act, for their failure to comply with the terms of the auction in the matter of payment 0£ the two instalments."}}, {"text": "section 36(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2220, "end_char": 2233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 12, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2388, "end_char": 2400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their reply dated May 12, 1967, the respondents stated that they were illiterate villagers, that the terms of auction were not expl-ained to them, that the district of Rohtakl was in the grip of a severe drought leading to a fall in the sale of li(J, uor, that April being a sum ... mer month, the consumption of liquor was less as compared with the consumption during winter months and that, there was in fact no default on their part as alleged in the notice sent to them."}}, {"text": "Rohtakl", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2538, "end_char": 2545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their reply dated May 12, 1967, the respondents stated that they were illiterate villagers, that the terms of auction were not expl-ained to them, that the district of Rohtakl was in the grip of a severe drought leading to a fall in the sale of li(J, uor, that April being a sum ... mer month, the consumption of liquor was less as compared with the consumption during winter months and that, there was in fact no default on their part as alleged in the notice sent to them."}}, {"text": "May 17, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2848, "end_char": 2860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17, 1967, the Collector and Deputy Excise & Taxation CommissiOner, Haryana, passed an order, after hear ing the respondents, cancelling their licence under section 36 (b) and ( c) of the Punjab Excise Act with immediate effect and stating that the vend will be resold on May 23, 1967 at 10.00 AM."}}, {"text": "section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3008, "end_char": 3018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 23, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17, 1967, the Collector and Deputy Excise & Taxation CommissiOner, Haryana, passed an order, after hear ing the respondents, cancelling their licence under section 36 (b) and ( c) of the Punjab Excise Act with immediate effect and stating that the vend will be resold on May 23, 1967 at 10.00 AM."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3357, "end_char": 3389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "900 of 1967) wh A. was by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on May 26, on the i:r<lllMI lbat it was premature."}}, {"text": "July 11, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3814, "end_char": 3827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 11, 1967 respondents were served with a notice dated July 7 by whi<lh they were called upon to pay the aforesaid amoont, failing which, they were warned, the amount was liable to be recovered as arrears of land revenue."}}, {"text": "21-8-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4336, "end_char": 4343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21-8-72, the High Court allowed the\n\nwrit petition and quashed the order cancelling the respondents' licence and cajlin!l upon them to pay the difference between the amount payable by them under tlteir bid and the amount realit; ed in the reauction of the vend."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4973, "end_char": 4984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Har Shanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5989, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[755 F, 756 C-DJ\n\nHar Shanker and Ors.", "canonical_name": "Har Shanker"}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 SCR 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6070, "end_char": 6086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1976 SC 2045", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6123, "end_char": 6139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhajan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6343, "end_char": 6353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lkre is no doubt that a distinction does exist between the Rules which were im)1Ugned in Bhajan Lal, and in the instant case on one hand and the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R,\n\nRules which were impugned in Har Shanker's case on the other.", "canonical_name": "Bhajan Lal"}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 SCR 1041", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9135, "end_char": 9152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. Kacker So!. Genl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9717, "end_char": 9736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s, N. Kacker So!."}}, {"text": "R.arinder Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9739, "end_char": 9753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.arinder Rana and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants. ·"}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9758, "end_char": 9770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.arinder Rana and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants. ·"}}, {"text": "HARYANA V. JAGE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9799, "end_char": 9814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nHARYANA V. JAGE Rl'\\M (Chandrachud, C.J.) 7 49\n\n.: . \""}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9822, "end_char": 9833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nHARYANA V. JAGE Rl'\\M (Chandrachud, C.J.) 7 49\n\n.: . \""}}, {"text": "Tinath Singh Munjral", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9853, "end_char": 9873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tinath Singh Munjral."}}, {"text": "H. K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9875, "end_char": 9885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. K. Puri and V. K. Bahl for Respondent No._.,!"}}, {"text": "V. K. Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9890, "end_char": 9900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. K. Puri and V. K. Bahl for Respondent No._.,!"}}, {"text": "Article 133(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10081, "end_char": 10098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10222, "end_char": 10263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 16, 1967 the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Haryana, appellant No."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10894, "end_char": 10908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , amended rules issued by the Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Financial Commissioner) were published in the Government Gazette D dated March 31, 1967 and came into effect ori April I, 1967."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10973, "end_char": 10987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the auction held on March 27, 1967 for the retail vend known air \"Biwan Mee!\","}}, {"text": "Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11572, "end_char": 11605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th and 25th\n\nApril; 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12156, "end_char": 12182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the failure of the respondents to pay the instalments due for the periods ending with April 10 and 25, 1967, the Excise arid-Taxation Officer, Rohtak, gave them notices dated 15th and 25th\n\nApril; 1967 calling upon them to make good the short-fall of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 36(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12611, "end_char": 12624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 17, 1%7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13233, "end_char": 13244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17, 1%7, the Collector and Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner, Haryana, passed an order, after hearing the respondents, cam:efling their licence under section 36(b) and (c) of the Punjab Excise Act with immediate effect and stating that the vend will be resold on May 23, 1967 at IO 00 A.M. in the office of the Excise and Taxation Olker, Rohtak, at the risk of the respondents."}}, {"text": "section 36(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13391, "end_char": 13404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 22, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13623, "end_char": 13635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 22, 1967 respondents filed a Writ Petition (No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and HttrJl'lf!lll on", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13714, "end_char": 13755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "900 of 1%7) which was dismissed by the High Court of Punjab and HttrJl'lf!lll on May 26, on the ground that it was premature."}}, {"text": "Article 133(fX; I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14844, "end_char": 14862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "10th and 25th of each month", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17333, "end_char": 17360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23) (2) A person to whom a country spirit shop is ;; old shall pay the amount or licence fee as calculated nuder .clause (16) in 22 equal instalments, each instalment being payable on the 10th and 25th of each month starting from the month of April."}}, {"text": "section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18339, "end_char": 18349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18357, "end_char": 18380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhqjan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21200, "end_char": 21210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sheet-anchor of the respondents' argument before us is that the decision of the High Court in Bhqjan Lal was affirmed by this Court in Civil Appeals 1042 and 1043 of 1968 (decided on August 21, 1972) and since, in the instant case, the High ."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21289, "end_char": 21304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sheet-anchor of the respondents' argument before us is that the decision of the High Court in Bhqjan Lal was affirmed by this Court in Civil Appeals 1042 and 1043 of 1968 (decided on August 21, 1972) and since, in the instant case, the High ."}}, {"text": "Tirath Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21512, "end_char": 21524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If , the matter were to rest there, as assumed by the respondents' counsel Shri Tirath Singh ; vlunjral, the contention would be unassailable b<cauce the position would then approximate to the application of a mathematical formula: Bhajan Lal was affirmed by this Court; the judgment of the High Court in the instant case follows Bhajan Lal; the judgment under appeal must therefore be upheld.", "canonical_name": "Tirath Singh Munjral"}}, {"text": "Bhajan Lai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21870, "end_char": 21880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But after the decision of the High Court in Bhajan Lai (supra) was affirmed by this Court on August 21, 1972, the legal position has been further examined by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Har Shankar & Ors.", "canonical_name": "Bhajan Lal"}}, {"text": "Har Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22309, "end_char": 22320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must proceed to consider the decision in Har Shankar straightaway.", "canonical_name": "Har Shanker"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22364, "end_char": 22370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Shankar was a case from Punjab and though the instant case is from Haryana, the liquor auctions in bo1h 1he cases are governed by the Punjab Excise Act, I cf 1914, and 1he Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956, as al)1ended from time to time."}}, {"text": "Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22512, "end_char": 22545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22711, "end_char": 22740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Shankar' s case has an interesting relationship with the present proceedings because it was as 'I result of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the:instant case, which was rendered on March 12,."}}, {"text": "March 12,. 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22784, "end_char": 22799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Har Shankar' s case has an interesting relationship with the present proceedings because it was as 'I result of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the:instant case, which was rendered on March 12,."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22922, "end_char": 22936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1968 that the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules were further amended on March 22 and the auction impugned in Har Shankar was held on March 23, 1968."}}, {"text": "[1975] 3 S.C.R 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23154, "end_char": 23172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Har Slidar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23417, "end_char": 23427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlli&, from the respondents' point of view, would apparently fUrnisb an imjloTtant consideration for distinguishing the decision in Har Slidar But, as we will presently point out, the Solicitor General relies upon that decision on an aspect which is altogether different and of fundamental importance ."}}, {"text": "Ludhiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23728, "end_char": 23736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Har Shankar, the appellants' bid was accepted in an auction held on March 23, 1968 for the right to sell country liquor at two vends in Ludhiana."}}, {"text": "High Ctmrt of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24061, "end_char": 24093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the State demanded the payment, threatened to cancel the licences granted to the appellants and declared its intention to resale the vends, the appellants filed writ petitions in the High Ctmrt of Punjab and Haryana asking that the auction be quashed and the repondents be restrained from enforcing the obligation arising under its terms and conditions."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24406, "end_char": 24421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What is important for our purpose in this appeal is that the State of Punjab, which was respondent to the appeal in Har Shankar, (supra) raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of tre \\\\rit petitions filed by the appellants and that objection was upre!d by this Court."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27164, "end_char": 27175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 1226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28942, "end_char": 28954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 22, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30393, "end_char": 30407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have already pointed out, the licensing rules were r_amended on March 22, 1968\n\nbause of the judgment which the High Court gave in this case on March 12, 1968 and the auction in Har Shankar was held in pursuance of the amended rules on March 23, 1968."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30473, "end_char": 30487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have already pointed out, the licensing rules were r_amended on March 22, 1968\n\nbause of the judgment which the High Court gave in this case on March 12, 1968 and the auction in Har Shankar was held in pursuance of the amended rules on March 23, 1968."}}, {"text": "Har Shank", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30772, "end_char": 30781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if it be true that there is difference between the rules involved in the present case and those which .came up for examination in Har Shank or, the preliminary objection rests .on an entirely different basis which would remain unaffected by the <!", "canonical_name": "Har Shanker"}}, {"text": "May 2, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33033, "end_char": 33044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the application dated May 2, 1968 filed by the State Government in the High Court for certificate to appeal to this Coc•rt, it was stated that\n\nia the interest of justice it was necessary that the points involved in the writ petition be decided by the Supreme Court since they affected \"lacs\n\nof rupees as excise duty\"."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33263, "end_char": 33276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the application dated May 2, 1968 filed by the State Government in the High Court for certificate to appeal to this Coc•rt, it was stated that\n\nia the interest of justice it was necessary that the points involved in the writ petition be decided by the Supreme Court since they affected \"lacs\n\nof rupees as excise duty\"."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34254, "end_char": 34291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We might add that:the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll."}}, {"text": "Bimal Chandra Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37734, "end_char": 37756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bimal Chandra Banerjee,(!)"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37996, "end_char": 38010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That decision was followed in tbe Madhya Pradesh case(2) where also, the licensees were required to pay what was described as \"Pratikar\", which was nothing but excise duty on undrawn liquor."}}, {"text": "Tirath Singh Munjral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39000, "end_char": 39020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged by Shri Tirath Singh Munjral for the respondents that the reauction which was held on May 23, 1967 was not in accordance with the Rules and therefore, the respondents cannot be called upon to pay the difference between the amount which they had agreed to pay and the amount which was fetched in the reauction of the vend.", "canonical_name": "Tirath Singh Munjral"}}, {"text": "1976] 2 SCR. 1041", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 39623, "end_char": 39640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lal Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40172, "end_char": 40181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that happened on May 23, according to the respondents, was that one Lal Chand, a leadii:tg licensee of Haryana, went to the office of the Excise & Taxation Officer, Rohtak, and managed to have his bid accepted."}}, {"text": "August 16, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40712, "end_char": 40727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit dated August 16, 1967 filed by Shri Pritam Singh,'."}}, {"text": "Pritam Singh,'", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40742, "end_char": 40756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter-affidavit dated August 16, 1967 filed by Shri Pritam Singh,'."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42184, "end_char": 42202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In\\ paragraph 14 of their rejojnder aflidavit filed in the High Court on September 14, 1967, respondents had stated that it was incorrect that the reauction was duly published in accordance with the Rules."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_762_776_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "BAI DOSABAI\n\nMATHURDAS GOVINDDAS AND 0RS.\n\nApril 21, 1980\n\n(R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nEnglish doctrine of conversi.on, applicability to Fndfan I.nw-Tran.~Jer o~ Property Act. Section 54, ndian Trust Act, p. 94, Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sections 12, 13, 16, 21-Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1916 Sections 15 and 21, Bombay Tend11cy and Agricultural Lands Act, 11pplicability of,\n\nThe appellant Bai Dosabhai obtained two plot• of land in Survey Nos. 59 and 63 at Vastrapur from her father-in-law, Jehangirji~ by way of gift.\n\nOn: February 25, 1946, Dosabhai executed a deed styled \"a deed of lease\" in favour of Indu Prasad Dev Shankar Bhatt whose successors-in-interest are the respondents to this appeal. The vital terms of the lease were : The lessee was entitled to pun:hase the land at any time within seven years by paying the stipulated price of Rs. 1,29, 111-8-0 a fourth of which was paid in adV<lllCO.\n\nUntil the date of sale he was to pay certain stipulated rent. Two year's rent\n\nwas paid in advance but if the sale took place within two years of the deed, the lessor would not be obliged to return a proportionate part of the advance rent paid by him. If there was default in payment of rent and if _the default continued even after three months• notice had been given or if the lessor failed to pay the purchase price and get a sale deed executed in his favour, the lessor was entitled to call upon the lessee, by giving three month&' notice, to pay the purchase price and take a deed of sale in his favour. If the lessee failed to comply with the notice the lessor was entitled to take possession of the land alongwith the .structures thereon. After taking 'possession the lessor was bound to sell the same by public auction at the cost and risk of the lessee. If, at the auction, a price less than the stipulated price was fetched the lessee was bound to make good the deficiency to the lessor. If, the price realised was more, -the lessor was to pay the surplus to lessee. The amount of Rs. 32,277-14-0 paid by the lessee to the lessor as advance of one fourth of the consideration was to be given credit to the lessor.\n\nSince the lessee, in spite of three notices dated October, 25, 1950, :March 1~ 1951 and June 19, 1952 issued by the lessor calling upon the lessee to pay the balance of price within three months , from the date of receipt of the notice, failing which a suit would be instituted to recover possession of the property and to sell it by public aution at the cost and risk of the lessee remained silent, the lessor, on November 21, 1952 filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Ahmedabad to recOver rent for the period from January 2J,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953 .and for possession as well as damages in lieu of rent from January 22, 1953 onwards. The present plaintiff, the successor-in-interest of the original lessee who was defendant No. 4 in the suit filed a written statement pleading that he was a tenant as defined by the Bombay Tenancy and Agriw!tural Lands Act 1948, that his possession could not be disturbed and that the Civil Court bad no jurisdiction to pass a decree ifor possession or for mesne profits,, This plea was based on the circumstance that an amendment\n\n--t' ..\n\ni i\n\nOOSABAI V. MA THU RD AS 76-:l\n\nwhich came into force on January 1, 1953 made the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, applicable to the suit lands. This Act, however ceased to be applicable to the suit lands on August 11, 1958, when the suit lands came to be included within the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipality. The suit filed by the lessor was decreed on December 30, 1955. In execution of the decree obtained by her, the lessor obtained posse_ssion of the lands on December 22, 1960.\n\nImmediately on the lessor obtaining possession, the lessee on January, 16, 1961,. instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arose seeking (a) specific performance of the agreement dated February 25, 1940 by directing the lessor-defendant to execute a sale deed in his favour after receiving from him the balance of sale price of Rs. 96,833-10-0 and (b) in the alternative, to direct the defendant to sell the land by public auction to retain a sum of Rs. 96,833-10-0 out of the sale price and to pay the excess amount to the plaintiff. The first relief sought was subsequently given up. The lessor who had in the meanwhile entered into an agreement of sale in favour of Patel Singhvi & Co., filed a written statement contesting the suit on various grounds. The City Civil Court dismissed the suit on July 16, 1965, but on appeal by the plaintiff, the jlldgment of. the Trial Court was reversed and it was decreed that the suit land should be sold by public auction, or by private treaty if the parties so agreed, in one .lot or by consent of the parties in several lots within six months from the date of the decree. Out of the sale price fetched the defendant was first to reimburse herself to the extent o:t the balance of the original purchase price of Rs. 96,833-10-0 with interest at 9 per cent from January 23, 1953 and thereafter the remaining amount was to be equally divided between the plaintiff and the defendan~ If the price fetclied at the sale was less than Rs. %,833-10-0,\n\nthe defendant was to recover the deficit from the plaintiff. The decree in these terms was so granted by the High Court as it was th<>ught that both parties had coinmitted default and that the decree if granted in those terms would meet the ends of justice. On the basis of the English equitable doctrine of 'conversion' which they held applied in India also, the High Court took the view that the deed dated February 25, 1946 had created an equitable interest in the land in fav<>ur of the plaintiff. The High Court also expressed the view that neither the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultnral Lands Act nor the scheme made under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act stood in the way of the plaintiff. The defendant preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave.\n\nDismissing the appeal with modifications in the decree the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. The English doctrine of conversion of reality into personality cannot be bcxlily lifted from its native English soil and transplanted in statutebound Indian Law.\n\nMany of the principles of English Equ.ity have taken sta G tutory form in India and have been incorporated in occasional provisions of various Indian Statutes such as the Indian Trusts Act, the specific Relief Act.\n\nTransfer of Property Act etc., and where a question of interpretation of such Equity based statutory provisions arise, the Court will be well justified in seeking aid from the Equity source. [770 H, 771 A-Bl\n\nThe concept and creation of quality of ownership, legal and equitable, on the execution of an agreement to convey immovable property, as understood H in England is alien to Indian law which recognises one owner, i.e., the legal owner.\n\n[771 B-C]\n\nThe ultimate paragraph of Section 54 ol Transfer of Property Act .expressly enunciates that a-contract for the sale of immovable property does not, of itself create any interest in or charge on such property. But the ultimate and pennlti mate paragraphs .of s. 40 of the Transfer of Property Act make it clear that such a contract creates an obligation annexed to the ownership of immovable 'property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but which obligation may be enfbrced against a transferee with notice of the contract or a gratuitous transferee of the property. Thus the Equitable 'ownership in property recognised by Equity in England is translated into Indian law as an obligation annexed to the ownership of_ property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but an obligation which may be enforced against a -transferee with notice or a gratnitons trallSlferee. [771 C.E]\n\nThe Indian Trust Act defines 'trust' and 'beneficial inter .. !' and section 94 finally lays down \"In any case not coming within the scope of any of the preceeding sections, where there is no trust; but the person having posseSiSion of. property has not the whole beneficial interest therein, be must hold the pro perty for the benefit of the persons having such inter .. t or the residue thereof (as the case may be), to the extent necessary to satisfy their just demands\".\n\nSection 12(a) of tho Specific Relief Act provides for enforcement of specific performance of contract, in the discretion of the Court, when the act agreed to be done is in tho performance wholly or partly of a trnsi. Section 16 of the Act prescribes part performance of the contract, when that part of a contract which taken by itself oan and ought to be specifically performed, stands on a separate and independent footing rfrom another contract. [771 F-H, 772 B-DJ\n\nRamboran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra and Ors. [1967) I SCR 293, Narendas Karsondas v. S. A. Kamtam & Anr., [1977] 2 SCR 341; referred to.\n\n2. In the instant case, as seen from the terms of the deed the right of the lessor basically is to get the full sale price of Rs. 1,29,111·8-0 either from the lessee or by selling the property by public auction if the lessee does not himoelf want to buy, the lessee however, making up any deficit.\n\nThe lessor is under an obligation to sell the land to the lessee if the latter so desires within a period of seven years and pays the purchaS'e price and, if he does not so desire, lb p , sell the land by public auction and to recoup the balance of the stipulated price.\n\nThe lessor is under an obligation to pay the excess price, if any, realized by the sale by public auction to tlte lessee. To sell the property by public auction is thus both a right and an obligation. The obligation of the lessee is to pay one fourth of the stipulated price in advance and to pay the balance if he desires to purchase the property or to pay the deficit if any, if the le11or\n\nis obliged to sell the property consequent on his failure to purchase.\n\nHis right G\n\nis to obtain a sale deed by paying the balance price or to get any excess amount realised at the public auction.\n\nWhatever happens, he is not entitled to get a refund of the advance of one fourth of the purchase price paid by him, and whatever happens, the lessor is bound to sell the property either to the lessee or by publication. [772 E-H, 773 A]\n\nThe obligation of the lessor to sen the land by public auction and pay the excess price to the lessee is an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property, not amounting to an interest .in the property, it is an obligation in th~ nature of a trast, and, therefore, an obligation which may be specifically en.- forced.\n\n[7/3 A-BJ\n\nOOSABAI V. MATHURDAS 765\n\n3. The contention that the plaintiff could be compensated in terms of money and therefore the contract should not be specifically enforced does not appear from the terms of the contract.\n\nIt is clear from the very nature and the terms of the contract and the facts and circumstances of the case that compensation or damages is not determinable. In fact the defendant, apart from not raising an appropriate plea, did not offer any evidence to prove what would be suitable compensation. (773 C-D]\n\n4. The defendant did not commit 'any default in not paying the, balance of the purchase price and taking a sale deed in his own favour. The defendant had the option to purchase the property if he so desired, but he was under no obligation to do so.\n\n[773 D-FJ\n\n5. U is true that the defendant ~!aimed the benefits given to a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural I.ands Act and resisted giving possession to the plaintiff. If under a bonafide mistaken belief that the statute had stepped in to give him higher rights than under the contract the defendant refused to deliver possession to the plaintiff until it was found by the Court that 1 he had no such higher rights the defendant cannot later be denied even the rights under the contract on the ground that he had claimed higher statutory rights. A person claiming the benefits of a beneficient social legislation should not be denied his contractnal rights, if he is found not to be entitled to the legislative benefits. [773 F-H]\n\n6. Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural I.ands Act offered no impediment to the respondent-plaintiff's seeking to enforce the contract. The espondent/ plaintiff became entitled to demand that the property should be sold by public auction only when the appellant/defendant obtained possession. On the date when the appellant defendant obta.ined possession of the property the Act was not applicable to the lands. Similarly the Gujarat Vacant I.ands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienations) Aci, 1972, was in force for a limited period of one year only. While it prohibited alienation of land during that period it did not render the contract, which was1 earlier in point of time incapabale of being per formed after the Act itself expired. (773 H, 774 A-CJ\n\n7. It is true that Section .5(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 prohibits every person holding vacant land in excess of the\n\nceiling limit before the commencement of the Act from transferring such F land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, $ift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement as prescribed by the Act and a notification has been published after the prescribed procedure has been gone through, The Act catnc into force subsequent to the passing of the decree by the High Court.\n\nWhile it is true that events and changes in t1te law occurring during thC pendency of an appeal require to be taken into consideration in order to do complete justice between parties and so that a futile decree may not G be passed. It is also right and necessary that the decree should be so moulded a8 to accord with the changed statutory situation. The right obtained by a party under a decree cannot be allowed , to be defeated by delay in the disposal of the appeal against the decree, if it is possible to save the decree. by moulding it to conform to the statutes subsequently coming into force. [774 C-F]\n\nPasupuleti Venkateswarlu v.\n\nThe Motor General Troders, AIR 1975 SC B 1409 Rltmeshwar and Ors. v. Jot Ram and Ors. (1976] 1 SCR 847; referred lo,\n\n[In view of the provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Urban Land .(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 the Court gave nocessary directions by way of , appointment of a Receiver to draw up a scheme to build residential flats for v<'eaker sections, and to take action to obtain exemption under section 20 and 21 of the Urban I.and (Ceiling and Regulation) Act.]\n\nB CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1!47 of 1978.\n\nand 915of1980.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 19-9-1975 of the Gujarat High Court in FA No. 92/66.\n\nS.B. Vakil and I.N. Shroff for the Appellant in C.A. 1!47/78.\n\nV.M. Tarkirnde, P.H. Parekh and I. M. Nanavati for R.R. l in\n\nC.A. 1!47/78.\n\nS.K. Dho/kia for R.R. 2 & 3 in C.A. 1147/78.\n\nP.H. Parekh for the Appellant in C.A. 915/80.\n\nD The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nClllNNAPPA REDDY, J. The appellant Bai Dosabai obtained two plots of land in Survey Nos. 59 and 63 of Vastrapur.from her fatherin-law, Jehangirji, by way of gift. On February 25, 1946, Dosabai executed a deed, styled \"a deed of lease\", in favo11r of Indu Prasad Dev Shanker Bhatt, whose successors in interest are the respondents to this appeal. The material terms of the deed were the following : The lease was to be for a period of seven 'years from January 23, 1946. As a tenant was already in actual possession of the land, the lessee in whose favour the deed was executed was given symbolic possession only. The stipulated rent was Rs. 4357-8-3 per year. Rent for two years was to be paid in advance.\n\nIn fact it had already been paid on January 23, 1946. The future rent was to be paid in advance every year. If the lessee failed to pay the rent the lessor was to demand the same by giving notice of three months. If the lessee continued to default despite the notice, the lessor was entitled to recover the rent with damages and costs.\n\nThe rent was to be a first charge on the land as well as the structures that might be constructed on the land, the lessee having been given the right to raise constructions on the land or to use it as an open land. On default of payment of rent even after three months' notice, it was provided by clause (4) of the deed that the lessor would be further entitled to take steps in the manner provided in clause }7 of the deed, which we shall presently extract. It. was also agreed that the lessor :nould sell the land to the lessee withi11the period specified in clause 15 of the deed, to which we shall efer\n\n' .\n\n. .\n\nDOSABAI v. 'MATHURDAS (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 767\n\nimmediately, for a price of Rs. 1,29,111-8-0 out of which a sum of Rs. 32,227-14-0 being one-fourth of the amount was paid in .cash on the very date of the execution of the deed of lease. lt was .agreed that if the land was acquired under the provision of the\n\nLand Acquisition Act, the lessee should take the entire amount of compensation and pay to the lessor an amount calculated at the irate of Rs. 3-8-0 per square yard whether such amount was more or less than the amount of compensation. Clause 15 provided that if at any time after two years and within seven years from the date -0f execution of the deed the lessee desired to purchase the land for the stipulated price of Rs. 1,29,111-8-0 (calculated at the rate of Rs. 3-8-0 per square yards), the lessor was bound to execute a deed of sale, in favour of the lessee or his nominees.\n\nIf the lessee, On calculation, was found to have over paid the rent upto the date -of sale he was to get credit for the same. If the lessee got the -deed of sale executed within two years, he would have no claim to _get credit for any part of the two years' rent paid in advance, the whole of which was to be retained by the lessor. Clause 17 of the <leed, the most important clause for our present purpose was as follows :\n\n\"(17). If the party of the second part fails to get the sale effected within the specified time, after paying the sale price agreed to by the parties of both the parts as mentioned in para 15 herein above, the party of the first parts -\n\nshall after giving three months notice in writing be lawfully entitled to force the party of the second part to get the sale effected. If in spite of giving the notice, the party -0fthe second part fails to pay the balance of the consideration amount and get sale deed executed, the party of the first part\n\nhall be entitled to take possession of the said land together with whatever structures the party of the second part may have constructed thereon. After taking such possession, the party of the first part shall be bound to sell the same by public auction at the cost and risk of the party of the second part. If, the amount realised at the public auction mentioned above, is less than the price of the land agreed to in this deed, the party of the first part shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the second part, and if the amount realised is more, the party of the first part shall pay the surplus to the party of the second part. In this account Rs. 32,277-14-0 being the onefourth the consideration amount already paid shall be given credit for without interest by one part to other.\"\n\nThus, a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the deed reveals .certain vital terms which may be summarised thus : . The lessee was\n\n. entitled to purchase the land at any time within seven years by paying the stipulated price, a fourth of which was paid in advance. I Until the date of sale he was to pay the rent but if the sale took place within two years of the deed, the lessor would not be obliged to return a proportionate part of the advance rent paid by him. If [there was default in payment of rent and if the default continued even after three months' notice had been given or if the lessor failed to pay the purchase price and get sale deed executed in his favour, the lessor was entitled to call upon the lessee, by giving three months' notice, to pay the purchase price and take a deed . of sale in his favour. If the lessee failed to comply with the notice the lessor was entitled to take possession of the land alongwith the structures thereon. After taking possession the lessor was bound to sell the same by public auction at the cost and risk of the lessee.\n\nIf, at the auction, a price less than the stipulated price was feWhed the lessee was bound to make good the deficiency to the lessor.\n\nIf the price realised was more, the lessor was to pay the surplus to the lessee. The amount of Rs. 32,277-14-0 paid by the lessee to the lessor as advance of one fourth of the consideration was to be given credit to the lessor .\n\n. Three peculiar features of the agreement were : (I) Though the lessor was entitled to obtain possession of the land from the lessee on his committing_ default, she was not entitled to retain possession of the land but was under an obligation to sell the lands by public auction, (2) the lessor was to be entitled to the originally stipulated sale price of Rs. 1,29,111-8-0 neither more nor less, under any circumstances, and (3) the amount of Rs. 32,227-14-0 which was paid by way of advance of one fourth of the consideration was never to be forfeited. Nor was it to be refunded to the lessee. It was to be given credit to the lessee even if he had defaulted in any respect.\n\nOn October 25, 1950 the lessor gave a notice to the lessee (when we use the expression lessee hereafter we include the successors in interest of the original lessee also within that term) demanding payment of rent for the year 1950-51 which was payable in advance but wa~\n\nin default. On March 7, 1951, the lessor gave a second notice to the lessee demanding payment of rent due for the years 1950-51, and 1951-52. The lessee was informed that if the rent demanded was not paid a suit would be instituted to recover possession of the property in terms of clauses 15 and 17 of the deed and the prperty woud be sold thereafter by public auction at the cost and risk of the Jessee. On June 19, 1952, the lessor issued a third notice to the lessee demanding payment of rent for the three years 1950-51, 1951-\n\n~ ..\n\n• DOSABAI v. MATHURDAS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 769\n\n52 and 1952-53 and also callinon the lessee pay the balance, of price within three months from the date of receipt of the notice and get a deed of sale executed and registered in his favour. \\The lessee was further informed that if he failed to do so, a suit would be instituted to recover possession of the property and to sell it by public auction at the cost and risk of the Jessee. Thereafter, on November 21, 1952, the lessor filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad to recover rent for the period from January 23,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953. The plaint was, however, returned for presentation to the proper Court and it was then filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad. The lessor with the permission of the Court, amended the plaint so as to include a claim for possession as well as damages in lieu of rent from January 22, 1953 onwards. The present plaintiff, the successor-in-interest of the original lessee who was defendant No. 4 in the suit filed a written statement pleading that he was a tenant as defined by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948, that his possession could not be disturbed and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession or for mesne profits. This plea was based on the circumstance that an amendment which came into force on January I, 1953 made the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act applicable to the suit lands. We may also mentiqn here that the Act ceased to be applicable to the suit lands on August 11, 1958, when the suit lands came to be included within the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipality.\n\nTo continue the narration, the suit filed by the lessor for possession was decreed on December 30, 1955. It must be mentioned here that the lessee himself had filed a suit for possession against the tenant who was ih actual occupation of the lands and obtained possession from him on April 30, 1955. The lessee filed an appeal to the- High Court of Bombay which wttS dismissed on March 19, 1958 and a further appeal to the Supreme Court which was also dismissed on March 8, 1965.\n\nIn execution of the decree obtained by her, the lessor obtained possession of the lands on December 22, 1960. Immediately on the lessor obtaining possession, the lessee, on January 16, 1961, instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises seeking (a) specific performance of the agreement dated February 25, 1946 by directing the lessor-defendant to execute a sale deed in his favour after receiving from the plaintiff the balance of sale price of Rs. 96,833-10-0, and, (b) in the alternative, to direct the defendant to sell the land by public auction to retain a sum of Rs. 96,833-10-0 out of the sale price and to pay the excess amount to the plaintiff. The first\n\nrelief sought was subsequently given up. The lessor who had in the meanwhile entered into an agreement of sale in favour of Patel Singhvi & Co. filed a written statement contesting the uit on various grounds. The City Civil Court dismissed the suit on July 16, 1965, but on appeal by the plaintiff, the judgment of the Trial Court was reversed and it was decreed that the suit land should be sold by public auction, or by private treaty if the parties so agreed, in one lot or by consent of the parties in several lots within six months from the date of the decree. Out of the sale price fetched the defendant was first to reimburse herself to the extent of the balance of the original purchase price of Rs. 96,833-1-0-0 with interest at 9 percent from January 23, 1953 and thereafter the remaining amount was to be eGually divided between the plaintiff and the defendant. If the price fetched at the sale was less than Rs. 96,833-10-0, the defel'\\dant was to recover the deficit from.the plaintiff. The decree in these terms was so granted by the High Court as it was thought that both parties had committed default and that the decree if granted in those terms would meet the ends of justice. On the basis of the English equitable doctrine of 'conversion' which they held applied in India also, the High Court took the view that the deed dated February 25, 1946 had created an equitable interest in the land in favour of the plaintiff. The High Court also expressed the view that neither the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act nor the scheme made under the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act stood in the way of the plaintiff. The defendant has preferred this appeal by special leave of this Court.\n\nShri Vakil learned counsel for the appellant raised several contentions befote us. He contended that the English Equitable doctrine of conversion of reality into personalty had no application in India. He submitted that the plaintilhvas disentitled to specific performance of any term of agreement as he Jiad done eyery thing that was posse to prevent the defendant from obtaining possession of the lands thereby clearly indicating that he had resiled from and was not ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement. It was further argued t.hat the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and the provisions of the Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban areas (Prohibition of Alienations) Act, 1972, and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, were a bar to the sale by public auction of the lands by defendant. ti We do not wish to go in any detail into the question whether .the English Equitable doctrine of conversion of reality into personalty is applicable in India. However, we do wish to say that the English\n\nOOSABAI v. MATHURDAS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 7 71\n\ndoctrine of conversion of reality into personalty cannot be bodily lifted from its native English soil and transplanted in statutebound Indian law. But, we have to notice that many of the principles of English Equity have taken statutory form in India and have been incorporated in occasional provisions of various Indian statutes such as the Indian Trusts Act, the Specific Relief Act, Transfer of Property Act etc. and where a question of interpretation of such Equity based statutory provisions arises we will be well justified in seeking aid from the Equity source. The concept and creation of duality of ownership, legal and equitable, on the execution of an agreement to convey immoveable property, as understood in England is alien to Indian Law which recognises one owner i.e. the legal owner : vide, Ramboran Prasad v.\n\nRam Mohit Hazra & Ors.(1) and Narandas Karsondas v. S. A. Kamtam & Anr.(2). The ultimate paragraph of s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, expressly enunciates that a contract for the sale of immoveable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. But the ultimate and penultimate paragraphs of s. 40 of the Transfer of Property Act make it clear that such a contract creates an obligation annexed to the ownership of immoveable property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but which obligation may be enforced against a. transferee with notice of the contract or a gratuitous transferee of the property. Thus the Equitable ownership in property recognised by Equity in England is translated. into Indian law as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, not amounting to an interest in the property, but an obligation which may be enforced against a transferee with notice or a gratuitous transferee.\n\nIfwe now turn to the Indian Trusts Act, we find \"trust\" defined as\n\n\"an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by .the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for the benefit of another, or of another and the owner'',\n\nand \"beneficial interest\" defined as the interest of the beneficiary against the trustee as owner of the trust-property. Chapter TX of the Trusts Act enumerates. in section after section cases where obligations in the nature of trust are created. S. 94 finally provides :\n\n\"94. In any case not coming within the scope of any of the preceding sections, where there is no trust, but the person having possession of property has not the whole beneficial interest therein, he must hold the property for the benefit of the persons\n\n(I) [1967] I S.C.R. 293\n\n(2) [1977] 2 S.C.R. 341.\n\nhaving such interest, or the residue thereof (as the case may be), to the extent necessary to satisfy their just demands\".\n\nWe may now examine some of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, which though repealed and replaced by Act 47 of 1963. is the statute with which we are concerned. ''Trust\" was defined in Section 3 of the 1877 Act as having \"the same meaning as in Section 3 of the Indian Trusts_Act\" and as \"including an obligation in the nature ofa trust within the meaning of Chapter IX of that Act\". Sectionl2( a} of the Act of 1877 provided, \"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, specific performance of contract may, in the discretion of the Court, be enforced when the act agreed to be done is in the performance wholly or partly of a trust\". The other clauses of Section 12 and Sections 13 to 18 enumerated the other contracts which might be specifically enforced. S. 21 specified when contracts were not specifically enforceable.\n\nS. 16 is of some relevance. It said :\n\n\"when part of a contract which, taken by itself can and ought to be specifically performed, stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot or ought not to be specifically performed, the Court may direct specific performance of the former part''.\n\nWe may now consider the deed dated February 25, 1946 the important and relevant terms of which we have either summarised or extracted[earlier. We have also pointedly mentioned some pecnliar features of the deed. From the terms 9f the deed we gather that the right of the lessor, basically is to get the full sale price of Rs. 1,29,111-8-0 either from the lessee or by selling the property by pnblic auction if the lessee does not himself want to buy, the lessee however, making up 'any deficit. The lessor is under an obligation to sell the land to the lessee if the latter so desires within a period of seven years ancl pays the purchase price and, if he does not so desire, to sell the land by public auction and to recoup the balance of the stipulated price. The lessor is under an obligation to pay the excess price, if any, realised by the sale by public auction to the lessee. To sell, the property by public auction is thus both a right and an obligation. The obligation of the\n\nlesee is to pay one fourth of the stipulated price in advance and to pay the balance if he desires to purchase the property or to pay the deficit, if any, if the lessor is obliged to sell the property consequent on his failure to purchase. His right is to obtain a sale deed by paying the balance price or lo get any excess amount realised at the public auction.\n\nWhatever happens, he is not entitled to get a refund of the advance of one-fourth of the purchase price paid by him, and whatever happens,\n\n-~-.·\n\nOOSABAI v. MATHURDAS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 773\n\nthe lessor is bound to sell the property either to the lessee or by public A auction.\n\nWe do not have any doubt, on a consideration of the terms of the deed and the relevant statutory provisions earlier referred, thatthe ob\n\nligation of the lessor to sell the land by public auction and pay the excess price to the lessee is an obligation annexed to the ownership of the property, not amounting to an interest in the property, that it is an obligation in the nature of a trust, and, therefore an obligation which may be pecifically enforced.\n\nIt was contended that the plaintiff could be compensated in terms of money and therefore, the contract should not be specifically enforced.\n\nIt is obvious from the very nature and the terms uf the contract and the facts and circumstances of the case that compensation or damages is not determinable. In fact the defendant, apart from not raising an appropriate plea, did not offer any evidence to prove what would be suitable compensation.\n\nIt was argued thatfthe defendant had throughout committed'default first by not paying the balance of the purchase price and taking the sale deed in his favour and next by resisting delivery of possession to the plaintiff. It was submitted that the defendant was thus never ready and willing to perform his obligation under the contract. We find no force in these submissions. As already observed by us the defendant had the option to purchase the property if he so desired but he was under no obligation to do so. The contract itself provided for the eventuality of the defendant ultimately not desiring to purchase the property himself. It cannot, therefore, be said that the defendant committed any default in not paying the balance of the purchase price and taking a deed of sale in his own favour. Regarding resistance to delivery of possession, it is true that he claimed the benefits given to a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act and resisted giving possession to the plaintiff. If under a bonafide mistaken belief that the statute had stepped in to give him higher rights than under the contract the defendant refused to deliver possession to the plaintiff until it was found by the Court that he had no such higher rights, the defendant cannot later be denied even the rights under the contract on the ground that he had claimed higher statutory rights.\n\nWe do not subscribe to the proposition that a person claiming the benefits of a beneficient social legislation should be denied his contractual rights if he is found not to be entitled to the legislativebenefits.\n\nIt was said that the contract became void so soon as the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, became applicable to the suit\n\nlands and that it could not be revived after the act ceased to apply to the suit lands. We do not see any force in this submission either. The plaintiff-respondent became entitled to demand that the property should be sold by public auction only when the defendant-appellant obtained possession and since on the date when the defendant obtained possession of the property the Act was not applicable to the lands in question, we see no impediment in the plaintiff seeking to enforce the contract. Similarly the Gujarat Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienations) Act, 1972, was in force forja limited period.of one year only. While it prohibited alienation of land during that period it did not render the contract which was earlier in point of time void so as to render it incapable of being performed after the Act itself expired.\n\nShri Vakil finally submitted that the contract had become impossible of performance as a result of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act 1976. It is true that s. 5(3) of the Act prohibits every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit before the commencement of the Act from transferring such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement as prescribed by the Act and a 'notification has been published after the prescribed procedure has been gone through. The Act came into force subsequent to the passing of the decree by the High Court. The <iiiestion for our consideration is what is the effect of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 on the decree passed by the High Court. While it is true that events and changes in the law occurring during the pendency of an appeal require to be taken into consideration in ordeT to do complete justice between parties and so that a futile decree may not be passed. It is also right and necessary that the decree should be so moulded as to accord with the changed statutory situation. The right obtained by a party under a decree cannot be allowed to be defeated by delay in the disposal of the appeal against the decree, if it is possible to save the decree by moulding it to conform to the statutes subsequently coming into force. Thtcse propositions emerge from the decisions of the Court in Pasupu'eti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders,(1) and Rameshwar & Ors: v.\n\nJot Ram & Or.v.(2). The question, therefore, is how the decree passed by the High Court can be saved and given effect.\n\nS. 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976, prcvid<S that where a p<lrnn holds any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and web pl1 son declares within the precribed time and in the, prescrib<d manner before the competent authority that the land is to' be utilised for the con-\n\n(!) A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1409.\n\n(2) [1976] l S.C.R. 847.\n\n. .. .. \"\n\nDOSABAI v. MATHURDAS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 775\n\nstruetion of dwelling units, for the accommodation of the weaker section of the society in accordance with any scheme approved by the specified authority, then the competent authority may after due enquiry declare such land not to be excess land and permit such person to continue to hold the land for the said purpose subject to the prescribed terms and conditions. The Government of Gujarat by various orders has prescribed the terms and conditions subject to which exemption will be granted under s. 21. The last circular dated October 25, 1979 of the Government also specifies that the value of the land for the purpose of s. 21 and the scheme should not exceed Rs. 50 per square meter. The last date for submitting a scheme under the rules made by the Government of Gujarat was January 31, 1980. Realising tha< all would be lost and none would be the gainer if no scheme was submitted before January 31, 1980, the respondent filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 183 of 1980 for the appointment of a Receiver of the suit land \"with power to apply for seeking exemption from the operation of the said Act under section 20 and/or 21 of the Act, by taking help of an organiser and/or builder to build residential premises for weaker sections of the Society, and/or by joining with the Co-operative Society m applying for an exemption under the said Act, and in the process after getting necessary permission, allow buildings to be built, and then permission to sell the tenements, so built either collectively and/or Individually and/or to a cooperative Scciety and in the process realize price of suit land at a price not lesser then Rs. 50/- per meter and to invest the same when realized at prevailing Bank rate, in Fixed Deposit, in a Nationalised Bank\". By our order dated January 18, 1980, we appointed Shri R. L. Dave, Additional Registrar of the Gujarat High Court as Receiver and charged him with the duly of submitting a building scheme and other necessary documents to the Competent authority under s. 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, before January 31, 1980. He was directed to do so in consultation with the parties or their counsel. The order was made without prejudice to the application said to have been made by the appellant under s. 20 of the Act. As directed by us the Receiver submitted a scheme to the Competent authority. He also entered into an agreement with a builder as the scheme would not be otherwise received by the Compe\n\ntent authority. Various objections have been filed before us by the defendant and some. other parties. We do not desire to adjudicate upon the objections raised by the plaintiff and other parties. We, however, affirm the action taken by the Receiver in submitting a scheme to the Competent authority. Allfurther directions in this matter may be obtained from the Trial Court to whom all the relevant records will be forwarded.\n\nWe think that the decree of the High Court s'hould be\n\nmodified in the following manner in order to bring it in conformity with the provisipns of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.\n\nIn the place of the direction to the lessor to sell the land by public auction or by private treaty and to reimburse himself from the sale price the sum of Rs. 96833-10-0 with interest at 9 per cent from!January 23, 1953 and the balance to be equally divided between the lessor and the lessee, a direction will issue for the appointment of a Receiver to take all necessary steps to seek exemption from the operation of the Act, under s. 20 and/or s. 21 of the Act by taking the help of an organiser and/or builder to build residential premises for weaker section of the Society, and/or by joining with the co-operative Society in applying for an exemption under the said Act and in .the process after getting necessary Pfrmission, allow buildings to be built, and then permission to sell the tenements, so built either collectively and/or individually and/or to a Cooperative Society and in the process realize price of suit land at a price not lesser than Rs. 50 per meter and to invest the same when realised at prevailing Bank rate, in fixed Deposit, in a Nationalised Bank. The Receiver appointed by us in C.M.P. No. 183 of 1980 will continue to act as Receiver under the decree. Out of the sum realised after deducting the expenses involved, a sum of Rs. 96833-10-0 together with interest at 9 percent per annum from January 23, 1953 upto the date of payment, will be paid in the first instance to the defendant and the balance will be divided equally between the plaintiff and; the defendant. If the amount realised by the Receiver after deducting . the' expenses fall short of sum of Rs. 96833-10-0 with interest at 9 per cent . per annum from January 23, 1953, the plaintiff shall make good the. amount to the defendant. The appeal is dismissed but the decree is modified as indicated above.\n\n'I .\n\nSpecial Leave Petition No. 4023 of 1980 filed by the defendant is allowed, leave granted and the appeal disposed of in the same terms as Civil Appeal No. 1147 of 1978. Delay condoned. There will be no order regarding costs in both the Appeals.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismiued.", "total_entities": 109, "entities": [{"text": "BAI DOSABAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bai Dosabhai", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MATHURDAS GOVINDDAS AND 0RS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MATHURDAS GOVINDDAS AND 0RS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. SARKARIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. SARKARIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 194, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 12, 13, 16, 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 257, "end_char": 280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Sections 15 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "statute": "Specific Relief Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Agricultural Lands Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bai Dosabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 425, "end_char": 437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 54, ndian Trust Act, p. 94, Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sections 12, 13, 16, 21-Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1916 Sections 15 and 21, Bombay Tend11cy and Agricultural Lands Act, 11pplicability of,\n\nThe appellant Bai Dosabhai obtained two plot• of land in Survey Nos.", "canonical_name": "Bai Dosabhai"}}, {"text": "February 25, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 560, "end_char": 577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On: February 25, 1946, Dosabhai executed a deed styled \"a deed of lease\" in favour of Indu Prasad Dev Shankar Bhatt whose successors-in-interest are the respondents to this appeal."}}, {"text": "Dosabhai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 579, "end_char": 587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On: February 25, 1946, Dosabhai executed a deed styled \"a deed of lease\" in favour of Indu Prasad Dev Shankar Bhatt whose successors-in-interest are the respondents to this appeal.", "canonical_name": "Dosabhai"}}, {"text": "Indu Prasad Dev Shankar Bhatt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 642, "end_char": 671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On: February 25, 1946, Dosabhai executed a deed styled \"a deed of lease\" in favour of Indu Prasad Dev Shankar Bhatt whose successors-in-interest are the respondents to this appeal.", "canonical_name": "Indu Prasad Dev Shankar Bhatt"}}, {"text": "November 21, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the lessee, in spite of three notices dated October, 25, 1950, :March 1~ 1951 and June 19, 1952 issued by the lessor calling upon the lessee to pay the balance of price within three months , from the date of receipt of the notice, failing which a suit would be instituted to recover possession of the property and to sell it by public aution at the cost and risk of the lessee remained silent, the lessor, on November 21, 1952 filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Ahmedabad to recOver rent for the period from January 2J,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953 .and for possession as well as damages in lieu of rent from January 22, 1953 onwards."}}, {"text": "Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the lessee, in spite of three notices dated October, 25, 1950, :March 1~ 1951 and June 19, 1952 issued by the lessor calling upon the lessee to pay the balance of price within three months , from the date of receipt of the notice, failing which a suit would be instituted to recover possession of the property and to sell it by public aution at the cost and risk of the lessee remained silent, the lessor, on November 21, 1952 filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Ahmedabad to recOver rent for the period from January 2J,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953 .and for possession as well as damages in lieu of rent from January 22, 1953 onwards."}}, {"text": "January 2J,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2708, "end_char": 2725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the lessee, in spite of three notices dated October, 25, 1950, :March 1~ 1951 and June 19, 1952 issued by the lessor calling upon the lessee to pay the balance of price within three months , from the date of receipt of the notice, failing which a suit would be instituted to recover possession of the property and to sell it by public aution at the cost and risk of the lessee remained silent, the lessor, on November 21, 1952 filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Ahmedabad to recOver rent for the period from January 2J,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953 .and for possession as well as damages in lieu of rent from January 22, 1953 onwards."}}, {"text": "January 22, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2729, "end_char": 2745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the lessee, in spite of three notices dated October, 25, 1950, :March 1~ 1951 and June 19, 1952 issued by the lessor calling upon the lessee to pay the balance of price within three months , from the date of receipt of the notice, failing which a suit would be instituted to recover possession of the property and to sell it by public aution at the cost and risk of the lessee remained silent, the lessor, on November 21, 1952 filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division Ahmedabad to recOver rent for the period from January 2J,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953 .and for possession as well as damages in lieu of rent from January 22, 1953 onwards."}}, {"text": "Lands Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3045, "end_char": 3059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 1, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3334, "end_char": 3349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 in the suit filed a written statement pleading that he was a tenant as defined by the Bombay Tenancy and Agriw!tural Lands Act 1948, that his possession could not be disturbed and that the Civil Court bad no jurisdiction to pass a decree ifor possession or for mesne profits,, This plea was based on the circumstance that an amendment\nt' ..\n\ni i\n\nOOSABAI V. MA THU RD AS 76-:l\n\nwhich came into force on January 1, 1953 made the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, applicable to the suit lands."}}, {"text": "August 11, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3513, "end_char": 3528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act, however ceased to be applicable to the suit lands on August 11, 1958, when the suit lands came to be included within the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipality."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act, however ceased to be applicable to the suit lands on August 11, 1958, when the suit lands came to be included within the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipality."}}, {"text": "December 30, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3663, "end_char": 3680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit filed by the lessor was decreed on December 30, 1955."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3774, "end_char": 3791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of the decree obtained by her, the lessor obtained posse_ssion of the lands on December 22, 1960."}}, {"text": "January, 16, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3856, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately on the lessor obtaining possession, the lessee on January, 16, 1961,."}}, {"text": "Patel Singhvi & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4474, "end_char": 4493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessor who had in the meanwhile entered into an agreement of sale in favour of Patel Singhvi & Co., filed a written statement contesting the suit on various grounds."}}, {"text": "July 16, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The City Civil Court dismissed the suit on July 16, 1965, but on appeal by the plaintiff, the jlldgment of."}}, {"text": "January 23, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5109, "end_char": 5125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "96,833-10-0 with interest at 9 per cent from January 23, 1953 and thereafter the remaining amount was to be equally divided between the plaintiff and the defendan~ If the price fetclied at the sale was less than Rs. %,"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5641, "end_char": 5646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of the English equitable doctrine of 'conversion' which they held applied in India also, the High Court took the view that the deed dated February 25, 1946 had created an equitable interest in the land in fav<>ur of the plaintiff."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6056, "end_char": 6069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave."}}, {"text": "Indian Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6517, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6542, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6545, "end_char": 6569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6907, "end_char": 6914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "770 H, 771 A-Bl\n\nThe concept and creation of quality of ownership, legal and equitable, on the execution of an agreement to convey immovable property, as understood H in England is alien to Indian law which recognises one owner, i.e., the legal owner."}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7041, "end_char": 7065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7259, "end_char": 7264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7272, "end_char": 7296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7969, "end_char": 7979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Section 12(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8376, "end_char": 8389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8397, "end_char": 8416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8593, "end_char": 8603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Specific Relief Act", "statute": "Specific Relief Act"}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 SCR 341", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8949, "end_char": 8965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12240, "end_char": 12254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural I.ands Act offered no impediment to the respondent-plaintiff's seeking to enforce the contract."}}, {"text": "(1976] 1 SCR 847", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14249, "end_char": 14265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14311, "end_char": 14329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 20 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14571, "end_char": 14588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.B. Vakil", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Vakil and I.N. Shroff for the Appellant in C.A. 1!47/78."}}, {"text": "I.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14850, "end_char": 14861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Vakil and I.N. Shroff for the Appellant in C.A. 1!47/78."}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkirnde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14898, "end_char": 14912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkirnde, P.H. Parekh and I. M. Nanavati for R.R. l in\n\nC.A. 1!47/78."}}, {"text": "P.H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14914, "end_char": 14925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkirnde, P.H. Parekh and I. M. Nanavati for R.R. l in\n\nC.A. 1!47/78."}}, {"text": "I. M. Nanavati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14930, "end_char": 14944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkirnde, P.H. Parekh and I. M. Nanavati for R.R. l in\n\nC.A. 1!47/78."}}, {"text": "S.K. Dho", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14975, "end_char": 14983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Dho/kia for R.R. 2 & 3 in C.A. 1147/78."}}, {"text": "ClllNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15114, "end_char": 15130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nClllNNAPPA REDDY, J. The appellant Bai Dosabai obtained two plots of land in Survey Nos.", "canonical_name": "ClllNNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Bai Dosabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15149, "end_char": 15160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nClllNNAPPA REDDY, J. The appellant Bai Dosabai obtained two plots of land in Survey Nos.", "canonical_name": "Bai Dosabhai"}}, {"text": "Dosabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15299, "end_char": 15306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 25, 1946, Dosabai executed a deed, styled \"a deed of lease\", in favo11r of Indu Prasad Dev Shanker Bhatt, whose successors in interest are the respondents to this appeal.", "canonical_name": "Dosabhai"}}, {"text": "Indu Prasad Dev Shanker Bhatt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15364, "end_char": 15393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 25, 1946, Dosabai executed a deed, styled \"a deed of lease\", in favo11r of Indu Prasad Dev Shanker Bhatt, whose successors in interest are the respondents to this appeal.", "canonical_name": "Indu Prasad Dev Shankar Bhatt"}}, {"text": "January 23, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15566, "end_char": 15582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The material terms of the deed were the following : The lease was to be for a period of seven 'years from January 23, 1946."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16719, "end_char": 16728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17320, "end_char": 17329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18002, "end_char": 18011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21568, "end_char": 21584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 25, 1950 the lessor gave a notice to the lessee (when we use the expression lessee hereafter we include the successors in interest of the original lessee also within that term) demanding payment of rent for the year 1950-51 which was payable in advance but wa~\n\nin default."}}, {"text": "March 7, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21853, "end_char": 21866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 7, 1951, the lessor gave a second notice to the lessee demanding payment of rent due for the years 1950-51, and 1951-52."}}, {"text": "June 19, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22247, "end_char": 22260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 19, 1952, the lessor issued a third notice to the lessee demanding payment of rent for the three years 1950-51, 1951-\n\n~ ..\n\n• DOSABAI v. MATHURDAS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 769\n\n52 and 1952-53 and also callinon the lessee pay the balance, of price within three months from the date of receipt of the notice and get a deed of sale executed and registered in his favour."}}, {"text": "Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22878, "end_char": 22912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on November 21, 1952, the lessor filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad to recover rent for the period from January 23,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953."}}, {"text": "January 23,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22949, "end_char": 22966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, on November 21, 1952, the lessor filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad to recover rent for the period from January 23,\n\n1950 to January 22, 1953."}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23494, "end_char": 23540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January I, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23767, "end_char": 23782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This plea was based on the circumstance that an amendment which came into force on January I, 1953 made the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act applicable to the suit lands."}}, {"text": "April 30, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24356, "end_char": 24370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be mentioned here that the lessee himself had filed a suit for possession against the tenant who was ih actual occupation of the lands and obtained possession from him on April 30, 1955."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24407, "end_char": 24427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessee filed an appeal to the- High Court of Bombay which wttS dismissed on March 19, 1958 and a further appeal to the Supreme Court which was also dismissed on March 8, 1965."}}, {"text": "March 19, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24452, "end_char": 24466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessee filed an appeal to the- High Court of Bombay which wttS dismissed on March 19, 1958 and a further appeal to the Supreme Court which was also dismissed on March 8, 1965."}}, {"text": "March 8, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24537, "end_char": 24550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessee filed an appeal to the- High Court of Bombay which wttS dismissed on March 19, 1958 and a further appeal to the Supreme Court which was also dismissed on March 8, 1965."}}, {"text": "January 16, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24726, "end_char": 24742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Immediately on the lessor obtaining possession, the lessee, on January 16, 1961, instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises seeking (a) specific performance of the agreement dated February 25, 1946 by directing the lessor-defendant to execute a sale deed in his favour after receiving from the plaintiff the balance of sale price of Rs."}}, {"text": "Vakil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26968, "end_char": 26973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Vakil learned counsel for the appellant raised several contentions befote us."}}, {"text": "Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27538, "end_char": 27585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28410, "end_char": 28427, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28433, "end_char": 28452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28454, "end_char": 28478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28998, "end_char": 29003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29011, "end_char": 29035, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29229, "end_char": 29234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29242, "end_char": 29266, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ifwe now turn to the Indian Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29857, "end_char": 29895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chapter TX of the Trusts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30263, "end_char": 30291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30389, "end_char": 30394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter TX of the Trusts Act", "statute": "Chapter TX of the Trusts Act"}}, {"text": "[1977] 2 S.C.R. 341", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30698, "end_char": 30717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "may now examine some of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30847, "end_char": 30918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31042, "end_char": 31051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We may now examine some of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "We may now examine some of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31102, "end_char": 31111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We may now examine some of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1877", "statute": "We may now examine some of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1877"}}, {"text": "Chapter IX of that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31216, "end_char": 31238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31513, "end_char": 31523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IX of that Act", "statute": "Chapter IX of that Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 13 to 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31528, "end_char": 31545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IX of that Act", "statute": "Chapter IX of that Act"}}, {"text": "S. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31615, "end_char": 31620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IX of that Act", "statute": "Chapter IX of that Act"}}, {"text": "S. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31682, "end_char": 31687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IX of that Act", "statute": "Chapter IX of that Act"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33537, "end_char": 33552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OOSABAI v. MATHURDAS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 773\n\nthe lessor is bound to sell the property either to the lessee or by public A auction.", "canonical_name": "ClllNNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37304, "end_char": 37311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38776, "end_char": 38781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Gujarat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39562, "end_char": 39583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Gujarat by various orders has prescribed the terms and conditions subject to which exemption will be granted under s. 21."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39691, "end_char": 39696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 25, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39722, "end_char": 39738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last circular dated October 25, 1979 of the Government also specifies that the value of the land for the purpose of s. 21 and the scheme should not exceed Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39818, "end_char": 39823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 31, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39974, "end_char": 39990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last date for submitting a scheme under the rules made by the Government of Gujarat was January 31, 1980."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40307, "end_char": 40317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 18, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40972, "end_char": 40988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By our order dated January 18, 1980, we appointed Shri R. L. Dave, Additional Registrar of the Gujarat High Court as Receiver and charged him with the duly of submitting a building scheme and other necessary documents to the Competent authority under s. 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, before January 31, 1980."}}, {"text": "R. L. Dave", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41008, "end_char": 41018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By our order dated January 18, 1980, we appointed Shri R. L. Dave, Additional Registrar of the Gujarat High Court as Receiver and charged him with the duly of submitting a building scheme and other necessary documents to the Competent authority under s. 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, before January 31, 1980."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41048, "end_char": 41066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By our order dated January 18, 1980, we appointed Shri R. L. Dave, Additional Registrar of the Gujarat High Court as Receiver and charged him with the duly of submitting a building scheme and other necessary documents to the Competent authority under s. 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, before January 31, 1980."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41204, "end_char": 41209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41461, "end_char": 41466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42726, "end_char": 42731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42739, "end_char": 42744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_777_782_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "-~ ..\n\nK.DHEENADHAYALAN\n\nSTATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR.\n\nApril 22, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKAR!A AND R. S. PATIIAK, JJ.J\n\nSeniority List-Fresh lnter-se seniority list drawn as per the principles indicated by the liigh Court and according to the soecial Rules for Tamil Nadu\n\nCommercial Taxes Service-Petitioner not a party before the Iligh Court's proceedings-Whether directions would bind the petitioner-The power of the High Court to fill up the lacuna in an order assailed.\n\nUnder the Special Rules of the Tamil Nadu Commercial Taxes Service, recruitment to the junior most post, Joint Commercial Tax Officer is made by direct recn1itn1ent and recruitment by transfer from Deputy Conlffiercial Tax Officers in the State Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services in the proportion\n\nI : 2.\n\nThe higher posts are filled by promotion from officers in the category of posts immediately below.\n\nUnder Rule 2 (b) all promotions are to be made on the grounds of merit and ability, seriiority being considered \\Vhere merit and ability are equal.\n\nRule 5(c) provides that every person appointed as a Joint Commercial Tax Officer must be on probation for at least two years on duty; in the case of direct recruitment the probationary period con1n1ences from the date on which the officer complet~ his training and; in the case of recruitment by trnru; fer it commences from the date the officer }oins duty. Under rule 7(b), the periOO of training of a direct recruit does not count towards probation.\n\nThe petitioner was recruited to the Cadre of Joint Co1nrnercial Tax Officer as a direct recruit in 1966 and WM posted for training which he joined on 6th June 1966; he comrnenced his period of probation on 18th August 1967. On\n\n16th August 1972, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Commercial Tax Officer and on 14th January 1976 he was promoted as Assistant Commisioner. The second respondent joined the post of Joit commercia1 Tax (Jfficer ns a promotee on 25th .January 1967 and comn1enccd his probation from that date.\n\nHe was promoted as Conunercial 'fax Officer on 17th December 1972 and as Assistant Commissioner on 26th AuguM: 1976 .\n\nJn the combined inter-~ seniority list issued in G.0.Ms. No. 4103 dated 9th July 1973, herein the petitioner and the second respondent were shown in the 1966 list at serial numbers 43 and 52 respectively. The validity of the combined int&-se seniority list was challenged in two writ petitions Nos. 2016\n\nand 2017 of 1972 filed by certam other officers in respect of the ranking from serial numbers 51 to serial number 78.\n\nThe petitioner was not a party to the writ petition. The writ petition wa' allowed by the Madras High Court. The High Court took note of the fact that no rules had been framed indicating how the inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and the transferee recruits had to be fixed and therefore directed a fresh determination of the inter-se seniority on the basis of three principles: (i) Each year should be taken as a unit for fixing the inter-se seniority; (ii) Persons not actually appoiNed in the year 1966 should not be included in the 1966 year's list l l-463 SCI/80\n\nand their seniority should be determined with reference to the date of tloeir joining as Joint Commercial Tax Officers; and (iii) The date on which an officer commences probation is the proper criterion for fixing the in1er-se seniority.\n\nIn the new combined interse seniority list, so prepared and issued by the Government in their order No. G.O. Ms. No. 2228 dated 27th December 1977, both the second respondent and the petitioner were shown at serial number 48 and serial No. 49 respectively in the 1967 List.\n\nThe petitioner, apprehending that the seniority assigned to him in the second combined interse seniority list of Joint Commercial Tax Officers would prejudice him in the promotions to be made to the category of Deputy Commissioners has challenged the validity of that seniority list.\n\nDismissing the petition, the Court\n\nHEW : I. Where the rules are specifically sileat there is no doubt that the Government is entitled to make an order filling up any lacuna or uncovered gap in the rules. There is good reason in the principle followed in this case that seniority should be based on th.e length of effective service. 'The date .of confirmation in a post then loses its relevance.\n\n[781 F-G]\n\n2. The principle that officers whose effective entry into the service pertains to a particular year should be regarded as a unit in themselves for futiag tlleir\n\ninterse seniority is valid.\n\nCorrectly, threfore, the petitioner and tho secoru1 respondent have been placed in the 1967 List. Since the Special Ru!~ do not contemplate any credit being given for the period of training undergone by a direct recruit and the probationary period commences only the training ends, the year of appointment is of little moment. [781 B-C. o:BJ\n\n3. The principles propowided by the High Court are principles of gene.-al application and drawn from the rules governing the service and the conCepto;; . implied therein. They are not principles applicable peculiarly olily to the parties to the v.1rit petitions.\n\nThey are principles which could legitimately fonn the basis of a combined inter se seniority list in respect of Joint Celnn1ercial Tax Officers.\n\nThe places assigned to the petitioner and the second respondent duly represent their relative seniority. The second seniority list was prepared after issuing notice to all including the petitioner and prepared after considering objections raised. [782 A-CJ\n\n• ORIGINAL JURISDICTIO'l : Writ Petition No. 461 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, R. Mohan, P. N. Ramalingam and A. T. M.\n\nSampath for the Petitioner.\n\nA. V. Rang am for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Cca; rt was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-The Tamil Nadu Commercial Taxes Service consists ff of a hierarchy of posts. At the base lies the post of Joint Commercial Tax Officer, above it is the post of Commercial Tax Officer, then of As11istant-Commissioner, thereafter of Deputy Commissioner and\n\n' .....\n\nii!\n\n\" I\"\n\n~ .\n\n~ i·\n\n_.._\n\nfinally there is the post of Selection Grade Deputy Commissioner.\n\nThe service is governed by the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Commercial Taxes Service (the \"Special Rules\"). Recruitment to the junior most post, the Joint Commrcial Tax Officer, is made by (i) -direct recruitment and (ii) recruitment by transfer from Deputy Commercial Tax Officers in the State Commercial Taxes Subordinate Service. Permanent vacancies in the posts of Joint Commercial Tax Officer are filled by direct recruitment and by \"transfer\" recruitment in the proportion I : 2. The higher posts are filled by promotion from officers in the category of posts immediately below. Under rule :C(b) -of the Special Rules all promotions are to be made on the grounds of merit and ability, seniority being considered only where merit and ability are equal. Rule 5(c) provides that every person appointed as a Joint Commercial Tax Officer must be on probation for at least two years on duty; in the case of direct recruitment the probationary period commences from the date on which the Officer completes his training, and in the case of recruitment by transfer it commences from the date the officer joins duty. Under rule 7(b) the period of training of a direct recruit does_ not count towards probation.\n\nThe petitioner was recruited to the cadre of Joint Comn1ercja} Tax 'Officers as a direct recrnit in 1966, and was posted for training which he joined on 6th June, 1966; thereafter he completed the probationary period of two years. On 16th August, 1972 the petitioner was promoted to the post of Commercial Tax Officer. The second respondent was promoted as Commercial Tax Officer on 17th December, 1972.\n\nPromotion to the next higher category of posts, the Assistant Commissioners, followed. The petitioner was promoted as Assistant Commissioner on 14th January, 1976 while the seeond respondent was promoted on 26th August, 1976.\n\nMeanwhile, by G. 0. Ms. No. 4103 dated 9th July, 1973 the GoverR• ment passed an order notifying the combinedfinter-se seniority list of directly recruited Joint Commercial Tax Officers during the years 1964 to 1967 and the transferee Joint Commercial Tax Officers recruited during the years 1964 and 1966 on the basis of the principles set forth in that order. The seniority list reflected the cyclical order based on rule 2(c) of the Special Rules, that is to say, (i) direct recruit (ii) transferee recruit (iii) transferee recruit. The petitioner was shown in the\n\n\"1966 list\" at serial No. 43 of the overall seniority list and 18th August,\n\n1967 was shown as the date of commencement of his probation. The second respondent was also shown in the 1966 list, at serial No. 52 with 25th January, 1967 as the date of commencement of his probation.\n\nThe validity of the combined inter-se seniority list was challenged by two writ petitions, Writ Petitions Nos. 2016 and 2017 of 1972 filed by certain other officers in respect of the ranking from serial number 51 to serial Number 78. The petitioner was not a party to the writ peti tions. The writ petitions were allowed by the Madras High Court by its judgment dated 16th September, 1975. The High Court took note of the fact that no rules had been framed indicating how the inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and the transferee recruits had to be fixed. The High Court quashed the seniority list and directed a fresh determination of the interse seniority on the basis of three principles :\n\nC I. Each year should be taken as a.unit for fixing the interse\n\nseniority.\n\n2. Persons not actually appointed in the year 1966 should not be included in the 1966 year's list and their seniority should be determined with reference to the date of their joining as Joint Commercial Tax Officers; and\n\n3. The date on which an officer commences probation is the proper criterion for fixing the interse seniority.\n\nTaking those principles into account, the Government then prepared a fresh combined interse seniority list and published it by an order set forth in 0.0. No. 2228 dated 27th December, 1977. The second respondent was now shown at serial number 48 and the petitioner was shown at serial number 49 in the 1967 list.\n\nThe petitioner, apprehensive that the seniority assigned to him in the second combined inter-se seniority list of Joint Commercial Tax Officers would prejudice him in the promotions to be made to the .ate gory of Deputy Commissioners, has challenged the validity of that seniority list.\n\nThe petitioner contends that the High Court has no power to lay down the principles for determining inter-se seniority between direct G recruits and transferee recruits and, in any event, his seniority cannot be determined on the basis of the principles laid down by the High Court inasmuch as he was not a party to the writ petitions. The petitioner also takes exception to the statement contained in paragraph 16 of the State Government's counter affidavit to the effect that the seniority of a Government Officer in the lower category is also the basis H for assigning seniority in the higher category. Great emphasis has been laid by the petitioner on the circumstance that he joined as Joint Commercial Tax Officer earlier than the second respondent.\n\nIn our opinion, the ptinciples which the Hiljh Court culled out as the basis for determining the inter-se seniority of !oint Commercial Tax Officers are in the main drawn from the rules governing the service.\n\nThe petitioner cannot claim thaffor'the'purposeof seniority has service must be considered with reference to the date on which he commenced the period of training. The special Rules require that a direct recruit must undergo a period of training. They also provide that he must pass through a period' of probation. Thty further declare t:hat the period of training will not count as a period spent on probation and that the probationary period commences only when the training ends . That being so, the relevant date for considering the petitioner's seniority is 18th August, 1967. The rules do not contemplate any credit being given for the period of training undergone by a direct recruit and, therefore, the fact that he was appointed in 1966 is of little moment.\n\nThe second respondent joined the post of Joint Commercial Tax Officer as a transferee recruit and therefore the date of commencement of his probation was 25th January, 1967. Clearly, he entered service effectively from an earlier date than the petitioner.\n\nNow having regard to the circumstance that the cadre of Joint Commercial Tax Officers is drawn both from direct recruits and transferee recruits, it is necessary to have a single combimd intcr-se seniority list. There can be no quarrel with the principle that officers whose effective entry into the service pertains to a particular year should be regarded as a unit in themselves for fixing their inter-se seniority.\n\nCorrectly, therefore, the petitioner and the second respondent have been placed in the 1967 list. We have already observed that the effective date on which. a direct recruit joins as a Joint Commercial Tax Officer is the date on which he commences his probation. In the determination of inter-se seniority, the High Court has followed the provision in the Special Rules that the posts of Joint Commerci2J Tax Officers are to be filled in the proportion of I : 2 between direct recruits and transferee recruits. The cyclical order in which the vacancies will be filled on that basis are provided by the order of the Government published in G.0. Ms. No. 4103 dated 9th July, 1973. Where the rules are specifically silent there is no doubt that the Government is entitled to make an order filling up\"any lacuna or uncovered gap in the rules. It may also be observed that there is good reason in the principle followed in this case that seniority should be based on the length of effective service. The date of confirmation in a post then loses its relevance.\n\nIn regard to the contention of the petitioner that he was not a party to the writ petitions decided by the High Court and that, therefore, the\n\nSUPRE'.\\IE COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nprinciples laid down in the High Court judgment should not be applied to him, we think the submission to be without force. The principles propounded by the High Court are principles of general application and drawn from the rules governing the service and the concepts implied therein. They are not principles applicable peculiarly only to the parties to the writ petitions. Indeed, we find no fault with the terms in which the principles have been enunciated. They are principles which could legitimately form the basis of a combined inter-se seniority list in respect of Joint Commercial Tax Officers. Having due regard to the considerations mentioned above, we are of opinion that the places assigned in the second seniority list to the petitioner and the second respondent truly represent their relative seniority.\n\nWe may also observe that the second seniority list was prepared after issuing notice to the petitioner and affording him an opportunity to be heard in the matter. It was after all the objections had been considered that the list was finally drawn up. As regards the point whether the seniority of the petitioner in the category of posts higher D than the category of Joint Commercial Tax Officers should be determined on the basis of his seniority as Joint Commercial Tax Officer, that is a question which does not arise presently. No combined interse seniority list in respect of the cadre of Assistant Commissioners or of higher posts appears to have been drawn up. There is no material before us to show that it has and, if it has, what is the position of se- E niority assigned to the petitioner therein. In the circumstances we think it premature to express any opinion on this point.\n\nThe second seniority list was prepared on 27th December, 1977.\n\nThe writ petition was filed in this Court in May, 1979. The gross delay, plainly apparent, would constitute another ground for denying relief to the petitioner. But as, in onr judgment, the petitioner fails h '..,,_,... on the merits we need not go further into the question of lac es. __,,\n\nThe petition fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition dismissed", "total_entities": 18, "entities": [{"text": "K.DHEENADHAYALAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.DHEENADHAYALAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 22, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 69, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 22, 1980\n\n[R. S. SARKAR!A AND R. S. PATIIAK, JJ.J\n\nSeniority List-Fresh lnter-se seniority list drawn as per the principles indicated by the liigh Court and according to the soecial Rules for Tamil Nadu\n\nCommercial Taxes Service-Petitioner not a party before the Iligh Court's proceedings-Whether directions would bind the petitioner-The power of the High Court to fill up the lacuna in an order assailed."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2644, "end_char": 2661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition wa' allowed by the Madras High Court."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5610, "end_char": 5620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5647, "end_char": 5660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, R. Mohan, P. N. Ramalingam and A. T. M.\n\nSampath for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "R. Mohan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5662, "end_char": 5670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, R. Mohan, P. N. Ramalingam and A. T. M.\n\nSampath for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "N. Ramalingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5675, "end_char": 5688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, R. Mohan, P. N. Ramalingam and A. T. M.\n\nSampath for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. T. M.\n\nSampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5693, "end_char": 5710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, R. Mohan, P. N. Ramalingam and A. T. M.\n\nSampath for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rang", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Rang am for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Cca; rt was delivered by\n\nPATHAK, J.-The Tamil Nadu Commercial Taxes Service consists ff of a hierarchy of posts."}}, {"text": "6th June, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7549, "end_char": 7563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was recruited to the cadre of Joint Comn1ercja} Tax 'Officers as a direct recrnit in 1966, and was posted for training which he joined on 6th June, 1966; thereafter he completed the probationary period of two years."}}, {"text": "16th August, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7630, "end_char": 7647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 16th August, 1972 the petitioner was promoted to the post of Commercial Tax Officer."}}, {"text": "26th August, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8008, "end_char": 8025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was promoted as Assistant Commissioner on 14th January, 1976 while the seeond respondent was promoted on 26th August, 1976."}}, {"text": "9th July, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8067, "end_char": 8081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4103 dated 9th July, 1973 the GoverR• ment passed an order notifying the combinedfinter-se seniority list of directly recruited Joint Commercial Tax Officers during the years 1964 to 1967 and the transferee Joint Commercial Tax Officers recruited during the years 1964 and 1966 on the basis of the principles set forth in that order."}}, {"text": "16th September, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9246, "end_char": 9266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petitions were allowed by the Madras High Court by its judgment dated 16th September, 1975."}}, {"text": "27th December, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10163, "end_char": 10182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2228 dated 27th December, 1977."}}, {"text": "18th August, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12126, "end_char": 12143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That being so, the relevant date for considering the petitioner's seniority is 18th August, 1967."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_783_793_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ".. J.-\n\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.\n\nSURENDRA NATH BHATTACHARYA AND ANR.\n\nApril 24, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]\n\nLand Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 31 of 1962, Section 40(aa)-lnterpre'ilation of Section 40(aa) Gnd also Section 7 of the Amending Act of 1962-Acquisition of land for company engaged in industry or werk which is for public purpose is valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution-Section 44B of the Act is prospective and does not relate to Qcquisitiol'I.\n\nRespondent 2 known as Calcutta Mineral Supply Company having its office at 31, Jack.son Lane, Calcutta was carrying on the businesa of manufacturl.Oi sodium silicate, plaster of paris etc., which were formerly imported on a very large scale from foreign countries. The manufactured goods of the Company\n\nare widely used all over India saving considerable foreign exchange which otherwise would have had to be spent in importing these materials. With a view tO extend its business and i\\(lprove the standard of its manufacture but\n\ntor waat of space for big underground storage tanks, the Company was handi\"\"J>ped, the Company applied to the Collector for acquiring for public purpoee, the lands in dispute which were contiguous to the lands on which the existing factory of the company stood was best suited.\n\nConsequent to the application :.in agreement was executed between the Government and the Compaliy on the 29th of November 1954.\n\nOn December 9, 1954, a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published and the first respondent filed his objection which was rejected and was foJJowed by a otification under section 9 of the Act.\n\nAfter, the land acquisition proceedings were complete a writ petition was filed by the first respondent before tlte High Court on January 14, 1957 which was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court and therefore the first respondent filed an \"Ppeal to the Division Bench of tlte High Court on\n\nFelml&\"y 21, 1957. While the appeal was pending before the High Court tlte Collector made an Award dated 14-10-1957 and after taking possession from the owners of the land, delivered the same to the company-respondent No. 2 on October 22. 1957. The first respondent filed an application for permission to urge additional grounds before the High Court which was permitted and ultimately the Division Bench of the High Court by the order under appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the Land acquisition proceedings taken under the Act.\n\nHence, this appeal before this Court after getting a certilieate from the High Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal by certificate. tlte Court\n\nHEW: I. Analysing tlte ratio of the decision of this Court in (Second) H R. Li Arora v. State of U.P., [1964] 6 S.C.R. and followed in Himalayan 1'iles & Marbles v. Francis Victor Continho (dead) by I.rs .. [1980] 3 S.C.R. 235,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19 80] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nA the following conditions must be satisfied before an acquisition made prior\n\nto July 20, 1962 could be said to be constitutionally valid-\n\n(a) that the acquisition bad taken place before July 20, 1962, the date 'vhen the Amending Act came into force;\n\n(b) that the said acquisition should have been fully compleled in that property said to have been acquired had vested absolutely in the Government;\n\n( c) that the acquisition was made for purposes mentioned in clause\n\n( aa) of the amended clause added to s. 40;\n\n(d) that if these conditions were satisfied, then any acquisitioo proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with much acquisition would be deemed to have. been valid as if the arnooded provisions were in force at the time when the acquisition was made.\n\n[788 E-0]\n\nTl>o facts of the present case squarely fall within the ambit of the cooditions laid down by section 7 of the Amending Act and hence the cballenge on the ground of the constitutional validity of the acquisition must neceeuri- D ly fail.\n\nTl>o proceedings for acquisition were started long before July 20, 1962 that is, as early as December 9, 1?54 when notification under section 6 of the Act was issued. After inviting objections an Award was made by the Collector on October 14, 1957 and after the property in dispute fully\n\nrested in the Government, the Collector then delivered the same to the Company-respondent 2 on October 22, 1957. [789 A-BJ\n\n'.E Himalayan Tiles and Mmbles v. Francis Victor Countinho (dead) by I.rs .. [1980] 3 SCR 235; applied.\n\n2. To hold that section 40(aa) of the Act also requires proof of public purpose in the restricted iense in that it must be for the general good of the people at large, then the very object sought to be achieved bY the amendment would be completely frustrated and the provisions of Secti01t 7. would become otiose. [789 D-FJ .\n\n3. The words \"public purpose\" are not to be interpreted in a restrictive -.... ~\n\nsense but take colour from thei nature of the industry itse1f, the uticles it _. manufactures and the benefit to the people that it subscrves. The land should be acquired for building or work. which would serve the J'Ublic\n\npurpo~ of th~ Company and not public purpose as it is generally understood.\n\n[791 C-D]\n\nIn the instant case the articles produced by the Company are vsed for the benefit of the people and as it saves a lot of foreign exchange, it is unmistakably for the general good of the country particularly frooi the economic point of view. The obje.ct of the Company in extending its operations by enlarging the area of its prcxluction was for the public pu.rpciee of the Company. Taking an overall picture of the nature of the prooucts of tbe company, its various activities, the general public good that it seeks to achieve and the great benefit that the people derive, the acquisition was for a public purpose. [791 C-FJ · ·\n\n'lllEST BENGAL v. s. N. BHATTACHARY.A (Fazal Ali, J.) 785\n\n4. Section 44B of lhe Land Acquisition Act is purely prospective in A character and has absolutely no application to acquisition proceedings taken before July 20, 1962, tho date when the amendment was enacted. [791 FG]\n\n5. Section 40(aa) of the Act does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution, by permitting acquisition of land for a Company but not for an individual or a private Company through these persons may also be engaged in an industry which was for a public purpose. [792 A-BJ B\n\nP. GirdhoJ'aJ1 Prasad Missair and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr., Al.R. 1968 Pat 77; Chhotubhat Babarbhai Patel v.\n\nState of Gujarat and Anr., 1.L.R. Gujarat 1964 p. 472; approved. ·\n\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1969.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 3-5-1966 of the Calcutta High Court in F.M.A. No. 71/57.\n\nP. K. Chatterjee & Rathin Dass for the Appellant.\n\nV. S. Desai, S. C. Majumdar and Miss Kirobi Banerjee for Respondent No. I.\n\nP. K. Mukherji for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment dated B May 3, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court quashing the acquisition proceedings taken as also the notifications made by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') in respect of the lands in dispute which comprised 73 acres in village Kanpura, P.S. Dum Dum.\n\nAlthough the case had a rather chf'quered career and was preceded by a full-fledged litigation starting from the trial court and ending with the High Court regarding the question of title, we are not, however, concerned with the past history in view of the short point on the basis of which the appeal was decided by the Division Bench of the High Court. The case of the Government was that on December 16, 1949, respondent No. 2 known as Calcutta Mineral Supply Company having its office at 31, Jackson Lane, Calcutta, appli£d to the Collector for acquiring the land in question in order to extend its business. The company was carrying on the business of manufacturing sodium silicate, plaster of Paris, etc., which were form£rly imported on a very large scale from foreign countries. The manufactured goods of the Company are widely used all over India saving considerable foreign .exchange which otherwise would have had to he spent in impcrting\n\nthese materials. The company pleaded that it wanted to extenci its business and improve the standards of its manufacture but for want of space for big underground storage tanks, the company was seriously handicapped. The company, therefore, prayed that the lands in dispute which were contiguous to the lands on which the existing factory\n\nof the company stood was best suited for this purpose and hence tile Collector was requested to acquire the lands for public purpose.\n\nConsequent to the application, an agreement was executed between the Government and the company on the 29th of November 1954. On December 9, 1954, a notification under s. 6 of the Act was published and the first respondent filed his objection which was rejected and was followed by a notification under s. 9 of the Act. After the land acquisition proceedings were complete a writ petitiol) was filed by the first'respondent before the High Court on January 14, 1957 which was dismissed by a single Judge ou the High Court and therefore the first respondent filed an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court on February 21, 1957. While the appeal was pending before the High Court the Collector made an Award dated 14-10-1957 and after taking possession from the owners of the land, delivered the same to the company-respondent No. 2 on October 23, 1957. The first respondent \"filed an application for permission to urge additional grounds before the High Court which was permitted and ultimately the Divisioa Bench of the High Court by the Order under appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the land acquisition proceedings taken under the Act.\n\nHence, this appeal before this Court after getting a certificate from the High Court.\n\nThe only point that has been canvassed before us by counsel for the parties is as to whether or not the acquisition of the land in dispute was valid in law. The appellant contended that in view of the amertdment of section 40 by Act. No. 31 of 1962, acquisition ofland for the purpose of the company was validated and all acquisitions made before the amendment were validated retrospectively provided certain conditions laid down under s. 7 of the Amending Act were fulfilled.\n\nWe might mention here that prioF to the amendment, this Court in R. L. Arora v. State of U.P. (1) had held that any acquisition under the Act for purposes of a Private Company would not be a public purpose and would, therefore, be void. It was on the basis of this decision, which is usually known as the 'first Arora case', that the first respondent filed a petition in the High Court for quashing the land acquisition proceedings. The legislature, however, intervened by the Amending Act, as mentioned aforesaid, and removed the basis of the judgment of\n\n(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149.\n\n• I ~\n\nthis Court by adding clause (aa) to s. 40 of the Act so as to validate all A acquisitions of private lands for purposes of a private company provided the conditions laid down in s. 7 were fulfilled. This amendment was also challenged before this Court in what is known as the 'second Arora case' (2) where this Court by majority of 4 : I held that the Amending Act was valid and that under s. 40(aa) an acquisition could be made even for a private company if it was engaged in an industry which was for a public purpose. We are not concerned with the other amendments made which do not apply to the facts of the present case .\n\nThe High Court undoubetdly referred to the \"first Arora case\" as also to the \"second Arora case\" but, with due respect, we might\n\nobsel'Ve that the High Court relied mainly on the observations made in the \"first Arora case\" and has not correctly interpreted the later decision of this Court and the effect of the amendment which completely superseded the ''first Arora case\". The argument of the learned Gounsel before us centered round the interpretation of s. 40(aa) as amended by the amendment as also s. 7 of the Amending Act. In order to understand the scope of the argument it may be necessary to extract both s. 40(aa) and s. 7 of the Amending Act, which run thus :\n\n.. 7. Validation of certain acquisitions.-Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, every acquisition of land for a company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962, shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of the purpose• mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have been made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-section, and accordingly every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at all material times when such acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken.\n\nExplanation-In this section \"Company\" has the same meaning as in clause (e) of section 3 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act.\"\n\n\"40(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of wme building or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose;\"\n\n(2) ·[1964] 6 S.C.R 784.\n\n.A In this connection, this Court observed as follows:-\n\n\"Therefore before s. 7 can validate an acquisition made before July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition is complete and the land acquired has vested in Government.\n\nThis means that the land acquired has vested in Government eitherunders.16ors.17(1)oftheAct. Thuss. ?of the Amendment Act validates such acquisitions in which property has vested absolutely in Government either under s.16 ors. 17(1). Secondly's. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that where acquisition hasbeenmadeforacompanybefore July 20, 1962 or purported to have been made under cl. (a) or cl. (b)ofs. 40(l)and those clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in R. L. Arora's case (1962 Supp. 2 SCR 149), it shall be deemed that the acquisition was for the purpose mentioned in cl. (aa) as inserted in s. 40(1) of the Act by the Amenment.\n\nAct. Thirdly, s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that every\n\nsuch acquisition and auy prodeeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment act were in force at all material times when any action was taken for such acquisition. Finally, this validity is given to such acquisitions and to all actions taken in connection therewith notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court\".\n\nThus, analysing the ratio or the \"second Arora case\",' the: following conditions must be satisfied before an acquisition made prior to July 20, 1962 could be said to be constitutionally valid-\n\n( a) that the acquisition had taken place before July 20;\n\n1962, the date when the Amending Act came into force;\n\n(b) that the said acquisition should have been fully completed in that the property said to have been acquired had:vesteq absolutely in the Government;\n\n(c) that the acquisition was made for purposes mentioned in G clause (aa) of the amended clause added to s. 40;\n\n(d) that if these conditions were staisfied, then any acquisition proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition would be deemed to have been valid as if the amended provisions were in force at the time when the acquisition was made.\n\nOn this aspect of the matter, the view taken by this Court in the \"second Arora case\" was followed in a recent decision of this Court in\n\nWEST BENGAL '\" s. N •. BHATTACBARYA (Fazal Ali, /.) 7 89\n\nHimalayan Tiles and Marbles v. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by A.\n\nLrs (I). In the instant case, it is not disputed that the proceedings for acquisition were started long before July 20, 1962, that is to say, as early as December 9, 1954 when notification under s. 6 of the Act was issued.\n\nSecondly, it is also not disputed that after inviting objections, etc., an Award was made by the Collector on October 14, 1957 and after the property in dispute fully vested in the Government, the Collector\n\nB . then delivered the same to the company-respondent No. 2 on October\n\n23, 1957. For these reasons, the facts of the present case squarely fall within the ambit of the conditions laid down by s. 7 of the Amending Act and hence the challenge on the ground of the constitutional validity of the acquisition must necessarily fail.\n\nMr. V. S. Desai, appearing for respondent No. I, however, submitted that s. 7 itself wa.s violative of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.\n\nIt is not neceS>ary to examine this argument in detail because a similar argument was urged in the \"second Arora case\" (supra) and rejected.\n\nIt was then contended that even if we assume that s. 7 validated D' the present land acquisition proceedings, the conditions prescribed in clause (aa) of s. 40 were not fulfilled in this case inasmuch as the acquisition could not be said to be for a public purpose. It was submitted by the counsel for respondent No. I that as the company was a private one and there is nothing to show that there was any direct connection or close nexus between the articles produced by the company and the general good of the public, it could not be said that the acquisition was made for a company which was engaged in an industry which was for a public purpose. This argument, in our opinion, is based on a misconception of the concept of the Amending Act and the introduction of clauses (aa) to s. 40. If we are persuaded to hold that s. 40 (aa) also requires proof of a public purpose in the restricted sense, in that it must be for the general good of the people at large, then the very object sought to be achieved by the amendment would be completely frustrated and the provisions of s. 7 would become otiose. A similar argument was advanced in the \"second Arora case\" (supra) and was fully considered by this Court which observed as follows :-·\n\n\"Jn approaching the question of construction of this clause, it cannot be forgotten that the amendment was made in consequence of the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora' s case (1962 Supp. 2 SCR 149) and the intention of Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the\n\nmatter of acquisitions for a company .... Further, a literal H interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision\n\n(!) [19801 3 S.C.R.235.\n\nin a statute and the court has to look at the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used in a provision of the statute.\n\n• • •\n\nTherefore, we have to see whether the provision in cl. (aa) bears another construction also in the setting in which it appears and in the circumstances in which it was put on the statute book and also in view of the language used in the clause. The circumstances in which the amendment came to be made have already been mentioned by us and the intention of Parliament clearly was to fill up the lacuna in the Act.which became evident on the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora's case (!962 Supp. 2 SCR 149) ...... It was only for such a company that land was to be acquired compulsorily and the acquisition was for the construction of some .building or work for such a company, i.e., a company engaged or about to be engaged in some industry or work which is for a public purpose. In this setting it seems to ns reasonable to hold that the intention of Parliament could only have been that land should be acquired for such building or work for a company as would subserve the public purpose of the company; it could not have been intended, considering the setting in which cl. (aa) was introduced, that land could be acquired for a building or work which would not subserve the public purpose of the company .... Further, acquisition is for the construction of some building or work for a company and the nature of that company is that it is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose. When therefore the building or work is for such a company it seems to us that it is reasonable to hold that the nature of the building or work to be constructed takes colour from the nature of the company for which it is to be constructed. We are therefore of opinion that the literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is neither the only nor the true construction of cl. (aa) and that when cl. (aa) provides for acquisition of land needed for construction of some building or work it implicitly intends that the building or work which is to be constructed must be such as to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged or is about to be engaged.\n\nIn short, the words \"building or work\" used in cl. (aa) take their colour from the adjectival clause which governs the company\n\nfor which the building or work is being constructed .... It is only in these cases where the company is engaged in an industry or work of that kind and where the building or work is also constructed for a purpose of that kind, which is a public purpose, that acquisition can be made under cl. (aa). As we read the clause we are of opinion that the public purpose of the company for which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from the purpose of the building or work and it is not open for such a company to acquire land under cl. (aa) for a building or work which will not subserve the public purpose of the company.\"\n\n.(Emphasis ours)\n\nThe effect of the observations made above leads to the irresistible .conclusion that the words 'public purpose' are not to be interpreted in a restricted sense but take colour from the nature of the industry itself, the articles that it manufactures and the benefit to the people that it subserves. This Court clearly indicated that the land should be acquired for building or work which would serve the public purpose of the company and not public purpose as it is generally understood.\n\nIn the instant case, we have also set out the nature of the products of the company and have stressed the fact that the articles produced by the company are used for the benefit of the people and as it saves lot of foreign exchange, it is unmistakably for the general good of the country particularly from the economic point of view. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the object of the company in extending its operations by enlarging the area of its production was not for the public purpose of the company. Taking an overall picture of the nature of the products of the company, its various activities, the general public gpod that it seeks to achieve and the great benefit that the people derive, it cannot be said that the acquisition, in the present case, was not for a public purpose. According to the test laid down by this Court it is sufficient if it is shown that the building sought to be built or the work undertaken subserves the public purpose of the company which is completely fulfilled in this case. The High Court seems'to have been impressed by the argument advanced before it that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case are hit by s. 44B of the Act.\n\nThe High Court, however, has failed to consider that s. 44B is purely prospective in character and has absolutely no application to acquisition proceedings taken before July 20, 1962, the date when the amendment was enacted.\n\nThe High Court also seems to have accepted the argument of the H first respondent that s. 40(aa) violates Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it permits acquisition of laud for a company but\n\nnot for an individual or a private company though these persons may also be engaged in an industry which was for a public purpose. This J. argument was repelled by this Court and it was held that s. 40(aa) r-- was not violative of Art. 14. In this connection, this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"Therefore a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object behind cl. (aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under this head must therefore also fail.\"\n\nC Some of the High Courts also have takeu a similar view which has found favour with!us in view of the second Arora case, referred to above.\n\nIn the case of P. Girdharan Prasad Missir and Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (1) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court while dealing with this question observed as follows :-\n\nD \"Thirdly, it was urged that the acquisition was not for a public purpose but merely for the purpose of helping a person (here the company) to make profits. This argument, however, is no longer available. It is well knewn that sugar industry is one of the importam industries of India engaged in the production of an essential commodity, and the fostering of the growth of that E industry is undoubtedly for a public purpose. A company engaged in the manufacture of sugar would, therefore, come within the scope of clause (a) of sub-section (!) of section 40 of the Act.\"\n\nA Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Chhotubhai Babarbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (2) while construing the second Arora case referred to above clearly held that s. 40(aa) contemplated that the building or work which the company intended to construct was to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work for which it was being constructed. In that case also, the company concerned was manufacturing caustic soda, dyes, chemicals, colours and drugs (caustic soda is one of the products of the company in the instant case also). Dwelling on the importance of the public purpose of the industry concerned in that case, Shela!, C. J., observed as follows:-\n\n\"Taking all these factors into consideration, it is not possible to deny that the industry in which the second; respondent company H is already engaged and is about to be engaged in, and for the\n\n(I) A.I. R. 1968 Patna 77.\n\n(2) I. L. R. Gujarat 1964, 472 .\n\n-~- •\n\nbuildings or works for which the lands .in question are being~~ A acquired is such that it will promote public purpose and will be in the interest of the public.\"\n\nWe find ourselves in complete agreemenf with the aforesaid observations of the learned Chief Justice.\n\nFinally, even in the second Arora case, it would appear that the company in question was engaged in the production of textile machinery and its parts which were for the use of the general public. This was held by this Court to be a definite public purpose behind the acquisition. In this connection, this Court observed as follows :-\n\n\"We are concerned here with acquisition for a public purpose, which is undisputed. This is not a case of a house of one person being requisitioned for another; this is a case of constructing some work which will be useful to the public and will subserve the public purpose of the production of textile machinery and its parts for the use of the general public. In the circumstances we are of opinion that there being a definite public purpose behind the acquisition in the present case, the acquisition would be justified under the Act irrespective of the intention of the previous owner of the land to use it for son1e other public purpose.\"\n\nThe industrial venture in which respondent No. 2 was engaged was undoubtedly of much greater use than a company producing textile machinery because apart from being useful to the people at large and producing chemicals it has also resulted in saving lot of foreign exchange and thus improving the economy of our country so as to be an efficient instrument of economic benefit. We are satisfied that all the conditions of s. 7 of the Amending Act as also that of s. 40(aa) have been fulfilled in the instant case and the High Court was wrong in law in quashing the said proceedings. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the High Court is quashed and the Award of the Collector as also the proceedings before the Award are restored.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, the appellant will be entitled to costs in this Court against respondent No. 1.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nl2-463SC!.80", "total_entities": 100, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SURENDRA NATH BHATTACHARYA AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURENDRA NATH BHATTACHARYA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 24, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 90, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 24, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S. 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:.in agreement was executed between the Government and the Compaliy on the 29th of November 1954."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1461, "end_char": 1477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 9, 1954, a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published and the first respondent filed his objection which was rejected and was foJJowed by a otification under section 9 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1500, "end_char": 1509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1517, "end_char": 1543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1662, "end_char": 1671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "January 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1815, "end_char": 1831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After, the land acquisition proceedings were complete a writ petition was filed by the first respondent before tlte High Court on January 14, 1957 which was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court and therefore the first respondent filed an \"Ppeal to the Division Bench of tlte High Court on\n\nFelml&\"y 21, 1957."}}, {"text": "14-10-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2089, "end_char": 2099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the appeal was pending before the High Court tlte Collector made an Award dated 14-10-1957 and after taking possession from the owners of the land, delivered the same to the company-respondent No."}}, {"text": "October 22. 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2211, "end_char": 2227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 on October 22."}}, {"text": "[1980] 3 S.C.R. 235", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2861, "end_char": 2880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 20, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3006, "end_char": 3019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A the following conditions must be satisfied before an acquisition made prior\n\nto July 20, 1962 could be said to be constitutionally valid-\n\n(a) that the acquisition bad taken place before July 20, 1962, the date 'vhen the Amending Act came into force;\n\n(b) that the said acquisition should have been fully compleled in that property said to have been acquired had vested absolutely in the Government;\n\n( c) that the acquisition was made for purposes mentioned in clause\n\n( aa) of the amended clause added to s. 40;\n\n(d) that if these conditions were satisfied, then any acquisitioo proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with much acquisition would be deemed to have."}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3433, "end_char": 3438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 9, 1?54", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4048, "end_char": 4064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl>o proceedings for acquisition were started long before July 20, 1962 that is, as early as December 9, 1?54 when notification under section 6 of the Act was issued."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4089, "end_char": 4098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 14, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4186, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After inviting objections an Award was made by the Collector on October 14, 1957 and after the property in dispute fully\n\nrested in the Government, the Collector then delivered the same to the Company-respondent 2 on October 22, 1957. ["}}, {"text": "October 22, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4339, "end_char": 4355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After inviting objections an Award was made by the Collector on October 14, 1957 and after the property in dispute fully\n\nrested in the Government, the Collector then delivered the same to the Company-respondent 2 on October 22, 1957. ["}}, {"text": "[1980] 3 SCR 235", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4445, "end_char": 4461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4489, "end_char": 4503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5863, "end_char": 5872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "791 C-FJ · ·\n\n'lllEST BENGAL v. s. N. BHATTACHARY.A (Fazal Ali, J.) 785\n\n4.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "Section 44B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5886, "end_char": 5897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5905, "end_char": 5925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6149, "end_char": 6159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6718, "end_char": 6734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee & Rathin Dass for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Rathin Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6737, "end_char": 6748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee & Rathin Dass for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6769, "end_char": 6780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, S. C. Majumdar and Miss Kirobi Banerjee for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "S. C. Majumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6782, "end_char": 6796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, S. C. Majumdar and Miss Kirobi Banerjee for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Kirobi Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6806, "end_char": 6821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. S. Desai, S. C. Majumdar and Miss Kirobi Banerjee for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6845, "end_char": 6859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nP. K. Mukherji for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6927, "end_char": 6935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment dated B May 3, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court quashing the acquisition proceedings taken as also the notifications made by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') in respect of the lands in dispute which comprised 73 acres in village Kanpura, P.S. Dum Dum.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7111, "end_char": 7131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment dated B May 3, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court quashing the acquisition proceedings taken as also the notifications made by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') in respect of the lands in dispute which comprised 73 acres in village Kanpura, P.S. Dum Dum."}}, {"text": "Kanpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7297, "end_char": 7304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment dated B May 3, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court quashing the acquisition proceedings taken as also the notifications made by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') in respect of the lands in dispute which comprised 73 acres in village Kanpura, P.S. Dum Dum."}}, {"text": "P.S. Dum Dum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7306, "end_char": 7318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J.-This appeal is directed against a judgment dated B May 3, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court quashing the acquisition proceedings taken as also the notifications made by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') in respect of the lands in dispute which comprised 73 acres in village Kanpura, P.S. Dum Dum."}}, {"text": "December 16, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7715, "end_char": 7732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the Government was that on December 16, 1949, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Paris", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8020, "end_char": 8025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company was carrying on the business of manufacturing sodium silicate, plaster of Paris, etc.,"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8915, "end_char": 8919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9050, "end_char": 9054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 21, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9363, "end_char": 9380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the land acquisition proceedings were complete a writ petitiol) was filed by the first'respondent before the High Court on January 14, 1957 which was dismissed by a single Judge ou the High Court and therefore the first respondent filed an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court on February 21, 1957."}}, {"text": "October 23, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9589, "end_char": 9605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 on October 23, 1957."}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10200, "end_char": 10210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10421, "end_char": 10425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11095, "end_char": 11100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11237, "end_char": 11241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11449, "end_char": 11458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12146, "end_char": 12155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12192, "end_char": 12196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12303, "end_char": 12312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12317, "end_char": 12321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part VII of the principal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12546, "end_char": 12575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "20th day of July 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12587, "end_char": 12608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Validation of certain acquisitions.-Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, every acquisition of land for a company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962, shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of the purpose• mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have been made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-section, and accordingly every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at all material times when such acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken."}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12738, "end_char": 12748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the principal Act", "statute": "Part VII of the principal Act"}}, {"text": "sections 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13071, "end_char": 13089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the principal Act", "statute": "Part VII of the principal Act"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13375, "end_char": 13384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part VII of the principal Act", "statute": "Part VII of the principal Act"}}, {"text": "[1964] 6 S.C.R 784", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13650, "end_char": 13668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13746, "end_char": 13750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14128, "end_char": 14132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14154, "end_char": 14158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. L. Arora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14396, "end_char": 14407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40(l)and those clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in R. L. Arora's case (1962 Supp."}}, {"text": "s. 40(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14536, "end_char": 14544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 40 and 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14819, "end_char": 14832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15690, "end_char": 15695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16421, "end_char": 16425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October\n\n23, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16721, "end_char": 16738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 on October\n\n23, 1957."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16851, "end_char": 16855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16992, "end_char": 17003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. V. S. Desai, appearing for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "V. S. Desai"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17061, "end_char": 17065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17091, "end_char": 17101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17316, "end_char": 17320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17420, "end_char": 17425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18049, "end_char": 18054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18089, "end_char": 18094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18342, "end_char": 18346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18729, "end_char": 18739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 SCR 149) and the intention of Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the\n\nmatter of acquisitions for a company .... Further, a literal H interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "s. 44B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23898, "end_char": 23904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23971, "end_char": 23977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24231, "end_char": 24240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24250, "end_char": 24257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24536, "end_char": 24545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24571, "end_char": 24578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25223, "end_char": 25239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court while dealing with this question observed as follows :-\n\nD \"Thirdly, it was urged that the acquisition was not for a public purpose but merely for the purpose of helping a person (here the company) to make profits."}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25846, "end_char": 25856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25895, "end_char": 25913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Chhotubhai Babarbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr. ("}}, {"text": "s. 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26052, "end_char": 26061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shela", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26512, "end_char": 26517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dwelling on the importance of the public purpose of the industry concerned in that case, Shela!,"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28482, "end_char": 28486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 40(aa)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28523, "end_char": 28532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_794_810_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAJA MALLAIAH AND ANR.\n\nAN!L KISHORE AND ORS.\n\nApril 25, 1980\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\n.. 4ndhra Pradesh (Lease of Rigllt to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules. 1969- Rule 12 read with Rules 3 and 4 and administrative instruction thereunder> scope of-J¥hrther regrouping of 78 shops as a single lot for auctioning at the postponed auction, without 'recording reasons therefor and holding of such an auction within half an hour of the decision regarding regroup is contrary to Rule 12.\n\nUnder Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980. The notification mentioned that 22 out of 78 shops would be auctioned in ten groups of two and three shc>ps, while the remaining 56 shops would be auctioned individually. This was according to the pattern which obtained for the year 1978-79 for which year the auction fetched an aggregate monthly rental of Rs. 32,99,537-72 np.\n\nOn account of some representations made by Excise Contractors in regard to some conditions regarding the bottling of arrack, the auction was postponed to September 7, 1979. Auction was sought to be held on September 7, 1979 and September 12, 1979 but there were no bids.\n\nOn September 21, 1979, the Collector (the auctioning authority) followed a peculiar procedure. First he auctioned 34 arrack shops in Hyderabad City individually and the bids fetched an aggregate of Rs. 6,49,700 (monthly rental). Then he put the 34 shops to auction as a single lot but there was no bid. Similarly he auctioned the 44 arrack shops of Secunderabad city individually and they fetched an aggregate bid of Rs. 6,02,100 (monthly rental). He then put the 44 shops to auction as a single lot, but there was no bid. Thereafter he put the entire lot of 78 shops to auction as a single lot. There was no bid. The auction was postponed to September 22, 1979 and on that 'day the same peculiar procedure was repea.ted.\n\nThe highest bid for all the 78 shops in one lot was Rs. 24,00,000/-, while there were two tenders for Rs.~15.ll,111/11 ps and Rs. 25,55,555/55 ps. Therefore, the tender for Rs. 25,55,555155 ps. was accepted.\n\nSeventeen persons who were lessees of the arrack shops in the twin cities during the year 1978-79 filed two writ petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh questioning the auction held on September 21. 1979 and September 22, 1979 on the ground that the Collector had no jurisdiction to auction the 78 shops as one lot, thereby altering the entire pattern of the auction as\n\nRAJ A MALLAIAH v. ANIL KISHORE 795\n\nnotified earlier. lt was pleaded that the action of the Collector was contrary A to rule 12 of the A.P. (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969 and the administrative instructions issued by the Excise Commissioner by .J which the Collector was bound. A learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions and directed a reauction to be held within __.?.. period of fifteen days.\n\nThe present appellants and some others, as well as the State of Andhra Pradesh preferred appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench dismissed them on the ground that there was a contravention B\n\n..,. oJ Rule 12 of the Rules as the auctioning authority failed to record reasons for grouping the 78 shops in one lot.\n\nDismissing all the appeals by special leave, the Court\n\nHEW : I. The scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act sho\\vs that the Commissioner is at the apex, as it were, of the Excise Administrations of the State. He is the Chief Controlling Authority for all matters connected , with the administration of the Excise Act and has the control of the administration of the Excise Department The Collector who is invested with the power to perform various functions under the Act is also subject to the control of the Commissioner. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, it may be presumed that such functions as are directly assigned to the Commissioner under the Rules are considered by the Legislative delegate to be important functions for the purposes of the Act and if the Commissioner is authorised to issue instructions, those instructions are meant to be obeyed by ¢.e other authorities constituted under the Act. [803 A-CJ\n\nUnder Rule 3 it is the Commissioner that is invested with the power to fix th'e number of shops to be established in an area, their location and the minimum guaranteed quantity that should be sold in each shop. These matters are required to be determined by the Commissioner before the auction notice is published under R. 4 so that the details may be incorporated in the auction notice. The auction notice has to specify, among other particulars, the shop or group of shops in respect of Which the lease to sell liquor is proposed to be granted by public auction. The advance notice is obviously meant to enable the intending bidder and tenderers to make the necessary preparations including vital arrangements regarding finance, since the successful bidder has to deposit one month's rental and two percent of the annual rental forthwith on acceptance of the bid or tender and an\n\n\"\"\"\"~ additional two months rental within fifteen days from the date of auction.\n\n~- [803\n\nD-F] • The fixation of number of shops, the location of the shops and their grouping is considered so important a matter that the power in regard to it is vested in the apex authority, the Commissioner. If some changes have to be made, as a measure of emergency such changes also can only be made in accordance with the administrative instructions issued on the subject by the Commissioner. Even so, the emergency exercise can only be undertake if reasons are recorded in writing.\n\nThe freedom of the auctioning authority to regroup and rearrange shops is thus deliberately circumscribed. It is not for the aoctioning authority to make ad-hoc experiments on the spot if he decid'es to regroup the shops. If he desires to regroup the shops, he has (1) to act in accordance with the administrative instructions issued on the subject by the Commissioner, and (2) to record in writing the reasons for the change.\n\n[803 G-H, 804 A)\n\nIt is true that the Collector, as per the administrative instructions issued on June 10, 1975, sought instructions from the Commissioner on September 20, 1979 over the phone and the Commissioner did give certain instructions on September 21, 1979. All that was said in the instructions dated September 21. 1979 was that regrouping: n1ight be done to get n1aximum revenue.\n\nIt did not n1ean that the instructions previously in force were to be ignored or thrown overboard of that complete freedom was given to the auctioning authorities to act at their discretion. All that it meant was that regrouping might be done, if necessary, to get maximum revenue, but such regrouping was naturally to be in accordance with the instructions already given from tin1e to time. In the earlier instruction dated June 10, 1975, the Commissioner pointed out that the shops and groups approved by the Board of Revenue (Commissioner of Excise) and notified for auction should be auctioned without disturbing the approved pattern.\n\nBigger groups could be split intu smaller groups and auctioned if the highest rental offered wa.s lo\\ver than the current rental for the bigger group. It was strictly stipulated that approved groups should not be enlarged under any circumstances and where groups were re-formed reasons should be recorded in detail.\n\nThe en1phasis throughout v;•as on the splitting of bigger groups into smaller groups but was never in the opposite direction i.e. forming bigger groups in the place of smaller groups. The instructions were definitely against creation of nlonopoly. The instructions dated August 3, 1979 also emphasised this aspect and expressly mentioned that monopoly should be broken as that would fetch better Revenue.. The specific instructions given on September 20, 1979, i.e. on the eve of the adjourned auction wer'e that two to four groups might be forn1ed in the case of the arrack shops of the twin cities.\n\n[806 F-H, 8.07 A-C]\n\nIn the instant case, the regrouping of all 78 shops into a single group was clearly opposed to the instructions issued by the Commissioner of Excise particularly the specific instruction issued on Septen1ber 20, 1979 with respect to the very shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.\n\nIt was opposed to the earlier genertll instruction that 'approved groups should not be enlarged under any circumstances' and monopoly should be avoided.\n\nThe accident that the regrouping fetched a higher bid is not sufficient justification of the departure from the administrative instructions which aim at breaking a monopoly in regard to lease of excise shops. The result could well have been otherwise and the bids lower.\n\n[807D-E]\n\nThe question.. whether a provision is mandatory or directory is not to be resolved merely by reference to the emphatic or gentle language employed in the provision, nor even by the presence or absence of an express stipulation regarding the consequences of a breach of the provision. These are circumstances of importance Which naturally have to be considered.\n\nBut one must give greater consideration to the statutory design and the importance of the provision in the context of that design.\n\nGenerally one may say a provision which insists upon recording of reasons before an action is taken must prima facie be considered to be mandatory, ae it is aimed at preventing arbitrariness.\n\nWhere the rights of citizens are involved there can be no question that such a provision should be regarded as mandatory. Where the provision involves the public inte-rest also the provision must be regarded as mandatory.. Examined in that light the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act is an Act intended to rafae and secure revenue to the State, without at the same time sacrificing the public interest involved which requires the regulation of\n\nr , .\n\n• f\n\nRAJ A MALLAIAH v. ANIL KISH ORE 797\n\ntrade in intoxicants.\n\nTh'e administration of the Act is, therefore, vested pri- 1narily and centrally in the Commisioner of Excise who is expected to take a decision on all vital matters. The fixation of the number of shops, their location and grouping are considered by the legislative delegate to be matters of such vital importance in Excise administration that the power in regard to these matters is vested in the Excise Commissioner. In that setting, the object of the rule is clearly seen to be to secure strict compliance with the arrangen1ent already made by the Commissioner of Excise, the highest authority, and to permit no departure from the arrangement save in exceptional cases, on the clearest of grounds. What is involved is the protection of re\\'enue and \\Vhat is to be prevented is lid hoc improvisation which jeopardises the revenue. That a particular improvisation yielded better results may be the exception which proves the rule.\n\nThe public interest is thus seen to be served in two ways by the recording of reasons, first by protecting the public revenue and next by making public authOrities not to function arbitrarily and also not appear to function arbitrarily. [807 G-H, 808 A-E]\n\nIt is true that the Government is the exclusive owner of all rights and privileges in regard to intoxicants and no citizen has any right in regard to them.\n\nHere, the question is wheth'er the Government having invited mem ..\n\nbers of the public to participate in a public auction on certain terms and conditions, it is open to the officer entrusted with the task of conducting the D auction to vary the terms and conditions publicly announced earlier, with .. out assigning any reasons when the statutory rules require the recording of reasons. Departure from the rules and failure to record the reasons is imper~ 1nissib1e merely because no citizen has any right in the sale of intoxicants.\n\nThe situation changes aS soon as statutory provision and rules are made and the public is invited to participate in the auctions to be held as provided by rules.\n\nTherefore, the requirement regarding recording of reasons contained E in Ruic 12 of the Andbra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor ia Retail) Rules. 1969 is mandatory. [808 E-H, 809 A]\n\nTo record the reasons contemporaneously. that is to say, soon after the auction was hld is not proper. The object of the insistence upon the recording of reasons is to eliminate <brbitrariness.\n\nReasons, if given, substitute objectivity for subjectivity.\n\nWhen reasons are set down in writing gr'eater thought goes into it and greater objectivity is attained.\n\nWhere the action to be taken involves a departure from what ha.-. already been decided by the apex ::i.uthority and the public interest is involved, the reasons required to be recorded must be recorded before and not ofter the action is taken. [809 A-Cl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3427-3432fof 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order \"'dated 22-11-1979 of the Andhra ?radesh High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 367, 368, 397 and 398/79 ; espectively.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, P. N. Ramalingam and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellants in CA Nos. 3429-3432/79.\n\nK. K. Venugopal and B. Parthasarathy for the Appellants in CA Nos. 3427-3428/79 and for the State in CA Nos. 3429-3432/79.\n\nA S. N. Kacker, P. R. Mridul, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C.\n\nAggarwal for the Respondents I, 3, 4 and 7 in CA Nos. 3427-3432/ 79.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-Apparently there is big money in the liquor business. When, at the close of the hearing on Friday 18th April, 1980, we asked M/s. Kacker and Mridul whether their clients were prepared to deposit or furnish security in a sum of Rs. 35 lakhs in order to guarantee that the bids at a reauction, if so ordered, would so start that their aggregate would be not less than Rs. 35 lakhs, they agreed with alacrity. We asked the question as we wanted to satisfy ourselves about their bonaftdes. On a request made on April 21, 1980, we have given them a week's time to give security to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Excise, Hyderabad.\n\nOn August 20, 1979, a notification was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise, Andhra Pradesh, giving notice of a proposal to hold an auction, from September I, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad dnring the Abkari year, October I, 1979 to September 30, 1980. The notification was published under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government bys. 72 read with ss. 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968. The notification mentioned that 22 0ut of the 78 shops would be auctioned in ten groups of two and three shops, while the remaining 56 shops would be auctioned individually. This was according to the pattern which obtained for the year 1978-79 for which year the auction fetched, an aggregate monthly rental of Rs. 32,99,537 72 ps. On account of some representations made by excise contractors in regard to some conditions regarding the bottling of arrack, the auction was postponed to September 7, 1979. The first auction was held on September 7, 1979, when no bids were received for the arrack shops. A second auction was held on September 12, l979 and again there were no bids.\n\nOn September 19, 1979, no auction could be held as all the bidders walked out. On September 21, 1979, the Collector (the auctioning authority) followed a peculiar procedure. First he auctioned 34 arrack shops in Hyderabad city individually and the bids fetched an aggregate of Rs .. 6,49,700 (monthly rental). Then he put the 34 shops to auction as a single lot but there was no bid. Similarly he auctioned the 44 arrack shops of Secunderabad city individually and they fetched an aggregate bid of Rs. 6,02, 100 (monthly rental).\n\nHe then put the\n\n,.J,'\n\n.. f\n\nRAJA MALLAIAH '\" ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 799\n\n44 shops to auction as a single lot but there was no bid. Thereafter he put the entire lot of78 arrack shops to auction as a single lot. There was no bid. There was a tender but the tender had to be rejected as the tenderer was not present in the auction hall even after an announcement was made on the microphone and the auctioning authority waited for a considerable time. The auction was then postponed to September 22, 1979 and on that day, the same peculiar procedure was repeated.\n\nThe 34 shops of Hyderabad city when auctioned individually fetched bids aggregating to Rs. 6,75,000. There were also tenders. The aggregate of the highest bid or tender for the different shops came to Rs. 7,78,060/55 ps. The 44 shops in Secunderabad city were then auctioned individually. The aggregate of the bids came to Rs. 8,30,000.\n\nThere were tenders also. The aggregate of the highest bid or tender for the different shops came to Rs. 10,82,885 27. Thereafter 34 shops of Hyderabad city were auctioned as one lot and there was a bid for Rs. 8,00,000 and a tender for Rs. 10,55,229. Similarly the 44 shops in Secunderabad city were auctioned as one lot and the maximum bid was Rs. 13,50,000 while two tenders were received, the highest of which was Rs. 14,11,111. The Collector then auctioned all the 78 shops as one lot. The highest bid was Rs. 24,00,000 while there were two tenders for Rs. 15,11,111/11 and Rs. 25,55,555/55. The tender for Rs. 25,55,555/55 for all 78 shops was accepted.\n\n17 persons who were lessees of the arrack shops in the twin cities during the year 1978-79 filed two Writ Petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh questioning the auction held on September 21, 1979, and September 22, 1979 on the ground that the Collector had no jurisdiction to auction the 78 shops as one lot, thereby altering the ; entire pattern of the auction as notified earlier. It was pleaded that the action of the Collector was contrary to R. 12 of the Andhra Pradesh (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, and the administrative instructions issued by the Excise Commissioner by which the Collector was bound.\n\nAmareswari, J., who heard the Writ Petitions in the first instance,\n\nin a careful and well-considered judgment held ; 1. The action of the G auctioning authority grouping all the 78 shops into one group was opposed to the administrative instructions issued by the Excise Commissioner and hence contrary to R. 12 ; (2) the action of the auctioning authority was contrary to the rule also because the auctioning authority failed to record reasons, as he was required to do under the rule before he could regroup the shops; and, (3) the petitioners were not B given sufficient time to make preparations to bid at the auction of 78 shops as a single lot since half an hour's time only was given to them.\n\nA On those findings Amareswari J., allowed the Writ Petitions and directed a reauction to be held within a period of 15 days.\n\nThe present appellants and some others, as well as the State of Andhra Pradesh preferred appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Appellate Bench consisting of Kuppuswamy and P. A.\n\nChaudhary, JJ., did not agree with Amareswari J's view that the auction was contrary to R. 12 read with the administrative instructions or that the petitioners in the Writ Petition were not given sufficient time to make preparations for participating in the auction of the 78 shops as a single lot. They, however, upheld the judgment of Amareswari J., on the _ground that there was a contravention of R.12 of the Rules as the auctioning authority failed to record reasons for grouping the 78 . shops into one lot.\n\nIt was argued by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the successful bidder-appellants and Shri K. K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh that the rule requiring recording of reasons was not mandatory and, in any case, recording of reasons was not a condition precedent. The rule was sufficiently complied by reasons being recorded immediately after the auction. Shri Kacker and Shri Mridul, learned counsel for the respondents, urged that the rule was mandatory and that. recording of reasons was a condition precedent to regrouping of shops. They also contended the view expressed by Amareswari J., on the other two questions was the better view.\n\nA brief reference to some of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act and the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, is necessary here. S 3 of the Act provides for the appointment of the Commissioner of Excise for the State who is to be the Chief Controlling authority in all matters connected with the administration of the Act. He is to have the control of the administration of the Excise Department. S. 4 provides that the Collector shall excercise the powers and perform the functions assigned to him under the Act, subject to the general control° of the CommiS'.' skner. Chapter IV of tl1e Act deals with the manufacture, possession, and sale of liquor. S. 17 in particular empowers the Government to grant leases for the supply, manufacture or sale of any intoxicant.\n\nChapter VI deals with licences and permits. Chapter IX deals with 'Appeals and Revisons'. S. 63 provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed by any Officer other than the Commissioner or Collector may appeal to the Deputy Commissioner and any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector may\n\nII'\n\nRA.IA MALLAIAH v. ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 801\n\nappeal to the Commissioner. S. 72 empowers the Government to A make rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act.\n\nIn exercise of the powers vested in the Government under s. 72 of the Act, the Government has made the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules. R. 2(vi) defines \"Excise Year\" as a period of 12 months commencing from !st October -0f a year and ending with the 30th September of the succeeding year.\n\nR. 2 (viii) defines \"Highest Bidder\" as the person who offers the highest price by bid or tender. R. 2(ix) defines \"Rental\" as rent payable in respect of a shop or group of shops in consideration of the grant of lease for the sale of liquor. R. 3(1) prescribes that every lease of right to sell liquor in retail shall be granted by auction ordinarily for a period or one excise year. The Commissioner is, however, empowered to grant a lease in any other manner, with the prior approval of the Government if he considers it necessary to do so. R.3(2) is important and it is as follows :\n\n\"3(2) The Commissioner shall be, before the publication of D auction notice nnder rule 4, competent to fix the number of shops to be established in an area, their location, the total number of excise trees to be earmarked to each shop, the assignment of trees for tapping, and the minimum guaranteed quantity that should be sold in the case of the arrack shops in every excise year\".\n\nR. 4 is also important. It is as follows :\n\n\"4. Auction Notice:-(!) Whenever it is proposed to grant the lease for sale ofliquor in retail in respect ofa shop or a group of shops, a notice of the proposed auction containing the particulars mentioned in sub rule (2) shall be published, atleast ten days in advance of the date of auction, by the Collector of the district in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette or in the District Gazette or in such other manner as the Collector may deem fit :\n\n(Provided that the time limit of 10 days shall not be applicable in the case of postponed auctions).\n\n(2) The auction notice shall contain the following particulars, namely-\n\n(i) the name or locality of a shop or group of shops which sell liquor in the area;\n\n(ii) the place of auction with time and date;\n\n(iii) the last date, time and place for receipt of tenders;\n\n(iv) the conditions governing the auction:\n\n(v) the period of lease; and\n\n(vi) any other matter which may be considered by the auctioning authority necessary for the information of bidders and tenderers\".\n\nR. 10 empowers the Collector or any other Gazetted Officer not below the rank of a Deputy Collector authorised by the Collector in that behalf to conduct the auction. There are some provisos with which we are not concerned. R. 12 is vital for the purposes of these appeals and it is as follows :\n\n\"12. Auction of.Shops:-(]) The right to sell liquor may ordinarily be auctioned shopwise or groupwise according to the list of shops approved by the Commissioner of Excise under Rule\n\n3. The auctioning authority may for reasons to be recorded in writing, either regroup any shop or split any group of shops and re-arrange them in accordance with the administrative instructions issued on the subject by the Commissioner at the commencement of the auction or at any time before the sale is knocked down.\n\n(2) The Commissioner may withdraw any shop from the auction before the auction is commenced.\n\n(3) The auctioning authority may, for sufficient cause, E postpone the date of auction of a shop or group of shops.\"\n\nR. 13 regulates the manner of submission of tenders and bids.\n\nA tender is to be opened only if the auctioning authority decides that the highest bid offered for a shop or group of shops is satisfactory. The tender may then be considered alongwith the highest bid offered. If the auctioning authority considers that the bid is not satisfactory and decides to postpone the auction the tender is to be opened at the postponed auction after the bidding is over. It shall be at the discretion of the auctioning authority to accept or reject any tender or bid but he shall record his reasons therefor. R. 16 stipnlates that the auction purchaser shall pay two per cent of the annual rental as earnest money together with one month's rental on the day of the auction immediately after the acceptance of the tender or bid as the case may be. The earnest money and one month's rental are to be in addition to the further deposit, required to be made by R. 18, of two months' rental in cash or any fixed deposit certificates within fifteen days from the date of auction. R. 17 enables the Commissioner suo moto or on an application made by an aggrieved party within seven days from the. date of acceptance of bid or tender, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, and after giVing an opportunity to the\n\n...\n\nRAJA MALLAIAH v. ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 803\n\nparty concerned, to cancel the auction of any shop or group of shops A and order a reauction.\n\nThe scheme of the Act shows that the Commissioner of Excise is at the apex, as it were, of the Excise Administration of the State.\n\nHe is the Chief Controlling Authority for all matters connected with the administration of the Excise Act and has the control of the administration of the Excise Department. The Collector who is invested with the power to perform various functions under the Act is also subject to the control of the Commissioner. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, we may presume that such functions as are directly assigned to the Commissioner under the Rules are considered by the legislative delegate to be important functions for the purposes of the Act and if the Commissioner is authorised to issue instructions, those instructions are meant to be obeyed by the other authorities constituted under the Act.\n\nNow under R. 3 it is the Commissioner that is invested with the power to fix the number of shops to be established in an area, their location and the minimum guaranteed quantity that should be sold in each shop. These matters are required to be determined by the Commissioner before the auction notice is published under R. 4 so that the details may be incorporated in the auction notice. The auction notice has to specify, among other particulars, the shop or group of shops in respect of which the lease to sell liquor is proposed to be granted by public auction. The auction notice with all these particulars has to be published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette or in the District Gazette atleast ten days in advance of the date of the auction. The advance notice is obviously meant to enable the intending bidders and tenderers to make the necernary preparations including vital arrangements regarding finance, since the successful bidder has to deposit one month's rental and two percent of the annual rental forthwith on acceptance of the bid or tender and an additional two months' rental within fifteen days from the date of auction.\n\nFrom the scheme of the Act and the rules it appears that the fixation\n\nof the number of shops, the location of the shops and their grouping G is considered so important a matter that the power in regard to it is vested in the apex authority, the Commissioner. If some changes have to be made, as a measure of emergency such changes also can only be made in accordance with the administrative instructions issued on the subject by the Commissioner. Even so, the emergency exercise can only be undertaken if reasons are recorded in writing. The freedom of B the auctioning authority. to regroup and rearrange shops is thus deliberately circumscribed. It is not for the auctioning authority to make\n\nadhoc experiments on the spot if he decides to regroup the shops.\n\nIfhe desires to regroup the shops, he has (I) to act in accordance with the administrative instructions issued on the subject by the Commissioner, and (2) to record in writing the reasons for the change. The case of the respondents is that both these conditions were not fulfilled by the auctioning authoity in the present case.\n\nWe may now refer to the administrative instructions issued by the Commissioner from time to time in connection with the grouping and regrouping of arrack shops. The earliest of the instructions .. was issued on June 10, 1975 and it is common ground that it is still in .. force. It will be useful to extract these instructions in their entirety. The instructions were as foll0 ws :\n\n\"Collectors are being advised every year of the policy of Government regarding formation of groups of toddy and arrack shops. Accordingly, Collectors are submitting proposals for approval of the Commissioner. After scrutiny of their proposals, approval is being communicated to them for notification and auction accordingly.\n\nBut it has been noticed that at times soine changes in the grouping of shops, are being made by the Collectors without assigning reasons, on the eve of auction, apparently, in exercise of the powers given in Rule 12 of Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules 1969. This procedure is not in keeping with the instructions.\n\nIn many cases this exercise of power has only led to formation of bigger groups, thereby encouraging monopolistic tendencies, loss in revenue and defeat of the policy aims of the Government. Such an exercise of powers under Rule 12 of Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969 with the object of obtaining highe(rentals, has also ; received severe criticism on. the floor of •the Legislative Assembly.\n\nThe following instructions are therefore, renewed once again for strict compliance :\n\n(I) The shops and groups approved by the Board of Revenue and notified for auction should be auctioned without disturbing the approved pattern.\n\n(2) The rentals offered or tenders received should be com- H pared with the current rentals. If the auctioning authority is satisfied that there is no collusion among bidders for the slightly and lower bid than that of last year the bid\n\nV-t\n\nRAJA MALl.ATAH v. ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 805\n\nultimately received is regarded as the best available one, the auction should be finalised recording the reasons.\n\n(3) In case the highest rental offered is considerably lower than the current rental and the auctioning authority has reasons to believe that extraneous factors are im1uencing the bids he may exercise the discretion vested in him under Rule 12 and split any group of shops or rearrange them into smaller groups and auction them.\n\nIt may be noted for strict compliance that approved groups should not be enlarged under any circumstances .\n\nWhere approved groups are re-formed otherwise, the reasons for such action must be recorded in detail and the facts of the case reported to the Commissioner within\n\n10 days from the date of auction.\n\n(4) lnspite of splitting the notified groups and re-arranging them as discussed at (3) above the bids offered for them are lower than the current rentals they may be disposed of on the best available bid. Auctions should not be postponed beyond September of the year in which auctions are held.\n\nSd/- Anil De\n\nCon1missioner of Excise\".\n\nOn August 3, 1979 the Excise policy for the Excise year 1979-80 was announced and the grouping policy was enunciated in these terms :\n\n\"Grouping of toddy and arrack shops :\n\nThe grouping policy for toddy and arrack shops followed for the Excise Year 1978-79 shall continue for the ensuring Excise Year 1979-80 with the following modifications.\n\nThe arrack shops which have been monopolised by certain persons, if they are fetching low rentals and are contiguous, may be grouped together provided the shops are located within a radius of 8 kms.\n\nThe auctioning authority after recording reasons may split a group, re-arrange groups or regroup any shops at the time ofauction under Rule 12 of the Auction Rules with a view to breaking monopoly and to achieving more revenue or for other admi.nistrative reasons. Under no circumstances should the groups be split or regrouped or re-arranged and auctioned if there is any likelihood of loss of rentals hitherto\n\nsecured. No shops given to existing Tappers Cooperative\n\nSociety and under Trees for Tapper Scheme shall be clubbed with the Group shops even if they are within 8 Kms. radius\".\n\nOn September 20, 1979, the District Collector appears to have sought, on the telephone, specific instructions with regard to the auction of arrack shops in the twin cities. The instructions received were noted in the note-file and they are as follows : \"Received certain instructions from the Commissioner of Excise for regrouping of entire twin city arrack shops into two to fonr groups. As per the above instructions groups may be formed\". On September 21, 1979 the Commissioner of Excise addressed a communication, apparently to all the Collectors in the State, to the following effect :\n\n\"The Government in the reference first cited have informed that the auctions of arrack and toddy shops should be completed by 27th instant positively as 29th and 30th happen to be Public holidays. The Government have further directed that the remaining shops should be disposed off at the best available bids.\n\nRegarding auction of shops, where bottling is proposed to be introduced, where contractors are not offering reasonable bids inspite of Government having given them maximum concessions the auctioning authorities may regroup the shops, if ! necessary, to get best available bids\". ·\n\nNow, it will be seen that in the instructions dated June 10, 1975, the Commissioner of Excise expressly drew attention to the circumstance that changes in the grouping of shops were being made by the Collectors without assigning reasons and that such a procedure was not in keeping with the instructions given. He pointed out that the shops and groups approved by the Board of Revenue (Commissioner of Excise) and notified for auction should be auctioned without disturbing the approved pattern. Bigger groups could be split into smaller groups and auctioned if the highest rental offered was lower than r the current rental for the bigger group. It was strictly stipulated that approved groups should not be enlarged under any circumstances and where groups were re-formed reasons should be recorded in detail.\n\nThe emphasis throughout was on the splitting of bigger gtoups into smaller groups but was never in the opposite direction i.e. forming bigger groups in the place of smaller groups. The instructions were definitely against creation of monopoly. The instructions dated August 3, 1979 also emphasised this aspect and expressly mentioned that monopoly should be broken as that would fetch better Revenue.\n\nRAJ,\\ MAlLA!AH v. ANIL K!SIIORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 807\n\nThe specific instructions given on September 20, 1979, i.e. on the eve of the adjourned auction were that two to four groups might be formed in the case of the arrack shops of the twin cities. Some argument was advanced to the effect that the instructions dated September 21. 1979 altered the position and that liberty was given to the auctioning authorities to regroup the shops in any manner they liked to get maximum revenue. The instructions do not warrant any such conclusion. All that was said in the instructions dated September 21, 1979 was that regrouping might be done to get maximum revenue. It did not mean that the instructions previously in force were to be ignored or thrown overboard or that complete freedom was given to the auctioning authorities to act at their discretion. All that it meant was that regrouping\n\nmight be done, if necessary, to get maximum revenue, but such regrouping was naturally to be in accordance with the instructions already given from time to time.\n\nIn the instant case the regrouping of all 78 shops into a single group was clearly opposed to the instructions issued by the Commissioner of Excise particularly the specific instruction issued on September 20,\n\n1979 with respect to the very shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. It was opposed to the earlier general instruction that \"approved groups should not be enlarged under any circumstances\"\n\nand monopoly should be avoided. The accident that the regrouping fetched a higher bid is not sufficient justification of the departure from the administrative instructions which aim at breaking a monopoly in regard to lease of excise shops. The result could well have been otherwise and the bids lower.\n\nShri Tarkunde and Shri Venugopal argued that the object of the requirement that reasons should be recorded under R. 12 was to enable the Commissioner of Excise to exercise appropriate supervisory powers over the auctioning authority. It was not intended to vest any right in the contractors participating in the auction and so, if reasons were not given the contractors could not complain. They urged that the Government is the exclusive owner of all rights and privileges in regard[to intoxicants andjno citizen had any justiciable right in thorn.\n\nViewed in that light, they submitted, the rule had been sufficiently complied with as reasons were recorded first on the 21st and again after the auction on the 22nd September, 1979.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the submission that the requirement regarding the recording of reason is directory. The question whether\n\na provision is mandatory or directory is not to be resolved merely by H reference to the emphatic or gentle language employed in the provision, nor even by the presence or absence of an express stipulation regarding\n\nthe consequences of a breach of the provision. These are circumstances of importance which naturally have to be considered. But one must give greater consideration to the statutorY. design and the importance of the provision in the context of that debgn. Generally one may say a provision which insists upon recording of reasons before an action is taken must prima facie be considered to be mandatory, as it is aimed at preventing arbitrariness. Where the rights of citizens are involved there can be no question that such a provision should be regarded as mandatory. Where the provision involves the public interest also the provision must be regarded as mandatory. Examined in that light the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act is an Act intended to raise and secure revenue to the State, without at the same time sacrificing the public interest involved which requires the regulation of trade in intoxicants. The administration of the Act is, therefore, vested primarily and centrally in the Commissioner of Excise who is expected to take a decision on all vital matters. The fixation of the number of shops, their location, and grouping are considered by the legislative delegate to be matters of such vital importance in Excise administration that the power in regard to these matters is vested in the Excise Commissioner.\n\nIn that setting, the object of the rule is clearly seen to be to secure strict compliance with the arrangement already made by the Commissioner of Excise, the highest authority, and to permit no departure from the arrangement save in exceptional cases, on the clearest of grounds. What is involved is the protection of revenue and what is to .be prevented is adhoc improvisation which jeopardises the revenue. That a particular improvisation yielded better results may be the exception which proves the rule. The public interest is thus seen to be served in two ways by the recording of reasons, first by protecting the public revenue and next by making public authorities not to function arbitrarily and also not appear to function arbitrarily. It is true that the Government is the exclusive owner of all rights and privileges in regard to intoxicants and no citizen has any right in regard to them.\n\nThat is not in question here. The question is whether the Government having invited members of the public to participate in a public auction on certain terms and conditions, it is open to the officer entrusted with the task of conducting the auction to vary the terms and conditions publicly announced earlier, without assigning any reasons when the statutory rules require the recording of reasons. We do not see how a departure from the rules and failure to record the reasons is permissible merely because no citizen has any right in the sale of intoxicants. The situation changes as soon as statutory provision and rules are made and the public is invited to participate in the auctions to be held as provided by rules. We do not doubt that the requirement regarding recording of reasons contained in R. 12 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise\n\nt':';\n\n. RAJA MALLAIAH v. ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 809\n\n(Lease of Right to Sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, is mandatory.\n\nIt was argued that even if the recording of reasons was mandatory it was not a condition precedent. It was said that the reasons could be recorded contemporaneously, that is to say, soon after the auction was held. We have grave doubt about the propriety of such a procedure. The object of the insistence upon the recording of reasons is to eliminate arbitrariness. Reasons, if given, substitute objectivity for subjectivity. It is common experience that when reasons are set down in writing greater thought goes into it and greater objectivity is attained.\n\nWhere the action to be taken involves a departure from what has already been decided by the apex authority and the public interest is involved, we cannot but hold that the reasons required to be recorded must be recorded before and not after the action is taken. The language of the rule also supports this conclusion.\n\nLet us examine if any reasons have been recorded at all. The note file has been produced before us. On September 20, 1979, the note file refers to a telephone message to the effect that the Commissioner was appraised of the situation and that he had instructed that the twin city arrack shops should be grouped into two to four groups. There is then a note that viable groups may be formed as per the guidelines given by the Commissioner. On September 21, 1979 the note file begins with the statement that 'viable groups are formed as per the guidelines given by the Commissioner of Excise'. There is then a. narration of events that took place that day, written by the Excise Superintendent, signed by him and countersigned by the Collector ..\n\nThe note refers to the fact that the arrack shops were first put to auction individtlally, then in two and then in a single lot. The aggregate of the bids 'is noted. It is then mentioned that the auction is adjourned tQ September 22, 1979. There is nothing to indicate why a departure was made from the grouping that was announced in the original notice. of auction. The note made on September 22, 1979 was admittedly written (it is typed) after the auction on September 22, 1979. This note also merely narrates what took place. It is mentioned that the shops. were put to auction first individually, then in two groups, am'\n\nfinally as one group. The last paragraph of the note is as follows :\n\n\"As the prospects to achieve reasonable bids on small ten groups and (56) individual shops and also on 2 groups called Hyderabad and Secunderabad were not foreseen then all the (78) shops were grouped in one group and called as Twin Cities group.\n\nThe bids amount offered was Rs. 24,00,000/- and the 2 tenders H received offered Rs. 15,11, l l l/ll and of Rs. 25,55,555/55.\n\nThe highest tender of Rs. 25,55,555/55 is considered as the l )--463SCI/80\n\nA best available bid and !ht auction of the Twin Cities Group consisting (78) shops is finalised by me in favour of Sri RajamalJaiah and others on 22-9-1978\".\n\nThus it is seen that no reasons at all were mentioned on September 21, 1979 and even on September 22, 1979, such reason as had been given B was ex-post facto and was not in accordance with the administrative instructions issued by the Commissioner of Excise. The general instructions given earlier on June 10, 1975 and August 3, 1979 that 'approv<; d groups should not be enlarged under any circumstances' was flouted.\n\nThe instruction given on September 20, 1979, with express reference to the arrack shops of the twin cities though mentioned in the note file -C both on September 20, 1979 and September 21, 1979 that the shops may be grouped into two to four groups' was ignored on September 22, 1979.\n\nWe also notice that the allegation of the respondents that they were given but half an hour's time on September 22, 1979, to prepare for the D auction of the shops as a single group was not controverted. Having regard to the fact that the rules required large deposits to be made it is impossible to hold that half an hour's time could be considered sufficient by any stretch of imagination.\n\nWe have already recorded the undertaking given by the respondents that they would give security of Rs. 35 lakhs within one week from April 21, 1980 and that they would start the bids at the re-auction in such a way that the aggregate of the bids wonld not be less than Rs. 35 lakhs.\n\nFor the aforesaid reasons we confirm the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and dismiss all the appeals with costs. The re-auction will be held within three weeks from today and until the new auction purchasers take over the present appellant will continue to run he shops.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA MALLAIAH AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA MALLAIAH AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AN!L KISHORE AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANIL KISHORE AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 25, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 25, 1980\n\n[0."}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 658, "end_char": 668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17, 29, 31 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 679, "end_char": 704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 766, "end_char": 781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 821, "end_char": 830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 862, "end_char": 876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "September 1, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 932, "end_char": 949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 953, "end_char": 970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "Secunderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1077, "end_char": 1089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1113, "end_char": 1128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1132, "end_char": 1150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right to sell Liquor in Retail) Rules, 1969, made in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 72 read with section 17, 29, 31 and 64 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968, a notification dated August 20, 1979 was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise Andhra Pradesh, giving a notice of a proposal to hold an auction from September 1, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack, in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad during the Abkari year October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1635, "end_char": 1652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On account of some representations made by Excise Contractors in regard to some conditions regarding the bottling of arrack, the auction was postponed to September 7, 1979."}}, {"text": "September 12, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1709, "end_char": 1727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Auction was sought to be held on September 7, 1979 and September 12, 1979 but there were no bids."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1756, "end_char": 1774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1979, the Collector (the auctioning authority) followed a peculiar procedure."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1886, "end_char": 1900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First he auctioned 34 arrack shops in Hyderabad City individually and the bids fetched an aggregate of Rs."}}, {"text": "Secunderabad city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly he auctioned the 44 arrack shops of Secunderabad city individually and they fetched an aggregate bid of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2396, "end_char": 2414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The auction was postponed to September 22, 1979 and on that 'day the same peculiar procedure was repea.ted."}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2815, "end_char": 2843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seventeen persons who were lessees of the arrack shops in the twin cities during the year 1978-79 filed two writ petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh questioning the auction held on September 21."}}, {"text": "September 21. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2876, "end_char": 2894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seventeen persons who were lessees of the arrack shops in the twin cities during the year 1978-79 filed two writ petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh questioning the auction held on September 21."}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appellants and some others, as well as the State of Andhra Pradesh preferred appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent."}}, {"text": "clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3591, "end_char": 3600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CJ\n\nUnder Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4751, "end_char": 4765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 10, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6737, "end_char": 6750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[803 G-H, 804 A)\n\nIt is true that the Collector, as per the administrative instructions issued on June 10, 1975, sought instructions from the Commissioner on September 20, 1979 over the phone and the Commissioner did give certain instructions on September 21, 1979."}}, {"text": "September 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6797, "end_char": 6815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[803 G-H, 804 A)\n\nIt is true that the Collector, as per the administrative instructions issued on June 10, 1975, sought instructions from the Commissioner on September 20, 1979 over the phone and the Commissioner did give certain instructions on September 21, 1979."}}, {"text": "August 3, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8258, "end_char": 8272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The instructions dated August 3, 1979 also emphasised this aspect and expressly mentioned that monopoly should be broken as that would fetch better Revenue.. The specific instructions given on September 20, 1979, i.e. on the eve of the adjourned auction wer'e that two to four groups might be forn1ed in the case of the arrack shops of the twin cities."}}, {"text": "Septen1ber 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8807, "end_char": 8826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[806 F-H, 8.07 A-C]\n\nIn the instant case, the regrouping of all 78 shops into a single group was clearly opposed to the instructions issued by the Commissioner of Excise particularly the specific instruction issued on Septen1ber 20, 1979 with respect to the very shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad."}}, {"text": "Examined in that light the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act is an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10255, "end_char": 10317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13608, "end_char": 13622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P. N. Ramalingam and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellants in CA Nos.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "P. N. Ramalingam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13624, "end_char": 13640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P. N. Ramalingam and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellants in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "A.T.M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13645, "end_char": 13659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P. N. Ramalingam and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellants in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13705, "end_char": 13720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal and B. Parthasarathy for the Appellants in CA Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Venugopal"}}, {"text": "B. Parthasarathy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13725, "end_char": 13741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopal and B. Parthasarathy for the Appellants in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "A S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13829, "end_char": 13843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S. N. Kacker, P. R. Mridul, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C.\n\nAggarwal for the Respondents I, 3, 4 and 7 in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13845, "end_char": 13857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S. N. Kacker, P. R. Mridul, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C.\n\nAggarwal for the Respondents I, 3, 4 and 7 in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Salish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13859, "end_char": 13868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S. N. Kacker, P. R. Mridul, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C.\n\nAggarwal for the Respondents I, 3, 4 and 7 in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "V. K. Pandita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13870, "end_char": 13883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S. N. Kacker, P. R. Mridul, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C.\n\nAggarwal for the Respondents I, 3, 4 and 7 in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "E. C.\n\nAggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13888, "end_char": 13903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S. N. Kacker, P. R. Mridul, R. Salish, V. K. Pandita and E. C.\n\nAggarwal for the Respondents I, 3, 4 and 7 in CA Nos."}}, {"text": "Friday 18th April, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14120, "end_char": 14143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When, at the close of the hearing on Friday 18th April, 1980, we asked M/s. Kacker and Mridul whether their clients were prepared to deposit or furnish security in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14159, "end_char": 14165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When, at the close of the hearing on Friday 18th April, 1980, we asked M/s. Kacker and Mridul whether their clients were prepared to deposit or furnish security in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14170, "end_char": 14176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When, at the close of the hearing on Friday 18th April, 1980, we asked M/s. Kacker and Mridul whether their clients were prepared to deposit or furnish security in a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14536, "end_char": 14550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a request made on April 21, 1980, we have given them a week's time to give security to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Excise, Hyderabad."}}, {"text": "September I, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14850, "end_char": 14867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 20, 1979, a notification was published in the District Gazette, Hyderabad, by the Commissioner of Excise, Andhra Pradesh, giving notice of a proposal to hold an auction, from September I, 1979 to September 3, 1979, of the right to sell arrack in retail in respect of 78 arrack shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad dnring the Abkari year, October I, 1979 to September 30, 1980."}}, {"text": "ss. 17, 29, 31 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15277, "end_char": 15298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15306, "end_char": 15337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 12, l979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15971, "end_char": 15989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second auction was held on September 12, l979 and again there were no bids."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16024, "end_char": 16042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 19, 1979, no auction could be held as all the bidders walked out."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16233, "end_char": 16247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First he auctioned 34 arrack shops in Hyderabad city individually and the bids fetched an aggregate of Rs .. 6,49,700 (monthly rental)."}}, {"text": "RAJA MALLAIAH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16582, "end_char": 16595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then put the\n\n,.J,'\n\n.. f\n\nRAJA MALLAIAH '\" ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 799\n\n44 shops to auction as a single lot but there was no bid.", "canonical_name": "RAJA MALLAIAH AND ANR"}}, {"text": "ANIL KISHORE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16599, "end_char": 16611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then put the\n\n,.J,'\n\n.. f\n\nRAJA MALLAIAH '\" ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 799\n\n44 shops to auction as a single lot but there was no bid."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then put the\n\n,.J,'\n\n.. f\n\nRAJA MALLAIAH '\" ANIL KISHORE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 799\n\n44 shops to auction as a single lot but there was no bid."}}, {"text": "Amareswari", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18767, "end_char": 18777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amareswari, J., who heard the Writ Petitions in the first instance,\n\nin a careful and well-considered judgment held ; 1."}}, {"text": "Clause 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19698, "end_char": 19707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kuppuswamy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19765, "end_char": 19775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Bench consisting of Kuppuswamy and P. A.\n\nChaudhary, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "P. A.\n\nChaudhary", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19780, "end_char": 19796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Bench consisting of Kuppuswamy and P. A.\n\nChaudhary, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20324, "end_char": 20338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the successful bidder-appellants and Shri K. K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh that the rule requiring recording of reasons was not mandatory and, in any case, recording of reasons was not a condition precedent.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20402, "end_char": 20417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the successful bidder-appellants and Shri K. K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh that the rule requiring recording of reasons was not mandatory and, in any case, recording of reasons was not a condition precedent.", "canonical_name": "K. K. Venugopal"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20443, "end_char": 20466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was argued by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the successful bidder-appellants and Shri K. K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh that the rule requiring recording of reasons was not mandatory and, in any case, recording of reasons was not a condition precedent."}}, {"text": "S 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21160, "end_char": 21163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21428, "end_char": 21432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21684, "end_char": 21689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21890, "end_char": 21895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22224, "end_char": 22229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22384, "end_char": 22389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excise Administration of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27253, "end_char": 27287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scheme of the Act shows that the Commissioner of Excise is at the apex, as it were, of the Excise Administration of the State."}}, {"text": "20,\n\n1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38143, "end_char": 38152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case the regrouping of all 78 shops into a single group was clearly opposed to the instructions issued by the Commissioner of Excise particularly the specific instruction issued on September 20,\n\n1979 with respect to the very shops in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad."}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38664, "end_char": 38672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Tarkunde and Shri Venugopal argued that the object of the requirement that reasons should be recorded under R. 12 was to enable the Commissioner of Excise to exercise appropriate supervisory powers over the auctioning authority."}}, {"text": "Venugopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38682, "end_char": 38691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Tarkunde and Shri Venugopal argued that the object of the requirement that reasons should be recorded under R. 12 was to enable the Commissioner of Excise to exercise appropriate supervisory powers over the auctioning authority."}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39370, "end_char": 39390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viewed in that light, they submitted, the rule had been sufficiently complied with as reasons were recorded first on the 21st and again after the auction on the 22nd September, 1979."}}, {"text": "Examined in that light the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act is an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40412, "end_char": 40474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "RajamalJaiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45836, "end_char": 45848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ht auction of the Twin Cities Group consisting (78) shops is finalised by me in favour of Sri RajamalJaiah and others on 22-9-1978\".", "canonical_name": "RAJA MALLAIAH AND ANR"}}, {"text": "22-9-1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45863, "end_char": 45872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ht auction of the Twin Cities Group consisting (78) shops is finalised by me in favour of Sri RajamalJaiah and others on 22-9-1978\"."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 47315, "end_char": 47340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the aforesaid reasons we confirm the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and dismiss all the appeals with costs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_811_854_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "KAMAL KANT! DUTTA AND ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nApril 23, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, C.J., N. L. UNTWAUA, P. S. KAILASAM,\n\nD. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nReview of Judgments of the Supreme Court of India under Airticle 137 1 of\n\nihe Constitution read with Order XXL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966- Petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution indirectly invoking the review c iurisdiction and seeking a revie1v of earlier decision of the' Courts Held, there is no substance in the request.\n\nWith a view to imp:roving the Income-tax administration, the Government of India in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission decided to -reconstitute then existing income-tax services, Class I and II. Under the scheme of reorganisation of the services set out in a letter dated September 29, 1944 D of the Government of India Finance Department, the central service Class I was to consist of (i) Commissioners of Income-Tax (ii) Assistant Commis- sioners of Income-Tax; (iii) lncome.-Tax Officers Grade I and (iv) Income-Tax Officers Grade-II. Thus Income-Tax Officers Class I were to be of two grades, Grade I and II; while Income-Tax Officers Class II were to consist of one grade, namely, Grade III. Clauses (a) to (e) of paragraph 2 of the letter, prescribed the mode of recruitment to the various posts in Class I and Class II, E Under Clause (d) recruitment to Class I Grade II was 20% by promotion from Class II, Grade III and 80% by direct recruitment via Indian Audit and Accounts Service etc. examination.\n\nRules regulating recruitment to the Income-Tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) service ''liable to alteration from year io year\" were published on May 26, 1945, by a resolution of the Finance (Central Revenues) Department. Rule 3 provided that recruitment to Class I, Grade !I's service shall be made (I) by competitive examination held in India F in accrnlance with Part-II of the Rules and (ii) by promotion on the basis of selection of Grade ill (Class II service, in accordance with Part lII of the :Rules.\n\nBy Rule 4 of the Government was to determine, subject to the provi• sioos of Rule 3, the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of filling any particular vacancies, or such vacancies as may be required to be filled during any particular period, and tho number of candidates to be recruited by such method. Part ill of the Rules called (Recruitment by Promotion) G provided by paragraph 21 that \"recruitment by promotion shall be made by selection from Grade-Ill Income-Tax Officers (Class II service) after consuli•tion with the Federal Public Service and that no officer shall have any claim to such promotion as of right\".\n\n1ly a letter dated January 24, 1950 the Government of India laid down certain rules of seniority: (a) as between direct recruits;\n\n(b) as between promotees selected from Class II and ( c) as between direct recruits who com- H pl_eted their probation in a given year and the promotees appointed in the same year to Class r.\n\nll:\n\nOn October 18, 1951 the Government of India addressed a letter to all the Ccmn1issioners of IncomeTax titled \"Income-Tax Officers, Grade-II (Class- I service)-quota of vacancies filled by promotions\" wherein it was outlined that for a period of 5 years in the first instance 66 and 2/3 per cent of the\n\nvacancies in Class-I, Grade-II would be filled by direct recrnittnent by a combined. competitive examination and the remaining 33 and 1/3 per cent on the basis of selection by promotion from Grade-III (Class-II service). Any surplus vacancies which could not be filled by promotion for want of suitable candidates would be added to the quota of vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment.\n\nBy a letter dated September 5, 1952 the Government of India revised with a retrospective effect the Rules of Seniority which were laid down on January 24, 1950.\n\nRule 1 (f)(iii) as framed on January 24, 1950 which was to the effect that \"the promotees who have been certified by the comms sion in any calendar year sha.11 be senior to all direct recruits who complete their probation during that year or after and are confirmed with effect from a date in that year or after\" was revised on September 5, 1952 as \"officers promoted in accordance with the recommendations of .the Departmental Promotion Committee before the next sitting of the Departmental Promotion Committee shall be senior to all direct recrui:ts appointed on the results of the examinations held by the Union Public Service Commission during the calendar year in which the Departmental Promotion Committee met during the three previous years\". Rule l(f)(iv) of the 1952 Rules dealt with a special situation in \\Vhich an officer initially appointed to Class Il service was given seniority in thei same manner as a departmental promotee, if subsequent to bis passing the departmental examination he was appointed to Class I on the results of the competitive examination. Rule 4 of Chapter IX of the Rules of Promotion of the Central Board of Revenue Office Procedure Manual states that the pres cribed n1inimum service for an officer of Class-I, Grade-TI for promotion to Grade-I is 5 years gazetted service including one year in Class-I, Grade-Il.\n\nFor a promotee from Cass-II the minimum period of service for promotion t'o Class-I, Grade-I would be actually 4 years service in Class-II and one\n\nyear service in Oass-1, Grade--11.\n\nIn an appeal arising out of Writ Petition No. 189-D af 1962 filed by one S. G. Jai Singhani (who is respondent No. 358 in Writ Petition No. 66 of 1974 and respondent No. S in Writ Petition No. 4146 of 1978), a constitutional Bench of this Court held : {i) Rules I (f)(iii) and (iv) of the Seniority Rules framed\n\n~1952 did not violate Articles 14 and 16 since theywerebased on a reasonable classification; (ii) Rule 4 of Chapter IX of the Central Board of Revenue Office Procedure Manual did not lead to any discrimination as between direct recruits and promotees, since the object of the rule was really to carry out 'the policy of Rule I (f) (iii) of the Rules of Seniority and not allow it to be defeated by the recruitment of 5 years' service in Oass-I, Grade-Il itself, before a person could be considered for promotion to Class-I, Grade-I; (iii) Rule 4 of the Income-Tax Officers (Clas~I, Grade-II) Service Recruitment Rules was a statutory rule to which a statutory duty was cast on the Government to determine the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of filling of the vacancies and the number of candid; ites to 'be recruited by. each method; and that though in the letter of the Government of India dated October 18, 1951 there was no specific reference to Rule 4, the quota fixed by that letter must be deemed to have been fixed in exercise of the statutory power\n\ngien by Rule 4. There was, therefore, no discretion left to the Government of\n\nK. K. DUTTA V. UNION 813\n\n!India to alter that quota according to the exigencies of the situation or to .cJeviate from the quota in any particular year at its own wilt and pleasure. The ..quota rule) according to the Court, was linked up with the Seniority Rule and unless it was strictly observed in practice it would be difficult to hold that the :seniority rule contained in rule 1 (f) (iii) was not unreasonable and did not offend Article 16 of the Constitution. The Court suggested that for future years the 'foster system should be adopted by framing an appropriate rule for \\Vorking out the quota between the direct recruits and the promotees and that a roster should be maintained indicating the order in which appointments \\Vere made -by direct recruitment and by promotion in accordance with the percentages fixed under the statutory rule for each method of recruitment. Thus the direct ; recruit.3 succeeded substantially in their contentions, the quota rule acquired statutory force, appointments of promotees in excess of the quota became bad and it became obligatory for the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list.\n\nPromotees found to have been appointed in excess of the quota admissible to promotees had naturally to go down in the final gradation of seniority.\n\nOn July 15, 1968 the Govcrnn1ent prepared a fresh seniority list and filed it .in the Supreme Court. That list failed to satisfy promotees as well as direct recruits. Whether this seniority list was correct and in accordance with the mandan1us which was issued by this Court in S. G. Jai Singhani's case, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703 came up for consideration in four appeals which '\\Vere disposed of by a common judgment dated August 16, 1972 reported as Bishan Sarup Gupta v: 'Union of India (first Gupta\"s case) in [1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 491. The Court was also called upon to examine the correctness of seven principles enumerated iri the Government letter dated July 15. 1968 governing seniority. The first principle was accepted as good. The second and the third principles were held to be partially incorrect in so for as they excluded reference to all the promotees of 1952. The Court held that the promoteesi of 1952 should be referred to 'in the seniority list whether they are affected or not, the object being the ascertainment of excess promotions. This Court further held that the rule dated October 18, 1951 was not concerned with the onstitution of the cadre but \"was concerned with how permanent vacancies were to be filled\" and, therefore, the promotees would be entitled to l/r3 of the vacancies in any particular year whether or not there was direct recruitment by competitive examination in that year. This ratio of 2 : 1 between the direct recruits and the promotees. could not be made to depend on whether any direct recruits were appointed in any particular year. It, therefore, became essential to detennine th'e actual vacancies in the cadre but the Government put forward the plea even in this case as in Jai Singhani's) that it was impossible for them to give the exact figure of vacancies in any particular year.\n\nAccording to the Court, when the quota rule referred to vacancies it was implicit that the vacancies are those which the Government wanted to fill up '\\Vhatever may be the actual number of vacancies available for being filled up. Any number of posts among the promotees more than 1 /3 of the total number of appoint, ments in the particular year was considered to be in excess of the quota available for promotees. The Court rejected the argument that the quota rule which is co-related to vacancies of permanent posts only and not to those in temporary posts. While upholding the weightage allowed under Rule I (!)(iii) ro Class II officers promoted to Class-I. Grade-II, the Court also held .that even after 1956, the Government was entitled by reason of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules of I 945 to follow the quora rule of 1951 as a rough guideline, \"without\n\ngoing through the trouble of putting the same on record in so many words\" and\n\nthat in the normal course the Government was entitled to prepare the seniority list till the end of 1958 in accordance with the quota rule of 195.1. In regard to the position after year 1958 the Court came to the conclusion that the quota rule ceased to apply and came to an end on January 16, 1959, when the sanction to upgrade 100 t'emporary posts in Class-II, Grade-III t0- Class-I, Grade-II was given by the President. The seniority rule then fell with quota rule. On these considerations the Court held that the seniority list' was valid in regard to promotions made up tu January 15, 1959 to the extent that it was prepared on the basis of the quota rule dated October 18, 1951 read with Seniority Rule l(f) (iii).\n\nAs a corollary, the Court set aside the seniority list of July 15_, 1968 and directed the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list. The List for the years 1955 to January 15, 1959 was directed to be prepared in accordance with the quota rule of 195 l read with Seniority Rule l(f) (iii). The List to be effective from January\n\n16, 1959 was directed to be prepared in accordance with the rules to be made afresh by the Government.\n\n\nsecond Gupta's case~ When the new list of seniority was prepared. by the Government, in accordance with these rules, the Government had on its hand 7'5 promotees who though appointed earlier between 1956 and 1958 had no quota post, for their absorption.\n\nThe 73 promotees described as \"spill-overs on January 15, 1959'', as also those who were promoted subsequently had to be absorbed in the Service, which could only be done by a special rule framed in that behalf. The new seniority rule contained a formula for the absorption of all promotees with effect from January 16, 1959 in posts allocated to them, ir determined their seniority intel' se and last but not the least it determined their seniority qua the direct recruits appointed from 1959.\n\nThe. Court overruled' the objection of the '73' spill-over promotees that since in the first Gupta's case the cCourt had directed that they should be absorbed on a '; priority basis·. all of them should have been shown in the seniority list as having been appointed on January 16, 1959' en bloc and the direct recruits for that year should have been shown thereafter.\n\nIt was explai Jed that by use of the expression \"priority basis\" what was meant by the Court was that the position of the spill-over promotees as senkirs should not be prejudiced by claims made by later promotees on the ground tha.t since the spill-over promotees were recruited in excess of the quota, the later promotees whose promotion did not violate the quota rule had higher rights than, those 73. The Court further held that, when the 73 spill-over appointments were made, there were no allocated or earmarked posts to which those promotees could have been validly appointed, the ordinary consequence of which would have been their reversion to Cla.ss II po11ts\n\nwhich they originally held.' So long as the quota rule was in i!xistence. appointments in excess of the quota, though invalid when n1ade, were atleast Jiable to be regularised in subsequent years when vacancies were avai1ableto the promotees as a C-Onsequence of the quota rule.\n\nBur once the quota rule ceased to exist on JanuarY 16, 1959, any possibility of the excess appointments of the promotees being regularised vanished.\n\nIt \\Vas in order\n\n' ~\n\nK K. DUTTA V. UNION 815\n\nto overcome this injustice to the promotees, that the new rule was framed A by the Government. The new rule was thus not only the direct outcome of the judgment of the Court in the !st Gupta case, but it was founded on the very principles on which the Income-tax Service had been constituted.\n\nThe Court finally said that it had also to be remembered that promotees appointed from January 16, 1959 onwards were appointed on an officiating or adhoc basis with notice that the question of their seniority was still undecided. 'fhis circmnstance coupled with the absence of clea.r allocation of posts, made\n\nB'. ir impossible for the promotees to lay claim to seniority and contend that they were deprived of their natural seniority in violation of Article 16.\n\n\n1. The Conclusion that Rule 4 of the Income.Tax Officers (Class-I, Grad&-11) Service Recruitment Rules is statutory and, therefore, the quota pte9albcd by the Government of India for recruitment to Income-Tax Offi cers Class-I, Grade-II in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 4 would be statutory, proceeds on an assumption not warranted by the provisions of law bearing on the point and if both Rule 4 and the quota presumably prescribed in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 4 are not shown to be statutory, the foundation of which the edifice in S. G. Jai Singhanfs c.ase rests is knocked down because it can be demonstrably established that neither rule 4 nor the quota prescribed thereunder .was stautory in character but was at best an administrative instruction.\n\n2. After the Court on an interpretation of the quota rule held that the quota \\Vas ielated to vacancies arising in the grade every year, the conclusion reached did not conform to this finding but accommodated the so-called inability (now shown to be factually incorrect) of the Government of India to give information to the Court about .the' vacancies ; in the grade every year with the result that the .whole calculation of spill-over is vitiated.\n\n3. The mandamus issued in Jai Singllani's'case was misinterpreted by the Government because even if the quota was statutory it was operative only between 1951 and 1956 but the Government interpreted the mandamus w be operative beyond 1956 and upto 1967 which misinterpretation has been pointed\n\nout .ia the first Gupta's case.\n\n4. Jn the first Gupta's case while holding that the mandamus directing to treat the quota statutory beyond 1956 was not justified yet till January 16, 1959, the Court itself indirectly accepted the quota rule as a guideline anrl treated that there was a spill-over of 73 promotees. If Rule 4 was not statutory and consequently the quota prescribed in exercise of the power which had\n\noutlived. its prescribed span of life in 1956 could not be brought in to treat any appoiatment as invalid on the ground that there was no allocated post for those H appointeet treated as spill-over because under Rule 4 itself the Government harl power to-detern1ine the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of\n\nA filling in particular vacancies or such vacancies as may be required to be filled in during any particular period and the number of candidates. to be recruited ( by each method. '!'-\n\n5. The action of the Government of upgrading 214 posts between 1959 and 196-Z from Class-II, Grade-II to Class I, Grade II was not open to question as at that stage there was no quota rule and Rule 4 enabled the Government to B make recruitment from either of the two sources in exercise of its executive power. In regard to the second Gupta's case the Court introduced quota rule retrospectively by the back door which is impermissible and its operation manifestly establishes its utter unfairness inasmuch as a direct recruit nor any where in the department or may be a student may secure a marchover a promotee \\vhich has been working in Class-I, Grade-II.\n\nDismissing the petitions the Court,\n\nHELD: Per Chandrachud, C.J. (On behalf of N.\n\nUntwalia, P.\n\nKailasam, E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ. and himself). (Majority view)\n\n\nS.C.R. 28. [840 E-FJ\n\nFor nearly adecade after 1950, appointments of promotees were made far in excess of the quota available to them. So long as the quota rule operated, it \\vas possible to regularise their appointments when posts within thCir quota became available in later years. But a omewhat unprecedented situation arose by the upgrading of Class II posts to Class I grade II-100 of them on January 16, 1959 and 114 en December 9, 1960. This massive upgrading of posts brought about a colla-pse of the quota rule. Subsequent absorption in posts which became available for being filled up later really mearui rngularisation of appointments, which is possible provided there is no excessive: deviation from the quota rule. [840 G-H, 841 AJ\n\nIt is true that no blame can be laid at the doors of the promotees on the score that they were appointed in excess of the quota avail~ able to them. Perhaps, their appointments must even have enabled the administration to tide over administrative stale-mate. But the tough problem which the administration has to face is that whereas it is necessary to recognUe and protect the claims of promotees who were appointed in excess of their quota, it is equally necessary to ensure that the direct recruits do not suffer an undlle set-back in service on account of the appointments of promotees. The conflicting claims of the two components of Service, both having an importance of their own, have therefore to be reconciled.\n\nIt was with that object that the rules have been modified from time to time. The judgments rendered y this Court in the aforesaid four cases show, without a. shadow doubt, bow every effort was made to ensure that no hardship or injustice is caused to lh~ pro~ n1ctees merely because their appointments exceeded their quota. (841 A..C]\n\n2. It is not correct to say that the judg:meilt in Jai Singhani was based on a concession or that the Court felt compelled to draw the particular conclusions\n\nK. K. DUTTA V. UNION 817\n\ntherein because of the inability or refusal of the Financei lVIinistiy to produce A the relevant files.\n\nThe Court adopted what it considered in the circumstances .to be a satisfactory and scientific method of ascertaining the number of vaca.ll-.. cies available for being filled up. lt came to the conclusion that the1 number ., of actual appointments should determine the number of vacancies available which ¥.ras a perfectly legitimate conclusion to draw. In the grey area where service rules operate, more than one view is always possible to take without \"Sacrificing either reason or con1monsense but the ultimate choic~ has to be neces B sarily conditioned by serveral considerations ensurin_g justice to as many as possible and injustice to as few. There was no error in the conclusion in Jiti Singlzani that Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules was a statlltory rule Subse- , quent decisions V.'ould show that there was hrirdly ooy dispute between the\n\n-parties, at later stages at any rate, that Rule 4 was a statutory rule. (841 D-G]\n\n3. No doubt, the. pron1otees should not be penalised for the mere rOO::Son C that those of them who were appointed after Ja-nuary 16, 1959 were appointed on an officiating or ad hoc basis and had clear notice that the question of their seniority was still undecided.\n\nThe circumstances attendant upon their appoint~ ments cannot, ho\\vever, be wholly overlooked in determining whether the constitutional constraints have been over-stepped. [841 H. 842 A]\n\n4. It is not safe to test the constitutionality of a service rule on the iouch stone of fortunes of individuals.\n\nNo matter With what care, objectivity and foresight a rule is framed, some hardship, inconvenience or injustice is bound to result to some members of the service. The paramount consideration is the reconciliation of conflicting claims of two important constituents of :Service, one of v, ihich brings fresh blood and the other mature experience.\n\n[842 A-CJ\n\n5. Though the promotees submitted in the Second Gupta case that the new E seniority rule was unfair to them, they were unable to put forward any rational alternative.\n\nOn the contrary the counter-affidavit dated August 31,. 1973 filed in the Second Gupta case by Shri Mehra, the Deputy secretary Finance, shows the fullness with which the Government had consulted all possible interests while framing the impugned rules of seniority.\n\nThe gamut of reasonable\n\nl)Oibilities is fairly covered by the four alternatives referred to in Shri Mehra's\n\naffidavit The inconveniences and disadvantages flowing from the first three F alternatives would be far greater than those flowing from the fourth.\n\nTha.t is why the choice ultimately fell on the fourth alternative Under which the seniority 'between promotees and direct recruits was fixed alternately on a roster system, vacancies being equally divided between promotees and direct recruits, for the entire period frnm 1959 up.to-date. The observation of the Court in the second Gupta's case at page 119 shows how difficult it is to solve the jig-s5W' :puzzle of service disputes. [842 C-H] G\n\n6. The report of the 'Committee on petition9' of the Rajya Sabha, howso~ ever, sincerely rnotiva-ted and fuJly dra\\.\\'Il cannot be given the importance1 which the promotees seem to attach to it. Jn paragraph 16 of its Report the Com~ mittee does refer to certain files but those files appear to contain some notings in regard to the direct recruitment only. The Committee has given a table of comparative appointments in paragraph 19 of its Report but it had to speculate on an important aspect of the matter, M is shown by its own language, that the table shows the number of direct recruits which the Government wanted to iake and \"on the basis of which the promotees , nust havebeeri given promotions''. If indeed t~ relevant files were produced before the Committee, it would not have expressed its sense of deep shock and resentment at the disappearance of the files.\n\nFurther para 32 of the Report shows that the C.Ommittee had to grope in the dark and indulge in a certain amount of speculation on matters under its consideration. In the circumstances it has done as good a job as a Committee can and no f11ult need to found with it. But nevertheless the said Corun1ittee's report cannot displace the Court's judgments.\n\n[842 H, 843 A-C]\n\nEven on n1erits there is no justificatio~ for considering lhe judgments already rendered by this Cburt inasmuch as no fresh facts were brought to notice by way of discovery of ncv, i and imJXlrtant evidence which would justify reconsideration of the decisions already rendered by this Court after the most careful examination of the competing contcnions. The report of the Rajya\n\nSabha Committee on petitions shows that the relevant files are still not trace~ able. [843 E-F, G-H, 844 A]\n\nPer Desai, J. {contra)\n\n1. While, n0 doubt, the Supreme Court has constitutional po\\ver tOt review its decision, it is a power to be sparingly exeircised because any such review has the tendency to unsettle que5tions which may' have been finally determined.\n\nThe Supreme Court does not lightly undertake retview of its decisions more especially where conflicting claims have been setUed by the decision of this.\n\nCourt and the whole gamut may have to be gone through over again on a reconsideration of the decision.\n\nWhile exercising inherent power to reconsider and review its earlier decision, the Suprme Court would naturaJly 1 lik.e to impose cerWl.in reasonable limitations and 'vould be reluctarnt to entert3in plea for reconsideration and review all its earlier decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so. It -is general judicfal experience that in ma-tters of la'v involving questions of construing stntutory or constitutional provisions, t\\\\'O views are often reasonably possible and when judicial appronch has to make a choice between the two reasonable possible views, the process of decision makingis often very difficult and delicate.\n\n[846 A-B, 847 C, G-H, 848 A-BT\n\nF In deciding 'vhether a reviev.\" is necessary, when two views. are po6Sible it\n\nwould not necessarily b~ an adequate reason for such review and revision to bold that though the earlier view is reasonably possible view the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. The Court's discretion should be guided by such considerationl whether in the interest of public good or for any other valid or compulsive reason it is necessary that: the\n\nearJier decision should be revised. [848 B~C]\n\n\n2. Jai Singhani case proceeds on a concession that Rule 4 and the quota. prescribed by the Government referable to the power conferred by Rule 4 were, R statutory in character. [848 D-E]\n\nIncome-tax service was reconstltuted on September 29, 1974. The Govern-· ment of India classified the existing income-ta:ii::· service as Class I and Clas!I Il.\n\n-r-·\n\nK. K. DUTTA V. UNION 819\n\nThe scheme provided for recruitment of income-tax officers Class I grade II partly by promotion and partly by direct recruitment. The scheme was set out in Ute Government of India Fmance Department (Central Revenues) letter dated September 29, 1944. The quota prescribed therein has undergone a rev.Won at a later dale. The rules being Pre-constitution Rules, their source muSt be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 241 of the 1935 Act made provision for recruitment and conditions of service. Section 241 makes it cleiar that the power to make appointments in the case of service of Federation and posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation was. conferred on the Governor-General or such person as he may direct. The power to 1nake rule~ in this behalf was confened by sub-section 2 on tfie Govemor-General or by some person or persons authorised by the Governor- Gcneral to n1akc the rules for the purpose.\n\nBut, the rules ware not made either by the Goyemor-General or such person authorised by him. The rules were made by the Finance Department and no material was placed to show that the persons or the persons \\Vho made the rules were authorised by the Govemor- Geneml, under Section 241(2) of the 1935 Act in this behalf. The assumption made, therefore, that Rule 4 of the .Rules are statutory and that the quota prescribed in exercise of the power contfe1Ted by Rule 4 must be statutory is\n\nill-founded. This knocks out the entire foundation of the judgment of this Court in Jai Singhani's case because this Court proceeded to hold that as the quota tvas statutory, any recruitment made in excess of the quota in any given year would be invalid and at bestJ can be regularised by relegating such excess appointments to the quota neix.t year. If Rule 4 and the quota referable to the power conferred by Rule 4 were not statutory but were merely executive instructions, its violation \\VOUld not render any appointment in excess of it invalid but ot best would be irregular and in this case on [l! plain reading of Rule 4 it\n\nwollid not even be irregular. [848 G-H, 849 A-El\n\n3'. ln P. C. Sethi & Ors. v. U11io11 of India & Ors.' this Court held t:.._1.at in thei absence of any statutory rulels it wasi open to the Government in exercise of its executive power to isue administrative instructions \\vith regard to constitution and reorganisation of service as long as there is no viola4.ion of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ff the. present Rule 4 enables the Governn1ent to preScribe method to be employed for the purpose of filling in any particular vacancy or such v<1cancit:s as may be required to be filled in durin_'( aity parti- . (' cular period nnd the number of candidates to be' recruited by each method atfd\n\nif the o-called quota is not statutory but merely a guideline, the Government\n\n-.,, when'evt-r 1naking appointments would be acting in exercise of power conferred\n\n'f I\n\nby -Ruk 4 which leaves it to the discretion, of the Government to decide from what source recruitment should be made and what must be the quantum of vacancies that 1nust be filled in at a given pont of 'time and such appointment\n\ncould ::at be said to be invalid. f849 E-Hl\n\nAlternatively, even if the assumption made in Jai Singharzi'.s case that Rule 4 and the quota referable to the exercise of powei::. conferred by Rule 4 is unquestionable yet \\vhcn this Court held that the quota is rela-ted to tha vacancies, the decision procecUing on an incorrect plea thar the information about the nluiiber of vacancies in a year is not available, is unsustainable flor two reasons, namtly, (l) that the files are now produced; (2) in the abseince of information\n\nabout \"the vacancies available the Court could not have invalidated any appoint~ rii.Cnt. on the assu1nption that appointment from the source of promotees was in\n\nexte111; of the quota. [850 A-BJ\n\nOn a plain reading of Rules 3,, 4 and 5, it is clear that the quota \\\\'as related to vacancies and at one stage \\that was accepted. On this finding unless the fac.t situation is clearly established showing vacancies year to year it ould be impossible to hold that in a-ny year there was excess in either source. Suppose there \\Vere 90 vacancies in a year and the quota was 66-2/3 for direct recruits and 33 113 for pr; o1notees it would be open to the Government to promote 30 persons irrespective of the; fact whether 60 direct recruits have become available or not. The assumption made that the recruitment made in a given yeM front both the sources would furnish information. about the vacancies in a year would lead to a rather unfair conclusion inasmuch as the action of the Government in acting in acertain manner without due regard to the quota rule \\vould work hardship on appointees even though on a correct calculation of vacancies the appointments may be valid and legal. [850 C-E]\n\n4. The Government understood the mandamus issued in Jai Singlzani's case as covering the whole pericxl from 1951 to 1967. When this was questioned in the First Gupta's case this, Court held that the quota rule proprio vigor£' operated between 1951 to 1956 and if there were promotions in any year in excess of rhc quota, those promotions were merely invalid for that year but they were. not invalid for all time and they could be regularised. by being absorbed in the quota for the later years. So adjusting the quota at any,- rate\n\nup to 1956, the quota rule on its O\\Vll strength evaporated because. it \\\\138 to rn~ in operation for a period of five years and no fresh quota rule was issued by the Government. Therefore, after 1956 Rule, 4 remained in forcein1 all its rigour and was not hedged in by a-ny quota. Rule 4 permitted the Govelmment to make recruitment from either source without fettering its discretioP.; by any quota rule which it was not bound to prescribe. On January 16, 1-19~9 Government in the Ministry of Finance i.nformed the Commissioners. of Income- + tax that the President had sanctioned the upgrading to Class l of one hundrtd temporary posts of Income-Tax Officers Class II.\n\nOn December 19, 1960 there was further upgrading of 114 posts from Class II to Class I.\n\nBetwe<m 1959 and 1962 these 214 posts were filled in by promotees. Now in the- First Gupta's case, this Comt held even though the quota expired in 1956 yet :the Government of India adopted it as a guideline. May be it may be so. .But, it cannot be sa-id that any appointment inJ breach of the' guideline neither statutory nor even having the fragrance of any executive instruction becomes invalid \\').. ·\n\nmore so, when the Government had power to make appointment from either source t.:ninhibited by any quota rule under Rule 4. Yet the Court found that i'f between 1956 and 1959 when one hundred pests came to be upgraded there was a spi11-over of 73 persons and because of the huge departure from guidelines the weightage rule giving seniority to the promotees by 2 to 3 years was crusl:ted .;, vunder its O\\VllJ debris. Again, Rule 4 is overlooked or by-passed when say; ing that there was a spill-over of 73 promotees between 1956 and 1959, nor could it be said that the upgrading of 214 posts and filling them up by promotees would be in any \\\\1ay even irregular much less invalid because Rule 4 enables ,,, the Government to draw fr6m either _source. [851 A-G]\n\n5. In the Second Gupta's case in view of the decisio111 in the First Gupta's case, a fresh seniority rule was prepared and it was made retroactive from January 16, 1959.\n\nIt, inter alia, provides that the relative seniority a_mon_gst the promotees and the direct recruits. sha11 be in the ratio of 1 : 1 and - .the same shalt be so determined and regulated in accordance \\Vith a roster min-\n\nK. K. DUTTA V, UNION Bil\n\ntained for this purpose which shall follow the following sequence. namely, promotee; direct recruit, promotee; direct recruit etc. This method of roster undoubtedly introduces a quota by the back door. Once a roster is introduced promotee direct recruit, promotee direct recruit etc. even if some promotees have come in a bulk and if at a later date some direct recruits are appointed in bulk while preparing roster an earlier date-promotee will have to yield bis place to a later date direct recruit. Bluntly translated it means that the ditect recruit who was never in service when promotee was promoted probably he may be• a student, he may not have even passed the competitive exairo.ination, yet lie may come into the picture challenge one who has already been serving in the department for a number of years. To illustrate in the new seniority list prepared by the Government pursuant to the order made by this Court in the Fir.st Gupta's case and upheld by this Court in the Second Gupta's case a promotee of 1962 will have to yield bis place to a direct recruit of 1966.\n\n[851 G-H, 852 A-DJ\n\n6. &rvice jurisprudence hardly permits a1 situation where a man not in' service comes and challenges something which has been done much before he\n\ncame into service and gets such an advantage which on the face of it appear to be unfair. But apart from this, even in 1959 there was no quota ruh.': 1 and assuming that the old service rule giving weightage to the pron1otees crushed under weight of large nun1ber of promotees being promoted it would not be\n\nopen to the Government to so prepare a fresh seniority list which cannot be given effect to unless a roster is introduced \\vhich introduces quota by the back door and which is so unfair in its operation that promotees of 1962 will have to yield p]ace to direct recruits of 1966. Under the old weightage rule, promotees were given weightage for seIVice of 2 to 3 yearn over direct recruits because direct recruits wer~ llllahle to undertake regula.r assessment work for a period of 2 to 3 years when they were, more or less under training \\\\.'bile promotees have been doing this work for a number of years and whose experience is reflected in the weightage. The whole thing now appears to be in the reverse gear in that an uninitiated direct recruit takes precedence over an experienced promotee. The unfairness of the new rule is :writ large on the face of the\n\nrecord. [852 &HJ\n\n7. The fresh seniority rule violates another important rule well--Tecognised principle in the service jurisprudence that in the abs(:nce of any valid rule of seniority date of continuous officiation provides a valid rule of seniority. This\n\nrole is completely crucified upon two unsustainable assumptions that a quota\n\nrule having guideline sanction is made imperative in character and assumed to be in force between 1956 and 1959, and that even though Government in exercise of power conferred by Rule 4 fOr its own necessity promoted 214 promotees to the upgraded post, yet they niust yield to some future direct recruits who may come to the department at a later date. This Court sustained the decision hold ing that these were ad hoc appointments and there are no regular posts, for\n\nthese. promotees. This approach wholly overlooks the fact and the force of Rule 4. [853 A-CJ\n\n8. Certainty and continuity demand that this Court should not reopen settled decisions or reopen closed questions unless under compelling necessity.\n\nIt may be that the fate of Income-Tax Officers promoteeS and direct recruits\n\nmay rest with the three decisions of this. Court. Unfairness to some of them H may itself not provide a good and compelling reason for reopening and recon~\n\nsidering the decisions. [853 C-DJ\n\nJai Singllani and the Two Gupta cases are being quoted, times wit.bout number before this Court for the principles enunciated therein.\n\nThese decisions, therefore, affected subsequent decisions of this Court as \\Yell as the High Courts and some of the principles. enunciated in these three cases stand in sharp contrast to other decisions of this Court an<l in fact this Court itself feJt it nee1; ssary to warn that it may become necessary to reconcilei these conflicting decisions.\n\nThe three decisions a:'e incorrect in the light 0£ the mate-- rials TIO\\V placed, especially the files which were withheld fron1 the Court and the Committee. A strong case has been made out for reconsideration of these decisions. [853 E-F, 854 C-D]\n\nN. D. Chauhan & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [1977] I S.C.R. 1037 and 1053 referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 66/1974 & 4146/1978.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, J. N. Haldar, Rathin Dass and A. K. Sanghi, for the Petitioners in WP 66/74.\n\nD Dr. Y. S. Chitale, Mukul Mudgal and B. R. Aggarwal for the Petitioners in WP No. 4146/78.\n\nS. N. Kackar, Sol. Genl. R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Miss A. Subhashinifor RR 1-3 in WP 66 and RR 1-2 in WP 4146.\n\nRam Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for ; E R. 4 in WP 4146 and Intervener (Gujjar Mal.). '\n\nRam Panjwani, Bishamber Lal, Raj Panjwani and Vijay Panjwani for the R. 6 in WP No. 4146 and R. 358 in WP 66.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the R. 7 in WP 4146.\n\nA. K. Sanghi for the Interveners (Hari Narain and L. S. Chakravarty).\n\nThe Judgment of Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., N. L. Untwalia, P. S.\n\nKailasam and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ. was delivered by Chandrachud, C.J. D, A. Desai, J. gave a dissenting Opinion.\n\nCHANDRACHUD, C. J.-The disputes between promotees and direct\n\nrecruits in various departments of the Government seem to have no ·~-- end.· No sooner does one round of litigation come to a decision than r , is another round started by one party or the other, sometimes alleging, as in these Writ Petitions, that important facts and circumstances were 11 not taken into consideration in the earlier proceedings either because they were suppressed or because, though cited, they were overlooked or misunderstood. A virtual review is thus asked for, opening flood\n\n--i\n\nK. K. DUTTA 1\". UNION (Char.drachu.d, C.J.) 823\n\n:gates to fresh litigation. There are few other litigative areas than disputes between members of various services inter se, where the prin- Ciple that public policy requires that all litigation must have an end can apply with greater force.\n\nPublic servants ought not to be driven or required to dissipate their time and energy in court-room battles.\n\nThereby their attention is diverted from public to private affairs and their inter se disputes affect their sense of oneness without which no institution can function effectively. The constitution of Service Tribunals by State Governments with an apex Tribunal at the Centre, which, in the generality of cases, should be the final arbiter of controversies relating to conditions of service, including the. vexed question Of seniority, may save the courts from the avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service matter'. The proceedings of such Tribunals can have the merit of informality and if they will not be tied down to strict rules of evidence, they might be able to produce solutions which will satisfy many and displease only a few.\n\nThere are always a few whom nothing can please.\n\nThe three petitioners in Writ Petition No. 66 of 1974 are all promotees. Petitioner No. I, Kamal Kanti Dutta, was appointed as an Inspector of Income-tax on December, 7, 1950 and after passing the departmental examination he was promoted an Income-tax Officer, Class II on June 21, 1954. Ori January I, 1966 he was promoted as Income-tax Officer, Class I, which post he was holding 6n the date of the petition, February 8, 1974.\n\nPetitioners 2 and 3, Bikash Mohan Das Gupta and Sushi! Ranjan Das, were promoted as Inspectors of Income-tax in April, 1955. The former was promoted as l.T.O., Oass II in December, 1957 and as l.T.O., Class I, in May, 1971 while the latter was promoted as I.T.O., Class II, in August, 1973.\n\nRespondents I to 5 to the petition are the Union of India, Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Union Public Service -Commission respectively. Respondents 6 to 357 who were recruited directly as LT.Os., Class I, were appointed on probation as Class I {)iicers after Petitioner No. I was promoted to that cadre on January, 1, 1966. Respondents 280 to 357 were appointed on probation as I.T.Os., Gass I, after Petitioner No. 2 was promoted to that cadre in May 1971.\n\nRespondent No. 358, S. G. Jaisinghani, who was recruited directly as I.T.O., Class I, in 1951 was holding the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax on the date of the petition. He was posted at the\n\nrelevant time as the Deputy Director of Investigation, New Delhi.\n\nH Respondent 359, Mohan Chandra Joshi, who was recruited directly as I.T.O., Class I, in 1953 was also holding a similar rank and was\n\nworking as Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 4146of1978 the Petitioner, Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani, was appointed directly on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission as I.T.O., Class II (Trainee) on July l, 1947.\n\nAfter successfully completing the period of probation, he passed the departmental examination for LT.Os. in July 1950. In 1959-60 he was promoted as I.T.O., Class I, and was confirmed in tha.t cadre with effect from December 9, 1960. He was promoted as an Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax.with effect from December 17, 1969.\n\nRespondents 1 to 3 to that petition are the Union of India, the Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Union Public Service Commission respectively. Respondents 4 to 8 are B. D. Roy, S. G. Jaisinghani, M. C. Joshi, B. S. Gupta and M. Jangamayya respectively. These officers have figured in certain well-known decisions of this Court, as a result of which their names have become household words in service jurisprudence. In fact, Shr; B. S. Gupta figures in two cause-titles known as •the first Gupta cam' and the 'Second Gupta case'. Respondents 4, 7 and 8 are Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax while respondents 5 and 6 are working as Deputy Directors of Investigation.\n\nIt will be difficult to appreciate the nature of the relief sought in these.\n\nWrit Petitions without a proper understanding of the history of the litigation leading to these petitions. That history is quite checkered.\n\nOne of the principal grievances of the petitioners is that some ohhe previous decisions rendered by this Court are erroneous and that some have not been properly understood and interpreted while framing rules of seniority. That makes it necessary to refer to the previous. proceedings leading to the present controversy.\n\nWith a view to improving the income-tax administration, the Government of India, in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission, decided to reconstitute and classify the then existing Income-tax Services, Classes I and II. The scheme of reorganisation of the Services was set out in a letter dated September 29, 1944 of the Government oflndia, Finance Department (Central Revenues), which was sent to all the Commissioneri oflncome-tax. The Central Service, Class I was to consist of (I) Commissioners of Income-tax, (2) Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax, (3) Income-tax Officers, Grade I and\n\n(4) Income-tax Officers, Grade JI. The Central Service, Class II comprised Income-tax Officers, Grade III. Thus Income-tax Officers,.\n\nClass I were to be of two grades, Grades I and II, while Income-tax\n\n. K. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandraclzud, C.J.) 825\n\nOfficers, Class II, were to consist of one grade, namely, Grade Ill.\n\nClauses (a) to (e) of paragraph 2 of the aforesaid letter prescribed modes of recruitment to the various posts in Class I and Class II.\n\nClause (d) which prescribed the mode of recruitment to the post of Income-tax Officer, Class I, Grade II, said :\n\nRecruitment to Grade-II will be made partly by promotion and partly by direct recruitment. 80 per cent of the vacancies arising in this Grade will be filled by direct recruitment via the Indian Audit & Accounts and Allied Service Examination.\n\nThe remaining 20 per cent of vacancies will be filled by promotion on the basis of selection from Grade III (Class II Service), provided that suitable men upto the number required are available for appointment. Any surplus vacancies which cannot be filled by promotion for want of suital:>le randidates will be added to the quota of vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment via the Indiaµ Audit and Accounts etc. Services examination.\n\nRules regulating recruitment to the Income-tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) Service, \"liable to alteration from year to year\", were pub- ' lished on May 26, 1945 by a resolution of the Finance Department (Central Revenues). Rule 3 provided that reeruitment to Class I, Grade II Service shall be made (i) by competitive examination held in India in accordance with Part II of the Rules and (ii) by promotion on the basis of selection from Grade III (Class II Service) in accordance with Part III of the Rules. By rule 4, the Government was to determine, subject to the provisions of rule 3, the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of filling any particular vacancies, or such vacancies as may require to be filled during any particular' periop, and the number of -candidates to be recruited by each method. Part\n\nIII of the Rules called 'Recruitment by Promotion' provided by paragraph 21 that recruitment by promotion shall be made by selection from among Grade III Income-tax Officers (Class II Service)lafter consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission and that no officer shall have any claim to such promotion as of right.\n\nBy a letter dated January 24, 1950 the Government of India laid do, wn certain rules of seniority (a) as between direct recruits, (b) as ' between promotees selected from Class II, and (c) as between direct recruits who completed their probation in a given year and the pro-. motees appointed in the same year to Class I.\n\nOn October 18, 1951, the Government of India addressed a letter to\n\nallth~ Commissioners of Income-tax on the subject 'Incometax Officers,\n\n14-463 SCl/80\n\nc '\n\nA Grade II (Class I Service)-quota of vacancies filled by promotion.\n\nThe letter says :\n\nThe Government of India have had under consideration the question of increasing the proportion of vacancies reserved fqr promotion from Class II Income-tax Officers in Class I. It has been decided in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission and in modification of para 2(d) of the Finance Pep!. (Central Revenues) letter No. 195-Admn. (IT)/39 dated the 29th September, 1944 that for a period of five years in the first instance 66/2-3 % of the vacancies in Class I, Grade II, will be filled by direct recruitment via combined competitive examination . and the remaining 33! % by promotion on the basis of selection from Grade III (Class II Service). 'Any surplus vacancies which cannot be filled by promotion for want of suitable candidates will be added to tbe quota of vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment.\n\nBy a Jetter dated September 5, 1952, the Govemment of India revised with retrospective effect the rules of seniority which were laid down on January 24, 1950.\n\nRule l(f)(iii) as framed on January 24, 1950 read thus :\n\nThe pr0motees who have been certified by the Commission in any calendar year shall be senior .to all direct recruits who complete their probation during that year or after and are confirmed with effect from a date in that year or after.\n\nThe rule as revised on September 5, 1952 read thus :\n\nOfficers promoted in accordance with the reeommenda~ tion of the Departmental Promotion Committee before the next meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committee sha!'' be senior to all direct recruits appointed on the resul~ of the examinations held by the Union Public Service Commission during the calendar year in which the Departmental Promotion Committee met and the three previous years.\n\nRule l(f)(iv) of the 1952 Rules dealt with a special situation in which an officer initially appointed to Class II service is given seniority in the same manner as a departmental promotee, if subsequent to his passing\n\n-Ythe departmental examination he is appointed in Class I on the ; esults of the competitive examination.\n\nRule 4 of Chapter IX of the \"Rules of Promotion of the Central Board of Revenue Office Procedure Manual states, that the prescribed\n\nI '\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.l.) 827\n\nminimum service for an officer of Class I, Grade II for promotion to Grade I is 5 years gazetted service including 1 year in Class I, Grade II. For a promotee from Class II, the minimnm period of service for promotion to Class I, Grade I, would be actually 4 years service in Class II and 1 year service in Class I, Grade II.\n\nIn 1962, S. G. Jaisinghani (who is respondent No. 358 in Writ Petition No. 66 of 1974 and respondent No. 5 in Writ Petition No. 4146 of 1978) filed Civil Writ No. 189-D of 1962 in the High Court of\n\nPunjab under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of th.e seniority rnles in regard to Income-tax Service, Class I, Grade II as also the actual implementation of the 'quota' rule, as infringing Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Promotees who were likely to be affected by the decision of the Writ Petition were added as respondents 4 to 126 to that Petition. Jaisinghani who was recruited directly as an Income-tax Officer, Class I (Grade II), raised four principal contentions :\n\n(i) Rule l(fJ(iii) of the seniority rules as \"framed in 1952 was based upon an unjustifiable classification between direct recruits and promotees after they had entered Class I, Grade II Service. On the basis of that classification, promotees were given seniority over direct recruits of the same year and with weightage of three previous years. All officers appointed to Class I, Gr.ade II Service formed one class and after being recruited to that class, no distinction could be made between direct recruits and promotees.\n\n(ii) Rule l(f)(iv) was discriminatory because though the petitioner, Jaisinghani, qualified in the same competitive examination of 1950 for appointment to Class I, Grade II Service as respondents 4, 5 and 6 to that petition, they were treated as senior to him by the operation of the artificial rule by which. they were regarded as \"deemed promotees\", since they were appointed to Class II, Grade III Service in 1947. All the four of them were appointed to Class I, Grade II Service in !951 and therefore the period of service put in by respondents 4, 5 and 6 in Class II, Grade III Service cannot be counted for fixing their seniority vis-a-vis the petitioner.\n\n(iii) Rule 4 of Chapter IX of the 'Central Board of Revenue\n\nOffice Procedure Manual' leads to discrimination as between direct recruits and promotees; and that\n\n(iv) during the years 1951 to 1956, there was excessive recruitment of 71. promotees, in violation of the quota rule of 2 : 1 contained in Government of India's letter dated October 18, 195L The quota fixed by that letter must be deemed to have been fixed in exercise of the, statutory power given by rule 4 of the Income-tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) Service Recruitment Rules published on May 26, 1945.\n\nA full Bench of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench, Delhi, rejected the writ petition, holding that the principles for determining seniority between direct recru, its and promotees laid down in rules l(f}\n\n(iii) and (iv), 1952 were not discriminatory, that the quota rule announced by the Government of India were, merely a policy statement and had no statutory force, that departure from the quota rule did not give rise to any justiciable issue and that the promotion rule governing promotions from Class I, Grade U to Class I, Grade I was not discriminatory and ultra vires of Articl1' 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nIn appeal, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that rules l(f)(iii) and (iv) of the seniority rules framed in 1952 did not violate Articles 14 and 16 since they were based on a, reasonable classification and that rule 4 of Chapter IX of the 'Central Board of Revenue Office Procedure Manual' cannot be held to lead to any discrimination as between direct recruits and promotees, since the object of the rule was really to carry out the policy of le l(fJ(iii) of the Rules of Seniority ,+ and not allow it to be defeated by the , requirement of five years service in Class I, Grade II itself, before a person could be considered for promotion to Class I, Grade J. On the question of excessive recruitment of promotees from. 1951 to 1956 in violation of quota rule, the Court had directed the Secretary of the Finance Ministry, during the hearing of the appeal, to furnish information regarding the number of ,~ , vacancies which had arisen from year to year from 1945 onwards, '- the nature of the vacancies-permanent or temporary-the chain of vacancies and such other details which were relevant to the matters pending before the Court. In his affidavit dated January 31, 1967 Shri R. C. Dutt, Finance Setretary, said that he was not able to work out, in spite of his best endeavours, the number of vacancies arising in a particular year. However, a statement, Ex. E. was furnished to the Court showing the number of officers recruited by the two methods of '\"\"( recruitment to Class I Service during the relevant years. The Court found that it was not clear from Shri Dutt's affidavit whether the quota rule was followed strictly for the years in question ar d noted that in the absence of fig1lres of permanent vacancies in Class I, Grade II, for the relevant years, the Solicitor General was unable to say to what extent\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 829\n\nthere had been deviation! from that rule. Rejecting the submission of the Solicitor General that the quota rule was merely an administrative direction, the Court held rtiat rule 4 of the Income-tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) Service Recruitment Rules was a statutory rule nnder which a statutory duty was cast on the Government to determine the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of filling the vacancies and the number of candidates to be recruited by each method; and that, though in the letter of the Government of India dated October 18, 1951 there was no specific reference to rule 4, the quota fixed by that letter must be deemed to have been fixed in exercise of the statutory power given by rule 4. There was therefore no discretion left with the Government of India to alter that quota according to the exigencies of the situation or to deviate from the quota, in any particular year, at its own will and pleasure. The quota rule, according to the Court, was linked up with the seniority rules and unless it was strictly observed in practice it would be difficult to hold that the seniority rule contained in rule l(f)(iii) was not unreasonable and did not offend Article 16 of the Constitution. The Court expressed its conclusion thus :\n\nWe are aocordingly of the opinion that promotees from Clltss II, Grade III to Class I, Grade II Service in excess of the prescribed quotas for each of the years 1951 to 1956 and onwards have been illegally promoted and the appellant is entitled to a writ in the nature of mandamus com man ding respondents I to 3 to adjust the seniority of the appellant and other officers similarly placed like him and to prepare a fresh seniority list in accordance with law after adjusting the recruitment for the period 1951 to 1956 and onwards in accordance with the quota rule prescribed in the letter of the Government of India No.\n\nI;'. 24(2)-Admn. I.T./51 dated October 18, 1951. We, however, wish to make it clear that this order will not affect such Class II Officers who have been appointed permanently a~ Assistant commissioners of Income Tax. (emphasis supplied).\n\nThe Court suggested that for future years the roster system should be adopted by framing an appropriate rule for working out the quota between the direct recruits and the promotees and that a roster should be maintained indicating the order in which appointments are made by direct recruitment and by promotion in accordance with the percentages fixed under the statutory rule for each method of recruitment.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 5 f 1966 filed by Mohan Chandra Joshi under\n\nH., Article 32 of the Constitution, a similar mandamus was' issued by the Court. Mohan Chandra Joshi, like Jaisinghani, was recruited dfrectly\n\n... ;\n\nas Income-tax Officer, Class I, Grade II, with the only difference that he was appointed in 1953 while Jaisinghani was appointed in 1951.\n\nThus the direct recruits succeeded substantially in their contentions. the quota rule acquired statutory force, appointments of promotees in excess of the quota became bad and it became obligatory for the Govern-· ment to prepare a fresh seniority , list. Promotees found to have been appointed in excess of the quota admissible to promotees had naturally to go down in the final gradation of seniority.\n\nThe aforesaid decision was given by this Court on February 2,\n\n1967. But, in spite of the mandamus issued by it, Government did not prepare a fresh seniority list for over a year, which led to the filing of a contempt petition by Jaisinghani and Joshi. Those proceedings were dismissed by this Court on. November 6, 1968.\n\nIn the meanwhile, on July 15, 1968, the Government prepared a fresh seniority list and filed it in this Court. That list failed to satisfy promotees as well as direct recruits.\n\nTwo writ petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court to challenge the fresh seniority list : one by B. S. Gupta, a promotee of 1962 and the other by M. C. Joshi, a direct recruit who had succeeded in the eerlier round of litigation in this Court. .These writ petitions were heard by two separate Benches of the Delhi High Court. Writ Petition No. 196 of 1970 filed by B. S. Gupta was dismissed whereas Writ Petition No. 550 of 1970 filed by .M. C. Joshi was substantially allowed. Setting aside the seniority list, the High Court gave a direction that another seniority list be prepared in the light of its judgment.\n\nThe decision of the Delhi High Court in the aforesaid two writ petitions was challenged in this Court in four appeals : one by Il. S. Gupta against the dismissal of his Writ petition and the other three by (i) the Government, (ii) .M. C. Joshi and (iii) 5 promotees. In all these appeais, the only question or consideration was whether the seniority list prepared on July 15, 1968 was correct and in accordance with the mandamus issued by this Court in Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors.(1 J. These appeals were heard together and were disposed of by a judgment dated August 16, 1972 which is reprted in Bishan Sarup Gupta v. Union of India and Ors.(2).\n\nWhile preparing the seniority list the Government understood the mandamus issued in Jaisinghani(}) as covering the entire period from 1951 to 1967. For doing that it could not be blamed, since the mandamus issued in Jaisinghani~) clirected the Government to adjust the\n\n\n(2) [1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 491.\n\n·~\n\n4J\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.l.) 8 31\n\nseniority of various officers for the period 1951 to 1956 \"and onwards\", though the argument regarding excessive recruitment of the promotees was confined to the years 1951 to 1956. Palekar, J. speaking for the Court in Bishan Sarup Gupta (Supra) observed in the first instance that this Court could not possibly have in mind a seniority list which took in promotees after 1956 and that therefore under the mandamus issued by this Court, appointments of promotees in excess of the quota could only be taken into consideration in relation to the period 1951 to 1956.\n\nThe reason for the use of the words \"and onwards\" was explained to be that Government should be able to push down exceis promotions to later years in order that such promotions could be absorbed in the lawful quota available for later years.\n\nIn Blshan Sarup Gupta---the Court was called upon to examine the correctness of. seven principles enumerated in the Government letter dated July 15, 1968 governing seniority. The first principle was accepted as good. The second and the thirdh>rinciples were held to be partially incorrect in so far as they excluded reference to all the promotees of 1952. The Court held that the promotees of 1952 should be referred to in the seniority list whether they are affected or not, the obje\"ct being the ascertainment of excess promotions.\n\nThe (ourth principle set out in the letter of July 15, 1968 which is important for our purpose reads thus :\n\nIn view of the difficulty in working out the vacancies arising in each year the total number of direct recruits and promotees in each year have been taken into account for the pur- . pose of implementing the quota rule.\n\nThis Court held that the rule dated October 18, 1951 was not concerned with the constitution of the cadre but \"was concerned with how pe(lllaneat vacancies were to be filled\" and therefore the promotees would. he entitled to l /3 of the vacancies in any particular year whether or not there was direct recruitment by competitive examination in that year. This ratio of 2 : l between the direct rerruits and the promotees could not be made to depend on whether. any direct recruits were appointed in any particular year. It therefore became essential to determine the actual vacancies in the cadre but even in B. S. Gupta the Government put forward the plea that it was impossible for them to give the exact figure of vacancies in any particular year. Counsel who appeared for the promotees in that case filed a chart marked Annexu re I which, according to him, showed the correct number of\n\nH ' .\n\nSUPREME COURT IU!PORTS (1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\n' vacancies in the particular years. The Court, however, foundit impossible to determine the actual vacancies on the basis of the figures given in that chart. In the circumstances, the Court considered it reasonable to accept the number of appointments made in the particular years as substantially representing the actual vacancies available . for being filled up. One of the reasons which the Court gave in support of this conclusion was that when the quota rule referred to vacancies, it was implicit that the vacancies are those which the Govc111ment wanted to fill up, whatever may be the actual number of vacancies available for being filled up. Thus, if in the year 1953, 53 pos~ were filled by direct recruits and 38 by promotees, the total number of vacancies which were intended by the Government to be filled in W4>'*1 be\n\n91. Promotees would be entitled to hold 1 /3 of , these namely, 30. 8 promotees therefore could be said to have been appointed in excess of the quota available for ptomotees. This was.in fact what the Gov-. ernment had done while preparing the fresh seniority list, though it had wrongly calculated the vacancies with effect from the ye11r 1953 instead of doing so w.e.f. the beginning of the year 1952. There were no promotions in 1951. and therefore, the question of appointment of promotees in excess of their quota did not arise for that year.\n\nThe argument advanced on behalf of the direct recruits that the quota rule should be corelated to vacancies in permanent posts only and not to those in temporary posts was rejected by the Court.\n\nThe Court upheld the 5th principle under which Class II Officers promoted to Class I, Grade II, were allowed weightage und1:r rule\n\nl(f)(iii).!\n\nThe Court then considered the question whether the quota rule could be applied after the year 1956. It held that even after I9S6, the Government was entitled by reason of rule 4 of the Recruitment .Rules of 1945 to follow the quota rule of 1951 as a rough guideline, \"Without going to the trouble of putting the same on record in so many words\". The Court observed that if the rule is followed as a gul'deline, a slight deviation from the quota would be permissible but if there was an \"enormous deviation\", other considerations ma.Jr arise.\n\nTaking into consideration the relevant circumstances, the Court came to the conclusion that in. the normal course the Government was entitled to prepare the seniority list till the end of 1958 in accordance\n\nwith the quota rule of 1951.\n\nIn regard to the position after the year 1958, the Court came to the cone! us ion that the quota rule ceased to apply and came to an end on January 16, 1959 when the sanction to upgrade 100 temporary posts in\n\n~.\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.l.) 833\n\nclass II, grade III to class I, grade II was given by the President. The seniority rule then fell with the quota rule .. On these considerations it was held that the seniority list was valid in regard to promotions made upto January 15, 1959 to the extent that it was prepared on the basis of the quota rule dated October 18, 1951 read with the seniority rule l(f) (iii).\n\nThis position made it necessary for the Court to consider as to how the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees was to be fixed after January 16, 1959, if the seniority rule l(f)(iii) ceased to be operative from that date.\n\nSeveral suggestions were made to the Court with a view to evolving a fair and just seniority rule.\n\nThe COurt declined to be drawn into any such exercise and preferred to leave it to the Government to devise a fair and just seniority rule, if necessary, in consultation with the U.P.S.C. As a corollary, the\n\nCourf8et aside the seniority list of July 15, 1968 and directed the Governmimt to prepare a fresh seniority list. The list for the years 1955 to January 15, 1959 was directed to be prepared in accordance with the quotll rule of 1951 read with seniority rule l(f)(iii). The list to be effective from January 16, ]959 \"(as directed to be prepared in accordance with rules to be made afresh by the Government.\n\nPrinciples (6) and (7) did not survive for consideration separately in view of the position mentioned above. ·\n\nThe Court kept the proceedings pending OJ). its file to enable the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list in the light of the directions\n\ngiven by it within six months from the date of the order. Liberty was given to the parties to apply to the Court after the list was file!!.\n\nThe judgment in B.S. Gupta ~(supra) was given on August 16, 19n.\n\nOn February 9, 1973, the President made rules called the Income-tax\n\n(Class I) Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1973. These Rules were made under Article 309 of the Constitution and were given retrospective effect from Januafy 16, 1959. In pursuance of the liberty resel'VC)d to the parties under the judgment in B.S. Gupta, the validity of the new Seniority Rules was challenged by the promotees. That challenge was considered and repelled by this Court in Bishan Sarup <Jupta etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc.,(1) the 2nd Gupta case.\n\nRule 3 of the new Seniority Rules of 1973 reads thus :\n\n\"3. Seniority of Officers-The seniority of the Income-tax\n\nOfficers iu the Class I service shall be regulated as from the H.\n\n(I} (197;] t S.C.R. 104.\n\ndate of commencement of these rules in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained namely :-\n\n(i) the seniority among the promotees inter se shall be determined in the order of selection for such promotion and the officers promoted as a result of any earlier selection shall rank senior to those selerted as a result of any subsequent selection;\n\n(ii) the seniority among the direct recruits inter se shall be deter--\n\nmined by the order of merit in which they are selected for such appointment by the Union Public Service Commission and any person appointed as a result of an earlier selection shall rank senior to all other persons appointed as a result of any subsequentselection; and\n\n(iil) the relative seniority among the promotees and the direct recruits shall be in the ratio of 1 : 1 and the same shall be so determined and regulated in accordance with a roster maintained for the purpose, which shall follow the following sequence, namely :-\n\n(a) promotee;\n\n(b) direct recruit;\n\n(c) promotee;\n\n(d) direct recruit; and so on\".\n\nWhen the new list of 'seniority was prepared by the Government irt\n\naccordance with these rules, the Government had on its hands 73promotees who, though appointed earlier between 1956 and 1958, hll(l no quota posts for their absorption. The 73 promotees, described as \"spillovers .on January 16, 1959\" as also those who were promoted subsequently had to he absorbed in the Service, which could' only be done by a special rule framed in that behalf.\n\nThe method adopted in the preparation of this list was, accord_ing to Palekar, J., who spoke again for the Constitution Bench in the 2ntf .\n\nGupta case, \"simple enough\", though the wording of die rule \"is not . happy\". The simple method adopted by the Government was like this : The seniority list from serial No. l to serial No. 485 relating. to the period from 1951 to January 16, 1959 was prepared in accordance with the quota rule read with the seniority rule which prevailed until January 16, 1959. At serial numbers 486 to 1717 are office~ who had to be accommodated from January 16, 1959 in accordance with the new seniority rules. Since under rule 3 (iii), the first post in the roster has to go to a promotee and the next to a direct recruit,\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.l.) 835\n\nserial No. 486 goes to a promotee, serial No. 487 to a direct recruit and so on. Promotees whose ranking is below serial No. 485 are either out or the 73 spillovers as on January 1959, or are those who were appointed later. Thus, the new seniority rule contains a formula for the absorption of all promotees with effect from January 16, 1959 in posts allocated to them, it determines their seniority inter se and last but not the least, it determines their seniority qua the direct recruits appointed from 1959.\n\nThe Court over-tu led the objection of the 73 spillover promotees that since, in the: 1st Gupta case, the Court hd directed that they should be absorbed on-a \"priority basis•', all of them should have been shown in tire seniority list as having been appointed on January 16, 1959 en bloc and the direct recruits for that year should' have been shown thereafter. It was explained that by the use of the expression \"priority\n\nbasis\", what was meant by the Court was that tbe position of the spillover promotees as seniors should not be prejudfoed by claims made by later promotees on the ground that since the spillover promotees were recruited in excess of the quota, the later promotees whose promotion did not violate the quota rule bad higher.rights than those73.\n\nThe principal contention of the promotees in the 2nd Gupta. case was this : As the quota rule collapsed on January 16, 1959 the spill over promotees as also those who were promoted thereafter must be deemed to have been validly appointed in accordance with rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules of 1945. Since there was no seniority or quota rule in existence for determining the seniority of promotees que the direct recruits, the natural seniority linked with the' earlier date of appointment must be respected. It could not be altered to the detriment of the promo tees since to do so would violate Article 16 of the Constitution. This contention 'was rejected by the Court on the ground that when the 73 spillover appointments were made, there were no allocated or earn\\arked posts to which those promotees could have been validly appointed, the ordinary consequence of which would have been their reversion to Class II posts which they originally held. So long, as the quota rule was in existence, appointments in excess of the quota, though invalid when made, were at least liable to be regularised\n\nin subsequent years when vacancies were available to the promotees 'as a conse'fuence of the quota rule. But once the quota rule ceased to exist on January 16, 1959, any possibility of the excess appointments of the promotees being regularised vanished. It was in order , to overcome this injustice to the promotees, that the new rule was framed by the Government. The new rule was thus not otily the direct outcome of the judgment of the Court in the 1st Gupta case,\n\nbut it was founded on the very principles on which the Income-tax Service had been constituted. The Court finally said that it had also to be remembered that promotees appointed from January 16, 1959 onwards were appointed on au officiating or ad-hoc basis with notice that the question of their seniority was still undecided. This ci1rcumstance, coupled with the absence of clear allocation of posts, made it impossible for the promotees to lay claim to seniority and contend that they were deprived of their natural seniority in violation of Article 16.\n\nShri V.M. Tarkunde who appears on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 66 of 1974 has made a fresh challenge to the aew seniority list prepared in pursuance of the rules dated February 9, 1973 the validity of which was upheld by this Court in the 2nd Gupta case (Supra). According to the learned counsel, the decision in Jaisinghani (Supra) suffers from the following three infirmities :\n\n(i) It was assumed in that case that the appointments of promotees were in excess of the quota available to them because the relevant files were not made available to the Cou.rt, nor indeed was the necessary data placed before the Court, even though during the hearing of the appeal the C011r; t had asked the Secretary of the Finance Ministry to f1irnish information in that behalf. In the absence of such information, the Court made an assumption which was unjustified, that the total number of vacancies a vailab.le for promotees was equal to the total number of appoit)tments actually mad~. If, for example, 10 direct recruits and 20 promotees are appointed in a particular year. it cannot be assumed either that only 30 vacancies a.i:e available for being filled up in that year or that only 30 appointments are intended to be made by the Government during that year. The proper inference for the Court to draw, in the absence of material which ought to have been produced by the Governm, ent, was that. if appointments were to be made of direct recruits and proril.gtees in the proportion of 2 : I, and if 20 promotees were in fact appointed, the Government desired to appoint 40 direct recruits but could only appoint 10, probably because of the non-availability of suitable candidates for direc.t recruitment. ··:It was wrongly assumed or held that rule 4 of the Incometax Officers (Class I, Grade II) Service Recruitment Rules was a statutory rule ..\n\n~-·\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 8 31\n\n(iii) It was wrongly assumed that I 00 posts in Class II, Grade III, and 114 posts in the same cadre which were upgraded as Class I, Grade II posts on January 16, 1959 and Decem ber 9, 1960 respectively were exclusively allotted to promotees and were in fact filled in by the appointment of promotees. '\n\nIn regard to the decision in the 2nd Gupta case (Supra) it is contended that the decision suffers from the following infirmities :\n\n(i) It was wrongly held there\\n that the 73 spillover promotees as on January 16, 1959 could not be given priority en bloc, even thoµgh it was directed in the judgment in the 1st Gupta Case (supra) that they should be dealt with on a '\"priority basis\". ·\n\n(ii) It was wrongly held that 214 promotees were appointed in excess of the quota available to the promotees.\n\n(iii) The conclusion that no distinction can be made between promotees and direct recruits once they belong to a common cadre was erroneous, as a result of which the promotees were unjustly deprived of their right to weightage.\n\n(iv) The provision in rule 3 (iii) of the new Rules of seniority of 1973 that direct recruits and promotees will be appointed in the ratio of 50 : 50 cannot work to the advantage of the promotees because the measure of 50 percent is fixed by the new rules in relation to the actual appointments made, whereas the old proportion of 2 : r was in relation to the actual number of vacancies available for being filled in.\n\nLearned counsel has demonstrated with the help of some of the instances in the new seniority list, as to how promotees have been treated unfairly and unjustly in comparison with direct recruits. One such instance is that a direct recruit, Hrushikesh Mishra, who was appointed on July 3, 1966 is placed at serial No. 1001 while one of the petitioners, Kamal Kanti Dutta, who was appointed six months earlier on January I, 1966 is placed at serial No. 1318. Another instance cited is that of a promotee, V. R. Hiremath, who was appointed on March 1, 1956 but is placed at serial No. 486, the first 485 officers hav ing been ranked according to the quota rule read wi.th the seniority rule which prevailed till January 16, 1959. Hiremath, it is contended, not having been appointed in excess of the quota should have been given his seniority, on alcount of the three years weightage, with effect from March 1, 1953. In the process, he has lost a benefit spread\n\n, A over not only three but six years, because his ran)dng has been made according to the new rule in relation to the date January 16, 1959.\n\nThese contentions were adopted by Dr. Y.S. Chitale who appears on behalf of. the petitioner H.K. Sajnani in Writ Petition No. 4146 of 1978. It may be mentioned that in Writ Petition No. 66 of 1974 of K.K. Dutta and others which was filed on February 8, 1974 no demand was made for the review of the decisions earlier given by this Court on the points under consideration. The request for review of those decisions was made for the first time by the petitioners by paragraph 3 of their supplementary affidavit in rejoinder which was filed in this Conrt in April 1978. By paragraph 45 of his Writ p, etition, which was filed on June 27, 1978 Sajnani did contend that the aforesaid judgments be reviewed since they were wrongly decided. Sajnani asked by paragraph 51 of his petition, and so did the petitioners in.the companion petitions asked by their supplementary rejoinder, that the decision of this Court in Union of India v. M. Jangamayya(l) should also be reviewed.\n\nIn his writ petition, Sajnani has cited several specific instances in support of his contention that under the new seniority rules, the!Promotees have been treated with an evil eye and an uneven hand. His complaint is that direct recruits who are \"15 years junior in age and 15 years junior in experience had been placed above him\"; and that the seniority list; dated April 15, 1978 of Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax, which is the basis of further promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income-tax, does not include his name at all, though he has been working as an Assistant Commissioner ever since 1969 when he was selected by the competent authority with the concurrence of the U.P.S.C., after putting in 22 years of service as an I.T.O., out of which 10 years' service was rendered in Class I itself. Sajnani also prays that the seniority list dated April 15, 1978 for the cadre of Assistant Commissioners be set aside as violating Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.\n\nIn addition to these grounds which are pressed upon us for reviewing our decisions in Jaisinihani, 1st Gupta case, 2nd Gupta case and Jangamayya, (supra) the petitioners have placed strong reliance on the findings of the 49th Report of the Committee on Petitions of the Rajya Sabha, which was presented on January 9, 1976. A full text of that Report is extracted at pages 242 to 363 of the compilation filed l;>y the writ petitioners in this Court.\n\nIt appears from that report that at the sitting of the Rajya Sabha held on the 23rd August, 1974, Shri Kali Mukherjee, M.P., presented\n\n(I) [1977J 2. S.C.R. 2.8\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 839\n\n, ; a petition signed by Shri R.C. Pandey, General Secretary, AU India Federation of Income-tax Gazetted Services Associations, New Delhi, !Praying for the repeal of the Income'tax Officers (Class I Service) (Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1973) and for the framing of fresh seniority rules in lieu thereof. The Committee heard the representatives of (i) promotees on whose behalf the petition was presented to the Rajya Sabha; (ii) the Ministry of Finance and (iii) the direct re- .cruits who were represented by the Indian Revenue Service Association. After going through the evidence, the memoranda and the files 11upplied by the Ministry of Finance the Committee observed :\n\n\" ...... the Department from 1944 till today has been working in a very haphazard, irregular and unscientific way. They made policies, rules, etc. and then went on deviating from them to suit certain exigencies. Instead of meeting the new situation or the demands of the Department in a scientific or rational way, ad-hocism prevailed. This led to litigation for nearly two decades. Since the year 1944, the Department has .made so many commissions and o=issions in its long working, thereby it has provided arguments to both the direct re- <eruits and promotees which have been advocated by them forcefully. This has created bitterness and a picture of civil war in the Department. It would facilitate our understanding if we look at the various points, like vacancies, quota, seniority, weightage, confirmations, recruitments or promotions to temporary and permanent vacancies, etc. in a proper perspective.\"\n\nThe Committee examined the files produced beforeit by the Ministry, expressed its sense of \"shock\" at the plea of the Ministry that files of vital matters were not traceable and concluded that the new seniority rules of 1973 should be scrapped. The Co=ittee recommended, inter alia, :\n\n\"The entire concept of a co=on seniorityist should be given . up. The existing common seniority list of 1973 be replaced by two sets of seniority lists consisting of direct recruits and promotees respectively, on the basis of the dates of their appoint ment. The integration of the two channels which.maybe tum\n\ned into two cadres should not be done at the level of I.T.Os. but after the level of Assistant Commissioners.\"\n\nThe Committee hoped that with the separation of the two seniority lists, the controversy of inter se, seniority will be resolved and the hardship caused to the 434 officers promoted between 1956 to 1966 will be relieved. The Committee made certain calculations according to which, the correct number of spill-over promotees as on Januazy 16, 1959 was 15 and not 73. Observing in paragraph 7(i) that the Parliament owes responsibility in service matters too and that the executive is answerable to the Parliament for its actions, the Committee concluded its Report with the observation :\n\n\" ...... if necessary, a special law could be enacted and in corporated in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution so that no further scope is left for disputes and litigation and the Department would start functioning as an efficient and well-knit unit and fulfil its intended role in combating the evils of blackmoney and tax evasion and ensuring the stability and progress of our country.\"\n\nIt is not necessary to go into complications arising out of the random placement of statutes, rules and notifications in th~ 9th Schedule, but we do hope that, some day, the promised millannium will come.\n\n The Solicitor General and the other learned counsel who appear for the respondents resisted with great stoutness the attempt of the petitioners to reopen decisions rendered by this Court in dispute& between promotees and direct recruits of the Income-tax Service.\n\nThe respondents contend tha~ everyone of the arguments now pre sented before us has been already considered carefully in the earlier dec.isions and the petitioners' demand for review is only yet a.nother attempt to retrieve a lost cause. The learned Solicitor General also pressed upon us the need for treating the matter as closed. Reviews, he contends, should not be granted save in exceptional circumstances and at any rate, he says, no solution in service matters ean ever satisfy both the p; omotees and .direct recruits in an equal measure.\n\n,.,\n\nHaving considered these rival submissions carefully we are of .the\n\nopi~on tha; here is .no sufbstah ncde in _the rqu; s~ nahde n hbeh 1 alfoGf the r\\ii,. 1 pet1lloners 1or a review o t e ecmons m ; azsmg am, t e st 11pta \" case, the 2nd Gupta case and Jangamayya (supra). 'I\n\nCertain historic facts have to be borne in mind while considering the points raised before us. It is necessary to recall that for nearly a decade after 1950, appointments of promotees were made far in excess of the quota available to them. So long as the quota rule operated, it was possible to regularise their appointments when posts within their quota became available in later years. But a somewhat unprecedent ed situation arose by the upgrading of Class II posts to Class I, Grade 11,-100 of them on Janvary 16, 1959 and 114 on December 9, 1960.\n\nThis massive upgrading of posts brought about a collapse of the quota rule. Subsequent absorption in posts which become available for being filled up later really means regularisation of appointments, which i&\n\ni ~\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION ( Chandrachud, C.J.) 8 41\n\npossible provided there is no excessive deviation from the quota rule.\n\nWe quite appreciate that no blame can be laid at the doors of the promo tees on the score that they were appointed in excess of the quota available to them. Perhaps, their appointments must even have en abled the administration to tide over administrative stalemate. But the tough problem which the administration has to face is that where as it is necessary to recognise and protect the claims of promotees who are appointed in excess of their quota, it is equally necessary to ensure that the direct recruits do not suffer an undue set back in service on account of the excessive appointments of promotees. jThe conflicting claims of the two components of Service, both having an importance of their own, have therefore to be reconciled. It was with that object that the rules have been modified from time to time. The judgments rendered by this Court in matters which the petitioners want to be reopened show, without a shadow of doubt, bow every effort wa' made to ensure that no hardship or injustice is caused to the promotees merely because their appointments exceeded their quota.\n\nIt is not correct to say that the judgment in Jaisinghani (supra) was based on a concession or that the Court felt compelled to draw the particular conclusions therein because of the inability or refusal of the Finance Ministry to produce the relevant files. The Court adopted what it considered in the circumstances to be a satisfactory and scientific method of ascertaining the number of vacancies available for being ---( filled up. It came to 'the conclusions that the number; or actual appointments should determine the number of vacancies available which, with great respect, was a perfectly legitimate conclusion to draw. In the grey area where service rules operate, more than one view is always possible to take without sacrificing either reason or commonsense; but the ultimate choice has to be necessarily conditioned by several r considerations ensuring justice to as many as possible and injustice l to as few.\n\nWe also find it impossible to hold that thei:e was any error ,. ' in the conclusions in Jaisin!!hani [(supra) that rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules was a statutory rule. Subsequent decisions would show that 1here was hardly any dispute between the parties, at later stages at any ' rate, that rule 4 was a statutory rule.\n\nThe other objections raised against the judgments in the various cases partake more or less of the same character and must be over- 7' -ruled for similar reasons.\n\nWe appreciate that the promotees shouldjnot be penafoed for the mere reasons that those of them who were appointed after January 16,\n\nH 1959 were appointed on an officiating or ad-hoc basis and had clear natice that the question of their seniority was still undecided. The\n\n!S-463 SCI/80\n\nA circumstances attendant upon their appointments cannot, however, be wholly over-looked in determining whether the, constitutionalcon, straints have been over-stepped.\n\nIn regard to the individual instances cited before us as exemplifying the injustice caused to the Promotees, it is not safe to test the B constitutionality of a service • ule on the touchstone of fortunes of individuals.\n\nNo matter with .what care, objectivity and foresight a rule is framed, some hardship, inconvenience or injustice is bound to result to some members of the service. The paramount consideration is the reconciliation of conflicting claims of two important constituents of Service, one of which brings fresh blood and the C other mature experience.\n\nThe counter-affidavit dated August 31, 1973, filed in the 2nd Gupta case (supra) by Shri Mehra, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance, shows the fullness with which the Government had consulted all possible interests while framing the impugned rules of :seniority.\n\nThe gamut of reasonable possibilities is fairly covered by the four alternatives referred to in Shri Mehra's affidavit. The inconveniences and disadvantages flowing from the first three alternatives would be far greater than those flowing from the 4th. That is why the choice ultimately fell on the 4th alternative, uuder which the seniority between promotees and direct recruits was fixed alternately on a roster system, vacancies being equally divided between promotees and direct recruits, for the entire period from 1959 up-to-date. Though the promotees submitted in the 2nd Gupta case ~(supra) that the new seniority rule was unfair to them, they werelunable to put forward any rational alternative, a fact which is noted at page 119 of the Report. That led the Court to remark : ·\n\n\"They are indeed pleased with the increase in the promotional chances. But they are sore that the artificial rule of seniiority which gave them weightage, has been removed. They do not dispute that by the increase in their ratio in Class I service, a larger number of Class II officers will, in course of time get a chance to be appointed by promotion as Assistant Commissioners. But they are sorry that their chances to be promoted to posts higher than that of the Assistant Commissioner are now retarded by the removal of the weightage.\"\n\nThis shows how difficult it is to solve the jig-saw puzzle of service disputes.\n\nThe Report of the 'Committee on Petitions' of the Rajya Sabha,: howsoever sincerely motivated and fully drawn, cannot be given the\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 843\n\nimportance which the promotees seem to attach to it. It is urged that the findings of the Committee are authentic because the Finance Ministry had made the relevant files available to it. We do not think that this argument is well-founded. In paragraph 16 of its Report, the Committee does refer to certain files but those files appear to . contain some notings in regard to the direct recruitment only.[ne:ccrrmitte e has given a table of corr.parative appointments in paragraph 19 of its Report, but it bad to speculate on an important asp<et oftbc matter, as is shewn by its own language, that the table shows the mmter of direct recruits which the Government wanted to take and\"cn the basis of which the promotees must have been given promotions\". (emphasis supplied). If indeed the relevant files were produced before the Committee. it would not have expressed its sense of deep ' shock and resentment at the , disanearance of the files.\n\nWe share the concern of the Committee which is expressed in paragraph 32 of its Report; thus :\n\n~'It is strange that many of the files which could probably have thrown light on the question of excess pre motion, are reported 'missing' or 'not available'. The conclusion is inescapable th at these losses of files are far frcm teing accidental. We can o nly conclude that important information was deliterately withheld fr cm the Supnme Court as well as frcm the Ccrrmittee.\n\nHad the Ccmmittee teen allcwed access to the file relating to the Seniority Rules framed in 1973, we cculd have kncwn scir.c more facts\".\n\nThis st.ows that the Ccrrmitke, tea, h<d to grcpe in the dark and indulge in a certain amount of speculaticn on matters under its consideration. In the circumstances. it bas done as good a job as a Committee can and we desire to find no fault with its Report. But we cannot accept the sulmission pressed uron us by the petitioners that the Committee's Report must displace our judgments. n\n\nIt shall have been noticed that we have refused to reconsider our decisions not so much because of the view taken in the various cases cited by the learned Solicitor General, like Safjan Singh v. State of G Rajasthan,(I) that this Court should not review its decisions tea readily, as because, on merits, we see no justification for reconsidering the judgments already rendered by this Court. No fresh facts are brought to our notice, by way of discovery of new and important evidence, which would justify reconsideration of the decisions already rendered by this Court after the most careful examination of the competing H\n\n(!) (1965] I S.C.R. 933, 947, 948.\n\nA contentions. The report of the Rajya Sabha Committee on Petitions shows, as already indicated, that the relevant files are \"till' not traceable.\n\nThe petitions are accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.\n\nDESAI, J.-1 have carefully gone through the Judgment prepared by My Lord the Chief Justice but I regret my inability to agree with the same.\n\nThe history, chronology of events, contentions canvassed an(the three decisions of this Court disposing of the contentions have been so succinctly drawn up in the miin judgment that its repetition would merely be an idle form1lity.\n\nI would, therefore, straightaway deal with the points raised in these petitions.\n\nThe petitioners who are prom)tee Incom~ Tax Olbers Class I, Grade II, pray for reconsideration of the three decisions sp\"cifically S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors.(1) Bishan Sarup Gupta v Union of India & Ors.(2) ('1st Gupta case' for short) and)Bishan Sarup Gupta etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc.(3) ('2nd Gupta case' for short), and to the extent the first mentioned case is relied upon in\n\nUnion of India etc. v. Ma/ji Jangamayya etc.,(4) on the , following grounds :\n\nThe conclusion that rule 4 of the Income Tax 0 fficers (Class I, Grade II) Service Recruitment Rules is statutory and, therefore, the quota prescribed by the Government of India for recruitment to Income Tax Officers Class I, Grade II in exercise of the power conferred by rule 4 would be statutory, proceeds on an assumption not warranted by the provisions of law bearing on the point and if bath rule 4 and the quota presumably prescribed in exercise of the power conferred by rule 4 are not shown to be statutory, the foundation on which the edifice in Jaisinghani\"s(l) case rests is knocked out because it can be demnstrably established that neither rule 4 nor the quota prescribed thereunder was statutory in character but was at best an administrative instruction.\n\n\n(2) \\1975] Suppl. S.C.R. 491.\n\n(3) [1975] I S.C.R. 104.\n\n(4) [1977] Z S.C.R. 28.\n\n...\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 845\n\nAfter the Court on an interpretation of the quota rule held that the quota was related to vacancies arising in the grade every year, the conclusion reached did not conform to this finding but accommodated the so called inability (now shown to be factually incorrect) of the Government of India to give information to the Court about the vacancies in the grade every year with the result that the whole calculation of spill over is vitiated.\n\nThe mandamus issued in Jaisinghani's case was misinterpreted by the Government because even if the quota was statutory it was operative only between 1951 and 1956 but the Government interpreted the mandamus to be operative beyond 1956 and npto 1967 which misinterpretation has been pointed out in the first Gupta case.\n\nIn the 1st Gupta case while holding that the mandamus directing to treat the quota as statutory beyond 1956 was not justified yet till January 16, 1959, the Court itself indirectly accepted the quota rule as a guideline and treated that there was a spill over of 73 promotees. If rule 4 was not statutory and consequently the quota prescribed in exercise of the power which had outlived its prescribed span of life in 1956 could not be brought in to treat any appointment as invalid on the ground that there was no allocated post for those appointees treated as spill over because under rule 4 itself the Government had power to determine the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of filling in particular vacancies or such vacancies as may be required to be fil)ed in during any particular period and the number of candidates to be recruited by each method.\n\nThe action of the Government in upgrading 214 posts between 1959 and 1962 from Class II, Grade III to Class I.\n\nGrade II was not open to question as at that stage there was no quota rule and rule 4 enabled the Government to make recruitment from either of the two sources in exercise .of its executive power. In upholding the seniority rules in 2nd Gupta case the Court introduced quota rule retrospectively by the back door which is impermissible and its operation manifestly establishes its utter unfairness inasmuch as a direct recruit not any where in the Department or may be a student may secure a march over a promotee who has been working in Class I, yrade II.\n\nWhile no doubt this Court has constitutional power to review its decision, it is a power to be sparingly exercised because any such review has the tendency to unsettle questions which may have been finally determind. In fact, learned Solicitor-General appearing for the Union of India warned us that the credibility of this Court is at stake if it goes on re-opening and reviewing propositions which havejbeen finally determind by this Court. Whose credibility is at stake would be pre>ently pJintei out because.the examination of this ugly aspect could hive been s; nrd if srrcl:t a contention was not canvassed. Re peatedly the GJvernment of India kept back material from this Court filing affidavit after affidavit showing its inability to provide such im portant information on which the decision of the Court would turn even thougl:t it can now be demonstrably established that such material and information was with tl:te Government. If the Government of India had not withheld such material information; which has been rather adversely commented upon not by the Court but by the Legis lature, the credibility of the department would be exposed. Reference may be made in this connection to the 49th Report of Committee on Petitions presented on January 9, 1976, to Rajya Sabha Secretariat, set up to dispJse of a petition filed by one R.C. Pandey, General Secre tary, All India Federation of Income Tax Gazetted Services Associations, praying for repeal of the Income Tax Officers (Class I Service) (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1973, and for the framing of fresh seniority rules in lieu thereJf.\n\nWhile dispJsing of til'ts petition., the observation pertinent to the point under discussion may be extracted:\n\n\"The Committee is shocked at the pleas of loss of vital records taken by the administration. In response to the Corn•\n\nrnittee's requests relating to important files the administration has taken a similar plea. The Committee asked for a file which could possibly show the correct position on the question whether the 80 : 20 quota during the period 1945-50 was really operative. The file is reported missing. Another file reported missing is that relating to the framing of the recruitment rules,\n\n1945. The file relating to Shri R.C. Dutt's affidavit (filed in Jaisinghani's case) is also not available. Even the very recent file relating to the framing of Seniority Rules, 1970, is reported as 'not available'. On our insistence they have produced a thick sheaf of papers said to be 'reconstructed file'.\n\nH is strange that many of the files which could probably have thrown light on the question of excess promotion, are reported 'missing' or 'not available'. The conclusion is inescapable that these losses of files are far from being accidental.\n\nWe can only\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Des\">, !.) 847\n\nconclude that important information was de/iberately''withheld from the Supreme Court as well as from the Committee\".\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nOn these observation*he credibility submission would not only stand squarely answered, but need not deter us from going into the points made in these petitions.\n\nHowever, this Court does not lightly undertake review of its decisions, more especially where conflicting claims have been settled by a decision of the Court and the whole gamut may have to be gone through over again on a reconsideration of the decision. The approach of the Court on a plea of reconsideration has been spelt out in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan,(') where a plea for reconsideration of the decision of this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India & State of Bihar,(2) was repelled observing as under :\n\n\"It was, however, urged before us during the course of the hearing of these writ petitions that we should reconsider the matter and review our earlier decision in Sankari Praiad's\n\ncase, It is true that the Constitution does not place any restriction on our powers to review our ear1ier decisions or even to depart from them and there can be no doubt that in matters relating to the decision of constitutional points which have a significant impact on the fundamental rights of citizens, we would be prepared to review our earlier decisions in the interest of public good. The doctrine of stare decisis may not strictly apply in this context and no one can dispute the position that the said doctrine should not b~ permitted to perpetuate erroneous decisions pronounced by this Court to the detriment of general welfare. Even so, the normal principle that judgments pronounced by this Court would be final, cannot be ignored and unless considerations of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so, we should be slow to doubt the correctness of previous decisions or to depart from them\".\n\nSimilarly, in the Keshav Mi/is Co. Ltd. v. Commis<ioner of Income Tax, Bombay North,(3) it was held that while exercising inherent power to reconsider and review its earlier decisions this Court would naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be reluctant\n\n(!) [l965J 1 s.c.R. 931\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. 89\n\n(3) [1965] 2. S.C.R 908 at 921.\n\nto entertain plea for reconsideration and review of its earlier decisions, nnless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so. It is general judicial experience that in matters of law involving questions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision-making is often very difficult and delicate. In deciding whether a review is necessary when two views are possible it would not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. The Court's discretion should be guided by such consideration whether in the interest of public good or for any other valid or compulsive reasons it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. This view was '.re-affirmed in Manganese Ore (India) Lta. v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jaba/pur.(I)\n\nBearing these principles in mind, it is necessary to examine whether a case for reconsideration of the three earlier decisions is made out by the petitioners or .. not.\n\nJaisinghani's case.· proceeds on a concession: that rule 4 and the l quota prescribed by the Government referable to the power! conferred by rule 4 were statutory in character. This is borne out, by the observation of the Court which may be extracted :\n\n\"It is not disputed that rule 4 of the Income Tax Officers, Class I, Grade II Service Recruitment Rules is a statutory rule and there is a statutory duty cast on the Government under this Rule to determine the method or methods to be employed for the purpose of filling the vacancies or number of candidates to be recruited by each method\".\n\nIncome Tax Service was reconstituted on September 29, 1944.\n\nThe Government of India classified the existing Income Tax Service as Class I and Class II. The scheme provided for recruitment of Income Tax Officers Class I, Grade II partly by promotion and partly by direct recruitment. The scheme was set out in the Government of India, Finance Department (Central Revenues) letter dated September 29, 1944. The quota prescribed therein has underi; one a revision at a later date. It thus appears that the rules were pre .. Constitntion Rules and, therefore, their source must be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935 ('1935 Act' for short). Section 241 of the\n\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Desai, I.) 849\n\n1935 Act made provision for recruitment and conditions of service.\n\nA bare perusal of the section would show that the power to make appointments in the case of service of Federatfon and posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation was conferred on the Governor-General or such person as he may direct. The power to make rules in this behalf was conferred by sub-s. (2) on the Governor-General or by some person or persons authorised by the Governor-General t<J make the rules for the purpose. On an examination of the rules nnder discussion no material was placed on record to show that the rules were made either by the Governor-General or such person as authorised by him. As pointed out a little while ago, the rules were made by the Finance Department and no material was plae<d to show -that the person or the persons who made tbe rules were autborised 'by the Governor-General under s. 241(2) of the 1935 Act in this behalf. The assumption made, tberefore, that rule 4 of the Rules was statutory and that the quota prescribed in exercise of the power conferred by rule 4 must be statutory, is ill-founded. This knccks out the entire foundation of the judgment of this Court in Jaisinghani's case because this Court proceeded to hold that as the quota was sta- . tutory any recruitment made in excess of the quota in any given year would be invalid and at best can be rcfularised by relegating such excess appointments to the quota next year. If rule 4 and the quota referable to the power conferred by rule 4 were not statutory but were merely executive instructions, its violation wculd r:ot render any appointment in excess of it invalid, but at best would be irregnlar and in this case on a plain reading of rule 4 it would not even be irregnlar.\n\nIn P.C. Sethi & Ors. v. Union f India & Ors.,(l) this Court held that in the absence of any statutory rules it was open to the Government in exercise of its executive power to issue administrative instructions with regard to constitution and reorganisation of service as long as there is no violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. If the parent rule 4 enables the Government to prescribe method to b, e employed for the purpose of filling in any particular vacancy or such vacancies as may be required to be filled in during any particular period and the number of candidates to be recruited by each method and if the so called quota is not statutory bnt merely a gnideline, the Government whenever making appointment would be acting in exercise of power conferred by rule 4 which leaves it to the discretion of the Government to decide from what source recruitment should be made and what must be the quantum of vacancies that must be filled in at a given point of time and such appointment could not be said to be invalid.\n\n\nAlternatively, even if the assumption made in Jaisinghani's case that rule 4 and the quota referable to the exercise of power conferred by rule 4 is unquestionable yet when this Court held that the quota is related to the vacancies, the decision proceeding on an incorrect plea that the information about the number of vacancies in a year is not available, is unsustainable for two reasons, namely, (l) that the files are now produced; and (2) in the absence of information ;, bout the vacancies available the Court could not have invalidated any appointment on the assumption that appointment from the source of promotees was in excess of the quota. On a plain reading of rules 3, 4 and 5 it appears crystal clear that the quota was related to \\ acancies and at one stage that was accepted. On this finding unless tho fact situation is clearly established showing vacancies year to year it would be impossible to hold that in any year there was in excess in either\n\nsource. Supp0se there were 90 vacancies in a year and the quota was 66-2/3 for direct recruits and 33-1/3 for promotees, it would be open to the Government to promote 30 persons ; rrespective of the fact whether 60 direct recruits have become available or not. The assumption made that the recruitmellt made in a given year from both the sources would furnish information about the vacancies in a year would lead to a rather unfair conclusion inasmuch as the action of the Government in acting in a certain manner without due re:gard to the quota rule would work hardship on appointees even though on a correct calculation of vacancies the appointments may be valid and legal.\n\n1\"he mandamus issued in Jaisinghani's case \\\\'Us as under :\n\n\"We are accordingly of the opinion that promotees from class II, grade III to class I, grade II service in excess of thie prescribed quotas for each of the years 1951 to 1956 and on .. wards have been illegally promoted and the appollant is entitled to a writ in the nature of manda1nus commanding respondents I to 3 to adjust the seniority of the appellant and other officers similarly placed like him and to prepare a fresh s1miority list in accordance with law after adjusting the recruit .. ment for the period 1951 to 1956 and onwards in accordance with the quota rule prescribed in the letter of the Government of India No. F.24(2)-Admn. I.T./51 dated October 18, 1951.\n\nWe, howenr, wish to m1b it clear tlnt this order will not affect such class II Officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners of Income-Tax. But this order will apply to all oth; r offioors i1duding tho30 w:10 hwe boen ap-\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 851\n\npointed Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax l'rov1sionally A pursuant to the orders of the High Court\".\n\nThe Government understood the mandamus as covering the whole period from 1951 to 1967. When this was questioned in the !st Gupta case, this Court held that the quota rule Proprio vigor operated between 1951 to 1956 and if there were promotions in any year in excess of the quota those promotions were merely invalid for that year but they were not invalid for all time and they could be regularised by being absorbed in the quota for the later years.\n\nSo adjusting the quota at any rate upto 1956, the quota rule on its own strength evaporated because it was to be in operation for a period of five years and no fresh quota rule wa> issued by the Government.\n\nTherefore, after 1956 rule 4 remained in force in all its rigour and was not hedged in by any quota. Rule 4 permitted the Government to make recruitment from either source without lettering its discretion by any quota rule which it was not bound to prescribe.\n\nOn January 16, 1959, Government in the Ministry of Finance informed the commissioners of Income Tax that the President had sanctioned the upgrading to class I of I 00 temporary Posts oflncome Tax Officers, Class JI. On December 19, 1960, there was further upgrading of 114 posts from class II to class I. Between 1959 and 1962 these 214 posts were filled in by prornotees. Now. in the !st Gupta case this court held that even though the quota rule expired in 1956, yet the Government of India adopted it as a guideline. May be, it may be so.\n\nDoes any appointment in breach of the guideline neither statutory nor even having the fragrance of any executive instruction become invalid more so when the Government had power to make appointment from either source uninhibited by any quota rule under rule 4? Yet the Court found that between 1956 and 1959 when 100 • posts came to be upgraded there was a spillover of 73 persons and because of the huge departure from'' guidelines the weightage rule giving seniority to the promotees by 2-3-years was crushed under its own debris. Again, with respect it must be confessed that rule 4 is overlooked or bypassed when saying that there was a spillover of 73 promotees between 1956 and 1959. Nor could it be said that the upgrading of 214 posts and filling them up by promotees would be in any way even irregular much less invalid because rule 4 enables Government to drs.\\v from either source.\n\nIn the 2nd Gupta case in view of the decision in ]st Gupta case a\n\nfresh seniority rule was prepared and it was made retroactive from H January 16, 1959. If, the inter a/ia, provides that the relative seniority amongst the promotees and the direct recruits shall be in the ratio of\n\n1 : 1 and the same shall be so determined and regulated in accordance with a roter maintained for the purpose, which shall follow the following sequence, namely :\n\n(a) Promotee ;!\n\n(b) direct recruit;\n\n(c) promotee,\n\n(d) direct recruits, and 'o on.\n\nThis methed of roster undoubtedly intrcduces a quota by the back door. Once a roster is introduced promotee direct rucruit, promotee direct rucruit etc. even if some promotees have come in a bulk and if at a later date some direct 'recruits are appointed in bulk, while preparing roster[an earlier date promotee will have'.to yieldhis place to a later date direct recruit. Bluntly translated it means that the direct recru, it who was never in service when promotee was promoteed, probably he may be a student. May be he may not have even passed the competitive examination, yet he may come into the picture and challenge one who has already been servmg in the Department for a number of years. To illustrate, in the new seniority list prepared by the Government pursuant to the order made by this Court in the 1st Gupta case and upheld by this Court in 2nd Gupta case a promotee of 1962 will have to yield his place to a direct recruit of 1966. With utmost hesitation I must say that service jurisprudence hardly permits a situation where a man not in service comes and challenges some thing which has been done much before he came in to service and gets such an advantage which on the face of it appears to be unfair. But apart from this, even in 1959 there was no quota rule and assuming that the old service rule giving weightage to the promotees crushed under that weight of large number of promotees being promoted, it would not, '\"\"\n\nbe open to the Govenment to so prepare a fresh seniority list which cannot be given effect to unless a roster is introduced which introduces quota by the back door and which is so unfair in its operation that promo tees of 1962 will have to yield place to direct recruits of 1966. Now under the old weightage rule promotees were given a weightage for service of 2-3 years over direct recruits because direct recruits were unable to undertake regular assessment work for a period of 2-3 years when they were more or less under training while promotees have been doing this work for a number of years and their experience is reflected in the weightage. The whole thing now appears in the reverse I gear in that an uninitiated direct recruit takes precedence over an experienced promotee. The unfairness of the new rule is writ large on the face of it.\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Desai, J.) 853\n\nThis rule violates another important rule well recognised in the ser vice jurisprudence that in the absence of any valid rule of seniority d ate of continuous officiation provides a valid rule of seniority. This rule is completely crucified under two unsustainable assumption that a quota rule having guideline sanction is made imperative in character and assumed to be in force between 1956 and 1959, and that even though Government in exercise of power conferred by rule 4 for its own necessity promoted 214 promotees to the upgraded posts yet they mnst yield place to some future direct recruits who may come to the department at a later date. This Court sustained the position holding that these were ad hoc appointments, and there were no regular posts for those promotees. This approach wholly overlooks the effect and the force of rule 4.\n\nCertainty and continuity demand that this Court should not reopen settled decisions or reopen closed questions unless under a compelling necessity. It may be that the fate of Income Tax Officers, promotees and direct recruits, may rest with the three decisions of this Court.\n\nUnfairness to some of them may itself not provide a good and compelling reason for reopening and reconsidering the decisions. Therefore, ; f that were the only point for our consideration I would have unhesitatingly agreed with the decision rendered by My Lord the Chief Justice. But there is a further compelling necessity which impels me to pen these few lines.\n\nJaisinghani and the two Gupta cases are being quoted times with- <mt number before this Court for the principles enunciated therein.\n\nThese decisions, therefore, affect, subsequent decisionsof this Court as well as the High Courts. And some of the principles enunciated in these three cases stand in sharp contrast to other decisions ohhis\n\nCourt and in fact this Court itself felt it necessary to warn that it may become necessary to reconcile these conflicting decisions. In this connection reference may be made to N. K. Chauhan and Ors. v.\n\nState of Gujarat and Ors.,(') where this Court after referring to two sets of decisions charting two different courses, observed as under :\n\n\"After all, we live in a judicial system where earlier curial wisdom, unless competently over-ruled, binds the Court. The decisions cited before us start with the leading case in Mervyn Coutindo & Ors. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (2) and close with the last pronouncement in Badami v. State of Mysore and Ors.(l) This time-span has seen dicta go zigzag but we see no difficulty\n\n(1) [1977] I SC.R. 1037 at 1053.\n\n\nin tracing a common thread of reasoning. However, there are divergencies in the ratiocination between Mervyn Coutindo\n\n(supra) and Govind Dattatray Kelkar and Ors. v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors., (1) On the one hand and S. G.\n\nJaisinghani v. Union of India (supra) Bishan Sarup Guptav.\n\nUnion of Ind1a (supra) Union of India and Ors. v. Bishan Sarup Gupta (3), and A. K. Subraman and Ors. v. Union of India (2) on the other, especially on the rota system and the year being regarded as a unit, that this Court may one day have to harmonize the discordance unless Government wakes up to the need for properly drafting its service rules so as to eliminate litigative waste of its servants' energies\".\n\nIt is not for a moment suggested and I say so with utmost respect that the aforementioned three decisions are incorrect.\n\nIn the light of the materials now placed especially the files which were withheld from the Court and the Committee the only view that I express is that enough compelling and necessary material has been placed on record making out a strong case for reconsideration of these . decisions. Accordingly, in my view the present two petitions deserve to be placed before a larger Bench to be constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India.\n\nORDER\n\nIn view of the majority opinion the Writ Petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nS. R.\n\n\n(2) (1975] 2 S.C.R. 979.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n' :~\n\n...", "total_entities": 208, "entities": [{"text": "KAMAL KANT! DUTTA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAMAL KANT! DUTTA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 23, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 23, 1980\n\n[Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, C.J., N. L. UNTWAUA, P. S. KAILASAM,\n\nD. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. S. KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. S.\n\nKailasam", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. 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VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution read with Order XXL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 250, "end_char": 315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution read with Order XXL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "statute": "Constitution read with Order XXL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966"}}, {"text": "Federal Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 624, "end_char": 657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With a view to imp:roving the Income-tax administration, the Government of India in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission decided to -reconstitute then existing income-tax services, Class I and II."}}, {"text": "September 29, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the scheme of reorganisation of the services set out in a letter dated September 29, 1944 D of the Government of India Finance Department, the central service Class I was to consist of (i) Commissioners of Income-Tax (ii) Assistant Commis- sioners of Income-Tax; (iii) lncome.-Tax Officers Grade I and (iv) Income-Tax Officers Grade-II."}}, {"text": "Government of India Finance Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 839, "end_char": 877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the scheme of reorganisation of the services set out in a letter dated September 29, 1944 D of the Government of India Finance Department, the central service Class I was to consist of (i) Commissioners of Income-Tax (ii) Assistant Commis- sioners of Income-Tax; (iii) lncome.-Tax Officers Grade I and (iv) Income-Tax Officers Grade-II."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1694, "end_char": 1706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rules regulating recruitment to the Income-Tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) service ''liable to alteration from year io year\" were published on May 26, 1945, by a resolution of the Finance (Central Revenues) Department."}}, {"text": "India F in accrnlance with Part-II of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 24, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2714, "end_char": 2730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1ly a letter dated January 24, 1950 the Government of India laid down certain rules of seniority: (a) as between direct recruits;\n\n(b) as between promotees selected from Class II and ( c) as between direct recruits who com- H pl_eted their probation in a given year and the promotees appointed in the same year to Class r.\n\nll:\n\nOn October 18, 1951 the Government of India addressed a letter to all the Ccmn1issioners of IncomeTax titled \"Income-Tax Officers, Grade-II (Class- I service)-quota of vacancies filled by promotions\" wherein it was outlined that for a period of 5 years in the first instance 66 and 2/3 per cent of the\n\nvacancies in Class-I, Grade-II would be filled by direct recrnittnent by a combined."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2735, "end_char": 2754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1ly a letter dated January 24, 1950 the Government of India laid down certain rules of seniority: (a) as between direct recruits;\n\n(b) as between promotees selected from Class II and ( c) as between direct recruits who com- H pl_eted their probation in a given year and the promotees appointed in the same year to Class r.\n\nll:\n\nOn October 18, 1951 the Government of India addressed a letter to all the Ccmn1issioners of IncomeTax titled \"Income-Tax Officers, Grade-II (Class- I service)-quota of vacancies filled by promotions\" wherein it was outlined that for a period of 5 years in the first instance 66 and 2/3 per cent of the\n\nvacancies in Class-I, Grade-II would be filled by direct recrnittnent by a combined."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3027, "end_char": 3043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1ly a letter dated January 24, 1950 the Government of India laid down certain rules of seniority: (a) as between direct recruits;\n\n(b) as between promotees selected from Class II and ( c) as between direct recruits who com- H pl_eted their probation in a given year and the promotees appointed in the same year to Class r.\n\nll:\n\nOn October 18, 1951 the Government of India addressed a letter to all the Ccmn1issioners of IncomeTax titled \"Income-Tax Officers, Grade-II (Class- I service)-quota of vacancies filled by promotions\" wherein it was outlined that for a period of 5 years in the first instance 66 and 2/3 per cent of the\n\nvacancies in Class-I, Grade-II would be filled by direct recrnittnent by a combined."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3737, "end_char": 3754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a letter dated September 5, 1952 the Government of India revised with a retrospective effect the Rules of Seniority which were laid down on January 24, 1950."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 1 (f)(iii) as framed on January 24, 1950 which was to the effect that \"the promotees who have been certified by the comms sion in any calendar year sha.11 be senior to all direct recruits who complete their probation during that year or after and are confirmed with effect from a date in that year or after\" was revised on September 5, 1952 as \"officers promoted in accordance with the recommendations of .the Departmental Promotion Committee before the next sitting of the Departmental Promotion Committee shall be senior to all direct recrui:ts appointed on the results of the examinations held by the Union Public Service Commission during the calendar year in which the Departmental Promotion Committee met during the three previous years\"."}}, {"text": "Chapter IX of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. G. Jai Singhani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "189-D af 1962 filed by one S. G. Jai Singhani (who is respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. G. Jai Singhanfs"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5754, "end_char": 5772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IX of the Rules", "statute": "Chapter IX of the Rules"}}, {"text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6324, "end_char": 6349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7321, "end_char": 7331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "statute": "Service Recruitment Rules"}}, {"text": "July 15, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8174, "end_char": 8187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 15, 1968 the Govcrnn1ent prepared a fresh seniority list and filed it .in the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8257, "end_char": 8270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 15, 1968 the Govcrnn1ent prepared a fresh seniority list and filed it .in the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "S. G. Jai Singhani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8449, "end_char": 8467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether this seniority list was correct and in accordance with the mandan1us which was issued by this Court in S. G. Jai Singhani's case, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703 came up for consideration in four appeals which '\\Vere disposed of by a common judgment dated August 16, 1972 reported as Bishan Sarup Gupta v: 'Union of India (first Gupta\"s case) in [1975] Suppl.", "canonical_name": "S. G. Jai Singhanfs"}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S.C.R. 703", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8476, "end_char": 8495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 16, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8590, "end_char": 8605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether this seniority list was correct and in accordance with the mandan1us which was issued by this Court in S. G. Jai Singhani's case, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703 came up for consideration in four appeals which '\\Vere disposed of by a common judgment dated August 16, 1972 reported as Bishan Sarup Gupta v: 'Union of India (first Gupta\"s case) in [1975] Suppl."}}, {"text": "Jai Singhani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9892, "end_char": 9904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, therefore, became essential to detennine th'e actual vacancies in the cadre but the Government put forward the plea even in this case as in Jai Singhani's) that it was impossible for them to give the exact figure of vacancies in any particular year.", "canonical_name": "Jai Singharzi'.s"}}, {"text": "January 16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11227, "end_char": 11243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the position after year 1958 the Court came to the conclusion that the quota rule ceased to apply and came to an end on January 16, 1959, when the sanction to upgrade 100 t'emporary posts in Class-II, Grade-III t0- Class-I, Grade-II was given by the President."}}, {"text": "January 15, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11523, "end_char": 11539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these considerations the Court held that the seniority list' was valid in regard to promotions made up tu January 15, 1959 to the extent that it was prepared on the basis of the quota rule dated October 18, 1951 read with Seniority Rule l(f) (iii)."}}, {"text": "July 15_, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11725, "end_char": 11739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a corollary, the Court set aside the seniority list of July 15_, 1968 and directed the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list."}}, {"text": "January\n\n16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11989, "end_char": 12006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The List to be effective from January\n\n16, 1959 was directed to be prepared in accordance with the rules to be made afresh by the Government."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12947, "end_char": 12952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court overruled' the objection of the '73' spill-over promotees that since in the first Gupta's case the cCourt had directed that they should be absorbed on a '; priority basis·."}}, {"text": "JanuarY 16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14216, "end_char": 14232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bur once the quota rule ceased to exist on JanuarY 16, 1959, any possibility of the excess appointments of the promotees being regularised vanished."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15117, "end_char": 15127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15208, "end_char": 15233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. G. Jai Singhanfs", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15689, "end_char": 15708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tax Officers (Class-I, Grad&-11) Service Recruitment Rules is statutory and, therefore, the quota pte9albcd by the Government of India for recruitment to Income-Tax Offi cers Class-I, Grade-II in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 4 would be statutory, proceeds on an assumption not warranted by the provisions of law bearing on the point and if both Rule 4 and the quota presumably prescribed in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 4 are not shown to be statutory, the foundation of which the edifice in S. G. Jai Singhanfs c.ase rests is knocked down because it can be demonstrably established that neither rule 4 nor the quota prescribed thereunder .was stautory in character but was at best an administrative instruction.", "canonical_name": "S. G. Jai Singhanfs"}}, {"text": "Grade II was not open to question as at that stage there was no quota rule and Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17697, "end_char": 17780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18291, "end_char": 18302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the petitions the Court,\n\nHELD: Per Chandrachud, C.J. (On behalf of N.\n\nUntwalia, P.\n\nKailasam, E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "N.\n\nUntwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18323, "end_char": 18335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the petitions the Court,\n\nHELD: Per Chandrachud, C.J. (On behalf of N.\n\nUntwalia, P.\n\nKailasam, E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ."}}, {"text": "P.\n\nKailasam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18337, "end_char": 18349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the petitions the Court,\n\nHELD: Per Chandrachud, C.J. (On behalf of N.\n\nUntwalia, P.\n\nKailasam, E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ."}}, {"text": "S. Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18354, "end_char": 18370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dismissing the petitions the Court,\n\nHELD: Per Chandrachud, C.J. (On behalf of N.\n\nUntwalia, P.\n\nKailasam, E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ.", "canonical_name": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18834, "end_char": 18850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But a omewhat unprecedented situation arose by the upgrading of Class II posts to Class I grade II-100 of them on January 16, 1959 and 114 en December 9, 1960."}}, {"text": "was no error in the conclusion in Jiti Singlzani that Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21159, "end_char": 21217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "August 31,. 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22576, "end_char": 22592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the contrary the counter-affidavit dated August 31,."}}, {"text": "Mehra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22632, "end_char": 22637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1973 filed in the Second Gupta case by Shri Mehra, the Deputy secretary Finance, shows the fullness with which the Government had consulted all possible interests while framing the impugned rules of seniority."}}, {"text": "s5W", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23457, "end_char": 23460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rajya\n\nSabha Committee", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25123, "end_char": 25145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report of the Rajya\n\nSabha Committee on petitions shows that the relevant files are still not trace~ able. ["}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25243, "end_char": 25248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "843 E-F, G-H, 844 A]\n\nPer Desai, J. {contra)\n\n1.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Jai Singhani case proceeds on a concession that Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26998, "end_char": 27050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 29, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27223, "end_char": 27241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "848 D-E]\n\nIncome-tax service was reconstltuted on September 29, 1974."}}, {"text": "K. K. DUTTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27351, "end_char": 27362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r-·\n\nK. K. DUTTA V. UNION 819\n\nThe scheme provided for recruitment of income-tax officers Class I grade II partly by promotion and partly by direct recruitment.", "canonical_name": "K. K. DUTTA"}}, {"text": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27752, "end_char": 27801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27803, "end_char": 27814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27889, "end_char": 27900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28181, "end_char": 28190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 241(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28589, "end_char": 28603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "St be traced to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29806, "end_char": 29824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jai Singharzi'.s", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30633, "end_char": 30649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f849 E-Hl\n\nAlternatively, even if the assumption made in Jai Singharzi'.s case that Rule 4 and the quota referable to the exercise of powei::.", "canonical_name": "Jai Singharzi'.s"}}, {"text": "On a plain reading of Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31267, "end_char": 31294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jai Singlzani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32313, "end_char": 32326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government understood the mandamus issued in Jai Singlzani's case as covering the whole pericxl from 1951 to 1967.", "canonical_name": "Jai Singharzi'.s"}}, {"text": "January 16, 1-19~9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33240, "end_char": 33258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 16, 1-19~9 Government in the Ministry of Finance i.nformed the Commissioners."}}, {"text": "December 19, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33470, "end_char": 33487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 19, 1960 there was further upgrading of 114 posts from Class II to Class I.\n\nBetwe<m 1959 and 1962 these 214 posts were filled in by promotees."}}, {"text": "Jai Singllani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38881, "end_char": 38894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "853 C-DJ\n\nJai Singllani and the Two Gupta cases are being quoted, times wit.bout number before this Court for the principles enunciated therein.", "canonical_name": "Jai Singharzi'.s"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39782, "end_char": 39792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39815, "end_char": 39829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, J. N. Haldar, Rathin Dass and A. K. Sanghi, for the Petitioners in WP 66/74.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "J. N. Haldar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39831, "end_char": 39843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, J. N. Haldar, Rathin Dass and A. K. Sanghi, for the Petitioners in WP 66/74."}}, {"text": "Rathin Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39845, "end_char": 39856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, J. N. Haldar, Rathin Dass and A. K. Sanghi, for the Petitioners in WP 66/74."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39861, "end_char": 39873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the Constitution)\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, J. N. Haldar, Rathin Dass and A. K. Sanghi, for the Petitioners in WP 66/74."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39915, "end_char": 39928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Dr. Y. S. Chitale, Mukul Mudgal and B. R. Aggarwal for the Petitioners in WP No.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39930, "end_char": 39942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Dr. Y. S. Chitale, Mukul Mudgal and B. R. Aggarwal for the Petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "B. R. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39947, "end_char": 39961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Dr. Y. S. Chitale, Mukul Mudgal and B. R. Aggarwal for the Petitioners in WP No."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kackar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40002, "end_char": 40014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kackar, Sol."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40027, "end_char": 40041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Miss A. Subhashinifor RR 1-3 in WP 66 and RR 1-2 in WP 4146."}}, {"text": "E. C. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40043, "end_char": 40057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Miss A. Subhashinifor RR 1-3 in WP 66 and RR 1-2 in WP 4146."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashinifor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40067, "end_char": 40083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Miss A. Subhashinifor RR 1-3 in WP 66 and RR 1-2 in WP 4146."}}, {"text": "Ram Panjwani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40124, "end_char": 40136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for ; E R. 4 in WP 4146 and Intervener (Gujjar Mal.). '", "canonical_name": "Ram Panjwani"}}, {"text": "Raj Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40138, "end_char": 40150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for ; E R. 4 in WP 4146 and Intervener (Gujjar Mal.). '"}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40152, "end_char": 40163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for ; E R. 4 in WP 4146 and Intervener (Gujjar Mal.). '", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40173, "end_char": 40181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, S. K. Bagga and Mrs. S. Bagga for ; E R. 4 in WP 4146 and Intervener (Gujjar Mal.). '", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "Ram Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40239, "end_char": 40251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Bishamber Lal, Raj Panjwani and Vijay Panjwani for the R. 6 in WP No.", "canonical_name": "Ram Panjwani"}}, {"text": "Bishamber Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40253, "end_char": 40266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Bishamber Lal, Raj Panjwani and Vijay Panjwani for the R. 6 in WP No."}}, {"text": "Vijay Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40285, "end_char": 40299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Bishamber Lal, Raj Panjwani and Vijay Panjwani for the R. 6 in WP No."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40350, "end_char": 40366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the R. 7 in WP 4146."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40376, "end_char": 40388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the R. 7 in WP 4146."}}, {"text": "Hari Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40449, "end_char": 40460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sanghi for the Interveners (Hari Narain and L. S. Chakravarty)."}}, {"text": "L. S. Chakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40465, "end_char": 40482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sanghi for the Interveners (Hari Narain and L. S. Chakravarty)."}}, {"text": "Y. V. Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40502, "end_char": 40519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., N. L. Untwalia, P. S.\n\nKailasam and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Y. V. Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "N. L. Untwalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40527, "end_char": 40541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., N. L. Untwalia, P. S.\n\nKailasam and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ."}}, {"text": "P. S.\n\nKailasam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40543, "end_char": 40558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., N. L. Untwalia, P. S.\n\nKailasam and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ.", "canonical_name": "P. S.\n\nKailasam"}}, {"text": "E. S. Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40563, "end_char": 40582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., N. L. Untwalia, P. S.\n\nKailasam and E. S. Venkataramiah, JJ.", "canonical_name": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ."}}, {"text": "A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40626, "end_char": 40634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Chandrachud, C.J. D, A. Desai, J. gave a dissenting Opinion."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40667, "end_char": 40678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHANDRACHUD, C. J.-The disputes between promotees and direct\n\nrecruits in various departments of the Government seem to have no ·~-- end.·", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "K. K. DUTTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41233, "end_char": 41244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A virtual review is thus asked for, opening flood\ni\n\nK. K. DUTTA 1\".", "canonical_name": "K. K. DUTTA"}}, {"text": "Kamal Kanti Dutta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42521, "end_char": 42538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, Kamal Kanti Dutta, was appointed as an Inspector of Income-tax on December, 7, 1950 and after passing the departmental examination he was promoted an Income-tax Officer, Class II on June 21, 1954.", "canonical_name": "KAMAL KANT! DUTTA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "December, 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42587, "end_char": 42604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, Kamal Kanti Dutta, was appointed as an Inspector of Income-tax on December, 7, 1950 and after passing the departmental examination he was promoted an Income-tax Officer, Class II on June 21, 1954."}}, {"text": "June 21, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42703, "end_char": 42716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, Kamal Kanti Dutta, was appointed as an Inspector of Income-tax on December, 7, 1950 and after passing the departmental examination he was promoted an Income-tax Officer, Class II on June 21, 1954."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42841, "end_char": 42857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ori January I, 1966 he was promoted as Income-tax Officer, Class I, which post he was holding 6n the date of the petition, February 8, 1974."}}, {"text": "Bikash Mohan Das Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42881, "end_char": 42903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioners 2 and 3, Bikash Mohan Das Gupta and Sushi!"}}, {"text": "Sushi! Ranjan Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42908, "end_char": 42925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioners 2 and 3, Bikash Mohan Das Gupta and Sushi!"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43195, "end_char": 43209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents I to 5 to the petition are the Union of India, Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Union Public Service -Commission respectively.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Central Board of Direct Taxes", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43253, "end_char": 43282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents I to 5 to the petition are the Union of India, Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Union Public Service -Commission respectively."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service -Commission respectively", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43334, "end_char": 43379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents I to 5 to the petition are the Union of India, Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, the Central Board of Direct Taxes, Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Union Public Service -Commission respectively."}}, {"text": "S. G. Jaisinghani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43724, "end_char": 43741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "358, S. G. Jaisinghani, who was recruited directly as I.T.O., Class I, in 1951 was holding the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax on the date of the petition.", "canonical_name": "S. G. Jai Singhanfs"}}, {"text": "Mohan Chandra Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43995, "end_char": 44014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Respondent 359, Mohan Chandra Joshi, who was recruited directly as I.T.O., Class I, in 1953 was also holding a similar rank and was\n\nworking as Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Chandra Joshi"}}, {"text": "Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44232, "end_char": 44256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4146of1978 the Petitioner, Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani, was appointed directly on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission as I.T.O., Class II (Trainee) on July l, 1947."}}, {"text": "July l, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44375, "end_char": 44387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4146of1978 the Petitioner, Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani, was appointed directly on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission as I.T.O., Class II (Trainee) on July l, 1947."}}, {"text": "B. D. Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44907, "end_char": 44916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 4 to 8 are B. D. Roy, S. G. Jaisinghani, M. C. Joshi, B. S. Gupta and M. Jangamayya respectively."}}, {"text": "S. G. Jaisinghani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44918, "end_char": 44935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 4 to 8 are B. D. Roy, S. G. Jaisinghani, M. C. Joshi, B. S. Gupta and M. Jangamayya respectively.", "canonical_name": "S. G. Jai Singhanfs"}}, {"text": "M. C. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44937, "end_char": 44948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 4 to 8 are B. D. Roy, S. G. Jaisinghani, M. C. Joshi, B. S. Gupta and M. Jangamayya respectively.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Joshi"}}, {"text": "B. S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44950, "end_char": 44961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 4 to 8 are B. D. Roy, S. G. Jaisinghani, M. C. Joshi, B. S. Gupta and M. Jangamayya respectively.", "canonical_name": "Il. S. Gupta"}}, {"text": "M. Jangamayya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44966, "end_char": 44979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 4 to 8 are B. D. Roy, S. G. Jaisinghani, M. C. Joshi, B. S. Gupta and M. Jangamayya respectively."}}, {"text": "B. S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45170, "end_char": 45181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, Shr; B. S. Gupta figures in two cause-titles known as •the first Gupta cam' and the 'Second Gupta case'.", "canonical_name": "Il. S. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Government oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46289, "end_char": 46307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scheme of reorganisation of the Services was set out in a letter dated September 29, 1944 of the Government oflndia, Finance Department (Central Revenues), which was sent to all the Commissioneri oflncome-tax."}}, {"text": "India in accordance with Part II of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48160, "end_char": 48205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part III of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48307, "end_char": 48328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "III of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48646, "end_char": 48662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "29th September, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49912, "end_char": 49932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IT)/39 dated the 29th September, 1944 that for a period of five years in the first instance 66/2-3 % of the vacancies in Class I, Grade II, will be filled by direct recruitment via combined competitive examination ."}}, {"text": "Govemment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50418, "end_char": 50436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a Jetter dated September 5, 1952, the Govemment of India revised with retrospective effect the rules of seniority which were laid down on January 24, 1950."}}, {"text": "S. G. Jaisinghani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 52129, "end_char": 52146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1962, S. G. Jaisinghani (who is respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S. G. Jai Singhanfs"}}, {"text": "High Court of\n\nPunjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 52304, "end_char": 52325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "189-D of 1962 in the High Court of\n\nPunjab under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of th.e seniority rnles in regard to Income-tax Service, Class I, Grade II as also the actual implementation of the 'quota' rule, as infringing Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52332, "end_char": 52343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52534, "end_char": 52555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaisinghani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 52708, "end_char": 52719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaisinghani who was recruited directly as an Income-tax Officer, Class I (Grade II), raised four principal contentions :\n\n(i) Rule l(fJ(iii) of the seniority rules as \"framed in 1952 was based upon an unjustifiable classification between direct recruits and promotees after they had entered Class I, Grade II Service."}}, {"text": "Jaisinghani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53425, "end_char": 53436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Rule l(f)(iv) was discriminatory because though the petitioner, Jaisinghani, qualified in the same competitive examination of 1950 for appointment to Class I, Grade II Service as respondents 4, 5 and 6 to that petition, they were treated as senior to him by the operation of the artificial rule by which.", "canonical_name": "Jai Singharzi'.s"}}, {"text": "October 18, 195L", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54355, "end_char": 54371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "promotees, in violation of the quota rule of 2 : 1 contained in Government of India's letter dated October 18, 195L The quota fixed by that letter must be deemed to have been fixed in exercise of the, statutory power given by rule 4 of the Income-tax Officers (Class I, Grade II) Service Recruitment Rules published on May 26, 1945."}}, {"text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54536, "end_char": 54561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54610, "end_char": 54649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A full Bench of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench, Delhi, rejected the writ petition, holding that the principles for determining seniority between direct recru, its and promotees laid down in rules l(f}\n\n(iii) and (iv), 1952 were not discriminatory, that the quota rule announced by the Government of India were, merely a policy statement and had no statutory force, that departure from the quota rule did not give rise to any justiciable issue and that the promotion rule governing promotions from Class I, Grade U to Class I, Grade I was not discriminatory and ultra vires of Articl1' 14 and 16 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 55226, "end_char": 55244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that rules l(f)(iii) and (iv) of the seniority rules framed in 1952 did not violate Articles 14 and 16 since they were based on a, reasonable classification and that rule 4 of Chapter IX of the 'Central Board of Revenue Office Procedure Manual' cannot be held to lead to any discrimination as between direct recruits and promotees, since the object of the rule was really to carry out the policy of le l(fJ(iii) of the Rules of Seniority ,+ and not allow it to be defeated by the , requirement of five years service in Class I, Grade II itself, before a person could be considered for promotion to Class I, Grade J. On the question of excessive recruitment of promotees from."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55348, "end_char": 55366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "statute": "Service Recruitment Rules"}}, {"text": "January 31, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56377, "end_char": 56393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his affidavit dated January 31, 1967 Shri R. C. Dutt, Finance Setretary, said that he was not able to work out, in spite of his best endeavours, the number of vacancies arising in a particular year."}}, {"text": "R. C. Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56399, "end_char": 56409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his affidavit dated January 31, 1967 Shri R. C. Dutt, Finance Setretary, said that he was not able to work out, in spite of his best endeavours, the number of vacancies arising in a particular year.", "canonical_name": "R. C. Dutt"}}, {"text": "Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56786, "end_char": 56790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court found that it was not clear from Shri Dutt's affidavit whether the quota rule was followed strictly for the years in question ar d noted that in the absence of fig1lres of permanent vacancies in Class I, Grade II, for the relevant years, the Solicitor General was unable to say to what extent\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 829\n\nthere had been deviation!"}}, {"text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57315, "end_char": 57340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58277, "end_char": 58287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "statute": "Service Recruitment Rules"}}, {"text": "Mohan Chandra Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 59663, "end_char": 59682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 f 1966 filed by Mohan Chandra Joshi under\n\nH., Article 32 of the Constitution, a similar mandamus was' issued by the Court.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Chandra Joshi"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59694, "end_char": 59704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mohan Chandra Joshi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59771, "end_char": 59790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Chandra Joshi, like Jaisinghani, was recruited dfrectly\n\n... ;\n\nas Income-tax Officer, Class I, Grade II, with the only difference that he was appointed in 1953 while Jaisinghani was appointed in 1951.", "canonical_name": "Mohan Chandra Joshi"}}, {"text": "Jaisinghani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 59797, "end_char": 59808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohan Chandra Joshi, like Jaisinghani, was recruited dfrectly\n\n... ;\n\nas Income-tax Officer, Class I, Grade II, with the only difference that he was appointed in 1953 while Jaisinghani was appointed in 1951.", "canonical_name": "Jai Singharzi'.s"}}, {"text": "February 2,\n\n1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60435, "end_char": 60452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The aforesaid decision was given by this Court on February 2,\n\n1967."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60631, "end_char": 60636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, in spite of the mandamus issued by it, Government did not prepare a fresh seniority list for over a year, which led to the filing of a contempt petition by Jaisinghani and Joshi."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60689, "end_char": 60705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "November 6, 1968."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 60923, "end_char": 60939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two writ petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court to challenge the fresh seniority list : one by B. S. Gupta, a promotee of 1962 and the other by M. C. Joshi, a direct recruit who had succeeded in the eerlier round of litigation in this Court."}}, {"text": "M. C. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 61036, "end_char": 61047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two writ petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court to challenge the fresh seniority list : one by B. S. Gupta, a promotee of 1962 and the other by M. C. Joshi, a direct recruit who had succeeded in the eerlier round of litigation in this Court.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Joshi"}}, {"text": "C. Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61332, "end_char": 61340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "550 of 1970 filed by .M. C. Joshi was substantially allowed."}}, {"text": "Il. S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 61632, "end_char": 61644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Delhi High Court in the aforesaid two writ petitions was challenged in this Court in four appeals : one by Il.", "canonical_name": "Il. S. Gupta"}}, {"text": ".M. C. Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61736, "end_char": 61748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Gupta against the dismissal of his Writ petition and the other three by (i) the Government, (ii) .M. C. Joshi and (iii) 5 promotees."}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62703, "end_char": 62710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Palekar, J. speaking for the Court in Bishan Sarup Gupta (Supra) observed in the first instance that this Court could not possibly have in mind a seniority list which took in promotees after 1956 and that therefore under the mandamus issued by this Court, appointments of promotees in excess of the quota could only be taken into consideration in relation to the period 1951 to 1956."}}, {"text": "Bishan Sarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62741, "end_char": 62759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Palekar, J. speaking for the Court in Bishan Sarup Gupta (Supra) observed in the first instance that this Court could not possibly have in mind a seniority list which took in promotees after 1956 and that therefore under the mandamus issued by this Court, appointments of promotees in excess of the quota could only be taken into consideration in relation to the period 1951 to 1956.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Sarup Guptav"}}, {"text": "Blshan Sarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63334, "end_char": 63352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Blshan Sarup Gupta---the Court was called upon to examine the correctness of.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Sarup Guptav"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT IU!PORTS (1980]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 65094, "end_char": 65123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT IU!PORTS (1980] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "U.P.S.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 68800, "end_char": 68808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The COurt declined to be drawn into any such exercise and preferred to leave it to the Government to devise a fair and just seniority rule, if necessary, in consultation with the U.P.S.C. As a corollary, the\n\nCourf8et aside the seniority list of July 15, 1968 and directed the Governmimt to prepare a fresh seniority list."}}, {"text": "January 16, ]959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69129, "end_char": 69145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The list to be effective from January 16, ]959 \"(as directed to be prepared in accordance with rules to be made afresh by the Government."}}, {"text": "B.S. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69651, "end_char": 69661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment in B.S. Gupta ~(supra) was given on August 16, 19n.", "canonical_name": "Il. S. Gupta"}}, {"text": "August 16, 19n", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69684, "end_char": 69698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment in B.S. Gupta ~(supra) was given on August 16, 19n."}}, {"text": "February 9, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69704, "end_char": 69720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 9, 1973, the President made rules called the Income-tax\n\n(Class I) Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1973."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69855, "end_char": 69866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Januafy 16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 69928, "end_char": 69944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These Rules were made under Article 309 of the Constitution and were given retrospective effect from Januafy 16, 1959."}}, {"text": "B.S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 70022, "end_char": 70032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of the liberty resel'VC)d to the parties under the judgment in B.S. Gupta, the validity of the new Seniority Rules was challenged by the promotees.", "canonical_name": "Il. S. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74631, "end_char": 74641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76148, "end_char": 76158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 76166, "end_char": 76179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri V.M. Tarkunde who appears on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77970, "end_char": 77995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hrushikesh Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79764, "end_char": 79781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One such instance is that a direct recruit, Hrushikesh Mishra, who was appointed on July 3, 1966 is placed at serial No."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79804, "end_char": 79816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One such instance is that a direct recruit, Hrushikesh Mishra, who was appointed on July 3, 1966 is placed at serial No."}}, {"text": "January I, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79935, "end_char": 79950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1001 while one of the petitioners, Kamal Kanti Dutta, who was appointed six months earlier on January I, 1966 is placed at serial No."}}, {"text": "V. R. Hiremath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80027, "end_char": 80041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another instance cited is that of a promotee, V. R. Hiremath, who was appointed on March 1, 1956 but is placed at serial No."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80064, "end_char": 80077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another instance cited is that of a promotee, V. R. Hiremath, who was appointed on March 1, 1956 but is placed at serial No."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80423, "end_char": 80436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hiremath, it is contended, not having been appointed in excess of the quota should have been given his seniority, on alcount of the three years weightage, with effect from March 1, 1953."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 80664, "end_char": 80676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These contentions were adopted by Dr. Y.S. Chitale who appears on behalf of.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "H.K. Sajnani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80718, "end_char": 80730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the petitioner H.K. Sajnani in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "K.K. Dutta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80826, "end_char": 80836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66 of 1974 of K.K. Dutta and others which was filed on February 8, 1974 no demand was made for the review of the decisions earlier given by this Court on the points under consideration.", "canonical_name": "K. K. DUTTA"}}, {"text": "Sajnani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 81266, "end_char": 81273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By paragraph 45 of his Writ p, etition, which was filed on June 27, 1978 Sajnani did contend that the aforesaid judgments be reviewed since they were wrongly decided."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81965, "end_char": 81979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His complaint is that direct recruits who are \"15 years junior in age and 15 years junior in experience had been placed above him\"; and that the seniority list; dated April 15, 1978 of Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax, which is the basis of further promotion to the post of Commissioner of Income-tax, does not include his name at all, though he has been working as an Assistant Commissioner ever since 1969 when he was selected by the competent authority with the concurrence of the U.P.S.C., after putting in 22 years of service as an I.T.O., out of which 10 years' service was rendered in Class I itself."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82542, "end_char": 82563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaisinihani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 82672, "end_char": 82683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In addition to these grounds which are pressed upon us for reviewing our decisions in Jaisinihani, 1st Gupta case, 2nd Gupta case and Jangamayya, (supra) the petitioners have placed strong reliance on the findings of the 49th Report of the Committee on Petitions of the Rajya Sabha, which was presented on January 9, 1976.", "canonical_name": "Jai Singharzi'.s"}}, {"text": "Jangamayya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 82720, "end_char": 82730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In addition to these grounds which are pressed upon us for reviewing our decisions in Jaisinihani, 1st Gupta case, 2nd Gupta case and Jangamayya, (supra) the petitioners have placed strong reliance on the findings of the 49th Report of the Committee on Petitions of the Rajya Sabha, which was presented on January 9, 1976.", "canonical_name": "Jangamayya"}}, {"text": "January 9, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82892, "end_char": 82907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In addition to these grounds which are pressed upon us for reviewing our decisions in Jaisinihani, 1st Gupta case, 2nd Gupta case and Jangamayya, (supra) the petitioners have placed strong reliance on the findings of the 49th Report of the Committee on Petitions of the Rajya Sabha, which was presented on January 9, 1976."}}, {"text": "Kali Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83139, "end_char": 83153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from that report that at the sitting of the Rajya Sabha held on the 23rd August, 1974, Shri Kali Mukherjee, M.P., presented\n\n(I) [1977J 2."}}, {"text": "R.C. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 83274, "end_char": 83285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R. 2.8\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 839\n\n, ; a petition signed by Shri R.C. Pandey, General Secretary, AU India Federation of Income-tax Gazetted Services Associations, New Delhi, !", "canonical_name": "R.C. Pandey"}}, {"text": "AU India Federation of Income-tax Gazetted Services Associations, New Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83306, "end_char": 83381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R. 2.8\n\nK. K. DUTTA v. UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 839\n\n, ; a petition signed by Shri R.C. Pandey, General Secretary, AU India Federation of Income-tax Gazetted Services Associations, New Delhi, !"}}, {"text": "Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83453, "end_char": 83488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ministry of Finance", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83681, "end_char": 83700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee heard the representatives of (i) promotees on whose behalf the petition was presented to the Rajya Sabha; (ii) the Ministry of Finance and (iii) the direct re- .cruits who were represented by the Indian Revenue Service Association."}}, {"text": "Indian Revenue Service Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83762, "end_char": 83796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee heard the representatives of (i) promotees on whose behalf the petition was presented to the Rajya Sabha; (ii) the Ministry of Finance and (iii) the direct re- .cruits who were represented by the Indian Revenue Service Association."}}, {"text": "Januazy 16, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85875, "end_char": 85891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee made certain calculations according to which, the correct number of spill-over promotees as on Januazy 16, 1959 was 15 and not 73."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85948, "end_char": 85958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Observing in paragraph 7(i) that the Parliament owes responsibility in service matters too and that the executive is answerable to the Parliament for its actions, the Committee concluded its Report with the observation :\n\n\" ...... if necessary, a special law could be enacted and in corporated in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution so that no further scope is left for disputes and litigation and the Department would start functioning as an efficient and well-knit unit and fulfil its intended role in combating the evils of blackmoney and tax evasion and ensuring the stability and progress of our country.\""}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86212, "end_char": 86226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jangamayya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 87804, "end_char": 87814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 pet1lloners 1or a review o t e ecmons m ; azsmg am, t e st 11pta \" case, the 2nd Gupta case and Jangamayya (supra). '", "canonical_name": "Jangamayya"}}, {"text": "Janvary 16, 1959 and 114", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88334, "end_char": 88358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But a somewhat unprecedent ed situation arose by the upgrading of Class II posts to Class I, Grade 11,-100 of them on Janvary 16, 1959 and 114 on December 9, 1960."}}, {"text": "Jaisin!!hani [(supra) that rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules was a statutory rule. Subsequent decisions would show that 1here was hardly any dispute between the parties, at later stages at any ' rate, that rule 4 was a statutory rule.\n\nThe other objections raised against the judgments in the various cases partake more or less of the same character and must be over- 7' -ruled for similar reasons.\n\nWe appreciate that the promotees shouldjnot be penafoed for the mere reasons that those of them who were appointed after January 16,\n\nH 1959 were appointed on an officiating or ad-hoc basis and had clear natice that the question of their seniority was still undecided. The\n\n!S-463 SCI/80\n\nA circumstances attendant upon their appointments cannot, however, be wholly over-looked in determining whether the, constitutionalcon, straints have been over-stepped.\n\nIn regard to the individual instances cited before us as exemplifying the injustice caused to the Promotees, it is not safe to test the B constitutionality of a service • ule on the touchstone of fortunes of individuals.\n\nNo matter with .what care, objectivity and foresight a rule is framed, some hardship, inconvenience or injustice is bound to result to some members of the service. The paramount consideration is the reconciliation of conflicting claims of two important constituents of Service, one of which brings fresh blood and the C other mature experience.\n\nThe counter-affidavit dated August 31, 1973, filed in the 2nd Gupta case (supra) by Shri Mehra,", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90820, "end_char": 92340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the conclusions in Jaisin!!hani [(supra) that rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules was a statutory rule."}}, {"text": "Had the Ccmmittee teen allcwed access to the file relating to the Seniority Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95518, "end_char": 95599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96938, "end_char": 96943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DESAI, J.-1 have carefully gone through the Judgment prepared by My Lord the Chief Justice but I regret my inability to agree with the same.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Service Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97963, "end_char": 97988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 101359, "end_char": 101373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, learned Solicitor-General appearing for the Union of India warned us that the credibility of this Court is at stake if it goes on re-opening and reviewing propositions which havejbeen finally determind by this Court."}}, {"text": "GJvernment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 101719, "end_char": 101738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Re peatedly the GJvernment of India kept back material from this Court filing affidavit after affidavit showing its inability to provide such im portant information on which the decision of the Court would turn even thougl:t it can now be demonstrably established that such material and information was with tl:te Government."}}, {"text": "Rajya Sabha Secretariat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 102360, "end_char": 102383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may be made in this connection to the 49th Report of Committee on Petitions presented on January 9, 1976, to Rajya Sabha Secretariat, set up to dispJse of a petition filed by one R.C. Pandey, General Secre tary, All India Federation of Income Tax Gazetted Services Associations, praying for repeal of the Income Tax Officers (Class I Service) (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1973, and for the framing of fresh seniority rules in lieu thereJf."}}, {"text": "R.C. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 102430, "end_char": 102441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference may be made in this connection to the 49th Report of Committee on Petitions presented on January 9, 1976, to Rajya Sabha Secretariat, set up to dispJse of a petition filed by one R.C. Pandey, General Secre tary, All India Federation of Income Tax Gazetted Services Associations, praying for repeal of the Income Tax Officers (Class I Service) (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1973, and for the framing of fresh seniority rules in lieu thereJf.", "canonical_name": "R.C. Pandey"}}, {"text": "R.C. Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103338, "end_char": 103347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The file relating to Shri R.C. Dutt's affidavit (filed in Jaisinghani's case) is also not available.", "canonical_name": "R. C. Dutt"}}, {"text": "Even the very recent file relating to the framing of Seniority Rules, 1970", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103413, "end_char": 103487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sankari Praiad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 104916, "end_char": 104930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The approach of the Court on a plea of reconsideration has been spelt out in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan,(') where a plea for reconsideration of the decision of this Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India & State of Bihar,(2) was repelled observing as under :\n\n\"It was, however, urged before us during the course of the hearing of these writ petitions that we should reconsider the matter and review our earlier decision in Sankari Praiad's\n\ncase, It is true that the Constitution does not place any restriction on our powers to review our ear1ier decisions or even to depart from them and there can be no doubt that in matters relating to the decision of constitutional points which have a significant impact on the fundamental rights of citizens, we would be prepared to review our earlier decisions in the interest of public good."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108704, "end_char": 108733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108758, "end_char": 108769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 241(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109716, "end_char": 109725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110888, "end_char": 110906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113756, "end_char": 113758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bishan Sarup Guptav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 122501, "end_char": 122520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) On the one hand and S. G.\n\nJaisinghani v. Union of India (supra) Bishan Sarup Guptav.", "canonical_name": "Bishan Sarup Guptav"}}, {"text": "(1975] 2 S.C.R. 979", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 123607, "end_char": 123626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_855_883_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "PREM SHANK.AR SHUKLA\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\nApril 29, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND o. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\nHu111an justice vis-a-vis Detention Jurisprudence-Manacling a man accused at an ofiencc, constitutional validity of-Constitution of India Articles 14, 19 and 21--ls.suance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for human 1 Justice under Article 32 of the Constitution-Univer.rol Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 Articles 5 and IO read lvith nonns in Part III and the provisions in the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955-Punjab Police Rules, 1934, ro/. ll/ Chop. 25. Rule 26 : 22, 23.\n\nAllo, ving the petition, the Court\n\nHELD : Per /er J. (On behalf of Chinnappa Reddy J. and himself).\n\n1. The guarantee of human dignity forms part of an Constitutional cu17 ture and the positive provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 spring into action to disshackle any man since to manacle man is more than to mortify him; it is to dehumanize him and, therefore, to violate his very personhood, too often using the mask of 'dangerousness' and security.\n\nEven a prisoner is a person, not an animal, and an undertrial prisoner is\n\na fortiori so.\n\nOur nations founding document admits of no exception.\n\nE Therefore. all measures authorised by the law must be taken by the Court to keep the stream of prison justice unsullied. [862 D-F, 863 E-F]\n\nSunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Ors.,\n\n[1978] 4 S.C.C. 494; fol~ lowed.\n\n2. Th~ Supreme Court is the functional sentinel on the qui vive wherei F \"habeas\" justice is in jeopardy. If iron enters the soul of law and of the enforcing agents of la\\v-rather, if it is credibly alleged so-the Supreme Court must fling aside forms of procedure and defend the complaining indivi;\n\ndual's personal liberty under Articles 14, 19 and 21 after due investigation ..\n\nAccess to human justice is the essence of Article 32. [864 A-BJ\n\n3. Where personal freedom is at stake or torture is in store to read down the law is to write off the law and to rise to the remedial demand of the mariacled man is to break human bondage, if within the reach of judicial\n\nprocess. [864 F-GJ\n\n4. There cannot be a quasi-caste system among prisoners in the egalitarian context of Article 14, In plain language, to say that the \"better class nnder,\n\ntrial be not handcuffed without recording the reasons in the daily diary for considering the -necessity of the use on such a prisoner while escort to and from court\" means that ordinary Indian undertrials shall be rentively handcuffed during transit between jail and court and the better class prisoner\n\nshall be so confined only if reasonably apprehended to be violent or rescued and is against the express provisions of Article 21. [863 D-E, 865 G-H]\n\nManeka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621 @ 647; applied.\n\nVishwanath v. State, Crl. Misc. Main No. 430 of 1978 decid¢ on 6-4-79 (Delhi High Court); overruled_\n\nB S. Though circurn.scribed by the constraints of lawful detention, the indwelling essence and inalienable attributes of man qua n1an are entitled to the great rights guaranteed by the Constitution.\n\nThat is why in India, as in the sin1ilar jurisdiction in America, the broader horizons of habeas corpus spread out, beyond 'the orbit of release from illegal custody, into every trauma and torture on persons in legal custody, if the cruelty is contrary to law, degrades human dignity 01• defiles his persohhood to a degree that violaJes C Article' 21, 14 and 19 enlivened by the Preamble. [868 A-B, 867 G-H]\n\n6. The collection of handcuff law, namely, Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955; Pun1ab Police Rules, 1934, (VoL Ill) Rules 26 : 22(i)\n\n(a) to (f); 26.21A, 27.12, Standing Order 44, Instruction on handcuffs of November, 1977, and Orders of April 1979, must meet the demands of Articles 14, 19 and 21. Irons forced on undertria1s in transit must conform D to the humane imperatives of the triple articles. Official cruelty, sans consti tutionality degenerates into criminality. Rules, St\\1nding orders, Instruct'ions and Circulars must bow before Part III of the Constitution. [872 B-D]\n\nThe Preamble sets the human tone and temper of the Founding Docu- '1ent and highlights justice, Equality and the dignity of the individual, Article 14 interdicts arbitrary treatment, discriminatory dealings and capricious cruelty. Article 19 prescribes restrictions on free movement unless in the interests of the general public. Article 2) is the sanctuary of human values, prescribes fair procedure and forbids barbarities, punitive or procedural. such is the apercu. [872 C-E]\n\n\n7. Handcuffing is prbna f<icie inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable, is over harsh nnd at the first blush, arbitro.ry.\n\nAbsent fair procedure and objective monitoring to inflict \"irons\" is to resort to zoological strategies repugnant ro Artic1e 21. Surely, the competing claims of securing the prisoner from fleeing and protecting his personality from barbarity have to be harmonized.\n\nTo prevent the escape of an undertrial is in public interest, reasonable, just and cannot, by itself be castigated. But to bind a man hand and foot, fetter his limbs V.'ith hoops of steel, shuffle him along in the streets r nd stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile his. dignity, vulgarise society and foul the soul of our Constitutional culture. [872 F-0]\n\n8. Insurance against escape does not compulsorily required handcuffing.\n\nThere are other measures \\Vhereby an escort can keep safe custody of a detenu without the indignity and cruelty implicit in handcuffs or other iron contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the hands or feet Or bo'h has not merely a preventive impact but also a punitive hurtfulness.\n\nManacles are mayhem on the human person and inflict humiliarion on the be; rer.\n\n.·~\n\nP. S. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. 857\n\n'Ille thtee con1poncnts of \"irons\" forced on the human person are : to band- A cuff i.e., to hoop harshly io punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers\n\nalso. Iron straps are insult and pain writ large, animalising victim and keepers.\n\nSice there are other ways of ensuring safety as a rule handcuffs or other fetters shall not be forced on the person of an undertrial prisoner ordinarily.\n\nAs necessarily implicit in Ai; iicles 14 and 19, when there is no compulsive 11Ced to fel1er a person's limbs it is sadistic, capricious, despotic an<l demoralizing to humble a man by manacling him.\n\nSuch arbitrary con- B duct surely slaps Article 14 on the face. The animal freedom of movement, which even a detainee is entitled to under Article 19, cannot be cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs or other hoops. It will be unreasonable so tO do unless the State is able to make out that no other practical way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and desperate and the circumstances s'o hostile to safe keeping. [872 G-H, 873 A-E]\n\n9. Once the Supreme Court make it a constitutional mandare and law that no i:risoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely or merely for the convenience of the custodian or escort, the distinction between classes of prisoners become constitutionally obsolete.\n\nApart from the fact that economic and social importance cannot be the basis for classifying prisoners for\n\npurposes of handcuffs or otherwise, a rich criminal or undertrial is in no\n\nway different from a poor or pariah convict or under trial in the matter D of .security risk.\n\nAn affluent in custody may be as dangerous or desperate as an indigent, if not more. He may be more prone to be rescued than an ordinary person.\n\nTherefore, it is arbitrary and irrational to classify prisoners for Purposes of handcuffs, into 'B' class and ordinary class. No one shall be fettered in any form based on superior class differential as the law lreats them equally. It is brutalising to handcuff a person in public and so is unreasonable to do so.\n\nOf course, the police escort will find it com- E fortable to fetlel1 their charges and be at ease, but that is not a relevant consideration. [873 'E-H]\n\n10. The only circumstance which validates incapacitation by irons-an extreme measurer-is that otherwise there is no other reasonable way of preventing his escape, in the given circumstances.\n\nSecuring the prisoner being a necessity of judicial trial, the. State must take steps in this behalf.\n\nBut even here, the policeman's easy assumption or scary apprehension or subje.ctive satisfaction of likely escape if fetters are not fitted on the prisoner is not enough.\n\nThe heavy deprivation of personal liberty must be justifiable as reasonable restriction in the circumstances. Ignominy, inhumanity and affliction, implicit in chains and shackles are permissible, as not unreasonable, only if every other less c1uel means is fraught with risks or beyond availability.\n\nSo it is that to be consistent with Arts. 14 and 19 handcuffs must be the last refuge, not the routine regimen. If a few more guards will suffice, then no handcuffs. If a close watch by armed policemen will do, then no handcuffs. If alternative measures may be provided, then no iron bondage.\n\nTllis is the legal norm. [874 ACJ\n\nFnctional compulsions of security must reach that dismal degree that no alternative will work except manacles.\n\nOur Funda1nental Rights are heavily Joa<led in favour of personal liberty even in prison, and so, the traditional approaches without reverence for the worth of the human rrrson are obs0Jete 1 although they die hard.\n\nDiscipline can be exaggerated by prison\n\n16-463 SCJ/80\n\nkeepers; dangerouslless can be physically worked up by escorts and sadistic disposition, \\Vhere higher awareness of constitutional rights is absent, IDaf' overpower the finer values of dignity and humanity. [874 DBJ\n\nTherefore,. there must first be well-grounded basis for drawing a strong inference that the prisoner is likely to jump jail or break out of custody or play the vanishing trick.\n\nThe belief in this behalf must be based on antecedents which must be recorded and proneness to violence must be\n\nauthntic.\n\nVague surmises or general averments that the under-trial is a crook or desperado, rowdy or maniac, cannot suffice. In short, save in rare cases of -concrete proof readily available of the dangerousness of the prisoner in transit-the onus of proof of which is on him who puts the person under irons-the police escort will be committing personal assault or mayhem if he handcuffs or fetters his charge. It is disgusting to see the mechanical way jn which callous policemen, cavalier fashion, handcuff prison.- in their charge, indifferently keeping them company assured by the thought that the detainee is under 'iron' restraint. [874 F-H]\n\n11, Even orders of superiors are no valid justification as con.sti.tvtional rights cannot be kept in suspense by superior orders, unless there is material, sufficiently stringent, to satisfy a reasonable mind that dangerous and des- D perate is the prisoner who is being transported and further that by adding to the escort party or other strategy he cannot be kept under conlrol.\n\nIt iS hard to imagine such situations. It is unconscionable, indeed outrilgeous, to make the strange classification between better class prisoners and ordinary prisoners in the matter of handcuffing.\n\nThi~ elitist concept has no basic except that on the assumption the ordinary Indian is a sub-citizen an4 free. doms under Part Ill of the Constitution are the privilege of the upper sector E of society. [875 A-CJ\n\nMerely because a person is charged with a &rave offence he can.not be handcuffed. He may be very quiet, well-behaved, docile or even timid.\n\nMerely because the offence is serious, the inference of escape-proneneas or desperate character does not follow.\n\nMany other conditions mentioned in the Police Manual are totally incongruous and must fall as unlawful. Taagi ble testimony, documentary or other, or desperate behaviour, geared to making good his escape, along will be a valid ground for handcuffing and fettering, and even this may be avoided by increasing the strength of the escorts or taking the prisoners in wellprotected vans. And increase in the number of escorts, arming them if necessary special training for escorts police, transport of prisoners in protected vehicles, are easily available alter~ natives. [875 CEl G\n\n- 12. Even in cases where, in extreme circumstances handcuffs have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so.\n\nOtherwise, uD.der Art. 21 the procedure will be unfair and bad in. law. Nor will mere recording of the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical process mindlessly made. The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasoos so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval. Otherwise, there is H no control over possible arbitrariness in applying handcuffs and fetters.\n\nThe minions of the police establishment must make good their security recipes by getting judicial approval.\n\nAnd, once the court directs that handcuffs •hall\n\nP. S. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 859\n\n.be off, no escorting authority can overrule judicial direction. This is implicj!.\n\nA in Art. 21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in the very procedure \\vllich authorises stringent deprivation of life and liberty. [875 G-l{, 876 A]\n\nMa11eka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621, and Sunil Batra v.\n\nDelhi Administration, [1978] 4 SCC 494; applied.\n\n13. Punjab Police Manual, in so far as it puts the ordinary Indian beneath the better class breed (paragraphs 26.21A and 26.22 of Chapter XXVI) is untenable and arbitrary and Indian humans shall not be dischotomised and tlte\n\ncommon run discriminated against regarding handcuffs. The p.rovisions in par.i 26.22 that every under trial who is accused of a non-bailable offence punishable with more than 3 years prison term shall be routinely handcuffed is violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 21. So also para 26.22 (b) and (c). The nature of the accusation is not the criterion. The clear and present danger of escape breaking out of the police control is the determinant. And for this there 1 must be clear\n\nmatrial, not qlib assumption, record of reasons and judicial oversight and sllmmary hearing and' direction by the Court where the victim is produced. Para 2,, 22(1)(d), (e) and (f) also hover perilously near unconstitutionality unless read down. Handcuffs are not summary punishment vicariously imposed at police level, at once obnoxious 'and irreversible.\n\nArmed escorts, worth the salt, can overpower any wiarmed undertrial and extraguards can make up exceptional needs.\n\nJn very special situations, the application of irons cannot be ruled out. The prisone11 Cannot be tortured because others will demonstrate or attempt his rescue. The plain law of under trial custody is thus contrary to unedifying escort practice. [87 6 C-G]\n\n14. The impossibility of easy recapture supplied the temptation to jump custody, not the nature of the offence or sentence.\n\nLikewise, the habitual <>r violent 'escape propensities' proved by past conduct or present att~ are a surer guide to the prospects of running away on the sly or by use of force than the oITence with which the person is charged or the sentence.\n\nfany a murderer, assilming him to be one, is otherwise a normal, \\Vellbehaved, even docile, person and it rarely registers in his mind to run aV\\'ay\n\nor force his escape. It is an indifferent escort or incompetellt guard, nGt the Section with which the accused is charged, that must give the clue to the few escapes that occur.\n\nTo abscond is a difficult adventure. \"Human rights\" seriousness loses it valence whi:re administrator's convenience prevails over cultural values.\n\nThere is no genetic crimlnol tribe as such among humans. A disarmed arrestee has no hope of escape from the law if reoa.pture is a certainty. He heaves a sigh of relief if taken into custody as against the desperate evasions of the chasing and the haunting fear that he may\n\nbe caught any time.\n\nIt is superstitious to practise the barbarous bigotry of handcuffs as a routine regimen-an imperial heritage well preserved.\n\nThe problem is to get rid of mind-cuffs which make us callous to hand-cuffing a prisoner who may be a patient even in the hospital bed and tie him up with ropes to the legs of the cot. [877 A-D, 878 A-CJ\n\n15. The rule regarding a prisoner in transit between prison house and court house is freedom from handcuffs and the exception, under conditions H of judicial supervision will be restraints with irons to be justified before or after. The judicial officers, before whom the prisoner is produced shall\n\nA interrogate the prisoner, as a rule, whether he has been subjected to hand~ cuffs or other 'irons' re3.tment and, if he has been, the official concerned , shall be asked to explain the action forthwith. [879 G-H, 880 A-BJ ,.:...\n\nPer Pathak J. (Concurring)\n\n1. It is an axiom of criminal law that a person alleged to have committed an offence is liable to arrest. Sections 46 and 49 of the Code of Criminal Procedure define the parameters of the power envisaged in the Code in the matter of arrest And s. 46, in particular foreshadows the central principle controlling the power to impose restraint on the person of a prisone:r while in continued custody.\n\nRestraint may be imposed where it is reasonably apprehended that the prisoner will attempt to escape, and it should not be more than is necessary to prevent him from escaping. 1 Viewed in the light of the la\\V laid down by this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Ors., [1978] 4 SCC 494; that a person in custody is not wholly denuded of his fundamental rights, the limitations flowing from that principle acquire a profound significance. [880 C-FJ\n\nThe power to restrain, and the degree of restraint to be employed, are not for arbitrary exercise.\n\nAn arbitrary exercise of that power infringes the fundamental rights of the person in custody.\n\nAnd a malicious use of that powe• can bring s. 220 of the Indian Penal Code into play.· Too often is it forgotten that if a police officer is vested with the power to restrain a person by handcuffing him or otherwise there is a simultaneous restraint by the law on the police 'officer as to the exercise of that power. [880 F-G]\n\n2. Whether a person should be physically restrained and, if so, what should be the degree of restraint, is a matter which affects the person in custody so long as he remains in custody.\n\nConsistent with the fundamental rights of such person the restraint can be imposed, if at all, to a degree no greater than is necessary for preventing his escape.\n\nTo prevent his escape is the object of imposing the reSltraint and that object at once defines that power. [880 H, 881 Al\n\n3. Section 9(2)(e) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Court) Act, 1955 empo\\vers the State Government to make rules providing for the escort of , \"\"'\\..._ persons confined in a prison to and from courts in which their attendance \\.- is required and for their cus'!ody during the period of such attendance. The Punjab Police Rules, 1934 contain Rule 26.22 which classifies those cases '\" in which hand-cuffs may be applied.\n\nThe classification has been attempted somewhat broadly.\n\nBut the classification attempted by some of the clauses of Rule 26.22, particularly (a) to (c) which presume that in every instance • covered by any of these clauses the accused will attempt to escape cannot be sustained. [881 C-E]\n\nThe rule should be that the authority responsible for the prisoners custody should consider the case of each prisoner individually and decide \\vbether the prisoner is a person who having regard to his circumstances, general conduct, behaviour and character will attempt to escape or disturb the peace by becoming violent. That is the basic criterion, and all provisions relating to the imposition of restraint must be guided by it. In the ultimate\n\nanarisis it is that guiding principle which must determine in each individual case whether a restraint should be imposed and to what degree. [881 E-GJ\n\nP. S. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. 861\n\n4. Rule 26.22 read with Rule 26.21 A of the Punjab Police Rules 1934 A draw a distinction between \"better class\" undertrial prisoners and \"ordinary\"\n\nundertrial prisoners, as a basis for determining who should be handcuffed and who should not be.\n\nThe social status of a person, his education and habit of life associated with a superior mode of living is intended to protect his dignity of person.\n\nBut that dignity is a dignity which belongs to all, rich and poor, of high social status and low, literate and illiterate.\n\nIt is the basic assumption that all individuals are entitled to enjoy--that dignity B that determines the rule that ordinarily no restraint should be imposed except in those cases where there is a reasonable fear of the prisoner attempt~ ing to escape or attempting violence. It is abhorrent to envisage a prisoner being handicuffed merely because it is assumed that he does not belong to\n\n\"a better class\", that he does not possess the basic dignity pertaining to every individual. Then there is need to guard against a misuse of the power from other motives. It is grossly objectionable that the power given by C the law to impose a restraint, either by applying handcuffs or otherwise, should be seen as an opportunity for exposing the accused to public ridicule and humiliation. Nor is the power intended to be used vindictively or by way of punishment. Even Standing Order 44 and the instructions on handcuffs of November 1977 operate some what in excess of the object to be observed by the imposition of handcuffs, having regard to the central principle that only he should be handcuffed who can be reasonably apprehended D to attempt from escape or become violent. [881 G-H, 882 A-DJ\n\n5. Whether handcuffs or other restraint should be imposed on a prisoner is primarily a matter for the iecision of the authority responsible for his custody.\n\nIt is a judgment to be exercised with reference to each individual case. It is fof! that authority to exercise its discretion.\n\nThe primary deci sion should not be that of any other, The matter is one where the circums- E tances may change from one moment to another, and inevitably in some cases it may fill.I to the decision of the escorting authority midway to decide on imposing a restraint on the prisoner. The prior decision of an external authority can not be reasonably imposed on the exercise of that power. But there is room for imposing a supervisory regime over the exercise of that power.\n\nOne sector of superviory jurisdiction could appropriately lie with\" the court trying the accused, and it would be desirable for the custodial authority\n\nJ!' to inform that court of the circumstances in which, and the justification for, imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. It should be for the court concerned to work out the modalities of the procedure requisite for the i:mrpose of enforcing such control 882 E-GJ\n\n6. In the present case, the question whether the petitioner should be G handcuffed should be left to be dealt with by the Magistrate concerned before whom he is brought for trial in the cases instituted against him. [882 H, 883 Al\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1979.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Cunstitution.)\n\nDr. Y. S. Chitale, (Amicus Curiae) and Mukul Mudgal, for the Petitioner.\n\nR. N. Sachthey, H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J.-\"When they arrested my neighbour I did not protest. Whe_n they arrested the men and women in the opposite house I did noi protest. And when they finally came for me, there was nobody left to protest.\" (1)\n\nThis grim scenario burns into our judicial consciousness the moral' emerging from the case being that if to-day freedom of one forlom person falls to the police somewhere, tomorrow the freedom of many may fall elsewhere with none to whimper unless the court process invigilates in time and polices the police before it is too late. Thi£ futuristic thought, triggered off by a telegram from one Shukla, prisoner lodged in the Tihar Jail, has prompted the present 'habeas• proceedings. The brief message he sent runs thus:\n\nIn spite of Court Order and directions of your Lordship in Sunil LBatra V. Delhi handcuffs are forced on me and othen.\n\nAdmit writ of Habeas Corpus.\n\nThose who are injured to handcuffs and bar fetters on others mae ignore this grievance, but the guarantee ofhuman[dignity, which forms part of our constitutional culture, and the positive provisions of Arts. 14, 19 and 21 spring into action when we realise that to manacle man Is more than to mortify him; it is to dehumanize him and, therefore, to violate his very personhood, too often using the mask of 'dangerousness' and £eCUrity. This sensitized perspective, shared by court and counsel alike, has prompted us toexaminethe_issue from'.a fundamental viewpoint and not to dismiss it as a daily sight to be pitied and buried. hi.deed, we have been informed that the High Court had earlier dismissed this petitioner's demand to be freed from fetters on his person but we are far from satisfied going by what is stated in Annexure A to the counter-affidavit of the Asst. Superintendent of Police, that the matter has received the constitutional concern it deserves. Annexure A to the counter-affidavit is a communication from the Delhi Administration for general guidance and makes disturbing reading as it has the flavour of legal advice and executive directive and make£ mention ofa petition for like relief in the High Court:\n\nH The petition was listed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal of Delhi High Court. After hearing arguments,\n\n(1) Pastor :tviiemoller.\n\nthe Hon'ble Court was pleased to dismiss the petitionfikd, bythe\n\npetitioner Shri P.S. Shukla asking for directions for r.of putting the handcuffs when escorted from jail to the court and back to the Jail. In view of the circumstances of the case, it was observed that no directions were needed. However, it came to my notice that the requirements of Punjab Police Rules contained in Volume III Chapter 25 Rule 26,22,23,!and High Court Rules and Orders Volume III Chapter 27 Rule 19 are not being complied with. I would also draw the attention of all concerned to the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice R.N. Aggarwal in Vishwa Nath Versus State, Cr!. .Misc.\n\nMain No. 430 of 1978 decided on 6-4-1979 wherein it has been observed that a better class undertrial be not handcuffed without recording the reasons in the daily diary for considering the necessity of the use of such a prisoner is being escorted to and from the court by the police, use of handcuffs be not reported to unless there is a reasonable expectation that such prisoner will use violence or that an attempt will be made to rescue him.\n\nThe practice of use of handcuffs be follow<d in acccrdance with the rules mentioned above.\n\nIn plain language, it means that ordinary Indian undertria/s shall be\n\nroutinely handcuff<d during transit between jail and court and the better class prisoner shall be so confined only if reasonably apprehended to be violent or rescued.\n\nThe facts are largely beyond dispute and need brief narration so that the law may be discussed and decland. The basic assurr.ption we humanistically make is that even a prisoner is a person, not an animal, that an under-trial prirnner a fortiori so. Our nation's founding document admits of no exception on this subject as Suni/ Batra' s case( I) has clearly stated. Based on this thesis, all measures authorised by the faw must be takrn by the court to kc<p the stm m of prison Justice unsullied .\n\nA condensed statemrnt of the facts may help ccr.cretise the l<gal issue argued before us. A prisoner sent a tel< grim to a ji:cge of this court (one of us) complaining of forced handcuffs on him ar.d other prisoners, implicitly protesting against the humiliation ar.d torture of being held in irons in public, back and forth, when, as under-trials kGpt in custody in the Tihar Jail, they were being taken to Delhi courts for trial of their cases. The practice persisted, bewails the petitioner, despite the court's direction not to use irons on him and this Jed to\n\n(1) [1978] 4 s.c.c. 494.\n\nthe telegraphic 'litany' to the Supreme Court which is the functional sentinel on the qui-vive where 'habeas' justice is in jeopardy. If iron enters the soul of law and of the enforcing agents oflaw-rather, ifit is credibly alleged so-this court must fling aside forms of procedure and defend the complaining individual's personal liberty under Arts. 14, 19 and 21 after due iuvestigatiou. Access to human justice is the essence of Art. 32, and sensitized by this dynamic perspective we have examined the facts and the law and the rival versions of the petitioner and the Delhi Administration. The blurred area of 'detention jurisprudence' where considerations of prevention of escape and personhood of prisoner come into concftict, warrants fuller exploration than this isolated case necessitates and counsel on both sides (Dr. Chitale as amicus curiae, aided ably by Shri .Mndgal, and Shri Sachthey for the State) have rendered brief oral assistance and presented written submissions on a wider basis. After all, even while discussing the relevent statutory provisions and constitutional requirements, court and counsel must never forget the core principle found in Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948:\n\n\"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\"\n\nAnd read Art. 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:\n\nArt. I 0: All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.\n\nOf course, while these larger considerations may colour our mental process, our task cannot over flow the actual facts of the case or the norms in Part III and the Provisions in the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 (for short, the Act). All that we mean is that where personal freedom is at stake or torture is in store to read down the law is to write off the law and to rise to the remedial demand of the manacled man is to break human bondage, if within the reach of the judicial process. In this jurisdiction, the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter are a 1nariner's compass:\n\n\"The history of liberty has largely been the history of obser vance of procedural safeguards.\n\nAnd, in Maneka Gandhi's case (1) it has been stated:\n\n(!) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 at 647.\n\n'the ambit of personal liberty protected by Art. 21 is wide and A comprehensive. It embraces both substantive rights to personal liberty and the procedure provided for their deprivation.\"\n\nHas the handcuffs device-if so, how far-procedural sanction? That is the key question.\n\nThe prisoner complains that he was also chained but that fact is controverted and may be left out for the while. Within this frame of facts we have to consider whether it was right that Shukla was shackled.\n\nThe respondent relies upon the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder and under the Police Act as making shackling lawful. This plea of legality has to be scanned for constitutionality in the light of the submissions of Dr. Chi tale who heavily relies upon Art. 21 of the Constitution and the collective consciousness relating to human rights burgeoning in our half-century. , The petitioner is an under-trial prisoner whose presence is needed in several cases, making periodical trips between jail house and magistrate's courts inevitable. Being in custody he may try to flee and so escort duty to prevent escape is necessary. But escorts, while taking responsible care not to allow their charges to escape, must respect their personhood. The dilemma of human rights jurisprudence comes here. Can the custodian fetter the person of the prisoner, while in transit, with irons, maybe handcuffs or chains or bar fetters?\n\nWhen does such traumatic treatment break into the inviolable zone of guaranteed rights? When does disciplinary measure end and draconic torture begin? What are the constitutional parameters, viable guidelines and practical strategies which will permit the peaceful co-existence of custodial conditions and basic dignity? The decisional focus turns on this know-how and it affects tens of thousands of persons languishing for long years in prisons with pending trials. Many Shuk!as in shackles are invisible parties before us that makes the issue a matter of moment.\n\nWe appreciate the services of Dr. Chitale and his junior Shri Mudgal' who have appeared as amicus curiae and belighted the blurred area -of law and recognise the help rendered by Shri Sachthey who has .appeared for the State and given the full facts.\n\nThe petitioner claims that he is a 'better class' prisoner, a fact which is admitted, although one fails to understand how there can be a quasi-caste system among prisoners in the egalitarian -context of Art. 14.\n\nIt is a sour fact of life that discrimi natory treatment based upon wealth and circumstances dies\n\nhard under the Indian Sun. We hope the Ministry of Home .\n\nH Affairs and the Prison Administration will take due note of the\n\n£urvival after legal death of this invidious distinction and put all\n\nprisoners on the same footing unless there is a rational classification based upon health, age, academic or occupational needs or like legitimate ground and not irrelevant factors like wealth, political im portance, social status and other criteria which are a hang-over of the hierarchical social structure hostile to the constitutional ethos. Be that as it may, under the existing rules, the petitioner is a better class prisoner and claims certain advantage for that reason in the matte(of freedom from handcuffs. It is alleged by the State that there are several cases where the petitioner is needed in the courts of Delhi. The respondents would have it that he is \"an inter-State cheat and a very clever trickster and tries to brow-beat and misbehave'with the objecfto escape from custody.\" Of course, the petitioner , contends that his social status, family background and academic qualificationswarrant his being treated as a better class prisoner and adds that the courtfhad\n\ndirected that for that reason he be not handcuffed. He also states that under the relevant rules better class prisoners are exempt from hand cuffs and cites in support the view of the High Court of Delhi that a better class under trial should not be handcuffed without recording of reasons in the daily diary for considering the necessity for the use of handcuffs. The High Court appears to have observed (Annexure A to the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State) that unless there be reasonable expectation of violence or attempt to be rescued the prisoner should not be handcuffed.\n\nThe fact, nevertheless, remains that even apart from the High Court's order the trial judge (Shri A. K. Garg) had directed the officers concerned that while escorting the accused from jail to court and back handcuffing should not be done unless it was so warranted.\n\n\" .... I direct that the officers concerned while escorting the accused from jail to court and back, shall resort to handcuffing only if warranted by rule applicable to better class prisoners and if so warranted by the exigency of the:situation on obtaining the requisite permission as required under the relevant rules.\"\n\nHeedless of judicial command the man was fettered during transit, G under superior police orders, and so this habeas corpus petition and this Court appointed Dr. Y. S. Chitale as amicus curiae, gave suitable directions to the prison officials to make the work of counsel fruitful and issued notice to the State before further action. \"To wipe every tear from every eye\" has judicial dimension. Here is a prisoner who bitterly complains that he has been publicly handcuffed while being H escorted to court and invokes the court's power to protect the integrity of his person and the dignity of his humanhood against custodial cruelty contrary to constitutional prescriptions.\n\nr •\n\nThe Superintendent of the Jail pleaded he had nothing to do with the transport to and from court and Shri Sachthey, counsel for the Delhi Administration, explained that escorting prisoners between custodial campus and court was the responsibility of a special wing of the police. He urged that when a prisoner was a security-risk, irons were not allergic to the law and the rules permitted their use. The petitioner was a clever crook and by enticements wo\\lld escape from gullible constables. Since iron was too stern to be fooled, his hands were clad with handcuffs. The safety of the prisoner being the onus of the escort police the order of the trial court was not blindly binding.\n\nThe Rules state so and this explanation must absolve the police. Many more details have been mentioned in the return of the police officer concerned and will be referred to where necessary but the basic defence, put in blunt terms, is that all soft talk of human dignity is banished when security claims come into stern play. Sutely, no cutand-dried reply to a composite security-versus-humanity question can be given. We have been persuaded by counsel to consider this grim issue because it occurs frequently and the law must be clarified for the benefit of the escort officials and their human charges. Dr. Chita)e's contention comes to this : Human rights are not constitutional clap trap in silent meditation but part of the nation's founding charter in sensitized animation. No prisoner is beneath the law and while the Act does provide for rules regarding journey in custody when the ceurt demands his presence, they must be read in the light of the larger back drop of human rights.\n\nHere is a prisoner-the petitioner-who protests against his being handcuffed routinely, publicly, vulgarly and unjmtifiably in the trips to and fro between the prison house and the court house in callous contumely and invokes the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 to protect, within the limited circumstances of his lawful custody.\n\nWe must investigate the deeper issues of detainee's rights against custodial cruelty ancl infliction of indignity, within the human rights parameters of Part III of the Constitution, informed by the compassionate international charters and covenants. The raw history of human bondage and the roots of the habeas corpus writ enlighten the wise exercise of constitutional power in enlarging the person of men in unlawful detention. No longer is this liberating writ tramelled by the traditional limits of English vintage; for, our.founding fathers exceeded the inspiration of the prerogative writs by phrasing the power in larger diction. That is why, in India, as in the similar jurisdiction in America, the broader horizons of habeas corpus spread out, beyond the orbit of release from illegal custody, into every trauma and torture on persons in legal custody, if the cruelty is contrary to law, degrades\n\nhuman dignity or defiles his personhood to a degree that violates Arts. 21, 14 and 19 enlivened by the Preamble.\n\nThe legality of the petitioner's custody is not directly in issue but, though circumscribed by the constraints of lawful detention, the indwelling essence and inalienable attributes of man qua man are entitled to the great rights guranteed by the Constitution.\n\nIn Sunil Batra'i case'(supra) it has'been laid1down by a Constitution Bench of this Court that imprisonment does not, ipso facto mean that fundamental rights desert the detainee.\n\nThere is no dispute that the petitioner was, as a fact, handcuffed on several occasions. It is admitted, again, that the petitioner was so handcuffed on 6-10-1979 under orders of the Inspector of Police whose reasons set out in Annexure E, to say the least, are vague and unverifiable, even vagarious.\n\nCounsel for the respondent in his written submissions states that the petitioner is involved in over a score of cases. But that, by itself, is no ground for handcuffing the prisoner. He further contends that the police authorities are in charge of escorting prisoners and have the discretion to handcuff them, a claim which must be substantiated not merely with reference to the Act and the Rules but also the Articles of the Constitution. We may first state the law and then test that law on the touch-stone of constitutionality.\n\nSection 9(2)(e) of the Act empowers the State Government to make Rules regarding the escort of persons confined in a prison to and from courts in which their attendance is required and for their custody during the period of such attendance. The Punjab Police Rules, 1934\n\n(Vol. III), contain some relevant provisions although the statutory source is not cited. We may extract them here :\n\n26.22(1) Every male person falling within the following category, who has to be 'escorted in police custody, and whether under police arrest, remand Conditions in which or trial, shall, provided that he. handcuffs are to be appears to be in health and not used. incapable of offering effective resistance by reason of age, be carefully handcuffed on arrest and before removal from any building from which he may be taken after arrest:-\n\n(a) persons accused of a non .. bailable offence punishable with any sentence exceeding in severity a term of three. years' i1nprisonment.\n\n(b) Persons accused of an offence punishable under section 148 or 226, Indian Penal Code.\n\n(c) Persons accused of, and previously convicted of, such an\n\n0ffence as to bring the case under section 75, Indian Penal Code.\n\n(d) Desperate characters.\n\n(e) Persons who are violent, disorderly or obstructive or acting in a manner calculated to provoke popular demonstration.\n\n(f) Persons who are likely to attempt to escape or to commit suicide or to be the object of an attempt at rescue.\n\nThis rule shall apply whether the prisoners are escorted by road or in a vehicle.\n\n(2) Better class under-trial prisoners must only be handcuffed when this is regarded as necessary for safe custody.\n\nWhen a better class prisoner is handcuffed for reasons other than those contained in (a), (b) and (c) of sub-rule (I) the officer responsible shall enter in the Station Diary or other appropriate record his reasons for considering the use of hand-cuffs necessary.\n\nThis paragraph sanctions handcuffing as a routine exercise on arrest, if any of the conditions (a) to (f) is satisfied. 'Better Class' undertrial prisoners receive more respectable treatment in the sense that they shall not be handcuffed unless it is necessary for safe custody Moreover, when handcuffing better class under-trials the officer con: cerned shall record the reasons for, considering the use of handcuffs necessary.\n\nBetter class prisoners are defined in rule 26.21-A which also may be set out here :\n\n26.21-A. Under-trial prisoners are divided into two classes based on previous standard of living. The classifying authority is the trying court subject to the approval of the District Magistrate, but during Classification of underthe period before a prisoner is trial prisoners. brought before a competent court, discretion shall be exercised by the officer in charge of the Police Station concerned to classify him as either 'better class' or 'ordinary'. Only those prisoners should be classified provisionally as 'better class' who by social status, education or habit of life have been accustomed\n\nto a superior mode of living. The fact, that the prisoner is to be tried for the commission of any particular class of offence is not to be considered. The possession of a certain degree of literacy is in itself not sufficient for 'better class' classification and no under-trial prisoner shall be so classified whose mode of living does not appear to the Police officer concerned to have definitely superior to that of the ordinary run of the population; whether urban or rural. Under-trial prisoners classified as 'better class' shall be given the diet on the same scale as prescribed for A and B class convict prisoners in Rule 26.27(1).\n\nThe dichtomy between ordinary and better class prisoners has rele-\n\n- vance to the facilities they enjoy and also bear upon the manacles that may be clamped on their person. Social status, education, mode of living superior to that of the ordinary run of the population an the demarcating tests.\n\nParagraph 27.12 directs that prisoners brought into court in handcuffs shall continue in handcuffs unless removal thereof is \"specially ordered by the Presiding Officer\", that is to say, handcuffs even within the court is the rule and removal an exception.\n\nWe may advert to revised police instructions and standing orders bearing on handcuffs on prisoners. since the escort officials treat these as of scriptural authority. Standing Order 44 reads:\n\n(I) The rules relating to handcuffing of political prisoners and others are laid down in Police Rules 18.30, 18.35, 26.22, 26.23 and 26.24. A careful perusal of these provisions shows that handcuffs are to be used if a person is involved in serious non-bailable offences, ~- is a previous convict, a desperate character, violent, disorderly or ' obstructive or a person who is likely to commit suicide or who may • attempt to escape.\n\n(2) In accordance with the imtructions issued by the Government G of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi vide their letters No. 2/15/57-P-TV dated 26-7-57 and No. 8/70/74-GPA-I dated 8-11-74, copies of which were sent to all concerned vide this Hdqrs. endst. 'y No. 19143-293/C&T dated 3-9-76, handcuffs are normally, to be used by the Police only where the accused/prisoner is violent, disorderly, obstrnctive or is likely to attempt to escape or commit e suicide or is charged with certain serious non-bailable] offences.\n\n(3) xx xx xx\n\n(4) It has been observed that in actu1l practice prisoners/persons arrested by the police are handcuffed as a matter of routine.\n\nThis is t\" be strictly stopped forthwith.\n\n(5) Handcuffs should not be usei in routine. They are to be used only where the person is desperate, rowdy or is involved in nonbailable offence. There should ordinarily be no occasion to handcuff persons occupying a good social position in public life, or professionals like jurists, advocates doctors, writers, educationists' and well known journalists. This is at best an illustrative list; obviously it cannot be exhaustive. It is the spirit behind these instructions that should be understood. It shall be the duty of supervisory officers at various levels, the SHO primarily, to see that these instructions are strictly complied with. In case of non-observance of these instructions severe action should be taken again!! the defaulter.\n\nThere is a procedural safeguard in sub-clause (6) :\n\n(6) The duty officers of the police station must also ensure that an accused when brought at the police station or despatched, the facts where he was handcuffed or otherwise should be clearly mentioned along with the reasons for handcuffing in the relevant daily diary report. The SHO of the police station and ACP of the SubDivision , will ocnsion11ly check up the relevant daily diary to\n\nsee that these instructions are being complied with by the police station staff.\n\nPvlitical prisoners, if hiniculfed, should not be: walked through the. streets (>bpira 7) and so, by im21ication others can be.\n\nThese orders are of April 1979 and cancel those of 1972. The F\n\n,, r-instrutio11 on h1nicu1f; of NJvem'Jer 1977 may be reproduced in ( fairness:\n\nIn practice it has been observed that handcuffs are being used for under-trials who are charged with the offences punishable with imprisonment ofless than 3 years which is contrary to the instructions of P .P.R. unless and until the officer handcuffing the undertrial has reasons to believe that the handcuff was used because the undertrial was violent, disorderly or obstructive or acting in the manner calculated to provoke popular demonstrations or he has apprehensions that the person so handcuffed was likely to attempt to escape or to commit suicide or any other reason of that type for which he should record a report in D.D. before use of hand\n\n.cuff when and wherever available.\n\nA The above instructions should be complied with meticulously and all formalities for use of handcuff should be done before the use of handcuffs.\n\nThis collection of handcuff law must meet the demands of Arts. 14, 19 and 21. In the Sobraj case (1) the imposition of bar fetters on B a prisoner was subjected to constitutional scrutiny by this Court.\n\nLikewise, irons forced on undertrials in transit must conform to the humane imperatives of the triple articles. Official crulety, sans constitutionality, degenerates into criminality. Rules, Standing Orders, Instructions and Circulars must bow before Part III of the Constitution. So the first task is to assess the limits set by these C articles.\n\nThe Preamble sets the humane tone and temper of the Founding\n\nDocment and highlights Justice, Equality and the dignity of the individual. Art. 14 interdicts arbitrary treatment discriminatory dealings and capricious cruelty. Art. 19 prescribes restrictions on D free movement unless in the interests of the general public. Art. 21 after the landmark case in Maneka Gandhi(2) followed by Sunil Batra (supra) is the sanctuary of human values prescribes fair procedure and forbids barbarities, punitive or processual. Such is the apercu, if we may generalise.\n\nHandcuffing is prima facie inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable, is over-harsh and at the first flush, arbitrary. Absent fair procedure and objective monitoring, to inflict 'irons' is to resort to zoological strategies repugnant to Art. 21. Thus, we must cric tically examine the justification offered by the State for this mode of restraint. Surely, the competing claims of securing the prisoner from fleeing and protecting his personality from barbarity have to be harmonised. To prevent the escape of an under-trial is in public interest, reasonable, just and cannot, by itself, be castigated.\n\nBut to bind a man hand-and-foot, fetter his limbs with hoops of steel, shuflle him along in the streets and stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society and foul the soul of our constitutional culture. Where then do we draw the humane line and how far do the rules err in print and praxis ?\n\nInsurance against escape does not compulsorily require handcuffing. There are other measures whereby an escort can keep safe custody of a detenu without the indignity and cruelty implicit in handcuffs or other iron contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the.\n\n\n(2) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978] 1 S.C.C. 248.\n\n' '\n\nhands or the feet or both has not merely a preventive impact, but also a punitive hurtfulness. Manacles are mayhem on the human person and inflict humiliation on the bearer. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. II (1973 Edn.) at p. 53 states \"handcuffs and fetters arll instruments for securing the hands or feet of prisoners under arrest, or as a means of punishment.\" The three components of 'irons' forced on the human person must be distinctly understood.\n\nFirstly, to handcuff is to hoop harshly. Further, to handcuff is to punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers also.\n\nIron straps are insult and pain writ large, animalising victim and keeper.\n\nSince there are other ways of ensuring security, it can be laid down as a rule that handcuffs or other fetters shall not be forced on the person of an undertrial prisoner ordinari!p. The latest police instructions produced before us hearteningly reflect this view. We lay down as necessarily implicit in Arts. 14 and 19 that nhen there is no compulsive need to fetter a person's limbs, it is sadistic, capricious despotic and demoralizing to humble a man by manacling him.\n\nSuch arbitrary conduct surely slaps Art. 14 on the face. The minimal freedom of movement which even a detainee is entitled to under Art. 19 (see Sunil Batra, supra) cannot be cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs or other hoops. It will be unreasonable so to do unless the State is able to make out that no other practical way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and desperate and the circumstance . so hostile to safe-keeping.\n\nOnce we make it a constitutional mandate that no prisoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely or merely for the convenience of the custodian or escort-and we declare that to be the law-the\n\ndistinction between classes of prisoners becomes constitutionally obsolete. Apart from the fact that economic and social importance cannot be the basis for classifying prisoners for purposes of handcuffs or otherwise, how can we assume that a rich criminal or under-trial is any different from a poor or pariah convict or under-trial in the matter of security risk ? An affluent in cu; tody may be as dangerous or desperate as an indigent, if not more. He may be more prone to be rescued than an ordinary person. We hold that it is arbitrary and irrational to classify, prisoners for purposes of handcuffs, into 'B' class and ordinary class. No one shall be fettered in any form based on superior class differentia, as the law treats them equally.\n\nIt is brutalising to handcuff a person in public and so is unreasonable to do so. Of course, the police escort will find it comfortable to fetter their charges and be at ease but that is not a relevant considera ti on.\n\n17-463 SCI/80\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nThe only circumstance which validates incapacitation by ironsan extreme measure-is that otherwise there is no other reasonabl• way of preventing his escape, in the given circumstances. Secuting the prisoner being a necessity of judicial trial, the State must tale steps in this behalf. But even here, the policeman's easy assnmption or scary apprehension. or subjective satisfaction of likely escape if fetters are not fitted on the prisoner is not enough. The heavy deprivation of personal liberty must be justifiable as reasonable restriction in the circumstances. Ignominy, inhumanity and aftli<:- tion, implicit in chains and shackles are permissible, . as not unreasonable, only if every other less cruel means is fraught. with risks or beyond availability.\n\nSo it is that to be consistent with Arts. 14 and 19 handcuffs must be . the last refnge, not the routine regimen.\n\nIf a few more guards will suffice, then no handcuffs. If a close watch by armed policemen will do, then no handcuffs. If alternative mea~ sures may be provided, then no iron bondage. This is the legal norm,\n\n Functional compulsions of security must reach that dismal degree that no alternative Will work except manacles. We mnst realise that our Fundamental Rights are heavily loaded in favonr of personal liberty even in prison, and so, the traditional approaches withont reverence for the worth of the human person are obsolete, althongh they die hard. Discipline can be exaggerated by prisor keepers; dangeronsness can be physically worked up by escorts and sadistic disposition, where higher awareness of constitutional rights is absent, may overpower the Ji.er valnes of dignity , and nmanitY.\n\nWe regret to observe that cruel and nnnsnal treatment has an unhapp) appeal to jail keepers and escorting officers, which must be conntered by strict directions to keep to the parameters of the constitution. The conclnsion flowing from these considerations is that there must first be well-grounded basis for drawing a strong inference that the prisoner is likely to jnmp jail or break ont of custody or play the vanishing trick. The belief in this behalf must be based on antecedents which must be recorded and proneness to violence must'be authentic. Vague surmises or general avLrments that the under-trial is a crook or desperado, rowdy or maniac, cannot suffice. In short, save in rare cases of concrete proof readily available of the dangerousness of the prisoner in transit-the onus of. proof of which is on him who puts the person under irons-the police escort will be committing personal assault or mayhem if he handcuffs or fetters his charge. It is disgusting to see the mechanical way in which callous policemen, cavalier fashion, handcuff prisoner in their charge, indifferently keeping them company assured by the thought that the detainee is under 'iron' restraint.\n\n' !\n\nEven orders of superiors are no valid justification as constitutional rights cannot be kept in suspense by superior orders, unless there is material, sufficiently stringent, to satisfy a reasonable mind\n\nthat dangerous and desperate is the prisoner who is being transporte<l\n\nand further that by adding to the escort party or other strategy he cannot be kept under control. It is hard to imagine such situations.\n\nWe must repeat that it is unconscionable, indeed, outrageous, to make the strange classification between better class prisoners and ordinary prisoners in the matter of handcuffing. This elitist concept has no basis except that on the assumption the ordinary Indian is a sub-citizen and freedoms under Part III of the constitution are the privilege of the upper sector of society.\n\nWe must clarify a few other facets, in the light of Police 'Standing Orders. Merely becauso a person is charged with a grave -offence he cannot be handcuffed, He may be very 4uiet, well-behaved, docile or even timid. Merely because the offence is serious, the inference of escape proneness or desperate character does not follow.\n\nMany other conditions mentioned in the Police Manual are totally incongruous with what we have stated above and must fall as unlawful. Tangible testimony, documentary or other, or desparate behaviour, geared to making good his escape, alone will be a valid ground for handcuffing and fettering, and even this may be avoided by. increasing the strength of the escorts or taking the prisoners in well. protected vans. It is heartening to note that in some States in this country no handcuffing is done at all, save in rare cases, when taking under-trials to courts and the scary impression that unless the person is confined in irons he will run away is a convenient myth.\n\nSome increase in the number of escorts, arming them if necessary, special training for escort police, transport of prisoners in protected vehicles, are easily availalble alternatives and, in fact, are adopted in some States in the country where handcuffing is virtually abolished, e.g. Tamil Nadu.\n\nEven in cases where, in extreme circumstances, handcuffs have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously the reasons for d0ing so.\n\nOtherwise, under Art. 21 theprocedurewillbeunfair and bad in law. Nor will mere recording the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical pr0cess mindlsslY made. The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval. Otherwise, there is \"no control over\n\npOEsible arbitrariness in applying handcuffs and fetters.\n\nThe minions of the police establishment must make good their seeurity recipes by getting judicial approval. And, once the court directs that handcuffs shall be off no escorting authority can overrule judicial direction. This is implicit in Art. 21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in the very procedure which authorises stringent deprivation of life and liberty. The ratio in Maneka Gan<lhi's case and Sunil- Batra's case (supra), read in its proper tight, leads us to this conclusion.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the petition must be allowed and handcuffs on the prisoner dropped. We declare that the Punjab Polici> .Manual, in so far as it puts the ordinary Indian beneath the better class breed (paragraphs 26 21A and 26 22 of Chapter XXVI) is untenable and arbitrary and direct that Indian humans shall not be dichotomised and the common run discriminated against regarding handcuffs. The provisions in para 26 22 that every under-trial who is accused of a non-bailable offence punishable with more than J years prison term shall be routinely handcuffed is violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 21. So also para 26 22 (b) and (c). The nature of the accusation is not the criterion. The clear and present danger of escape breaking out of the police control is the determinent. Anti for this there must be clear material, not glib assumption, recor<l\n\nof reasons and judicial oversight and summary hearing and direction by the court where the victim is produced.\n\nWe go further to hold that para 26 22 (1) (b), (e) and (f) also hover perilously near unconstitutionality unless read down as we herein direct. 'Desparaie character' is who ? Handcuffs are not summary punishment vicariously imposed at police level, at once obnoxious and irreversible.\n\nArmed escorts, worth the salt, can overpower any unarmed undertrial and extraguards can make up exceptional needs. In very special situations, we do not rule out the application of irons. The same reasoning appears to (e) and (f). Why torture the prisoner because others will demonstrate or attempt his rescue ? The plain law of undertrial custody is thus contrary to the unedifying escort practice. We remove the handcuffs from the law and humanize the police praxis to harmonize with the satvic values of Part 'IJL The law must be firm, not foul, stern, not sadistic, strong, not callous.\n\nTraditionaliy, it used to be thought that the seriousness of the possible sentence is the decisive factor for refusal of bail. The H assumption was that this gave a temptation for the prisoner to escape.\n\nThis is held by modern penologists to be a psychic fallacy and the bail jurisprudence evolved in the English and American Jurisdictions and\n\n.in India now takes a liberal view. The impossibility of easy recapture supplied the temptation to jump custody, .not the nature of the offence or sentence. Likewise, the habitual or violent 'escape propensities' proved by past conduct or present attempts are a surer guide to the prospects of running away on the sly or by use of force than the offence with which the person is charged or the sentence ..\n\nMany a murderer, as$uming him to be one, is otherwise a normal, well-behaved, even docile, person and it rarely registers in his mind to run away or force his escape. It is au indifferent escort or incom• petent guard, not the Section with which the accused is charged, that must give the clue to the few escapes that occur. To abscond is a difficult adventure. No study of escapes and their reasons has been made by criminologists and the facile resort to animal keeping methods as an easy substitute appeals to Authority in such circumstances. 'Human rights', seriousness loses its valence where administrator's convenience prevails over cultural values.\n\nThe fact remains for its empirical worth, that in some States, e.g.\n\nTamil Nadu and Kerala, handcuffing is rarely done even in serious cases, save in those cases where evidence of dangerousness, underground operations to escape and the like is available. It is interesting that a streak of humanism had found its place in the law of handcuffing even in the old Bombay Criminal Manual(!) which now prevails in the Gujarat State and perhaps in the Maharashtra State.* But in the light\n\n(!) Criminal Manual published by the Bombay High Court, Chapter 5, \"Hand- E cuffing of Prisoners\", para 67. (and also para 213 of Criminal Manual Gujarat).\n\n(t) Unless the couft otherwise directs, no prisoner shall be handcuffed or bound while being taken from the court premises to a jail or a borstal school :\n\nProvided that if a police officer escorting such prisoner from the Court premises to a jail or a borstal school, considers it necessary to do so in exceptional circumstances such as violence on the part of the pri .. soner after leaving the Court Premises, and cannot get the directions of the Court, he may handcuff or bind such prisoner after leaving the premises {2) No prisoner shall be handcuffed or bound when being taken from a jai1 or a borstal school to the court Premises. unless the jai1or of the jai1 or the Superintendent of the borstal school otherwise directs in writing. If the jailor of a jail or the superintendent of borstal school from which the prisoner is being taken to the court considers in the circumstances st<..ted in clause\n\n(1) above necessary to bind or hand~ cuff the Prisoner he may direct in writing the officer incharge of the .escort to do so and the officer shall obey such direction.\n\n• Provided that the officer in charge of the escort may handcuff and/ Or bind the prisoner when he considers it ncecssary to do so in .exceptional circumstances arising after leaving the jail or the borstal school Premises and it is not possible to obtain a direction from the jailor or the suprintendent of the borstal school or the court.\n\nof the constitutional imperatives we have discussed, we enlarge the law of personal liberty further to be in consonance with fundamentat rights of persons in custody.\n\nThere is no genetic criminal tribe as such among humans.\n\nA disarmed arrestee has no hope of escape from the law if recapture is a. certainty. He heaves a sigh of relief if taken into custody as against the desperate evasions of the chasing and the haunting fear that he may be caught any time. It is superstitious to practise the barbarous bigotry of handcuffs as a routine regimen-an imperial' heritage, well preserved. The problem is to get rid of mind-cuffs which make us callous to hand-cuffing a prisoner who may be a. patient even in the hospital bed and tie him up with ropes to the legs:\n\nof the cot.\n\nZoological culture_ cannot be compatible with reverence for life, even of a terrible criminal.\n\nWe have discussed at length what may be dismissed as of little concern. The reason is simple. Any man may, by a freak of fate,. become an under-trial and every man, barring those who through wealth and political clout, are regarded as V.I'.Ps, are ordinary classes and under the existing Police Manual may be man-handled by handcuffs. The peril to human dignity and fair procedure is, therefore, widespread and we must speak up. Of course, the 1977 and 1979 'instructi, ons' we have referred to earlier show a change of heart. This Court must declare the law so that abuse by escort constables may be repelled. We repeat with respect, the observations in William King Jackson v. D . .E. Bishop.(!)\n\n(I) We are not convinced that any rule or regulation as to the use of the strap, however seriously or sincerely conceived and drawn, will successfully prevent abuse. The present record discloses misinterpretation even of the newly adopted ....\n\n(2) Rules in this area are seen often to go unobserved.\n\n(3) Regulations are e_asily circumvented\n\n(4) Corporal punishment is easily subject to abuse in the hands of the sadistic and the unscrupulous.\n\n(5) Where power to punish is granted to persons in lower levels of administrative authority, there is an inherent and natural difficulty in enforcing the limitations of that power.\n\n(I) Federal Reports, 2nd series, Vol. 404, p. 571.\n\nLabels like 'desperate' and 'dangerous' are treacherous. Kent A S. Miller, writing on 'dangerousness' says: (I)\n\nConsiderable attention has been given to the role of psychological tests in predicting dangerous behaviour, and there is a wide range of opinion as to their value.\n\nThus far no, structured or projective test scale has been derived which, when used alone will predict violence in the individual case in a satisfactory manner. Indeed, none has been developed which will adequately postdict let alone predict,\n\nvioknt behaviour ..... .\n\n, ... But we are on dangerous ground when deprivation of liberty occurs under sut:h conditions .\n\n. . . . The practice has been to markedly overprcdict. In addition, the courts and mental health professionals involved have systematically ignored statutory requirements relating to dangerousnes' and mental illness ....\n\n. . . . In balancing the interests of the state against the loss D of liberty and rights of the individual, a prediction of dangerous behaviour must have a high level of probability, (a condition which currently does not exist) and the harm to be prevented should be considerable.\n\nA law which handcuffs almost every undertrial (who, Pre- E sumably, is innocent) is itself dangerous.\n\nBefore we conclude, we must confess that we have been inll11enced by the thought that some in authority are sometimes moved by the punitive passion for retribution through the process of parading under-trial prisoners cruelly clad in hateful irons, We must alro frankly state that our culture, constitutional and other, revolts\n\nagainst such an attitude because, truth to tell .\n\n'each tear that flows, when it could ltave been spared, is an accusation, and he commits a crime who with brutal inadvertancy crushes a poor earthworm.' (2)\n\nWe clearly declare-and it shall be obeyed from the Inspector General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons to the escort constable and the jail warder-that the rule regarding a prisoner in transit between prison house and court house;, freedom from handcujjs and the exception, under conditions of judicial supervision we\n\n(I) Managing Madness, pp, 58, 66-68,\n\n(2) Rosa Luxemburg.\n\nhave indicated earlier, will be restraints with irons, to be justified before or after. We mandate the judicial officer before whom the prisoner is produced to interrogate th~ prisoner, as a rule, whether he has been subjected to handcuffs or other \"irons\" treatment and, if he has been, the official concerned shall be asked to explain the action forthwith in the light of this judgment.\n\nPATHAK, J: I have read the judgment of my learned brother Krishna Iyer with considerable interest but I should like to set forth my own views shortly. •\n\nIt is an axiom of the criminal law that a person alleged to have committed an offence is liable to arrest. In making an arrest, declares s. 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, \"the police officer or other person.making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action.\" If there is forcible resistance to the endeavour to arrest or an attempt to evade the arrest, the law allows the police officer or other person to use all means necessary to effect the arrest.\n\nSimultaneously, S 49 provides that the person arrested must \"not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.\" The two sections define the parameters of the power envisaged by the Code in the matter of arrest. And s. 46, in particular, foreshadows the central principle controlling the power to impose restraint on the person of a prisoner while in continued custody.\n\nRestraint may be imposed where it is reasonably appreh!lnded\n\nthat the prisoner will attempt to escape, and it should not be more than is necessary to prevent him from escaping. Viewed in the light of the law laid down by this Court in Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration and others(') that a person i.n custody is not wholly denuded of his fundamental rights, the limitations following from that principle acquire a profound significance. The power to restrain, and the degree of restraint to be employed, are not for arbitrary exercise. An arbitrary exercise of that power infringes the fundamental rights of the person In custody. And a malicious use of that power can brings. 220 of the Indian Penal Code into play. Too often is it forgotten that if a police officer is vested with the power to restrain a person by hand-cuffing him or otherwise there is a simultaneous restraint by the law on the police officer as to the exercise of that power.\n\nWhether a person should be physically restrained and, if so, what should be the degree of restraint, is a matter which affecls the person in custody so long lfS he remains in custody. Consistent with\n\n\n( ).-- I\n\nP. s. SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMN. (Pathak, J.) 881\n\nthe fundemantal rights of such person the restraint can be imposed, if at all, to a degree no greater than is necessary for preventing his escape. To prevent his escape is the object of imposing the restraint,\n\nlid that object defines at once the bounds of that power. The principle is of significant relevance in the present case. The petitioner complains that he is unnecessarily handcuffed when escorted from the jail )louse to the court building, where he is being tried for criminal offences, and back from the court building to the jail house. He contends that there is no reason why he should be handcuffed. On behalf of the respondent it is pointed out by the Superintendent Central Jail, Tihar, where the petitioner is detained, that the police authorities take charge of prisoners from the main gate of the jail for the purpose of escorting them to the court building and back, and that the jail authorities have no control during such custody over the manner in which the prisoners are treated. S.9(2) (e) of the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 empowers the State Government to make rules providing for the escort of persons confined in a prison to and from courts in which their attendance\n\nis required and for their custody during the period of such attendance. The Punjab Police Rules, 1934 contain Rule 26 22 which classifies those cases in which handcuffs may be applied. The classification has been attempted some what broadly, but it seems to me that some of the clauses of Rule 26'22, particularly clauses (a) to (cl, appear to presume that in every instance covered by any of those clauses the accused will attempt to escape. It is difficult to sustain the classification attempted by those clauses. The rule, I think, should be that the authority responsible for the prisoners custody should consider the case of each prisoner individually and decide whether the prisoner is a person who having regard to his circumstances, general conduct, behaviour and character will attempt to escape or disturb the peace by -becoming violent. That is the basic criterion, and all provisions -relating to the imposition of restraint must be guided by it. In the ulti- mate analysis it is that guiding principle which must determine in each individual case whether a restraint should be imposed and to what degree.\n\nRule 26 22 read with rule 26 21-A of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 draw a distinction between \"better class\" undertrial prisoners and\n\n\"ordinary\" undertrial prisoner as a basis for determining who should\n\n, be .handcuffed and who should not be. As I have observed, the appropriate principle for a classification should be defined by the need to . prevent the prisoner escaping from custody or becoming violent. The H social status of a person, his education and habit oflife associated with .a superior mode of living seem to me to be intended to protect his\n\ndignity of person. :Qut that dignity is a dignity which belongs to all, rich and poor, of high social status and low, literate and illiterate.\n\nIt is the basic assumption that all individuals are entitled to enjoy that dignity that determines the rule that ordinarily no restraint should be imposed except in those cases where there is a reasonable fear of the prisoner attempting to escape or attempting violence. It is abhorreat to envisage a prisoner being handcuffed merely because it is assumed that he does not belong to \"a better class'', that he does not possessthe basic dignity pertaining to every individual. Then there is need to guard against a misuse of the power from other motives. It is gmssty objectionable that the power given by the law to impose a restraint, either by applying handcuffs or other,\\>ise, should be seen as an oppor-- tunity for exposing the accused to public ridicule and humiliation.\n\n- Nor is the power intended to be used vindictively or by way of punishment. Standing Order 44 and the Instructions on Handcuffs of' November, 1977, reproduced by my learned brother, evidence t1tegrowing concern at a higher level of the administration over the indiscriminate manner in which handcuffs are being used. To my mind, even those provisions operate somewhat in excess of the object to be subserved by the imposition of handcuffs, having regard to the central priuciple that only he should be handcuffed who can be reasonablyapprehended to attempt an escape or become violent.\n\nNow whether handcuffs or other restraint should be imposed' on a prisoner is primarily a matteifor the decision of the authority responsible for his custody. It is a judgment to be exercised with reference to each individual case. It is for that authority to exerciseits discretion, and I am not willing to accept that the primary decisiono should be that of any other. The matter is one where the circumstances may change from one moment to another, and inevitably insomecases it may fall to the decision of the escorting authority midway to decide on imposing a restraint on the prisoner. I do not think that any prior decision of an external authority can be reasonably impose<t on the exercise of that power. But I do agree that there is room for 'imposing a supervisory regime over the exercise of that power. 0.1e sector of supervisory jurisdiction could appropriately lie with the court trying the accused, and it would be desirable for the custodial authority to inform that court of the circumstances in which, and the justification for, imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. It shoulti be for the court concerned to work out the modalities of the procedure requisite for the purpose of enforcing such control.\n\nIn the present case it seems sufficient, in my judgment, that thequestion whether the petitioner should be handcuffed should be left.\n\nP. S. SHUKLA V. DELHI ADMN. (Pathak, J.) 883\n\nto be dealt with in the light of the observations made herein by the A Magistrate concerned, before whom the petitioner is brought for ;.. trial in the cases instituted against him. The petition is disposed ofaccordingly.\n\nS. R.\n\nPetition a/loH-ed .", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "PREM SHANK.AR SHUKLA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PREM SHANKAR SHUKLA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 29, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PREM SHANK.AR SHUKLA\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\nApril 29, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, R. S. PATHAK AND o. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "o. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 240, "end_char": 261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 262, "end_char": 284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 349, "end_char": 359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 425, "end_char": 435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 498, "end_char": 540, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 815, "end_char": 837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1364, "end_char": 1384, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1437, "end_char": 1450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Supreme Court is the functional sentinel on the qui vive wherei F \"habeas\" justice is in jeopardy."}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1760, "end_char": 1782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2204, "end_char": 2214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2695, "end_char": 2705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2760, "end_char": 2776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3111, "end_char": 3116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why in India, as in the sin1ilar jurisdiction in America, the broader horizons of habeas corpus spread out, beyond 'the orbit of release from illegal custody, into every trauma and torture on persons in legal custody, if the cruelty is contrary to law, degrades human dignity 01• defiles his persohhood to a degree that violaJes C Article' 21, 14 and 19 enlivened by the Preamble. ["}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3153, "end_char": 3160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why in India, as in the sin1ilar jurisdiction in America, the broader horizons of habeas corpus spread out, beyond 'the orbit of release from illegal custody, into every trauma and torture on persons in legal custody, if the cruelty is contrary to law, degrades human dignity 01• defiles his persohhood to a degree that violaJes C Article' 21, 14 and 19 enlivened by the Preamble. ["}}, {"text": "Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3548, "end_char": 3590, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3599, "end_char": 3617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3788, "end_char": 3810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4238, "end_char": 4248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4428, "end_char": 4437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6464, "end_char": 6474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6563, "end_char": 6573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8857, "end_char": 8872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12517, "end_char": 12524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13199, "end_char": 13206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13400, "end_char": 13416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Manual", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13492, "end_char": 13512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab Police Manual, in so far as it puts the ordinary Indian beneath the better class breed (paragraphs 26.21A and 26.22 of Chapter XXVI) is untenable and arbitrary and Indian humans shall not be dischotomised and tlte\n\ncommon run discriminated against regarding handcuffs."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13955, "end_char": 13974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Per Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16928, "end_char": 16938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Pathak J. (Concurring)\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Sections 46 and 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17062, "end_char": 17080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17088, "end_char": 17114, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17200, "end_char": 17205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 220", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18058, "end_char": 18064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18072, "end_char": 18089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 9(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18821, "end_char": 18836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19125, "end_char": 19150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20207, "end_char": 20231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23365, "end_char": 23375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23403, "end_char": 23416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, (Amicus Curiae) and Mukul Mudgal, for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23438, "end_char": 23450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y. S. Chitale, (Amicus Curiae) and Mukul Mudgal, for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "R. N. Sachthey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23473, "end_char": 23487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "H. S. Marwah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23489, "end_char": 23501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23506, "end_char": 23518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. N. Sachthey, H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23584, "end_char": 23596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J.-\"When they arrested my neighbour I did not protest.", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24200, "end_char": 24206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi£ futuristic thought, triggered off by a telegram from one Shukla, prisoner lodged in the Tihar Jail, has prompted the present 'habeas• proceedings."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24680, "end_char": 24699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25762, "end_char": 25777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Annexure A to the counter-affidavit is a communication from the Delhi Administration for general guidance and makes disturbing reading as it has the flavour of legal advice and executive directive and make£ mention ofa petition for like relief in the High Court:\n\nH The petition was listed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal of Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25781, "end_char": 25797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Annexure A to the counter-affidavit is a communication from the Delhi Administration for general guidance and makes disturbing reading as it has the flavour of legal advice and executive directive and make£ mention ofa petition for like relief in the High Court:\n\nH The petition was listed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal of Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "P.S. Shukla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25933, "end_char": 25944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Hon'ble Court was pleased to dismiss the petitionfikd, bythe\n\npetitioner Shri P.S. Shukla asking for directions for r.of putting the handcuffs when escorted from jail to the court and back to the Jail."}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26202, "end_char": 26221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26276, "end_char": 26292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R.N. Aggarwal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26453, "end_char": 26466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I would also draw the attention of all concerned to the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice R.N. Aggarwal in Vishwa Nath Versus State, Cr!."}}, {"text": "6-4-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26541, "end_char": 26549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "430 of 1978 decided on 6-4-1979 wherein it has been observed that a better class undertrial be not handcuffed without recording the reasons in the daily diary for considering the necessity of the use of such a prisoner is being escorted to and from the court by the police, use of handcuffs be not reported to unless there is a reasonable expectation that such prisoner will use violence or that an attempt will be made to rescue him."}}, {"text": "Suni/ Batra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27608, "end_char": 27619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our nation's founding document admits of no exception on this subject as Suni/ Batra' s case( I) has clearly stated.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batra'i"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28722, "end_char": 28741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28809, "end_char": 28816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28949, "end_char": 28969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32, and sensitized by this dynamic perspective we have examined the facts and the law and the rival versions of the petitioner and the Delhi Administration."}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29206, "end_char": 29213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The blurred area of 'detention jurisprudence' where considerations of prevention of escape and personhood of prisoner come into concftict, warrants fuller exploration than this isolated case necessitates and counsel on both sides (Dr. Chitale as amicus curiae, aided ably by Shri .Mndgal, and Shri Sachthey for the State) have rendered brief oral assistance and presented written submissions on a wider basis.", "canonical_name": "Chita)e's"}}, {"text": ".Mndgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29251, "end_char": 29258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The blurred area of 'detention jurisprudence' where considerations of prevention of escape and personhood of prisoner come into concftict, warrants fuller exploration than this isolated case necessitates and counsel on both sides (Dr. Chitale as amicus curiae, aided ably by Shri .Mndgal, and Shri Sachthey for the State) have rendered brief oral assistance and presented written submissions on a wider basis."}}, {"text": "Sachthey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29269, "end_char": 29277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The blurred area of 'detention jurisprudence' where considerations of prevention of escape and personhood of prisoner come into concftict, warrants fuller exploration than this isolated case necessitates and counsel on both sides (Dr. Chitale as amicus curiae, aided ably by Shri .Mndgal, and Shri Sachthey for the State) have rendered brief oral assistance and presented written submissions on a wider basis."}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29545, "end_char": 29551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29713, "end_char": 29720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30108, "end_char": 30150, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Felix Frankfurter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30471, "end_char": 30488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this jurisdiction, the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter are a 1nariner's compass:\n\n\"The history of liberty has largely been the history of obser vance of procedural safeguards."}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30619, "end_char": 30632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And, in Maneka Gandhi's case (1) it has been stated:\n\n(!)", "canonical_name": "Maneka Gandhi(2"}}, {"text": "[1978) 2 S.C.R. 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30702, "end_char": 30721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30775, "end_char": 30782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31315, "end_char": 31325, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chi tale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31455, "end_char": 31463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This plea of legality has to be scanned for constitutionality in the light of the submissions of Dr. Chi tale who heavily relies upon Art.", "canonical_name": "Chita)e's"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31488, "end_char": 31495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mudgal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32780, "end_char": 32786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We appreciate the services of Dr. Chitale and his junior Shri Mudgal' who have appeared as amicus curiae and belighted the blurred area -of law and recognise the help rendered by Shri Sachthey who has .appeared for the State and given the full facts."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33174, "end_char": 33181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33322, "end_char": 33338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We hope the Ministry of Home ."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 34100, "end_char": 34105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged by the State that there are several cases where the petitioner is needed in the courts of Delhi."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34647, "end_char": 34666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also states that under the relevant rules better class prisoners are exempt from hand cuffs and cites in support the view of the High Court of Delhi that a better class under trial should not be handcuffed without recording of reasons in the daily diary for considering the necessity for the use of handcuffs."}}, {"text": "A. K. Garg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35148, "end_char": 35158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact, nevertheless, remains that even apart from the High Court's order the trial judge (Shri A. K. Garg) had directed the officers concerned that while escorting the accused from jail to court and back handcuffing should not be done unless it was so warranted."}}, {"text": "Y. S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35802, "end_char": 35815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Heedless of judicial command the man was fettered during transit, G under superior police orders, and so this habeas corpus petition and this Court appointed Dr. Y. S. Chitale as amicus curiae, gave suitable directions to the prison officials to make the work of counsel fruitful and issued notice to the State before further action. \"", "canonical_name": "Y. S. Chitale"}}, {"text": "Chita)e's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37617, "end_char": 37626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Chita)e's contention comes to this : Human rights are not constitutional clap trap in silent meditation but part of the nation's founding charter in sensitized animation.", "canonical_name": "Chita)e's"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38266, "end_char": 38273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 21, 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39316, "end_char": 39335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sunil Batra'i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39629, "end_char": 39642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Sunil Batra'i case'(supra) it has'been laid1down by a Constitution Bench of this Court that imprisonment does not, ipso facto mean that fundamental rights desert the detainee.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batra'i"}}, {"text": "6-10-1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39959, "end_char": 39968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is admitted, again, that the petitioner was so handcuffed on 6-10-1979 under orders of the Inspector of Police whose reasons set out in Annexure E, to say the least, are vague and unverifiable, even vagarious."}}, {"text": "Section 9(2)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40641, "end_char": 40656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40886, "end_char": 40911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41658, "end_char": 41669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "statute": "The Punjab Police Rules, 1934"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41678, "end_char": 41695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41795, "end_char": 41805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41807, "end_char": 41824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government G of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45551, "end_char": 45572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) In accordance with the imtructions issued by the Government G of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi vide their letters No."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45574, "end_char": 45609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) In accordance with the imtructions issued by the Government G of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi vide their letters No."}}, {"text": "26-7-57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45652, "end_char": 45659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2/15/57-P-TV dated 26-7-57 and No."}}, {"text": "8-11-74", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45688, "end_char": 45695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8/70/74-GPA-I dated 8-11-74, copies of which were sent to all concerned vide this Hdqrs."}}, {"text": "3-9-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45791, "end_char": 45797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19143-293/C&T dated 3-9-76, handcuffs are normally, to be used by the Police only where the accused/prisoner is violent, disorderly, obstrnctive or is likely to attempt to escape or commit e suicide or is charged with certain serious non-bailable] offences."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48654, "end_char": 48673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sobraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48682, "end_char": 48688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Sobraj case (1) the imposition of bar fetters on B a prisoner was subjected to constitutional scrutiny by this Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49288, "end_char": 49295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49375, "end_char": 49382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49473, "end_char": 49480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi(2", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49508, "end_char": 49523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 after the landmark case in Maneka Gandhi(2) followed by Sunil Batra (supra) is the sanctuary of human values prescribes fair procedure and forbids barbarities, punitive or processual.", "canonical_name": "Maneka Gandhi(2"}}, {"text": "Sunil Batra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49537, "end_char": 49548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 after the landmark case in Maneka Gandhi(2) followed by Sunil Batra (supra) is the sanctuary of human values prescribes fair procedure and forbids barbarities, punitive or processual.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batra'i"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49940, "end_char": 49947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51940, "end_char": 51955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52146, "end_char": 52153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52242, "end_char": 52249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54597, "end_char": 54612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58747, "end_char": 58757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some increase in the number of escorts, arming them if necessary, special training for escort police, transport of prisoners in protected vehicles, are easily availalble alternatives and, in fact, are adopted in some States in the country where handcuffing is virtually abolished, e.g. Tamil Nadu."}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58947, "end_char": 58954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59579, "end_char": 59586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59738, "end_char": 59748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio in Maneka Gan<lhi's case and Sunil- Batra's case (supra), read in its proper tight, leads us to this conclusion.", "canonical_name": "Maneka Gandhi(2"}}, {"text": "Sunil- Batra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59764, "end_char": 59776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio in Maneka Gan<lhi's case and Sunil- Batra's case (supra), read in its proper tight, leads us to this conclusion.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batra'i"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60434, "end_char": 60453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63191, "end_char": 63197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact remains for its empirical worth, that in some States, e.g.\n\nTamil Nadu and Kerala, handcuffing is rarely done even in serious cases, save in those cases where evidence of dangerousness, underground operations to escape and the like is available."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63553, "end_char": 63564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which now prevails in the Gujarat State and perhaps in the Maharashtra State.*"}}, {"text": "Kent A S. Miller", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67481, "end_char": 67497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kent A S. Miller, writing on 'dangerousness' says: (I)\n\nConsiderable attention has been given to the role of psychological tests in predicting dangerous behaviour, and there is a wide range of opinion as to their value."}}, {"text": "Rosa Luxemburg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69584, "end_char": 69598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2)\n\nWe clearly declare-and it shall be obeyed from the Inspector General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons to the escort constable and the jail warder-that the rule regarding a prisoner in transit between prison house and court house;, freedom from handcujjs and the exception, under conditions of judicial supervision we\n\n(I) Managing Madness, pp, 58, 66-68,\n\n(2) Rosa Luxemburg."}}, {"text": "PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69991, "end_char": 69997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J: I have read the judgment of my learned brother Krishna Iyer with considerable interest but I should like to set forth my own views shortly. •"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70049, "end_char": 70061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATHAK, J: I have read the judgment of my learned brother Krishna Iyer with considerable interest but I should like to set forth my own views shortly. •", "canonical_name": "KRISHNA IYER"}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70282, "end_char": 70287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70295, "end_char": 70321, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70720, "end_char": 70724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70945, "end_char": 70950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71791, "end_char": 71808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Superintendent Central Jail, Tihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 72978, "end_char": 73012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondent it is pointed out by the Superintendent Central Jail, Tihar, where the petitioner is detained, that the police authorities take charge of prisoners from the main gate of the jail for the purpose of escorting them to the court building and back, and that the jail authorities have no control during such custody over the manner in which the prisoners are treated."}}, {"text": "S.9(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73316, "end_char": 73322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73334, "end_char": 73376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73600, "end_char": 73625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Police Rules, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74685, "end_char": 74710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. R.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78351, "end_char": 78356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R.\n\nPetition a/loH-ed ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_884_892_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "SANTOSH GUPTA\n\nSTATE BANK OF PATIALA\n\nApril 29, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND 0. CH!NNAPPA REnoY JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1941-Section 2 (00)-\"Retrenchment\"-Terminafion. ·.· •. ·.for t11lY rea'>'iO!. whatsoever, meaning uf Section 25 FF and Section\n\n25 FFF object of. \"\n\nThe appellant was employed in the State Bank of Patiala, The Mall, Paliala, from July 13, 1973 till August 21, 1974, when her services were terminated.\n\nDespite some breaks in service for a few days, the appellant had admittedly worked for 240 days in the year preceding August 21, 1974. According to the workman, the termination of her service was \"retrenchment\" within the meaning of that expression in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, 1inco it did not fall within any of the excepted cases mentioned in Section 2(00), Since there was \"retrenchment\", it was bad for non-compliance with the provi sions of section 25 l' of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nOn the other hand, the contention of the management was that the termination of services was not due to discharge of surplus labour. It was due to the failure of the workman to pass the test which would have enabled him to be confirmed in the service.\n\nTherefore, it was not retrenchment within the meaning of section 2 ( 00) of the, Industrial Disputes Act. The Presiding Officer, Central Government, Industrial Tribunal-cumLabour Court, accepted the management's contention and decided against the workman appellant. Hence the appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : (i) The discharge of the workman on the ground that she did not pass the test which would have enabled him to be confirmed was \"retrenchment\" within the meaning of section 2(00) and, therefore, the requirements of section 25F had to be complied with. [892 F-GJ\n\n.. ~\n\n(ii) Section 2(00) of the Jndustirial Disputes Act uses a wide language_...~ particularly the words \"term.iriation .............. for any reason whatsoever\". ' The definition \"retrenchment\" expressly excludes termination of service as a / .. punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action\". It does not include, voluntary retrenchment of the workman or retrenchmCnt of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation or termination of the service of the workman on the ground of continuous illhealth. The Legislature took special care to mention that these were not included within the meaning of \"termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever\".\n\nTh..i8 emphasises the broad interpretation to be given to the expression \"retrenchment\".\n\n[887 E-H, 888 A]\n\n2. If due weight is given to the words \"the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any: reason whatsoever\" and if the words 'for any reason whatsoever\" are understood to mean what they plainly say, iti is\n\ndifficult to escape the conclusion that the expression 'retrenchment' must include\n\nevery termination of the service of a workman by an act of the employer. Tle underlying assumption, of course, is that the undertaking is ru!!D.ing as an under-\n\nSANTOSH GUPTA V, STATE BANK 885\n\ntaking and the employer continues Wi an employer but where either on account of transfer of the undertaking or on account of the closure of the undertaking\n\ntlie basic assumption disappears, there can be no question of 'etrenChment' within the meaning of the definition contained in s. 2(00) of the Act.\n\n[888 A-CJ\n\nHariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divakar [1957] SCR 121; applied.\n\nBy introducing section 25 FF and Section 25 FFF, Parliament treated the B: termination of the service of a work.man on the transfer or closure of an undertaking as \"deemed retrenchment\". The effect was that every case of termination of service by act of employer even if such termination was a consequence of transfer or closure of the undertaking was to be treated as 'retrenchment' for tho purposes of notice, compensation etc.\" The expression ''termination of service for any reason whatsoever\" now covers every kind of termination of service. except those not expressly included in S. 25F or not expressly provided C' for by ot'her provisions of theAct as 25 FF and 25 FFF. [888 C-F]\n\n4. The manifest object of Section 25 FF and S. 25 FFF is to so compensate the workman for loss of employment as to provide him the wherewithal to subsist until he finds fresh employment. The non-inclusion of 'voluntary retirement of the workmen, retirement of workmen, on reaching the age of superannuation, termination of the service of a workman, on the ground of continued I) ill-health' in the definition of 'retrenchment' clearly indicate and emphasise the true object of 25F, 25 FF and 25 FFF and the nature of the compensation provided by those provisions.\" [888 F-H]\n\nIndian H111ne Pipe Co. Ltd. v. The Workman [1960] 2 SCR 32; followed.\n\n5. The submission that notwithstanding the comprehensive language of the definition of retrenchment\" in section 2(00) the expression continues to retain its original meaning, namely, discharg~ .from service on account of surplus age is not correct. It cannot be assumed that Parliament was undertaking an exercise in futility to give a long winded definition merely to say that the expression means what it always meant. [889 D-EJ\n\nHariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Dii, akar [1957] SCR 121, Hin- rdustan Steel Ltd. v. 1 lu~ Presiding officer, Labour Court Orissa & Ors. [1977] 1 SCR 585; State Bank of /lldia v. Slzri N. Sundaramoney [1974] 3 SCR 160; f Delhi Clath and General Mills Ltd. v. Slzambunath Mukherjee & Ors. [19781 1 SCR 591; explained and .followed. '\n\nManagement of M/s. Willcose Buckwell India Lt<f. v. Jagannath & Ors.\n\nAIR 1974 S.C. 1164; L111ployees in Relation v. Dign1ode11 Colliery v. Tlieir\n\nWor!111e11 [1965] 3 SCR 4•S; distinguished.\n\nL. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr. (1979) KLJ Kerala 211; The Managing Director, Natio11al Garage v.\n\nGonsalves fl962J KU 56. Good/as Nerolac Paints v. Cl1ief Commissioner, Delhi (1961) 1 LLJ. 545; Rajastlzan State Electricity Board v. Labour Court (1966) I LLJ. 381: over-ruled.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil. Appeal No. 3563 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated 9-7-1978 of the Presiding Officer Central Government. Industrial Tribunal-Cum-\n\nA La'>our ··eourt, New Delhi in f.D0 No. 90 of 1977. published in J!azette of India on )1-8-1979.\n\n-~. M. K. Ramamurthi, and Romes/! C. Pathak for the Appellant.\n\nDr. Anand Parkash, Aclarsh Kumar, Mrs. Laxmi Anand Parkash, and Jagat Arora for:the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHI~APPA REDDY, J.-Santosh Gupta, the appellant-Workman (a woman), was employed in the State Bank of Patiala, the Mall, Patiala, from July 13, 1973, till August 21, 1974, when her services were terminated. Though there were some breaks in service for a few days, those breaks are not relevant for the purpose of deciding this case though we may have to advert to them in another connection. Despite the breaks, the workman had admittedly worked for 240 days in the year preceding Augnst 21, 1974. According to the workman the termination of her services was 'retrenchment' within the meaning of that expression ins. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, since it did not fall within any of the 3 excepted cases mentioned in s. 2(00). Since there was 'retrenchment', it was bad for noncompliance with the provisions of s. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. On the other hand the contention of the management was that the termination of services was not due to discharge of surplus labour. It was due to the failure of the workman to pass the test which would have enabled her to be confirmed in the service. Therefore, it was not retrenchment within the meaning of s. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nS. 25-F prescribes that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year shall be retrenched by the employer until-(a) the workman has been given '\n\none month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrench- , ment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been • paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman bas been paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation ., which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in a excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or any such authority as may be spe- )' cified by the appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette. There is a proviso to clause (a) which dispenses with the necessity for the notice contemplated by the clause if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies the date for the termination of service.\n\nS/.NT05ll:'GIJPTA v. STATE BANK (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 887\n\nThe expression retrenchment is specially defined by s. 2(00) A\n\n--'(\n\nollf the Act and is as follows:\n\n\"2(00) 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-\n\n(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or\n\n(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or\n\n(c) termination of the service of a workman on the gtound\n\nof continued ill-health;\"\n\nIn Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divikar (1.), the 'Supreme Court took the view that the word 'retrenchment' as de- !fined ins. 2(00) did not include termination of services of all werkmen on a bonafide closure of an industry or on change of ownership or Jnanaem•mt. of the industry. In order to provide for the situations which the. Supreme Court held were not covered by the -definition of the expression 'retrenchment', the Parliament added s. 25 FF and s. 25 FFF providing for the payment of compensation to the workmen in case of transfer of undertakings and in case of dosure of undertakings respectively.\n\nIf the definition of 'retrenchment' is looked at unaided and unhampered by precedent, one. is at once struck by the remarkably wide language employed and particularly by the use of the words '6 \"termination ...... for any reason whatsoever\". The definition expressly excludes termination of service as a 'punishment inflicted • ' by way of disciplinary action'. The definition does not include, so it expressly says, voluntary retrenchment of the workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation or termination of the service of the workman on the ground of continuous ill-health. Voluntary retrenchment of a workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannation ean hardly be described as termination, by the employer, of the service of a workman. Yet, the Legislature took special care to mention that they were not included within the meaning of \"termination. by the employer of the serviee of a workman for any reason whatsoever\". This, in our opinion, emphasizes the broad interpretation to\n\n(I) [1957j S.C.R. 121.\n\nbe given to the expression 'retrenchment'. In our view if due weig~ is given to the words \"the termination by the employer o. f the servic of a workman for any reason whatsoever\" and if the words 'for an reason whatsoever' are understood to mean what they plainly sa it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the expressi9n 'retrenchf\n\nment' must include every termination of the service of a workman bt an act of the employer. Tbe underlying assumption, of course~ is that tbe undertaking is running as an undertaking, and the em ployer continues as an employer but where either on account o transfer of the undertaking or on account of the closure of the under1 taking the basic assumption disappears, there can be no question 011 'retrenchment' within the meaning of the definition contained in, I S. 2(00). This came to be realised as a result of the decision of this] Court in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla v. A. D. Divikar (supra). I The Parliament then stepped in and introduced 25 FF and 25FFFI by providing that compensation shall be payable to workmen in I case of transfer or undertaking or closure of undertaking as if the work I men had been retrenched. We may rightly say that the termination I\n\nof the service of a workman on the transfer or closure of an under I taking was treated by Parliament as 'deemed retrenchment'. The I\n\neffect was that every case of termination of service by act of employer I\n\neven if such termination involved was a consequence of transfer or I closure of the undertaking was to be treated as 'retrenchment' for the 1\n\n1 purposes of notice, compensation etc. Whatever doubts might I have existed before Parliament enacted 25FF and 25FFF •about I the width of 25F there cannot now be any doubt that the expression I 'termination' of service for any reason whatsoever now covers every I kind of termination of service except those not expressly included\" I in S. 25F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the I\n\nAct such as Ss. 25FF and 25FFF. ~\n\nIn interpreting these provisions i.e. 25F, 25FF and 25FFF . ' • one must not ignore their object. The manifest object ofthese provisions is to so compensate the workman for loss of employment as to provide him the wherewithal to subsist until lie finds fresh em-· ployment. The non-inclusion of 'voluntary retirement of the work men, retirement of workmen on reaching the age of superannuation, termination of the service of a workman on the ground of couti11ued ill-health' in the definition of 'retrenchment' clearly indicate a1~<f emphasise what we have said about the true object of 25F, 25FF and\" 25FFF and the nature of the compensation provided by those provisions. The nature of retrenchment con )lensation has been explained in Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. V. the Workmen,(') as follows:\n\n(lJ [1960] 2 S.C.R. 32.\n\n~ I\n\n1:.\n\nSANTOSH GUPTA v. STATE BANK (Chinnappa Reddy, /.) 889\n\n\"As the expression 'retrenchment compensation' indicates it is compensation paid to a workman on his retrenchment and it is intended to give him some relief and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment inevitably causes. The retrenched workman is, suddenly and without his fault, thrown on the street and has to face the grim problem of unemployment. At the commencement of his employment a workmen naturally expects and looks forward to security of service spread over a long period but retrenchment destroys his hopes and expectations. The object of retrenchment compensation is to give partial protection to the retrenched employee and his family to enable them to tide over the hard period of unemployment\".\n\nOnce the object of 25F, 25FF and 25FFF is understood and the true nature of the compensation which those provisions provide is realised, it is difficult to make any distinction between termination of service for one reason and termination of service for another.\n\nDf. Anand Prakash wants us to hold that notwithstanding the comprehensive language of the defimtion of \"retrenchment\" in s. 2 (00) the expression continues to retain its original meaning which was, according to the counsel, discharged from service on account of 'surplusage'. It is impossible to accept his submission.\n\nIf the submission is right, there was no need to define the expression 'retrenchment', and in such wide terms. We cannot assume that the Parliament s undertaking an exercise in futility to give a long winded definition merely to say that the expression means what it always meant.\n\n'-, A.\n\nLet us now examine the precedents of this Court to discover whether the true position in law is what has been stated by us in the previous paragraphs. The earliest of the cases of this Court to which our attention was invited was Harprasad Shivashankar\n\nShukla v. A. D. Divikar (supra). That was a case which was decided before Ss. 25FF and 25FFF were brought on the statute book. In fact it was as a consequence of that decision that the Industrial Disputes Act had to be amended and these two provisions came to be introduced into the Act. The question which arose for decision in that case was stated by the learned judges themselves as follows:\n\n\"The question, however, before us is-does this definition merely give effect to the ordinary, accepted notion of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by 18-463SCl/80\n\nembodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does it go so far bcy,--nd the accepted notion of retrenchment as to include the termination of services of all workmen in an industry when the industry itself ceases to exist on a bonafide closure or discontinuance of his business by the employer\"\n\nThe question so stated was answered by the learned judges in the following way :\n\n\"In the absence of any compelling words to indicate that the intention was even to include a bonafide closure of the whole business, it would, we think, be divorcing the expression altogether from the context to give it such a wide meaning as is contended for by learned counsel for the respondents ......•• it would be against the entire scheme of the Act to give the definition clause relating to retrenchment t such a meaning as would include within the definition termination of service of all workmen by the employer when the business itself eeases to exist\".\n\nIt is true that there are some observations which, if not properly understood with referenee to the question at issue, seemingly support the submission of Dr. Anand Prakash that 'termination of serviee for any reason whatsoever' means no more and no less than discharge of a labour force which is a surplus age. The misuuderstanding of the observations and the resulting confusion stem from not appreciating (!)the lead question which was posed and answered by the learned judges and (2) that the reference to 'discharge on account of surplus age' was illustrative and not exhaustive and by way of contrast with discharge on account of transfer or closure of business.\n\nManagement of M/s Wi /cox Buckwe!l India Ltd. v. Jagannath and Ors.(1) and Employers in Re a1on to Digwadih Col iery v. Their , Workmen(2) were both cases where the termination of the Workman~ ! from service was on account of \"surplusage'' and, therefore, the ···\n\ncases were clear cases of retrenchment. They do not throw any light on the question now at issue.\n\nIn State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundaramoney(3) a Bench of three judges of this Court consisting of C!-candrachud J. (as he then was), Krishna_ Iyer, J., and Gupta , J., considered the question whether s. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was attracted to a ca'e where the order of appointment carried an automatic cessation of service,\n\n(I) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 1166.\n\n(2) [1%5] 3 S.C.R. 448.\n\n\nSANTOSH GUPTA v. STATE BANK (Chirmappa Reddy,!.) 891\n\nthe period of employment working itself out by efflux of time and not A by an act of employer, Krishna Iyer, J. who spoke for the Court observed.\n\n'Termination ...... for any reason whatsoever' are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is--has the employee's service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive: A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. . ....... True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract s. 25F and automatic extinguishment'of service be effiuxion of time cannot be sufficient ... Words of multiple import have to be winnowed judicially to suit the social philosophy of the statute So screened We hold that the transitive and intransitive senses are covered in the current context. Moreover, an employer terminates employment not merely by passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a composite order, one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it. A separate, subsequent determination is no.t the sole magnetic pull of the provision. A pre-emptive provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination. Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision\".\n\nIn ffndustan Steel Ltd. v. the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, )\"\"'\"Orissa and Ors.(') the question again arose whether termination of ser-\n\n\\_ vice by effil'X of time was termination of service within the definition of retrenchment in s. 2 (00) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Both the earlier decisions of the Court in Hariprasad Shivshartkar Shukla v. A.D. Divikar and State Bank of India v. S. Sundaramoney (supra) were considered. There was also a request that N. Sundaramoney's 'case con1ictcd with the decision in Harprasad Sh,.vshankar Shuk av. 'A. D. D'v kar and therefore required reconsideration. A Bench of • threeiudges of this Court consisting ofChandrachud J (as he then was), \"Goswami J and Gupta J held that there was nothing in Huriparsad \"Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. D\"vikar which was inconsistent with the\n\n•decision in N. Sundaramoney' s case. They held that the decision in\n\n(1) [1977] I S.C.R. 586.\n\n~ ,,\n\nllarivarsad Shivshankar's case was 1tat !le \\101ds \"fer any reason whatsoever\" used in the definition of retrencnmem would not include a bonafide closure of the wh<.,, o uusmsse because it would be against the entire scheme of the Act. The learned judges then observed that, on the facts before them to give full effect to the words \"for any reason whatsoever\" would be consistent with the scope and purpose of s. 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act and r.ot contrary to the schen:e of the Act. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhunath Mukherjee and Ors.,(1) Goswami, Shinghal and Jaswant Singh JJ, held that striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the management was termination of the service which was retrenchment within the meaning of s. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nDr. Anand Prakash, cited before us the decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr.(2) and some other cases decided by other High Courts purporting to follow the decision of this Court in llariparsad Shivshankar Shukla v.\n\nA. D. Divikar's case, Shuk!a's case, we have explained. The ratio of Shukla' s case in fact, has already been explained in Hindustan Steel, Ltd., v. the Presiding Officer, Labour Court Orissa\n\nand Ors. The decisions in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. the Presiding Officer, Labour Court Orissa and Ors., and State Bank of India v. N.Sundara money have, in our view, properly explained Shuk/a'scase and have laid down the correct! aw. The decision of the Kerala High Court in L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer Southern Railway & Anr.,(2) and the other decisions of the other High Courts to similar effect viz. The'.Managing Director, National Garages v. J. Gonsalvel3) Good/as Nerolac Paints v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi(4) and Rajasthan State Electricity Board. v. Labour Court,(') are, therefore, over-ruled. We hold, as a resul(of our discussion, that the discharge of the workman on the ground-she did not pass the test which would have enabled \\ her' to be confirmed was 'retrenchment' within the meaning of s. 2(00) \" and, therefore, the requirements of s. 2SF had to be complied with. The order of the Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum- , Labour Court, new Delhi, is set aside and the appellant is directed to be reinstated with full back wages.\n\nThe appellant is entitled to her costs.\n\nS. R.\n\n\n(2) [19791 1 L.L.J. 211.\n\n(3) [1962) 1 L.L.J. 56.\n\n(4) [1967] 1 L-L-J. 545.\n\n(5) [1966] 1 L.L.J. 381.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 84, "entities": [{"text": "SANTOSH GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.-Santosh Gupta", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 29, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 52, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SANTOSH GUPTA\n\nSTATE BANK OF PATIALA\n\nApril 29, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA !"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229, "end_char": 239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247, "end_char": 258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "the State Bank of Patiala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 307, "end_char": 332, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE BANK OF PATIALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 682, "end_char": 695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1941"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 703, "end_char": 732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 802, "end_char": 815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 903, "end_char": 913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 947, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1260, "end_char": 1269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1284, "end_char": 1307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1708, "end_char": 1721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1758, "end_char": 1769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1817, "end_char": 1830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3398, "end_char": 3406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3519, "end_char": 3529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3537, "end_char": 3547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3553, "end_char": 3563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By introducing section 25 FF and Section 25 FFF, Parliament treated the B: termination of the service of a work.man on the transfer or closure of an undertaking as \"deemed retrenchment\"."}}, {"text": "S. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4090, "end_char": 4096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4219, "end_char": 4229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 SCR 32", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4812, "end_char": 4827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4944, "end_char": 4957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 SCR 585", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5416, "end_char": 5432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 SCR 160", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5480, "end_char": 5496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1965] 3 SCR 4", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5772, "end_char": 5786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5990, "end_char": 5993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. 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Ramamurthi, and Romes/!"}}, {"text": "Anand Parkash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6475, "end_char": 6488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Anand Parkash, Aclarsh Kumar, Mrs. Laxmi Anand Parkash, and Jagat Arora for:the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "Anand Parkash"}}, {"text": "Aclarsh Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Anand Parkash, Aclarsh Kumar, Mrs. Laxmi Anand Parkash, and Jagat Arora for:the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Anand Parkash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6510, "end_char": 6529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Anand Parkash, Aclarsh Kumar, Mrs. Laxmi Anand Parkash, and Jagat Arora for:the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Jagat Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6535, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Anand Parkash, Aclarsh Kumar, Mrs. Laxmi Anand Parkash, and Jagat Arora for:the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHI~APPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6612, "end_char": 6626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHI~APPA REDDY, J.-Santosh Gupta, the appellant-Workman (a woman), was employed in the State Bank of Patiala, the Mall, Patiala, from July 13, 1973, till August 21, 1974, when her services were terminated."}}, {"text": "J.-Santosh Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6628, "end_char": 6644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHI~APPA REDDY, J.-Santosh Gupta, the appellant-Workman (a woman), was employed in the State Bank of Patiala, the Mall, Patiala, from July 13, 1973, till August 21, 1974, when her services were terminated.", "canonical_name": "J.-Santosh Gupta"}}, {"text": "Augnst 21, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Despite the breaks, the workman had admittedly worked for 240 days in 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respectively."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10001, "end_char": 10006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10014, "end_char": 10019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12046, "end_char": 12054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13147, "end_char": 13153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13226, "end_char": 13233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 32", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14048, "end_char": 14066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anand Prakash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15126, "end_char": 15139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anand Prakash wants us to hold that notwithstanding the comprehensive language of the defimtion of \"retrenchment\" in s. 2 (00) the expression continues to retain its original meaning which was, according to the counsel, discharged from service on account of 'surplusage'.", "canonical_name": "Anand Parkash"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15243, "end_char": 15247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ss. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16060, "end_char": 16067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16171, "end_char": 16194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C!-candrachud J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18656, "end_char": 18672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State Bank of India v. 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Sundaramoney", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21152, "end_char": 21167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also a request that N. Sundaramoney's 'case con1ictcd with the decision in Harprasad Sh,.vshankar Shuk av. '"}}, {"text": "ofChandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21344, "end_char": 21357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Bench of • threeiudges of this Court consisting ofChandrachud J (as he then was), \"Goswami J and Gupta J held that there was nothing in Huriparsad \"Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. D\"vikar which was inconsistent with the\n\n•decision in N. Sundaramoney' s case."}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21379, "end_char": 21386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Bench of • threeiudges of this Court consisting ofChandrachud J (as he then was), \"Goswami J and Gupta J held that there was nothing in Huriparsad \"Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. 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Sundaramoney' s case."}}, {"text": "llarivarsad Shivshankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21614, "end_char": 21637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ ,,\n\nllarivarsad Shivshankar's case was 1tat !"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22025, "end_char": 22030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22038, "end_char": 22061, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shinghal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22192, "end_char": 22200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(1) Goswami, Shinghal and Jaswant Singh JJ, held that striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the management was termination of the service which was retrenchment within the meaning of s. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act."}}, {"text": "Jaswant Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22205, "end_char": 22218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(1) Goswami, Shinghal and Jaswant Singh JJ, held that striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the management was termination of the service which was retrenchment within the meaning of s. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22377, "end_char": 22385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22393, "end_char": 22416, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22490, "end_char": 22507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Anand Prakash, cited before us the decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr.(2) and some other cases decided by other High Courts purporting to follow the decision of this Court in llariparsad Shivshankar Shukla v.\n\nA. D. Divikar's case, Shuk!a's case, we have explained."}}, {"text": "Shuk!a", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22739, "end_char": 22745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Anand Prakash, cited before us the decision of a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr.(2) and some other cases decided by other High Courts purporting to follow the decision of this Court in llariparsad Shivshankar Shukla v.\n\nA. D. Divikar's case, Shuk!a's case, we have explained.", "canonical_name": "Shuk!a"}}, {"text": "Shukla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22786, "end_char": 22792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio of Shukla' s case in fact, has already been explained in Hindustan Steel, Ltd., v. the Presiding Officer, Labour Court Orissa\n\nand Ors.", "canonical_name": "Shuk!a"}}, {"text": "Shuk", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23094, "end_char": 23098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and State Bank of India v. N.Sundara money have, in our view, properly explained Shuk/a'scase and have laid down the correct!", "canonical_name": "Shuk!a"}}, {"text": "s. 2(00)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23727, "end_char": 23735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23774, "end_char": 23779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum- , Labour Court, new Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23842, "end_char": 23906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the Presiding Officer, Central Govt."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_893_901_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "... .(\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nJ. K. GAS PLANT\n\nApril 29, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZ.AL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.J\n\nContract Act, Section 10, Scope of-Conditions to be applied-Government <Jf lndia Act, 1935, Section 175(3), applicability of-Defence of India Act, Section 17(2), scope of.\n\nThe appellant had supplied some steel to the respondent plaintiff Company for manufacturing gas plants at Rampur. Only a part of the steel so supplied C was utilised for the intended purpose and with regard to the rest, the Regional Deputy Iron & Steel Controiler, U.P. Circle, Kanpur directed the respondents through a letter dated 8th/10th of November, 1944 to deliver the same to the U.P. Registered Stock Holders Associations and to send to the Kanpur office, the bill of costs of the material, handling charges etc. made in the name of Iron & Steel Controller, Calcutta. Since the order contained in that letter could not be implemented on account of lack of transport facilities, the Kanpur Con- D troller, directed the respondent .company to deliver the surplus steel to MfS\n\nG. Brothers Ltd., Rampur and to this extent the order dated 8th/10th November 1944 stood modified.\n\nThough the surplns material was delivered to Govan Brothers between 11th April 1945• and 30th of April, 1945, the price therefor to the tune of Rs. 43,728-6-6 remained unpaid inspite of repeated demands made by the E respondent. Ultimately, the Iron & Steel Controller informed the respondent to take up the matter with Govan Brothers.\n\nAs the price of the steel remained unpaid by the Union of India as well as G. Brothers the plaintiff company filed its suit for Rs. 46,652-14-6 which was inclusive of interest on the principal price calculated at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from April, 1945, upto the date of the institution of the suit, after F Y' serving the defendant with the requisite notice under section 80 of the Code of\n\n' Civil Procedure. \\\n\nThe trial Court decreed the claim of the plaintiff company in full and also directed that it would be entitled to the costs of the suit as also interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit to the date of payment. The trial Court held that the Kanpur Controller had undertaken the liability to pay the price of the goods to the plaintiff company even in respect of the delivery to G. Brothers and that the defendant could not escape liability by reason of the contents of section 65 of the Indian Contract Act even though the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, had not been complied with. The contention raised by the defendant to the effect that section 17(2) of the Defence of India Act was a bar to the suit was negatived.\n\nIn appeal, the High Court agreed that Se<:tion 17(2) of the Defence of India Act would be a complete bar to the suit if it was one for damages. or\n\n894 SUPREME COURl' REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\n~ compensation but held that the suit was not of that nature and, on the other hand, it was for recovery of the price of the goods supplied to G. Brothers as was also found by the trial Court.\n\nIt further held that even though the provisions of section 17 5 ( 3) of tbe Government of India Act were not complied with the agreement resulting from the correspondence which took place between the plaintiff company and the officers of the detendant '\\Vas good.\n\nRelying on Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act and on the basis thereof, it held the B plaintiff company to be entitled to recover the price of the goods from the defendant even if it was assumed that the provisions of section 175(3) were a bar to the recognition of the contract envisaged by the correspondence bt:tween the parties. The High Court dismissed the appeal, but granted a certificate under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution to the appellant.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The suit is not one for Compensation or damages etc. as contemplated by Section 17 (2) of the Defence of India Act and hence is not barred by .oat section [898 Al.\n\n2. The legality of the matter under which the respondent company transferred its stock to G. Brothers cannot be allowed to be questioned at the appellate stage.\n\nThe question whether the requirements of clause (5) of the Indian Iron and Steel Control Order, 1941 which postulates only a written direction for disposal of surplus stocks were satisfied or not is a mixed question of fact and law which was never raised in the Courts below. Further tbe plea taken in paragraph ( 4) of the written statements filed by th'e appellant wais categorically to the effect that \"the fresh instructions issued to the plaintiff are contained in the letter in the possession of the plaintiff\" runs counter to the factual part of the argument. Besides another question would arise whether the word \"vrritten\" in clause (5) aforesaid is di.rectory or mandatory.\n\n[898 C-D1\n\n3. Three conditions must be satisfied before Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act can be invoked : first, a person should lawfully do something for another person or deliver something to him; second, in doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must not intend to act gratuitously; and third, the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. [898 H, 899 A] \\\n\nIn the instant case, the appellant had enjoyed the full benefit of the delivery • or the gooJs to G. Bros. and not merely an. indirect benefit thereof.\n\n[901 B]\n\nState of West Bengal v. M/s. B. K. Monda/ [1962] 2 Suppl.\n\nS.C.R. 876; .. reiterated,\n\nS. I. Indian Rly. Co. v. Madura Municipality, A.LR. 1964 l\\1adras 427; distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPfl.LA TE\n\nJURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1273/70.\n\nH Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 28·1-1966 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 431 of 1957.\n\nUNION v . .) . K. GAS PLANT (Kasha/, J.) 895\n\nP. P. Rao, Subodh Markendeya, R. Venkataramani and Miss A.\n\nA Subhashini for the Appellant.\n\nSo/i. J. Sorabjee and Ramesh war Nath for the Respondent.\n\nThe Jnc1grr.ent of the C0 urt wos delivered by\n\nKOSHAL, J. This appeal by certificate granted under article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India by the Allahabad High Court B is directed against its judgment dated the 28th of January, 1966, confirming on appeal a decree passed by the Civil Judge, Kanpur, for the ,; recovery of Rs. 46,652-14-6 with interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit till payment in ,.. favour of Mis. J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited\n\n' '\n\nagainst the sole defendant, namely, the Union ofindia.\n\n2. The case of the plaintiff company may be briefly stated thus.\n\nThe Government of India had supplied some steel to the plaintiff company for manufacturing gas plants at Rampur. Only a part of the steel so supplied was utilized for the intended purpose and with regard to the rest the Regional Deputy Iron and Steel Controller, U.P. Circle, Kanpur (hereinafter reterred to as the Kanpur Controller) directed D the plaintiff company through a letter dated the 8th/10th of November, 1944 (exhibit 16) to deliver the same to the U.P. Registered Stock Holders Association Kanpur (for short the Association). Jn relation to the recovery of price of the material the letter statec' :\n\n\"Your bill for cost of the material supported by original receipts from suppliers should be made out in the name ofiron and Steel Controller, Calcutta, and submitted to this office.\n\nPlease make out a separate bill for handling, storage expenses, etc., and send to this 0ffice supported with original freight and payee's receipt.\" The order contained in letter exhibit 16 could not be implemented on ace .i•nt' flack of transport facilities. The Kanpur Controller therefore directed the plaintiff company to deliver the surplus tee! to M/s.\n\nGovan Brothers Ltd., , Rampur (hereinafter referred to as G. Brothers) and to this extent the order contained in letter exhibit 16 stood modified.\n\nThe plaintiff company delivered to G. Brothers the surplus material G lying with it between the I Ith April, 1945 and 30th of April, 1945.\n\nThe deliveries totalled 135 tons, 6 cwts., 1 quarter and 1 pound, the price whereof amonted to Rs. 43,728-6-6 which remained unpaid inspite of repeated demands made by the plaintiff company through letters addressed to the Kanpur Controller to whom the bills bad been forwarded as desired. Ultimately th~ plaintiff company was informed H by the Accounts Officer attached to the Iron and Steel Controller, Calcutta, that it should take up the matter with G. Brothers. ·\n\nA As the price of the steel remained unpaid by the Union of India\n\nas well as G. Brothers the plaintiff company filed its suit for Rs. 46,652-14-6 which was inclusive of interest on the principal price calculated at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from April, 1945, up to the date of the institution of the suit, after serving the defendant with the requisite notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\n3. In its written:statement the Union of India admitted the correctness of the order contained in letter exhibit 16. It pleaded however that that order was cancelled in toto and not merely in regard to the party to whom the plaintiff company had to make over the surplus steel. It was specifically denied that the disputed goods had been delivered to G. Brothers at the risk and responsibility of the defendant and that the defendant was liable to pay the price thereof.\n\nIt was asserted that the defendant was merely controlling the supply and distribution of iron and steel and that the liability to pay the price of any goods dealt with by it in the exercise of its powers of control rested upon the party receiving the goods. Another plea taken was that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India!Act, 1935, lwhich enjoins that a contract between the Government oflndia and a third party has to be in writing and in a particular form.\n\nIt was emphasized that G. Brothers alone were liable for the payment demanded by the plaintiff company.\n\n4. The trial courtiheld that the Kanpur Controller had undertaken the liability to' pay the price of the goods to the plaintiff company even in respect of the delivery to G. Brothers and that the defendant could\n\nnofescapeliability bY'.reason of the contents of section 65 of the Indian Contract Act even though the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, had not been complied with. The contention raised by the defendant to the effect that section 17(2) of the Defence oflndia Act was a bar to the suit was negatived by the trial court. Some other findings were also arrived at which are not relevant for the purposes of this appeal.\n\nThe trial court therefore decreed the claimlof the plaintiff company in full and also directed that it would be entitled to the costs of the suit as also interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit to the date of payment.\n\n5. When the[first appeal came np for hearing before the High Court the contention based on the provisions of section 17(2) of the Defence of India Act was reiterated on the ground that the suit was one for damages or compensation. Section 17(2) states :\n\n\"Save as otherwise expressly provided under this Act, no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Crown for\n\nany damage caused or likely to be caused by anything in good A faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this_Act or any rules made thereunder or any order issued under any such rule.\"\n\nThe High Court agreed with the learned counsel for the defendant that this section would be a complete bar to the suit if it was one for damages or compensation but held that the suit was not of that nature and, on the other hand, it was for recovery of the price of the goods supplied to G. Brothers as was also found by the trial court. The contention was therefore rejected as untenable. The High Court then proceeded to examine the true nature of the transaction culminating in the delivery of steel to G. Brothers and held that the defendant had failed to establish that the direction regarding preparation and submission of bills contained in letter exhibit 16 had been cancelled when the plaintiff company was required to deliver the goods to G. Brothers. It was further held that even though the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act were not complied with the agreement resulting from the correspondence which took place between the plaintiff company and the officers of the defendant was good. In this connection reliance was placed on Debi Prasad Srikrishna PrasadJLtd. V- Secretary of State(I). The sheet anchor of the judgment of the High Court however was its reliance on section 70\n\nof the Indian Contract Act and on the basis thereof it held the plaintiff company to be entitled to recover the price of the goods from the defendant even if it was assumed that the provisions of section 175(3) were a bar to the recognition of the contract envisaged by the correspondence between the parties. In this connection reference was made to New Marine Coal Co. (Bengai) Private Ltd. v. Union of Jndia(2).\n\nIt was argued before the High Court that the conditions requisite for the applicability of section 70 of the Indian Contract Act were not available in the present case in as much as the defendant had not been shown to have enjoyed the benefit of the transaction which accrued only to G. Brothers. The High Court however took a contrary view with the observation:\n\n\"The benefit or advantage that has been derived by the defendants lies in the fact that it has been able to distribute the stock to persons of its choice according to the rules and regulations framed by it.\"\n\nIt was in these premises that the High Court dismissed the defendant's appeal with costs.\n\n(1) A I. R. 1941 All. 377.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 152.\n\n6. The argument based on section 17(2) of the Defence oflndia Act has been reiterated before us but it has merely to be noticed to be rejected. We are clearly. of the opinion that the suit is not for damages, etc., such as are contemplated by that section. ·\n\n7. It was seriously argued on behalf of the defendant that throughout the period during which the Kanpur Controller dealt with the matter in dispute he was exercising the powers conferred on him under the Iron and Steel Control Order,1941, that under clause 5 of that order the plaintiff company could dispose of its stock of steel only in pursuance of a written direction from the Kanpur Controller and that the mandate issued by the Kanpur Controller to the plaintiff company requiring the latter to deliver the goods to G. Brothers having been found to be an oral one, the whole transaction fell outside the ambit of the law so that the Union of India could not be bound by it. The argument as it stands does not lack plausibility although it would be a question whether the word 'written' occurring in clause\n\n(5) of the Indian Iron and Steel Control order is directory or mandatory.\n\nHowever we refuse to allow the argument to be raised and\n\ntha~ for two reasons. Firstly, it is a mixed question of fact and law which was never raised in the courts below. Secondly, the plea taken in paragraph 4 of the written statement filed by the defendant was categorically to the effect that \"the fresh instructions issued to the plaintiff are contained in the letter in the possession of the plain\n\ntiff\", which plea runs counter to the factual part of the argument. In this view <f the matter the legality of the order under which the plaintiff company transferred its stock to G. Brothers cannot be allowed to be questioned at this a stage.\n\n8. The only other ground put forward in support of the appeal was that the provisions of section 70 of the Indian Contract Act were not applicable to the facts of the present case. That section reads:\n\n\"Where a person lawfully does anything for another person or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.\"\n\nAs pointed out in State of West Bengal v. Mis. B.K. Moftdal(1), three conditions must be satisfied before this section can be invoked:\n\n\"The first condition is that a person should lawfully do some\n\nthing for another Person or deliver something to him. The second condition is that in doing the said thing or delivering, the said\n\n(I) [1962] I Supp. S. C. R. 876\n\n• (\n\n\"·--t\n\nthing he must not intend to act gratuitously; and the third is that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof.\n\nWhen these conditions are satisfied section 70 imposes upon the latter person, the liability to make compensation to the former in respect of or to restore. the thing so done or delivered.\"\n\nOn behalf of the defendant the objection raised to the applicability of this section to the transaction in dispute is two-fold. The first contention in this behalf is that the delivery to G. Brothers was unlawful-a contention which we have already turned down. Secondly it is said that no benefit at all was derived from the transaction by the Union of India and that its sole beneficiaries were G. Brothers. This objection has not only been overruled by the High Court but appears to us also to be without substance. In this connection reference may be made to some documentary and oral evidence. To begin with, letter exhibit 16 which directed the plaintiff company to deliver the\n\ngoods to the Association specificirlly required that the plaintiff com- D pany would make the bills in the name of the Iron and Steel Controller, Calcutta, and send them for payment to the Kanpur Controller, The inference which may reasonably be drawn from the contents of the letter is that the Kanpur Controller was dealing with the goods as if they belonged to the Government of India whose duty it was to pay for them when they changed hands. and that the idrnti; y cf the party to E whom the goods were to be delivered by the plaintill cc111pany under the orders of the Kanpur Contrcllcr was immaterial. Secondly, the Kanpur Controller (Mr.R.R. Chari) in his dcpcsiticn dnt<d the 24th of June, 1946 made before the Second Special, Tribunal, Lahore (Camp Bombay) in Criminal Case No. 3 of 1946, stated thus:\n\n\"In September. 1944, J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., Rampur, Ltd., handed over 137 tons of iron and.steel to Messrs .\n\nGovan Brothers, Rampur, under instructions from our Dcpa1tment. Messrs Govan Brothers thus held the, materials on behalf of the Government.\"\n\nIt has been urged by learned counsel for the defendant that this statement is not admissible in evidence as it was not made at the trial of the case in hand. ButJit is toollate in the day for such an objection to be entertained. The statement was admitted in evidence as exhibit 15 at the trial presumably, without1.objectioRand cannot now be thrown out. According to it G. Brothers held the supply of steel made to them by the plaintiff company not for themselves but on behalf of the Government. Besides, a letter (exhibit 51) which was issued by the\n\nA .Kanpur Controller to Mr. Siddiq Ali Khan of the Department of Industries and Commerce, Rampur, also states:\n\n\"In thiS:connection I may mention that the steel is virtually the property of the Government of India, War Transport Department and under no circumstances can the Government loose B money in the bargain. I am obtaining the actual cost of the materials plus all incidental charges and I will let you know the amount to be paid by each party alongwith written orders regularising the issue of these materials to the various parties.\n\nI have to hold you and you in turn Messrs. Govan Bros. (Rampur) Ltd., responsible for the recovery of the cost of the C materials when intimated to you.\"\n\nThere is no reason for us to hold, in view of this statement that the steel supplied by the plaintiff company to G. Brothers was not being held by the latter on behalf of the Government of India and if that be so, the Government must be held to have reaped full bene- ' . fit of the delivery to G. Brothers and it is immaterial how the steel supplied to the latter was dealt with later on.\n\n9. Learned counsel for the defendant cited S. I. Railway Co.\n\nv. Madura Municipa,'ity (') for the proposition that the benefit to the defendant was in any case an indirect one which would not faUwithin the ambit of the third condition envisaged by the provisions of section 70 of the Indian Contract Act. In that case the South Indian Railway had widened a culvert in compliance with an order passed by the Provincial Government under certain provisions of the Railways Act,\n\n1890. The work was done primarily for the benefit of the private owners of property in the neighbourhood. The Railway Company however sued the Municipal Committee within the territorial limits of whose jurisdiction the culvert lay for the cost of widening it on the ground that the Municipal Committee received a benefit because it recovered taxes from the owners or occupiers of the property. In turning down the claim of the South Indian Raihvay Company Leach.\n\nC. J., who delivered the judgment of the division Bench consisting of himself and Lakshmana Rao, J., stated:\n\n\"This is a very indirect benefit, and section 70 can in our opinion only have application where there is direct benefit to the person for whom the work is done.\n\nThe persons who are eajoying the benefit o! this work are the owners and occupiers of the buildings in the locality. Tt would be doing violence to\n\n(!) A. I. R. 1945 Madras 427.\n\nthe section to say that in these circumstances the work was done A, for the benefit of the municipality.\"\n\nThe judgment of the Division Bench was upheld by their Lord - ships of the Privy Council in Governor-General In Council, Represented by the General Manager, South Indian Railway v. Municipal Council, Madura, Through its Commissioner along with the reasons on which it was based. But then the case is of no help to the defendant\n\nwho had enjoyed\"the fullbenefitof the delivery\"of goods to G. Brothers and not merely an indirect benefit thereof.\n\n10. For the reasons stated the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeal dismissed", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "J. K. GAS PLANT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. K. GAS PLANT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 29, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 55, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nJ. K. GAS PLANT\n\nApril 29, 1980\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZ.AL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.J\n\nContract Act, Section 10, Scope of-Conditions to be applied-Government <Jf lndia Act, 1935, Section 175(3), applicability of-Defence of India Act, Section 17(2), scope of."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZ.AL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 79, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. D. KosHAL, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.D. KOSHAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jf lndia Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jf lndia Act, 1935", "statute": "Jf lndia Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 229, "end_char": 249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251, "end_char": 264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Defence of India Act", "statute": "Defence of India Act"}}, {"text": "8th/10th of November, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 610, "end_char": 636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only a part of the steel so supplied C was utilised for the intended purpose and with regard to the rest, the Regional Deputy Iron & Steel Controiler, U.P. Circle, Kanpur directed the respondents through a letter dated 8th/10th of November, 1944 to deliver the same to the U.P. Registered Stock Holders Associations and to send to the Kanpur office, the bill of costs of the material, handling charges etc."}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 726, "end_char": 732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only a part of the steel so supplied C was utilised for the intended purpose and with regard to the rest, the Regional Deputy Iron & Steel Controiler, U.P. Circle, Kanpur directed the respondents through a letter dated 8th/10th of November, 1944 to deliver the same to the U.P. Registered Stock Holders Associations and to send to the Kanpur office, the bill of costs of the material, handling charges etc."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 843, "end_char": 851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "made in the name of Iron & Steel Controller, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Rampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1078, "end_char": 1084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the order contained in that letter could not be implemented on account of lack of transport facilities, the Kanpur Con- D troller, directed the respondent .company to deliver the surplus steel to MfS\n\nG. Brothers Ltd., Rampur and to this extent the order dated 8th/10th November 1944 stood modified."}}, {"text": "8th/10th November 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1120, "end_char": 1142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the order contained in that letter could not be implemented on account of lack of transport facilities, the Kanpur Con- D troller, directed the respondent .company to deliver the surplus steel to MfS\n\nG. Brothers Ltd., Rampur and to this extent the order dated 8th/10th November 1944 stood modified."}}, {"text": "Govan Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1205, "end_char": 1219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the surplns material was delivered to Govan Brothers between 11th April 1945• and 30th of April, 1945, the price therefor to the tune of Rs."}}, {"text": "11th April 1945•", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1228, "end_char": 1244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the surplns material was delivered to Govan Brothers between 11th April 1945• and 30th of April, 1945, the price therefor to the tune of Rs."}}, {"text": "30th of April, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1249, "end_char": 1268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though the surplns material was delivered to Govan Brothers between 11th April 1945• and 30th of April, 1945, the price therefor to the tune of Rs."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1546, "end_char": 1560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the price of the steel remained unpaid by the Union of India as well as G. Brothers the plaintiff company filed its suit for Rs."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1872, "end_char": 1882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kanpur Controller", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2209, "end_char": 2226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial Court held that the Kanpur Controller had undertaken the liability to pay the price of the goods to the plaintiff company even in respect of the delivery to G. Brothers and that the defendant could not escape liability by reason of the contents of section 65 of the Indian Contract Act even though the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, had not been complied with."}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2437, "end_char": 2447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2455, "end_char": 2474, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2505, "end_char": 2519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2527, "end_char": 2556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2644, "end_char": 2657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3162, "end_char": 3172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3187, "end_char": 3210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3387, "end_char": 3397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3405, "end_char": 3424, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3597, "end_char": 3611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3781, "end_char": 3795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3955, "end_char": 3965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government of India Act", "statute": "Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "G. Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4138, "end_char": 4149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legality of the matter under which the respondent company transferred its stock to G. Brothers cannot be allowed to be questioned at the appellate stage."}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4969, "end_char": 4988, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "UNION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5867, "end_char": 5872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION v . .) ."}}, {"text": "K. GAS PLANT", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5882, "end_char": 5894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. GAS PLANT (Kasha/, J.) 895\n\nP. P. Rao, Subodh Markendeya, R. Venkataramani and Miss A.\n\nA Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5913, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. GAS PLANT (Kasha/, J.) 895\n\nP. P. Rao, Subodh Markendeya, R. Venkataramani and Miss A.\n\nA Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Subodh Markendeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5924, "end_char": 5941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. GAS PLANT (Kasha/, J.) 895\n\nP. P. Rao, Subodh Markendeya, R. Venkataramani and Miss A.\n\nA Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Venkataramani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5943, "end_char": 5959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. GAS PLANT (Kasha/, J.) 895\n\nP. P. Rao, Subodh Markendeya, R. Venkataramani and Miss A.\n\nA Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.\n\nA Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5969, "end_char": 5985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. GAS PLANT (Kasha/, J.) 895\n\nP. P. Rao, Subodh Markendeya, R. Venkataramani and Miss A.\n\nA Subhashini for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6012, "end_char": 6023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/i. J. Sorabjee and Ramesh war Nath for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Ramesh war Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6028, "end_char": 6043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/i. J. Sorabjee and Ramesh war Nath for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KOSHAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6113, "end_char": 6119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jnc1grr.ent of the C0 urt wos delivered by\n\nKOSHAL, J. This appeal by certificate granted under article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India by the Allahabad High Court B is directed against its judgment dated the 28th of January, 1966, confirming on appeal a decree passed by the Civil Judge, Kanpur, for the ,; recovery of Rs."}}, {"text": "article 133(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6165, "end_char": 6182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6190, "end_char": 6211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6542, "end_char": 6586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited\n\n' '\n\nagainst the sole defendant, namely, the Union ofindia."}}, {"text": "Union ofindia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6633, "end_char": 6646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Company Limited\n\n' '\n\nagainst the sole defendant, namely, the Union ofindia.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6719, "end_char": 6738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India had supplied some steel to the plaintiff company for manufacturing gas plants at Rampur."}}, {"text": "U.P. Registered Stock Holders Association Kanpur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7176, "end_char": 7224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only a part of the steel so supplied was utilized for the intended purpose and with regard to the rest the Regional Deputy Iron and Steel Controller, U.P. Circle, Kanpur (hereinafter reterred to as the Kanpur Controller) directed D the plaintiff company through a letter dated the 8th/10th of November, 1944 (exhibit 16) to deliver the same to the U.P. Registered Stock Holders Association Kanpur (for short the Association)."}}, {"text": "Govan Brothers Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7871, "end_char": 7890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to M/s.\n\nGovan Brothers Ltd., , Rampur (hereinafter referred to as G. Brothers) and to this extent the order contained in letter exhibit 16 stood modified."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9003, "end_char": 9013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9017, "end_char": 9044, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9960, "end_char": 9978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another plea taken was that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India!Act, 1935, lwhich enjoins that a contract between the Government oflndia and a third party has to be in writing and in a particular form."}}, {"text": "section 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10412, "end_char": 10422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10430, "end_char": 10449, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10480, "end_char": 10494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10502, "end_char": 10531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10619, "end_char": 10632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11192, "end_char": 11205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11314, "end_char": 11327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12471, "end_char": 12485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12861, "end_char": 12871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12880, "end_char": 12899, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 175(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13069, "end_char": 13083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13380, "end_char": 13390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13398, "end_char": 13417, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 17(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14036, "end_char": 14049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14522, "end_char": 14530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15899, "end_char": 15909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15917, "end_char": 15936, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16896, "end_char": 16906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kanpur Contrcllcr", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18310, "end_char": 18327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and that the idrnti; y cf the party to E whom the goods were to be delivered by the plaintill cc111pany under the orders of the Kanpur Contrcllcr was immaterial."}}, {"text": "R.R. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18380, "end_char": 18390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, the Kanpur Controller (Mr.R.R. Chari) in his dcpcsiticn dnt<d the 24th of June, 1946 made before the Second Special, Tribunal, Lahore (Camp Bombay) in Criminal Case No."}}, {"text": "24th of June,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18420, "end_char": 18433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, the Kanpur Controller (Mr.R.R. Chari) in his dcpcsiticn dnt<d the 24th of June, 1946 made before the Second Special, Tribunal, Lahore (Camp Bombay) in Criminal Case No."}}, {"text": "Second Special, Tribunal, Lahore (Camp Bombay)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18455, "end_char": 18501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, the Kanpur Controller (Mr.R.R. Chari) in his dcpcsiticn dnt<d the 24th of June, 1946 made before the Second Special, Tribunal, Lahore (Camp Bombay) in Criminal Case No."}}, {"text": "J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., Rampur, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18569, "end_char": 18615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1944, J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co., Rampur, Ltd., handed over 137 tons of iron and.steel to Messrs ."}}, {"text": "Govan Brothers, Rampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18669, "end_char": 18691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govan Brothers, Rampur, under instructions from our Dcpa1tment."}}, {"text": "A .Kanpur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19365, "end_char": 19374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, a letter (exhibit 51) which was issued by the\n\nA .Kanpur Controller to Mr. Siddiq Ali Khan of the Department of Industries and Commerce, Rampur, also states:\n\n\"In thiS:connection I may mention that the steel is virtually the property of the Government of India, War Transport Department and under no circumstances can the Government loose B money in the bargain."}}, {"text": "Siddiq Ali Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19393, "end_char": 19408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, a letter (exhibit 51) which was issued by the\n\nA .Kanpur Controller to Mr. Siddiq Ali Khan of the Department of Industries and Commerce, Rampur, also states:\n\n\"In thiS:connection I may mention that the steel is virtually the property of the Government of India, War Transport Department and under no circumstances can the Government loose B money in the bargain."}}, {"text": "Department of Industries and Commerce, Rampur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19416, "end_char": 19461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, a letter (exhibit 51) which was issued by the\n\nA .Kanpur Controller to Mr. Siddiq Ali Khan of the Department of Industries and Commerce, Rampur, also states:\n\n\"In thiS:connection I may mention that the steel is virtually the property of the Government of India, War Transport Department and under no circumstances can the Government loose B money in the bargain."}}, {"text": "Govan Bros. (Rampur) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19952, "end_char": 19977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I have to hold you and you in turn Messrs. Govan Bros. (Rampur) Ltd., responsible for the recovery of the cost of the C materials when intimated to you.\""}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20721, "end_char": 20731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20739, "end_char": 20758, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "South Indian Railway", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20777, "end_char": 20797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the South Indian Railway had widened a culvert in compliance with an order passed by the Provincial Government under certain provisions of the Railways Act,\n\n1890."}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20916, "end_char": 20928, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "South Indian Raihvay Company Leach", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21358, "end_char": 21392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In turning down the claim of the South Indian Raihvay Company Leach."}}, {"text": "Lakshmana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21477, "end_char": 21490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. J., who delivered the judgment of the division Bench consisting of himself and Lakshmana Rao, J., stated:\n\n\"This is a very indirect benefit, and section 70 can in our opinion only have application where there is direct benefit to the person for whom the work is done."}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21543, "end_char": 21553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_902_914_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "DR. J. P. KULSHRESHTHA AND ORS.\n\nCHANCELLOR, ALLAHABAD UNIVERS11'Y,\n\nRAJ BHAWAN AND ORS.\n\nApril 30, 1980\n\nIV. R. KRISHNA IYER. A. D. KosHAL \"\"\" 0. 011NNAPPA\n\nREDDY, JJ.]\n\nOrdinance 9(2) of the University of Allahabad issued under section 32(2) (/) of the Allahabad University Act, 1921-Whether striCt compliance regarding the qualifications etc. prescribed for appolntment of teachers is necessary- Wflether non-compliance vitiates the selection.\n\nSix posts of Readers in the English Department of the University fell vacant and applications were invited by advertisement. The appellants and respondent<; 5 to 10, among others were applicants and they were all serving as lecturers in the U n!versity at that time.\n\nSin Ce section 29 of the Allahabad University Act, 1921 stipulates that teachers of the University shll be appointed by the Executive Council on the recommendations of the Selection Committee. a Selection Committee was constituted.\n\nThe selection committee has to do the statutory exercise of choosing the best among the applicants in conformity with the minimum qualifications prescribed under Ordinance 9(2) of the University.\n\nBut the committee chose to interview the candidates who were otherwise eligible for consideration. 13 applicants turned up for interview. Respondent 9, Dr.\n\nRhattacharya and appellant Skand Gupta resented the viva voce test as unautho rised and did not care to appear for the interview.\n\nHowever Dr. Bhattacharya. on being persuaded, did later turn up, was intervi'ewed and eventually included in the Select List.\n\nSkand Gupta did not enjoy the benefit of a second pursuation to present himself for interview, did not appear befor'e the Selection Committee a.nd missed the bus.\n\nRespondentc; 5 to 10 were chooen and on the recommendation, the Executive Council made their appointment. The appellants thereupon moved the Chancellor under section 42 of the Act requesting him to cancel the appointments of respondents 5 to 10.\n\nBut by an order dated November 22, 1973 he upheld the selection and appointment. The appellants, therefore, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and impugned the selection process and the appointments on various grounds. The. teamed single judge considered the merits of the contentions c.nd concluded that the selections and the consequent iappointments were bad in law except in regard to respondents 7 and 10 and directed the University to make fresh selection and fill up the vacancies.\n\nRespondents 5 to 6 and 8 and 9 went in appeal to the Division Bench which accepted their appeals and reversed the judgment of the\n\nsingle judge in; its entirety and hence the appeal by special Ie:ive.\n\nAllowing the appeal the Court,\n\nHEID: 1. Any Administrative or quasi-judicial body clothed with pawers and left unfettered by procedures is free to device its own pragmatic, flexible and functiona11y viable processes of transacting business subj'ect. of course, to the basics of natural justice, fadr play in acCon, reasonableness in collecting dcci~ sional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and etraneous considerations a.nd\n\n...\n\n,..\n\nJ. P. KULSHRESHTHA v. ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY 903\n\notherwise keeping within the leading strings of the law. Though there is no flaw in the methodology of interviews, certainly, (:ases arise where the art of interviewing .candidates deteriorates from strategy to strategem and undetectable\n\nrnanipultion of results is achieved by remote control tactics masked as viva voce tests.\n\nThis, if allO\\\\'ed is surely a s:.ibotage of the purity or proceedings, a subterfuge whreby legal means to reach il!egal ends is achieved.\n\nSo, it is that Courts insist on recording of' ma.rks at interviews and oth'er fair checks like guidelines for murks a.nd remarks, about candidates and the like. If the Court is skeptioal, the record of the Selection proceedings., including the notes regarding the interviews, may have to be made available. Interviews, as such, are not bad but polluting it to attain illegitimate ends is bad [908 H, 909 A-CJ\n\n2. Social scientists and educational avant garde may find pitfalls in our system of education and condemn the unscientific aspects of marks as the measure of merit, things as they now stand. But, however imperfect a.nd obtuse th'e current sYstem and however urgent the modernisation of our courses cul~\n\nminating in examinations may be: the fact remains that the Court has to go by what is extent and cannot explore on its own or ignore the measure of merit adopted by universities. Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread.\n\nSo the criterion of marks and class, the Allahabad University has laid down is sound, although to swear religiously by class and grade may be exaggerated reverence ood false scales if strictly scrutinised by progressive criteria. [909, E-Gl\n\n3. The prescription of a high second class in Ordinance 9 is a mandatory nnrumum.\n\nA glance at the relevant portion of Ordinance 9 reveals t:OOt wherever relaxation of qualifications is intended, the Ordina.nce specifically spells it out and by necessary implication, where it has not said so, the possession of such qualification is imperative. The ordinance has a purpose when it prescribes at least a high second class for a. R'eader's post. It is obligatory.\n\n[909 H. 910 A, C-DJ\n\n4. ''High\" is the antithesis of \"low\" and a high second' class is, therefore, a contrast to a low second class. When the range of a second class marks is wide, of the candidate who gets that cle6S with marks within the lower half bracket it C&llnot be said that he gets a high second c]ass. If he manages to get 48 marks he barely gets a second class not a high second class. An<l commonsense, which is not an enemy of Courtsense, points clearly to the meaning 1 of hi!:h \"second class as one where the marks fall a little short of first class marks and\n\n1\"- be narrowly misses first class. In the context of Ordinance 9 and its purpose and the co!locution of words used viz. 'first class or a high second cJ.ass', the interpreta.tion will misfire if the Court diregard the intent and effect of the adjective 1 'high' and indifferently read it to mean merely the minimum marks needed to bring the candidate within the second class.\n\nHigh is high and a sup'erior second class denotes marks somewhere near first class mark<;.\n\nEven by relaxing, diluting and liberalising the rigour clearly imported bv the rlraftsman by using the expression \"high second class\", still it is impermissible to render the \\Vord 'high' nugatory or make, by construction, that inten'li\"e adjective redundant.\n\nNor did the University has all these years treat ri hinh .;;:cond class to mean a mere second class and English has not lost its potrncy in he Allahabad University so oo to include low in high. The utmost construction would be : Draw a line at midpo1nt, and marks .above and below that tine will be high and low second' class respectiv'ely.\n\nJn the instant case, the mid-line\n\nA being 54 those who have not secured above 54 cannot claim to ha.ve obtaioed a higi1 second class and are ineligible. [910 D\"H, 911 A, DJ\n\nS. It is true that the Selection Committee is an expert body.\n\nBut their ex- \" pertise is not in law, but in other branches of learning and the final interpreta .-_ tion of an Ordinance is a legal skill outside the academic orbit. .£911 EF]\n\n6. While there is no absolute ban, it is a rul'e of prudence that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies.\n\nBut university organs, for that matter any authority in our system, is bound by the rule of law and cannot be a. law unto itself.\n\nIf the Chancellor or any oth'er authority lesser in level decides an academic matter or an educational question, the court keeps its hands off; but where a provision of law has to be read and understood, it is not fair to keep th'e court out. To respect an authority is not to worship it unquestioningly since the bhakti cult is inept in the critical field of law. In short. while dealing with legal affairs which have an impact on academic bodies, the views of educational experts are entitl'ed to great consideration but not to exclusive wisdom. [911 G-H, 912 B-Dl\n\nThe University of Mysare and Anr. v. C. D. Govinda and Anr .• [1964] 4 SCR 515 @ 586; followed.\n\n7. An, illegal act cannot be deemed to be legal by reading a legislative funetion into ian executive action.\n\nWere this dubious doctrine applied to gave~ mental affairs and confusion between executive and legislative fuiictions jurisprudentially sanctioned, the consequences could well be disastrous to the basics of our democracy. Small gains in som'e case should not justify the urging of propositions which are subversive of our constitution. [912 E-Fl\n\nClVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION 1524 of 1977.\n\nCivil Appeal No.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 21-9-1976 of the Allahabad High Court in S.A.Nos.26,66 and 37/76.\n\nS. P. Gupta and Pramod Swaroop for the Appellants.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Respondents ~. 5and6. )\n\nU. R. La/it and Manoj Swarup, Miss La/it Koh.'i for the Respondent (University.)\n\n\"The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J.-The core controversy in this appeal by special leave rages round the legality of the selection of Readers by the AIJahabad'University. The fortunes of the litigation, pending for seven years have been fluctuating from court to court. The fine line of distinction between internal autonomy for educational bodies and insulation of their operations from judicial interference on the one hand and the constitutional obligation of the court to examine the legality of academic\n\nJ.P. IWLSHRBSHTHA v. ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY (Krishna l?er, I.) 9o5\n\nactions and correct clear injustices on the other is jurisprudentially real and the present appeal illustrates the demarcation between the two positions. While legal shibboleths like \"hand-off universities\" and metivulous forensic invigilation of educational organs may both be wrong, a balanced approach of leaving universities in their internal functioning well alone to a large extent, but striking at illegalities and injustices, if committed by however high an authority, educational or other, will resolve the problem raised.by counsel before us in this . appeal from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court.\n\nOnce we recognise the basic yet simple proposition that no islands of insubordination to the rule of law exist in our Republic and tha~ discretion to disobey the 111andate of the law does not belong even to university organs or other authoritieS, the retreat of the Court at the sight of an academic body, as has happened here, cannot be approved. On the facts and features of this case such a balanced exercis., of jurisdiction will, if We may anticipate our utltimate conclusion, result in the reversal of the appellate judgment and the restoration, in substantial measure, of the learned single Judge's judgment quashing the selections made by the University bodies for the posts of Readers in English way back in 1973.\n\nA perception in pe.rspective of the facts which are brief and the law which is clear, persuades us to narrate the circumstances which have led a number of lecturers of the Allahabad University to fighting forensic battles over the selection of some as Readers in English by the selection Committee and their opportunity by the Executive Council.\n\nNearly a decade ago, six posts of Readers in the English Depart- Iljent of the University fell vacant and applications were invited by advertisement.\n\nThe petitioners and respondents 5 to JO, among , others'. Wee applicants.These parties .were all srving as lecturers in\n\n. the un1venty at that lime. A select10n committee was constituted as contemplated by the statutes and ordinances framed under the Allahabad University Act, 1921 (for short, hereinafter called the Act.)\n\nSection 29 of the Act, stipulates that teachers of the university shall be appointed by the executive council on the recommendations of the 'selection committee. There are sttutory provisions regulating the functions of the selection committee section 32(2)(f) of the Act. provides for the issuance of ordinances prescribing qualifications for appointment of teachers. ordinance 9(2) lays down the qualifications fod1lachers in the various fa, culties. We are conerned with Ordinance 9 wMh special reference to the pre&cription of qualifications for R<W!e1s and it runs thus;\n\nI 9-463SCI/80\n\n9. Tne following qu1litiations are prescribei for the appoint\n\nmentofteacher> in the Faculties of Arts, Scienee, Com111arce\n\nand Law\n\n(2) For Reaiers : (i) First or High S•cona Class M1ster's\n\nd>gree in the subject concrnei ani go:>d academic record. ,\n\n~(ii) Established reputation for sound scholarship and be compe\n\ntent to teach upto Master's degree and guide research.\n\nL(iii) A doctor's degree, or eqnivalent published work.\n\n(iv) At least 5 years' teaching experience of the subject con\n\ncernd in plst-grafaate classes in a University recJgnised by law, or research e1'perience in a Research Institute recog niSed by the University or the State, or the Central Govern. ment.\n\nProvided that the selection Comnittee may relax the quali\n\nfications contained in clause (iii) for the post of Readers in the case of candidates whose total length of service a11 tea\n\nchers in this Universty is not less than the period required to teach the maximum of the Lecturer's grade and who shall have established a reputation as teachers.\n\nProvided further that 'in the case of women teacher11 of this (i.e. Atlahabad University), in place of qualification tNo. (IV) requiring 5 years' teaching experience in pet , graduate classes , a minimum of 5 years teaching experience of the subject in the graduate classes in this University may also be considered adequate for the post of Readers.\n\nThe statutory exercise of choosing the best among the applicants in clnformity with the minimm qualifications is done by the selection\n\nco~'lllttee .which re:omn,.nh. to the .eecutive ouncil its panel. \\' While there is no specific legtslative prov!Slon regardmg the procedure '-\n\nto be adopted by the selection committee there is no doubt that arbi \" trariness is anathema, violation of natural justice vitiates and subject to this, self-created rules, flexible and pragmatic, fair and functionally viable, may well be fashioned by the selection committee.\n\nIn this case the committee chose to interview the candidates who were other\n\nwise eligible for consideration. 13 applicants turned up for i)lterview. But respondent No, 9, Dr.\n\nBhattacharya, and peti tioner No. 2, Skand Gupta, apparently resented the viva voce test as unauthorised and did not care to appear for the interview. How\n\never, Dr. Bhattacharya (R. 9), on being persuaded, !did later turn up, was interviewed and eventually included in the 'select list'. The •\n\nJ. P. KULSHRESHTHA v. ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY (Krishna Iyer,!.) 901\n\nSecond petititioner did not enjoy the benefit of a second persuasion to persent himself for interview, did not appear before the Selection Committee and missed the bus.\n\nThe Committee, which consisted of academic experts, prepared a panel and forwarded it to the Executive Council. As is inevitable in situations of over supply, many are called but few are chosen and Respondents 5 to 10 (Dr. Mrs. Hem Lata Joshi, R-5, Shri H. S Saxena, R-6 Dr. R.R. Dutt, R-7, Shri I. N.\n\nAgarwal, R-8, Dr.\n\nA. N. Bhattacharyya, R-9, and Dr. L. M. Upadhayaya, R-10) were lucky to be chosen while the petitioners were luckleSs and .lost. Petitioner No. 2 represented against the propriety of the selection to the executive council, but the latter overruled the abjeGtion and accepted the recommendation. Respondents 5 to 10 were thus appointed Readers. The Petitioners thereupon moved the chaneellor uader s.42 of the Act and urged, in their petition, that the selection was illegal, but were disappointed because the chancellor, by this order of November 22, 1973, upheld the selection and the appointments.\n\nThe last refuge of those with lost causes is the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The petititoners invoked Art. 226 of the1 Constitution and impugned the legality of the selection process and the appointments on various grounds.The learned single Judge considered the merits of the contentions and concluded that the selections and the consequent appointments were bad in law except in regard to respondents 7 and JO and directed the university, in January 1976, to hold fresh selections for filling the vacancies of long years ago.\n\nInevitably, the vanquished respondents rushed to the appellate Bench of the High Court where success greeted them; for, the appeals were allowed in reversal of the sini:le Judge's reasoning and the writ petition was dismissed in entirety. The final sanctuary of those who fancy that they are victims of judicial injustiee of other forms of iniquity is the Supreme Court in its misleadh1gly immense and Self defeatingly multiform jurisdiction under Art. 136, The appellants are here hopefully invoking our power to heal their alleged injury.\n\nWith this backdrop, it will be easy to appreciate the few submissions urged by the appellants in substantiation of their case that although the selection committee was legally constituted, the process of selection and the criteria for selection were illegal. If the selecion were uinvalidated by any lethal vi.Ce the '.council's action in accepting the commendees cannot survive.\n\nNor can the chancellor's dismissal of the objections of the appellants lend life to what otherwise is non est. Thull, the crucial issue is whether the grounds of attack levelled against the selection have substance.\n\n908 SUPREME COUJl.f REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA few basic facts must be remembered before we discuss tbe merits.\n\nAll tbe parties with whom we are concerned as candidates, have acquired their master's degree from tbe Allahabad University. In tune with tbe hierarchical ethos of Indian society which does not spare tbe academia, tbere is a pyramidal structure with lecturers at tbe bottom, Readers above tbem aud professors at the top, speaking simplistically.\n\nOur concern in this appeal is with Readers; and tbe eligibility qualifications mentioned in Ordinance 9 are tbe minimum, not tbe maximum. We may straight get into the meat of tbe matter. The [substantial contention urged by tbe appellant with success before tbe single Judge and failure before tbe Division Benchjis tha(tbe contesting respondents are not even qualified for consideration because they do not have a first class or a high second class in tbeMaster's degree. It is common ground that none of them has a first class. It is undisputed that the Allahabad Universicy awards first class to those who obtain 60 % and above and second class to those who secure anything between 48 % to 59 %.\n\nFor the nonce, we are not concerned with the other qualifications itemised in Ordinance 9. The marks obtained by the appellants show that they are recipients of first class or high second class. The controversy is not about their eligibility but that of the contesting respondents.\n\nDr. Mrs. Joshi (R. 5) has secured 52 • 2 mar ks; Shri Saxena (R. 6) has scraped through with 49 3 marks; Dr. Dutt (R. 7) has, however, obtained a first class while Shri Agarwal (RS) is slightly below the middle line in the second class range having got only 53 8, marks; Dr. Bhattacharya (R9.) 'has fared a little better with 54 5 marks. Dr. Upadhyaya (R. 10) also has a better performance record in the Master's degree examination since he has 55 l marks to his credit.\n\nFrom these figures it is obvious that Dr. Dutt (R.7) has the :rustitien of being the holder of a first class. It is beyond one's comprehension how his selection can be challenged on the score of ineligibility.\n\nIndeed, the appellants have accepted the findings of the learned single Judge who has disallowed the writ petition vis-a-vis R. 7 and R. 10. , ,.\n\nWe agree. Even in regard to the conclusion arrived at so far as R. 10, Dr. Upadhyaya, is concerned who has secured marks above the middle line in the range between 48 % and 59 %, we are not disposed to disagree with the single Judge. Thus, the appointments of R. 7 and R.10 do not call for any interference. The rest will, right now, be exposed to the actinic light oflegal scrutiny.\n\nWe may dispel two mystiques before we debate the real issues.\n\nDid the selection committee act illegally in resorting to the interview process to pi ck outthe best ? We think not. Any administrative or quasi-judicial body clothed with powers and left unfettered\n\nJ. P. KULSH'RESHTHA v. ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY (Krishna lr, 1.) 909\n\nby procedures is free to devise its own pragmatic, fieXible and functional\n\nly viable processes of transacting business subject, of course to the basics of natural justice fairplay in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous considerations and otherwise keeping with in the leading strings of the law.\n\nWe find no flaw in the methodology of 'interviews.'Certainaly, cases arise where the art of interviewing candidates deteriorates from strategy to strategem and undetectable manipulation of results is achieved by remote control tactics masked as viva v9ce tests. This, if allowed; is surely a sabotage of the purity of proceedings, a subterfuge whereby legal means to reach illegal ends is achieved. So it is that courts insist, as the learned single Judge has, in this very case,\n\nuggested on recording of marks at interviews and other fair checks 'like guidelines for marks and remarks about candidates and the like.\n\nIf the court is skeptical, the record of the Selection proceedings, including the notes regarding the interviews, may have to be made available.\n\nInterviews, as such, ll're not bad but polluting it to attain illegitimate .ends is bad. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was right when be wrote{')\n\n\"So I have tried to make it clear that it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends.\n\nBut now I must affirm that it is just as wrong, or even more, to use moral means to preserye immoral ends.\"\n\nThe second obscurantism we must remove is the blind veueration .of marks at examination as the main measure of merit. Social\n\nscientists and educational avant garde may find pitfalls in our system of education and condemn the unscientific aspects of marks as the measure of merit, things as they now stand. But, however imperfect and obtuse the current system and however urgent the modernisation of -0ur courses culminating in examinations may be, the fact remains that the court has to go by what is extent and cannot explore on its .own or ignore the measure of merit adopted by universities. Judges must not rush in where even educationists fear to tread. So, we see no purpose in belittling the criterion of marks and class the Allahabad University has laid down, although to swear religiously by class and grade may be exaggerated reverence and false scales if strictly scrutinised by progressive criteria.\n\nWe have stated earlier that the prescription of first class or high second class is part of the Ordinance as a qualification for a Reader's post. Is this condition mandatory or directory ? The High Court at the two tiers has taken contrary views. But we are inclined to\n\n(I) The Negro is your Brother by Martin Luther King Jr. published in \"119\n\nyears of the Atlantic\" ed. by Louise Desaulniers, p. 515.\n\nhold that a high second class is a mandatory minimum. A glance at the relevant portion of Ordinance 9 reveals that wherever relaxation of qualifications is intended, the Ordinance specifically spells it out and by , necessary implication, where it has not said so, the possession of such qualification is imperative. We must remember that a Reader is but next to a Professor and holds high responsibility in giving academie guidance to post-graduate students. He has to be a creative scholar himself capable of stimulating in his students a spirit of enquiry and challenge, intellectual ferment and thirst for research. If the teacher is innocent of academic excellence, the student, in tum, will be passive, mechanical, negative and memorising where he should be innovative, imaginative and inventive. The inference is irresistible that a Reader who guides the students. and raises his faculties into creative heights is one who himself has had attainments to his credit. Putting aside for a moment the value of examinations and marks as indicators of the student's potential, we must agree that the ordinance has a purpose when it prescribes atleast a high second class for a Reader's post.\n\nIt is obligatory.\n\nNow we come to close grips with the principal point debated before us. When is a second class high, going by marks? For any layman the meaning is clear. For any purpose-oriented interpretation the decoding is simple. High is the antithesis of low and a high second class is, therefore, a contrast to a low second class. When the range of second class marks is wide, of the candidate who gets that class with marks within the lower half bracket you cauuot say he gets a high second class. If he manages to get 48 marks he barely gets a second class-not a high second class. And commonsense which is not an enemy of court sense, points clearly to the meaning of .high seconcf clas!l as one where the marks fall a little short of first class marks and he narrowly misses first class. In the context of Ordinance 9 and its purpose and the collocution of words used viz. 'first class or a high second class', the interpretation will misfire if we disregard the intent and effect of the adjective 'high' and indifferently read it to mean merely the minimum marks needed to bring the candidate within the second class.· High is high and a superior second class denotes marks some where near first class marks. Assuming we relax, dilute and liberalise the rigour clearly imported by the draftsman by using the expression 'high second class', still it is impermissible to render the word 'high' nugatory or make, by construction, that intensive adjective redundant. Nor are we impressed with theJstrange submission that the\n\nUniversity has all these years treated a high second class to mean a mere second class, and, therefore English has lost its potency in the Allahabad University and high includes low. Such bathetic semantics .\n\n. '\n\nJ. P. KULSHRESHTHA v. ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY (Krishna Iyer,!.) 911\n\nmust be rejected since continuing ccmmission cf w1crg does not A right it.\n\nThe utmost we may reluctantly accept is the construction that the learned single Judge has adopted. Draw a line at mid-point, and marks above and below that line wiJI be high and low second class respectively.\n\nIt was urged that marks for the second-class grade vary frcm university to university and start sometimes with 40 % and so, even 4~ must be regarded as high second class for Allahabad University.-Here r--· we are e.ncerned only with holdrrs lilf second class from the Allahabad\n\nUnive111ity and so the complication of other universities does not rise.\n\nEven &therwise, with reference to any particular university, the marks for second class may be from X to Y and 'high' with reference to that university will be the superior half between X and Y. Lexically, logically, legally, teleologically, we find the conclusion the same. We regretfully but respectfully disagree with the Division Bench and uphold the sense of high second class attributed by the learned single Judge. The midline takes us to 54 and although it is unpalatable to be mechanical and mathematical, we have to hold that those iwho have not secured above 54 marks cannot claim to have obtained a high second class and are ineligible. In the instant case, Dr. Mrs.\n\nJoshi, Shri Saxena and Shri Agarwal do not fill the biJI, their marks being below 54 in the Master's degree examination.\n\nWe have earlier held that the power to relax, as the Ordii; iance now runs,'hilso far as high second class is concerned, does not exist. Inevitably, the appointment of the 3 respondents violate the Ordinance and are therefore, illegal. It is true, as counsel for the respondent urged, that he Selection Committee is an expert body. But their expertise is not\n\n' in laV1, but in other branches oflearning and the:final interpretation of an ordinance is a legal skiJI outside the academic orbit.\n\nRulings of this Court were cited before us to hammer home the point that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of academicians when the dispute relates to educational affairs. While there is no absolqte ban, it is a rule of prudence that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies.\n\nBut university organs, for that matter any authority in our system, is bound by the rule of law and cannot be a law unto itself. If the Chancellor or any other authority lesser in level decides an academic matter or an educational question, the Court keeps its hands off; but where a provision oflaw has to be read and understood, it is not fair to keep the Court\n\nout. In Govinda Rao's case (I) Gajendragadkar, J (as he then was) struck the right note:\n\n\"What the High Court should have considered is whether the appointment made by the Chancellor had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance, and in doing so, the\n\nHigh Court should have shown due regard to the opinions expressed by the Board and its recommendations on wbieh the Chancellor has acted.\"\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\nThe later decisions cited before us broadly conform to the rule of caution sounded in Govinda Rao.\n\nBut to respect an authority is not to worship it unquestioningly sinee the bhakti cult is inept in the critical field of law. In short, wfille dealing with legal affairs which have an impact on academic bodies, the views of educational experts are entitled to great consideration but not to exclusive wisdom.\n\nMoreover, the present case is so simple that profound doctrines about academic autonomy have no plaee here.\n\nA strange submission was mildly made that the Executive Council has also the power to make ordinanees and so, by aceepting a low second class has equal to a High second class in the case of the three respondents, the Council must be deemed to have amended the Ordinanee and implicitly re-written it to delete the adjective 'high' before ~- 'second class'. This argument means that an illegal act must be deemed to be legal by reading a legislative function inio an eXeCUtive action. W e(e this dubious doctrine applied to governmental affairs and confusion between executive and legislative functions jurisprudentially sanctioned, the consequences could well be disastrous to the basics of our democracy. We mention this facet of the argument\"'. not only to reject it but to emphasise that small gain in some case -'l should not justify the urging of propositions which are subversive of ' our Constitution Be that as it may, We are satisfied that respondents 5, 6 and 8 do not possess a high second class in their Master's if degree.\n\nThe second condition suceessfully urged before the single Jud11e of the High Court relates to Dr.\n\nBhattacharya (R. 9). The point is that R. 9 and petitioner No. 2 for selection the second petitioner Jost hs chance of being consired because he did not appear fOt' the interview and Dr. Bhattachafya averted that fate because he was sent for a second time. The equivocal version of Dr. Bltattacharya\n\n(1) The University of Mysor1;, and Anr. v. C.D. Govinda Rao an6 .Anr.\n\n\n- (\n\n.J.P. KULSHllESHTHA v. ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY (Krishna Iyer, 1.) 913\n\nhas not been accepted by the learned single Judge ai1f1 we are nnhappy that an academic has been pnt to the necessity of this dubiety which suggests that taking liberties with truth for getting a temporary advantage is a tendency which does not spare highly educated and gifted persons. In this connection, even the terminological inexactitude\n\nindlged iu by Dr. Hem Lata Joshi (R. 5) is not complimentary, when she says that in her application she gave 54 marks as against the actual figure of 52 2 and when challenged, she excused herself by saying that her memory, working in a hurry, let her down. We are satisfied that if the Selection Committee had chosen to give an opportunity to the 2nd petitioner, even as they did to R. 9, he might well have turned up and having regard to his high marks, might also have stood a good chance of being selected. The criticism is not that the Selection Committee's action was mala-fide or biassed, but that there has been unequal treatment between equals.\n\nFor this reason, th;;' selection of R. 9 deServes to be struck down as violative of Art. 14.\n\nOther minor points which have been urged and countered do not deierve serious consideration and we decline to deal with them. The .conclusion we reach is that the selection and appointments of respondents 7 and 10 are good; but the selection and appointment of respondents 5, 6, 8 and 9 are bad in law.\n\nThe tragic sequel cannot be dismissed as none of our coneern because the Court, by its process, must, as far as possible, act constructively, minimising the injury and maximising the benefit. Indifferenee to consequences upon institutions and individuals has an imperial flavour and we wish to make it clear that the fact that since 1973 the respondents 5, 6, 8 and 9 have been functioning as Readers without blemish is a factor which distresses us when we demolish their appointments. They have gained experience of several years in the Reader's post. They are otherwise well qualified on the academic side. The short-fall in the matter of a high second class, while some of them have Deen doctorates, should not have such disastrous consequences as t\" throw out the appointees 7 years after. We think that these special .circumstances may well justify the appropriate authority in the University resorting to alternatives which may mitigate their misfortune.\n\nWe have been informed by counsel Mr. Manoj Swamp that the University is inclined to take an accommodative attitude to mitigate the hardship that may flow from the adjudication. Of course, they are free to take such steps as they deem just and necessary.\n\nWe do not think there was anything wrong in Dr. Bhattacharya having been jpersuaded to come to the interview, but we regard it as improper that\n\n1!uch a facility was not extended to the 2nd petitioner.\n\nA In conclusion, we allow the appeal and direct a fresh selection from\n\namong those candidates who are qualified for Readership in the light of our interpretation of Ordinanee 9. We make it clear that the appointments of respondents 7 and 10 sustained by the High Coart, will remain untouched.\n\nThe appeal is allowed subject lo the observations made above.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "J. P. KULSHRESHTHA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. P. 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CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 230, "end_char": 243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad University Act, 1921", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 255, "end_char": 285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Allahabad University Act, 1921", "statute": "the Allahabad University Act, 1921"}}, {"text": "Allahabad University Act, 1921", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 741, "end_char": 771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhattacharya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1446, "end_char": 1458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However Dr. Bhattacharya.", "canonical_name": "Bltattacharya"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1883, "end_char": 1893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 22, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 2011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But by an order dated November 22, 1973 he upheld the selection and appointment."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4645, "end_char": 4665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So the criterion of marks and class, the Allahabad University has laid down is sound, although to swear religiously by class and grade may be exaggerated reverence ood false scales if strictly scrutinised by progressive criteria. ["}}, {"text": "[1964] 4 SCR 515", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8269, "end_char": 8285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8900, "end_char": 8920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 21-9-1976 of the Allahabad High Court in S.A.Nos.26,66 and 37/76."}}, {"text": "S. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8950, "end_char": 8961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta and Pramod Swaroop for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swaroop", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8966, "end_char": 8980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Gupta and Pramod Swaroop for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9002, "end_char": 9018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Respondents ~. 5and6. )"}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9028, "end_char": 9040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Respondents ~. 5and6. )"}}, {"text": "U. R. La", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9074, "end_char": 9082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it and Manoj Swarup, Miss La/it Koh."}}, {"text": "Manoj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9090, "end_char": 9102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it and Manoj Swarup, Miss La/it Koh.", "canonical_name": "Manoj Swarup"}}, {"text": "La/it Koh.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9109, "end_char": 9119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. R. La/it and Manoj Swarup, Miss La/it Koh."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9201, "end_char": 9213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER J.-The core controversy in this appeal by special leave rages round the legality of the selection of Readers by the AIJahabad'University."}}, {"text": "Krishna l?er, I.) 9o5", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9734, "end_char": 9755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fine line of distinction between internal autonomy for educational bodies and insulation of their operations from judicial interference on the one hand and the constitutional obligation of the court to examine the legality of academic\n\nJ.P. IWLSHRBSHTHA v. ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY (Krishna l?er, I.) 9o5\n\nactions and correct clear injustices on the other is jurisprudentially real and the present appeal illustrates the demarcation between the two positions."}}, {"text": "Allahabad University Act, 1921", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11858, "end_char": 11888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11931, "end_char": 11941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Allahabad University Act, 1921", "statute": "the Allahabad University Act, 1921"}}, {"text": "section 32(2)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12175, "end_char": 12191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Allahabad University Act, 1921", "statute": "the Allahabad University Act, 1921"}}, {"text": "Bhattacharya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14641, "end_char": 14653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But respondent No, 9, Dr.\n\nBhattacharya, and peti tioner No.", "canonical_name": "Bltattacharya"}}, {"text": "Skand Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14678, "end_char": 14689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Skand Gupta, apparently resented the viva voce test as unauthorised and did not care to appear for the interview."}}, {"text": "Bhattacharya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14807, "end_char": 14819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How\n\never, Dr. Bhattacharya (R. 9), on being persuaded, !"}}, {"text": "Hem Lata Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15401, "end_char": 15415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is inevitable in situations of over supply, many are called but few are chosen and Respondents 5 to 10 (Dr. Mrs. Hem Lata Joshi, R-5, Shri H. S Saxena, R-6 Dr. R.R. Dutt, R-7, Shri I. N.\n\nAgarwal, R-8, Dr.\n\nA. N. Bhattacharyya, R-9, and Dr. L. M. Upadhayaya, R-10) were lucky to be chosen while the petitioners were luckleSs and .lost."}}, {"text": "H. S Saxena", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15427, "end_char": 15438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is inevitable in situations of over supply, many are called but few are chosen and Respondents 5 to 10 (Dr. Mrs. Hem Lata Joshi, R-5, Shri H. S Saxena, R-6 Dr. R.R. Dutt, R-7, Shri I. N.\n\nAgarwal, R-8, Dr.\n\nA. N. Bhattacharyya, R-9, and Dr. L. M. Upadhayaya, R-10) were lucky to be chosen while the petitioners were luckleSs and .lost."}}, {"text": "R.R. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15448, "end_char": 15457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is inevitable in situations of over supply, many are called but few are chosen and Respondents 5 to 10 (Dr. Mrs. Hem Lata Joshi, R-5, Shri H. S Saxena, R-6 Dr. R.R. Dutt, R-7, Shri I. N.\n\nAgarwal, R-8, Dr.\n\nA. N. Bhattacharyya, R-9, and Dr. L. M. Upadhayaya, R-10) were lucky to be chosen while the petitioners were luckleSs and .lost."}}, {"text": "I. N.\n\nAgarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15469, "end_char": 15483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is inevitable in situations of over supply, many are called but few are chosen and Respondents 5 to 10 (Dr. Mrs. Hem Lata Joshi, R-5, Shri H. S Saxena, R-6 Dr. R.R. Dutt, R-7, Shri I. N.\n\nAgarwal, R-8, Dr.\n\nA. N. Bhattacharyya, R-9, and Dr. L. M. Upadhayaya, R-10) were lucky to be chosen while the petitioners were luckleSs and .lost."}}, {"text": "A. N. Bhattacharyya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15495, "end_char": 15514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is inevitable in situations of over supply, many are called but few are chosen and Respondents 5 to 10 (Dr. Mrs. Hem Lata Joshi, R-5, Shri H. S Saxena, R-6 Dr. R.R. Dutt, R-7, Shri I. N.\n\nAgarwal, R-8, Dr.\n\nA. N. Bhattacharyya, R-9, and Dr. L. M. Upadhayaya, R-10) were lucky to be chosen while the petitioners were luckleSs and .lost."}}, {"text": "L. M. Upadhayaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15529, "end_char": 15545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is inevitable in situations of over supply, many are called but few are chosen and Respondents 5 to 10 (Dr. Mrs. Hem Lata Joshi, R-5, Shri H. S Saxena, R-6 Dr. R.R. Dutt, R-7, Shri I. N.\n\nAgarwal, R-8, Dr.\n\nA. N. Bhattacharyya, R-9, and Dr. L. M. Upadhayaya, R-10) were lucky to be chosen while the petitioners were luckleSs and .lost."}}, {"text": "s.42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15892, "end_char": 15896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16207, "end_char": 16215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16990, "end_char": 17003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The final sanctuary of those who fancy that they are victims of judicial injustiee of other forms of iniquity is the Supreme Court in its misleadh1gly immense and Self defeatingly multiform jurisdiction under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17082, "end_char": 17090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad Universicy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18791, "end_char": 18811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is undisputed that the Allahabad Universicy awards first class to those who obtain 60 % and above and second class to those who secure anything between 48 % to 59 %."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19227, "end_char": 19232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Mrs. Joshi (R. 5) has secured 52 • 2 mar ks; Shri Saxena (R. 6) has scraped through with 49 3 marks; Dr. Dutt (R. 7) has, however, obtained a first class while Shri Agarwal (RS) is slightly below the middle line in the second class range having got only 53 8, marks; Dr. Bhattacharya (R9.) '"}}, {"text": "Saxena", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19272, "end_char": 19278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Mrs. Joshi (R. 5) has secured 52 • 2 mar ks; Shri Saxena (R. 6) has scraped through with 49 3 marks; Dr. Dutt (R. 7) has, however, obtained a first class while Shri Agarwal (RS) is slightly below the middle line in the second class range having got only 53 8, marks; Dr. Bhattacharya (R9.) '"}}, {"text": "Dutt", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19327, "end_char": 19331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Mrs. Joshi (R. 5) has secured 52 • 2 mar ks; Shri Saxena (R. 6) has scraped through with 49 3 marks; Dr. Dutt (R. 7) has, however, obtained a first class while Shri Agarwal (RS) is slightly below the middle line in the second class range having got only 53 8, marks; Dr. Bhattacharya (R9.) '"}}, {"text": "Agarwal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19387, "end_char": 19394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Mrs. Joshi (R. 5) has secured 52 • 2 mar ks; Shri Saxena (R. 6) has scraped through with 49 3 marks; Dr. Dutt (R. 7) has, however, obtained a first class while Shri Agarwal (RS) is slightly below the middle line in the second class range having got only 53 8, marks; Dr. Bhattacharya (R9.) '"}}, {"text": "Upadhyaya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19560, "end_char": 19569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Upadhyaya (R. 10) also has a better performance record in the Master's degree examination since he has 55 l marks to his credit."}}, {"text": "Upadhyaya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20123, "end_char": 20132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in regard to the conclusion arrived at so far as R. 10, Dr. Upadhyaya, is concerned who has secured marks above the middle line in the range between 48 % and 59 %, we are not disposed to disagree with the single Judge."}}, {"text": "Martin Luther King", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21983, "end_char": 22001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was right when be wrote{')\n\n\"So I have tried to make it clear that it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends."}}, {"text": "Louise Desaulniers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23528, "end_char": 23546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Louise Desaulniers, p. 515."}}, {"text": "Allahabad University.-Here", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27028, "end_char": 27054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that marks for the second-class grade vary frcm university to university and start sometimes with 40 % and so, even 4~ must be regarded as high second class for Allahabad University.-Here r--· we are e.ncerned only with holdrrs lilf second class from the Allahabad\n\nUnive111ity and so the complication of other universities does not rise."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27887, "end_char": 27892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, Dr. Mrs.\n\nJoshi, Shri Saxena and Shri Agarwal do not fill the biJI, their marks being below 54 in the Master's degree examination."}}, {"text": "Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27899, "end_char": 27905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, Dr. Mrs.\n\nJoshi, Shri Saxena and Shri Agarwal do not fill the biJI, their marks being below 54 in the Master's degree examination."}}, {"text": "Agarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27915, "end_char": 27922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, Dr. Mrs.\n\nJoshi, Shri Saxena and Shri Agarwal do not fill the biJI, their marks being below 54 in the Master's degree examination."}}, {"text": "Govinda Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29197, "end_char": 29208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Govinda Rao's case (I) Gajendragadkar, J (as he then was) struck the right note:\n\n\"What the High Court should have considered is whether the appointment made by the Chancellor had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance, and in doing so, the\n\nHigh Court should have shown due regard to the opinions expressed by the Board and its recommendations on wbieh the Chancellor has acted.\""}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29220, "end_char": 29234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Govinda Rao's case (I) Gajendragadkar, J (as he then was) struck the right note:\n\n\"What the High Court should have considered is whether the appointment made by the Chancellor had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance, and in doing so, the\n\nHigh Court should have shown due regard to the opinions expressed by the Board and its recommendations on wbieh the Chancellor has acted.\""}}, {"text": "Jost", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31368, "end_char": 31372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 for selection the second petitioner Jost hs chance of being consired because he did not appear fOt' the interview and Dr. Bhattachafya averted that fate because he was sent for a second time."}}, {"text": "Bhattachafya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31454, "end_char": 31466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 for selection the second petitioner Jost hs chance of being consired because he did not appear fOt' the interview and Dr. Bhattachafya averted that fate because he was sent for a second time.", "canonical_name": "Bltattacharya"}}, {"text": "Bltattacharya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31553, "end_char": 31566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The equivocal version of Dr. Bltattacharya\n\n(1) The University of Mysor1;, and Anr.", "canonical_name": "Bltattacharya"}}, {"text": "C.D. Govinda Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31611, "end_char": 31627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. C.D. Govinda Rao an6 .Anr."}}, {"text": "Hem Lata Joshi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32076, "end_char": 32090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection, even the terminological inexactitude\n\nindlged iu by Dr. Hem Lata Joshi (R. 5) is not complimentary, when she says that in her application she gave 54 marks as against the actual figure of 52 2 and when challenged, she excused herself by saying that her memory, working in a hurry, let her down."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32796, "end_char": 32803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Manoj Swamp", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34109, "end_char": 34120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have been informed by counsel Mr. Manoj Swamp that the University is inclined to take an accommodative attitude to mitigate the hardship that may flow from the adjudication.", "canonical_name": "Manoj Swarup"}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_915_928_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA\n\nv .\n\n.. ~/\n\nCHITRANJAN RANGNATH RAJA AND ANR.\n\nApril 30, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA, D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] B\n\nIndian Contract Act, Section 141, scope of-Discharge of surety-Conditions under which surety can be discharged under sections 139-141 of the Act,-Secu- 1 rity of pledged goods was lost on account of the negligence of the Creditor- Wheiher \"the Surety would not be discharged in the instant case on ti proper con- ,-_ struction of clauses 5, 7 and 13 of, the letter of guarantee. c\n\nCivil Procedure Code, 1908-Secton 144 as amended by Amendment Act of 1976, scope o/-Re.stitution-Dir'ections by the SUpreme Courl) in the instant case, whether could be made-\"Court of first instance\", meaning of.\n\n The appellant bank allowed a cash credit facility limited to Rs. 75,000/- to the principal debtor Harilal Parmananddas Adatia on his pledging 5,000 tins of groundnut oil under the lock and key of the Bank and on personal guarantee of D' the surety, respondent No. 2. The principal debtor executed a demand promissory note Ext. 81 in fayour of the Bank on Sept'ernber 16, 1957, and on the same day the principal debtor also executed a. demand promissory note, Ext. 30, in favour of the surety which the surety endorsed in favour of the Bank.\n\nAlong with the rwo demand promissory notes, simultan'eously the surety executed a letter of guar.:intee F...xt. 31 in favour of the Bank and the principal debtor executed a\n\n--.J.. bond Ext. 83 in favour of the Bank. The principal debtor also passed letter of E continuity of the bond and the promissory note Ext. 82. Thereafter the principal debtor enjoyed the cash credit facility by borrowing various amounts.\n\nBy the end of February 1959 the principal debtor owed Rs. 76,368.04 P in this account to the Bank. Principal debtor died in November 1959. The Bank wrofe to the surety letter Ext. 32 dated December 24, 1959, calling upon him to pay the outstanding balance of Rs. 70,879/- in cash credit account of principal debtor as in the circumsta.nces mentioned in the letter the balance was required to be r'e- F\n\nvered from the surety. Some correspondence ensued thereafter between the Bank and the surety and ultimately the Bank filed the suit for recovery of ii \\ Rs. 76,368.04 P . .;;:.gainst defendant 1, the legal representative of princi:Pal debtor and defendant. 2, the surety.\n\nThe trial court found tb2.t there was negligence on the part of th'e Bank with regard to the safe custody of the pledged oil tins but as the contract of guarantee\n\nenfered into by the surety with the Bank was independent of the pledge of goods given by the principal debtor, the sur'ety is not discharged from his liability under the guarantee.\n\nSo oOOerving the trial court decreed the suit.\n\nThe .surety pai<l the entire amount demanded and appealed to t'he High Court.\n\nThe High Court held that the two promissory notes, on'e executed by the principal debtor in favour of the Bank Ext. 81, and another by the principal debtor in favour of the surety and endorsed by the surety to the Bank, Ext. 30, and the letter of guarantee Ext. 31 executed by the surety in favour of the Bank as also the bond executed by the principal debtor in favoor Qf the Bank Ext. 83\n\nA and the letter of conlinuity Ext. 82 executed by the principal debtor in favour of the Bank, all on September 16, 1957, constituted one composite transaction and they evidenced that the principal debtor bad offered two securities, one the pledge of oil !ins and another personal guarantee of the surety. The High Court\n\nJ.._ further held tht the Bank was utterly negligent and had not exercised. such care\n\nas a prudent man would in the circumstances of th'e case which resulted in the loss of security, namely, pledged oil tins and, therefore, in view of combined B operation of sections 139' and 141 of the Indian Contract Act, the surety is d.i£.. charged. Accordingly, the appeal of th'e surety was allowed and the suit against him wlis dismissed. Hence this appeal by plaintiff Bank.\n\nDismissing the appeal by certificate, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. In order to attract section 141 of the Contract Act, it must be shown that the creditor had' ta.ken more than one security from the principal\n\n-~ debtor at the time when the contract of guarantee was enfered into and irrespective of the fact whether the sur'ety knew of such other security offered by the principal debtor, if the creditor loses or without the consent of the surety parts with the other security the surety would be discharged 16 th:e extent of theo value of the security. In the instant case as found by the High Court and not controverted, the principal debtor had offered two securities, (i) the pledge of goods,\n\n(ii) personal guarantee of the surety. Verily, the General Manager of the Bank accepted tire proposal for cash credit facility on the specific condition that the principal debtor s.hall offer two securities, one the pledge of goods to be kept under the lock and key of the Bank to be supervised by the Bank's 'employee, and secondly, the personal guarantee of the surety. The surety himself agreed to give p'ersonal guarant4ee on the specific understanding a.nd with the full knowledge of the Bank that the principal debtor was offering another security, namely, pledge of goods. The' surety contracted on the good faith Of the principal contract when entering into contract of guarantee in which case h'e is d'eemed so to contract that both the securities would be available to the creditor.\n\nIf the two promisoory notes Exts. 81 and 30 coupled with the letter of guarantee Ext. 31 executed by the sufety and the bond Ext. 83 executed by the principal debtor at one sitting on September 16, 1957, evidence one composite tr, ansaction, it is an inescapable . concluSion that the principal debtor offered two securities, one the pledge of goods\n\nand the other thepersonal guarantee of th'e surety. The surety in good faith contracted to offer personal guarantee on the dear understanding that the principal debtor has offered security by way of pledge of goods and the goods were - be in the custody of the creditor Bank. On this conclusions. 141 of the Act Wl11 ) be indubitably attracted. [922 A-Fl\n\nSanderson v. Aston, [1873] L. R. 8 Exch. 73 at 76, quoted wit.h npproval.\n\n2. ,&ction 141 comprehends a situation where the debtor has offered more G than one security one of which is the personal guarantee of the surety. Even if the surety of personal guarante'e is not aware of any other security offered by the principal debtor yet once the right of the surety against the principal debtor is impaired by any action or inaction, which implies negligence appearing from lack of supervision undertaken in the contract, the surety would be disCharged under the combined operation of sections. 139 and 141 of the Act. In any event, if the creditor loses or without the consent of the surety parts with the security, the H surety is discbarged to the extent of tire security lost as provided by s. 141. [922\n\nF-HJ\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh v. Kaluram, [1967] 1 SCR 266. followed .\n\nSTATE BANK V. C. R. RAJA 91 7\n\n. Wulff and Billing v. Jay, (1872) 7 QB 756, quoted with approval.\n\nA.·\n\n3. Jn the instant case, clauses 5, 7 and 13 of the letter of guarantee, Ext. 31 would'be of no assistance to the Bank. [926 B, G, HJ\n\n(a) Clause 5 confers right upon the creditor Bank to gra.nt any time or indulgence in payment of the deht or to determine, enlarge or vary its credit and to vary, exchange or take other securities or releae any other securities held by the Bank but such an act on the part of the Bank would not have the effect of disi:Qarging the surety or in any manner affecting his liability under the letter of guarantee. It is not a case of granting time or indulgence to the principal debtor or variation of the credit or taking one set of security in substitution of some other security or release of any s'ecurity. Release of security implies a volitional r\n\nact on the part of the Bank. Loss on account of negligence cannot be e<luated\n\nwith release. [925 G-H. 926 A-Bl I\n\n(b) Clause 7 provides for non-Oischarge of surety even if the creditor Bank\n\nenter~ into a composition with the principal debtor and that the surety would nonetheless be liable even if the Bank has other guarantee, security or reniedy guarantees, securities or remedies from the principal debtor. UpOn a true construction of clause 7, the expression 'any other guarantee, s'ecurity or remedy' therein mentioned must be security other than the pledged goods. [926 B-C]\n\nAmrit Lal Goverdhan Lal and Ors. v. State Bank of Travancore and Ors., [19681 3 S.C.R. 724 @ 731, followed.\n\n(c) aause 13 provides for continuing the guarantee where the principal debtor is an association of persons and for continuance of the guaralitee in the event of death, retirement, etc. of one of such association of persons or the guarantee remaining intact and effective and legally enforceable in'Cspective of some defect arising from the internal management of such association of persons.\n\nFirst security, namely, the pledged goods are lost to the Bank and the concurrent finding again incontrovertible is that the pledged goods were lost on account of the negligence of the creditor Bank. Whole of the security was lost and, therefore, the surety would be discharged in entirety because it is crystal clear that the principal debtor had agreed and had in fact pledged 5,000 tins of oil which even if sold at the then current market price would have satisfied the Bank's ,_.entire claim. Accordingly, the surety would be discharged in entirety. ['>26 G-H, \\ 927 A-Bl\n\n4. Accepting a contention that section 141 would not be attracted and the surety would not be discharged even if it is found that a creditor has taken more than one security on the basis of whiph ad'vance was mad'e and the surety gave pelllonal guaranteei on the good faith of other security being offered by the prlnciplli debtor which itself may be a consideration for th'e surety offering his personal guarantee and the creditor by its own negligence lost one of the securities, would tantamount to putting a premium on the negligence of the creditor to the detriment of the surety who is usually described as a 'preferred debtor'.\n\nA Q>urt shonld not by its construction of such letter of guarantee enabre the creditor to ·\n\nact negligently and yet be not in any manner accountable. [927 B-E]\n\n5. By section 144 of Civil PrO\\Xl<lure Code 1908, as amended by the Amend IOllD!. Act, 1976, the jurisdiction to grant restitution is conferred upon \"the Court\n\nwl!ih ped the decree or order\". By an explanation added to section 144 by the Amendment Act of 1976, the expression \"Court which passed the decree or\n\norder\" shall be deemed to include where the decree or order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first\n\ninstance. [927 G-H, 928 Al\n\nIn the illstant case (i) the appellant was the plcintiff and its suit was decreed by the trial Court, i.e. the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gonda!, on November 18, 1960. The present appellant by its letter dated February 14, 1961, demanded from the surety a sum of Rs. 84,828.07 P. inclusive of costs and in terests on the principal amount decreed. The surety respondent 1 in this Court paid the appellant Rs. 84,828.07 P. on April 3, 1961. In the appeal by the surety the High Court reversed the decre'e and dismissed the suit against the surety.\n\nAccordingly, the surety .is entitled to restitution; and (ii) the present one is th'e simplest case where the suit in f.avour of the appellant and against the surety was decreed by the trial court, i.e. the Court of first instance, and this ·-~ decree has been reversed by the High Court in 'exercise of its a.ppellate jurisdic~ ti on.\n\nIn such a situation clause (a) of the explanation w6uld be attract.ed and an application for restitution will have to be mad'e to the Court of first instance,\n\ni.e. the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gonda!. It is nowhere suggested that such a Court does not exist.\n\nTherefore, it would not be prop'er for this Court to direct restitution. However, there will be no justification for the appellant Bank to withhold the amount which was collecfed from the surety on a mere demand. Therefore, an application for restitution, made by the surety would not lie to this Court [928 B-D, F-H].\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1058 of 1970.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated 25-4-1969 of the Gujarat\n\n'\"h Court in Appeal No. 22/61.\n\nS. N. Kackar, K. J. John and Sri Narain for the Appellant.\n\nS. T. Desai, H. S. Parihar and I. N. Shroff for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.~· This appeal by certificate under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitutionlis by; the'original plaintiff-StateflBank of Saurashtra ('the Bank', for]short)-w, hose suit for recovery.of Rs.' 76,368 04SP.~ from the legal representative of the deceased principal debtor Harilal Parmanaddas Adatia and his surety original defendant 2 Chitranjan Rangnath Raja. ('Surety' Jor short) was decreed by the trial court I both against the legal representative of the principal debtor and the surety but on appeal by the surety, was dismissed by the High Court .only against the surety . • Harilal Parmananddas Adatia, hereinafter referred to as 'principal\n\n- debtor', approached the Mmager of the Bagasra Branch of State .-Bank ofSaurashtra seeking facilityl for cash credit1 upto' Rs. 75,000/·.\n\n\"'i'k\"Silbmitted proposal form Ext.\" 66 on September 10, 1957, offering to give security for the cash credit by pledge of groundnut oil tins as also a personal guarantee of defendant 2 Chitranjan Rangnath Raja ..\n\n~ (\n\nSTATE llANK v. c. R. RAJA (Desai, J.) 919\n\nAfter obtaining !be approval of tbe ©eneral Manager of the Bank cash credit facility to the extent of Rs. 75,000/- was sanctioned against the pledge of approved goods nnder the lock and key of the Bank and on personal guarantee of the surety. The principal debtor executed a\n\nemand promissory note, Ext. 81 in favour of the Bank on September 16, 1957, and on the same day the principal debtor also executed a demand promissory note, Ext. 30, in favour of the surety which the surety endorsed in favour of the Bank. •Along with the two demand promissory notes, simultaneously the surety execufed a letterof guarantee Ext. 31 in favourofthe Bankand' the principal debtor executed a bond Ext. 83 in favour of the Bank.\n\nThe principal debtor also passed letter of continuity of the bond and the promissiory note Ext. 82. Thereafter the principal debtor enjoyed the cash\n\nredit facility by borrowing various amounts. By the end of February 1959 the principal debtor owed Rs. 76,368 04 P. in this account to the Bank. Principal debtor .died in November 1957. The Bank wrote to the surety letter Ext. 32dated December 24, 1957, calling upon him to pay the outstanding balance of Rs. 70,879/- in cash credit account of principal debtor as in the circumstances mentioned in the letter the balance was required to be recovered from the surety. Some\n\norrespondence ensued thereafter between the Bank and the surety and ultimately the Bank filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 76,368 04 P. against defendant 1, the legal representative of principal debtor and defendant 2, the surety.\n\nDefendant 1 contested the suit, inter alia, conten, ding that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit and he had no knowledge about the suit transaction. The allegation of fraud made against him in the plaint was denied. He also denied his liability for the claim of the Bank as heir and legal representative of deceased principal debtor. Defendant 2, the surety, contested the suit as per written statement Ext. 7, inter alia, contending that the Bank had agreed to grant cash credit facility to deceased principal debtor on the security .of goads by way of pledge and that though the goods were to be kept in the godown in the compound of Vijay Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd., but the godown was to be kept under the lock and key of the Bank. It was also contended that the principal debtor would provide such quantity of goods as would provide full cover to the outstanding balance in the cash credit account and the Bank was to be responsible for the safe . custody and keeping of the pledged goods. It was also contended that . the principal debtor had all throughout pledged sufficient quantity of goods to provide full cover for the Bank's claim but the Bank either wrongfully lost the goods or was negligent in retaining the goods within\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOIITS\n\n[1980) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA its custody or the Bank wrongfully parted with the goods without the co'lsent of the surety and, therefore, the surety was discharged.\n\nThe trial Court found that there was negligence on the part of the Bank with regard to the safe custody of the pledged oil tin.s but as the contract of guarantee entered [into by the surety with the Bank was independent o\"f the pledge of goods given by the principal debtor, the surety is not discharged from his liability under the guarantee. So observing the trial court decreed the suit.\n\nOn appeal by the surety, the High Court held that the two promissory notes,' one executed by the principal:debtor in favour of the Bank, Ext. 81, and another by the principal debtor in favour of the surety and endorsed by the surety to the Bank, Ext. 30, and the letter of guarantee Ext. 31 executed by the surety in favour of the Bank as also the bond executed by the principal debtor in favour of the Bank Ext. 83 and the letter of continuity Ext. 82 executed by the principal debtor in favour of the Bank, all on September 16, 1957, constituted one composite transaction and they evidence that the principal debtor had offered two securities, one the pledge of oil tins and another personal guarantee of the surety. The High Court further held that the Bank was utterly negligent and had not exercised such care as a prudent man would in the circumstances of the case which resulted in the loss of security, namely, pledged oil tins and,)herefore, in view of combined operation of sections 139 and 141 of the Indian Contract Act, ('Act' for short), . the surety is discharged. Accordingly, the appeal of the surety was allowed and the suit against him was dismissed. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff Bank.\n\nUncontroverted facts concurrently found and not sought to be reviewed in this appeal are that the principal debtor as per his application \"!!!'ii\n\nExt. 65 sought cash credit facility to the extent of Rs. 75,00-0/- pur- - ) suant to which the Bagasra Branch of the Bank submitted a proposal Ext. 66 seeking permission of the General .Manager of the Bank to extend the facility. The General Manager of the Bank sanctioned 4 advance, inter a/ia, on the following terms:\n\n\"A cash credit limit of Rs. 75,000/- (Rupees Seventyfivethousand only) is hereby sanctioned against pledge of approved goods under Bank's lock and key and on the personal guarantee of Shri C. R. Raia, Junagadh.\n\nNoted that the Bank's godown keeper already posted at Amrali would look after the goods pledged by the above party also.\n\n••I I\n\nSTATE BANK v. c. R. RAJA (Desai, !.) 921\n\n, .r.\n\nAll other terms as proposed.\" {underlining ours). Accordingly, on tile strength of two pronotes Exts. 30 and 81 and on the strength of\n\nJdtter of guarantee Ext. 31 and the bond Ext. 83 cash credit facility .was extended to the principal debtor. The pledged goods were kept\n\nin the godown in the compound of Vijay Oil Mills under the lock and\n\nkey of the Bank and the Bank had appointed a Godown keeper to look after the goods pledged by the principal debtor. Two promissory\n\nn!)tes Exts. 30 and 81 and letter of guarantee Ext. 31 and the bond executed by the principal debtor Ext. 83 all of September 16, 1957, constituted one transaction. The High Court held that the surety had agreed to become surety, on the principal debtor pledging oil tins as and by way of security for the advance and, therefore, two securities were offered, namely, pledge of goods and the Personal guarantee of the surety. The High Court also found that 5,000 tins of oil had eome to be transferred by Vijay Oil Mills in the name of the deceased principal debtor and they were treated as pledged with the Bank as security for cash credit facility. It is concurrently found thatthe Bank was utterly negligent with regard to the safe keeping and handling of pledged oil tins and the security of pledged oil tins waspostfon\n\naccount of the negligence of the Bank. Disagreeing with the trial court the High Court held that the pledge and the personal guarantee were not two independent transactions but they formed part and parcel of one composite tranasaction. The High Court, therefore, held that the creditor having lost one security, namely, the pledg¢ goods, the\n\ns111ety was discharged to the extent of the value of secluity and that as in this case the entire security was lost, the surety was wholly diseharged.\n\nOnly contention canYassed in this appeal is that in view of elauses . 5, 7 and 13 of letter of guarantee Ext. 31, even if it is found as a fact that . F V-· negligence of the creditor Bank was responsible for the loss of security\n\n~ of pledged oil tins, Yet the surety would not be discharged. Before we refer to clauses 5, 7 and 13, it is necessary to notice section 141 of the Indian Contract Act under which the surety claims the relief of dis-] charge. Section 141 reads as under:\n\n\"141. A surety is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at the time when\n\nthe contract of suretyship is entered into, whether the surety knows of the existence of such security or riot; and if the creditor loses, or, without the consent of the surety, parts If with such security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security.\"\n\nW--463 SCI/80 .\n\nIn order to attract s. 141 it must be shown that the creditor had taken more than one security from the principal debtor at the time wlien the conn:act of guarantee was entered into and irrespective of the fact whether the surety knew of such other security offered by the principal debtor, if the creditor loses or without the consent of the surety parts with the other security the surety would be discharged to the extent of the value of the security. In the instant case as found by th~ High Court and not controverted, the fprincipal debtor had offered two securities, (i) the pledge of goods, (ii) personal guarantee of the surety.\n\nVerily, the General Manager of the Bank accepted the proposal for cash credit facility on the specific condition that the principal debtor shall offer two securities, one the pledge of goods to be kept under the lock and key of the Bank to be supervised by the Bank's employee, and secondly, the personal guarantee of the surety. The surety himself agreed to give personal guarantee on the specific understanding and with the full knowledge of the Bank that the principal debtor was offer-, ing another security, namely, pledge of goods. The surety contracted on the good faith of the principal contract when entering into contract of guarantee in which case he is deemed so to contract that both the securities would be availabe to the creditor (see Sanderson v. Aston)(!)\n\nIf the two promissory notes Exts. 81 and 30 coupled with the lettei: of guarantee Ext. 31 .executed by the surety and the bond Ext. 83 executed by the principal debtor at one sitting on September 16, 1957, evidence one composite transaction, it is an inescapable conclusion that the principal debtor offered two securities, one the pledge of goods and the other the personal guarantee of the surety. The surety in good faith contracted to offer personal guarantee on the clear understanding that the principal debtor has offered security by. way of pledge of goods and the goods were to be in the custody of the\"creditor. Bank. ..\n\nOn this conclusion s. 141 of the Act will be indubitably attracted. 1 Section 141 comprehends a situation where the debtor ha& offered .1 more than one security one of which is the personal guarantee of the \\ surety. Even if the surety of personal guarantee is not aware of any j. , /. other securitY offered by the principal debtor yet once the right of the surety against the principal debtor is impairedi\\ly any, action or inaction, . ' which implies riegligence appearing from lack. of supervision undertaken in the contract, the surety would be discharged under the combined voperation of sections 139 and 141 of the Act. In any event, if the 1 creditor loses or without the consent of the surety parts with the security, the surety is discha1ged to the extent of the security lost as] provided by s. 141.\n\n- (!) [1873] LR 8 Exch. 73 at 76.\n\n' STATE BANK V. c. R. RAJA (Desai, !.) 923\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 20, para 280, p.\n\nA 152, the statement oflaw bearing on this point reads as under:\n\n''280. Effect of loss of securities.-On paying the guaranteed debt the surety is entitled to have all securities held by the creditor for the debt handed over to him by the creditor in exactly the same state and condition in which they were originally provided whether they were in existence at the date of the contract of suretyship or came into existence subsequently.\n\nConseqUently, any act of the creditor interfering with or impairing that right will, to the extent, at all events, of any loss inflicted, relieve the surety from liability, and, if it has the effect of altering or purporting to alter the contract of suretY ship, discharge him altogether. Thus, where there is a mortgage security given in respect of a debt which is subsequently guaranteed, the creditor must hold the security for the benefit of surety, so that, on paying the debt, the surety\n\nmay obtain a transfer of mortgage in its original unimpaired .condition. If the creditor does not fulfil his duty in this\n\n'' I' respect the surety is discharged.\"\n\nThi• statement oflaw is reflected in ss. 140 and 141 of the Act.\n\nIn State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ka'uram(I) the facts were that one J(aluram had executed a surety bond undertaking to discharge the liability arising out of any act or omission or negligence or default of a forest contractor whose bid was accepted at an auction held for sale of felled trees and who was required to pay the bid amount in four instalments. The forest contract rules provided for preventing the contrac tor from removing the forest goods in case he mage default in payment valJ.f the instalments due. The authorities responsible for supervising \\-We contract allowed the contractor to remove the felled trees without\n\n making the subsequent payments. Subsequently the State of Madhya Pradesh initiated proceedings to recover the balance of the amount throuj!h surety Kaluram. The slirety Kaluram contended before this Court that because the State had lost or parted witj) the security, namely, forest produce, he stood discharged. Upholding this 'contention this Court quoted Wu ff and Bi!iing v. Jay, (2) wherein Hannen, J., stated the law as under:\n\n''. ... I take it to be established that the defendant became\n\nsurety upon the faith of there being some real and substantial H -----\n\n{I) [19671 I S.C.R. 266.\n\n{2) LR [18721 7 QB 156.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT! [1~0] 3 s.c.R.\n\nsecurity pledged, as well as his own credit, to the plaintiff, and he was entitled, therefore, to the benefit of that rea; I\n\nand substantial security in the event of his being ~. called on to fulfil his duty as a surety, and to pay the debt for which he had so become surety. He will, however, be discharged from his liability as surety if the creditors have put itout of their power to band over to the 'surety the means of recouping himself by the security given by the principal. That doctrine is very clearly expressed in the notes in Kees v. Bqrrington-2 White & Tudor's L.C.\n\nJ 4th Edn. at p. 1002-As a surety, on payment of the debt, is entitled to all the securities of the creditor, whether he is. aware of their existence or not, even though they were given after the contract of suretyship, if the creditor who has had, or ought to have had, them in his full possession or power, loses them or Permits them to get into the possession of t)le debtor, or does not make them effectual by giving proper notice, the surety to the extent of such security will be discharged. A surety, moreover, will be released if the creditor, by reason of what he has done, cannot, on payment by the surety, give him the securities in exactly the same condition as they formerly stood in his hands.\"\n\nThis Court concluded that subject to certain variations s. 141 of the Indian Contract Act incorporates the English law relating to discharge from liability of a surety where the creditor parts with or losses t security held by it.\n\nMr. Kackar, however, contended that in view of clauses 5, 7 and 1J of the letter'ofguarantee, Ext. 31, even ifit is held proved that security\n\nof pledged goods was lost on account of the negligence ofthe creditor~ Bank, yet the surety would not be discharged from the obligation ! undertaken under the letter of. guarantee. Clauses 5, 7 and 13 \\ may be extracted:\n\n\"5. You shall in any case, be at liberty and without my/our further assent or knowledge, at any .time, to grant to the customer or any person liable with or for him, whether as guarantor or otherwise, any time or indulgence and to determine, enlarge or vary its credit and t<J vary exchange or take other securities or release any other securities held or to be held by you for or on account of the moBeys intended to be hereby secured or any part thereof or to renew any bills, notes or other negotiable s.ecurity and to compound or make any other arrangements with the customer or any\n\n. ,,\n\nUA['E BANI:: v. c. R. RAJA (Desai, J.) 92 5\n\nPerson so liable with or for the customer as you may think fit A\n\nwithout dischar_ging or in any manner affecting my/our liability under this guarantee.\"\n\n\"7. To tho.extent that you may obtain satisfaction of the whole of your claim ll8ainatthe customer, I/we agree that you may enforce and recover upon this guarantee the full amount\n\nhereby guaranteed and interest thereon notwithstanding any such proof or composition as aforesaid, and notwith standing any other guarantee, security or remedy, guarantees, securities or remedies which. you may hold or be entitled to in respect of the sum inded to be hereby secured or any part thereof, and notwithstanding any charges or interest which may be debited in your account current with the customer, or in any other accouµt upon which the customer may be liable.\"\n\n\"13. Should the customer be a limited company, corporate or D anincorporate body, committee, firm, partnership, trustees or debtors on a joint account, the provisions hereinbefore contained shall be construed and take effect where necesary\n\nas if the words importing the singular number included also the plural number. This my/our guarantee shall then remain effective notwithstanding any death, retirement, E change, accession o.r addition as fully as if the person or persons constituting or trading or acting as, such body, committee, firm, partnership, trustees, or debtors on joint account, at the date of the customer's default or at and time previously, was or were the same as the date hereof. And further you may recover against me/us to the extent here in F before mentioned notwithstanding that any security given or to be given to you may be void, defeetive, or informal, or . notwithstanding that the customer being a limitedJcompany,\n\ncorporate or unincorporate body or committee, may exceed its borrowing powers or that the borrowing from you may have been ultra vires.\" G\n\nClause 5 confers right upon the creditor Bank to grant any time or ii:idu!gence in payment of the debt or to determine, enlarge or vary its credit and to vary, exchange or take other securities or release any\n\nother securities held by the Bank but such an act on the part of the Bank would not have thedJ:ect of discharging the surety or in any manner ; affecting his liability under the letter of guarantee. We fail to see how\n\n'.,,.\n\nclause 5 can help the creditor Bank in any manner. It is not a case of granting time or indulgence to the principal debtor or variation of the credit or taking one set of security in substitution of some other security . or release of any security. Release of security implies a volitional act on the part of the Bank. Loss on account of negligence cannot be equated with release. Therefore, clause 5 would.not assist the Bank J. in this case.\n\nClause 7 provides\"for non-discharge of surety even if the creditor Bank enters into a composition with the principal debtor and that the (. surety would nonetheless be liable even if the Bank has guarantee, security or remedy, guarantees, securities or remedies from the principal debtor. Upon a true construction of clause 7, theeXPression 'any other guarantee, Security or remedy' therein mentioned must be security other than the pledged goods. In an almost iilentical situation with regard to an identical clauses in Amrit Lal Goverdhan La/an v. State Bank of Travancore and Ors,(1) this Court after referring to clause 5 in the letter of guarantee which is in pari materia with clause 7' of the letter of guarantee under discussion, held as under:\n\n\"On behalf of the respondent Bank reference was made to cl. 5 of Ex. P-4 which has already been quoted. It was contended that on acccount of this clause in Ex. P-4 the apPel- !ant has opted out of the benefit of s. 141 of the Indian >.- Contract Act. We are unable to aceept the argument put forward by the Attorney General on behalf of the reSpondent Bank. In our opinion, the expression \"any security,. in cl. 5 of Ex. P-4 should be prowly construed as \"any security other than the pledge of goods mentioned in the primary agreement, Ex. P-1 between the Bank and the . firm''. We consider that there is nothing in cl. 5 ofEx.P-4-e(\n\nto indicate that the appellant is not entitled to invoke the J \\ provisions of s. 141 of the Indian Contract Act.\"\n\nTherefore, cl. 7 is of no assistance to the Bank.\n\nA bare perusal of clause 13 would show that it provides for continuing the guarantee where the principal debtor is an association of persons. and for continuance of the guarantee in the event of death, retirement, etc. of one of such association of persons or the guarantee remaining intact and effective and legally enforceable irrespectiv~ of some defect arising from the internal .management of such association of persons.\n\nWe faitto see how it can render anyassistance to the Bank. - (I) [i968J 3 SCR724_at 731.\n\n.).\n\nI ,_ '\n\nSTATE BANK v. C. R. RA.TA (Desai, J.) 927\n\nFirst•security, namely, the pledged goods are lost to the Bank an~. the concurrent finding again incontrovertible is that the pledged goods were lost on account of the negligence of the creditor Bank. WhoTe' of the security was lost and, therefore the surety would be discharged in entirety .because it is crystal clear that the principal debtor had agreed and had in fact pledged 5,000 tins of oil which even if sold at the then current market price would have satisfied the Bank's entire claim. Accordingly, the surety would be discharged in entirety.\n\nIt is difficult to entertain a contention that s. 141 would not. be attracted and the surety would not be discharged even if it is found that a creditor has taken more than one Security on the basis of which advanee was made and the surety gave personal guarantee on the good faith of other security being offered by the principal debtor which itself may be a consideratfon for the surety offering his personal guarantee and the creditor by its own negligence lost lone of the SeCUrities. Aceeptance of such a contention would tantainount to putting a premium on the negligence of the creditor to the detriment of the surety who is usually described as a preferred debtor. Should a Court by its construction of such letter of guaranteeenable 'the'crditor to act negligently and yet be not in any manner accountable ? Was the guarantee a guarantee against proper performance of the contract evidencing advance of loan and methods of its repayment, or a guarantee covering Bank's utter disregard of its responsibility or to use the words of the High Court, the Bank's utter negligence in failing to eXercise the care; ora prudent man which one would expect in management of one's own affairs ?\n\nThe appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. The respondent surety has made an application that in comp 1tanct>\n\n11 I._ with the decree made by the trial court he had paid the entire amount\n\nand he should not be exposed to second round of litigation for resti- 1 tution of the amount and that this Court should give aldirection to the Bank as part of this judgment that the amount be returned with interest at current rate to the respondent surety.\n\nBys.144 of the Code of Civil Proeedure, il90S as it stooa prior to amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the jurisdiction to grant reStitution was conferred upon the 'Court\n\nof first instance'. Since the amendment the expressioni'the Court of\n\n H first instance' has been substituted by 'the Court which passed the decree or order'. An explanation has been added to s. 144 by the\n\nAmendment Act of 1976, the relevant portion of which reads as under:\n\n\"Explanation-For the purpoSes of sub-section (I) the exprcliion\n\n\"Court which pasSed the decree or order\" shall be deellled to include-\n\n(a) where the decree or order has been varied or rcvoned\n\nin exerciSe of apJleUate or revisional jurisdictioa, the Court of first instance.''\n\nIn the instant caSe the apjlellant was the plaintiff and its suit was decreed by the trial court, i.e. the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Dfvi. sion, Gonda!, on November 18, 1960. The present apjlellant by its letter dated February 14, 196t,.demanded from the surety a sum of Its. 84,828 07P. inclusive of costs and interest on the principal amo11nt decreed. The surety respondent I in this Court paid the apPcllant\n\nRs. 84,828 07P. on April 3, 1961. In the apJleal by the ty the High Court reVersed the deeree and dismisSed the suit against the surety. Accordingly, the surety is entitled to restitution.\n\nThe limited question is whether this Court can grant restimtion.\n\nPrior .to Amendment Act, 1976, an application for re&titution Wider\n\ns.144 in all caSes had to be made to the Court of first instanee.\n\nEYer since the amendment the substituted eXPreSSion 'the Court which pa8Scd the decree or order' would as Jler clauSe(a) of the explanation, mean the Court of first instance becauSe the expression 'the Court which palled the decree or order' has been deemed to include where the decree or order has been varied or reverSed in eXerCiSe of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first instance. The present one is the simplest case where the suit in favour of the appellant and against the surety was decreed by the trial court, i.e. the Court of first instance, and this decree has been reverSed by the High Court in e:tercise of its apJlellatc jurisdiction. In such a situation clause (a) of the explanation would be attracted and an application for re&titution will have to be made to the Court of first instance, i.e. the Court of CiYil Judge, Senior Division, Gonda!. It is nowhere suggested that au..m a Court does not exist. Therefore, it would not be proJler for this Court\n\nt~ direct restitution. However, there will 6e no justification for the apjlellant Bank to withhold the amount which was collected from the surety on a mere demand. Therefore, an applicat_ion for re&titu&ion made by the surety would not lie to this Court and it would stand disposed of accordingly. l ., -.\\\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "STATE BANK OF SAURASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "StateflBank of Saurashtra", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHITRANJAN RANGNATH RAJA AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHITRANJAN RANGNATH RAJA AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 30, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 87, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 30, 1980\n\n[A. C. GUPTA, D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A. C. GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. GUPTA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "sections 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 265, "end_char": 277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 530, "end_char": 556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sept'ernber 16, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1100, "end_char": 1120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81 in fayour of the Bank on Sept'ernber 16, 1957, and on the same day the principal debtor also executed a. demand promissory note, Ext."}}, {"text": "December 24, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1890, "end_char": 1907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 dated December 24, 1959, calling upon him to pay the outstanding balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 16, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3343, "end_char": 3361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "82 executed by the principal debtor in favour of the Bank, all on September 16, 1957, constituted one composite transaction and they evidenced that the principal debtor bad offered two securities, one the pledge of oil !"}}, {"text": "sections 139", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3852, "end_char": 3871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Verily", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verily, the General Manager of the Bank accepted tire proposal for cash credit facility on the specific condition that the principal debtor s.hall offer two securities, one the pledge of goods to be kept under the lock and key of the Bank to be supervised by the Bank's 'employee, and secondly, the personal guarantee of the surety."}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7020, "end_char": 7026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1967] 1 SCR 266", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7076, "end_char": 7092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7348, "end_char": 7356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8114, "end_char": 8122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8435, "end_char": 8443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9690, "end_char": 9701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10463, "end_char": 10474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10677, "end_char": 10688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gonda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11069, "end_char": 11113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "927 G-H, 928 Al\n\nIn the illstant case (i) the appellant was the plcintiff and its suit was decreed by the trial Court, i.e. the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gonda!,"}}, {"text": "April 3, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11394, "end_char": 11407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "84,828.07 P. on April 3, 1961."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12605, "end_char": 12617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kackar, K. J. John and Sri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K. J. John", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12619, "end_char": 12629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kackar, K. J. John and Sri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Narain for the Appellant.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12638, "end_char": 12663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kackar, K. J. John and Sri Narain for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12665, "end_char": 12676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, H. S. Parihar and I. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "H. S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12678, "end_char": 12691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, H. S. Parihar and I. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12696, "end_char": 12708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. T. Desai, H. S. Parihar and I. N. Shroff for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12775, "end_char": 12780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.~· This appeal by certificate under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitutionlis by; the'original plaintiff-StateflBank of Saurashtra ('the Bank', for]short)-w, hose suit for recovery.of Rs.'"}}, {"text": "Article 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12820, "end_char": 12834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "StateflBank of Saurashtra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12889, "end_char": 12914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J.~· This appeal by certificate under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitutionlis by; the'original plaintiff-StateflBank of Saurashtra ('the Bank', for]short)-w, hose suit for recovery.of Rs.'", "canonical_name": "StateflBank of Saurashtra"}}, {"text": "Chitranjan Rangnath Raja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13113, "end_char": 13137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "76,368 04SP.~ from the legal representative of the deceased principal debtor Harilal Parmanaddas Adatia and his surety original defendant 2 Chitranjan Rangnath Raja. ('", "canonical_name": "CHITRANJAN RANGNATH RAJA AND ANR"}}, {"text": "Harilal Parmananddas Adatia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13360, "end_char": 13387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harilal Parmananddas Adatia, hereinafter referred to as 'principal\ndebtor', approached the Mmager of the Bagasra Branch of State .-Bank ofSaurashtra seeking facilityl for cash credit1 upto' Rs."}}, {"text": "Vijay Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16050, "end_char": 16075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7, inter alia, contending that the Bank had agreed to grant cash credit facility to deceased principal debtor on the security .of goads by way of pledge and that though the goods were to be kept in the godown in the compound of Vijay Oil Mills Pvt."}}, {"text": "sections 139 and 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18200, "end_char": 18220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18228, "end_char": 18247, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "C. R. Raia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19085, "end_char": 19095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75,000/- (Rupees Seventyfivethousand only) is hereby sanctioned against pledge of approved goods under Bank's lock and key and on the personal guarantee of Shri C. R. Raia, Junagadh."}}, {"text": "Junagadh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19097, "end_char": 19105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75,000/- (Rupees Seventyfivethousand only) is hereby sanctioned against pledge of approved goods under Bank's lock and key and on the personal guarantee of Shri C. R. Raia, Junagadh."}}, {"text": "Amrali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19162, "end_char": 19168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Noted that the Bank's godown keeper already posted at Amrali would look after the goods pledged by the above party also."}}, {"text": "Vijay Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19593, "end_char": 19608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pledged goods were kept\n\nin the godown in the compound of Vijay Oil Mills under the lock and\n\nkey of the Bank and the Bank had appointed a Godown keeper to look after the goods pledged by the principal debtor."}}, {"text": "s111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20928, "end_char": 20932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21440, "end_char": 21451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21459, "end_char": 21478, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21537, "end_char": 21548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22011, "end_char": 22017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24056, "end_char": 24062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24107, "end_char": 24118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 139 and 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24631, "end_char": 24651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24840, "end_char": 24846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24950, "end_char": 24957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "923\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "ss. 140 and 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26127, "end_char": 26142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J(aluram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26221, "end_char": 26229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ka'uram(I) the facts were that one J(aluram had executed a surety bond undertaking to discharge the liability arising out of any act or omission or negligence or default of a forest contractor whose bid was accepted at an auction held for sale of felled trees and who was required to pay the bid amount in four instalments."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26837, "end_char": 26860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently the State of Madhya Pradesh initiated proceedings to recover the balance of the amount throuj!h surety Kaluram."}}, {"text": "Kaluram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26936, "end_char": 26943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently the State of Madhya Pradesh initiated proceedings to recover the balance of the amount throuj!h surety Kaluram."}}, {"text": "Hannen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27183, "end_char": 27189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upholding this 'contention this Court quoted Wu ff and Bi!iing v. Jay, (2) wherein Hannen, J., stated the law as under:\n\n''. ..."}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28794, "end_char": 28800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28808, "end_char": 28827, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kackar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28974, "end_char": 28980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kackar, however, contended that in view of clauses 5, 7 and 1J of the letter'ofguarantee, Ext."}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31877, "end_char": 31885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32313, "end_char": 32321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32705, "end_char": 32713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32758, "end_char": 32766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33075, "end_char": 33083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33375, "end_char": 33383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33441, "end_char": 33449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33568, "end_char": 33573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33724, "end_char": 33730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33920, "end_char": 33925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34128, "end_char": 34133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34226, "end_char": 34232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34240, "end_char": 34259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34274, "end_char": 34279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34332, "end_char": 34341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35490, "end_char": 35496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37179, "end_char": 37206, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37491, "end_char": 37497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court of Civil Judge, Senior Dfvi. sion, Gonda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37963, "end_char": 38009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant caSe the apjlellant was the plaintiff and its suit was decreed by the trial court, i.e. the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Dfvi."}}, {"text": "February 14, 196t,.demanded", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38077, "end_char": 38104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present apjlellant by its letter dated February 14, 196t,.demanded from the surety a sum of Its."}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38537, "end_char": 38556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38596, "end_char": 38601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1976"}}, {"text": "Court of CiYil Judge, Senior Division, Gonda", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39499, "end_char": 39543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In such a situation clause (a) of the explanation would be attracted and an application for re&titution will have to be made to the Court of first instance, i.e. the Court of CiYil Judge, Senior Division, Gonda!."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_929_945_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "RAMESH KAUSHIK\n\nB. L. VIG, SUPERINIBNDENT AND ANR.\n\nApril 30, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]\n\nJtdl Jurisprudence-Prison torture and Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Cowt-Tl'eatment for 'B' class amf 'C' class in Tihar !Mil whither o/Jlmlfs\n\nArtidt 14 of the Constitution-Constitution of India Artie/ea 21, 19 and 14.\n\nKaushik, a lifer lodged in Tihar Jail moved a quasi habeas corpus petition .bittaiy complaining with facts and figures, of the terror and horror, pb, ysica1 C and poycbic, let loose on him and ot:ber jail mates by a crypto criminal combiaa- ·.tiOD of senior officials and superior prisoners, thereby making the prison life withia that walled world such a trauma a-nd torment the law never mearit under the sentence suffered at the bands of the Court. Briefly, the petitioner .allqiod that his life in jail is subjected to intimidation by overbearing ooglls'\n\ninlide, that he is forced to be party to misappropriation of jail funds by Biid bribe<y of officers, that homoS:exual and sexual indulence with the connivmi<e D of ollicials are going on, that smuggling in and out is frequent and drug racket <:OOUllOll, that alcoholic and violent nUsconduct by gangs like those involved\n\nin Bank Robbery and other notoriou,, cases are a menace to quieter prisoner& and the whole goal of reformation of sentences is defeated by this supercrimc syndrome. On this the Court appointed Sri Subodh Markentleya as amiaus curiae to inquire into the allegations and submit a report. The respondent Delhi. Adminitration transversed the grounds in the petition.\n\nAllowing the petitions, the Court\n\nHEID : 1. Prison torture is not beyond the reach of the Supreme Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. [931 Fl\n\nWere there a modicum of truth in the disclosures made; of vice and violence,.\n\n~-overt and covert, in the goings on in Tihar such an institutional outrage would\n\nI. mate our constitutional culture blllsh and our judicial punishment 'guilty' pro- ' cednre. And on the materials placed before the, Court there is gronnd enough to exercise our exceptional but undoubted jurisdiction to ensure some minimum ''°f\" aocial hygierie and banishment of licentious excesses lest the sentence of court be frustrated in its dual ends of deterrence and rehabilltatioo by prison\n\npathology. [932 B-C]\n\n2.· When police and prison torture is escalating in our human rights era, courts owe a duty to society not to ignore such a dangerous reality. Under our , a-ilution, deprivatioo of personal liberty as penal policy ill purposive and the\n\nPemmf O:xle itself is valid because the imprisonment of the criminal is reason~ able. not arbitrary, and is sanctioned as a measure of social defence atid\n\nindmdual rehabilitation. A court sentence does not deprive the prisooer of bis Dmdamental rights. To reform and deter the criminal and to work out that\n\nprocellS to social defence, the convict is cast into prison-not k> make Jhim more hardened, more brutal, more cunning and dangerous to society. This\n\nA ron d'etr~ of penological institutions in our Gandhian country, with hnmarusm basic to. the. constitutional scheme, caonot be; written off without peril.\n\nA Prison trm _in T1~ Jail is not a post graduate training in tough crime.\n\nNo sentencmg Judge, high and low should hang his helpless head in frustration and. humibation because institutional alternations and personnel perversions havec sullied and stultified the justice of his sentence. [932 F-H, 933 A, B, CJ -\n\nB Sunil Batra v. State (Delhi Administration), [1980] 2 SCR,557; referred to.\n\n3. The human rights of common prisoners are at a discount and~ ia our Socialist Republic moneyed 'B' class convicts operate to oppress the humbler inmates. There cannot be inequality in prison too on the score of social and financial status. Bank robbers in 'B' class because they are rich by robbery andJ nameless little men in •c• class because they are only common Indians! Article C 14 is suffocated if this classification is permitted, and yet that, according to rule itself, is prevalent. Therefore, the Supreme Court must act, will act, to resto1e the rule Of the law and respect of the residual fundamental risbls 0£\n\nany harassed itioner. [933 D-F].\n\n4. The writ jurisdiction Of the Supreme Court must be equal to the need& of human rights and human wrongs. In Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Admiltistration, [1979) 1 S.C.R. 393, this Court held that fundamental rights did not forsake prisoners and that the penological purpose of \"'1tence was importantly,\n\nreformatory even though deterrent too. In the second Sunil Batrds after a long discussion covering.American Rulings U.N. specifications of the Standard\n\nMinimum Rules for prisons and the implications of Articles 21, 19 and 14 readl in the• light of Maneka Gandhi's case, [1978) 1 S.C.C. 248, this Court accented on the habilitative value contained in Rule 58 of the International Standard Minimum Roles. Jura! justice thus set makei lite COurt an activist instrument of jail Justice. [934 A-B, 935 A-B, 938 G]\n\n5. In the instant case, even aftyr making a liberal allowance for adulteration and distortion, the mia6miatic process and restore basic humanism insidethis penal institution where sentences, punitively sent by court, are subjected' to unbearable tensions and torments oo their physical and moral fibre, thanb tothe prison milieu being what it is. [938 G-H, 939 A]\n\n~ ..\n\n'--'-I\n\n'B' class status for prisoners is, going by averments in the petition, a pa.m~ poring process much abused by officials and, in ., 'class' culture, obnoxbm to-........., ., the Constitution. Equality before the law cannot co-exist with aftluent blacl<- '> guards being looked after with luxury and solicitude and lawly indigents being treated as pmaiahs inside the prisoru. There is reference in the petition to the.. l three dangerous criminals involved in aj big Bank Van Robbery Case being- G lodged in Ward 14 as 'B' aass VIPs, who have, on top of other advantages, certain facilities. It is fairly clear that many vices, including drng racl:ets, occasional violence, smuggling and trafficking in maay other impermissible .\".~ things; have hospitable home in this peniteril:iary. The Administration has cons- 1' cientious responsibility for the decency and dignity, for correctional obligationsand social itygiene inside. prison houses and the time is long overdue for a. 'n thorough ov'erhaul of the prison managemenf in Tihar. [940 CE, 941 E-Fj.\n\n6. The crisis in our prisons, the collapse of values in these campuseso th~ inner tension 'red in tooth and c1ass'! the corruption that makes for sensual in.du!-\n\n, • , __ '._L_\n\ngences, the barbarities that blirden the convicts and never heal them-<ill these A> processes can be reviewed and hwnaniution resorted if, only if, onr philosophy toww:ds crime and punishment change. If vengeance is the spirit of punish .. ment violence will be the prison way of life. [944 C-DJ\n\n[The Court, keeping in view the principle of natural justice and, the limita tion of Court time directed a judicial enquiry by the District and Sessions Judge of Delhi who is a member of th\" Boani of Visitors stressing the points to be B covered in particular1]\n\n\"I . [ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 393 & 549 of 1980.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the; Constitution)\n\nS. Markendaya (Amicus Curiae) for the Petitioner.\n\nM. N. Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by.\n\nKRISHNA IYER J •. ls a prison term in Tihar Jail a post-graduate course in crime? Such is the poignant issue that emerges from the facts of this case.\n\n'The fundamental human right is not to a legal system that is infallible but to one that is fair' -these great words of Lord Diplock in\n\nMah(uaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) (I) trigger our jurisdiction to ensure a fair legal deal to the prisoner whose petition to this Court makes frightening exposures about the insiders of Delhi's Central Jail.\n\nKaushik, a 'lifer' (to use jail jargon), now lodged in the Tihar Central Jail, has moved this quasi-habeas corpus petition wherein he bitterly complains with facts and figures, of the terror and horror,\n\nphysical and psychic, let loose on him and other jail-mates by a cryptocrim.inal combination of senior officials and superior prisoners, thereb~ making the prison life within that walled world such a trauma and torment the law never meant under the sentence suffered at the hands of the court. Prison torture is not beyond the reach of this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction and so we appointed Shri Subodh\n\nMarkandeya as amicus Curiae and directed the Superintendent' of the JaH to make available for him facilities to meet the prisoner Icaushik and to present, after a brief fact-finding enquiry, the facts necesary for taking\n\nfurther action, if any. Shri Markandeya has, with a gush of gusto, executed his work of assisting this Court and made a report, and we record our appreciation therefor. What makes law a force is a lawyer with a cause.\n\n(I) (1978]1WLR902, 911.\n\nll The Delhi Administration has responded through counsel' and traversed the grounds in the petition but Shri Abdul Khader, apJJcllrilig\n\nfor the State, has fairly agrood that the Superintendent of the Celllral ~. jail, far from fighting shy of a probe into the prison management SJJ.d the shocking aspersions cast on it would welcome a judicial investigation where he could prove his innocence of the foul charges levelled . .. ) ' Were there a modicum of truth in the disclosures made of Vice\n\nand violence, overt and covert, in the goings-on in Tihar such an illlltitutional outrage would make our constitutional culture blush and our judicial punishment 'guilty' procedure. And on the materials placed before us there is ground enough to exercise our exceptional but undoubted jurisdiction to ensure some minimum of social hygiene and banishment of licentious excesses lest the sentence of court be frustrated in its dual ends of deterrence and rehabilitation by prison pathology.\n\nBriefly, the petitioner alleges that his life in jail is subjected to intimidation by. overbearing 'toughs' inside, that he is forced to be party to misappropriation of jail funds by and bribery of officers, that homosexual and sexual indulgence with the connivance of officials are going on, that smuggling in and out is frequent and drug racket common,\" that alcoholic and violent miscondu.ct by gangs like those involved in Bank Robbery and other notorious cases are a menace to <1Uieter prisoners and the whole goal of reformation of sentencees is defeated by this supercrime syndrome. Maybe, like Oicar Wilde, the petitioner, in flinging allegations, considers that \"moderation is a fatal thing. Nothing succeeds like excess\". Making a large margin for unveracious dilution, still if a fragment of truth survives, something is rotten in the state of Denmark'. This Courts'writ must remove from Tihar face such indelible stain and incurable wound.\n\nWhen police and prison torture is escalating in our human rights era, courts owe a duty to socfoty not to ignore such a dangerous reality. \"At this time the lack of law and order is especially of prime concern. Our courts must bear their .share .of blame and shame for / this condition\" .(I)\n\nUnder our Constitution, deprivation of personal liberty as penal policy is purposive and the Penal Code itself is valid because the impriwnment of the criminal is reasonable, not arbitarary, and is sallCtioned as a measure of social defence and individual rehabilitation. A court sentence does not deprive the prisoner of his fundamental rights as a Constitution Bench., in Suni/ Batra' s case(2) recently expounded.\n\n(1) From the dissellt of Montogomery, J. in Workmen and Pipes v. Kentucky\n\n(376) (see also United States Prison Law Edn. 1975, Vol. I, p. 624 .\n\n(2) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration [1980] 2 S.C.R. 557.\n\nTo reform and deter the criminal and to work out that process geared to social defence, the conviq is cast; into Prison-not[to make him more hardened, more brutal, more cunning and dangerous to society. This raison d'etre of penological institutions in our[Gandhian country, with humanism as basic to the constitutional scheme, cannot be written off without peril. And so it is that, after reading the fea1ful circumstances revealed in this case we focussed sharply, right at the outset, the grave issue:, Is a prison term in Tihar Jail a post-graduate training in tough crime? Is an invisible 'carser' mafia in defacto management of this penal institution? Should every sentencing judge, high and low, hang his helpless head in frustration and humiliation becanse institutional aberrations and personnel perversions have sullied and stultified the justice of his sentence?\n\nWe have been told by counsel for the State that several hundreds of VIPs have (ceremonially) visited and, of course, complimented the jail management. These conducted tours cannot, in themselves, contradict the contention that this campus of correction has degenerated into a human zoo. We keep an open mind and examine the facts bnt must confess that the Tihar Jail has come up for unhappy judicial notice too often in the past. We must also stress that the human rights of common prisoners are at a discount and, in our Socialist Republic, moneyed 'B' class convicts operate to oppress the humbler inmates, Can there be inequality in prison too on the score of social and financial status?, Bank robbers in 'B' class because they are rich by robbery and nameless little man in 'C' class because they are only common Indians! Article 14 is suffocated if this classification is permitted, and yet that according to rule itself, is prevalent as this Court has even in earlier cases pointed out. This , Court must act, will act, to restore the rule of law am! respect the residual fundamental tights of any harassed petitioner.\n\nWe are aware that general charges and sweeping complaints may tarnish innocent officers. We do not intend to find fault with any until proof is forthcoming. We are conscious 'that correctional orientation and cautious humanization have changed the attitudes of many jail officials. To blame them is beyound our purpose or power but to protect the caged humans from torture, gross or subtle, beyond what the law permits is our function, indeed, our duty.\n\nFrom this perspective we may rapidly suryey the circumstances and\n\nmould the reliefs.\n\nPrison Jurisprudence, developed through case-law and derived Jl from constitutional law, already exists. As a jurisdictional matter and background-setter we may briefly refer to some of these aspects\n\nbefore we discuss the controversial questions. In the Sunil Batra Case(I) the Constitution Bench brushed aside the 'hands off prisons' doctrine, upheld the fundamental rights of prisoners, though circumscribed severely by the reality of lawful custody. Desai, J., speaking for three of his colleagues and broadly concurring with the fourth clarified two positions (a) that fundamental rights did not forsake prisoners, and (b) tkat the penological purpose of sentence was, importantly, reformatory, even though deterrent too. In a later case, Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration (supra) another bench explained:\n\nThe court has a continuing responsibility to ensure that the constitutional purpose of the deprivation is not defeated by the prison administration.\n\nIn a few cases, this validation of judicial invigilation of prisoners' condition has been voiced by this Court and finally reinforced by the Constitution Bench in Batra (supra) (2).\n\nThe Court need not adopt a \"hands off\"[ attitude ... .in regard .D to the problem of prison administration. It is all the more so because a convict is in prison under the order and direction of the Court.\n\n. .E.\n\n. F\n\nUnder the caption \"Retention of Authority over Prisoner by Sentencing Judge\" (Krantz notes) (3),\n\nAs noted by Judge Lay in a Judicial Mandate, Trial Magazine (Nov.-Dec. 1971) at p.15\n\nIt should be the responsibility of the court in imposing the sentence to set forth as it would in any equitable decree, the end to be achieved and the specifics necessary to achieve that purpose .\n\nIf then, we are to have accountability in the execution of the sentence, courts must make clear what is intended in the imposition of the sentence. Every sentence should be couched in terms similar to a mandatory injunction. In this manner, the penology system is to be held to account if the government does not faithfully execute the order. '\n\nIn other words, the sentencing court should be required to retain jurisdiction to ensure that the prison system responds to the purposes of the sentence. If it does not, the sentencing court p could arguably have the authority to demand compliance with\n\n; H (I) Suni/ Batra v. Delhi Administration [1979] l S.C.R. 393.\n\n\n(3) Sheldon Krantz : Corrections and Prisoners' Rights P. 274-75.\n\n\\ . .........,\n\n.,,\n\n' IlAMESH KAUSHJK v. B. L. VIG (Krishna Iyer, J.) 935\n\nthe sentence or even order the prisoner released for non- A compliance.\n\nWhether inside prison or outside, a person shall not be deprived of his guaranteed freedom save by methods, 'right, just and fair'.\n\nA long discussion covering American rulings, U .N. specifications .of the Standard Minimum Rules for Prisons and the implications of B Arts. 21, 19 and 14 read in the light of ManekiJ Gandhi's case(I) led this Court in Suni/ Batra (2) (supra) to accent on the habilitative value contained in Rule 58 of the\n\nInternational Standard Minimum Rules :\n\nThe purpose and justification of sentenee of imprisonment or a similar measure deprivative of liberty is ultimately. c\n\nto 'protect society against crime. This end can only be achiev ed if the period of imprisonment is used to ensure, so far as possible, that upon his return to society the offender is not only willing but able to lead a law-abiding and Self-supporting life.\n\nThe action-oriented conclusion in that judgment, which bind the State, need re-emphasis since die-hard, practiees Persist. We rePeat\n\nsome of them here : (2)\n\nLawyers nominated by the District Magistrate, Sessions Judge, High Court and the Supreme Court will be given all facilities for interviews, visits and confidential communication\n\nwith prisoners subjeet to discipline and Security considerations.\n\nThis has root~ in the visitorial and supervisory judicial role.\n\nThe lawyers so designated shall be bound to make Periodical visits and records and report to the coneerned court results which have relevance to legal grievances.\n\nWithin the next three months, Grievance Deposit Boxes shall be maintained by or under the orders of the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge which will be OPened as frequently as is deemed fit and suitable action taken on complaints made.\n\nAccess to such boxes shall be afforded to all prisoners.\n\nDistrict Magistrates and Sessions Judges shall, personally or through surrogates, visit prisons in their jurisdiction and afford effeetive opportunities for ventilating legal grievanees, shall make expeditious enquiries there into and take suitable remedial action. In appropriate cases reports shall be made\n\n(I) [1978] I S.C.C. 248\n\n\n936 SUPREME COURr ltEPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R'.\n\nA to the High Court for the latter to initiate, it found necessary, habeas action.\n\nxx xx xx\n\nNo solitary or pun\\tive cell, no hard labour or dietary change as painful additive, no other punishment or denial of privileges and amenities, no transfer to other prisons with iJenal consequences, shall be impoSed thout judicial appraisal of the Sessions Judge and where such intimation, on account of emergency, is difficult, such information shall be given within two days of the action. xx xx xx\n\nThe State shall take early steps to prepare in Hindi a Prisoner's Handbook and circulate copies to bring legal awareness home to tbe inmates. Periodical jail bulletins stating how improvements and habilitative programmes are brought into the prison may create a fellow-ship which will eaSe tensions. A prisoners' wall paper, which will freely ventilategrievances will also reduce stress. All these are implementary . of s.61 of the Prisons Act. xx xx xx\n\nThe prisoners' rights shall 'be protected by the court by its writ jurisdiction plus contempt power. To make this jurisdiction viable, free legal services to the prisoner programmes shall be promoted by professional organisations recogni&ed by the Court such as for e.g. Free Legal Aid (Supreme Court) Society. The District Bar shall, we recommend, keep a cell for prisoner relief.\n\nHow far have these directives been implemented, especially to the !\"\"'JI extent they affect the present petitioner? We will examine it pre- -, t sently, but before that, some materials about this jail and its way of life is needed to appreciate where the truth lies, as between assertiou. ! and denials.\n\nIn the 2nd Sunil Batra case(l)--- the Superintendent of the Tihar Jail testified :\n\nA number of prisoners in the Tihar Jail are habitual offenders, professional .criminals who have been inmates of the Jail from time to time. . . . It has been noticed that these types of' prisoners have been able to develop a certain rapport with some\n\n(1) [1980] 2 S.C-R. 557\n\nof the lower staff in the jail namely Head Warders, Warders etc. and obtain certain facilities illegally including smuggling of number of items e.g. drugs etc. for their use. It may also submitted that to check smuggliug of narcotic drugs against prisoners who indulge in such activities 30 cases of narcotic offences were got registered against the prisoners with the Janakpuri Police Station during this year ...... It may also be mentioned that due to paucity of accommodation, the said jail is occupied by double the number of prisoners than it is otherwise authorised.\n\nIn that very case, the Court bad occasion to observe, on the materials present there :\n\n\"Since many officers busy themselves with production of prisoners in court, the case of the Superiutendent is that the other prisoners \"try to do mischief, make thefts of other prisoners who go to work, smuggle things and even resort to assaults.\"\n\nThe crowning piece is that the jail officials themselves are allegedly in league with the criminals in the cells. That is, there is a large network of criminals, officials and non-officials in the house of corrections Drug racket, alcoholism, smuggling, violence, theft, unconstitutional punishment by way of solitary cellular life and transfer to other jails are not uncommon.\"\n\nIn that case, Dr. Chitale, who appeared for the prisoner, brought to our notice a literary work written by Shri Kuldip Nayar \"In Jail\" where the author bas recorded I: (1)\n\n\" ........ one could get as much money as one wanted from outside against a price. There was a money order and mail service that perhaps was more dependable than what the postal department could offer.\n\nFor instance, when a prisoner in my ward wanted two hundred rupees, he sent a note through a warder to his people in old Delhi and in less than twenty-four hours he had the money. He paid sixty-six rupees as collectiug char.gestbirty-three per cent was the prescribed \"money-order charges.\" ...... Dharma Teja, the shipping magnate who served his sentence in Tihar, for instance, had thousands of TUPeeS delivered to him, we were told. And if one could pay the jail functionaries one could have all the comforts one sought.\n\nTeja bad all the comforts-he had an air eooler in his cell, a . radio-cum-record player set aud even the facility of using the -(l) pp:-30-34.\n\n21-463SCI/80\n\nphone ...... Haridas Mundhra, a business man who was convicted of fraud, was another rich man who spent some time in Tihar. Not only did he have all the facilities, but he could also go out of the jail whenever he liked, at times he would be out for several days and travel even up to Calcutta.\n\nAll this, of course, cost a Jot of money. An even richer prisoner was Ram Kishan Dalmia; he spent most of his jail term in hospital. He was known for his generosity to jail authorities, and one doctor received a car as a gift.\n\nBut more than businessmen it was the smugglers jailed in Tihar who were lavish spenders. Their food came from Moti Mahal and their whisky from Connaught Place. They had not only wine but also women. \"Babu ji, not tarts but real society girls,\" one warder said. The women would be brought in when \"the sahiblog\" went home for lunch, and their empty offices became \"recreation rooms\".\n\nCorruption in jail wus so well organised aud so systematic that everything went like clockwork once the price had been paid. Jail employees at almost all levels. were involved, and everyone's share was fixed. There was never a dispute; there has to be the proverbial honour among thieves.\"\n\n.. ..,\n\nThis backdrop to the Tihar lifestyle is disturbing enough. (Have )..\n\nE other States their Tihars ?) The writ jurisdiction of this Court must be equal to the needs of human rights and human wrongs. Relying upon legal literature in the American jurisdiction especially the crystallised statement in American jurisprudence, this Court has laid down : (•)\n\nThe writ is not and never has been a static, narrow forma- listic remedy. Its scope has grown to achieve its purpose- 1 the production of individuals against erosion of the right to i. be free from wrongful restraints on their liberty.\n\nJura\\ perspectives, thus set, make the Court an activist instrument of Jail Justice. We proceed on this basis to a consideration of the issues raised before us. But to clothe theSe issues with flesh and blood and to make abstract poignancies into concrete problems, We may excerpt at random some of the allegations made by the petitioner, perhaps, by mixing fiction with fact. Even after making a liberal allowance for adulteration and distortion, the miasmatic residue presses upon our judicial conscience to use the court processes and restore basic humanism inside this penal institution where sentencees, punitively\n\n\nRAMESH KAUSH!K v. B. L. VIG (Krishna Iyer, J.) 93 9\n\nsent by court, are subjects to unbearable tensions and torments on their physical and moral fibre, thanks to the prison milieu being what it is. The petitioner states that he had sent to one of the Judges of this Court* complaints about \"atrociously unwholesome\". treatment in the jail, on September 21, 22 and 24, 1979. He alleges that he had lodged a complaint against the Superintendent with the vigilance De partment of the Delhi State. His further version is better projected by quoting a few paragraphs from his own petition :\n\n That the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent, under a severe threat of dire consequences and infliction of punitive torture, pressured the petitioner into signing an affi davit, denying having lodged any such complaints in the Supreme Court, the Delhi Administration and the Vigilance Department.\n\nThat, judging from the incidents of corruption, torture and drug-distribution, there can be no two opinions aut the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent, brought from the adjoining province of Haryana, performing only in a manner of predators. Torture and drug-distribution are merely the means to corruption to achieve their ultimate end.\n\nThat there is a foreign convict confined in the Tihar Jail, along with a woman, who he claims to be his wife. They are\n\n--J. both wanted by the Interpol. This man's criminal biography has been published in two books, written by foreign authors, wherein the criminal exploits of this criminal are admitted facts. He performs in the Tihar Jail as though he is the virtual administrator thereof. He retains a portable tape recorder, strapped of his calf, wherein he has filled incriminating , evidence against the Superintendent and the Deputy Superinl. :endent. By virtue of this black-mailing hold upon them he ) enjoys the following privileges :\n\n(a) Free movements all over the jail compound from his own place of confinement in Ward 2.\n\n(b) At least a dozen visits are made by him daily to the B class Ward 14.\n\nHere he holds periodic conferences to plan his furtive strategy in company with three intimate associates-all co-accused in the six-lacs Bank Van Robbezy Case.\n\n(c) The petitioner has himself seen the tape recorder kept hidden by him and his B Class criminal associates.\n\n;; •Krishna Iyer, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT IUIPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R,\n\n(d) This foreigner is especially encouraged. and protected by the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent. He can be seen visiting these offic.ers and holding private conforences in the private retiring rooms at the back of their offices almost daily.\n\n(e) So much so, that the Deputy Superintendent even allows this foreign-convict to consummate sexual intercourse in his private back-room from time to time-the Deputy Superintendent performing as though he were this foreignconvict's pimp.\n\n(f) Naturally, for conceding such and many more extra facilities, both the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent charge heavy amounts from his foreign convict, who has now struck rich after the publication of his two books. ·\n\n'B' Class status for prisoners 1s, going by averments in the petition, a pamperiug process much abused by officials and, in a 'class' culture, obnoxious to the Constitution. Equality before the law.cannot coexist with affluent black-guards being looked after with luxury and '\n\nsolicitude and lawly indigents being treated as paraiahs inside the prison. There is reference in the. petition to the three dangerous criminals involved in a big Bank Van Robbery Case being lodged inward 14 as 'B' Class VIPs, who have, on top of other advantages,. certain facilities like being. }.._\n\n\"Specially. allowed the privilege of having two young and handsome habitual drug-addicts locked in his cell at night, to serve him as passive agents for the appeasment of his homosexual lust, (e) has been provided with a TV set in his cell exclusively for his and his associates' entertainment, (f) smuggled-in alcohol is being regularly consumed by. the so- ·--f locked-together several prisoners in his cell, being rich, it is } these so-locked, together associates who finance the drug-and- '- alcohol racket.\n\nAnother shocking allegation of corruption is that even from sentencees undergoing rigorous imprisonment money is collected by high officials\n\n\"for allotting hard labour (of soft types'/) in the course of serving rigorous imprisonment and placing the convicts in the general barraks or private cells.\"\n\nThe petitioner further complains of having been physiCljllY assaulted and the averments relating to it run thus :\n\n• I\n\nThat the agents appointed by the Superintendent and Dy.\n\nSuperintendent to sell narcotics in the Tihar Jail; (written complaint to this effect lodged with the Superintendent, who passed the matter on far enquiry to the Dy. Superintendent, who in turn took no disciplinary action) physically assaulted the petitioner on December 25, 1979 and Janu11ry 6 and February 7, 1980. However, no action has so far been taken and the culprits, being the agents of the Superintendent and Dy. Superintendent were skilfully shielded. In fact, the matter was deliberately suppressed because of the involved personal financial interests of the officers.\n\nApart from these statements there are serious charges of misappopriation, corruption, bribery and the like and the artful strategems adopted in that behalf. Shri .Markandeya contended that there was truth in the allegation that mandrex, charas and opium are freely ava1lable, thereby trying to establish that the sub-culture in the Central Jail, far from being reformatory is de-formatory of the morals of the prisoners. Indeed, many more things are mentioned in support of the petition, including newspaper reports, of the vices of the jail. But we are/not concerned in these proceedings with a general enquiry into the jail affairs and, therefore, confine ourselves to what has bearing on the ill-treatment of the petitioner.\n\nIt is basic fairness that we should not come to any conclusiop without remembering the fact that detailed counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of the Superintendent and the Dy. Superintendent with supportive materials calculated to exonerate them. Even so it is fairly clear that many vices,. including drug rackets, occasional violence, smuggling and trafficking in many other impermissible ..... -things, have a hospitable home in this penitentiary. The Adminis-\n\n' tration has conscientious responsibility for the decency and dignity, ...l.1. for correctional obligations and social hygiene inside prison houses f and the time _is lo_ng overdue for a. through overhaul. of the prison · management ID T1har. In an earlier Judgment, late ID 1979 (!W.P.\n\n1009 of 1979), the Supreme Court had, in the strongest terms, stressed the imperative and urgent need for carrying out certain reforms and added the imprimatur of the court's authority for certain directives contained in Sun ii Batra' s case. Shri Markandeya complained that the injunctions of this Court have not been carried out while a contrary version is given by the Superintendent. While we express our consternation at the deterioration of the conditions in Tihar Jail despite its being in the capital city of the country, we are disturbed that no major measure of reform has yet taken place in the prison order or,\n\nA for that matter, in the prison manual. Such indifference cannot deter the writ of this court running into the prison and compelling compliance, however tough the resistence, however high the officials.\n\nNatural justiee and the limitations of court time persuade us to avoid a detailed investigation into the charges and the defences, by us B directly. We, therefore, adopt the alternative and more feasible method of directing a judicial enqujry by the District & Sessions Judge of Delhi who is a member of the Board of Visitors and whose responsibilities in this behalf have been outlined by us in both the Simi! Batra cases.\n\nThe petition contains specific grievances of physical assault and psychic torture, of tense atmosphere and delinquent pressure for which some 'B' class prisoners and superior officers are responsible.\n\nThis matter has to be investigated. Furthermore; iu the Suni/ Batra case (Supra), precisely to obviate the pernicious potential of prison torture, remedial mechanics had been worked out, formulated and translated into mandates. Whether these have been complied with, and if not, why not, require to be enquired into. When this Court issues a writ recusant parties will have to pay the penalty for noncompliance. This means, the violations and violators will have to be identified after due investigation. Having regard to all these instructions we make the following directions :\n\n(1) The District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, will, within three months from today, hold an open enquiry within the jail premises, into the allegations contained in the petition of the prisoner Kaushik and in the report submitted to this Court by Advocate, Shri Subodh Markandeya.\n\n(2) He will further enquire, with specific reference to the charges ofpersonal assault and compulsion for collaboration in canteen~ swindle and other vices made by the prisoner against the Superin- 'J 1 tendent and the Dy. Superintendent. . .1 ~\n\n(3) He will go into the question of the directives issued in the concluding portion of Sunil Batra's case (supra) with a view to ascertain whether these directions have been substantially complied with and to the extent there is shortfall or default whether there is any reasonable explanation therefor.\n\n(4) Being a Visitor of the jail, it is part of his visitorial functions for the Sessions Judge to acquaint himSelf with the condition of tension, vice and violence and prisoners' grievances. He will take . this opportunity to enquire into thoe aspects also with a view to\n\nsuggest remedial action.\n\nThe result of this inveStigation will be crystallised in the shape of findings, followed by specific instructions with a view to See that the petitioner and others like him are not burdened by additional aeerbities and harsher pressures than a legal, sentenee of rigorous im prisonment geared to reformation and intended for deterrenee necessari ly implied. The Sessions Judge will also give a specific time to the jail authorities for carrying out his directives, and after the period for compliance is over, will make a fresh visit to verify whether those mandates have been fulfilled. In the event of non-fulfilment, a report will be made to this Court before September 30, 1980 whereupon appropriate action to enforce compliance will be taken by this Court in its jurisdiction.\n\nWe may make it perfectly clear that the Sessions Judge will allow any person or official who wants to make any representations to him in the course of his enquiry to meet him publicly or in camera, but o.utsiders and strangers will not be allowed exeept Shri Subodh Markandeya or Government's Counsel. Of course, it will be open to\n\nthe Judge if he considers that such a stepwilladvancetheinterestsof D justice to allow any other public organisation or legal aid society.\n\nThe sessions judge, whom We have charged with the responsibility for enquiry, will make constructive suggestions to protect prisoner~· rights and to promote prisoners' habilitation and thus disprove Oscar Wilde :\n\n. This two I know-and wise it were If each could know the same-\n\nThat every prison that men build is built with bricks of shame,\n\nAnd bound with bars lest Christ should see How men their brothers main .\n\n• • • • The wiles! deeds like poison weeds Blowm well in prison air :\n\nIt is only what is good in Man' That wastes and withers there.\n\n(The Ballad of Reading Gaol)\n\n' Jn this context, the focus of the Sessions Judge should not be\n\nsolely upon the warden and warders ofthejail, but also on the medical H offieers, whose connivance may, perhaps, explain Jiow drugs like mandraix are officially indented.\n\nOur immediate concern is to protect the petitioner and others of his ill-from physical assaults by fellow-prisoner or warders, from moral stress by being forced; to assist in falsification and manipulation for canteen sales misappropriation, from discrimination in being subjected to hard labour of a harsh type if he does not oblige the 'B' class 'bosses' or senior officer's, from pressure against transmitting grievances to the Sessions Judge through the Grievance Box ordirectly to this Court bf.post. But remedial perspectives and procedures, to be successful, must be holistic, collective and not individualistic.\n\nSo, the human canvas ha' to be spread wider, the diagnosis has to be deeper and the recipe must senitize the environ.\n\nThe crisis in our prisons, the collapse of values in these campuses, the inner tension 'red in tooth and claw', the corruption that makes for sensual indulgences, the barbarities that harden the convicts and never heal them-all these processes can he reviewed and humanization resorted if only if, our philosophy\n\nowards crime and punishment change. If vengeance is the spirit of punishment, violence will be the prison way of life. That is why Karl Menninger in his \"The Crime of Punishment\" exposes this folly: ...... Punishment is in part an attitude, a philosophy. It is the deliberate infliction of pain in addition to or in lieu cif penalty .... What is gained for anybody when a man who has forged a check for sixty dollars is sentenced to the penitentiary for thirty years •... The judge's rationalization was that the man had offended in this way twice before (!)and had served shorter sentence without reforming :\n\n( , \"' ..\n\nI. -...,\n\n'll ...... This is not penalization. This is not correction. This is not public protection. This is not reformation. It is sadistic persecution of the helpless at public expense, justified by the ~. .. 1 ': .. ·· punishment principle. '\"' .\n\nFrom this new angle, the hospifal-setting approach to pisons . < t .\n\nGandhiji advocated, the therapeutic tbuch penologists argue for and l ;,, the raising of the level of consciousness, institutional and individual, l of officials and prisoners-all these woven into a composite strategy- ·\" may well be the highway to higher awarensss and socialisation of feeling inside correctional homes. This technology takes us to method like transcendental meditation, self-expression through work, facilities for studies and artistic development. The warden's drill the warder's billy or the VIP's 'good chit' cannot work magic.\n\nShri Markandeya's further report substantiates the thesis we have set out that prison violence and scalating criminality directly\n\n' 1\"i'\n\nRAKBSH KAUSHIK v. B. L. VIG (Krishna Iyer, J.) 945\n\nll.ow from the anti-rehabilitative strategies and counter-productive 'life-style prevalent in the Tihar. The VIP criminals in league with other prison toughs are alleged to have organised the beating up of one prisoner. The part of the prison officials may or may not be direct, but is surely vicarious. Not until a transformation iri the awareness .of the top-brass, not until new techniques of instilling dignity and mutual respect among the prisoners, not until a hospital setting and -curative techniques pervade the staff and the inmates, can there be any human right conscious reformation in the Tihar prison. All that we need say is that in the enquiry that we have directed the Sessions Judge to hold this perspective will inform his interrogations and investigations.\n\nWe have drawn the broad lines indicative] of the direction of correction and leave it at that. The fundamental fact of prison reforms comes from our constitutional recognition that every pri- -soner is a person and personhood holds the human potential which, if unfolded, makes a robber a Valmiki and a sinner a saint. ·\n\nS.R.\n\nPetition allowed. ,", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "RAMESH KAUSHIK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMESH KAUSHIK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. L. VIG, SUPERINIBNDENT AND ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. L. VIG, SUPERINIBNDENT AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 30, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 30, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER, 0."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 308, "end_char": 329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subodh Markentleya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1433, "end_char": 1451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this the Court appointed Sri Subodh Markentleya as amiaus curiae to inquire into the allegations and submit a report.", "canonical_name": "Subodh Markentleya"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1691, "end_char": 1704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prison torture is not beyond the reach of the Supreme Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. ["}}, {"text": "Gandhian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\nA ron d'etr~ of penological institutions in our Gandhian country, with hnmarusm basic to."}}, {"text": "[1979) 1 S.C.R. 393", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4395, "end_char": 4414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sunil Batrds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4598, "end_char": 4610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the second Sunil Batrds after a long discussion covering.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batrds"}}, {"text": "Articles 21, 19 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4748, "end_char": 4770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Maneka Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4794, "end_char": 4807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "American Rulings U.N. specifications of the Standard\n\nMinimum Rules for prisons and the implications of Articles 21, 19 and 14 readl in the• light of Maneka Gandhi's case, [1978) 1 S.C.C. 248, this Court accented on the habilitative value contained in Rule 58 of the International Standard Minimum Roles.", "canonical_name": "ManekiJ Gandhi"}}, {"text": "crisis in our prisons", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The crisis in our prisons, the collapse of values in these campuseso th~ inner tension 'red in tooth and c1ass'!"}}, {"text": "District and Sessions Judge of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "944 C-DJ\n\n[The Court, keeping in view the principle of natural justice and, the limita tion of Court time directed a judicial enquiry by the District and Sessions Judge of Delhi who is a member of th\" Boani of Visitors stressing the points to be B covered in particular1]\n\n\"I . ["}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7301, "end_char": 7311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. Markendaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7335, "end_char": 7348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under Article 32 of the; Constitution)\n\nS. Markendaya (Amicus Curiae) for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "S. Markendaya"}}, {"text": "M. N. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7386, "end_char": 7404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7414, "end_char": 7427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Abdul Khader and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7495, "end_char": 7507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KRISHNA IYER J •. ls a prison term in Tihar Jail a post-graduate course in crime?", "canonical_name": "•Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Diplock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7772, "end_char": 7779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The fundamental human right is not to a legal system that is infallible but to one that is fair' -these great words of Lord Diplock in\n\nMah(uaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) (I) trigger our jurisdiction to ensure a fair legal deal to the prisoner whose petition to this Court makes frightening exposures about the insiders of Delhi's Central Jail."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7994, "end_char": 7999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The fundamental human right is not to a legal system that is infallible but to one that is fair' -these great words of Lord Diplock in\n\nMah(uaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) (I) trigger our jurisdiction to ensure a fair legal deal to the prisoner whose petition to this Court makes frightening exposures about the insiders of Delhi's Central Jail."}}, {"text": "Subodh\n\nMarkandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8628, "end_char": 8646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prison torture is not beyond the reach of this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction and so we appointed Shri Subodh\n\nMarkandeya as amicus Curiae and directed the Superintendent' of the JaH to make available for him facilities to meet the prisoner Icaushik and to present, after a brief fact-finding enquiry, the facts necesary for taking\n\nfurther action, if any.", "canonical_name": "Subodh Markentleya"}}, {"text": "Icaushik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8766, "end_char": 8774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prison torture is not beyond the reach of this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction and so we appointed Shri Subodh\n\nMarkandeya as amicus Curiae and directed the Superintendent' of the JaH to make available for him facilities to meet the prisoner Icaushik and to present, after a brief fact-finding enquiry, the facts necesary for taking\n\nfurther action, if any."}}, {"text": "Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8887, "end_char": 8897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Markandeya has, with a gush of gusto, executed his work of assisting this Court and made a report, and we record our appreciation therefor.", "canonical_name": "S. Markendaya"}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9109, "end_char": 9129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll The Delhi Administration has responded through counsel' and traversed the grounds in the petition but Shri Abdul Khader, apJJcllrilig\n\nfor the State, has fairly agrood that the Superintendent of the Celllral ~. jail, far from fighting shy of a probe into the prison management SJJ.d the shocking aspersions cast on it would welcome a judicial investigation where he could prove his innocence of the foul charges levelled . .. ) '"}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9212, "end_char": 9224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ll The Delhi Administration has responded through counsel' and traversed the grounds in the petition but Shri Abdul Khader, apJJcllrilig\n\nfor the State, has fairly agrood that the Superintendent of the Celllral ~. jail, far from fighting shy of a probe into the prison management SJJ.d the shocking aspersions cast on it would welcome a judicial investigation where he could prove his innocence of the foul charges levelled . .. ) '"}}, {"text": "Oicar Wilde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10690, "end_char": 10701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maybe, like Oicar Wilde, the petitioner, in flinging allegations, considers that \"moderation is a fatal thing.", "canonical_name": "Oicar Wilde"}}, {"text": "Denmark", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10943, "end_char": 10950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Making a large margin for unveracious dilution, still if a fragment of truth survives, something is rotten in the state of Denmark'."}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11427, "end_char": 11437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Suni/ Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11708, "end_char": 11719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Suni/ Batra' s case(2) recently expounded.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batrds"}}, {"text": "Montogomery", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11777, "end_char": 11788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) From the dissellt of Montogomery, J. in Workmen and Pipes v. Kentucky\n\n(376) (see also United States Prison Law Edn."}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 S.C.R. 557", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11937, "end_char": 11956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13661, "end_char": 13671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sunil Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14758, "end_char": 14769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Sunil Batra Case(I) the Constitution Bench brushed aside the 'hands off prisons' doctrine, upheld the fundamental rights of prisoners, though circumscribed severely by the reality of lawful custody.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batrds"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14782, "end_char": 14800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Sunil Batra Case(I) the Constitution Bench brushed aside the 'hands off prisons' doctrine, upheld the fundamental rights of prisoners, though circumscribed severely by the reality of lawful custody."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14957, "end_char": 14962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Desai, J., speaking for three of his colleagues and broadly concurring with the fourth clarified two positions (a) that fundamental rights did not forsake prisoners, and (b) tkat the penological purpose of sentence was, importantly, reformatory, even though deterrent too."}}, {"text": "Batra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15630, "end_char": 15635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a few cases, this validation of judicial invigilation of prisoners' condition has been voiced by this Court and finally reinforced by the Constitution Bench in Batra (supra) (2)."}}, {"text": "Lay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15984, "end_char": 15987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F\n\nUnder the caption \"Retention of Authority over Prisoner by Sentencing Judge\" (Krantz notes) (3),\n\nAs noted by Judge Lay in a Judicial Mandate, Trial Magazine (Nov.-Dec."}}, {"text": "Sheldon Krantz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16921, "end_char": 16935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) Sheldon Krantz : Corrections and Prisoners' Rights P. 274-75."}}, {"text": "Arts. 21, 19 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17401, "end_char": 17420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ManekiJ Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17442, "end_char": 17456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21, 19 and 14 read in the light of ManekiJ Gandhi's case(I) led this Court in Suni/ Batra (2) (supra) to accent on the habilitative value contained in Rule 58 of the\n\nInternational Standard Minimum Rules :\n\nThe purpose and justification of sentenee of imprisonment or a similar measure deprivative of liberty is ultimately.", "canonical_name": "ManekiJ Gandhi"}}, {"text": "s.61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20227, "end_char": 20231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prisons Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20239, "end_char": 20250, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Janakpuri Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21681, "end_char": 21705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may also submitted that to check smuggliug of narcotic drugs against prisoners who indulge in such activities 30 cases of narcotic offences were got registered against the prisoners with the Janakpuri Police Station during this year ...... It may also be mentioned that due to paucity of accommodation, the said jail is occupied by double the number of prisoners than it is otherwise authorised."}}, {"text": "Chitale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22622, "end_char": 22629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, Dr. Chitale, who appeared for the prisoner, brought to our notice a literary work written by Shri Kuldip Nayar \"In Jail\" where the author bas recorded I: (1)\n\n\" ........ one could get as much money as one wanted from outside against a price."}}, {"text": "Kuldip Nayar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22716, "end_char": 22728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, Dr. Chitale, who appeared for the prisoner, brought to our notice a literary work written by Shri Kuldip Nayar \"In Jail\" where the author bas recorded I: (1)\n\n\" ........ one could get as much money as one wanted from outside against a price."}}, {"text": "Dharma Teja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23278, "end_char": 23289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dharma Teja, the shipping magnate who served his sentence in Tihar, for instance, had thousands of TUPeeS delivered to him, we were told."}}, {"text": "Tihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23339, "end_char": 23344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dharma Teja, the shipping magnate who served his sentence in Tihar, for instance, had thousands of TUPeeS delivered to him, we were told."}}, {"text": "Haridas Mundhra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23676, "end_char": 23691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21-463SCI/80\n\nphone ...... Haridas Mundhra, a business man who was convicted of fraud, was another rich man who spent some time in Tihar."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23948, "end_char": 23956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not only did he have all the facilities, but he could also go out of the jail whenever he liked, at times he would be out for several days and travel even up to Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Ram Kishan Dalmia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24029, "end_char": 24046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An even richer prisoner was Ram Kishan Dalmia; he spent most of his jail term in hospital."}}, {"text": "Connaught Place", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24330, "end_char": 24345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their food came from Moti Mahal and their whisky from Connaught Place."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26112, "end_char": 26124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even after making a liberal allowance for adulteration and distortion, the miasmatic residue presses upon our judicial conscience to use the court processes and restore basic humanism inside this penal institution where sentencees, punitively\n\nRAMESH KAUSH!K v. B. L. VIG (Krishna Iyer, J.) 93 9\n\nsent by court, are subjects to unbearable tensions and torments on their physical and moral fibre, thanks to the prison milieu being what it is.", "canonical_name": "•Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "September 21, 22 and 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26426, "end_char": 26455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "treatment in the jail, on September 21, 22 and 24, 1979."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27171, "end_char": 27178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, judging from the incidents of corruption, torture and drug-distribution, there can be no two opinions aut the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent, brought from the adjoining province of Haryana, performing only in a manner of predators."}}, {"text": "Interpol", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27463, "end_char": 27471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are\nJ. both wanted by the Interpol."}}, {"text": "•Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28408, "end_char": 28421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ";; •Krishna Iyer, J.\n\nSUPREME COURT IUIPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R,\n\n(d) This foreigner is especially encouraged.", "canonical_name": "•Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "December 25, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31028, "end_char": 31045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Superintendent, who in turn took no disciplinary action) physically assaulted the petitioner on December 25, 1979 and Janu11ry 6 and February 7, 1980."}}, {"text": "Janu11ry 6 and February 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31050, "end_char": 31081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Superintendent, who in turn took no disciplinary action) physically assaulted the petitioner on December 25, 1979 and Janu11ry 6 and February 7, 1980."}}, {"text": ".Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31510, "end_char": 31521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri .Markandeya contended that there was truth in the allegation that mandrex, charas and opium are freely ava1lable, thereby trying to establish that the sub-culture in the Central Jail, far from being reformatory is de-formatory of the morals of the prisoners.", "canonical_name": "S. Markendaya"}}, {"text": "Sun ii Batra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33061, "end_char": 33073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W.P.\n\n1009 of 1979), the Supreme Court had, in the strongest terms, stressed the imperative and urgent need for carrying out certain reforms and added the imprimatur of the court's authority for certain directives contained in Sun ii Batra' s case.", "canonical_name": "Sunil Batrds"}}, {"text": "District & Sessions Judge of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33919, "end_char": 33953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, adopt the alternative and more feasible method of directing a judicial enqujry by the District & Sessions Judge of Delhi who is a member of the Board of Visitors and whose responsibilities in this behalf have been outlined by us in both the Simi!"}}, {"text": "Simi! Batra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34074, "end_char": 34085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, adopt the alternative and more feasible method of directing a judicial enqujry by the District & Sessions Judge of Delhi who is a member of the Board of Visitors and whose responsibilities in this behalf have been outlined by us in both the Simi!"}}, {"text": "District and Sessions Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34885, "end_char": 34919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to all these instructions we make the following directions :\n\n(1) The District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, will, within three months from today, hold an open enquiry within the jail premises, into the allegations contained in the petition of the prisoner Kaushik and in the report submitted to this Court by Advocate, Shri Subodh Markandeya."}}, {"text": "Kaushik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35069, "end_char": 35076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to all these instructions we make the following directions :\n\n(1) The District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, will, within three months from today, hold an open enquiry within the jail premises, into the allegations contained in the petition of the prisoner Kaushik and in the report submitted to this Court by Advocate, Shri Subodh Markandeya."}}, {"text": "Subodh Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35137, "end_char": 35154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to all these instructions we make the following directions :\n\n(1) The District and Sessions Judge, Delhi, will, within three months from today, hold an open enquiry within the jail premises, into the allegations contained in the petition of the prisoner Kaushik and in the report submitted to this Court by Advocate, Shri Subodh Markandeya.", "canonical_name": "Subodh Markentleya"}}, {"text": "September 30, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36671, "end_char": 36689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the event of non-fulfilment, a report will be made to this Court before September 30, 1980 whereupon appropriate action to enforce compliance will be taken by this Court in its jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "Oscar Wilde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37463, "end_char": 37474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sessions judge, whom We have charged with the responsibility for enquiry, will make constructive suggestions to protect prisoner~· rights and to promote prisoners' habilitation and thus disprove Oscar Wilde :\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Oicar Wilde"}}, {"text": "Karl Menninger", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39270, "end_char": 39284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why Karl Menninger in his \"The Crime of Punishment\" exposes this folly: ...... Punishment is in part an attitude, a philosophy."}}, {"text": "Gandhiji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40083, "end_char": 40091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gandhiji advocated, the therapeutic tbuch penologists argue for and l ;,, the raising of the level of consciousness, institutional and individual, l of officials and prisoners-all these woven into a composite strategy- ·\" may well be the highway to higher awarensss and socialisation of feeling inside correctional homes."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_93_100_EN", "year": 1980, "text": ".\"\"-\n\nPRADESH KUMAR BAJPAI v.\n\nBINOD BEHARI SARKAR\n\nMarch 21, 1980\n\nrs. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. s. KAILASAM AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]\n\nDouble Protection-Once the requirements of Rent Act are satisfied, the tenant cannot claim the double protection of invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the terms of the contract-Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, (Act 4 of 1882) and section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act.\n\nThe appellant plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the respondent tenant and for arrears of rent and mesne profits. Though no specific plea of re1 ief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent under section 114 of the Transfer <>f Property Act was taken in the pleadings, during the. course of the arguments,\n\nthe tenant claimed the benefit under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Trial Judge found that the respondent \\\\'as a defaulter and held tha~ the notice to quit was a valid one but found that as section 114 of the Trans fer of Property Act was applicable to the facts of the case and the balance of convenience being with the respondent tenant, dismissed the suit for possessipn, but gave a decree for arrears of rent. In appeal the first appellate court held that the trial Court was in error in granting relief against forfeiture under Section 114 of the Tansfer of Property Act and decreed the suit as prayed for.\n\nOn serond appeal, the High Court after making a fresh appraisal of the evidence came to the conculsion that as per the terms of the lease deed of 1955 six months' notice was necessary even if the premises were not taken for manu facturing purposes and as required notice of six months was not given the suit was not maintainable and as such liable to be dismissed.\n\nAllowing the plaintiff's appeal by special leave, the Court,\n\nHELD : 1. Once the requirements of Rent Act are satisfied, the tenant cannot claim the doubfe protection of invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the terms of the contract. The provision of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot therefore be read into the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act.\n\n[99 B & D, 100 DJ\n\nIn the instant case :\n\n(a) The question of termination of the lease by forfeiture does not aris~ on the facts of the case; [100 BJ\n\n(b) after the Rent Act cante into force, the landlord cannot avail himself of clause 12 which provides fdr forfeiture, even if the tenant neglected to pay the rent for over two months; [100 BJ\n\n(c) the landlord cannot enter into possession forthwith without notice. The H only remedy for him is to seek eviction under the provisions of the Rent Act; and [100 B C:1\n\nA ( d) in such circumstances, the tenant cannot rely on S. 114 of Transfer cf\n\nl'roperty Act and claim that he should be given an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent, even though the requirements of section 3(1) bad been fulti.lled,\n\n[100 CJ\n\nV. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasadai Amma/, [1980] I S.C.R. 334 at 350-51; followed.\n\n2. Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act Ill -restricts the rights of the landlord to have the tenant evicted.\n\nBut for the statutory provisions, the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant accord: ing to the terms of the contract or the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. As the Rent Act has restricted the power of the landlord to evict the tenant except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the terms of the contract and the provisions of the Transfer of 'Property Act to that extent are no longer applicable. [97 C-EJ\n\n3. -Jn the instant case :\n\n(a) the condition required under section 3(1) of the U.P. Act had been satisfied and permission by the District Magistrate was rightly granted and suit ftled as contemplated by section 3 (I); and [98 A]\n\n(b) the notice is based on default of payment of rent for more than three months and called upon the tenant to vacate the premises a =nth after the rec.eipt of the notice if he failed to pay the rent as required under section 3 of the U.P. Act. [98 B-CJ\n\nCrVJL APPELLATE JURTSDICTION : Civil Appeal No .. 1235/70.\n\nE Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n25-9-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 1520 of 1966.\n\nP. Govinda Nair, S. Ba'akrishnan and S. Q; Sambandan for the Appellant.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Mrs. Rani Clrabra and Shit/a Prasad for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J,-Tbis appeal is by special leave by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal No. 1520 of 1966,\n\nThe plaintiff Pradesh Kumar Bajpai who is the owner of premises No. 048/128-129 let a portion of the premises to the respondent Binod Behari Sarkar in the year 1949 for carrying on his business of manufacturing blocks and other printing materials. In October, 1955, the plaintiff let out the entire premises on a monthly rent of Rs, 200/-. The p!ilintiff filed the suit on the ground that the respondent had defaulted in payment of rent and prayed for a decree for ejectment and for being put in possession of the premises and for arrears of rent\n\n,. •\n\nPRADESH KUMAR v. BINOD BEHAR! (Kailasam, J.) 95\n\nand or mesne profits pendente/ite at the rate of Rs. 200/· per month.\n\nTue defendant denied that he was a defaulter stating that he was always ready and willing to pay the dues and the respondent had deliberately declined to accept the rent. Though no specific plea of relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act was taken in the pleadings, during the course of the arguments, the tenant claimed the benefit under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nThe Civil Judge who tried the suit found that the tenant was a\n\ndfaulter in a sum of Rs. 6269 86. He further held that the notice to quit was a valid one but found that as s.114 of the Transfer of Property Act was applicable to the facts of the case and the balance of convenience being with the defendant, dismissed the suit for possession, but gave a decree for the arrears of rent. The plaintiff aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court went up in appeal to the District Judge who allowed the appeal holding that the tenant was a defaulter within the meaning of S.3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Disagreeing with the trial Court, the learned Judge held that the trial court was in error in granting relief against forfeitures under S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act and decreed the suit as prayed for.\n\nTue defendant preferred a Second Appeal to the High Court.\n\nThe High Court after making a fresh appraisal of the evidence came to the conclusion that the premises were taken for manufacturing purposes in 1955. On a consideration of the terms of the lease deed of 1955 it found that six months' notice was necessary even if the premises were not taken for manufacturing purposes and as required notice of six months; was not given the suit is not maintainable and as such liable to be dismissed.\n\nThe lease deed dated 28-9-1955 is marked as Annexure A-2.\n\nThe relevant clauses are, 3, 6, 9 and 12 which are as follows :-\n\n\"3. The lessee will not sell, mortgage or in any other manner transfer or part with the possession of the whole or any part of the demised premises, structure and buildings or his interest with the same, and the lessee will also not enter into any partnership with anybody regarding the business carried on or in any way in the demised premises. But the lessee will be entitled to sublet part of the structure and buildings with the consent of the lessor in writing and lessee will.be always responsible for all loss and damage if any.\n\n6. The lessee has the option to continue the tenancy for another period of 3 years that is from 1-9-1956 to 31-8-1959 on the same terms and conditions. The lessee must exercise the option of renewal within 30-6-1956 in writing.\n\n9. That it is hereby agreed by the parties that after the expiry of the period of three years the Lessor will have the option to revise the rent with the consent of the lessee.\n\nIt is also agreed by both the parties that the lease may, be terminated by the Lessor on giving six months' written notice and after 4 years at any time. Lessor will also be entitled to terminate the lease on giving six months' notice in writing ending with English Calendar month.\n\n12. If the lessee fails and/or neglects to pay rent at the place and in the manner mentioned above for two months and/or breaks any of the terms and conditions herein before mentioned the lessor will be entitled to enter possession forthwith without notice and terminate the D lease.\"\n\nIt may be noted that the parties agreed that after the expiry of the period of three years the lessor will have the option to revise the ren_t\n\nwith the consent of the lessee. It was further agreed that the lease ,._ may be terminated by the lessee on giving six months' written notioe E and after four years at any time, the lessor will be entitled to terminate the lease on giving siJi: months notice in writing. If these clauses are applicable six months' notioe is necessary.\n\nClause 12 provides that if the lessee fails and/or neglects to pay rent at the place and in the manner mentioned above for two months F and/or breaks any of the terms and conditions mentioned, the lessor\n\nwill be entitled to enter possession forthwith without notice and termi- _ ~-· nate the lease. It is not disputed that the lessee neglected to pay rent for more than two months and as such if the clause is applicable the lease is liable to be forfeited and the lessor is entitled to enter possession forthwith without notice.\n\nMr. Govindan Nair learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant submitted that the lease is governed by the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as the lease was entered into after the Act had come into foroe, the relationship between the parties is regulated by the provisions of the enactment and not by the terms of the contract. He submitted that the requirements of S. 3 of the Act had been fulfilled and the defendant cannot resist the suit for eviction. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction\n\nPRADP.:m KUMAR v. B!NOD BEHARI (Kailasam, J.) 97\n\nAct III 1947 came iuto force in 1948. Though the Act was subse quently repeakd by the \\r.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, as the lease was of the year 1955, S.43 of Act III, 1972 saves proceedings initiated under U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. S. 43(2)(r) provides that any suit for the eviction of a tenant instituted without or with the permission referred to in S.3 of the old Act or any proceeding arising out of such suit, pending immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, may be conti\n\nnued and concluded as if this Act had not been passed. It is, there fore, not in dispute that the proceedings in this matter are governed by the 1947 Act.\n\nAs the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (III of 1947) are applicable, the terms of the lease deed becomes irrelevant. The only question that arises and which was seriously contended for on behalf of the respondent is that in addi tion to the safeguards provided to the tenant under the Act, he is also entitled to the benefits of S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act. S.3\n\nof the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act III resc tricts the rights of the landlord to have the tenant evicted. But for the statutory provisions, the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant according to the terms of the contract or the provisions of the Trans fer of Property Act, As the Rent Act has restricted the power of the landlord to evict the tenant except in accordance with the provisions -0f the Act, the terms of the contract and the provisions of the Trans\n\nfer of Property Act to that extent are no longer applicable. Section 3(1) of the Rent Act runs as follows :\n\n\"Subject to any order passed under sub-section (3)\n\nno suit shall, without the permission of the District Magis- F trate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds that are mentioned in sub-clause (a) to (g) of sub-section(!).\"\n\nThe relevant clause with which we are concerned is S. 3(l)(a) G which provides that a suit may be filed with the permission of the District Magistrate when the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of the notice of demand.\n\nThe notice Exhibit P.7 shows that the tenant was in arrears for more than three months. The notice dated 12-5-63 was served on the tenant B on 14-6-63 and no reply was sent by the tenant and it is not disputed that the tenant failed to pay the rent to the landlord within one month\n\nof the service upon him of the notice of demand. Thus the condition required under S. 3(1) had been satisfied and permission by the District Magistrate was rightly granted and suit filed as contemplated under S. 3(1 ). ·\n\nAs the tenant could not rely either on the terms of lease or provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and insist on six __ months' notice, it was submitted on his behalf that as the notice was issued not only on the ground of default in payment of rent as contemplated in the Act but also under clause 12 .of the agreement which provides for forfeiture, he was entitled to the safeguards provided under S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the facts it is clear that the notice is based on default of payment of rent for more than three months, and called upon the tenant to vacate the premises a month after the receipt of the notice if he failed to pay the rent as required under S.3. The notice is not based on the forfeiture of the lease unc'er clause 12. If clause 12 is valid on default of paymert of rent fer two months, the landlord is entitled to enter into possession forthwith without notice terminating the lease.\n\nAlthough the question of termination of the lease by forfeiture does not arise on the facts of the case as the learned counsel strenuously contended that even then the tenant is entitled to the benefit of S.114 of the Transfer of Property A\"t and that plea was accepted by the Trial Court, we would briefly deal with the point raised. During the trial when the arguments of the case were going on and the case was due to be closed, the learned ccunsel for the tenant prayed that the Court be pleased to confer benefit of S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act on the defendant. He tendered the full amount of rent alongwith full costs of the suit and interest as ordered by the Court. The learned counsel for the plaintiff _submitted that the defendant should not be allowed the benefit cf S.114. S. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for relief against forfeiture en nonpayment of rent on the following terms :-\n\n\"Where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrears, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for . making such payment within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred.\"\n\nPRADESH KUMAR v. BINOD BEHARl (Kailasam, J.) 99\n\nIf the relief provided for under the fecticn is available, as the lessee had tendered the rent in arrears alongwith the intue&t therecn and his full costs in the suit, it was open to the Court to pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture. The plea of the karmd counsel for\n\nthe tenant is that this provision should alrn le r\"d into the U.P.\n\n(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In a decision of seven Judges' Bench of this Court in V. Dhanapa/ Chettiar v. Yasodai\n\nAmmal,(l-) the question as to whether in order to get a decree for evic- .tion, the landlord under the Rent Control Act should give notice as required under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was considered.\n\nThis Court held that determination of the lease in accordance with the transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and that if a case is made out for eviction under the Rent Act, it is itself sufficient and it is not obligatory to determine the lease by issue of notice as required in accordance with S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel for the tenant submitted that the d.ecision is confined only to the question as to whether notice under S.IC6 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary and did not decide as to whether the provisions of the other Sections of Transfer of Property Act are applicable.\n\nIt is to be noted, however, that the question of determination of a lease by forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act, was specifically dealt with by the Court and it was held that the claim of the tenant that he is entitled to a double protection(!) under the Rent Act and (2) under the Transfer of Property Act, is without any substance. While ru1ing thus the Court noted the following passage occuring in Manjujandra's case(2) and quoted with approval in Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander.(l)\n\n\"We are inclined to hold that the landlord in the present case cannot secure an order for eviction without first establishing that he had validly determined the lease under the Transfer of Property Act\".\n\nDisapproving this view, the Court framed a question \"why this dual requirement?\" and answered it as follows :-\n\n\"Even if tlie lease is determined by a forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into play only if he has incurred the liability to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise*** one\n\n(I) [1980] I S.C.R. 334 at 350-51.\n\n(2) [1967] I S.C.R. 475.\n\n(3) (1976] 2 S.C.R. 906.\n\nhas to look to the provisions of law contained in the four corners of any State Rent Act to find out whether a tenant can be evicted or not. The theory of double protection or additi.onal protection, it seems to us, has been stret- ched too far and without a proper and due consideration of all its ramifications\".\n\nIn the case before us, it is not in dispute that after the Rent Act came into force, the landlord cannot avail himself of clause 12 which provides for forfeiture, even if the tenant neglected to pay the rent for over two months. The landlord cannot enter into possession forth-\n\n'\\ ..\n\nwith without notice. The only remedy for him is to seek eviction _,,.\n\nC under the provisions of the Rent Act. In such circumstances the tenant cannot rely on S.114 of Transfer of Property Act and claim that he should be given an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent, even though the requirements of S.3(1) had been fulfilled.\n\nWe are satisfied that once the requirements of Rent Act are D satisfied, the tenant cannot claim the double protection of invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the terms of the contract.\n\nIn the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the lower appellate Court aud decree the suit for possession and ejectment of the defendant. The appellant is entitled to his costs in this appeaL\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "PRADESH KUMAR BAJPAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRADESH KUMAR BAJPAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BINOD BEHARI SARKAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BINOD BEHARI SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 21, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 66, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".\"\"-\n\nPRADESH KUMAR BAJPAI v.\n\nBINOD BEHARI SARKAR\n\nMarch 21, 1980\n\nrs."}}, {"text": "rs. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. s. 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Govinda Nair", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4281, "end_char": 4296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govinda Nair, S. Ba'akrishnan and S. Q; Sambandan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Ba'akrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govinda Nair, S. Ba'akrishnan and S. Q; Sambandan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Q", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4318, "end_char": 4322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govinda Nair, S. Ba'akrishnan and S. Q; Sambandan for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4354, "end_char": 4370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Mrs. Rani Clrabra and Shit/a Prasad for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Mrs. Rani Clrabra and Shit/a Prasad for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "S. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4390, "end_char": 4398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Mrs. Rani Clrabra and Shit/a Prasad for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Bagga"}}, {"text": "Rani Clrabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4405, "end_char": 4417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, Mrs. Rani Clrabra and Shit/a Prasad for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "KAILASAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4501, "end_char": 4509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J,-Tbis appeal is by special leave by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAILASAM, J,-Tbis appeal is by special leave by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Pradesh Kumar Bajpai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4690, "end_char": 4710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1520 of 1966,\n\nThe plaintiff Pradesh Kumar Bajpai who is the owner of premises No.", "canonical_name": "PRADESH KUMAR BAJPAI"}}, {"text": "Binod Behari Sarkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "048/128-129 let a portion of the premises to the respondent Binod Behari Sarkar in the year 1949 for carrying on his business of manufacturing blocks and other printing materials.", "canonical_name": "BINOD BEHARI SARKAR"}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5604, "end_char": 5615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5647, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5749, "end_char": 5760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5792, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5980, "end_char": 6004, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6364, "end_char": 6367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6392, "end_char": 6424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6575, "end_char": 6599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "28-9-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7154, "end_char": 7163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease deed dated 28-9-1955 is marked as Annexure A-2."}}, {"text": "1-9-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7891, "end_char": 7899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessee has the option to continue the tenancy for another period of 3 years that is from 1-9-1956 to 31-8-1959 on the same terms and conditions."}}, {"text": "31-8-1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7903, "end_char": 7912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessee has the option to continue the tenancy for another period of 3 years that is from 1-9-1956 to 31-8-1959 on the same terms and conditions."}}, {"text": "30-6-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8001, "end_char": 8010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lessee must exercise the option of renewal within 30-6-1956 in writing."}}, {"text": "Clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9252, "end_char": 9261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Govindan Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9788, "end_char": 9801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Govindan Nair learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant submitted that the lease is governed by the provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as the lease was entered into after the Act had come into foroe, the relationship between the parties is regulated by the provisions of the enactment and not by the terms of the contract."}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as the lease was entered into after the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9925, "end_char": 10005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10188, "end_char": 10192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as the lease was entered into after the Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as the lease was entered into after the Act"}}, {"text": "S.43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10576, "end_char": 10580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as the lease was entered into after the Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as the lease was entered into after the Act"}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10649, "end_char": 10687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 43(2)(r)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10689, "end_char": 10700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10810, "end_char": 10813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10924, "end_char": 10968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11182, "end_char": 11214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11505, "end_char": 11510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11518, "end_char": 11542, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11572, "end_char": 11604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12103, "end_char": 12115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "S. 3(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12511, "end_char": 12521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "12-5-63", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12895, "end_char": 12902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice dated 12-5-63 was served on the tenant B on 14-6-63 and no reply was sent by the tenant and it is not disputed that the tenant failed to pay the rent to the landlord within one month\n\nof the service upon him of the notice of demand."}}, {"text": "14-6-63", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12933, "end_char": 12940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice dated 12-5-63 was served on the tenant B on 14-6-63 and no reply was sent by the tenant and it is not disputed that the tenant failed to pay the rent to the landlord within one month\n\nof the service upon him of the notice of demand."}}, {"text": "S. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13156, "end_char": 13163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 3(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13282, "end_char": 13290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13374, "end_char": 13398, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13592, "end_char": 13601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13700, "end_char": 13705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13713, "end_char": 13737, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13984, "end_char": 13987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14051, "end_char": 14060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14065, "end_char": 14074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14434, "end_char": 14439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14750, "end_char": 14755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14763, "end_char": 14787, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15018, "end_char": 15023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15025, "end_char": 15031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15039, "end_char": 15063, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16174, "end_char": 16206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16452, "end_char": 16457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16465, "end_char": 16489, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16578, "end_char": 16602, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16804, "end_char": 16810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act", "statute": "Control of Rent and Eviction Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16818, "end_char": 16842, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16981, "end_char": 17005, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17092, "end_char": 17116, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17232, "end_char": 17256, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17427, "end_char": 17451, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Manjujandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17547, "end_char": 17558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While ru1ing thus the Court noted the following passage occuring in Manjujandra's case(2) and quoted with approval in Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander.(l)\n\n\"We are inclined to hold that the landlord in the present case cannot secure an order for eviction without first establishing that he had validly determined the lease under the Transfer of Property Act\"."}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17809, "end_char": 17833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Even if tlie lease is determined by a forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17950, "end_char": 18033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "(1976] 2 S.C.R. 906", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18367, "end_char": 18386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18463, "end_char": 18477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18827, "end_char": 18836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Rent Act", "statute": "State Rent Act"}}, {"text": "S.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19150, "end_char": 19155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Rent Act", "statute": "State Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19159, "end_char": 19183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19293, "end_char": 19299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transfer of Property Act", "statute": "Transfer of Property Act"}}, {"text": "are satisfied that once the requirements of Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19324, "end_char": 19376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19474, "end_char": 19498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_946_965_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI AND ANR. ETC. v.\n\nSURJEET SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nMay 1, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, V. D. Tul.ZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JI.]\n\nBar Council of Delhi Election Rules 1968 Rule 3(i) validity of-JUJViiic-\" tion of the High Court under Article 226-Alfernative remedy no bar-Rig'ltt to vote and right to stand for election-Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel allll\n\nprinciple of approbation and reprobation.\n\nIn the year 1978, a proviso wa< added to \"Rule 3(j) of the Bar Council of Delhi Flection Rules, 1968 with the approval of the Bar Couucil of India in accordance with the requirement of Sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Advocates Act, 1961. In accordance with that proviso a copy of the declaration form was sent on 14th June, 1978 to the Advocates whose names found place in the State roll of Advocates asking them to return the declaration form duly filled up and signed within the specified period. A publication to this effect was also made in some newspapers viz. Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Statesman etc.\n\nThe last extended date for the submission of the declaration\" forms was 14th September, 1978 and the electoral 'roll was finally\" published on the 16th September, 1978 excluding the names of about 2,000 Advocates who had failed ro submit such declaration forms. On the besis of the electoral roll so prepared, elections to tho Bar Council of Delhi was held on the 17th November, 1978.\n\nThe total number of advocates on the Advocates roll was 5,000 and odd out of which the names of about 3,000 and odd only were included in the electoral roll in accordance with the proviso to Rule 3 (j) of the Election Rules of the Bar Council of Delhi. The re!ults of the election were declared on the 19th November, 1978. The names of lhe\n\n15 persons Who were declared elected were published in the Gazette on the 22ild November, 1978.\n\nThereafter the respondents in these appeals filed writ petitions challenging the whole election by attacking the validity of the proviso to Rule 3(j).\n\nThe Delhi High Court allowed the three writ petitions taking the view,\n\n(i) so for as the qualifications to be possessed by and the conditions to be satisfied by an advocate before being brought on to the Electoral Roll was concerned only the Bar Council of. India has the competence to make the rules under section 3(4) and section 49(1)(a) of the Advocates Act, 1961 and\n\nthe State Bar Council has no power at. all to make o. rule on this subject;\n\n(ii) the plea of estoppel against Surjeet Singh does not arise, (ill) nmt injustice has been done to the petitioners because more than 2000 advocates were wrongfully disqualified being brought on the Electoral Roll. Thi.! has materially affected the result of the elections; and (iv) Rule 3(j) of the Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules, 1968 is in excess of the roles making power\n\nof Bar Council of Delhi.\n\nH Dismissing the appeals by special leave the Court,\n\nHEID : 1. The impugned proviso to Rule 3(j) of the Delhi B!ll Comu:IV bf Electiop.. Rules is ultra vires and invalid 3.nd the. electoml roll prepared by\n\nt l '\n\nI ~\n\n\\ . .\n\n• J\n\n) _,.. ..\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELHI V. SURJEET SINGH 947\n\nthe Delhi Bar Council o~ the basis of the same resulting in the exclusion o! the names of about 2000 advocates from the said roll was not valid in lMV.\n\n[958!}.E]\n\n(b) The whole election was invalid on that account and it could be challenged as such in a writ petition. It was not a case of challenging the preparation of the electoral roll on the factual basis of wrong exclusion of a few namei. For the said purpose Rule 4 occurring in Chapter I of the Bar Cotmcil of India Rules could come into play. But here, because of the invalidity of the Rules itself, the preparation of the electoral roll was completely vitiated-a matter which cannot be put within the narrow limit of the said rule.\n\n[958E-F]\n\nHowever, it depends upon the nature and the intensity of the error committed in the preparation of the electoral. roll and its effect on the whole election for deciding the question as to whether a writ petition wonld be maintainable or not.\n\n[862E-F]\n\nChief Commissioner, Aimer v. Radhey Shyam Dani,\n\n[1957] S.C.R. 68; Parme1hwar Mahaseth and Ors. v. 1 State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1958 Patna 149; Umakant Singh and Ors. v. Binda Choudhary and Ors., AIR 1965 Patna\n\n459; D<v Prakash Balmukand v. Babu Ram Rewti Mal and Ors. AIR 1961 Punjab 429; Ramgulam Shri Baijnath Parsad v. The Collector, District Guna D and OFJ., AIR 1975 M.P. 145 and Bhoop Singh v. Bar Council of P1miab and Haryana through its Secretary and Ors., AIR 1976 M.P. 110; referred to.\n\n(c) The illegal preparation of the electoral roll by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to Rule 3 (j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be upheld.\n\nThere is no question of the result being materially affected in such a E case. [958F-GJ ·\n\n(d) The contesting respondents could not be defeated in their writ petitions on the ground of estoppel or the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate or that they were guilty of laches. In the first instance some of the contesting respondents were merely voters. Even Sri Surjeet Singh in his writ petition claimed to be both a candidate and a voter.\n\nAs a voter be could F challenge the election even assuming that as candidate after being unsuccessful he was estopped from doing so.\n\nBut, merely because he took part in the electiOn by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of fmnchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was\n\naringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso. There\n\nIS no question of approbation and reprobation in such a case.\n\nA voter could come to the High Court eyen earlier before the election was held.\n\nBut mere- G ly beoouse he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of ]aches and must be. non-suited on that account. [958F-H, 959AB]\n\nKanglu Beula Kotwal and Anr. v. Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Sabha, Durga and Ors., AIR 1955 Nagpur 49; distinguished.\n\n(e) The manner of resolving disputes as to the validity of election is pro vided for in Rule 34 of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules. This is not an\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll,\n\nA appropriate and adequate alte'l\"'tive remedy to defeat the writ petitioner on that account.\n\nFirstly, 'no clause of Rule 34 covers the challenging of the election on the ground that it has been done in this case. Secondly, the Election Tribuool will not be competent to declare any provision of the Blee- .-(. ti.on Rules ultra vires and invalid.\n\nIt not a case where the name of any voter was wrongly omitted from the electoral roll but it is a case Where the preparation of the whole electoral roll was null and void because of the in- • B validity of the impugned proviso. [959C-D, &Fl\n\nRamgulam Shri Baijnath Pd. v. The Collector, Dist. Guna and Ors., AIR 1975 M.P. 145 and Bhupendra Kumar Jain v. Y. S. Dharmadhikari and Ors., AIR .1976, M.P. llO; referred to.\n\nBhoop Singh v. Bar Council of Puniab and Haryana through its Secretary\n\n'C and Ors., AlR 1977 Pb. & Haryana; quoted with approval. ~·\n\nK. K. Srivastava etc. v. B1iupendra Kumar Jain and Ors., AIR 1977 S.C. 1703; distinguished.\n\n2. If the alternative remedy fully covers the challenge to the election then that remedy and that remedy alone must be resorted to even though it in- D volves the challenge of the election of all the successful oandidates. But if the nature and the ground of the challenge of the whole election are such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge or, in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy, then the remedy of writ petition to challenge the \\Vhole election is still available. In the present case the Election Tribunal would have found itself incompetent to declare the proviso to Rule 3(j) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules ultra yires and E that being so the alternative remedy provided in Rule 34(8) was no remedy at all.\n\n[9641)..F]\n\nSuryya Kumar Ray v. The Bar Council of India and Ors. Matter No. 304 of 1976 decided on December 17, 1976, ovemiled.\n\nBarish Sambhu Prasad v. Bar Council of Gujarat, Special Civil Applica- F tion Nos. 542 and 551 of 1969; approved.\n\n3. So long the existing rules framed by the Bar Council of India remained In vogne all persons whose names are ori .the State Roll are entitled proprio vl11.ore to be put on the electoral roll. Sections 24( e )( 1) and 26A of the Advocates Act, 1961 read with Rules l, 2 and 3 of Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules male this position clear.\n\n[954A-B, [).HJ\n\n4. On a plain reading of sub-sections 4 of section 3 of the Advocate& Act, 1961, it is manifest that under the Act the qualifications and conditions entitling an advocate to vote at an election or for being chosen as a member of the State Bar CQuncil has to be prescribed by the Bar Council of India. Tlte State Bar Council bas no such power. The power of the State Bar Council is merely to prepare and revise from time to time the electoral roll subject to the Rules made by the Bar Council of India concerning the qualifications and conditions aforesaid. This interpretation of Section 3 ( 4) of the Act finds ample support from the very special and specific provision contained in section . 49(l)(a) providing for the general power of the Bar Council of India. [956F-H]\n\n.i ~\n\nBftR COUNCIL OF DELHI V. SURJEBT SINGH 949\n\nS. It is true that the power to make rules conferred by section IS is both A. for the Bar O>uncil of India as also for the Bar O>uncil of a State. But no provision Of section IS can override die specific provision IJlllde in section 3(4) and section 49(1)(a) of the Act. Sub-section (I) of section 15 says- \"A Bar Council may make rules to carry out !he purpooes of !his Chapter\"\n\nwhich means Chapter ll including section 3. But the power to prescn'be qualillcatioDS and conditions entitling an advocate to vote at an election being that of the Bar O>uncil of India section IS(!) cannot be interpreted to confer power B. on the State Bar O>uncil to make rules regarding the qualifications and conditiono aforesaid. [957B-DJ\n\nThe State Bar O>ancil can franw rules for the preparation and revision of electoral rolls under section 15(2)(a). That would be in conformity witll the latter part of sub-section ( 4) of section 3 elso. But in the garb of making a rule for the preparation and revision of die electoral rolls it cannot prescribe disqualifications, qualiftoations or conditions subject to which an advocate whose name occurs in the. State roll can find place in the electoral roll resulting in his deprivation of his right to vote at the election. In the instant case nndef the impugned proviso failure on the part of an advocate to submit the required declaration within the specified time entitles 1he State Bar Council to exclude his name from the electorel roll. Such a thing was squarely oovered by the exclusive power conferred on the Bar O>uncil of India under sections 3(4) and 49(l)(a) of the Advocates Act. The Stste Bar Cotmcil hail no such power. [957F-H]\n\n6. The approval of the Bar Council of India can make the rule made by the State Bar Council valid and effective only if the rule made is within the\n\ncompetence of the State Bar Council otherwise not. Mere approval by the Bar E.\n\nCouncil of India to a rule ultra vir\"\" the State Bar O>uncil cannot make the rule valid. Nor has it the effect of a rule made by the Bar Council of India.\n\nMaking a rule by the Bar Council of India and giving approval to a rnle made by the State Bar Council are two distinct and different things.\n\nOne cannot take the place of the other. [958B-DJ\n\nClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals NOil, 2224, 2225 F. and 2226 of 1979 .\n\n.,,., Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-5-1979 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ NOil. 111, 551 and 284 of 1979.\n\n• V.M. Tarkunde, A. K. Sen, G. L. Sanghi, B. P. Maheshwari and G: S. K. Bhattacharya for the Appellants in C.A.s. 2224, 2225, 2226179.\n\nP. R. Mridul, Vimal Shanker, K. R. R. Pillai, P. N. Wadhera and Aruneshwar Gupta for Respondent No. 1 in CA 2224/79.\n\nD. D. Chawla, Vineet Kumar and R. S. Sihota for Respondent Nos. 1-3 in CA 2225/79.\n\nB. D. Sharma and Aloka Bhattacharya for Respondent No. 1 in\n\nCA 2226/79.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J .-These th!ee appeals by the Bar Council of Delhi and the Bar Council of India are from the common judgment of the Delhi High Court .allowing three writ petitions filed by the first respondent in each appeal and others seeking the setting aside of the election of the Bar Conncil of Delhi held in the year 1978. As the points involved in them are identica( they are all being disposed of by this common judgment. We shall proceed to state the facts from the records of Chi! Appeal No. 2224 of 1979 in which respondent no. 1 is Shri Surjeet Singh Bhangul. He was a voter as also a candidate for the election wherein he lost In the writ petition giving rise to Civil Appeal 2225 of 1979 there were three petitioners-two were candidates but Shri D. R. Thakur was an advocate whose name was not included in the electoral roll although his name occurs in the State roll of Advocates.\n\nShri A S. Randhawa, respondent no. 1 in Civil Appeal 2226 of 1979 was a person whose name occurred both in the State roll of Advocates as also in the electoral roll. But he was not a candidate.\n\nSurjeet Singh was an advocate who was a member of the Delhi Bar Conncil before the impugned election. A proviso was added to Rnle 3.(j) of the Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules, 1968 in the year\n\n1978. In accordance with that proviso a copy of the declaration form was sent on 14th Jnne, 1978 to the advocates whose names fonnd place in the State roll o1' Advocates asking them to return the declaration form dnly filled up and signed within the specified Fod. A publication to this effect was also made in some newspapers viz. Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Statesman etc. The last exnded date for th• submission of the declaration forms was 14th September 1978 and the electoral roll was finally published on the 16th Septelnber 197 8 excluding the names df about 2,000 advocates who had faijed to submit such declaration forms.\n\nOn the basis of the electoral toll so prepared, according to the programme of election, the electi?Jl of members to the Bar Council of Delhi was held on the 17th Nofomber 1978. The total number of adrocates on the Advocates roll was ji,000 and odd oot of which the names of about 3,000 and odd only were included in the el.ectoral roll in accordance with the proviso to Rulel 3 (j) of the Election Rules of the Bar Council of Delhi. The results of the election were declared on the 19th November, 1978. The names lof the 15 persons who were declared elected were published in the Gazette on the 22nd November, 1978. Thereafter on the 24th of Januaijy 1979 the writ petition was filed in the High Court challenging the whole election by attacking the validity of the proviso to Rule 3 (j).\n\n.,,,_.\n\n• l\n\n'. 7 t\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELHI v. SURJEET SINGH ( Untwalia, J.) 951\n\nApart from the successful candidates the writ petitions were mainly A .and vigorously contested by the two Bar Councils, namely, the Bar Council of Delhi and the Bar Council of India. The latter seems to have taken keen interest in the matter of contesting the writ petitions because the impugned proviso to Rule 3 (j) was introduced in the Election Rules with the approval of the Bar Council of India in accordance with the requirement of sub-s. ( 3) of Section 15 of the Advocates Act,\n\n.B ·\n\n1961. The High Court has taken the view;-\n\n( 1) \"Lastly, the irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that so far as the qualifications to be possessed by and the conditions to be satisfied by an advocate before being brought on the Electoral Roll are concerned only C the Bar Council of India has the competence to make the rules under Section 3( 4) and Section 49(1)(a) and the State Bar Council has no power at all to make a rule on this subject.\"\n\n( 2) The plea of estoppel raised against Snrjeet Singh was rejected.\n\n(3) \"Rank injustice has been done to the petitioner because more than 2,000 advocates were wrongfully disqualified from being brought on tho Electoral Roll.\n\nTim has materially affected the regnlt of the olection.\" ( 4) \"For the reasons stated above, we hold that Rule E 3(j) of the Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules, 1%8, is in excess of the ruleS making power of the Bar Council of Delhi. Since the action taken by the Bar Council of Delhi to disqnalify more than 2,000 advocates because of their non-<:<>mpliance with the proviso to Rule 3 (j) has resulted in great prejudice to the F petitioner who can justly claim that the bringing on the Electoral Roll of more than 2000 advocates wonld have made a considerable difference to his own election and to the election as a whole, we are constrained to set aside the election to the Bar Council of Delhi held on 17th November 1978.\" G\n\nM/s V. M. Tarkunde, A. K. Sen and G. L. Sanghi appearing for >the appellMm, broadly speaking, made the following submissions :-\n\n( 1) That the impugned proviso of Delhi Bar Council Election Rufo; was valid as it was within the competence\n\nof the Delhi Bar Council to add 1uch a proviso in the H Rules under its tale making power with the approval of the Bar Council of India. In any event the ap-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [198Q] 3 S.C.ll~\n\nproval had the effect of making it a rule made by the Bar Council of India.\n\n(2) The electoral roll prepared by the Bar Council of Delhi could not be challenged in a writ petition. The preparation of the electoral roll is final and any wrong exclusion or inclusion of name from or in the electoral roll is beyond the pale of challenge in a writ petition.\n\n(3) That it was not shown that the result of the election has been materially affected due to the non-inclusion of the names of about 2,000 advocates from the eloo-- toral roll. There was neither any pleading to this. effect nor was any material placed before the High.\n\nCourt in support of this assertion.\n\n( 4) That Surjeet Singh and others like him who had taken part in the election and were defeated were estopped from challenging the election as they could not approbate and reprobate at the same time. They were guilty of !aches also as they could have challenged in the High Court the validity of the impugned proviso before the election was actually held.\n\n(5) That there is a specific remedy provided in the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules for challenging any election to the Bar Council and hence in view of the adequate remedy being available the election could not be challenged by a writ petition.\n\nM/s. P. R. Mridul and F. S. Nariman appearing for the contesting respondents combated all the submissions made on behalf of the appelc\n\nF !ants and supported the judgment of the High Court.\n\nWe find no substance in any of the points urged on behalf of the i appellants. We are, by and ]arge, in agreement with the decision of t the High Court on each and every point. We proceed to briefly state our reasons for the same.\n\nG Section 4 of the Advocates Act provides for persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll. Clause ( e) of sub-s. ( l ) says that the person must fulfil such other conditions as may be specified in y the rules made by the State Bar Council under Chapter Ill of the Act 'I which concerns the admission and enrolment of advocates.\n\nUnder the Rules so framed a person desirous of being enrolled as an advocate H has to apply in the prescribed form furnishing all the details Qf his qualifications to be enrolled as an advocate. In item 3 of the application the applicant declares-\"I. declare that upon admission I pro-\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELHI v. SURJEET SINGH ( Untwalia, J.) 95 3\n\npose to practise within the State of Delhi.\" At the end of the appli- A cation form certain undertakings are given by the applicant. Clause ).._ ( c) of the undertaking runs thus :-\n\n• J\n\n17 ~\n\n\"I hereby declare and undertake that- . .... ................................. .\n\n(iv) I intend to practise Qrdinarily and regularly within the jurisdiction of the Bar Council of Delhi.\n\n( v) I shall inform the Bar Council of a11y change of address of my residence or place of practice for the proper maintenance of the roll and voters' list.\"\n\nAccording to the case of the Delhi Bar Council many advocates after having been enrolled and put on the State roll of advocates of Delhi break the said undertaking. They do not ordinarily and regularly practise within the jurisdiction of the Bar Council of Delhi nor do they inform any change of address fQI' the proper maintenance of the roll and the voters' list. It is a pertinent matter no doubt. It 1is the duty of the Bar Council to obtain information as to whether any person put on the roll of State advocates ceased ordinarily and regularly to practise within the jurisdiction of the Bar Council of Delhi, if so, to take steps for removal of his name from the State rolls.\n\nThat would automatically, as we shall presently show, debar the person concerne<l to be put on the electoral roll.\n\nBut no provision in the Advocates Act or any rule was brought to our notice enabling the Delhi Bar Council to remove the name of a pel'l!on from th@ State roll if he has broken the undertaking aforesaid.\n\nSection 26A, of the Advocates Act merely says-\"A State Bar Council may remove from the State roll the name of any advocate who is dead or from whom a request has been received to that effect.\" In para 2 of the affidavit of Shri D. Gupta, Advocate it is tated :-\n\n\"It is the experience of this Council that most of the advocates who are elevated to the Bench or those who join subordinate judiciary or family or other business or employment, seldom care to notify this Council to get their licence revoked or suspended, nor do the advocates shifting their place of practice from Delhi to elsewhere, care to notify this Council in that respect, although the undertakings at internal page 8 of the Enrolment form of this Council oblii:es them to do so.\"\n\nIt may be so but the lacunae in this regard have got to be removed by amending the Advocates Act or by properly framing the rules in thati\n\n2-610SCI/80\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S, C, R,\n\nrespect.\n\nWe are definitely of the opinion that so long the existing rules framed by the Bar Council of India remained in vogue all persons whOie names are on the State roll are entitled proprio vigore to be put on the electoral roll Rule 1 occurring in Chapter I of Part III of the Bar Council of India Rules says :-\n\n\"1. Every advocate whose name .is on the Electoral Roll of the State Council shall be entitled to vote at an .election.\"\n\nRule 2 provides :-\n\n\"2, Subject to the provisions of Rule 3, the name of every advocate entered in ihe State Roll shall be entered in the electoral roll of the State Council.\"\n\n&ceptions to Rule 2 are to be found embodied, in Rule 3 which runs thus:-\n\n\"3. The name of an advocate appearing in the State Roll shall not be entered in the Electoral Roll, if on information obtained by the State Council :\n\n(a) his name has any time been removed;\n\n(b) he has been suspended from practice, provided that this disqualification shall operate only for a period of five years from the date of the expiry of the period of suspension;\n\n( c) he is an undischarged insolvent;\n\n( d) he has been found guilty of an election offence in regard to an election to the State Council by an Election Tribunal, provided however that such . disqualification shall not operate beyond the election next following after such finding has been made;\n\n( e) he is convicted by a competent court for un offence involving moral turpitude, provided that this disqualification shall cease to have effect after a period of two years has elapsed since his release;\n\n(f) he is in full-time service or is in such part-time business or other vocation not permitted in the case cf. practising advocates by the rules either of the State Cmmcil concerned or of the Council;\n\n(g) he has intimated voluntary suspension of practice and has not .given intimation of resumption of practice.\"\n\nNone of the clauses in Rule 3 covers a clause of the kind found in the proviso to Rule 3 (j) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules.\n\n.,_\n\n17 •\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELIII v. SURJEET SINGH (Untwalia, J.) 95 5\n\nule 3 of Delhi Bar Council Election Rules is headed 'Interpretation\".\n\nA Clause (j) of the said Rules says :-\n\n\"\"Electoral Roll\" means and includes the roll containing the names of the advocates prepared in accordance with the rules of the Bar Council of India in Part III, Chapter I.\"\n\nThe impugned proviso added to clause (j) in the year 1978 runs thus:-\n\n\"Provided that the Elector; il Roll shall not include the name of such advocate who fails to file in the office of the Bar Council, on or before such date (not being earlier than 30 days of the date of notification) as may he notified by the Bar Council in such mannoc , as may be considered proper by it from time to time, or withiri 45 days of the putting up of the preliminary Electoral Roll under Rule 4 ( 1 ) of Chapter I of Part II! of the Bar Council, of India Rules, a declaration containing the name, address and number of the advocate on the State Roll and to the effect that :-\n\n(a) He is an advocate ordinarily practisinlll in the Union -\n\nTerritory of Delhi and that his principal place of\n\npractice is within Union Territory of Delhi;\n\n(b) He is not an undischarged insolvent;\n\n( c) l{e has never been convicted by any court for an offence E involving moral turpitude;\n\nA period of two years has elapsed since his release after being. convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; F\n\n(In case of conviction particulars of such conviction should be given)\n\n(d) He is not in full-time service or business or in any such part-time business or other vocation as is not permitted in the case of practising adrocates by the rules of the Bar Council; and\n\n( e) He has not been suspended from practice; and on the failure to file the declaration or C1ll filing of incomplete or incorrect declaration in any respect, it shall be presumed that the name of such advocate is not to be entered on the Electoral Roll in accordance with Rule 3 of Chapter I of Part ID of the Bar Council of India Rules.\"\n\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA In these appeals we are not concerned with the proprfoty or legality of asking such a declaration from a person belonging to the, noble profession.\n\nWe shall proceed on the assumption that such an information could be asked for from a person concerned whose name is on the State roll of Advocates.\n\nOn the furnishing of such information the name of the advocate concerned could not included in the B electoral roll only if on the basis of that information one or more clauses of Rule 3 of the Bar Council of India Rules to be found iii Part III, Chapter I could come into play, not otherwise. In these appeals w, e are not concerned with any such case.\n\nThe contrversy here centres round the fact that under the impugned !Proviso mere failure to file the required declaration disqualified the advocate cone cerned from being put on the electoral roll thus depriving him of his right to vote or to stand as a candidate.\n\nThe crux of the matter in these appeals is as to whether such a proviso was valid or ultra vires.\n\nIn order to determine the point at issue we shall now read some relevant provisions of the Advocates Act. Section 3 provides for the constitution of the State Bar Council, sub-s. ( 4) of which says :-\n\n-----.~\n\n\"( 4) An advocate shall be disqualified from voting at an election under sub-section (2) or for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a State Bar Council, unless he possesses such qualifications or satisfies such conditions as may be prescribed in this behalf by the Bar Council of fadia, and subject to any such rules that may be made, an electoral roll shall be prepared and revised from time to time by each State Bar Coll!lcil.\"\n\nOn a plain reading of this sub-section it is manifest that under the Act the qualifications and conditions entitling an advocate ta vote at an election or for being chosen as a member of the, State Bar Council ha~ to be prescribed by the Bar Council af India.\n\nThe State Bar Council has no such power. The power of the State Bar Council is merely to prepare. and revise from time to time the electoral roll subject to the rules made by the Bar Council of India concerning the qualifications and conditions aforesaid.\n\nThis interpretation of Section 3 ( 4) of the Act finds ample support from the very special and specific J\"\"Ovision contained in section 49(1)(a) providing for the general power of the Bar Council of India in these terms:-\n\nH \"49. (l) The Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under this Act, and, in particular, such rules may prescribe-\n\n:r ..\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELHI v. SURJEET SINGH ( Untwalia, !.) 95 7\n\n(a) the conditions subject to which an advocate may be entitled to vote at an election to the State Bar Council in.eluding the qualifications or disqualifications of voters, and the manner in which an electoral roll of voters may be prepared and revised by a State Bar Council;\"\n\nGreat reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants on the concurrent power of the State Bar Council and the. Bar Council of India engrafted in section 15 of the Advocates Act. It is true that the power to make rules conferred by section 15 is both for the Bar Council of India as\n\nalso for the Bar Council of a State. But no provision of section 15 c can override the specific provision made in section 3 ( 4) and section 49(1)(a) of the Act.\n\nSub-section (1) of section 15 says-\"A Bar Council may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Chapter\"\n\nwhich means Chapter II including section 3.\n\nBut the power to prescribe qualifications and conditions entitling an advocate to vote at an election being that of the Bar Council of India section 15 ( 1) cannot D be interpreted to confer power on the State Bar Council to make rules regarding ths qualifications and conditions aforesaid.\n\nThe relevant words of sub-section 2(a) of section 15 are the following:-\n\n\"In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may pmvide for:-\n\n(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the preparation and revision of electoral rolls and the manner in which the results of election shall be published.\"\n\nThe State Bar Council can frame rules for the preparation and revi sion of electoral rolls under section 15(2)(a). That would be in conformity with' the latter part of sub-section ( 4) of section 3 also.\n\nBut in the garb of making a rule for the preparation and revision of\n\nthe electoral rolls it cannot prescribe disqualifications, qualifications or conditions subject to which an advocate whose name occurs in the G State roll can find place in the electoral roll resulting in his depriva- . tion of bis right to vote at the election.\n\nIn the instan~ case under the impugned proviso failure on the part of an advocate ta submit the required declaration within the specified time entitles the State Bar Council to exclude his name from the electoral roll. Such a thing was squarely covered by the exclusive power conferred on the Bar H Council of India under sections 3 ( 4) and 49 (1) (a) qf the Advocates Act.\n\nThe State Bar Council had no such power.\n\n958 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R,\n\nA Sub-s. (3) of section 15 says :-\n\n\"No rules made under this section by a State Bar Council shall have effecj unless they have been approved by the Bar Council of India.\"\n\nIntroduction of the impugned proviso in Rule 3 (j) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules was approved by Resolution No. 18 of 1978 passed by the Bar Council of India.\n\nAny rule made by the State Bar Council cannot have effe_ct unless it is approved by the Bar Council of India.\n\nBut the approval of the Bar Council of India can make the rule made by the S!ate Bar Council valid and effective only if the rule made is within the competence of the State Bar Council, ptherwi8e C not.\n\nMere approval by the Bar Council of India to a rulo ultra vires the State Bar Council cannot make the rulef vaiid.\n\nNor has it the effect of a rule made by the Bar Council of India.\n\nMaking a rule by the Bar Council of India and giving approval to a rule made by the State Bar Council are two distinct and different things.\n\nOne cannot\n\n'take the place of the other.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that the impugned proviso to Rule 3 (j) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules is ultra vires and invalid and the electoral roll prepare.cl by the Delhi Bar Council on: the basis of the same resulting in the exclusion of the names of about 2,000 advocates from the said roll was not valid in law.\n\nWe are further of the opinion that the whole election was. invalid on that account and it could be challenged as such in a writ petition. It was1 not a case of challenging the preparation of the electoral roll Oil the factual basis of wrong exclusion of a few names.\n\nFor the said purpose Rule 4 occurring in Chapter I of the Bar Council of India Rules could come into play.\n\nBut here, because of the invalidity of the Rules itself, the preparation of the electoral roll was completely vitiated-a matter which cannot be put within the narrow limit of the said rule.\n\nThe illegal preparation of the electoral roU by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to Rule 3 (j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be qpheld.\n\nThere is no question a( the result being materially affected in such a case.\n\nThe contesting respondents could not be defeated in their writ petitions on. the ground of estoppel or the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate or that they were guilty of !aches. In the first inst312cc some of the contesting respondeois were merely voters.\n\nEven Shri Surjeet Singh in his writ petition claimed to be bo'th a can- -didate and a VQter.\n\nA$ a voter he could challenge the election even\n\nI r\n\n• l\n\nI t ,.,\n\nBAR COUNCIL .OF DELHI v. SURJEET SINGH (Untwalia, !.) 959\n\nassuming that as a candidate after being unsuccessful he was estopped A from doing so.\n\nBut to be precise, we are of the opinion that merely beL<1use he took part in the election by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of franchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was glaringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso.\n\nThere ii; no question of approbation and reprobation at the same time in such a case. A voter B could come to the !figh Court e.ven earlier before the election was held.\n\nBut merely, because he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of any !aches and must be non-suited only on that accow1t.\n\nThere is no substance in the last submissiqn; made on behalf of the c appellants.\n\nThe manner of resolving disputes as to the validity of election is provided for in Rule 34 of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules.\n\nThis is not an appropriate and adequate alternative remedy to defeat the writ petitioner on that account.\n\nFirstly, no Flause of Rule 34 coven. the challenging of the election on the; ground it has been done in this case.\n\nSecondly, the Election Tribunal will not be D competent to declare any provision o!- the Election Rules ultra vius and invalid. Our attention was specifically drawn to clause (8) of Rule 34 which says :-\n\n\"No petition shall lie on the ground tl1at any nomination paper was wrongly rejected or the name of any voter wus wrongly included in or omitted from the electoral roll or any error or irregularity which is not of a substantial character.\"\n\nAs we have said above, it is not .a case where the name of any voter ' was wrongly omitted from the electoral roll but it is a case where the preparation of the whole electoral roll was null and void because of the invalidity of the impugned proviso.\n\nWe now proceed to refer to some relevant decisions of the High Courts and of this Court cited at the Bar in support of some of the points discussed above.\n\nMudholkar J., delivering the leading and the majority judgment of G a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kanglu Baula Kotwal & another v. Chief Executive Officer. Janpad Sabha, Durg and others('), rejected the plea of estoppel to challenge the election at page 58, para 25 in these terms :-\n\n\"As regards the petitioners who were also candidates at H the elections but were defeated, the learned counsel said that\n\n(ll A. I. R. 1955 Nagpur 49.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO~TS [l 98QJ 3 S.C.R.\n\nthose who took their chances at the elections and failed should not now be allowed to challenge elections of their opponents on the ground that the electoral rolls were defective. The plea is in substance one of estoppel. There can be no question of any estoppel, because it cannot be said that the position of. the other side has in any way altered by reason of sqmething done or not done by the petitioners.\"\n\nWe are of the view that neither the principle of estoppel nor the principle of approbation and reprobation can be pressed into services1 in this case.\n\nIn Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam Dani(') the respondent before the Supreme Court had filed a writ petition ln the Court of Chief Commissioner of Ajmer challenging the validity of the notification directing the holding of the election of the Ajmer Municipnlity and the electoral roll.\n\nThis challenge was made before the election was held.\n\nSince the electoral roll prepared was found to be invalid as it was prepared in accordance with some invalid rules, a Constitution Bench of this Court upheld the decision of the Chief Commissioner.\n\nAt page 75, Bhagwati J., speaking for the Court said:-\n\n\"It is of the essence of these elections that proper electoral rolls should be. lll'aintained and in order that a proper electoral roll should be maintained it is necessary that after the preparation of the electoral roll opportunity should be given to the parties concerned to scrutinize whether the persons enrolled as electors possessed the requisite qualifications.\n\nOpportunity should also be given for the revision of the electroral roll and for the adjudication of cl-aims to be enrolled therein and entertaining objections to such enrolment.\n\nUnless this is done, the entire obligation cast upon the authorities holding the elections is not discharged and the elections held on s11ch imperfect electoral rolls would acquire no validity and would be liable to be challenged at the instance of the parties concerned. It was in our opiaion, therefore, necessary for the Chief Commissioner to frame rules in this behlllf, and in so far as the rules which were thus framed omitted these provisions they were defective.\"\n\n:Finally at pages 76 and 77 it was said :-\n\n\"If Rules 7 and 9 above referred to were intended to focm a complete code for the finalisation of the electonil roll\n\n(I) [1957J S. C. R. 68.\n\n\\ •r\n\n. 11\"'-\n\nI t •\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELHI v. SURJEET SINGH (Untwalia, J.) 661\n\nof the Municipality they did not serve the intended purpose and were either inconsistent with the provisions of s. 30, sub--s. (2), of the Regulation or were defective in so far as they failed to provide the proper procedure for taking of the steps hereinabove indicated for finalising the electoral roll of the Municipality. If that was the true position the electoral roll of the Municipality which has been authenticated and published by the Chief Commissioner on August 8, 1955 was certainly not an electoral roll prepared in accordance with law on the basis of which the elections and poll to the Ajmer Municipal Committee could be held either on September 9, 1955, or at -any time thereafter.\"\n\nIn the instant case the electoral roll was prepared on the basis of a\n\nrule which has been found to be void and ultra vires.\n\nThat being so, een though the contesting respondents came to challenge the election after it was held, they could do so because of the gravity of the infraction of the law in the preparation of the electoral roll.\n\nDani's case (supra) was followed by the Patna High Court in two decisions.\n\nIn Parmeshwar Mahaseth and others v. State of Bihar and others(!) and Umakant Singh and others v.\n\nBinda Choudhary and others('). After quoting a passage at page 153 from Dani's case Kanhaiya Singh J., said in Parmeshwar Mahaseth's case at the same page in paragraph 14 thus :-\n\n\"It was urged by the learned Government Advocate that the election cannot be disputed except by an election petition, us laid down in R. 62 of the Election Rules.\n\nHe submitted that petitioner 9 had already filed an election petition after the presentation of this writ application.\n\nThis contention is not valid.\n\nWhat is challenged here is not the election of a particular candidate, but the validity of the entire election; because of the violation of the essential provisions of the Election Rules and the Act. I think, R. 62 provides for a case where a person challenges the election of a particular candidate. I would overrule the objection.\"\n\nIn Umakant's case the Court quoted the passage from Dani's case from page 461 and finally expressed the view in paragraph 12 at page 462 in these terms : -\n\n\"Mr. Shankar Kumar appearing for respondents 6 and\n\nI;'\n\n7 submitted that the e:ection ought to have beeh challenged II\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1958 Patna 149. f2) A- I. R. 1965 Patna 459.\n\n\nby following the machinery provided in rule 148 of the rules, and this Court, in exercise of its power under Article. 226 of the Constitution, should not interfere with the elec tion when a special machinery was provided for challenging it.\n\nI am unable to accept this argument. It is the well settled view of the Court that if the entire election is challenged as having been held under statutes or 'statutory rules which are invalid or by committing illegalities which make the entire election void, it can be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari.\" '\n\nA Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Dev Prakash Balmukand v. Babu Ram Rewti Mal and others(') had occassion to consider this question and in that connection at page 434 Dulat J., said in paragraph 15 :-\n\n\"Everybaly, of course, agrees that, if the very foundation of the election, namely, the electoral roll is illegal, no election on its basis can proceed or be allowed to stand, but that does not mean that a'ny kind of defect in the roll, however technical in its nature, will suffice to reach such a conclusion.\"\n\nIt would thus be seen that it depends upon the nature and the intensity of the error committed in the preparation of the electoral roll and its effect on the whole election for deciding the question as to whether a writ petition would be maintainable or not. In Ramgulam Shri Baiinath Prasad v. The Collector, District Guna af1d others(') Oza J., delivering the judgment of the Division Bench stated in para 17 at page 152 thus :-\n\n\"It was also contended that the petition was not filed immediately, but has been filed after the elections were over. As regards the question of estoppel we had already considered it and found that the petition under Art. 226 cannot be disposed on the question of estoppel.\n\nAs regards delay, it is sufficient to state that it could not be said that the petition was unduly delayed.\n\nApart from it, it is also clear that a'n election held on the basis of rolls which have not been prepared in accordance with law, the petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of delay.\"\n\n(ll A. I. R. 1961, Punjab 429.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1975 M. P. 145.\n\n\\ ..,\n\n\" ·:'l''\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELlil v. SURJBBT SINGH (Untwalia, J.) 963\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken a similar view in the A case of Bhupendra Kumar Jain v. Y. S. Dharmadhikari and others(') )- wherein it was held that the entire election could be challenged on the basis of certain types of illegalities committed in holding it.\n\n\" )\n\n\"'f/ 'f ' '\n\nShri Bhoop Singh, an Adocate and a member of the Bar Association at Chandigarh was a candidate to the Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana.\n\nAfter being unsuccessful he challenged the election by filing a writ. petition in the High Court.\n\nThe full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhoop Singh v. Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana through its Secretary and others(') disl)lissed\n\nthe writ petition on the particular facts of that case.\n\nYet the view expressed at page 43 in para 9 was :-\n\n\"I am extremely doubtful whether the nature of the relief which the petitioner claims here, namely the setting aside of the whole of the election and the ordering of a repoll could be claimed by way of an election petition under rule 34(1). No provision in the said rule was brought to our notice which in express terms empowers or warrants the setting aside of the whole of the election (in contradistinction to the election of individual candidates) or to direct a repoll.\n\nIn any case it is well settled that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute legal bar to the issuance of a writ\".\n\nReliance was placed for the appellants upon the decision of this Court in K.\n\nShrivastava etc. v., Bhupendra Kumar Jain and others(\") that because of rule 34(8) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules the writ petitions ought to have been held to be 'not maintainable.\n\nIt would be noticed from the facts of that case that an election petition had already been filed.\n\nAbout four months later a writ petition was also filed to challenge the election.\n\nAt page 1704, column 1 Krishna Iyer' J., speaking for the Court said :-\n\n\"One of them which is relevant for the present case is that where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off.\n\nThis is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election.\n\nStill more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms\".\n\n(l) A. I. R. 1976 Madhya Pradesh 110.\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1977 Punjab & Hacyana 40.\n\n(3) A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 1703.\n\n\n'~~,-- '\n\nA But he added :-\n\n\"While we need not in this case go to the extent of stating that if there are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances the Court should still refuse to entertain a writ petition.\"\n\nFinally the view expressed in K. K. Shrivastava's cas. is\n\n\"There is no foundation whatever for thinking that where the challenge is to an \"entire election\" then the writ jurisdiction springs into action.\n\nOn the other hand the circumstances of this c; ase convince us that exercise of the power under Art. 226 may be described as mis-exercise.\"\n\nWe may add that the view expressed by some of the High Courts in t}1e cases referred to above that 111erely because the whole election has been challenged by a writ petition, the petition would be maintainable in spite of there being an alternative remedy being available, so widely put, may not be quite correct and especially after the recent\n\namndment of Art. 226 of the Constitution. If the alternative remedy fully covers the challenge to the election then that remedy and that remedy alone must be resorted to even though it involves the challenge of the election of all the successful candidates.\n\nBut if the nature and the ground of the challenge of the whole election are such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge or, in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy then the remedy of writ petition to challenge the whole election is still available.\n\nIn the present case we have pointed out above that the Election Tribunal would have found itself incompetent to declare the proviso to Rule 3 (j) of the Delhi Bar Council Electicm Rules 11/tra vires and that being so the alternative remedy provided in Rule 34(8) was no remedy at all.\n\nAppellants heavily relied upon an unreported decision , of the Calcutta High Court in Suryya Kumar Ray v. The Bar Council of India & Ors.('). The challenge to the election to the Bar Council of West Bengal was almost on grounds which are similar to those in the present case.\n\nThe Calcutta High Court upheld the validity of the Rule and the election held on the basis of electoral roll prepared in accordance with that Rule and dissented from the. view of the Gujarat High Court in Barish Sambhu Prasad v. Bar Council of Gujarat(').\n\n(I) Matter No. 304 of 1976 decided on December 17, 1976. (Cal. H. C.)\n\n(2) Special Civil Application Nos. 542 and 551 of 1969. (Gaj H. C.)\n\nMR COUNCIL OF DELHI v. SURJEET SINGH (U-ntwalia, J.) 965\n\nThe learned Judge said with reference to the decision of the Gujarat A High Court thus :-\n\n\"It al'l1\"ars to me that this decision will not be of much assistance to the petitioner in the instant case i'n as much as the electoral rules which are before me have duly been approved by the Bar Council of India itself. Such approval confers upon these rules the authority and sanction of the Bar Council of India and may be deemed to be the rules framed by the Bar Council of India.\"\n\nThe enunciation of the law as made above, in our opinion, is not correct.\n\nWe have held to the contrary.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, we dismiss all the appeals but make no order as to costs in any of them.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 155, "entities": [{"text": "BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI AND ANR. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAR COUNCIL OF DELHI AND ANR. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SURJEET SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURJEET SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 84, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 1, 1980\n\n[N. L. UNTWALIA, V. D. Tul."}}, {"text": "N. L. UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. UNTWALIA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246, "end_char": 257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules 1968", "statute": "Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules 1968"}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Delhi Flection Rules, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 473, "end_char": 514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Couucil of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 544, "end_char": 560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1978, a proviso wa< added to \"Rule 3(j) of the Bar Council of Delhi Flection Rules, 1968 with the approval of the Bar Couucil of India in accordance with the requirement of Sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Advocates Act, 1961."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 618, "end_char": 628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bar Council of Delhi Flection Rules, 1968", "statute": "the Bar Council of Delhi Flection Rules, 1968"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 636, "end_char": 655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "14th June, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 732, "end_char": 747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In accordance with that proviso a copy of the declaration form was sent on 14th June, 1978 to the Advocates whose names found place in the State roll of Advocates asking them to return the declaration form duly filled up and signed within the specified period."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Times", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 985, "end_char": 1000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Statesman etc."}}, {"text": "Indian Express", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1002, "end_char": 1016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hindustan Times, Indian Express, Statesman etc."}}, {"text": "14th September, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1106, "end_char": 1126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last extended date for the submission of the declaration\" forms was 14th September, 1978 and the electoral 'roll was finally\" published on the 16th September, 1978 excluding the names of about 2,000 Advocates who had failed ro submit such declaration forms."}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1361, "end_char": 1381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the besis of the electoral roll so prepared, elections to tho Bar Council of Delhi was held on the 17th November, 1978."}}, {"text": "17th November, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1398, "end_char": 1417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the besis of the electoral roll so prepared, elections to tho Bar Council of Delhi was held on the 17th November, 1978."}}, {"text": "19th November, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1722, "end_char": 1741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The re!ults of the election were declared on the 19th November, 1978."}}, {"text": "22ild November, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1835, "end_char": 1855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names of lhe\n\n15 persons Who were declared elected were published in the Gazette on the 22ild November, 1978."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi High Court allowed the three writ petitions taking the view,\n\n(i) so for as the qualifications to be possessed by and the conditions to be satisfied by an advocate before being brought on to the Electoral Roll was concerned only the Bar Council of."}}, {"text": "Bar Council of. India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2253, "end_char": 2274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi High Court allowed the three writ petitions taking the view,\n\n(i) so for as the qualifications to be possessed by and the conditions to be satisfied by an advocate before being brought on to the Electoral Roll was concerned only the Bar Council of."}}, {"text": "section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2335, "end_char": 2351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2359, "end_char": 2378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2388, "end_char": 2405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India has the competence to make the rules under section 3(4) and section 49(1)(a) of the Advocates Act, 1961 and\n\nthe State Bar Council has no power at."}}, {"text": "Surjeet Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2495, "end_char": 2508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "all to make o. rule on this subject;\n\n(ii) the plea of estoppel against Surjeet Singh does not arise, (ill) nmt injustice has been done to the petitioners because more than 2000 advocates were wrongfully disqualified being brought on the Electoral Roll.", "canonical_name": "Surjeet Singh Bhangul"}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2762, "end_char": 2803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapter I of the Bar Cotmcil of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4674, "end_char": 4691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c) The illegal preparation of the electoral roll by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to Rule 3 (j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be upheld."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6304, "end_char": 6341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is not an\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll,\n\nA appropriate and adequate alte'l\"'tive remedy to defeat the writ petitioner on that account."}}, {"text": "Election Tribuool", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6573, "end_char": 6590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, the Election Tribuool will not be competent to declare any provision of the Blee- .-(."}}, {"text": "December 17, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "304 of 1976 decided on December 17, 1976, ovemiled."}}, {"text": "Sections 24( e )( 1) and 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8565, "end_char": 8593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8651, "end_char": 8706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules", "statute": "Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8793, "end_char": 8802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules", "statute": "Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules"}}, {"text": "Bar Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9029, "end_char": 9049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a plain reading of sub-sections 4 of section 3 of the Advocate& Act, 1961, it is manifest that under the Act the qualifications and conditions entitling an advocate to vote at an election or for being chosen as a member of the State Bar CQuncil has to be prescribed by the Bar Council of India."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9330, "end_char": 9339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules", "statute": "Chapter I of Part ill of the Bar Council of India Rules"}}, {"text": "section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9799, "end_char": 9811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9816, "end_char": 9832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9988, "end_char": 9997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Bar O>ancil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10303, "end_char": 10320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "957B-DJ\n\nThe State Bar O>ancil can franw rules for the preparation and revision of electoral rolls under section 15(2)(a)."}}, {"text": "section 15(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10395, "end_char": 10411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10486, "end_char": 10495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bar O>uncil of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11122, "end_char": 11142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a thing was squarely oovered by the exclusive power conferred on the Bar O>uncil of India under sections 3(4) and 49(l)(a) of the Advocates Act."}}, {"text": "sections 3(4) and 49(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11149, "end_char": 11175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11183, "end_char": 11196, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Stste Bar Cotmcil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11202, "end_char": 11219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stste Bar Cotmcil hail no such power. ["}}, {"text": "Bar E.\n\nCouncil of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11471, "end_char": 11495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mere approval by the Bar E.\n\nCouncil of India to a rule ultra vir\"\" the State Bar O>uncil cannot make the rule valid."}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12060, "end_char": 12073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• V.M. Tarkunde, A. K. Sen, G. L. Sanghi, B. P. Maheshwari and G: S. K. Bhattacharya for the Appellants in C.A.s.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12075, "end_char": 12084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• V.M. Tarkunde, A. K. Sen, G. L. Sanghi, B. P. Maheshwari and G: S. K. Bhattacharya for the Appellants in C.A.s.", "canonical_name": "A. P. SEN"}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12086, "end_char": 12098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• V.M. Tarkunde, A. K. 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Wadhera and Aruneshwar Gupta for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "P. R. Mridul"}}, {"text": "Vimal Shanker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12208, "end_char": 12221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, Vimal Shanker, K. R. R. Pillai, P. N. Wadhera and Aruneshwar Gupta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. R. R. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, Vimal Shanker, K. R. R. Pillai, P. N. Wadhera and Aruneshwar Gupta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. N. Wadhera", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12240, "end_char": 12253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, Vimal Shanker, K. R. R. Pillai, P. N. Wadhera and Aruneshwar Gupta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Aruneshwar Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12258, "end_char": 12274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul, Vimal Shanker, K. R. R. Pillai, P. N. Wadhera and Aruneshwar Gupta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. D. Chawla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12312, "end_char": 12324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. D. Chawla, Vineet Kumar and R. S. Sihota for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12326, "end_char": 12338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. D. Chawla, Vineet Kumar and R. S. Sihota for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "R. S. Sihota", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12343, "end_char": 12355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. D. Chawla, Vineet Kumar and R. S. Sihota for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12396, "end_char": 12408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma and Aloka Bhattacharya for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Aloka Bhattacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12413, "end_char": 12431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma and Aloka Bhattacharya for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "UNTWALIA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12555, "end_char": 12563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nUNTWALIA J .-These th!ee appeals by the Bar Council of Delhi and the Bar Council of India are from the common judgment of the Delhi High Court .allowing three writ petitions filed by the first respondent in each appeal and others seeking the setting aside of the election of the Bar Conncil of Delhi held in the year 1978."}}, {"text": "Surjeet Singh Bhangul", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13098, "end_char": 13119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 is Shri Surjeet Singh Bhangul.", "canonical_name": "Surjeet Singh Bhangul"}}, {"text": "D. R. Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13309, "end_char": 13321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was a voter as also a candidate for the election wherein he lost In the writ petition giving rise to Civil Appeal 2225 of 1979 there were three petitioners-two were candidates but Shri D. R. Thakur was an advocate whose name was not included in the electoral roll although his name occurs in the State roll of Advocates."}}, {"text": "A S. Randhawa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri A S. Randhawa, respondent no."}}, {"text": "Delhi Bar Conncil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13695, "end_char": 13712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surjeet Singh was an advocate who was a member of the Delhi Bar Conncil before the impugned election."}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Delhi Election Rules, 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13784, "end_char": 13825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th September 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14288, "end_char": 14307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last exnded date for th• submission of the declaration forms was 14th September 1978 and the electoral roll was finally published on the 16th Septelnber 197 8 excluding the names df about 2,000 advocates who had faijed to submit such declaration forms."}}, {"text": "16th Septelnber 197 8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14360, "end_char": 14381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last exnded date for th• submission of the declaration forms was 14th September 1978 and the electoral roll was finally published on the 16th Septelnber 197 8 excluding the names df about 2,000 advocates who had faijed to submit such declaration forms."}}, {"text": "17th Nofomber 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14634, "end_char": 14652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of the electoral toll so prepared, according to the programme of election, the electi?Jl of members to the Bar Council of Delhi was held on the 17th Nofomber 1978."}}, {"text": "22nd November, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15072, "end_char": 15091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The names lof the 15 persons who were declared elected were published in the Gazette on the 22nd November, 1978."}}, {"text": "24th of Januaijy 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15111, "end_char": 15132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on the 24th of Januaijy 1979 the writ petition was filed in the High Court challenging the whole election by attacking the validity of the proviso to Rule 3 (j)."}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15802, "end_char": 15812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15820, "end_char": 15833, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16177, "end_char": 16190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16195, "end_char": 16211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Snrjeet Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16333, "end_char": 16346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 2) The plea of estoppel raised against Snrjeet Singh was rejected.", "canonical_name": "Surjeet Singh Bhangul"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17255, "end_char": 17269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G\n\nM/s V. M. Tarkunde, A. K. Sen and G. L. Sanghi appearing for >the appellMm, broadly speaking, made the following submissions :-\n\n( 1) That the impugned proviso of Delhi Bar Council Election Rufo; was valid as it was within the competence\n\nof the Delhi Bar Council to add 1uch a proviso in the H Rules under its tale making power with the approval of the Bar Council of India.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17271, "end_char": 17280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G\n\nM/s V. M. Tarkunde, A. K. Sen and G. L. Sanghi appearing for >the appellMm, broadly speaking, made the following submissions :-\n\n( 1) That the impugned proviso of Delhi Bar Council Election Rufo; was valid as it was within the competence\n\nof the Delhi Bar Council to add 1uch a proviso in the H Rules under its tale making power with the approval of the Bar Council of India.", "canonical_name": "A. P. SEN"}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18964, "end_char": 18976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. P. R. Mridul and F. S. Nariman appearing for the contesting respondents combated all the submissions made on behalf of the appelc\n\nF !", "canonical_name": "P. R. Mridul"}}, {"text": "F. S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18981, "end_char": 18994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. P. R. Mridul and F. S. Nariman appearing for the contesting respondents combated all the submissions made on behalf of the appelc\n\nF !"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19384, "end_char": 19393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19401, "end_char": 19414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20741, "end_char": 20746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the case of the Delhi Bar Council many advocates after having been enrolled and put on the State roll of advocates of Delhi break the said undertaking."}}, {"text": "no provision in the Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21413, "end_char": 21446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21614, "end_char": 21625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But no provision in the Advocates Act", "statute": "But no provision in the Advocates Act"}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21634, "end_char": 21647, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21842, "end_char": 21850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para 2 of the affidavit of Shri D. Gupta, Advocate it is tated :-\n\n\"It is the experience of this Council that most of the advocates who are elevated to the Bench or those who join subordinate judiciary or family or other business or employment, seldom care to notify this Council to get their licence revoked or suspended, nor do the advocates shifting their place of practice from Delhi to elsewhere, care to notify this Council in that respect, although the undertakings at internal page 8 of the Enrolment form of this Council oblii:es them to do so.\""}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22449, "end_char": 22462, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chapter I of Part III of the Bar Council of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22815, "end_char": 22870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi Bar Council Election Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24662, "end_char": 24694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Electoral Roll under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25391, "end_char": 25416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chapter I of Part ID of the Bar Council of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26562, "end_char": 26616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27750, "end_char": 27763, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27765, "end_char": 27774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bar Council af India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28548, "end_char": 28568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a plain reading of this sub-section it is manifest that under the Act the qualifications and conditions entitling an advocate ta vote at an election or for being chosen as a member of the, State Bar Council ha~ to be prescribed by the Bar Council af India."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28851, "end_char": 28860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28956, "end_char": 28972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29688, "end_char": 29698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29706, "end_char": 29719, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29774, "end_char": 29784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bar Council of a State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29839, "end_char": 29861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the power to make rules conferred by section 15 is both for the Bar Council of India as\n\nalso for the Bar Council of a State."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29883, "end_char": 29893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29940, "end_char": 29949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 49(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29959, "end_char": 29975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30008, "end_char": 30018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30131, "end_char": 30140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30284, "end_char": 30294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30461, "end_char": 30473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30477, "end_char": 30487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(2)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30889, "end_char": 30905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30980, "end_char": 30989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bar H Council of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31624, "end_char": 31646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a thing was squarely covered by the exclusive power conferred on the Bar H Council of India under sections 3 ( 4) and 49 (1) (a) qf the Advocates Act."}}, {"text": "sections 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31653, "end_char": 31663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Advocates Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31691, "end_char": 31704, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31810, "end_char": 31820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S!ate Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32323, "end_char": 32340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the approval of the Bar Council of India can make the rule made by the S!ate Bar Council valid and effective only if the rule made is within the competence of the State Bar Council, ptherwi8e C not."}}, {"text": "Chapter I of the Bar Council of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33448, "end_char": 33491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36531, "end_char": 36540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mudholkar J., delivering the leading and the majority judgment of G a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kanglu Baula Kotwal & another v. Chief Executive Officer."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36619, "end_char": 36636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mudholkar J., delivering the leading and the majority judgment of G a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kanglu Baula Kotwal & another v. Chief Executive Officer."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37662, "end_char": 37675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Radhey Shyam Dani(') the respondent before the Supreme Court had filed a writ petition ln the Court of Chief Commissioner of Ajmer challenging the validity of the notification directing the holding of the election of the Ajmer Municipnlity and the electoral roll."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38146, "end_char": 38154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 75, Bhagwati J., speaking for the Court said:-\n\n\"It is of the essence of these elections that proper electoral rolls should be."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38876, "end_char": 38879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39593, "end_char": 39598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 8, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39948, "end_char": 39962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that was the true position the electoral roll of the Municipality which has been authenticated and published by the Chief Commissioner on August 8, 1955 was certainly not an electoral roll prepared in accordance with law on the basis of which the elections and poll to the Ajmer Municipal Committee could be held either on September 9, 1955, or at -any time thereafter.\""}}, {"text": "Ajmer Municipal Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40083, "end_char": 40108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that was the true position the electoral roll of the Municipality which has been authenticated and published by the Chief Commissioner on August 8, 1955 was certainly not an electoral roll prepared in accordance with law on the basis of which the elections and poll to the Ajmer Municipal Committee could be held either on September 9, 1955, or at -any time thereafter.\""}}, {"text": "September 9, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40133, "end_char": 40150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that was the true position the electoral roll of the Municipality which has been authenticated and published by the Chief Commissioner on August 8, 1955 was certainly not an electoral roll prepared in accordance with law on the basis of which the elections and poll to the Ajmer Municipal Committee could be held either on September 9, 1955, or at -any time thereafter.\""}}, {"text": "Dani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40523, "end_char": 40527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dani's case (supra) was followed by the Patna High Court in two decisions."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40563, "end_char": 40579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dani's case (supra) was followed by the Patna High Court in two decisions."}}, {"text": "Kanhaiya Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40782, "end_char": 40796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After quoting a passage at page 153 from Dani's case Kanhaiya Singh J., said in Parmeshwar Mahaseth's case at the same page in paragraph 14 thus :-\n\n\"It was urged by the learned Government Advocate that the election cannot be disputed except by an election petition, us laid down in R. 62 of the Election Rules."}}, {"text": "Parmeshwar Mahaseth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40809, "end_char": 40828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After quoting a passage at page 153 from Dani's case Kanhaiya Singh J., said in Parmeshwar Mahaseth's case at the same page in paragraph 14 thus :-\n\n\"It was urged by the learned Government Advocate that the election cannot be disputed except by an election petition, us laid down in R. 62 of the Election Rules."}}, {"text": "Umakant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41531, "end_char": 41538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Umakant's case the Court quoted the passage from Dani's case from page 461 and finally expressed the view in paragraph 12 at page 462 in these terms : -\n\n\"Mr. Shankar Kumar appearing for respondents 6 and\n\nI;'\n\n7 submitted that the e:ection ought to have beeh challenged II\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1958 Patna 149."}}, {"text": "Shankar Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 41690, "end_char": 41703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Umakant's case the Court quoted the passage from Dani's case from page 461 and finally expressed the view in paragraph 12 at page 462 in these terms : -\n\n\"Mr. Shankar Kumar appearing for respondents 6 and\n\nI;'\n\n7 submitted that the e:ection ought to have beeh challenged II\n\n(I) A. I. R. 1958 Patna 149."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42458, "end_char": 42475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Dev Prakash Balmukand v. Babu Ram Rewti Mal and others(') had occassion to consider this question and in that connection at page 434 Dulat J., said in paragraph 15 :-\n\n\"Everybaly, of course, agrees that, if the very foundation of the election, namely, the electoral roll is illegal, no election on its basis can proceed or be allowed to stand, but that does not mean that a'ny kind of defect in the roll, however technical in its nature, will suffice to reach such a conclusion.\""}}, {"text": "Dulat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42612, "end_char": 42617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Dev Prakash Balmukand v. Babu Ram Rewti Mal and others(') had occassion to consider this question and in that connection at page 434 Dulat J., said in paragraph 15 :-\n\n\"Everybaly, of course, agrees that, if the very foundation of the election, namely, the electoral roll is illegal, no election on its basis can proceed or be allowed to stand, but that does not mean that a'ny kind of defect in the roll, however technical in its nature, will suffice to reach such a conclusion.\""}}, {"text": "Everybaly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42648, "end_char": 42657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Dev Prakash Balmukand v. Babu Ram Rewti Mal and others(') had occassion to consider this question and in that connection at page 434 Dulat J., said in paragraph 15 :-\n\n\"Everybaly, of course, agrees that, if the very foundation of the election, namely, the electoral roll is illegal, no election on its basis can proceed or be allowed to stand, but that does not mean that a'ny kind of defect in the roll, however technical in its nature, will suffice to reach such a conclusion.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43609, "end_char": 43617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44114, "end_char": 44139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ ..,\n\n\" ·:'l''\n\nBAR COUNCIL OF DELlil v. SURJBBT SINGH (Untwalia, J.) 963\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken a similar view in the A case of Bhupendra Kumar Jain v. Y. S. Dharmadhikari and others(') )- wherein it was held that the entire election could be challenged on the basis of certain types of illegalities committed in holding it."}}, {"text": "Bhoop Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44403, "end_char": 44414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" )\n\n\"'f/ 'f ' '\n\nShri Bhoop Singh, an Adocate and a member of the Bar Association at Chandigarh was a candidate to the Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana."}}, {"text": "Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44500, "end_char": 44531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" )\n\n\"'f/ 'f ' '\n\nShri Bhoop Singh, an Adocate and a member of the Bar Association at Chandigarh was a candidate to the Bar Council of Punjab & Haryana."}}, {"text": "Punjab & Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 44655, "end_char": 44682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhoop Singh v. Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana through its Secretary and others(') disl)lissed\n\nthe writ petition on the particular facts of that case."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45977, "end_char": 45989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 1704, column 1 Krishna Iyer' J., speaking for the Court said :-\n\n\"One of them which is relevant for the present case is that where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off."}}, {"text": "K. K. Shrivastava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46712, "end_char": 46729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finally the view expressed in K. K. Shrivastava's cas."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46984, "end_char": 46992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47387, "end_char": 47395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48289, "end_char": 48308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appellants heavily relied upon an unreported decision , of the Calcutta High Court in Suryya Kumar Ray v. The Bar Council of India & Ors.(')."}}, {"text": "Bar Council of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48405, "end_char": 48431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The challenge to the election to the Bar Council of West Bengal was almost on grounds which are similar to those in the present case."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48686, "end_char": 48704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "view of the Gujarat High Court in Barish Sambhu Prasad v. Bar Council of Gujarat(')."}}, {"text": "Gujarat A High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49019, "end_char": 49039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gaj H. C.)\n\nMR COUNCIL OF DELHI v. SURJEET SINGH (U-ntwalia, J.) 965\n\nThe learned Judge said with reference to the decision of the Gujarat A High Court thus :-\n\n\"It al'l1\"ars to me that this decision will not be of much assistance to the petitioner in the instant case i'n as much as the electoral rules which are before me have duly been approved by the Bar Council of India itself."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_966_972_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "WORKMEN OF SUDDER WORKSHOP OF JOREHAUT\n\nTEA CO. LTD.\n\nITS MANAGEMENT AND VICE-VERSA\n\nMay 1, 1980\n\n(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHINNAPPA RllDDY, JJ.]\n\nNew Pica-Article 136 of \"the Cons1itution-Supre1ne l'ourt cannot accept .,,. new plea not taken earlier.\n\nlndustri/ll Diputes Act, Sections 25F and 25G, scope of-Back wages paynJent of.\n\nThe Management Tea Co. Ltd. appellant in C. A. 1538/71 retrenched on.\n\nNovember 5, 1966, 23 workmen, 16 of whom were paid retrenchment compensation allegedly in term. of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act based on wages obtaining prior to Wage Board Award, which came into force on\n\n1-4~66 retroactively and in the order of 'last come, first go', while the services of other seven were terminated, although on payment of retrenchment com~ pensation, allegedly in breach of Section 25G of the Act, i.e. out of turn. The dispute that was raised was decided by the Tribunal which upheld the validly of the retrenchment of the 16, but set aside the termination of the other seven.\n\nThe High Court agreed with the Tribunal's Award and hence the appeals both by the workmen and the management after obtaining special leave.\n\nDismissing both the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD : 1. The plea that the amount paid by way of retrenchment compensation envisaged in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, not having been computed as per the revised pay scales as per the Wage Boe.rd Award, fell short of what was legally due and hence there was non-compliance is not tenable because before the Tribunal this contention was neither pleaded nor proved. There was \\no hint of it in the Award. Jn the High Court this new plea based on the facts was not permitted. Further the Wage Boards' .A ward was subsequent ro the retrenchment although retroactively applied and the. \\vorkmen had accepted the retrenchnient compensation on the wages prevalent at the time of the retrenchment. In the absence of any basis for this new plea Supreme Court cannor reopen cm ancient matter of 1966. But the 16 Work men, being admittedly eligible for the Wage Board scale, would be paid the difference for the period between 1-4-66 to 5-11-66.\n\n[969 A-BJ\n\n2. Se<:tion 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act postulates that ordinarily the 'last come, first g~ will be the methodology of retrenchment. Of course, it is not an inflexible rule and extra-ordinary situations may justify variations.\n\nThere must be valid reason for this decision, and, obviously, the burden is on the Management to substantiate the special ground for depsrture from the rule.\n\nSurely, valid and justifiable reasons are for the management to make our, and if made out, s. 25G will be vindicated and not violated, varying the ordinary rule of 'last come first go.' There is none made out here, nor even a1leged, except the only plea that t'he retrenchment was done in compliance\n\nI , ..\n\nI 't T\n\n\"\"'\n\nwith s. 25G grade-wise. Absence of mala fides by itself is no absolution from A the rule in s.25G. Affirmatively, some valid and justifiable grounds must be proved by the Management to be exonerated from the 'last come first gc>' prin ciple. The aboye rule can be applied category wise. That is to say tbose who fell in the same category shall suffer retrenchment only in accordance with !be principle of last come first go. [969 E, H, 970 A, B, 0-FJ\n\nMl s. Om Oil & Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd., Delhi v. Their Workmen, [1966] Suppl. S.C.R. 74, followed.\n\n3. Grading for purposes of scales of pay and like considerations will no! create new categorisation. ..ft is a confusion or unwarranted circumvention to contend that within the seme category if grades for scales of pay, based on length of service etc., are evolved, that process amounts to creation of seporate categories. In the instant case, the senioriiy List is the same which is a tell ing circumstance to show that they fell in the same category.\n\n[971 C-E]\n\n4. Supreme eoUrt cannot sympathise with a party who gambles in litigation to put off the evil day and when that day arrives prays to be saved from his own gamble. The Award had given convincing reasons for reinstatement and even reduced the back wages to half. Still, the workmen were dragged to the High Court and, worse, when worsted there, were driven from Assam to Delhi to defend their pittance. The logistics of litigation for indipt work.men is a burden the management tried to use by a covert blackmail throogh the judicial process. Misplaced sympathy is a mirage justice. [971 G-H, 972 A-Bl\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1303 of 1972 and 1538 of 1971.\n\nAppeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Orders dated 13-4-1971 Of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule No. 368/68 and 174/68.\n\nM. N. Phadke and S. N. Choudhary for the appellant in CA.\n\nNo. 1538 and Respondent in CA No. 1303172.\n\nP. R. Mridul and K. P. Gupta for Respondent No. 1 in CA 1538 and Appellant in CA No. 1303/72.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. These two appeals, turning on the validity of the retrenchment of 23 workmen way back in 1966, arp amenable to common dispo1al. Mr. Phadke, appearing for the Management, argued straight to the point; so did Shri Mridul, with the result that we could get the hang of the case without much wrestling with time or getting paper-logged. Since, in substance, we are inclined to leave undisturbed the Award of the Industrial Tribunal, affirmed, as it were, by the High Court, both these appeals will be given short shrift with brief reasons.\n\nThe facts, to the extent necessary to appreciate the isses canvas-. sect, are brief.\n\nThe Management of a tea plantation by name Jorehaut Tea Co., Ltd., retrenched 23 workmen, 16 of. whom were paid retrenchment compensation allegedly in terms of s.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short, the Act) and in the order of 'last come, first go', while the services of the other seven were terminated, although on payment of retrenchment compensatioo, allegedly in breach of s. 25G of the Act, i.e. out of tum. The dispute that was raised was decided b'y the\n\nTribunal which upheld the validity of the retrenchment of the 16 but set aside the termination of the other 7. Consequently it directed their re-instatement with some back wages.\n\nThe Award granted the following relief: ·\n\nIn respect of the workmen, viz., Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service.\n\nThese workmen have not come forward to say that they remained unemployed from the date of their retrenchment.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case, I think they may be given wages at half the rate from the date of retrenchment till the date of publication of the award in the Gazette.\n\nWe may first dispose of the workers' appeal. In all, 23 persons were retrenched.\n\nIn respect of 16 the rule of 'last come, first go' was applied .. Thus homage was paid to s.25G of the Act. But then, the workmen in their appeal, contended before us that s. 25F bad been breached and, therefore, the termination was bad in law.\n\nThe Management's case is that, as a fact, all or most of them had been reinstated when fresh vacancies had arisen, although neither party is able to assert with certainty this case of reinstatement. That apart, if there be non-<:ompliance with s.25F, the Jaw is plain that the retrenchment is bad. However, when probed further as to bow s.25F had been violated, Shri Mridul argued that the amount paid by way of retrenchment compensation envisaged in s.25F fell short of what was legally due and hence there was non-<:ompliance.\n\nUnder more searching interrogation, Shri Mridul stated that the compensation bad been computed on the basis of wages previously paid and in derogation of the Wage Board Award which had been implemented by the Management with effect from 1-4-1966.\n\nThe retrenchment was on November 5, 1966, i.e. months after April 1, 1966. Therefore, the revised payscales as per the Wage Board Award should have been adopted in calculating the retrenchment cmpensation. This spinal flaw rendered\n\n...\n\nI r\n\n... . .\n\n.Y\n\n~·\n\nWORKMEN SUDDl!ll. WORKSHOP v. MANAGEMENT (Krishna Iyer, I.) 9 6 9\n\n- -:\"~- the tender of campensation insufficient and, therefore, the retrenchment itself was invalid. Maybe, there is apparent force in this contention. But Shri Phadke countered it by saying that it was not open to the workmen to spring a surprise on the Management especially when the question was one of fact. He urged that before the Tribunal no\n\nplea based on the Wage Board -!\\ward was made and it was quite pllssi'llfe that the Management would have adequately met the conten-\n\n B tion if such a plea had been raised. The fact is that before the Tnl>unal the contention pressed before us was neither pleaded nor proved.\n\nThere is no hint of it in the Award. In the High Court this new plea based on the facts was not permitted. Had there been some foundation laid at least in the written statement of the workmen, we might have been inclined to expli>re the tenability of the plea, especially because there is no dispute about the. Wage Board Award and the fact that it had been given effect to from 1-4-1966 and the further fact that in the retrenchmlll!t notice the wages were not calculated according to the Wage Board's Award. It must be remembered, however, that the Wage Board's Award was subsequent to the retrenchment although retroactively applied and the workmen had accepted the retrenchment compensation on the wages prevalent at the time of the retrenchment.\n\nIn the absence of any basis for this new plea we are unable to reopen an ancient matter of 1966 and, agreeing with the High Court; dismiss tht appeal. But the 16 workmen, being eligible admittedly for the Wage Board scale, will be paid the difference for the period between 1-4-1966 to 5-11-1966. ·\n\nNow, we will take up the merits of the Management's appeal which relates to the retrenchment of seven workmen. Admittedly, the rule in s.25G of the Act, which postulates that ordinarily the 'last come, first gd Mll be the methQdology of retrenchment, has not been complied with provided we treat all the workmen in the category as .one group.\n\nIt makes for better appreciation of the point if we read s. 25G at this stage : Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to . a particular category of workmen in that es!ablishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons tt'.1 be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.\n\nThe key-note thought of the provision, even on ii bare reading, Is evident.. The rule is that the employer shall retrench the wotkman who came last, first, poptJlarly known a8 'last come first go'. Of\n\n3-610SCI/80\n\ncourse it is not an inflexible rule and extra-ordinary situations may justify variations.\n\nFor instance, a junior recruit who has a special qualification needed by the employer may be retained even though another who is one up is retrenched. There must be a valid reason for tbis deviation, and obviously,, the burden 1s on the Management to substantiate the special ground for departure from the ru!ei.\n\nShri Phadke brought to oui notice the decision in Ml s Om Oil & Oilseeds J; xchange Ltd., Delhi v. Their Worf<n?en(') to make out that it was not a universal principle which could not . be departed from by the Management that the last should go first.\n\nThe Management had a discretion provided it acted bona fide, and on good grounds.\n\nShah, J. in that very ruling, while agreeing that a breach of the rule could not be assumed as prompted by ma1a fides or induced bY unfair labour practice merely because of a departure or deviation, further observed that the Tribunal had to determine in each case whether the Management had acted fairly and not. with ulterior motive.\n\nThe crucial consideration next mentioned by the learned Judge is . ' ' that the Management's decision to depart from the nde must be for valid and justifiable reasons, in which case \"the senior employee may be retrenched before his junior in employment.'' Surely, valid and justifiable rasons are for the Management to make out, and if made out, s. 25G will be vindicated and not violated. Indeed, that very decision stresses the necessity for valid and good ground for varying the ordinary rule of 'last come first go'. There is none made out here, nor even alleged, ext the only plea that the retrenchment was done in compliance with s. 25G grade-wise. Absence of mala fides by itself is no absolution from' the rule in s. 2SG.\n\nAffirmatively, some valid a!Jd justifiable grounds must, be proved by the Management to be exonerated from the 'last come first go' prim; iple.\n\nIt must be remembered that the above provision which we have quoted insists on the rule being applied category-wise. That is to say, those who fall in the same category shall suffer retrenchment only in accoroance with the principle of last come first go.\n\nThe short pmnt raised is tha~ the seven workmen are not in the same category. The finding of the Tribunal, concurred in by the High Court is that they fell in the same category. We quote the award :\n\n\"It will be seen that when there is no trade test or anything to mark efficiency, there is no basis for placing the workmen in different grade~ and when all the workmen o!I' the same category are to do the same work inasmuch as by the management's own evidence there is no gradewisel allo-\n\n(1) (1966) Supp. SCR. 74.\n\nI J ·-r\n\ncation of duty within the same category. Although in the e.vJdence the Management wanted to justify their departure from the principle of 'last come first go' there is nothing to show that such a reason was recorded for deviating from the principle. In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the management's selection of persons to be retrenched leaving the juniormost in. some category was justified and the reason now adduced for deviating from the principle cannot be accepted in the absence of the reason being not recorded at. the time of retrenchment. Further\n\n11 will be also noticed that although there is classification of workmen into grades (?) within the cat.egory, there is nothing to distinguish one workman of one grade from another workman of another Grade inasmuch as there is no allocation of duties amongst the workmen of different Grades in the category.\"\n\nThe seniority list is the same, which is a telling circumstance to show that they fell in the same category. Grading for purposes of scales of pay and like considerations will not create new categorisation. It\n\nJS a confusion or unwarranted circumvention to contend that within the same category if grades for scales of pay, based on length of service etc., are evolved, that process amounts to creation of separate categories. This fallacy has been rightly negatived by a detai!lld discussion in the Award. The High Court has a voided the pitfall and we decline to accept the submission.\n\nThe result is that the Award must hold good in regard to the illegally retrenched seven workmen.\n\nWhat remains to be considered is the last submision of Shri Phadke that the engineering establishment wherein these seven workmen are to be reinstated is no longer in existence.\n\nFurther, he• pleads that on account of long lapse of time on account of the pendency of the appeal in this Court the compensation payable by way of full wages may amount to a huge sum disproportiom1te to the deviance from the law.\n\nHe, therefore, pleads for moulding the relief Jes~ harshly .\n\nWe cannot sympathise with a party who gambles in litigation to put off the evil day and when that day' arrives prays to be saved from his own gamble. The Award had given convincing reasons for reinstatement and even reduced the back wages to half.\n\nStill, the1 work-\n\nG •\n\nmen were dragged to the High Court and, worse, when worsted there, were driven from Assam to Delhi to defend their pittance. the B logistics of litigation for indigent workmen is a burden the Manaoement trie.d to nse by a covert blackmail through the judicial proce\"s.~.\n\nMisplaced sympathy is mirage justice.\n\nWe cannot agree.\n\nEven so, we take note of the inordinate delay due to long pendency which is part of the pathology of processual justice in the Supreme Court.\n\nSo we direct that half the back wages between the \\]ate of retrenchment and the publication of the Award shall be paid, as directed in the Award itself.\n\nFor the post-Award period, full wages )Vill be paid until the High Court's judgment on 13-4-71 and thereafter 75% of the wages will be paid until 30-4-1980.\n\nCounsel contends that the Workshop is not in existence now and reinstatement is physically impossible.\n\nSri Mridul, for the workmen, states that a just solution by the court in the given (circumstances 1s e acceptable.\n\nWe direct that, in lieu of reinstatement, one year's wages calculated on the scale sanctioned by the Wage Board recommendations for each such workman be paid. All the sums, if no~ paid before 15-5-80, shall carry 12% interest.\n\nAnd upto 15-5-80 they shall carry 9% interest in supersesion of the interim order dated 5-5-72. Rough\n\n\" ~\n\n'1\"\n\n\\' ' ~\n\n....\n\nand ready justice, for want of full information, is riot satisfactory but ,.\n\nD cannot be helped.\n\nWe dismiss the workmen's apF.1. No costs.\n\nWe dismiss the Management's appeal, subject to the above directions, with costli quantified at Rs. 5,000/-.\n\ns. R.\n\nAppeals dismissed", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "WORKMEN OF SUDDER WORKSHOP OF JOREHAUT\n\nTEA CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN OF SUDDER WORKSHOP OF JOREHAUT TEA CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ITS MANAGEMENT AND VICE-VERSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ITS MANAGEMENT AND VICE-VERSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 25F and 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 280, "end_char": 300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 506, "end_char": 517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 525, "end_char": 548, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "1-4~66 retroactively", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 627, "end_char": 647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act based on wages obtaining prior to Wage Board Award, which came into force on\n\n1-4~66 retroactively and in the order of 'last come, first go', while the services of other seven were terminated, although on payment of retrenchment com~ pensation, allegedly in breach of Section 25G of the Act, i.e. out of turn."}}, {"text": "Section 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 817, "end_char": 828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1292, "end_char": 1303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1311, "end_char": 1334, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1954, "end_char": 1967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of any basis for this new plea Supreme Court cannor reopen cm ancient matter of 1966."}}, {"text": "1-4-66", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2134, "end_char": 2140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the 16 Work men, being admittedly eligible for the Wage Board scale, would be paid the difference for the period between 1-4-66 to 5-11-66."}}, {"text": "5-11-66", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2144, "end_char": 2151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the 16 Work men, being admittedly eligible for the Wage Board scale, would be paid the difference for the period between 1-4-66 to 5-11-66."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2188, "end_char": 2211, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2650, "end_char": 2656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2886, "end_char": 2892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme eoUrt", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3901, "end_char": 3914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Supreme eoUrt cannot sympathise with a party who gambles in litigation to put off the evil day and when that day arrives prays to be saved from his own gamble."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Still, the workmen were dragged to the High Court and, worse, when worsted there, were driven from Assam to Delhi to defend their pittance."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Still, the workmen were dragged to the High Court and, worse, when worsted there, were driven from Assam to Delhi to defend their pittance."}}, {"text": "M. N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4724, "end_char": 4736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke and S. N. Choudhary for the appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "S. N. Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. N. Phadke and S. N. Choudhary for the appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4827, "end_char": 4839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and K. P. Gupta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4844, "end_char": 4855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Mridul and K. P. Gupta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4966, "end_char": 4978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKRISHNA IYER, J. These two appeals, turning on the validity of the retrenchment of 23 workmen way back in 1966, arp amenable to common dispo1al."}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5115, "end_char": 5121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phadke, appearing for the Management, argued straight to the point; so did Shri Mridul, with the result that we could get the hang of the case without much wrestling with time or getting paper-logged."}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5195, "end_char": 5201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phadke, appearing for the Management, argued straight to the point; so did Shri Mridul, with the result that we could get the hang of the case without much wrestling with time or getting paper-logged."}}, {"text": "Jorehaut Tea Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Management of a tea plantation by name Jorehaut Tea Co., Ltd., retrenched 23 workmen, 16 of."}}, {"text": "s.25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5779, "end_char": 5802, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5995, "end_char": 6001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhogeswar Saikia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6340, "end_char": 6356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service."}}, {"text": "Nandeswar Bora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6361, "end_char": 6375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service."}}, {"text": "Gunai Bora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6381, "end_char": 6391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service."}}, {"text": "Premodhar Sarma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6397, "end_char": 6412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service."}}, {"text": "Alimuddin Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6419, "end_char": 6434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service."}}, {"text": "Deven Sarma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6440, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service."}}, {"text": "Harlal Biswas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6461, "end_char": 6474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhogeswar Saikia Sri Nandeswar Bora, Sri Gunai Bora, Sri Premodhar Sarma,\n\nSri Alimuddin Ahmed, Sri Deven Sarma and Shri Harlal Biswas whose retrenchment has been found to be not justified they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service."}}, {"text": "s.25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7130, "end_char": 7136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7448, "end_char": 7453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7541, "end_char": 7546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7655, "end_char": 7660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-4-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7971, "end_char": 7979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under more searching interrogation, Shri Mridul stated that the compensation bad been computed on the basis of wages previously paid and in derogation of the Wage Board Award which had been implemented by the Management with effect from 1-4-1966."}}, {"text": "November 5, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8006, "end_char": 8022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The retrenchment was on November 5, 1966, i.e. months after April 1, 1966."}}, {"text": "5-11-1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9974, "end_char": 9983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the 16 workmen, being eligible admittedly for the Wage Board scale, will be paid the difference for the period between 1-4-1966 to 5-11-1966. ·"}}, {"text": "s.25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10123, "end_char": 10128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10482, "end_char": 10487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It makes for better appreciation of the point if we read s. 25G at this stage : Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to ."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11815, "end_char": 11819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. in that very ruling, while agreeing that a breach of the rule could not be assumed as prompted by ma1a fides or induced bY unfair labour practice merely because of a departure or deviation, further observed that the Tribunal had to determine in each case whether the Management had acted fairly and not."}}, {"text": "s. 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12497, "end_char": 12503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12787, "end_char": 12793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12873, "end_char": 12878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13-4-71", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16850, "end_char": 16857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the post-Award period, full wages )Vill be paid until the High Court's judgment on 13-4-71 and thereafter 75% of the wages will be paid until 30-4-1980."}}, {"text": "30-4-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16909, "end_char": 16918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the post-Award period, full wages )Vill be paid until the High Court's judgment on 13-4-71 and thereafter 75% of the wages will be paid until 30-4-1980."}}, {"text": "15-5-80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17333, "end_char": 17340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the sums, if no~ paid before 15-5-80, shall carry 12% interest."}}, {"text": "5-5-72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17457, "end_char": 17463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And upto 15-5-80 they shall carry 9% interest in supersesion of the interim order dated 5-5-72."}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_973_981_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "' ...\n\nVISHNU AWATAR ETC.\n\nSHIV AUTAR AND ORS.\n\nMay 2, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRlsHNA IYER AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.)\n\nCode of Civil Proce4ure, 1908, Section 115-Revisory furisdiction uf the Bi11h Court-Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (U.P.) Act, 1978 forbidding a\n\nrevision under Section 115 of the C.P.C. to the High Court from a Judgment or . order in appeal by the District Court where the suit out of whi'ch the case arisea\n\nis not one of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above-Import and impact ol Section 3 of the U.P. Amendment Act, 1918-Article 136 of the Constitution-Supreme Court's power to interfere.\n\nDismissing the spedal leave petitions, the Court\n\n. HEID : !. Ordinarily when a State Legislation is being interpreted the mean ing received by it in the High Court as the settled intent shontd rarely be disturbed by the supreme Conrt unless the error is so egregiou&, the impsct goes beyond the State or.like legislation elsewhere and decisions of the High Courts thereon D may lead to confusion and uncertainty. [979 AB]\n\n2. Viewing the text of Section 3, lexically literally, schematically, and in the setting of social justice of which saving the average litigant from the intoxication of tantalising litigation is component, \"No revision to the High Conrt\" wonld be the only conclusion. Purposively speaking, it will b'e stultifying fO interpret, oection 3 to mean that orders in appeol by District Conrts must suffer a distmit journey to revisory justice from the High Court. [980 CD}\n\nVishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980) 3 S.C.R. 32 clarified.\n\n3. The short test to refuse revisory jurisdiction to the High Court is to aecertain whether the decision sought to be challen&ed is in a case arising out of a suit of the valuation of Rs. 20,000/· and more. If the aaswer is 'Yes' theB the High. Court bas revisory1power, but if the suit from which the cue arises and in \\\\!llch the decision is made is one where the valuation is lesa than Rs. 20,000/· then the litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class of cases where the decioion is taken for the first time by the District Court it&elf in a case ariSing ont of an ori&inal proceeding. From thiS angle, none of the Specill Leave Petitions survive.\n\n(980 DFJ\n\nAfter all, our District Courts are easier of acce!S for titigimla, and the High Courts, especially in large States like Uttar Pradesh, are 'untouchable' and 'un approach•ble' for agrestic populations and even urban middle classes.\n\nNor la there ground to distrust the District Judges. A hierarchy of courts built upon a heritage of disbelief in inferiors has an imperial llavonr. If we suspect a Munsif and put a District Judge over him for everything he does, if We distrUlt a district Judge and vest the High Court with pervasive supervision, if we be skeptical about the High Courts and watch meticulously over all their orders, the\n\nSystem will break down as its morale will crack up. A psychic communicable disease o! suspicion, skepticism 0nd servility cannot make for the health of the\n\nSIJPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1980] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA judicial system. If the Supreme Court has a super-Supreme Court above it, it is <doubtful whether many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it diffeno from itself. [979 P,.GJ\n\nObservation\n\nDemocracy, in a vast country of diversity, demographic immensity, logistic difficulty and larg'e-sca!e indigency, makea decentralisation an . imperative of Administration. Ae<:eas to Justice also implies early finality within reach of the rich and the poor. Theae considerations persuaded the U.P. State, one of Ill& direst in pover:ty, largest in population, and most agrestic in life-style, to attempt a tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in litigations of lesSer financial stakes. Judicial reform is upto now a tinkering exercise, not 8Jl\n\nengineering project but even that little tinkering is fiercely challenged as litigative anathema by the profession which is unfortunate. [980 G-H, 981 A-BJ\n\nCIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9945, 10550, 8857 of 1979. ·\n\nFrom the Judgments and Orders dated 23-7-1979, 25-9-1979 and 18-7-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision Nos. 3832/ 78, 2042/79 & 264/76.\n\nManoj Swarup for the Petitioner in SLP Nos. 9945 & 8857.\n\nPramod Swarup for the Petitioners in SLP No. 10550. ,\n\nN. N. Sharma for the Respondent .No. 1 in SLP No. 9945.\n\nB A. K. Srivastava for Respondents Nos. 1-2 in ~LP No. 10550.\n\nilfohan Behari Lal for Respondent No. 1 in SLP No. 8857.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKrusHNA IYER, J. These petitions for special leave deserve to be dismissed because the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court which is challenged in all the three has been rightly decided in our view.\n\nEven so, a speaking. order has become necessary because, as rightly pointed out by counsel, the earlier decision of this Court in Vishesh. Kumar v. Shanti Prasad(') does not specifically cover the precise point that has been raised before us by counsel f-Or thll petitioner. We are concerned with the ambit and impact of s. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978 (for short, the Act) , which forbids a revision under s. 115 ofl the Civil Procedure Code (acronymically, the C.P.C.) to the High Court from a judgment or order in appeal by the District Court where the suit out of which the case arises is not one of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above.\n\n\n,_,. j\n\nWe have, in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad (supra) considered A the scheme, setting and purpose of the U.P. Amendment ro the Civil Procedure Code bearing on the revisory power of the High\n\n. _, L .\n\nCourt under s. 115 C.P.C. We may quote:\n\n' I --.\n\n...\n\n A schematic analysis of the judicial hierarchy within a State indicates that the High Court, as the apex court in the hierarchy, has been entrusted, not only with the supreme appellate power exercised within the State but also, by virtue of s. 115, the power to remove, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate court in those cases where the error cannot be corrected by resOrt to its appellate jurisdiction. The two salient features of revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 are, on the one hand, the closely limited grounds on which the court is permitted to interfere and on the other, the wide expanse of discretion available to the court,. when it decides to interfere, in making an appropriate order. The intent is that so serious an error as one of jurisdiction, if committed by a subordinate court, should not remain uncorrected, and should be removed and record healed of the infirmity by an order shaped to reinstate the proceeding within the proper jurisdictional confines of the subordinate court.\n\nxx xx xx\n\nFrom its inception there was increasing resort to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115. Over\n\nthe years the volume of litigation reached an insupportable point in the pending docket of the Court. To alleviate the;\n\nburden, a pattern of decentralisation of revisional power was adopted and s. 115 was amended by successive State\n\namendments, each attempting to close the gap left by its predecessors.\n\nMany times, amendments were made by the U .P.\n\nLegislature to. effectuate its determined purpose of dichotomising and decentralising the revisional jurisdiction, a goal which is laµdable and which other States may well regard as a paradigm.\n\nThe crucial provision, s. 3 of the Act, reads thus :\n\n115. The High Court, in cases arising Oil! of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug. 1, 1978 and the District Court in any\n\n. :; ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nother case, including a case arising out of an original' suit or other proceedings instituted before such date, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court or District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto,. and if such subordinate court appears -\n\n(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it gy\n\nlaw; or ·\n\n(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or\n\n( c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illega!ly or with material irregularity;\n\nthe High Court or the I>istrict Court, as the case may be, may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.\n\nProvided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits ()[' other proceedings of any valuation, decided, by the District Court, D the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this sec!ion.\n\nProvided further that the High Court or the District Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any ()['der including an order deci.cling an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceeding, E except where,.- ·\n\n(i) the order, if so varied or reversed, w(!Uld finally dis ~· pose of the suit or other proceeding; or\n\n(ii) the order, if allowed to stand, woold occasion a failure, of justice or cause irreparable injury to the p party against whom it was made. (Explanation)-In this section, the expression 'any case which bas been decided' includes any other deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding.\n\nThe bulk of the cases we disposed of in the earlier round turned G on the teaability of a revision upon a revii; ion-a product of legal ingenuity oy which the attempt of the legislature to save the little litigant from the logistics of justice from the distant High Court by confining lesser revisions to the District Court was metamorphosed into a du!!! revision, one at the District Court level and the other at the High Court against the District Court's order in revision. Value- 8 free legalistics can be counter-productive acrobatics ! When that happened the Legislature stepped in again and again and we are concerned with the import and impact of s. 3 of the Act vis a vis\n\n...\n\niippellat~ orders of District Courts where the suits from which they A mem are Jess than Rs. 20,000/c in value.\n\nA brief analysi~ of that provision is contained in Vishesh Kumar (supra) :\n\n\"4. From 1st August, 1978 :\n\nFmally, s. 3, Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978, which was deemed to have come into force on 1st August, 1978, amended s.115 again and restored the bifurcation of revisional jurIBdictien between the High Court and the District Court.\n\nAccordingly now :\n\n(i) The High Court alone had jurisdiction under s.115 in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value 'of Rs. 20,000 and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before 1st August, 1978;\n\n(ii) The District Court alone has jurisdiction under D s.115 in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suits or other proceedings. instituted before 1st August, 1978;\n\n(iii) The High Court has jurisdiction under s.115 in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court;\n\n(iv) A revision proceeding pending immediately before 1st August, 1978 of the nature in which a District Court could exercise revisional power under s.115 as amended by the Amendment Act, 1978 if pending;\n\n(a) in the District Court, would be decided by that court as if the Amenlhtent Act of 1978 were in force at all material times;\n\n(b) in the High Court, would be decided by the High Court as if the Amendement Act of 1978 had not come into force.\n\nThe provision now before us is slightly different although the purpose and the result are the same.\n\nThe scheme is clear. The High Court has rey iiower only in cases arising out of original suits or\n\nother proceedings of the value of twenty thousand n:ipees and above R including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug.1,\n\n1978. The entire residuary area belongs to the District Court. An-\n\nA other test of revisional jurisdiction for the High Court is (o see whether the first proviso applies :\n\nll'\n\nProvided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section .\n\nThe High Court, in the last Full Bench decision traced the story of the rare between the legislature and judicial interpretation and summed up the result rightly thus : (') .,'f'\n\n''The High Court was confined to cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of Rupees 20,000/- or. above,· including such suits or other proceed. ings instituted before 1st August, 1978. The jurisdictioni of the District Court was in respect of any other case including a case arising out of an appeal suit or other proceeding instituted before such date. The legislature has continued to use the phrase \"cases arising out of original suits\". The interpretation placed upon this phrase by the Full Beoch in Har Prasad Singh\"s case (AIR 1973 All.\n\n390) will apply. The revisional jurisdiction would hence not extend 'to cases arising out of the disposal of appeals or revisions by the District Court. The proviso is also in the same terms as the proviso added in 1973 namely, it uses the phrase cases arifiing out of original suits or other proceedings\".\n\nAs already seen, it will not cover cases arising out of disposal of appeals or revisions.\n\nThe words \"or oer proceeding8\" in the! phrase \"cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings\" refer to proceedings of final nature. These words have been added in order to bring within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction ordern passed iri proceedings .of an origill!ll nature, which are not of the nature of suits, like arbitration proceeding11.\n\nThis phrase cannot include decisions of appeals or revisions, because then the legislature will be deemed to have contradicted itself.\n\nThe words \"or other proceed- . ings\" have to be read ejusdem generis with the words \"original suits\".\n\nThey will not include appeals or revisions.\n\nThe phrase \"in any other case\" used with reference to the District G:ourt will refer to cases arising out of original\n\n(1) Jupitor Chit Fund (Pvt) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh (FB) AIR 1979 All. 218 at-\n\n225 .\n\n\\ \\ ,-,\n\nsuits of the value of less than Rs. 20,000/- and also cases A arising out of other proceedings of an original nature of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/-\".\n\nOrdinarily whe'n a State legislation is being interpreted the meaning received by it in the High Court as the settled intent should rarely be disturbed by this Court unless the error is so egregious; the impact goes beyond the State or like legislation elsewhere and decisions of the High Courts thereon may lead to confusion and uncertainty.\n\nHere llo such consideration arises and the reasoning of the High Court strikes us as sound. ·\n\nThe residuary power is with the District Court. The High Court has no revisional power under s. 115 unless the case arises out ol\n\nan original suit or other proceeding i.e. other original proceeding decided by the District Court or where the case arises from a snit of and above Rs. 20,000/- in value.\n\nIf thl' District Court has decided, not in its original jurisdiction, then the case, be it a revisional or appellate order, is 'not amenable to the High Court's revisional jurisdiction.\n\nOf course, if the case arises out of suits or other proceeding of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above, the High Court has revisory power.\n\nAll other cases fall . outside and become final at the District Court level.\n\nAfter all, our District Courts are easier of access for litigants, and\n\nthe High Courts; especially in large States like Uttar Pradesh, are 'untouchable' and 'unapproachable' for agrestic populations and even urban middle classes.\n\nNor is there ground to distrust the District Judges.\n\nA hierarchy <?f courts built upon a heritage of disbelief in inferiors has an imperial flavour. If we suspect a Munsif and put Jr a District Judge QVer him-for every thing he does, if we distrust a District Judge and vest the High Court with pervasive supervision, if we be skeptical about the High Courts and watch meticulously over all their orders, the System will break down as it~ morale will crack up.\n\nA phychic communicable disease of suspicion, skepticism and servility cannot make for the health of the judicial system. If the G Supreme Court has a super-Supreme Court above it, who knows how many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it ditrers from itself.\n\nSchematically, we are satisfied, that decisions of District Courts rendered in appeal or revision are beyond revision by the High Court, D if the suit is of less than Rs. 20,000/-. But an exception has been engrafted by the first proviso to s.3 to the effect that where an origi-\n\n~ I ' •\n\nA nal decision has been made by a District Court the High Court's appellate or revisional power will come into play.\n\nThat is at as it should be, for one appeal or revision is almost universal.\n\nBut other- . wise, the District Court's decision is immune to revisional probe by the High Court.\n\n. :B Lexically, there is no escape from s. 3 because the whole residue, except where the High Court has been expressly vested with revisory power, is beyond reach under s. 115 C; P.C.\n\nPrecedentially, the result is no different as the Full Bench of the High Court has been at pains to make out. Purposively speaking, it : c will be stultifying to interpret s. 3 to mean that orders in apjieal by District Courts must suffer a distant journey to revisory justice from the High Court. /fhus we reach thel convergent conclusion of \"110 revision to the High Court\", viewing the text of ~. 3, lexically, literally, schematically, and in the setting of spcial justice of which ooving the average litigent from the intoxication 00' tantalising litigation is a oom 1> ponent.\n\nThe short te&t to refuse revisory juriscliction to the High Court is to ascertain whether the decision sought to be challenged is in a case\n\narising out of a suit of the valuation of Rs. 20,000/- and more. If the answer is 'yes' then the High Court has revisory power, but if the .\n\n. E suit from which the case arises and in which the decision is made is one where the valuation is less than! Rs. 20,000/• then the litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class of cases where the decision is taken for the first time by the District Court itself in a case arising out of an original proceeding. From this angle, none of the Special Leave Petitions sui'vive.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition fl No. 9945 of 1979 is a case where the District Judge dis)JOISed of an appeal and the revision to the Hi&h Court was directed agaiRst the appellate order.\n\nThe subject-matter of the suit being below Rs. 20,000/- in valuation, the High Court was right in refusing to exercise any revisional power.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition No. 10550 of 1979 falls ih the same category and must be dismissed.\n\nThe result in G Special Leave Petition No. 8857 of 1979 is equally fatal and for the same lethal reason.\n\nBef.ore we part with the case, we may make .a general observation in the hope that it may have value as legislative guidance. Democ- ·,,,..-r racy, in a vast country, of diversity, demographic immensity, logistic 0 difficulty and large-scale indigency, makes decentralisation ; i.nd imperative of Administration.\n\nAccess to Justice also implies early finality within reach of the rich and the poor. These considerations pel'-\n\nsuaded the U.P. State, one of the direst in poverty, largest in population, and most agrestic in life-style, to attempt a tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in litigations of lesser financial stakes. J udicia! reform is up to now a tinkering exercise, not an engineering project but even that little tinkering is fiercely challenged as litigative anathema by the profession which is unfortunate.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitiona, dismissed.\n\n\"' .", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "VISHNU AWATAR ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VISHNU AWATAR ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHIV AUTAR AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIV AUTAR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 2, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 2, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRlsHNA IYER AND 0."}}, {"text": "V. R. KRlsHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 235, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 282, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 301, "end_char": 306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1918", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 524, "end_char": 543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 544, "end_char": 555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1918", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1918", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1918"}}, {"text": "[1980) 3 S.C.R. 32", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1537, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(980 DFJ\n\nAfter all, our District Courts are easier of acce!S for titigimla, and the High Courts, especially in large States like Uttar Pradesh, are 'untouchable' and 'un approach•ble' for agrestic populations and even urban middle classes."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3119, "end_char": 3132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Supreme Court has a super-Supreme Court above it, it is <doubtful whether many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it diffeno from itself. ["}}, {"text": "U.P. State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3606, "end_char": 3616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Theae considerations persuaded the U.P. State, one of Ill& direst in pover:ty, largest in population, and most agrestic in life-style, to attempt a tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in litigations of lesSer financial stakes."}}, {"text": "CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4045, "end_char": 4074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "980 G-H, 981 A-BJ\n\nCIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4221, "end_char": 4241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgments and Orders dated 23-7-1979, 25-9-1979 and 18-7-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision Nos."}}, {"text": "Manoj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4294, "end_char": 4306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manoj Swarup for the Petitioner in SLP Nos."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pramod Swarup for the Petitioners in SLP No."}}, {"text": "N. N. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4407, "end_char": 4419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. N. Sharma for the Respondent .No."}}, {"text": "B A. K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4464, "end_char": 4482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B A. K. Srivastava for Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "ilfohan Behari Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4527, "end_char": 4545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ilfohan Behari Lal for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "KrusHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4626, "end_char": 4638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nKrusHNA IYER, J. These petitions for special leave deserve to be dismissed because the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court which is challenged in all the three has been rightly decided in our view."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5158, "end_char": 5162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5166, "end_char": 5193, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5284, "end_char": 5290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5340, "end_char": 5345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amendment ro the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5636, "end_char": 5673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5739, "end_char": 5745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment ro the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Amendment ro the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5746, "end_char": 5751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6024, "end_char": 6030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6307, "end_char": 6313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6961, "end_char": 6967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7170, "end_char": 7176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7547, "end_char": 7551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aug. 1, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7770, "end_char": 7782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug. 1, 1978 and the District Court in any\n\n. :; .."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10044, "end_char": 10048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vishesh Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10240, "end_char": 10253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A brief analysi~ of that provision is contained in Vishesh Kumar (supra) :\n\n\"4."}}, {"text": "1st August, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10274, "end_char": 10290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From 1st August, 1978 :\n\nFmally, s. 3, Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978, which was deemed to have come into force on 1st August, 1978, amended s.115 again and restored the bifurcation of revisional jurIBdictien between the High Court and the District Court."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10302, "end_char": 10306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10308, "end_char": 10331, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10439, "end_char": 10444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10622, "end_char": 10627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10861, "end_char": 10866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11039, "end_char": 11044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11315, "end_char": 11320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1978", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11339, "end_char": 11358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Aug.1,\n\n1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11948, "end_char": 11960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has rey iiower only in cases arising out of original suits or\n\nother proceedings of the value of twenty thousand n:ipees and above R including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug.1,\n\n1978."}}, {"text": "Har Prasad Singh\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13062, "end_char": 13080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The interpretation placed upon this phrase by the Full Beoch in Har Prasad Singh\"s case (AIR 1973 All."}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15048, "end_char": 15054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16888, "end_char": 16891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17271, "end_char": 17275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17400, "end_char": 17406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17588, "end_char": 17592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1980_3_982_1005_EN", "year": 1980, "text": "i. :\n\nRAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN ETC. v.\n\nSTATE THROUGH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT\n\nAND ORS. ETC. ETC.\n\nMay 2, 1980\n\n[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J\n\nNolle Prost'iqui-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Act II of 1974), Section 321, scope of-Conditions under which withdrawal from prosecution are permissible-Competency of the Magistrate's Court to permit withdrawal-Public Prosecutor in charge of the ca.re, meanin'g of-Political ofJences explained.\n\nC Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which correspond& to section 494 of the 1898 cod'e provides for the withdtawal from prosecution by the Public Prosecutor or Assistoot Public Prosecutor incharge of a case with the consent of the Court at any time before the judgment is pronounced. In Criminal Appeal No. 287 /79, the case instituted against George Mathew Fernandes & others on 24-9-76 was allowOd to be withdrown on March 26, 1977 on an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 made D by N. S. Mathur Special Public Prosecutor.\n\nThe learn'ed Chief Metropolitan Magistrate expressed his opinion that \"it was expedient to accord consent to withdraw from the prosecution\".\n\nA revision petition under section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 challenging the said order granting permission to . withdraw filed by ihe appellant an advocate in the High Court f:u1ed. The High\n\nCourt also held that the appellant had no locus standL\n\nE Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 31iS/79 was filed by one Manohar Lal\n\ndirectly under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani, permitting the public prosecutor to withdraw from tho prosecution in case No. 186-1 filed by the State aaainst Choudhury Bansilal Ex-Defence Minister, his son Surinder Singh, Ex. M.L.A., R. S. Verma, Ex.\n\nDeputy Commissioner, Bhiwani and several othets officials and non officials for a hos'.t of' offences.\n\nIn Cr!. Appeal No. 287179, the Contentions were : (a) The Offence for which the accused persons were to be tried were exclusively triable by a Court of Session, and therefore, the Committing Magistrate had no jurisdic8 tion to give consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecu;.. tions; (b) The PUblic Prosecutor had abdicated his function and had filed the application at the behest of the Central Government without applying his mind; (c) The Magistrate was. in error in giving !'ODSent on the ground that. it was expedient to do so. Expedience was never for the judiciary; ( d) S. N.\n\nMathur who had filed the application for withdrawal from the prosecution was not the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case and the application \\Vas therefore incompetent. ' ·\n\nIn the special leave (Cr!.) No. 3115179, it was contended : (i) the Public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Sri Bhajan, Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the• case; (ii) Sri Bhajan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution because his ministry would not survive without ihe help of\n\nr'\n\n\\ ~\n\nR K. JAIN V. STATE 983\n\nChaudhuri Bansi Lal :i:nu (tii) the withdrawal was not based on any public A policy.\n\nDismissing the appeal by special leave and the special lec\\ve petition, the) Court .\n\nHELD : I. The contention that under the new code .of Criminal Procedure, l 973, the Court of Committing Magistrate had no iJldicial function to perform in rel:ition to the case which he was required to commit to the Court of Session as W<l'S the position under section 494 of the 1898, and since the Court of\n\nthe Committing Magistrate under the new ccxle was not invested with: the power of acquitting or discharging the accused, it was not the Court which could grant its consent to withdraw from the prosecutioii is erroneous. In the fin; t place there is no warrant for thinking that only tha Court competent to discharge or acquit the accused under some other provision of the Code can exercise the power under s. 321 Criminal Procedure Code. The power conferred by S. 321 is itself a special power conferred on the Court before whom a prosecutiont is pending and the exercise of the power is not made dependent upon the power of the Court to acquit or discharge the accused under some other provision of; the Code. The power to discharge or acquit the accused under s. 321 is a special power founded on s. 321 itself, to be exercised by the Court indepen,1 dently of its power of Cnquiry inlo the offence or try the accused.\n\nAgain, tho expression 'judgment' in the context may be understood to mean the judgment which may be ultimately pronounced if the case were to be committed to a Court of Session. In the second place it may not be accurate to say that the Committing Magistrate has no judicial function! to perform under the 1973 Code of Crintinal Procedure.· S. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 obliges the Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Session whe11 it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. Therefore, the Magistrate has to be satisfied that an offence is prima facie disclosed and the offence so disclosed is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. If no offence is disclosed the Magistrate may refuse to take cognizance of the case or if the oftence. disclosed is one not triable exclusively by the Court of Session he may proceed to deal with it under the other provisions of the Code. To that extent the Court of the Committing Magistrate does discharge a judicial function. [991 E-H, 992 A-El\n\nlitate of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SC:R 279 followed.\n\n.A.. Venkataramana v.\n\nMudem Sanjeeva Ragudu and 'Ors. (1976) Andhra Law Times Reports 317; over ruled. '\n\n2. The notification dated June 17, 1966 of the Ministry of Home Affairs; Government of India, shows that the Senior Public Prosecutor,. Public Prosecu tor and Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Delhi Special Police Establishment attached to the Delhi office of the Special Police Establishment were appointm as Public Prosecutors under s: 492(1) of the Crimiqal Procedure Code 1898' to conduct the cases of the Special Police Establishment before the Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, and Sessions Judges, in the Union TerritorY Delhi. All notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been\n\nmade under the correspQnding provisions of the new Code. Sri S. N. Mathur is a Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Police E.stablishment at Delhi and has been functioning right throueh as Public Prosecntoc in the Union Territory of Delhi and it was be who was in charge of the case practically throughout\n\n[992 GH, 993 A-BJ\n\n,;;.,· ..\n\n3. In this country the scheme of the administration of Criminal Justice places the prime responsibility of prosecuting serious offences on the executive authorities. 1hJ investigation, including collection of the requisite evidence, and the prosecution .for the offence with reference to such evidence were the functions of the executive, and in that particular segment the power of the Magistrate was limited and intended only to prevent abuse.\n\n[993 H, 994 A-BJ From the precedents of this Court, the following propQSitions emerge ' B\n\n(i) Under the scheme of the COde prosecotio1' of an offender for a oerieus offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive.\n\n(ii) The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor.\n\n(iii) The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the PubliCi Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that discretion to some-- one else.\n\n(iv) The Government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that he maJI' withdraw from the prosecution but none can compel him to do so.\n\n(v) The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant grounds as well in order to further broad ends of public justice, public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and, political purposes Sans Tammany Hall enterprises.\n\n(vi) The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court . and responsible\\ WI the Court. ·\n\n' (vii) The Court porforms a supervisory function in granting its co111ent .to the withdrawal.\n\n(viii) The Conrt's duty is not to reappreciaic the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninlluenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting Or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution. [996 B-0]\n\nIt shall be the duty of the Public Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of the Court to apprise itself of the reasons which prompt Iha Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. The Court has a reoponsibility and a stake in the administrallion of criminal justice and so hall the public Prosecutor, its 'Minister of Justice'. Both have a duty to protect the administration of Criminal Justice against possible abuse or misuse by the Ex&o cutive by resort to the provisions of s. 361 Criminal Procedure COde. The\n\nindependence of the judjiciary requires that once the case has travelled to t1io COurt, the COurt and its officers alone must have control over the calie and decide what is to be done in each case.\n\n[996 H, 997 A-BJ\n\nState of Blhar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957J SCR 279; M. N. SaRkara• narayanan Nair v. P. v.· Balakrishnan and Ors; [1972] 2 SCR 599; State of Orissa\n\nv. Chandrika Mahapatra and Ors., [1977] 1 SCR 335 at 340; Ba/\":ant Single . and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1978] 1 SOR 604 @ 605; Subhmh Chander v. Th•\n\nState (Chandigarh Admn.) and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 423; referred to.\n\n4. Paucity of evidence is not the only ground on which the Public Prooecu tor may withdraw from the .prooecution. In the past, it has been fomid e\"-\n\n,.,.. .\n\nI r\n\n.~\n\n;'':___,- __\n\n--r 1 '\n\nR K. JAIN V. STATE 985 .\n\npedient and necessary in the public interest that the Public Prosecutor should withdraw from prosecutions arising out of mass agitations, communal riot.5, regional disputes, -industrial conflicts, student unrest etc. Wherever issues - involve ihe emotions and there is a surcharge of violence iill the atmoiphere it has often been found necessary to withdraw from prosecutions in order to . restore peace, to free the atmosphere from the surcharge of violence, to bring about a peaceful settlement of issues and to preserve the calm which may follow the storm. To persist '\\\\'\"ith prosecutions where emotive issues are inVolved in the name of vindicating the law may even be utterly counter-productive. An elected Government, sensitive and responsive to the feelings and .emotions of the people, y.-ill be amply justified if for the purpose: of not disturbing a calm\n\nv; hich has descended it decides not to prosecute the offenders involved or not to proceed further with prosecutions already launched. In such matters, it is only the Govemnient and nonei else can and should decide in the first instance . y, hether it should be baneful or beneficial to launch or continue proseCutions.\n\n[997 BFJ\n\n5. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure it is the Public Prosecutor that has to \\Vithdraw from the prOsecution and it is the Court that has to give its consent to such '\\vithdrawal.\n\nRightly too, because the independence of the judiciary so requires it. . The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court. He conducts the prosecUtion in the Court for the people. So it is he that is entrusted with the task of initiating the proceedingJor withdrawal from the prosecution..\n\nBut, where such large and sensitive issu'es of Public policy are involved, he must~ if be is right ntlnded, seek advice and guidance from the policy-maker. If the\n\nPolicy makers themselve'j move in the matter.' in the first instance, as indeed it is proper that they should \"'here matters of momentus public policy are involved, and if they ad\"ice the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prose-- cution, it iS not for the Court to say t!iat the initiative ; came frorµ the Govem1 ment and therefore the PubliC Prosecutor cannot be said to have exercised a free mind. Nor can there be any quibbling over words. If ill informed but well meaning bureaucrats choose to use expressions like .. the Public Prosecutor.\n\nis directed\" or \"the Public Prosecutor is instructed~, the Court will not on that ground alone stultify the larger issue of Public Policy by refusing its consent on the ground that the Public Prosecutor did not act as a free agent when he! sougb.t withdrawal from the prosecution. \\Vhat is at stake is not the language of the tetter or the prestige of the Public Prosecutor but a wider question of policy. The Court, in such a situation is to make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal and satisfy itself that the Public Prosecutor too was satisfied that he should '\\Vithdraw from he prosecution for good and refevant rea-sons.\n\n[997 G-H, 998 A-DJ\n\nHo\\vever, the bureaucrat too should be careful not to use peremtory language when addressing the Public Prosecutor since it may give rise to an impression that be is coercing the Public Prosecutor to move in the matter. !le must remember -that in addressing the Public Prosecutor be is addressing an Officer of the Court and there should be no suspicion of unwholesome pressure on the Public Prosecutor. Any suspicion of such pressun; on the Public Prosecutor may lead the Court to withhold its consent. [998 D-E]\n\n6. It is true that the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure do not recognise offences of a political nature, as a category of offences; they cannot, in the ordinary course of things. That does not mean the offences of a political character are unknown to jurisProdence or that judges must\n\n4-610SCI/80\n\n: >- :--\n\nexhibit such naivette as to feign ignorance about them. In fact International\n\nLaw recognises offences of a political character and the Indian Extradition Act specifically refers to them. [998 F-H]\n\nBriefly, politics are about Government and therefore, a political offencC is one committed with the object of changing the Government of a State or inducing it to change its policy. 'fhe expression ''po1itical offence\" is thus commonly used and understood though perhaps \"political offence\" may escape easy identification. [998 H, 999 A, C]\n\nTo say that an offence is of a political char, acter is not to absolve, the Qll\"enders of the offence.\n\nBut it will be a valid ground for the Government to advise the Public Prosecutor to withdravl from the prosecution. The Public Pro.-\n\nsecutor. may withdraw from the prosecution of a case not merely on the ground\n\nof paucity of evidence but also in order to further the broad ends of public justice and such broad ends of public justice may well include appropriate social, economic and political purposes. [999 E-F]\n\nIf the Government of the day interpreted the result of the elections, es in the appeal, as a mandate of the people and on the besis of that interpretation, the Government advised the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, it cannot be said that the Public Prosecutor was activated by any improper motive in withdrawing from the prosecution nor can lt be &trid that the Magistrate failed to exercise the supervisory function vested in him in giving . his consent. (999 H, 1000 A-Bl\n\nObservation :\n\nCriminal justice is not a plaything and Criminal Court is not a playground for politicking. Political fervour should not convert the prosecution into persecution nor political favour reward . wrongdoer by withdrawal from prosecution. If political fortnnes are allowed to be reflected in the processes\n\nof the Court very soon the credibility of the rule of law will be lost. Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before grsnting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should llppraise himself from the Government and thet'tafter appraise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases.\n\nBut under no circumstances should he allow himself to become anyone's stooge. [1005 E-G]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimina~ Appeal No. 287 of 1979.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment ,11ond Order dated 12-10-1967 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No. 117 of 1977.\n\nWITH JI SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 3115 of 1979.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21\"9-1979 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Bhiwani in Case No. 1861 of 1978.\n\nI r\n\n.. \\J\n\nR. K. JAIN V. STATE 987\n\nAND\n\nCRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION No. 3890: of 1979.\n\nJ.- An Application for direction under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 and Rule 3 ( b) of the Rules to regulate proceedings< • for contempt of Supreme Court, 197 5.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl., M. K. Banerjee, Addi. Sol. Ge~!. Miss A. Subhashini and R. B. Datar for the Petitioner in Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 3 890 /79.\n\nU. D. Gour Adv. Genl. Haryana and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 3890/1979.\n\nP. H. Parekh, Hemani Sharma, Rajan Karanjawala and C. B.\n\nSingh for the Petitioner in SLP 3115/79.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare and T. Sridharan for Respo'ndent No. 1 in SLP 3115/79.\n\nA. N. Kharkhanis for Respondent No. 4 in SLP 3115/79.\n\nU. D. Gour Adv. Genl. Haryana and M. N. Shroff for Respondents, 26-27 in SLP 311.5/79.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Att. Genl., Miss A. Subhashini and R. B. Datar for Respondent No. 30 m SLP 3115/79.\n\nRam Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani and S. K. Bagga, E\n\n...\n\nfor the Petitioner in Cr!. A. 287 /79.\n\nLal Narain Sinha Att. Genl. and M. K. Banerjee Addi. Sol. Genl. and Miss. A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1 in Cr!. A. 297 /79.\n\nRam lethmalani, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, A. K. Pande and Mrs, Hemanlika Wahl for RespO!!ldent No. 2 in Cr!. A 297 /79.\n\nV. M. Tarkunde, T. U. M_ehta, P. H. Parekh and Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan for Respondent N:o. 5 in Cr!. A. No. 297 of 1979.\n\nRam lethmalani and Ranjan Dwivedl for Respondent Nos. 2, 11, 12, and 13 in Crl. 1A. 287 /79.\n\nRam lethmalani, A. G. Noorani, Miss Rani Jethmalani and Mrs.\n\nKamini laiswal for Respondent Nos. 3, 15 and 16 in Crl. A. 287 /79.\n\nRam lethmalani and A. G. Noorani and Miss Rani, Jethmalaiii for Respondent No. 21 in Cr!. A. 287 /79.\n\nSushi! Chandra Bhatnagar in persolli (Respondent No. 14. in Cr! .\n\nA. 287 /79). '\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCmNNAPPA REDDY, J.-A cocktail of law and politics, reason and extravagance is the only way we can describe the S1Jbmissions made to us in these two cases. Well known personalities are involved, one case an Ex-Central Minister, the present Governor of a State _and some leading journalists, and in the othet an ex-Central Minister, and a' host of Government officials. Perhaps that was responsible for the passion and the tension which appeared to characterise and sometimes mar the arguments in the two cases.\n\nWe Will first take up for consideration Criminal Appeal No. 287 of 1979.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred bys. 196(1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and s. 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, the Govermnent of India by its order dated September 6; 1976 accorded sanction for the prosecution of George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes and 24 others for alleged offences under Ss. 121-A Indian Penal Code, 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Ss. 4, 5 and 6 of Explosive Snbstances Act, and S. 5 (3) (b) and\n\nS. 12 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884. The first paragraph of the order according sanction set ont the subject of the conspiracy in the following words : '\n\n\"Whereas, it is alleged that after the issue of the proclamation of Emergency on 25th June, 1975 by the President of fndia in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution, George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes, Chairman of Socialist Party of India and Chairman of All India Railwaymen's Federation sought to arouse resistence against the said emergency by declaring that the said emergency had been \"clamped\" on the country by the \"despotic rule\" of Smt. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and to entertain an idea! that a conspiracy be hatched with the! help of the persons of his confidence, to over-awe the Government a'nd in pursuance of the conspiracy do such acts which might result in the destruction of public property and vital installations in the country\".\n\nThereafter the order set out the various acts committed by the several accused persons in pursuance! of the objects of the conspiracy.\n\nOn September 24, 1976 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation, Central Investi-\n\n• lo\n\n;..__\n\n\" *\n\nI T\n\n....\n\nR K.JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 989\n\n gation Unit (A), New Delhi, filed a charge-sheet in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, against the! said accused persons for the offences mentiOIJled in the order sanctioning . the prose- cution. Two of the accused persons had been tendered pardon.\n\nThey had, therefore, to be examined as witnesses in the urt of the Magistrate taking cognivmce of the offences iiotwijhftiihding the fact that the case was exclusively triable by the! Court of Session.\n\nThe evidence of the approvers was recorded on March 22, 1977 and the case was adjourned to March 26, 1977 for further proceedings.\n\nAt that stage, oil March 26, 1977, N. S. Mathur, Special Public Prosecutor filed an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, for permission to withdraw from the prosecution.\n\nThe application was as follows :\n\n\"It is submitted on behalf of the State as under :-\n\n1. That on 24-9-76 the Special Police Establishment after necessary investigation had filed a charge shee~ in this Hon'ble Court against Shri George Mathew Fernandes and 24 others for offences 11/s. 121 A IPC,\n\n120B IPC r/w sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 .and Section 5(3) (b) and 12 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884 as well as the substantive offences.\n\n2. That besides the accused who were sent up for trial two accused namely Shri Bharat C. Patel and Rewati Kant Sinha were granted pardon by the Hon'ble Court and were examined as approver u/s. 306( 4) Cr. P.C.\n\n3. That o'ut of 25 accused sent up for trial cited in the charge sheet, 2 accused namely Ladli Mohan Nigam and Atul Patel were declared proclaimed offenders by the Hon'ble Court.\n\n4. That in public interest arid changed circumstances, the Central Government has desired to withdraw from the prosecutions of all the accused.\n\n5. It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may accord consent to withdraw from 26th March 1977.\n\nSdb- (N.· S. Mathur) Special Public Prosecutor for the State, New Delhi\".\n\n990 SUPl,{EME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA On the same day the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, expressing the opinion that it was \"expedient to accord consent to\n\n. •:,-,.;::\n\nwithdraw from the prosecution\", granted his coll8ent for withdrawal from the prosecution. •\n\nOne Dr. Rajender Kumar Jain, and Advocate, filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi, under s. 397 of the' Criminal Procedure Code for revision of the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate giving his consent to the Special Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. Several grounds were raised all of which were negatived by the High Court. It was also held by the High Court that the applicant had '.no locus standi. The Revision Petition was dismissed. Dr. Rajender Kumar Jain has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.\n\nShri Ram Panjwani, learned counsel for the appellant made the ' following submissions : (1) The offences for which the accused persons were to be trie& ; were exclusively triable by a Court of Session and, therefore, the Committing Magistrate had no jurisdiction to give consent to the Public Prosecl!tor to withdraw from the prosecution,\n\n(2) The Public Prosecutor had abdicated his function and had filed the application at the behest of the Central Government without applying his mind.\n\n(3) The Magistrate was in error in giving consent on the ground that it was eApedient to do so. Expedience was never for the judiciary. ( 4) S. N. Mathur who had. filed the application for withdrawal from the prosecution was not the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case and the application was therefore, incompetent. The submissions of Shri Ram Panjwani were controverted by\n\nShri Ram Jethmalani and Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents. They all; o submitted that the offences with which the accused persons were charged were of a political nature and if the Government of the day thought that the Public Prosecutor should withdraw from the prosecution on grounds of public policy and advised the Public Prosecutor to do so, it could not be said that the Public Prosecutor abdicated his function merely because the proposal to withdraw from the prosecution emanated from the Government and he acted upon such preposal. It was also submitted that so far as the fifth respondent was concerned no prosecution could be launched or continued against him under Art. 361 (2) as he was the Gover nor of a State. Shri Panjwani in his reply submitted !!rut political offences were unknown to the Municipal law of the land and that in the instant case the withdrawal from the prosecution was for a purely political purpose and not in the public interest at all. It . was said that the case was withdrawn in order .that Shri George Fernandes could , be appointed as a Minister in th~ Central Cabinet.\n\n.:-:~\\ -\n\nR f JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, 1.) 991\n\nI S. 321 of'the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 which corresponds A to s. 494 of *1e Codeof Criminal Procedure of 1898 is as fo'llows :\n\n\"Wi\\hdrawal from prosecution.\n\n321.1 The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in: charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from tlje prosecution of any person either generally or in respect 1of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal,-\n\n(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the 'accused shall be discharged in respect of such off-\n\n' - 1 ence or offences;\n\n(b) : if it is made after a charge has been framed, or\n\n1 when under this Code no charge is required, he 'shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or off-\n\n' 1 ences\".\n\nWe have pot extracted the proviso as it is not necessary for the purpoSt?s of these cases. i Under s. 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, it was held by this Coj\\rt in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey,(') that the Court of the Committing Magistrate before whom a committal proceeding was pending was \"the Court\" within the meaning of s. 494 which was: competent to give its consent even in the case of offences exclusively1 triable by the Court of Session.\n\nBut, it was contended that after the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, the situation ad changed since bnder the new Code the Court of the Committing Magistrate had no judicial function to perform in relation to the case whic~ he was required to commit to the Court of Session.\n\nTile , Subnlission was that the Court contemplated by s. 494 was the Court capable of pronouncing a judgment, ending the proceeding by an order pf acquittal or discharge and, since the Court of the Committing Magistrate under the new Code was not invested with the power of' acquitting or discharging the ace.used it was not the Court which cbld grant its consent to withdraw from the prosecution. In the first place there is no warrant for thinking that only the Court competeijt to discharge or acquit the accused under some other provision o~ the Code can exercise the power under s. 321 Criminal Procedurte Code. The power conferred by s. 321 is itself a special power crnferred on the Court , before whom a prosecution is pending and the 1exercise of the power is not made dependent upon the power\n\n(!) \\1957] SCR 279 .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nof the Court to acquit or discharge the accused under some other provision of the Code. 'The power to discharge or acquit the accused undec s. 321 isa special power founded on s. 321 itself, to be exercised by the Court independently of its power of enquiry into the offence or try the accused. \"Again, \"the expression 'judgment' in the context may be understood to mean the judgment which may be ultimately pronounced if the case were to be cmpmitted to a Court of Session. That was th~ view expressed in the State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey,\n\n(supra) where the Court observed :\n\nv1n any view, even if 'judgment' in this context is to Be understood in a limited sense it does not follow that an application during preliminary enquiry-which is necessarily prior to judgment in the trial-is excluded\".\n\nIn the second place it may not be accurate to say that the Committing Magistrate has no judicial function to perform under tke 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nS. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 obliges the Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Session when it 11ppears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session.\n\nTherefore, the Magistrate has to be satisfied that an offence is prirna-facie discloseo and the offence so disclosed'is triable exclusively by the Court of Session.\n\nIf no offence is disclosed the Magistrate may refuse to take cognizance of the case or if the offence disclosed is one not triable exclusively by the Court of Session he may proceed to deal with it under the other provisions of the Code.\n\nTo that extent the Court of the Committing Magistrate does discharge a judicial function. We therefore, over-rule the first submission of Shri Ram Panjwani. We do not agree with the view taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A. Venkatari:rmana v. Mudem Sanjeeva Ragudu & Ors,,(1) that the court of the Committing Magistrate is noti competent to give consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution.\n\nThe fourth submission of Shri Ram Panjwani does not appeal to us.\n\nThe notification dated. June 17, 1966 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, shows that the Senior Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Delhi Special Police Establishment attached to the Delhi office of t1te Special Police Establishment were appointed as Public Prosecutors under s. 492 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 to conduct the cases of the Special Police Establishment before the Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, aud Sessions Judges, in the Union Territory of Delhi.\n\n(!) [1976] Andhra Law Times Reports 317.\n\n+ '\n\n'•'t-r\n\nR K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 993\n\nAll notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the new Code. It appears that Shri N. S. Mathur is a Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Police Establishment at Delhi and has been functioning right through as Public Pro5eutor in the Union Teritory of Delhi.. The High Court' has also pointed out on a scrutiny of the proceedings of the Magistrate that it as Shri N. S. Mathur who was incharge of the case practically throughout.\n\nThe second and third submissions of Shri Panjwani , may be considzred together. Decisions of this Court have made c:ear the functional dichotomy of the Public Prosecutor and the Court. In the State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, (supra) the Court while considering s. 494 of the old Code explained :'\n\n\"The section is an enabling one and veSts in tho Public Prosecutor ihe discretion to apply to the .Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution of any person . . . . . . . . . The function of the Court, therefore, in granting its consent may well be taken to be a judicial function.\n\nIt follows that in granting the consent the Court must exercise a judicial discretion.\n\nBut it does not follow that the discretion is to be exercis\"d only with q:ference to material gathered by the judicial method.\n\nOtherwise the apparently wide language of s. 494 would become considerably narrowed down in its application. In understanding and applying the section two main features thereof have to be kept in mind. The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. • •...••• The judicial function .... implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself t]Jat the executive func- . tiori of the Public Prosecutor has not been. improperly xer\n\ncised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.\n\nIn the context it is right to remember that the Public Prose- 'cutor (though an executive Officer ........ ) is, in a larger sense, also an officer of. the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with tlie fairly-considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his functions\".\n\nThe Court also appreciated that in this Cou;, try t]Je scheme of the administration of Criminal Justice places the prime responsibility\n\nA of prosecuting serious offences on the executive authorities. The investigation, including collection of tb, e. requisite evidence, and the prosecution for the offence with reference to such evidence were the functions of the executive, and i'n that particular segment the power ,,.l._ of the Magistrate was limited and intended only to prevent abuse.\n\nB In M. N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P: v. Balakrishnan & Ors.( 1) the Court while reiterating decision that the Court granting permission for withdrawal should satisfy itself that the exec.utive . function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised and that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of .justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes, observed that the wide C and general powers conferred on the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the proS\"ecution have to be exercised by him \"in furtherance of, raL'ler than as a hindrance to the object of the law\" and that the Court while considering the request to grant permissioru should not do so as \"a necessary formality-the grant of it for the mere asking\".\n\nD In State of Orissti v. Chandrika Mahapatra & Ors. (2 ) the Court\n\nsaid :\n\n\"We cannot forget that ultimately every offence has a social or economic cause behind it and if the State feels that the elimination or eradication of the social or economic\n\ncause of the crime would be better served by DI)! proceeding with the prosecution, the State should clearly be at , liberty to withdraw from the prosecution\".\n\nIn Balwant Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar('), the independent rok of the Pnblic Prosecutor in making an application for withdrawal from a prosecution was emphasised. It was pointed out that statutory responsibility for deciding upon withdrawal vested in the Public Prosecutor and the sole consideration which should guide the Public Prosecutor was the larger factor of the administration of justice and neither political favour nOlr party pressure or the like.\n\nNor should he allow himself to be dictated to by his administrative superiors to withdraw from the prosecution.\n\nThe Court also indicated some instance Where withdrawal from prosecution might be resorted to independently of the merits of the case :\n\n\"Of course, the interests of public justice being the paramount consideration they may transcend and overflow\n\n(!) [19721 2 SCR 599.\n\n(2) [19771 1 SCR 335 at 340.\n\n(3) [1978] 1 SCR 604 at 605\n\ni-' '\n\nR. K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 995\n\nthe legal justice of the particular litigation.\n\nFor instance, communal feuds which may have been ainicably settled should not re-erupt on account of one or two prosecutions pending. Labour disputes which, might have given rise to criminal cases, when settled, might probably be another instance where the interests of public justice in the broader connotation may perhaps warrant withdrawal from the prosecution.\n\nOther instance also may be given\".\n\nIn Subhash Chander v. The State (Chandigarh Admn.) & Ors.(') the Court once again emphasised the independence of the Public Prosecutor in the matter of seeking to withdraw from the prosecution.\n\nIt was observed \"Any authority who coerces cir orders or pressures a functionary like the Public Prosecutor, in the exclusive province of his discretionary powers, violates the rule of law, and any Public Prosecutor who bends before such command betrays the authority of his office\".\n\nHowe.ver, it was indicated : .\n\n\"Maybe,' Government or the District Magistrate will consider that a prosec!'tion or class of prosecutions deserves to be withdrawn on grounds of policy or reasons of public interest relevant to law and justice in their larger connotation and request the Public Prosecutor to consider whether the case or cases may not be withdrawn. Thereupon, the Prosecutor will give due weight to the material placed, the policy behind the recommendation and the responsible position of Government which, in the last analysis; has to maintain public order and promote public. justice.\n\nBut the decision to withdraw must be his. ·\n\n_ . A reference was made to some considerations which may justify withdrawal from prosecution. It was said :\n\n\"The fact that broader considerations of public. peace, larger considerations of public justice and even deeper con- . siderations of promotion of long-lasting security in a locality, cf order in a disorderly situation or harmony in a faction milieu, or .halting a false and vexatious prosecution m a court, persuades the Executive, pro bona publico, . sacrifice a ponding case for a wider benefit, is not ruled out although the power must be •pariugly exercised and the statu- tory agency to be satisfied is the public prosecutor, not the District Magistrate. or Minister.\n\nThe concurrence of the\n\n(I) AIR 1980 SC 423.\n\ncourt is necessary. The subsequent discovery of a hoax behind the prosecution or false baiis for the criminal proceeding as is alleged in this case, may well be a relevant ground for withdrawal.\n\nFor the court should not be misused to continue 11 case conclusively proved to be a counterfeit. This statement of the law is not exhaustive but is enough for the present purpose and indeed, is well-grounded .on precedents\".\n\nThus, from the precedents of this Court; we gather,\n\n1. Under the scheme of the Code prosecution of an offender for C a serious offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive.\n\n2. The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor.\n\n3. The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that dis- D cretion to someone else.\n\n4. The Government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that he may withdraw from the prosecution but none can compel him to do so.\n\n5. The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not\n\nE merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant grounds as well in order to futther the broad ends of public justice, public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and, we add, political purposes Sans Tammany_ Hall enterprise.\n\n6. The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and responsible to the Court.\n\n7. The Court performs a supervisorv function in granting its consent to the Withdrawal.\n\n8. The Court's duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request Withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and . extraneous considerations. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding iis consent to withdrawal from the prosecution.\n\nWe may add it shall be the duty of the Public Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of th\" Court to appraise itself of the\n\n.~··\n\ni •\n\nR K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa. Reddy, !.) 997\n\nreasons which prompt the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from' \\he prosecution. The Court has a responsibility and a stake in the administration of crlmirud justice and so has the Public Prosecutor, its 'Minister of Justice'. Both have a duty to protect the administration of criminal justice against possible abuse or misuse by the Executive by resdrt to the provisions of s. 361 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nThe independence of the judiciary requires that once the case has travelled to the Court, the Court and its officers alone must have control over the case and decide what is to be done in each case.\n\nWe have referred to the precedents of this Court where it has been said that paucity of evidence is not the only ground on which the\n\nPublic Prosecutor may withdraw from the .prosecution.\n\nIn the past we ha, ve often known how expedient and necessary it is in the public interest for the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecutions arising out of mass agitations, communal riots, regional disputes, industrial conflicts, student unrest etc.\n\nWherever issues involve the emotions and there is a surcharge of violence in the atmosphere it has often been found necessary to withdraw from prosecutions in order to restore peace, to free the atmosphere from the surcharge of violence, to bring about a peaceful settlement of issues and to preserve the calm which may follow the storm.\n\nTo persist with prosecutions where emo.- tive issues are involved in the name of vindicating the law may even be utterly counter-productive.\n\nAn elected Government, sensitive and responsive to the feelings and emotions of the people, will be amply justified if for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of goodwill or for the purpose of not disturbing a calm which has descended it decides not to prosecute the offenders involved or not to proceed further with prosecutions already launched. In such matters who but the Government, can and should decide in the first instance, whether it should be baneful or beneficial to launch or continul'j prosecutions ..\n\nIf the Government decides that it would be in the public interest to withdraw from prosecutions, how is the Government to go about this task?\n\nI Under the Code of Criminal Procedure it is the Public Prosecutor that has to withdraw from the prosecution and it is the Court that has to give its consnt to such withdrawal. Rightly too, because the independence of the judiciary so requires it, as we have already mentioned.\n\nNow, the Public Prosecutor is an Officer of the Court. He sets the criminal Jaw in motion in the Court. He conducts the prosecution in the Court for the people. So it is he that is entrusted with the task of initiating the proceeding for withdrawal from the prosecution.\n\nBut, where such large and sensitive issues of public policy are involved, he\n\nA '\n\nmust, if he is right minded, seek advice and guidance from the policy- . makers. His sources of information and resources are of a very limited nature unlike those of the policy-makers. If the policymakers themselves move in the matter in the first instance, as indeed it is proper that they should where matters of momentus public policy are involved, and if they advise the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, ii is not for the Court to say that the initiative came from the Government and therefore the Public Prosecutor cannot be said to have exercised a free mind. Nor can there be any quibbling over words. If ill-informed but well-meaning bureaucrats choose to use expressions like \"the Public Prosecutor is directed\" or \"the Public Prosecutor is instructed\", the Court will not on that ground alone stnltify the larger issne of Public Policy by refusing its consent on the .ground that the Public Prosecutor did not act as a fre~ agent when he sought withdrawal from the prosecution.\n\nWhat is at stake is not the language of the letter or the prestige of the Public Prosecutor but a wider question of policy. The Court, in such a situation is to make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal and satisfy itself, that the Public Prosecutor too was satisfied that he should withdraw from the prosecution for good and relevant reasons.\n\nWe, however, issue a note of warning. The bureaucrat too should be careful not to use peremptory language when addressing the Public Prosecutor since it may give rise to an impression that he is coercing the Public Prosecutor to move in the matter. He must remember that in addressing the Public Prosecutor he is addressing an Officer of the Court and there should be no suspicion of unwholesome pressure on the Public Prosecutor. Any suspicion of such pressure on the Public Prosecutor may lead the Court to withhold its consent.\n\nWe may now consider Shri Ram Panjwani's argument that the Criminal law of India does not recognise 'political offences' and so there can not be withdrawal from a pros_ecution on the ground that the offen, ces involved are 'political offences'. It is true th.at the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure do not recognise ,.c; offences of a political nature, as a category of offences. They cannot, in the ordinary course of things. That does not mean that offeiic:eS of a political character are unknown . to jurisprudence or that judges must exhibit such a naivette as to feign ignorance about them.\n\nOffences of a political character are well-known in International Law and the Law of Extradition. The Indian Extradition Act also refers ; II to offences of a political character.\n\nFor our present purpose it is really unnecessary to enter into a discussion as to what are political offences except in a sketchy way. It is sufficient to say that politics\n\n+- i\n\n' .\n\nR K. JAIN v. STATE (Chin11appa Reddy, J.) 999\n\nare about Government and therefore, a political offence is one committed with the object of changing the Government of a State or inducing it to change its policy.\n\nMahatma Gandhi, the father of the Nation, was convicted and jailed for offences against the' Municipal laws; so was his spiritual son and the first Prime Minister of our ceountry; .so was the present Prime Minister and so were the first' Presi- .dent and the present President of India.\n\nNo one would hesitate to -say that the offences of which they were convicted were political. Even .as we are writing this judgment we read in the morning's newspapers that King Birendra of Nepal has declared a \"general amnesty to all Nepalese accused of political changes''. The expression 'political .offence' is thus commonly used and understood though perhaps 'political offence' may escape easy identification.\n\nEarlier in the judgment we set out the alleged object of the cons- -piracy as recited in the order sanctioning the prosecution. It was to overawe the Government by committing varions acts of destruction .of public property and vital installations and the motiv~ attributed was that the accused wanted to change the Government led by Shrimati Gandhi. One need not agree with the ends or the means-genuine revolutions have never yet , been made by acts of senseless terrorism or wanton destruction, putting innocent lives and public 'property in jeo- pardy-but, it is clear that the very order sanctioning the prosecution imputes to the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused '.the character of 'poiitical offences'.\n\nTo say that an offence is of a political character is not to absolve the offender of the offence.\n\nBut the question is, is it a valid ground for the Government to advise the Public Prosecutor to Withdraw from the prosecntion? We mentioned earlier that the Public Prosecutor may withdraw from te prosecution of a case not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but also in order to further the broad ends of public justice and that such broad enc!s f public justice may well include appropriate social, economic and political purposes. It is now a matter of history that the motivating force of the party which was formed to fight the elections in 1977 was the same as the motivating force of the criminal conspiracy .as alleged in the order sanctioning the prosecution; only the means were different.\n\nThe party which came to power as a ljji.ult of 1977 elections chose to interpret the result of the elections as Pbiandate of the people against the politics and the policy of the party led by Shrimati Gandhi. Subsequent events leading upto the 1980 elections which reversed the result o~ the 1977 elections may cast a doubt whether such interpretation was\n\nrrect; only history can tell. But, if the Government of the day\n\ninterpreted the result of the 1977 elections as a mandate of the people and' on the basis of that interpretation tl}e Goverumeut advised the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, one cannot say that the Public Prosecutor was activated by any improper motive in withdrawing from the prosecution nor can one say that the Magistrate fuileq to exercise the supervisory function vested in him.in giviug his consent.\n\nWe are unable to say that the High Court misdirected itself in affirming the order of the Magistrate.\n\nWe also notice that the learned Attorney General who dis-associated himself from the legal submissions made by the parties did not withdraw the counter\n\naffidavit filed earlier on behalf of the State. No fresh counter affidavit disclosing a change of attitude on the part of the new Government which took office in January this year was filed.\n\nApparently the 'new Government did not do so as a gesture of grace _and goodwill and to prevent rancour and bitterness. That we appreciate, Criminal Appeal No. 287 of 1979 is therefore, dismissed.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3115 of 1979 has been filed by one Manohar Lal, against the order of .the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani, permitting the Public Prosecut<; ir to withdraw from the prosecution in oase No. 186-1 filed by the State against Chandhury Bansi Lal, ex-Defence Minister, his son Surinder Singh, ex- M.L.A., R. S. Verma, Ex. Deputy Commissioner, Bhiwani and several other officials and non-officials for a host of offences.\n\nThe applicant has come straight to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution\n\nwitl; lout going to the High Court in the first instance.\n\nOn that ground alone t]le petition is liable to be dismissed as we do not ordinarily entertain such petitions.\n\nWe refrain from doing .so as the matter has been fully argued before us.\n\nOn July 13, 1977, Manohar Lal, laid information with the Station House Officer, Police Station, Bhiwani City, against the several accused persons. The charge-sheet was filed by the Bhiwani Police on July 21, 1978 on the basis of information laid with them by Manohar Lal.\n\nThe gravamen of the allegation against the accused persons was that Chaudhury Bansi Lal was annoyed with Manohar Lal and his sons as they failed to transfer two plots of land to his son and a relative. Chaudhury Bansi Lal, therefor~, induced the Dhiwani Town\n\nImprovement Trnst to include in its smssive schemes land belonging to Mano'bar Lal and his sons, in Bhiwani Town, on which stood s9me buildings including two temples. .As Manohar Lal apprehended that his buildings might be demolished, he filed a Wdt Petition in the Supreme Court and obtained an order of stay of demolition. However, the stay\n\n•t \"\n\n\"'.\n\nt I y\n\nr-+-\n\n'I ,\n\n.. ' \"\n\nR- K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1001\n\nwas vacated on December I, 1976 and on the same day, on the instructions, by telephone or wireless, of Chaudhury Bansi Lal, R. S. Verma, the Deputy Commissioner instructed his officers to demolish the build: ings standing on the land.\n\nThe Land Acquisition Collector made his Award of compensation and deposited the amount in a bank.\n\nAll this was done in the course of a few hours and the demolition of the building was started forthwith and completed by December 4, 1976.\n\nTbe chargesheet, as we said, was filed on _July 21, 1978.\n\nChaudhury Bansi, Lal filed a petition in this Court for transfer of the case to a Court outside the States of Punjab and Haryana. This Court issued notice on the petition for transfer and granted stay of further proceedings in the case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani.\n\nThe order of stay continued.\n\nOn September 20, 1979 on the basis of a letter addressed to him by the District Magistrate, the Public Prosecutor filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for permission to withdraw from the' prosecution. On September 21, 1979 the Court granted its consent to the withdrawal of the Pl]blic Prosecutor from the prosecution.\n\nIt is this order that is questioned in the Special Leave Petition,\n\nShri Parekh, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Shri Bhajan Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the case. According to Shri Parekh Shri Bha jan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the public Prose_cutor from the prosecution because his Ministry would not survive without the help of Chaudhury Bansi Lal.\n\nA motionof no confidence was imminent against Shri Bhajan Lal and was to be considered on September 24, 1979; so he ordered withdrawal of the cases against Chaudhury Bansi Lal _on September 20,\n\n1979, in order to secure the support of his group. It was said that the withdrawal from the prosecution was not based on anyground of public policy.\n\nShri Parekh. drew our attention to the wireless message which was sent by the Government to the District Magistrate. Bhiwani informing him that the Government had decided to withdraw the four cases mentioned in the message, pending in the Court of Bhiwani and that four cases should be withdrawn immediately from the concerned Courts and the Government informed accordingly. The District Magistrate Bhiwani forwarded a copy of the wireless meS.sage to the District Attorney, Bhiwani for necessary action directing him to withdraw the four cases from the concerned courts a• desired by the Government and to report compliance to this office.. The District Atterney thereafter filed an application for permission to withdraw from the pfosecution. On September 21, 1979, he made a statement before the Chief\n\n5-610SCI180\n\nJudicial :Magistrate that he had made the application on the orders of District Magistrate, Bhiwani and that the reasons were given in the application. In answer it was contended by the advocate General of Haryana who appeareg for the State of Haryana and M. C. Bhandare who appeared for Chaudhury Bansi Lal, that Surinder Singh, son of Chaudhury Bansi Lal had petitioned to t)le Chief Minister of Haryana alleging that he, his father and their associates were being harassed by numerous cases being filed against them without any justification.\n\nHe requested the Chief Minister to stop needless harassment.\n\nThe Minister constituted a Sub-Committee consisting of himself, the Finance Minister and the Irrigation and Power Minister to look into the question. The Sub-Committee examined the cases in detail and decided that four out of twenty five cases filed against Chaudhury Bansi Lal shoul)l be withdrawn as the evidence available was meagre and, in particular, in the case based on Manohar Lal's information the complainant had also been suitably and profitably compensated.\n\nThe decision of the Government was communicated to the District Magistrate who in turn asked the Public prosecutor to move the Court ror\n\nconsent to withdraw from the prosecution.\n\nThe Chief Minister and his colleagues on the Sub-Committee have filed before us affidavits regarding the constitution of the Sub-Committee and the decision to withdraw from the prosecution.\n\nThey have also denied the allegation that the case had been withdrawn with a view to gain the support of Chaudhury Bansi Lal against a no-confidence motion which the petitioner alleged was to be moved against the Chief Minister.\n\nIt was pointed out in the affidavits that no no-confidence motion was ever tabled against Chief Minister Bhaian Lal and that on the very figures given by the petitioner regarding the party position in the Haryana Assembly the support of Chaudhary Bansi Lal and his group would not matter. It was also brought out in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of some of the respondents that the petitioner had himself admitted in the agreement which he. had entered into with the Bhiwani Town Planning Trust on May 6, 1977, that his land and plots had been duly acquired under various development schemes, that he desired to withdraw all the petitions etc. filed by him in various courts and that he would not claim any damages against the Trust The Town Planning Trust agreed to release the lands to him with a view to enable him to reconstruct the buildings. It was expressly recited in the agreement that the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust agreed to the terms of the agreement as it was thought to be \"in the best interest of the parties concerned as well as in the good of the residents of the Bhiwani Town to settle the matter amicably and mutually\".\n\nThe Government of Haryana also. it was so recited in the agreement, had accorded its approval to the\n\nI r~\n\nR K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1003\n\nterms of the settlement. It has been mentioned in the counter-affidavits that the agreement between Manohar Lal and the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust in which Manohar Lal admitted the title of the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust to the land and buildings was never placed before the Jaganmohan Reddy Commission. In fact it is one of the complaints of Chaudhury Bansi Lal that those that were in charge of producing evidence before the Jaganmohan Reddy Commission took care to see that nothing in his favour was placed before the Commission.\n\nChaudhury Bansi Lal filed a counter-affidavit in which he has stated that the allegation that his son and relative wanted to purchase the land of Manohar Lal was an allegation which Manohar Lal never made in any of the objections filed by him against the schemes proposed by the Town Improvement Trust. It has also been pointed out that in the several writ Petitions filed by Manoh.ar Lal against the schemes no allegations of malafides were made against Bansi Lal. In one Writ Petition an attempt was made to introduce such an llegation by way of amendment but the High Court held that the allegation was a mere 'after-thought'. The District Attorney has filed a counter-affidavit in which he has stated that the evidence i'll the case was of a meagre nature and he was of the view that it might not be possible to obtain a conviction in the case. He had brought it to the notice of the District Magistrate earlier but as important personalities were involved it was not thought proper and prudent to make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution. The occurrence which was the subject matter of the ase was said to have taken place at 10 p.m.\n\nA large number of accused had been named. There were reasons to believe that most of the names of the accused were included on mere suspicion.\n\nIn fact two advocates who had been implicated as accused led unimpeachable evidence that they were not in Bhiwani at all that night.\n\nAfter he received advice from the District Magistrate he was convinced that an application should be filed for withdrawal from the prosecution and so he filed the same.\n\nSri Bhaskar Chatterji, the District Magistrate has also filed an affidavit in which he has stated that the District Attorney had informed him that some of the cases filed against Chaudhury Bansi Lal and his family members were weak in nature. He did not however, take any action at that time as important personalities were involved and as there were no directions from the Government Jn that regard.\n\nLater he received a wireless message which he forwarded t<~ the District Attorney for action, Shri Kataria, Secretary to Government of Haryana, Department of Administration of Justice has also filed a counter-affidavit in which he has mentioned the detailed of the proceedings of the Cab\\net Sub-Committee which took the decision to withdraw the case on September 20. 1979.\n\n1004 St; PREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA On a perusal of the allegations and counter-allegations, the facts.\n\nwhich emerge from the record as beyond dispute are :\n\n(] ) The land of Manohar Lal and his sons on which there were certain buildings was included in the Bhiwani Town Improvement Scheme.\n\n(2)\n\nI (3)\n\n(4)\n\n(5)\n\nThe allegation that Bansilal's son and relative wanted to purchase the land originally was not made by Manohar Lal in the original objections and writ Petitions filed by Manohar Lal.\n\nThe Supreme Court first granted stay of the demolition of buildings but later vacated the stay on December 1, 1976.\n\nAs soon as stay was vacated, without any loss of time, the demolition work started and completed. 'oynami!te and bull-dozers were used and the buildings were demolished.\n\nOn May 6, 1977, Manohar Lal and his sons entered into an agreement with the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust agreeing to withdraw all the cases filed by them against the improvement Trust and accepting the title of the trust to the land acquired under the Town Improvement schemes.\n\nIn return the Improvement Trust agreed to release the lands to Manohar Lal and his sons for the purpose of reconstructing the buildings and to receive , the compensation assessed for the demolished buildings. It was recited in the agreement that the Town Improvement Trust bad agreed to this course as -it was thought to be \"in the, best interest of the parties concerned as well as -in the good of the residents of the Bhiwani Town\".\n\n(6) On Jµly 13, 1977 Mano'har Lal lodged a First Information Report with the Police.\n\n(7) On July 21, 1978 the police filed a charge-sheet in the Court o~ the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani.\n\n(8) The District Attorney had informed the District Magistrate that the evidence was of a weak na(ure as most of the accused appeared to have been implicated on merei suspicion and some of the accused were not even present in the town on the night of the occnrrence.\n\n(9) Surinder Singh, son of Bansi Lal made a representation to the Govermnent that they were being harassed by innumerable cases being filed against them.\n\n\"-·\n\nI r\n\n·\"' •\n\n<' I\n\nR K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1005 I\n\n(10) On September 20, 1979, the Cabinet Sub-Committee A decided that four out of twenty five cases filed against Bansi Lal and others should be withdrawn.\n\nA wireless message was sent by the Government to the District Magistrate asking him to withdraw the four cases and to report compliance.\n\nThe letter was forwarded to the District Attorney.\n\nThe District Attorney filed an application for withdrawal from the prosecution on the same day. (l J) Neither before nor after the Cabinet Sub-Committee took its decision was there a no-confidence motion tabled against Chief Minister Bhajanlal.\n\n(12) On September 21, 1979, the Court granted its consent to the withdrawal of the public Prosecutor (the District Attorney) from the case.\n\nIt is on this material we have to determine whether the wi1hdrawal from the prosecution could be said to be malafide, that is,1 for irrelevant or extraneous reasons. We are not satisfied that there is sufficient basis to come to such a conclusion particularly in view of two outstanding circumstances namely that only four out of twenty-five cases have been withdrawn and the complainant himself had acknowledged the title of the Town Improvement Trust to the lands and the Trust had not only returned the lands to the complainant but also paid him compensation for the demolished buildings in the interest of all parties in Bhiwani town.\n\nWe, therefore, dismiss the Special Leave Petition.\n\nBefore bidding farewell to these cases it may be appropriate for us to say that Criminal justice is not a plaything and a Criminal Court is not a play-ground for politicking. Political fervour should not convert prosecution into persecution, nor political favour reward wrongdoer by withdrawal from prosecution. If political fortunes are allowed to be reflected in the processes of the Court very soon the credibility of the rule of law will be lost. So we insist that Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before granting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should appraise himself from the Government and thereafter appraise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases. But under no circumstances should he allow himself to become anyooe's stooge.\n\nNo arguments were advanced in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3890 o[ 1979. It is, therefore, dismissed.'\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal and Petitions dismissed.", "total_entities": 219, "entities": [{"text": "RAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE THROUGH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT\n\nAND ORS. ETC. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE THROUGH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORS. ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. R. KRISHNA IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.R. KRISHNA IYER*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 179, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 227, "end_char": 238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 461, "end_char": 472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 480, "end_char": 512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 534, "end_char": 545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "George Mathew Fernandes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 821, "end_char": 844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "287 /79, the case instituted against George Mathew Fernandes & others on 24-9-76 was allowOd to be withdrown on March 26, 1977 on an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 made D by N. S. Mathur Special Public Prosecutor.", "canonical_name": "George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes"}}, {"text": "24-9-76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 857, "end_char": 864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "287 /79, the case instituted against George Mathew Fernandes & others on 24-9-76 was allowOd to be withdrown on March 26, 1977 on an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 made D by N. S. Mathur Special Public Prosecutor."}}, {"text": "March 26, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 896, "end_char": 910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "287 /79, the case instituted against George Mathew Fernandes & others on 24-9-76 was allowOd to be withdrown on March 26, 1977 on an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 made D by N. S. Mathur Special Public Prosecutor."}}, {"text": "section 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 935, "end_char": 946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 954, "end_char": 983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. S. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 994, "end_char": 1006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "287 /79, the case instituted against George Mathew Fernandes & others on 24-9-76 was allowOd to be withdrown on March 26, 1977 on an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 made D by N. S. Mathur Special Public Prosecutor.", "canonical_name": "S. N.\n\nMathur"}}, {"text": "section 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1203, "end_char": 1214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1222, "end_char": 1251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Manohar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31iS/79 was filed by one Manohar Lal\n\ndirectly under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani, permitting the public prosecutor to withdraw from tho prosecution in case No.", "canonical_name": "Mano'bar Lal"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1529, "end_char": 1540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973"}}, {"text": "Choudhury Bansilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1733, "end_char": 1751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "186-1 filed by the State aaainst Choudhury Bansilal Ex-Defence Minister, his son Surinder Singh, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhuri Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "Surinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1781, "end_char": 1795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "186-1 filed by the State aaainst Choudhury Bansilal Ex-Defence Minister, his son Surinder Singh, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Surinder Singh"}}, {"text": "R. S. Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1809, "end_char": 1820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.L.A., R. S. Verma, Ex."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2339, "end_char": 2357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "287179, the Contentions were : (a) The Offence for which the accused persons were to be tried were exclusively triable by a Court of Session, and therefore, the Committing Magistrate had no jurisdic8 tion to give consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecu;.. tions; (b) The PUblic Prosecutor had abdicated his function and had filed the application at the behest of the Central Government without applying his mind; (c) The Magistrate was."}}, {"text": "S. N.\n\nMathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2529, "end_char": 2542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Expedience was never for the judiciary; ( d) S. N.\n\nMathur who had filed the application for withdrawal from the prosecution was not the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case and the application \\Vas therefore incompetent. ' ·", "canonical_name": "S. N.\n\nMathur"}}, {"text": "Bhajan, Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2842, "end_char": 2853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3115179, it was contended : (i) the Public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Sri Bhajan, Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the• case; (ii) Sri Bhajan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution because his ministry would not survive without ihe help of\n\nr'\n\n\\ ~\n\nR K. JAIN V. STATE 983\n\nChaudhuri Bansi Lal :i:nu (tii) the withdrawal was not based on any public A policy.", "canonical_name": "Bhajan, Lal"}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2877, "end_char": 2884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3115179, it was contended : (i) the Public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Sri Bhajan, Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the• case; (ii) Sri Bhajan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution because his ministry would not survive without ihe help of\n\nr'\n\n\\ ~\n\nR K. JAIN V. STATE 983\n\nChaudhuri Bansi Lal :i:nu (tii) the withdrawal was not based on any public A policy."}}, {"text": "Bhajan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2956, "end_char": 2966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3115179, it was contended : (i) the Public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Sri Bhajan, Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the• case; (ii) Sri Bhajan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution because his ministry would not survive without ihe help of\n\nr'\n\n\\ ~\n\nR K. JAIN V. STATE 983\n\nChaudhuri Bansi Lal :i:nu (tii) the withdrawal was not based on any public A policy.", "canonical_name": "Bhajan, Lal"}}, {"text": "R K. JAIN", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3105, "end_char": 3114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3115179, it was contended : (i) the Public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Sri Bhajan, Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the• case; (ii) Sri Bhajan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution because his ministry would not survive without ihe help of\n\nr'\n\n\\ ~\n\nR K. JAIN V. STATE 983\n\nChaudhuri Bansi Lal :i:nu (tii) the withdrawal was not based on any public A policy."}}, {"text": "Chaudhuri Bansi Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3129, "end_char": 3148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3115179, it was contended : (i) the Public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Sri Bhajan, Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the• case; (ii) Sri Bhajan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution because his ministry would not survive without ihe help of\n\nr'\n\n\\ ~\n\nR K. JAIN V. STATE 983\n\nChaudhuri Bansi Lal :i:nu (tii) the withdrawal was not based on any public A policy.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhuri Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "section 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4017, "end_char": 4023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4024, "end_char": 4047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4072, "end_char": 4078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4373, "end_char": 4379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4410, "end_char": 4416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "S. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4874, "end_char": 4880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4888, "end_char": 4916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 17, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification dated June 17, 1966 of the Ministry of Home Affairs; Government of India, shows that the Senior Public Prosecutor,."}}, {"text": "Crimiqal Procedure Code 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6121, "end_char": 6149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "All notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6309, "end_char": 6376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. N. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6439, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri S. N. Mathur is a Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Police E.stablishment at Delhi and has been functioning right throueh as Public Prosecntoc in the Union Territory of Delhi and it was be who was in charge of the case practically throughout\n\n[992 GH, 993 A-BJ\n\n,;;.,· ..", "canonical_name": "S. N.\n\nMathur"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6524, "end_char": 6529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri S. N. 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K. JAIN V. STATE 987", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16856, "end_char": 16879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I r\n\n.. \\J\n\nR. K. JAIN V. STATE 987\n\nAND\n\nCRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION No."}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16977, "end_char": 16987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 17022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17118, "end_char": 17134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha Att.", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha"}}, {"text": "M. K. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Banerjee, Addi.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Banerjee Addi"}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17185, "end_char": 17198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A. Subhashini and R. B. Datar for the Petitioner in Cr!."}}, {"text": "R. B. Datar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17203, "end_char": 17214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss A. Subhashini and R. B. Datar for the Petitioner in Cr!."}}, {"text": "U. D. Gour", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17273, "end_char": 17283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U. D. Gour Adv."}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17307, "end_char": 17319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haryana and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in Cr!."}}, {"text": "P. H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17378, "end_char": 17390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. H. Parekh, Hemani Sharma, Rajan Karanjawala and C. B.\n\nSingh for the Petitioner in SLP 3115/79."}}, {"text": "Hemani Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17392, "end_char": 17405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. H. Parekh, Hemani Sharma, Rajan Karanjawala and C. B.\n\nSingh for the Petitioner in SLP 3115/79."}}, {"text": "Rajan Karanjawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17407, "end_char": 17424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. H. Parekh, Hemani Sharma, Rajan Karanjawala and C. B.\n\nSingh for the Petitioner in SLP 3115/79."}}, {"text": "C. B.\n\nSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17429, "end_char": 17441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. H. Parekh, Hemani Sharma, Rajan Karanjawala and C. B.\n\nSingh for the Petitioner in SLP 3115/79."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17478, "end_char": 17492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare and T. Sridharan for Respo'ndent No.", "canonical_name": "M. C. 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Bagga, E\n\n...\n\nfor the Petitioner in Cr!.", "canonical_name": "Ram Panjwani"}}, {"text": "Raj Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17832, "end_char": 17844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani and S. K. Bagga, E\n\n...\n\nfor the Petitioner in Cr!."}}, {"text": "Vijay Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17846, "end_char": 17860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani and S. K. Bagga, E\n\n...\n\nfor the Petitioner in Cr!."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17865, "end_char": 17876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani and S. K. Bagga, E\n\n...\n\nfor the Petitioner in Cr!."}}, {"text": "M. K. Banerjee Addi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17958, "end_char": 17977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and M. K. Banerjee Addi.", "canonical_name": "M. K. Banerjee Addi"}}, {"text": "Ram lethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18056, "end_char": 18070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, A. K. Pande and Mrs, Hemanlika Wahl for RespO!!ldent No.", "canonical_name": "Rani, Jethmalaiii"}}, {"text": "Sushma Swaraj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18077, "end_char": 18090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, A. K. Pande and Mrs, Hemanlika Wahl for RespO!!ldent No."}}, {"text": "A. K. Pande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18092, "end_char": 18103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, A. K. Pande and Mrs, Hemanlika Wahl for RespO!!ldent No."}}, {"text": "Hemanlika Wahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, A. K. Pande and Mrs, Hemanlika Wahl for RespO!!ldent No."}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18171, "end_char": 18185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, T. U. M_ehta, P. H. Parekh and Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan for Respondent N:o.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "T. U. M_ehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18187, "end_char": 18199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, T. U. M_ehta, P. H. Parekh and Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan for Respondent N:o."}}, {"text": "Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18218, "end_char": 18241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, T. U. M_ehta, P. H. Parekh and Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan for Respondent N:o."}}, {"text": "Ranjan Dwivedl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18312, "end_char": 18326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani and Ranjan Dwivedl for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "A. G. Noorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18403, "end_char": 18416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani, A. G. Noorani, Miss Rani Jethmalani and Mrs.\n\nKamini laiswal for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18423, "end_char": 18438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani, A. G. Noorani, Miss Rani Jethmalani and Mrs.\n\nKamini laiswal for Respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "Rani, Jethmalaiii"}}, {"text": "Kamini laiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18449, "end_char": 18463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani, A. G. Noorani, Miss Rani Jethmalani and Mrs.\n\nKamini laiswal for Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Ram lethmalani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18518, "end_char": 18532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani and A. G. Noorani and Miss Rani, Jethmalaiii for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Rani, Jethmalaiii"}}, {"text": "Rani, Jethmalaiii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18560, "end_char": 18577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram lethmalani and A. G. Noorani and Miss Rani, Jethmalaiii for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Rani, Jethmalaiii"}}, {"text": "Sushi! Chandra Bhatnagar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18621, "end_char": 18645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushi!"}}, {"text": "CmNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18748, "end_char": 18762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCmNNAPPA REDDY, J.-A cocktail of law and politics, reason and extravagance is the only way we can describe the S1Jbmissions made to us in these two cases.", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "S1J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18859, "end_char": 18862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19392, "end_char": 19423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19429, "end_char": 19433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19441, "end_char": 19471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "September 6; 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19516, "end_char": 19533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196(1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and s. 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, the Govermnent of India by its order dated September 6; 1976 accorded sanction for the prosecution of George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes and 24 others for alleged offences under Ss."}}, {"text": "George Fernandes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19605, "end_char": 19621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196(1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and s. 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, the Govermnent of India by its order dated September 6; 1976 accorded sanction for the prosecution of George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes and 24 others for alleged offences under Ss.", "canonical_name": "George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes"}}, {"text": "Ss. 121", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19663, "end_char": 19670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1908", "statute": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19673, "end_char": 19690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19698, "end_char": 19715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ss. 4, 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19726, "end_char": 19740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Explosive Snbstances Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19744, "end_char": 19768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19774, "end_char": 19778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Snbstances Act", "statute": "Explosive Snbstances Act"}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19792, "end_char": 19797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Explosive Snbstances Act", "statute": "Explosive Snbstances Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Explosives Act, 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19805, "end_char": 19832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 352", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20128, "end_char": 20139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Explosives Act, 1884", "statute": "the Indian Explosives Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20161, "end_char": 20207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first paragraph of the order according sanction set ont the subject of the conspiracy in the following words : '\n\n\"Whereas, it is alleged that after the issue of the proclamation of Emergency on 25th June, 1975 by the President of fndia in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution, George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes, Chairman of Socialist Party of India and Chairman of All India Railwaymen's Federation sought to arouse resistence against the said emergency by declaring that the said emergency had been \"clamped\" on the country by the \"despotic rule\" of Smt.", "canonical_name": "George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes"}}, {"text": "Socialist Party of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20221, "end_char": 20245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first paragraph of the order according sanction set ont the subject of the conspiracy in the following words : '\n\n\"Whereas, it is alleged that after the issue of the proclamation of Emergency on 25th June, 1975 by the President of fndia in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution, George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes, Chairman of Socialist Party of India and Chairman of All India Railwaymen's Federation sought to arouse resistence against the said emergency by declaring that the said emergency had been \"clamped\" on the country by the \"despotic rule\" of Smt."}}, {"text": "All India Railwaymen's Federation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20262, "end_char": 20295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first paragraph of the order according sanction set ont the subject of the conspiracy in the following words : '\n\n\"Whereas, it is alleged that after the issue of the proclamation of Emergency on 25th June, 1975 by the President of fndia in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution, George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes, Chairman of Socialist Party of India and Chairman of All India Railwaymen's Federation sought to arouse resistence against the said emergency by declaring that the said emergency had been \"clamped\" on the country by the \"despotic rule\" of Smt."}}, {"text": "Indira Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20453, "end_char": 20466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and to entertain an idea!"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20486, "end_char": 20491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and to entertain an idea!"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20910, "end_char": 20928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 24, 1976 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation, Central Investi-\n\n• lo\n\n;..\n\n\" *\n\nI T\n\n....\n\nR K.JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 989\n\n gation Unit (A), New Delhi, filed a charge-sheet in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, against the!"}}, {"text": "Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation, Central Investi-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20933, "end_char": 21044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 24, 1976 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation, Central Investi-\n\n• lo\n\n;..\n\n\" *\n\nI T\n\n....\n\nR K.JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 989\n\n gation Unit (A), New Delhi, filed a charge-sheet in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, against the!"}}, {"text": "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21190, "end_char": 21226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 24, 1976 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation, Central Investi-\n\n• lo\n\n;..\n\n\" *\n\nI T\n\n....\n\nR K.JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 989\n\n gation Unit (A), New Delhi, filed a charge-sheet in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, against the!"}}, {"text": "March 22, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21640, "end_char": 21654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of the approvers was recorded on March 22, 1977 and the case was adjourned to March 26, 1977 for further proceedings."}}, {"text": "section 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21828, "end_char": 21839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21847, "end_char": 21875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 121", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22210, "end_char": 22216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1973", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1973"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22219, "end_char": 22222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22230, "end_char": 22233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 4, 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22238, "end_char": 22257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Explosive Substances Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22265, "end_char": 22295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22301, "end_char": 22313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1908", "statute": "the Explosive Substances Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Indian Explosives Act, 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22332, "end_char": 22359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bharat C. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22477, "end_char": 22492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That besides the accused who were sent up for trial two accused namely Shri Bharat C. Patel and Rewati Kant Sinha were granted pardon by the Hon'ble Court and were examined as approver u/s. 306( 4) Cr."}}, {"text": "Rewati Kant Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22497, "end_char": 22514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That besides the accused who were sent up for trial two accused namely Shri Bharat C. Patel and Rewati Kant Sinha were granted pardon by the Hon'ble Court and were examined as approver u/s. 306( 4) Cr."}}, {"text": "s. 306( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22588, "end_char": 22598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Explosives Act, 1884", "statute": "the Indian Explosives Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "Ladli Mohan Nigam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22698, "end_char": 22715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That o'ut of 25 accused sent up for trial cited in the charge sheet, 2 accused namely Ladli Mohan Nigam and Atul Patel were declared proclaimed offenders by the Hon'ble Court."}}, {"text": "Atul Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22720, "end_char": 22730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That o'ut of 25 accused sent up for trial cited in the charge sheet, 2 accused namely Ladli Mohan Nigam and Atul Patel were declared proclaimed offenders by the Hon'ble Court."}}, {"text": "26th March 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23020, "end_char": 23035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may accord consent to withdraw from 26th March 1977."}}, {"text": "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23188, "end_char": 23217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA On the same day the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, expressing the opinion that it was \"expedient to accord consent to\n\n. •:,-,.;::"}}, {"text": "Rajender Kumar Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23401, "end_char": 23420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Dr. Rajender Kumar Jain, and Advocate, filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi, under s. 397 of the' Criminal Procedure Code for revision of the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate giving his consent to the Special Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23460, "end_char": 23479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Dr. Rajender Kumar Jain, and Advocate, filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi, under s. 397 of the' Criminal Procedure Code for revision of the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate giving his consent to the Special Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution."}}, {"text": "s. 397", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23487, "end_char": 23493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23502, "end_char": 23525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Panjwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23971, "end_char": 23983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ram Panjwani, learned counsel for the appellant made the ' following submissions : (1) The offences for which the accused persons were to be trie& ; were exclusively triable by a Court of Session and, therefore, the Committing Magistrate had no jurisdiction to give consent to the Public Prosecl!tor to withdraw from the prosecution,\n\n(2) The Public Prosecutor had abdicated his function and had filed the application at the behest of the Central Government without applying his mind.", "canonical_name": "Ram Panjwani"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24841, "end_char": 24855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submissions of Shri Ram Panjwani were controverted by\n\nShri Ram Jethmalani and Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "Rani, Jethmalaiii"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24865, "end_char": 24879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submissions of Shri Ram Panjwani were controverted by\n\nShri Ram Jethmalani and Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "V. M. Tarkunde"}}, {"text": "Art. 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25536, "end_char": 25544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Panjwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25590, "end_char": 25598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Panjwani in his reply submitted !!"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26000, "end_char": 26015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".:-:~\\ -\n\nR f JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, 1.)", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "S. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26028, "end_char": 26034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26097, "end_char": 26103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26928, "end_char": 26934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26942, "end_char": 26970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27171, "end_char": 27177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27643, "end_char": 27649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "statute": "the Criminal Procedure Code 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28173, "end_char": 28179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedurte Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28180, "end_char": 28204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28229, "end_char": 28235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedurte Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedurte Code"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.lt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28415, "end_char": 28452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.lt."}}, {"text": "s. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28595, "end_char": 28601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedurte Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedurte Code"}}, {"text": "s. 321", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28631, "end_char": 28637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedurte Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedurte Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29392, "end_char": 29418, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 209", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29421, "end_char": 29427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29435, "end_char": 29463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30236, "end_char": 30264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not agree with the view taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A. Venkatari:rmana v. Mudem Sanjeeva Ragudu & Ors,,(1) that the court of the Committing Magistrate is noti competent to give consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30573, "end_char": 30618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "June 17, 1966 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, shows that the Senior Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Delhi Special Police Establishment attached to the Delhi office of t1te Special Police Establishment were appointed as Public Prosecutors under s. 492 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 to conduct the cases of the Special Police Establishment before the Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, aud Sessions Judges, in the Union Territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 492", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30862, "end_char": 30868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30880, "end_char": 30908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, aud Sessions Judges, in the Union Territory of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30977, "end_char": 31068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "June 17, 1966 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, shows that the Senior Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Delhi Special Police Establishment attached to the Delhi office of t1te Special Police Establishment were appointed as Public Prosecutors under s. 492 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 to conduct the cases of the Special Police Establishment before the Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, aud Sessions Judges, in the Union Territory of Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31936, "end_char": 31942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "All notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the new Code", "statute": "All notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the new Code"}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32525, "end_char": 32531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 1 SCR 604", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 36070, "end_char": 36086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1980 SC 423", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38441, "end_char": 38456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 361", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41024, "end_char": 41030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41031, "end_char": 41054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42858, "end_char": 42884, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45641, "end_char": 45658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45667, "end_char": 45693, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Extradition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46101, "end_char": 46116, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46570, "end_char": 46584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Nation, was convicted and jailed for offences against the' Municipal laws; so was his spiritual son and the first Prime Minister of our ceountry; .so was the present Prime Minister and so were the first' Presi- .dent and the present President of India."}}, {"text": "Birendra of", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47035, "end_char": 47046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even .as we are writing this judgment we read in the morning's newspapers that King Birendra of Nepal has declared a \"general amnesty to all Nepalese accused of political changes''."}}, {"text": "Nepal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47047, "end_char": 47052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even .as we are writing this judgment we read in the morning's newspapers that King Birendra of Nepal has declared a \"general amnesty to all Nepalese accused of political changes''."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47607, "end_char": 47622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was to overawe the Government by committing varions acts of destruction .of public property and vital installations and the motiv~ attributed was that the accused wanted to change the Government led by Shrimati Gandhi."}}, {"text": "Goverumeut", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49353, "end_char": 49363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, if the Government of the day\n\ninterpreted the result of the 1977 elections as a mandate of the people and' on the basis of that interpretation tl}e Goverumeut advised the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, one cannot say that the Public Prosecutor was activated by any improper motive in withdrawing from the prosecution nor can one say that the Magistrate fuileq to exercise the supervisory function vested in him.in giviug his consent."}}, {"text": "Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50419, "end_char": 50453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3115 of 1979 has been filed by one Manohar Lal, against the order of .the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani, permitting the Public Prosecut<; ir to withdraw from the prosecution in oase No."}}, {"text": "Chandhury Bansi Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50569, "end_char": 50588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "186-1 filed by the State against Chandhury Bansi Lal, ex-Defence Minister, his son Surinder Singh, ex- M.L.A., R. S. Verma, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhuri Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "Bhiwani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50685, "end_char": 50692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deputy Commissioner, Bhiwani and several other officials and non-officials for a host of offences."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50816, "end_char": 50824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 13, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51094, "end_char": 51107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 13, 1977, Manohar Lal, laid information with the Station House Officer, Police Station, Bhiwani City, against the several accused persons."}}, {"text": "Bhiwani Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51272, "end_char": 51286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet was filed by the Bhiwani Police on July 21, 1978 on the basis of information laid with them by Manohar Lal."}}, {"text": "July 21, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51290, "end_char": 51303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge-sheet was filed by the Bhiwani Police on July 21, 1978 on the basis of information laid with them by Manohar Lal."}}, {"text": "Chaudhury Bansi Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51432, "end_char": 51451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The gravamen of the allegation against the accused persons was that Chaudhury Bansi Lal was annoyed with Manohar Lal and his sons as they failed to transfer two plots of land to his son and a relative.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhuri Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "Mano'bar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51694, "end_char": 51706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chaudhury Bansi Lal, therefor~, induced the Dhiwani Town\n\nImprovement Trnst to include in its smssive schemes land belonging to Mano'bar Lal and his sons, in Bhiwani Town, on which stood s9me buildings including two temples.", "canonical_name": "Mano'bar Lal"}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51753, "end_char": 51755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51890, "end_char": 51903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".As Manohar Lal apprehended that his buildings might be demolished, he filed a Wdt Petition in the Supreme Court and obtained an order of stay of demolition."}}, {"text": "December 4, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52510, "end_char": 52526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All this was done in the course of a few hours and the demolition of the building was started forthwith and completed by December 4, 1976."}}, {"text": "Chaudhury Bansi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52588, "end_char": 52603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chaudhury Bansi, Lal filed a petition in this Court for transfer of the case to a Court outside the States of Punjab and Haryana.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhuri Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 52698, "end_char": 52704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chaudhury Bansi, Lal filed a petition in this Court for transfer of the case to a Court outside the States of Punjab and Haryana."}}, {"text": "September 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52905, "end_char": 52923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 20, 1979 on the basis of a letter addressed to him by the District Magistrate, the Public Prosecutor filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for permission to withdraw from the' prosecution."}}, {"text": "September 21, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53127, "end_char": 53145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 21, 1979 the Court granted its consent to the withdrawal of the Pl]blic Prosecutor from the prosecution."}}, {"text": "Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53316, "end_char": 53322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this order that is questioned in the Special Leave Petition,\n\nShri Parekh, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Shri Bhajan Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the case."}}, {"text": "Bha jan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 53569, "end_char": 53580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to Shri Parekh Shri Bha jan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the public Prose_cutor from the prosecution because his Ministry would not survive without the help of Chaudhury Bansi Lal.", "canonical_name": "Bhajan, Lal"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53822, "end_char": 53840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A motionof no confidence was imminent against Shri Bhajan Lal and was to be considered on September 24, 1979; so he ordered withdrawal of the cases against Chaudhury Bansi Lal _on September 20,\n\n1979, in order to secure the support of his group."}}, {"text": "September 20,\n\n1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53912, "end_char": 53931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A motionof no confidence was imminent against Shri Bhajan Lal and was to be considered on September 24, 1979; so he ordered withdrawal of the cases against Chaudhury Bansi Lal _on September 20,\n\n1979, in order to secure the support of his group."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate. Bhiwani", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54173, "end_char": 54201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "drew our attention to the wireless message which was sent by the Government to the District Magistrate."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate Bhiwani", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54456, "end_char": 54483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate Bhiwani forwarded a copy of the wireless meS.sage to the District Attorney, Bhiwani for necessary action directing him to withdraw the four cases from the concerned courts a• desired by the Government and to report compliance to this office.. The District Atterney thereafter filed an application for permission to withdraw from the pfosecution."}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 55152, "end_char": 55166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer it was contended by the advocate General of Haryana who appeareg for the State of Haryana and M. C. Bhandare who appeared for Chaudhury Bansi Lal, that Surinder Singh, son of Chaudhury Bansi Lal had petitioned to t)le Chief Minister of Haryana alleging that he, his father and their associates were being harassed by numerous cases being filed against them without any justification.", "canonical_name": "M. C. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "Bhaian Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 56683, "end_char": 56693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out in the affidavits that no no-confidence motion was ever tabled against Chief Minister Bhaian Lal and that on the very figures given by the petitioner regarding the party position in the Haryana Assembly the support of Chaudhary Bansi Lal and his group would not matter.", "canonical_name": "Bhajan, Lal"}}, {"text": "Chaudhary Bansi Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 56815, "end_char": 56834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out in the affidavits that no no-confidence motion was ever tabled against Chief Minister Bhaian Lal and that on the very figures given by the petitioner regarding the party position in the Haryana Assembly the support of Chaudhary Bansi Lal and his group would not matter.", "canonical_name": "Chaudhuri Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "Bhiwani Town Planning Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57054, "end_char": 57081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had entered into with the Bhiwani Town Planning Trust on May 6, 1977, that his land and plots had been duly acquired under various development schemes, that he desired to withdraw all the petitions etc."}}, {"text": "May 6, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57085, "end_char": 57096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had entered into with the Bhiwani Town Planning Trust on May 6, 1977, that his land and plots had been duly acquired under various development schemes, that he desired to withdraw all the petitions etc."}}, {"text": "Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57486, "end_char": 57516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was expressly recited in the agreement that the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust agreed to the terms of the agreement as it was thought to be \"in the best interest of the parties concerned as well as in the good of the residents of the Bhiwani Town to settle the matter amicably and mutually\"."}}, {"text": "Government of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57735, "end_char": 57756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Haryana also."}}, {"text": "Jaganmohan Reddy Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58169, "end_char": 58196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been mentioned in the counter-affidavits that the agreement between Manohar Lal and the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust in which Manohar Lal admitted the title of the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust to the land and buildings was never placed before the Jaganmohan Reddy Commission."}}, {"text": "Town Improvement Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58707, "end_char": 58729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chaudhury Bansi Lal filed a counter-affidavit in which he has stated that the allegation that his son and relative wanted to purchase the land of Manohar Lal was an allegation which Manohar Lal never made in any of the objections filed by him against the schemes proposed by the Town Improvement Trust."}}, {"text": "Manoh.ar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58804, "end_char": 58816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also been pointed out that in the several writ Petitions filed by Manoh.ar Lal against the schemes no allegations of malafides were made against Bansi Lal.", "canonical_name": "Mano'bar Lal"}}, {"text": "Bansi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58883, "end_char": 58892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also been pointed out that in the several writ Petitions filed by Manoh.ar Lal against the schemes no allegations of malafides were made against Bansi Lal.", "canonical_name": "Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "Bhiwani", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59833, "end_char": 59840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact two advocates who had been implicated as accused led unimpeachable evidence that they were not in Bhiwani at all that night."}}, {"text": "Bhaskar Chatterji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60035, "end_char": 60052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Bhaskar Chatterji, the District Magistrate has also filed an affidavit in which he has stated that the District Attorney had informed him that some of the cases filed against Chaudhury Bansi Lal and his family members were weak in nature."}}, {"text": "Kataria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60532, "end_char": 60539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later he received a wireless message which he forwarded t<~ the District Attorney for action, Shri Kataria, Secretary to Government of Haryana, Department of Administration of Justice has also filed a counter-affidavit in which he has mentioned the detailed of the proceedings of the Cab\\net Sub-Committee which took the decision to withdraw the case on September 20."}}, {"text": "September 20. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60787, "end_char": 60805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later he received a wireless message which he forwarded t<~ the District Attorney for action, Shri Kataria, Secretary to Government of Haryana, Department of Administration of Justice has also filed a counter-affidavit in which he has mentioned the detailed of the proceedings of the Cab\\net Sub-Committee which took the decision to withdraw the case on September 20."}}, {"text": "Bansilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61155, "end_char": 61163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2)\n\nI (3)\n\n(4)\n\n(5)\n\nThe allegation that Bansilal's son and relative wanted to purchase the land originally was not made by Manohar Lal in the original objections and writ Petitions filed by Manohar Lal.", "canonical_name": "Bansi Lal"}}, {"text": "December 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61417, "end_char": 61433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court first granted stay of the demolition of buildings but later vacated the stay on December 1, 1976."}}, {"text": "Bhiwani Town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62308, "end_char": 62320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was recited in the agreement that the Town Improvement Trust bad agreed to this course as -it was thought to be \"in the, best interest of the parties concerned as well as -in the good of the residents of the Bhiwani Town\"."}}, {"text": "13, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62336, "end_char": 62344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) On Jµly 13, 1977 Mano'har Lal lodged a First Information Report with the Police."}}, {"text": "Mano'har Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62345, "end_char": 62357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) On Jµly 13, 1977 Mano'har Lal lodged a First Information Report with the Police.", "canonical_name": "Mano'bar Lal"}}, {"text": "Surinder Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 62792, "end_char": 62806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(9) Surinder Singh, son of Bansi Lal made a representation to the Govermnent that they were being harassed by innumerable cases being filed against them.", "canonical_name": "Surinder Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhajanlal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 63595, "end_char": 63604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l J) Neither before nor after the Cabinet Sub-Committee took its decision was there a no-confidence motion tabled against Chief Minister Bhajanlal.", "canonical_name": "Bhajan, Lal"}}, {"text": "Bhiwani town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 64373, "end_char": 64385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not satisfied that there is sufficient basis to come to such a conclusion particularly in view of two outstanding circumstances namely that only four out of twenty-five cases have been withdrawn and the complainant himself had acknowledged the title of the Town Improvement Trust to the lands and the Trust had not only returned the lands to the complainant but also paid him compensation for the demolished buildings in the interest of all parties in Bhiwani town."}}]}