JAI SINGH JAIRAM TY AGI ETC.

MAMANCHAND RATILAL AGARWAL AND ORS.

• March 28, 1980

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]

The Canton111ents (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 as amended retrospectively by An1ending Act 22 of 1972-Efject of the provi.sions of the Amending ACt-Whether a compromise decree passed in 1967 before the amendment is saved by tlze Amending Act.

Doctrine of Re.s judicata-C'o1npro111ise decree declared nullity by the Excut ing Court as the Bornbay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate~ Control Act, 1947 had no application to buildings in Cantonment area-All decrees validated by Amtnding Act 22 df 1967-fVhether earlier decision of the Ex, ecutive Court barsfurther execution stit on the ground of res ; udicata.

The respondents in Civil Appeal , No. 708 /78 Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and others, who are the landlords of premises b.earing door No. 16 in Nawa Bazar Area Kirkee Cantonment, filed a civil suit No. 1730 of 1964 against the Appellant-tenant for recovery of possession and arrears of rent under the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rt:ttcs Control Act, 1947.

The suit was decreed. There was an appeal by the tenant. It resulted in a compromise decree dated.July 12, 1967 by \Vhich some time was given to th~ tenant to vacate the premises.

On April 29, 1969, in the case of In.du Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi and Anr. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 443, this Court held that Parliament alone had and the State Legislature did not have the necessary competence to make a law in regard to the "regulation of house accommodation in Cantonment Areas." The expression "regulation of house accommodation" was interpreted as not to be confined to allotment only but as extending to other incients, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of house accomn1odation etc. To get over the situation created by the said decision, on Deceinber 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other cantonment areat:;. On June 2, 1972, the Parliatnent also eoocted Act 22 of 1972 amending the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Con~

trot l, aws) Act 1957, purporting to enable the Central Government to make the Rent Control L'lws in the sel\feral States applicable to Cantonment areas from diltes anterior to the dates of notification and further purporting to validate cer~ tain pre-existing decrees. In the meanwhile, taking advantage of the decision in the case of lndu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi and Anr., the appellanttenant filed Miscellaneous Application No. 597 /70 for a declaration that the decree obtained against him was a nullity and incapable of being executed. This iapplication 'vas allowed by the <; ourt on November, 19, 1971. But, after the enactment of Act 22 of 1972, on January II, 1973 the landlords filed Darkhast No. 104 of 1973 to execute the decree in their favour. The appellant-tenant raised three objections, namely, (i) subsequent to the compromise decree there was a

 ..

JAJSINGH V. MAMANCHAND 225

fresh agreement of lease between the Iaridlords and himself; (ii) the provisions A of the lam.ending Act 22 of 1972 were not extensive enough to save the decree :dated July 12, 1967; (iii) in any case, the decision in Miscellaneous Application No. 597 /70 holding the decree to be a nullity operated as res judicau~ between the parties. The first objection was left open by all the Courts for future adjudication, as the landlord denied the existence of any fresh agreement.

The second and third objections alone were considered. In the judgment under appeal, the High Court overruled them and hence this appeal by special le:tve B and two other similar appea1s.

Disn1issing the appeals the Court,

HELD:

Though this AC"t came into force on .December 18, 1957, no notification was issued extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to Kirkee and other Cantonment la.Teas within the State

of Bombay until 1969. Apparently such a notification was thought unneces5ary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act was supposed to operate within the said Cantonment area-s because of the consistent vie\v taken by the Bombay High Court regarding the applicability of the Bombay Act to such areas. In view of the Supreme Court decision in Indu. Bhushan's case, it became necessary that a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Thws) Act, 1957, should be issued. It was accordingly done on December 29,

1969. But it v1as realised that the entire problem was not thereby solved since all such notifications as the one issued on December 29, 1969 could only be prospec .. ve and could not save decrees which had already been passed. Therefore, Amending Act 22 of 1972 was enacted for the express purpose of saving decrees which htad already been passed. By section 2 of the Amending Act of 1972 the Principal Act of 1957 was itself deemed to have come into force on January 26,

1950. Original Section 3 was renumbered as sub-section 1 and the words "on: the' date of the notification" were omitted and "were deemed always to have been ·.omitted." [229 B-G & 230 C-D]

2. Under section 3 of the unamended Act, 1957, ta• notification could be issued extendinr a State Legislation to a Cantonment area with effect from the -date of notification. As a result of the introduction of sub-section 2 of section H 3 the notification can be given effect from an anterior date or a future late .but it cannot be made effective from a date earlier than the commencement

A of the State Legislation or the establishment of the Cantonment or the commencement of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act,.

1951. Sub-section 3 is merely consequential to sub-section 2, in that it provides that a State Legislation when extended to a Cantonment area wit_h effect from the date of the notification from an anterior date, such legislation is to stand extended with all the amendments to such State Legislt¥tion made after such: anterior date but before the commenement of the 1972 Amending Act, the B amendments being applicable as and when they come into force.

Sub-s. 4 makes provision for the saving of decrees or orders for the regulation of or for evictionfrom any house accommodation in a Cantonment made before the extension of the State Legislation to the Cantonment provided certain conditions are fulfiled.

One condition is that the decree or order must have been made by any Court, Tribunal or other authority in accordance with a law for the conror of rent and regulation of hous-e accommodation for rthe time being in force C in the State in which such Cantonment is situated.

In other words the decree or order must have been n1ade by the wrong application of the Slate l..egi<>- lation to the Cantonment area. If a decree or order has been made by such, Vi•rong applica¢ion of the State Legislation to the Cantonment area it shall be deemed, with effect fron1 the date of the notification to have been properly made under the relevant provisions of the State LegislatiO!n. [23 l AH, 232 A-BJ

3. The applicability of sub-section 4 cannot be confined to cases where

notifications are issued with retrospective effect under sub-section z. Subr.; ection 4 is nOt so confined. It applies to all cases of dercees or orders made before the extension of a State Legislation to a Cantonment area irrespective of the question whether such extension is retrospective or not. The essential. condition to be fulfilled is thnt the decree or order must have been tnade as if the State Legislation was already in force, although, strictly speaking, it was not so in force.

Sub-section 4 is wide enough to save all decrees and orders made by the wrong application of a. State rent control and house accommodatio~ legislation tO a Cantonment 'area, though sUch State Legislation could not in law have been applied to Cantonment areas at the time of the passing of the decrees or order. The decree obtained by the respondent is saved by the provisionsof section 3, sub-section 4 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act of 1957, as amended by Act 22 of 1972. [232 E-F]

4. If the decision in the previous proceeding was to be regarded as res iudicata it would assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the mle declared by the legislature. [234 Al

Jn the present case, the executing Court had refused to exercise jurisdiction and to execute the decree on the ground that the decree was a nullity as... the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, had no application to buildings in Cantonment areas. 'fhla.t defect having been re moved and all decrees obtained on the basis that the Bombay rent law applied' to the Kirkce Cantonment area having been validated by Act 22 of 1972, it

Cannot be said that the earlier decision holding that the decree was a nullity operated as res judicata. [234 B-D]

Mathura Prasad Bajoo laiswal and Ors. v. Dessibai N. B. ]eejeebhoy, [1970}l 3 S.C.R. 830 @ 836; followed.

JAIS!NGH v. MAMANCHAND (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 227

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISD!Cl!ON : Civil Appeal Nos. 708 to 710 of 1978.

Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 18-2-1978 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 2564/74, 5997/78 and 5999/78.

V.M. Tarkunde, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, V.N. Ganpule, Mrs. Veena ·Devi Khanna and Miss Manik 1arkunde for the Appellants in all the appeals.

So/i J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and E.M.S. Anam for the Respondents 1 to 6 in CAs 708 to 710/1978.

P.H. Parekh, C.B. Singh, BL. Verma, Miss V. Caprihan, Hemani C Sharma and Raian Karanjawala for the Respondent No. 5 in CA

710/78.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHl"iNAPPA REDDY, J. The respondents in Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978, Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and others, who are the landlords of premises bearing door No. 16 in Nawa Bazar Area Kirkee Cantonment, filed civil suit No. 1730 of 1964 against the appellanttenant for recovery of possession and arrears of rent under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate Control Act, 1947. The suit was decreed. There was an appeal by the tenant.

It resulted in a compromise decree dated July 12, 1967 by which some time was given to the tenant to vacate the premises. As the tenant failed to vacate the premises within the time given to him, the landlords were compelled to take out execution.

On April 29, 1969, in the case of lndu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr.(1), this Court held that Parliament alone had and the State

Legislature did not have the necessary competence to make a law in regard to the "regulation of house accommodation in Cantonment areas". The expression "regulation of house accommodation" was interpreted as not to be confined to allotment only but as extending to other incidents, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of house accommodation etc.

To get over the situation created by Indu Bhusan Bosev!Rama Sundari Devi &Anr.(1), on December 29, 1969, the Central Government issued a notification under Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to the Kirkee and other Cantonment areas. On June 2, 1972, the Parliament also

(I) (1970] I S.C.R. 443.

enacted Act 22 of 1972 amending the C1ntonments (Extension of Rent Control L 1w J) Aot, IJ57, p1rp >rtin~ to en1b!, th' Central GJvernment to mike the rent control law; in theseveral States applicable to lCantonment are1s frJm dites anterior to the dates of notifbation and further purporting to validate certain pre-existing decrees.

In the meanwhile taking advantage of the decision in the case of Indu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), the appellant-tenant filed Misc, elleneous. -Application No. 597 of 1970 for a declaration that the decree obtained against him was a nullity and incapable of being executed. This application was allowed by the Court on November 15, 1971. But, after the enactment of Act 22 of 1972, on January 11, 1973, the landlords filed Darkhast No. 104of1973 to execute the decree in their favour.· The tenant raised various objections. One of the objections was that subsequent to the compromise decree there was a fresh agreement of lease between the landlords and himself. This was denied by the landlords., Another objection was that the provisions of the Amending Act 22 of 1972 were not extensive enough to save the decree dated July 12, 1967. The third objection was that in any case the decision in miscellaneous application No. 597 of 1970 holding the decree to be a nullity operated as res judicata between the parties. The first of the objections was left open by all the Courts for future adjudication.

The second and third objections alone were considered, for the time being. In the judgment under appeal, the High Court over-ruled the second and third objections of the tenant and hence this appeal by special leave.

The first question for our consideration is whether the compromise decree dated July 12, 1967 is saved by Amending Act 22of1972?

Before the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bo; se v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), there was a conflict of views on the question whether Entry 3 of List I of Schedule VII to the Constitution which enabled Parliament to legislate in regard to "the regulation of housing accommodation (including the control of rents)" in Cantonment areas was wide enough to include the subject ofrelationship of landlord and tenant of buildings situated in Cantonment areas. The High Courts of Bom- 0bay, Nagpur and Patna had taken the view that regulation of the relationship of landlord and tenant did not fall within Entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Govt. of India Act, 1935 (which corresponded to Entry 3 of List I l'f Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that the Provincial Legislature was competent to legislate even in regard to the regulation of the relationship between landlord and tenant in Cantonment areas by virtue of Entry 21 of List II of the

.~\

...

JAISINGH v. MAMANCHAND (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 229

Seventh Schedule to the Govt. of India Act, 1935 (which"corresponded to Entry 18 of the list If of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution).

On the other hand the High Courts of Calcutta and Rajasthan held that the power of the State legislatre to legislate in respect oflandlord and tenant of buildings was to re found net in Ent1y 18 of list II but in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of list JII of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that such power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of list I.

The view expressed by the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts was accepted as correct by this Ccurt in Jndu Bhusan Bose v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), But even before the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bose v. Ram~ Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra), Parliament appeared to take view of the Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts as the correct view and prcce<ded to enact the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control laws) Act, 1957, by Section 3 of which the Central Government was enabled, by notification in the Official Gazette, to extend to any Cantonment with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit. Any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation which was in force on the date of the notification in the State in which the Cantonment was situated. Though this Act came into force on December 18, 1957, no notification was issued extending the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to Kirkee and other Cantonment areas within the State of Bombay until 1969. Apparently such a notification was thought unnecessary in view of the fact that the Bombay Act was supposed to cperate within the said Cantonment areas because of the consistent view taken by the Bombay High .. Court, regarding the applicability of the Bombay Act to such areas. But the position was upset as a result of the decision of this Court in Indu Bhusan Bose

v. Rama Sundari Devi & Anr. (supra). Thereafter it became necessary \{ that a notification under section 3 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, should be iuued. It was acordingly done on December 29, 1969. But it was scon realised that the entire problem was not there by solved since all such notification as the one issued on December 29, 1969 could cnly be rrospective and could not save decree which had already ban pamd. Amending Act 22 of 1972 was; therefore, enacted for the express purpose of saving decrees which had already been pamd. Th statrnco, t; cf objects and reasons of the amending act stated :

" ........ But these notifications could be issued H only prospectively. and could not save the decrees already passed. A number of representations had been received

from and on behalf of tenants and tenants' associations, ventilating their grievances in this regard. It was accordingly proposed to amend s. 3 to empower the Governme'lt to extend to any Cantonment any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation in force in the State in wluch the Cantonment was situated either from the commencement of such enactment or from 26-1-1950, the date when the Constitution came into force, whichever was later, and to save decrees already passed under the enactment deemed to have been in force in the Cantonment before such extension."

By section 2 of the Amending Act of 1972 the Principal Act of 1957 was itself deemed to have come into force on January 26, 1950.

Original s. 3 was renumbered as sub.-s. 1 and the words "on the date of the notification" were omitted and "were deemed always to have been omitted". New sub.-sections 2, 3 and 4 were introduced o and they are as follows :

"(2) The extension of and enactment under subsection (I) may be made from such earlier ofifuture date as the Central Government may think fit :

Provided that no such extension shall be made from a date earlier than-

(a) the commencement of such enactment, or

(b) the establislunent of the cantonment, or

(c) the commencement of this Act, whichever is later.

(3) Where any enactment in force in any State relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation is extended to a cantonment from a date earlier than the I date on which such extension is made (hereafter referred to as the "earlier date"), such enactment, as in force on such . earlier date, shall apply to such cantonment, and where any such enactment, has been amended at any time after the earlier date but before the commencement of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws Amendment Act 1971, such enactment, as amended, shall apply to the cantonment on and from the date on which the enactment by which such amendment was made, came into force.

(4) Where, before the extension to a cantonment of any enactments, relating to the control of rent and regula-

I y

JAISINGH v. MAMANCHAND (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)

tion of house accommodation therein (hereafter referred to as the "Rent Control Act"):-

(i) any decree or order for the regulation of, -0r for eviction from, any house accommodation in that cantonment, or

(ii) any order in the proceedings for the execution -0f such decree or order, or

(iii) any order relating to the control of rent or other incident of such house accommodation,

was made by any court, tribunal or other authority in accordance with any law for the control of rent and regulation of house acccommodation for the time being in force in the State in which such cantonment is situated, such decree or order shall, on and from the date on which the Rent Control Act is extended to that cantonment, be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the Rent Control Act, as extended to that cantonment, as if the said Rent Control Act, as so extended, were in force in that Cantonment, on the date on which such decree or order was made".

2 il I

The effect of the provisions of the Amending Act appear to us to be very clear. Under s. 3 of the unamended Act, a notification could be issued extending a State Legislation to a Cantonment area with effect from the date of the notification. As a result of the introduction of sub.-s. 2 of s. 3 the notification can be given effect from an anterior date or a future date, but it cannot be made effective from a date earlier than the commencement of the State Legislation or the establishment of the Cantonment or the commencement of the Can- .'( tonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957. Sub.-•. 3 is merely consequential to sub.-s. 2 in that it provides that a State Legislation when extended to a Cantonment area from an anterior date, such legislation is to stand extended with all the amendments to -such State Legislation made after such anterior date but before the • -commencement of the 1972 Amending Act, the amendments being

l>- applicable as and when they come into force. Sub-.s. 4 makes pro- " vision for the saving of decrees or orders for the regulation of or for eviction from any house accommodation in a Cantonment made before the extension of the State Legislation to the Cantonment provided certain conditions are fulfilled. One condition is that the -decree or order must havebeen made by any Court, Tribunal or other :authority in accordance with a law for the control of rent and regula-

SUPREME COURT REPO&TS

tion of house accommodation for the time being in force in the State in which such Cantonment is situated. In other words the decree or order must have been made by the wrong application of the State legislation to the Cantonment area. If a decree or order has been made by such wrong application of the State Legislation to the Canton ment area, it shall be deemed, with effect from the date of the notification, to have been properly made under the relevant provisions of the State Legislation.

Shri V.M. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the appellant urged that sub.-s. 4 bad to be read in the context of sub.-ss. 2 and 3 and that it was to be applied only to cases where a notification issued under sub.-s. 1 was given retrospective effect under the provisions of sub.-s. 2. We see no justification for confining the applicability of sub.-s. 4 to cass where notifications are issued with retrospective effect under sub.-s. 2.

Sub.-s. 4 in terms is not as confined. It applies to all cases of decrees or orders made before the extension of a State Legislation to a Cantonment area irrespective of the question whether such extension is retrospective or not. The essential condition to be fulfilled is that the decree or order must have been made as if the State Legislation was already in force, although, striclty speaking, it was not so in force.

In our view sub.-s. 4 is wide enough to save all decrees and orders made by the wrong application of a State rent control and house accommodation legislation to a Cantonment area, though such State Legislation could not in law have been applied to Cantonment areas at the time of' the pass'ing. of the decrees or order. We, therefore, hold that the decree obtained by the respondents is saved by the provisions of s. 3, sub.-s. 4 of the Cantonment (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act of 1957, as amended by Act 22 of 1972.

The second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that tlie decision of the executing Court in Miscelleneous 'Application No. 597 of 1970 declaring the decree to be a uullity seperated as res judicata between the parties. The learned counsel relied upon the following observations of this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors., v. Dessibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy(l).

"The matter in issue, if it is one purely of act, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between

' '

JAISINGH v. MAMANCHANU ( Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 2 3 3

the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of Jaw, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression 'the matter in issue' in s. 11 Code of Civil Porcedure means the right litigated between the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the Jaw applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of Jaw and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the Jaw of the land.

In the very observations relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant the last sentence is clearly against the appellant. The matter J becomes clear if certain observations made earlier in the very judgment D are considered. They are :

"A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it E has no jurisdiction, the question would not, jin our judgment, operate as re• judicata.

Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same F or otherwise". ~

In that case the appellant who had a lease of an open land for construetion of buildings bad applied for determination of standard rent under the Born bay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The application was rejected on the ground that the Act did not apply to open land let for construction, The view was confirmed by the High Court. Later in another case, the view taken by the High Court was over-ruled by the Supreme Court and it was held that the Act applied to open land let out for construction. The appellant once again filed an application for determination of standard rent. The lower Courts and the High Court held that the previous decision operated as res judicata between the parties. The Supreme Court 1eversed the view of the lower courts and the High Court. It !6--I89SC!i80

S\JPRilM!l COURT REPORTS

[1980] 3 S.C .R.

was held that the earlier decillion that the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for determination of standard rent

Wll.S wrong in view of the judgment of the Supreme Conrt. If the decision in the previous proceeding was to be regarded as res judicata it would assume the statm of a llpecial rule of law applicable to the .parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the legislature. The &ituation in the present case is amtfogous. The executing Court had refused to exercise jurisdiction and to execute the decree on the ground that the decree was a nullity as the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, had no application to buildings in Cantonment areas. That defect having been removed and all; decrees obta

 ined on the basis that the Bombay rent law applied to the Kirkee .Cantonment area having been validatedjby Act 22 of 1972, it cannot bh said that the earlier decillion holding that the:decree was a nullity operated as res judicata.

A& pointed out by this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswa/ & Ors.

v. Dassibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (supra) if the darlier decision in the Miscellaneous Application is to be regarded as rJs judicata it would assume. the status of a special rule of jurisdiction applicable to the parties iu :ierogatiou of the.1law declared by the legislature. We, therefore, see no substance '., in the second. submissioi; i. Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978 is accordingly dismissed with cqsts.

In Civil Appeal No. 709 of 1978, the only question is about the validity of a decree obtained before the date of the notification issued under s. 3 of the Cantonments (Eftension of Rent Control

Law~) Act, 1957. In view of what we have said above, this question 'fu to be decided against the appellant. Thls appeal is also dismissed with costs.

In Civil Appeal No. 718 of 1978, spec!rl leave was granted under a misapprehension that the appeal raised tqe same questions as were raised in Civil Appeal No. 708 of 1978. It Is now stated that it is not so. This appeal is also dismissed with costs,

S.R. •

JAI SINGH JAIRAM TY AGI ETC

MAMANCHAND RATILAL AGARWAL AND ORS

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.

Control Act, 1947

Control Act, 1947

July 12, 1967

April 29, 1969

[1970] 1 S.C.R. 443

Parliament

Deceinber 29, 1969

Central Government

section 3

January II, 1973

.December 18, 1957

Bombay High Court

Supreme Court

Indu. Bhushan

section 3

December 29,

1969

December 29, 1969

section 2

January 26,

1950

Section 3

section 1

section 3

section 2

section 3

section 2

s. 4

section 4

section 4

section 3

section 4

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISD!Cl!ON :

V.M. Tarkunde

C.K. Ratnaparkhi

V.N. Ganpule

Veena ·Devi Khanna

Manik 1arkunde

J. Sorabjee

S.K. Mehta

P.N. Puri

E.M.S. Anam

P.H. Parekh

C.B. Singh

BL. Verma

V. Caprihan

Hemani C Sharma

Raian Karanjawala

CHl"iNAPPA REDDY

Kirkee Cantonment

Indu Bhusan Bosev!Rama Sundari Devi

Section 3

Kirkee

June 2, 1972

November 15, 1971

January 11, 1973

Schedule VII

High Courts of Bom- 0bay, Nagpur

Patna

Seventh Schedule

India Act, 1935

Seventh Schedule

Seventh Schedule

India Act, 1935

Seventh Schedule

High Courts of Calcutta and Rajasthan

Seventh Schedule

Calcutta and Rajasthan High Courts

Section 3

December 18, 1957

Bombay

Bombay High .. Court

section 3

s. 3

section 2

January 26, 1950

s. 3

s. 1

sections 2, 3 and 4

Rent Control Act

Rent Control Act

s. 3

s. 2

s. 3

s. 2

s. 4

V.M. Tarkunde

s. 4

ss. 2 and 3

s. 1

s. 2

s. 4

s. 2

s. 4

s. 4

s. 3

s. 4

s. 11

Supreme Conrt

s. 3


. E

' -G

KUSHALBHAI MAHOJIBHAI PATEL

A FIRM OF MOHMADHUSSAIN RAHIMBUX

March 11, 1980

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]

Prlvity of Contract-Supply made by appellant Plaintiff to respondent de}eti dant of 268 Bengali Maunds of Tobacco and accepted by the larrer-Pour cheques issued by the latter covering th£ value bumped-No document was executed to evidence the contract-Whether suit for recovery of n1oney is main tainable, for want of privity of contract ?-Onus of proof is on the defendant in such cases by producing best evidence like Books of Accounts.

In the money suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff to recover the value of tobacoo, sold to respondent-defendant after the four cheques covering the value of tobacco and issued by latter bumpe<l, the defendant took a plea of nonexistence of privity of contract and while admitting both the receipt of the tobacco from and issuance of cheques to plaintiff, explained the tobacco bad been supplied to defendant by the plaintiff at the instaru:e of another Firm R. K. Patel with whom the defendant had placed the order for the supply of the tobacco and, that the four cheques were issued in favour of plainlllf at the instance of Firm ''R. K. Patel", in respect of another tr<tnsaction for the supply by that Firm of 900 bags of tobacco, which transaction later failed .

The Trial Court decreed the suit after rejecting the evidence and plead ings of the defendant In appeal the High Court reversed the judgment and set a')idc decree of the trial Court.

Allowing the appeal by certificate, the Court

HEW : Supply of the goods by the plaintiff to the defendant and the issuance of. cheques by the latter ill favour of the former shifted the onus of proof on the point of privity of contract to the defendant. The fact that the

goods had been sent to the defendant by the plaintiff and had been receivro by the former was admitted on all hands and was sufficient to raise a presumption, till the contrary wa& proved, that an order had been placed for the supply of the goods with the plaintiff by the defendant firm. The plaintiff could thus bank on the said fact for the purpose of discharging t!ji> initial onus Which lay on him to prove> the privity of contract between the parties and it \Vas for the defendant to rebut the presumption which the fact raised. [27 G-H, 28 Al

(ii) Tue books of account maintained by the defendant being the best evidence available in proof of the stand of the defendant firm that no order had been placed by it with the plaintiff the failure of the defendant to place on record those books is a clincher.

Non production of these books by the defendant raises a presumption against it that if such evidence had been produced, the same would have gone against the case propounded by it, more

I _l;,.

, ./

K. M. PATEL v. FIRM OF MOHAMAD l!USS~IN (Koshal, J.) 23

1 ••o when the defendant fail• to bring witnesses to the transactions set up, by it A foto witness-box and examine them. l28 A-C, 29 A-El

CVllL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1376 of 1970.

From the Judgment and Decree dated 29th/30th October, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Appeal No. 795/61.

D. V. Patel, T. U. Mehta and M. V. Goswami for the Appellant.

Dr. W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KosHAL, J -This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under sub-clause (a) of clause (I) of Article 133 of the Consti- 1ution of India is directed against its judgment dated the 29th/30th

October, 1969, accepting a first appeal preferred by the defendant firm 10 it and dismissing the plaintiff's suit which had been decreed by the >trial court.

2. The said suit was filed on the 24th November, 1958, in the court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad, by one K. M. Patel for the recovery of Rs. 38,718/- from the defendant firm on account of the price of 225 bags of tobacco weighing 268 Bengali matmds at the irate of Rs. 112/- per such maund and interest thereon. The case set ·<>Ut in the plaint was that the tobacco in question had been purchased 1>y the defendant firm on the 28th of November, 1955, that the same was despatched to the defendant firm by train from Anklav railway station on the !st of December, 1955, on which date a bill for Rs. 30,523/- covering the price of the goods and incidental expenses was sent to the defendant firm, that the goods were received by the defen- ·<lant firm who failed to pay for the same, that ultimately the defendant firm gave to the plaintiff four cheques, each for Rs. 5,000/- drawn on a banking company of Santa but that all of them were dishonoured on presentation. In addition to the said amount of Rs 30,523/-, the plaintiff claimed Rs. 8,195/- on account of interest at the rate of 9 per c:ent per annum for the period preceding the suit. He further prayed , for award of future interest and costs.

3. The defendant firm denied the plaintiff's claim in toto. It .. averred in the written statement that no goods had been received by it from the plaintiff and that it had given no cheques to him. According •to the defendant firm the goods in question had been purchased by it from a firm carrying on business in the name and style of 'R. 1K. Patel' .at'Jabalpur, which had told the defendant firm that the goods would

.be sen to it by the plaintiff. In relation to the four cheques the defen- dant firm stated that on the 29th November, 1957, it had enteren into

a transaction for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco from firm R •. K ..

Patel, that these goods had also to be supplied from the plaintifl's warehouse and that it was at the instance of one Chhotabhai belonging to firm R. K. Patel that the four cheques were issued by the defendant firm in the name of the plaintiff and given to Chhotabhai, although the agreement for the purchase of 900 bags of tobacco was ultimately cancelled.

4. On the pleadings of the parties the main question which arose for determination was whether a privity of contract existed between them in relation to the sale and purchase of the goods in dispute in regard to which no document was admittedly executed. ---f-

5. At the trial the plaintiff examined only one witness besides himself. He deposed that the transaction was entered into at his business premises in Joshi Kurva by Khudabux, a munim of the dei fondant firm, with himself in the presence of Indravadan Muljibha~, P.W. 2 who supported that stand. The plaintiff also banked on documents showing that he had obtained permission of the Central Excise authorities for the transfer of 225 bags of tobacco from hjs_ godown to the defendant firm at Mahiyar where the defendant firm carried on its business, that the goods were actually received by tl\e defendant firm on the 17th of December, 1955, and that they were stored by the defendant firm in its warehouse. The plaintiff produce() his cash book which contained an entry (exhibit 54) indicating that .an amount of Rs. 30,523/- was debited on the !st December, 1955, to the account of the defendant firm on account of the price of 225 bags of" tobacco at the rate of Rs. Il2/- per Bengali maund and incidental expenses. The ledger entry (exhibit 55) conforms to the cash boo_k entry.

On the other hand, Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbux, one of the partners of the defendant firm appeared as its sole witness who denied that any contract had been entered into by it with the plaintiff for the supply of the disputed tobacco through Khudabux or Otherwise.

According to the witness Khudabux was not an employee of the defen~

dant firm at the relevant time although it was admitted that he had acted as a [munim for the defendant firm earlier to and also some time after November,' 1955. The witness produced some documents purporting to evidence a transaction of purchase of 225 bags of tobacco y the defendant firm from firm R. K. Patel. These documents consisted mainly of three letters and a bill.

Letter exhibit 124 bears the d&t~ 19th November, 1955, and is signed by Chhotabhai. It informs the defendant firm that 225 bags of tobacco had been purchased by the writer and' that the same would be booked to t"e defendant firm within, . .

, ,,

• I

a period of eight days. Another letter (exhibit 125) is dated the 17th A of December, 1955. This is also signed by Chhotabhai and states that the tobacco had already been despatched to the defendant firm.

Bil exhibit 126 is dated 4th of January, 1956 and states the price of225 bags of tobacco as Rs. 30,361-14-0. The only other letter worth mention is exhibit 119. It is dated the 13th September, 1958 and states that accounts had been settled between firm R. K. Patel and the defendant B firm so that firm R. K. Patel owed a sum of Rs. 340-2-0 to the defendant firm. The letter specifically mentions that the disputed transaction formed part of the settlement of accounts.

6. In the above state of the evidence the trial court accepted the plea of the plaintiff that an order for the supply of the disputed tobacco C was placed by the defendant firm with the plaintiff as alleged by the latter. The plaintiff was further held entitled to interest but at the reduced rate of 6 per cent per annum. The learned Civil Judge therefore granted to the plaintiffja decree for the recovery of Rs. 35,986 33

with proportionate costs of the suit and also directed that the plaintiff would receive interest at the said rate from the date of the suit till the D date of realisation of the decretal amount.

7. The High Court did not believe the word of the plaintiff that an order had been placed with him by Khudabux acting on behalf of the defendant firm. In doing so the High Court gave reasons which may be summarised as under : E

(i) The plaint did not mention that the defendant firm had placed the order in question through Khudabux acting as its agent.

(ii) Although the order was of considerable magnitude and the only transaction of its kind to be entered into between the parties )t was not authenticated by Khudabux in writing.

(iii) The plaintiff would not have remained silent for two years in regard to the money due to him.

(iv) The evidence does not disclose any other occasion on which Khudabux may have acted as the agent of the defendant firm.

(v) Bill exhibit 56 and entries in the plaintiff's account books (exhibits 54 and 55) do not mention the name of Khudabux.

(vi) No letter from the defendant firm to the plaintiff acknowledging the receipt of the goods at Mahiyar has been placed on the record.

(vii) No notice of dishonour of the chqeues was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant firm. 3-189SCl/80

(viii) The plaintiff would not have sent the goods without de. mantling advance payment or earnest money.

(ix) Khudabux has not been produced by the plaintiff in the wit ness box. Plaintiff's own munim Ashabhai who is said to have been present at the time of the alleged agreement also does not figure as a B witness.

(x) The testimony of Indravadan does not inspire confidence.

The High Court then took up for examination the evidence produced by the defendant firm and accepted letters exhibits 119, 124 and 125 as also bill exhibit 126 at their face value. In this connection the -·+ c

High Court remarked that it was difficult for it to imagine that the de-. fondant firm could have manufactured the letter-heads of firm R. K.

Patel. The testimony of Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbax was also accepted by it as trustworthy. It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the plaintiff that the failure of the defendant firm to produce its own account books and th 1se of firm R. K. Patel, as well as Chhotabhai, was fatal to its case. The argument was rejected with the observation that it was for the plaintiff to have the said account books produced and to examine Chhotabhai as a witness. It noted the admissions made by the defendant firm's own witness to the effect that Khudabux had been in its employment both before and after the transacti<:m in dispute but remarked that there was nothing to indicate that Khudabux was in the employment of the defendant firm on the crucial date, i.e., the 28th of November, 1955, or that he had authority from the defendant firm to place the disputed order. It refused to believe that the railway receipt and the bill for the price of the goods (exhibit 56) along with the covering letter (exhibit 57) were sent by the plaintiff to the defendant firm at Mahiyar. It examined the account books of the plaintiff and rejected them as unreliable mainly on the grounds that the cash book was maintained in fortnightly instalments and not on a daily basis and that the four cheques above mentioned were made the subject matter of entries therein long after their issuance. The story of the cheques having been given to the plaintiff by the defendant firm in part payment of his dues was also discredited. In this connection it was observed :

 " .... It is difficult for us to believe that if the plaintiff was suffering any damage at the instance of the defendant on account of the dishonour of these cheques, he'would have really remained content as if with trusting his destiny and trusting the defendant ..... if the plaintiff had obtained these cheques after making several attempts to recover

the amount due to him, as he states in his deposition, Ju

would have taken immediate action. against the defendant after the dishonour of the cheques .... ".

The' High Conrt further remarked :

" ...... The cheques must have reached the plaintiff not , directly from the defendant but through some other route and it is clear that he must have complain('d of their dishonour to the person from whom they arrived in his hands.

His silence after the cheques were dishonoured also indicates in the same direction. Absence of any correspondence with the plaintiff throughout a period of more than two years also indicates in the same direction ...• ".

Two main contentions were pointedly raised before the High Court: '(!) that the supply of the goods by the plaintiff to the defendant firm and the issuance of cheques by the latter in favour of the former shifted the onus of proof on the point of privity of contract to the defendant

8 .

firm, and, (2) that the failure of the defendant firm to produce"the bes D evidence which was available to it in the form of its own and firm R. K.

Patel's account Books should have been treated as a .clincher.

The first contention was turned down with the remark that the plaintiff could not be deemed to have <lischarged the initial onus which was on him to prove privily of contract because he had failed to put E Khudabux in the witness-box. The second was repelled for the reason that the defendant firm could not "be deemed to have withheld any , document when there was no notice given by the plaintiff to it for pro

, duction thereof.

8. It was in the above premises that the High Court passed the F impugned judgment.

9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length we are of , the opinion that the very approach of the High Court to the determination of the crucial question in the case, namely, that of privily of contract between the parties, is erroneous. The fact that the goods G had been sent to the defendant firm by the plaintiff and had been received by the former was admitted on all hands and was sufficient to pise a presumption, till the contrary was proved, that an order had been placed fc:>r the supply of the goods with the plaintif! by the defen- , dant firm; and it was immaterial whether the person actually placing the order was a partner of the defer, dant firm or a person authorised by B it. The plaintiff could thus bar, k on the said fact for the purpose of .discharging the initial onus which lay on him to prove privity of

: G

contract between the parties and it wafor the defendant firm to rebut the presumption which the fact_ raised as stated above. In rejecting the first of the two main contentions raised before thejHigh; Cour(on behalf of the plaintiff, therefore, the High Court fell into a serious error.[

The same is true of the second main contention which was raised by learned counsel for the; plaintiff and was turned down by the High Court. In the circumstances of the case it was the duty of the defendant firm to place its books of account on record, those books being the best evidence available in proof of the stand of the defendant firm that no order had been placed by it with the plaintiff. The:production of letters exhibits 119, 124 and 125 and bill exhibit 126[does not serve the purpose sought to be achieved. In the absence of such production they are loose documents which could have come into existence even after the suit was filed, if Chhotabhai chose to oblige the defendant firm and colluded with it. And there is intrinsic evidence ava1labk Tn letter exhibit 119 that such was the case. That letter purports tojiave

come into existeuce on the 14th of September, 1958, i.e., about threC: months and a half after the defendant firm had been informed of the plaintiff's claim through a notice dated the 27th of May, 1958, and that claim had been repudiated by the defendant firm. The contents of the:

letter are tell-tale and may be reproduced in extenso :

"To "Bhai Mohammad Hussain Rahim Bux of Mahiar written, from Jabalpur by R.K. Patel of Jabalpur whose salutations. to you be pleased to accept. Further it is learnt that [on the date 13-9-58 the account is made by the partner of our firm Shri Chhotabhai Patel upto the date 12-9-58 by taking into account the balance of Rs. 75/- seventy five at the end of 1954-55 and balance of Rs. 340-2-0 are found due by us. The same is agreed. The price of 225 bags of tobacco-- of Kbusbalbbai Mahijibbai Patel of Joshikuva (Anklav). is also included in the said account and so Rs. 340-2-0 are found balance payable by us including the said amount and if any dispute arises subsequently in the said account we shall be responsible in every way about the same.

"It is respectfully to be stated that this note is written_ while in sound state of mind so that it may remain as. authority and may become useful when required.

"C::bbotabbai Kbusbalbhai Pate)

"Partner R. K. Patel

"Jabalpur "Date 14-9-58.'"

.J.._

, _,.

\.-.

\ ,

Had the accounts been really settled as the letter claimed, there is no reason at all why a copy of the settlement, which must, in the very nature of things, have contained a statement of all the transactions ·covered by it was not furnished to the court. Such a statement must : have been provided by firm R. K. Patel to the defendant firm who was entitled to scrutinize the correctness of the settlement and point out any inaccuracies therein to firm R. K. Patel. Besides, we fail to under- . stand why the transaction disputed before us came in for special mention in letter exhibit 119 when no other transaction covered by the settlement found a place therein. The conclusion is irresistible that the 'Jetter had been procured merely to serve as evidence in rebuttal of the . plaintiff's case and not because any settlement really took place.

10. lf the case propounded by the defendant firm at the trial is correct, its account books must be containing entries to the effect that the agreement of purchase of 225 bags of tobacco was entered into with firm R. K. Patel and not with the plaintiff and that some time in Decem- 'ber, 1955, the account of firm R. K. Patel was credited with the amount of the price of the goods. Entries would further be available therein indicating unmistakably the periods for which Khudabux was admittedly employed with the defendant firm. The non-production of those books by the defendant firm and the production by it of stray letters

0and a bill constitute failure on its part to produce the best evidence and a presumption has therefore to be raised against it that if such evidence had been produced, the same would have gone against the case propounded by it. The matter does not end there. The failure of the defendant firm to bring Chhotabhai and Khudabux into the witnessbox and the fact that it made no attempt to have the account books of 1irm R. K. Patel (the entries in which account would perhaps have clinched the matter in dispute) must be similarly construed and a presumption drawn that this evidence also would have gone against the defendant firm.

I I. The view we have just above taken of the approach of the High Court is sufficient to dislodge its judgment and for a restoration of the decree passed by the trial court. We may add, however, that .apart therefrom the impugned judgment suffers from another serious defect and that is that the appreciation of the evidence of the parties is based more on conjectures than logic. We may give a few instan- ces. The absence of the name of Khudabux from the plaint is immaterial pecause pleadings are required merely to state facts and not the evidence through which they are to be proved. The relevant fact was that an agreement for the purchase of goods had been entered into by Jhe defendant firm with the plaintiff. The manner in which that

contract came into being was a matter of evidence which need not have formed part of the plaint. Again, the circumstances that the agreement of purchase was not reduced to writing, that Khudabux was not shown to have acted as the agent of the defendant firm on any other occasion and that the name of Khudabux does not appear in entries exhibits 54 and 55 do not disclose any abnormality when it is borne in mind that goods were actually supplied by the plaintiff to the defendant firm and were received by the latter. The other reasons given by the High Court in disbelieving the plaintiff's word that the order for the supply of goods had been placed with him by Khudabux are equally untenable. Jn this connection it is to be noted that no plausible reason can be found for the plaintiff recording in his books the name of the defendant firm as the purchaser ifthe goods had really been sold to firm R. K. Patel. We may point out that the name of the defendant firm as the purchaser is entered in the cash book maintained by the plaintiff and it is no reason at all for that book to be rejected as un-· reliable that it is maintained on a fortnightly ad not daily basis. The failure of the plaintiff to demand advance payment or earnest money and to keep quiet for a long period of time are also not relevant matters in view of the admitted fact of the supply of the goods by the plaintiff to the defendant firm and its failnre to produce on record its own books of account and those of firm R. K. Patel.

12. The four cheques issued by the defendant firm in favour of the plaintiff furnish another very important circumstance in derogation of the claim made by the former. The explanation furnished by its solitary witness that they were issued at the instance of Chhotabhai to whom they were delivered does not inspire confidence in us, the main reason therefor being again the non-prcduction of the account books of the two firms-a reason which makes us repel as untenable the inference drawn by the High Court (from the plaintiff's failure to act immediately after the dishonour of the cheques) that "the cheques must have reached the plaintiff not directly from the defendant but through some. other ronte".

13. There is no reason whatsoever for us to believe that ifthe caseof the defendant firm was true the plaintiff would have made out the story given by him in the plaint, absolved the real debtor of the responsibility to pay and claimed his dues from some one not at all Hable for them. Firm R. K. Patel being the party liable to the plaintiff, according to the case set np by the defendant firm, the plaintiff could not be expected to make false entries in this account books and. file._ a suit not against firm R. K. Patel but against the defendant firm~

-~.

I ._;___

14 For the reasons stated we have no hesitation in accepting this appeal, setting aside the impngned judgment and restoring the decree passed by the trial court with a direction thRt the plaintiff will be entitled to his costs throughout.

S.R.

Appeal allowed.

G

KUSHALBHAI MAHOJIBHAI PATEL

A FIRM OF MOHMADHUSSAIN RAHIMBUX

March 11, 1980

S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI

A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.

R. K. Patel

R. K. Patel

Koshal

D. V. Patel

T. U. Mehta

M. V. Goswami

W. S. Barlingay

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

KosHAL

High Court of Gujarat

Article 133

24th November, 1958

Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nadiad

K. M. Patel

28th of November, 1955

Anklav

st of December, 1955

29th November, 1957

Chhotabhai

Joshi Kurva

Khudabux

Indravadan Muljibha~

Mahiyar

The plaintiff also banked on documents showing that he had obtained permission of the Central Excise authorities for the transfer of 225 bags of tobacco from hjs godown to the defendant firm at Mahiyar where the defendant firm carried on its business, that the goods were actually received by tl\e defendant firm on the 17th of December, 1955, and that they were stored by the defendant firm in its warehouse.

17th of December, 1955

st December, 1955

Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbux

Khudabux

17th A of December, 1955

4th of January, 1956

13th September, 1958

Khudabux

Indravadan

R. K.

Abdul Halim Haji Rahimbax

Chhotabhai

E Khudabux

27th of May, 1958

Jabalpur

R.K. Patel

Chhotabhai Patel

Kbusbalbbai Mahijibbai Patel

Joshikuva

C::bbotabbai Kbusbalbhai Pate

Decem- 'ber, 1955


HJ.MAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD.

FRANCIS VICTOR COUTINHO (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS .

March 28, 1980

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KosHAL, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act 1894 (I of 1894) Section 18(1) & Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1962 (31 of 1962) S<etion 7 Scope of.

Land acquisition proceedings 'person interested' who is.

,,.fcquisitio11 for company before July 20, 1962-Po.rsession not vesting in government-acquisition not complete-Invalidity nor cured by Section 7 of amen ding Act.

The appellant a private company was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles.

In or about 1957 the company moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes of the compeny and the Government on January 7, 1958 issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition .Act, 1894, which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acquisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by another notification under section 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on January 25, 1960. The purpose of the acquisition was mentioned in the notification, as "public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd." The acquisition proceedings culminated in an award made under section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December II, 1961 a letter was written on behalf of the Government inlforming the owner of the acquired llllld that possession would be taken on or about tho 12th of January, 1962.

The first respondent in his writ petition to the High Court, contended that , tho Government was not competent to acquire the land for purposes of a 'nte company which could not be said to ho a public purpose under section 4 of the Act and prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings shoold bo quashed. A Single Judge of the High Court accepted the plea, allowed the writ petition and quashed tho land acquisition proceedings along with the notificatiOllS.

The appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal, as it was not 'a person interested' within the meaning of section 18(1) of the Act.

In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant :

(1) the Letten Patent Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was not 'a person interested' and therefore had no locus standi to file an appeal, and (2) in view of the various amendments in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 particularly in sections 40 and 41 it could not be said that the acquisition under section 4 was ultra vlru Olf the Act.

SUPREME COURT REPQRTS

[1980] 3 S.C.R

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : 1 (i) The appellant was undoubtedly 'a person interested' as con- "ttemplated by section 18(1) of the Act. 'Ihe gh Court committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on fthe ground that it had no locus • standi to file an appeal before the Bench.

[243F]

(ii) The 'definition of 'a pemon interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusiVe definition and must be liberally coll8trued so as o embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested, either in the title tO the land or in the quantum of compensation.

[240D]

In the instant case, the lands were actually acquired for the pnrpose of the Company and once the land vested in the <(iovernment, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the Company under' the agreement entered into between the Company and tho Government. Thus it cannot be said that the Company had no claim or tide to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the Company had to pay tho cof1pensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of. compensation was fixed so that the Company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this pnrpose, the Company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantnrn of compen.ation.

~240E-F]

(iii) The preponderance of judicial opinion seem, s to favour the view that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for wose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agrume11t to ay the compensation. This view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. [243 B]

(iv) The view taken by the Ori1Sa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, Local authority or a r_e:rson for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person is not 1correct.

Such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property rui also in the compensation to be paid

therof because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him seriously prejudice hi• rits. [243EJ

Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas [1968] 1 S.C.R. 362 referred to; The Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd.

Bahadurgarh. & Anr. v. The State of llaryana & Ors. A.I.R. [1972] Punjab & llaryana 59, M. Kuppu>wami v. The .

Special Tahsildar (L.A.) 11 Industrial &taff, Ambathur ai. Saidapet, Madria....J [1967] 1 M.L.J. 329 approved; Comil/a Eleetric Supply Ltd. v. East Bengal " Bank Ltd. Comilla & Ors. A.I.R. [1939} Calcutta 669; State of Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collecto1',. Sambalpur v. Amarandra Pratap Singh & Anr.

A.I.R. [1967] Orissa, 180 over-ruled.

I 2(i)The properties not having vested in the Government the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by section 7 of the amendment Act. [246 G]

(iii) Even under section 7 of the amending Act; an acquisition made by a company prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfill the following conditions : (a) that

HIMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, !.) 237

the land has been acquired and is vested in Government, (b) that the acquisi- A tion has been made under Clauses (a) and \b) of section 41, (c) ftrat wery such acquisition and any proceeding, order etc. shall be deemed always as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by tho amending Act, were in force at all material times; and ( d) that by virtno of section 7 validity to the acquisition is given to all actions taketi in connection tQerewith in spite of any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary. {244FH]

In the instant case the first condition that there must be a complete acquisition before section 7 could validate the same has not been fulfilled at all. [245A]

(iv) Until the possession of the entire land acquired was taken by the Government, the acquisition could not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of section 7 of the amending Act.

[246H-247A]

,/>, In the instant case the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in C the writ petition filed by th' respondents and the petition was contested only by

the State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as his interests were fully safeguarded by the Government, it was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court. The pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the Government and thus no title vested in the Government despite the notification acquiring the land. [246F-G] D

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1098 of 1971.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-7-1970 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 13 of 1965.

Y. S. Chitale, P. G. Gokhale and B. R. Agarwala for the Appellant.

V. S. Desai, Mrs. Urmila Sirur far the Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.

Ex-parte for the RR 4 and.5.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAZAL1Au,'J. :-This appeal'!by special leave is directed'against a judgment dated November 3, 1970 of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant against a decision of a Single Judge allowing a writ petition filed by the first respondent.

The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may

briefly summarised as follows : G The appellant was a private company which was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles and other accessories at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, East Bombay. The company was spread over about 10 acres ofland.

Sometime in 1957 or 1958 the company moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes:of the company. Accordingly, H on the 7th January 1958, the Government issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, )894 (hereinafter referred to

- B

as the 'Act') which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acqnisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by another notification under s. 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on the 25th January, 1960. In pursuance of these notifi-' cations the acquisition proceedings went on which culminated in an award mad~ under s. 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December 11, 1961, a letter was written on behalf of the Government informing the owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken on or about the 12th of January 1962. The purpose of the acquisition, as mentioned in the notification, was 'public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (Pvt.) Ltd'. The first respondent in the writ petition filed in the High Court before a Single Judge prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings should be quashed because the land was not acquired for any public purpose as contemplated by s. 4 of the Act. It was contended before the Single Judge that the Government was not competent to acquire the land for purposes of a private company which could not be said to be a public purpose under s. 4 of the Act. The plea taken by the first respondent found favour with the Single Judge who af!owed the writ petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings alongwith the notifications mentioned above.

Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal before the Bench inasmuch as it was not a person interested within the meaning of s. 18(1) of the Act.

In support of this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant, Dr. Chi tale, has argued two points before us. In the first place, it was submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was not a person interested and therefore had no locus to file an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench. Secondly, it was argued that in view of the various amendments in the Act, particularly in ss. 40 and 41, it could not be said that the acquisition under s. 4 was ultra vires of the Act. We might mention here that in the case of R.L. Arora v. State of U.P.(1) majority of the Judges of this Court took the view that a mere acquisition for the benefit of a company was not a public purpose and therefore the notification made in that case was strnck down. Sarkar, J., however, took a contrary view. In view of the decision Parliament amended certain provisions of the Act particularly ss. 40, 41, 44A, 44B and added a new sub-

(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R.149.

HIMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTO!l (Fazal Ali, J.) 239

section 5A after section 5. In other words, by virtue of the amendments, the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the first Arora case was removed.

By virtue of s. 7 of the amending Act, retrospective effect was given to the amendment superseding any judgment, decree or order passed before July 20, 1962. Section 7 of the l amending Act may be extracted thus : Validation of certain acquisitions

"7. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or 01 der of any court, every acquisition of land for a Company made or purporting to have been made under Part VII of the principal Act before the 20th day of July 1962, shall, in so far as such acquisition is not for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have lJeen made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-section, and accordingly every such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at all material times when rnch acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken .... " Thls amending Act was also challenged in the case of R.L. Arora

v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,(1) 'where this Court:upheld its constitutional validity subject to certain conditior.s. The appellar.t crntended before us that in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court the previous decision of this Court stood superseded and the land acquisition proceedings taken even before the amendments were validated.

In support of this argument, Dr. Chitale drew our attention to various provisions of the Act.

Defore, however, deciding the question as to whether or not the proceedings taken under s. 4 were cured by the amending Act, we would first deal with the contention of Dr. Chitale that the High Court w1s wrong iu holding that the company had no locus standi to file an appeal befo1 e the Letters Patent Bench. Learned counsel submitted that the definition of 'a person interested' ins. 18 is an inclusive one and is wide enough to include the appellant for whose benefit the land was acquired and who had to pay the entire compensation in accordance with the agreement entered into by the Government with the appellant. He argued that it could not be said that the appellant was not interested in defending the acquisition or in the

I!'

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.Jl

quantum of compenstion which was to be awarded by the Court on a reference made by the Collector. The High Court was of the view that as the land was acquired by the Government, the company had no interest in the same and was, therefore, not entitled either to appear or to defend the proceedings before the court. In order to decide this question it may be necessary to extract the relevant part of s. 18(1) which runs thus :-

" 18(1).

Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, ot the apportionment of the compenation among the persons i11terested."

It seems to us that the definition of 'a person inte1ested' given in s. 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land 01 in the quantum of compensat10n.

In the instant case, it is not disputed that the landi were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all.

Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money.

For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compep, ation.

So far as this aspect of matter is concerned, there appears to be a general consensus of judicial opinion that even though the company may not have any title to the property yet it certainly has a right to appear and put forward its case in the matter of determination of the quantum of compensation.

In the case of Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas(l) this Court observed as follows :

"It will be noticed that it is an inclusive definition.

Jt is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land, which has been Ii acquired.

A person becomes a person interested if lie claims an interest in compens1tion to be awarded.

It seems

(I) [1968] I S.C.R. 362.

IIlMALAYAN TILES v. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 241

to us that Paramsukhdas is a "persou interested" within s. 3(b) of the Act because he claims an inte1est in compensation.

It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a person interested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the references made to it and that he was also a person whose interest would be affected by the objections, within s.21. He was cccmc'.il'gly entitled to be made a party."

In the case of The Hindustan Sanitaryware and Industries Ltd.

Bahadurgarh & Anr. v. The State of Haryana & Ors{l); Pandit J. observed as follows :-

"From the facts stated above, it is apparent that the compensation amount has to be paid by the two companies.

If the said amount is increased by the learned Additional District Judge on a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it would be the two companies who would be prejudiced .... No authority even was cited by him that under similar circumstances any Court had ever held that the persons who had actually to pay the compensation, could not be allowed to lead evidence and say that the compensation amount be not enhanced."

In the case of Camilla Electric Supple Ltd. v. East Bengal Bank Ltd., Comila & Ors.(2) while the High Court took the view that the company for whose benefit the land was acquired may not strictly be an interested person yet it had undoubtedly a right to appear and adduce evidence on the quantum of compensation. In this connection, Mukherjea, J. observed thus :-

"Section 50, cl. (2) purports to remedy this disability and it lays down that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

The reason is plain. It is the company or the local authority who has got to pay the money in such cases and it would be unjust to deny them the right to appear and adduce

(I) A.I.R. 1972 Punjab & Haryana 59.

(2) A.I. R. 1939 Calcutta 669.

F .

SUPREME COURT REPO&TS (1980] 3 S.C.lt

evidence which would have a bearing on the amount of the compsenation money."

Roxburgh, J, made the following observations :-

"Thus the first question for decision is clearly settled by the above decision and there can be no doubt that in the circumstances at present being considered the company is a person interested, as defined in the Act, and is entitled to reqnire a reference under s. 18 unless that right is restricted by the terms of the proviso to s. 50(2)."

In the case of M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (L.A.) II Industrial Estate, Ambathur at Saidapet, Madras (1) Venkatadri, J. interpreting the definition of 'interested [person' observed as follows:-

"The only question for consideration therefore is whether the petitioner is a person interested, as defined in section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.

The definition section says that the expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act. The expression 'person interested' is very comprehensive and it does not profess to give an exhaustive definition. The expression 'person interested' has been interpreted, by various Courts, and the trend of the opinion seems to be that I should give a liberal interpretation ....

On a review of the case-Jaw on the subject, it seems to me that the expression 'person interested' does not require that a person must really have an interest in the land sought to be acquired. It is enough if he claims an interest in compensation, as distinguished from an interest in the property sought to be acquired. As long as a person.claims an interest in the compensation, he is a person interested within the meaning of the definition of that expression."

The only case which appears to have taken a contrary view is a Division Bench decision of the Orissa Hiih Court in the case of State of 'Orissa through the Land Acquisition Collector, Samba!pur

v. AmarandraPratap Singh & Anr., (2) where the High Court held that

(I) (1967) I M. L. J. 329 .

(2) A. I. R. 1967 Orissa 180.

• +

HIMALAYAN TILES V. FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, !.) 243

the expression 'person interested' did not include a local authority or a company on whose behalf acquisition is made by the State. At the same time, it was clearly held that it was open to the company in any proceeding before the Collector or court to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of 'person interested' must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agree. ment to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital ? For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly, if such a person is not beard by the Collector or a court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person or whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him, seriously prejudice his rights.

Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by s. 18(1) of the Act. The Higl1

Court, therefore, committed an errorl:in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the IJench.

The next point that was argued before us was as to whether the land acquisition proceedings are cured by s. 7 of the amending Act referred to above. Mr. V.S. Desai, appearing for the respondents, submitted that in the second Arora case (supra) while upholding the.' constitutional validity of s. 4 and other amendments, this Court laid down certain conditions which had to be fulfilled if an acquisition made prior to July 20, 1962 was held to be valid. In this connection, reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondents on.the following passage from R.L. Arora's case (supra) :

"Therefore~ before s.p can validakan acquisition made before July 20, 1962, it must first be shown that the acquisition is complete and the land acquired has vested in Government. This means that the land acquired has vested in Government either under s. 16 or s. 17(1) of the Act.

Thuss. 7 of the Amendment Act validates such acquisitions in which property has vested absolutely in Government either under s. 16 ors. 17(1). Secondly s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that where acquisition has been made for a company before July 20, 1962 or purported to have been made under cl.(a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) and those clauses do not apply in view of the interpretation put thereon in R.L. Arora's case [1962 (2) Supp. S.C.R. 149), it shall be deemed that the acquisition was for the purpose mentioned in cl. (aa) as inserted in s.40(1) of the Act by the Amendment Act. Thirdly s. 7 of the Amendment Act provides that every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement, or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act were inforce at all material times when any action was taken for such acquisition.

Finally, this validity is given to such acquisitions and to all actions taken in connection therewith notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court."

A perusal of these observations would manifestly reveal that even under s. 7 of the amending Act, an acquisition made for a company prior to July 20, 1962 must fulfil the following conditions :-

(a) that the land has been acquired and is vested in Government;

(b) that the acquisition has been made under clauses (a) and (b) of s. 40 (I)

(c) that every such acquisition and any proceeding, order, etc., shall be deemed always as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the amending Act, were in force at all material times; and

(d) that by virtue of s. 7 validity to the acquisition is given to all actions taken in connection therewith inspite of any judgment. decree or order of any court to the contrary.

., +

• -+

llIMALAYAN TILES '" FRANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, J.) 245

We are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first con- A dition adumbrated by this Court, viz., that there must be a complete acquisition before s. 7 could validate the same, has not been !fulfilled at all. In this view of the matter we need not go into the other conditions indicated by this Court.

It was contended by Mr. Desai that according to the unchallena ged pleadings of the respondents, including the Government, which was a party before the District Court and also before !lie Single Judge of the High Court, there is nothing to show that after the issue of notification the Government had taken possession of the land so that it could be said that the land had vested in the Government in which case alone the acquisition prcceedings would have been completed. In C this connection, our attention was drawn to para 1 of the petition filed by the respondents before the High Court, which runs thus :

"The petitioners have become the owners of the said lands by inheritance, and the present lands records in respect of the said lands stand in the name of the petitioners.

There is no dispute between the petitioners and the respondents that the petitioners are the owners of the said immovable property. The petitioners were at all times and still are in possession of the said immovable properties."

According to this averment, it is clearly pleaded that inspite of the notifications, the possession had not been given to the Government and the respondents (petitioners before the High Court) were still in possession of the properties in question. A similar averment has been made in para 15 of the petition which maybe extracted thus :-

"The petitioners say that they are still in possession of the said lands and possession of the said lands has not been taken away from them and the tenants of the petitioners numbering about 53 at present are in physical occupation of the same."

It was also alleged that the Government had : threatened the petitioners in the High Court that possession would be taken through police but despite such threats given by the Government, the petitioners were still in possession of the said lands and the structures were in possession of the tenants. The Government in its reply-affidavit did not deny these averments. On the other hand, they admitted the same. Para 8 of the reply-affidavit may be extracted thus :

"with reference to paragraph 1 of the petition, I believe H the contents thereof to be substantially correct though as stated above the petitioners' names do not appear as

occupants or owners in the record of rights relatfog to the land in question."

Similarly, in para 21 of the reply, the contents of para 15 of the petition were admitted and further the fact that possession was with the petitioners, was not denied but was admitted to be correct. Para 21 of the reply-affidavit runs thus :-

"21. With reference to paragraph 15 of the petition, I believe the contents thereof to be substantially correct."

Learned counsel for the appellant, however, drew our attention to a letter sent by the' respondents and went on to show that posses- C sion of only one acre of land has been taken by the Government.

Even the High Court clearly found that. possession had not been fully delivered to the Government after the notification. In this connection, the Division Bench observed as follows :-

"On the question of possession being delivered to the Government the petitioners specifically averred at the end of paragraph 15 of the petition. "The Petitioners further say that notwithstanding the said letter and the threat therein contained the petitioners are still in possession of the said lands and their tenants are occupying the said structures standing thereon and possession thereof has not been taken by the respondents". They made similar averments at the end of paragraph I of the petition, that "the petitioners were at all times and still are in possession of the said immovable properties"."

Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the respondents and the petition was contested only by the State.

Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as its interests were fully safeguarded by the Government, it was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court.

Even so, the pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the Government and thus no title vested in the Government despite the notification acquiring the land. In these circumstances, therefore, it is unmistakably clear that the properties not having vested in the Government, the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by s. 7 of the amendment Act as pointed out by this Court in the case referred to above. On this ground alone the appellant must fail.

Dr. Chitale, however, suggested that out of 2 2 acres, possession of one acre may have been taken by the Government.

Assuming that to be so, until the possession of the e11tire land acquired was taken

' y

HIMALAYAN TILES"· l'RANCIS VICTOR (Fazal Ali, l.) 247

by the Government, the acquisition conld not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of s. 7 of the amending Act. Io this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to prove that one of the essential conditions for application of s. 1 of the amending Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the acquisition proceedings suffer, has been fulfilled. The inescapable

conclusion, therefore, is that the land acquisition proceedings were

void and no benefit accrued to the appellant from the amending Act. _ The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to costs.

N.V.K.

Appeal dismissed.

HJ.MAIAYAN TILES & MARBLES (P) LTD

S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI

A. D. KosHAL, JJ.

Land Acquisition Act 1894

Section 18(1)

Section 7

January 7, 1958

section 4

section 6

January 25, 1960

Himalayan Tiles and Marble (Pvt) Ltd.

section 12

April 11, 1961

April 18, 1961

December II, 1961

12th of January, 1962

section 4

section 18(1)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

sections 40 and 41

section 4

section 18(1)

Section 18

Ori1Sa High Court

Calcutta High Court

[1968] 1 S.C.R. 362

State of Orissa

section 7

section 7

July 20, 1962

section 41

sections 40 and 41

section 7

section 7

section 7

Y. S. Chitale

P. G. Gokhale

B. R. Agarwala

V. S. Desai

Urmila Sirur

Majas Mogra

Bombay

7th January 1958

Accordingly, H on the 7th January 1958, the Government issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, )894 (hereinafter referred to
B

as the 'Act') which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acqnisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute.

section 4

s. 6

25th January, 1960

s. 12

December 11, 1961

12th of January 1962

s. 4

s. 4

s. 18(1)

Chi tale

ss. 40 and 41

s. 4

Sarkar

Parliament

ss. 40, 41, 44A, 44B

section 5A

section 5

Supreme Court

s. 7

Section 7

20th day of July 1962

section 40

sections 40 and 41

Chitale

s. 4

s. 18(1)

s. 18

Paramsukhdas

s. 3(b)

Pandit

section 18

Mukherjea

Section 50

SUPREME COURT REPO&TS (1980] 3 S.C.lt

Roxburgh

s. 18

s. 50(2)

Venkatadri

section 3(b)

Orissa Hiih Court

State of 'Orissa

Orissa High Court

s. 18(1)

IJench

s. 7

V.S. Desai

s. 4

R.L. Arora

s. 16

s. 17(1)

s. 16

s. 7

s. 40(1)

s. 7

ss. 40 and 41

s. 7

s. 40

ss. 40 and 41

s. 7

llIMALAYAN TILES

FRANCIS VICTOR

Fazal Ali

s. 7

Desai

s. 7

s. 7

s. 1