' ...

VISHNU AWATAR ETC.

SHIV AUTAR AND ORS.

May 2, 1980

[V. R. KRlsHNA IYER AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.)

Code of Civil Proce4ure, 1908, Section 115-Revisory furisdiction uf the Bi11h Court-Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (U.P.) Act, 1978 forbidding a

revision under Section 115 of the C.P.C. to the High Court from a Judgment or . order in appeal by the District Court where the suit out of whi'ch the case arisea

is not one of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above-Import and impact ol Section 3 of the U.P. Amendment Act, 1918-Article 136 of the Constitution-Supreme Court's power to interfere.

Dismissing the spedal leave petitions, the Court

. HEID : !. Ordinarily when a State Legislation is being interpreted the mean ing received by it in the High Court as the settled intent shontd rarely be disturbed by the supreme Conrt unless the error is so egregiou&, the impsct goes beyond the State or.like legislation elsewhere and decisions of the High Courts thereon D may lead to confusion and uncertainty. [979 AB]

2. Viewing the text of Section 3, lexically literally, schematically, and in the setting of social justice of which saving the average litigant from the intoxication of tantalising litigation is component, "No revision to the High Conrt" wonld be the only conclusion. Purposively speaking, it will b'e stultifying fO interpret, oection 3 to mean that orders in appeol by District Conrts must suffer a distmit journey to revisory justice from the High Court. [980 CD}

Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980) 3 S.C.R. 32 clarified.

3. The short test to refuse revisory jurisdiction to the High Court is to aecertain whether the decision sought to be challen&ed is in a case arising out of a suit of the valuation of Rs. 20,000/· and more. If the aaswer is 'Yes' theB the High. Court bas revisory1power, but if the suit from which the cue arises and in \\!llch the decision is made is one where the valuation is lesa than Rs. 20,000/· then the litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class of cases where the decioion is taken for the first time by the District Court it&elf in a case ariSing ont of an ori&inal proceeding. From thiS angle, none of the Specill Leave Petitions survive.

(980 DFJ

After all, our District Courts are easier of acce!S for titigimla, and the High Courts, especially in large States like Uttar Pradesh, are 'untouchable' and 'un approach•ble' for agrestic populations and even urban middle classes.

Nor la there ground to distrust the District Judges. A hierarchy of courts built upon a heritage of disbelief in inferiors has an imperial llavonr. If we suspect a Munsif and put a District Judge over him for everything he does, if We distrUlt a district Judge and vest the High Court with pervasive supervision, if we be skeptical about the High Courts and watch meticulously over all their orders, the

System will break down as its morale will crack up. A psychic communicable disease o! suspicion, skepticism 0nd servility cannot make for the health of the

SIJPRBMB COURT REPORTS

[1980] 3 S.C.R.

A judicial system. If the Supreme Court has a super-Supreme Court above it, it is <doubtful whether many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it diffeno from itself. [979 P,.GJ

Observation

Democracy, in a vast country of diversity, demographic immensity, logistic difficulty and larg'e-sca!e indigency, makea decentralisation an . imperative of Administration. Ae<:eas to Justice also implies early finality within reach of the rich and the poor. Theae considerations persuaded the U.P. State, one of Ill& direst in pover:ty, largest in population, and most agrestic in life-style, to attempt a tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in litigations of lesSer financial stakes. Judicial reform is upto now a tinkering exercise, not 8Jl

engineering project but even that little tinkering is fiercely challenged as litigative anathema by the profession which is unfortunate. [980 G-H, 981 A-BJ

CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9945, 10550, 8857 of 1979. ·

From the Judgments and Orders dated 23-7-1979, 25-9-1979 and 18-7-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision Nos. 3832/ 78, 2042/79 & 264/76.

Manoj Swarup for the Petitioner in SLP Nos. 9945 & 8857.

Pramod Swarup for the Petitioners in SLP No. 10550. ,

N. N. Sharma for the Respondent .No. 1 in SLP No. 9945.

B A. K. Srivastava for Respondents Nos. 1-2 in ~LP No. 10550.

ilfohan Behari Lal for Respondent No. 1 in SLP No. 8857.

The Order of the Court was delivered by

KrusHNA IYER, J. These petitions for special leave deserve to be dismissed because the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court which is challenged in all the three has been rightly decided in our view.

Even so, a speaking. order has become necessary because, as rightly pointed out by counsel, the earlier decision of this Court in Vishesh. Kumar v. Shanti Prasad(') does not specifically cover the precise point that has been raised before us by counsel f-Or thll petitioner. We are concerned with the ambit and impact of s. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978 (for short, the Act) , which forbids a revision under s. 115 ofl the Civil Procedure Code (acronymically, the C.P.C.) to the High Court from a judgment or order in appeal by the District Court where the suit out of which the case arises is not one of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above.

,_,. j

We have, in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad (supra) considered A the scheme, setting and purpose of the U.P. Amendment ro the Civil Procedure Code bearing on the revisory power of the High

. _, L .

Court under s. 115 C.P.C. We may quote:

' I --.

...

 A schematic analysis of the judicial hierarchy within a State indicates that the High Court, as the apex court in the hierarchy, has been entrusted, not only with the supreme appellate power exercised within the State but also, by virtue of s. 115, the power to remove, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate court in those cases where the error cannot be corrected by resOrt to its appellate jurisdiction. The two salient features of revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 are, on the one hand, the closely limited grounds on which the court is permitted to interfere and on the other, the wide expanse of discretion available to the court,. when it decides to interfere, in making an appropriate order. The intent is that so serious an error as one of jurisdiction, if committed by a subordinate court, should not remain uncorrected, and should be removed and record healed of the infirmity by an order shaped to reinstate the proceeding within the proper jurisdictional confines of the subordinate court.

xx xx xx

From its inception there was increasing resort to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 115. Over

the years the volume of litigation reached an insupportable point in the pending docket of the Court. To alleviate the;

burden, a pattern of decentralisation of revisional power was adopted and s. 115 was amended by successive State

amendments, each attempting to close the gap left by its predecessors.

Many times, amendments were made by the U .P.

Legislature to. effectuate its determined purpose of dichotomising and decentralising the revisional jurisdiction, a goal which is laµdable and which other States may well regard as a paradigm.

The crucial provision, s. 3 of the Act, reads thus :

115. The High Court, in cases arising Oil! of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug. 1, 1978 and the District Court in any

. :; ..

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 S.C.ll.

other case, including a case arising out of an original' suit or other proceedings instituted before such date, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court or District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto,. and if such subordinate court appears -

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it gy

law; or ·

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or

( c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illega!ly or with material irregularity;

the High Court or the I>istrict Court, as the case may be, may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.

Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits ()[' other proceedings of any valuation, decided, by the District Court, D the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this sec!ion.

Provided further that the High Court or the District Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any ()['der including an order deci.cling an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceeding, E except where,.- ·

(i) the order, if so varied or reversed, w(!Uld finally dis ~· pose of the suit or other proceeding; or

(ii) the order, if allowed to stand, woold occasion a failure, of justice or cause irreparable injury to the p party against whom it was made. (Explanation)-In this section, the expression 'any case which bas been decided' includes any other deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding.

The bulk of the cases we disposed of in the earlier round turned G on the teaability of a revision upon a revii; ion-a product of legal ingenuity oy which the attempt of the legislature to save the little litigant from the logistics of justice from the distant High Court by confining lesser revisions to the District Court was metamorphosed into a du!!! revision, one at the District Court level and the other at the High Court against the District Court's order in revision. Value- 8 free legalistics can be counter-productive acrobatics ! When that happened the Legislature stepped in again and again and we are concerned with the import and impact of s. 3 of the Act vis a vis

...

iippellat~ orders of District Courts where the suits from which they A mem are Jess than Rs. 20,000/c in value.

A brief analysi~ of that provision is contained in Vishesh Kumar (supra) :

"4. From 1st August, 1978 :

Fmally, s. 3, Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978, which was deemed to have come into force on 1st August, 1978, amended s.115 again and restored the bifurcation of revisional jurIBdictien between the High Court and the District Court.

Accordingly now :

(i) The High Court alone had jurisdiction under s.115 in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value 'of Rs. 20,000 and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before 1st August, 1978;

(ii) The District Court alone has jurisdiction under D s.115 in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suits or other proceedings. instituted before 1st August, 1978;

(iii) The High Court has jurisdiction under s.115 in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court;

(iv) A revision proceeding pending immediately before 1st August, 1978 of the nature in which a District Court could exercise revisional power under s.115 as amended by the Amendment Act, 1978 if pending;

(a) in the District Court, would be decided by that court as if the Amenlhtent Act of 1978 were in force at all material times;

(b) in the High Court, would be decided by the High Court as if the Amendement Act of 1978 had not come into force.

The provision now before us is slightly different although the purpose and the result are the same.

The scheme is clear. The High Court has rey iiower only in cases arising out of original suits or

other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand n:ipees and above R including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug.1,

1978. The entire residuary area belongs to the District Court. An-

A other test of revisional jurisdiction for the High Court is (o see whether the first proviso applies :

ll'

Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section .

The High Court, in the last Full Bench decision traced the story of the rare between the legislature and judicial interpretation and summed up the result rightly thus : (') .,'f'

''The High Court was confined to cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of Rupees 20,000/- or. above,· including such suits or other proceed. ings instituted before 1st August, 1978. The jurisdictioni of the District Court was in respect of any other case including a case arising out of an appeal suit or other proceeding instituted before such date. The legislature has continued to use the phrase "cases arising out of original suits". The interpretation placed upon this phrase by the Full Beoch in Har Prasad Singh"s case (AIR 1973 All.

390) will apply. The revisional jurisdiction would hence not extend 'to cases arising out of the disposal of appeals or revisions by the District Court. The proviso is also in the same terms as the proviso added in 1973 namely, it uses the phrase cases arifiing out of original suits or other proceedings".

As already seen, it will not cover cases arising out of disposal of appeals or revisions.

The words "or oer proceeding8" in the! phrase "cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings" refer to proceedings of final nature. These words have been added in order to bring within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction ordern passed iri proceedings .of an origill!ll nature, which are not of the nature of suits, like arbitration proceeding11.

This phrase cannot include decisions of appeals or revisions, because then the legislature will be deemed to have contradicted itself.

The words "or other proceed- . ings" have to be read ejusdem generis with the words "original suits".

They will not include appeals or revisions.

The phrase "in any other case" used with reference to the District G:ourt will refer to cases arising out of original

(1) Jupitor Chit Fund (Pvt) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh (FB) AIR 1979 All. 218 at-

225 .

\ \ ,-,

suits of the value of less than Rs. 20,000/- and also cases A arising out of other proceedings of an original nature of a valuation below Rs. 20,000/-".

Ordinarily whe'n a State legislation is being interpreted the meaning received by it in the High Court as the settled intent should rarely be disturbed by this Court unless the error is so egregious; the impact goes beyond the State or like legislation elsewhere and decisions of the High Courts thereon may lead to confusion and uncertainty.

Here llo such consideration arises and the reasoning of the High Court strikes us as sound. ·

The residuary power is with the District Court. The High Court has no revisional power under s. 115 unless the case arises out ol

an original suit or other proceeding i.e. other original proceeding decided by the District Court or where the case arises from a snit of and above Rs. 20,000/- in value.

If thl' District Court has decided, not in its original jurisdiction, then the case, be it a revisional or appellate order, is 'not amenable to the High Court's revisional jurisdiction.

Of course, if the case arises out of suits or other proceeding of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and above, the High Court has revisory power.

All other cases fall . outside and become final at the District Court level.

After all, our District Courts are easier of access for litigants, and

the High Courts; especially in large States like Uttar Pradesh, are 'untouchable' and 'unapproachable' for agrestic populations and even urban middle classes.

Nor is there ground to distrust the District Judges.

A hierarchy <?f courts built upon a heritage of disbelief in inferiors has an imperial flavour. If we suspect a Munsif and put Jr a District Judge QVer him-for every thing he does, if we distrust a District Judge and vest the High Court with pervasive supervision, if we be skeptical about the High Courts and watch meticulously over all their orders, the System will break down as it~ morale will crack up.

A phychic communicable disease of suspicion, skepticism and servility cannot make for the health of the judicial system. If the G Supreme Court has a super-Supreme Court above it, who knows how many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it ditrers from itself.

Schematically, we are satisfied, that decisions of District Courts rendered in appeal or revision are beyond revision by the High Court, D if the suit is of less than Rs. 20,000/-. But an exception has been engrafted by the first proviso to s.3 to the effect that where an origi-

~ I ' •

A nal decision has been made by a District Court the High Court's appellate or revisional power will come into play.

That is at as it should be, for one appeal or revision is almost universal.

But other- . wise, the District Court's decision is immune to revisional probe by the High Court.

. :B Lexically, there is no escape from s. 3 because the whole residue, except where the High Court has been expressly vested with revisory power, is beyond reach under s. 115 C; P.C.

Precedentially, the result is no different as the Full Bench of the High Court has been at pains to make out. Purposively speaking, it : c will be stultifying to interpret s. 3 to mean that orders in apjieal by District Courts must suffer a distant journey to revisory justice from the High Court. /fhus we reach thel convergent conclusion of "110 revision to the High Court", viewing the text of ~. 3, lexically, literally, schematically, and in the setting of spcial justice of which ooving the average litigent from the intoxication 00' tantalising litigation is a oom 1> ponent.

The short te&t to refuse revisory juriscliction to the High Court is to ascertain whether the decision sought to be challenged is in a case

arising out of a suit of the valuation of Rs. 20,000/- and more. If the answer is 'yes' then the High Court has revisory power, but if the .

. E suit from which the case arises and in which the decision is made is one where the valuation is less than! Rs. 20,000/• then the litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class of cases where the decision is taken for the first time by the District Court itself in a case arising out of an original proceeding. From this angle, none of the Special Leave Petitions sui'vive.

Special Leave Petition fl No. 9945 of 1979 is a case where the District Judge dis)JOISed of an appeal and the revision to the Hi&h Court was directed agaiRst the appellate order.

The subject-matter of the suit being below Rs. 20,000/- in valuation, the High Court was right in refusing to exercise any revisional power.

Special Leave Petition No. 10550 of 1979 falls ih the same category and must be dismissed.

The result in G Special Leave Petition No. 8857 of 1979 is equally fatal and for the same lethal reason.

Bef.ore we part with the case, we may make .a general observation in the hope that it may have value as legislative guidance. Democ- ·,,,..-r racy, in a vast country, of diversity, demographic immensity, logistic 0 difficulty and large-scale indigency, makes decentralisation ; i.nd imperative of Administration.

Access to Justice also implies early finality within reach of the rich and the poor. These considerations pel'-

suaded the U.P. State, one of the direst in poverty, largest in population, and most agrestic in life-style, to attempt a tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in litigations of lesser financial stakes. J udicia! reform is up to now a tinkering exercise, not an engineering project but even that little tinkering is fiercely challenged as litigative anathema by the profession which is unfortunate.

S.R.

Petitiona, dismissed.

"' .

VISHNU AWATAR ETC

SHIV AUTAR AND ORS

May 2, 1980

V. R. KRlsHNA IYER

0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.

Section 115

Section 3

the Code of Civil Procedure

Section 115

C.P.C

Section 3

Amendment Act, 1918

Article 136

Section 3

[1980) 3 S.C.R. 32

Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court

U.P. State

CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Allahabad High Court

Manoj Swarup

Pramod Swarup

N. N. Sharma

B A. K. Srivastava

ilfohan Behari Lal

KrusHNA IYER

s. 3

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 115

C.P.C

Amendment ro the Civil Procedure Code

s. 115

C.P.C

s. 115

s. 115

s. 115

s. 115

s. 3

Aug. 1, 1978

s. 3

Vishesh Kumar

1st August, 1978

s. 3

Code of Civil Procedure

Amendment Act, 1978

Aug.1,

1978

Har Prasad Singh"s

s. 115

s. 3

s. 115

s. 3


i. :

RAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN ETC. v.

STATE THROUGH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT

AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

May 2, 1980

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J

Nolle Prost'iqui-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Act II of 1974), Section 321, scope of-Conditions under which withdrawal from prosecution are permissible-Competency of the Magistrate's Court to permit withdrawal-Public Prosecutor in charge of the ca.re, meanin'g of-Political ofJences explained.

C Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which correspond& to section 494 of the 1898 cod'e provides for the withdtawal from prosecution by the Public Prosecutor or Assistoot Public Prosecutor incharge of a case with the consent of the Court at any time before the judgment is pronounced. In Criminal Appeal No. 287 /79, the case instituted against George Mathew Fernandes & others on 24-9-76 was allowOd to be withdrown on March 26, 1977 on an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 made D by N. S. Mathur Special Public Prosecutor.

The learn'ed Chief Metropolitan Magistrate expressed his opinion that "it was expedient to accord consent to withdraw from the prosecution".

A revision petition under section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 challenging the said order granting permission to . withdraw filed by ihe appellant an advocate in the High Court f:u1ed. The High

Court also held that the appellant had no locus standL

E Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 31iS/79 was filed by one Manohar Lal

directly under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani, permitting the public prosecutor to withdraw from tho prosecution in case No. 186-1 filed by the State aaainst Choudhury Bansilal Ex-Defence Minister, his son Surinder Singh, Ex. M.L.A., R. S. Verma, Ex.

Deputy Commissioner, Bhiwani and several othets officials and non officials for a hos'.t of' offences.

In Cr!. Appeal No. 287179, the Contentions were : (a) The Offence for which the accused persons were to be tried were exclusively triable by a Court of Session, and therefore, the Committing Magistrate had no jurisdic8 tion to give consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecu;.. tions; (b) The PUblic Prosecutor had abdicated his function and had filed the application at the behest of the Central Government without applying his mind; (c) The Magistrate was. in error in giving !'ODSent on the ground that. it was expedient to do so. Expedience was never for the judiciary; ( d) S. N.

Mathur who had filed the application for withdrawal from the prosecution was not the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case and the application \Vas therefore incompetent. ' ·

In the special leave (Cr!.) No. 3115179, it was contended : (i) the Public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Sri Bhajan, Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the• case; (ii) Sri Bhajan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution because his ministry would not survive without ihe help of

r'

\ ~

R K. JAIN V. STATE 983

Chaudhuri Bansi Lal :i:nu (tii) the withdrawal was not based on any public A policy.

Dismissing the appeal by special leave and the special lec\ve petition, the) Court .

HELD : I. The contention that under the new code .of Criminal Procedure, l 973, the Court of Committing Magistrate had no iJldicial function to perform in rel:ition to the case which he was required to commit to the Court of Session as W<l'S the position under section 494 of the 1898, and since the Court of

the Committing Magistrate under the new ccxle was not invested with: the power of acquitting or discharging the accused, it was not the Court which could grant its consent to withdraw from the prosecutioii is erroneous. In the fin; t place there is no warrant for thinking that only tha Court competent to discharge or acquit the accused under some other provision of the Code can exercise the power under s. 321 Criminal Procedure Code. The power conferred by S. 321 is itself a special power conferred on the Court before whom a prosecutiont is pending and the exercise of the power is not made dependent upon the power of the Court to acquit or discharge the accused under some other provision of; the Code. The power to discharge or acquit the accused under s. 321 is a special power founded on s. 321 itself, to be exercised by the Court indepen,1 dently of its power of Cnquiry inlo the offence or try the accused.

Again, tho expression 'judgment' in the context may be understood to mean the judgment which may be ultimately pronounced if the case were to be committed to a Court of Session. In the second place it may not be accurate to say that the Committing Magistrate has no judicial function! to perform under the 1973 Code of Crintinal Procedure.· S. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 obliges the Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Session whe11 it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. Therefore, the Magistrate has to be satisfied that an offence is prima facie disclosed and the offence so disclosed is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. If no offence is disclosed the Magistrate may refuse to take cognizance of the case or if the oftence. disclosed is one not triable exclusively by the Court of Session he may proceed to deal with it under the other provisions of the Code. To that extent the Court of the Committing Magistrate does discharge a judicial function. [991 E-H, 992 A-El

litate of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957] SC:R 279 followed.

.A.. Venkataramana v.

Mudem Sanjeeva Ragudu and 'Ors. (1976) Andhra Law Times Reports 317; over ruled. '

2. The notification dated June 17, 1966 of the Ministry of Home Affairs; Government of India, shows that the Senior Public Prosecutor,. Public Prosecu tor and Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Delhi Special Police Establishment attached to the Delhi office of the Special Police Establishment were appointm as Public Prosecutors under s: 492(1) of the Crimiqal Procedure Code 1898' to conduct the cases of the Special Police Establishment before the Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, and Sessions Judges, in the Union TerritorY Delhi. All notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been

made under the correspQnding provisions of the new Code. Sri S. N. Mathur is a Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Police E.stablishment at Delhi and has been functioning right throueh as Public Prosecntoc in the Union Territory of Delhi and it was be who was in charge of the case practically throughout

[992 GH, 993 A-BJ

,;;.,· ..

3. In this country the scheme of the administration of Criminal Justice places the prime responsibility of prosecuting serious offences on the executive authorities. 1hJ investigation, including collection of the requisite evidence, and the prosecution .for the offence with reference to such evidence were the functions of the executive, and in that particular segment the power of the Magistrate was limited and intended only to prevent abuse.

[993 H, 994 A-BJ From the precedents of this Court, the following propQSitions emerge ' B

(i) Under the scheme of the COde prosecotio1' of an offender for a oerieus offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive.

(ii) The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor.

(iii) The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the PubliCi Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that discretion to some-- one else.

(iv) The Government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that he maJI' withdraw from the prosecution but none can compel him to do so.

(v) The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant grounds as well in order to further broad ends of public justice, public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and, political purposes Sans Tammany Hall enterprises.

(vi) The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court . and responsible\ WI the Court. ·

' (vii) The Court porforms a supervisory function in granting its co111ent .to the withdrawal.

(viii) The Conrt's duty is not to reappreciaic the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninlluenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting Or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution. [996 B-0]

It shall be the duty of the Public Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of the Court to apprise itself of the reasons which prompt Iha Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. The Court has a reoponsibility and a stake in the administrallion of criminal justice and so hall the public Prosecutor, its 'Minister of Justice'. Both have a duty to protect the administration of Criminal Justice against possible abuse or misuse by the Ex&o cutive by resort to the provisions of s. 361 Criminal Procedure COde. The

independence of the judjiciary requires that once the case has travelled to t1io COurt, the COurt and its officers alone must have control over the calie and decide what is to be done in each case.

[996 H, 997 A-BJ

State of Blhar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, [1957J SCR 279; M. N. SaRkara• narayanan Nair v. P. v.· Balakrishnan and Ors; [1972] 2 SCR 599; State of Orissa

v. Chandrika Mahapatra and Ors., [1977] 1 SCR 335 at 340; Ba/":ant Single . and Ors. v. State of Bihar, [1978] 1 SOR 604 @ 605; Subhmh Chander v. Th•

State (Chandigarh Admn.) and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 423; referred to.

4. Paucity of evidence is not the only ground on which the Public Prooecu tor may withdraw from the .prooecution. In the past, it has been fomid e"-

,.,.. .

I r

.~

;'':___,- __

--r 1 '

R K. JAIN V. STATE 985 .

pedient and necessary in the public interest that the Public Prosecutor should withdraw from prosecutions arising out of mass agitations, communal riot.5, regional disputes, -industrial conflicts, student unrest etc. Wherever issues - involve ihe emotions and there is a surcharge of violence iill the atmoiphere it has often been found necessary to withdraw from prosecutions in order to . restore peace, to free the atmosphere from the surcharge of violence, to bring about a peaceful settlement of issues and to preserve the calm which may follow the storm. To persist '\\'"ith prosecutions where emotive issues are inVolved in the name of vindicating the law may even be utterly counter-productive. An elected Government, sensitive and responsive to the feelings and .emotions of the people, y.-ill be amply justified if for the purpose: of not disturbing a calm

v; hich has descended it decides not to prosecute the offenders involved or not to proceed further with prosecutions already launched. In such matters, it is only the Govemnient and nonei else can and should decide in the first instance . y, hether it should be baneful or beneficial to launch or continue proseCutions.

[997 BFJ

5. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure it is the Public Prosecutor that has to \Vithdraw from the prOsecution and it is the Court that has to give its consent to such '\vithdrawal.

Rightly too, because the independence of the judiciary so requires it. . The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court. He conducts the prosecUtion in the Court for the people. So it is he that is entrusted with the task of initiating the proceedingJor withdrawal from the prosecution..

But, where such large and sensitive issu'es of Public policy are involved, he must~ if be is right ntlnded, seek advice and guidance from the policy-maker. If the

Policy makers themselve'j move in the matter.' in the first instance, as indeed it is proper that they should "'here matters of momentus public policy are involved, and if they ad"ice the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prose-- cution, it iS not for the Court to say t!iat the initiative ; came frorµ the Govem1 ment and therefore the PubliC Prosecutor cannot be said to have exercised a free mind. Nor can there be any quibbling over words. If ill informed but well meaning bureaucrats choose to use expressions like .. the Public Prosecutor.

is directed" or "the Public Prosecutor is instructed~, the Court will not on that ground alone stultify the larger issue of Public Policy by refusing its consent on the ground that the Public Prosecutor did not act as a free agent when he! sougb.t withdrawal from the prosecution. \Vhat is at stake is not the language of the tetter or the prestige of the Public Prosecutor but a wider question of policy. The Court, in such a situation is to make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal and satisfy itself that the Public Prosecutor too was satisfied that he should '\Vithdraw from he prosecution for good and refevant rea-sons.

[997 G-H, 998 A-DJ

Ho\vever, the bureaucrat too should be careful not to use peremtory language when addressing the Public Prosecutor since it may give rise to an impression that be is coercing the Public Prosecutor to move in the matter. !le must remember -that in addressing the Public Prosecutor be is addressing an Officer of the Court and there should be no suspicion of unwholesome pressure on the Public Prosecutor. Any suspicion of such pressun; on the Public Prosecutor may lead the Court to withhold its consent. [998 D-E]

6. It is true that the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure do not recognise offences of a political nature, as a category of offences; they cannot, in the ordinary course of things. That does not mean the offences of a political character are unknown to jurisProdence or that judges must

4-610SCI/80

: >- :--

exhibit such naivette as to feign ignorance about them. In fact International

Law recognises offences of a political character and the Indian Extradition Act specifically refers to them. [998 F-H]

Briefly, politics are about Government and therefore, a political offencC is one committed with the object of changing the Government of a State or inducing it to change its policy. 'fhe expression ''po1itical offence" is thus commonly used and understood though perhaps "political offence" may escape easy identification. [998 H, 999 A, C]

To say that an offence is of a political char, acter is not to absolve, the Qll"enders of the offence.

But it will be a valid ground for the Government to advise the Public Prosecutor to withdravl from the prosecution. The Public Pro.-

secutor. may withdraw from the prosecution of a case not merely on the ground

of paucity of evidence but also in order to further the broad ends of public justice and such broad ends of public justice may well include appropriate social, economic and political purposes. [999 E-F]

If the Government of the day interpreted the result of the elections, es in the appeal, as a mandate of the people and on the besis of that interpretation, the Government advised the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, it cannot be said that the Public Prosecutor was activated by any improper motive in withdrawing from the prosecution nor can lt be &trid that the Magistrate failed to exercise the supervisory function vested in him in giving . his consent. (999 H, 1000 A-Bl

Observation :

Criminal justice is not a plaything and Criminal Court is not a playground for politicking. Political fervour should not convert the prosecution into persecution nor political favour reward . wrongdoer by withdrawal from prosecution. If political fortnnes are allowed to be reflected in the processes

of the Court very soon the credibility of the rule of law will be lost. Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before grsnting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should llppraise himself from the Government and thet'tafter appraise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases.

But under no circumstances should he allow himself to become anyone's stooge. [1005 E-G]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimina~ Appeal No. 287 of 1979.

Appeal by special leave from the Judgment ,11ond Order dated 12-10-1967 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No. 117 of 1977.

WITH JI SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 3115 of 1979.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21"9-1979 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Bhiwani in Case No. 1861 of 1978.

I r

.. \J

R. K. JAIN V. STATE 987

AND

CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION No. 3890: of 1979.

J.- An Application for direction under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 and Rule 3 ( b) of the Rules to regulate proceedings< • for contempt of Supreme Court, 197 5.

Lal Narain Sinha Att. Genl., M. K. Banerjee, Addi. Sol. Ge~!. Miss A. Subhashini and R. B. Datar for the Petitioner in Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 3 890 /79.

U. D. Gour Adv. Genl. Haryana and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in Cr!. Misc. Petition No. 3890/1979.

P. H. Parekh, Hemani Sharma, Rajan Karanjawala and C. B.

Singh for the Petitioner in SLP 3115/79.

M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare and T. Sridharan for Respo'ndent No. 1 in SLP 3115/79.

A. N. Kharkhanis for Respondent No. 4 in SLP 3115/79.

U. D. Gour Adv. Genl. Haryana and M. N. Shroff for Respondents, 26-27 in SLP 311.5/79.

Lal Narain Sinha, Att. Genl., Miss A. Subhashini and R. B. Datar for Respondent No. 30 m SLP 3115/79.

Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani and S. K. Bagga, E

...

for the Petitioner in Cr!. A. 287 /79.

Lal Narain Sinha Att. Genl. and M. K. Banerjee Addi. Sol. Genl. and Miss. A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1 in Cr!. A. 297 /79.

Ram lethmalani, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, A. K. Pande and Mrs, Hemanlika Wahl for RespO!!ldent No. 2 in Cr!. A 297 /79.

V. M. Tarkunde, T. U. M_ehta, P. H. Parekh and Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan for Respondent N:o. 5 in Cr!. A. No. 297 of 1979.

Ram lethmalani and Ranjan Dwivedl for Respondent Nos. 2, 11, 12, and 13 in Crl. 1A. 287 /79.

Ram lethmalani, A. G. Noorani, Miss Rani Jethmalani and Mrs.

Kamini laiswal for Respondent Nos. 3, 15 and 16 in Crl. A. 287 /79.

Ram lethmalani and A. G. Noorani and Miss Rani, Jethmalaiii for Respondent No. 21 in Cr!. A. 287 /79.

Sushi! Chandra Bhatnagar in persolli (Respondent No. 14. in Cr! .

A. 287 /79). '

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CmNNAPPA REDDY, J.-A cocktail of law and politics, reason and extravagance is the only way we can describe the S1Jbmissions made to us in these two cases. Well known personalities are involved, one case an Ex-Central Minister, the present Governor of a State _and some leading journalists, and in the othet an ex-Central Minister, and a' host of Government officials. Perhaps that was responsible for the passion and the tension which appeared to characterise and sometimes mar the arguments in the two cases.

We Will first take up for consideration Criminal Appeal No. 287 of 1979.

In exercise of the powers conferred bys. 196(1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and s. 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, the Govermnent of India by its order dated September 6; 1976 accorded sanction for the prosecution of George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes and 24 others for alleged offences under Ss. 121-A Indian Penal Code, 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Ss. 4, 5 and 6 of Explosive Snbstances Act, and S. 5 (3) (b) and

S. 12 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884. The first paragraph of the order according sanction set ont the subject of the conspiracy in the following words : '

"Whereas, it is alleged that after the issue of the proclamation of Emergency on 25th June, 1975 by the President of fndia in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution, George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes, Chairman of Socialist Party of India and Chairman of All India Railwaymen's Federation sought to arouse resistence against the said emergency by declaring that the said emergency had been "clamped" on the country by the "despotic rule" of Smt. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and to entertain an idea! that a conspiracy be hatched with the! help of the persons of his confidence, to over-awe the Government a'nd in pursuance of the conspiracy do such acts which might result in the destruction of public property and vital installations in the country".

Thereafter the order set out the various acts committed by the several accused persons in pursuance! of the objects of the conspiracy.

On September 24, 1976 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation, Central Investi-

• lo

;..__

" *

I T

....

R K.JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 989

 gation Unit (A), New Delhi, filed a charge-sheet in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, against the! said accused persons for the offences mentiOIJled in the order sanctioning . the prose- cution. Two of the accused persons had been tendered pardon.

They had, therefore, to be examined as witnesses in the urt of the Magistrate taking cognivmce of the offences iiotwijhftiihding the fact that the case was exclusively triable by the! Court of Session.

The evidence of the approvers was recorded on March 22, 1977 and the case was adjourned to March 26, 1977 for further proceedings.

At that stage, oil March 26, 1977, N. S. Mathur, Special Public Prosecutor filed an application under section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, for permission to withdraw from the prosecution.

The application was as follows :

"It is submitted on behalf of the State as under :-

1. That on 24-9-76 the Special Police Establishment after necessary investigation had filed a charge shee~ in this Hon'ble Court against Shri George Mathew Fernandes and 24 others for offences 11/s. 121 A IPC,

120B IPC r/w sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 .and Section 5(3) (b) and 12 of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884 as well as the substantive offences.

2. That besides the accused who were sent up for trial two accused namely Shri Bharat C. Patel and Rewati Kant Sinha were granted pardon by the Hon'ble Court and were examined as approver u/s. 306( 4) Cr. P.C.

3. That o'ut of 25 accused sent up for trial cited in the charge sheet, 2 accused namely Ladli Mohan Nigam and Atul Patel were declared proclaimed offenders by the Hon'ble Court.

4. That in public interest arid changed circumstances, the Central Government has desired to withdraw from the prosecutions of all the accused.

5. It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may accord consent to withdraw from 26th March 1977.

Sdb- (N.· S. Mathur) Special Public Prosecutor for the State, New Delhi".

990 SUPl,{EME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.

A On the same day the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, expressing the opinion that it was "expedient to accord consent to

. •:,-,.;::

withdraw from the prosecution", granted his coll8ent for withdrawal from the prosecution. •

One Dr. Rajender Kumar Jain, and Advocate, filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi, under s. 397 of the' Criminal Procedure Code for revision of the order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate giving his consent to the Special Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. Several grounds were raised all of which were negatived by the High Court. It was also held by the High Court that the applicant had '.no locus standi. The Revision Petition was dismissed. Dr. Rajender Kumar Jain has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.

Shri Ram Panjwani, learned counsel for the appellant made the ' following submissions : (1) The offences for which the accused persons were to be trie& ; were exclusively triable by a Court of Session and, therefore, the Committing Magistrate had no jurisdiction to give consent to the Public Prosecl!tor to withdraw from the prosecution,

(2) The Public Prosecutor had abdicated his function and had filed the application at the behest of the Central Government without applying his mind.

(3) The Magistrate was in error in giving consent on the ground that it was eApedient to do so. Expedience was never for the judiciary. ( 4) S. N. Mathur who had. filed the application for withdrawal from the prosecution was not the Public Prosecutor incharge of the case and the application was therefore, incompetent. The submissions of Shri Ram Panjwani were controverted by

Shri Ram Jethmalani and Shri V. M. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the respondents. They all; o submitted that the offences with which the accused persons were charged were of a political nature and if the Government of the day thought that the Public Prosecutor should withdraw from the prosecution on grounds of public policy and advised the Public Prosecutor to do so, it could not be said that the Public Prosecutor abdicated his function merely because the proposal to withdraw from the prosecution emanated from the Government and he acted upon such preposal. It was also submitted that so far as the fifth respondent was concerned no prosecution could be launched or continued against him under Art. 361 (2) as he was the Gover nor of a State. Shri Panjwani in his reply submitted !!rut political offences were unknown to the Municipal law of the land and that in the instant case the withdrawal from the prosecution was for a purely political purpose and not in the public interest at all. It . was said that the case was withdrawn in order .that Shri George Fernandes could , be appointed as a Minister in th~ Central Cabinet.

.:-:~\ -

R f JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, 1.) 991

I S. 321 of'the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 which corresponds A to s. 494 of *1e Codeof Criminal Procedure of 1898 is as fo'llows :

"Wi\hdrawal from prosecution.

321.1 The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in: charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from tlje prosecution of any person either generally or in respect 1of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal,-

(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the 'accused shall be discharged in respect of such off-

' - 1 ence or offences;

(b) : if it is made after a charge has been framed, or

1 when under this Code no charge is required, he 'shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or off-

' 1 ences".

We have pot extracted the proviso as it is not necessary for the purpoSt?s of these cases. i Under s. 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, it was held by this Coj\rt in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey,(') that the Court of the Committing Magistrate before whom a committal proceeding was pending was "the Court" within the meaning of s. 494 which was: competent to give its consent even in the case of offences exclusively1 triable by the Court of Session.

But, it was contended that after the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, the situation ad changed since bnder the new Code the Court of the Committing Magistrate had no judicial function to perform in relation to the case whic~ he was required to commit to the Court of Session.

Tile , Subnlission was that the Court contemplated by s. 494 was the Court capable of pronouncing a judgment, ending the proceeding by an order pf acquittal or discharge and, since the Court of the Committing Magistrate under the new Code was not invested with the power of' acquitting or discharging the ace.used it was not the Court which cbld grant its consent to withdraw from the prosecution. In the first place there is no warrant for thinking that only the Court competeijt to discharge or acquit the accused under some other provision o~ the Code can exercise the power under s. 321 Criminal Procedurte Code. The power conferred by s. 321 is itself a special power crnferred on the Court , before whom a prosecution is pending and the 1exercise of the power is not made dependent upon the power

(!) \1957] SCR 279 .

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.lt.

of the Court to acquit or discharge the accused under some other provision of the Code. 'The power to discharge or acquit the accused undec s. 321 isa special power founded on s. 321 itself, to be exercised by the Court independently of its power of enquiry into the offence or try the accused. "Again, "the expression 'judgment' in the context may be understood to mean the judgment which may be ultimately pronounced if the case were to be cmpmitted to a Court of Session. That was th~ view expressed in the State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey,

(supra) where the Court observed :

v1n any view, even if 'judgment' in this context is to Be understood in a limited sense it does not follow that an application during preliminary enquiry-which is necessarily prior to judgment in the trial-is excluded".

In the second place it may not be accurate to say that the Committing Magistrate has no judicial function to perform under tke 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure.

S. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 obliges the Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Session when it 11ppears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session.

Therefore, the Magistrate has to be satisfied that an offence is prirna-facie discloseo and the offence so disclosed'is triable exclusively by the Court of Session.

If no offence is disclosed the Magistrate may refuse to take cognizance of the case or if the offence disclosed is one not triable exclusively by the Court of Session he may proceed to deal with it under the other provisions of the Code.

To that extent the Court of the Committing Magistrate does discharge a judicial function. We therefore, over-rule the first submission of Shri Ram Panjwani. We do not agree with the view taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A. Venkatari:rmana v. Mudem Sanjeeva Ragudu & Ors,,(1) that the court of the Committing Magistrate is noti competent to give consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution.

The fourth submission of Shri Ram Panjwani does not appeal to us.

The notification dated. June 17, 1966 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, shows that the Senior Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public Prosecutor of the Delhi Special Police Establishment attached to the Delhi office of t1te Special Police Establishment were appointed as Public Prosecutors under s. 492 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 to conduct the cases of the Special Police Establishment before the Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, aud Sessions Judges, in the Union Territory of Delhi.

(!) [1976] Andhra Law Times Reports 317.

+ '

'•'t-r

R K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 993

All notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the new Code. It appears that Shri N. S. Mathur is a Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Police Establishment at Delhi and has been functioning right through as Public Pro5eutor in the Union Teritory of Delhi.. The High Court' has also pointed out on a scrutiny of the proceedings of the Magistrate that it as Shri N. S. Mathur who was incharge of the case practically throughout.

The second and third submissions of Shri Panjwani , may be considzred together. Decisions of this Court have made c:ear the functional dichotomy of the Public Prosecutor and the Court. In the State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey, (supra) the Court while considering s. 494 of the old Code explained :'

"The section is an enabling one and veSts in tho Public Prosecutor ihe discretion to apply to the .Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution of any person . . . . . . . . . The function of the Court, therefore, in granting its consent may well be taken to be a judicial function.

It follows that in granting the consent the Court must exercise a judicial discretion.

But it does not follow that the discretion is to be exercis"d only with q:ference to material gathered by the judicial method.

Otherwise the apparently wide language of s. 494 would become considerably narrowed down in its application. In understanding and applying the section two main features thereof have to be kept in mind. The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. • •...••• The judicial function .... implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself t]Jat the executive func- . tiori of the Public Prosecutor has not been. improperly xer

cised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.

In the context it is right to remember that the Public Prose- 'cutor (though an executive Officer ........ ) is, in a larger sense, also an officer of. the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with tlie fairly-considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his functions".

The Court also appreciated that in this Cou;, try t]Je scheme of the administration of Criminal Justice places the prime responsibility

A of prosecuting serious offences on the executive authorities. The investigation, including collection of tb, e. requisite evidence, and the prosecution for the offence with reference to such evidence were the functions of the executive, and i'n that particular segment the power ,,.l._ of the Magistrate was limited and intended only to prevent abuse.

B In M. N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P: v. Balakrishnan & Ors.( 1) the Court while reiterating decision that the Court granting permission for withdrawal should satisfy itself that the exec.utive . function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised and that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of .justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes, observed that the wide C and general powers conferred on the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the proS"ecution have to be exercised by him "in furtherance of, raL'ler than as a hindrance to the object of the law" and that the Court while considering the request to grant permissioru should not do so as "a necessary formality-the grant of it for the mere asking".

D In State of Orissti v. Chandrika Mahapatra & Ors. (2 ) the Court

said :

"We cannot forget that ultimately every offence has a social or economic cause behind it and if the State feels that the elimination or eradication of the social or economic

cause of the crime would be better served by DI)! proceeding with the prosecution, the State should clearly be at , liberty to withdraw from the prosecution".

In Balwant Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar('), the independent rok of the Pnblic Prosecutor in making an application for withdrawal from a prosecution was emphasised. It was pointed out that statutory responsibility for deciding upon withdrawal vested in the Public Prosecutor and the sole consideration which should guide the Public Prosecutor was the larger factor of the administration of justice and neither political favour nOlr party pressure or the like.

Nor should he allow himself to be dictated to by his administrative superiors to withdraw from the prosecution.

The Court also indicated some instance Where withdrawal from prosecution might be resorted to independently of the merits of the case :

"Of course, the interests of public justice being the paramount consideration they may transcend and overflow

(!) [19721 2 SCR 599.

(2) [19771 1 SCR 335 at 340.

(3) [1978] 1 SCR 604 at 605

i-' '

R. K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 995

the legal justice of the particular litigation.

For instance, communal feuds which may have been ainicably settled should not re-erupt on account of one or two prosecutions pending. Labour disputes which, might have given rise to criminal cases, when settled, might probably be another instance where the interests of public justice in the broader connotation may perhaps warrant withdrawal from the prosecution.

Other instance also may be given".

In Subhash Chander v. The State (Chandigarh Admn.) & Ors.(') the Court once again emphasised the independence of the Public Prosecutor in the matter of seeking to withdraw from the prosecution.

It was observed "Any authority who coerces cir orders or pressures a functionary like the Public Prosecutor, in the exclusive province of his discretionary powers, violates the rule of law, and any Public Prosecutor who bends before such command betrays the authority of his office".

Howe.ver, it was indicated : .

"Maybe,' Government or the District Magistrate will consider that a prosec!'tion or class of prosecutions deserves to be withdrawn on grounds of policy or reasons of public interest relevant to law and justice in their larger connotation and request the Public Prosecutor to consider whether the case or cases may not be withdrawn. Thereupon, the Prosecutor will give due weight to the material placed, the policy behind the recommendation and the responsible position of Government which, in the last analysis; has to maintain public order and promote public. justice.

But the decision to withdraw must be his. ·

_ . A reference was made to some considerations which may justify withdrawal from prosecution. It was said :

"The fact that broader considerations of public. peace, larger considerations of public justice and even deeper con- . siderations of promotion of long-lasting security in a locality, cf order in a disorderly situation or harmony in a faction milieu, or .halting a false and vexatious prosecution m a court, persuades the Executive, pro bona publico, . sacrifice a ponding case for a wider benefit, is not ruled out although the power must be •pariugly exercised and the statu- tory agency to be satisfied is the public prosecutor, not the District Magistrate. or Minister.

The concurrence of the

(I) AIR 1980 SC 423.

court is necessary. The subsequent discovery of a hoax behind the prosecution or false baiis for the criminal proceeding as is alleged in this case, may well be a relevant ground for withdrawal.

For the court should not be misused to continue 11 case conclusively proved to be a counterfeit. This statement of the law is not exhaustive but is enough for the present purpose and indeed, is well-grounded .on precedents".

Thus, from the precedents of this Court; we gather,

1. Under the scheme of the Code prosecution of an offender for C a serious offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive.

2. The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor.

3. The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that dis- D cretion to someone else.

4. The Government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that he may withdraw from the prosecution but none can compel him to do so.

5. The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not

E merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant grounds as well in order to futther the broad ends of public justice, public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and, we add, political purposes Sans Tammany_ Hall enterprise.

6. The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and responsible to the Court.

7. The Court performs a supervisorv function in granting its consent to the Withdrawal.

8. The Court's duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request Withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and . extraneous considerations. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding iis consent to withdrawal from the prosecution.

We may add it shall be the duty of the Public Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of th" Court to appraise itself of the

.~··

i •

R K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa. Reddy, !.) 997

reasons which prompt the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from' \he prosecution. The Court has a responsibility and a stake in the administration of crlmirud justice and so has the Public Prosecutor, its 'Minister of Justice'. Both have a duty to protect the administration of criminal justice against possible abuse or misuse by the Executive by resdrt to the provisions of s. 361 Criminal Procedure Code.

The independence of the judiciary requires that once the case has travelled to the Court, the Court and its officers alone must have control over the case and decide what is to be done in each case.

We have referred to the precedents of this Court where it has been said that paucity of evidence is not the only ground on which the

Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the .prosecution.

In the past we ha, ve often known how expedient and necessary it is in the public interest for the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecutions arising out of mass agitations, communal riots, regional disputes, industrial conflicts, student unrest etc.

Wherever issues involve the emotions and there is a surcharge of violence in the atmosphere it has often been found necessary to withdraw from prosecutions in order to restore peace, to free the atmosphere from the surcharge of violence, to bring about a peaceful settlement of issues and to preserve the calm which may follow the storm.

To persist with prosecutions where emo.- tive issues are involved in the name of vindicating the law may even be utterly counter-productive.

An elected Government, sensitive and responsive to the feelings and emotions of the people, will be amply justified if for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of goodwill or for the purpose of not disturbing a calm which has descended it decides not to prosecute the offenders involved or not to proceed further with prosecutions already launched. In such matters who but the Government, can and should decide in the first instance, whether it should be baneful or beneficial to launch or continul'j prosecutions ..

If the Government decides that it would be in the public interest to withdraw from prosecutions, how is the Government to go about this task?

I Under the Code of Criminal Procedure it is the Public Prosecutor that has to withdraw from the prosecution and it is the Court that has to give its consnt to such withdrawal. Rightly too, because the independence of the judiciary so requires it, as we have already mentioned.

Now, the Public Prosecutor is an Officer of the Court. He sets the criminal Jaw in motion in the Court. He conducts the prosecution in the Court for the people. So it is he that is entrusted with the task of initiating the proceeding for withdrawal from the prosecution.

But, where such large and sensitive issues of public policy are involved, he

A '

must, if he is right minded, seek advice and guidance from the policy- . makers. His sources of information and resources are of a very limited nature unlike those of the policy-makers. If the policymakers themselves move in the matter in the first instance, as indeed it is proper that they should where matters of momentus public policy are involved, and if they advise the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, ii is not for the Court to say that the initiative came from the Government and therefore the Public Prosecutor cannot be said to have exercised a free mind. Nor can there be any quibbling over words. If ill-informed but well-meaning bureaucrats choose to use expressions like "the Public Prosecutor is directed" or "the Public Prosecutor is instructed", the Court will not on that ground alone stnltify the larger issne of Public Policy by refusing its consent on the .ground that the Public Prosecutor did not act as a fre~ agent when he sought withdrawal from the prosecution.

What is at stake is not the language of the letter or the prestige of the Public Prosecutor but a wider question of policy. The Court, in such a situation is to make an effort to elicit the reasons for withdrawal and satisfy itself, that the Public Prosecutor too was satisfied that he should withdraw from the prosecution for good and relevant reasons.

We, however, issue a note of warning. The bureaucrat too should be careful not to use peremptory language when addressing the Public Prosecutor since it may give rise to an impression that he is coercing the Public Prosecutor to move in the matter. He must remember that in addressing the Public Prosecutor he is addressing an Officer of the Court and there should be no suspicion of unwholesome pressure on the Public Prosecutor. Any suspicion of such pressure on the Public Prosecutor may lead the Court to withhold its consent.

We may now consider Shri Ram Panjwani's argument that the Criminal law of India does not recognise 'political offences' and so there can not be withdrawal from a pros_ecution on the ground that the offen, ces involved are 'political offences'. It is true th.at the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure do not recognise ,.c; offences of a political nature, as a category of offences. They cannot, in the ordinary course of things. That does not mean that offeiic:eS of a political character are unknown . to jurisprudence or that judges must exhibit such a naivette as to feign ignorance about them.

Offences of a political character are well-known in International Law and the Law of Extradition. The Indian Extradition Act also refers ; II to offences of a political character.

For our present purpose it is really unnecessary to enter into a discussion as to what are political offences except in a sketchy way. It is sufficient to say that politics

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R K. JAIN v. STATE (Chin11appa Reddy, J.) 999

are about Government and therefore, a political offence is one committed with the object of changing the Government of a State or inducing it to change its policy.

Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Nation, was convicted and jailed for offences against the' Municipal laws; so was his spiritual son and the first Prime Minister of our ceountry; .so was the present Prime Minister and so were the first' Presi- .dent and the present President of India.

No one would hesitate to -say that the offences of which they were convicted were political. Even .as we are writing this judgment we read in the morning's newspapers that King Birendra of Nepal has declared a "general amnesty to all Nepalese accused of political changes''. The expression 'political .offence' is thus commonly used and understood though perhaps 'political offence' may escape easy identification.

Earlier in the judgment we set out the alleged object of the cons- -piracy as recited in the order sanctioning the prosecution. It was to overawe the Government by committing varions acts of destruction .of public property and vital installations and the motiv~ attributed was that the accused wanted to change the Government led by Shrimati Gandhi. One need not agree with the ends or the means-genuine revolutions have never yet , been made by acts of senseless terrorism or wanton destruction, putting innocent lives and public 'property in jeo- pardy-but, it is clear that the very order sanctioning the prosecution imputes to the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused '.the character of 'poiitical offences'.

To say that an offence is of a political character is not to absolve the offender of the offence.

But the question is, is it a valid ground for the Government to advise the Public Prosecutor to Withdraw from the prosecntion? We mentioned earlier that the Public Prosecutor may withdraw from te prosecution of a case not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but also in order to further the broad ends of public justice and that such broad enc!s f public justice may well include appropriate social, economic and political purposes. It is now a matter of history that the motivating force of the party which was formed to fight the elections in 1977 was the same as the motivating force of the criminal conspiracy .as alleged in the order sanctioning the prosecution; only the means were different.

The party which came to power as a ljji.ult of 1977 elections chose to interpret the result of the elections as Pbiandate of the people against the politics and the policy of the party led by Shrimati Gandhi. Subsequent events leading upto the 1980 elections which reversed the result o~ the 1977 elections may cast a doubt whether such interpretation was

rrect; only history can tell. But, if the Government of the day

interpreted the result of the 1977 elections as a mandate of the people and' on the basis of that interpretation tl}e Goverumeut advised the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution, one cannot say that the Public Prosecutor was activated by any improper motive in withdrawing from the prosecution nor can one say that the Magistrate fuileq to exercise the supervisory function vested in him.in giviug his consent.

We are unable to say that the High Court misdirected itself in affirming the order of the Magistrate.

We also notice that the learned Attorney General who dis-associated himself from the legal submissions made by the parties did not withdraw the counter

affidavit filed earlier on behalf of the State. No fresh counter affidavit disclosing a change of attitude on the part of the new Government which took office in January this year was filed.

Apparently the 'new Government did not do so as a gesture of grace _and goodwill and to prevent rancour and bitterness. That we appreciate, Criminal Appeal No. 287 of 1979 is therefore, dismissed.

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3115 of 1979 has been filed by one Manohar Lal, against the order of .the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani, permitting the Public Prosecut<; ir to withdraw from the prosecution in oase No. 186-1 filed by the State against Chandhury Bansi Lal, ex-Defence Minister, his son Surinder Singh, ex- M.L.A., R. S. Verma, Ex. Deputy Commissioner, Bhiwani and several other officials and non-officials for a host of offences.

The applicant has come straight to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution

witl; lout going to the High Court in the first instance.

On that ground alone t]le petition is liable to be dismissed as we do not ordinarily entertain such petitions.

We refrain from doing .so as the matter has been fully argued before us.

On July 13, 1977, Manohar Lal, laid information with the Station House Officer, Police Station, Bhiwani City, against the several accused persons. The charge-sheet was filed by the Bhiwani Police on July 21, 1978 on the basis of information laid with them by Manohar Lal.

The gravamen of the allegation against the accused persons was that Chaudhury Bansi Lal was annoyed with Manohar Lal and his sons as they failed to transfer two plots of land to his son and a relative. Chaudhury Bansi Lal, therefor~, induced the Dhiwani Town

Improvement Trnst to include in its smssive schemes land belonging to Mano'bar Lal and his sons, in Bhiwani Town, on which stood s9me buildings including two temples. .As Manohar Lal apprehended that his buildings might be demolished, he filed a Wdt Petition in the Supreme Court and obtained an order of stay of demolition. However, the stay

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R- K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1001

was vacated on December I, 1976 and on the same day, on the instructions, by telephone or wireless, of Chaudhury Bansi Lal, R. S. Verma, the Deputy Commissioner instructed his officers to demolish the build: ings standing on the land.

The Land Acquisition Collector made his Award of compensation and deposited the amount in a bank.

All this was done in the course of a few hours and the demolition of the building was started forthwith and completed by December 4, 1976.

Tbe chargesheet, as we said, was filed on _July 21, 1978.

Chaudhury Bansi, Lal filed a petition in this Court for transfer of the case to a Court outside the States of Punjab and Haryana. This Court issued notice on the petition for transfer and granted stay of further proceedings in the case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani.

The order of stay continued.

On September 20, 1979 on the basis of a letter addressed to him by the District Magistrate, the Public Prosecutor filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate for permission to withdraw from the' prosecution. On September 21, 1979 the Court granted its consent to the withdrawal of the Pl]blic Prosecutor from the prosecution.

It is this order that is questioned in the Special Leave Petition,

Shri Parekh, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the public Prosecutor filed the application at the behest of Shri Bhajan Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and that he never applied his mind to the facts of the case. According to Shri Parekh Shri Bha jan Lal ordered the withdrawal of the public Prose_cutor from the prosecution because his Ministry would not survive without the help of Chaudhury Bansi Lal.

A motionof no confidence was imminent against Shri Bhajan Lal and was to be considered on September 24, 1979; so he ordered withdrawal of the cases against Chaudhury Bansi Lal _on September 20,

1979, in order to secure the support of his group. It was said that the withdrawal from the prosecution was not based on anyground of public policy.

Shri Parekh. drew our attention to the wireless message which was sent by the Government to the District Magistrate. Bhiwani informing him that the Government had decided to withdraw the four cases mentioned in the message, pending in the Court of Bhiwani and that four cases should be withdrawn immediately from the concerned Courts and the Government informed accordingly. The District Magistrate Bhiwani forwarded a copy of the wireless meS.sage to the District Attorney, Bhiwani for necessary action directing him to withdraw the four cases from the concerned courts a• desired by the Government and to report compliance to this office.. The District Atterney thereafter filed an application for permission to withdraw from the pfosecution. On September 21, 1979, he made a statement before the Chief

5-610SCI180

Judicial :Magistrate that he had made the application on the orders of District Magistrate, Bhiwani and that the reasons were given in the application. In answer it was contended by the advocate General of Haryana who appeareg for the State of Haryana and M. C. Bhandare who appeared for Chaudhury Bansi Lal, that Surinder Singh, son of Chaudhury Bansi Lal had petitioned to t)le Chief Minister of Haryana alleging that he, his father and their associates were being harassed by numerous cases being filed against them without any justification.

He requested the Chief Minister to stop needless harassment.

The Minister constituted a Sub-Committee consisting of himself, the Finance Minister and the Irrigation and Power Minister to look into the question. The Sub-Committee examined the cases in detail and decided that four out of twenty five cases filed against Chaudhury Bansi Lal shoul)l be withdrawn as the evidence available was meagre and, in particular, in the case based on Manohar Lal's information the complainant had also been suitably and profitably compensated.

The decision of the Government was communicated to the District Magistrate who in turn asked the Public prosecutor to move the Court ror

consent to withdraw from the prosecution.

The Chief Minister and his colleagues on the Sub-Committee have filed before us affidavits regarding the constitution of the Sub-Committee and the decision to withdraw from the prosecution.

They have also denied the allegation that the case had been withdrawn with a view to gain the support of Chaudhury Bansi Lal against a no-confidence motion which the petitioner alleged was to be moved against the Chief Minister.

It was pointed out in the affidavits that no no-confidence motion was ever tabled against Chief Minister Bhaian Lal and that on the very figures given by the petitioner regarding the party position in the Haryana Assembly the support of Chaudhary Bansi Lal and his group would not matter. It was also brought out in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of some of the respondents that the petitioner had himself admitted in the agreement which he. had entered into with the Bhiwani Town Planning Trust on May 6, 1977, that his land and plots had been duly acquired under various development schemes, that he desired to withdraw all the petitions etc. filed by him in various courts and that he would not claim any damages against the Trust The Town Planning Trust agreed to release the lands to him with a view to enable him to reconstruct the buildings. It was expressly recited in the agreement that the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust agreed to the terms of the agreement as it was thought to be "in the best interest of the parties concerned as well as in the good of the residents of the Bhiwani Town to settle the matter amicably and mutually".

The Government of Haryana also. it was so recited in the agreement, had accorded its approval to the

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R K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1003

terms of the settlement. It has been mentioned in the counter-affidavits that the agreement between Manohar Lal and the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust in which Manohar Lal admitted the title of the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust to the land and buildings was never placed before the Jaganmohan Reddy Commission. In fact it is one of the complaints of Chaudhury Bansi Lal that those that were in charge of producing evidence before the Jaganmohan Reddy Commission took care to see that nothing in his favour was placed before the Commission.

Chaudhury Bansi Lal filed a counter-affidavit in which he has stated that the allegation that his son and relative wanted to purchase the land of Manohar Lal was an allegation which Manohar Lal never made in any of the objections filed by him against the schemes proposed by the Town Improvement Trust. It has also been pointed out that in the several writ Petitions filed by Manoh.ar Lal against the schemes no allegations of malafides were made against Bansi Lal. In one Writ Petition an attempt was made to introduce such an llegation by way of amendment but the High Court held that the allegation was a mere 'after-thought'. The District Attorney has filed a counter-affidavit in which he has stated that the evidence i'll the case was of a meagre nature and he was of the view that it might not be possible to obtain a conviction in the case. He had brought it to the notice of the District Magistrate earlier but as important personalities were involved it was not thought proper and prudent to make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution. The occurrence which was the subject matter of the ase was said to have taken place at 10 p.m.

A large number of accused had been named. There were reasons to believe that most of the names of the accused were included on mere suspicion.

In fact two advocates who had been implicated as accused led unimpeachable evidence that they were not in Bhiwani at all that night.

After he received advice from the District Magistrate he was convinced that an application should be filed for withdrawal from the prosecution and so he filed the same.

Sri Bhaskar Chatterji, the District Magistrate has also filed an affidavit in which he has stated that the District Attorney had informed him that some of the cases filed against Chaudhury Bansi Lal and his family members were weak in nature. He did not however, take any action at that time as important personalities were involved and as there were no directions from the Government Jn that regard.

Later he received a wireless message which he forwarded t<~ the District Attorney for action, Shri Kataria, Secretary to Government of Haryana, Department of Administration of Justice has also filed a counter-affidavit in which he has mentioned the detailed of the proceedings of the Cab\net Sub-Committee which took the decision to withdraw the case on September 20. 1979.

1004 St; PREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 3 s.c.R.

A On a perusal of the allegations and counter-allegations, the facts.

which emerge from the record as beyond dispute are :

(] ) The land of Manohar Lal and his sons on which there were certain buildings was included in the Bhiwani Town Improvement Scheme.

(2)

I (3)

(4)

(5)

The allegation that Bansilal's son and relative wanted to purchase the land originally was not made by Manohar Lal in the original objections and writ Petitions filed by Manohar Lal.

The Supreme Court first granted stay of the demolition of buildings but later vacated the stay on December 1, 1976.

As soon as stay was vacated, without any loss of time, the demolition work started and completed. 'oynami!te and bull-dozers were used and the buildings were demolished.

On May 6, 1977, Manohar Lal and his sons entered into an agreement with the Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust agreeing to withdraw all the cases filed by them against the improvement Trust and accepting the title of the trust to the land acquired under the Town Improvement schemes.

In return the Improvement Trust agreed to release the lands to Manohar Lal and his sons for the purpose of reconstructing the buildings and to receive , the compensation assessed for the demolished buildings. It was recited in the agreement that the Town Improvement Trust bad agreed to this course as -it was thought to be "in the, best interest of the parties concerned as well as -in the good of the residents of the Bhiwani Town".

(6) On Jµly 13, 1977 Mano'har Lal lodged a First Information Report with the Police.

(7) On July 21, 1978 the police filed a charge-sheet in the Court o~ the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani.

(8) The District Attorney had informed the District Magistrate that the evidence was of a weak na(ure as most of the accused appeared to have been implicated on merei suspicion and some of the accused were not even present in the town on the night of the occnrrence.

(9) Surinder Singh, son of Bansi Lal made a representation to the Govermnent that they were being harassed by innumerable cases being filed against them.

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R K. JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 1005 I

(10) On September 20, 1979, the Cabinet Sub-Committee A decided that four out of twenty five cases filed against Bansi Lal and others should be withdrawn.

A wireless message was sent by the Government to the District Magistrate asking him to withdraw the four cases and to report compliance.

The letter was forwarded to the District Attorney.

The District Attorney filed an application for withdrawal from the prosecution on the same day. (l J) Neither before nor after the Cabinet Sub-Committee took its decision was there a no-confidence motion tabled against Chief Minister Bhajanlal.

(12) On September 21, 1979, the Court granted its consent to the withdrawal of the public Prosecutor (the District Attorney) from the case.

It is on this material we have to determine whether the wi1hdrawal from the prosecution could be said to be malafide, that is,1 for irrelevant or extraneous reasons. We are not satisfied that there is sufficient basis to come to such a conclusion particularly in view of two outstanding circumstances namely that only four out of twenty-five cases have been withdrawn and the complainant himself had acknowledged the title of the Town Improvement Trust to the lands and the Trust had not only returned the lands to the complainant but also paid him compensation for the demolished buildings in the interest of all parties in Bhiwani town.

We, therefore, dismiss the Special Leave Petition.

Before bidding farewell to these cases it may be appropriate for us to say that Criminal justice is not a plaything and a Criminal Court is not a play-ground for politicking. Political fervour should not convert prosecution into persecution, nor political favour reward wrongdoer by withdrawal from prosecution. If political fortunes are allowed to be reflected in the processes of the Court very soon the credibility of the rule of law will be lost. So we insist that Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before granting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should appraise himself from the Government and thereafter appraise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases. But under no circumstances should he allow himself to become anyooe's stooge.

No arguments were advanced in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 3890 o[ 1979. It is, therefore, dismissed.'

S.R.

Appeal and Petitions dismissed.

RAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN ETC

STATE THROUGH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT

AND ORS. ETC. ETC

STATE THROUGH SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORS. ETC. ETC

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Section 321

Section 321

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

section 494

George Mathew Fernandes

George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes

March 26, 1977

section 321

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

N. S. Mathur

section 397

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Manohar Lal

Article 136

Choudhury Bansilal

Surinder Singh

R. S. Verma

Central Government

S. N.

Mathur

Bhajan, Lal

Haryana

Bhajan Lal

R K. JAIN

Chaudhuri Bansi Lal

section 494

s. 321

Criminal Procedure Code

S. 321

s. 321

s. 321

S. 209

Criminal Procedure Code 1973

June 17, 1966

Crimiqal Procedure Code 1898

All notifications issued under the old Code are deemed to have been

S. N. Mathur

Delhi

Iha Public Prosecutor

s. 361

[1972] 2 SCR 599

[1977] 1 SCR 335

AIR 1980 SC 423

Code of Criminal Procedure

Indian Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

Extradition Act

R. K. JAIN V. STATE 987

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R. K. JAIN V. STATE 987

AND

CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION No.

section 15

Contempt of Courts Act 1971

Lal Narain Sinha

M. K. Banerjee

A. Subhashini

Miss A. Subhashini and R. B. Datar for the Petitioner in Cr!.

R. B. Datar

U. D. Gour

M. N. Shroff

Haryana and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent in Cr!.

P. H. Parekh

P. H. Parekh, Hemani Sharma, Rajan Karanjawala and C. B.

Singh for the Petitioner in SLP 3115/79.

Hemani Sharma

Rajan Karanjawala

C. B.

Singh

M. C. Bhandare

M. C. Bhandare, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare and T. Sridharan for Respo'ndent No.

Sunanda Bhandare

T. Sridharan

A. N. Kharkhanis

Lal Narain Sinha

Ram Panjwani

Ram Panjwani, Raj Panjwani, Vijay Panjwani and S. K. Bagga, E

...

for the Petitioner in Cr!.

Raj Panjwani

Vijay Panjwani

S. K. Bagga

M. K. Banerjee Addi

Ram lethmalani

Ram lethmalani, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj, A. K. Pande and Mrs, Hemanlika Wahl for RespO!!ldent No.

Sushma Swaraj

A. K. Pande

Hemanlika Wahl

V. M. Tarkunde

V. M. Tarkunde, T. U. M_ehta, P. H. Parekh and Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan for Respondent N:o.

T. U. M_ehta

Mi.is Vii1eeta Caprihan

Ranjan Dwivedl

Ram lethmalani and Ranjan Dwivedl for Respondent Nos.

A. G. Noorani

Ram lethmalani, A. G. Noorani, Miss Rani Jethmalani and Mrs.

Kamini laiswal for Respondent Nos.

Rani Jethmalani

Kamini laiswal

Ram lethmalani

Ram lethmalani and A. G. Noorani and Miss Rani, Jethmalaiii for Respondent No.

Rani, Jethmalaiii

Sushi! Chandra Bhatnagar

CmNNAPPA REDDY

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

s. 7

Explosive Substances Act, 1908

September 6; 1976

George Fernandes

Ss. 121

Indian Penal Code

Indian Penal Code

Ss. 4, 5 and 6

Explosive Snbstances Act

S. 5

S. 12

Indian Explosives Act, 1884

Article 352

George Mathew Fernandes alias George Fernandes

Socialist Party of India

All India Railwaymen's Federation

Indira Gandhi

Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and to entertain an idea!

India

September 24, 1976

On September 24, 1976 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation, Central Investi-

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R K.JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 989

 gation Unit (A), New Delhi, filed a charge-sheet in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, against the!

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi

March 22, 1977

section 321

Criminal Procedure Code 1973

s. 121

IPC

IPC

sections 4, 5 and 6

Explosive Substances Act, 1908

Section 5(3)

Indian Explosives Act, 1884

Bharat C. Patel

Rewati Kant Sinha

s. 306( 4)

Ladli Mohan Nigam

Atul Patel

26th March 1977

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate

Rajender Kumar Jain

High Court of Delhi

s. 397

Criminal Procedure Code

Ram Panjwani

Ram Jethmalani

V. M. Tarkunde

Art. 361

Panjwani

Chinnappa Reddy

.:-:~\ -

R f JAIN v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, 1.)

S. 321

s. 494

s. 494

Criminal Procedure Code 1898

s. 494

s. 494

s. 321

Criminal Procedurte Code

s. 321

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 3 S.C.lt

s. 321

s. 321

Code of Criminal Procedure

S. 209

Criminal Procedure Code 1973

High Court of Andhra Pradesh

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

s. 492

Criminal Procedure Code 1898

Courts of Magistrates, Special Judges, aud Sessions Judges, in the Union Territory of Delhi

s. 494

s. 494

[1978] 1 SCR 604

AIR 1980 SC 423

s. 361

Criminal Procedure Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

Indian Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

Extradition Act

Mahatma Gandhi

Birendra of

Nepal

Shrimati Gandhi

Goverumeut

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhiwani

Chandhury Bansi Lal

Bhiwani

Art. 136

July 13, 1977

Bhiwani Police

July 21, 1978

Chaudhury Bansi Lal

Mano'bar Lal

Supreme Court

December 4, 1976

Chaudhury Bansi

Punjab

September 20, 1979

September 21, 1979

Parekh

Bha jan Lal

September 24, 1979

September 20,

1979

District Magistrate. Bhiwani

District Magistrate Bhiwani

M. C. Bhandare

Bhaian Lal

Chaudhary Bansi Lal

Bhiwani Town Planning Trust

May 6, 1977

Bhiwani Town Improvement Trust

Government of Haryana

Jaganmohan Reddy Commission

Town Improvement Trust

Manoh.ar Lal

Bansi Lal

Bhiwani

Bhaskar Chatterji

Kataria

September 20. 1979

Bansilal

December 1, 1976

Bhiwani Town

13, 1977

(6) On Jµly 13, 1977 Mano'har Lal lodged a First Information Report with the Police.

Mano'har Lal

Surinder Singh

Bhajanlal

Bhiwani town