I }-

M ____ 'If.!

FAZLUNBI .. v .

K. KHADER V ALI AND ANR.

May 8, 1980 [V. R. KRISHNA !YER, 0. CmNNAPPA REDDY AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]

CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 127 (3) (b), scheme and scope of-Whether by the payment of Mahar and Iddat dues, the provisions of s. 127(3)(b) of the Code would be complied with or th• vinculum juris created by the order under s. 125 continues despite the make--believe ritual of miniscule mahar which merely stultified section 127 (3) (b) Cr.P.C.-Precede11ts and binding nature under Article 141 of the Constitution.

F'azlunbi, tho appellant, married Khader Vali, the respondent, in 1966, and during their conjugal life, a son Khader Basha;· was born to them. Tho respondent, husband, an additional accounlt!nt in the Stare Bank of India, drawing a salary of Rs. 1000/-, discarded tho wife and the child, and the tormented woman talaqed out of the conjugal home, -sought shelter in her parent's abode. Driven by destitution, she prayed for maintenance allowance. for .herself and her son under section 125 Cr. P.C. and tho Magistrate granted payment of a monthly sum of Rs. 250/r to the wife and Rs. 150/- to the child. The respondent husband challenged the award in the High Court where thC unjustified neglect was upheld, but the quantum of maintenance of the child .was reduced to Rs. 100/- per menscm.

Thereafter, the respondent husband resorted to the unilateral technique of talaq and tendered the magnificent sum of Rs. 500 /- by way of Mahar and Rs. 750/- towards maintenance for the period of iddat, hopeful thereby, of extricating himself from lhe obligation to maintain the appellant The Addi-· tional First Qass Magistrate vacated the grant of maintenance already granted on the score of divorce coupled with discharge of mahar and Iddat dues. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in the Sessions Court. The desperate appellant reached the High Court end invoked its jurisdiction under section 482 Cr!. P.C. A Division Bench of that High Court, though the revision petitioner banked upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahlrris case [1979) '2 SCR 75 in her favour, distinguished that case and dismissed the petition.•

Hence the appellant-wife's appeal by special leave.

Allowing tho appeal, the Court

HELD. : 1. Tho conscience of social justice, the cornerstone of our Consti tution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code, a secular safeguard of British India vintage against the outrage 0£ jetsam women and 11otsam children, will be defiled if judicial interpretation sabotagca the true meaning and reduces a benign protection into a damp squib. [1131

E-F]

2. Precedents of the Supreme Court are not to be left on the shelves.

Neither could they be brushed aside saying that precedents is an .authority only "on its actual facts". Such devices are not permissible for the High Courts when decisions of the Supreme Court are cited before them. not merely because of the jurisprudence of precedents, but because of the imperatives of Article 141.

[1134 DEJ

No Judge in India, except a laraer Be:n.eh of the Supreme Court, without a departure from judicial discipline can whittle down, wish away or be un .. bound by the ratio in Bai Tahira's case, in which Section 127(3)(b) Of Cr!. P.C. was interpreted. The langual!C used is unmistakable, the logic at play is irresistible, the conClusion reached is inescapable the application of the law as expanded there is an easy task. And yet, the Division Bench, by the fine art of skirting the real reasoning laid d-own "unlaw" in the face of th.e law in Bail T ahira which is hardly a service and surely a mischief, unintended by the Court may be, but embarrassing to the subordinate Judiciary. There is no

warrant whatever for the High Court to reduce to a busk a decision of this Court by its doctrinal gloss. [1132 C-E]

(3) Cr!. P.C. (Sections 125-127) is a secular code deliberately designed to protect destitute women, who are victims of neglect during marriage and after divorce.

It is rooted in the State's responsibility for the welfare of the weaker sections of women and children and is not confined to members of one religion or region, but the whole community of womanhood. Secondly muslim law show its -reverence for the wife in the institution of Mehar (dower). It is neither dowry nor price for marriage. [1138 C-E]

4. The quintessence of mehar whether it is prompt or deferred is clearly not a contemplated quantification of a sum of money in lieu of maintenanbc upon divorce. Indeed, dower focusses on marital happiness and -is an incident of connubial joy. Divorce is farthest fron1 the thought of the bride and the bridegroom \Vhen mehar is promised. Moreover, dower MJlY be prompt and is payable during marriage and' cannot, therefore, be a recompense for divorce too distant and unpleasant for the bride and bridegroom to envision on the buptial bed. May be, some how the masculine obsessioll of jurisprudence linked up this promise or payment as a consolidated equivalent of maintenance after divorce. [1140 D-F]'

5. The language of Section 127 (3 )(b) suggests that payment of the sum and the divorce should be essential parts of the same transaction so as to make one the consideration for the other. The payment of money contemp• F lated by section 127(3) (b) should be so linked with the divorce as to become payable only in the event of the divorce. Mehar as understood in Mohammadan Le.w cannot, under any circumstances be considered as consideration for divorce or a payment made in lieu of loss of connubial relationship. Under s. 127(3) (b) of the Cr. P.C., an order for maintenance may be cancelled if the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the said order,_ the whole of the sum G which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was payable on such divorce. Therefore, even by harmonising payments under personal and customary laws with the obligations under ss. 125 to 127 of the Cr. P.C., the conclusion is clear that the liquidated :sum paid at the time of divorce must be a reasonable and not an illusory amount and will release the -.. quondam husband from the continuing liability, only if the sum paid is roolistically sufficient to maintain the ex-wife and salvage her from destitution H which is the anathema of the law. This perspective of social justice alone does

iustife to the complex of provisions from s. 125 to s. 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [1140 F-H, 1141 A-CJ

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PAZLUNDI v. K. K. VAL! (Krishna Iyer, !.) 1129

Kunhi Muyln v. Pathimma, 1976 KLT 87 at 96; Kama/akshi v. Sankaran, A AIR 1979 Kerala 116; Hajabean Su/aiman & Anr. v. Ibrahim Gandhabai and Anr., Guj, L.R. Vol. XVIII 1977 p. 133 at 137-139, referred to.

6. (i) Section 127(3)(b) has a setting, scheme and a purpose and no talaq of the purpose different from tb'e sense is permissible in statutory construction. [1141 C.D]

(ii) The payment of an amount, customary or other, contemplated by the measure must inset the intent of preventing destitution and providing a sum which is more or less the present worth of tho monthly maintenance allowances the divorce may need until death or remarriage overtake her. The policy of the law abhors neglected wives and destitute divcrcees and <. 127 (3 )(b) takes care to avoid double payment one under custom at the time of divorce and another under s. 125. [1141 D-EJ

• I (Iii) Whatever the facts of a particular case, the Code, by enacting "· 12~ to 127, charges the court with the humane obligation of enforcing maintenance or its just equivalent to ill-used wives and castaway ex-wives, only if the woman

bas received voluntarily a sum, at the time of divorce, sufficient to keep her going according to the circumstances of the parties. [1141 E-F] '

(iv) Neither personal law nor other salvationary plea will hold against the policy of public law pervading s. 127(3) (b) as much as it does s. 125. So . a farthing is no substitute for a fortune nor naive consent equimlent to intelli-

&ent acceptance. [1141 F-0]

(v) Here the mahar paid is Rs. 500/- and the income therefrom may will be Rs. S/- a month, too ludicrous to mention as maintenance. The amount earlier awarded is the minimum.

[1141 G-HJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1980.

Appeal by certificate against the Judgment and Order dated he 21 Nov., 1979 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Misc.

Petition No. 1351 of 1979.

A. Suba Rao for the Appellant.

F G. Narasimhulu for Respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J.- The last judicial lap of the joorney to gender justice made by Fazulnbi, a married woman just past 30 years and talaged into destitution, constitutes the compassionate core of this case.

G The saga of Fazlunbi, who had earlier secured an order for maintenance in her favour under s. 125 Cr. P. C. which was cancelled under s. 127(3)(b) Cr. P. C., by three courts, tier upoo. tier in the vertical system, by concurrent misinterpretation of the relevant provision, constitutes the kernel of her legal grievance. If her plea has substance, social justice has been jettisoned by judicial process and a H just and lawful claim due to a woman in distress has been denied heartlessly and lawlessly.

We say 'heartlessly', because no sensitive 13-610SCl/80

A juage with empathy for the weaker sex could have callously cancelled an order for a monthly allowance already made in her favour, as has been done here. We say 'lawlessly', because no disciplined judge bound by the decision of this Court which lays down the law for the nation under Art. 141 of the Constitution could have

defied the crystal clear ruling of this Court in Bai .Tahh"a v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia(') by the disingenuous process distinguishing the decision. We are surprised by this process of getting round the rule in Bai Tahira's case (supra) by the artful art of concocting a distinction without a difference.

The Sessions Court and the High Court, who had before them the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, chopped legal logic to circumvent it. Reading their 'reasoning' we are left to exclaim how the high Bench argued itself out of Bai Tahira's case by discovering the strange difference.

"Twixt Tweeldedum and Tweedledee", the discipline of law, the due process of law and the rule of law become mere claptrap if judges bmmd to obey precedent choose to disobey on untenable alibi.

D And, behind it all is the unheeded wail of Fazulnbi's womanhood for the karuna and samata of the law and we are conscientized into reversing the judgment under appeal in terms express, explicit and mandatory so that masculine injustice may not crucify the weaker sex.

Small wonder that many a divorcee, beguiled by Arts. 14 and 15 and

E the decision in Bai Tahira's case, may well exclaim, "How long, 0 Lord, how long!"

The brief facts which have led to this appeal are that Fazlunbi, the appellant married Khader Vali, the respondent, in 1966. and during their conjugal life, a son, Kader Basha, was born to them. The husband, an Additional Accountant in the State Bank F of India, apparently drawing a salary well above Rs. 1000/-, dis carded the wife and the child,_ and the tormented woman, ta/aged out of the conjugal home, sought shelter in her parents' abode. Driven by destitution, she prayed for maintenance allowance for herself and her son under s. 125 Cr. P. C. and the Magistrate granted payment of a monthly sum of Rs. 250/- to the wife and Rs. 150/- to the child. The G husband challenged the award in the High Court where the unjustified J. neglect was upheld but the quantum o1' maintenance of the child was reduced to Rs. 100/- per mensem.

The respondent-husband resorted to the . unilateral technique of ~-f. talaq, and tendered the magnificent sum of Rs. 500/- by way of

11 mahar and Rs. 750/- towards maintenance for the period of iddat, hopeful thereby, of extricating himself from the obligation to maintain

(!) 11979] 2 SCR 75.

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FAZLUNBI v. K. K. VALi (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1131

the appellant. The Additio:nal First Class Magistrate vacated the grant A of maintenance on the score of divorce coupled with discharge of mahar and iddat dues. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in the Sessions Court.

The desperate appellant reached the High Court and invoked its jurisdiction under s. 482 Cr. P.C. A Division Bench of that Court, however, dismissed the revision petition and Fazlunbi has landed up in this Court and banks upon the application of the rule in B Bai Tahirai's case (supra).

The facts are clear, the ta/aq has snapped the marital tie, the flimsy mahar has been tendered together with the three months' iddat dues and the divorcee remains neglected. The question is whether s. 127 ( 3) (b) of the Code has been complied with or the vinculum juris C created by the order under s. 125 continues despite the make-believe ritual of miniscule mahar which merely stultifies s. 127(3)(b) Cr. P. C. and hardly fulfils it. The matter is no longer res integra. No one in his senses can contend that the mahar of Rs. 500/- will yield income sutlicient to maintain a woman even if she were to live on city pavements! What is the intendment o( s. 127(3)(b)? What is the D scheme of relief for driftwood and destitute wives and divorcees discarded by heartless husbands? What is the purpose of providing absoc lution from the obligation to pay continued maintenance by Iumpsurn liquidation? What, in short is the text and texture of the provision, if read in the light of the mischief to be avoided, the justice to be E advm1ced? The conscience of social justice, the cornerstone of our Constitution will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code, a secular safeguard of British Indian vintage against the outrage of jetsam women and flotsam children, will be defiled if judicial interpretation sabotages the true meaning and reduces a benign protection into a damp squib.

The holistic art of statutory F construction has not the pettifogging craft of lexical and literal reading of the text woefully keeping alive the moribund mores of a bygone age but, in the felicitous diction of Cardozo, 'the task of a translator, the reading of signs and symbols given from without (by those) who have absorbed the spirit, have filled themselves with a love of the language they must read'. Lord Denning's great tribute to the task of G a judge is never barred by .the law of limitation(').

Many of the. Judges of England have said that they do not make law. They only interpret it. This is an illusion _which they have. fostered. But it is a notion which is now being discarded everywhere. Every new decision-on every new situation-is a development on the law.

Law does nat

(I) Foreward by Denning M. R. to Supreme CoUrt of India by Rajeev Dhavan.

stand still. It moves continually. Once this is recognised, then the task of the Judge is put on a higher plane. He must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the, needs of the time. He must not be a mere mechanic, a mere working mason, laying brick on brick, without thought to the overall design. He must be an architect-thinking of the structure as a whole-building for society a system of law which is strong, durable and just. It is on his work that civilised society itself depends. \Ve lay so much emphasis on the functional sensitization of a judge lest what is absurd may be fobbed as obvious by judicial semanticisation.

We need not labour the point because' this Court has already interpreted s. 127(3)(b) in Bai Tahira and no judge in India; except a larger bench of the Supreme Court without a departure from judicial discipline can whittle down, wish away or be unbound by the ratio thereof. The language used is unmistakable, the logic at play is irresistible, the conclusion reached is inescapable, the application of the law as expounded there is an easy task.

And yet, the Division Bench, if we may with respect say so, has, by the fine art of skirting

th~ real reasoning laid dpwn 'unlaw' in the' face of the law in Bai Tahira which is hardly a service and surely a mischief, unintended by the Court may be, but embarrassing to the subordinate judiciary.

There is no warrant whatever for the High Court to reduce to a husk a decision of this Court by its doctrinal gloss. The learned judges observe, to our baftlement--

"The decision in Bai Tahira v.

Ali Hussain Fassalli

(supra) is to be confined only to the fact~ of that case. It falls to be distinguished for the following reasons : (iJ the , compromise of 1962 referred to therein was construed as not affecting the rights of a Muslim divorced wife in seeking to recover maintenance under Sec. 125 Cr. P.C., (ii) what was considered to have been paid to the Muslim divorced wife was only the Mahar amount and not the maintenance amount payable for the Iddat period, (iii) The Mahar amount paid revealed a rate _of interest which for a person residing in Bombay was held to be wholly inadequate to do duty for maintenance allowance, (iv) there was nothing in that caBe to show that the amount of Rs. 130/- paid towards Iddat represented the payment of a sufficient maintenance amount for the three months period of Iddat and (v) the husband in that case did not raise any plea based on sec. 127(3)(b) Cr. P.C."

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PAZLUNBI v. K. K. VALi (Krishna Iyer, !.) 1133

Let us quote a few passages from this Court's ruling in Bai Tahira (supra) to express the untenability of the excuse not to follow the binding ratio.

Nor can Sectioh 12 7 rescue the respondent from his obligation, payment of mehar money, as a customary discharge, is within the cognizance of that provision. But what was the amount of mehar?

Rs .. 5000/-, interest from which could not keep the woman's body and soul to• &ether for a day, even in that city where 40% of the population are reported to live on pavements, unless she was ready to sell her body and give up her soul! The point must be clearly understood that the scheme of the complex of provisions in Chapter IX has a social purpose. !TI-used wives and despen1te divorcees shall not be driven to material and moral dereliction to seek sanctuary in the streets . • This traumatic horror animates the amplitude of Section,

127. Where the husbahd, by customary payment at the time of divorce, has adequately provided for the divorce, a subsequent series of recurrent doles is contra-indicated and the husband liberated. This is the teleological interpretation, the sociological decoding of the text of Sec.

127. The key-note though is adequacy of payment which will take reasonable care of her mainenance.

The payment of illusory amounts by way of customary or personal law requirement will be COljSidered in the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate the rate unless it is a reasonable substitute. The legal sanctity of the payment is certified by the fulfilment of the social obligation, not by a ritual exercise rooted in custom.

No construdfon which leads to frustration of the statutory project can secure validation if the court is to pay true homage to . the Constitution. The only just construqtion of the section is that Parliament intended divorcees should not derive a double benefit. If the payment by ahy mehar or ordained by custom has a reasonable relation to the object and is a capitalised substitute for the order under Section 125-not mathematical! y but fair! y-then Section 127(3)(b) subserves the goal and relieves the obliger, not pro tanto but wholly. The purpose of the payment 'under any customary . or personal law' must be to obviate destitution of the divorcee and to provide her with wherewithal to maintain herself.

The whole scheme

of Section 127(3) (b) is mainfestly to recognise the substitute maintenance arrangement by lump sum so paid and is potential as provision for maintenance to interpret otherwise is to stultify the project.

Law is dynamic and its mea'ning cannot be pedantic but purposeful.

The proposition, therefore, is that no husband can claim under Section 127(3)(b) abs<Jlution from his obligation under Section 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance.

Granville Williams in his "Learning the Law" (pp. 77-78) gives one of the reasons persuading judges to distinguish precedents is "that the earlier decision is altogether unpalatable to the court in the later case, so that the1 latter court wishes, to interpret it a~ narrowly as possible''.

The same learned author notes that some .iudges may "in extreme and unusual circumstances, be apt to seize on almost any factual difference between this previous case and the case before him in order to arrive at a different decbion.

Some precedents are continually left on the shelf in this way, as a wag observed, they become very "distinguished''. The limit of the process is reached when a judge says that the precedent is an authority ottly "on its actual facts".

We need hardly say that these devices are not permissible for the High Courts when decisions of the Supreme Court are cited before them not merely because of the jurisprudence of precedents, but because of the imperatives of Art. 141. .

We have been painstakingly drawn into many rulings of the High Courts but none except this one has had t.he advantage of the pro- F nouncement in Bai Tahira.

A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court-a ruling which perhaps advances the purpose more than the Full Bench decision which overruled it-dwelt on s. 127(3) (b) of the Code.

Khalid, J. speaking for the court observed, and rightly if we may say so with respect,(')

This section provides that the Magistrate shall cancel the order for maintena'nce if any sum under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties is paid on divgrce.

This section may be pressed into service by some ingenious h1jsbands to defeat the provisions contained in section

125. We would like to make ft clear that section 127(3) . (b) refers riot to maintenance during the period of iddat or payment of dower. Unfortunately, place of dower is

{fjKunhfMoyin v-Pathumma 1976 KLT 87 at96.

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FAZLUNBI v. K. K. VAL! (Krishna Iyer, l.)

now occupied by dowry, payable by the girl's parents, which till 1-6-1961 was paid in public and thereafter in private; thanks to the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. It is therefore not a sum of money which under the personal law is payable on divorce as eirpressed i'n Section 127(3) (b A On the other hand, what is impliedly covered by this clause is such sums of money as alimony or compensation made payable on dissolution of the marriage und.er customary or personal law codified 6r uncodified, or such amount agreed upon at the time of marriage to be paid at the time of divorce; the wife agreeing not to claim mainte'nance or any other amount.

We thought it necessary to clarify this position lest there be any doubt regarding the scope of s. 127(3)(b), for, at the first blush, it might appear that, it takes away by one hand what is given under s.125 by the other hand. This is not so.

While, in our view, the Full Bench decision in Kamalakshi v.

Sar.karan( 1) in so far as it does not insist on an adequate sum which will yield a recurring income to maintain the divorcee in future, is bad law and the Division Be:nch, in so far as 'it excuses the huoband if he pays a sum which the ignorant, wife at the time of marriage has agreed upon to relinquish maintenance after divorce, does not go far enough. ·

A. division Bench of the Gujarat High Court(') has sought, even by literal construction, to reach the conclusion that unless the divorcee volu'ntarily accepts a sum in lieu of future maintenance she is still entitled to her claim and s. 127(3)(b) will not dissolve the liability of the husband.

The Judges argue :

We are concerned with the interpretation of sub-sec.

(3) of sec. 127, more particularly clause (b) thereof.

Evi, dently, this provision which seeks to confer power on the court to cancel an order of monthly allowance passed by it in certain specified contingencies, has to be confined strictly within the narrow limits laid down by snb-sec. ( 3).

This is because the provision for maintenance of wives, whether married or divorced, who are unable to maintain themselves is a social welfare measure applicable to all people irrespective. of caste, creed, community or nationality.

(!) AIR 1979 Ker. 116.

(2) Hajeben Su/eman & Anr. v. Ibrahim Ganadbhai & Aur. Guj. L. R. Vol.

xvm 1977 p. 133 at 137-139.

With the aforesaid background, we will now proceed to examine the provisions of sub-sec.

(3) of sec. 127.

A bare reading of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that provision shows that three fact situations have been contemplated by the Legislature in which the Magistrate is given the power to cancel the order for monthly allowance. These fuel situations are shown by the words ( 1) has remarried in clause (a), (2) has received in claiise (b) and (c) and

(3) had vo:untarily surrendered in clause (c). Clauses

(a) and ( c) of the said provision do not postulate any difficulty because they contemplate the fact situations brought about by a voluntary and irrevocable act on the part of the divorced wife.

Thus, clause (a) contemplates the act of the wife in getting remarried and clause ( c) contemplates the act of the wife in obtaining divorce from her husband and surrendering her rights to maintenance after divorce. Both these eventualities, as observed earlier, are brought abo1.1t by a voluntary and irrevocable act on the part of the wife. If this is the obvious position to be kept in mind with regard to the scope and content of clauses (a) and (c) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 127, we see no reason why we should adopt a different standard in ascertaining the scope and content of clause (b) ;

xx xx xx .... it is clear that one of the eventualities conferring jurisdiction on the Magistrate to cancel an order of monthly aQowance can come into existence only on doing of a voluntary act by the wife of actually accepting the amount offered as contemplated by clause (b). It is to be noted that the Legislature has not used words indicating mere offer by the husband of the amount contemplated by clause (b) as sufficient to bring into existence the fact situation contemplated or bring into existence the evenfoality on which the power of the Magistrate to cancel the order of maintenance is based. It appears that the Legislature has advisedly used the words "has received" in order to indicate and at the same time restrict the power of cancelling the order of monthly allowance to cases where the wife by a voluntary act on her part of receiving the amount contemplated by clause (b) bri"ngs about the eventuality contemplated for exercise of the said power. . . .

We, therefore, hold that in order to exercise power conferred by clause (b) of sul:>-sec.

(3) of sec. 127, it has to be

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FAZLUNBI v. K. K. VALi (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1137

found as a fact that the wife has done a voluntary act of receiving the who:e sum contemplated to be. payable by clause (b): If the wife showi> ]Jer unwillingness to receive. the amount tendered, the provisions of clause (b) are not applicable.

Even the literal and the purposive approaches may sometimes concur, once we grasp the social dynamics of interpretation, will serve the cause of truth and justice.

We are reminded of Lord Denning's fascinating reference in his "The Discipline of the Law" to Portia's plea for the pound of flesh but not a drop of blood; The traditional English view is Yielding to the pressure of the modern European view (which is also the American view) expressed by Denning in delightful diction as(')

"the 'schematic and teleological' method of interpretation. It is not really so alarming as it sounds.

All it means is that the judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words or by the grammatical structure of the sentence.

They go by the design of . purpose which lies behind it.

When they come upon a situation which is to their minds within the spiritbut not the letterf the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and purpose of the legislature-at the effect which it was sought to achieve.

They then interpret the legislation so as to produce the unashamedly, without hesitation.

They ask simply: What is the sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect to the presumed purpose of the legislation ? They Jay down the law accordingly.

Jf you study the decisions of the European Court, you will see that they do it every day.

To our eyes-shdrtsighted by tradition - it is legislation, pure and simp:e.

But, to their eyes, it is fulfilling the true role of the courts.

They are giving effect' to what the legislature intendfd, or may be presumed to have intended.

I see nothing wrong in this.

Quite the contrary.

Another angle to the subject of Mahar and its impact on liability

H for maintenance after divorce may be briefly considered. Khalid, J. of the Kerala High Court in two cases has taken the view that s.125 and s.127 Cr.P.C. are conceptually unconnected with payment of mahar and cannot bail out a muslim husband from his statutory obli- H gation under s.125.

We are aware of the criticism of this conceptual

(1) The Discipline of Law, Lord Denning, pp. 20·21.

A divorce between mahar and post-divorce maintenance by Dr.

Tahir Mahmood in his recent book on the 'Muslim Law of india' (see p. l 33) where the learned author. prefers to retain the hexus between mahar and maintenance but has this to say :

In a recent case the Supreme Court has held that the B sum paid under personal law-referred to in clause (b) of section 127(3) of the Code-should be "more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance"; if it is not so it can be considred by the court for the reduction of the maintenance rate but cannot annihilate that rate.

This, indeed, is a liberal ruling and conforms to the spirit C of Islamic law on the subject.

Aside from this controversy, we may look perspicaciously at the legal connotation of 'dower' and the impact of its payment on divorcees' clailll5 for maintenance.

We must first remember that Cr.P. Code, (s. 125·127) is a secular code deliberately designed to protect destitute D women, who are victilll5 of neglect during marrrage and after divorce.

It is rooted in the State's responsibility for the welfare of the weaker sections of women and children and is not confined to members ot one religion or region, but the whole community of womanhood.

Secondly we must realise that Muslim law shows its reverence for the wife in the institution of Mahar (dower). It is neither dowry E nor price for marriage.

As explained i'n an old judgment by Justice Syed Mahmood, mahar is "not the exchange or consideration given by the man to the woman, but an effect of tl1e contract imposed by law on the husband as a token of respect for its subject : the woman''.

Giving a correct appraisal of the concept of mahar, the Privy Council once described it as "an essential incident to the status of marriage".

On another occasion it explained that mahar was a 'legal responsibility' of the husband.

These judicial observations evidence a correct understanding of the Islamic legal cohcept of mahar. (')

Baillie in his Digest of Mohammaden Law says :

"Dower is not the exchange or consideration given by the man to woman for entering into the contract; but ah effect of the contract, imposed by the law on the husband as a token in respect, for its respect the woman ....

Dower being, as already mentioned, opposed to the, usu-

(1) Dr. Tahir Mahmood '~The Muslim Law of India" p. 71.

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FAZLUNBI. v. K. K. VALi (Kn\<; hna Iyer, !.)

fruct of the woman's person, the right to either is not completed without the other. Hence on the one hand, dower is said to be confirmed and made binding o'n the husband by consummation, or by its substitute, a valid retirement, or by death, which by terminating the maniage, pnts an end to all the contingencies to which it is exposed; and on the other hand the woman becomes entitled to it as soon as she has surrendered her person."

I I

Justice Mahmood has described the nature of Meharin Abdul Kadir v. Salima and anr. (8 All. 149 at 157-158). According to him:

"Dower, under the Muhammadan law, is the sum of money or other property promised by the husba'nd to be paid or delivered to the wife in consideration of the marriage, and even where no . dower is expressly fixed or mentioned at the marriage ceremony, the law confers the right of dower upon the wife as a necessary effect of marriage.

To use the language of the Hedaya, 'the payment of dower is enjoined by the law merely as a token of respect for its subject (the woman), wherefore the mention of it is not absolutely essential to the validity of a maniage; and, for the same reason, a marriage is also valid, although the man were to engage in the contract on the special condition that there should be no

dower" .... (Hamilton's Hedaya by Grady, p. 44). Even after the marriage the dower may be increased by the husband during coverture .... In this sense and in no other can dower under the Muhammadan law be regarqed as the consideration for the connubial intercourse, and if the authors of the Arabic Text-books of Muhammadan law have compared it to price in. the contract of sale, it is simply because marriage is a civil contract under that law ...... Such being the nature of the dower, the rules which regulate its payment are necessarily affected by the position of a married woman under the Muhammadan law.

Under that Jaw marriage does not make her property the property of the husba'nd, nor does coverture impose any disability upon her as to freedom of 'contract.

The marriage contract is easily dissoluble, and the freedom of divorce and the rule of polygamy place a power in the hands of the husband which the law-giver intended to restrain by rendering the rules as to payments of dower stringent upon the husband. No limit as to the amount of dower has

- E

been imposed, and it may either be prompt, that is, immediately payable upon demand, or deferred, that is payable upon the dissolution of marriage, whether by death or divorce.

The dower may also be partly prompt and partly deferred; but when at the time of the marriage ceremony no specification in this respect is made, the whole dower is presumed to be prompt and due on demand''.

In Tyabji's Muslim Law (4th Edn) it is stated :

"Mahar is an essential incident to the status of marriage.

Regarded as a consideration for the marriage it is in theory payable before consummation; but the Jaw allows its division in two parts, one of which is called 'prompt' payable before the wife can be called upon to enter the conjugal domicle, the other '.deferred' payable on the dissolution of the contract by the death of either of the parties or by divorce.

When the Kabin nama does hot specify the portion that is prompt and that which is deferred, evi- - dence may be given of the custom or usage of wife's family".

The quintessence of mahar whether it is prompt or deferred is clearly not a contemplated quantification of a sum of money in lieu of maintenance upoh divorce.

Indeed, dower focusses on marital happi, ness and is an incident of connubial joy.

Divorce is fartl\cst from the thought of the bride and the bridegroom when mehar is promised.

Moreover, dower may be prompt and is payable during marriage and cannot, therefore, be a recompense for divorce too dista'nt and unpleasant for the bride and bridegroom to envision on the nuptial bed.

Maybe, some how the masculine obsession of jurisprudence linked up this promise or payment as a consolidated equivalent of maintenance after divorce.

Maybe, some legislatures might have taken it in that light, but the law is to be read as the law enacted.

The language of s. 127(3)(b) appears to suggest that payment of the sum and the divorce should be essentially parts of the same transaction so as to make one the consideration tor the other.

Such customary divorce on payment of a sum of money among the so called lower castes are not uncommon.

At any rate the payment of money contemplated by s. 127(3) (b) should be so Jinked with the divorce as to become payable only in the event of the .jivorce. Mahar as understood in Mohammadan Law cannot under any circumstances be considered as consideration for divorce H or a payment made in lieu of Joss of connubial relationship.

Under s. 127(3)(b) of the Cr.P.C., an order for maintenahce may be can- . celled if the Magistrate is satisfied that the woman has been divorced

' -•

"' •

., •

FAZLUNBI v. IC. IC. VAL! (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1141

by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after A the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was payable on such divorce .

• We are, therefore, inclined to the view that even by harmonising payments under persona!! and oustomary laws with the obligations under ss. 125 to 127 of the Cr.P.C., the conclusion is clear that the liquidated sum paid at the time of divorce must be a reasonable and not an illusory amount and will release the quondam husband from the continuing liability, only if the sum paid is realistically sufficient to maintain the ex-wife l!nd salvage her from destitution which is the anathema of the law .. This perspective of social justice alone does justice to the complex of provisions from s. 125 to s. 127 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

We may sum up and declare the law fool-proof fashion :

(1) Section 127(3)(b) has a setting, scheme and a purpose and. no talaq of the purpose different from the sense is permissible in statutory construction.

(2) The paymeut ot'an amount, customary or other, contemplated by the measure must inset the intent of preventing destitution and providing a sum which is more or less the present worth of the monthly maintenance allowances the .divorce may need until death or remarriage overtake her. The policy of the law abhors neglected wives and destitute divorcees and s. 127(3) (b) takes care to avoid double payment one under custom at the time of divorce and another under s. 125.

(3) Whatever the facts of a particular case, the Code, by enacting ss. 125 to 127, charges the court with the humane obligation of enforcing maintenance or its just equivalent to ill-used wives and castaway ex-wives, only if the woman has received voluntarily a sum, at the time of divorce, sufficient to keep her going according to the circumstances of the parties.

( 4) Neither personal law nor other salvationary plea will hold

I -

against the policy of public law pervading s. 127 (3) (b) as much as G it does s. 125.

So a farthing is no substitute for a fortune nor naive consent equivalent to intelligent acceptance.

(5) Here the mahar paid is Rs. 500/- and the income therefrom may well be Rs. 5/- a month, too ludicrous to mention as maintenance. , The amount earlier awarded is the minimum.

Before we bid farewell to Faz/unbi it is necessary to mention that Chief Justice Baharul Islam, in an elaborate judgment replete,

A with quotes from the Holy Quoran, has exposed the error of early English authors and judges who deait with talaq in Muslim Law as good even if pronounced at whim or in tantrum, and argued against the diehard view of Batchelor J. (ILR 30 Bombay 539) that this view 'is good in law, though bad in theology'.

Maybe, when th" point directly arises, the question will have to be considered by this B court, but enough unto the day the evil thereof and we do not express our opinion o'n this question as it does not call for a decision in the present case.

We allow the appeal.

" •

Appeal allowed.. ~

FAZLUNBI

K. KHADER V ALI AND ANR

May 8, 1980

0. CmNNAPPA REDDY

A. P. SEN, JJ.

CJode of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Section 127

s. 127(3)(b)

s. 125

section 127

Cr.P.C

Article 141

section 125

section 482

Supreme Court

Article 141

India

Bai Tahira

Section 127(3)(b)

Sections 125

Section 127

section 127(3)

Mehar

Mohammadan Le.w

s. 127(3)

ss. 125 to 127

s. 125

s. 127

Section 127(3)(b)

s. 125

s. 127(3)

s. 125

A. Suba Rao

F G. Narasimhulu

KRISHNA IYER

Fazulnbi

Fazlunbi

s. 125

s. 127(3)(b)

Art. 141

Arts. 14 and 15

Fazlunbi

Kader Basha

State Bank F of India

s. 125

1979] 2 SCR 75

Krishna Iyer

s. 482

B Bai Tahirai

s. 127

s. 125

s. 127(3)(b)

s. 127(3)(b)

Cardozo

Denning

England

Rajeev Dhavan

s. 127(3)(b)

Sec. 125

Bombay

sec. 127(3)(b)

Sec.

127

Section 125

Section 127(3)(b)

Section 127(3)

Section 127(3)(b)

Section 125

Granville Williams

Art. 141

s. 127(3)

Khalid

section

125

section 127(3)

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Section 127(3)

s. 127(3)(b)

Gujarat High Court

s. 127(3)(b)

sec. 127

sec. 127

sec. 127

sec. 127

Portia

Kerala High Court

Cr.P.C

Tahir Mahmood

section 127(3)

s. 125

Syed Mahmood

Tahir Mahmood

Mahmood

Tyabji

s. 127(3)(b)

s. 127(3)

s. 127(3)(b)

Cr.P.C

ss. 125 to 127

Cr.P.C

s. 125

s. 127

Section 127(3)(b)

s. 127(3)

s. 125

ss. 125 to 127

s. 127

s. 125

Baharul Islam

Batchelor


" •

• •

TUMATI VENKAISH ETC. ETC.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

. May 9, 1980

[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD,' C.J., P. N. BHAGWATI, V. R. KRISHNA IYER,

V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A P. SEN, JJ.]

The Atu/hra P; adesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act I of 1913, as aniended by the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms. (Ceiling on Agricuiturnl floldings) Amendment Act, 1977-Section. 4A Constitutional validity of-Whether, by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulatiou) Act 1976 (Central Act), the Andhra Pradesh Act had be

con1e void and inoperative. as being outside the legilslative competence of the A 11dhra Pradesh Legislature-Resolutions dated 7th April 1972 and 8th April 1972 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council and the Andhra Pra~ desh Legislatil'e Assembly under Art. 252 ( 1) of the Constitution.

The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act I of 1973 wa's enacted 011 !st of January 1973. Though a Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh when challenged by some of the land holders held! by its judgment dated I Ith April, 1973, the Act to be constitu

tionally valid; yet the said Act was not brought into force till 1st January 1975.

In 1977, the Act was amended with retrospective effect from 1st January 1975 by the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Amendment Act 1977. As soon as the Amending Act was pa'ssed, the land holders once again filed writ petitions in the High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act. The main ground, inter alia, was that by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Central Act, 1976, the Andhra Pradesh Act had become void and inoperative.

A Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court held that the enactment of

the Central Act did not have the effect of invalidating the whole of the F Andhra Pradesh Act, but since the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were repugnant to the provision's of the Central Act so far as concerned land satisfying both the definition of "land" in the Andhra Pradesh Act and the :iefini.tion Of "vacant land", in the 1 central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Act was held oot applicable to "vacant lands" falling within, the ambit of the Central Act. Save for this limited relief, the High Court dismissed the Wit petitions in all other respects. Hence the appeals by the land holders after obtaining G special leave from this Court. Writ Petitions were also filed directly in this Court by ·:some of the land holders.

J)ismissing the appeals, and writ petitions, the Court

HELD : 1 .. Article 246 of the Constitution of India carves out an exception derogating from t'he normal distriblltion of legislative powers between the Union and the States. The effect of passing of resolutions by the Houses of H Legislature of two Or more State"s under this constitutional provision is that Parliament which has otherwise no power to legislate with respect to a matter,

I A

except as provided in Articles 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with regard to such matter and the State Legislature passing the resolutions ceaseto have power to make law relating to that matter. The resolutions operate as abdication or surrender of the powers of the State Legislatures with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolutions and such matter is placed entirely in the hands of Parliament and Parliament alone can then legislate with respect to each. It is as if such matter is lifted out of list II and placed in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. A plain natural construction of the language of Clauses (!) and (2) of Article 252 makes this position clear. It was in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 352 that a resolution was passed by the Andhra Prade'sh Legislative Council on 7th April, 1972 to the effect that "the imposition of ceiling of urban immovable property and acquisition of. such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters concerned therewith or ancilliary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law" and on identical resolution in the same terms was passed on the next day by the Andhra Pradesh LegfsJative Assembly. The result was that at the date when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, Parliament alone was competent to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ciling and all connected, ancilHary or incidental matters, and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature stood denuded of its power to legislate on that subject.

[1149 A, E-H, 1150 A-C]

Union of India v. V. B. Choudhary, [1979] 3 SCR 802; followed.

2. Under the powers thus transfeired Parliament enacted the Central Act with a view to imposing ceiling on vacant land, other tnan land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration.

The Central Act imposes a ceiling on holding of land in urban agglomeration other than land E Which i's mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture in this connection includes horticulture, but does not include raising of grass, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding live-stock and such cultivation or the grow ing of such plants as maY be prescribed by the Rules, and, moreover, in order to fall within the exclusion, the land must be entered in the revenue er land record before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture and must also not have been specified in rhe master plan for a purpose other than agri F culture. tl159 C-F]

3. It is no doubt true that if the And.bra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it would be outside t"hc area of its legislative competence, because it cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property.

But the only urban agglomerations in the State of Andhra Pradesh recognised in the Central Act were those referred to in Section 2(n) (A) (i) end there can be no doubt that so far as these urban agglomerations are concerned, it \\US not within the legislative compe tence of the And.bra Pradesh Legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within these urban agglomerations.

But, the Andhra Pradesh Act is not out side the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legisla tive in so far as lands situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh are concerned. Any other area in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of more than one lakh could be notified as an urban aggleme- H ration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of the Central Act but until it is so notified it would not be an urban agglomeration and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence to provide for imposition of ceilin& on

• •

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TUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. 1145

land situate within such area. No "SOOner such area is notified to be an urbari agglomeration, the Central Act would apply in relation to land situate within such area, but until that happens the Andhra Pradesh Act would con- L tinue ro .be applicable to determine the ceiling on holding of land. The /' Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st January 1975 and it was with reference to thisdate that the surplus holding of land in excess of the ceiling "rea was required to be determined and if there was any surplus it was ro

be surrendered to the State Government.

Therefore, in an area other than that comprised in the urban agglometations referted to in section 2 (n)(A) (i), land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area would be lieble ro be determined as on !st January 1975 under fhe Aildhra Pradesh Act and only

land within the ceiling area will be allowed to remain with him. It is only

• •

• •

in respect of land remaining with a person whether an individual or a family ' after the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act, thar the Central Act would apply if and when the area in question is notified to. be an urban agglomera- , tion under section 2(n) (A) (il) of the Central Act. [1155 G-H, 1156 A-G]

Merely because an area may possibly in the future be notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii). of the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would not cease to have competence to legislate with 1'espect to ceiling on land iitllate in such area even thou&h it is not -an urban

agglomeration at the date of the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act.

Un~ D

doubtedly, when an area is notified as an urbe.n agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii), the Central Act would apply to Ianvituate in such area and the Andhm Pradesh Act wonld cease to have application but by that time the Andhra Pradesh Act would have already operated to determine the ceiling on holding of land falling within the definition in section 3 (i) of that Act and situate within such area. Therefore, the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act is neither ultmvires nor void as being outSide the area of legis E lative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. It i1 only in respect of land situate within the urban agglomerations rcfefred to in section 2(n) (A) (i) of the Central Act that the Andhra Prad., h Act would not apply but it would be fully applicable in rOSpect of land situate in all the other area. of the State of Andhra Pradesh. [1156 G-R, 1157 A-Bl

4. A divided minor calinot be exclud\; d from the 'family unit' as defu!ed P in section 3 (f) of the Andhro.

Pradesh Act. Thllt would be flying in the ' face of sections 3 (f) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Act.

I! is true that a ptlrtitiott affected prior to 2nd May 1972 is not invaliditted by the Andhra Pradeoh Act and therefore any pt<iperty which come• to the share of a divided minor son would in law belong to him and would not be l!Uble to be n!garded as pan of jbh'lt family property. Bui nrider the definition of faniily unit in section :!(f) tile dividc!d minor ; on wbld clearly be included in the family unit and by reason of section -4 his land whether self

acquired or obtained on partition would be liable to be clubbed with tlie land heli! by the other me'mll<irs of the fail:tily unit. The lltnd obtaintd by the divided minor son on partition would be liable to be aggregated with fhe lands of other !1!61!!titrs of' the fmnily unit nm b<!cause the partition is invalid but beoouse tl1!;' !!Ind held by him howsoever acquired is 'liable to be clubbed togothtr with the 1..00. of others for fho purpose of applying the ceiling area to the family unit. . (1151 C, FiIJ

14-610 SCI/80

5. The Andbra Pradesh Act is admittedly an agrarian reform legislation and it is protected against challenge on the ground of infraction of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by the protective umbrella of Article 31A. (1158 B.C]

6. The definition of 'family unit' is not violative of Article 14 'of the Constitution by including a minor son in "the family unit while excluding a major son from it. (1158 A] • B

Seth Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, (1980] 3 SCR p. 1181 followed.

Civn./ORIGJN.AL JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 14-32, 902, 879, 1130--32, 1121, 1172, 1215, 1201, 1127, 1128, 1222, 1224, 1223, 1275, 1129, 1523, 1539, 1280, 863, 1361, 1323, 1375, 1621,, c 1374, 1410, 1628, 2117, 1961, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920 & 2290 of 1978 & 3447 & 3450/79.

Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgmeuts and Orders dated 13.10.1977 etc. etc. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1872/77 etc. etc.

AND

WRIT PETITION Nos : 3973, 3998, 3836, 4198, 4199, 4200, 4210, 4263, 4317, 4318, 4414, 4256, 4537 and 4500 of 1978.

F. S. Nariman, K. Krishna Rao and K. Rajendro Choudhary for the Appellants in CA Nos. 14 to 23, 25-29, 1223-1224 & 1628/7& B 3447 and 3449/79.

A. Subba Rao for the Appellants in CA No. 1126 & WP No8. 3973, 4198, 4199, 4200, 4317, 4318 & 4210/78.

A. V. V. Nair for the Appellanls in CA Nos. 1215, 1361, 2117, 1286 and W.P. No. 1374/78.

I' G. S. Ramo Rao for the Appellants in CA No. 1121 & Petitioners in WP Nos. 4256 and 3836/78.

Vepa Sarathi and B. Kanta Rao for the Appellants/Petitioners ' tn CA Nos. 24, 30, 32, 1172, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1261, 1323 & 1275/ 78 and WP Nos. 4263, 4500 & 4537 /78.

Venkata Reddy and G. Narsimhulu for the Appellants in CA Nos. 31, 902, 879, 1130-32, 1410, 1621, 1917-20, 1961/78 & 1373/78.

A. K. Ganguli for the Appellants in CAs 1222 and 863/78.

A. v. Rangom for the Petitioners in WP No. 3998/78.

S. BalokrishTiizn for the Petitioner in WP 44~4 /78. .

V. S. Desai and if. Subba Rao for the Applicant/Intervener.

• •

• •

TUMATl VENKAISH v. A. P. (Bhagwati, /.) 1147

K. K. Venugopal Addl. Sol. Genl., Ram Chandra Reddy Adv.

A Genl. A. P. and B. Parthasarthy for the appearing respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by,

BHAGWATI, J.-These appeals by special leave and the writ petitions represent a last but desparate attempt by the class of land-holders in Andhra Pradesh to defeat an agrarian reform legislation enacted by the State for the benefit of the weaker sections of community. It is indeed a matter of regret that a statute intended to strike at concentration of land in the hands of a few and to act as a great equaliser by reducing inequality in holding of land between the haves and the have-

(. nots should have practical! y remained unimplemented for a period of JI' over seven years.

Unfortunately, this is the common fate of much of our social welfare legislation.

We can boast of some of the finest legislative measures calculated to ameliorate the socio-economic conditions of the poor and the deprived and to reach social and economic justice to them, but regretably, a large part of such legislation has remained merely on paper, and the benefits of such legislation have not reached the common man to any appreciable extent.

The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Andhra Pradesh Act) which is challenged in the present appeals

,).-. was enacted by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature on 1st January 1973.

Soon after its enactment, the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds, but a full Bench of the High Court negatived the challenge and held the Andhra Pradesh Act to be constitutionally valid.

Though this judgment was delivered by the High Court as early as 11th April, 1973, no effective steps for implementation of the Andhra Pradesh Act could be taken, since the Andhra Pradesh Act

':\ merely remained on the statute book and for some inexplicable reason, it was not brought into force until !st January 1975. Even after the Andhra Pradesh Act was brought into force, not much enthusiasm was shown by the Government in implementing its provisions and in the mean while, it was found necessary to amend the legislation and hence the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultuntl Holdings) Amendment Act 1977 was enacted with retrospective effect from 1st January 1975 and by this amending Act certain amendments were made which included inter alia the introduction of section

4A.

We shall presently refer to the relevant provisions of the amen- H ded Andhra Pradesh Act, but before we do .so, it is necessary to point out that as soon as the amending Act was passed, another round

of litigation was started by the la!lldholders by filing writ petitions in the High Court challenging once again the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act.

There were several grounds on which the constitutional validity was challenged but the main ground was that by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act), the Andhra Pradesh Act had become void and inoperative. -Certain other questions involving the interpretation of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were also raised in some of the writ petitions, but they too need not be mentioned here, because in the course of the hearing we made it clear to the parties that we would examine on! y the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act and other questions could be agitated by the landholders in the appeals filed by them against the orders determining surplus land.

It was pointed out to us that £ome of the landholders had not filed appeals within the prescribed time and grave injustice would therefore result to them if these questiom were not decided by us.

But the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State fairly stated before us that if appeals have been filed beyond time or are filed within a month of disposal of ihese appeals, the delay in filing the appeals would be condoned.

Turning to the constitutional challenge which in those days was required to be decided by a full Bench of 5 Judges of the High Court, it was held that the enactment of the Central Act did noti have the effect of invalidating the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act, but since the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were repugnant to the provisions of the Central Aet so far as concerned land satisfying both the definition of '1and" in the Andlira Pradesh Act and the definition of "vacant land" in the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Act was held not applicable to "vacant land" falling within the ambn of the Central Act.

The High Court accordingly granted a declaration to ibis effect to the landholders, but save for ibis limited relief, dismissed the writ petitions in all other respects, since in the opinion of the High Court there was no substance in any of the other contentions raised on behalf of the landholders.

The landholders thereupon preferred the present appeals after obtaining special leave from this Court.

The principal contention urged on behalf of the landholders in support of the appeals was that the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. This contention was based on two res- H olutions, one dated 7th April 1972 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council and the other dated 8th April 1972 paS<Sed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly under clause ( 1) of Article

• . \

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TUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, !.) 1149

252 of the Constitution.

This Article carves out an exception derogating frol!l the normal distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States under Article 246 and is in the following tef!Ds : Art. 252(1) : If it appears to the legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with reipect to which Parli.anu>I\t has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Articles Z49 al\d 250 should 111' regulated in such State11 by Parliainent by law, and

if rewlutio!J$ to that eject are passec; I by !Ill the IJoug, es of tlw Legislatures of tho5e States, it shall be lawful for Par liarnent to pass an Act for regulating thllt matter accordy. am! any A.ct so passed shall ajlply to such Sl; ltes apd to any othor State by which i¢ is adop!eQ afte!'Wlll'.ds by realution J; lllSsed in that behalf by the I!o~ or, where there are two IU>uses, by each of tne House~ of the Legislature of that State.

(Z) An N:t 'o JM~•d by Parllamc11t 1n1y ho qemi- "i or r'ed by JI\ A.ct of Parliall\ellt plli&Cd ot adojltc4 iII like iiwr but '~U not, as rl:i~I~ ...,_y State to whicb it apPlilli, bi amoad"I or repealod by a11; Act of !114 gis lature of that State."

1' The effect of passing al' resolutions by the Hou&ell of Legislature of two of more Stat~ 11ndr this cotutitutiolllll provision is that Parliument wJiich has othefWise no power to l, gis1'te with respect to a matter, except &s pnlvidro in A, rtic~ 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with respect to such matter and the State Legislatures passing the resolutions cease to have power to make law

F ' relating to that matter.

The resolutions operate 3$ abdication or surrender of the powers of the State Legislatures with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolutions and such matter is placed entirely in the hands of Parliament and Parliament alone can \

then legislate with respect to it. It is as if such matter is lifted out of List II and placed in Lilst I of the Seventh Sched\lk to the Constitution.

This would seem to be quite clear on a plain natural construct10n of the language of clauses (1) aQd (2) of Article 252 and no authority is necessary in support of it, but if any was wanted,

it may be found in the decision of a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in Union of India v. V. V. Chaudhary(')-in fact the same Bench as the present one--where an identical view has been taken.

H It was in pursuance of clause (1) of this Article that a Resolution ------

(!) 11979] 3 SCR 802.

was passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council on 7th April 1972 to the effect that "the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acqnisiti'CJn of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancilliary and incidental -l thereto should be regulated in the State of Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law" and an identical resolution in the same tem1s was passed on the next day by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature Assembly.

Similar resolutions were also passed by the Houses of Legislature of some other States, though there is no material to show as to when

' '

they were passed.

It was however common ground that at best some of these resolutions were passed prior to the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act.

The result was that at the date when the J Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, Parliament alone was competent ''"'\

to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all connected, ancilliary or incidental matters, and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature stood denuded of its power to legislate on that subject.

Now the Andbra Pradesh Act, as its long title shows, was enacted to consolidate and mnend the law relatirig to the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over of surplus land and matters

connected therewith. On its plain terms, it applies to land situate in any part of Andhra Pradesh.

Section 3 ( f) creates an artificial unit called 'family unit' by defining it as follows :

"Sec. 3 ( f) "family unit" means- ( i) in the case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses, snch individual, the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters; if any;

(ii) in the case of an individual who. has no spouse such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters;

(iii) in the case of an individual who is a divorced husband and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in his custody or not; and

(iv) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and unmarriej minor daughters.

T Explanation-Where a minor son is married, his wife and their offspring, if any, shall also be deemed to be members of the family unit of which the minor son is a member;

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TUMATI VBNKAISH v. A. P. (Bhagwati, /,) 1151

The term "land" is defined in section 3 (j) to mean "land which is used or is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture, or for purposes ancillary thereto, including horticulture, forest land, pasture land, waste land, plantation and tope; and includes land deemed to be agricultural land under this Act". Explanation I to this definition enacts a rebuttable presumption that land held under Ryotwari settlement shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be 'land' under the Andhra Pradesh Act.

Section 3 ( o) defines 'person' as including inter alia an individual and a faintly unit. Sec tion 10 is the key section which imposes ceiling on the holding of land by providing that if the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the person shall be liable to surrender the '1and held in excess. If therefore an individual or a family unit holds land in excess of the ceiling area, the excess would have to be

urrendered to the State Government. But the question then arises, what is the ceiling area above which a person cannot hold land. The answer is provided by section 4 .which reads as follows :-

"Sec. 4 (1) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding.

(2) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding plus an additional extent of one-fifth of one standard holding for every such member in excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holdings.

(3) The ceiling area in the case of every individual who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of any other person shall be an exte0t of land equal to one standard holding.

Explanation :-In the case of a family unit, the ceil" ing area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit".

It will thus be seen that the ceiling area in the case of an individual who is not a member of a family unit is equivalent to one sfandard holding and so also in the case of a family unit with not more than five members, the ceiling area is the same, but if the family unit consists of more than five members, the ceiling area would stand increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional member H of the family unit, subject however to the maximum limit of 2 standard holdings.

When the ceiling area is applied t<;> the holding of a

A family u¢t, the Explanation requires that the lands held by all the members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing the holding of the family unit.

Where, therefore, there ill a family unit consisting of father, mother and three minor sons or daughters, the lands held by all these persons would have to be clul>- bed together and then the ceiling area applied to the aggregate ho)d- B ing.

There is no distii:iction made in the definition of 'family uuit• between a divided minor son and an undivided minor son.

Both stand on the same footing and a di<vided minor son is as much a member of the family unit as an undivided minor son, and consequently the lands held by a divided minor son would have to be included in the holding of the family unit for the purpose of application of the C . ceiling area. Section 7 invalidates certain transfers of land and provides for inclusion of such lands in the holding of an individual or a family unit.

Then there is a provision in section 8 for furnishing a declaration in respect of his holding by every person whose land exceeds the ceiling area and the Tribunal is required by section 9 to D hold w. quiry d s ttn order determining the land held in excess of the ceiling arCtt• Such l; md has to be surrendered by the person holding the land and on such surrender, the Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered under section 11 to take possession of the land which thereupon vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

Section 14 provides inter alia that the land vested in the E State Governmeat 1>hall be allotted for use as house-sites for agricultural labourers, village artisans or other poor persons owning no houses or house-sites or transferred to the weaker sections of the people dependent on agriculture for purposes of agriculture/or for purposes ancilliary thereto in such manner as may be prescribed by the Rnles, subject to a proviso that as far as practicable not less than one-half F of the total extent of land so allotted or transferre_d shall be allotted: or transferred to the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

Section 15 enacts a provision for payment of compensation for fand vested in the State Government at the rates specified in the

Second Schedule.

These are the only relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act which need to be referred to for the purpose of the present appeals.

We may now tum to examine the relevant provisions of the

~.

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Central Act.

This Act was enacted by Parliament pursuant to the M authority conferred upon it by the resolutions passed by the Houses of Legislature of several States~ including the State o' Amllira H Pradesh under clause (1) of Article 252. It received the assent of the President on 17th February 1976 and as its long tide and recita1 'hows

it was enacted to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant

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TUMATI VBNKA!SH V. A. P. (Bhi:zgwati, !.) ll 53

land is urban agglomerations for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the conc.eutr.ation of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an eqii.itabli: distribution of land in urban agglomeflltiOJJs to subserve the common good. We shall ri:i; er to a few material p!Oyisions of this Act. i<m 2(a) (i) l!efines "appointed day" to mean in relation to any State to wbich tJiis Act applies i11 the first instimce which includes the State of Andhra Pradesh - t, he date of iutroduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament.

This was t!Je Bill which culminated in the Act and it was introduced in Parlia111ent on iSth Jam1ary 1976.

Consequently, this date would be the 'appointed day' for the purpose of applicability of the Act to the State of Andhra Pradesh.

The definition of "family" in section 2

(f) is materially in the same terms as the definition of "family unit" in the Andhra Pradesh Act.

Then follow two imp<;>rtant !Wfiuitions which needed to be set out in extenso.

The word "Pfrson" is defined in section 2(i) as including intu alia an 'individual' and the 'i!a.mily'.

Section 2(n) defines "urban agglomeration" in the following terms :

"&ec.2(n) (A) in relation to any State of Ullion territory specified in column ( 1 ) of Scheduk l, mllllllS--

(i) lbe url:mn i1wo1;1.eration &l)ecilied in the conpon

diPJ: entry in column ( 2) tb!:reof and inctndes tlw

periphe.raJ a.rea specified ip the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof; and

(ii) any other area which the State Government may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, having regard to its location, population (population being more than one lakh) and such other relevant factors as the circumstance of the case may require, by notification in the Official Gaette, declare to be an urban agglomeration and any agglomeration so declared shall be deemed to belong to category D in that Schedule and the peripheral area therefor shall be one kilometre;

(B) xx xx xx xx

Tire term 'urban land' is defined in section 2 ( o) to mean:-

Sec. 2 ( o) (i) : any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or

xx"

(ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name dilled), a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the plirpose of agriculture.

Explanation: For the purpose of this clause and clause (q),-

(A) "agriculture" includes horticulture, but does not include--

(i) raising of grass,

(ii) dairy farming,

'.D

(iii) poultry farming,

(iv) breeding of live-stock, and

(v) such cultivation, or the growing of such plant, as may be prescribed.

(B) land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the . purpose of agriculture;

(C) notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture; " (

Section 2 ( q) gives a definition of "vacant land" by providing that "vacant land" means, subject to certain e.xceptions which are not mat- -0 erial, land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agricultur!,

in an urban agglomeration.

Section 3 is the rebuttal section which imposes ceiling on holding of 'vacant land' by providing that:

"Sec. 3. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be H entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-section

(2) of section 1."

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TUMATI VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, J.) 1155

Section 4 divides urban agglomeration into categories A, B, C and D lays down different ceiling limits for these different categories.

Then there is a provision in section 5 invalidating in certain circumstances the transfer of vacant land made at any time during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending with the commencement of the Act.

The procedure for determining "vacant land" held in excess of the ceiling limit is laid down in sections 6 to 9 and section 1 O enacts a provision for acquisition of such land held in excess of such limit.

Section 23 provides for disposal of vacant land acquired uJ&!ier the Act and it empowers the State Government to allot such vacant land to "any person for any purpose relating to or in connection with any industry or for providing residential accommodation of snch type as may be approved by the State Government to the employees of any industry. It will thus be seen that the Central Act imposes a ceiling on holding of land in urban agglomeration other than land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture in this connection inclndes horticulture, bnt does not include raising of grass, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding live-stock and cultivation or the growing of such plants as may be prescribed by the Rules, and, moreover, in order to fall within the exclusion, the land must be entered in the revenue or land record before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture and must also not have been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture.

. Now, as we have already pointed out above, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature had, at the time when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, no power to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable . property.

That power stood trnnsferred to parliament and as a first step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on immovable property of every other description, the Parliament enacted the Central Act with a view to imposing ceiling on vacant land, other than land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration.

The argument of the landholders was that the Andhra Pradesh Act sought

to impose ceiling on land in the whole of Andhra Pradesh including land situate in urban agglomeration and since the concept of agglomeration defined in section 2(n) of the Central Act was an expansive concept and any area with an ei1isting or future population of more than one lakh could be notified to be an uban agglomeration, the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competance of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature.

This argument plausible though it may seem, in our opinion, is unsustainable. It is no doubt true that if the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks H to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it weuld be outside the area of its legislative competence, because it !

I!'

cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property.

But the only urban agglomerations in the State of Andhra Pradesh: recognised in the Central Act were those referred to in section 2(n} (A) (ii) and there can be no doubt that so far as these urban agglo merations are concerned, it was not within the legislative competence

of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within these urban aglliomerations. It is, however, dil!icult to see how the Andhra Pradesh Act could be said to be outsil;!e the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature in so far as land situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Praclesh is concerned.

We accept that any other area in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of more than om> lakh could be notit)!, Xl as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of th~ Central Act but until it is SP notified it would not be an urban 11gglomeration and the Andhrn Pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence tp provide for imposition of ceiling on lane! situate within such area.

No SOPner such area is notified to bt all urb!ln aggloiru; ratlon, tllC Central Act would apply in relation to land situ/lte within such ania, but until that hiippens the Andhra Pradesh A.ct would continue to be applicable to determine the ceilin, c o• ltol!lins of land. It m.ay be noticed that the Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st Jaa11ary 1975 and it was with reference to tltis !lile thii surplus holding of lam! in excess of the ceiling area wa! requirtd to be determined a11d if there was any surplus it was to be surrendered to the State Governftient.

It mnst therefore follow that in an area other than that comprised in the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2(n) (A) (i), land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area would be liable to be determined as on 1st January 1975 under _the Andhra Pradesh Act and only land within the ceiling area will be allowed to remain with him. It is only in respect of land remaining with a person whether an individual or a family after the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act, that the Central Act would apply if and when the area in question is notified to be an urban agglomeration under section 2(n) (A) (ii) of the Central Act.

We fail to see how it can at all be contended G that merely because an area may possibly in the future be nctified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A) (ii) of the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would cease to have competence to legislate with respect to ceiling on land situate in such area even though it is not an urban agglomeration at the date of the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act. l'ndoubtedly, when an area is notified as H an urban agglomeration under section 2(nl (Al (ii), the Central Act would apply to land situate in such area and the Andhra Pradesh Act would cease to have application but by that time the Andhra Pradesh

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.~ -~

TUMAT! VENKAISH V. A. P. (Bhagwati, /.) llS'/

Act would have already operated to determine the ceiling on holding

>Of land falling within the definition in section 3 (j) of that Act and

situate within such area. It is therefpre not possible to uphold the. contention of the landholders that the whole of the. Andhra Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void as being outside the area of legislative competence of the . Andhra Pradesh Legislature. It is only in respect oI land situate within the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2 ( n) (A) (i) of the Central Act that the Andhra Pradesh Act would not apply but it would be fully applicable in respect of land situate in all 1he other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh .

The next contention nrged on behalf of the landholders was that on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Andllra Pradesh Act, a divided minor son was not liable to be included in "family unit" as defined in section 3 (f) of that Act. the argument was that sub-section (2) of section 7 did not invalidate all partitions of joint family property but struck only against partitions effected on or before 2nd May 1972 and thus by necessary implication recognised 1he validity of partitions affected prior to that date. If therefore a partition was effected prior to 2nd May 1972 and under that partition a minor son become divided from his father and mother, the divided minor son could not be included in the family unit and his property could not be clubbed with that of his father and mother, because otherwise it would amount to invalidation of the partition though section 7, sub-section (2) clearly recognised such partition as vnlid.

This argument is clearly fallacious in that it fails to give .due effect to the definition of family unit in section 3 (f) and the provisions of section 4.

It is undoubtedly true that a partition effected prior to 2nd May 1972 is not invalidated by the Andhra Pradesh Act and therefore any property which comes to the share of a divided minor son would in law belong to him and would not be liable to be required as part of joint family property. But under the definition of family unit in section 3 (I) the divided minor son would clearly be included in the family unit and by reason of section 4 his land whether self-acquired or obtained on partition would be liable to be clubbed with the land held by the other members of the family unit. The land obtained by the divided minor son on partition would be liable to be aggregated with the lands of other members of the family unit not because the partition is invalid

but because the land held by him howsoever acquired is liable to be clubbed together with the lands of others for the purpose of applying the ceiling area to tlJe family unit. We do not therefore see how a divided minor son can be excluded from the family unit.

That would H be flying in the face of sections 3 ( f) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh

Act.

A Then a contention was advanced on behalf of the landholders that

the definition of "family unit" was violative of Article 14, of the Constitution in that it made unjust discrimination between a minor son and the major son by including minor son in the "family unit" while excluding a major son from it.

This contention has already been dealt with by learned brother Tulzapurkar, J. in the judgment delivered by him today in the Haryana Land Ceiling matters and we need not repeat what he bad already stated there while repelling this contention.

Moreover, this contention is, no longer open to the landholders since the Andhra Pradesh Act is admittedly an agrarian reform legislation and it is protected against challenge on the ground of infraction of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by the protective umbrella of Article 31A. We do not therefore see any substance in the contentions urged on behalf of the landholders and we accordingly dismiss the appeals and the writ petitions with costs.

S.R.

Appeals & Petitions dismissed.

• t

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.__,.

( (

TUMATI VENKAISH ETC. ETC

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD

P. N. BHAGWATI

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

V. D. TULZAPURKAR

A P. SEN, JJ.

Amendment Act, 1977

Art. 252

st of January 1973

High Court of Andhra Pradesh

Amendment Act 1977

Central Act, 1976

Article 246

Constitution of India

Parliament

Articles 249 and 250

Seventh Schedule

Article 252

Article 352

Andhra Prade'sh Legislative Council

7th April, 1972

Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh LegfsJative Assembly

Andhra Pradesh Legislature

[1979] 3 SCR 802

Section 2(n)

State of Andhra Pradesh

section 2(n)(A)(ii)

Andhra Pradesh Act

1st January 1975

section 2

Aildhra Pradesh Act

section 2(n)

section 2(n)(A)(ii)

section 2(n)(A)(ii)

section 3

section 2(n)

section 3

sections 3

Articles 14, 19 and 31

Article 31A

Article 14

F. S. Nariman

K. Krishna Rao

K. Rajendro Choudhary

A. V. V. Nair

I' G. S. Ramo Rao

Vepa Sarathi

B. Kanta Rao

Venkata Reddy

G. Narsimhulu

A. K. Ganguli

A. v. Rangom

S. BalokrishTiizn

V. S. Desai

Subba Rao

K. K. Venugopal

Ram Chandra Reddy

B. Parthasarthy

BHAGWATI

1st January 1973

Andhra Pradesh High Court

11th April, 1973

Even after the Andhra Pradesh Act

Amendment Act 1977

section

4A

Article 246

Art. 252(1)

Article 252

1979] 3 SCR 802

Andhra Pradesh Legislature Assembly

Now the Andbra Pradesh Act

Section 3

Sec. 3

section 3

Section 3

section 4

Sec. 4

Section 7

section 8

section 9

section 11

Section 14

Section 15

Second Schedule

Article 252

State of Andhra Pradesh

Je Bill which culminated in the Act

section 2

section 2(i)

Section 2(n)

Central Government

section 2

Sec. 2

Section 2

Section 3

Sec. 3

section 1

TUMATI VENKAISH

Bhagwati

Section 4

section 5

sections 6 to 9

section 1

Section 23

section 2(n)

section 2(n} (A)

Andhra Praclesh

section 2(n)(A)(ii)

Andhrn Pradesh Legislature

1st Jaa11ary 1975

section 2(n)

section 2(n)

section 2(n)(A)

section 2(nl (Al (ii)

section 3

Andhra Pradesh Act

section 2

section 3

section 7

section 7

section 3

section 4

2nd May 1972

section 3

section 4

sections 3

Article 14

Tulzapurkar

Articles 14, 19 and 31

Article 31A