R. DALMIA v.

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NEW DELHI

January 19, 1977

[R. S. SARKARIA AND P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.J

Indian Income Tax Act (XI of 1922)-s. 2(6C) (iii)-Scope of-"Person concerned in the management of b11siness"-Meanin11 of.

Words and plzrases-"concerned", "manage", meaning of.

Section 2(6C) (iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 provides that the value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, obtained from a company either by a director or by any other person who has a substantial interest in .the company (that is to. say, who .is concerned in the management of the busmess of the company, bemg beneficial owner of shares, not being shares entitled to fixed rate of dividend carrying not less than 20% of !he voting power) and any sum paid by any such company in respect of anv obligation which, but for such appointment, w011ld have been payable by the director or other person aforesaid is income ..

The assessee was the beneficial owner of 1800 out of 3000 equiiy shares of a company.

He was, however, not its director.

He had a similar int<:rest in another company.

Both the companies had spent on his personal necessities a large sum of money, which the Income-tax Officer treated as his income under s. 2(6C) (iii) of the Act.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, as also the Tribunal, dismissed his appeal against the order of the Income-tax Officer and the High Court answered the reference against the assessee. . ' In appeal to this Court it was contended that the expression "concerned" in the management of the business of the company takes in only the person wh•

legally participates in the management of its business and not one who has only remote control of its business, even if he had the majority of voting power.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : The expression "person concerned in the management of business" may take in not only a person who directly participates or engages in the management of the business but also one who indirectly controls its management through the managerial staff from behind the scenes.

[657 BJ

1. (a) The term "concerned" in s. 2(6C)(iii) cannot be restricted to a per son who is an employee of the business OL, an office-holder of the company.

In the context of "management" it is wide enough to include every person "ifllerested" in the management, in the sense of having the direction and control of the managerial staff. [659 C-D]

(b) The word "concerned" is not a term of art, having a precise and fixed meaning. It has several nuances, and is used to convey diverse shades of meaning. It may mean "to have a relation to. or bearing on, be of interest or importance" or ''to have an anxiety, worry''. "Concerned" as an adjective may n1ean "interested", "involved".

In one context, it may mean one thing and in a different context another. [658 G-HJ

(c) The word "concerned" takes its colour from the words "in the management of the business" in associatiop with which it occurs.

Jn the context of business, "manage" means "to control, to guide, to administer to conduct or direct affairs', carry on 'business. "Management" includes the act of manageing by direction or regulation or administration or control or superintendence.

[658 H, 659 A]

(2) The .fast part of the clause is. confined to the obtaini_ng of the value of any benefit or perquisite from a company by a director, eveJ! if he has no subs- ·. tantial interest in the company. The second part applies to a person who may riot be a director but has a substantial interest iri the company. What is ."subs- . tantial interest'' is further equated by the succeeding expression "that is to say"

with the co-existence of two elements, namely, (i) concern in the management of the business of the company and (ii) beneficial ownership of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend) carrying not less than 20% of

the voting power. [657 G-HJ

In the instant case, the ass,, ssee. obtained the benefit from the company holding 1800 out of 3000 shares, that is, carrying a voting power of 60% and, therefore, satisfied the second element. His own admission that he was in

B a

control of the company necessarily includes an admission of his being "conerned in the management of the business of the company". [658 A-BJ

'- CIVIL APPELLATE. JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 283 of 1972.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated

,~ 12-7~1971 of the Delhi High Court .in Income Tax Reference No. 31 of 1967.

. .I

Bishamber Lal for the Appellant.

V. S. Desai, !. Ramamurthi and R. N. Sachthey for the Res- D pondent.

Tl1e Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SARKARIA, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated July 12, 1971, of the High Court of Delhi. It ariss out of these facts :

The. appellant (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) is an individual.

The assessment year is 19 5 5-5 6.

Bharat Union Agencies Pvt. Ltd. had spent Rs. 53,398/- after the personal necessities of the assessee during the previous year ending 30-9-1964, without charging for the same.

The assessee was not a director of the said Company.

He however was the beneficial owner F of 1800 shares out of the total of 3000 equity shares of the said Com- pany during the previous year.

Similarly, Allen Berry and Co. Pvt. t Ltd .. had spent a sum of Rs. 4406/- after the personal necessities of the assessee, without charging for the same.

The Income-tax Officer treated the total benefit of Rs. 57,804/- received by the assessec from these two Companies, as his 'income' G under s. 2(6C) (iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 which was introduced by the Finance Act, 1955 with effect from 1-4-1955, and charged it, to tax along with some other items of income.

The assessee carried an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who found th11, t the assessee was beneficial owner of the shares of Bharat Union Agencies. Pvt. Ltd. carrying more than 20 per H cent of the voting power.

He further held on the basis of certain findings in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the administration of Dalmia Jain Companies published in 1963, that the assessee

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1977] 2 S.C.R.

had 100 per cent of the share-holding control of Allen Berry and Co. Pvt. Ltd.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not specifically deal with the question whether the assessee was "concerned in the management" of both these Companies.

In the result he upheld the order of the Income-tax Officer.

The assessee preferred a further appeal to the Inc:ome-tax Appellate Tribunal which held that the asscssee was "concerned in the management of the Bha.rat Union Agencies (P) Ltd., being the beneficial owner of shares carrying more than 20% of the voting power, and as such the benefit of Rs. 53,398/- received by him from that Company was his 'income' within the later part of Clause (iii) of s. 2(6C) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.

On this reasoning the Tribunal dismissed the assessee's appeal in regard to the item of Rs. 53,398/-. However, it allowed, on a different ground his appeal with regard to the item of Rs. 4406/- received from Allen Berry and Co. (P) Ltd.

In this appeal we are not concerned with that item any more.

At the iristance of the assessec, the Tribunal stated the case and referred the following question under s. 66 ( 1) of the Income-tax Act, D 1922 to the High Court :

"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 53,398/- spent by Bharat Union Agencies P. Ltd. after the personal necessities of the assessee is income within the meaning of section 2(6C) (iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922".

The High Court answered this question against the assessee. Hence this appeal.

At the outset, Shri Bishamber Lal, appearing for the appellant, tried to contend that the item of Rs. 53,398/- received by the assessee from Bharat Union Agencies Pvt. Ltd. was not a "benefit or perquisite" within the contemplation of s. 2(6C) (iii) of the 1922 Act because, firstly, the constituents of this item were not cash amounts 1 but gifts or bounties, and secondly, the receipt of this benefit by the assessee was unauthorised and could not be claimed by him as of right on the basis of any agreement with the Company.

This was altogether a new plea. It was not even indirectly raised before the authorities under the Income-tax Act or the High Court.

lt has not been raised even in the Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

It was never the case of the assessee that this amount of Rs. 53,398/- was not "benefit obtained", by the assessee from the Company within the meaning of s. 2 ( 6C) (iii). On the contrary it is apparent from the judgment of the Tribunal. that there was "no dispute about the fact that the assessee received benefits from both the Companies to the extent stated by the authorities below", i.e. benefits to the extent of Rs. 53,398/- and Rs. 4406/" were received by the assessee from Bharat Union Agencies P.

Ltd. and Allen Berry and Co. Pvt. Ltd. respectively.

The plea now sought to

be raised in regard to the item of Rs. 53,398/- involvs a question of fact.. We therefore did not permit the Counsel to raise this plea for the first time at the time of arguments before us.

Counsel next contended that the expression "concerned in . tl.\! management of the business of the Company" takes in only that person who by virtue of a position or office held by him in the Company, legally and actually participates in the management of its business and not he who holds no such position or office but is in remote control of the Company and its affairs merely on account of being in ownership of a certain number of shares, carrying more than 20 per cent or even the majority of the voting power. In support of this restricted construction of the term "concerned'', Counsel referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in Arya Bhavan, Madras v. M. S. Narayana Rao('), wherein Rajamannar C.J. held that the word "concerned" as used in the context of 'workman' in s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, connotes a more intimate and direct relation to the matter than the word "interest" and therefore this term should be given a more restricted meaning than the word "interest".

Mr. Bishamber Lal also referred to the meaning of the terms "concerned", "concerning" as given in the Dictionary, "Words and Phrases", Permanent Edition pp. 504-505 Vol. 8.

Before dealing with this contention, it will be appropriate to examine the material part of s. 2(6C) (iii) of the 1922 Act, which runs as fo!Jows:

"(iii) the value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, obtained from a company either by a director or by any other person who has a substantial interest in the company (that is to say, who is concerned in the management of the business of the company, being the beneficial owner of shares, not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits, carrying not less than twenty per cent of the voting power), and any sum paid by any such company in respect of any obligation which but for such payment would have been payable by the director or other person aforesaid."

From an analysis of Clause (iii), it is clear that it falls in two distinct parts. The first part is confined to the obtaining of the value of any benefit or perquisite from a Company by a director, even if G he has no substantial interest in the Company.

The second part applies to a person who may not be a director but has a substantial interest in the Company.

What is "substantial interest" is further equated by the succeeding expression, "that is to say", with the coexistence of two clements, namely, (i) concern in the management of the business of the Company, and (ii) beneficial ownership of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend) carrying not less H than twenty per cent of the voting power.

There is no dispute before

(1) A.l.R. 1960 Mad. 143.

SUPREME COURT REPQRTS

(1977] 2 S.C.R.

A us that the assessee had obtained the benefit of Rs. 53,398/- from Bharat Union Agencies Pvt. Ltd.

It is further admitted that he holds 1800 shares out of the total of 3000 equity shares in this Company, carrying a voting power of 60 per cent.

Thus, the existence of the secortd element is more than satisfied.

Controversy pivots around the first element, only.

B The arguments which have been advanced before us on behalf of the assessee with regard to the construction and application of the expression "concerned in the management" of the business of the Company, were canvassed before the Tribunal, also.

The Tribunal repelled these arguments.

The reasoning of the Tribunal-with which the High Court found itself entirely in agreement-is as under :

C "Shri Sharma conceded the position that the assessee was controlling both the Companies in question ... To exercise control over a Company is something more than. to manage the Company.

A person who manages the company may not necessarily be in a position to control the business or affairs of the Company.

He may be managing under the instructions of those who are controlling the Company.

But D a person who controls a Company also directly or indirectly through the managerial staff manages the business of the Company.

It is again not necessary that the person who manages the business of the Company should be rightfully entitled to do it.

A person who is not rightfully entitled to manage the business of the Company but usurps the power by virtue of his certain position, is, in our opinion, certainly E a person covered by this expFession. It is also not necessary ... that the management should be carried on in an ostensible manner.

One who carried on the management indirectly and imperceptibly through the persons who outwardly and ostensibly carry on the. management is covered by the expression. It is not necessary, in our opinion, that the management should be both seen, and felt; it is sufficient F if it is felt, without being seen."

In our opinion, the above is a correct exposition of the law on the point.

The word "concern" is not a term of art, having a precise, fixed meaning.

It has several nuances, and is used to convey diverse shades of meaning over a wide spectrum. It may mean "to have a relation to, or bearing on, be of interest or, importance" or "to have an anxiety, worry". "Concerned" as an adjective may mean "interested", "involved".

In one context, it may mean one thing, and in a different context another.

The decisions as to the meaning of. this word used in a different context in another statute, are scarcely of much value in construing it in the setting of the provision with which we are concerned.

The best way therefore to construe this word is with reference to the context in which it is used.

In sub-clause (iii) of s. 2(6C) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the word "concerned" takes its colour from the words "in the management of the business" in association with which it occurs.

In the context of . ):msiness, "manage" means "to control, to guide, to administer, to conduct or direct affairs;

...

R. DALMIA v. GOMM. OF J.T. (Sarkaria, /.) 659

carry on 'business' (Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Webster New World

Dictionary). "Management" includes the act of managing by direction, or regulation, or administration or control or superintendence.

Construed with reference to the context, and the circumstances of

a case, the expression "person concerned in the management of the business" may take in not only a person who directly participates or engages in the management of the business but also one who indirectly B controls its management through the managerial staff, from behind the scenes.

The assessee's admission that he is in control of the Company necessarily includes an admission of his being "concerned in the management of the business of the Company", We, therefore, agree with the High Court, that the ambit of the term "concerned" in s. 2(6C) (iii) cannot be restricted to a person who is an employee of the business or an office-holder of the Company. In the context of C "management" it is wide enough to include every person 'interested' in the management, in the sense of having the direction and control of the managerial staff.

On the facts of the case, the assessee was such a person.

We are therefore, of opinion that the High eourt was right in answering the question referred to it, against the assessee.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

P.B.R .

Appeal dismissed.

8-l 12SCI/77

R. DALMIA

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NEW DELHI

January 19, 1977

R. S. SARKARIA

P. S. KAILASAM, JJ

Indian Income Tax Act

s. 2(6C)

Section 2(6C)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 2(6C)

s. 2(6C)(iii)

Bishamber Lal

V. S. Desai

Ramamurthi

R. N. Sachthey

SARKARIA

Bharat Union Agencies Pvt. Ltd.

Allen Berry and Co. Pvt. t Ltd

s. 2(6C)

Income-tax Act, 1922

Finance Act, 1955

Bharat Union Agencies. Pvt. Ltd.

Dalmia Jain Companies

Allen Berry

Bha.rat Union Agencies (P) Ltd.

s. 2(6C)

Income-tax Act, 1922

Allen Berry and Co. (P) Ltd.

s. 66

Income-tax Act

Bharat Union Agencies P. Ltd.

section 2(6C)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 2(6C)

Income-tax Act

Article 136

s. 2

Bharat Union Agencies P.

Ltd.

Allen Berry and Co. Pvt. Ltd.

Madras High Court

Rajamannar

s. 22

Bishamber Lal

s. 2(6C)

SUPREME COURT REPQRTS

(1977] 2 S.C.R.

Sharma

s. 2(6C)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 2(6C)


TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

URMILLA KOTHARI

January 20, 1977

[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]

Ka_rnataka Municipalities Act, 1964-Sec. 124-Karnataka Mu11icipalities T_axatu:n .Rules, 1965-Rule 26-Trncks pa, rsing on the highways within muni- ,.t c1pal /lm1ts-Whether octroi payable-Meaning of "brought into" and "immediate exportation".

The rspWldent is a transporter. The respondent lifts the iron ore in his trucks from Hubli Railway yard and carries it to Karwar and Belekeri harbours.

The trucks of the respondent have to pass in the course of transit through the limits of various Town Municipalities situate on the highway of which the appellant happens to be one.

The respondent does not nnload or re-load the iron ore at any intermediary point or stop. The appellant passed a resolution in purported exercise of s. 124 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act; 1964 read with rule 26 of the Karnataka Municipalities Taxation Rules, 1965, imposing a fee of Re. 1 /- per trip of each tmck. The respondent filed a writ petition challenging the levy of the fee.

The learned single Judge of the High Court

<limissed the writ petition. The Division Bench, however, allowed the appeal.

Dismissing the appeal by ce1iificate,

HELD : The present case is not covered by "any article or animal brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation" mentioned in s. 124. "Brought into" and "immediate exportation" do not comprehend within their sweep the coptinuous process of tranit of goods by vehicles which merely use the State High W1y passing through the areas which lie within 1.he municipal limits. In the instant case, the iron ore is carried in the trucks of the respondent which merely pass through the areas which lie within the .nunicipal limits and is not unloaded and reloaded at any place within the mc.1icipal areas. The continuity or continuous process of the carriage of iron ore is not in any way, in fact, broken within the municipal limits. The respondent cannot be said either to bring in or export the iron ore as contemplated by s. 124 of the Act read with Rule 26 of the Rules and, as such, is not liable to pay octroi or what is styled as supervision fee.

A contrary interpretation would make rail borne goods passing through the Railway Station within the limits of the municipality liable to the imposition of the fee on their arrival at the Railway Station and departure therefrom which could not be the intention of the "Legislature. [662 G-H, 664 B, G-H, 665 A-BJ

Tke Central India Spinning and Weavi1111 and Manufacturing Company ~- Limited, the Empire Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Nagpur [19581 SCR 1102=AIR 1958 SC 352, followed.

Brown v. State of Maryla11d (1827) 12 Wheat -419, 442: 6 L. Ed. 678, 686 and Wilson v. Robertson 24 L.J.Q.B. 185, quoted with approval.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1386 of

1~76.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21-9-76 of the Karnataka High Court in W.A. No. 150 of 1976.

H H. B. Datar, Sanjeev Aggarwal and R. B. Datar for the Appellant.

S. T. Desai, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and P. N. Puri for Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delvered by

JASWANT SINGH, J.

This appeal by certificate which is directed against the judgment and order dated September 21, 1976, of tho High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore reversing the judgment and order dated March 3, 1976 of a Single Judge of .that Court dismissing writ petition No. 6945 of 1975 filed by the respondent involves a substantial question of law of general public importance relating to the validity of the levy of what is styled as 'supervision fee' under section 124 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with rule 26 of the Karnataka Municipalities Tax(!tion Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules').

The facts of the case lie in a short compass and may be stated as follows:- Iron ore which is extracted from its mine heads in Hospet Taluka is brought over and stocked in Hubli Railyard by the Mysore Minerals Limited which is a Government undertaking.

Having taken up the contract of transhipment of the iron ore from Hubli Railyard to Karwar and Belekeri harbours, the Mysore Minerals Limited has sublet the same to the West End Minerals and Exports Private Limited.

The latter has in turn entrusted the execution of the contract to the respondent which is engaged in transport business.

The iron ore is accordingly lifted by the respondent in its trucks from Hubli Railyard and carried to Karwar and Belekeri harbours.

The trucks of the respondent carrying the iron ore have (en route) to pass in the course of transit through the limits of various town municipalities situate on the highway of which the appellant happens to be one, but they do not unload and reload the iron ore at any intermediary point or stop.

The appellant, on the basis of a resolution passed by it on January 25, 1975, and approved by the State Government levies the aforesaid fee of Re. 1/- per truck under section 124 of the Act read with rule 26 of the Rules.

The trucks of the respondent using the State highway within the municipal limits of Kalghatgi, District Dharwar are accordingly made to pay the fee for each of their trips.

Feeling that the fee realised by the appellant was invalid, the respondent filed a writ petition, being writ petition No. 6945 of 1975 in the High Court of Karnataka challenging the levy of the fee and seek· ing the issuance of a writ of mandamus restraining the appellant from realising the said fee.

A Single Judge of the High Court upheld the fee in question and dismissed the writ petition holding that the expression 'importer', 'place of import' and 'place of export' a8 used in section 124(1) of the Act are comprehensive enough to describe a person who merely brings the goods within the municipal limits for immediate exportation and the respondent who answered that description was bound to pay the fee. Aggrieved by this judgment and order, the respondent took the matter in appeal to a Division Bench of. the High Court which a1lowed the appeal and issued the writ prayed for by the respondent by its

A !udgment and order dated September 21, 1976. It is against this Judgment and order that the present appeal is directed.

At the hearing of the appeal, counsel have reiterated the contentions urged on behalf of the parties in the High Court.

The sole question that arises for determination in this appeal relates to the validity of the aforesaid levy.

For a proper determination of this question, it is necessary to advert to section 124 of the Act and rule 26 of the Rules.

"Section 124 : Non-liability for octroi and refund of octroi on } goods in transit.- 1 c

(1) Any article or animal brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation may at the option of the importer not to be subjected to lfvy of octroi if such article or animal be conveyed direct from the place of import to the place of export by such routes, within such time, and under such supervision as the municipal council may by resolution determine.

For purposes of this subsection the municipal council shall on payment of the prescribed fees issue promptly the necessary transport permits .

. (2) When any article in respect of which octroi has been paid is exported from the municipal limits, in the same condition in which it was brought into or received from beyond the municipal limits, the amount of octroi paid shall, subject E to such rules as may be prescribed, be refunded."

"Rule 26 : ... In case the person bringing the goods wishes to transport the goods at once beyond the limits of the municipality he shall do so only after obtaining a transport permit in Form IV, on payment of a fee of rupees two for each lorry and rupee one in other cases in the case of a city municipal council and rupee one for each lorry and fifty paise in other cases in the case of a town municipal council."

The opening words of section 124 of the Act viz. "any article or animal brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation" on the construction of which the up-shot of the case depends are very important.

They imply processes of 'importing into' and 'exporting from' the municipal limits of goods or animals and are indicative of an element of repose and rest of the goods within the municipal limits.

As rightly held bv the Division Bench of the High Court, the expressions 'brought into' and 'immediate exportation' do not comprehend within their sweep the continuous process of transit of goods, by vehicles which merelv use the State highways passing through the areas which lie within the municipal limits.

In the instant case, the iron ore is carried in the trucks of the respondent which merely pass through the areas which lie within the municipal limits and is not unloaded and reloaded at any place within the municipal

"•·

area.

As such, the important element of repose and rest which the words 'brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation' imply is absent in the instant case.

In The Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Company Limited, The Empire Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Nagpur('), this Court while discussing the meaning of the expression 'a terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of the municipality' occurring in section 66(1) (o) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, hold that the goods which were in transit and were merely carried across the limits of the municipality were not liable to terminal tax.

The following observations made therein which have an important bearing on the decision of the present appeal are worth quoting :-

"The efficacy of the relative contentions of the parties requires the determination of the construction to be placed on the really important words of whirh are "terminal tax", "imparted into or exported from" and "the limits of the Municipality".

In construing these word~ of the statute if there are two possible interpretations then effect is to be given to the one that favours the citizen and not the one that imposes a burden on him. . . . . . . Lexico-logically they (the words 'import' and 'export') do not have any reference to goods in 'transit' a word derived from transit bearing a meaning similar to transport, i.e. to g9 across.

The dictionary meaning of the words 'import' and 'export' is not restricted to their derivative meaning but bear other connotations also. . ... The word "transit", in the Oxford Dictionary means the action or fact of passing across or through; passage or journey from one place or point to another; the passage or carriage of persons or goods from one place to another; it also means to pass across or through (something) to traverse, to cross.

Even according to the ordinary meaning of the words which is relied upon by the respondent, goods which are in transit or are being transported can hardly be called goods "imported into or exported from" because they are neither being exported nor imported but are merely goods carried across a particular stretch of territory or across a particular area with the object of being transported to their ultimate destination which in the instant case was Nagpur ..... By giving to the words "imported into or exported from" their derivative meaning without any reference to the ordinary connotation of these words as used in the commercial sense, the decided cases in India have ascribed too general a meaning to these words which it appears from the setting, context and history of the clause was not intended.

The effect of the construction of "import" or "export" in the manner insisted upon by the respondent would make rail-borne goods passing through a railway staton within the limits of a Municipality liable to the imposition of the tax on their arrival at the railway station or

(!) (1958] S.C.R. 1102=A.T.R. 1958 S.C. 352.

A departure therefrom or both which would not only result in inordinate delays and unbearable burden on trade both inter State and intra State.

It is hardly likely that that was the intention of the Legislature.

Such an interpretation would lead to absurdity which has, according to the rules of interpretation, to be avoided."

The enunciation of law in the above case fully covers the present case. In the present case also, the iron ore which is in transit from Railyard at Hubli to Karwar and Belekeri harbours can hardly be characterised as goods brought into or exported from the municipal limits of Kalghatgi because they are neither imported into nor exported from any point within the municipal limits but are merely carried across a particular stretch of territory or across a particular area with the object of being transported to its ultimate destination. In Brown

v. State of Maryland('), Chief Justice Marshall dealing with the word 'importation' said as follows :--

"The practice of most commercial nations conforms to this idea.

Duties, according to that practice, are charged on those articles only which are intended for sale or consumption in the country.

Thus sea-stores, goods imported and re-exported in the same vessel, goods landed and carried over land for the purpose of being re-exported from some other port, goods forced in by stress of weather, and landed, but not for sale are exempted from the payment of duties.

The whole course of legislation on the subject shows that in the opinion of the legislature the right to sell is connected with the payment of the duties." '

In Wilson v. Robertson(2) where section 33 of The 48 Geo; 3, c.

civ. imposed a duty on all goods "imported into or exported from Berwick Harbour'', and the harbour extended from Berwick Bridge down the Tweed to the sea, but not above the bridge and goods were brought up the river in a seagoing vessel which, having first used the Harbour Commissioners' rings and posts in order to moor the vessel while lowering the masts, passed through Berwick Bridge and unloaded her cargo about 200 yards above the bridge and beyond the limits of the harobur; it was held that these goods were not "imported into" the harbour and as such liable to duty.

Bearing in mind the above authoritative enunciation of law, we are of opinion that as the continuity or continuous proces~ of the carriage of iron ore is not in any way in fact broken within the municipal limits of Kalghatgi, the respondent cannot be said either to bring in or export the iron ore as contemplated by section 124 of the Act read with rnle 26 of the Rules and as such is not liable to pay the octroi or what is styled as 'supervision _fee'.

A contrary nterpretaton woud . make rail borne goods passmg through the Railway Stations w1thm the

(!) 1827 12 Wheat 419=442=6 L. Ed. 678. 686.

(2) 24 L.J.Q.B. 185.

limits of the municipality liable to the imposition of the fee on their A arrival at these Railway Stations and departure therefrom which could not be the intention of the Legislature.

The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in allowing the appeal and issuing the writ sought for.

In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.

P.H.P. .ppeal dismissed.

TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

URMILLA KOTHARI

January 20, 1977

A. N. RAY, C.J.

M. H. BEG

JASWANT SINGH, JJ.

Municipalities Act, 1964

Sec. 124

Karwar

s. 124

s. 124

s. 124

AIR 1958 SC 352

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

H H. B. Datar

Sanjeev Aggarwal

R. B. Datar

S. T. Desai

S. K. Mehta

K. R. Nagaraja

P. N. Puri

section 124

Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964

Hubli Railyard

Mysore Minerals Limited

Belekeri

January 25, 1975

section 124

Kalghatgi

Dharwar

High Court of Karnataka

section 124(1)

September 21, 1976

section 124

Section 124

section 124

section 66(1)

Berar Municipalities Act, 1922

Nagpur

India

Hubli

section 33

section 124


MANGAL ORAM & ORS.

STATE OF ORISSA & ANR.

January 20, 1977

[H. R. KHANNA, R. S. SARKARIA AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.)

La_nd acquisition-Land acquired "for development of , industries namely est11b/ishment of a steel plant and allied and ancillary industries"-Establishing Rp!'rkela Steel Plant and a civil township around it, whether outside the definl/lon of word.s "development of industries" in ss. 2(c) and 3(1)-0rissa Development of lndustrie.J, Irrigation, Agriculture, Capital construction and resell/ement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (Orissa Act XVIII of

1948) read with Notification dated 20-2-54.

Section 2(c) of the Orissa Development of Industries, Irrigation, Agiiculture; . pita! construction and Resettlement of Displaced persons" (Land Acqms1tlon) Act, 1948 (Act XVIII of 1948), defines development of industries to mean and include the construction of Hiralmnd Dam and other dams and reservoirs, Hydro Electric Projects and such other schemes or property as the State Government may by a notification specify in this behalf. By a notification dated 20th Febl'l!ary, 1954 it was stated that "the project for the establishment of a steel plant and allied and ancillary industry in the block of villages round about Rourkela 'hall be included within the meanin~ of the expression "development of industries" as defined in cl. ( c) of e. 2 of the Act.

By notification dated 22nd February, 1954 and 9th February, 1955 82 sq. miles of land was acquired for the "development of industries, namely esta blishment of steel plant and allied and ancillary industries". The above land vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances on the dates of the above notifications.

The writ petitions filed by some ownern of some of the acquired lands challenging the validity of the acquisition were dismissed in limine.

In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended (a) the State Government was not competent to acquire the land in question under the Act for the establishment of a steel plant as it cannot be said to be for the purpose of the development of industry; (b) the acquired land could ouly be used for the steel pl1mt and ancillary industries and not for a civil township; (c) the trans

fer of 3.21 acres of land by the Railway authorities long after 14 years of the acquisition to the Notified Area Committee for construction of taxi-stand, busroad etc. in and around the Railway Station is bad.

Dismissing the appeals to this Court,

HELD : ( 1) In the face of the notification dated 20th February, 1954 and s. 2(c) of the Orissa Development ?f Industry, Irrigation, Agiicutl!r.e, Capital Construction and Resettlement of D!Splaced Persons (Land Acqu1S1tlon) Act 1948 the establishment of steel plant and ancillary industries at Rourkela answ'ers to the definition of development of industries as given in the Act.

[668 G-HJ

Clause ( c) of Section 2 confers wide powers on the State Government to notify any sche.me or projec~ as it .ma}'. consider appropriate for the devel_opment of industnes and there IS nothmg m that clause that the scheme or pro1ect can be the subject matter of a notification must be similar to Hirakund Dam or other darns or reservoirs or hydro electric project3. [669 A-Bl

(2) The contention tha~ the acquired land uld ouly be. use~ for th~ steel plant and ancillary industr.1es and no~ for the CIVll twnsh1p ts deo1d of force.

A township is a necessary adiunct aJ!d concomitant of a big steel plant. The establishment of a steel plant necessarily postulates the constmction of residential quarters for the workmen, shopping areas, schools, hospitals, A post-offices etc. The fact therefore that part of the land which was acquired has been used for civil township would not affect the validity of the acquisition of the land. r 669 C-Dl

(3) There is no principle of law by which a valid, compulsory acquisition stands void because long later the requiring authority diverts it to 8. pubHo purpose other than the one stated in the declaration. In the instant CllSe, the transfer of 3.21 acres of the land by the Railways is to the Notified Area Com- B mittee who is the appropriate body to construct and maintain the link roads, bus and taxi stands and shop surrounding the Railway Station. The land is not being used for a purpose extraneous from that for which the land was initially acquired. [669 G-H, 670 A-Bl

Gulam Mu.rtafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [1976] 1 SCR 875 applied; '

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1237 and C

~ 1238/72.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8-11-71 of the Orissa High Ceurt in O.J.C. Nos. 339 and 385 of 1968.

AND

Civil Appeal No. 1730 of 1973.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th February, 1973 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 130 of 1973.

Gobirul Das, (Mrs.) S. Bhandare, M. S.

Narasimhan,

A. K.

Mathur, A. K. Sharma and (Miss) Malini Paduval for the Appellants E in all the appeals.

D. P. Singh and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondent No. 1 in CAs. 1237-38/72.

Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for Respondent No. 2 in C.As. 1237-38/72.

B. Parthasarthi for Respondents 1, 3, and 4 in CA 1730/73.

L. N. Sinha, Sol. Gen. of India and Vinoo Bhagat for Respondent 7 in CA 1730/73.

Nemo for Respondents 2, 5, 6 in C.A. 1730/73.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KHANNA, J. This judgment would dispose of three civil appeals Nos. 1237 and 1238 of 1972 and 1730 of 1973 against the judgment of Orissa High Court. The first two appeals have been filed on certificate, while the third appeal has been filed by special leave.

We may first deal with civil appeals 1237 and 1238.

On February 22, 1954 a notification was issued under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Orissa Development of Industries, Irrigation, Agriculture, I Capital Construction and Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (Orissa Act XVIII of 1948) (hereinafter

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1977) 2 S.C.R.

referred to as the Act) by the Government of Orissa for the acquisition of 78 square miles of land for the "development of industries, namely, establishment of a steel plant and allied and ancillary industries".

The steel plant mentioned in the notification subsequently came to be known as the Rourkela steel plant.

Another notification wa.<i issued on Febmary 9, 1955 for the acquisition of further four square miles of land for the above purpose. It may be mentioned that according to section 5 (1) of the Act, when a notice of acquisition is served or is published under section 4, the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances on the date the notice is served or published in the gazette.

The appellants, who were owners of some of the acquired lands, filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the validity of the acquisition.

The High Court dismissed both the petitions.

In appeal before us, Mr. Gobind Das on behalf of the appellants has contended that the State Government was not competent to acquire the land in question under the Act for the establishment of a steel plant.

Our attention is invited in this connection to sub-section

(1) of section 3 of the Act which provides inter alia that whenever it appears to the State Government that it is necessary or expedient to acquire speedily any land for the purpose of the development of industry, a notification to that effect shall be published in the gazette stating the area and the boundaries of the land proposed to be acquired.

The argument of Mr. Gobind Das is that the acquisition of the land for the establishment of a steel plant cannot be said to bG for the purpose of the development of the industry.

It is not denied by the learned counsel that a steel plant constitutes an industrial undertaking and that the object of establishing a steel plant is not different from the purpose of the development of the industry as ordinarily understood. It also cannot be disputed that Rourkela steel plant constitutes a big milestone in the industrial development of the country. The contention of Mr. Gobind Das, however, is that the words "development of industries" have a limited meaning as defined in the Act and the establishment of a steel plant cannot be considered to be for development of industries.

The definition of "development of industries" has been given in section 2(c) of the Act.

According to the definition, development of industries means and includes the construction of the Hirakud Dam and other dams and reservoirs, Hydr0-Electric Projects and such other schemes or projects as the State Government may, by notification from time to time, specify in this behalf.

We have already mentioned above that the first notification for the acquisition of land was issued on February 22, 1954. Two days before that notification, on February 20, 1954 the Governor of Orissa issued a notification in pursuance of clause ( c) of section 2 of the Act In that notification, it was stated that the proiect for the establishment of a steel µlant and allied and ancillary industries in the block of villages round about Rourkela, shall be included within the meaning of the expression "development of industries", as defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Act.

In the face of this notification, we are of the opinion that the establishment of the steel plant and ancillary industries at Rourkela should be held to answer to the definition of "deve- 1 Iopment of industries'', as given in the Act.

We are unable to subsribe to the submission of Mr. Gobind Das that the scheme5 and pro- A jects which could be the subject-matter of a notification under section 2(c) must be such as are similar to Hirakud Dam or other Hydro- Electric projects. Clause ( c) of section 2 confers wide powers on the State Government to ntjfy any scheme or project as it may sidr appropriate for the development of industries and we find nothing m that clause that the scheme or project which can be the subject matter of a notification must be one simifar to Hirakud Dam or other dams B or reservoirs or hydro-electric projects.

It is then argued by Mr. Gobind Das that part of the lands which were acquired for the purpose of steel plant and ancillary industries are being used as a civil township.

It is contended that the acquired land could only be used for the steel plant and ancillary industries and not for a civil township.

This contention is equally devoid of force.

The establishment of a steel plant n.ecessarily postulates the construction of residential quarters for the workmen to be employed in the plant.

In addition to that, lands would be needed for shopping areas, for schools for the children of the employees, for play-grounds, for hospitals and for residential qua1iers of persons opening their shops catering to the needs of the employees of the steel plant.

Lands would likewise be need for post offices, banks, clubs, parks, cinemas, roads, police stations as also for cremation and burial of the dead.

Land would also be needed for a variety of other purposes and civic amenities.

A township is a necessary adjunct and concomitant of a big steel plant. The fact, therefore, that part of the land which was acquired has been used for civil township would not, in our opinion, affect the validity of the acquisition of the land.

In civil appeal 1237 of 1972, Mr. Gobind Das has also advanced an argument that possession of the land was not taken from the appellant.

We, however, find that the judgment of the High Court shows that no such contention was advanced before the High Court when the writ petition giving rise to this appeal was argued.

In the circumstances, we are not inclined to permit the appellant to raise this contention for the first time in appeal before u~.

Civil appeal 1730 of 1973 arises out of writ petition to challenge the validity of a notification dated March 19, 1958 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of 31.06 acres of land for expansion of rail facilities to serve the steel plant at Rourkela.

A writ petition to challenge this notification was filed on February 3, 1973. The contention which was advanced before the High Court and has been repeated before us with a view to challenge the validity of the acquisition of this land is that fourteen years after the acquisition of the land, the railway authorities for whom the land was acquired have transferred 3.21 acres of land to the Notified Area Committee, Rourkela.

The above submission, in our opinion, is without merit.

According to the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, the above mentioned area is sought to be transferred to the Notified Area Committee because the Notified Area Committee is the appropriate body to construct and maintain the

SUPREM!. COURT REPORTS

[1977] 2 S.C.R.

link road, bus and taxi stands and shops surrounding the railway station. The averments contained in the affidavit thus go to show that 3.21 acres of land is not being used for a purpose extraneous from that for which the land was initially acquired.

Apart from that, we find that this Court has recently held in the case of Gulam Mustafa &: Ors.

v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.(') that there is no principle of law by which a valid, compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the declaration.

All the three appeals consequently fail and are dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.

S.R.

Appeals dismissed.

(1) [1976] I S.C.R. 875.

MANGAL ORAM & ORS

STATE OF ORISSA & ANR

January 20, 1977

H. R. KHANNA

R. S. SARKARIA

JASWANT SINGH, JJ.

ss. 2(c) and 3(1)

Orissa Act XVIII of

Section 2(c)

20th Febl'l!ary, 1954

Rourkela

22nd February, 1954

9th February, 1955

20th February, 1954

s. 2(c)

Section 2

[1976] 1 SCR 875

Gobirul Das

S. Bhandare

M. S.

Narasimhan

A. K.

Mathur

A. K. Sharma

Malini Paduval

D. P. Singh

G. S. Chatterjee

Santosh Chatterjee

B. Parthasarthi

L. N. Sinha

Vinoo Bhagat

KHANNA

Orissa High Court

22, 1954

section 3

Orissa Act XVIII of 1948

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1977) 2 S.C.R.

Government of Orissa

Febmary 9, 1955

section 5

section 4

section 3

Rourkela steel plant

section 2(c)

February 22, 1954

February 20, 1954

Orissa

section 2

section 2

section 2(c)

Hirakud Dam

section 2

section 4

February 3, 1973


SITA RAM BHAU PATIL

RAMCHANDRA NAGO PATIL (DEAD) BY L. Rs. & ANR.

January 20, 1977

[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND P. s. KAILASAM, JI.]

) Bombay Tenancy &: Agricultural Lands Act 1948-Sec. 16-Power of

~· ,~

Revenue Tribunal to interfere with findings of fact.

llldian Evidence A.ct-Sec. 17-Admissibi/ity and relevance af vrevious ad111is.io11-E11tries in record of right-Presumptive value.

The appellant was owner of the suit land. The appellant's wife sold this land to respondent No 1. Thereafter, 1he appellant made an application under s. 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, for a declaration that ht< was a tenant of two of the 4 plots of the land. The dispute went up to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal who rejected the claim of the appellant to tenancy. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application under section 70(b) of the said Act praying for a declaration that the appellant was not a tenant in respect of the remaining two survey numbers also.

The respondent alleged that he never leased the land to the (lppellant and that he came to know of the entry of the record of rights for the year 1955-56 on the strength of mutation alleged to have been made on 30.1.1966. The respondent was cross-examined and it was suggested to him that he had made an admission in previous deposition although the said. deposition was not shown to the

repondent. After the cross-examination of the respondent was over, a certified copy of the said deposition was placed on record.

Thereafter the appellant was examined and he relied on the extract of the record of rights. The Mamlatdar rejected the claim of the appellant to be a tenant which was confirmed by the Deputy Collector. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held in exercise of its revisional powers that the appellant was proved to be a tenant of the land and set aside the concurrent. findings of the two authorities below. In a writ petition filed by the respondent under Art. 227 of the Constitution the High Courts set aside the order of ihe Revenue Tribunal.

Dismissing the appeal by Special Leave,

HELD : 1. Admission on which reliance has been placed by the appellant suffers from 3 infirmities :

(i) Earlier deposition related to two different survey numbers.

Whatever was stated about another survey number is irrelevant and inadmissible.

Since under s. 17 of the Indian Evidence Act an admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact.

(ii) In fact there was no admission in the earlier proceedings; and

. (iii) The deposition was not brought to the notice of respondent when he was being cross-examined.

Privy Council has laid down in the case of Bal Gangadhar Tilak that before any person is to be faced with any statemeat he should be given an opportunity to see that statement and to answer the atatement. [673 E, 674 A-C, 675 A-El

Bal Gancadhar Tilak v. Sltri11ivu P"niit 42 Indian Appeals 135 at pa2e 147, applied.

2. There is a presumption abput the correctness of the record of rights.

However, there is no abstract principle that whatever will appear in the Record of Rights will be presumed to be correct. In the present case it is ihown by evidence that the entries are not correct. [676 B-DJ

3. Under section 76 of the Act power of Tribunal to interfere is limited.

There was no error of law on the face of the record. If the authority entrusted with. adjudication goes into the question and assesse~ the same, the decision may be nght or wrong but that will not go to show that there is any error of law on the face of record. [676 E, 677 A-Bl

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1997 of 1968.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1968 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 643 of 1967.

B. N. Lokur and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellant.

S. V. Gupte, R. B. Datar and Sanjeev Kumar for Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAY, C.J. This appeal by special leave is from the judgment dated 13 February 1968 of the High Court of Bombay.

The appellant was owner of land covered by Survey No. 201/2, 194/13, 200/29 and 194/15. The appellant's wife sold this land to respondent No. 1 on 14 June 1946.

On 12 April 1962 the appellant made an application under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter ref('._rred to as the Bombay Act) for a declaration that he was a tenant of two of the four plots of land namely, Survey Nos. 194/15 and 200/29. This dispute between the appellant and the respondent in regard to alleged tenancy claim for these two survey numbers went up to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.

The Tribunal by order dated 19 March, 1954 rejected the claim of the appellant to tenancy in respect of the land covered by Survey Nos. 200/29 and 194/15.

Thereafter the respondent filed an application on 24 January 1963 under section 70(b) of the Bombay Act for a declaration that the appellant was not tenant of the remaining two Survey Nos. 201/2 and 194/13. The respondent alleged that he never leased the land to the appellant. The respondent further said that he came to know about entry in the record of rights for the years 1955-56 on the strength of mutation alleged to have been made on 30 January 1956 and sanctioned on 13 November 1956. This application of the respondent was resisted by the appellant on the ground that he was tenant of these two survey Nos. 201/2 and 194/13.

The matter was heard by the Mamlatdar. By an order dated 31 July 1963 the Mamlatdar rejected the claim of the appellant to be a tenant.

Thereafter the matter was taken up to the District Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector by his order dated 27 June 1966 upheld the Mamlatdar's order. Before the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector the respondent examined himself.

He was cross examined and his attention was drawn in cross examination towards an alleged admission about the appellant being his tenant in the deposition recorded by the Tenancy Aval Karkun in an earlier case on 10 September

1962. The respondent denied that he made any admission.

The previous deposition was not shown to him on that day.

F--

On 9 July 1963 a certified copy of the deposition in the earlier proceedings was placed on record.

On that very day the appellant examined himself, saying that he was a tenant of the land and he pad

no other evidence to show in support of his case except the certified copy of the statement which was produced on that day.

The appellant also relied on the extracts of the record of rights B showing that the respondent was shown as 'Kabzedar' of Survey Nos.

201/2 and the appellant was shown as tenant of the same. .In regard to Survey No. 194/13 it also appeared from the record of rights that the respondent was shown as 'kabzedar' and the appellant as a tenant.

On this evidence the Mamlatdar held that the appellant was not cultivating the lands as a tenant of the respondent and he declared that c the appellant was not a tenant.

The Deputy Collector affirmed the order of the Mamlatdar.

The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal however by its order dated 19 January 1967 hel<l that the appellant was "proved to be a tenant of the land. The respondent thereupon took the matter to the High Court under Article 227.

The High Court set aside the order of the Reve- D nue Tribunal. The appellant obtained special leave from this Court.

On behalf of the appellant three contentions were advanced. First, that the respondent was bound by his admission that the appellant is a tenant.

Second, there is a presumption of the correctness of the record of rights under section 135-J of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879.

Third, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was justified E in setting aside the findings of fact of the Mamlatdar a!1d the Deputy • Collector because of error of law.

The admission on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the appellant suffers from three infirmities.

In the deposition of the respondent in Tenancy Case No. 6/61-62 dated 10 September 1962, the respondent gave evidence in regard to dispute between the respon- F dent and the appellant in relation to Survey Nos. 200/29 and 194/15 respondent said that he never kept the appellant as a tenant on the '-'. land.

In cross examination it was suggested to the respondent that the land bearing Survey No. 201/2 belonged to the respondent and that the appellant is a tenant in the land.

The respondent said as follows : G "The land Survey No. 201/2 situate in Balkum belongs to me in Balkum.

The applicant is a tenant in the said land.

I do not take the rent in respect of the said land. . . . . . . . I have prior to 15-20

years purchased this land from Sitaram Bhau.

Even the land bearing S. No. 201/2 was purchased right from him.

I have never cultivated the land bearings S. No. 201/2.

It was barren at that time.

When this land was to be acquired J learnt whether Sitaram Bhau was cul- H !hating this land .... or whether his name has been entered as a tenant against this land(?) I cannot say as to whose land is around the land bearing S. No. 201/2 or other Land."

SUPREMECOURT REPORTS

[1977] 2 S.C.R.

A This evidence read in its entirety is not an admission at all.

person who says that. 'I have taken no rent' obviously says that thera is BO relationship of landlord or tenant.

The first infirmity in regard to this admission is that whatever was said by the respondent in regard to Survey No. 201/2 is irrelevant and inadmissible in the deposition of the respondent in that case.

Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act states that 'An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which 1mggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumsl!ances, hereinafter mentioned'. In regard to dispute between the appellant and the respondent arising out of Survey No. 194/15 and 200/29, Survey Nos. 201/2 and 194/13 were neither issues in fact nor relevant fact.

The second infirmity against this admission being used against the respondent is that as long as the respondent was under cross examination, it was not brought to his notice. It is said by counsel for the appellant relying on the decision of this Court in Bharat Singh and Anr. v. Bhagirathi reported in 1966(1) S.C.R. 606, that this admission was proved by the appellant and this admission on the ruling of the decision of this Court (Supra) is substantive evidence and is therefore admissible against the respondent.

The decision of this Court in Bharat Singh's case (Supra) is that :

"Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them.

Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of ss. 17 & 22 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted."

Admission proved are said in the decision to be

"admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether the party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions".

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent even though not confronted with the admissions would be bound by his admissions and the appellant would be entitled to rely on the admissions as admissible.

There is the observation in the very next sentence in the aforesaid decision of this Court that "the purpose of contradicting the witness under section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission".

It, therefore, follows that admission is relevant and it has to be proved before it becomes evidence.

If admission is proved and if it is thereafter to be use9 against the party who has made it the question comes within the provisi@ns of Section 145 of .the Evidence Act.

The provisions in the Indian Evidence Act that 'admission is not conclusive proof' are to be considered in regard to two features of evidenc.e.

First, what weight is to be attached to an admission ? In order to l\ttach weight it has to

be found out whether the admission is clear, unambiguous and is a A relevant piece of evidence.

Second, even if the admission is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act and if it is to be used against the party who has made it, "it is sound that if a Witness is under cross examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity, if the document are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute.

This is a general salutary and intelligible rule" (see Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas B Pandit-42 Indian Appeals 135 at page 147). The Judicial Committee in that case said, "it has to be observed with regret and with surprise that the general principle and the specific statutory provisions have not been followed".

The general principle is that before any person is to be faced with any statement he should be given an opportunity to see that statement and to answer the same.

The specific statutory provision is contained in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence C Act that "A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing c: reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him". Therefore, a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it D is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no avail and cannot be utilised against him.

The third infirmity with regard to this admission is whether this is a clear and unequivocal admission.

The High Court said that "a certified copy of the deposition was placed on record on 9 July 1973, on which day against it does not appear that the contents of the depo- E sition were read out to the respondent or that any attempt was made to obtain leave of the Court to further cross examine the witness." The contents of the alleged admission to which reference has been made are not unambiguous and cannot be accepted as an admission.

The contents are that he was not receiving any rent and the land was

fllow. Therefore, the High Court was right in rejecting the contentions advanced by the appellants that there w11s any admission and in F setting aside the decision of the Revenue Tribunal.

The second contention on behalf of the appellant is that the certain record of rights relied on by the appellant would establish that the appellant was a tenant.

The High Court rightly accepted the contention of the respondent that after a careful consideration of the evidence on record the fact finding courts, i.e. the Mamlatdar and the Special Deputy Collector recorded a finding that the appellant had not culti- G vated the land in dispute as the tenant of the respondent.

Therefore the Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere and set aside the finding of fact. ·

As to the record of rights it appears that the High Court referred to two important features.

It is true that the record of rights relate to Survey Nos. 201/2 and 194/13 and there is mention of the appel- H lant as tenant.

There is also a reference to the mutation proceedings.

The name of the respondent is shown as Kabjedar.

Two of the 9-l 12SCJ/77

important heads in the record are 'Mode' and 'Crops & fallows'.

The Mode is shown as "I" and under Crops and Fallows en, ry 'Paddy' is shown.

The High Court referred to this feature of the record of rights Mode "I" means that the respondent cultivated as owner of the land that was never even case of the appellant.

The High Court rightly said that the irresistible conclusion therefore is that the extracts from the record of rights contain entries which do not have any relation to true facts. If that is the position with regard to these extracts, these cannot be relied on for inference that actually the land was cultivated and paddy crops were grown on the said land.

With regard to the record of rights counsel for the appellant said that presumption arises with regard to its correctness.

There is no abstract principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will C be presumed to be correct when it is shown by evidence that the entries are not correct.

Apart from the intrinsic evidence in the record of rights that they refer to facts which are untrue it ao appears that the record of rights have reference to the mutation entry that was made by the Circle Officer on 30 January 1956. Counsel for the respondent rightly contended that no presumption could arise for two principal reasons.

First, the oral evidence in this case nullified the entries in D the record of rights as showing a state of affairs opposed to the real state of affairs and, second, no notice was ever given to the respondent with regard to mutation proceedings. Therefore the respondent is right in contending that no presumption can validly . arise from the record of rights.

The third contention on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal was justified to interfere because of error of law is also unacceptable.

Tiie provisions contained in section 76 of the Bombay Act enumerate the grounds on which there can be revision by the Revenue Tribunal.

One of the grounds is that there is 'error of law'. In the present case the manner in which the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal entertained the revision was by holding, as follows :

"There is evidence that the applicant (meaning thereby the appellant) has been in actual possession of land since 1956-57 onwards".

However, the authorities below have rejected the entries as well as the opponents' (meaning thereby the respondent) admission on the ground that the applicant did not support the entries by producing the rent receipts.

According to the authorities below the burden was on the applicant to prove his case by producing evidence to corroborate the entries.

The appellate authority has also observed that the alleged admission of the opponent, made in the other case was rejected by the Revenue Tribunal.

The authorities below arrived at the conclusion that the applicant's possession was otherwise than lawful.

This concurrent finding of the authorities below is being challenged by the applicant in this revision application."

The Revenue Tribunal seemed to consider the approach of the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector to be erroneous because according to the Revenue Tribunal the burden was shifted to the respondent

' \

to rebut the entry in the record of rights and that the respondent failed A to discharge that burden.

When the entire evidence is before the Court, it is well settled that the burden of proof becomes immaterial.

Further the Revenue Tribunal fell into error of entertaining the Revision when there was no error of law on the face of the record.

The presumption which was said to arise in the record of rights was before the Deputy Collector as well as the Mamlatdar. If the autho- B rity entrusted with adjudication goesinto the question and assesses the .same, the decision may be right or wrong but that will not go to show that there is any error of law on the fact of record.

All the three contentions advanced by the appellant fail.

The appeal is for the foregoing reasons dismissed with costs.

P.H.P.

Appeal dismissed.

SITA RAM BHAU PATIL

RAMCHANDRA NAGO PATIL (DEAD) BY L.Rs. & ANR

A. N. RAY, C.J.

M. H. BEG

P. s. KAILASAM

Agricultural Lands Act 1948

Sec. 16

Sec. 17

s. 70(b)

Agricultural Lands Act, 1948

section 70(b)

Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal

Art. 227

s. 17

Indian Evidence Act

Bal Gangadhar Tilak

Bal Gancadhar Tilak

section 76

B. N. Lokur

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

S. V. Gupte

R. B. Datar

Sanjeev Kumar

RAY

14 June 1946

12 April 1962

section 70(b)

Agricultural Lands Act

19 March, 1954

24 January 1963

section 70(b)

13 November 1956

10 September

1962

Article 227

section 135

Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879

Balkum

Sitaram Bhau

Section 17

Indian Evidence Act

Bharat Singh

ss. 17 & 22

Indian Evidence Act

section 145

Section 145

Indian Evidence Act

Section 145

9 July 1973

section 76


BALKRISHNA SOMNATH

SADA DEVRAM KOLI & ANOTHER

January 20, 1977

[V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.]

Bombay Tenancy & Agricultwal Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of

1948) as amended by Bombay Act XIII of 1956, section 32-Scope of-Interpretation of the words "disabled person's share in the joint family has beerr separated by metes and bounds" occurring in proviso to s. 32 F(l) (a). ~

Under s. 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 the tiller of the land had the. right to purchase the land tenanted to him. Where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to any mental or physic'.11 disability, the right to purchase such land is postponed till their disability

d1sappeas and one year lapses thereafter. But this embargo on the exercise of the nght of purchase ]:>y the tenant does not operate as per proviso to s. 32F(l)(a), if the property belongs to a joint family and there is a partition therein and the land is alloJted to the person under disability.

In both the appeals, the family owned lands and other assets and there was a partition confined to agricultural land only. In one case the share fell to a widow while in the other it fell to a minor, admittedly a disabled person within the meaning of s 32F(1). Before the Tribunal and lhe High Court, the landlord claimed, ther_efore, protection under the proviso to clause (a) of section 32F(l) of the Act while the respondent contended that even if the agricultural land had been divided and other assets admittedly remained joint, the appellant was ineligible to .claim the benefit of the proviso. The High Court decided against the landlord and held : "The proviso is not satisfied unless the share of a disabled person is separated by metes and bounds in all the joint family property and unless the agricultural land allotted to him corresponds to his share in the entire property and is not in excess thereof'.

Dismissing the appal to this Court,

HELD : (1) The broad idea is to vest full ownership in the tenantry. A compassionate exception is made in favour of a handicapped landlords who cannot prove their need to recover their land on approved grounds. The Legislature conditioned the proviso by insisting that the sej)aration should be from the whole joint family assets and not a tell-tale transaction where agricultural lands alone are divided and secondly even where there is a total partition only a fair proportion of the lands is allotted to the disabled person. [682 C-D-FJ

(2) What section 32F(1) insists upon is that (a) share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds; (b) the Mamlatdar is satisfied that the share of the disabled person in the land is separated in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in a larger proportian. [681 GJ

(3) The imperative condition for the operation of the proviso is that there should be a total separation and so far as a disabled member is concerned, it must cover all the joint family properties. The usage of the expressions "the share of such person in the joint_family", "the share of such person in the land" "the share of that person in the entire joint family property" in the

sectio~ the clear statement in the proviso that the disabled person's share in the joint family must have been separated by metes a.nd ound~ and the sta!utory exercise expected of the Mamlatdar by the proviso mvolvmg an enqmry into the share of the disabled person in the land and its value, the share of that person in the entire joint family properties, the proportion that the allot-

I ,,

' I,

i ment of the land bears to his share in the entire joint family property with a A view to see that there is no unfair manouvre to defeat the scheme of the Act- .lead to the necssary postulate that it is not confined to the share of the land <0nly but really means his share in the entire joint family property. [683 E-H, 684 Al

( 4) In the instant case there is no division of all the joint family property. <Only the landed properties have been separa~. [684-B]

-Observation :

The reform of the inherited law-niaking methodology may save court time ; and reduce litigation. Our legislative process, not an unmixed blessing, works under such instant stress and ad hoc hephazardness that the whole piece of legislation when produced makes experienced draftsmen blush, as in the instant .case, the involved drafting of s. 32F has had its share in the marginal obscurity , of meaning. [682 B-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 129 of 1968,

,; Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 18-8-66 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 1299/67 and

Civil Appeal No. 2007 of 1969

From the Judgment and Order dated the 18th, 20th June 1968 <Jf the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 1676 of 1964. and

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3175/75

From the Judgment and Order dated the 31-10-74 of the Bombay.

High Court ; n Special Civil Appln. No. 2610 of 1970.

V. M. Tarkunde, V. N. Ganpule and P. C. Kapoor for the appellant in C. A. 129 of 1968.

S. N. Anand for Respondent No. 1 in CA 129/68

V. N. Ganpule for the Petitioner in SLP

S. B. Wad and R. N. Nath for the Appellants in CA 2007 of 1969. R. B. Datar and S. C. Agarwal for Respondent No. 1 in CA 2007 I 69

The Judgment of the Court was. del(•vered by

KRISHNA IYER, J.

These two appeals raise a short issue of interpretation of the proviso to s. 32F (1) (a) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

The appellants in both the cases are the aggrieved landlords, the tenants' right of puchase under t.he Act having been upheld by the Hi•gh Court.

The correctness of this view is canvassed . before us by counsel.

The facts necessary . to appreciate the rival contentions may be stated briefly.

The parties are different but the issue is identical. and 110 a single judgment will dispose of both the appeals.

In Civil Appeal No. 2007 of 1969 the witlow of a deceased landowner, one Dattatraya, is the appellant. The deceased owned several houses, had a money-lending business and considerable agricultural lands.

He left behind him on his death in .1952 a widow'{the second, appellant) and two sons, one of whom is the first appellant. Admittedly the Act, an agrarian reform measure, was extensively amended by Bombay Act XIII of 1956 conferring great rights on tenants and, inflicting erious mayhem on landlordism. The case of the appellants is that there was a partition among the mother and the two sons of the agricultural estate whereunder the second appellant (the widow) was allotted around 80 acres of land out of which about 15 acres were held by the first respondent as a tenant. On the Tillers' Day tenants bloomed into owners by the conferment of the right of purchase.

On the basis that the first respondent had become the o..yner, a proceeding !or the determination of the purchase-price of these lands was initiated; by the Tribunal, as provi'ded under s. 32G of the Act.

Although notice was not given to the second appellant, the first appellant appeared before the Tribunal, urged the case that the land held by the first responden~ was set apart in a family partition to his mother, the second appellant, and that1 since she was a widow she came squarely within the protective provision of the proviso to cl. (a) of s. 32F(l) of the Act.

The first respondent, however, contested the partition and further pressed the plea that even if the agricultural lands had been divided since the house and the money-lending business and other assets admittedly remained joint, the appellant was ineligible to claim the benefit of the proviso aforesaid.

We need not trace the history of the litigation from deck to deck but may conclude the story for the present purpose by stating that the High Court took the view

that the second appellant (widow did not qualify under the said pro- . viso : "The proviso is not satisfied unless the share of a disabled person is separated by metes and bounds in all of the joint family property and unless the agricultural land allotted to him corresponds to his share in the enti•re property and is not in excess thereof."-This was the construction put by the Court on the proviso and challenged before us by Shri Wad in C. A. 2007 of 1969 and by Shri Tarkunde in C. A. 129 of 1968.

In Civil Appeal No. 129 of 1968 the legal scenario is similar~ The family owned1 lands and other assets and tbere was a partition on November 7, 1956 confined to agricultural land only, but the house property remained undivided.

The partition deed shows that the land under the tenancy of the first respondent has been set apart to the share of a minor appellant.

The Tillers' Day arrived.

The tenant claimed to have become owner.

Proceedings ur1der s. 32G of the Act for determination of the compensation were commenced, and the mantle of protection of the proviso to s. 32F (1) (a) was pleaded in vain.

The High Court having negatived the landlor?'s contention summarily, this Court has been approached, the pomt urged being the same as in the previous appeal.

In both the appeals we may proceed, for testing the legal proposition, on assumed facts.

We may take it that there was a partition in both cases during the period referred to in the proviso, i.e., A before March 31, 1958.

We may further take it that the widow and the minor come within the category specified in s. 3 2F (1) (a).

- We have also to proceed on the basis that the joint family in each case has other assets which remain joint and undivided.

Before proceeding further with the discussion t may be proper to read the relevant provision for a break up of the, statutory iimbs : B

"32F. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the proceeding sections- ( a) where the landlord i<s a minor, or a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disabi'lity the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land under section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31 and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimatiton to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31 :

Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-secti'on shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion.

x x x x"

Where the landlord is a minor or a widow, as in this case, the tenants' right to purchase such land under s. 32 is postponed till their

disability disappears and one year lapses thereafter. But this embargo on the exercise of the right of purchase by the tenant does not operate if the property belongs to a joint family and there is a partition therein and the land in question is allotted to the person under disabiMy.

What the section insists upon is that (a) share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds; andi

(b) the Mamlatdar is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint-family property and not in a larger proportion.

We are dealing with an agrarian reform law whose avowed object its to confer full proprietorship on tilling tenants and it is a fact of H common knowledge that landlords resort to cute agrarian legal engineering to circumvent the provisions.

The legislature, with local knowledge of famili'ar manipulations and manouvres calculated to

A defeat land reors, mkes widely-worded provisions the 'why' of it may not. be easily ~1s.cermble to the Court. We have to give full force <\lld effect without whittling down or supplying words. Nor can the Court presume the mischief and remedy. the evil by interpretative truncation. bl7nd of the grammatical and !]ie teleological modes of construction ts the best and that iSJ what has been done by the High Court.

We arei free to agree that the itnvolved drafting of the section has had its share in the marginal obscurity of meaning.

But our legis~ lative process, not an unmixed blessing, works under such instant stress and ad hoc haphazardness that the whole piece when produced makes experienced draftsmen blush.

Reform of the inherited lawmaking methodology may save court time and reduce litigation.

Be that as it may, we have to wrestle with the language of the Proviso to decode its true sense.

The broad idea is to vest full ownership in the tenantry.

A compassionate exception is made in favour of handicapped landlords who cannot prove their need to recover their land on approved grounds.

These disabled categories include infants and widows.

But if the lands belong to joint fami!l.ies of which they are members, the raison d'etre for such protection does not exist because the manager of this joint family_ takes care of its collective interests.

Where, h.owever, there has been a partition of the joint family, then the widow or minor has to stand on her or his own disabled legs and so the Proviso to s. 32F (1) (a) was brought in by amendment to give them protection for the period of the disability and a little longer.

But every ruse to save the lands is used by landlords and so, once it was in the air that minors and widows may be exempted, a spate of partitions perhaps ensued.

Joint living is the dear, traditional hindu way of life but jettisoning jointness to salvage land is dearer still.

Blood is thicker than water, it has been said; but in this mundane world, property i'S thicker than blood: So partition deeds, conveniently confined to land, became a popular art of extrication.

And the, Legislature, anxious to inhibit such abuse, while willing to exempt genuine, total separations, conditioned the Proviso under consideration by insisting that the separation should be from the whole joint family assets and not a tell-tale transaction where agricultural lands alone are divided and secondly, even where there is a total partition, only a fair proportion of the lands is allotted to the disabled person.

In this light, we may read the Proviso.

To steer clear of possible confusion we may agree that partial partition may be lega!Iy permisible and the Hindu law does not require investigation into the motives or motivelessness behind the partition.

We also accept that division in status is good enough to end commensality .or jointness under the personal law.

But we are now in the jurisdiction of land reform legislation and the Legislature, with a view to fulfil its objectives, may prescribe special requirements.

The Court has to give effect to them, in the spirit of agrarian reform and not read down the wide words on judicial suppositions.

., .

.llALKRISHNA v. SADA DEVRAM (Krishna Iyer, J.) 683

Here the Proviso can rescue. the widow or the minor only if the prerequisites are fai!rly and fully fulfilled.

Section 32 states that the tenants shall be deemed to have purchased the tenanted land on the Tillers' Day. The Tribunal suo motu takes action to determine the purchase price.

But all this is kept in abeyance if the landlord belongs to the disabled category and qualifies under s. 3 2F ( 1) . The crucial issue is whether the Proviso applies even if the separat;\ln of the widow or minor is restricted to agricultural lands.

Shri Wad and Shri Tarkunde vehemently urge that it is none of the concern of the agrarian law what happens to the other assets of the joint family, so long as the lands are divided i!n fair proportion.

Shri Datar presses what the High Court has laconically reasoned, viz., that it is possible tq defeat the scheme by division of the lands alone.

For one thing, in most such partial partitions, inspired by the desire to avoid the land reforms i•n the offing, the Legislature can, as a policy

decision, insist on a whole partition, to reduce the evasion.

Moreover, there will be a: sudden fancy for allotting all the good lands to the share of widows and minors, depriving the tenants of their legitimate expectations. And, if lands and other assets are to be divided, then less lands will go to the disabled persons or even none. For instance the house may be allotted to the widow and the lands taken over by adult males.

The ornaments may all go to the woman, the agriculture to the men.

We need not speculate, but may content ourselves with stating that the Legislature has, for some reasons, decided to lay' down conditions and the words of the text must be assigned full effect.

The Proviso clearly states that the disabled person's s_!iare 'in the joint fam:Jl.y' must have been 'separated by metes and bounds'.

Separation from ~~ joint family means separation from all the joint family assets. Otherwise the sharer remains partly joint and, to that ex~ tent, i's not separated from the joint family. Notional division or division . in status also may not be enough because the Act insists on separation 'by metes and bounds'. Ordinarily 'metes and bounds' are appropriate to real property, meaning, as the phrase does, 'the boundary lines of land, with their terminal points and angles'.

In the context, the thrust of the expression is that the division must be more than notional but actual, concrete, clearly demarcated.

The ineptness and involved structure and some ambigui.lfy notwithstanding, the sense of the sentence is clear.

The share of a person in the joint family, plainly understood, means his share in all the joint family properties and not merely in the real estate part. What is more, the sedion uses the expressions 'the share of such person in the joint family', 'the share of such person i!n the land', 'the share of that person in the entire joint family property'. Thus it is reasonable to hold that when the expression used is 'the share of such person in the point family', it is not confined to the share in the land only. It really means his share 'in the entire joint family property'. Moreover. the statutory exercise expected of the Mamlatdar by the Provi<so involves an enquiry into the share of the disabled person in the Jand, and its value, the share of that person in the entire joint family property, the proportion that the allotment of the land bears to his share in the entire joint

A family property, wifth a view to see that there is no unfair manouvre to defeat the scheme of the Act.

The. necessary postulate is that there is a division in the entire joint family property.

Therefore, the imperative condition for the operation of the Proviso is that there should be a total separation and so far as a disabled member i's concerned it must cover all the joint family properties.

B We are therefore in agreement with the interpretation adopted by the High Court.

In the cases under appeal there is no division of all the joint family properties.

Only the landed properties have been separated.

The appeals therefore faill. and are dismissed.

In the circumstances, we direct parties to bear their costs.

S.R.

Appeals dismissed.

. ..

BALKRISHNA SOMNATH

SADA DEVRAM KOLI & ANOTHER

January 20, 1977

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

A. C. GUPTA, JJ.

Agricultwal Lands Act, 1948

Bombay Act LXVII of

Bombay Act XIII of 1956

section 32

s. 32

s. 32

s. 32F(l)(a)

s 32F(1)

section 32F(l)

section 32F(1)

s. 32F

V. M. Tarkunde

V. N. Ganpule

P. C. Kapoor

S. N. Anand

S. B. Wad

R. N. Nath

R. B. Datar

S. C. Agarwal

KRISHNA IYER

s. 32F

Bombay Act LXVII of 1948

Dattatraya

Bombay Act XIII of 1956

s. 32G

s. 32F(l)

Tarkunde

November 7, 1956

s. 32G

s. 32F

March 31, 1958

s. 3

section 32

section 31

section 31

31st day of March 1958

s. 32

s. 32F

Krishna Iyer

Section 32

s. 3

Wad

Datar