COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, NEW DELHI v.

P. N. SIKAND

April l, 1977

(P. N. BHAGWATJ AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]

Wealth Tax Act. 1957 (Act 27 of 1957)-S. 7 rlw ss. i(e)(m), 3-Valuation of the hase-hold interest, when attached with a restraint or disadvantage- "Net wealth" in s. 2(m)-Whetlzer 50% of unearned increase "payable" to the lessor as per the agreement deductible out of the valuation.

The respondent an assessee to wealth tax as an individual, in the assessment for the assessment year 1968-69, valued his property situate on plot No. 12, Block 39 Kautilya Mrg, Chanakyapuri in his return of net wealth @ Rs. 4,52,000

as against the value of Rs. 6,00,000 shown by him in_ the previous years. The property consisted of leasehold interest in the land together with a house built on it.

The land belonged to the President of India and it was leased by the President of India to one Vashesharan Devi on the terms and conditions set out in an agreement of lease dated 30th December, 1954 and the leasehold interest was acquired from Vashesharan Devi by the assessee. Clause (13) of the le<lfic deed provided that the assessee shall not be entitled to assign the leasehold interest in the land without obtaining the prior approval in writing of the lessor and 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land at the time of assignment shall be claimable by the lessor and moreover, if the lessor so desires, he shall have pre-emptive right to purchase the property after deducting

50% of the unearned increase in the value of the land. It further provided that "all such assignees and transferees ........ shall be bound by alf the covenants and conditions herein contained and be answerable in respect therefor".

In accordance with this clau!le, the Architects who are approved valuers estimated the value of the property @ Rs. 5,82,268 and from this figure, they deducted a sum of Rs. 1,30,000 representing 50 per cent of the unearned increa!le in the value of the land, which belonged to the lessor and arrived at the value of Rs. 4,52,268/-.

The Wealth Tax Officer did not accept the estimate of the valuation and taking the annual rental value of Rs. 1,32,000 /- fetched by the property as the basis, computed the net annual rent at Rs. 82,956/- and arrived at the figure of Rs. 8,29,560/- as the value of the property by applying the multiple of ten to the net annual rental value of Rs. 82,956/-. The claim of the assessee to deduct from the value of the property 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land was rejected on the ground that this claim. was based "merely on hypothetical presumptions". The value of the property was, however, reduced from Rs. 8,29,560/- to Rs. 6,00,000/- since that was the figure accepted by the Revf'.nue in the past assessment years. The appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal failed.

On a reference, the High Court took the view that the liability to pay 50. per cent of te unearned increase in the value of the land to the lessor at the time of the assignment was a disadvantage attached to the lea-sehold interest in the Ian~ and. h.ence its value was liable to be deducted from the value of the property 1n arnv1ng at the net wealth.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court,

HELD : ( 1) In determining the value of the leasehold interest of the assessee in the land for the purpose of assessment to wealth tax the price which the leasehold interest would fetch in the open market, were it not encumbered or affected

by the burden of the restriction contained in clause ( 13) of the leasedeed, would have to be reduced by 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land on the basis of the hypothetical sale on the valuation date.

[427 C-D]

(2) The only way in which in a case of this kind the valuation u/s. 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act can be done is by taking the market value of the leasehold interest as if it were unencumbered or unaffected by the burden or restriction contained in clause (13) nnd deducting from it, 50 per cent of the unearned

t '

increase in the value of the land on the basis of the hypothetical sale as repre- A sent1ng the value of such burden or restriction. [425 A-Cl

(3) The true test for determining: tbe matter of payment ruade by an assessee out of an amount received by him whether it is an application of part of the amount which belon&s to him or it is payment of an amount which is diverted before it reaches the assessee so that at the time of receipt, it belongs to the payee and not to the assessee. In the present case 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land would be diverted to the lessor before it reaches the hands of the assessee as part of the price.

[425 E-F] B

C.l.T. v. Sitaldas Tiralhda.s 41 J.T.R. 367 SC; applied.

Pandit Lakshn1i Kant Jha v. Conunissioner of Wea.lth~Tqx, Bihar 90 I.T.R. 97, explained.

( 4) The burden or limitation attaching to the leasehold interest must be tall.en into account in arriving at the value of the leasehold interest and it cannot be value ig11onni;:: the burden or limitation. The covenant in clause (13) is C clearly a. covenant running with the land and it would bind whosoever is the holder of the leasehold interest for the timf:I being. It is a constituent part of the rights and liabilities and advantages and disadvantages which go to make up the leasehold interest and it is an incident which is in the nature of burden, on the leasehold interest.

Plainly and indisputably, it has the affect of depressing the value which the leasehold interest would fetch if it were free from this burden or disadvantage. When the leasehold interest in the land has to be valued this burden or disadvantage attaching to the leasehold interest must be duly discounted in estimated the price which the leasehold interest would fetch. To D value the leasehold interest on the basis that this burden or disadvantage were to be ignored would be to value an asset different in content and quality from that actually owned by the asse., ee. [424 B, 423 D-Hl

Corrit! v. MecDer1nott [1914] A.C. 1056, quoted with approval.

(5) When under the lease deed the le5sor has a bundle of rights \Vhich includes "somethin, e" more than the reversion, that "something" would necessarily be subtracted from the interest of the lessee and to that extent, the interest of the lessee would be the leasehold interest minus that "something". What goes E to augment the interest of the lessor would correspondingly reduce the interest of the lessee and it cannot be taxed as the wealth of both the lessor and the lessee. It would be includible in the net wealth of the lessor and hence it cannot at the same time form part of the wealth of the lessee and must be subtracted in determining the nature and extent of the interest of the lessee. [424 E-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1174 of 1974.

(From the Judgment and Order dated the 4-4-1974 of the Delhi High Court in Wealth Tax Ref. No. 5 of 1972).

R. M. Mehta and P. L. Juneja, for the appellant.

G. C. Sharma, M. L. Khanna, Anup Sharma, Miss Jaswal K. K. and K. R. Jagaraja and D. K. Jain, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI, J.-This appeal raises a rather difficult but interesting questio11 of law relating to valuation for tbe purpose of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 of leasehold interest in land when there is a covenant in the lease tat the les.se_e shall no_t' be entitled to assign the leasehold mterest without obtammg the pnor approval in writing of the lesso~ and the lessor shall be entitled to claim and recover from the lessee a. certain specified proportion oJi the unearned increase in the value of the land at the time of the assignment.

! 3-436SCI/77

A The controversy in this appeal relates to the assessment year 1968-69, the relevant valuation date. being 31st December, 1\167.

The assessee is assessed to wealth tax as, an individual.

Hls net wealth on th(1 valuation date included a property situate on plot No. 12, Block 39, Kautilya Marg, Chanakyapun. fhe property consisted of leasehold interest in the land together with a house built upon it.

The land belonged to the President of India and it was leased B by the President of India to one Vashesharan Devi on the terms amt conditions set out in an agreement of lease dated 30th December, 1954 and the leasehold interest was acquired from Vashcsharan Devi by the assessee.

The premium for the grant of the lease was Rs. 24,400/- and the annual rent was fixed at Rs. 610/-, subject to certain variations.

The terms and conditions of the lease are a little c

important and, so far material, they may be reproduced as follows :

"13. The lessee shall before any assignment or transfer of the said premises hereby demised or any part thereof obtain from the lessor or such officer or body as the lessor may autl1orise in this behalf approval in writmg of the said assignment or transfer and all such assignees and transferees and the heirs of the lessee shall be bound by all the covenants and conditions herein contained and the answerable in all respect therefor.

Provided also that the lessor be entitled to claim and rewver a portion of the unearned increase (i.e. the difference between the premium already paid and current market value) in the value of land at the time of transfer (whether such transfer is an entire site or only a part thereof), the amonnt to be recovered being 50 per cent of the unearned increase.

The Lessor shall have a pre-emptive right to the property after deducting 50 per cent 0£ the unearned (torn) said." , :i ;~ 1

The assessee constructed a large building on the land and the question arose as to how the leasehold interest of the assessee in the land together with the building should be valued.

This prDperty hacl been valued in the past assessment years at Rs. 6,00,000/- and the assessee had accepted this valuation and not challenged it.

But in the assessment for the assessment year, 1968-69 the assessee valued this property in its return of net wealth at Rs. 4,52,000/- on the basis of a certificate obtained from M/s Anand Apte and Jhabvala, Architects who are approved valuers recognised by the Department.

The Architects estimated the value of the property at Rs. 5,82,268/- and from this figure, they deducted a sum of Rs. I ,30,000/- representing 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land, which under the tern1s and conditions of the lease belonged to the lessor and arrived at the value of Rs. 4,52,000/-.

The Wealth Tax Officer did not accept the estimate of the valuation made by the Architects and taking the annnal rent of Rs. 1,30,000/- fe.tchcd by the property as the basis, computed the net annual rent at Rs. 82,956/-

eoMMR. WEALTH TAX v. P. N. SIKAND (Bhagwati, !.) 421

Ltnd arrived at the figure of Rs. 8,29,560/- as the value of the pro- A perty by applying the multiple of ten to the annual rental value of Rs. 82,956/-. The Wealth Tax Officer rejected the claim of the _assessee to deduct from the value of the property 50 per cent of the l!nearned increase in the value of the land on the ground that this , claim was based "merely on hypothetical presumptions" but reduced the value olf the property from Rs. 8,29,560/- to Rs. 6,00,000/-, since that was the figure accepted by the Revenue in the past assess- B ment years.

The assessee challenged the valuation made by the Wealth Tax Officer in an appeal preferred bfore the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the appeal was unsuccessful as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner took the same view as the Wealth Tax Officer.

The Tribunal also, in further appeal, affirmed the same view holding that "the fact that the assessee might have to pay 50 per cel)t of the unearned increase to the lessor does not 11ffect the, C valuation( of the property under section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act" .and the words used in that section "make it clear that the estimate which should be made by the Wealth Tax Officer is of th() gross _price" and henrn no part of the unearned increase was deductible m computing the value of the property for the purpose of the W calth Tax Act.

The Tribunal also upheld the rental method of valuation .of the property and finding that the valuation of Rs. 6,00,000 /- ad op- D ted by the Wealth Tax Officer was even less than eight times the .annual rental value of Rs. 82,956/-, the Tribunal declined to, interfere with the valuation made by the Wealth Tax Officer.

The assessee thereupon applied to the Tribunal for making a feference to the High Court and on the application of the assessee, the following question of law was referred by the Tribunal for the E .opinion of the High Court :

"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in taking the view that 50% of the unearned increase payable to the lessor of the land formed part of, and was not deductible out of, the valuation of the property for the purposes of Wealth-tax F Act?"

.The High Court took the view that the liability to pay 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value o~ the land to the lessor at the time of the assignment was a disadvantage attached to the leasehold interest in the land and hence its value was liable to be deducted from the value of the property in arriving at the net wealth of fue assessee G and on this view, it answered the question in the negative in favour of the assessee. '!is led to .the filing of the present appeal by the Revenue after obtammg a certificate of fitness from the High Court.

.. It would be convenient at the outset to refer to the relevant pro- 'V1s1ons of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 before we address ourselves to the question which arises for determination in the appeal. J:he Wealth H Tax Act, J 957 was passed by the Parliament in: exercise of the legislative power conferred under Entry 86 of List I oti the Seventh Sche- .dule to the Constitution and, as pointed out by Shah, J., in Sudhir

Chandra Nawa v. Wealth Tax Officer, Calcutta,(1) wealth tax "is a tax imposed on the capital valne of the assets of individuals and companies on the valuation date . . . . . . it is imposed on the total assets. which the assessee owns" and it is levied on the value of those assets. 'Section 3 is the charging section and it provides that, snbject to the other provisions contained in the Act, there shall be charged for every assessment year commencing on and from the 1st day of April, 1957 a tax in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu Undivided Famil)' and company at the rate or rates specified in the Schedule. Thus, wealth tax is a tax on the net wealth of the assessee on the valuation date. Net wealth is defined in section 2 (m) to mean "the amount by which the aggregate value, computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, of all the assets, wherever located, belonging to the assessee on the valuation date, including assets required to be included in his net wealth as on that date under this Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the valuation date" other than debts falling within certain specified categories. The word 'asset' used in section 2(m) is of the widest signification and under section 2( e), it includes property of every description, movable or immovable, barring certain exceptions which are not material for our purpose. What is, therefore, necessary for the purpose of determining the net wealth of the assessee is, first to compute the ggregate value of all assets belonging to the assessee in accordance with the provisions of the Act and then to deduct from it the aggregate value of all the debts, and the resultant which is obtained would be the net wealth assessable to tax. Section 7, sub-section (1) fays down the mode of determination of the value of an. asset for the purposes of the Act and it says that, subject to any rules made in this behalf, the value of any asset other than cash "shall be estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the Wealth Tax Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date".

Now, plainly one of the assets belonging to the assessee in the present case was the leasehold interest in the land together with the building upon it and for the purpose of computing the net wealth of the assessee, it was necessary to determine the value of this asset.

The question which must, therefore, be asked in; terms of section 7 (1) is : what would be the price which this asset would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date? This question cannot be satisfactorily answered, unless we first determine what is the nature of this asset : what is the interest in property, qualitative as well as quantitative, which this asset repre sents ?

The asset consists of leasehold interest of the asse8see in the land together with the building constructed upon it.

The building, of course, belongs to the assessee having been constructed by him and the determination of its valull should not present any difficulty, because there are recognised methods of valuation of buildings.

The difficulty, however, arises: in regard to valuation of the leasehold interest in the! land. The leasehold interest is held by the assessee under a lease-deed executed by the President of India and apart from

(1) 69 I.T.R. 897.

dausc ( 13), which we have reproduced above, it is an ordinary leasedeed of the usual kind.

Clause ( 13) of the lease-deed provides that the assessee shall not be entitled to assign the leasehold! interest in the land without obtaining the prior approval in writing of the lessor and

SO per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land at the time of the assignment shall be claimable by the lessor, and moreover, if the lessor so desires, he shall have pre-emptive right to purchase the property after deducting 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land.

Does this covenant merely impose a personal obligation on .the lessee which arises on assignment of the leasehold interest or it is a covenant rnnning with the land ? That is a question which has a direct bearing on the valuatio_n of the . leasehold interest.

Now, the last portion of the first paragraph of clause (13) provides that "all such assignees and transferees .... shall be bound by all the cpvenants and conditions herein contained and, be answerable in respect therefor". This means that whenevev an assignment of the leasehold interest is made by the lessee, the assignee would be bound by all the covenants contained in the lease-deed and these would indisputably include the covenant.in clause (13). Clause (13) would equally bind the assignee and if the assignee in his tum wants to assign his leasehold interest in the. land, he would have to obtain the prior approval in writing of the lessor to such assignment and the lessor would be entitled to claim 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land. This indeed was not disputed on behalf of the Revenue.

The covenant in clause ( 13) is, there.fore, clearly a covenant running with the land and it would bind whosoever is the holder of the leasehold interest! for the time being.

It is a constituent part of the rights and liabilities and advantages an<;[ disadvantages which go to make up the leasehold interest and, it is ani iiicident which is in the nature of burden on the leasehold interest.

Plainly and indisputably it has the effect of depressing the value which the leasehold interest would fetch if it were free from this burden or disadvantage.

Therefore, when the leasehold interest in the land has to be valued, this burden or disadvantage attaching to the leasehold interest must be duly discounted in estimating th~ price which the leasehold interest would fetch.

To value the leasehold interest on the basis that this burden or diSadvantage were to be ignored would be tq value an asset different in content and quality from that actually owned by the assessee.-This was the principle applied by the Judicial Committee in Corrie v. MacDemott,(') an appeal from Australia where the question arose as to how certain land granted by the Go; ernment of Queensland to the trustees of the Acclimatisation Society of Queensland to be used only for the purpose of the Society should be valued on resumption by the Government.

The trustees had no general power of sale but they were by statute authorised to sell any part of the Ian~ to the .ioal authority and to the National Agricultural and

ndstnal Asociatin.. It was held! by the Judicial Committee that !n view of this restriction on the nature of the interest of the trustees m the. land, the trustees were not entitled, upon resumption of the land by the Government, to be paid unrestricted free-hold value of

(I) [1914] A.C. 1056.

the land but only the value of the land to the trustees under the conditions upon which they held it.

The Judicial Committee pointed out that if the owner holds the property subject to restrictions, "it is a necessary point of enquiry how far these restrictions affect the value" and the property cann\lt be valued as if it were "unrestricted in any way".

The burden or limitation attaching to the leasehold interest in the present case must, therefore, be taken into account in arriving at the value of the leasehold interest and it cannot be valued ignoring the burden or limitation.

This problem can also be looked at from a slightly different angle and thiJ> approac~' too would throw some light on the true nat4re of the leasehold interest required to be valued.

Let us approach the question from the point of view of the lessor.

What is the nature of the lessor's interest in the land?

The lessor has undoubtedly the reversion, but coupled with it is also the right to 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value 0£ the land at the time of assignment of the leasehold interest by the lessee as also the pre-emptive right to the land after deducting 50 per cent of the unearned increas~Jrom the price obtainable, by the lessee.

This is the asset of the lessor which would have to l)e valued when the lessot is sought to be assessed to wealth tax.

The right to 50 per cent of the unearned increase on assignment of the leasehold interest would certainly add to the value which the reversion would otherwise fetch in the open market.

Now, once it is granted that under the lease deed the lessor has a bundle of rights, which includes 'something' more than the reversion, that 'something' would necessarily be subtracted from the interest of the lessee and to that extent, the interest of the lessee would stand reduced.

The interest of the lessee would be the leasehold interest minus that 'something'.

What goes to augment the interest of the lessor would. correspondingly reduce the interest of the lessee and! it

pnnot be taxed as the wealth of both the lessor and the lessee. It would! be includible in the net wealth of the lessor and hence it cannot at the same time form1part of the wealth of the lessee and must be subtracted in determining the nature and extent of the interest of the lessee.

That takes us to the question as to how the leasehold interest ol the assessee with the burden or limitation attaching under clause ( 13) of the lease-deed should he valued. It is clear from the language of section 7, sub-sction (1) that what the Revenue is required to do for the purpose of determining the valne of an asset is to assume that the asset which is to be valued is being sold in the open market and to fix ifs value for the purpose of wealth tax upon that hypothesis.

Now, whenever the value of an asset has to be determined on the basis of a hypothetical sale, the court has necessarily to embark upon speculations which may be quite difficult and in some cases, even artificial.

Here the asset to be valued is the leasehold interest in the land with the bnrden or restriction contained in clause (13) of the lease deed and the inquiry has, therefore, to be d_irected to the question as to what is the price which this asset w_onld fetch if sold in the open market.

What wonld be fhe realisable value of this asset ? It would indeed be difficult to speculate as to what

the leasehold interest in the land would fetch in the open market when it is affected by the burden or restriction contained in clause (13) of the lease deed. If the leasehold interest were free from this burden or restriction, i( would b~ comparatively easy to determine i!s market value, for there a_re recognised methods of valuation of leasehold interest, but wjiere tjle leasehold interest is cQt down by this burden

or restriction and some right of interest is abstracted from it, the pro- B blem of valuation becomes a difficult one and some method has to be

evolved for resolving it.

The only way it can be done in a case of this kind is by taking the market value of the leasehold interest as if it were unencumbered or unaffected by the burden or restriction of clause ( 13) and deducting from it, 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land on the basis of the hypothetical sale, as representing the value of such burden or restriction.

There is also one other consideration which reinforces the adoption of this method of valuation.

When, for the purpose of valuation of the leasehold interest, it is assumed that the leasehold interest is sold in the open market, the price received does not in it's entirety belong to the assessee.

Fifty per cent of the unearned increase in

the value of the land is diverted to the lessor by virtue of the paramount title contained in clause (13) and when received by the asses- D see, it belongs to the lessor. It is in truth and substance collected by the assessee on behalf of the lessor.

What is received by the assessee on his own account is only the price less 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land and that represents the net realisable worth of the asset in the hands of the assessee.

The Revenue contended that payment of 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value 0f the land to the lessor is really an in'stance of application of the E price received by the assessee and not diversion of !l part of the price by paramount title and hence the whole of the price must be taken as the measure of the wealth of the assessee.

But this contention is, in our opinion, not well founded and cannot be sustained.

The true test for determining whether a payment made by an assessee out of an amount received by him is an application of part of the amount which belongs to him or it is payment of an '.Lmount whi.ch i~ diverted before F it reaches the assessee so that at the Ume of receipt, it belongs to the payee and not to the assessee, has been explained by Hidayatullah, J., in C. I .. T. v. Silaldas Tirathdas(') in the following words :

"In our opinion, the true test is whether the amount sought to be deducted, in truth, never reached the assessee as his income. Obligations, no doubt, there are in every case G but it is the nture of the obligation which is the decisive fact.

There is a difference between an amount which a person is. obliged to apply out of his income and an amount which by the nature of the obligation cannot be said to be a part of the income of the assessee.

Where by the obligation income is diverted before it reaches the assessee, it i:S deductible; but where the income is required to be applied H to discharge an obligation after such income reaches the

41 I.T.R. 367.

assessee, the same consequence, in law, does not follow. It

i~ the. first kinft of payment which can truly be excused and not the second.

The second payment is merely an obligation to pay another a portion of one's own income, which has been received and is since applied.

The first is a case in which the income never reaches the assessee, who, even if he were to collect it, does so, not as part of his income, but for and on behalf of the person to whom it is payable.

In our opinion, the present case is one in which the wife and children of the assessee who continued to be members of the family received a portion of the income of the assessee, after the assessee had received the income as his own.

The case is one of application of :i portion of the income to discharge an obligation and not a case in which by an overriding charge the assessee became only a collector of another's income."

It is clear on the application of this test that in the present case, 50 per cent of th'(O unearned increase ill the value of the land would be diverted fo the lessor before it reaches the hands of the assessee as part of the price.

The assessee holds the leasehold interest on condition that if he assigns it, 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land will be payable to the lessor.

That is the condition on which he has acquired the leasehold interest arid hence 50 per cent of he unearned increase in the value of the land must be held to belong to the lessor at the time when it is received by the assessee and it would not be part of the net realisable worth of the leasehold interest in the hands of the assessee.

If a question is asked as to what is the real wealth of the assessee in terms of money so far as the leasehold interest is concerned, the answer would inevitably be that it is the price less 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land. It is difficult to see how 50 per cent of the unearned iucrease in the value of the land which belongs to the lessor can be regarded as part of the wealth of the assessee.

The position would undoubtedly be different where a payment is made by an assessee which is an application of a part of the price received by him.

Where such is the case, the whole of the price would represent the net realisable worth of the asset in the hands of the a'ssessee and what is paid out by the assessee would e merely a disbursement made aftr the price reaches the assessee as fas own property. That was the position in Pandit Lakshi Kant Jha v.

Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, G Bihar(') where the question arose whether the expenditure in connec- . tion with brokerage, commission or other expenses which would be liable to be incurred by the assessee in effectuating a sale would be deductible from the market value of the shares in determining their value for the purpose of assessment to wealth tax.

This Court held that in computing the value of the shares, the assessee is not entitled

H to deduction of brokerage and commis'sion from the valuation of the shares as given in, the Stock Exchange quotations or qnotations furnished by well known brokers. It was pointed out by this Court that :

(I) 90 J.T.R. 97.

COMMR. WEALTH .TAX v. P. N. SIKAND (lJhagwati, J.) 427

"it is not. .. the amount which the veridor would receive after deduction of ibis expense, but the price which the asse-t would fetch when sold in the open mrket which would constitute the value of the asset for the purpose of section 7(1) of the Act".

Obviously, this view was taken because the entire price, when receiv'ed, would belong to the assessee and payment of brokerage and commission would be merely application of part of the price in meeting expenditure necessary for effectuating the sale and hence it would not be deductible in ascertaining the net realisable worth of the shares in the hands of the assessee.

We are, therefore, of the view that the question referred by the Tribunal must be answered in the negative and it must be held that in determining the xalue of the leasehold interest ot the assessee in the land for the purpose of assessment to wealth tax, the price which the leasehold inte_rest would fetch in the open market were it not encumbered or affected by the burden or restriction contained in clause (13) -of the lease deed, would have. to be reduced by 50 per cent of the unearned increase in the value of the land on the basis of the hypothetical sale on the valuation date.

The appal accordingly fails and must be dismissed with costs.

S.R.

Appeal dismissed.

COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, NEW DELHI

P. N. SIKAND

S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.

Wealth Tax Act

S. 7

s. 2(m)

Chanakyapuri

Vashesharan Devi

30th December, 1954

s. 7(1)

s 41

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

R. M. Mehta

P. L. Juneja

G. C. Sharma

M. L. Khanna

Anup Sharma

Jaswal K. K.

K. R. Jagaraja

D. K. Jain

BHAGWATI

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI, J.-This appeal raises a rather difficult but interesting questio11 of law relating to valuation for tbe purpose of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 of leasehold interest in land when there is a covenant in the lease tat the les.see shall not' be entitled to assign the leasehold mterest without obtammg the pnor approval in writing of the lesso~ and the lessor shall be entitled to claim and recover from the lessee a. certain specified proportion oJi the unearned increase in the value of the land at the time of the assignment.

Wealth Tax Act, 1957

Chanakyapun

Vashcsharan Devi

Anand Apte

Jhabvala

section 7

Wealth-tax F Act

Wealth Tax Act, 1957

Wealth H Tax Act

Parliament

Shah

Section 3

1st day of April, 1957

section 2

section 2(m)

section 2( e)

Section 7

section 7

India

Australia

Queensland

Acclimatisation Society of Queensland

section 7

Hidayatullah

lJhagwati

section 7(1)


STATE OF UT_TAR PRADESH

NAWAB HUSSAIN

April 4, 1977

(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]

Constr1ctive res jdi'cata-Mtter which might or ought to have been raised in a!z earlter proceeding not ra1sed-lf principle of constructive res judicata applicable.

in a Writ jjeti'tion filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution impugning bis dismissal from service, the respondent contended that since he had not been given a reasonable opportunity of meeting the allegations against him, his dismissal was void.

The writ petition was dismissed.

Thereupon, the r.espondent filed a suit in a civil cout challenging his dismissal on the ground, among others, that since he had been appointed by the Inspector-General of Police, his dismissal by the Deputy Inspector Gene-ral of Police was wrong. The State took the plea that the suit was barred by res-iudicata. Dismissing th~ suit, the trial court held that it was not barred by res-judicata.

The first appellate court dismissed the respondent's appeal. Purporting to follow a line of decisions of this Court~ the High Court held that only that issue between the parties would be res-judicata which was raised in the earlier writ petition and was decided by the High Court after contest and since in this case the respondent did not raise in the earlier writ petition the plea of competence of the Deputy Inspector General of Police

to dismiss him. the parties were never at issue on it and that the High Court never considered and decided this issue in the writ petition. On the question of invoking the principle of constructive res-judicata by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground that the matter might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceedings, the High Court held that this question was left open by the Supreme Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bo1nbay [19651 2 SCR 547, and allowed the respondent's appeal.

Allowing the State's appeal to this Court, HELD : The High Court was \Vrong in its vie\V because the la\v in regard to the applicability of the principle of constructive res-judicata having been clearly laid down in Devi Lal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer Ratlam and Others [1965] 1 S.C.R. 686 it was not necessary to reiterate it in Gulabchand's case as it did not arise for consideration in that case. The clarificatory observation in G ulabchand's case was misunderstood by the High Court in observing that the matter had been left open by this Court. [435 G]

1. The doctrine of resjudicata is based on two theories : (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of <liisputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the inaividual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation.

[430 DJ

2. (a) In certain cases, the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. In such cases res-judicata is not confined to the issues which the Court is actually asked to decide but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding. to be started in respect of them. This rule has sometim~_s be!_!l

ferred to as constructive resiudicata which is an aspect or amplification: of the general principle. [431 A]

(b) Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with its six explanations, covers almost the whole field, but the section has, in terms, no application to a petition for the issue of a high prerogative writ. [ 431 D]

(c) Although in the A1nalr:ama1ed COalfields Ltd. and others v. lanapada Sabha, [1962] I S.C.R. 1 this Court held that constructive res-iudica!a being a special and artificial form of res-judicata should n?t generally. be applied to v.:nt petitions, in Devilal. Modi's this Court held that if the doctrine of constructive

res-judicata was not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to a party to take one procee'ding after another and urge new grounds every time, which was plainly inconsistent with considerations of public policy. The principle of constructive res-judicata was, therefore, held applicable to writ petitions as well.

[433 G & 434 DJ

3. The High Court missed the significaIJce of these decisions and relied upon L. Jankirama Iyer and Others v. P. M. Nilakanta Iyer and Others [1962} Supp. 1 S.C.R. 206 which had no bearing on the controversy. In Gulabchand's case, this Court observed that it did not consider it necessary to examine whether the principle of constructive res-judicata could be invoked by a party to the subse~

quent suit on the_ ground that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding but_ was not so r:iised therein could be raised again relying on which the High Court concluded that the question was left open by this Court. This in turn led the High Court to hold that the ifincij)le of resiudicata could not be made applicable to a writ petition. [435 E-F]

In the instant case, the respondent did nof raise the plea that he could not be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. This was an imp_ortant plea which was -within his knowledge and could well have been taken in the writ petition. "' Instead. he raised the plea that he was not afforded 'a reasonable opportunity of meeting the case in the departmental inquiry. It was therefore not permissible for him to take in the subsequent suit the plea that he had been dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. That was clearly barred by the -principle of constructive res-iudicata and the High Court erred in taking a contrary view.

[436 A-B]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2339 of .1968. (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 27-3-1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Scond Appeal No. 2352 of 1963).

G. N. D1kshit, and 0. P. Rana, for the appellant.

E. C. Agrawala, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHINGHAL, J. Respondent Nawab Hussain was a confirmed Sub- Jru; pector of Police in Uttar Pradesh. An anonymous complaint was madei against him and was investigated by Inspector Suraj Singh who submitted his report to the Superintendent of Police on February 25, 1954.

Two cases were registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Penal Code. They were also investigated by Inspector Suraj Singh, and the respondent was dismissed from service by an order of the Deputy Inspecto~ General o~ Police dated December 20, 1954. He filed an appeal, brit it was dismissed on April 17, 1956. Hei then filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court for quashing the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations against him and the action taken against him was mala fide.

It Was dismissed oa October 3(}, 1959; The respondent then filed a suit in the court of Civil Judge, Etah, on January 7, 196(}, in which he challenged the

orer of his dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that he had been appomted by the Inspector General of Police and that the Deputy Inspector Genr.al of Polic.e was not competent to dismiss him hy virtue of the prov1s1ons of article 311 ( 1) of the Constitution. The State of !Jttar Pradesh traversed the claim in the suit on several grounds, includ- '.ng. the lea tpat the suit was barred by res judicata as "all the matters m issue m this case had been raised or ought to have been raised both

III

SUPRE~E COUTS REPORTS [1977] 3 s.c.R.

in the writ petition and special appeal." The trial court dismissed the suit on July 21, 1960, mainly on the ground that the Deputy Inspector General of Police would be deemed to be the plaintiff's appointing .authority. It however held that the suit was not barred by the principle of res judicata.

The District Judge upheld the trial court's judgment and dismissed the appeal on February 15, 1963. The respon• dent preferred a second appea! which has been allowed by the impugned judgment of the High Court dated March 27, 1968, and the suit has been decreed. The appellant State of Uttar Pradesh has therefore come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.

The High Court has taken the view that the suit was not barred by the principle of constructive res judicata and that the respondent could not be dismissed by an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police as he had been appointedlby the Inspector General of Police. As we have reached the conclusion that the High Court committed an error of law ii). deciding the objection regarding the bar of res judicata, it will not be necessary for us to examine the other point.

The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam, is a rule of evidence.

As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council,(') it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action." This doctrine is based on two theories:

(i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest 0£ the indidual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to confliCting judgments of eqool authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It' is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgmnt, or give rise to 'another cause of action on the same facts. This is wht is known as the general principle of res iudicata.

But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon! one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of ac'tion as an abuse of its process and Somervell L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v.

Mallard(').-

"I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would bei accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is

(1) [1939] 2 K.B. 426 at p. 437.

(2) [1947] All. E.R. 255 at p. 257.

not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked

ta decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them."

This is therefore nother and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other rule has sometimes been referred to as constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or ampli- .fication of the general principle.

These simple but ef!kacious rules of evidence have been recognised for long, and it will be enough to refer to this Court's decision in Gulab- Chand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay(') for the genesis of the -doctrine and its development over the years culminating in the present

sec, tion 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The section, with its six explanations, covers almost the whole field, and has admirably

erved the purpose of the doC!rine. But it relates to suits and former suits, and has, in terms, no direct application to a petition for the issue -of a high prerogative writ.

The general principles of res judicata and -constructive res judicata have however been acted upon in cases of

-renewed applicaitions for a writ. Reference in this connection may be made to Ex Parle Thompson( 2 ). There A. J. Stephens moved fon a rule calling upon the authorities concerned to show cause why a mandamus should not issue.

He obtained a rule nisi, but it was discharged as it did not appear that there had been 31 demand and a refusal. He applied again saying that there had been a demand and a refusal since then. Lord Denman C.J., observed that as Stephens was making an application which had already been refused, on fresh materials, he eould not have "the same application repeated from time to time" as they had "often refused rules" on that ground. The same view has been taken in England in respect of renewed petition for certiorari, quo.warranto and prohibition, and, as we shall show, that is also the position in this country.

We find that the High Court in this case took note of the decisions <if this Court in L. Janakimma Tyer and others v. P.

Nilakanta Tyer and others(8), Devllal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam and -Others(') and Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay

(supra) and reached the following conclusion :-

"On a consideration of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the above three cases I am inclined to agree with the alernative argument of Sri K. C. Saxena, learn-

(2) 6 Q.B. 720.

(3) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 206 . . (4) [1965] l S.C.R. 686.

SUPREME COUTS REPORTS [1977] 3 s.c.R.

ed counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, that the law as declared by the Supreme Court in regard to the plea of res judicatti barnng a subsequent suit on the ground of dismissal of a prior writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is that only that issue between the parties will be res judicata which was raised in the earlier writ petition and was decided by the High Court after contest. Since no plea questioning the validity of the dismissal order based on the incompetence of the Deputy Inspector General of Police was raised in the earlier writ petition filed by the plaintiff in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the parties were never at issue on it and the High Court never considered or decided it.

I think it is competent for the plaintiff to raise such a plea in the subsequent suit and bar of res judicata will not apply."

We have gone through these cases.

Janakirama lyer's was a case' wher0 the suit which was brought by defendants 1 to 6 was withdrawrr during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court and was dismissed.

In the mean timlj a suit was filed in a representative capacity under

Order 1 rule 8 C.P.C.

One of the defences there was the plea of res judicata.

The suit was decreed.

Appeals were filed against the decree, but the High Court dismissed them on the ground that there was no bar of res judicata.

When the matter came to this Court it was "fairly conceded" that .in terms section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not apply because the suit was filed by the creditors de-- fendants 1 to 6 in their representative character and was conducted as a representative suit, and it could not be said that defendants 1 l; j>

6 who were plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the creditors who had brought the subsequent suit were the same parties or parties who claimed through each other. It was accordingly held that where sec lion 11 was' thus inapplicable, it would not be permissible to rely upon

th~ general doctrine of res juaicata, as the only ground on which res judicata could be urged in a suit could be the provisions of section 11 and no Other. That was therefore quite a different case and the High Court failed to appreciate that it had no bearing on the presentcontroversy.

The High Court then proceeded to consider this Court's decisions in Devi/al Modi's case (supra) and Gu/abchand's case (supra). Guiab~ chand's was the later of these two cases. The High Court has interpreted it to mean as follows :-

"It was held that the decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Article 226 on the merits on a matter after contest will operate as res-judicata in a subsequent regular suit between the same parties with respect to the same matter.

As appears from the report the above was majority view of the Court and the question whether the principles of constructive res-judicata can be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the .grou_nd that a. matter which might or ought to have been raISed m the earlwr proceedings was left open.

The learned Judges took care to

lI' 1

observe that they made! it clear that it was not necessary A and they had not considered that the principles of constructive res-judicata could be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding was not so raised therein."

As we shall show, that was quite an erroneous view of the decision B of this Court on the question of constructive res-judicata. It will help in appreciating the view of this Court correctly if we make a brier reference to the earlier decisions in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and others v. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara(') and Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. at8J another v. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara, (') which was also a case between th(j same parties.

In the first of these cases a writ petition was filed to challenge the coal tax on some grounds.

An C effort was made to canvass an additional ground, but that was not allowed by this Conrt and the writ petition was dismissed.

Another writ petition was filed to challenge the levy of the lax for the subsequent periods on grounds distinct and separate from those which were rejected by this Court. The High Court held that the writ petition was barred by res-judicata because of the earlier decision of this Court. The matter came up in appeal to this Conrt in the second D case, The question which directly arose for decision was whether the principle of constructive res judicdta was applicable to petitions under articles 32 and 226 ofl the Constitution and it was answered as follows,-

"It is significant that the attack against the validity of the notices in the present proceedings is based on grounds E different and distinct from the grounds raised on the earlier occasion. It is not as if the same ground which was urged on the earlier occasion is placed before the Court in another - form.

The grounds now urged are entirely distinct, and so, the decision of the High Court can be upheld only if the principle of constructive res judicata can be said to apply to writ petitions filed under Art. 32 or Art. 226. In F. our opinion, constructive res judicata which is a special and artificial form of res judicata enacted by section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code should not generally he applied to writ petitions field under Art. 32 or Art. 226.

We would be reluctant to apply' this principle to the present appeals all the more because we are dealing with cases where the impungned tax liability is for different years." G

It .ma, y thus appeau that this Court rejected the application of the pnnc1ple of constructive res judicata on the ground that it was a

"special. and artifiial f?~ of nes judicata" and should not generally be .applied to wnt petitions, but the matter did not rest there. It agam arose for consideration in Devi/al Modi's case (supra).

Gajenc(ragadkar, J. who had spoken for the court in the second case of H Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. spoke for the Court in that case also. The

petitioner in that case was assessed to sales tax and filed a writ petition to challenge the assessment. The petition was dismissed by the High Court and he came in appeal to this Court. He sought to make some additional contentions in this Court, but was not permit_ted to do so.

He therefore filed another writ petition in the High Court raising those additional contentions and challenged the order of assessment for the same year.

The High Coult dismissed the petition on merits, and the case came up again to this Court in appeal. The question which specifically arose for consideration was whether the principle of constructive res judicata was applicable to writ petitions of that kind. While observing that the rule of constructive res judicata was "in a sense a somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure", this Court declared the law in the following tenfts.-

"This rule postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in. a proceeding between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even this view is founded on the same considerations of public Policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another an urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is in.consistent with considerations of public policy to which we have just referred." . .

While taking that view, Gajendragadkar c.J., tried to explain the earlier decision in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. lanapada Sabha, Chhindwara(') and categorically held that the principle of constructive res judicata was applicable to writ petitions also.

As has been stated, that case was brought to thti notice of the High .Court, but its significance appears to have been lost because of the decisions in Janakirama Iyer and others v. P. M. Nilakanta Iyer. (supra) and Gulabchand's case (supra).

We have made a reference to the decision in Janakirama Iyer's case which has no bearing on the present controversy, and we may refer to the decision in Gulabchand's lease as well.

That was a case where the question which specifically arose for consideration was whether a decision of the High Court on merits on a certain matter after contest, in a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution, operates as res judicata in a regular suit with respect to the same matter between thel same parties.

After a consideration of the earlier decisions in England and in this country, Raghubar, Dayal J., who spoke for the majority of this Court, observed as follows,-

These deciSions of the Privy Council well lay down that the provisions of s. 11 C.P.C. are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision in a proceeding operating as res judicata in a subsequent suit with respect , to the same matter inter parties, and .do not preclude the application to regular suits of the general principles of res judicata based on public policy and applied from ancient times."

...

He made a reference to the decision in Daryao land others v. The State

A.. of U.P. and others(') on the question of res judicdta and the decisions in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and others v. lanapada Sabha, Chhindwara(') and Dev11al Modi's case (supra) and summarised the decision of the Court as follows :-

"As a result of the above discussion, we are of opinion that the provisions of s. 11 C.P.C. are not exhausti\ce with & respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicaJa between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit and that on the general principle of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter in contrnversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a C: subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject matter.

The nature of the former proceeding is immaterial."

He however went on to make the following further observation,-

"We may make it clear that it was not necessary, and we have not considered, whether the principles of constructive res judicata can be invoked by a party to the subsequent suit on the ground that a matter which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proce::ding was not so, raised therein." E It was this othet observation which led the High Court to take the view that the question whether the principle of constructive res judicata could be invoked by a party to a subsequent suit on the ground that a plea which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding but was not so raised therein, was left open.

That, in turn, led the High Court to the conclusion that the principle of constructive

res judicata could not he made applicable to a writ petition, and that was why it took the view that it was competent for the plaintiff in .this case to rais!l an additional plea in the suit even though it was available to him in the writ petition which was filed by him earlier but was not taken.

As is obvious, the High Court went wrong in taking that view because the law in regard fo the applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata having been clearly laid down in the decision in Devi/al Modi's case (supra), it was not neces sary to reiterate it in Gu/abchand's case (supra) as it did not arise for consideration there.

The clarificatory observation of this Court in Gulabchand's case (snpra) was thus misunderstood by the High Court in observing that th<') matter had been "left open" by this Court.

It is not in controversy before us that the respondent did not raise the plea, in the writ petition which had been filed in the High Court, that by virtue of clause (1) of article 311 of the Constitution he

(!) [196i] l S.C.R. 574.

(2) [19631 Supp. 1 S.C.R.tn.

could not be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police as he had been appointed by the Inspector, General of Police. It is also not in controversy that tha~ was an important plea which was within the knowledge of the respondent and could well have been taken in the writ petition, but he contented himself by raising the other pleas that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the case against him in the departmental inquiry and that the action taken against him was mala fide. It was therefore not permissiole for him to challenge his dismissal, in the subsequent suit, on the other ground that he had been dimissed by' an authority subordinate to. that by which he was appointed.

That was clearly barred by the principle of constructive res judicata and the High Court erred in taking a contrary view.

The. appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated March 27, 1968, is set aside and the respondent's suit is dismissed.

In the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall pay and bear their own costs.

, P.B.R.

Appeal allowed.

'436SCI/77-'2500-12-1_0-77 GIPF.

STATE OF UT_TAR PRADESH

NAWAB HUSSAIN

April 4, 1977

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD

P. K. GOSWAMI

Art. 226

Supreme Court

[1965] 1 S.C.R. 686

Gulabchand

G ulabchand

Section 11

the Code of Civil Procedure

Devilal. Modi

Allahabad High Court

G. N. D1kshit

. P. Rana

E. C. Agrawala

SHINGHAL

Suraj Singh

February 25, 1954

December 20, 1954

April 17, 1956

October 3(}, 1959

Civil Judge, Etah

January 7, 196

article 311

State of !Jttar Pradesh

July 21, 1960

February 15, 1963

March 27, 1968

State of Uttar Pradesh

Somervell

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

A. J. Stephens

Denman

Stephens

England

K. C. Saxena

SUPREME COUTS REPORTS

Article 226

Article 226

Janakirama lyer

Order 1 rule 8

C.P.C

section 11

the Code of Civil Procedure

section 11

Devi/al Modi

Gu/abchand's

Guiab~ chand

Article 226

articles 32 and 226

Art. 32

Art. 226

section 11

Art. 32

Art. 226

Gajenc(ragadkar

H Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd.

the Code of Civil Procedure

Gajendragadkar

Janakirama Iyer

article 226

Raghubar

Dayal

s. 11

C.P.C

Dev11al Modi

s. 11

C.P.C

article 311