PIAREY LAL

HORiLAL

February 7, 1977

[P. K. GdSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]

U.P. Co11solidatio11 of Holdiitgs Act, 1953, s. 30(b)-Whether agreement for sale creates liability for tenure-Jzolder "in" original holding for the purpose of.

The appellant Piarey Lal had agreed to sell his original nolding to Hori Lal C nut later refused to do so on the ground that his p"roperty which was the subject matter ofthe contract had been consolidated under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, and it was impossible to perform the agreement.

Hori Lal filed a suit for specific performance contending that the agreement for sale had created a liability for Piarey Lal for the purpose of section 30(b) o.f the Act, arid the same wl!S transferred to the new plot or "chak" allotted to him as a result of the consolidation. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and Piarey Lal's appeals before the District Court and the n.

High Cuurt were dismissed. u

Allowing the appeal by Special Leave the Court,

HELD : . By virtue of s. 54 of the_ Trapsfer of Property Act, the agreement for shle did not give fise to any interest "in" the original holding of the dtifen<'innt as the tenure-holder.

There could thus be no occasion for the transfer of any such "liability" in his new land or "chak" so as to attract clause (b) of s. 30 of the Act. When he lost that property as a result of the scheme of consolidation, the agreement for sale became void. [918 C-El

Sugna & Anr. v. Kali Ram & Ors. 1966 A. L. J. 1004, ruiiproved.

Shanti frasad v. Akhtar & Anr. 1972 A.L.J. 549 and Clzetan Singh & Ors.

v. Hira Singh & Ors. 1969 A.L.J. 189. overruled .

. CIVIL ArPELLATE Juiusi>ICTION : Civil Appel No. 1252 of 1976.

Appeal by spei; ial Leave froni the Judgment and Order dated 13-8-1975 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 179/ 75. .

A. k. Gupta, for the Appellant.

S. T. Desdi and R. B. , D'a(ar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.

~HINGHAL, J .-This appeal_, by special leave, is dire"cted agafust the summary dismissal of defendant Piiffey Lal's second appeal on Augtist 13, 1975.

A..; the leave has been limited to tM question of i_nterprefatioi\ of Clauses (a) a, nd, (b). of seCtion 30 of the U.P.

C-Offsolidatiofi of Holdings Act, 1953, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), "for the purpose of deciding whether the liability of the petitioner to specifically perform the contract of sale . of the old holding was transferred to the new 'chak' allotted to hiiri oh consolidation," it will be enough to state the facts which he'at on it.

Respondent Hori Lal raised the suit for specific performance of an agreement dated March 6, 1966, for the sale of six plate of land measuring nine high and six biswas in village Hathiawali, Tehsil Gannaur. It was alleged in the plaint that Rs. 3000/- were paid by the plaintiff Hori Lal in advance, and the balance of Rs. 2000/-

was to be paid at the time of the execution of the sale deed, within one year of the agreement. It was also pleaded that as defendant Piarey Lal refused to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff was driven to the necessity of filing the suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale and, in the alternative, for the recovery of Rs. 3000/- which had been paid as advance.

Defendant Piarey Lal denied the execution of the agreement for sale and the receipt of Rs. 3000/-, and pleaded that as new plots had been allotted as a result of the consolidation of his holding under the Act, he could not perform the agreement for sale.

The trial coun framed issues, inter alia, on questions. relating to the execution of the agreement .for sale, payment of Rs. 3000/- to the defendant, and the inability of the defendant to perform the contract.

That court held that the plaintiff had proved the agreement for sale and the payment of Rs. 3000/-. It also held that the agreement for sale could be "enforced for plots allotted to the defendant in lieu of plot mentioned in the agreement in consolidation." It therefore decreed the suit for specific performance by its judgment dated August 23, 1973.

The Second Additional District Jiudge, Badaun, upheld the decree, and as the High Court has dismi'ssed the second appeal as aforesaid, dfendant Piarey Lal has come to this Court for a redress of hi's grievance by special leave.

As has be!<n stated, the limited question for consideration in this Court is whether the defendant was liable to specifically perform the contract for sale of his old holding even after its consolidatfori and the allotment of a 'chak' ? It appears that there was controversy in the Allahabad High Court on the question whether an agreement for sale, in the circumstances of a case like this, was rendered void under section 56 of the Contract Act because of the order of consolidation allotting new plots for the earlier plots in respect of which the agreement fr sale had been executed.

A Single Judge of that Court took the view in Sugna and another v. Kali Ram and others(') that the ·.agreement became void and impossible of performance, and was not saved by section 30 of the Act.

A different view was however taken ; by another Single Judge in Chetan Singh and others v. Hira Singh and others(').

The matter was referred to a Division Bench in Shanti Prasad v. Akhtar and another. (8) One of the Judges in the Division Bench was the Judge who had _given the decision in Chelan Singh's case.

The Bench held that the duty of the seller to execute the conveyance of the property agreed to be sold was a liability recognised by law and was enforceable as the liability "relates to the land mentioned in the agreement" and was "transferred to the new 'chak' " under _section 30 (b) of the Act.

The decision in Shanti Prasad's case formed the basis of the decision of the first appellate

(1) 1966 A .. L.J. 1004.

(2) 1969 A.L.J. 189.

(3) 1972 A.L.J. 549.

• ..

PIAREY LAL v .. HO.Ill LAL (Shinghal, J.) 917

court in this case, and that appears to be the. reason why the High Court has dismissed the second appeal summanly.

The controversy . therefore turns on the proper interpretation of section 30 of the Act which deals with the consequences which ensue on exchange of possession as a result of the allotment of a 'chak' to the tenure-holder.

Clauses (a) and (b) of section 30 of the Act provide as foliows,-

"30. Consequences which shall ensue on exchange of possession.-With effect from the date on w.hich a tenu_reholder enters, or is deemed to have entered mto possess10n of the chak allotted to him, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the following consequences shall ensue-

(a) the rights, title, interests and liabilities-

(i) of the tensure-holder entering, or deemed to have entered, into possession, and

(ii)

(b)

of the former tenure-holder of the plots comprising the chak, in their respective original holdings shall cease; and

the tenure-holder entering into possession, or deemed to have entered into possession, shall have in hi& chak the same rights, title, interests and liabilities ai he had in the original holdings together with such other benefits of irrigation from a private source, till such source exists, as the former tenure-holder of the plots comprising the chak had in regard to them."

Ml.I&

It w9uld thus appear that while clause (a) deals with the rights, title, interests and liabilities of the tenure-holder entering into possession of the 'chak', as well as of the former tenure-holder of the plots comprising the 'chak', in their respective original holdings, and F provides that those rights, title, interests and liabilities shall "cease", clause (b) P, i'ovides that the tenure-holder l'.ntering into possession of the 'chak' shall have, in that 'chak', the 'same rights, title, interests and liabilities "as he had in the original holdings." The expression 'chak' has been defined in section 3(1-A) of the Act to mean "the parcel of land allotted to a tenure-holder on consolidation." The two clauses therefore are quite simple and clear, and do not raise any G real problems of interpretation, but the question is whether there is

justification for the argument, in the facts and circumstance's of this case, that the expression "liabilities" would cover the liability of the seller (i.e. the defendant) , under the aforesaid agreement for the sale of his original holding ?

As is obvious, clause (a) of section 30 does not bear on the H question in controversybecau'se it only provides for the cessation of the rights, title, interests and liabilities both of the tenure-holder to whom the 'chak' has been allotted, .and of the former tenure-holder

of the plots comprising the 'chak' in their respective "original holdings".

There is no controversy that this was so in the present case.

It is afso no body's case that the rights, title, and interests of the tenure-holder ntering into possession of his 'chak' have any bearing on. the controvrsy relating to the specified performance of the agreement for sale, for all that has been urged before us is tat the defendant, as the tenure-holder of the new holding or 'chak' had the same "liabilities" in that 'chak' as he had in tjle original holding.

What therefore remains for consideration is whether, Qn the defendant's entering into possession of his new land or 'chak', there was the same liability "in" the new land as "in" the original holding. It has therefore to be examined whether, by virtue of the agreement for sale, any liability accrued "in" the original holding ?

A cross-reference to section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act shows that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the P,_arties.

It has however been specifically provided in the section that such a contract "does not, of itsellf, create any interest in or charge on such prol'erty." It would therefore follow that the agreement for sale in the present case did not give rise to any interest "in" the original holding of the defendant as the tenure-holder. That being so, there could be no occasion for the tiansfer of any such "liability in" the new land or 'chak' of the defendant so as to attract clause (b) of section 30 of the Act. In fact what the defendant was bound to do under section 55(1) (d) of the Transfer qf Property Act wag to execute a proper conveyance of "the property" which was the subject matter of the contract for sale, and not of _any other property.

So when he lost that property as a result of the scheme of consolidation and his rights, title, interest's ceased in ttla_t property by virtue of clause (a) of section 30 of the Act, the agreement for sale became void within the meaning of section 56 of the Contratt Act, and it is futile to urge that they were saved by clause (a) or clausf-

(b) of 11ection 30 of the Act.

We have gone through the decision in Shanti Prasad's case (supra), but we find that while the High Court took note of the fact that the rightS, title, interests and liabilities of the tenure-holder "in" his original holdings ceased, and he acquired the same rights, title, interests and liabilities "in" the 'chak' allotted to him, it lost sight of the significance of the word "in", and the afores_aid provisions of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, and disposed of the controversy before it by raising the other question whether "the tenure.-

holder" was subject to any liability "in respect of" his old holding.

That was why it felL into the error of holding that a liability w311 created in the original holding of the defendant, and was transferred to his 'chak' on his entering into its possession.

As ha;; been shown, that was an erroneous view which has to be re:ctified.

It may be mentioned that counsel for the respondent tried to argue that the defendant was bound to execute a proper conveyance of his original holding, which was. the subject .matter of the agteement of sale, because, that holding liad been supstituted" by the 'chak'.

___ -. ~----~-----~-------------·-----~----- --, ·· __ ccc_-' '' _' _ •-··_• ---_ .,_ •. ,,. ·-~-1"'-",;·-_u__- -_--, _y•_-~·~__._l!l!!!!M! ___ ---__ w_-. __ • ·-· - ..• -- -~"llr' -"""'~~~°''"'"")+-;.-~'~"~"*~~;;' -- '-~~-m•@l@lli-l!IJ!l!ll!'I!!~ ..

PIA:it.EY LAL v. HORI LAL (Shinghal, !.) 919

He also tried to argue that the '.chak' allotted to the defendant by way A of consolidation of his holding was the same as his original holding so that there was no occasion to invoke section 30 of the Act. Counsel could not however support his argument by reference to the law, or the facts of the case.

Moreover he was unable to 'show how he could raise any such argument when the special leave had been limited to the interpretation of clauses (a) and (b) of section 30 of the

ct.

B It would thus_ appear that the plaintiff respondent's suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale was liable to dismissal, and the High Court as well as the courts below erred in taking a contrary view.

Counsel for the appellant has however frankly stated at the bar that the appellant would be willing to refund the sum of Rs. 3000/- along with interest at 6 per_ cent per annum from the date Of payment. - C

The appeal is allowed with costs, the impugned juJgment of the High Court is set aside, and the suit of plaintiff-respondent Hori Lal is dismissed in so far as it relates to specific performance of the agreement for sale.

It is however ordered that the dfendant shall repay Rs. 3000 /- to the plaintiff, along with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of payment, within three months from today.

M.R.

Appeal allowed.

PIAREY LAL

February 7, 1977

Holdiitgs Act, 1953

s. 30(b)

to Hori Lal

Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953

Piarey Lal

section 30(b)

s. 54

Trapsfer of Property Act

s. 30

CIVIL ArPELLATE Juiusi

A. k. Gupta

S. T. Desdi

R. B.

~HINGHAL

Piiffey Lal

Offsolidatiofi of Holdings Act, 1953

Hori Lal

March 6, 1966

Hathiawali

Gannaur

Hori Lal

Piarey Lal

August 23, 1973

Badaun

Allahabad High Court

section 56

section 30

Chelan Singh

section 30

Shanti Prasad

section 30

section 30

section 3(1-A)

section 30

section 54

Transfer of Property Act

section 30

section 55(1)

section 30

section 56

section 54

Transfer of Property Act

section 30

section 30


BAI MANI & OTHERS

II.

MANILAL LALLUBHAI & ORS.

February 7, 1977

[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. S . .KAILASAM, JJ.]

Hindu Succession Act-Hindu Women's Rig/zt to Property Act 1937- Whether vartition bv metes and bounds-Whether new case can be made out in the absence of issue.

The respondent-plaintiffs filed a suit for partition and allotment of one half share of the suit house and the moveab'.c properties.

One Faqir Cll'.nd b:td 3 sons, N athubhai, Lallubhai and N anabhai. N anabhai was the defendant in the suit whose legal representatives are appellants.

Lallubhai's heirs are the plaintiffs.

According to the plaintiffs the three \Jroth., ro were mmbers of a Joint Undivided Hindu Family. According to the respondents the properties were never partitioned thoug~ the three brothers were staying and messing separntely and each branch carried on its business se, parately.

The respon~ dents also challenged the validity of the sale deed executed by Bai Kashi the widow of Nathubhai in favour of the appellants on the ground that the sale .was not for legal necesity. The appellants contended that the three brothers

were eparate and each branch used to do its business separately.

That as far as the suit house was concerned it was divided though not by metes and bounds and that the brothers lived in separate portions of the house.

The appellants claimed that they were entitled to 2/3 share on the house.

The Trial Court found that the 3 brothers had separated before the deaths of Nathubhai and Lallubhai.

It also found that the defendant and his brothers had separated and the suit house wiis also divided as alleged by the defendant.

It came to the conclusion that the defendant had failed to prove th"t there was any legal necessity for Bai Kashi to sell the share in the suit house and that after Bai Kashi's death the respondent was entitled to one half share in the suit house. The Trial Court found that Bai Kashi became entitled to one half share of her husband in the suit house under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937.

As her interest was only limited interest known as Hindu Women's Estate when Bai Kashi died in January 1956, she had not become the full owner of the share under the Hindu succession Act, 1956.

The court was of the view that on the death of Bai Kashi her share would go to the reversioners.

The court held that the parties were governed by Mayukh school which over-rules the Mitakshara school and, therefore, after the de&th of Bai Kashi the defendant and plaintiff No. 1 would inherit together to the share of Nathubhai. The court held that the claim of the plaintiff for one half share should be decreed though there was no specific claim on the plea cf separation and heirship. The High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the findings of the Trial Court.

In an appeal by Special Leave the appellants contended that the respondents' plea that the 3 brothers were joint and the share of Bai Kashi was inherited by the remaining two branches by survivorship having been negatived by the courts below the suit ought to have been dismissed and that the court erred in making out a new case of succession to the property of Bai Kashi without necessary pleadings.

Allowing the appeal partly,

HELD : 1. On the question whether the respondents are entitled to one half share on her death has not been dealt with by the High Court. This Court agreed with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that the family was separate and that the sale deed by Bai Kashi in favour of the appellants was not for legal necessity. However, the claim of the respondent for partition and allotment of 1 /3 share' by metes and bounds

' ,

... -

,., ' .

BAI NANI v. MANILAL LALLUBHAI (Kailasam, J.) 921

cannot be resisted.

Though the brothers became separate admittedly there A was no division by metes and bounds. There is also no dispute that the respondents are entitled to 1/3 share in the house. (924 A-Cl

2. The High Court did not deal satisfactorily with the contention of the defendant that the Trial Judge erred in saying that Bai Kashi had only a widow's estate when she died in the absence of any issue as to who were heirs of the deceased Bai Kashi. On the question whether respondents are entitled to succeed to Bai Kashi's 1/2 share, the Court remitted the matter to the High Court for consideration. [924 C-Dl B:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1988 of 1968.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 21/22-3-1968 of the Gujarat High Court in First Appeal No. 760/60.

S. T. Desai, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for the Appellants.

J. B. Nagarsett and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KArLASAM, J.

This appeal is by the legal representatives of the defendant in the suit by special leave against the judgment and decrC'e of the High Court of Guiarat.

The suit was filed by Manilal Lallubhai and his widow Bai Mani against Nanabhai Fakirchand for partition and allotment of one-half share of the suit house and the moveable properties mentioned in the plaint.

One Fakirchand had three sons, . Nathubhai, Lallubhai and Nanabhai.

Nanabhai is the defendant whose legal representatives are the present appellants in this Court.

Lallubhai's son, Manila!, was the first pla!intiff and his mother and widow of Lallubhai, Bai Mani, was the second plaintiff.

The second plaintiff is since dead and his legal representatives are respondents 2 (b) and 2(c) in this appeal.

Nathubhai, Lallubhai and Nanabhai were originally the members of a joint Hindu family.

The case of the plaintiffs, respondents in this appeal, is that the three brothers Nathubhai, Lallubhai and Nanabhai were mempers of

a joint undivided Hindu family and when they were joint in the year F 1940 Nathubhai died leaving his widow Bai Kashi.

Subsequently in the year 1942 Lallubhai died.

On 24th January, 1956 Bai Kashi, the widow of Nathubhai, died while the family continued to be a joint undivided Hindu family.

According to the respondents the properties were never partitioned though the three brothers were staying and messing separately and each branch carried on its business separately. The family immoveable and moveable prqperties were never Gdivided. The respondents also questioned the validity of a sale deed executed by Bai Kashi on 25th April, 1955 in favour of the appellants of her share in the immoveable property as it was not for legal necessity .

In the written statement the appellants denied that the three brothers were members of a joint family.

They pleaded that the brothers were H, separated and each branch used to do its own business keeping their earnings separately and messing separately.

So far as the suit house was concerned it was divided though not by metes and bounds and the

SUPREMJl COURT REPORTS (1977] 2 s.C.R.

.brothers livd in separate portions of the house.

The appellants claimed that t)ley were entitled to 2/3 share in the house as Bai Kashi the widow of Nathubhai had sold her share by registered deed 25th April, 1955 to the appellants.

On these pleadings 9 issues were framed of which three are relevant for the purpose of this appeal.

They are: (1) Does the defendant prove that he and his two brothers-Nathubhai and Lallubhai had separated and the suit-house was also divided (through not by. metes and bounds) at the time of the, death of Nathubhai ? (2) Does he further prove that the sale-deed executed by Bai Kashi in respect of the one-thlfd share of the suit-house was for legal necessity and to satisfy her debts ? and (3) Do the plaintiffs prove that after Bai Kashi's death they become entitled to a one-half share in the whole of the suithouse ? The trial court found that the three brothers had become separate in status before the deaths of N athubhai and Lallubhai.

It also found that the defendant and his brothers had separated and the suit-house was also divided as alleged by the defendant and recorded the finding in favour of the defendant.

Regarding the second issue it found that the defendant had failed to prove that there was legal necessity for Bai Kashi to sell away the share in the suit-house.

On the third issue the trial court recorded a finding that after Bai Kashi's .death the respondents became entitled to 1 /2 share in the whole of the suit-house.

On appeal the High Court confirmed the findings of the trial court on three issues and dismissed the appeal.

E The findings of both the courts below that the defendant and his two brothers had separated and the suit-house was also divided by metes and bounds was not challenged before us by the counsel for the respondents. So also the finding that the sale deed executed by Bai Kashi in respect of her 1/3 share of the suit-house was not proved to have been for legal necessity.

The only point that was raised by the counsel for the appellants is that the respondents' plea that the three F brothers were joint and the share of Bai Kashi was inherited by the remaining two branches by survivorship having been negatived by the courts below the suit ought to have been dismissed and that the courts erred in finding a new case of succession to the property of Bai Kashi without the necessary pleadings.

It may be observed that on the accepted finding of the courts below that the sale in favour of the appellants by Bai Kashi is not supported by legal necessity if on the :G death of Bai Kashi the other two branches i.e. that of the appellants and the respondents, are entitled to share equally the decree granted by courts below would be right even though the claim to the 1(2 share is not based on succession.

The contention of the counsel for the appellants is that the courts below have found an entirely new case on the basis of succession which is contrary to fhe claim made in the plaint. The averment in the paiint

is that on 24th January, 1956 Bai KasM the widow of Nathubhai died .aqd Nanabhai continued as the µiember of the joint Hindu family.

.. -

BAI MANI v. MANILAL LALLUBHAI (Katlasam, J.) 923

There is no alternate claim that in the event of the partition being negatived the plaintiff would be entitled to 1 /2 share of Hai Kashi by succession.

The 3rd issue that was raised was whether on Bai Kashi's death the appellants became entitled to 1/2 share in the whole suit-house.

The trial court on that issue found that Bai Kashi became entitled to 1/2 share of her husband in the suit-house under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. As her interest was only a limited interest known as Hindu Women's Estate when Bai Kashi died in January 1956 she had not become the full owner of the share under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

On this basis the trial court was of the view that on the death of Bai Kashi her share would go to the reversioners.

On the question as to who the heirs of Nathubhai are at the time of the death of Bai Kashi the trial court held that as the parties were in Gujarat the Mayukh school will govern the inheritance and in Gujarat the Mayukh school overrules the Mitakshara school and therefore full brothers inherit along with sons Q_f full brothers who are dead and therefore after the death of Bai Kashi the defendant and plaintiff No. 1 would inherit together to the share of Nathubha; i. The court held that the claim of the plaintiff for l /2 share should be decreed though there is no specific claim on the plea of separation and heirship.

The defendant, present appellants, in their appeal to the High Court submitted that the trial Judge erred in saying that Bai Kashi had only a widow's estate when she died and that the trial court failed to appr-eciate that no issue was framed as to who were the heirs of the deceased Bai Kashi and that the parties to the suit had not gone to the trial oa the basis of the succession.

The High Court has not dealt with this issue satisfactorily.

The High Court after referring to . the pleadings observed that the plaintiffs claimed 1 /2 share in the suit properties on the ground of survivorship and that at the time of the arguments it was contended before the trial court that even if the brothers had separated the defendant and the plaintiff No. 1 inherited together to Nathubhai after Bai Kashi's death and therefore the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/3 share.

After making these observations the High Court has referred to the plea n the written statement that the three brothers were separated and has observed that the trial Judge had framed the issue as to whether the defendant proves that he and his two brothers Nathubhai and Lallubhai had separated and the suithouse was divided and concluded that this issue which was raised by the learned trial Judge clearly arose out of the contention which was raised by the defendant to the plaintiff's suit and a specific issue was raised on that point by the learned trial Judge and therefore there is no prejudice to any of the parties because the issue was framed and evidence wa$ led by both the parties on that point.

This reference, we are afraid, does not relate to issue No, 3 which is about the succession to Bai Kashi's share after her death.

In the Memorandum of Grounds in the appeal to the High Court as well as in the special leave petition the ground that is taken specifically is that the plaintiff has not proved how he became entitled to the share of Bai Kashi.

In fact, the contention is that on the death of Nathubhai his widow Bai Kashi inherited under the Mayukh law Nathubhai's 1/3 share in the suit-house absolutely.

It was also contended before the High Court that the trial Judge was in error in saying that Mayukh school of Hindu law would override the Mitakshara school in Gujarat.

We find that the question l l-206SCI/77

!SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1977] 2 S.C.R.

that arose mainly whether the respondents are entitled to succeed to Bai Kashi's 1/2 share on her death has not been satisfactorily dealt with by the High Court especially when the point was specifically raised on behalf of the appellants.

While we agree with the concurrent finding of the trial court and the High Court that the family became separated and that the sale deed by Bai Kashi in favour of the appellants is not for legal necessity we are satisfied that the claim of the respondents for partition and allotment of 1/3 share by metes and bounds cannot be resisted.

Though the brothers became separate admittedly there was no division by metes and bounds.

There is also no dispute that the respondents are entitled to 1/3 share in the house.

Therefore though they became separated in status the suit-house was not divided by metes and bounds and therefore they will be entitled to division and separate possession of 1/3 share in the house. To this extent the decree of the courts below will be modified.

But so far as the.1/3 share of Bai Kashi is concerned as the courts below have not considered the appellants' plea that the respondents are not entitled to succeed to Bai Kashi's 1/2 share the question is remitted to the High Court for consideration. The High Court will consider as to whether the respondents are entitled to succeed to 1/2 of the 1/3 share of Bai Kashi and pass a decree accordingly.

To this extent the appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial court and the High Court modified.

The parties will bear their own costs in thi! appeal.

P.H.P.

Appeal allowed.

BAI MANI & OTHERS

MANILAL LALLUBHAI & ORS

February 7, 1977

S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI

P. S . .KAILASAM, JJ.

Hindu Succession Act

Property Act 1937

Bai Kashi

Nathubhai

Lallubhai

Rights to Property Act, 1937

Hindu succession Act, 1956

Cl

2

s 1

S. T. Desai

I. N. Shroff

H. S. Parihar

J. B. Nagarsett

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

KArLASAM

High Court of Guiarat

Manilal Lallubhai

Bai Mani

Nanabhai Fakirchand

Fakirchand

Nathubhai

Nanabhai

Nanabhai

Manila

24th January, 1956

25th April, 1955

SUPREMJl COURT REPORTS (1977]

N athubhai

Bai KasM

Rights to Property Act, 1937

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Gujarat

Nathubha

s 1

s 1

s 1


MYSORE STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION A v.

BABAJAN CONDUCTOR & ANR.

February 8, 1977

[M. H. BEG, C.J. AND P. s. KAILASAM, J.]

Co11stilutio11 of India Ari. 226--Inherent powers of the lligh Gour/ 10 grant relief in individual cases of hardship, when permissible-Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950-And Notification made by the Mysore Government 11/s 34 (!)-Scope of-Winding up of a department operates as a discharge of its .servants.

Respondent I, a conductor of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department was dismissed for misconduct on 25-1-1961.

The legality of the

said dismissal order was questioned in the High Court under Art. 226 with a C further prayer to declare that he had continued in service since the date of his suspension and commencement of disciplinary proceedings.

The I:Tigb Court allowed the writ petition on 11-9-1964 and quashed rhe dismissal order with an Observation viz. "It is further ordered that this is without prejudice to the holding of fresh enquiry if they consider the same necessary".

On 1-8-1961. the Road Transport Corporation was constituted and the Government Road Trans- port Department was abolished. Such of the employees who had exercised their .option as per the notice dated 23-6-1961, were taken over by the appcllnnt

corporation.

The respondent No. 1 was not given the option a" he was dis- D missed by that date. On a complaint under the Contempt of Courts Act against respondent 2 and the appellant, that there was disobedience to the order of the High Court dated 11-9-1964, the respondent 1 was paid 1be salaiy by the State

Government for the period 25-1-1961 to 31-7-1971. Since he was not paid back

salary and allowances and also the salary due from 1-8-1961, the respondent Jiled a writ petition No. 1579 I 66 which was again allowed.

On a concession m11de by the counsel for the State Government that the State Government was willing to make available to the petitioner an option to become an employee of the appellant corporation, the High Court held : "Notice shall be in the same E form in which it was served on other employees and with a month's time to exercise his option. ' If he exercises his option to become an employee of the <:orporation the petitioner will have, all the, benefits such as continuity in service, seniority, the benefit o~ the old conditions of service applicable in Mysore Government Road Transport Department. The petitioner will also be entitled to the saiary for the period~ between August l, 1961 and the date of his appointment as an employee, of the corporation". On appeal by special leave by the corporation, the Cami,

HELD: (1) The order of the High Court dated 11-9-1964 could not possibly amount to a declaration that the first respondent had continued in the service of either the Mysore Government or had become the servant of the t1ppellant corporation, a separate legal entity which came into existence by mea, ns

of a Notification under s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950.

As a separate legal entity the corporation could not be said to ha•ve stepped automatically into the shoes of the Mysore Road Transport Department, there being .RO provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder to that effect.

[927 A-DJ

(2) The declaratory relief asked for not having been granted, that relief would be deemed to have been refused.

Failure to go in appeal against that decision operates as a bar for claiming sueli. a relief in the subsequent writ petition. [931 Bl

(3) The effect of the High Courts~ order setting aside the dismissal was thllt the .stigma of dismissal was removed from the .record of the first respond ei;•.

H 'The winding of the department on the facts of the case, operates as the discharge of the respondent. The respondent cannot be deemed to be the corporation's employee inasmuch as he has not exercised any option, nor did he askfor a notice of option in the original writ petition filed by him. [931 D-EJ

Mysore State Road Transport Corporafion v. A. Krishna Rao & Anr., C.A.

No. 1720 of 1967 S.C. decided on 6-8-1969, followed.

( 4) Neither the Act nor the two notifications under s. 34(1) of the Act contain any provision which could entitle an employee of the Mysore Governmont Road Transport Departmen~ to get a notice automatically.

The notifications could apply only to those persons who, on 1-8-196i bad already exercised an option to serve under the corporation in pursuance of notice issued to them.

It makes no provision for persons to whom for any considerable reason, no notice has been issued. [928 D-Fl

(5) When the first resporulent applied in the High Court for another wri< or direction under Art. 226 in 1966, the High Court over-stepped the limits of mere interpretation or application of the law and indulged in what is nothing short of legislation byl directing the State Government to serve a notice. call in upon the first respOndent to exercise his option on the question whether he wanted to become an employee of the Mysore State Road Transport Corporatior> in the same way in which other employees Qf the Transport Department had been asked to exercise their option. [929 C-EJ

(6) The State Government owed no duty to the first respondent to pay him after transport department was wound up in the absence of any contract to show what duty the Government could have to employ the first respondent after its transport department was wound up or to direct the corporation to do so. [929 G-Hl

(7) In order to compel the corporation to do anythlng only a general direction u/s 34 of the Act could be given by the Government. There neither could b~ a .speci'.11 direction with regard to a particular case nor was any special direction given .by the Government for any such case.

The High Court could !10t take upon itself the power to fill any gap in the provision of the Act, even if there be one, and compel the Government to perform a function which the Government was i:ot under '.!UY ind. of obligation to ?\scharge. The High Court could not give a specific drrecl!on to make a provis10n to meet what it thought was required in a particular or individual case if such a case fell outside the provisions made by the Act and the rules. There is no justification at all for such assumption of. powers by the High Court. [929 H, 930 A-Bl

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1919 of 1968.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 15-12-1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 1579 of 1966.

Shyamla (Mrs.) Pappu and E. K. Jose-ph for the Appellants

R. B. Datar for Respondent No. 1.

N. Nettar for Respondent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BEG, C.J.

The Mysore State Road Transport Corporation is the appellant by special leave before us.

The first respondent, a conductor in the Mysore Government Road Transport Department, had petitioned in the High Court under Article 226 against the appellant and the State of Mysore and asked it to quash an order of his dismissal, passed on 25-1-1961, in disciplinary proceedings taken against him at a time when he was a servant of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department.

The Government Department was abolished on 1-8-1961. But, before this event happened, the Mysore Government had sent notices to its employees on 23-6-61 proposing to transfer alt those persons who were actually in its service on the date of issue of

these notices and had accepted offers of appointment a~ employees of the Corporation. The first respondent, having been already dismi•ssed for misconduct on 25-1-1961, was not the recipient of one of these .notices to exercise an option.

In his writ petition, questioning the order of his dismissal, the first respondent had also asked for a declaratlion that he had continec_l i!1

service since the date of his suspension and commencement of d1sc1phnary proceedings.

The High Court of Mysore merely qushed the dismissal order of 25-1-1961 and the order of suspens10n dated 23-7-1960. It did not grant the declaratory relief asked for.

It observed : "It is further ordered that this is without prejudice to the holding of fresh enquiry if they consider the .same necessary".

Thi•s . order could not possibly amount to a declarat10n that the first respon- dent had continued in the service of either the Mysore Government or bad become the servant of the appellant Corporatfon, a separate legal

1entity which came into existence by means of a Notification under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation~ Act, 1950. <.l1erina1'~~~- referred to as 'the Act') . As a separate legal entity, the Corporat::)!l could not be said to have stepped automatically into the shoes of the Mysore Road Transport Department.

No provision of the Act or rules made thereunder has been shown to us which could have that effect.

The first respondent, however, relied upon a Notification under section 34 of the Act which contains, inter alia, clause 3 which preserves :

"(3). All rights and liabilities which have accrued or are

1incurred or which may accrue or may be incurred under any contract made by the State Government or by any Officer of the Road Transport Department, excepting the Bangalore

Trnsport Service Division prior to the First August 1961, which would have been the rights and liabilities of the Corporation."

He also cites another Notification which reads as follows :-

"l. The _employees of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department who have opted to serve under the Corporation in pursuance of the Notices issued to them .by !he Government shall be employed by the Corporatlion sub- 1ect to such regulations as may be made by it under section 45(2) (c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 and also subject to the following conditions, namely :-

(a) The transfer of the service of the employees of the Mysore. Government Road Transport Department to the Corporation shall not amount to interruption of service and shall not entail any loss of seniority pre-

vi•ously held by such employees.

(b) The terms and conditions of service applicable to such transferred employees including those relating to

Provident Fund, Gratuity and other benefits shall not in any way be less favourable than those applicable to them immediately before the transfer.

( c) Benefits regarding leave and other conditions of servce available to such transferred employees immediately before the transfer shall be conr.inued.

(d) In the event of retrenchment of such transferred employees, in determining the retrenchment compensation, if any, length of service rendered by such transferred employees before the transfer shall also be considered.

( e) Changes in the conditions of service of the transferred employees shall not be effected to their disadvantage without the prior approval of the Government.

2. In respect of all disciplinary proceed!ings or appeals arising therefrom pending immediately before 1st August, D 1961, the Corporation or such Officer or Offic;:rs as may be designated by it shall be the disciplinary authority competent to pass appropriate orders in accordance with the relevant mies applicable to them before the transfer.".

It 1is clear that the last mentioned notification could apply only to those persons who, on 1-8-1961, had already exercised an option to E serve under the Corporation in pursuance of notices issued t-o them.

It makes no provision for persons to whom, for any conceivable reason, no notice had been issued.

Neither the Act nor the two notifications u/s. 34(1) of the Act mentioned above contained any provisions which could entitle an employee of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department to get a notice automatically.

It appears that the notices were issued only in exercise of the executive power of the Government.

F Clause (7) of one of the two notifications of 1-8-1961 laid down:

"(7) The members of the staff of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department, excepting those who are serving in connection with the affairs of the Bangalore Trans- port Service Division, who have opted to serve under the Corporation with effect from 1st August, 1961, in response to the notice issued to them by Government shall be employed by the Corporation subject to such regulations as may be made by it under section 45(ii) (c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act and subject to such assurances as have been

gliven to them by Government in their notice No. HD 8 TRC 60 dated 23rd June 1961."

This provision also relates to persons who had already exercised options under notices issued to them already.

It may be that there was a lacuna in the rules or in the Act so that cases like those of the first respondent were not provided for at all in the Act or in the rules.

•. -

'-,_

__ ,_ -~.,.", _, --ii-"' .. -(-"'"'"--*' ..._"..,

- ~-,~-~---- "i ><-~> =··/·&l~~-~"~1"1"'('~-:_~:-·~·*k-'.'"Y'•1ll>ii;:t.ll J\IJl!f ll

'"!'."

Learned counsel for the first respondent relied strongly on s. 34 of the Act which lays down as follows :-

"34(1). The State Government may, after consultation with a Corporation established by such Government, give to the Corporation general instructions to be followed by the Corporation, and such instructions may include directions relating to the recruitment, conditions of service and training of ; its employees, wages to be paid to the employees, reserves to be maintained by it and disposal of its profits or stocks.

(2) In the exercise of its powers and performance of its duties under this Act, the Corporation shall not depart from any general instructions issued under sub-section ( 1) except with the previous permiss;'on of the State Government."

This section enables only general directions to be given.

When the first respondent applied in the High Court for another writ or direction under Art. 226 in 1966, the High Court seems to us to have over-stepped the limits of mere interpretation or application of the law and to have.indulged in what is nothing short of legislation.

The High Court directed the State Government to serve a notice calling D upon the first respondent to exercise his option on the question whether he wanted to become an employee of the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation in the same way in which other employees of the Transport Department of that State had been asked to exercise their options.

The High Court observed :- ·

"It is clear that the State Government were under a duty to make available to him that option when the order by which he was illegally dismissed was set aside, Government are therefore, in our opinion, right in making available to the petitioner that option at least now.

We, therefore, issue a direction that that option will be made available to the petitioner within fifteen days from this date".

We also find that, after proceedings under the Contempt of F Courts Act against the Government of Mysore, the petitioner had been paid his salary between 25-1-61, the date of a dismissal which was declared to be illegal by the High Court, and 1-8-61, when the Mysore Government Road Transport Department was abolished and its place taken by the State Road Transport Corporation.

The State Government owed no duty to the first respondent to pay G him after its transport department was wound up.

No term of any contract was placed before the Court to show what duty the Government could have to employ the first respondent after its transport department was wound up or to direct the Corporation to do so, We do not know what option the State Government has given to the first respondent after the writ petition was filed.

If it had already given any option to him, there was no point in directing it to give another H option, In order to compel the Corporation to do anything, as already indicated, only a general direction u/s. 34 of the Act, set out

ab_ove, could be given by the Government. There neither could be a

specific direction with regard to a particular case nor was any specific direction given by the Government for any such case. The High Court could not take upon itself the power to fill any gap in the provision of the Act, even if we were to assume that there was one here, and c9mpel the Government to perform a function which the Government was under any kind of obligation to do.

The High Court could not give a specific direction to make provision to meet what it thought was required in a particular or individual q1se if such a case fell outside the provisions made by the Act and the rules. We can find no justification at all for such assumption of powers by the High Court.

Mrs; Shyamla Pappu learned counsel for the appellant has sought support from a judgment of this Court in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Rao & Anr. ('), where this Court held as follows:-

It is quite clear the employees of the Bangalore Road Transport Serv!ce of the Government did not either under a statutory provision, as in Jestamani Gulabrai Dho/akia v. The Scindia Steam Navigation Co. [1961 (2)

SCR 811], or automatically, become the employees of the Corporation.

The Corporation was directed to take over only those of the employees who opted for its service and to give to them the same terms and conditions as were enjoyed by them while in the service of the Mysore Government. Thus,

the condition precedent. of an employee of the Road Transport Service of the Government of Mysore being transferred and regarded as the employee of the Corporation as from October 1, 1951, was the giving of the option to him and his exercise thereof.

There is no dispute that Respondent 1 was not given the

noice of option, presumably because, rightly or wrongly, he was not regarded as having been in the service of the Government's Road Transport Service immediately before the Corporation came into being.

It cannot also be disputed that he never asked for a notice of option on the ground that he continued to be in iliat service.

That he did not in fact exercise the option is an accepted fact.

That being so, it cannot be said that under the said notification the Corporation was required to have him as its employee or iliat his service was transferred to the Corporation thereunder, tile condition precedent to such employment or transfer not having been complied with."

This Court also held there :

Jn our view, the Labour Court could not, on the posi- . tion stated above, treat him as the Corporation's employee

and on that footing grant him the relief which it did.

Once it is found that he did not become the Corporation's

(l) CA. No. 1720 of 1967 given on 6-8-1969.

MY~ORE ROAD TRANSP. CORP. V. BABAJAN (Beg, C.J.) 931

employee, the Corporation could not be held liable to pay him the wages for the period from March 6, 1960, to April 19, 1962." .

The case cited by Mrs. Pappu arose out of a claim under section 33(c) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but the views e.xpressed there accord with ours.

We respectfully adopt the same reasoning.

Indeed, in the case now before us, the Corporation's legal position rests <m a stronger footing than it did in the case cited above inasmuch as the declaratory relief asked for by the first respondent against the Corporation had not been granted.

That relief would, therefore, be deemed to have been refused.

The first respondent did not himself go up in appeal against that decision.

He cannot claim such a relief C in the subsequent writ petition now before us.

The facts set out above show that there were ample grounds for discriminating between a person against whom an order of dismissal had been passed, so that he was no longer serving in the transport department, and others who were not in the same position but were actually in the service of the transport department of the Government. It may D be that the effect of the High Court's order, se:ting aside the dismissal, was that the stigma of dismissal was removed from the record of the first respondent.

Nevertheless, as no order granting a declaratory telief he had asked for was given to the first respondent, he could not be deemed to be. a servant even of the State Government after the department in which he was working was wound up.

The most he could say was that he was not dismissed.

The winding up of the depart- E ment would, on the facts stated above, 'operate as the discharge of the respondent who could, if so advised, seek whatever other means of redress he may stiJJ have under the law.

• / Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment a1id ' order of the High Court.

The parties will bear their own costs.

S.R.

Appeal allowed.

MYSORE STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION

BABAJAN CONDUCTOR & ANR

February 8, 1977

M. H. BEG, C.J.

P. s. KAILASAM, J.

Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950

s 34

Art. 226

I:Tigb Court

Government Road Trans- port Department

August l, 1961

Mysore Government

s. 3

Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950

Mysore Road Transport Department

s. 34(1)

Art. 226

Mysore State Road Transport Corporatior

s 34

Mysore High Court

Shyamla

Pappu

E. K. Jose

R. B. Datar

N. Nettar

BEG

Mysore State Road Transport Corporation

Article 226

State of Mysore

High Court of Mysore

Corporatfon

section 3

section 34

clause 3

Bangalore

section 45(2)

Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950

1st August, D 1961

s. 34(1)

Bangalore Trans- port Service Division

1st August, 1961

section 45(ii)

Road Transport Corporations Act

23rd June 1961

s. 34

Art. 226

Mysore State Road Transport Corporation

Government of Mysore

s. 34

Shyamla Pappu

October 1, 1951

MY~ORE ROAD TRANSP. CORP. V. BABAJAN

section 33(c)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947


BHA VNAGAR MUNICIPALITY

ALJBHAI KARlMBHAI & OTHERS

February 8, 1977

(P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]

Industrial. Dispufr Act, S. 33 ( 1 )(a), whet/1er contravened by retrenchment of workers d1tectly mvolved in dispute pending before Tribunal-Contravention 0! s. 33, wl1ether a11to111atically leads to reinstatement uf retrenched workers.

An industrial dispute between the appellant and its workmen including the respondents, was pending before the Industrial Tribunal. The dispute, inter alia, related to the demand for permanent status of the respondeilts who were daily

ra_ted workers of the water works section of the Municipality. Meanwhile, without obtaining the Tribunal's prior permission, the appellant retrenched the

repondents. On a ".ornplaint by ihe respondents u/s. 33-.( of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tnbunal made an award holding that tlie appellant had contravened s. 33(1 )(a) of the Act, and directed reinstatement of the respondents.

The complaint was not adjudicated on merits.

The appellant filed a writ petition which was dismissed i11 /i111i11e by the High Court.

Allowing the appeal, but agreeing that the appellant had contravened s. 33

(1) (a) and that the respondents' complaint u/s. 33(1)(a) was maintainable, the Court restored the respondents' complaint for disposal on merits by the Tribunal.

HELD : ( 1) The character of the temporary employment of the respondents being a direct issue before the Tribunal, that condition must subsist and cannot be altered to their prejudice by putting an end to that temporary condition.

This could be done only with the express permission of the Tribunal.

[933-G-HI

Tile Court further observed :

To permit rupture in employment, in this case, without the prior sanction of the Tribunal will be to set at naught the avowed object of section 33 which is principally directed to preserve the status quo under specified circumstances in the interest of industrial peace during the adjudication. [936 A-BJ

(2) I11 a complaint under s. 33-A. even if the employer is found to have t:ontravened the provisions of section 33, the Tribunal has to pronounce upon

the merits of the dispute between the parties. For the purposes of the Act, the

complaint under s. 33A takes the form of a reference o~ an industria! disppte by the appropriate authority and the same has to be disposed of rn a ltke ma-nner. f936 C-Dl

( 3) The Tribunal has committed an .eror of i1:1risietion in ordering reinstatement of the respondents and declmmg to ad1udicate the matter and to

make its award on the merits as required under the law. [93Q DJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 900 of 1976.

Appeal by Special Leave from th~ Judgmet. and Order dated 8-3-1976 of the Gujarat High Court m Spl. Civil Appln. No. 263 of 1976.

P. H. Parekh and (Miss) Manju !etley for the Appellant.

s. c. Agarwal, V. J. Francis and A. P. Gupta for the Respond.ents.

' .•

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Go;; wAMI, J.

This appeal by special leave at the instance of the Bhavnagar Municipality is directed against the order of the Gujarat High Court dismissing in limine its writ application challenging the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, made under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act (briefly the Act).

There was an industrial dispute pending between the Bhavnagar Municipality (briefly the appellant) and its workmen before the Industrial Tribunal in Reference No. 37 of 1974 referred to it under section

10(1) (d) of the Act on March 5, 1974.

The said industrial dispute related to several demands including the demand for permanent status of the daily rated workers of the Water Works Section of the Municipality who had completed 90 days' service.

While the aforesaid industrial dispute was pending before the Tribunal, the appellant, on September 30, 1974, passed orders retrenching 22 daily rated workmen (briefly the respondents) attached to the Water Works Section of the Municipality.

It is not disputed that the appellant had complied with section 25F of the Act and due retrenchment compensation had been paid to those workers.

On June 20, 1975, the respondents filed a complaint to the Tribunal under section 33A of the Act for contravention of secfam 3 3 of the Act by the appellant.

Neither party adduced any oral evidence before the Tribunal but relied only upon documents produced before it.

On October 30, 1975, the Tdbunal made its award holding that the appellant contravened section 33(1) (a) of the Act and, therefore, directed reinstatement of the respondents.

The appellant preferred a writ application before the High Court which was dismissed in limine, as stated abovle. Hence this appeal by special leave.

Two questions arise for decision .in this appeal. First, whether the appellent contravened section 33 (I) ( e) of the Act by ordering retrenchment of the respondents who, along with other workers, were directly involved in the industrial dispute pending before the Tribunal. Second, whether contravention of section 33 will automatically lead to an order F of reinstatement of the respondents, as has been held by the Tribunal.

It is common ground that the appellant did not obtain prior permission of the Tribunal before retrenching the respondents.

It is vrnll settled that a complaint under section 33A is maintainable only if the employer contravenes section 33 of the Act.

It is submitted by Mr. Agarwal, on behalf of the respondents, that the G object of section 33 should be borne in mind in considering the question about alteration of conditions of service under secton 33(1) (a) of the Act.

He submits that since the respondents were directly involved in the dispute and the question of their permanent status from a casual or temporary status formed the subject matter of the dispute. the reference has been made nugatory by the action of the appellant in retrenching them.

Mr. Parekh, on the other hand, sub- H mits that retrenchment of the respondents does not involve alteration of conditions of service and hence there is no contravention of section 33 of the Act.

. ~\

There is no complaint by Mr. Agarwal that there is any noncompliance by the appellant with section 28F of the Act. Mr. Agarwal further rightly concedes that he cannot bring his case under section 33(1) (b) or under section 33(2) (b) since it is not a case of discharge or dismissal for misconduct.

His entire submission is based on section 33(1) (a) of the Act.

Section 33 of the Act so far as material for us may be set out :

"33 ( 1) During the pendency of any .... proceeding before a . . . . . . Tribunal . . . . in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall-

( a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workm.:n concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediatelv before the commencement of such proceeding; ,

x x x x

save with the express permission 111 writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending".

There is a clear prohibition in section 33(1) (a) against altering conditions of service by the employer under the circumstances pecified except with the written permission of the Tribunal or other authority therein described. ·--,

In order to attract section 33 ( l) (a), the following features must be present :

(l) There is a proceeding in respect of an fodustrial dispute pending before the Tribunal.

(2) Conditions of service of the workmen applicable immediately before the commencement of the Tribunal proceeding are altered.

(3) The alteration of the conditions of service is in regard to a matter connected with the pending industrial dispute.

(4) The workmen whose conditions of service are altered are concerned in the pending industrial dispute.

(5) The alteration of the conditions of service is to the prejudice of the workmen.

The first feature is admittedly present in this case since action has been taken by the appellant in retrenching the respondents during the pendency of the proceeding before the Tribunal.

The point that requires consideration is whether the other features are also present in the instant case.

\ " ,--

Before we proceed further we should direct our attention to the A subject matter of the industrial dispute pending before the Tribunal.

It is sufficient to take note of the principal item of the dispute, namely, the demand of the respondents for conversion of the temporary status of their employment into perma!lent.

To recapitulate briefly the appellant employed daily rated workers to do the work of boring ad

hand pumps in its Water Works Section. These workers have been m employment for over a year.

They claimed permanency in their em- B ployment on their putting in more than 90 days' service. They also demanded two pairs of uniform every year, cycle allowance at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month, Provident Fund benefit and National Holidays and other holidays allowed to the other workers. While this particular dispute was pending before the Tribunal, the appellant decided to entrust the work, which had till then been performed by these workers in the Water Works Section, to a contractor. On the employment of the C contractor by the Municipality for the self-same work, the services of the respondents became unnecessary and the appellant passed the orders of retrenchment. It is, therefore, olear that by retrenchment of the respondents even the temporary employment of the workers ceased while their dispute before the Tribunal was pending in order to improve that temporary and insecure status.

Retrenchment may not, ordinarily, under all circumstances; amount to alteration of the conditions of service. For instance, when a wage dispute is pending before a Tribunal and on account of the abolition of a particular department the workers therein have to be retrenched by the employer, such a retrenchment cannot amount to alteration of

the. conditions of service. In this particular case, however, the subject matter being directly connected with the conversion of the temporary E employment into permanent, tampering with the status quo ante of

these workers is a clear alteration of the conditions of their service.

They were entitled during the pendency of the proceeding before the Tribunal to continue as temporary employees hoping for a better dispensation in the pending adjudication. And if the appellant wanted to effect a change of their system in getting the work done through a con~ tractor instead of by these temporary workers, it was incumbent upon F the appellant to obtain prior permission of the Tribunal to change the conditions of their employment leading to retrenchment of their ser-

- vices. The alteration of the method of work culminating in termination of the ervices by way of retrenchment in this case has a direct impact on the adjudication proceeding.

The alteration effected in the temporary employment of the respondents which was their condition of service immediately before the commencement of tl1e proceeding before G the Tribunal, is in regard to a matter connected with the pending industrial dispute.

The character of the temporary employment of the respondents being a direct issue before the Tribunal, that condition of employment, however insecure, must subsist during the pendency of the dispute before the Tribunal and cannot be 3'ltered to their prejudice by putting an H end to that temporary condition. This could have been done only with the express permission. of the Tribunal. It goes without saying that the

respondents were directly concerned in the pending industrial dispute.

No one also deny that snapping of the temporary employment of the respondents is not to their prejudice. All the five features adverted to above are present in the instant case.

To permit rupture in employment, in this case, without the prior sanction of the Tribunal will be to set at naught the avowed object of section 33 which is principally directed to preserve the status quo under specified circumstances in the interest of industrial peace during the adjudication.

We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the appellant has contravened the provisions of section 33(1) (a) of the Act and the complaint under se<'tion 33A, at the instance of the respondents, is maintainable. The submission of Mr. l'arekh to the contrary cannot be accepted.

That, however, does not conclude the matter.

The Tribunal was clearly in error in not adjudicating the complaint on the merits. It is well settled that in a complaint under section 32A, event if the employer is found to have contravened the provisions of section 33, the Tribunal has to pronounce upon the merits of the dispute between the parties.

The order passed in an application under section 33A is an award similar to one passed in a reference under section 10 of the Act. The award passed has to be submitted to the Government and the same has to b~ published under section 17 of the Act. For the purposes of the Act the complaint under section 33A takes, as it were, the form of a reference of an industrial dispute by the appropriate authority and the same has to be disposed of in a like manner. The Tribunal has committed an error of jurisdiction in declining to adjudicate the matter and to make its award on the merits as required under the Jaw. The High Court was, therefore, not right in dismissing the writ application of the appellant in limine.

We should also observe that,, in the absence of adjudication on the merits by the Tribunal, the High Court was not right in holding that the retrenchment by the appellant was "a g!oss act of victimisation". ·

In the result the order of the High Court is set aside. It follows that the award of the Tribunal ordering reinstatement of the respon- F dents falls and is set aside.. We should also add that the, observations of the Tribunal wit11 regard to the question of prosecution of the appellant under sections 31 and 32 of the Act were not at all pertinent in an enquiry under section 33A and ought not to have been made.

The writ application in the High Court stands allowed to the extent indicated.

The appeal is allowed as diretted in this order. The complaint under section 33A stands restored to the file of the Tribunal for G disposal on the merits in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. The appellant, however, shall pay the costs of the respondents as ordered at the time of granting of the Special Leave.

M. ':rt.

Appeal allowed.

' J

BHA VNAGAR MUNICIPALITY

ALJBHAI KARlMBHAI & OTHERS

February 8, 1977

P. K. GOSWAMI

S. 33

s. 33

s. 33

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 33(1 )(a)

s. 33

s. 33(1)(a)

section 33

s. 33

section 33

s. 33A

P. H. Parekh

Manju !

c. Agarwal

V. J. Francis

A. P. Gupta

Go;; wAMI

section 33A

Industrial Disputes Act

Bhavnagar Municipality

section

10(1)

March 5, 1974

September 30, 1974

section 25F

June 20, 1975

section 33A

October 30, 1975

section 33(1)

section 33

section 33

section 33A

section 33

Agarwal

section 33

Parekh

section 33

section 28F

section 33(1)

section 33(2)

section 33(1)

Section 33

section 33(1)

section 33

section 33

section 33(1)

l'arekh

section 32A

section 33

section 33A

section 10

section 17

section 33A

sections 31 and 32

section 33A

section 33A


A. P. M. MAYAKUTTY ETC. v.

SECRETARY, PUBLIC SERVICE DEPARTMENT, ETC.

February 8, 1977

[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.] B llllerstate senioritY, in equated posts consequent to the reorganfamion of .State.~Whether scrvtes rendered under Rule !O(a)(i)(l) of the Madras State .and Subo_rdnate Services Rules would count for the purpose of fixing the interstate se'!1or11y-Kerala Government order dated 10-5-63 based 011 the recommendatzon of the Central Government dated 16-2-1963-Va/idity of.

The three appellants, who were appointed as temporary junior engineers in .the Madras High Way Subordinate Service under mle !O(a)(i) (!) of the C Madras State and Subordinate Services Rules on 13-6-1950, 6-6-1951 and .8-6-1951 respectively, on being selected by the Public Service Commission and again appointed to the same posts were permitted by an order issued under rule 23(a) ibid to commence their probationary period with effect from 15-3-1953, -4th July, 1954 and 18th July 1954 respectively.

On 1-11-1956, on the re- .organisation of States, they were allotted as junior engineers in the Kerala State

which was formed by .inclusion therein of parts of the States of Madras and Travancore-Cochin. For the purpose of fixing the interstate seniority, several .orders were passed, from time tOI time, both by the Central Government and D the Government of Kerala.

A provisional integrated gradation list of junior engineers was prepared by the State Government in October 1962 giving the .appellants ranks therein at serial Nos. 123, 132 and 145 respectively.

On a representation by the employees of the Travancore-Cochin area, the Government of India recommended three alternatives for the acceptance of the Kerala Government on 16-2-1963. They were : (!) The Officers allocated to Kerala from the former Madras State may be allowed the benefit of emergency service towardi seniority in the equated category if such service would have been regularised from the date of their emergency appointment and if it would E have been counted for interstate seniority on November !, 1956 had these .officers remained in Madras. (2) The principles. laid down by the Governmenu -0f Madras in their order dated July 17, 1957 be accepted and (3) The Government of India would have no objection even if the State Government was to adopt the rule that interstate seniority would be determined on the basis of the length of continuous service in the equated grade subject to the exclusion of service rendered in purely stop-gap or emergency arrangements and that on! y short periods for which appointment was held under such arrangements should be excluded.

The Government of Kerala passed an order on May 10, 1963 F adopting the first two alternatives but not the third.

The writ petition filed by the appellants in the Kerala High Court challenging he said orders dated , 10-5-1963 was rejected.

Jn appeal by special leave, the appellants contended :

( 1) The emergency service rendered under Rnle !O(a) (i) (1) of the Rules .ongbt to be taken into account because snch service can be taken into account under Rnle 23 (a) ibid (ii) Such service is not liable to be excluded by reason G

~ ·Of the directives issued earlier by the Government of India on 3rd April 1957 and 1st March 1962, (iii) If the appellants had remained in Madras, the temporary sernce rendered by them would have been taken into account for fixing their seniority and (iv) Such, service should conn! in view of the grant of increments to them from the date of their initial appointments in view of the temporary service rendered by them having been counted for the purpose of eligibility for promotion to the higher post of Assistant Engineers, they beinJ! duly qualified to hold the posts of Junior Engineers, they having been permitted to appear for departmental tests which are open only to the probationers, their H service books having been opened from the date of their appointmfnt and the concurrence of the Public Service Commission having been obtained for continuing them in service after the expiry of three months and again after the .expiry of ooe year of their emergency service.

A Dismissing the appeals, the Comt,

HEID : ( 1) A fact of fundamental importance which permeates every one of these considerations is that the appellants were appointed under rule !O(a) (i)(l) at the Madras State and Subordinate Services Rules.

In face of the proviiiOilll of these rules and the express terms of their appointment, to the effect, "that appointments were under rule !O(a)(i)(l) purely temporary neceiiitated on account of, the non-availability of regularly selected candidates, conferring no claim for future appointment as junior engmeers aad they were liable to be terminated at any time without previous notice", it is clear, that the appointments were purely as a matter of stop-gap or emergency arrangement and such serrice cannot be taken into account for the purpose of seniority from the date of their initial appointment. [941 E, H, 942 A]

(2) Clauses (iii) and (iv) of rule IO(a) reflect significantly on the nature of the appointment held by the appellants and show that the appellants were appointed initially on a uniquely precarious tenure. Such tenures hardly even count for seniority in any system of service jurisprudence. [942-C-D]

(3) The fact that the appellants were qualified to hold the posts cannot, in view of clause (iii) of rule lO(a) entitle them to count for the purpose of seniority the period during which they served in a stop-gap or an emergency arrangement. [942 Bl

(4) The contention that if the appellants had remained in Madras their entire service would have counted for the purpose of seniority is without any merit and one of speculation as to what course the appellants' destiny would have taken had they remained in Madras. The Government of Madras itself did not trellt the entire service of the appellants as regular when they were selected by the Public Service Commission. That parent government undoubtedly assigned to them attificial dates for fixing he commencement of eir probationary periods but such dates, though antenor to the dates of their actual selection by the Public Service Commission, were quite subsequent to the dates of their initial appointment. The services rendered by them under rule IO(a)

(i) ( 1) wer-c treated by the Government which appointed them as a matter of stop-gap, emergency or fortuitous arrangement. [942 D-G]

(5) Tho concurrence of the Public Service Commission. to the continuance of the appellants in the post filled by them, firs~ after the !lxp1ry ?f three monts and then after the expiry of one year was obtame~ not with a. view to regularising the appointments but for the purpose of meetmg the r<:qu!rements of. a provision under which such concurrence is necessary to obtam 1f an appomtmcn' made \Tithout selection by the Public Service Commission is required for any F reaon to be continued beyond three months or a year. [943 E-F]

(6) In !he instant case, the initial appointment was not only made without any reference to the Public Service Commission but the various rules and the terms of the appointment show that the appellants were appointed purely as a matter oJ' fortuitous or stop-gap arrangement. Their initial temporary services cannot therefore be counted for the purpose of seniority. [943 B-C]

C. P. Dfll/lodaran Nayar v. State of Karn/a [1974] 2 SCR 867, distinguished and held not applicable.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 841 of 1974.

Appeal by Special Leave from! the Judgment and Order dated

3~-~-1970 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. 39/70 and C1v1l Appeal No. 1575 of 1970.

Appeal by Special Le-ave from the Judgment and Order dated 22-12-1969 of the Kerala High C0urt in O.P. No. 211/65,

. '

~·.

V. Sivarama Nair and A. S. Nambiar for the Appellants in both the Appeals.

M. C. Bhandare and K. M. K. Nair for Respondent No. 1 in CA 841 and R. 2 in CA 1575/70.

(Mrs.) Shyamla Pappu and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 1 in CA No. 1575/70.

K. S. Ramamurthi, N. Sudhakaran and P. K. Pillai for Respondent B No. 45 in CA 1575/70.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHANDRACHUD, J.-Since these two appeals involve identical questions, we propose to state the facts of one of these only.

The decision in Civil Appeal No. 1575 of 1970'will govern the other appeal.

The three appellants were -appointed as temporary Junior Engineers in the Madras High Way Subordinate Service under rule lO(a) (i) (1) of the Madras State and Subordinate Services Rules.

Appellants 1 and 2 were appointed on June 6 and June 8, 1951 respectively while the thir_d appellant was •appointed on June 30, 1950.

A few years later they were appointed to the very same posts after selection by the Public Service Commission and in course of time, orders were issued under rule 23(a) of the aforesaid rules permitting them to commence their probation from dates anterior to the dates of their appointments after selection by the Public Service Commission but subsequent to the dates of their initial •appointments under rule .IO( a) (i) (1). The first appellant was permitted to commence. his probationary period on July 4, 1954, the second on July 18, 1954 and the third ori March 15, 1953.

On November 1, 1956, on the reorganisation of States, appellants were allotted as Junior Engineers to the Kerala Srate which was formed by inclusion therein of parts of the States of Madras and Travancore-Cochin.

As in other States, so in Kerala, it became necessary to fix rules of seniority governing employees drawn from different.

States, parts of which were integrated in Kerala.

A conference of Chief Secretaries of various States was held on May 18 and 19, 1956, to consider problems arising out of reorganisation of States and the consequent integration of services.

Pursuant to the decision taken in that Conference, the Government of Kera1'a passed an order on December 29, 1956 providing that the relative seniority as between persons drawn from different States. and holding posts declared to be equivalent shall be determined by considering the length of continuous service in the equated grade, whether such service is temporary or officiating, quasi permanent or permanent.

The order, however, expressly provided that in the aforesaid determination, the period for which an appointment was held "in a purely stop-gap or emergency arrangement" was to be excluded.

On April 3, 1957 the Government of India issued a directive under section 117 of the States Reorganisation Act stating that it was agreed that in determining the relative seniority as between two persons holding posts declared as equivalent to ea.ch other and drawn from different States the length

12--206SCT /77

A of continuous service, whether temporary or persnanent, in the particular grade should be taken into account, excluding "periods for wllich an appointment is held in a purely stop-gap or fortuitous arrangement." On April 2, 1958 the Government of Kerala issued a clarificatory order stating that for computing length of continuous service "only short periods for which an appointment was held in purely stop gap or emergency appointment will be excluded." It issued B another order on August 16, 1961 stating &at one year of temporary service of Junior Engineers allotted from Madras would be excluded for the purposes of fixing their interstate seniority.

Representations were made against this order to the Government of India which direlcted by an order dated March 1, 1962 that services rendered under provisional or emergency appointments by the Travancore-Cochin or Madras personnel prior to November 1, 1956 before regularisation -1 C of their 'appointments should be taken into account for the purposes of deciding. interstate seniority, only if such service is either regularised, or it is in a time-scale of pay and is reckoned for grant of increments in the time-scale. and is continuous.

O'n May 16, 1962 the Government of Kerala passed an order modifying its earlier orders so as to conform to the decision taken by the Government of India on March 1, Consequ'ently, in October 1962 a provisional integ- D rated grad_ation list of Junior Engineers was prepared by the State Government giving to the appellants ranks therein at serial nos. 145, 137 and 123 respectively.

Employees d_rawn froni. the Travancore-Cochin area being evidently p~_ejudiced by the decision of the Kemla Government made representations to the Government of India which, on February 16, 1963 recommended three alternatives for the acceptance of Kerala Government.

The first alternative thus recommended was that the officers allocated to Kerala from the former Madras St'ate may be allowed the benefit of emergency service towards seniority in the equated category if such service would h'ave been regularised from the date of their emergency appointment and if it would have been counted for interstate seniority on November 1, 1956, had these officers remained in M'adras.

The second alternative was that the principles laid down by the Government of Madras in their order dated July 17, 1957 be accepted.

By the third alternative it was stated that the Government of India would have no objection even if the State Government was to adopt the rule that interstate seniority would be determined on the basis of the length of continuous service in the equated grade subject to the exclusion of service rendered in purely stop-gap or emergency arrangements and that only short periods for which appointment was held under such arrangements should be excluded.

On May 10, 1963 the Government of Kerala passed, an order adopting the first two alternatives but not the third.

The appellants thereafter field a writ petition in the Kerala High Court which wa~ disposed of in December 1964 by directing them to file representations to the Government of India on the basis of a certain decision rendered by the High Court earlier. The appellants accordingly made representations and on those being rejected, they filed a writ petition in the High Court in August 1965. That writ petition having been dismissed, they have filed this appeal by SIJecial leave ..

The question which arises for decision is whether the serviCes rendilred by the appellants under rule lO(a) (i) (1) of the Madras State and Subordinate Services Rules must be taken into account for the purpose of fixing their seniority in the service of the Kerala Government as from November 1, 1956.

It is urged on behalf of the appellants th•at the aforesaid service ought to be taken into account because such service can be taken into account under rule 23, econdly because such service is not liable to be excluded by reason of the directives issued earlier by the Government of India and thirdly because if the appellants had remained in Madras, the temporary service rendered by them would have been taken into account for fixing. their seniority.

Counsel for the appellants says that they were granted increments from the date of their initial appointments, that the temporary service rendered by them was counted for the purpose of eligibility for promotion to the higher post of Assistant Engineers, that they were duly qualified to hold the post of Junior Engineei:s, that they were entitled and permitted to appear for departmental tests which are open only to the probationers, that their service Qooks were opened from the data of their initial appointments, and that the concurrence of the Public Service Commission was obtained for continuing them in service after the expiry of three months and then again after the expiry of one year.

These facts and circumstances, according to the appellants, would justify the counting of temporary service rendered by them for the purpose of fixing their seniority.

Having given every consideratio11 to these matters we think it impossible to accept the appeal.

A fact of fundamental importance which permeates every one of these considerations is that the appellants were appointed under ru)e lO(a) (i) (1) of the Madras State E and Subordinate Services Rules which runs thus :

"10. Temporary appointments.-(a) (i) (1) Where it is necessary in the public interest owing to an emergency which has arisen to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and there would be

undue delay in making .such appointment in accordance with these rules and the Special Rules, the appointing authority may temporarily appoint a person, otherwise than in accordance with the said rules."

This provision contemplates the making of temporary appointments when it is necessary in the .public interest to do so owing to an emergency which has arisen for filling a vacancy immediately.

Such appointments, in terms, are permitted to made otherwise than in accordance with the rules. The letters of appointment issued to the appellants mention expressely that they were appointed under rule lO(a)

(i )( 1), that the appointments were "purely temporary necessitated on account of the non-availability of regularly selected candidates conferring no claim for future appointmerit as Junior Engineers .... and that the appointment is liable to be terminated at any time .without previous notice." In face of the provisions of the rule and the terms of the appointment it seems to us clear that the appellants were appointed purely as a matter of stop-gap or emergency arrangement. Since

A such service cannot be t•aken into account for purposes of seniority, the appellants cannot contend that the entire service rendered by them from the date of their initial appointment must count for purposes of seniority.

Clause (iii) of rule. lO(a) makes this position clearer by providmg that a person appomted under clause (i) shall, whether or not he possesses the qualifications prescribed for the service, be repl'aced as soon as possible by a member of the service or an approved candidate qualified to hold the post under the relevant rules.

The fact that the appellants were qualified to hold the posts cannot, therefore, entitle them to count for: the purposes of seniority the period during which they served in a stop-gap or emergency arrangement.

Clause

(v) of rule lO(a) provides that a person appointed under clause (i) shall not be regarded as a probationer, that he is not entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential claim to future appointment to the service •and that the services shall be liable to be terminated at any time without notice and without assigning any reason.

These provisions reflect significantly on the nature of the appointment held by the appellants and show that the appellants wete appointed initially on •a uniquely precarious tenure. Such tenures hardly ever count for seniority in any system of service jurisprudence.

It is now only necessary to consider the appellant's argument that had they remained in_ ¥adras, their entire service would have counted for purposes of seniority.

In support of this argument reliance was placed on the correspondence between the Governments of Keral'a and Madras, but neither that correspondence nor a certain order dated June 11, 1960, which is at Ex. P-17 in the record, can avail the appellants.

In a way of saying, the proof of pudding is in the eating.

It is needless to specurate as to what course the appellants' destiny would have taken had they remained in Madras, because the Government of Madras itself did not treat the entire service of the appellants as regular when they were selected by the Public Service Commission.

That parent government undoubtedly assigned to them artificial dates for fixing the commencement of their probationary periods but such dates, though anterior to the dates of their actual selection by the Public Service Commission, were quite subsequent to the dates of their initial appointment.

As stated earlier, the appellants were •appointed initially in June 1951 and June 1950, but the Government of Maaras, prior to the reorganisation of the States, had directed that their probationary periods should be deemed to commence in July 1954 and March 1953.

This shows th•at the services rendered by the appellants under rule lO(a) (i) (1) were treated by the Government which appointed them as a matter of stop-gap, emergency or fortuitous arrangement.

The decision in C. P. Damodaran Nayar v. State of Kerala(I) on which the -appellants' counsel has placed reliance for showing that temporary service of the kind rendered initially by the appellants can

(I) [1974] 2 S.C.R. 867.

.....

A.P.M. MAYAKUTTY v. SECRETARY, P. s. DEPTT. (Cha11drachud, !.) 943

be counted for the purposes of seniority has no application to the instant case.

One of the appellants in that case was selected as a District Munsif by the Madras Public Service Commission and was posted as such on May 26, 1951.

He was in continuous service in than post since his appointment but on being allotted to the State of Kerala on November 1, 1956 his seniority was reckoned from October 6, 1951 on the footing "that the said date was assigned to him as the date of conunencement of his continuous service.

Dealing with the appeal arising out of the dismissal of his writ petition, this Court held that the service rendered by the appellant after his initial appointment was neither emergency service nor was it a purely stop gap or fortuitous arrangement.

The distinguishing feature of that case, which is highlighted in the judgment of the Court, is that the appellant therein was "appointed in a regular manner through the Public Service Commission" and therefore his appointment could not "by any stretch of imagination" be described as having been made to fill a purely stop-gap or fortuitous vacuum (p. 876). In our case the initial appointment was not only made without any reference to the Public Service Commission but the various rules and the terms of the appellants' appointment to which we have dmwn attention show that the appellants were appointed purely as a matter of fortuitous or stop-gap arrangement.

The concurrence of the Public Service Commission to the continuance of the appellants in the posts filled by them, first after the expiry of three months and then after the i;; xpiry of one year, was obtained not with a view to regularising the appointments since their inception but for the purpose of meeting the requirements of a provision under which such concurrence is necessary to obtain if an appointment made without selection by the Public Service Commission is required for any reason to be continued beyond three months or a year.

For these reasons we confirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss this appeal.

There will be no order as to costs.

Civil Appeal No. 841 of 1974 will also stand dismissed but without an order of costs.

S.R.

Appeals dismissed.

A. P. M. MAYAKUTTY ETC

February 8, 1977

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD

P. K. GOSWAMI

Kerala

Madras

Travancore

Central Government

Government of Kerala

Cochin

Government of India

Kerala Government

November !, 1956

July 17, 1957

May 10, 1963

Kerala High Court

Government of Madras

Public Service Commission

[1974] 2 SCR 867

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

V. Sivarama Nair

A. S. Nambiar

M. C. Bhandare

K. M. K. Nair

Shyamla Pappu

Girish Chandra

K. S. Ramamurthi

N. Sudhakaran

P. K. Pillai

CHANDRACHUD

July 18, 1954

March 15, 1953

November 1, 1956

Travancore-Cochin

May 18 and 19, 1956

Government of Kera1'a

December 29, 1956

April 3, 1957

section 117

States Reorganisation Act

April 2, 1958

August 16, 1961

March 1, 1962

Travancore-Cochin

May 16, 1962

March 1, Consequ'ently

Kemla Government

the Travancore-Cochin area being evidently p~ejudiced by the decision of the Kemla Government made representations to the Government of India which, on February 16, 1963 recommended three alternatives for the acceptance of Kerala Government.

February 16, 1963

M'adras

June 11, 1960

Government of Maaras

[1974] 2 S.C.R. 867

Madras Public Service Commission

State of Kerala