NARHARI SHIVRAM SHET NARVEKAR v.

PANNALAL UMEDIRAM

January 16, 1976

(R. S. SARKARIA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.J

('ode of Civil Procedure-Ss. 38 and 39-Transfer of a decree dated 29-6-1960 passed by the Bombay lligh Court to the Goa Court for execution- T¥hether it is a "foreign decree' within the rneaning of sec. 2(6), C.P.C. and whether the High Court a "foreign court" within the n1eaning of s. 2(5) especially "'hen the parties subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of that Court by prosecuting their case upto a certain stage. , ('onstitution of India-Art. 261 (3 )-Meaning of the word "according to law"-Whether they refer to the "law in force" during the pendency of the appeal or the "law in force" on the date of transfer of the decree for execution-

Scope of Art. 261(3 ).

Decree-Executability of a decree is not a vested right-Extension of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code to a State later on does not affect the decree.

Jn the Civil Suit No. 203 of 1955, on the original side of the Bombay High , Court, filed by the decree-holder /respondent against the appellant/judgmentdebtor for recovery of certain amount of money, summons were served on the judgment-debtor who after filing his written staten1ent absented himself, and did not take any further part in the proceedings of the Court..1. resulting in a

decree dated 29-6-1960. for Rs. 65,953.79.

On 20-12-1961. Goa became a part of India and was made a Union Territory of India by the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962 passed on 27-3-1962.

The decree-holder applied to the Bornbay High Court for transferring the decree to Goa Court for execution and by t.n order dated 28-8-1963 the decree was transferred to the Goa Court for execution. The execution application before the Executing Cou1t at Panjim filed on 21-1-1964 was dismissed on 26-4-1965, holding that the decree transferred to it by the Bombay High Court was not executable.

An appeal was preferrfd to the Additional Judicial Commissioner on 1-6-1965 and the appellant/ Judg1nent-debtor filed his reply.

During the pendency of the appeal, the Code of Civil Procedure was extended to Goa on 15-6-1966 by the Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of the Code of Civil Procedure and Arbitration) Act (30) of 1965 and repealing the Portu.(?uese Code. The Additional Judicial Commissioner by its order dated 28-6-1967 held that in view of Art. 261(3) of -the Constitution, the decree passed by the Bombay High Court could not be treated as. nullity and, \Vas therefore, executable .

On appeal by certificate, the appellant/judgment-debtor contended ( 1) that the decree passed by the Bombay High Court qua Goa Court was a nullity being a decree of a foreign court. Even if the decree was not a nullity it could be executed by a Goa court if the original decree had been appn1Yed bv the Goa Court under s. 50 of the Portuguese Code; (2) that the Bombay High Court transferring _the decree for execution to the Gon Court under ss. 38 and 39 of the C. P. C. was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the C. P. C. had not been ap, plied to Goa when the order of transfer was passed: (3) that as the provisions of the C.P.C. were applied to Goa after the order of the Executing Court \vas passed and a vested right had accrued to the appellant/judgment-debtor. the decree continued to be inexecutable and could not be validated by Art. 261 (3) of the Constitution.

The respondent/decree-holder coritended (i) that inasmuch as the judgmentdebtor had anpeared and participated in the suit for some time the decree passed by the Bombay High Court could not be said tO\ be a nullity (ii) that as the C.P .C. was made applicable while the appeal was pending before the Additional Judicial Commissiorler, Goa the decree became clearly executable and the order of transfef of the decree by the Bombay High Court stood validated: and (iii) that in view of the provisions of Art. 261(3) of the Constitution of Jrtdia, there was no bar to the execution of the' decree, which was passed by a court which was in the territory of India.

A Dismissing the appeal, the Court,

JIELD : ( 1) Where a party appears before the court, the decree of the court, even if it is a foreign court, is not a nullity. [154-D]

Raj Rajendra Sardar Maloji Marsingh Rao Shitole v. Sri Shankar Saran and .1 others, L1963] 2 S.C.R. 577, distinguished and held not applicable.

Shaligra1n v. Dau/at Rani, [1963] 2 S.C.R. 574 and Lalji Raja & Sons v.

(2) The right of the judgment-debtor to pay up the decree passed against him cannot be said to be a vested right, nor can the question of executability of the decree be regarded as a substantive vested right of the judgment-<1ebtor.

A t<Ji'tiorari, the execution proceedingsr being purely a matter of procedure it is well-settled that any change in law which is made during the pendency of the cause \vould be deen1ed lo be retro-active in operation and the Appellate Court is bound to take notice of the change in law. The Additional Judicial Commiss1Jner was competent to take notice of the change in the law. [154 E--F,

155 Gl

others, A.T.R. 1959 S.C. 577, 579 and Jose De Costa and another v. Bascora #--- Sedashiva Sinai Naroornin and others, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1843, 1849, fo11owed.

(3) The proposition adumbrated v:iz., that the executability of the decree v.as a vested right which could not be taken av.1ay by the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa during the pendency of the appeal is wrong,

snce the executability of the decree could not be considered to be a vested right.

[155 F-G]

(4) The contention thatj as the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to Goa at the tirne when the Bombay High Court passed the order transferring the decree to the Goa Court, the order of transfer was absolutely Without jurisuiction WflS wrong. [156 C-Dl

As the decree was passed by the Bombay High Court, s. 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure would clearly apply and the decree passed by the Bombay High Court was not a foreign decree. It is true that at the time when the Bombay 1-ligh Court passed the order of transfer, the Code of Civil Procedure had not been applied to Goa.

But, that does not put the respondent/decree-holder out of Court.

The decree could be transferred and was valid and executable. 'But, because of infirmity, it could not be executed so long as the C.P.C.- was not made applicable to Goa. Thus, the only bar \vhich stood in the \Vay of the execution of the decree was the non-applicability of the provisions of the C.P.C. to Goa. This was, however, not an insurmountable bar or an obstacle and the bar or the obstacle disappeared the moment the Code of Civil Procedure \vas applied to Goa on 15-6-1966. [156 D-F]

HELD FURTHI;:R: (5) The instant case is a fit case in which the doctrine of eclipse would apply and he wall or the bar which separated Bombay from Goa having disappeared, there was iio impediment in the execution of a decree.

The decree lay dormant only so far as no bridge \Vas built between Bombay and Goa but as soon as the bridge was constructed in the shape of the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa the decree became at once executable. [156 F-G]

(6) Jn the instant case, the decree passed by the Bombay High Court having been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and not being a nullity because the judgment-debtor had appeared and participated in the proceedings of the Court to some extent, and the order of transfer under s. 38 of the Code of Civil Procedufe also not having suffered from any inherent lack of jurisdiction, the decree became enforceable and executable as soon as the Code of Civil Procedure \vas applied tO Goa.

[157 E-F}

BhaRwan Shankar v. Rajara1n Bapu Vithal, A.J.R. 1951 Born. 125, 127, A approved.

(7) Art. 261(3) of the Constitution enjoins that a decree shall be executable in any part of the territory of India, according to law. In the instant case, the decree was passed by the Bombay High Court after the Constitution came into force and Art. 261 (3) would apply to the decree passed by the Bombay High Court. The Article would also _apply to Goa because at the time when the application for execution was made in Goa Court, the Constitution had already been made applicable to that State also. (158 C-D]

(8) It is true that at the time when the Executing Court dismissed the suit of the decree-holder /respondent, the Code of Civil Procedure had not been <lpplied and the Portuguese Code continued to apply but after the application of the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration) Act, 1965; the Portu~ guese Code which was in force in Goa was clearly repealed and the present case does not fall within any of the clauses mentioned in the saving provisions oi s. 4 of the Act.

Thus, when the Civil Procedure Code was made applicable to Goa during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate Court, namely, the Additional J udiciul Commissioner was bound to decide the matter in accordance with the law that was in force.

Hence, the contention the matter in accordance with the law that waS1 inforce.

Hence, the contention that the words "according to law" in Art. 261(3) would mean that the decree v.ould be executable only in accordance with the law in force in the Portuguese Code is not correct. [158 B-F]

[Jose De Costa and another v. Bascore Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin and 01/iers, .-\.1.R. 1975 S.C. 1843, 1849 followed.]

OvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 909 of 1968.

(From the judgment and order dated the 28th June, 1967 of the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Goa, Daman and Diu in Civil Appeal No. 105 of 1965).

B. N. Lokur and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the appellant.

D. V. Patel and P. N. Bhardwaj for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-

FAzAL Au, J.

This is a judgment debtor's appeal on a certificate of fitness granted by the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Goa, Daman & Diu and arises under the following circumstances.

The decree holder/respondent had brought a suit on the original side of the Bombay High Court being Suit No. 203 of 1956 against the appellant/judgment debtor for recovery of certain amount of money. The Bombay High Court passed a decree for Rs. 65,953.79 on June 29, 1960. In the suit brought by the decree-holder/respondent summons were served on the defendant/ judgment debtor who filed his written statement and thereafter absented himself and did not take any part in the proceedings of the Court.

On December 20, 1961 Goa became a part of India and was made a Union Territory of India by the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962 passed on March 27, 1962. Thereafter the decree-holder respondent applied to the Bombay High Court for transferring the decree to Goa Court for execution.

This prayer was allowed by the Bombay High Court and by its order dated August 28, 1963 the decree was transferred

11-390 SCT/76

to the Goa Court for execution.

In pursuance of the order of 11c Bombay High Court the decree-holder filed an execution suit before the Executing Court at Panjim on Janumy 21, 1964. The Executing Court however by its order dated April 26, 1 %5 held that the decree transferred to it by the Bombay High Court was not executable and accordingly dismissed the execution.

Thereafter the decree-holder filed a memo of appeal before the Additional Judicial Commissioner on June I, 1965 and the appeal was admitted on June 5, 1965. On February 24, 1967 the judgment debtor/appellant filed his reply. While the appeal was pending before the Additional Judicial Commissioner the Code of Civil Procedure was extended to Goa on June 15, 1966.

Accordingly tlie Additional Judicial Commissioner by its order dated June 28, 1967 held that the decree was executable and he accordingly remitted the case to the Executing Court for proceeding in accordance with the law.

The Additional Judicial Commissioner also held that in view of Art. 261(3) of the Constitution of India the decree passed by the Bombay High Court could not be treated to be a nullity and was, therefore, clearly executable.

In support of the appeal Mr. B. N. Lokur submitted three main contentions before us :

(I) that the decree passed by the Bombay High Court qua Goa Court was a nullity being a decree of a foreign Court.

Even if the decree was not a nullity it could be executed by a Goa Court if the original decree had been appro\eci by the Goa Court under s. 50 of the Portuguese Code;

(2) that the order of the Bombay High Court transferring the

decree for execution to the Goa Court under ss. 38 & 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the Code of Civil Procedure had not been applied to Goa when the order of transfer was passed; and

(3) that as the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure

were applied to Goa after the order of the Executing Court was passed and a vested right had accrued to the appellantljudgmcnt debtor the decree continued to be inexecutable and could not be validated by Art. 261 ( 3) of the Omstitution of India.

Mr. D. V. Patel appearing for the respondent/decree-holder submitted that as the judgment-debtor had appeared and had participated in the suit for some time the decree passed by the Bombay High Court could not be said to be a nullity. Secondly it was contended that as the Code of Civil Procedure was made applicable while the appeal was pending before the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Goa, the decree became clearly executable and the order of transfer of the decree by the Bombay High Court stood validated.

Thirdly it was argued that in view of the provisions of Art. 261 (3) of the Constitution of India there was no bar to the execution of the decree which was passed by a Court which was in the territory of India.

The sheet-anchor of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant/judgment-debtor, that the decree passed by the Bombay

NARllARl v. PANNALAL (Faal Ali, !.) 153

High Court was a nullity either on the ground that it was passed by A a foreign Court or on the ground that the transfer was invalid under s. 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was the decision of this Court in Raj Rajendra Sardar Maloji Marsingh Rav Slzito/e v. Sri Shankar

Smw1 and Ors.(I).

In that case it appears that the appellant had instituted a suit in the Court in Gwalior State in May 1947.

The' respondents did not appear before the Court and the Gwalior Court passed a decree ex parte in November 1948. On September 14, 1951 B the Gwalior Court transferred the decree for execution to Allahabad. as a result of which the appellant before the Supreme Court filed an application for execution of the decree before the Allahabad Courl.

It was mainly contended before this Court that the decree being that of a foreign Court was a nullity and the execution application was nm nlaintainablc.

Jn these peculiar circun1stanccs this Court, after considering the entire Jaw on the subject, concluded as follows : C

"Our conclusion therefore is that the Allahabad Court had no power to execute the deem; either under section 38 or under ss. 43 or 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, even if the decree was not a foreig11 decree, the decree-holder's application for execution was rightly dismissed." D

An analysis of Shitole's case (supra)_ would clearly show that the facts in that case arc clearly distinguishable from the facts in the present case and there are indeed a large number of distinguishing features in the case indicated above which arc not at all applicable to the present case. In the first place the decree in Shitole's case( 1) was admittedly passed by the Gwalior Court in I 94 7 when Gwalior being a princely State the Court which passed the decree was undoubtedly a foreign Court.

Secondly, the judgment-debtors/defendants did not appear before the Gwalior Court at all as a result of which an ex parte decree was passed.

According to Private International Law it is well settled that an ex parte decree of a foreign Court is a nullity if the party against whom a decree is passed docs not appear at all and does not take part in the proceedings of the Court.

Thirdly, it would appear that the provisions of Art. 261 (3) of the Constitution would not apply to the facts of Shitole's case(') because the constitutional provisions not being retrospective they could not apply to decrees passed before the coming into force of the Constitution. ln view of these circumstances therefore it cannot be said that Shito/e's case(') referred to above is of any assistance to the appellant in deciding the issues involved in this case.

On the other hand the decision in Slzaligrum v. Daulat Ram(') appears to be directly in point so far as the facts in the present case arc concerned. In that case also a decree was passed by the Bombay High Court which was in the territory of India and to which the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applied. The appellant appeared before the Court and applied for leave to defend and thereafter absented himself.

The decree was thereafter transferred to the Court H

(I) [196.3] 2 S.C.R. 577.

of District Judge, Bhir in Hyderabad State. This Court held that the decree was executable and observed as follows :

"A person who appears in obedience to the process of a foreign Court and applies for leave to defend the suit without objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court when he is not compellable by law to do so must be held to have voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction of such Court Shaikh A tham Sahib v. David Sahib [1909] I.L.R. 32 Mad. 469. Therec

fore it cannot be said that this decree suffered from the defects which a foreign ex-parte decree without such submission would suffer from. The order for transfer was made at a time when the Indian Code of Civil Procedure became applicable to the whole of India including the former territories of Hyderabad State."

In Lalji Raja & Sons v. Firm Hansraj Nathuram(I) this Court reiterated the view taken in Shaligram's case (supra). It was also pointed out in the aforesaid case that where a party appears before the Court the decree of the Court even if it is a foreign Court is not D a nullity.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant however submitted that since the Code of Civil Prqcedure was not applicable to Goa the decree became inexecutable and this being a vested right could not be taken away by the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa E during the pendency of the appeal before the Additional Judicial Commissioner. It seems to us that the right of the judgment-debtor to pay up the decree passed against him cannot be said to be a vested ) right, nor can be question of executability of the decree be regarded as a substantive vested right of the judgment-debtor. A fortiorari the execution proceedings being purely a matter of procedure it is well F settled that any change in law which is made during the pendency of the cause would be deemed to be retro-active in operation and the Appellate Court is bound to take notice of the change in law.

Ill Mohan/al Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhowan Haribhai Tamboli(') it was clearly ruled by this Court that the Appellate Court was b.ound to apply the law as it was found on the date of the judgment. In this G connection this Court observed as follows :

"But it was during the pendency of the suit at the appellate stage that the second notification was issued cancelling the first. Hence, the Court was bound to apply the law as it was found on the date of the judgment. Hence, there is no question of taking away any vested rights in the landlords."

(!) [19711 3 S.C.R. 815

(2) [19631 2 S.C.R. 707, 715-716.

To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Gummalapura A Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva and others(') where this Court observed as follows :

"It is well settled that an appellate Court is entitled to take into consideration any change in the law (vide the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri

-1940 FCR 84)" B

A similar view was taken by a recent decision of this Court in Jose De Costa and another v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin and others(') where this Court observed as follows :

"Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two wellcstablished principles.

The first is that "while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence ai the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendmcnt" (see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. lnco111e-tax Commr.-54 Ind.

App. 421 (AIR 1927 PC 242). The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit."

In these circumstances, therefore, we arc unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the Additional Judicial Commissioner was not competent to take notice of the change in the law .

As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant

that the exccutability of the decree was a vested right which could F not be taken away by the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa during the pcndency of the appeal, the decision of this Court in Lalji Raja & Sons' case (supra) is a clear authority againstthe proposition adumbrated by the learned counsel for the appellant. In that case this Court appears to have considered this point in all its comprehensive aspects and was of the_opinion that the executabi!ity of the decree could not be considered to be a vested right.

In this con- G gection this Court made the following observations :

"Therefore the question for decision is whether the nonexecutability of the decree in the Morena court under the law in force in Madhva Bharat before the extension of 'the Code' can be said to be a right accrued under the repealed law. We do not think that even by straining the language H of the provision it can be said that the non-executability of

(I) A.i~R. (1959)-S:C~ 577, 579

(2) A.l.R.1975S.C.1843, 1849.

a decree within a particular territory can be corn;.idcred as a privilege. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . All that has happened in view of the extension of 'the Code' to the whole of India in 1951 is that the decree which could have been executed only by courts in British India arc now made executable in the whole of India.

The change made is one relating to procedure and jurisdiction ................... It was tk invalidity of the order transferring the decree to the Morena court that stood in the way of the decree-holders in executing their decree in that court on the earlier occasion and not because of any vested rights of the judgment-debtors ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . By the extension of the 'the Code to Madhya Bharat, want of jurisdiction on the part of the Morena court was remedied and that court is now made competent to execute the decree:·

It was then argued that as the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to Goa at the time when the Bombay High Court passed the order transferring the decree to the Goa Court, the order of. transfer was absolutely without jurisdiction.

We are. however, unable to agree with this contention. To begin with, as the decree was passed by the Bombay High Court, s. 38 o[ the Code of Civil Procedure would clearly apply because the decree passed by the Bombay High Court was not a foreign decree. It is true that at the time when the Bombay High Court passed the order of transfer, the Code of Civil Procedure bad not been applied to Goa.

But that does not put the respondent! decree-holder out of Court.

The decree could be transferred and was valid and executable. But because of an impediment or an infirmity it could not be executed so long as the Code of Civil Procedure was not made applicable to Goa. Thus the only bar which stood in the way of the execution of the decree was the non-applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa. This was, however, not an insurmountable bar or an obstacle and the bar or the obstacle disappeared the moment the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to Goa on June 15, 1966. It is common ground that this was done during the pendency of the appeal before the Additional Judicial Commissioner passed the impugned order on June 28, 1967.

In these circumstances, therefore, it seems to us that this is a fit case in which the doctrine of eclipse would apply and the wall or the bar which separated Bombay from Goa having disappeared there was no impediment in the execution of the decree.

The decree lay Jormant only so far as no bridge was built between Bombay and Goa but as soon as the bridge was constructed in the shape of the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa the decree became at once executable.

In Bhagwan Shankar v. Rajaram Bapu Vithal( 1) Chagla, C.J. as he then was, while delivering the opinion of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Conrt, observed as follows :

"Therefore, as far as this particular decree was concerned, as the defendant, we are assuming, did not submit to the

(!) A.l.R. 1951 Born. 125. 127.

NARHARl \'. PANNALAL (Fa::.al Ali, J.)

jurisdiction of the Sholapur Court, quae the Akalkot Court, the judgment of the Sholapur Court was a foreign judgment passed by a Court not of competent jurisdiction & therefore the decree could not be executed in the Akalkot Court so long as the Sholapur Court continued to be a foreign Court. 13ut once it is conceded that the decree was not a nullity & it was valid & binding as far as the Sholapur Court was concerned. then there is 110 difficulty, with respect. in understanding & appreciating the judgn1e11t rhich ue lnne to consider in this Full Bench, because if the charac/er of the Akalkol Court changes & if the status of the defendanl alters hecause of that facl, then the i111pedi111e111 which was initially tliere in the decree being enforced in the Akalkot Court disappears & the decree which was unenforceable till that change came aboul becomes enforceable & executable in the

Akalkot Court.

This is not in any way violating private international law.

Private international law remains the same. But under the circumstances of the case the Shoiapur Court no longer being a foreign Court quae the Akalkot Court, the question of private international law does not arise at all.

The decree is then being executed under the Municipal Law & clearly under the Municipal Law the decree is executable as it has been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction."

15 7

It would appear therefore that an idcutical phenomenon had taken place in the case before the Bombay High Court and the Full Bench held that the moment the decree became executable and enforceable the status of the defendant/judgment-debtor was altered and the decree became executable. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, in the present case also the decree passed by the Bombay High Court having been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and not being a nullity because the judgment-debtor had appeared and participated iu the proceedings of the Court to some extent, and the order of transfer under s. 3 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure also not having suffered from any inherent lac, k of jurisdiction, the decree became. enforceable and executable as soon as the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to Goa. As we have indicated above it was the duty of the Appellate Court, namely the Additional Judicial Commissioner, to take note of the change in law, namely, the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure to Goa and the repeal of the Portuguese Code which was in force before the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were applied. The Additional Judicial Commissioner was, therefore, fully justified in taking the view that the decree was executable and the bar of inexecutability came to an end, when the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were applied to Goa.

Mr. Patel appearing for the respondent submitted an alternative argument that even if the transfer of the decree under s. 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not valid, under the Portuguese Code

there was no provision which required transfer of the decree to that Court before the same could be executed. Counsel for the appellant objected to this argument on the ground that it was never raised at

any stage of the case and being a question of fact as to whether or not there was any such provision in the Portuguese Code it should not be entertained. In these circumstances, we do not think it necc'- sary to go into this question, particularly when the order of the Additional Judicial Commissioner can be upheld on other grounds mentioned by us. ' Finally it appears that this case is clearly covered by the principle' contained in Art. 261 (3) of the Constitution of India which rum thus :

"Final judgments or orders delivered or passed by civil courts in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of ~ecution anywhere within that territory according to law.

This is a constitutional provision which enjoins that a decree shall be executable in any part of the territory of India according to law.

It is obvious that in the instant case the decree was passed by the Bombay High Court after the Constitution came into force and this Article

would, therefore, clearly apply to the decree passed by the Bombay High Court.

The article would also apply to Goa because at the time when the application for execution was made in a Goa Court, the Constitution had already been made applicable to that State also.

Mr. Lokur counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that the words 'according to law' in Art. 261 (3) would clearly show that the decree would be executable only in accordance with the law in force, i.e. the Portuguese Code. It is true that at the time when the executi11g Court dismissed the suit of the decree-holder/respondent the Code of Civil Procedure had not been applied and the Portuguese Code co11tinued to apply but after the application of the Code of Civil Proc<:- dure by virtue of the Goa, Daman and Diti (Extension of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration) Act, 1965 (Act 30 of 1965J the Portuguese Code which was in force in Goa was clearly repealed and the present case does not fall within any of the clauses mentioned in the saving provisions of s. 4 of the Act. Thus when the Code of Civil Procedure wai made applicable to Goa during the pendency of the appeal, the Appellate Court, namely, the Additional Judicial Commissioner, was bound to decide the matter in accordance with the law that was in force, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure.

In Jose Da Costa's case (supra) this Court, while dwelling upon the applicability of the Portuguese Code, observed as follows :

"Thus considered, it is clear that the procedural provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code were no longer applicable to this case with effect from 15-6-1966.

If that be the correct position, there is no legal hurdle in the way of the appellant to the reagitation in this Court of the issue as to prescription left undecided by the court below.

• * * *

To sum up, since on and from 15-6-1966 the Portuguese Jaw relating to Reclamacao stood repealed and no substantive right or obligation had been acquired or incurred under

that repealed law within the meaning of the first proviso to S. 4 (I) of Act 30 of 1965, the appellants cannot be debarred from canvassing in this appeal under Article I 36, the pica of prescription notwithstanding the fact that they did not file any Reclamacao in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner.

We therefore negative the preliminary 0bjection ., raised by the respondents."

For these reasons, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the Additional Judicial Commissioner 'and hold that the decree passed by the Bombay High Court was clearly exeuctablc. The Executing Court will now proceed in accordance with the law as directed by the Additional Judicial Commis- 'Sioner.

The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed but in view of the somewhat uncertain legal position we leave the parties to bear thir respective costs in this Court.

Appeal dismissed.

S.R

NARHARI SHIVRAM SHET NARVEKAR

PANNALAL UMEDIRAM

January 16, 1976

R. S. SARKARIA

S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ

Ss. 38 and 39

sec. 2(6)

C.P.C

s. 2(5)

Art. 261

Art. 261(3 )

Bombay High , Court

Goa

India

Bornbay High Court

Goa Court

Panjim

Bombay High Court

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

Art. 261(3)

s. 50

ss. 38 and 39

C.P.C

Art. 261

Additional Judicial Commissiorler, Goa

Art. 261(3)

1963] 2 S.C.R. 577

[1963] 2 S.C.R. 574

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 38

the Code of Civil Procedure

Bombay 1-ligh Court

the Code of Civil Procedure

C.P.C

C.P.C

the Code of Civil Procedure

Bombay

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 38

the Code of Civil Procedure

Art. 261(3)

Art. 261

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 4

Art. 261(3)

B. N. Lokur

A. G. Ratnaparkhi

D. V. Patel

P. N. Bhardwaj

FAzAL Au

December 20, 1961

March 27, 1962

August 28, 1963

Janumy 21, 1964

April 26, 1 %

June I, 1965

June 5, 1965

February 24, 1967

June 15, 1966

June 28, 1967

Art. 261(3)

Constitution of India

B. N. Lokur

s. 50

ss. 38 & 39

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

Art. 261

D. V. Patel

the Code of Civil Procedure

Additional Judicial Commissioner, Goa

Art. 261

Constitution of India

s. 38

the Code of Civil Procedure

Gwalior State

Gwalior Court

September 14, 1951

Allahabad

Supreme Court

Allahabad Court

section 38

ss. 43

the Code of Civil Procedure

Shitole

Gwalior

Art. 261

Shito

the Code of Civil Procedure

Hyderabad

Code of Civil Procedure

Shaligram

the Code of Civil Procedure

1940 FCR 84

the Code of Civil Procedure

Lalji Raja

Madhva Bharat

Morena court

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 38

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

Bombay High Conrt

Fa::.al Ali

Sholapur Court

Akalkot Court

Akalkol Court

Shoiapur Court

s. 3

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

Patel

s. 38

the Code of Civil Procedure

Art. 261

Constitution of India

Lokur

Art. 261

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 4

the Code of Civil Procedure

the Code of Civil Procedure

Jose Da Costa

S. 4


ST A TE BANK OF INDIA v.

SHR[ N. SlJNDARA MONEY

January 16, 1976

[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD. \·. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. C. Gl!PTA, JJ.J

Constitution of India-Art. 133( l)-Sche111e of-Conditions preceden; for tlic issue of a certificate under in l'Xerci.H' of power under Art. 136 of ifle Constitution on such a ccrtific.alt'.

Jndt1.\'lrial l)ispntcs Act, 19-l-7 (Act 14 of 1947)-St•ction 25F read with s.\·. 2(oo) anti 25(B)(2)-Scupc of the co11cep1 of retre11clune11t under s. 2(00).

Statutory COil.\fruction of ,\ocial welfare legislation-Guidelines.

Words and p/rrases-.leanin.r: of the lvords ''.tennination ...... for any reason lvhatsoe1t•r" includes _autornatic exti11guisl1111ent of service by rirtuc of a pre-en1ptivc pro\ision to tenninate in the appointnient order itself.

Section 25(F)(b) of the Jndustrial Disputes Act, 1947, provides that no workman employed in {lny industry \Vho has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until he has been paid at the time of the refrcnchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months-.

Section 2(00) of the Act de.fines 'retrcnch- 1nent' as meaning the termination by the employer of the service of a v1orkn1an for any reasons \Vhatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by \Vay of disciplinary action. In the "Hospital Jvfazdoor Sabha's" the Supreme Court held that the statutory requirell}ent of the payment of compensation under s. 25(F)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of a workman and any retrenchment \Vithout payment at the time of the retrenchment makes the retrenchment order invalid and inoperatiYe.

As the aulomatic extinguishmcnt of his service consequent to the pre-en1;>tive provision in his appointment order as to the 'Jemporariness and the period of his cmploy111ent \Va<; covered by the \\'ords "termination ...... for any reasons whatsoever" occurring ins. 2(00) of the Act, in an application under Art. 2~6 of the Constitution by the respondent claiming that by virtue of his deernecl continuous service of one year within the meaning of s. 25B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. he \Vas entitled to be reinstated for non-compliance of s. 25F of the Act. The High Court of Madras, allowing .the. \Vfit, made the rule nisi absolute. The \\Tit appeal filed by the appellant respondent also failed. However, the High Court granted a certificate under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution.

Disn1issing the appeals and negaliving the contentions of the aprellant, the Court.

HELD : ( 1) The grant o.f a Constitutional passport to the Suprc1ne Court by the High Court is not a matter of easy insouciance but anxious advertenc~ to the dual vital requirements built into Art. 133(1) by specific an1endment. /.\ substantial question of law of general importance is a sine quo non to certify Jitness for hearing by the apex court. Nay. more; the question, however, imp6r.·-

tant and substantial, must be of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the High Court's judgn1ent it imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highe:it bench.

Failure here stultifies the schen1e of the Article and floods this court \Vith cases of lesser magnitude with illegitimate entry.

[162 C-1']

Union of lndill v. Hafi.::. Mo/id. Said, JLR [1973] TI Delhi 673, 676, approved.

(2) While exercising the vital po\vers under Art. 136 the Supreme Court must have due regard to the constitutional limitations of Art. 133(1) and owe allegiance to those restraints save in exceptional cases. (163 A]

• •

(3) If the workman s\vim~ into the harbour of s. 25f'--of the Industrial Dis- A pules Act. 1947, he cannot be retrenched Viithout payment, at the titne of retrenchment, compensation computed as prescribed therein read \vith s. 25ll(2).

[164 DJ

State of Bo111bay and other.~ v. Hospital Ma:::.door Sublia <C: others [1960] (2) S.CR. 866, applied.

( 4) Statutory construction, when courts consider \\'elf are legislation with an economic justice bias. cannot turn on cold print, glorified as grammatical construe- B tion, but on teleological purpose an<l protective intendment. Sections 25F, 25B aud 2(00), of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 ha\'e a \Yorkers' 111ission and the input of Part IV of the Constitution also underscores this benignant approach. \Vhile canonsof tra1.1itional sanctity cnnnot wholly govern. courts ..:a::u1ot go hay- \vire in interpreting provisions, ignoring the text and context. Words of multipk:

import have to he winno, Ye<l judicially to suit the social philosophy of the statute.

Dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction '"'here the benignant 1nood of a la\v and. more en1phatically, the definition clause furnish a difi:'i.:rent denotation. Section 2 ( oo) is the master of the situation and t11~ Court cannot C truncate its amplitude. The won.ls "for atiy reason whatsoever" ins. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act are very wide and almost admit of no exception.

[163 G, 164 H, 165 B, 166 BJ

(5) A breakdo\vn of s. 2(oo) unmis.takably expands the sen1antics of ret1u1chment. "Termination ...... for any reason \Vhatsoever" are the key words.

Every termination spells retrenchment. A termination takes place \\here a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of D cu1nprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not n1crely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of !ermination ho\vo;, oev<:r produced. Retrenchment is no longer terra incognita but area covered b1 an expansive definition. It means 'to end' conclude, cease'. That to write inlo the order of appointment the date of tern1ination confers '!10 n1oksha from s. 25F(b) is inferable "from the proviso to s. 25F(l). A separate subsequent termination of the service is not the sole n1agnetic pull of the provision. A pre-emptive provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as a postappoint- 11:. ment termination. Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision. [165 B-C. D. E, 166 CJ

Ob,., ervatio11 :.-Social justice has two sides and occasionally one party or the other makes myopic mistakes resulting in further litigation. [166 G] [The Court reiterated its vie'"'s hel<l out in Trustees of Port, Bo111bay's case, nan1ely, where the law is not free from obscurity and needs this Court's pronouncement an<l one of the affected parties is weak, being a Vv'orl.;.er, the costs

in1st come out of public funds and suggested the constitution by the State of a

suitors Fund'' which will take care of hardships and publi\.: interest in the area or necessary litigation.]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDfCTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 933 and 934 of 1975. -

From the judgment and orders dated the 24th and 25th March, 1975 of the Madras High Court at Madras in writ appeal No. 231 of 1973 and writ petition No. 5062 of 1973.

F. S. Nari"""'' MI s. I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar, for the appel- !ant.

M. K. Rwnamurthi and J. Ra111a111urthi, for the respondent.

The Judgment 9f the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA lYER, J.-The appellant employer, undaunted by a double H defeat at both tiers in the High Court, has appealed against the adverse judgments, by certificate, on the only ground that there was no rctrenchmem of the respondent-employee (within the meaning of

A of s. 2(oo) of the.Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) hereinafter called the Act) and, consequently the latter was ineligible to the statutory compensation the non-payment of which, along with the termination of service, nullified the termination itself.

The end result was that the Division Bench of the Court ruled that the respondent 'was entitled to retrenchment compensation' which, not having been paid, 'the termination would be invalid'.

The subtle B legal issue, substantial in its financial impact, is whether s. 25F read with s. 2 ( oo), vis a vis a short employment, casts a lethal spell on the cessation of service for non-compliance with the condition precedent set out in the provision.

The Certificate

The certificate issued by the High Court under Art.133 (1) is bad on its face. according to counsel for the respondent and the appeal consequently incompetent.

We are inclined to agree that the grant of a constitutional passport to the Supreme Court by the High Court is not a matter of easy insouciance but anxious advertence to the dual vital requirements built into Art. 133 (I) by specific amendment. , Failure here stultifies the scheme of the Article and floods this Court with cases of lesser magnitude with illegitimate entry.

A substantial question of law of general importance is a sine qua non to certify fitness for hearing by the apex court. Nay, more; the question, however important and substantial, must be of such pervasive import and deep significance that. in the High Court's

judgment it imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highest bench.

The crux of the matter has been correctly set out in a decision(') of the Delhi High Court in words which find our approval :

"A certificate can be granted only if the case involves a question of law :-

(i) which is not only substantial but is also of general importance; and

(ii) the said question, in our opinion, needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

It has to be noted that all the above requirements should be satisfied before a certificate can be granted. It means that it is not sufficient if the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance but in addition to it the High Court should be of the opinion that such question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

Further, the word 'needs' suggests that there has to be a necessity for a decision by the Supreme Court on the question, and such a necessity can be said to exist when, for instance, two views are possible regarding the question and the High Court takes one of the said views.

Such a necessity can also said to exist when a different view has been expressed by another High Court.

(!) Union of India v. Hafiz Mohd. Said: ILR [19731 II Delhi 673, 676.

It is but fair to add an implied but important foot note that A while exercising the wider power under Art. 136 this Court must have due regard to the constitutional limitations on Art. 133(1) and owe allegiance to those restraints save in exceptional cases.

This view of the certificate would have put the lid on this appeal but on hearing counsel we feel that the omission of the High Court to assess the case explicitly from this angle does not disable us from 8, granting special leave, if applied for.

So much so counsel have proceeded to argue on the merits, the penumbra! area of industrial law covered by the subject matter being one which cannot be left in legal twilight.

The facts

One of the two employees involved in these appeals has been re-absorbed in service and his case is therefore of lesser import, but the other is still out in the cold ad his legal fate falls for examination in the matrix of facts which we proceed to state.

This respondent was appointed as cashier, off and on, by the State Bank of India between July 31 , 1973 and August 29, 1973.

The intermittent breaks notwithstanding, his total number of days of employment answered the test of 'deemed' continuous service within s. 258 (2) and both sides accept that fact situation.

But the order of appointment. which bears in its bosom the 'good bye' to the employee after a few days, calls for construction in the light of s . 2 ( oo) and s. 25F and we may as well read it here

"(I) The appointment is purely a temporary one for a period of 9 days but may be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the bank's discretion;

(2) The employment, unless terminated earlier, will automaticallv cease at the expiry of the period i.e.,

18-11-1972."

This nine days' employment, tacked on to what has gone before, F has ripened to a continuous service for a year on the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days of broken bits of service.

The le11al issue The skiagram of the employment order must now be studied to ascertain which of the rival meanings counsel have pressed deserves preference.

Statutory construction, when courts consider welfare legislation with an economic justice bias, cannot turn on cold print glorified as grammatical construction but on teleological purpose and protective intendment.

Here s. 25F, 25B and 2 ( oo) have a workers' mission and the input of Part IV of the Constitution also underscores this benignant approach.

While canons of traditional sanctity cannot wholly govern, courts cannot go haywire in interpreting provisions, ignoring the text and context.

With these guidelines before us, we seek to decode the implications of the order of appointment.

But before doing so, an analysis of the legal components of s. 25F will facilitate the diagnostic task.

164 Sl; PREME COURT REPORTS

[J 976] 3 S.C.R.

A The leading case on this facet of law is The Hospital Mazdoor

Sabha( 1). Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed:

"Section 25F(b) provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not Jess than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until he has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' aYeragc pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months.

Clauses (a) and ( c) of the said section prescribe similar conditions but we are not concerned with them.

On a plain reading of s. 25F(b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman.

The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied.

It is difficult to accede to the argument that when the section imposes in mandatory terms a condition precedent, non-compliance with the said condition would not render the impugned retrenchment invalid .... failure to comply with the said provision renders the impugned orders invalid a.nd inoperative."

Without further ado, we reach the conclusion that if the workman swims into the harbour of s. 25F, he cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed as prescribed therein read with s. 25B(2).

But, argues the appellant, all these obligations flow only out of retrenchment, not termination outside that species of snapping employment.

What, then, is retrcnchm~.1t? The key to this vexed question is to be found in s. 2 ( oo) which reads thus :

"2 ( oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-

(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or

(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of supera-annuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains ." stipulation in that behalf; or

( c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;

for any reason whatsoever-very wide and almost admitting of no exception.

Still, the employer urges that when the order of appointment carries an automatic cessation of service, the period of ci;1ployment works itself out by efflux of times, not by act of employer. ---- - -- -----~

(1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866, 871-872.

' •

Such C•\scs arc outside the concept of 'retrenchment' and cannot entail the burdensome conditions of s. 25F. Of course, that a nine-days' employment, hedged in with an express condition of temporariness and automat'c cessation, may look like being in a different street (if we may use a colloquialism) from telling a man off by retrenching him.

To retrench is to cut down.

You cannot retrench without trenching or cutting.

But dictionaries are not dictators o! statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law and, more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation.

Section 2 ( oo) is the master of the situation and the Court cannot truncate its amplitude.

A hreak-down of s. 2(oo) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. 'Termination. . . for any reason whatsoever' are the key words.

Whatever the reason, every termination srells retrenchment.

So the sole question is-has the employee's service been terminated?

Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive.

A termination 'takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the running out of the stipulated term.

To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definitio11 has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the

act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced.

May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of s .25F ands .2(oo). Without speculat- , ing on possibilities, we may agree that 'retrenchment' is no longer

terra incognita but area covered by an expansive definition. It means 'to end, conclude, cease'.

In the present case the employment ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of nine days-automatically may be, but cessation all the same.

That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no moksha from s. 25F(b) is inferable from the proviso to s. 25F(l ).

True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract s. 25F and automatic extinguishment of service

by effluxion of time cannot be suflicient.

An English case R. v.

Secretary of State(') was relied on where Lord Denning MR observed :

"I think that the word 'terminate' or 'termination' is by itself ambiguous. It can refer to either of two things-either to termination by notice or to tcr1ninatio11 by effluxion of time. lt is often used in that dual sense in landlord and tenant and in n1astcr and servant cases.

But there are several indications in this paragraph to show that it refers here onlv to termination by notice." ·

Buckley L.C., concurred and said :

"In my judgment the words are not capable of bearing that meaning. As counsel for the Secretary of State has pointed out, the verb 'terminate' can be used either transitively or -- -----

(!) {1973] 2 All E.R. 103.

intransitively. A contract niay be said to terminate when it comes to an end by eflluxiou of time, or it may be said to be terminated when it is determined at notice or otherwise bv some act of one of the parties. Here in my judgment the word 'terminated' is used in this passage in para 190 in the transitive sense, and it postulates some act by somebody which is to bring the appointment to an end, and is not applicable to a case in which the appointment comes to end merely by effluxion of time."

Words of multiple import have to be winnowed judicially to suit the social philosophy of the statute. So screened we hold that the transitive and intransitive senses are covered in the current context. Moreover, an employer terminates employment not merely by passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a composite order, one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it. A separate. subsequent determination is not the sole magnetic pull of the provision.

A pre-emptive provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination.

Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision.

What follows ? Had the State Bank known the !aw and acted on it, hall-a-month's pay would have concluded the story.

But that did not happen.

And now, some years have passed and the Bank has to pay, for no service rendered.

Even so, hard cases cannot make bad law.

Re-instatement is the necessary relief that follows.

At what point ? In the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent shall be put back where he left off, but his new salary will be what he would draw where he to be appointed in the same post today de nova.

As for benefits, if any, flowing from service he will be rankbelow all permanent employees in that cadre and will be deemed to be a temporary hand upto now.

He will not be allowed to claim any advantages in the matter of seniority or other priority inter se among temporary employees on the ground that his retrenchment is being declared invalid by this Court.

Not that we are laying down any general proposition of law, but make this direction in the special circumstances of the case.

As for the respondent's emoluments, he will have to pursue other remedies, if any.

We substantially dismiss the appeal (C.A. 934 of 1975) subject to the slight modification made above. There was some intervening suggestion !or settlement of the dispute but it fell through. We are persuaded to make the observation based on that circumstance that social justice has two sides and, occasionally, one party or the other makes myopic mistakes resulting in further litigation.

Subject to the above observations, the appeal is dismissed.

The parties will bear their costs throughout, although, in cases like this, where the law is not free from obscurity and needs this Court's pronouncement and one of the affected parties is weak, being a worker, the costs must come out of public funds as suggested in Trustees of

Port, Bombay(f) .. The State, we hope, will constitute a snitors' fund

(1) [1974]4S.C.C. 710.

which will take care of hardships and public interest in the area of necessary litigation.

In C.A. 933 of 1975 the respondent has been re-employed by the

• appellant although in !!is case also we declare, for reasons already given and subject to the same terms till his absorption that the retrenchment is invalid. The costs, in this appeal, will be borne by each of the B • parties.

S.R.

Appeal dismissed.

!2--L390SCl/76

ST A TE BANK OF INDIA

Y. V. CHANDRACHUD. \·. R. KRISHNA IYER

Constitution of India

Art. 133( l)

Art. 136

s. 2(00)

Section 25(F)(b)

Jndustrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 2(00)

Supreme Court

s. 25(F)(b)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Art. 2

s. 25B(2)

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 25F

High Court of Madras

Art. 133(l)(c)

Art. 133(1)

apex court

Art. 136

Art. 133(1)

s. 25

s. 25

Sections 25F, 25B

Industrial Disputes Act

Section 2

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 2(oo)

s. 25F(b)

s. 25F(l)

F. S. Nari

I. N. Shroff

H. S. Parihar

M. K. Rwnamurthi

J. Ra111a111urthi

KRISHNA lYER

s. 2(oo)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 25F

s. 2

Art. 133

Delhi High Court

Art. 136

Art. 133(1)

State Bank of India

July 31 , 1973

August 29, 1973

s. 258

s. 25F

s. 25F, 25B and 2

s. 25F

Gajendragadkar

Section 25F(b)

s. 25F(b)

s. 25F

s. 25B(2)

s. 2

[1960] 2 S.C.R. 866

s. 25F

Section 2

s. 2(oo)

s. 25F(b)

s. 25F(l )

s. 25F

Secretary of State(')

Denning

Buckley


16 8

STATE OF TAMIL NADU

PY ARE LAL MALHOTRA ETC.

January 19. 1976

[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG, R. S. SARKARIA AND P. N. SHINGHAL, .TJ.]

Cp1.1:!11l Sah:s Tr:x Act-Secs. 14-15-Tainil Nadu Sales Tax Act Sec. 2(j)-- Prvlubll101.1 Gf.fll!ltst 1_n1posi11g tax at n1ore than one stage-Whether all categories

aud sub 11cn1.~ of iron and steel to be treated as one conunodity-Words & Fhra.Hs-Mea11i11;.: of "that is lo say."

l he respondents are dealers under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax 1\ct.

Section 14 <?f te Central ale~ Tax Act declares certain goods enumerated therein of

spec1a~ importance 1n inter-state trade or commerce. The list of goods given at scnal No. IV reads as under :-

(iv) Iron and Steel, that is to say-

(a) pig iron and iron scrap

{ b) iron plares solJ in the :-:ame fonn in which they are directly pro~

duced by the rolling mill;

( c) steel scrap, steel ingots, steel billets, steel bars and rods,

(d) (i) steel plates l

(ii) steel sheets, 1

(iii) sheet bars and tin bars, j

(iv) rolled steel sections, J

(v) tool alloy steel,

sold in the same form in which they are dirtctly produced by the rolling

mill.

The said clause JV \vas amended by the Central Sales Tax Amendment Act, Act 61 of 1972 by which certain more entries were added.

Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act provides that the tax payable under a St<lre Law on sale or purchase of declared goods shall not be levied at more

lhn vnc stage.

Respondents used to purchase iron scrap and thereafter used to convert them into :.teel rounds, flats, plates etc.

The scrap was already subject to tax once.

The respondents contended that the entry Iron & Steel was wide enough to ii'1clude scrap as well as the steel rounds, flats, plates, etc. made out of the scrap which wa~ subject to t;:ix once and that, therefore, the sale of the steel rounds, flats, plates, etc., c1nnot be subjected to tax again under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax AcL The High Court accepted the , contention of the respondents.

J\llowing an appeal by certificate,

HELD : I. The intention was to consider each sub-item in clause IV as a separate taxable commcxlity for purposes of sales tax.

The object was not to lay down that all the categories or sub-items of goods specified separately were to be viewed as a single saleable commodity called iron and steel for purposes of determining a starting point for a series of sales. The note against subdivision of Clause IV makes it dear that even each sub-category of a sub-iten1 retains. its identity as a commercially separate item for purposes of sales tax so long as it retains the sub-division. f171G, 172B-Cl

The eXpression 'that is to say' is en1ployed to make it clear and fix the meaning of words to be explained or defined. Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word 'includes' is generally employed. The precise meaning of the words

that is to say' must vary with the context. The purpos.e of the expression in a sales tax law would be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales. ll72f-H, 173B]

The chemical composition of iron and steel, cannot afford a clue to the meaning of iron and steel.

Sales Tax Law taxes sales of goods and is not a .taxation on sales of substance out of which goods are made.

We prefer to follow the more natural and normal inter_pretation which follows plainly from

the fact of separate specification numbering of each item.

State of Madhya B

Prade.h v. Hira Lal; (1966) 17 STC 313-315 distinguished. The case of Devidas applied. fl 7JC. E~Fl

It has not been shown to, us that any provision of the Tarnilnadu Sales Tax Act violates section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act enacted in accordance with Article 286(3) of the Constitution.

Section 2(j) of the Tamil Nadu Act -defines J:?.Oods and section 4 imposes charge in respect of tax on declared goods.

The Tamilnadu Act borrows clause (IV) of sectio11 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.

[176 C-HJ C

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 58-59 and 880-883 of 1971.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10-4-1970 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 437 /67 and 520/68 and Tax Cases Nos. 135-138 of 1970 respectively.

P. Ram Reddy, A. V. Rangam and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Appellant in C.As. 58-59 /71.

Sachin Chandra Chaudhury and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for Respondent.

Gobind Das. P. H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for the Inter-

vener (M/s Durga Steel).

E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BEG, J.-The two Civil Appeals Nos. 58-59 of 1971 arise out of a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissing two Writ Petitions filed against notices issued by a Commercial Tax Officer showing institution of Sales tax assessment proceedings in respect of certain iron and steel goods for the assessment year F 1965-66 in Writ Petition No. 437 of 1967 and for the assessment year 1966-67 ill Writ Petition No. 520 of 1968.

The High Court of Madras. had certified the cases as fit for appeal to this Court under Article 132 and 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution. Although, the Writ Petitions had been dismissed on the ground that they involve an investigation into the question of fact whether the iron and steel scrap, out of which the manufactured goods, sought to be subjected G to Sales tax, had been made, were already taxed or not, yet, the State of Tamil Nadu was aggrieved by the decision of the Madras High Court holding that the manufactured goods, said to consist of "st; el rounds, flat,, angles, plates, bars" or similar goods in other forms and shapes. could not be taxed again if the material out of which thev were made had already been subjected to sales' tax once an iron and steel scrap as both were "Iron and steel''.

It was possible to leave H the assessing authorities free to decide all the questions which they had jurisdiction to consider.

But, it appears that the Madras High Court thought it proper to decide the question as the Sales' tax

• A

authorities had already adopted the view, in other cases, that such goods, though co_vered by the broad genus "Iron and Steel", were separately taxable commodities because each kind of "Iron and Steel" goods was a commercially different and separately taxable species or category.

Moreover, this very question was also before the High Court in regular revision petitions under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Taniil Nadu Act').

Civil Appeals Nos. 880-883 of 1971 arise out of four petitions for revision under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act for the years l 964-65 aud 1965-66, which were allowed by the Madras High Court setting aside assessment orders by following its judgment and decision mentioned above given on 24-6-1970 on Writ Petitions Nos. 437 of 1967 and 520 of 1968. The Madras High Court had also granted C certificates of fitness for appeal to this Court under Article 132 read with Article 133(1) (a) (c) in the four cases before it on revision petitions.

Hence, six cases were connected and heard together by us.

The same question of law, decided by the Madras High Court on 1 grounds contained in one judgment, under appeal in Civil Appeals

Nos. 58-59 of 1971 before this Court, arise in all of them.

All the six cases before us relate to what are known as "declared goods"• under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Central Act'). It was claimed, on behalf of the dealers, sought to be assessed in each case, that, by reason of the restrictions imposed by Section 15 of the Central Act, the levy of tax under the Tamil Nadu Act was not permissible.

Section 14 of the Central Act declares certain goods enumerated there to be "of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce".

The list of goods given there at No. (iv), as it stood in 1968, was :

"(IV) Iron and Steel, that is to say-

(a) 'pig iron and iron scrap

(b) iron plates sold in the same form in which they are directly :Produced by the rolling mill;

(c) steel scrap, steel ingots, steel billets, steel bars and rods;

(d) (i) steel plates l

(ii) steel sheets, Id th ' h. h h

(iii) sheet bars and tin bars, sc_:i in e same 1orm in w. 1c t. ~¥.are

(iv) rolled steel sections, J directly produced by the rolhng m1ll, ( v) tool alloy steel, ·

By the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 61 of 1972, clause (iv) was redrafted.

It now reads as follows :

"(iv) iron and steel, that is to say-

(i) pig iron and cast iron includiug ingot, moulds, bottom plates, iron scrap, cast iron scrap, runuer scrap and iron skull scrap;

(ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes);

(iii) skelp bars, tin bars, sheet bars, bee-bars and sleeper bars;

(iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagone and A hexagone, plain and ribbed or twister, in coil from as well as straight lengths) : ( \') steel structurals (angles, joints, channels, tees, sheet piling

sections, sect10ns or any other rolled sections); \vi) sheets, hoops, strips and. skelj), both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plam and corrugated, in all qualities. in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in rivetted condition;

(vii) plates both plain and chequered in all qualities;

(viii) discs, rings, forgings and stl cijsting8;

(ix) tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories;

(x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel skull, turnings and borings;

(xi) steel cubes, both welded and seamless, of all diameters and lengths, including tube fittings; txii) tin-plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tin-free plates; - ·

(xiii) fish plate bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails-heavy arid crane rails;

(xiv) wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets;

(xv) wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, alumanised, tinned or coated such as by copper;

(xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings or end pieces of any of the above categories"; It will be seen that "Iron and Steel" is now divided into 16 categories which clearly embrace widely different commercial commodities, from mere scrap iron and left overs of processes of manufacturing to

' 1wires" and "wheels, tyres, axles, and wheel sets".

Some of the enumerated items like "melting scrap" or "tool alloys" and "special steels" could serve as raw material out of which other goods are made and others are definitely varieties of manufactured goods. If the subsequent amendment only clarifies the original intentions of Parliament, it would appear that heading 4 in Section 14, as originally worded, was also meant to enumerate separately taxable goods and not just to illustrate what is just one taxable substance, "Iron and Steel". The reason given, in the statement of objects and reasons of the 1972 Act, for an elucidation of the "definition" of iron and steel, was that the "definition" had led to varying interpretations by assessing authorities and the courts so _that a comprehensive list of specified declared iron and steel goods would remove ambiguity. The Select Committee, which recommended the amendment, called each specified category "a sub-item" falling under "Iron and Steel".

Apparently, the intention was to consider each "sub-item" as a separate taxable commodity for purposes of Sales' tax. Perhaps some items could overlap, but no difficulty arises in cases before us due to this feature.

As we have

pointed out, the statement of reasons for amendment spoke of Section

i'4(iv) as a "definition" of "Iron and. Steel". A definition is expected to be exhaustive.

Its very terms may, however, show that it is not meant to be exhaustive. For example, a purported definition may say that the term sought to be defined "includes" what it specifies, but, in that case, the definition itself is not complete.

Although, we have looked at the subsequent amendment of 1972 in order to find an indication of the original intention, because subsequent history of legislation is not irrelevant, yet, we think that, even if we confine our attention to Section 14 as it originally stood at the relevant time, with which we are concerned in the cases before us, the object was not to lay down that all the categories or sub-items of goods, as specified separately even before the amendment of 1972, were to be viewed as a single saleable commodity called "Iron and Steel" for purposes of determining a starting point for a series of sales. On the other hand, the note against the brackets in front of the five smaller sub divisions of (d) makes it clear that even each sub-category of a sub-item retains its identity as a commercially separate item for pw;- pose of sales tax so long as it retains the sub-division. The more natural and normal meaning of such a mode of listing special or declared kinds of goods seems to us to be that the object of specification was to enumerate only those categories of items, each of which was to serve as a new starting point for a series of sales, which were to be classed as "declared" goods. If one were to state the meaning in different words, it would seem to us to be : "Iron and Steel goods of various types enumerated below".

What we have inferred above also appears to us to be the significance and effect of the use of words "that is to say" in accordance with their normal connotation and effect.

Thus, in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edu. Vol. 5, at page 2753, we find:

"THAT. IS TO SAY. (1) 'That is to say' is the com-' mencement of an ancillary clause which explains the meaning of the principal clause. It has the following properties:

(1) it must not be contrary to the principal clause: (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3) but where the principal clause is general in terms it may restrict it : see this explained with many examples, Stukeloy v.

Butler Hob. 171"; The quotation, given above, from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary shows that, ordinarily, the expression "that is to say" is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word "includes" is generally employed. In unusual cases, depending upon the context of the words "that is to say", this expression may be followed by illustrative instances. In Megh Raj & Anr. v. Allah Rakhia & Ors.(') the words

"that is to say", with reference to a general category "land" were held to introduce "the most geenral concept" when followed, inter alia, by the words : "Rights in or over land." We think that the precise meaning ot the words "that is to say" must vary with the context, where,

(!)A.LR. !947 P.C. 7?,.

as in Megh Raj's case (supra), the amplitude of legislative power to A

enact provisions with regard to "land and rights over it was meant to be indicated, the expression was given a wide scope because it came after the word "land" and then followed "rights over land" as an explanation on "land".

Both were wide classes.

The object of using them or subject-matter of legislation was, obviously, to lay down a wide power to legislate.

But, in the context of single point sales' tax, subject to special conditions w11en imposed on seprate categories B: o[ speeitied goods, the expression wc\s apparently employed to specifically e•aumerate separate categories of goods on a given list.

The purpose of such specification and enumeration in a tatule dealing with sales' tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to i:iclicaw the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales.

Otherwise, the listing itself loses all meaning, and would be without any purpose behind it.

C Learned Counsel appearing foran intervener argued that the chemical position of iron and steel affords a clue to the meaning of "Iron and Steel" as used in Section 14 of the Central Act. We are unable to agree that this could be what Parliament or any legis'1ature would be thinking of when enumerating items to be taxed as commercial goods.

The ordinary meaning to be assigned to a taxable item i'1 a list of speci- D lied items is that each item so specified is considered as a separately taxable item for purposes of single point taxation in a series of sales unless the contrary is shown.

Some ccinfusion bas arisen because the separate items are all listed under one heading "Iron and Steel".

If the object was to make iron and steel taxable as a substance, the entry could have been : "Goods of Iron and Steel." Perhaps even this would not have been clear enough.

The entry to clearly have E that meaning would have to be : "Iron and Steel irrespective of change of form shape or character of goods made out of them". This is the very unusual meaning which the respondents would like us to adopt. If that was the meaning, sales' tax law itself would undergo a change from being a law which normally taxes sales of "goods" to a law which taxes sales of substances out of which goods are made. We, however, prefer the more natural and normal interpretation which F follows plainly from the fact of separate specification and numbering of each item.

This means that each item so specified forms >a separate species for each series of sales although they may all belong to the genus : "Iwa and Steel." Hence, if iron and steel "plates" are melted and converted into "wire" and then sold in the market, such wire would only be taxable once so long as it retains its identity as a commercial goods belonging to the category "wire" made of either iron or steel.

G The mere fact that the substance or raw material out of which it is made has also been taxed in some other form, when it was sold as a separate commercial commodity, would make up difference for purposes of the iaw of sales' tax.

The object appears to us to be to tax sales of goods of each variety and not the sale of the substance out of which they are made.

As we all know, sales' tax law is intended to tax sales of different

commecial commodities and not to tax the production or manufacture of partlcular substances out of which these commodities may have

A . been made. As soon as separate commercial commodities emerge or come into existence, they become separately taxable goods or entities tor purposes of sales' tax.

Where commercial goods, without ch.rage of their identity as such goods, are merely subjected to some processing or finishing or are merely jointed together, they may remain commercially the same goods which cannot be taxed again, in a series sales,

so Jong as they retain their identity as goods of a particular type.

In State of Madhya Bharat v. Hirala/( 1) this Court held that a dealer, who bought some scrap iron loc_ally and imported some iron plates from outside and then converted the material into bars, flats and plates, by rolling them in his mills, and then sold them, was still entitled to exemption given to iron and steel from sales tax.

But, in that case, the language of the provision giving the exemption justified this interpretation.

The exemption was given to a sale by either an importer or a purchaser of "goods prepared from any metal other than gold or silver." In other words, the question was whether exemption was given to the substance out of which goods were made.

In that context, it had become necessary to exami; ae whether the exemption from sales' tax was meant for all goods made out of a particular substance, or for goods as separate commercial commodities.

This Court held that the raw material from which the goods were made was decisive for the purposes of the exemption given.

This Court said (at p. 315) :

"A comparison of the said two Notifications brings out the distinction between raw materials of iron and steel and the goods prepared from iron and steel; while the former is exempted from tax, the latter is taxed.

Therefore, iron and steel used as raw material focmanufacturing other goods are exempted from taxation.

So long as iron and steel continue to be raw materials, they enjoy the exemption. Scrap iron purchased by the responde1at was merely re-rolled into bars, fiats and plates.

They were processed for convenience of sale.

The raw materials were only re-rolled to give them attractive and accep!'able forms.

They did not in the process lose their character is iron and steel.

The dealer sold 'Iron and steel' in the shape of bars,· fiats and plates and the customer purchased 'iron and steel' r.1 that shape.

We, therefore, hold that the bars, fiats and plates sol\! by the assessee.are iron and steel exempted under the Notification." The law to be interpreted in Hirala's case (supra) was entirely different.

Jn interpreting it, this Court did observe that u mere change of the form of a substance excepted from sales' tax did not matter. The language of the notifications involved there made it clear that the exemption was for the metal used.

In the cases before us now the object of single point taxation is the commerical commodity and not the substance out of which it is made.

Each commercial commodity here becomes a separate object of taxation in series of sales of that commercial commodity so long •as it retains its identity as that commodity. . .

We think that the correct rule to apply in the cases before us is the one laid down by this Court in Devi Dass Copa/ Krishan & Ors. v.

(!) [1966[ 17 S.T.C. 313, 3J5.

The State of Punjab & Ors.( 1) where Subba Rao, C.J., speaking for a Constitution Bench of this Court, said at (p. 44 7).

"Now coming to Civil Appeals Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965, the first additioml point raised is that when iron scrap is converted into rolled steel it does not involve the process of manufacture.

It is contended that the said conversion does not involve any process of manufacture, but the scarp is made into a better marketable commodity.

Before the High Court this contention was not pressed.

That apart, it is clear that scrap iron ingots undergo a vital change in the process of manufacture and are converted into a different commodity, viz., rolled steel sections.

During the process the scarp iron loses its identity and becomes a new marketable commodity." The process is certainly one of manufacture.

It is true that the question whether goods to be taxed have been subjected to a manufacturing process so as to produce a new marketable commodity, is the decisive test in determining whether an excise duty is Ieviable or not on certain goods.

No doubt, in the law dealing with the sales tax, the taxable event is the sale and not the manufacture of goods.

Nevertheless, if the question is whether a new commercial commodity has comeTtito existence or not, so that its sale is a new taxable event, in the Sales' Tax law, it may also become necessary to consider whether a manufacturing process, which has altered the identity of the commercial commodity, has taken place. The law of sale tax is also concerned with "goods" of various descriptions.

It, therefore, becomes necessary w determine when they cease to be goods of one taxable description and become those of a commercially different category and description.

It appears tQ us that the position has been simplified by the amendment of the law, as indicated above, so that each of the categories falling uader "Iron and Steel" constitutes a new species of commercial commodity more clearly new.

It follows that when one commercial . commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sales t, ax. ·

/ We think that the Madras High Court had committted an error in appl)ing Hiralal's case (supra) to the decision of cases now before us which turns really on a correct interpretation of Section 14 of the Central Act.

On the question now before us, we approve of the reasoning adopted by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Devgun Iron & Steel Rolling Mills v. State of Punjab(2).

Section 15 of the Central Act places certain restrictions and conditions upon State enactments imposing Sales tax. It says :

Every sales tax law of a State shall, in so for as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or

(1) (1967) 20 S.T.C. 430 at 447.

(2) (1961) 12 S.T.C. p. 590

A purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely :

(a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such goods inside the State shall not exceed three per cent of the sale or purchase price thereof, and such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage;

(b) where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods arc sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and tax has been paid under this Act in respect of the sale of such goods in the course of inter- State trade or commerce, the tax levied under such law shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce in such manner and subject to such condition as may be provided in any law in force in that State".

It has not been shown to us that any provision of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act violates Section 15 of the Central Act enacted in accordance with Article 266 ( 3) of the Constitution.

Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act levies taxes on sales and purchases of "goods" as defined in Section 2 (j) of the Act :

" ( j) 'goods, means all kinds of movable property (other than newspapers, actionable claims, stocks and shares and securities) and includes all materials, commodities, and articles (including these to be used in the fitting out, improvement or repair of movable property), and all growing crops grass or things attached to, or forming part of, the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale;"

Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act lays down :

"4. Tax in respect of declared goods.-Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, the tax under this Act shall be payable by a dealer or the sale or purchase inside the State of declared goods at the rate and only at the point specified against each in the Second Schedule on the turnover in such goods in each year, whatever be the quantum _of turnover in that year".

Item 4 of the second schedule specifies the rates of tax in accordance with the Central Act.

It reproduces Section 14(iv) of the Central Act. On an amendment of Section 14(iv) of the Central Act, serial No. 4 of the second schedule of the Tamil Nadu Act was also correspondingly ainended so as to reproduce the sixteen items found in Section 14(iv) of the Central Act.

Hence, the decision of these cases really depends on an interpretation of Section 14 of the Central Act which we have already given above.

Other provisions only fortify our conclusion.

\ ~

The result is that we allow these appeals. We set aside the orders of the High Court and restore the orders of the assessing authorities in cases giving rise to Civil Appeals Nos. 880-883 of 1971.

In cases 'Out of which Civil Appeals Nos. 58-59 of 1971 arise, we set aside the judgment of the High Court but maintain its order dismissing the Wnt Petitions and order that the assessing authorities will now proceed to determine such question of fact and law as still survive for determination after the decision given above of the question considered by us.

The parties will bear their own costs.

P.H.P.

Appeals allowed.

8

STATE OF TAMIL NADU

PY ARE LAL MALHOTRA ETC

A. N. RAY, C.J.

M. H. BEG

R. S. SARKARIA

Tainil Nadu Sales Tax Act

Sec. 2(j)

Section 14

Section 15

Central Sales Tax Act

State of Madhya B

section 15

Central Sales Tax Act

Article 286(3)

Section 2(j)

section 4

Central Sales Tax Act

Madras High Court

P. Ram Reddy

A. V. Rangam

A. Subhashini

Sachin Chandra Chaudhury

S. Gopalakrishnan

Gobind Das. P. H. Parekh

Manju Jetley

BEG

High Court of Madras

Article 132 and 133(1)(a)

State of Tamil Nadu

Article 132

Article 133(1)

Section 14

Central Sales Tax Act

Section 15

Section 14

Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act

Parliament

Section 14

Section 14

Stroud

Megh Raj

Section 14

Hirala

State of Punjab

Subba Rao

Hiralal

Section 14

Punjab High Court

Section 15

Section 15

Article 266

Section 3

Section 2

Section 4

Section 3

Second Schedule

Section 14(iv)

Section 14(iv)

Section 14(iv)

Section 14