K. L. SHINDE

11.

STATE OF MYSORE

March 26, 1976

[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGII, JJ.J

Constitution-Article 311-Domestic inquiry-Reasonable cpportunit'i:._ of , effectively defending-Dismissal pursuant to departmental proceedings-Whether Court can sit in appeal-Whether Evidence Act applies to departmental proceedings.

The appellant was a Police Constable. SOme persons were convicted for transporting smuggled illicit liquor under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibi~

tion Act. The Police Sub Inspector submitted a Confidential report on that incident to the Superintendent of Police and pointed out that some Police C '".

Constables including the appellant wen; indulging in smugglihg illicit liquor.

I The Superintendeht of Police directed the P.S.I. to record the statements of three constables, Akki, Warn.an and.Nishikant. The Police Sub Inspector, therefore, recorded the statements of those constables in the presence of the Superintendent of Police. The statements of Akki and Nishikan, t disclosed their complicity as well as complicity of six other Police constables including the appellant. D.S.P. ordered the S.D.P.0. t" hold a departmental enquiry against them. They were all transferred from Belgaum and directed not to leave D their new station without the permission of the D.S.P. except for purpoSes of' or in connectioh with1 departmental enquiry. The appellant did not plead guilty.

The Enquiry Officer held enquiry. A number of witnesses were examined both by the prosecution and the defence. The Enquiry Officer made a report to the Superintendent of Police that the charge: against the appeUaht \Vas not established. He, however, recommended that the appellant should be administered a severe warning since he was guilty of misconduct and dereliction of duty. The Superintendent of Police did hot agree with the finding; of the ' Enquiry Officer and directed him to examine. Police Constable Akki ¥.'h05e state- E rnent had been recorded before the enquiry was ordered against the ap-pellant.

Akki was accordingly examihed but be resiled fron11 his earlier statement. The

Enquiry Officer agaih submitted a further report and stn1ck to his former recommendation regarding administiratfun of severe warning to the appellant.

The Superintendent of Police disagreed with the. report of the Enquiry Officer and found that there was: sufficient evidehce against the appellant to prove his guilt.

A.ccordingly, he issued a notice to the appellant callirtg upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from Service.

Not feeling satisfied with the explanation tendered by t}Je appellant the Superintendent of F Police passed an order dismissing the appellant from service. An appeal filed to the D.I.G. was unsuccessful and so was a revision to the 'Government.

't Thereafter, the appellant filed a suit challenging the order of dismissal and -claiming arrears of nay. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. The Lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the Trial Court. The High Court nllowed the second appeal filed by the State.

In an appeal by Special Leave, the appellant contended :

( 1) The appellant was deprived of a reasonable opportunity of defending himself during the course of the departmental enquiry. He was not permitted to remain at Belgaum during the period of his, suspension. Evidence of some -of the prosecution witnesses was recorded in his absence.

(2) The impugned judgment and decree cannot be sustained as there is no cogent legal evidence to establish the charge against the appellant.

DismissinQ! the appeal, HELD : (I ) Whether a delinquent had a reasonable opportunity of effective 1y defending himself is a question of fact depending on cfrcumstances of each

case and no hard and fast rule can be laid in that behalf. In the instant case,. the order restricting his movement was not such as can b~. said to have deprived him of reasonable opportunity of making his defence.

The order did not "- ._ place any embargo on the appellant going to Belgaum for the purpose of an~ in connection with the departmental enquiry. In fact, the appellant fully participated in the enquiry held at that place.

He also made full use of the assistance of a policeman called Police friend. provided to him to conduct the defence on his behalf. He was furnished with the statements recorded of the 3 constables before the enquiry was ordered. The witnesses examined by the prosecution were tendered for cross-examination. It, therefore, cannot be held that a reasonable opportunity as contemplated by Article 311 of the Costitution was denied lo the appellant. [91W-Gl

(2) Neither the High Court nor this Court can re.examine and reassess the evidence in domestic enquiries of the instant natllre.

Whether or not there is sufficient evidence agaiinst .a delinquent to justify his dismissal from service is a matter on which this Court cannot embark. The departmental proceedings do not stand on the same footing as criminal proceedings in "''hich high. degree of proof is required. The departmental proceeding9 are not covered by strict rules of evidence as oontaihed in the Evklence Act. l\ copy of the statement made by Akki earlier was furnished to the appellant and he examined all the i

3 constables including Akki who made statements before the enquiry was ordered. [916 H, 917 A.q

Stole of My:Jore v. Shivabsappa, [19631 2 S.C.R. 941; A.LR. 1963 S.C. 375; State of U.P. v. Om Prakash, A.LR. 1970 S.C. 669 followed; Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava

v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1973

S.C. 1183 distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 847 of 1974.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 3-10-72 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 729 of 1967.

S. S. Javali and H. K. Puri, for the Appellant.

Narain Nettar, for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was de.livered by

JASWANT SINGH, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and decree dated October 3, 1972, passed by a Single Judge of the Mysore High Court whereby allowing the respondent's second appeal No. 72.9 of 1967, he set aside the appellate judgment and decree dated Apdl 18, 1967 passed by Civil Judge, Belgaum, declaring the order dismissing the appellant from service as illegal and ultra vires.

Facts material for the purpose of this appeal are : The appellant herein was a Police Constable attached to Khade-bazar Police Station at Belgaum in 1960. In the small hours of the morning of November 17, 1960, the Cantonment Police intercepted a tonga transporting smuggled illicit liquor in four tubes from Devi Temple to the cantonment area with the intention of disposing of the same to bootleggers.

After registering a case nnder section 66 (b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, the Cantonment P .S.I. proceeded against the tonga driver and another person who was found following the tonga, in a criminal court of competent jurisdiction and succeeded in securing their conviction for the aforesaid offence.

On November 18, 1960, the Cantonment P.S.I. submitted a confidential report about the incident to the Superintendent of Police, Belgaum, and brought to the notice of the latter

) K. L. SHINDE v. MYSORE (laswant Singh, l.) 915

that some police constables including the appellant who were newly A . , recruited and attached to different police stations in Belgaum were indulging in smuggling illicit liquor.

On receipt of this report, the Superintendent of Police directed the P.S.I. Khade-bazar police station, to record. the statements of three constables namely M. Y.

Akki, Waman Mangesh, and Nishikant Shimaji Satyannawar.

Pursuant to these directions, the P.S.I. recorded the statements of the aforesaid police constables in the presence of the Superintendent of Police.

The B statement of Nishikant and Akki, constables disclosed their own and six other police constables, complicity in the aforesaid smuggling activity.

The Superintendent of Police thereupon suspended the appellant and the other six constables and ordered the S.D.P.O. to hold a departmental enquiry against them.

The Superintendent of Police also transferred all the seven deliquents from Belgaum and directed that they would not leave their new stations without his permission except C for purposes of or in connection with the department enquiry. Though the appellant sought permission to stay at Belgaum during the period of his suspension, his request was refused.

As the appellant did not plead guilty to the charge framed against him, the Enquiry Officer proceeded to hold the enquiry against him in accordance with the rules contained in the Bombay Police Manual,

1950.

On the conclusion of the enquiry during the course of which a number of witnesses were examined both by the prosecution and the defence, the Enquiry Officer reported to the Superintendent of Police on November 10, 1961, that the charge against the appellant was not established.

He, however, recommended that the appellant should be administered a severe warning as he was convinced that he had been guilty of misconduct and dereliction of duty.

The Superintendent of Police did not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and directed him to examine police constable Akki whose statement had been recorded before the charge was framed against the appellant.

Akki was accordingly examined but he resiled from his earlier statement.

The Enquiry Officer in the course of his second report dated November 30, 1961, submitted to the Superintendent of Police that no fresh evidence was forthcoming against the appellant.

He, however, stuck to his former recommendation regarding administration of severe warning to the appellant.

The Superintendent of Police again disagreed with the report of the Enquiry Officer and found that there was sufficient evidence against

the appellant to prove his guilt.

Accordingly he issued a notice to G • the appellant on December 20, 1961, calling upon the latter to show ' cause why he should not be dismissed from service.

Not feeling satistied with the explanation tendered by the appellant, the Superintendent of Police passed an order on February 9, 1962, dismissing the appellant from service. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant went up in appeal to the D.l.G. of Police but was unsuccessful.

He also took the matter in revision to the Government but there also he failed.

H Eventually he brought a suit in the Court of the IInd Additional Munsiff, Relgaum, challenging the aforesaid orders of his dismissal and claiming the arrears of his pay.

A The principal contentions raised by the appellant were two.fold :

(1) That no reasonable opportunity was given to l]im to defend him self and (2) that the Superintendent of Police was wrong in relying on tbe statement~ of the witnesses recorded before the charge was framed against him and in re-assessing the evidence contrary to the conclusion arrived at by tbe Enquiry Officer who held that there was

no evidence to substantiate the charge against him.

After a regular trial, tbe suit was dismissed by tbe Munsiff, Belgaum. On appeal, tbe Civil Judge, Belgaum reversed the judgment of the Munsiff and decreed the suit.

Aggrieved by the decision of tbe Civil Judge, Belgaum, the State Government preferred an appeal to the High Court of Mysore which, as stated above, was allowed.

Counsel for the appellant has, while supporting the appeal, vehemently contended that tbe aforesaid judgment and decree of the High Court cannot be sustained as the appellant was deprived of a reasoni able opportunity of defending himself during tbe course of the departmental enquiry.

Elaborating his submission, counsel has urged tbat as restrictions were placed on the movement of tbe appellant and he was not permitted to remain at Belgaum during the period of his suspension and evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses was recorded in his absence, there has been a gross violation of tbe provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and tbe principles of natural justice. Counsel .has further contended that the impugned judgment and decree cannot also be sustained as tbere is no cogent and legal evidence to establish the charge against the appellant.

It is well settled tbat whether a delinquent had a reasonable opportunity of effectively defending himself is a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid in that behalf.

In tbe instant case, the order restricting tbe movement of tbe appellant on which strong reliance has been placed on his behalf for assailing tbe impugned order of his dismissal was not such as can be said to have deprived him of a reasonable opportunity of making his defence.

The order, it would be noted, did not place any embargo on tbe appellant's going to Belgaum for the purpose of and in connection with the departmental enquiry.

In fact the appellant fully participated in the enquiry held at that place.

He also made full use of tbe assistance of a police man (called police friend) provided to him to conduct tbe defence on his behalf.

The police friend appeared on his behalf before tbe Enquiry Officer and crossexamined all the witnesses whom the prosecution examined or tendered for cross-examination.

He was also furnished with copies of the statements of tbe three police constables recorded by the Cantonm'ent P.S.I. and allowed an adequate opportunity of cross-examining them.

There is also nothing to indicate that the appellant's request for an opportunity to examine any witness in his defence was refused. In fact, he did examine some witnesses in his defence. In view of all

tis, it cannot be held tbat a reasonable opportunity of defending himself as contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution was denied to tbe appellant. ·

. ,

• '

K. L. SHINDE v. MYSORE (Jaswant Singh, J.) 917

Regarding the appellant's contention that there was no cogent evidence to substantiate the charge against him, it may be observed that neither the High Court nor this Court can re-examine and reassess the evidence adduced in domestic enquiries of the rature with which we are at present concerned. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence against a delinquent to justify his dismissal from service is a matter on which this Court cannot embark. It may also be observed that departmental proceedings do not siand on the same footing as criminal prosecutions in which high degree of proof is required. It is true that in the instant case, reliance was pbced by the Superintendent of Police on the earlier statements made by the three police constables including Akki from which they resiled but that did not vitiate the enquiry or the impugned order of dismissal, as departmental proceedings are not governed by strict rules of evidence as contained in the Evidence Act.

That apart, as already stated, copies of the statements made by these constables were furnished to the appellant and he cross-examined all of them with the help of the police friend provided to him. It is also significant that Akki admitted in the course of his statement that he did make the former statement before the P .S.I. Khade-bazar police station, Belgaum, on November 21, 1961 (which revealed appellant's complicity in the smuggling activity) but when asked to expla.in as to why he made that statement, he expressed his inability to do so.

The present case is, in our opinion, covered by a decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. Shivabsappa( 1) where it was held as follows :-

"Domestic tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts and therefore, they are not bound to follow

the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in courts nor E are they bound by strict rules of evidence.

They can, unlike courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedures which govern proceedings in court.

The only obligation which the "law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against whom F it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but where such an opportunity kas been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in courts.

2. In respect of taking the evidence in an enquiry before such tribunal, the person against whom a charge is made should know the evidence which is given against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation.

When the evidence is oral, normally the explanation of the witness will in its entirety, take place before the party charged who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him.

The position is the same when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put

(I) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 943 : A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 375.

to him, and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is gi vcn to the party and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him.

To require in that case that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness word by word and sentence by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities and rules of natural justice are matters not of form but of substance.

They are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies thereof given to the person charged and he is given an opportunity to crossexamine them."

Following the above decision, this Court held in State of U.P. v.

Om Prakash ( 1) that the enquiry is not vitiated if the statements taken at the preliminary stage of enquiry are made available to the delinquent officer and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in respect of those statements.

The decision of this Court in Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v.

State of Madhya Pradesh( 2 ) on which strong reliance is placed is clearly distinguishable and is not at all helpful to the appellant.

In that case the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself by participating in the enquiry which was held at Jagdalpur, 500 kilometres away from Rewa where the appellant was residing on account of paucity of funds resulting from non payment of subsistence allowance during his suspension.

For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any force in the contention of counsel for the appellant that there was no evidence on the record which could justify the appellant's dismissal from service.

Both the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant being without any substance, we find ourselves unable to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the High Court.

The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.

P.H.P.

(!) A.LR. 1970 S.C 669.

(2) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1183.

Appeal dismissed.

" .

K. L. SHINDE

STATE OF MYSORE

March 26, 1976

A. N. RAY, C.J.

M. H. BEG

Article 311

section 66(b)

Akki

Nishikant

Nishikan

Belgaum

D.S.P.

D.I.G.

Article 311

Akki

H. K. Puri

Narain Nettar

JASWANT SINGH

Civil Judge, Belgaum

section 66

November 18, 1960

P.S.I.

P.S.I. Khade-bazar police station

M. Y.

Akki

Waman Mangesh

Nishikant Shimaji Satyannawar

S.D.P.O.

November 10, 1961

November 30, 1961

December 20, 1961

February 9, 1962

High Court of Mysore

Article 311

Article 311

November 21, 1961

[1963] 2 S.C.R. 943

Jagdalpur

Rewa


. ~

ACHUTANANDA PUROHIT AND ORS.

THE STATE OF ORISSA

March 26, 1976

[Y. V. CH, ANDRACHUD, V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]

Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951-Secs. 26-27-Constitution of India Articles 31A-31B-3l (2 )-31 (3 )-Agrarian ref arm-Whether ii1terr:st at n1arket rate or statutory rate-Calculation of cotnpensation.

The appellant was the intern1ediary in respect of vast forest and other land<; in the State of Orissa. The estates vested in the State i11 April 1960 by force

of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951.

The appellant submitted necessary return for compensation as provided by the Act.

The Compensation Officer passed an order adverse to the appellant whereupon the-appellant filed ah appeal to C the Col1ector which was rejei; ted. A second appeal filed before the Board of Revenue was dismissed.

Later on, Revision Petitions were filed in the High Court. The High Court set aside the order and directed remand to the Compensation Officer.

Thereafter, the District Forest Officer made his appraisal of the annual income and submitted to the Chief Conservator of Forests who altered the actual yield an<l reduced it substAntially.

Both the State and the appellant filed appeals to the Collector which were disn1issed.

A second appeal was filed by the appel-

- lant before the Board of Revenue without success. In the Revision Applications D filed before the High Court which led to the re.mand now challenged in the present appeals the appellant contended before this Court :

(l) The interest ought to have been awarded at 12 per cent as against

the statutory rate of 2t per cent from the date of the vesting till payment.

(2) Compensation money should be so calculated that the purchasing power of the amount of con1pensation to be paid .on the date of E actual payment will not be less than the purchasing pO\\'er on the date of vesting.

(3) The slab-system of calculation of compensation in the Act providing smaller multiples for estates yielding larger income is unconstitutional.

( 4) Unlike in case of fisheries etc., where the actual income is to be included in the gross assts, in the case of forests, the assumed income and not the actual income is to be included. During the agricultural F year immediately preceding the abolition, the petitioners had not actually derived any income from the forests and as such they ~'ere under no obligation to pay any income tax on such income.

There fore. deduction of income tax from the gross assets is illegal and unwarranted.

(5) The compensation has not been computed in accordance with the scheme of the Act.

(6J The date of vesting is the last date by which the calculation of G compensation should have been made and since that had not been done the Compensation Officer had become functus officio in awarding compensation.

Dismissing the appeals,

HELD : 1. The policy of the law of agrarian reforms postulates the ext!nguishment of ancient privileges and c9rnering of land rsources and the socio- H econon1ic yardstick is different from what applies to ordinary purchases of real estate and this is manifest in the special provisions contained in Article 31A and 31B of the Constitution. A similar principle applies to the a~'ard of interest which may sometimes be notional when feudal interests are puffed out. The

dynamic rule of Jaw with a social mission makes a meaningful distinction between rights steeped in the old system and compensation for deprivation of those interests on the one hand and the ordinary commercial traru; actions on the other. [923F-GJ

2. It is more or less a world phenomenon that the erosion in value of the unit of currency has been taking place.

But this invisible devaluation owing to the inflationary spiral does not affect the quantum of monetary compensation prescribed by statute. For the purposes of the law, the rupee of long ago is the same as the rupee of today although for the purposes of the, market place and cost of living, the housewife's answer may be different.

[924B-CJ

3. Article 31(3) read with Article 31(2) bars any challenge to the amount of compensation on acquisition by the State subject to the compliance with the prescriptions in the said sub articles on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate.

Presidential assent has been accorded to this State Act and so the loan operates. [924C-D]

4. The submission of the appellant proceeds on a misreading of section 27.

In the case of forests it is the assumed and not the actual income that forms the b:iis for calculation of compensation. Similarly an assumed income tax also has to be worked out and deducted.

[924F-G]

5. The scheme of the Act is that the compensation must be calculated on the basis of appraisal of the apnual yield of the forests en the date of vesting firstly by a Forest Officer and secondly by the Chief Conservator of Forests, screening it and approving it. In the present case, the Chief Conservator had substituted his appraisement which was accepted by the statutory Tribunal. There was a fundamental difference in the basis adopted by the Forest Officer and the Chief Conservator of Forests in the matter of assessing in the incorne of the Forest in Question. What the Chief Conservator did was not to approve wholly or in a modified form what the Forest Officer did but to make his own appraisal independently and without reference to the report of the statutory functionary. This was wrong and contrary to section 26. This Court is in agreement with the course adopted by the High Court and the reasoning \Vhich has prevailed with it.

[925C, 927A-BJ

6. Before the date of vesting the State never can nor does fix the compensation through the Compensation Officer in any of the agrarian refonn Jaws and these compensation operations are post-statutory exercises. Therefore, there is no substance in the funtcus officio argument.

If the officer had no jurisdiction the land would be gone because of the vesting provision and no compensation would be forthcoming for want of jurisdiction; a consequence the appellant never wants. Technicality can be frightened away by technicality. [927D-E]

7. After remand the Forest Officer will do the appraisement of the annual income, forward his report to the Chief Conservator of Forests who \Vitl take the said report into consideration and, if necessary, make the modifications therein or approve it th such changes as he deems fit.

Certainly, the Chief Conservator cannot be ignored by the Compensation Officer nor can the Chief Conservator ignore the assessment made by the Forest Officer and go through an independent exercise. The take over of the forest of the appeUant was effected as early as in 1960. '(he fligh Court has stated that a large part of the delay has been due to laches committed from time to time by the officers charged with the duty to calculate the compensation.

It is therefore directed that the proceedings before the Compensation Officer shall be completed within six months from today.

[927F-H, 928A-BJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 312 to 314 of 1972.

Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 19-3-71 of the Orissa High Court in C.W. Nos. 3'25 to 327 /70.

Appellant No. 1 in person and D. N. Misra for the Appellants.

" .

A. PUROHIT v .. ORISSA (Krishna Iyer, J.)

Gobind Das and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA IYER, J.

Three civil appeals, stemming from three revision petitions to the High Court of Orissa under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (Orissa Act I of 1952) (for short, the Act) have reached this Court, thanks to special leave granted to the appellant, who is common in all the cases.

The High Court, after deciding various issues, remanded the cases to the Compensation Officer under the Act, after over-ruling most of the contentions pressed before it by the appellant.

Shri Achutananda Purohit, appellant, was the intermediary in respect of vast forests and other lands comprised in the estate of Jujumura in the district of Sambalpur.

This estate vested in the State on April 1, 1960 by force of the Act and the crucial question agitated before us, consequentially, turns on the quantum of compensation awardable under Chapter V of the Act.

The appellant has received around Rs. 3,00,000/- but much more, according to him, is due and this controversy can be settled by examining his specific points.

Shri Purohit, appellant, is an Advocate by profession and is 83 D years old.

He has argued in person and with passion.

We have listened with patience to all his submissions, good, bad and indifferent.

If we may anticipate ourselves, none of the nine submissions has appealed to us, save to the extent the High Court has upheld.

Even so, a minimal narration of the facts and a brief consideration of each argument is necessary and we proceed to do so.

While his arguments did not impress us, we were touched by his concluding words E that he had been born and had grown in an adivasi village, in the only brahmin family and, in his evening years of life, proposed to give a substantial part of the compensation the State would give him for adivasi welfare.

Although he waxed sentimentally on this note, he did not convince us on his contentions.

With these prefatory observations, we proceed to formulate the many points urged and give our findings and reasons, one after the other.

We are directly concerned with the issue of compensation which is dealt with. as earlier stated, in Chapter V of the Act.

The Compensation Officer is charged with fixing_ the quantum in the prescribed manner.

A compensation assessment roll containing the gross asset and net income of each estate, together with the compensation payable in respect of such estate, has to be prepared by him.

Of course, when there is joint ownership, s. 24 stipulates that the compensation shall be determined for the estate as a whole and not separately for each of the shares therein.

Section 26 has great relevance as it lays down the method of arriving at the gross asset and s. 27 has like significance as it focuses on the manner in which the net income from an estate shall be computed by deducting certain items from the gross asset of the estate. Section 28 states how the amount of compensation is to be determined and the methodology of payment. There are a few other sections in Chapter VI which deal with payment of compensation. The Act also provides for appeal, second appeal and

revision, the last being to the High Court and the earlier ones being to the Collector and a Board constituted under s. 22.

The rule-making power is vested in the government under s. 4 7 and there is a routine 'removal of difficulties' clause contained in s. 50.

These furnish in bare outline the provisions with which we are directly concerned.

Against the background of law just projected, we may set out Shri Purohit's points which, if we may say so, are substantially the same as have been argued by him in revision before the High Court with partial success.

For convenience of reference, we may extract the statement by the High Court of the contentions urged before it (and repeated before us) by the appellant :

"(l) The provisions of s. 37(3) read with s. 26(2) (b) ( v) of the Act make it clear that the date of vesting is the last date by which the calculation of compensation should have been made.

As admittedly compensation had not been calculated by the date of vesting, the Compensation Officer lost his statutory jurisdiction to do so.

It is this Court which, by its order dated 10-4-1969 in Civil Revisions 201, 202 and 203 of 1968 conferred new jurisdiction on the Compensation Officer to deal freshly with the case and therefore notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the compensation has to be calculated according to the directions given by the Court;

(2) The Court was fully aware of the statutory provision in s. 26(2) (b) (v) of the Act, but in spite of it, the direction E was that the Divisional Forest Officer should make the appraisement.

There was no direction that this report of the

D.F.O. should be further subject to the approval of the Chief Conservator of Forests.

The calculatiOn made by the Chief Conservator of Forests therefore has no statutory force but could be just a piece of evidence.

But as the Court directed that no further evidence on behalf of the State F should be received, Ext. A/l is inadmissible in evidence.

( 3) Assuming that in spite of the directions of the court the Compensation Officer is entitled' to follow the procedure laid down in Section 26(2) (b) (v), the expression 'subject to the approval of the Chief Conservator of Forests' does not refer to the appraisement made by the D .F .0. but refers to his appointment.

(4) Assuming that s. 26(2) (b) (v) would have full force, what it contemplates is that the appraisement must be made by the D.F.O., and it is subject to the approval by the Chief Conservator of Forests.

But what has happened here is that the Chief Conservator himself made the appraisement without referring to the appraisement made by the D.F.O. and as such the appraisement made by the Chief Conservator is invalid.

(5) The report of the Chief Conservator of Forests is also invalid because of the fact that the appraisement is made

• i

A. PUROH!T v. ORISSA (Krishna Iyer, J.) 923

only with reference to the area of the disputed forests with- A out taking into consideration the density of growth therein;

( 6) Unlike in case of fisheries etc., where the actual income is to be included in the gross assets, in the case of forests, the assumed income and not the actual income is to be included.

During the agricultural year immediately preceding the abolition, the petitioners had not actually deriv, ed any income from the forests and as such they were under .no obligation to pay any income-tax on such income.

Therefore, deduction of income-tax from the gross assets is illegal and unwarranted.

(7) The slab-system of calculation of compensation in the Act providing smaller multiples for estates yielding larger income is unconstitutional.

(8) Compensation money should be so calculated that the purchasing power of the amount of compensation to be paid on the date of actual payment will not be less than its purchasing power on the date of vesting; and

(9) Interest should be calculated at not less than 12% per annum from the date of vesting till payment."

The meat of the matter, the primary question agitated in the appeal, lopping off the fringe issues of lesser import, consists in the statutory methodology and functionaries prescribed by the Act for quantifying the compensation and the compliance therewith by the statutory machinery in the case of the appellant.

But before examining this essen- E tial issue we may dispose of the minor points pressed, so that the deck may be cleared for dealing with what deserves to be dealt with.

Point No. 9, in the catalogue already given, relates-to the claim for 12 % interest on the amount of compensation as against the statntory rate of 2!%. The policy of the law of agrarian reform postulates F the extinguishment of ancient privileges and cornering of land resources, and the socio-economic yardstick is different from what applies to ordinary purchases of real estate and this is manifest in the special

provisions contained in Art. 3!A and Art. 31B of the Constitution.

A similar principle applies to the award of interest which may sometimes be notional when feudal interests are puffed out.

We cannot import the notion of prevailing bank rates in such situations.

The G dynamic rule of law, with a social mission, makes a meaningful distinction .behveen rights s!eeped in the old system and compensation for depnvatlon of those interests, on the one hand, and the ordinary commercial. transactions or regulation of rights untinged by social !ransformat10n urges, on the other.

This gives rtionality to the seemmg d1spanty.

Holmes once commented : 'It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in H the time of Henry IV'.

Here there is good reason to depart from the old rule of full compensation and it perhaps legitimates the reduced rate of recompense.

Moreover, the High Court has rightly pointed

out that the validity of s. 37(3) of the Act which fixes a small rate of interes_t on the compensation amount has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Ga; apati Narayan's Case(').

Point No. 8 has only to be stated to be rejected.

The contention is that on the date of vesting, which was well over two decades ago, the purchasing power of the rupee was much higher than its present value. It is more or less a world phenomenon that the erosii. •

on in value of the unit of currency has been taking place, but this invisible devaluation owing to the inflationary spiral does not affect the quantum of monetary compensation prescribed by statute.

For the purposes of the law, the rupee of long ago is the same as the rupee of today, although for the purposes of the market place and cost-ofliving, the housewife's answer may be different.

Law is sometimes blind.

The next point in the reverse order is equally unsubstantial and may be disposed of right away.

The appellant challenges the slab system of compensation provided in the Act which awards smaller __. multiples for estates yielding larger incomes, on the score of violation r of the fundamental rights under the Constitution.

The short answer is that Art. 31(3) read with Art. 31(2) bars any challenge to the amount of compensation on acquisition by the State subject to compliance with the prescriptions in the said sub-Articles, on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate.

Presidential assent has been accorded to this State Act and so the ban operates.

Moreover, Art. 31A repels the applicability of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 to the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein etc.

This provision directly demolishes the contention of the appellant.

Point No. 6 in the list of contentions earlier reproduced is also bereft of force and we may make short shrift of it.

The argument is that for certain reasons the appellant could not derive any actual income from the forests taken over by the State from him and therefore there was no income-tax payable on any agricnltural income from these forests.

The contention is that therefore in arriving at the next income the deduction of income-tax is uot permissible.

Here again, the flaw in the submission consists in mis-reading s. 27 of the Act which expressly states that the net income from an estate shall be computed by deducting from the gross assets of such estate any sum 'which was payable by the intermediary as income-tax in respect of any income . . . derived from such estate for the previous agricultural year'.

No income, therefore no income-tax, and therefore no deduction, is the syllogism of Shri Purohit.

He forgets that in the case of forests it is the assumed income and not the actual income that forms the basis of calculation of compensation.

Indeed, if the actnal income were to be the foundation for computation of compensation on the premise that no actnal income has accrued, the compensation might

be zero. On the other hand, statutory compensation is provided for on the formula of assumed income in the previous year.

Similarly, an assumed income-tax also has to be worked out and deducted. If

(!) A.LR. 1953 S.C. 375.

A. PUROHIT v. ORISSA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 925

a notional income on the assumed basis can be used for fixing compensation, a notional income-tax can be calculated and deducted. The confusion that vitiates the argument is prompted by a circular letter of government regarding non-deductability of income-tax due to the State from the amount of compensation lying to the credit of estateholders.

We have examined the circular letter and are satisfied that it has no relevance to a situation like the present and it deals with a totally different matter. In short, s. 27 properly construed, can- . not lend itself to the meaning imputed to it by the appellant.

The serious question that survives for consideration is covered by the remaining points which more or less overlap.

The statutory scheme of compensation for forest lands consists of a machinery for assessment of the net income which is multiplied on a sliding scale and the method of challenge to the determination by the aggrieved owner of State. Section '26(2)(b) (v) is relevant here and may be set out:

"26(2) 'gross asset' when used with reference to an estate means the aggregate of the rents, including all cesses, which were payable in respect of the estate for the previous agricultural year-

(b) by the raiyats or any other persons cultivating the land other than the land settled with the intermediary or intermidaris under Sub-section ( 1) of Section 7 and includes :- ( v) gross income from forests calculated on the basis of the appraisement made of annual yield of the forests on the date of vesting by a Forest Officer subject to the approval of the Chief Conservator of , Forests, such Forest O!licer being not below the rank of a Divisional Forest Officer to be appointed in this behalf by the State Government."

The expression 'Forest Officer', used here, has been explained in s. 26.

So the first step is for the Goverrnnent to appoint Forest Officers from out of D.F.Os. in the Forest Department, for the purposes of the Act.

Those Officers ascertain the income from the forest con- F cerned and the figure so fixed is subject to the approval of the C.C.F.

(Chief Conservator of Forests),, presumably the top expert in the department.

The power to approve implies the power to disapprove or modify but not to report or arrive at an income de hors the Forest Officer's Report altogether.

The section is clear that the gross income from forests must be G calculated on the basis of appraisal of the annual vield on the date of vesting,, firstly, by a Forest Officer and, secondly, by the Chief Conservator of orests scrning it a!ld appr<?ving it. . Indeed, p:eliminary to the appraisal operat10n, the mtermediary receives a nottce in Form 'D' (rule 13) and he is expected to furnish a return of the relevant particulars and supporting information to enable correct appraisement.

In the present case, the appellant did submit the 'D' return to the Comll pensation Officer and adduced some evidence to substantiate it. The Compensation Officer passed an order adverse to the appellant, whereupon he filed an appeal to the Collector which was rejected.

A Second

9-725SCIJ76 j\

A Appeal followed before the Board of Revenue which was dismissed Later, revision petitions were filed before the High Court and G. K ..

Misra J '" set aside the order disallowing the inclusion of the income " • from forests for ascertainment of compensation and directed a remand to the Compensation Officer.

The said order (th(: relevant portion of which we are concerned) rnns thus :

B "He would immediately call upon the Divisional Forest Ollicer to make appraisement within three months from the receipt of the record. The appraisement can be scientifically done by looking to the age of the trees as they stand now.

It is open to the petitioners to give evidence that after the date of vesting many of the trees and forest prodnce have been removed. Besides the evidence already on record would be C taken into consideration.

The Divisional Forest Officer who would make the appraisement will be examined as a witnes for the Compensation Officer and would be subjected to cross-examination.

No other evidence would be permissible as the State has not chosen to give any other evidence.

Under Rule 13(1-c) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Rnles, 1952 the compensation officer may rely upon snch other mater- D ihis as may otherwise be ascertained by him.

But in such a case the materials mnst be brought to the notice of the petitioners who would be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses connected therewith and may give rebutting evidence.

The compensation case is to be disposed of b:9 the compensatio11. officer within six months from today ( 10-4-1969) with intimation to this Court." E

Strictly speaking, the statutory requirement is for initial appraisal of tl1e annual income by the Forest Officer.

The use of the expression 'Divisional Forest Officer' is erroneous although Forest Officers are appointed from among Divisional Forest Officers.

Equally clearly, a slight error has crept into the Judge's order because he does not make any reference specifically to the statutory requiremi; nt of approval of the Chief Conservator of Forests of the appraisement made by the Forest Officer.

However, what followed is interesting though erroneous. The District Forest Officer (who, inc.identally, happens to be a Forest Officer under the Act, having been appointed as required thereunder) made his appraisal of the annual income and submitted to the Chief Conservator who altered the annual yield and reduced it substantially.

But he pointed out that the Forest Officer had omitted to include the income from kendu leaves and added that sum to the income from forests.

Even so, the total figure was less than what the Divisional Forest Officer had recommended.

The Compensation Officer accepted the report of the Chief Conservator and made the statutory calculation on that date.

Both the State and the appellant filed appeals to the Collector which were dismissed.

A second appeal was filed by the appellant before the Board of Revenue without success.

Then followed three revisi•m petitions to the High Court which led to the order of remand now attacked before us in the present appeals.

• .....

A. PUROHIT v. ORISSA (Krishna lyer, J.) 927

From this narrative, what follows is that the Chief Conservator had substituted his appraisement which was accepted by the statutory tribunal.

Indeed, there was a fundamental ditlerence in the basis adopted by the. Forest Officer and the Chief Conservator in the matter of assessing the income of the forests in question.

We need not go into this detail except for the purpose of noticing that what the Chief Conservator did was not to approve wholly or in a modified form what the Forest Officer did but to make his own appraisal independently and without reference to the report of the statutory functionary, viz.,, the Forest Officer. This was wrong and contrary to s. 26, as was contended by the appellant and in a way accepted by the High Court.

We are in agreement with the course adopted by the High Court and the reasoning which has prevailed with it.

The direction given

by the learned Judge in the remand order is correct although it may C require a little clarification. Having heard the appellant at some length, we see no flaw in the High Court's order on this aspect of the matter.

It is astonishing that anyone should urge, as the appellant did, that the date of vesting is the last date by which the calculation of compensation should have been made and since that had not been done, the Compensation Officer had becom.e funclus officio in awarding, compensation.

Before the date of vesting the State never can, nor docs, fix D the compensation through the Compensation Officer in any of the agrarian reform laws, and these compensation operations are poststatutory exercises.

Therefore there is no substance in the functus officio argument. If the officer had no jurisdiction, the land would be gone because of the vesting provision and no compensation would be forthcoming for want of jurisdicltion-a consequence the appellant never wants.

Technicality can be frightened away by technicality.

E Nor is it right to contend, as the appellant did, that the Compensation Officer's jurisdiction was created by the order of remand by the High Court. No, it was created by the statute and canalised by the order of remand.

It follows that, after the present second remand,, the re-appraisal of the annual net income cannot be done solely by the Forest Officer

without securing the approval of the Chief Conservator.

Nor can the Fj Compensation Officer by-pass the Chief Conservator on the misunderstood strength of the High Court's first order of remand. The true legal drill is-and this holds good after the second remand orderthat the Forest Officer will do the appraisement of the annual income, forward his report to the Chief Conservator of Forests who will take the said report into conside.ration and, if necessary, make modifications therein or approve it with such changes as he deems fit.

Certainly, the Chief Conservator cannot be ignored by the Compensation Officer

nor can the Chief Conservator ignore the assessment made by the Forest Officer and go through an independent exercise.

The integrated process has already been explained by us and will be followed in the proceedings to ensue on remand. We may make it clear that now that a Forest Officer has made an appraisement, the Chief Conservator of Forests will auply his mind to it and approve it as a whole or with such modifications as he thinks necessary and fonvard it to the Compensation Officer.

This will,, among other things, save time.

Thereafter, the appropriate statutory conrse will follow.

Substantially, this

A is what has been done by the learned Judge when allowing the revisions and remitting the case back to the Comnsation Officer.

The take-over of the forests of the appellant was effected as early as 1900 and 16 years have passed without the intermediary being out of the litigative woods.

The High Court has stated that a large part of the delay has been 'due to !aches committed from time to time by the Officers who have been charged with thfl duty to calculate the compensation. It is again du~ to mist; lkes committed by the authorities concerned that the matter is being remitted back to the Compensation Officer for disposal'. The force of these observations constrains us to direct that the proceedings before the Compensation Officer shall be completed within six months from today. In this context, it is perhaps not irrelevant to remember that the appellant, a freedom-fighter, is an 83-year-old man and, at this stage of his life, the State should show commisseration not merely in quickly disposing of the proceedin~ but also in not being cantankerous in awarding and disbursing the balance compensation.

With these directions and. observations we affirm the orders under appeal but, while dismissing the appeals, direct the parties to bear their costs in this Court.

P.H.P.

Appeals dismissed.

ACHUTANANDA PUROHIT AND ORS

March 26, 1976

N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.

Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951

Constitution of India

Articles 31A

in the State of Orissa

Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951

Article 31A and 31B

Article 31(3)

Article 31(2)

section 27

section 26

D. N. Misra

Gobind Das

G. S. Chatterjee

KRISHNA IYER

Orissa Act I of 1952

Achutananda Purohit

Sambalpur

April 1, 1960

Chapter V of the Act

Purohit

Chapter V of the Act

s. 24

Section 26

s. 27

Section 28

s. 22

s. 4

s. 50

Purohit

s. 37(3)

s. 26(2)

s. 26(2)

Section 26(2)

s. 26(2)

Krishna Iyer

Art. 3

Art. 31B

Holmes

s. 37(3)

Supreme Court

apati Narayan

Art. 31(3)

Art. 31(2)

Art. 31A

Arts. 14, 19 and 31

s. 27

s. 27

Section 7

s. 26

C.C.F.

Misra

District Forest Officer

Forest Officer under the Act

s. 26


STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

K. VEN.KATA REDDY & OTHERS

March 26. 1976

(R. S. SARKARJA AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]

. Evidence Act (l of 1872), s. 9-ldentification of accused a: test identification parad(;:-Use of. '

h Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 34 and 302-Conviction under w en named co-accused are acqulfted-When permissible. '

Whe1~ the bus in which the deceased and P.Ws. 1 to 3 were travelling, alone with other passengers, halted at a bus stop, a number of persons surrouned. the bus, orced all the passengers out of the bus except the deceased, and znfiicted multiple st!lbs on the deceased causing his death. Thirteen persons were charged with offences under s. 302, 34 and 149 I.P.C. The trial cc;>u-!1 convicted ome and acquitted the others.

In appeals against the conv1tion and acqmttal, the High Court acquitted all the accused. In appeal to this. Court against the acquittal of seven accused, including A-7,

HELD: Confirmihg the acquittal of others, A-7 is guilty of an offence under s. 302, read with s. 34, I.P.C.

( 1) The evidence of the intereited eye-witnesses PWs 2 and 3 was sufficiently corroborated as against A-7 by the testimony of PWs 9 and 11 the conductor and driver of the bus. They had identified A~7 at an identification parade. It is true that while picking out this accused at the parade these witbesses did not say anything w1th regard to the specific part played by hin1 in the commission of the crime. That, however, does not render the evidence of such idenofication inadmissible. From the fact that P\V 9 while testifying as to the fact of identification was referring: to this accused as A-7 in1pEes that he had identified him in court. He had in that connectioh elucidated why he had picked out A-7 at the identification parade. The evidence given by the witness in court was substantive testimony, while the identification made by him at the parade was confinnatory of that fact.

As regards PvY' 11 his evidence was more clear. The Magistrate who held the parade had mixed up 12 other persohs at this parade with the four accused, including A-7. It could not therefore be said that the number of other persons mixed with the accused was inadequate. [936H; 937F; 938B-F, G-H; 939C]

(2) The result is that excepting A-7, the participation of the other 12 F named accused in the commission of the crime has not been established. There is also no evidence to show as to which of the assailants dealt the fatal blow on the deceased. The medical evidence, however, shows that there were hot less than 44 incised injuries including penetrating wounds upon the body of the deceased. The extremelv large number of injuries on the body of the -deceased lends assurance to the testimony of PWs 2 ahd 3 that the number of assailants was more than 13 including some unnamed and unidentified persons.

Therefore, apart from the accused named in the charge, there \\''ere at least one or n1ore unidehtified person who participated in the fatal assault on the G deceased conjointly with A.7.

A~7 can, therefore, be convicted under s. 302 read with s. 34, l.P.C. [940B, G-941B]

Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1976] 3 SCR 651, followed.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 155 ()f 1971.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 31-7-70 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 45/69 and Criminal Revision Case No. 391/ 69.

A P. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao for the Appellants.

Govind Das, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare, A. K. Mathur, A. K. Sharma "- ,. and M. S. Narasimhan for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SARKARIA, J .-This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of acquittal rendered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

The facts may now be stated.

There are three villages, Konda Kala Vatala, Konda Papaya Palli and Govinda Palli situated at a short distance from each other There were warring factions in these villages One was led by Vellugoti Pedda Eswara Reddy deceased and Mumagala Narayana Reddy, the

Sarpanch of Konda Kala-Vatala.

The rival faction was headed by Akkanunareddigari Venkata Kondareddy, Accused No. 1 (for short, -1 A-1)_. There was bad bloq_d between the two factions. Both the factions were proceeded against under ss. 107 /151, Cr.P.C., also

The deceased was a resident of Konda Papayapalli village. On May D 16, 1968, the deceased accompanied by PW 1, K. Venkatareddy, went to Jammalamadugu and stayed for the night there in the hotel of PW 12 (Dastagiri).

On the following morning at about 8-30 a.m., they boarded bus No. APD 2083 for proceeding to their village. L.

Venkata Ramanna (PW 14) was checking tickets on that bus. When the bus stopped at Sanjamalavari House, Accused 2, 3, 5 to 8 (for short, A-2, A-3, A-5 to A-8) boarded it. On seeing the accused, who E belonged to his opposite faction, the deceased got apprehensive of his safety. He therefore alighted from the bus, and, accompanied by PW !, returned to the hotel of Dastagiri. After remaining at the hotel for some time they returned to the bus stan.d, and boarded bus No. APD 2276, at about 9-30 a.m. for going to their village. P.W. 11 (E. Solomon) was the driver and P.W. 9 (V. Bala Subbanna), the conductor of that bus. There were about 30 passengers, including PW 2, PW 3 F and PW 4, in the bus. At about 10-30 a.m., the bus halted at Nossam near the hotel of Rangappa, PW 10. This bus-stop is at a distance of about 60 or 65 yards from the Police Outpost and is located in a populated quarter of the town which has a population of 3,000 souls. The conductor, the driver and some of those passengers got down to take refreshments in the nearby hotel.

Some passengers including the deceased .and P.Ws. 1, 2 and 4, however, remained inside the vehicle.

G A-4 then came there. He peeped into the bus through the door and went away towards the house of one Yerikala Reddy, situated at a distance of 200 feet from the bus towards the north. Soon thereafter, A-1 and A-2, armed with revolvers, and A-3 to A-13, all armed with daggers, came there from Yerikala Reddy's house, encircled the bus, d at the point of daggers forced the passengers including PWs 1 and 4, to get out of the bus. The deceased also tried to get away but the H accusedprevented him from doing so.

A-1 and A-2 took positions in the doors of the vehicle. They fired revolvers in the air wh; Je their companions immediately entered the bus and there, stabbed the deceased to death causing no less than 44 injuries. The assailants were

yelling : "Stab! kill!" P.Ws. 1 to 4 witnessed the occurrence P.W. 1 A while raising an alarm proceeded towards the Police Outpost, but the accused obstructed and chased him over a short distance. P.W. 1 took to his heels, went away from the village and concealed himself somewhere. After abont two hours he came out of his hiding and returned to the spot at about 12-30 p.m.

After murdering the deceased, the miscreants went away towards the north taking their weapons with them.

Thereafter, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 entered the bus and found the deceased lying dead in a pool of blood. P.W. 2 then went to Papayapalli, five mHes away, and infoimecl the wife and the relations of the deceased about the occurrence. He returned to the scene of the crime in the company of those relations at about 4 p.m.

In the meantime, the village Munsiff (P.W. 15) on learning about this incident, also came there. At the dictation of P.W.l, the Munsiff recorded the complaint, Ex. P-3, and then prepared an ihjury statement c

of the deceased. At about 3 p.m., he sent the complaint together with other documents prepared by him, through the Talyari to the Police

Station, Vuyyalawada. A copy of the complaint was sent to the Judicial Magistrate Koilkuntla.

Prior to the making of this complaint, Head Constable Abdul Khadar, PW 16, of the Police Out-Post had sent an oral information to the Police Inspector about this murder. The Head Constable had heard the reports of revolver"fite at about.10-30 a.m. Thereupon, he alongwith a Constable went out to the bus stand. At the spot, he heard from the by-standers that the deceased had been killed inside the bus. But, despite inquiries, no one told him about the identity or particulars of the culprits. He looked for the complainant, if any. No one came forward to make a complaint.

The driver and the conductor of the bus were abo found absent. He therefore sent an oral information to the Inspector through the Talari, Pollana.

On receiving the information, Inspector Santhoji Rao (P.W. 25) reached the place of the murder at 6 p.m. He examined P.Ws. 1, 15, 16 and 19 and recorded their statements under s. 161, Cr.P.C. Thereafter, he held an inquest over the dead-body from 2-30 a.m. to 6 a.m. on May 18, 1968. During the inquest he examined P.Ws. 2, 9 and 11.

Ile Inspector searched for the accused but could not find them. A-4 to A-8 surrendered on May 22, 1968 and were taken into custody. A-2, A-3, A-9, A-10, A-11 and A-13 were arrested by the police on June 24, 1968. Thereafter, on some date before August 10, 1968, A-1, A-6 and A-12 were arrested.

All the accused persons were not previously known to the eyewitnesses. They were put up for test identification at three parades held by Mr. Johnson, Magistrate '1st Class (P.W. 20) on June 7, 1968, July 18, .1968 and August 10, 1968.

After completing the investigation the police sent 13 accused persons under a charge-sheet before the Magistrate for preliminary enquiry. The Magistrate committed all the 13 accused for trial to the H court of Session. The Sessions Judge acquitted A-5, A-6, A-8, A-9 an4 A-11, but convicted the remaining seven under s. 302, Penal Code and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for life.

Against that judgment, two appeals were preferred to the High Court, one by the State against the acquittal of A-5, A-6 and A-8, and the other by the co, nvicted accused against their conviction. The High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the State but accepted the other filed by the accused and acquitted all of them.

Aggrieved, the State made a petition in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal of A-1 to A-9 and A-12. This Court however granted special leave to appeal against the acquittal of A-1 to A-4, A-7, A-9 and A-12 only and refused it against A-5, A-6 and A-8.

Mr. Ram Reddy appearing for the appellant-State contends that the judgment of the: High Court acquitting all the accused persons is perverse in law and has occasioned gross failure of justice. It is maintained that the reasons given by the High Court for wholesale rejection of the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, :9 and 11 are manifestly erroneous and contrary to the fundamental canons of appraiSing

evidence.

As against this, Mr. Govind Das maintains that the reasons given by the High Court for rejecting the evidence of these witnesses are quite sound and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be branded as 'perverse'. According to the Counsel since the view taken by the High Court is also reasonably possible, this Court should not, in deference to the well-established ruler of practice, interfere with the order of acquittal.

To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to examine the reasons given by the High Court for not accepting the evidence of these five witnesses. P.W. 1 is the prime-mover of the gear. The case was registered on his complaint (Ex. P-3) lodged with the village Mnnsiff (P.W. 15) at 12-30 p.m. At the trial, he narrated more or less the same story which has been set out at the commencement of this judgment. The High Court found his evidence unworthy of credit for these reasons :

(i) P.W. 1 is a confirmed partisan of the deceased. (ii)

(iii)

He was unable to 'give a consistent and satisfactory account of the purpose of his going to Jammalamagdu on May 16, 1968. . .

In the First Information Ex. P-3, he did not state manv material facts.

For instance, . he did not mention there that, in the first instance, he and .the deceased had boarded the Nandyal-Koilkuntla bus at 8-30 a.m. and thereafter alighted from it on seeing the accused getting into t]le bus.

(iv) If P.W. 1 was really in the ill-fated bus, at the time of the occurrence, he could uot have been left unharmed;

(v) The conduct of P.W. 1 was so unnatural that it improbablises his presence at the time and place of the incident: ·

(a) If he had really seen A-4 peeping into the bus ancJ

going back to the house of Erikala Reddy, 60 or 70

.....

(b)

yards away, to inform the other accused, it was unlikely that P.W. 1 and the deceased would have remained sitting in the bus. P.W. 1 knew that A-4 was a partisan of the other accused:

The conduct of P.W. 1 after the occurrence, was also artificial, unnatural and strange.

He did not go to the Police Outpost which was at a stone's throw.

His explanation that he was prevented by the accused from going there and had to remaiin in hiding at some unspecified place towards the West for two hours till he returned to tho bus-stand at 12-30 p.m., was incredible. Although he had ample opportunity and time to go to his village and inform the co-villagers about the incident, he did nothing of the kind.

(vi) No bus-ticket was found with P.W. 1.

(vii) The evidence of the witnesses produced to corroborate the version of P.W. 1 was also unsatisfactory.

P.W. 14, Ticket-Checker of bus No. APO 2083 which the deceas- . ed and P.W. 1 are said to have boarded earlier at Jamalamae1ugu, , admittedly did not know P.W. 1 prior to that date. P.W. 14 was not

. asked to identify P.W. 1 at any test identification or even in court.

Moreover, P.W. 14 was examined by the investigating Police Officer

about a week after the occurrence.

The evidence of Dastgiri, P.W. 12, owner of the hotel at Jamala- . madugu was no better. He had no record to show that P.W. 1 and the deceased had spent the night between the 16th and 17th May at his hotel. His testimony was at variance with his statement recorded under s. 164, Cr.P.C. In that statement, he did not say that the sons (i.e. A-2, A-3 and A-6) of Kalavatala Reddy were also reported by the deceased to be in the bus. He had simply stated there, that Kalavatala (Reddy) and his men were in the bus. At the trial, he stated that the deceased had informed him about the presence of A-2, A-3 and A-6, also, in the bus.

P.W. 12 was not a disinterested witness.

Admittedly, the deceased had helped him in getting assignment of 1and for raising a building, before the revenue authorities. His state- . ment was also recorded by the police several days after the occur- : rence.

(viii) There was unexplained delay in registration of the case.

G The Police Statioin Vuyyalawada is 12 miles from Nos- . sam.

The complaint, Ex. P-3, was received there at 8 p.m.

Copy of the complaint reached the Magistrate Koi!akuntla, 16 miles away, at 6 1p.m.

There was a bus leaving Nossam at 4-30 p.m. for Koilakuntla. It was more likely that the copy of the complaint was sent to the Magistrate by that bus at 4-39 p.m., and not at 3 p.m. as the Munsiff H P-W. 15, wanted to have it believed. This inordinate delay in registering the FJ.R. shows that the First Information was lodged after confabulation with other persons

who had come from the village of the deceased. In these circumstances, the F.I.R. had little value .as a 'corroborative piece of evidence.

These reasons given by the High Court for not relying on the evidence of P.W. 1, cannot, by any standard be said to be unsound or puerile. There is a good deal of force in them.

We will now take up P.W. 2. Mr. P. Ram Reddy contends that the High Court was in error in dubbing this. witness , as an interested witness. It is maintained that his relationship or affinity with the deceased or his party had not been established. It is argued that his evidence was ahnost impeccable.

C The High Court has found that P.W. 2 is closely related to he deceased. This is an iuference drawn from the conduct of the witness in not denying a suggestion of such relationship put to him in crossexamination by the defence.

The pointed suggestion was, whether -1 the son of his junior paternal uncle was married to the daughter of the deceased. The witness replied that he did not know.

The relationship suggested was so near that the witness could not be unaware D of it. If the suggestion was wrong, he ought to have registered a categorical denial.

The High Court was therefore justified in prcsumjng that the wilness was he first cousin of the son-in-law of the. deceased.

The next infirmity in his evidence noted by the High Court, is . that his conduct in not trying to go to the Police Outpost or in not reporting the matter to the village Munsiff, was not the natural conduct of an eye-witness of the murder.

The third weakness in his evidence noted by the High Court, is, that he was not examined by ' the investigator on the 17th May, although he claimed to be present at the spot at that time.

Another reason given by the High Court for doubting his veracity was, that there was no necessity for him to go to Proddutur to ascertain the price of castor-oil cake because the same inquiry could be conveniently made telephonically. The Court further found that he could not give a satisfactory account as to why he adopted the circuitous route via Nossam when buses starting at 6-30 and 7-30 a.m. from Jammalamadugu and plying directly to Allagaddi were available. We need only add that this witness also was unable - to produce any bus ticket. ·

We agree with the High Court that in view of the infirmities enumerated above, the evidence of P.W. 2 could not be safely acted upon ./ without corroboration from independent sources.

This takes us to the evidence of P.W. 3.

The High Court found that P.W. 3, also, was not an independent H witness.

He stood surety for five partisans of the deceased in security proceedings under s. 107, Cr.P.C.

This fact was borne out by the documentary evidence furnished by the copies of the surety bonds, Exh. D-1 O to D-14, although the witness had the temerity to deny it ..

Mr. Ram Reddy laid great stress on the fact that the evidence of this witness with regard to his being among the passengers in the illfate<l bus at the time of occurrence, stands corroborated from the testimony of an independent witness, the bus conductor (P.W.9). It is further maintained that this witness (P.W. 3) was examined dming the inquest held on the night between the 17th and 18th May.

Reference on this point has been made to the inquest report Ex. P.6.

These twin circumstances-proceeds the argument-were sui!icient to lend assurance to the interested testimony of this witness so as to make it acceptable against A-1 and A-2, if not against the other accused respondents. These circumstances were noticed by the High Court. In its opinion, they did not furnish adequate confirmation of the testimony of P.W. 3. In this connection, the High Court observed :

"We do not think much assurance can be taken from the evidence of P.W. 9 about the presence of P.W. 3 on that day ; n that bus. It is true that the name of P.W. 3 was mentioned as a, n eye-witness in the inquest report. Even though

the inquest according to P.W. 25 was held in the early hours of the morning of 18-5-1968 and the inquest report

was said to be ready on that morning, the inquest report was ieceiYed in Court at 6 P.M. on 19-5-1968. As provided under sec. 174(2) Cr.P.C. the inquest report shall be forthwith forwarded to the Court.

P.W. 3 was examined on 19-5-68 only.

With regard to the inquest report no othet :ndependent panchayatdar was examined apart from P.W.

J 5, the village Munsiff.

Having regard. to these circum- ' tances we do not think much can be taken from the fact 1hat the !lame of P.W. 3 finds a place in the inquest report."

Another infirmity in the teflimony of PW 3, according to the High Court. was that documentary evidence of the sales allegedly made by the witness at the Shandy (periodical market) and the receipts of the fecs/cess paid on such sales to the Panchayat, was not forthcoming rmd that the explanation given by the witness for non-production

of such documentary evidence was unsatisfactory.

; c will be seen from the synopsis of the reasoning of the High Court. gi, en above, that whereas the evidence of P.W.1 was considered to be wholly unreliable, the possibility of P.Ws. 2 and 3 being witnesses of the occurrence was not positively ruled out. The conclusion reached in respect of these two witnesses was that their evidence suffered from several infirmities and, as such in the absence of corro- Gborutioa from independent sources, it could not be accepted as a safe basis for qJnvicting the accused.

We are also of the opinion that as a matter of prudence, it was not safe to convict any of the accuseu respondents merely 'on the basis of the testimony of P.Ws. 2 and :i We, however, do not agree with the High Court that the evidence of P.Wo.9 and 11 did not furnish reliable corroboration of the testimony of the interested witnesses (P.Ws. 2 and 3) against any of the H accused-respondents whatever.

The sum and substance of the testimony rendered by P.W.9, the Omduclor of the bus, was that when the bus halted at Nossam at

about 10-30 a.m., the witness accompanied by the Driver (P.W. 11), got down and both of them went to the nearby hospital for getting an injury on his leg (P.W 9's) dressed up. They however, did not find the Doctor there. Consequently, both of them returned to the hotel of Rangappa which is hardly 18 ft. from the scene of occurrence.

While the witness was standing in the verandah of the hotel, the driver took his meals inside and then came out and went to the adjacent hotel of Pullayya to take coffee. The witness asked Rangappa's wife to give him some water.

He was waiting in the doorway when he saw some persons coming from the northern side and going to the bus and encircling it.

Some of them were armed with daggers.

The witness heard the sound "dama dama" of the firing of a revolver.

The witness heard cries from the bus-"kill ! stab !".

After the disturbance had subsided, the witness went ollt and saw the deceased lying dead inside the bus in a pool of:blood. Due to fear, the witness and the driver (P.W.11) went into the nearby Vaisya's house and remained there till 7-30 or 8 p.m. when they came out on learning -.., that the Police Inspector had. come to the spot.

At the test identification parades, the witness had identified Accused 2 and 7. He stated that P.W. 3 was one of the passengers who travelled in the ill-fated bus.

The driver (P.W.11) substantially corroborated P.W.9. He stated that he had seen five or six persons carrying white think like daggers in their hands going behind the bus.

The witness was then taking coffee at the hotel of Pullayya. He then heard the "dum dum" sound from the bus. At the test identification parades held before the Magistrate, the witness had identified A-7 and A-11.

The High Court while conceding that P.Ws. 9 and 11 were the "\ "proper persons to have spoken about the occurrence", brushed aside their evidence even against the accused identified by them at the test identifications, mainly on the ground that they were "unwilling witnesses" and were not prepared to speak the whole truth.

The High Court noticed that there was a discrepancy with regard to the receipt

~F of injury by P.W. 9 between his statement before the police and the subsequent statement recorded under s. 164, Cr.P.C.

Before the police, P.W.9 had stated that he had received an injury. But in his statement recorded under s. 164, Cr.P.C. he said that he had a boil on his leg. It appears to us that this discrepancy was of no consequence.

P.Ws.9 and 11 were the conductor and the driver of the bus. It is undisputed that the bus was parked close to the hotels of Rangappa . .(; (P.W.10) and Pullayya.

Their presence near the bus at the hotels was a highly probable fact.

Even if the reason for their going to the J nearby hospital was disbelieved, it could not affect their being eye- / witnesses of the incident. Might be that they did not disclose all that they had seen and had not identified all the culprits whom they could identify; but that is no ground to hold that their evidence could not furnish valuable corroboration of the testimony of the interested wit- .H nesses (P.Ws. 2 and 3) even aginst the accused whom they identified at the test identifications and later in court.

The statements of P.Ws. 2, 9 and 11 were recorded bv the Investigating Officer during the night between the 17th and 18th May 1968

from 2-30 a.m. to 6 a.m. There was thus no good reason for wholesale rejection of the evidence of P .W s. 9 and 11. It therefore remains " to be seen to what extent the independent testimony of P.Ws. 9 and 11 lends corrobation to the statements of the interested witnesses (P.Ws. 2 and 3).

At the test identification parade held on June 7, 1968, A-4, A-5, A-7 and A-8 were paraded along with 12 other prisoners. P.Ws. 2, 3, 9 and 11 were called upon to identify the accused at this parade.

P.W. 2 while identifying A-7 at the parade, said : "I saw him while killing the deceased in the bus" P.W. 3 also identified A-7 as Konda Kalavatalavadu.

He also identified A-4 and A-8 by touching their hands. P .W .9 identified A-7 saying : "I suspect this man". He could not identify others. P.W.11 also at this parade picked out A-7 who was then standing at No. 15 in the parade and said that he had seen him. t- The second batch of the accused persons consisting of A-2, A-3, A-9, A-10, A-11 and A-13 was arrested on June 24, 1968. These six accused persons were paraded at the test identification on July 18,

1968. P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 9 were called upon to identify them at the parade. P.W. 3 picked out A-2, A-3, A-9 and A-10 at the parade.

P.W. 9 similarly identified A-2 by touching his hand. A-2 objected that in 1962 or 1963 P.W. 9 had served him as driver of his bus for

10 days.

The third test identification parade was held on August 10, 1968.

At this parade, nine accused persons A-1 to A-3, A-6, A-9 to A-13 were paraded. P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 11 were called upou to identify.

P.W. 2 identified A-8, while P.W.11 identified A-11 only. He could i' not identify A-2 or the other accused who were in this parade.

Thus the net result is that at the test identifications, P.Ws. 9 and 11 had correctly identified A-7, P.W 9 had identified A-2, also. But P.W. 11 could not identify him.

The question is, whether the evidence of P.Ws.9 and 11 can be safely relied upon as against A-7 and A-2.

In our opinion, so far as A-7 is concerned, chances of mistake in identification by these witnesses were extremely remote.

Mr. Gobind Das, Counsel for the respondents, contends that the evidence of test identification is not substantive evidence. It can be the Magistrate holding the parade did not mix up with the accused adequate 1number of other prisoners and did not hold separate parades for individual accused; (b) at the time of picking out A-7 and A-2 at the parade, the identifying witnesses did not say as to in what connection they were identifying them.

It is stressed that the evidence of test identification is not substantive evidence. It can be used only to corroborate or lend assurance to the identification made

by the same witness in court.

If at the time of picking out a particular accused at the parade, a witness _does not say anything about the He

role of the person, thus identified, in the commission of the crime, such test identification little evidentiary value.

Further, it is pointed out that P.W. 9 was not called upon to identify A-2 and A-7

in couFt at the time of his examination as a witness.

Reference has made to a number of decisions including Kamal Cope v. State of Bihar,( 1) Kanta Prasad v. Delhi Administration(') and Sampat Tatyada Shinde v. State of Maharashtra(').

In our opinion, so far as the identification of A-7 by P.Ws. 9 and 11 is concerned it can safely be relied npon as confirmatory of their evidence in court. A-7 was identified by P.Ws, 9 and n at the test identification parade held on June 7, 1968. It is true that while picking out this accused at the parade these witnesses did not say anything with regard to the specific part played by him in the commission of the crime.

That however does not render the evidence of such identification inadmissible. The Magistrate (P.W. 20) who held the parade had mixed up 12 other persons at this parade witJ1 the four accused, including A-7. It could not therefore be said that the number of other persons mixed with the accused was indequate.

The very fact that both P.Ws. 9 and 11 commonly identified A-7, dispels any suspicion of such identification being a chance identification. In .the witness-box, at the trial, however, P.W. 9 specifically stated: "I .could identify only accused 2 and 7 among those persons who came to the bus from the northern side armed with daggers".

Referring to the test identification parade, the witness added :

"I identified A-7 as one of the persons who came with dagger to the bus".

In cross-examination, the witness reaffirmed : "It is not true ........ that A-2 and A-7 were not among the persons who came to the bus ...... It is not true that I have identified A-2 and A-7 at the parades not because they were seen near the bus but because Police showed them to me earlier to facilitate identification".

From the very fact that the witness while testifying as to the fact of identification was referring to this accused as A-7 implies that he .had identified him in court, also, and had, in that connection, elucidatf ed why he had picked out A-7 at the identification parade. The evidence given by the witness in court was substantive testimony, while the identification made by him at the parade was confirmatory of that fact.

This proposition is well established and it is not necessary to discuss the rulings cited at the bar on this point.

No capital can be made out of the fact that the trial judge record- G ed the evidence of the witness with regard to identification of A-7, in court, in an inartistic, laconic manner.

In the case of P.W. 11, however, the trial Judge recorded this fact more clearly.

The witness stated : "I can identify 2 persons among the 5 or 6 persons who were seen going behind. the bus with white things like daggers.

They are accused 7 and 11 (witness identified accused 7 and 11) ."

(l) Cr. Appeal No. 45 of 1965 decided on 23-11-1967.

(2) [1958] SCR 1218.

(3) [19741 4 sec 213.

With reference to the test identification, the witness stated : A "I identified A-7 in the 1st parade and A-11 in the second parade".

In cross-examination, he refuted a suggestion made by the defence that he had identified accused 7 at the parade because the police had shown him to the witness, earlier.

For these reasons we think that the High Court was clearly in . error in discarding the evidence of these independent witnesses (P.Ws.

9 and 11) so far as the participation of A-7 in the commission of the crime was concerned.

The evidence of the interested witnesses (P.Ws. 2 and 3) was sufficiently corroborated as against A-7 by the credible testimony of P.Ws. 9 and 11. It could therefore be safely acted upon for convicting A-7 as one of the participants in the commission of the murder of P. Eswara Reddy, deceased.

~ As regards A-2, it is to be noted that neither PW 9 nor P.W. 11 . stated that this accused was armed with a revolver.

Neither of these witnesses has stated that any of the five or six persons who were seeu by them going to the bus and encircling it, was armed with a revolver.

They only say that those persons were carrying daggers.

The prosecution case however is that A-2 was armed with a revolver only, which he fired in the air.

Further when P.W. 9 picked out A-2 at the identification parade, the latter had objected thaL P.W. 9 was . already known to him because he had served him as a driver for about

10 days. It is true that this suggession was not repeated in the crossexamination of P.W. 9; but we have also to keep in mind in this con- _nection that P.W. 11 had failed to identify A-2 at the test identification / parade although both these witnesses had seen the culprits more or Jess from the same situation and distance.

As a matter of abundant

• '

 caution, while hearing this appeal, we do not consider the identification of A-2 at the test identification parade by P.W. 9, can lend sufficient assurance to the testimony of P.Ws. 2 and 3 so as to justify the con- . version of his acquittal into conviction.

Thus, the position that emerges is that the evidence of P.Ws. 2 . and 3 has been adequately confirmed by the reliable and independent testimony of P.Ws. 9 and 11 as against A-7, while no such corroboration is forthcoming against any of the other accused-respondents. The High Court was therefore not justified in acquitting A-7 .

The only question that remains to be considered is : What offence ha.s been made out _against ~-7 ? The charge-sheet by the police in ; this case was submitted agamst 13 named persons including A-7 The charge under s. 302 read with s. 34, Penal Code was also framed by the essions Judge against all the 13 named accused.

In the charge, it was. not _mentioned that besides these named accused, there were some umdentified or un-named persons who acted conjointly with the charged accused, A-1 to A-13.

But there was positive evidence on the rcord. that besides the 13 named accused, there were four or more umden!Ified persons who participated in the commission of the crime.

. ,

A Now the position which emerges is that excepting A-7, the parti-

" .. cipation of the other 12 named accused in the commission of the crime has not been established. The effect of their acquittal is that they would be deemed to have never participated in the criminal enterprise which resulted in the death of the deceased. There is nothing on the record to show as to who out of these persons dealt the fatal blows to the deceased. The question that falls to be deter- B. mined is : Can A-7, in such circumstances, be held vicariously liable by invoking s. 149 or s. 34, Penal Code for the inurder in question'/ In Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan(') after reviewing earlier decisions viz., Dalip Singh v. State. of Punjab(2); Bharwad Mepa Dana and Anr.

v. State of Bombay('), Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab('); Kri5lma

Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra('); Mohan Singh v.

State of c

Punjab(6); Yeshwant v. State of Maharashtra('); on this point this Court speaking through Shinghal J. reiterated the law, thus.:

"It would thus appear that even if, in a given case, the charge discloses only the named persons as co-accused and the prosecution witnesses confine their testimony to them, even then it would be permissible to come to the. conclusion that others named or unnamed, besides those mentioned in the charge or the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, acted conjointly with one of the charged accused if there was other evidence to lead to the conclusion, but not otherwise."

(emphasis supplied)

Let us now have another look at the case in hand, in the light of the above enunciation.

In the F.l.R., it was alleged by the informant that 8 named per- " sons and 10 unnamed persons who were not known to the informant, had conjointly committed the crime.

At the trial, P.W. 2 te8tified that the total number of culprits who had participated in the commission of the murder was 20. At the trial, he named A-2 to A-5 and identified A-7, A-10, and A-12 as 8 out of those 20 culprits who had committed the crime.

The evidence of P.W. 3 on this point was that the number of the culprits who committed the murder, while acting in concert, was 17. This means according to the evidcnce, there were acting conjointly with A 7 at least 4 or 7 more persons in addition to the 13 who were charged by the Committing Magistrate. The medical evidence shows that there were no less than 44 incised injuries, including penetrating wounds, apart from one lacerated wound, two contusions and one abrasion on the body of the deceased. Practically, he was .made minced meat.

The extremely large number of injuries f on the body of the deceased lends assurance to the testimony of / P.Ws. 2 and 3 that the number of assailants was more than 13 includ- ing some unnamed and unidentified persons. This evidence on the record is thus sufficient to base a firm finding that apart from the

(!) [1976j 3 S.C.R. 651.

(3) [1960j 2 SCR 172.

(5) [1964] 1 SCR 678.

(7) [1973] I, SCR 291.

(21 {1954j SCR 145.

(4) {1962] 2 SCR 395.

(6) {1962] Supp 3, SCR 818.

• '

accused named in the charge, there were at least one or more unidenti lied persons who participated in the criminal action against the deceased con-jointly with A-7. While the precise number of those unidentified persons, other than the 13 named in the charge, cannot be ascertained with certitude, it can safely be said that apart from 13 named in the charge, there were some more confederates of A-7 and all of them participated in the fatal assault on the deceased in the manner alleged by the prosecution. A-7 can therefore be safely convicted under s. 302 read with s. 34, Penal Code.

According, we allow this appeal against A-7, reverse his acquittal, convict him -under s. 302 read with s. 34, Penal Code and sentence him to imprisonment for life.

V.P.S.

Appeal allowed .

l0---725SCl/76

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

K. VEN.KATA REDDY & OTHERS

March 26. 1976

s. 9

Indian Penal Code

ss. 34 and 302

s. 302, 34 and 149

I.P.C

s. 302

s. 34

I.P.C

s. 302

s. 34

[1976] 3 SCR 651

A P. Ram Reddy

P. P. Rao

Govind Das

Sunanda Bhandare

A. K. Mathur

A. K. Sharma

M. S. Narasimhan

SARKARIA

High Court of Andhra Pradesh

Konda Papaya Palli

Govinda Palli

Vellugoti Pedda Eswara Reddy

Mumagala Narayana Reddy

Konda Kala-Vatala

Akkanunareddigari Venkata Kondareddy

ss. 107

Cr.P.C

Konda Papayapalli village

May D 16, 1968

K. Venkatareddy

Jammalamadugu

Dastagiri

L.

Venkata Ramanna

Dastagiri

E. Solomon

V. Bala Subbanna

Nossam

Rangappa

Yerikala Reddy

Papayapalli

Munsiff

Police

Station, Vuyyalawada

Judicial Magistrate Koilkuntla

Abdul Khadar

Pollana

Santhoji Rao

s. 161

Cr.P.C

May 18, 1968

May 22, 1968

June 24, 1968

August 10, 1968

Johnson

June 7, 1968

July 18, .1968

s. 302

Penal Code

Article 136

Ram Reddy

Govind Das

Mnnsiff

Jammalamagdu

May 16, 1968

Nandyal-Koilkuntla

Erikala Reddy

Dastgiri

Jamala-

s. 164

Cr.P.C

Kalavatala Reddy

Kalavatala (Reddy

Police Statioin Vuyyalawada

Koilakuntla

P. Ram Reddy

Munsiff

Proddutur

Allagaddi

s. 107

Cr.P.C

Ram Reddy

sec. 174(2)

Cr.P.C

Rangappa

Pullayya

Pullayya

s. 164

Cr.P.C

s. 164

Cr.P.C

Rangappa

17th and 18th May 1968

s. 9 and 11

Konda Kalavatalavadu

July 18,

1968

Gobind Das

sec 213

P. Eswara Reddy

s. 302

s. 34

Penal Code

s. 149

s. 34

Penal Code

Shinghal

[1964] 1 SCR 678

1962] 2 SCR 395

s. 302

s. 34

Penal Code

s. 302

s. 34

Penal Code