I i

PUWADA VENKATESWARA RAO

CHIDAMANA VENKATA RAMANA

March 8, 1976

[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.J B

Andhra Pradesh Buildinr: (Lea1e. Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 __, --Ei, iction of tenant-"Alotice under s. 10 i.1sued-Whether notice under s. 106,

Transfer of Property Act necessary.

Evidence-Pmty denies receipt of notice-Production of post11u1n-lf .necessary. ,

The n:spon<lent-landlord filed a petition under s. 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, for the eviction of the appellanttenant. There was a compromise.

Since the tenant defaulted in payment of the rent thereafter, a registered notice terminating the tenancy, issued by the landlord, came back with an endorsement that the appellant had

refused to accept it.

Later. the tenant was ordered to be evicted.

The tenant's t appeal to the appeilate court and then• his revision application to the 1-f.ir.h

, Court were rejected.

Relying upon an earlier Division Bench decision of that Court, the High Court held that the Act provided a self-contained procedure for eviction of tenants, and therefore, compliance with the provisions of s. 106, Transfer of Property Act was unnecessary.

Disniissing the tenant's appeal,

"HELD : The High Court has correctly applied the principle laid down by a Division Bench of that court in Ul/if!nnuna & Ors. v. S. Mohan Rao & Ors.

[1969] An. P.R. Law Journal 351.

[553-E]

Raval & Co. v. K. C. Ramachandran & Ors. [19741 2 SCH. 629 @) 634 and

 Shri Renz Chand v. Shrimati Shain Devi. ILR 1955 Punj. 36, referred to.

ln Manf:ilal v. Su£?an Chand Rathi rAIR 1955 SC 1011 this Court was considering an entirely different kind of provision of another Act in another State, f' and this case is distinguishable.

In the context of the remedy of cjectment by

an ordinary civil suit it was held in that case that the usual notice of termination of tenancy under s. 106. Transfer of Property Act was necesary.

[553F & D]

Obiter :

[In cases where a party denies receipt of registered notice it is not always necessary to produce the postman who tried to effect service.

Denial of service by a party n1ay be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct.

The decision of the Bombay High Court in NJ.

K. Patel v. Kundan Mal Chamanlal and that of the Calcutta High Court in l\'irn1al Bala Devi. v. Provar Kumar Basu are reconcilable.

The Calcutta High Court applied a rebuttable presumption under s. 114, Evidence Act. that the letter was received by the addressee in the ordinary course of business was refused by him beca1u; e the presumption from the endorsement made upon it had not been repelled by any evidence.

In the Bombay case, the presumption had been held to have been rebutted by the evidence of the defendant on oath so that it meant that the plaintiff could not succeed without further evidence.]

[554C-E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2534 of 1969. (Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 19-8-1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in C.R.P.

No. 2190 of 1968.)

P. P. Juneja, for the appellant.

G. N. Rao, for the respondent.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1976) 3 S.C.R.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BEG J.-The defendant-appellant had taken a house on rent under a registered lease dated 10th February, 1958, on a monthly rent of\ Rs. 25.0 /- for a pen?<l of five years for running a lodging house.

It J 1s admitted by both sides that m February, 1963, the lease had expired.

According to the landlord respondent, the defendant-appellant had contmued to hold over as a tenant "on the same terms" by which he, presumably, meant that it was a month to month tenancy. t' I The Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, (hereinater referred to as 'the Act') came into operaton before the lease expired.

The appellant seemed to be constantly making defaults in payments of rent.

The landlord respondcn had, therefore, to file a suit for arrears of rent in the Court of District Munsif, Visakhapatnam, which was decreed on 4th April, 1962.

The landlord respondent had to file a petition on 21st April, 1962, under Section 10 of the Act before tile 1 Rent Controller, Visakhapatnam for the eviction of the appellant as no rent was paid from 1st December, 1961 to 31st March, 1962.

There was a compromise on 12th. October, 1962.

The appellant agreed to clear arrears and to pay rents regularly.

The appellant, however, wilfully defaulted again in payments of rent from September, .,

1963 to April, 1964.

A notice dated 8th April, 1964, was sent by registered post by the landlord respondent to the appellant terminating his tenancy and calling upon him to pay up the arrears of rent and vacate the house by the end of April, 1964. This came back with "' the endorsement that the appellant was refusing to accept it.

On 9th April, 1964, the respondent filed another petition under Section 10 of the Act before the Rent Controller of Visakhapatnam who ordered the cYiction of the appellant after holding all the flimsy defences of the '4 appellant to be unsubstantiated.

The Subordinate Judge of Visakha-· I patnam dismissed the tenant's appeal on 23rd October, 1968. The appellant's revision application to the High Court was also rejected on 19th August, 1969.

The only question raised by the appellant before us, in this appeal by special leave, is that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served upon the appellant according to the finding of the Andhra Pradesh High Court itself. It was, therefore, urged that the petition under Section 10 of the Act could not succeed.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court had, however, relied upon Ulligamma &

Ors. v. S. Mohan Rao & Ors. (1), where a Division Bench of that High Court had held that the Act, with which we are now concerned, provided a procedure for eviction of tenants which was self-contained so that no recourse to the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of ..

Property Act was necessary.

We may also refer here to the observations of this Court in Raval & Co. v. K. C. Ramachandran & Ors. (2). There, this Court noticed •

(1) (1969) 1 An. P.R. Law Journal 351.

(2) [1974] 2 S.C.R. 629 @ 634

P. V. RAO v. C. V. RAMANA (Beg, /.) 553

Shri Hem Chand v. Shrimati Sham Devi(1), and pointed out "that it was held there that the Act uuder consideration in that case provided the whole procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment, aud, that being so, provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had no relevance".

No do.ubt the decision mentioned with approval by this Court related to another enactment. But, the principle indicated by this Court was the same as that applied by the Andhra Pradesh High Court .

.; It is true that, in Mangilal v. Sugan. Chand Rathi (Deceased) etc.('), this Court has held that the provisions of Section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act of 1955 do not dispense with the requirement to comply with the provisions of Section

106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

In that case, however, Section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Act merely operated as a bar to an ordinary c civil snit so that service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act became relevant in considering whether an ordinary civil suit filed on a ground which constituted an exception to the bar

~ contained in Section 4 had to be preceded by a notice under Section

106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

In the context of the remedy of ejectment by an ordinary civil suit, it was held that the usual notice of termination of tenancy under Section I 06 of the Transfer of Pro- D pcrty Act was necessary to terminate a tenancy as a condition prece- 'I dent to the maintainability of such a suit.

In the case before us, the respondent landlord relied upon a provision for special summary proceedings for eviction of tenants under an Act which contains all the requirements for those proceedings. We, therefore think that the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had correctly applied the principle laid down by a Division Bench decision of that Court.

He rightly distinguished such a case from Mangila/'s case (supra) where an entirely different kind of provision of another Act in another State was being considered by this Court.

The Division Bench decision of the High Court, applied by the learned Judge, had, we think, enunciated the correct principle.

A question raised before us by learned Counsel for the respondent F is whether the notice sent by the respondent-landlord could be held not to have been served at all simply because the postman, who had made the endorsement of refusal, had not been produced.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court had relied upon Meghji Kanji Patel v. Kundanmal Chamanlal ('), to hold that the notice was not served.

There, a writof summons, sought to be served by registered post, had been returned with the endorsement "refused". The Bombay High Court held G that the presumption of service had been repelled by the defendant's statement on oath that he had not refused it as it was never brought to him.

In this state of evidence, it was held that, unless the postman \HS produced, the statement of the defendant on oath must prevail. An

(I) I.L.R. [1955] Punj. 36.

(3) A.LR. 1968 Bombay 387.

3-608SCI/76

(2) A.LR. 1965 SC 101.

554 SUPREME COURT REPOJl.TS

(1976] 3 S.C.R.

ex-parte decree, passed on the basis of such an alleged service was, therefore, set aside.

On facts found, the view expressed could not be held to be incorrect.

In Nirmalabala Debi v. Prov at Kumar Basa ('), it was held by the Calcutta High Court, that a letter sent by registered post, with the endorsement "refused" on the cover, could be presumed to have been duly served upon the addressee without examining the postman who had tried to effect service.

What was held there was that the mere fact that the latter had come back with the endorsement "refused" could not raise a presumption of failure to serve.

On the other hand, the presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act would be that, in the ordinary course of business, it was received by the addressee and actually refused by him.

This is also a correct statement of the law.

The two decisions are reconcilable.

The Calcutta High Court applied a rebuttable presumption which had not been repelled by any evidence. In the Bombay case, the presumption had been held to have been rebutted by the evidence of the defendant on oath so that it meant that the plaintiff could not succeed without further evidence.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court had applied the ratio decidendi of the Bombay case because the defendant-appellant before us had deposed that he had not received the notice. It may be that, on a closer examination of evidence on record, the Court could have reached the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. It is not always necessary, in such cases, to produce the postman who tried to effect service.

The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its ow~1

admissions or conduct. We do not think it necessary to go into this question any further as we agree with the High Court on the first point argued before us.

Consequently, this appeal is dismissed with costs.

P.B.R.

Appeal dismissed.

(I) 52 C.W.N. 659.

RAO

CHIDAMANA VENKATA RAMANA

March 8, 1976

A. N. RAY, C.J.

M. H. BEG

JASWANT SINGH, JJ

Control Act, 1960

s. 10

s. 106

Transfer of Property Act

s. 10

Control Act, 1960

s. 106

Transfer of Property Act

AIR 1955 SC 1011

s. 106

Transfer of Property Act

Bombay High Court

Calcutta High Court

s. 114

P. P. Juneja

G. N. Rao

BEG

Control Act, 1960

Court of District Munsif, Visakhapatnam

4th April, 1962

Section 10

12th. October, 1962

8th April, 1964

9th April, 1964

Section 10

Visakhapatnam

Subordinate Judge of Visakha-· I patnam

23rd October, 1968

19th August, 1969

Section 106

Transfer of Property Act

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Section 10

Section 106

[1974] 2 S.C.R. 629

Section 106

Transfer of Property Act

Section 4

Section

106

Transfer of Property Act

Section 4

Section 106

Transfer of Property Act

Section 4

Section

106

Transfer of Property Act

Mangila/

section 114

Bombay


BECHAN PANDEY & ORS.

DULHIN JANKI DEVI & OTHERS

March 9, 1976

[H. R. KHANNA AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]

Practice and procedure-Old Litigation-Must con1e to an end-No re1nand.

The plaintiffMappellants filed a suit against defendants for a declaration of their title to the land in question admeasuring 142 bighas. 'Ihe trial Court dismissed the suit in respect of land admeasuring 28 acres and decreed the suit in respect of the remaining land. The plaintiffs' suit was held to be barred in respect of that land on acount of the doctrine of waiver and acquiescence.

The plaintiffs were also held entitled to recover mesne profits.

On an appeal filed by some of the respondents, the High Court accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The High Court held that it was not shown that the disputed land was the same as had been purchased by Mina Kucr in auction sale. The High Court also held that the plaintiffs' suit for possession was barred by limitation.

The appellants contended,

( 1) The respondent did not dispute that the suit land was the same which was purchased by Mina Kuer as per sale certificate dated 26-2-1935,

(2) In any case the matter may be remanded for determining the above issue.

Dismissing the appeal,

l-IELD: (1) The appellants have tailed to establish that the land in dispute is the same as has been purchased in auction by Mina Kuer as per sale E certificate dated 26-2-1935. The contention of the appellant that the respondents did not dispute that the suit land is the same as the one purchased by Mina Kuer is not correct. The respondents did deny this fact in their written statement. The land which is the subject matter of the present litigation is situate in the State of Bihar on the right bank of the Ganges.

Although the land is subject to river action, the onus to prove that the land in dispute in Bihar State represents the land in U.P. which got sub- IT'.erged as t.i result of river action was upon the appellants. 'fhe appellants F have failed to discharge this onus. [557F, H, 558A, El

(2) The prayer of the appellants for remand of the case is rejected because there was no valid basis for the assumption of the appellants that the appellants did not dispute the identity of the land. The suit was filed as long ago as in January, 1950. During the pendency of this litigation many of the o.riginal plaintiffs ancl defendants have died and are now represented by their legal representatives. It is time that we draw the final curtain and put an end to this Jong course of litigation between the parties.

If the passage of time and G laws of nature bring to an end the lives of men and women it \vould perhaps be the demand of reason and dictate of prudence not to keep alive after so many years the strife and conflict startea by the dead. To do so would in effect be defying the laws of nature and offering a futile resistance to the ravage of time. If human life has short span, it would be irrational to entertain a taller claim for disputes and conflicts which are a manifestation of human frailty. ihe Courts should be loth to entertain a plea in a case like the present which would have the effect of condemning succeeding generation of families • to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. [558G-H, 559A-DJ H

Sant Narain Mathur v. Rama Krishna Mission A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2241 reiterated.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1432 of 1968.

(From the judgment and decree dated the 26-10-1959 of the Patna High Court in appeal from Original decree No. 280 of 1953.)

Sarjoo Prasad with D. Goburdhun, for the appellants.

V. S. Desai with D. P. Mukherjee for respondents 3 4 5 6(a) 14 and 15. ' ' '

Ex parte, for respondents 1, 2, 6, 7 to 13 & 16-17.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KHANNA, J.-The plaintiff-appellants field a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge Arrah against 41 defendants for a declaration of their title to land measuring 142 bighas, 17 kathas described in the schedule to the plaint situated in village Shivpur Diar in District Shahbad.

Prayer was also made for delivery of possession of the land and for mesne profits amounting to Rs. 4,100.

The trial court dismissed the suit in respect of land measuring 28.36 acres out of plot No. 3863/ 41.

Suit in respect of the remaining land was decreed.

The plaintiffs were also held entitled to recover mesne profits from defendants who might be found in possession of the land decreed.

On appeal by defendants 3, 7, 12 and 14 the Patna High Court acceped the appeal and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiffs have come up in appeal to this Court against the judgment and decree of the High Court on certificate granted under article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution.

Village Shivpur Diar consists of five Mahals, Shivpuur Diar Nambari, Shivpur Diar Gangbarar Shumali, Shivpur Diar Gangbarar Janubi, Shivpur Diar Sarju Barar and Shivpur Diar Naubarar.

Each of the two Mahals, Shivpur Diar Gangbarar Shumali and Shivpur Diar N ambari has 18 pattis.

Proprietorship rights in each pat ti were calculated as 16 annas.

One Brahmdeo Singh had a share of 5 annas 4 pies in patti Bhrighunath Singh in the above Mahals.

He also held different shares in the other pattis of the two Mahals.

Brahmdeo Singh mortgaged with possession his share in the said lands in favour of Sitaram Sahu and Sheogulam Sahu by means of several mortgage deeds.

As the mortgagees were dispossessed from some of the lands mortgaged in their favour, they filed a suit for recovery of the mortgage amounts.

Final decree was awarded in that suit on Jiune 13 1925. In execution of that decree proprietary interest of Brahmdo Singh in Mahal Shivpur Diar N ambari and Mahal Shivpur Diar Gangbarar Shumali were auctioned on June 15, 1932 and was purchased by Maina Kuer, "1dow of Sitarm Sahu mortgage~. Sale certificate was granted to Mama Kuer auctlon purchaser on February 26, 1935.

She got delivery of possession of the land sold in her favour on March 19 and 20 1935. On November 9, 1936 Sheo Prasad Singh who held genral power of attorney from Maina Kuer, executed a ptta (lease) for seven years in respect of 135 bighas, 15 kathas out of the land purchased by Maina Kuer in favour of Mha~

cteo Rai and others.

On September 27, 1940 Sheo Prasad Smgh

I )

executed on behalf of Maina Kuer a deed for perpetual lease of land A measuring 134 bighas, 17 kathas out of the land purchased by her in favour of plaintiffs 1 to 9, 14, 16 to 18 and father of plaintiffs 10 to 13.

Three days later on September 30, 1940 Sheo Prasad Singh executed another deed for perpetual lease in respect of the remaining land measuring 8 bighas in favour of plaintiff No. 15.

On May 16, 1941 Mahadeo Rai and others, in whose favour lease deed of the land had been executed for seven years, relinquished their rights under the B lease in favour of the plaintiffs. On July 13, 1942 Maina Kuer sold her proprietary interest which she had acquired under the auction sale to Rajendra Prasad Singh and others.

The plaintiffs in whose favour deed for perpetual lease of the land purchased by Maina Kuer had been executed filed the present suit in January 1950 against the defendants, on the allegation that defendants 1 to 18 had taken wrongful possession of the land. Prayer was also made, as mentioned above, for recovery of Rs. 4,] 00 as mesne profit.

It was also mentioned by the plaintiffs that proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the land in dispute had been initiated but as those proceedings were dropped the plaintiffs had to seek redress by means of the present suit.

The suit was resisted by the defendants who denied the title of the plaintiffs or Maina Kuer to the land in dispute.

It was also stated that the said land had not been partitioned.

Plea was also taken that the defendants had all along remained in possession of the land and the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation.

The trial court dismissed the suit in respect of 28.36 acres of land -0n the ground that the defendants had built their houses on that land.

The plaintiffs suit was held to be barred in respect of that land on account of the doctrine of waiver and acquiescence.

The suit in respect of tho remaining land, as already mentioned, was decreed.

On appeal the High Court held that the plaintiffs had faikd to prove their title to the land in dispute.

The land in dispute, it was held, was not shown to be the same as had been purchased by Maina Kuer in auction sale.

The plaintiffs suit for possession of the land was also held to be barred by limitation.

In appeal before us Mr. Sarjoo Prasad on behalf of the appellants had made a number of contentions, but in our opinion, it is not necessary to go into all of them for the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the plaintiff-appellants have failed to establish G that the land in dispute is the same as had been purchased in auction by Maina Kuer as per sale certificate dated February 26, 1935 and was thereafter leased on her behalf in favour of the appellants as per two lease deeds dated September 27 and 30, 1940. It is not disputed that if on the above view of the matter the appellants are found to have not proved their title to the land in dispute, the question of going into other contentions would not arise.

Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, however, sub- H mils that the defendant-respondents did not dispute in the trial court that the land in dispute was the same which had been purchased by Maina Kuer in auction sale and had been leased in favour of the

558 SUPREME COURT REPO!l-TS

[1976] 3 S.C.R.

A plaintiffs.

We find it difficult to accede to this submission.

In para 15 of their written statement defendants 2, 3, 12 and 14 stated as under:

"That Maina Kuer was not at all auction purchaser of the property in dispute nor was she a proprietor nor Zamindar nor was she at any time in possession and occupation of the lands in dispute.

The allegation of the plaintiff in respect of these facts are altogether wrong."

In the same language is couched para 15 of the written statement of defendant No. 7 who filed a separate written statement. It was incumbent in view of the averments in para 15 of the written statements for the plaintiff-appellants to establish by clear evidence that the land in dispute was the same which had been purchased in auction sale by Maina Kuer and had been subsequently leased by her in favour of the appellants.

The learned Judges of the High Court discussed the oral and documentary evidence which had been adduced in the case and came to the conclusion that there was no cogent material to show that the land in dispute was the same which had been purchased by_ Maina Kuer and had been leased by her in favour of the appellants.

After hearing Mr. Sarjoo Prasad we find no sufficient ground to take a different view.

The land which had been purchased by Maina Kuer in the auction sale as per sale certificate dated February 26, 1935 was situated in Balia district in the State of Uttar Pradesh on the left bank of the Ganges.

The land which is the subject matter of the present litigation is situated in Shahbad district in the State of Bihar on the right bank of the Ganges.

Although the land is subject to river action, the onus to prove that the land in dispute in Shahbad district represents the laud which got submerged as a result of the river action in Belia district was upon the plaintiff-appellants.

The appellants have failed, as held by the High Court, to discharge this onus.

Mr. Sarjoo Prasad took us through the evidence of Ram Pachise Lall (DW 3) and Nanku Lall Singh (DW 5), but the evidence of these witnesses is far from proving that the land in dispute is the same as was purchased by Maina Kuer.

The evidence of Raghunath Prasad (PW 6), to which also passing reference was made, is not sufficient to connect the land in dispute with sale certificate dated February 26, 1935.

Prayer has also been made by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad for the remand of the case to the trial court as the plaintiff-appellants were labouring under the impression that the defendant-respondents had not disputed that the land in dispute was the same as had been purchased by Maina Kuer. It is urged that because of that impression, material which could have clearly proved that the land in dispute was the same as had been purchased by Maina Kuer could not be brought on the record.

We find it difficult to accede to this prayer.

As already pointed out above, the contesting defendants clearly stated in their written statements that Maina Kner was not the auction purchaser of the land in dispute. In view of that unequivocal averment, there was no valid

basis for the assumption or the impression under which plaintiff-appel- A !ants are stated to have laboured. Apart from that we find that the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen wa~ filed as long ago as January 1950. From the title of the appeal we find that many of the original plaintiffs and defendants have during this period of more than a quarter of century departed and are no more in the land of the living, having bowed as it were to the inexorable law of nature.

They are now represented by their legal representatives.

To remand the B suit to the trial court would necessarily have the effect of keeping alive the strife between the parties and prolonging this long drawn litigation by another round of legal battle in the trial court and thereafter in appeal.

It is time, in our opinion, that we draw the final curtain and put an end to this long meandering course of litigation between the parties. If the passage of time and the laws of nature bring to an end the lives of men and women, it would perhaps be the demand of c reason and dictate of prudence not to keep alive after so many years the strife and conflict started by the dead.

To do so would in effect be defying the laws of nature and offering a futile resistance to the ravage of time. If human life has a short span, it would be irrational to entertain a taller claim for dispntes and conflicts which are a manifestation of human frailty.

The courts should be loth to entertain a plea in a case like the present which would have the effect of con- D demning succeeding generation of families to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. It may be appropriate in the above context to reproduce what was said in the case of Sant Narain Mathur &

Ors. v. Rama Krishna Mission & Ors.(1) :

It is time, in our opinion, that we draw the final curtain on this long drawn litigation and not allow its embers to E smoulder for a further length of time, more so when the principal contestants have all departed bowing as it were to the inexorable law of nature.

One is tempted in this context to refer to the observations of Chief Justice Crewe in a case concerning peerage claim made after the dealth without issue of the Earl of Oxford.

Said the learned Chief Justice :

'Time hath its revolutions; there must be a period and an end to all temporal things-an end of names, and dignities and whatsoever is terrne, and why not of De Vere? For where is Bohun ? Where is Mowbray ?

Where is Mortimer ? Why, which is more and most of all, where is Plantagenet ? They are all entombed in the

urns and sepulchers of mortality." G

What was said about the inevitable end of all mortal beings, however eminent they may be, is equally true of the affairs of mortal beings, their disputes and conflicts, their ventures in the field of love and sport, their achievements and failures for essentially they \Lil have a stamp of mortality on them."

(1) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 2241.

One feels tempeted to add that if life like a dome of many coloured glass stains the white radiance of eternity, so do the doings and conflicts of mortal beings till death tramples them down.

The appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.

P.H.P.

Appeal dismissed.

BECHAN PANDEY & ORS

DULHIN JANKI DEVI & OTHERS

March 9, 1976

H. R. KHANNA

P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.

Mina Kucr

Mina Kuer

Bihar

U.P.

Sarjoo Prasad

D. Goburdhun

V. S. Desai

D. P. Mukherjee

KHANNA

Shahbad

Patna High Court

article 133

Shivpur Diar Gangbarar Janubi

Shivpur Diar Sarju Barar

Shivpur Diar Naubarar

Brahmdeo Singh

Bhrighunath Singh

Sitaram Sahu

Sheogulam Sahu

Jiune 13 1925

Brahmdo Singh

Mahal Shivpur Diar N ambari

Mahal Shivpur Diar Gangbarar Shumali

Maina Kuer

Sitarm Sahu

Mama Kuer

February 26, 1935

March 19 and 20 1935

November 9, 1936

Sheo Prasad Singh

Mha~

cteo Rai

September 27, 1940

Sheo Prasad Smgh

September 30, 1940

May 16, 1941

Mahadeo Rai

July 13, 1942

Rajendra Prasad Singh

section 145

Code of Criminal Procedure

Sarjoo Prasad

September 27 and 30, 1940

SUPREME COURT REPO!l-TS

[1976] 3 S.C.R.

Balia district

Uttar Pradesh

Shahbad district

Belia district

Ram Pachise Lall

Nanku Lall Singh

Raghunath Prasad

Maina Kner

Crewe

De Vere


ANNAPURNA CARBON INDUSTRIES CO.

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH March 9, 1976

[A. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.]

Andlira Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1967. Schedule I, Entry 4-Arc Carbons. if fall under entry. Entry 4 of the I Schedule of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, reads: Cinematographic equipment including ... parts and accessories required for use therewith.

On the question whether Arc Carbons, known as 'Cinama Arc Carbons' manufactured by the appellant fall under the entry and their sales were, there~ fore, rightly subjected to sales tax.

fIELD : The meaning of an entry can only be satisfactorily determined in the light of the language of the entry itself considered in the context in ¥/hich it occurs, and cases relating to totally different entries \vill hav~ only a very remote bearing.

Entry 4 occurs in a Schedule of taxable goods. \Vhen it was inteiided to confine an entry to particular gadgets and 'parts thereof' the entry said so.

Entry 4, however, includes 'parts' as well as 'accessories'. The term 'accessories' is used to describe goods which may have_ been manufactured for use as an aid or addition to particular machines, though, they may serve as aids to other kinds of instruments also.

But, this entry and other entries use the cxpre:-<sion 'required for use therewith'. The description of the goods in these entries indicates that the expression has been en1ployed for cquip1ncnt or accessories connected with the main purpose. Therefore, it is its general or predominant use that determines the category in which an article will fall.

[563D--F, G; 564B-CJ In the present case, the main use of Arc Carbons \\'as proved to be that of

production of po\verful light used in projectors in Cinemas. The fact that they E can also be used for other purposes such as for search lights etc., will not detract from their classification under Entry 4.

The classification is determined by their ordinary or common known purpose or user, which is evident from the fact they are known as 'Cinema Arc Carbons' in the 1narket. [564 F-H]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 630-631 of 1971.

Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the F 19-1-1970 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision Cases Nos 46 and 47 of 1969.

V. S. Desai, Mrs. Vimla Markandeyulu and G. N. Rao for the Appellant.

P. Ram Reddy and P. P. Rao for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BEG, J.

The short question before us in these appeals by special leave, is whether sales of Arc carbons, known as "Cinema Arc Carbons", manufactured by the appellant company, were rightly subjected to sales tax for two assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-77 on the ground that they fall under entry No. 4 of the 1st Schedule of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). This entry reads as follows :

"Cinematographic equipment, including cameras, projectors, and sound recording and reproducing equipment

A lenses, films and parts and accesories required for use therewith".

As indicated above, the very name of the Arc Carbons as commercial commodities, seems to attach the word "Cinema" ' to them because of the use to which they are generally put.

The High Court referred to the fact that the appellants had not produced their account books to show that they had been purchased by persons other than those who ran cinemas or for any other use.

Of course it is very difficult to identify a taxable commodity merely by the use' to which it may be put. Nevertheless, it appears that the entry under consideration links the taxable object with its general or ordinary use.

The taxing authorities were, therefore, compelled to consider the use which is generally made of the arc carbons.

They had concluded that the common or ordinary use of the arc carbons was that they exuded the powerful light cast, through the projectors, on cinema screens.

It was pointed out that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, the final departmental authority under the Act, had allowed an application for adducing expert evidence to determine the question whether arc carbons manufactured by the appellant company could be covered by the entry under consideration.

It, however, appears that, before further evidence could be taken, at the appellate stage, on the subject, a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Srimathi Nidmarthi Saraswathi Devi('), was brought to the notice of the Tribunal.

There, the High Court had held that such arc carbons are covered by the 4th entry in the 1st Schedule of the Act.

Hence, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal without taking further evidence.

In the High Court, two decisions cited on behalf of the appellants were : Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madhurai Division, Madhurai v. Ravi Auto Stores(2 ), ancl State of Madras v. llldian Oxygen Ltd. (3).

The High Court pointed out that in both these cases what was decided was whether "welding electrodes", considered by themselves, were "electrical goods" falling within entry 41 of Schedule 1 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.

It was held, in these cases, that they were only copper rods which were melted by electrical power in the process of welding.

Neither the use of the term "electrode" to describe them, suggesting a connection with electricity, nor their utilisation in a process involving application of electrical power could convert them into "electrical goods" as contemplated by the entry in the Madras Act.

The High Court rightly observed that these decisions had no bearing whatsoever upon the very different entry in a schedule of an entirely different Act of a different State.

The same question has been argued before us with the help of some more cases to which the same criticism applies.

The additional cases cited before us were: Pashabhai Patel & Co.(P) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State('), where it was held a "tractor"

(!) T.R.C. No. 26 of 2962 (decided on 9th August, 1963)

(2) (1968) 22 S.T.C. 172 (Madras)

(3) (1968) 22 S.T.C. 476 (Madras)

(4) (1964) 15 S.T.C.32.

ANNAPURNA CARBON co. v. STATE OF A.P (Untwalia, J.) 563

is not "agricultural machinery", within the meaning of entry 9 in Schedule B of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953; Agrawal Brothers v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh('); where it was also held that a "tractor", which is "nothing but a self-propelled vehicle capa- / ble of pulling a load", or "traction" does not acquire the character of )- "agricultural machinery or implement" merely because when used on agricultural land it is used also to draw certain agricultural implemnts like a plough; The State of Mysore v. Mores (India) Ltd.( 2 ), where it was held that a typewriter ribbon is not an essential part of a type- ; writer so as to attract the tax under entry 18 of the second schedule to the Mysore Sales Tax, Act, 1957, Commissioner, Sales Tax, U. P. v.

Free India Cycle lndustries( 3 ), where it was held that rexine saddle covers used also for bicycle scats are not covered by entry No. 34 introduced by Section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, as modified subsequently, which read : "bicycles, tricycles, cycle rickshaws and perambulators and parts and accessaries thereof other than tyres and tubes"; The Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Marketing Society, Jabalpur v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Indore('), where

>- il was held that oil-engines and pumps", which are not known in lhe commercial world as "agricultural machinery" could not be covered by an entry meant for goods sold for agricultural purposes simply because some of them are also sold to agriculturists for agricultural purposes.

We do not think that any useful purpose is served by multiplying cases relating to entries which are so very different and could have only a very remote hearing, if any, upon any reasoning which could + be adopted to support the submission that the arc carbons, under consideration here, fall within the relevant entry 4 of Schedule 1 of the Act.

The meaning of this entry can only be satisfactorily determined in the light of the language of the entry itself considered in the context ,, in which it occurs.

The entry No. 4 occurs in a schedule in which descriptions of goods to be taxed indicate that the expression "required for use therewith" has been employed for equipment or accessories connected with the main purpose.

For instance, in entry No. 5 the expression occurs at the end as follows :

"Photographic and other cameras and .. enlargers, films and plates, paper and cloth and other parts and accessories required for nse therewith''.

Apparently, the deciding factor is the predominant or ordinary purpose or use.

It is not enough to show that the article can be put to G other uses also.

It is its general or predominant user which seems to determine the category in which an article will fall.

The first entry in the schedule relates to "motor vehicles" and includes "c6mponent parts of motor vehicles" and "articles (includin.g batteries) adapted for use as parts and accessories of motor vehicles."

but excludes certain other articles by putting in the words "not beino- H such articles as are ordinarily also used for other pnrposes than a~ ----------

(!) (1965) 16S.T.C. 860.

(2) (1970) 26 S.T.C. 87.

(3 :(1970) 26 S.T.C. 428.

(4) (1971) 27 S.T.C. 45 ..

parts and accessories of motor vehicles''.

Entry No. 2, relating to refrigerators, air conditioning plants covers also "component parts thereof".

Again, entry No. 3, for "wireless reception instruments and apparatus" includes "electrical valves, accumulators, amplifiers and \ loud speakers and spare parts and accessories thereoi''.

The words "parts thereof" are used in several entries, such as entry No. 6 for .clocks, time-pieces and watches, entry No. 10 for dictaphones and other similar apparatus for recording sound, and entry No. 11 for sound transmitting equipment such as telephones and loud-speakers.

Our object in indicating the nature of entries, amdist which entry No. 4 occurs, is to show that some precision has been attempted in making the entries.

When it was intended to confine the entry to particular gadgets and "parts thereof" the entry said so.

Of course, even where an entry relates to parts manufactured for use for a particular kind of instrument of gadget only, the article, manufactured to serve as a part of a particular kind of apparatus, would not cease to be covered by the intended entry simply because a purchaser makes some other use of it.

We have to find the intention of the framers of the i. schedule in making the entry in each case.

The best guide to their intentions is the language actually employed by them.

We find that the term "accessories" is used in the schedule to describe goods which may have been manufactured for use as an aid or addition.

A sense in which the word accessory is used is given in • Webster's Third New International Dictionary as follows : "an object or device that is not essential in itself but that adds to the beauty, convenience, or effectiveness of something else''.

Other meanings given there are : "supplementary or secondary to something of greater or primary importance"; "additional"; "any of several n1echanica1 devices that assist in operating or controlling the tone resources of an organ." "Accessories" are not necessarily confined to particular '-./ machines for which they may serve as aids.

The same item may be l an accessory of more than one kind of instrument.

It will be noticed that the entry we have to interpret includes ''parts" as well as "accessories" which are required for use in pro.iectors or other cinematographic equipment.

We think that the Andhra Pradesh High Court correctly held that the main use of the arc carbons under consideration was duly proved to be that of production of powerful light used in projectors in cinemas.

The fact that they can also be used for search lights, signalling, stage lighting, or where powerful lighting for photography or other purposes may be required, could not detract from the classification to which the carbon arcs belong.

That is determined by their ordinary or commonly known purpose or user.

This, as already observed by us, is evident from the fact that they are known as "cinema arc carbons" in the market.

This finding \..... was enongh, in our opinion, to justify the view taken by the Andhra ' Pradesh High Court tl)at the goods under consideration are covered by the relevant entry No. 4.

Consequently, we dismiss these appeals with costs. •

V.P.S.

Appeals dismissed.

ANNAPURNA CARBON INDUSTRIES CO

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

March 9, 1976

A. N. RAY, C.J.

M. H. BEG

JASWANT SINGH, JJ.

Schedule I

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Andhra Pradesh High Court

V. S. Desai

Vimla Markandeyulu

G. N. Rao

P. Ram Reddy

P. P. Rao

BEG

Arc Carbons

Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal

Schedule 1

Section 3A

Sales Tax Act, 1948

Schedule 1

Andhra ' Pradesh High Court


STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS.

March 9. 1976

(V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.]

.f Bo1nbay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act (Bombay 39 of 1954), ss. 8, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 22-Principles of compensatioti-Solatitun and interest, when payable-'Three multiples', meanin[? of.

Land Acl!uisition Act (1 of 1894), ss. 23 and 26-Solatium, if conipensation.

Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), O. 41, r. 22-Applicability to tribunals.

Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136-Exercise of discretion under.

On the coming into force of the Bombay Merged Territories And Areas )- (Jagirs Abolition) Act 1953, on and from August 1, 1954, the jagirs were abolished and certain properties comprised therein vested in the State. Some compensation was awarded by the Jagir Abolition Officer to the jagirdars on their application, in respect of certain items. Oq appeal by the jagirdars, the Revenue Tribunal modified the award. Aggrieved by the decision, both the State and the jagirdars filed petitions and the High Court decided some points against the ._ State and some against the jagirdars and remanded the matter to the Tribunal.

Both sides appealed to this Court under Art. 136.

On behalf of the State it was contended that : (I) compenation for the unbuilt village site lands; (2) solatium of 15% on the amount of compensation; and (3) interest on the amount of instalments of compensation, which V.'erc delayed, houl<l not have been awarded. The jagirdars contended that (1) the expression 'three multiples' in s. 11 (2) means six times and so the compensation should be six times the assessment and not three times as held by the High C'ourt; (2) the Bagyat Kas should have been included in the assessment for the purpose of assessing the compensation; and (3) the Tribunal had no po\Ver and \Vas not justified in reducing the rates of the value of the villagt: site lands.

HELD : The appeals of the State are partly allowed on its 2nd and 3rd contentions and the appeals of the jagirdars are dismissed.

( 1) The jagirdars are entitled to compensation for all unbuilt village. site F lands.

[572F]

Section 11(3) provides that any jagirdar having any right or interest in any property referred to in s. 8 shall, if he proved to the satisfaction of the Collector that he had any such right or interest, be entitled to compensation in the manner provided in clauses (i) to (iii). In these clauses there is reference only to 3 kinds of property, but there are numerous other properties mentioned in s. 8.

The unbuilt village site land is one such. The jagirdar Vi'Ould be entitled to compensation for rights or interests in them under s. 11(3), but no manner ot' avo'arding compensation is indicated therein. Literally the language of sub-s. (3) does not n1ake sense, and so, it should be understood as proviJing that the person whose rights had been extinguished is entitled to cOmpensation, in respect of the properties in which he had an interest. in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but subject to the exceptions provided in clauses (i) to (iii). [572C-F]

(2) The Legislature did not intend nor did it provide for the payment of any solatiun1 on the amount of compensation awardable to the jagirdars. [574C]

The concept of compensation means just equivalent or market value of the property acquired.

Section 23(1), Land Acquisition Act provides that in detrn

A mining compensation various factors over nnd nbove the market value are to lie taken into account.

Section 23(2) provides for the payment of 15% of the market value as solatium in addition to the market value. That the leglslature did r.ot intend to give any solatium to the jagirdars as compensation is clear'\_ from (a) the Explanation to s. 11 of the Jagirs Abolition Act, which defines rr1arket value, refers only to s. 23(1) and nots. 23(2), Land Acquisition Act; .J

(b) Section 15, Jagirs Abolition Act, provides that every award under s. 13 or

or s. 14 shall be in the form prescribed in s. 26(1), Land Acquisition Act but solatium is not mentioned in the prescribed form of the award unde.r s. 26(1); and (c) solatium is awarded as a special compensation in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.

But when Jagirs are abolished and • acquired as a measure of agrarian reform even without payment of market value as con1pensation, the Legislature could not have intended to award any solatium in addition.

[573H-574C]

State of Gujarat etc. v. Vaktsinghji Sursinghji Baghela & Ors. fl9681 3 S.C.R. 692. referred to.

R. D. Suryanarayana Rao v. The Re11enue Divisional Officer. Land ,4cqnisition Officer, Guntur, A.l.R. 1969, A.P. 55 and Kesireddi Appala Swamy and Ors. v. Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Central Railway, Vijayau•ada, A.LR. 1970 A.P. 139 (approved) 1

(3) Section 22, Jagirs Abolition Act, provides that the amount of compensa:' tion shall be payable in transferable bonds carrying interest at 3% per annum from the date of the issue of such bonds and shall be repayable during a period of 20 years from the date of the issue by equated annual instalments of principal and interest as provided in the Tables to the Act. Rule 4 of the Rules. framed under the Act, provides that the date of the coming into force of the Act • shall be the date of issue of the bond. The ascertainment of the a1nount of con1pensation is bound to take time and so, the proviso to r. 5 made the instal~ 1nents which had fallen due before the delivery of the bond payable in1n1ediately after its delivery. [574E-575A] .;

In the present case the Jagirdar was deprived of his property on August 1, 1954, but the bonds \Vere delivered ten years later. The High Court following Satinder Singh v. A1nrao Singh and others [1961] 3 S.C.R. 676, rightly nllowcd interest hut erred on two aspects: (a) It awarded interest on the entire amount of instalments, principal and interest, paid after the lapse of ten years. Interest '{' is payable only on the principal amount of instalments but not on the amount of instalments of interest. (b) The jagirdar would not be entitled to inten .. --st on the total in!'.italments of the principal for 10 years. On the first instalment he will get interest for 9 years only, on the second for 8 years only and on the last instalment for one year only. [575D-F; 576B-D] ( 4) The High Court rightly held that there was no difference between '3 times' and '3 multiples'.

[576G]

Although the Legislature has used the two expressions, one in some places and the other in other places, it was done without any significance or variation.

The expression 'equivalent to 3 multiples' is used in the sense of comn1on par~

lance and not in a technical, mathematical or scientific sense. rs76F-G]

(5) (a) Bagyat Kas is not a part of the assessment fixed for the land within the meaning of s. 11 (2).

'Kas' n1eans tax. Bagyat lands are those which have irrigational facilities of water fron1 wells etc.

On such land, apart from the assessment fixed, Bagyat kas was also levied. It could not be contended by the jagirdar that Bagyat kiis was a part of the land assessment, because, in the records of the jagirdars, Bagyat kas was shown separately from the amount of assessment on land. If it \vas only a different kind of assessment fixed for a different type of land, then H there was no necessity of showing it as a separate item. [577B-El ..:

(b) No separate compensation has been provided for the toss of the Bagyat

ka~ which the jagirdars were realising, but it is for the Legislature to provide and Courts cannot help.

[577F]

I )

t ,

GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Untwa/ia, J.) 567

(6) raking the totality of the circumstances the jagirdar's appeal on the A last point, is not a fit case for interference by this Court under Art. 136.

Under s. 16 read with s. 17, Jagirs Abolition .Act, the State has no right of appeal to the Tribunal.

The State could not, also have challenged under

0. 41. r. 22. C.P.C. the rates of compensation given by the Jagir Abolition Officer.

But in appeal filed by the jagirdar the State persuaded the Tribunal to reduce the rates of compensation in some cases.

Since, howevr, the area of the village site lands was increased by the Tribunal, as it was of the opinion B that certnin lands were wrongly excluded by the Jagir Abolition Officer, the net result wa~ that in spite of the reduction of rates, more compensation was payable to the jagirdars for the village site lands. [577G-578C]

The Management of Itakhoolie Tea Estate v. Its Worknzen, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1349, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1804 and 1805 of 1970 and 1968 of 1970.

(Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 27tl1/28th August, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 868 and 891 of 1965).

S. T. Desai, G. A. Shah and M. N. Shroff, for the appellants in CAs 1804-1805/70 & for respondents 1 & 2 in CA 1968/70.

V. M. Tarkunde, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar, for respondents 2 & 3 in CAs 1804-1805/70 and for appellants in CAs 1968/70.

D. V. Patel, S. N. Parikh and M. Qamaruddin, for the interveners in CA 1804/70.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

UNTWALIA, J.-These three appeals by special leave arise out of E a common judgment of the Gujarat High Court and in them are involved some common questions of law as to the interpretation of certain provisions of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953-Bombay Act No. XXXIX of 1954-hereinafter referred to as the Act or the Jagirs Abolition Act.

The three appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.

On coming into force of the Act on and from !st August, 1954 the Jagirs of the Jagirdars were abolished and certain properties comprised in the jagirs vested in the State. The J agirdars filed before the Collector applications for award of compensation under the Act in respect of certain properties. The J agir Abolition Officer authorised to act as the Collector under the Act awarded some compensation to G the Jagirdars in respect of some items of the properties, refused in respect of some and made his award on the 30th July, 1963.

The Jagirdars (which expression would include their heirs also) filed an appeal under section 16 of the Act before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Ahmedabad.

The Tribunal modified the award of the Jagir Abolition Officer in some respects and disposed of the appeal on the 2/3rd December, 1964. Two Special Civil Applications under Article H 227 of the Constitution of India were filed in the High Court from

the decision of the Revenue Tribunal-one by the Jagirdars and the other by the State of Gujarat. The High Court bas disposed of the

two applications by a common judgment dated the 27 /28th August, 1969, decided some points against the jagirdars and some against the State and remanded the case to the Revenue Tribunal for a fresh decision in the light of thejudgment. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the High Court in the two Special Civil Applications, the State of Gujarat has preferred Civil Appeals 1804 and 1805 of 1970 on grant of special leave by this Court.

The Jagirdars also obtained special leave and filed Civil Appeal No. 1968 of 1970.

Under section 3 of the Act on and from the appointed date i.e. 1st August, 1954 all Jagirs were deemed to have been abolished. Section

5 provided as to who were to be the occupants of certain types of

lnds in a proprietary jagir village.

Similarly section 6 referred to the persons who were to be the occupants in life-time Jiwai Jagir. The rates of assessment were to be fixed under section 7. Section 8 provided for the vesting of the properties enumerated therein in the State Government and the extinguishment of the rights of the Jagirdars thereunder. Section 9 deals with right to trees and section 10 refers ., to mines or mineral products. Section 11 provides for compensation to jagirdar and section 12 makes provision for compensation to life-time Jiwai Jagirdars.

The method of awarding compensation to Jagirdar is indicated in section 13 and the method of awarding compensation for abolition etc. of rights of other persons in the property is provided t in section 14.

Section 15 makes applicable provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the making of an award.

In the High Court the concerned Jagirdars challenged the order E of the Revenue Tribunal in respect of 8 matters enumerated in its judgment. The State challenged the decision of the Tribunal in regard to 3 matters only. In these appeals we were not called upon to decide the correctness of the High Court's judgment in regard to each and 1 every item.

In argument the points of controversy were confined only to a few on either side.

On behalf of the State Mr. S. T. Desai at the end of his argument endeavoured to challenge the decision of the F High Court directing the award of some compensation for the Bhatha lands in the river beds and the trees in certain other lands but eventual- ly could not press these points by advancing any argument of substance.

It is, therefore, not necessary for us to deal with these two items in any detail. We merely uphold the order of the High Court in this regard.

On behalf of the State the strenuous attack was on the question of G compensation for the unbuilt village site lands, award of solatium of 15 % on the amount of compensation and award of interest on the amounts of instalments the payment of which was delayed. Mr. V. M.

Tarkunde, appearing for the J agirdars, followed by Mr. D. V. Patel, appearing for some of the intervener jagirdars attacked the decision of the High Court on three counts :-

H ( 1) that the expression three multiples occuring in subsection (2) of section 11 of the Act means at least six times of the assessment and not three times as held by the High . Court;

GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Untwalia, /.) 569

(2) that Bagayat kas forms part of the assessment fixed for the land within the meaning of sub-section ( 2) of section 11 and in awarding compensation under tlte said provision of law the amount of Bagayat kas was erroneously excluded from the assessment;

(3) that the Revenue Tribunal had neither any power nor was it justified in reducing the rates of the value of the village site lands.

We shall deal with the six points aforesaid in order we have mentioned a hove.

Apart from the other Acts which were before the Legislature when the Jagirs Abolition Act was passed in the year 1954 The Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949-hereinafter called the Taluqdari Act passed by the Bombay Legislature was very much there before the Same legislative body.

Yet we are grieved to find a confusion, meaningless and unpurposeful departure in the wordings of the Jagirs Abolition Act from those of the Taluqdari Act.

If the legislature intended to make any departure from the provisions of the earlier act, to avoid unnecessary controversy and arguments in courts, it ought to have done so in clear and unambiguous language. Section 7 ( 1) (b) of the Taluqdari Act provided for the Collector to make an award in the manner prescribed in section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act but subject to the conditions and exceptions provided in sub-clauses (i),

(ii) and (iii). In the Explanation appended to the section the market value was meant to mean the value as estimated in accordance with the provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act in so far as such provisions may be applicable.

Interpreting the said provision of law in the case of State of Gujara.t etc. v. Vakhtsingh1i Sursinghji Vaghela & Ors.('). Bachawat, J delivering the judgment on behalf of a Constitution Bench of this Court has said at page 701

"Section 7 (I) gives compensation to taluqdars for extinguishment of rights in any property under section 6. The

Collector is required by sec. 7 ( 1) (b) to make an award in the F manner prescribed in section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894. The Collector has to make an award of compensation under sec. 11 and having regard to sec. 15 in determining the amount of compensation, he is guided by the provisions of secs. 23 and 24. Section 23 ( 1) requires an award of the market value of the land. Section 23(2) requires an additional award of a sum of fifteen per centum on such market G value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition. It follows that under sec. 7 (1) (b) of the Abolition Act read with section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the taluqdars are entitled to receive as compensation the market value of all rights in any property extinguished under sec. 6 and in addition a sum of 15 per centum on such market value.

This right is subject to the conditions and exceptions enume- H rated in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of section 7(1){b).

(I) !19681 3 S.C.R. 692. 4-608SCl/76

In cases falling under clause (i) and in some cases under clause (ii) the amount of compensation is limited. In cases falling under clause (iii) and in some cases under clause (ii) the amount of compensation is the "market value" which according to the explanation to sec. 7 (1) means the value estimated in tccordance with sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The value so determined includes the solatium of 15 per centum payable under sub-section (2) of s. 23. Where the legislature intended to exclude the application of sub-section (2) of sec. 23, it has said so, as in section 14(2) under which compensation is determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (I) of sections 23 and 24.

It follows that the taluqdar is entitled to the solatium of 15 per centum on the market value, (I) under the main part of sec. 7 (1 )(b) subject to the provisions of the several sub-clauses thereof : (2) in cases falling under clause (iii) of section 7(1) (b) and (3) in cases under clause

(ii) of section 7(1) (b) where market value is awarded.

The direction of the High Court is modified accordingly."

Sub-section (2) of section 7 of the Taluqdari Act reads as follows :

"Every award made under sub-section (1) shall be in. the form prescribed in section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the provisions of the said Act, sh<>ll, so far as may be, apply to the making of such award." It is to be noticed that because of the clear provision in clause (b) and the Explanation, no significance was attached to what has been provided in sub-section (2).

Section 8 of the Jagir Abolition Act says :

"All public roads, etc., situate in jagir villages ta vest in Government-All public roads, lanes and paths, the bridges ditches, dikes and fences, on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours, creeks below high water mark, and of rivers, streams, nalas, lakes, wells and tanks, and all canals and water courses, and all standing and flowing water, all unbuilt village site lands, all waste lands and all uncultivated lands (excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes) which are situate within the limits of any jagir village, shall, except in so far as any rights of any person other than the jagirdar may be established in or over the same and except as may otherwise be provided by anv law for the time being in force, vest in and shall be deeme; I

to be. with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the State Government and all rights held by a jagirdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extin!!Uished and it shall be lawful for the Collector, subject to the general or special orders of the State Government, to dispose them of as he deems fit subject always to

the rights of way and other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting."

I )-

GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL ( Untwalia, J.) 5 71

Since in these appeals we are concerned with proprietary Jagirs we shall read sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 11. They provide:

"(2) In the case of a proprietary jagir, in respect of land held by a permanent holder the jagirdar shall be entitled to compensation equivalent to three multiples of the assessment for such land.

(3) Any jagirdar having any right or interest in any property referred to in section 8 shall, if he proves to the satisfaction of the Collector that he had any such right or interest, be entitled to compensation in the following manner, namely :-

(i) if the property in question is waste or uncultivated but is cultivable land, the amount of compensation shall not C exceed three times the assessment of the land : Provided that if the land has not been assessed the amount of compensation shall not exceed such amount of assessment as would be leviable, in the same village on the same extent of similar land used for the same purpose;

(ii) If the property in question is land over which the public has been enjoying or has acquired a right of way or any individual has any right of easement, the amount of compensation shall not exceed the amount of the annual assessment leviable in the village for uncultivated land in accordance with the rules made under the Code or if such rules do not provide for the levy of such assessment, such amount as in the opinion of the Collector shall be the market value of the right or interest held by tJ; ie claimant;

(iii) If there are any trees or structures on the land, the amount of compensation shall be the market value of such trees or structures, as the case may be.

Exp/anation.-For the purposes of this section, the "market value" shall mean the value as estimated in accordance F with the provisions of sub-section ( 1) of section 23 and section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1 894 ( 1 of 1 894) in so far as the said provisions may be applicable."

As in section 7(1) (a) of the Taluqdari Act a provision was made in sub-section ( 1) of section 13 of the Jagirs Abolition Act for the making of an application to the Collector for determining the amount G of compensation payable to the Jagirdars under sections 11 or 12.

Sub-section (2) of section 13 says :

"On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Collector shall, after making formal enquiry in the manner provided by the Code make an award determining the amount of compensation. Where there is a rn-sharer of a jagirdar H claiming compensation, the Collector shall by his award apportion the compensation between the Jagirdar and the co-sharer.,, , ':~·. l~;

There is a clear departure in section 13(2) from the language of section 7 (1) (b) of the Talnqdari Act.

In the former it is merely provided that the Collector shall make a formal enquiry in the manner provided in the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 and make a11 award determining the amount of compensation.

Here there is uo reference to section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 15 of the Jagirs Abolition Act reads as follows and is at par with subsection (2) of section 7 of the Taluqdari Act.

"Every award made under section 13 or 14 shall be in the form prescribed in section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), and the provisions of the said Act shall, so far as may be, apply to the making of such award."

In section 11(3) of the Act the langnage used is very unsatisfactory.

Instead of providing that the person whose rights had been extinguished would be entitled to compensation in respect of the properties in which he had an interest in accordance with the Land Acquision Act but only subject to the exceptions provided in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii), what is provided in sub-section (3) of section 11 is that the Jagirdar will be entitled to compensation in respect of any property in which he has any right or interest, but in the manner provided in clauses (i) to (iii). Literally the wordings of the two parts of subsection ( 3) are contradictory and carry not much sense.

In subclauses (i), (ii) and (iii) are more or less repeated sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of section 7(1)(b) of the Taluqdari Act. No manner of awarding compensation is indicated in the sub-clauses of section 11 (3) for awarding of compensation in respect of any other property in which the Jagirdar had any right or interest.

Apart from the three kinds of property included in sub'clauss(i) to (iii) there are numerous other properties mentioned in section 8 in some of which the Jagirdar may have a right or interest thus entitling him to have compensation under the first part of section 11 (3). The unbuilt village site land is one such property. Hence as a matter of construction of sub-section

(3) of section 11 of the Act we hold that the Jagirdars are entitled to compensation for all unbuilt village site lands in which they could prove to have any right or interest.

We may add that the right of the Jagirdars to claim compensation for the village site lands was not challenged on behalf of the State before the COurts or authorities below. Nor was Mr. Desai able to press this point in this COurt with such or much convincingness or vehemence as he did in respect of the points of solatium and interest.

Apropos the point of solatium, it may be pointed out at the outset that the sheet anchor of the Jagirdars in the High Conrt, as here, has been the decision of this Court in Vakhtsinghji's case (supra). The High Court a warded solatinm of 15 % on the amonnt of compensation following the said decision. We are unable to uphold the view of the High Court in this regard.

Ordinarily and generally as pointed out in several earlier decisions of this Court while dealing with the interpretation of Article 31 (2) of the Conslitution of India the concept of compensation means just •

GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRJBU!-\AL ( Untwa/ia, J.) 57 3

equivalent or market va1ue of the property acquired. Under the various clauses of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation are taken into account some other factors over and above the market value of the land.

Sub-section (2) says

"In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market-value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition."

The Collector because of section 15 of the Land Acquisition Act is obliged to be guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24 while determining the amount of compensation and thus to award solatium of 15% also.

But it is to be noticed that section 26(1) requires every award to specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (!) of section 23, and also the amounts (if any) awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section. The amount of solatium of 15 % which the Court is obliged to award under section (2) of section 23, strictly speaking, is not a part of the award of compensation as it is not to be mentioned in the prescribed form of the award under section 26(1). Jaganmohan Reddy, C.J. delivering the judgment of a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R. D. Suryanarayana Rao v. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Land Acquisition Officer, Guntur(I) observed at page 57 column 2 :

"The compensation as computed under Section 23 (1) is the amount which has to be set out in the award passed under Section 26(1) and it is that award which is deemed to be a decree under sub-section (2) of section 26. It may be pertinent to notice that neither solatium under sub-section

(2) of section 23, nor interest under Section 34 forms part of the award." '

The learned Chief Justice in another Full Bench decision in the case

of Kesireddi Appa/a Swamy and others v. Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition Officer, Central Rly., Vijayawada(') said at paragraph F 14 at page 145 :

"In our view, the result of the foregoing discussion is that 15 per cent of the market value to be added under Section 23(2) to the compensation awarded under Section 23(1) is not part of the award which has to be passed by the Court within the meaning of Section 26." G

It is to be remembered that the awarding of solatium of 15 per centum under sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act is a special compensation in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. In absence of an express provision such as was there in the Taluqdari Act when Jagirs were abolished and acquired as a measure of agrarian reform even without the payment of market value as compensation it is straining one's imagination to hold that H the intention of the legislature was to award 15 % solatium in view

(I) A.1.R. 1969 A.P. 55.

(2) A.LR. 1970 A.P. 139 .

of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. It may be added here that because of Article 3 lA of the Constitution the vires of the Act was upheld by this Court in Maharaj Umeg Singh and others v. The State of Bombay and others('). As we have pointed out above there is no reference to section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act in section 13(2) of the Act. The intention of the legislature that it did not intend to give any solatium is clear from the fact that unlike the Explanation appended to section 7 (1) of the Taluqdari Act in the Explanation to section 11 of the Jagirs Abolition Act reference is made to sub-section ( 1) only of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Similar is the provision in sub-section (2) of section 14. To crown all, in section 15 where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have been applied to the making of an award, care has been taken to say that every award made under section 13 or 14 shall be in the form prescribed in section 26. In our opinion, therefore, the Legislature did not intend nor did it provide to give any solatium on the amount of compensation awardable to the erstwhile Jagirdar.

Coming to the question of interest we find the judgment of the High Court to be correct in substance but not clear or right in form.

Section 22 of the Act says :

"The amount of compensation payable under the provisions of this Act shall be payable in transferable bonds carrying interest at the rate of three per cent per annum from the date of the issue of such bonds and shall be repayable during a period of twenty years from the date of the issue of such bonds by equated annual instalments of principal and interest.

The bonds shall be of such denomination and shall be in such forms as may as prescribed."

The Bombay Merged Territories And Areas (Jagirs Abolition Compensation Bonds) Rules, 1956 were framed by the State Government under section 25 of the Act. They will be called hereinafter the Rules.

Rule 4 provides : "The .elate of the coming into force of the Act shall be the elate of issue of such bond." In other words irrespective of the actual date of the issuance of the bond the bond will be deemed to have been issued on !st August. 1954 on which date the Act came into force. Rule 5 of the Rules reads as under :

"Annual instalment and repayment-Every such bond shall be repayable in equated annua; l instalments in accordance with the repayment Schedule in Form 8 and Table I to VII in Form C :

Provided that if one or more instalments have fallen due before the delivery of the bond and have not been paid already, such instalments or any balance thereof shall be payable immediately after the delivery of the bond."

The ascertainment of the amount of compensation payable to the erstwhile Jagirdars was bound to take time. The proviso to Rule 5, therefore, made the instalments which had fallen due before the delivery

/ >

GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Untwalia, J.) 575

of the bond payable immediately after its delivery. Roughly speaking A in the case in hand the bonds were delivered about 10 years later.

Question for consideration is whether the State was liable to pay isterest for the period of 1 O years, if so, what amount ?

The intention of the legislature in section 22 is clear that the bonds were to carry interest @ 3 % per annum from the date of issue of such bonds and were repayable during a period of 20 years. Suppose the B bond could be issued on the 1st of August, 1954, although it was not practicable to do so, the Jagirdar according to the tables appended to the Rules would have got the amount of principal with the requisite amount of interest every year starting from 1st of August, 1955. But because of the delay which was unavoidable in the delivery of the bonds the claimant could get the instalments-say 10 instalments only at the end of the I 0th year.

Because of the legal fiction introduced c by Rules 4 and 5 the Jagirdar got all the 10 instalments of principal and interest in one lump sum but after a delay of I 0 years.

The question for consideration is whether the Jagirdar was entitled to any interest on the sums of 10 instalments paid to him at one time after the lapse of 1 0 years.·

The High Court relying upon the decision of this Court in Satindcr Si"gh and others v. Amrao Singh and others(!) has allowed the claim of interest, but seems to have allowed it on the entire amount of instalments including the principal and interest paid after the lapse of 10 years.

In our opinion the awarding of interest on the delayed payments is justified but not on the entire amount of instalments. Interest would be payable only on the principal amount of instalments.

Interest will not be payable on the amount of instalments of interest.

Messrs Tarkunde and Patel conceded that this was the correct position in law.

We do not feel persuaded to accede to the submission of Mr. Desai that on the delayed payments of instalments no interest was payable at all because under the proviso to Rule 5 of the Rules the back instalments became payable only on the delivery of the bonds.

Ganjendragadkar, J as he then was, has said in Satinder Singh's case

(supra) at page 693 :

"What then is the contention raised by the claiments ?

They contend that their immovable property has been acquired by the State and the State has taken possession of it.

Thus they have been deprived of the right to receive the income from the property and there is a time lag between the taking of the possession by the State and the payment of compensation by it to the claimants.

During this period they have been deprived of the income of the property and they have not been able to receive interest from the amount of compensation.

Stated broadlv the act of taking possession of immovable property generally implies an agreement to pay interest on the value of the property and it is on this principle that a claim for interest is made against the State."

Even without pressing into service section 34 of the Land Acquisi- '.ion Act on the principles enunciated by this Court in Satinder Singh's

--~-- (!) [1961]

3 S.C.R. 676.

case and in the background of the intention of the legislature to award 3 % interest it is legitimate to hold fuat interest was payable on the arrears of the principal amount of instalments.

To avoid any confusion, we shall illustrate our view point with reference to Table No. II appended to the Rules.

Suppose the first 1 O instalments of interest and principal fell due when the bonds were delivered to the erstwhile Jagirdar, then all the 10 instalments of interest and principal became payable, and we are told, were paid after the delivery of the bonds.

The Jagirdar was deprived of his property on the coming into force of the Act i.e. the !st August, 1954.

He was, therefore, entitled to interest on the amount of delayed payment of compensation. But the delay will have to be taken into account only with reference to the total amount of the 10 instalments of the principal sums the first being Rs. 3. 73 and the last being Rs. 4.87 as mentioned in Table II. The Jagirdar is not entitled to any interest on the delayed payments of the amounts of interest.

One more precise statement and clarification in this regard is also necessary. The Jagirdar will not get interest at 3 % on the total I 0 instalments of principal for 10 years.

On the first amount of Rs. 3.73 he will get interest 3% for 9 years. On the second instalment of Rs. 3.84 he will get interest at the said rate for 8 years and so on and so forth.

On the last amount of Rs. 4.87 he will get interest for one year only @ 3 % .

This disposes of the three points urged on behalf of the States.

Now we proceed to discuss the other three points urged on behalf of the Jagirdars-either the respondents or the interveners.

Although it is true that the Legislatnre has in the Act used two kinds of expressions-somewhere 3 times and somewhere 3 multiples, it seems to have been so done without any significance or variation in the provision.

In sub-section (1) of section 11 the expression 3 times has been used because it is followed by the expression "the average of the land revenue". Similar is the position in section 12.

But because in snb-section (2) of section 11 the expression is "the assessment fixed" for indicating the amount of compensation the expression used is "equivalent to 3 multiples". The expression seems to have been used in a sense of common parlance and not in a technical, mathematic&! or scientifical sense. In the context we have no doubt in our mind that the expression "3 multiples" means 3 times and not 6 times. The High Court in the judgment under appeal has followed the decision of Dewan, J as he then was, in Special Civil Application No. 469 of 1971 decided on 12-2-1964. In our opinion the learned Judge rightly held that there was no difference between 3 times and 3 multiples.

The problem of Bagayat kasar or Bagayat kas presented s01:ne difficulty. , Mehta J in the judgment under appeal has agreed with and followed the 'decision of Dewan, J dated 12-2-1964 in Special Civil Application Nos. 629 and 630 of 1961 and held that the amount of Bagayat kas was rightly exclnded while fixing the amount of compensation under section 11 (2) of the Act.

Messrs Tarkunde and Patel took great pains to persuade us to take a contrary view.

Tue

GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Umwa/ia, J.) 577

argument advanced by them on the first look appeared to be attractive and forceful but did not stand closer scrutiny.

Dewan, J has pointed out in his judgment referred to above on a consideration of the j various old records and reports as also the Bhagwadgomandal dictionary that 'kas' or 'kasar' means a tax. Bagayat lands are those which have got irrigational facilities by water from well, kundi etc.

On such land apart from the amount of assessment fixed was also levied Bagayat kas.

In the records of the Jagirdars invariably the amount of Bagayat kas was shown separately than the amount of assessment on land.

The Jagir Abolition Officer, the Revenue Tribunal and the Gujarat High Court from time to time have held that while determining the amount of compensation under section 11 (2) the amount of Bagayat kas is not to be taken into account.

We see no sufficient reason to enable us to take a view different from the one taken by the local authorities and the High Court of the State.

It was argued with some force on behalf of the Jagirdars that Bagayat kas was a part of the land assessment although separately shown.

There was nothing to show that the wells had to be constructed or maintained by the Jagir-

,~ dars to enable them to realize Bagayat kas.

That being so, in substance and in effect, it was argued, that it was an extra assessment fixed on the land which had the facility of irrigation by water from wells or the like.

We could not accept the argument of the Jagirdars to be wholly correct. If it was merely a difference of assessment fixed for the different types of lands then there was no necessity of showing the realization of the Bagayat kas as a separate item. In that event only the amount of assessment of the land would have varied. It appears depending upon the situation of the well and its distancefrom a particular land Bagayat kas was imposed as a distinct and separate levy. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the arguments of the Jagirdars that it was a part of the assessment fixed for the land within the meaning of section 11 ( 2) of the Act. It was also submitted by the J agirdars that no separate compensation has been provided for the Bagayat kas which the Jagirdars were realizing and which they could not do on the abolition of the Jag' s.

It is so.

But then it was for the legislature to provide any separate compensation for such a realization by the Jagirdar.

Courts cannot help them if the legislature did not provide for any compensation for the Jagirdars for losing their right of Bagayat kas.

It is not possible to do so by treating the Bagayat kas as a part of the assessment fixed for the land.

We do not feel inclined to examine in any detail the correctness of the third submission made on behalf of the Jagirdars, The Jagirdars filed appeal before the Revenue Tribunal.

In that appeal areas of the village site lands in respect of which compensation was payable to the J agirdars were increased as some areas in the opinion of the Tribunal had been wrongly excluded by the J agir Abolition Officer.

But in that situation the State as a respondent before the Tribunal pointed out that the rates of compensation fixed for the village site land in some cases were high.

The State succeeded in persuading the Tribunal to reduce the rates in some cases.

But the net result was the awarding of more compensation to the Jagirdars for the village site lands. In their appeal the Tribunal did not reduce the amount of compensation.

On the other hand, it enhanced it. The High Court did not feel persuaded to interfere with this aspect of the matter.

Under section 16 read with section 17 of the Act it seems that the State had no right of appeal before the Revenue Tribunal. In such a situation in view of '\. the decision of this Court in The Management of ltakhoolie Tea Estate v. Its Workmen('') there may be substance in the argument put forward on behalf of the Jagirdars that the State could not challenge the rates of compensation fixed by the Jagir Abolition Officer on the principles engrafteJ in Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

But taking the totality of the circumstances we think this is not a fit item in respect of which we should interfere in an appeal filed by special leave of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Justice on this point is not in favour of the Jagirdars as on facts the decision of the Revenue Tribunal was not found to be erroneous.

In the result CAs 1804 and 1805/1970 are allowed in part in the manner and to the extent indicated above.

The directions given by the High Court in its remand order to the Tribunal stand modilied accordingly.

Civil Appeal No. 1968/1970 is dismissed.

In the cir- -1. cnmstances, we make no order as to costs.

V.P.S.

Appeals partly allowed.

(1) A.LR. !960 S.C. 1349.

STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS

GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS

March 9. 1976

V. R. KRISHNA IYER

N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.

ss. 8, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 22

ss. 23 and 26

Code of Civil Procedure

Constitution of India

Art. 136

Art. 136

s. 11

Section 11(3)

s. 8

s. 8

s. 11(3)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Section 23(1)

Land Acquisition Act

Section 23(2)

s. 11

s. 23(1)

Land Acquisition Act

Section 15

Jagirs Abolition Act

s. 13

s. 14

s. 26(1)

Land Acquisition Act

s. 26(1)

Section 22

Jagirs Abolition Act

Jagirdar

August 1, 1954

[1961] 3 S.C.R. 676

s. 11

Art. 136

s. 16

s. 17

C.P.C

S. T. Desai

G. A. Shah

M. N. Shroff

V. M. Tarkunde

I. N. Shroff

H. S. Parihar

D. V. Patel

S. N. Parikh

M. Qamaruddin

UNTWALIA

Gujarat High Court

Jagirdars

30th July, 1963

Jagirdars

section 16

Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Ahmedabad

2/3rd December, 1964

Constitution of India

Gujarat

27 /28th August, 1969

State of Gujarat

section 3

1st August, 1954

Section

5

section 6

section 7

Section 8

Section 9

section 10

Section 11

jagirdar

section 12

section 13

section 14

Section 15

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

S. T. Desai

V. M.

Tarkunde

section 11

section 11

Section 7

section 11

sections 23 and 24

Bachawat

Section 7

section 6

sec. 7

section 11

Land Acquisition Act

sec. 11

sec. 15

Section 23

Section 23(2)

sec. 7

section 11

sec. 6

section 7(1)

sec. 7

sections 23 and 24

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

s. 23

sec. 23

section 14(2)

sections 23 and 24

sec. 7

section 7(1)

section 7(1)

section 7

section 26

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Section 8

section 11

section 8

section 23

section 24

section 7(1)

section 13

sections 11

section 13

section 13(2)

section 7

section 11

Section 15

section 7

section 13

section 26

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

section 11(3)

section 11

section 7(1)(b)

section 11

section 8

section 11

section 11

Desai

Vakhtsinghji

Article 31

section 23

section 15

sections 23 and 24

section 26(1)

section 23

section 23

section 26(1)

Jaganmohan Reddy

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Section 23

Section 26(1)

section 26

section 23

Section 34

Section 23(2)

Section 23(1)

Section 26

section 23

Article 3

section 11

section 13(2)

section 7

section 11

section 23

section 14

section 15

section 13

section 26

Section 22

section 25

section 22

1st of August, 1954

1st of August, 1955

Tarkunde

Patel

Ganjendragadkar

Satinder Singh's

section 34

Satinder Singh

Even without pressing into service section 34 of the Land Acquisi- '.ion Act on the principles enunciated by this Court in Satinder Singh's
~-- (!) [

[1961]

3 S.C.R. 676

section 11

section 12

section 11

Dewan

Mehta

section 11

Tarkunde

section 11

High Court of the State

section 11

section 16

section 17

Order 41 Rule 22

the Code of Civil Procedure

Article 136