A COMMISSIONER OF WEALm TAX, BIHAR AND

ORISSA

KIRPASHANKAR DAYASHANKAR WORAH

July 29, 1971.

[K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JI.]

Wealth Tax A.ct (27 of 1957), s. 21(1} & (4'r-Liability of tnH1ce t• be &rttssed to wealth tax-Scope of s. 21(4).

The respondent, by means of a trust-deed, transferred certain proper~ ties described in the deed unto himself as a trustee for making pr..>- vision for the maintenance of himself and his wife. for the maintenance. education and marriage expense.s of his unmarried daughters, and for the maintenance and education expenses of his minor sons. For the as~!Wment years 1957 to 1961 the Department assessed the respondent to wealth-tax in respect of the trust properties as a trustee under s. 21 of tho Wealth Tax Act 1957. The respondent contended that: (1) Since, as a trustee he waa only holding the properties for the benefit of the beneficiaries and not uu behalf of the beneficiaries as laid down in the section he was not asses.sable to wealth-tax. and (2) as the share of each of the beneficjarjes was ovt indeterminate, he should not be taxed at the maximum rate.

The High Court in reference held that respondent Ytas not a.~esabte to wealth tax.

HELD: In appeal to this Court,

S. 21(1) of the Act specifically refers to uustees. The Leaislature i• competent, in the absence of any restrictions placed on it by the Consticution, to give its own meaning to the words used by it in a statute. In tho Wealth Tax Act, Parliament, while enacting s. 21(1) & (2) of the Act, proceeded on the basis that for the purpose of that Acl a trustee is holding the trust property on behalf of beneficiaries. The mere fact that this conception doea not accord with the provisions of the Trust Act doeo not invalidate the section. If the construction contended for on behalf of the respondent is accepted then a part of the section wouid bec:op1e otioi; c.

While a taxing provision must be strictly construed by courts and lhe benefit of any ambiguity must to go the assessee, if the intention of the Legislature is clear and beyond doubt then the fact that the provision could have been more artistically drafted cannot be a ground for treating any part of a provision as otiose.

[9738-F]

Therefore a trustee is assessable to wealth tax under the Act even as it then stood.

[975B)

Suhruhini Karuri v. Wealth Tax Officer, 46 I.T.R. 953, and 1'ru, ftes of Gordhandas Govindram Family Charity Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, 70 l.T.R. 600, approved.

Commissioner of lncometax v. Puthiya Ponamanichiritakam Wakf, 44 I.T.R. 172 (S.C.), Commissioner of Income-tax, v. Kokila Devi, 77 I.T.R..

350 (S.C.), The Commissioner of Income-tax v. Manila Bharti, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 902 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Manag; ng Trustees Nagor Durgha, 57 I.T.R. 321 (S.C.), referred to.

WEALTH TAX COM!olR., v. K. D, WOl\AH (Htgdt, J.)

W.O. Ho/daworth v. State of U.P., 33 I.T.R. 472 (S.C.), explained.

(2) In the present case, on the relevant dates, the settlor as well as his wife were alive and had a right to be maintained out of tho trust properties and they bad also a right of residence in a part of the trust property, and two of the sons of the settlor bad a right to be maintained and educated. Therefore the shares of tho beneficiaries were indeterminate, and hence, the trustee had to be assessed under s. 21(4) of the Act as it then

stood. [97SH; 976ABl

OV!L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1478 to 1481 of 1967.

Appeals from the judgment and order dated April 13, 1966

of the Patna Court in Misc. Judicial Cases Nos. SS2 to SSS of 1964.

Jagadish Swarup Solicitor-General, A. N.

Kirpal, B. D.

Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in all the appeals).

M. C. Setalvad, S. K. Mitra and A. K. Nag, for the respondent

in all the appeals).

The Judgment of the-Court was delivered by

Degele J.-This appeal by certificate arises from the decision of the High Court of Patna in a reference under s. 27(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 19S7 (which we shall hereafter refer to as the Act). The question of la.w arising for decision in these appeals E is :

"Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the trustee under the Trust deed dated 19th July 1949 executed by Kirpashankar D. Worah was assessable to wealth tax under Section 21 of the Wealth Tax Act ?"

The tribunal upheld the contention of the Revenue that the trustee is liable to be proceeded against under s. 21 of the Act but the High Court disagreeing with the view taken by the tribunal answered the question referred to it in the negative. Hence this appeal.

The facts of the case as set out in the statement of the ca;; e submitted to the High Court may now be briefty stated : The respondent Kirpashanker D. Worah by means of a deed of trust dated July 19, 1949 transferred certain shares described in Schedule 7 of the trust deed and cert&in immovable properties and shares in business described in Schedule 8 of that deed unto him- 1elf as the trus!ee for making provision for the maintenance of himself, his wife, for the maintenance, education and the marriage

970 SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS [1971] SUPP. s.c.R.

expenses of his unmarried di; ughters and for the maintenance and education expenses of his minor sons. The main purpose of the trust ;, ,.ot out in paragraph 3 of the objects of the trust. That para.graph reads :

"To apply the income of the Trust Estate for the maintenance and the joint use and benefit of the Settlor u, nd his wife the said Srimati Kanchan Kunver and also for the maintenance, education and marriage expenses of the said two minor daughters Kumari Kumud Bala and Kumari Jyoti and also for the maintenance and education of the Settlor's minor sons Harsukhari Worah and Chanderakant Worah PROVIDED ALWAYS that if the income of the Trust Estate is insufficient for the purpose of meeting any of the said expenses the Trustee shall have full liberty to dispose of or otherwise apply sufficient portion of the corpus of the Trust Estate for the purpose of discharging the trust contained in this clause." ·

D Sub-paragraph 4 of the Trust deed provides that in the event of the Settlor predeceasing his wife, the shares and securities

mntbned in Schedule 7 was to be made over to his wife to be enjoyed by her as her absolute property, provided fhat if the Settler predeceased his wife before the marriages of the two un-

E married daughters had been performed, the trustee was to ret&in out of the shares an~ securities mentioned in the said Schedule sufficient number of shares for the purpose of meeting the marriage expenses of the said two daughters or either of them as the case ma•v be. Sub-paragraph(5) provides that after the marriages of both the daughters and I or after the death of both of such

da11.hters, whiohever happens first and also after the death of the Settlor's wife and the atta'nment of majority of .both the minor sons, the trustee wa~ to hold the Trust Estate for the absolute use a•nd benefit of the two said sons, Harsukhari and Chandrakant. It was further provided that the intention of the Settlor

•f was that subject to the trust thereby created the said two minor sons would take avested interest in the trust estate. Under cl.

(4) of tho sa; d deed provision was made for the residence of the Settlor. his wife and the minor children free of rent in a part of the trust properties described in Schedule 8 until the determination of the trust as aforesaid.

Even before the first valuation date with which we a.-e concerned in these appeals, both the daughters had been married and the two sons had attained majority.

H The reference relates to wealth tax assessment of the assessee for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61, the corresponding vafaation dates being 2-11-1956. 23-11-1957, 11-11-1958 and 31-10-1959.

WBALTH TAX COl>GIR. \'. K. D. WORAH (Hegde, J.) 9fl'

11he department has assessed the respondent in respect of A the wealth tax due in respect of the trust proper\ies as a trustee.

The question for considera.tion is Whether he is liable to, be assessed to wealth tax in respect of the trust properties. The respondent contends \hat as h: is not )joldingthe trust properties on behalf of tile beneficiaries, he dos not come within the sope of s. 2'1 of the Act and further as the share of the beneficiaries under e the trust is not indeter!Dinate, he cannot be taxed at the maximum -ra.te.

We shall first take up the_queslion whether the case of the a•sessee comes within the scope of s. 21 (1) of the Act. At the material time s. 21' read thus : /

"21(1). In the case of the assets chargeable to .tax u:ider this Act which are held by a court of wa.rds or an administrator-general or an official trustee or anv receiver or ma\}ager or any other persog., by whatever name called, appointl'd under any order of a court to mana•ge property on behalf of another, or any trustee appointed under a trust declared by a duly executed instrument in writing, wh.ether testamenta.ry or otherwise including a trustee under a vaiid deed of wakf, the wealth tax shall be levied upon and recoverable from the court of wards, administrator-general, official trljstee, receiver, man:i.ger or trustee, as the case may be in he like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recove- .rable from the person otl whose behaJf the assets arc

held, and the provisibn of this Act shall apply accordingly."

Leaving out the u~necessary words, section 21 to the extent material for our present purpose can be recast thus :

In the case of the assets chargeable to ta.x under this Act which are held by a trustee appointed under a trust deed by a dul~ executed instrumeqt in writing, whether testamentary o~ otherwise, the wealth tax shall be levied upon a0nd recoverable from the tiustee inthe like manner and to the same extent as it would, be leviable upon .and recoverable from the person on whc5se behalf the assets are held and the provision of tJiis Act shall apply accordingly. .-

It is plain from the language of s. 21 (1) that a trustee is also brought within its scope. But tha.t section proceeds on the basis that a trustee is holding the trust property on behalf of one or more beneficiaries.

SUPRBMB OOURT RBPORTS (1971] SUPP. s.c.R.

The High Court has come to !he conclusion and that conclusion is supported by Mr. M. C. Setalvad, learned counsel for the assessee tha.t it is well established that a trustee does not hold the trust property on behalf of the beneficiaries but he holds it only for their benefit.

Under the Trust Act, ft is indisputable that a trustee is the legal owner of the trust property. He holds the trust property on his own right and not on behalf of someone else though he holds it for the benefit of the beneficiaries The High Court in coming to the conclusion that s. 21(1) is inapplica.ble to the facts of the case heavily relied on the decision of this Court in W. 0. Holdsworth and Ors. v. State of U. P.(1) In that case this Court was considering the scope of s. II(!) of the U.P. Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1948. That section reads:

"Where any person holds land, from which agricultural income is derived, as a common manager appointed under any law for the time being in force or under any agreement or as receiver, administrator or the like on behalf of persons jointly interested in such la.nd or in the agricultural income derived therefrom the aggregate of the sums payable as agricultural income-tax by each person on the agricultural income derived from such land and received by •him, shall be assessed on .such com mon manager, receiver, administrator or the like, and he shall be deemed to be the assessee in respect of the agri cultural income tax so payable by each such person and shal! be liable to pay the same."

It may be noted tha.t in that provision. there is no reference to trustees.

That section speaks of "receiver. administrator or the like on behalf of persons jointly interested in such land or in the agricultural income derived therefrom".

While interpreting that clause this Court held tha.t a trustee is not a person who can be equated to a receiver or an administrator inasmuch as those persons hold the property on behalf of other persons whereas a trustee is the legal owner of the trust property. In that decision this Court aJso observed that there is a fundamental difference between a property being held on behalf of others and property being held for the benefit of others. In our opinion the ratio of that decision does not bear on the point under consideratien though certain observations found therein may give some assistance to the respondent. Section 11 of the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act does not refer to trustees at all whereas s. 21(1) of the Act specifically refers to trustees. It is true that it refers to a trustee as holding a trust property on behalf of other persons.

The conception that the trustee is holding the trust property oa

(I) 33 I.T.R. 472.

WEALTH TAX COMM!\,,, K. D. WORAlll (Hegde, J.)

behalf of others may not be in conformity with the legal position as contemplated by the Trust Act but the legislature is competeat in the absence of any restrictions placed on it by the Constitution to give its own meaning to the words used by it in a statute. There can be hardly any doubt that the parliament while enacting s. 21

(2) of the Act proceeded on the basis that for llb.e purpose of that Act the trustee is holding the trust property on behalf of the beneficiaries.

The mere fact that this conception does not accord with the provisions of the Trust Act does not invalidate s. 21 (!)

A> seen earlier s. 21 (I) specifically takes in the trustees. It cannot i>e said and it was not said that the parliament had not specificailly brought in the trustee .under s. 21(1).

What was urged by Mr.

Setalvad was that though the parlia.ment intended to bring in llhe trustees within the scope of that provision, it failed to achieve its purpose because of the inartistic drafting, inasmuch as the section speaks of ilie "trustee holding the trust property on behalf of others". It is frue thait a taxing provision must receive a strict constr11Ction at the hands of the courts and if there is any ambiguity, the benefit of that ambiguity must go to the assessee. But that is not the same thing as saying that a taxing provision should not receive ai reasonable construction. If the intention of the legislature is clear and beyond doubt then the fact that the provision could have been more ; artistically drafted cannot be a ground to treat any part of a provision a6 otiose. If the. construction contended for on behalf of lhe respondent is accepted then a part of s. 21 (I) would become otiose. So long as the intention of the legislature is cleac and beyond doubt, the court's have to carry out that intention. In our opinion the High Court did not

take a proper -iew of the decision of this Court in Holdworth's case(').

Section 21(1) of the Act is analogous to s. 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The only difference between the two sections is diat whereas the former deals with assets, the latter deals with income. Subject to this difference, the two provisions are identically worded. Hence the decisions rendered under s. 41 (!) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 have bearing on the question arising for decision in this case.

In Commissioner of Income-tax Kera/a and Coimbatore v.

Puthiya Ponamanichintakam Wakf,(') this Court proceeded on the baisis that the income received by a trustee came within the scope of S. 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta v. Koki/a Devi and Ors.,(') a similar view was taken by this Court.

(1) 33 I.T.R. 472.

(3) 17 J.T.R. 350.

(2) 44 I.T.R. 172.

l'JPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1971] SUPP.s.c.a.

In The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Mantlal

Dhanji Bombay,(') this Court again proceeded on the basis that s. 41 applied to the trustees.

In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Managing Triuiees, Nagore Durgha,(') this Court was called upon to interpret the scope of s. 41(1).

Therein the question was whether nattamaigars of Nagore Durgha who are considered as trustees in w born the properties of the Durgba vested would come within the scope of s. 41(!) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. This Court answered tha.t question in the affirmative.

Therein also it was contended that as the property is vested in the managing trustee and be received the income in his own right and not on behalf of the beneficiaries though for their benefit, the income in the bands of the managing trustee fell outside the scope of s. 4 l(l) of the Act. Repelling that contention Subba Rao J. (36 be thea was) speaking for the Court, observed :

"There are two answers to this contention. The doctrine of vesting is not germane to this contention.

In some of the enumerated persons in the <ection the property vests and in others it does not vest, but they only manage the property. In general law the property does not vest in a receiver or mMlager but it vests in a trustee, but both trustees and receivers are included in section 41 of the Act. The common thread that passes through all of them is that they function legally or factually for others; they manage the property for the benefit of others. That the technical doctrine of vesting is not imported in the section is a.pparent from the fact that a trustee appointed under a trust deed is brought under the section though legally the property vests in him."

In G. T. Rajalnannar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore(') while dealing with the scope of s. 41(!), the High Court of Mysore had to deal with a contention similar to the one advanced in this case. Therein also the assessee relied on the decision of this Court in Holdsworth's case('). While rejecting the contention of the assessee the High Court held that the observations made by this Court in Holdsworth's case must be understood in the light of the provision that this Court was considering in that c~ The Court held that s. 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 is applicable to a case where income is derived from the trust property even though the trustee does not strictly speaking receive such

(1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R.. 902.

(3) Sl I.T.R.. 339.

(l) S7 I.T.R.. 321.

(4) 33 I.T.R.. 472.

WEALTII TAX COMMR. ' K. o. WORAH (Hegde, J.)

income "on behalf of" the beneficiaries but is the legal owner of that income; the words "on behalf of" in s. 41 (!) must be construed as being equivalent to "for the benefit of" and further in the case of a trust where the beneficiaries are indeterminate, the income must be assessed at the maximum rate in the hands of the trustee in view of the first proviso to s. 41 (!). In the course of that judgment it was observed:

"But in the present case if we do not read that expression in the manner I have indicated, then a good portion of section 41 (!) and the first proviso thereto becomes otiose. It is not proper to construe that any portion of a provision in a statute is superfluous. 1.'uch a construction should be avoided except in extreme cases. Though a.s a normal rule the courts should give to tihe words used in the statute its normal meaning, occasions do arise when it becomes necessary to give a special meaning to a word.

For the reasons mentioned above, I interpret the words "on behalf of" found in section 41 (I) and the first proviso thereto as eqnivalent to "for the benefit of'.

In Suhashini Karuri and anr. v. Wealth Tax Officer, Calcutta and anr.(') the High Court ol Calcutta held that the words "on behalf of' used in s. 21 (I) of the Act a.re synonymous with the expression "for the benefit of". It further held that notwithstanding that !he trustees hold property for the benefit of beneficiaries and not on their behalf, s. 21 (I) applies to them and they are liable to wealth tax only "in the like manner and to the extent a.s it would be leviable upon and recoverable from any such beneficiary". The Calcutta High Court distinguished the decision of this Court in Holdsworth's case.

The Bombay High Court in Trustees of Gordhandas Govindram Family Charity Trust, Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Bombay<:), disagreeing with the decision under a.ppeal and following the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Suhashini Karuri's case (supra) took the view that a trustee also came within the scope of s. 21(1) of the Act. The same view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Chintamani GhoSh Trust v.

Commissioner of Wealth Tax, U. P. We think that the view taken by the Calcutta,' Bombay and Allahabad High Courts is the correct view.

Now coming to the question whether the shares of the beneficiaries under the trust deed on the relevant valuation dates are determinate or indeterminate, we have to bear in mind the fact that on those dates the Settlor as well as his wife were alive.

(tr 46 I.T.R. 953.

(2) 70 I.T.R. 600.

SUPl\llMB COURT REPORTS [1971] SUPP. s.c.R.

They had a right to be maintained out of the income of the trust properties. They had also a right of residence in the house, situate in that property. The two sons of the Settlor had a right to be maintained and educated. 'Phait being so, there is no doubt that on the relevant dates, the shares of the beneficiaries were indeterminate. Hence the trustee had to be assessed under s. 21

(4) as it stood at the relevant time.

In the result these a.ppeals are allowed and the answer given by the High Court is revoked and in its place we answer that question in the affirmative namely that on the facts and circum stances of the case the trustee under the trust deed dated July 19, 1949 executed by Kirpashanker D. Woraih was assessable to wealth tax under s. 21 of the Wealth Tax Act as it stood at the relevant time. The respondent to pay costs of the department both in this Court and in the High Court-hearing fee one set.

V.P.S Appeals al101Veil.

COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, BIHAR AND ORISSA

KIRPASHANKAR DAYASHANKAR WORAH

K. S. HEGDE

A. N. GROVER

s. 21

Wealth Tax Act 1957

S. 21(1)

s. 21(1)

s. 21(4)

s. 27(1)

Section 21

s. 21

Schedule 7

Schedule 8

Schedule 7

Schedule 8

s. 2

s. 21

s. 21

section 21

s. 21

s. 21(1)

Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1948

Section 11

Agricultural Income-tax Act

s. 21(1)

s. 21

s. 21

s. 21

s. 21(1)

s. 21

Section 21(1)

s. 41(1)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 41

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

S. 41(1)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 41

s. 41(1)

s. 41(!)

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 4

section 41

s. 41(!)

s. 41(1)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 41

s. 41

section 41

section 41

s. 21

s. 21

s. 21(1)

s. 21

s. 21


PUNJAB PRODUCE AND TllADING CO. LID.

c.J.T. WFSf BENGAL, CALCUTIA

July 29, 1971.

[K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]

Income-tax Act, 1922, •· 23A(9) Explanation (b) (ii1)-Share• of company carrying more than 50% voting power held by less than six persotU-

AOairs of company not controlled by le11 than six /HTIOM-Company whether one in which public are subst1111tially i.nttre1ted-Whether one condition or both conditions in cl. (b) (iii) of Explanation should be fulfilled-Limitation under •· 34(1) of Act whether applicable where additional

1urtax is imposed under 1. 23.A.

The assessee company was incorporated under the erstwhile Gwalior Companies Act which did not make any distinction between public and private companies. The affairs of the company were not controlled by ICIS than six persons but shares carrying more than 50% of the total votin1 power were during the relevant previous year held by less than 6 persons.

After the company's assessment for the assessment year 1955-56 had been completed the Income-tax Officer levied additional super-tax on the company under s. 23A of the Income-tax Act, 1922 holding that it wa• not a company in which the public were substantially interested within the meanin& of sub-cl. (b) (iii) of the Explanation to cl. (9) of s. 23A. Under tho Explanation a company is treated to be one in which the public are substantially interested if it is not a private company under the Indian Companies Act and the affairs of the company or the shares carrying more than 50%

;, f the total voting power are at no time durina the previous year controlled or held by less than six persons. The authorities under th• Act as well as the High Court, in reference, held against the assessee. In appeal by speicia] leave to this Court the assessee contended that the word 'or' in sub-cl. (b) (ili) aforesaid had been used disjunctively and therefore if either of the conditions mentioned therein did not exist the company must be deemed to be one in which the public were substantially interested. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of the Star Company Ltd. in which the word 'or' used in sub-cl. (b) (ii) of the afo1esaid Explanation was held to have been used disjunctively.

It was also contended that on the facts and circumstances of the case the imposition of the additionol super-tax under s. 23A without recourse to the provisions of s. 34(1) was not valid.

. HELD: (i) The language of sub-els. (ii) and (ili) of cl. (b) is different.

The former relates to a positive state of affairs whereas the latter lays down negative conditions. The word 'or' is often used to express an alternative of terms defined or explanation of tho same thina in clilferent words. Therefore if either of the two negative conditions which are to. be found ID sub-cl. (b)'(iii) remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clauae cannot be said to have been satisfied. The clear Import of the word 'and' appearing there read with the negative or disqualifying con .. ditions in sub-cl. (b) (Iii) ia that the assessee was bound to satisfy apon from lb• conditions contained in tht> other sub-clau,.. that ita affairs were .at no time durina Ibo previous year controlled by less than 6 persona and ahatee carl'yillJ more than 50% of the totol votin11 JlOWCr were durina the

same period not held by less than 6 pmons. (9821'-0J ·

SUPREME COURT RLPORTS [1971] SUPP. s.c.R.

A Star Company Ltd. v. Co111mis:sioner of lncon1e-1a.'f (Central) Cah:1tta,

C. A. No. 1204/68 dt. 29·4-70. distinguished.

Indian Steel & Wire Products ltd. l'alculta v. Cv1nmis~'io11er of lncotnetax, West Be..ga/, Ca/c111ta, l.T.R. No. 204 of 1961, referred to.

(ii) An order made by the Income-ta< Officer directing payment of additional super-tax is not an order of assessment within the meaning of s. 34(3) of the Act and to such an order the period of limitation prescribed thereby does not apply. [983A-8]

M. M. Parikh, l.T.O .. Special Inveltigation Circle 'B', Al11nedabad v.

Navanagar Transport and Industries Ltd. & Anr .. 63 l.T.R. 663, followed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1344 of 1967.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 24, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Reference No.

D 8.6 of 1962.

V. S. Desai, N. R. Khaitan, B. P. Maheshwariand Krish11ii Sen, for the appellant.

Jagadish Swamp, Solicitor-General, S. K. Aiyer and B. D. E Sharma, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Grover, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Calcutta. High Court in an Income tax Reference.

The assessee is a limited company incorporated under the erstwhile Gwalior State Companies Act which did not make any distinction between a private company and a public company.

The paid-up capital of the compooy was Rs. 25,00,000 /- com posed of 25,000 Ordinary shares of Rs. I 00 /- each.

These 25,000 Ordinary shares were held by 17 share holders in all. It was also common ground that the shares carrying more than 50% of "1c total voting power were held by less than 6 persons duririg the accounting period.

The Msessment year was 1955-56 the accounting year being the one ending on March 31, 1955. The total income assessed for the aforesaid year was Rs. 9,54,658 /- on which tax payable amounted to Rs. 4,05,492. The surplus available for distribution of dividend was Rs. 5,49,166/-. No dividend, however, was distribute<! although at the meeting held on June 8,

PUNJAIHRODUCB & TRADING oo. Y. (l, J.T, (Grover, J.)

J 955 th~ account~ which were approved showed a net profit of Rs. 6,81,298/-.

The controversy before the Income tax Officer centered on the applicability of the provisions of s. 23A of the Income tax Act 1922. According to the assessee that section was not appli cable but the Income tax Officer came to the conclusion that since the shares carrying more than 50% of the total voting power were held by less than 6 persons the company was not one in which the public were substantially interested. As no justifiable reason for non-distribution. of the requisite percentage of the dividend had been furnished s. 23A was applicable and 100% distribution was called for. In view of the provisions of s. 23A(l) additional super ta•x of Rs. 1,37 ,291.50 paise was imposed subsequent to the completion of the assessment.

The asscssee went up in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but the same was dismissed. The sole point that was argued before the Appellate Tribunal was whether the asses- 5ee fulfilled the conditions stated in sub-clause (b) (iii) of the Expla.nation to s. 23A of the Act. This argument will be considered presently. The Tribunal, however, was not persuaded to accept the contention of the assessee.

On an application being filed under s. 66(1) the Tribunal referred the following question of law for the opinion of the High Court :

(I) "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of 1lhe case, the assessee company is one in which the public are substa.ntially interested within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 23A of the Income tax Act, as it stood at the relevant time ?

(2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the imposition of the additional super-tax under Section 23A without recourse to the provisions of Section 34(1) was legal a.nd valid ?"

Section 23A of the Act confers power on the Income tax Officer to assess companies to super tax on non-distributed income in certain cases. We are concerned, in the present appeal, only with sub-s. (9) and the Explanation thereto.

That sub-section provided inter alia that nothing contained in the section shall apply to any company in which the public arc substantially interested. The text of Explanation the interpretation of which is the subject matter of dispute is as follows :-

"Explanation.-For the purposes of this section a company shall be deemed to be a company in which the public are substantially interested.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1971) SUPP. S.C.R-

(a) If it is a company owned by the Government or in which not less than forty percent of the shares ace held by the Government.

(b) If it is not a private company as defined in the Indian Companies Act 1913 (VII of 1913) and

(i) its shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of .dividend, whether with or without a further right to participate in profits) carrying not less than fifty pi:r cent of the voting power have been a.llotted unconditionally to, or acquired unconditionally by, and were

throughout the previous year. beneficially held by the public (not including a company to which the provisions of this section apply) :

Provided that in ehe case of any such company as is referred to in sub-section (4), this sub-clause shall apply as if for the words 'not less than fifty percent' the words 'not less than forty percent,' bad been substituted:

(ii) the said shares were at anv time during the provlous year the sublect of dealing In any recognised stock: exchange in India or were freely transferable by the holder to other members of the public; and

(iii) the affairs of the company or the shares cacrying more than fifty percent of the total voting power were at no time during the previous year controlled or held by less lihan six persons (persons who are related to one another as husband, wife, lineal ascendant or descendant or brother or sister, as the case may be, being treated as a single person and persons who are nomim:es of another person together with that other person being likewise treated as a single person) :

Provided hat in the case of any such company as is referred to in sub-section (4), this clause shall apply as if for the words 'more than fifty per cent' the words 'm1'rt than sixty per cent' had been substituted.

It is quite clear that clause (a) was not relevant and had no application. It was also not disputed that the assessee had fulfilled the conditions contained in sub-clause (b)(i) and (b)(ii) or

/he Explanation.

The sole question which had to be decided f>y the Tribunal and the High Court was wheliher the asscssCCJ llad fulfilled the conditions set out in sub-clause (b)(iii) of the Explanation. It wae not found that the affairs of the company were, at any time, during the previous year controlled by less than 6 persons, the number six being arrived at according to the formula

PUNJAB PRODUCE & TRADING co .•. C.J.T. (Grorer J.)

laid down in sub-clause. The sole finding on which the deci- "Sion went against the assessee was that shares carrying more than

50 'j, of the total voting power were during the previous year held by less than 6 persons. The argument which has throughout been pressed on. behalf of the assessee is that the word "or" which is to be found between the words "the affairs of the company" and

th: shares carrying more than ............ " had been used disjunctively and therefore if either one of the conditions did not exist tho assessee would be entitled to say that the conditions laid down in sub-clause (b)(iii) had been fulfilled. In other words if it was established that the affairs of the assessee were at no time, during the previous year controlled by less than 6 persons it would be a company in which the public were substantially interested even though the shares carrying more than 50 % of the total voting power had been held during the previous year by less than si~ persons. The Tribunal disposed of this contention in the followmg manner :-

"Sub-clause (iii\ is divided into two parts; the first part relates to the affairs of the company being controlled by not less 6 persons and the second part relates to holding of shares carrying more than 50% of the total voting power by not less than 6 persons. Both these parts are joined with the main pa.rt of clause (b) by the use of the conjunctive word "and" so that the proper construction of the sub-clause (iii) would be as follows :-

(1) If it is not a private company as defined in the Indian Companies Act. 1913 and the affairs of the company were at no time during the previous year controlled by less than six persons ;

(2) If it is not a priva.te company as defined in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and the shares carrying more than 50% of the total voting power were at no time <luring the previous year held by less than 6 persons."

According to _the Tribµnal sub-cl. (iii) of cl. (b) sought to impose two distinct and separate conditions, namely, (I) control of the affairs of the company and 12) requiite percentage of the voting G power held by virtue of the holding of shares. In order that a company might be treated as one in which the public were substantially interested it had to show that not merely its affairs were controlled by not less han 6 persons but also that 50% of the total voting power had been held by not less than 6 persons. 1:he

Hieb Court looked closely into the language of the ExplanabOn 11 and had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the onditions laid down in all the sub-clauses of cl. (b) had to be sattslied.

SUPREME COURT REPORTii [1971rsuPP. s.c.R.

The difficulty, however, was created by the language of sub-cl.(b)

(iii) in which the word "or" appeared in more than one place.

In a previous Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in an Income tax Reference (The Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd.

Calcutta v.

The Commissioner of lncome-iax, West Bengal.

Calcutta) (') the same point had arisen and it had been held that the conditions prescribed in sub-cl. (b) (iii) would not be satisfied by mere compliance with one branch of it. Both branches namely t:ie control of the affairs by not less than 6 persons and the holding of shares carrying the requisite percentage of the total voting power by not less than 6 persons would have to be fulfilled.

On behalf of the assessee a good deal of reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in The Star Company Ltd.

v. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) Calcutta('). In that case sub-clause (b)(ii) came up for consideration and it was held that the two parts of the explanation contained in that sub-clause were alterna.tive. In other words if one part was satisfied it was unnecessary to consider whether the second part was also satisfied. Thus the word "or" was treated as having been used disjuntively and not conjunctively. The same reasoning is sought to be invoked with reference to sub-clause (b)(iii).

It is significant that the language of sub-cla.uses (ii) and (iii) of cl. (b) is different. The former relates to a positive state of affairs whereas the latter lays down negative conditions.

The word "or" is often used to express an alternative of. terms defined or explanation of the same thing in different words.

Therefore if either of the two negative conditions which are to be found in sub-clause (b)(iii) remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause crnnot be said to have been satisfied. The clear import of the opening part of cl. (b) with the word "and" appearing there read with the nega-tive or disqualifying conditions in sub-cl. (b) (iii) is that the assessee was bound to satisfy apart from the conditions contained in the oliher sub-clauses that its affairs were at no time during the previous year controlled by less than 6 persons and shates carrying more than 50% of the tota.1 voting power were during the same period not held by less than 6 persons. We are unable to find any infirmity in llhe reasoning or the conclusion of the Tribunal and the High Court so far as question No. I is concerned.

(I) Income Tax Reference No. 204of1961.

(2) C. A•. 1204 & 120S/68 dt. 29-4-70.

PUNJAB PRODUCE & TRADING co. v. c.J.T. (Grover, J.) 983

The second question stands concluded by the decision of A this Court in M. M. Parikh, I. T. 0. Special Investigation Circle "B'', Ahmedabad v. Navanagar Transport and Industries Ltd., & Another (') in which it was held that an order under s. 23A of the Act made by the Income tax Officer directing payment of additional Super tax was an order of assessment within the meaning of s. 34(3) of the Act and to such a.n order the period of B limitation prescribed thereby did not apply.

In the result this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.

G. C.

Appeal dismissed.

(I) 63 l.T.R. 663.

PUNJAB PRODUCE AND TllADING CO. LID

K. S. HEGDE

A. N. GROVER, JJ.

Income-tax Act, 1922

Companies Act

s. 23A

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 23A

Companies Act

s. 23A

s. 34(1)

s. 34(3)

Companies Act

s. 23A

Income tax Act 1922

s. 23A

s. 23A(l)

s. 23A

s. 66(1)

Section 23A

Section 23A

Section 34(1)

Section 23A

Companies Act

Indian Companies Act, 1913

s. 23A

s. 34(3)


SHRI M. P. SINGH, DY. TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER,

M.P., GWALIOR

ANAND TRANSPORT CO. (P) LTD. ETC.

July 29, 1971

(K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959- Section 1-Return filed accepted as correct-No order quantifying a1no1uit of lax necessary before issuing demand notice.

Under the Madhya Prade•h Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1939, where returns have been accepted as correct nothing more need be done except to recover the tax due which has not been paid and no assessment order need be passed in view of the express language of s. 7.

It ii only when the returns have not been submitted or when returns sutJ.. mitted are found to be incorrect and incomplete that the tax officer ha.." to make an enquiry and determine the sum payable by the operator by way of tu. Similarly if there bas been escapement of tax, proceedinp have to be taken under s. 8 and an order has to be made after an enquiry.

The position would be the same if penalty is soueht to be levied under s. 9.

[986F-H; 987 A]

CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1449 IB 1454 of 1967.

Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated December 15, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court ill Misc. Petitions Nos. 303 of 1966 etc.

I. N. Shroff, for the appellants (in all the appeals).

M. N. Phadke, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for the respoodents (in C.As. Nos. 1449, 1450 and 1452 of 1967).

V. S. Desai, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 1453 and 1454 of 1967).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Grover, J.-All these appea.ls arise out of writ petitions that were filed in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the notices of demand issued by the Deputy Transport Commissioner for payment of the amount of passenger tax said to be due under the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, hereina.fter referred to as the 'Act'. By a common judgment dated November 8, 1966 the High Court allowed the petitions and quashed the demand notices.

The appeals may be divided into two categories. In C. As. 1449 and 1453 of 1967 returns had been duly filed as contemplated by s. 5 of the Act but no tax had been deposited as required by s. 6.

Demand

M. P. SINGH' ANAND TRANSPORT (Grol'er, J.) 985

notices were issued in respect of the tax payable pursuant to the A returns some years later.

Proceedings were also taken as no payment was made for recovery of the tax as arrears of land revenue. In the other four appeals the returns were never filed but it appears the authorities did take certain proceedings under s. 7 of the Act and in some cases accounts of the respondents were checked and their liability detennined.

When demand B notices were sent and recoveries sought to be made the writ petitions were filed. The High Court did not go in these matters fully and treated all the petitions as if the facts werl! similar.

Section 3 of the Act which is the charging section provides that there shall be levied and paid to the State Government a tax on all passengers carried &y stage carriages at a rate equivalent to I 5 % of the fare inclusive of the tax payable to the operator of a stage carriage. The tax has to be collected by the operator of a stage carriage and paid to the Sta.le Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under s. 5 the operator must deliver to the tax officer or to such prescribed officer as may be specified a return in the prescribed fonn and manner either daily or at such intervals as ma.y be prescribed. Section 6 Jays down that the tax payable during any month in accordance with the return submitted under s. 5 shall be paid into a Governmen<

treasury by the operator and the receipt evidencing such payment ha.s to be forwarded to the Tax Officer. Sections 8, 9 and 10 arc in the following terms :-

"(8) Fares escaping assessment.-lf, for any reason, the whole or any portion of the tax Jeviable under thil Act, for any month has escaped assessment, the Tax Officer may, at any time within, but not beyond, one year from the expiry of that month, a.ssess the tax which has escaped assessment, after issuing a notice to the operator and making such inquiry as the officer may consider necessary.

(9) Penalty for non-paymefll 01 tax.-Wherc the whole or any portion of the tax pa.yable to the State Government in respect of any stage carriage for any month or portion thereof in pursuance of ss. 6, 7 and 8 has not been paid to it in time the Tax Officer may, in his discretion, levy in addition to the tax so payable, a penaHy not exceeding 25 per cent of the maximum tax which would have been payable to the State Government if the stage carriage had carried its full complement of passengers during such month or portion thereof.

(10) Recovery of tax, etc.-(!) In the cases referred to in sections 7, 8 and 9 the Tax Officer shall serve on

lhe operator a notice of demand for the sums payable

Ill

t86

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1971] SUPP. s.c.R.

to the State Government and the sums specified in >uch notice may be recovered from the operator as arrears of land revenue.

(2) The tax shall be a first charge on the stage carriage in respect of which it is due as a0lso on its accessories and such stage and the accessories thereof may be attached and sold for the recovery of the tax under the appropriate law relating to the recovery of arrears of land revenue."

Section 12 provides for a.n appeal against a notice of demand served under s. 10.

The scheme of the above provisions apparently is that the operator of a stage carriage has to submit a return in accordance with s. 5 and pay tax into the Government treasury every month as provided by s. 6. No question can arise of any assessment order being made under s. 7 by the Tax Officer where the returns are found to be correct and complete. It is only where either no returns have been submitted or where the return submitted appear to the Tax Officer to be incorrect or incomplete that the Tax Officer has to follow the procedure laid down in s. 7 and determine the tax payable by the operator.

The High Court wa<S of the view that even where returns had been filed and accep ted as correct the Tax Officer has to pass a proper assessment order holding the operator liable for payment of tax in accordance with the return submitted by him. In other words no notice of demand can be issued until the Tax Officer makes such an order quantifying the a.mount of tax.

We are unable to accede to the contention which prevailed with the High Court that even where returns had been submitted but the tax has not been paid the Tax Officer is bound to make an order before serving a notice of demand even though the dema.nd is strictly in accordance with the returns which have been submitted. Section 7 rules out any such course to be followed by the Tax Officer. It is only when the returns have not been submitted or when return submitted are found to be incorrect and incomplete that the Tax Officer has to make an inquiry and determine the sum payable by the operator by way of tax.

Similarly if there has been escapement of tax proceedings have to be taken under s. 8 and an order has to be made after an enquiry.

The position would be same if penalty is sought to be levied under s. 9.

But where returns have been accepted as correct nothing more need be done except to recover the tax due which has not been paid and no a.ssessment order need be passed in view of the express language of s. 7.

M. P. SINOH v. ANAND TRANSPORT (Grover, J.) 9&7

We are satisfied that in the two appeals, i.e., C. As. 1449 A and 1453 / 67 in which returns had been filed the Tax Officer was not bound to make any order quantifying the amount of tax before issuing the notice of demand. The amount sought to be realii:ed was quantified in the returns themselves vide Form IV read with Rule 4(2)(c) of the M. P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Rules. It ·!las not been shown that any penalty was sought to be B imposed in those two cases. The order of the High Court, therefore, in these appeals cannot be sustained and is hereby set aide and the writ petitions are ordered to be dismissed.

As regards c: As. Nos. 1450, 1451, 1452 and 1454/67, it arpears, as has been stated earlier, that some proceedings were held of the nature contemplated by s. 7 a.nd the notices of demand C' were issued after orders had been duly made by the Tax Officer.

But this is a matter which was not examined in each case by the High Court and we would like to express no opinion with regard to it. These appeals are also allowed and the orders of the High Court are set aside. The High Court will rehear and redecide the same in accordance with law. There will be no order as to D costs in all the. appe:ils.

K. B. N.

Appeals allowed.

ANAND TRANSPORT CO. (P) LTD. ETC

K. S. HEGDE

A. N. GROVER, JJ.

Section 1

s. 7

s. 8

s. 9

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

Section 3

s. 5

Section 6

s. 5

Sections 8, 9 and 10

ss. 6, 7 and 8

sections 7, 8 and 9

Section 12

s. 10

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 7

Section 7

s. 8

s. 9

s. 7

Form IV read with Rule

s. 7


TAX OFFICER.CUM-REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER

& ORS.

DURG TRANSPORT COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. DURG

July 30, 1971

(K. S. HEGDE AND A. N: GROVER, JJ.)

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passe11gers) Act. 1959. ss. 6, 7 and 8-A.sses.ree not filing return-Proceedings under s. 7 have to be taken within one year-Escaped assessment, meaning of.

Where an assessee liable to pay passenser tax under the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passenscrs) Act, 1959 submita no return as required by s. 5 nor niakes the required deposit under s. 6 the assessec escapes assessment and proceedings under s. 7 will have to be taken within the period of ono. year mentioned in s. 8. [99IAJ

When the liability to tax is evaded by one method or the other there is au escaped assessment. The term escaped assessment includes both rtonassessment as well as under assessment. [9900)

Clv!L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2289 of 1968.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 18, 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 640 of E 1966.

I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.

M. N. Phadke, and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Heade, J.-This is an appeal by certificate arising from the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous !'etition No. 640 of 1966 on its file. The asscsscc is a Transport Operator. It was liable to pay passenger tax under Madhya Pra desh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959-hcreinafter referred to as "the Act". It is said that it failed to pay the tax due from it for the period from October 1, 1961 to May 6,

1962. Admittedly it submitted no return as required by section 5 of the Act, nor did it make the required deposit under section 6 of that Act. No action appears to have been taken against It till November 6, 1963 on which date the Tax Officer issued to it a notice under section 7 of the Act. Thereafter he proceeded to assess it. The impugned assessment order was made on June 19,

1965.

That order was challenged before the Madhya Pradesh

(ll.T.O.V. DUllG TRANSPOllT Htgde, J.)

High Court by means of a writ petition under sections 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The High Court accepted that petition and quashed the impugned order.

The question before this Court is whether the order of the High Court is sustainable. The only question that ca.Jls for deci

sion in this appeal is whether the proceedinas initiated by the Tax Officer by means of a notice under section 7 of the Act was beyond the time prescribed and therefore the proceedings taken were not maintainable against !he assessee. In order to answer this question, we shall read sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Act.

Section (5) Submission of returns.-(!) In respect of the stage carriage or stage carries held by him, the operator shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Tax Officer or to such prescribed

officer as the Tax Officer may specify a return in the prescribed form and manner, either daily or at such intervals as ma.y be prescribed :

Provided that different rules may be prescribed for the purpose of this sub-section in relation to fleet-owner from those in D relation to other operators.

12) When any return is received by a prescribed officer he shall forward it to the Tax Officer within the prescribed period and in the prescribed manner.

E Section (6) Tax to be paid every month into Government Treasury.-The tax payable during any month in accordance with the returns submitted under section 5 shall be paid into a Government treasury by the operator and the receipt evidencing such payment forwarded to the Tax Officer, on or before such date or dates of the month immediately succeeding as may be prescribed in the case of fleet-owners and othe(' operators.

. Section (7) Procedure where no returns are submitted, etc.-ln the following cases, that is to say-

(a) Where no returns have been submitted by the operator in respect of any stage carriage for any month or portion thereof; or .

lb) where the returns submitted by the operator in respect of any stage carriage for any month or portion thereof appear to the Tax Officer to be incorrect or in complete;

the Tax cer shall, after givi_ng th~ operator a responsible op- .\)Ortunity, m case (a~ f makmg his represcntabon if any, and m case (b) of estabhshing the correctness and completeness of

Ji'

9UO

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1971] SUPP. s.c.R.

A the returns submitted by him, determine the sum payable to the .:.•.:e Government by he operator by way of tax during such month or portion thereof :

Provided that the sum so determined shall not exceed the rna.ximum tax which would have been payable to the State Government if the stage carriage had carried its full complement of passengers during such month or portion thereof.

Section (8) Fares e<caping assessment.-If, for any reason, the whole or any portion of the tax leviable under thi.• Act, for any month has escaped assessment, the Tax Officer may, at any time within, but not beyond, one year from the expiry of that month, assess the tax which has escaped assessment, after issuing a notice to the operator and making such inquiry as the officer may consider necessary.

D It may be noted that the expression "escaped assessment" ha6 not been defined in the Act. Therefore we have to consider whether an assessment that was not made as a result of the assessee not submitting his return can be considered as an escaped assessment.

According to Mr. Shroff, learned counsel for die State of Madhya Pradesh, "escaped assessment" means an amount that had escaped from being included in the tax assessed. According to him no amount can be considered as "escaped assessment" unless there has been an assessment anterior to the finding out of the amount that had escaped from being included in the a~ ment made. He submitted that only such cases come within the scope of section 8. Accordi.ng to his submission when a return is not submitted as a consequence of which there was no assessment the tax thus evaded does not become escaped assessment. This contention does not appeal to us. In our opinion, when the liability to pay tax is evaded by one method or other there is an escapement of Msessment.

The term "escaped assessment" includes both non-assessment as well as underassessment. When a person is not assessed to tax though he is liable to be taxed be escapes mcnt.

We are unable to agree with Mr. Shroff that while the legisfature fixed one year time within whioli a re-assessment has to be made it fixed no time limit for making the assessment. This is a prima facie unacceptable argument. The provisions of the Act are somewhat similar to the Madhya Bharat Sales Ta" Act,

1950. While considering the meaning to be given to the expression "escaped assessment" this Court in Regional Assistant Corn missioner of Siles Tax, Indore v. Malwa V anaspati & Chemical

R.T.O. v. DURG TRANSPORT (Hegde. J.) 991

Company Ltd.(') held that where a dealer has not tiled the pres- A cribed return of his turnover at all, it would be a case of "escaped assessment" and the proceedings for assessment must be commenced in respect of that turnover within the period of three years prescribed by s. 10. We are of the opinion that the ratio . of decision apply to the facts in the present case. Reading sections

6 to 8 together, we come to the conclusion that the proceedings B under section 7 or section 8 will have to be taken within the period of one year mentioned in section 8.

For the. reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Under the circumstances we make no order .as to costs.

.K. B. N.

Appeal Dismissed.

(1) [1968) 2 S.C.R. 431.

TAX OFFICER-CUM-REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER & ORS

DURG TRANSPORT COMPANY (PVT.) LTD. DURG

K. S. HEGDE

A. N: GROVER, JJ.

ss. 6, 7 and 8

s. 7

s. 5

s. 6

s. 7

s. 8

section 5

section 6

section 7

sections 226 and 227

section 7

sections 5, 6, 7 and 8

section 5

section 8

s. 10

sections

6 to 8

section 7

section 8

section 8

[1968) 2 S.C.R. 431