GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS & ORS.

TARAK NA'IH GHOSH

February 12, 1971

[G. K. MITTER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]

AJl India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, rr. 5(2) & 7- Civll Servant-Suspension-If can be ordered in contemplation of discip/mary proceedings.

Serious allegations of corruption and malpractices had been made against the respondent, a member of the Indian Police Service, serving in the State of Bihar. Inquiries made by the State Government revealed that there was a primc. facie. case made out against him. He was suspended by an order which stated that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the respondent.

On the question whether the suspension of a member of the service can only be ordered after definite charges have been communicated to him in terms of r. 5(2) of the All India Se1"ices (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, or whether the Government is entitled to place him under suspension even before that stage has been reached after a preliminary jnvestigation,

HELD : ( 1) The fact that in other rules of service there is specific provision for an order of suspension even when disciplinary proceedings were contemplated. does not mean that a member of the All India Service should be dealt with differently. It would not be proper to interpret the Rules, which form a self-contained Code, by reference to the provisions of other rules even if they were made by or under the authority of the President of India. [718 F-G]

(2) Rule 7 expressly provides for suspension of a member 01 the service, having regard to the nature of the charges, for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. The word 'charges' in the rule means accusations or imputations against a member of the service. If the disciplinary authority takes note of the allegation and is of the opinion after preliminary inquiries that the circumstances of the case justify further investigation to be made before definite charges can be framed it would not be improper to remove the officer from the sphere of his activity either by transfer or oy suspension inasmuch as it may be necessary to find out facts from people working under him or look into papers which are in his custody. ordinarily when serious imputations are made against the conduct of an officer, the disciplinary authorities cannot immediately draw up the charges and in some cases a considerable time may elapse before the superior authority can come to a conclusion that definite charges can be levelled against the officer.

Merely because the order mentions, that the disciplinary proceedings were contemplated_ it cannot be held that the situation in the present '-ase had not reached the stage which called for an order of suspension.

In substance, disciplinary proceedings can be said to have been started when complaints about the integrity of an officer are entertained, followed by a preliminary inquiry into them culminating

in the satisfac.tion of the Government that a prima facie case h,;.; been made out agamst him for the framing of charges.

When the order of

uspns1on ~self shows that he Government was of the view that such a pnnza fatie case fr launching departmental proceedings has bcn made out the fact that the i;>rder also mentions that such procecdin s were con templated makes no difference. [721 B-F; 723 G; 724 G-H; 7~5 B-C]

S. Gorinda Menon v. Union o} India, [ 1967] 2 S.C.R. 566, followed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2338 of 1968.

Appeal from the judgment. and order dated March 31, 1965 of the j:>atna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 1207 of 1964.

Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General and B. K. P. Sinha, for the appellants.

B, C. Ghosh, P. K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das, for the! respon- -Oent.

The Judgment of the tourt was delivered by

Mitter, J.

The question in this appeal is, whether the order of suspension passed on the respondent on July 31, 1964 was properly struck down by the Patna High Court.

The facts are as follows.

The respondent is a member of the Indian Police Service appointed on 25th January, 1937 and at the material time he was holding the substantive railk of Deputy Superintendent of Police in Bihar.

In June 1962 he was posted at Ranchi. He was transferred to Patna and appoint- .ed as Special Officer, Political, General and Transport Department on July 23, 1964. The order of which the validity is in question ran as follows :-

"Whereas serious allegations of corruption and malpractices have been made against Shri T. N. Ghosh, I. P., Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, Ranchi;

And whereas the said Shri T. N. Ghosh is also reported to 11ave contravened certain provisions of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954;

And whereas the enquiries made by the Government of Bihar into these al!egatiQns have revealed that there is a primit facie .case made out against him;

And whereas disciplinary proceedings in respect of these mat- iers are contemplated against the said Shri T. N. Ghosh;

And whereas the Government of India, after carefully considering the available material, and having regard to the nature <>f the charges and circumstances of the case, are satisfied that it is necessary and desirable to place the said Shri T. N. Ghosh under suspension :

Now, therefore, the Government of India hereby place the \aid. Shri T. N. Ghosh, under suspension with immediate effect, until further orders, and direct that the said Shri T. N. Ghosh 'hall, during the period of suspension be paid such subsistence allowance as is admissible under the rules.

By order and in the name of the President of India.

Sd./- K. Sivaraj Deputy Secretary to the Government of India."

The respondent addressed a memorial to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs on 24th August

1964 complaining against the above order on the ground that it was not sanctioned by the rules i.e. All India Service (Conduct) Rules, 1954. In particular his grievance was that as there were only allegations against him which had not crystalliscJ into charges an order of suspension could not be made before departmental proceedings were actually started and while they were merely contemplated.

He also asked for communication of the nature of the departmental proceedings which had been started against him within 14 days with a request that the order of suspension be withdrawn in default thereof. It appears that there was no response to this.

The respondent filed his writ petition on September 14, 1964 praying for the quashing of the order particularly on the above grounds raised in his memorandum.

A counter affidavit to the petition was filed on behalf of the Chief retary to the Government of Bihar who was the third respondent in the pet!tion. The averments in the said affidavit were that a report had been made to the Central Government against the petitioner on July 6, 1964 and having regard to the activities of the petitioner it had become necClisary to remove him from the field of activities and as such he had been transferred to Patna after being relieved of his post on July 13, 1964. ft was said further that even before the receipt of the suspension order the petitioner had been actually questioned by S. P; Verma, the then Inspector-General of Police, Bihar as early as February 8, 1964 apprising the petitioner that his activities had attracted the attention of Government. It was admitted that departmental enquiry and investigation into the conduct of the petitioner were still going on and as such charges had not been framed against

him. Finally, it was said that the order was not by way of punisll.-

ent and had been passed pending departmental enquiry into his conduct.

Another counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the Govemme1!-t of India and the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, respondents l and 2 in the petition wherein substantially the same averments were made as in the counter affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 3. ·

A large number of points were canvassed before the High Court which examined thee provisions of different sets of rules and relying particularly on the difference in wording of rule 12 of the Central Civil Services Rules which empowered the appointing authority to place an officer under suspension inter alia, where a disciplinary proceeding against him was contemplated or was pending and rule 7 of the All India Services Rules (quoted in extenso hereinafter) it came to the conclusion that the order of

suspension was not proper. Further, according to one of the Judges of that Court ·

''To allow a member of that (the All India) service to be placed under suspension without the formal proceeding being started may cause humiliation to an officer of such high rank without any justification whatsoever."

According to the other learned Judge who took substantially the same view the order of suspensioin only indicated that disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were in contemplation and this was not provided for in rule 7.

In our view it would not be proper to interpret the provisions of the AH India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955 by reference to the provisions of other rules even if they were made by or under the authority of the President of India. The All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955 as they stood at the relevant time were a self-contained code--and we have to examine the provisions thereof to find out whether the order passed on the petitioner was justified. These rules were promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. ( 1) of s. 3 of the All lnd_ia Services Act 1951 by the Central Govelf!lment after consultation with the Governments of the States concerned. They were applicable to nlembers of the Indian Administrative Service and those of the Indian Police Service. Cl. . 3 of the Rules provided for penalties which might .for good and sufficient reasons be imposed on a member of the servic7. . Suspension is n<?t. a penalty covered by this clause.

Cl. 4 md1cated the authonttes who would institute proceedings and impose penalty against members of the Services. Cl. 5 which generally dealt with the procedure for imposing penalties provided by the first three sub-clause&· as follows :-

" ( 1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiry Act, 1850, no order shall be passed imposing any of the penalties specified in rufo 3 on a member of the Service unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself.

(2) The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the member of the Service charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any . other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case.

( 3) The member of the Service shall be required within such time as may be considered by the Government reasonably adequate in the circumstances of the case, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person.

(4) 10 (10)

It was only after the written statement was received from the member that the Government might, if it considered necessary,

appoint a Board of Enquiry or an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges framed against him.

Other sub-clauses of. this rule laid down generally the procedure which was to be adopted in the enquiry. Rule 7 provided as follows : f

"Suspension during disciplinary proceedirtgs.-

( 1) If having regard to the natl!re of the charges and the circumstances in any case the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the Service against whom such proceedings

are started that Government may-·

(a) if the member of the Service is serving under it pass an order placing him under suspension, or

( b) if the member of the Service is serving under H another Government, request that Government to place him under suspension, pending the cqnclusion of the inquiry and the passing of the final order in the case 2-llOOSupCl/71

Provided that in cases where there is a difference of opinion A between two State Governments, the mater shall be referred to the Central Government whose decision theroon shall be final.

( 2) A member of the Service who is detained in

' official custody whether on a criminal charge .Jr other- • wise, for a period longer than forty-eight hours, shall be . . ,.

deemed to have been suspended by the Government B concerned under this rule.

( 3) A member of the Service in respect of or against whom an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the Government under which he is serving, be placed c under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his position as a Govt. servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or invo Ives moral turpitude.

Under rule 8 a member of a Service who was placed under sus- D pension was to be entitled to receive payment from the Govern- :ment suspending his subsistence allowance as specified therein.

The crucial question in this case is, whether suspension of a member of the Service can only be ordered after definite charges .have been communicated to him in terms of sub-cl. (2) of rule . 5 or whether the Government is entitled to place an officer under E :suspension even before that stage has been reached aftera preli- " minary invesgation has been made into the conduct of the officer concerned following allegations of corr.ipt or mal-practice :1evelled against him.

To determine this it is necessary. to find out the object of placing a Government officer under "suspension" in terms of the said .'rule.

F <-- 'Suspension' according to the Oitford Dictionary means "the ; action of suspending or condition of being suspended; e action of debarring or state of being debarred, esp. for a time, from a function or privilege; temporary deprivation of one's office or position". A master can, subject to the contract of senice, ask 'his servant not to render any service without assigning any reason G but this would not be by way of punishment and theaster would :have to pay the servant his full wages or remuneration in such an .eventuality.

As Halsbury puts it : ·

"Whether or not the master has power to suspend a servant during the duration of the contract of service H depends uponcthe construction of the particular.contract. ' In the absence of any express or implied term to the contrary, the master cannot punish a servant for alleg-

...

.A ed misconduct by suspending him from. employment and stopping his wag11s for thei period of the SUStJCDSion."

(See Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Ediuon, Vol. 25, Art. 989 page 518).

Rule 7 of the Service Rules expressly provides for suspending of a member of the .Service for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. When serious allegations of misconduct are imputed against a member of a Seirvice normally it would not be desirable to allow him to continue in the post where he was functioning. It the disciplinary authority takes note of such allegations and is of opinion after some preliminary enquiries that the circumstances of the case justify further investigation to be made before definite C .charges can be framed, it would ot be improper Lo remove the

officer concerned from the sphere of his activity inasmuch as it may be necessary to find out facts from people working under him or look into papers which are in his custody and it would be embarrassing and inopportune both for the officer concerneo as

well as to those whose duty it was to make the enquiry to do so while the officer was present at the spot. Such a situation can be avoided either by transferring the officer to some other place or by temporarily puttig him out of action by making an order of suspension. Government may rightly take the view that an officer against whom serious imputations are made should not be allo_wed to function anywhere before the matter has been finally set at rest after proper scrutiny and holding of departmental proceedings. Rule 7 is aimed at taking the latter course of conduct.

Ordinarily when serious imputations are made aginst the conduct of an officer the .disciplinary authority cannot immediately draw up the charge, s : it may be that the imputations are false or concocted or , gross exaggerations of trivial irregularities.

A considerable time may elapse between the receipt of imputations against an "Officer and a definite conclusion by a superior authority that the circumstances are such that definite charges can be levelled against the officer. Whether it is necessary or desirable to place the officer under suspension even before definite charges have been framed would depend upon the circumstances of the case .and the view which is taken by the Government concerned.

ere would be. nothing improper per se if the rules \\ere to proVIde for suspension even before definite charges of misconduct .had. been communicated to the officer concerned.

The question 1s whether, the language of rule 7 is so correlated to that of rule 5 as to lead us to hold tht the word "charges"in sub-cl. ( 1) of rule 7 must mean a defirute charge as mentioned in subcl. (2) of r. ~· It my be that even a case where definite charges have n raised agamst an officer he may satisfactonly explain the circumstances and the grounds alleged against him in his

written statement. It is also possible that after . the enquiry is conducted it is found that the charges are all baseless. In principle we can see no difference between the position of an o!Jicer

against whom definite charges have been framed to which he is required to put in his written statement and a .'>ituation where on receipt of al, legations of grave misconduct against him the Government is of opinion that it would not be proper to allow the officer concerned to function in the ordinary way.

The matter is however not res integra and there is a series of decisions of. this Court which throw considerable -light on the power of, a master including a Government to suspend a servant or an officer under rules of service or even de hors su-.h rules.

The law of master and servant .including Government servants with regard to suspension of an employee was discussed at some length in The Managemen; of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers'

Union('). However rules of service of Government officers did not fall for consideration there.

Champak Lal Chimanlal Shah

v. The Union of India( 2 ) was a case where a temporary Government servnt's services were terminated.

The case shows, as is well known, that even before a formal departmental enquiry is launched a prelimi:nary enquiry is usually held to find out whether a prima facie case is made out against a Government servant.

T!iis preliminary enquiry is directed to the collection of facts in regard to the work and conduct of a Government servant in which he. may or may not be associated so that the authority concerned may decide whether or not to subject the seryant concerned to the enquiry under Art. 311 for inflicting one of the thtee major punishments mentioned therein and such a preliminary enquiry may even be held ex parte. In R. P. Kapur v. Union of India & another(") the general principles governing a master and servant were discussed in some detail and .it was said :

F "If there is no express term in the contract relating to suspension and payment , during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any law or rule, the employee is entitled to his . full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension; on the other hand if there is a term in this respect in the contract or there G is a provision in--the" statute or the rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment during suspension, the payment would be in accordance therewith .

On general principles therefore the authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry H

(l) [19601 l S.C.R. 476, 482.

(2) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 190.

into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually , result in a departmental enquiry against him."

. There is however a direct authority of this Court in S. Govinda Menon v. The Union of India(').

The appellant before this Court was a member of the Indian Administrative Service. He was the First Member of the Board of Revenue, Kerala State and was holding the post of Commissioner of Hindu Religious _ and Charitable .Endowments. On the basis of certain complaints containing allegations of misconduct against the appellant in the discharge of his duties as such Commissioner the Kerala Government instituted certain preliminary enquiries and thereafter started

disciplinary proceedings against him and also placed him under suspension under rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. One of the grounds urged by the appellant was that the order of suspension which was dated March 8, 1963 was not in compliance with rule 7 inasmuch as definite charges were framed aginst him only on 6th June, 1963. On the basis of rule 5(2) it was argued that the word "charges" which occurred in this rule and in rule 7 should be given the same meaniag and no order of suspension could be passed under rule 7 before the charges in terms of r. 5 (2) were tramed against him. This was turned down by this Court observing (at p. 582) :·

"Rule 5 (2) prescribes that the grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges. The framing of the charge under Rule 5 ( 2) is necessary to enable' the member, of the Service to meet the case against him.

The language of rule 7 ( 1} is _however different, and that rule provides that the Government may place a member , of the Service under suspension "having regard to the nature of the charge/charges and the circumstances in any case" if the Government is satisfied that it is necessary to place him under suspension. In view of the difference of language in rule 5 ( 2) and rule 7 we are of the opinion that the worq 'charges' in rule 7 (1) should be giv'en a wider meaning as denoting the accusation or imoutation against the member of the Service."

It is worthy of note that in the order of suspension it was stated as follows :-

H "The Government have received several petitions containing serious allegations of official misconduct

against Shri S. Govinda Menon . . Preliminary enquiries caused to be conducted into the allegations have shown prima facie that the officer is guilty of corruption. The Kerala High Court has also occasion to cornment on the conduct of the officet in their judgment -in O.P. 2306 of 1962 delivered on 12th February 1963 .... , ...... .

The judgment in the above case and the preliminary report of the X-Branch police have disclosed the following grave charges of serious irregularity and official misconduct on the p, art of the accused officer ....... .

The detailed enquiry into the charges by the X- Branch is in progress.

The evidence in the case has to be collected from a large number of officers who are subordinate to the accused officer jn his capacity a, s First Member of the Bodrd of Revenue. In the interest of the proper conduct of the enquiry it is necessary that the officer should 111ot be allowed to continue in that post.

Having regard to the nature of the charges against the officer and the circumstances the proper course would be to place him under suspension. Shri S.

Govinda Menon J.A.S. . . . is therefore placed under suspension under Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955 till the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him are completed." It was urged before us that the order of suspension there was different from the one be.fore us.

While there is no doubt that thei order against the appellant in the above case was far more detailed both with regard to the nature of the charges and to the necessity of placing him under suspension, in substance there is little difference for the purpose of rule 7 of the Service Rules.

The order in this case dated 31st July 1964 shows that serious allegations of corruption and malpractice~ had been made against

theJ fespondent and he was also reported to have contravened thl' provisions of the All India Service Conduct Ruit.~ and enquiries mad@ by thll G9vemment of Bihar into the g))egations had revealed that there was a prima facie case made out ag:tlllBt him. Merely because the order mentioned that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the respondent, as compared to rule 7 which ot:ontains phrase1dike "the initiation of disciplinary proceedings" and the "starting of such proceedings" we cannot hold that the situation in the present case had not reached a stage which called for an order of suspension.

In su?stance disciplinary proceedings can be said to be started agamst an

officer when complaints abqut his integrity or honesty are entertained and followed by a preliminary enquiry into them culminating in the satisfaction of the Government that a prima facie case has been made out against him for the framing of charges.

When the order of suspension itself shows that Government was of the view that such a prima facie case for departmental proceedings had been made out the fact that the order also mentions that such proceedini;;; were contemplated makes no difference.

Again the fact that in other rules of service an order of sus pension may be made when "disciplinary proceeding; were contemplated" should not lead us to take the view that a membe; of an All India Service should be dealt with differently. Tht

reputation of an officer is equally valuable no matter whether he belongs to the All India Service or to one of a humbler carlre.

It is the exigency of the conditions of service which requires or calls for an order of suspension and there can be no difference in regard to this matter as between a member of . an All India Service and a member of a State Service or a Railway Service.

Jn the result the appeal is allowed but in the circurnsta!!·es of the case we direct the parties to pay and bear their own costs.

V.P.S.

Appeal allowed.

TARAK NA'IH GHOSH

February 12, 1971

G. K. MITTER

A. N. RAY, JJ.

Bihar

India

1967] 2 S.C.R. 566

Jagadish Swarup

B. K. P. Sinha

B, C. Ghosh

P. K. Chatterjee

Rathin Das

Mitter

Patna High Court

25th January, 1937

Ranchi

Patna

July 23, 1964

T. N. Ghosh

Government of Bihar

Government of India

K. Sivaraj

24th August

1964

September 14, 1964

Central Government

July 6, 1964

July 13, 1964

S. P; Verma

February 8, 1964

s. 3

Services Act 1951

Central Govelf!lment

Cl. 4

Cl. 5

Halsbury

Art. 989

Art. 311

[1964] 5 S.C.R. 190

Kerala Government

March 8, 1963

6th June, 1963

S. Govinda Menon

Kerala High Court

S.

Govinda Menon

31st July 1964


GANESH PRASAD DUBE

STATE OF BmAR AND OTHERS

February 16, 1971

[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM AND A. N. RAY, JI.]

Practice-Grant of Certificate by High Court-Application under Art<. 132(1) and 133(1)(a) to (c) of Constitution-Procedure to be followed J, y High Court.

The appellant, who was acting as Director of Public Instruction, challenged an order posting him as Director of State Institute of Education by a writ petition in the High Court, on various grounds. It was dismissed.

He applied for grant of certificate to appeal to this. Court under .Arts: 132(1) and 133(1) (a) to (c) of the. Constitution.

The High Court held that Art. 133(1) (a) did not apply, did not consider whether Arts. 133(1) (c) and 132 were applicable, doubted whether Art. 133 (!) (b) would apply, but 'ultimately granted a certificate under Art. 133(1).

On the question whether the certificate was properly granted.

HELD : As the High Court has not properly considered the applicalion for grant of certificate. under Arts. 132(1) and 133(l)(b) and (c), il will have to be remanded to be considered by the High Court afresh. 1he High Court, in the fresh order to be passed, must clearly indicate under what particular Article or clause of the Article the certificate is _granted [733 A-CJ

Saya Narain Prasad v. Sttte of Bihar {1970] 2 S.C.R. 275 and Mis Krishna Gyanodaya Sugar Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors. A.l.R.

1970 S.C. 2041, followed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1256 of 1969.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 17, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 153 of 1969 with Civil Miscel!ameous Petition No. 4499 of 1969.

Application by respondent No. 1 for revocation of the certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133(1 )(b) of the Constitution.

S. T. Desai, Tarkeshwar Dayal and S. N. Prasad, for the appellant.

L. M. Singhvi and U. P. SiTigh, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3 to 5.

A Basudeva Prasad, Nawal Kishore Prasad Sinha and U. P. Singh,

for respondents Nos. 2 and 6 to 10.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-

Vaidialingam, J.-In this appeal, on certificate, the appellant challenges the order dated February 17, 1969 of the Patna High Court dismissing summarily C.W.J.C. No. 153 of 1969 filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

The appellant was appointed by the order dated March 21, 1968, by the State of Bihar temporarily to act as Director of Public Instruction, Bihar. On the date of the said appointment the appellant was the Director of State Institute of Science. In the enaorsement in this order, it was stated that the appellant's appointment as Director of Public Instruction has been made by promotion on a temporary basis for a period not exceeding six months in anticipation of the concurrence of the Public Service Commission.

By order dated November 18, 1968, the State Government passed an order posting the appellant as Director of State Institute of Education. It is stated in the said order that the appellant had been officiating in the post of Director of Public Instruction by virtue of the order dated March 21, 1968.

The appellant filed C.W.J.C. No. 153 of 1969 before the High Court challenging this order of November 18, 1968 on various grounds.

He had also alleged mala-fides in the passing of the said order. In the view that we take that the order of the High Court granting the certificate has to be remitted for fresh consideration, we do not propose to refer to the various grounds of attack made by the appellant in his writ petition before the High Court.

The High Court by its order dated February 17, 1969 has taken the view that as the appellant's appointment as Director of Public Instruction was on a temporary basis for a period not exceeding six months in anticipation of the concurrence of the Public Service Commission, the Public Service Commiss; on, which was subsequently consulted did not give its con1currence to the appointment of the appellant as Director of Public Instruction and therefore, the government passed the impugned order dated November 18, 1968 posting the appellant as Director.

State Institute of Education.

As the appellant was appointed purely on a temporary basis, he has no right to claim the post.

The High Court has further expressed the view that it is not satisfied vrima facie that there was any mala-fides on the part of the Public Service Commission in not giving its concurrence to the appointment of the appellant or on the part of the government in not appointing the appellant as Director of Public Instruction. A further contention taken on behalf of the appellant

that the impugned order was not in conformity with the decision A of the Council of Ministers, was rejected by the High Court. On

this reasoning the High Court held "as no prima facie case has been made out for interference with the order of the Government, as contained in Annexure 1, this application is summarily rejected". Annexure l, in the above quotation was the impugned order dated November 18, 1968. It may be noted that the writ peti- B 1ion was dismiss.:d without issuing notice to the State and other respondents therein.

On behalf of the appe)lant Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel, attempted to argue on merits by urging that the High Court, in view of the allegations made by the appellant in the writ petition, was not justified in rejecting the petition summarily. The learned C counsel also attempted to argue that even on the basis of the materials placed before the court, the order is unsustainable.

On behalf of the first respondent, State of Bihar, C.M.P. No. 4498 'of 1969 has been filed for revoking the certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133(1)(b) of the Constitution.

Dr. L. M. Singhvi, learned counsel for the State, therefore, raised preliminary objection that the certificate granted by the High Court is .not valid and as such it should be revoked. If the certificate is revoked, as prayed for by the State, the counsel urged, then there will be no need to go into the merits of the appeal, sought to be canvassed by Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the appellant.

As the preliminary objection has to be first dealt with it is now necessary to refer to the order of the High Court granting the certificate. After dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, the appellant filed an application (Supreme Court Appeal No. 42 of 1969) for grant of certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court.

That application, no doubt, was opposed by the present respondents. The High Court by its order dated March 13, 1969 granted the certificate to the effect "that the requirement of valuation to enable the petitioner to get a certificate is fulfil!ed under Article 13 3.( 1 ) of the Constitution."

From the order of the High Court it is seen that the application for the grant of certificate was made , under Arts. 132 (1 ) 1 and 133(1) of the Constitution. So far as Art. 133(1) was concerned, the request for certificate was made under clauses (a) and ( c) and not under clause (b). But, however, during the course of arguments, the appellant's counsel relied on clause (b) of Art. 133(1) and that was permitted by the High Court. Therefore, ultimately the certificate was prayed for under Art. 132 (1) and Art. 133(1) dauses (a) to (c).

After discussing the case of the appellant, the High Court held that in a case of this nature the

,...,

G. P. DUBF.Y v. BIHAR (Vaidialingam, J.)

7UJ

salan or allowances attached to the office of the appellant cannot be considered to be the subject matter of dispute within the meaning of clause (a) of Art. 133 ( 1) of the Constitution. According to the High Court, the subject matter of the dispute is the right to continue in office and not the right to get the salary if he is allowed to continue in office. In this view the High Court held that the appellant cannot be granted a certificate under clause

(a) of Art. 133(1).

The High Court then considered the question of granting a certificate under clause (b) of Art .. 133yl) of the Constitution.

The High Court was of the view that it i!Vperhaps possible to hold that the emoluments attached to the om'.ce can be taken into consideration for the purpose of valuation under clause (b). The High Court has expressed the view that the future emoluments which an incumbent of an office will be getting, i.f he succeeds in getting the office, will be the property respecting which some claim or question will be directly involved in the judgment sought to be appealed against provided it is a property. But, however, the High Court entertained a doubt whether the emoluments which became payable to an incumbent of the office in future, if an incumbent does not lose the office, due to any other reason, other than the subject matter of the dispute in the case, can be said to be property within the meaning of clause (b). But inspite of a!I these doubts, the High Court held that certifica1es have been granted by the High Court of Patna in several cases and then finally concluded :

" ... but for the purpose of determination of the question of valuation it is legitimate to assume in his favour that he claims a right to the office of the Director of Public Instruction which could have brought him the emoluments for a period of 3 years 3 months, if he succeeds."

Ultimately the High Court certified that the requirements of valuation to enable the appellant to get a certificate is fulfilled under Art. 13 3 (1 ) of the Constitution.

Dr. 1:-· M. Singvi's cont7ntion is that the certificaie granted' by the. High Court 1s not valid.

His argument ran as follows : The High C'.ourt has not granted the certificate under Art. 133(1) ( c); the High Court has .categorically held that the appellant cannot be g; anted a certificate under Ai; t. 133(l)(a). Though the concludmg part of the o_rder granting the certificate states that It has een granted under Art. 133(1), in the circumstances mentioned above, it is clear that the certificate has been granted only under Art. 133(1 )(b). This is on the ground that the appellant claimed his right to the office o.f the Director, Public

Instruction, which would have brought him the emoluments referred to by him for a period of 3 years and three months, if the impugned order had not been passed. This method of valuation for the purpose of clause (b) is not correct.

W!e are to state that the appellant had claimed that on the date of the impugned notification, he was getting a monthly alary

of Rs. 1950/-. The post of Director of Public Instruction was dii the scale CJif Rs. 1850-100,2250.

He was entitled to get an annual increment of Rs. 100/-. But for the impugned order the appellant claimed that he would have continued in service for a period of, 3 years and 3 months before attaining the age of superannuation, and as suh during this period he would have earned a salary of Rs. 83,000/-.

Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the appellant urged that grant of a certificate under clause (b) of Art. 33 (1) is con'ect. In the alternative he contended that as the claim made by the appellant for grant of a certificate under Art. 132(1) and under Art. 133(1 )(e) has not been at all discussed or decided

by the. High Court and, if it is held that the certificate as no\l' _granted is not valid, the High Court may be required to consider the grant of a certificate under Arts. 132(1) and 133 (1 )( c).

Mr. Desai also urged that as very serious allegations of mala-fides in the passing of the impugned order have been made by the appellant, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the writ petition summarily without issuing notice to the respondents.

He conten4ed that all the material records bearing on the matters arising for consideration are available in this Court and in view of this circumstance, he requested that the hearing of the appeal may be proceeded with by this Court.

We are not inclined to agree with Mr. Desai that if the certificate granted by the High Court is not valid, this Court can proceed to hear the appeal on merits.

Mr. Desai relied on the decision of th_is Court reported in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and another v. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another(') in support of his contention that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition summarily. It is no doubt true that in the above decision it has been held that though the High Court has a discretion to decline to exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226, nevertheless, the discretion is to be judicially exercised and if the petitioner makes a claim which is frivolous, vexa"<ious or prima facie unjust, the High Court may decline to entertain the pet.ition.

But if a party claims to be aggrieved by the unlawful, arbitrary

(!) [1970] l s.c.c. 582.

or unjust order of a public body or authority, he is entitled to a hearing of his petition on .merits and the High Court will not

be justified in dismissing such a petition in limine. Following the above decision in M/ s Exen Industries v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and others('), Mitter J., speaking for the Court set aside the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition in limine with the following observations :

"However the High Court though competent to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution when it finds that the petition is frivolous or without subsiance should not throw it out in limine if a prima facie case for investigation is made out. The High Court can reject a petition in /imine if it takes the view that the authorities whose acts were called in question had not acted improperly or if it felt that the petition raised complicated questions of fact for determination which could not be properly adjudicated upon in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution."

Similarly in Gyan Chand and others v. State of Haryana and

others(') where allegations of mala-fides have been made and a writ petition was dismissed in limine by 1he High Court, this Court set aside the order and remanded the matter for a fresh consideration after calling upon the authorities concerned to file a return.

The above decisions are of no assistance to the appellant as the orders of remand were passed in those appeals which came to this Court either on a proper certificate issued by the High Court or on special leave granted by this Court. In all those cases there was a proper appeal pending before this Court in which merits of the points raised for decision in the appeal were gone into and suitable directions were given therein.

If_ the er!ifiate _granted by the High Court, a~ contended by Dr. Smghv1, JS mvalid, then the appeal before us ts an incompetent appeal anci no direction on merits can be given by this Court on such an incompetent appeal.

There can be no controversy that if the certificate is not valid, the only course open to this Court will be ; to dismiss the appeal. Dr. Singhvi urged that the grant of certificate under Art. 133 (I )(b) in this case is not

~tified ecaus~_t_~ method of valuation adopted by the High

(I) C.A. No.971of1967 decid<<f on 22-1-1971.

(2) C.A. N,>. 64of1970 decided on 21-8-197P.

Ill

Coun: is not correct.

In this context Dr. Singhvi relied on the decisions of this Court in Chhitarmal v. M/ s Shah Pannalal Chandulal(1) and Satyanarain Prasad v. State of Bihar(2 ) regarding 1he test to be applied for the purpose of granting a certificate under clause (a) or (b) of Art. 133(1). Dr. Singhvi also relied on the first of the above references, in support of his contention that in the absence of a valid certificate, the appeal is incompetent and it has to be dismissed.

Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that .the High Court has not properly considered the claim made by the appellant for a certificate under Arts. 132 (1) and 13 3 ( 1 )(b) and (c).

Article 132(1) has not been considered at all nor has fhe High Court considered clause (c) of Art. 133(1)(c). Even with regard to clause (b), the High Court has given a very haliing finding. Therefore, the counsel urged that the Higil Court may be required to consider the application for grant of a certificate afresh.

It is not necssary at this stage to consider whether correct , principles have been applied by the High Court in granting the certificate under Art 133 (1 )(b). As we have pointed out earlier, it has expressed doubts here and there and it has granted the certificate under that clause on the ground that the Patna High Court has granted certificates under similar circumstances. As the High Court is being required to consider this matter afresh, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on this aspect.

Admittedly the High Court has not considered the question whether the appellant will be entitled to a certificate under Art. J 32

(1) or Art. 133(1)(c). It was pointed out to us on behalf of the respondent that the High Court did not consider the grant of a certificate under clause (c) of Art. 133(1) as no argument was advanced by the appellant that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. No doubt there is such a passing remark in the order of the High Court, but as the matter has to be reconsidered by the High Court, it is desirable that the claim of the appellant under this clause is also considered by the High Court. We have already referred to the fact that even clause (b) has been considered only in a very halting manner by the High Court. Therefore, the position is that the certificate as granted by the High Court is not a valid certificate and as such the appeal must be held to be incompetent.

But the mattei: does no rest there. In cases where the claim for certificate made on other clauses or under other Articles have not been considered at all, this Court bas directed the High Court to consider the question whether a case bas been made out for issue of a certificate under such other provisions. (Vide Satyanarain

II) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 751.

(2) [1970] 2 s.cc 275.

G. P. DUBEY v. BllIAR (Vaidialingam, /.) 733

Prasad v. State of Bihar(') and M/s Shree Krishna Gyanodaya Sugar Ltd. v. The State of B1nar and others(').

As the High Court has not properly considered the application filed by the appellant, that is, Supreme Court Appeal No. 42 of 1969, before the High Court for grant of the certificate, that application will be taken up by the High Court afresh. The High Court will consider whether the appellant is able to satisfy the court that he is eligible to get a certificate under Art. 132(1) or under Art. 133 ( 1) (b) or ( c) of the Constitution. It is not necessary for the High Court to consider whether the certifu:ate is to be granted under clause (a) of Art. 133(1) as that question is already concluded against the appellant in its order dated March 13,1969.

The High Court in the fresh order to be passed must clearly indicate under what particular Article or clauses of the Article, the certificate is granted. We are constrained to make this remark because in the present order the High Court has merely stated that the certificate is issued under Art. 13 3 ( 1) .

As already ~. !long time has elapsed, the High Court is required to dispose of the said application as expeditiously as possible within a period not exceeding two month~ from the date of receipt of this order by the High Court. Subject to the observations contained above, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

V.P.S.

(I) [1970] 2 S.C.C. 275.

(2) A.LR. 1970 S.C. 2041.

Appeal dismissed.

DUBE

STATE OF BmAR AND OTHERS

February 16, 1971

A. N. RAY

Art. 133(1)

Arts. 133(1)

Art. 133

Art. 133(1)

Arts. 132(1) and 133(l)(b)

1970] 2 S.C.R. 275

Art. 133(1 )(b)

S. T. Desai

Tarkeshwar Dayal

S. N. Prasad

L. M. Singhvi

U. P. SiTigh

A Basudeva Prasad

Nawal Kishore Prasad Sinha

U. P. Singh

Vaidialingam

Art. 226

Public Service Commission

November 18, 1968

March 21, 1968

February 17, 1969

State Institute of Education

S. T. Desai

State of Bihar

Art. 133(1)(b)

L. M. Singhvi

March 13, 1969

Article 13

Arts. 132

Art. 133(1)

Art. 133(1)

Art. 132

Art. 133(1)

Art. 133

Art. 133(1)

High Court of Patna

Art. 13

M. Singvi

Art. 133(1)

Art. 133(1)

Art. 133(1 )(b)

Art. 33

Art. 132(1)

Art. 133(1 )(e)

Arts. 132(1) and 133

Desai

Ulhasnagar Municipal Council

Art. 226

Art. 226

Art. 226

If the er!ifiate granted by the High Court, a~ contended by Dr. Smghv1, JS mvalid, then the appeal before us ts an incompetent appeal anci no direction on merits can be given by this Court on such an incompetent appeal.

Singhvi

Art. 133

Art. 133(1)

Arts. 132

Article 132(1)

Art. 133(1)(c)

Art 133

Patna High Court

Art. 133(1)(c)

Art. 133(1)

Vide Satyanarain

[1965] 2 S.C.R. 751

Art. 132(1)

Art. 133

Art. 133(1)

March 13,1969.

Art. 13


SYED SHAH GHULAM GROUSE MOHIUDDIN AND ORS.

SYED SHAH AHMED MOIIIUDDIN KAMISUL QUADRI

(DEAD) BY L. Rs. AND OTHERS

February 17, 1971

[G. K. MITTER AND A. N. RAY, JJ.]

ldinorit, y and Guardianship-Muslim minor represented in orbitration proceedings and in Court by brother who was not appointed guardian by Courll--Award and decree on award are viti'ated.

Limitation Act, 1908, ss. 18 and 144-Renunciation of rights by co- Ol-Vners in property in favour of one co-owner under wrong impression that it was endowed property-Property later discovered to be Matrooka property-Limitation for filing suit is governed by s. 144 Limitation Act 1>08-Where knowledge of right to partition is held back by fraud limitation is extended under s. 18.

Adverse possession-Possession by one co-owner is not by itself udverse to oher co-owners-These must be open denial of title to the parties entitled to the property by excluding and ousting them-Possession is not adverse to parties not G'Ware of their rights.

Shah Abdul Rahim wa.S Sajfadnasheen of a Dargah and Khankah in Hyderabad.

He had four sons and two daughters.

After his death in 1905 he was succeeded as Sajjadanasheen by his eldest , son Abdul Hai Shah Abdur Rahim left Matrooka property apart from the properties appertaming to the Dargah and Khankah.

The matter of the partition of Matrooka properties was referred to arbitrators. The appellant who was Abdur Rahim's youngest son was a minor at the time and was represented in the arbitration proceeding by his brother Nooruddin.

The properties Exhibits B-1 to B-10 were acknowledged by the parties before arbitrators to be in the possession of Abdul Hai as Dargah and. Khankah properties and any right or claim to them was renounced by Abdul Hai's brothers and sisters.

The arbitrators gaye their awa'rd on August 1, 1908 partitioning the properties.

On August 13, 1908 there was a decree in the Darul Khaza Coust confirming the aforesaid award. The properties B-1 to B-10

thereafter remained in the possession of Abdul Hai. In 1927 Abdul Hai got an adjudication from the Nizam's Government that the Dargah and Khankah properties consisted only of two villages and that properties B-1 to B-10 were not Dargah and Khankah properties.

In 1938 Abdul Hai \\>rote a letter to the Nizam's government again asserting that properties B-1 to B-10 were his personal properties. The aprellant filed a suit on 24th Julv 1941 for setting aside the decree dated August 13, 1908, passed by the Darul_Khaza Court and for partition of the Matrooka properties left by his father including properties B-1 to B-10.

He impeached the award and the decree on the ground that he was not represented by a lawful guardian. "He claimed that the award and decree should be avoided because they were based on the Wrongful representation of Abdul Hai that they were Dargah and Khankah properties. The rial court decreed the suit holding : ( !) that the award and decree m question were obtained by fraud; (2) that the letter written by Abdul Hai in 19.38 showed that he was aware of the Mafi'ooka character of the properties but kept this fact from his brothers and sisters; (3) that the appellant

SHAH GHULAM v. SRAH AHMED 735

came to know the facts from the said letter of I 931> and the suit was not therefore barred by limitation. The High Court in appeal held : ( 1 J that the appellant was a minor and therefore reference to the arbitration and th.c award thereon were void; (2) that the decree passed by the Darulkhaza Court was not a nullity since the appellant did not file his suit within three years after attaining majority; (3) that the decree was not obtained by fraud; (4) that Abdul Hai asserted in 1927 that the prOjJerties in question were his personal properties and this assertion of title adverse to the appellant and his brothers and sisters became known to them in 1927 and for this reason also the suit was barred by limitation.

In appeal by certificate to this Court, HELD : The appeal mµst be allowed.

(i) The minority of the appellant was a fact found by the trial court and the High Court.

The appellant's brother who represented him in the arbitration and court proceedings was not a legal guardian, nor wa• he appointed by the Court. The relinquishment of property by Nooruduin on behalf of the minor was not binding on the minor whose interests

v.cre not protected.

The arbitration! proceedings, the award and the decree of the Darul Khaza Court on the award were therefore void. [740

D, 741 E-F] Mohd. Amin & Ors. v. Vakil Ahmed & Ors, [1952] S.C.R. 1133 and Jmambandi v. Mursi; ddi, 45 I.A. 73, referred to.

(ii) The estate of a deceased Mohammedan devolves on his heirs at the moment of his death.

The heirs succeed to the estate as tenants in common in specific shares.

When the heirs continue to hold the e'tate as tenants in common without dividing it and one of them subsequently brings a suit fdr recovery of the share the period of limitation for the suit does not run against him from the date of the death of the deceased but from the date of express ouster or denial of title and At.

1!4 of Sch. I to the Limitation Act 1908 would be the relevant Article. [741 H, 742 Al

(iii) The cause of action for partition of properties is a 'pe'rpetually recurring one'.

In Mohammedan Law the doctrine of partial partition is not applicable because the heirs are tenants in common and the heirs of the deceased Muslim succeed to the definite fraction of every part of his estate.

In the present case the suit was for partition of properties which were by consent of parties treated as Dargah and Khankah but which were later discovered to he Matrooka properties in fact and therefore the declaration in the award and the decree on the award that those were Dargah and Khankah properties could not stand and the entire partition had to be 'reopened by reason of fraud in the earlier proceedings.

[746 G-747 B]

Monsharam Chakravarty & Ors. v. Goneslz Chandra Chakra1(1rr_:: & On .. 17 C.W.N. 521, referred to.

(iv' The decree of the Darul Khaza Court could not be an oh, tacle 10 the claim of the appellant fdr partition of the properties, becau"' the poperties were admittedly not Dargah and Khankah properties but

\l atrooka properties.

If all parties proceeded upon a basis that these were Dargah and Khankah properties and that basis is wiped out by the adjudication by the Government of the Nizam, the parties are re1toted to their position as heirs to the Matrooka property.

The award and H the decree by reason of evidence of facts discovered since the judgment and the decree of the Darul Khaza Court could not he allowed to siand because the effect of the discovery .of the facts was to make it "reasonably probable that the action will succeed". [744 H-745 BJ 3-1 JOOSup Cl/72

Birch v. Birch, [1902] Probate Division 131, referred to.

. (v) 'Yhen a plaintiff has been kept from knowledge by the defendent o[ the crrcumstances constituting the fraud, the plaintiff can rely upon s. 18 of the Limitation Act to escape from the bar of limitation. When Abdul Hai got the properties released by reason of the decision Of the Governmel).t of the Nizam in the year 1927 the properties became divisible among the appellant and his brothers and sisters.

The existence of the right of the appellant was kept concealed by Abdul Hai. The B appellant was not aware of the right nor could he have with reasonable diligence discovered it.

There was active concealment by Abdul Hai of the fact that the properties were not Dargah aild Khankah having full " kr.owledge of the fact. It was only in 1941 that the appellant came to know of the .Matrooka character of the properties. [745 E, 746 BJ

Rolfe v. Gre11ory, [1964] 4 DeG. J & S 576, Boman Chandra Dalla Y. Promotha Nath Ghose, L.L.R. 49 Cal. 886 and Rc.himboy v. Turner, 20 I.A. 1, referred to.

(vi) On the facts of the case it was established that the fraud committed by Abdul Hai relates "to matters which prima facie would be a reason for setting the judgment aside". [747 E-F]

Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 22, para 1669 at D p. 790, referred to.

(vii) The plea of adverse possession must also fail.

It was apparent that until the year 1927 the appellant and the other parties were already kept out of the knowledge of the true character of the properties.

Even after l 'l,27 it could not be said on the evidence on record that the appellant had any knowledge of the true character E of the properties or of ouster or adverse possession of Abdul Hai. Possession by one o-owner is not by itself adevrse to other co-owners.

On the contrary possession by one co-owner is presumed to be the possession of all the co-owners unless it is established that the possession of the coowner is in denial of title of co-owners and the possession is in hostility 10 ru-owners by exclusion of them. In the present case there was no evidence fo support this conclusion.

Ouster is an unequivocal act of asselrtion of title. There has to be open denial of title to the parties who are entitled F to it oy excluding and ousting them. [745 F-H]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 219 of 1967.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 16, 1965 of the A; ndhra Pradesh High Court in C.C-C. Appeal No. 24 of 1969.

M. C. Chagla, R. V. Pillai and N. Nettar, for the appellants.

C. K. Daphtary, Rameshwar Nath and Swaranjit Sodhi, for respondent No. 1 (A).

V. A. Seyid Muhammad a, nd S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 3.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Ray, J.-This is an appeal by certificate against the judgement dated 15 Dec, bmber, 1965 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the appellants' suit and setting aside the decree in favour of the appellant passed by the Additional Chief Judge, B City Civil Court, Hyderabad on 18 October, 1958.

Shah Abdul Rahim a resident of the city of Hyderabad died on 26 September, 1905 leaving behind him four sons Abdul Hai, Ghulam Nooruddin, Abdul Razak and Ghulam Ghousie Mohiuddin and two daughters Kamarunnissa Begum and Badiunnissa Begum. Shah Abdul Rahim ha<kjarge movable and immovable properties. The sons and the daughters entered into two agreements in th'e month of July, 1908 and appointed _arbitrators to partition the Matrooka properties of Syed Shah Abdul Rahim.

On 1 August, 1908 the arbitrators made an Award partitioning the properties. On 13 August, 1908 there was a decree in the Darul Khaza Court, Hyderabad confirming ilie Award of 1 August, 1908. The appellant filed the suit out of which the appeal arises on 24 July, 1941 for setitng aside the decree dated 13 August, 1908 confirming the award and for partitioning certain Matrooka properties. In 1942, the sui_t was dismissed. An appeal was preferred to the High Court of Hyderabad.

During the pendency of the appeal Abdul Hai died in 1950 and his0 .wgal

representatives were brought on the record of the suit in the month of February, 1952.

The appeal filed in the year 1943 was disposed of by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in April 1957 remanding the case to the City Civil Court, Hyderabad. On

18 October, 1958 the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad decreed the suit in favour of the appellant and cancelled the decree of the Darul Khaza Court dated 13 August,

1908. On appeal the Andhra Pradesh Hjgh Court on 15 December, 1965 set aside the decree passed by the Additional Chief Judge.

The undisputed facts are these : When Abdul Rahim died in 1905 Abdul Hai the eldest son was major. The appellant was a minor.

There Wdre two references to arbitration Before the arbitrators the appellant a minor was represented by his brother Ghulam Nooruddin as the guardian. The parties to the arbitration agreements were Abdul Hai, Ghulam Nooruddin, Abdul Razak the appellant represented by his guardian Nooruddin, Qamarunnissa Begum and Badiunnisa Begum. It will appar from the award that before the arbitrators there was no dispute between the parties and the arbitrators did not think it necessary to frame any issues. Before the arbitrators the plaintiffs marked

with the letter 'F' a plan showing properties attached to the Khank:ah and Dargah and those properties were market as Exhibits B-1 to B-10 and the plaintiffs relinquished their title 'to proies marked Exhibits B-1 to B-10 and further stated "neither at present nor in future will they have any share and right in the said property". As to properties marked B-1 to B-10 the parties stated before the arbitrators that Abdul Hai was the Sajjada Nashin of lhe Dargah and was in possession of the Dargah and Khankah :properties.

The award was made a rule of court within a short time upon a plaint filed by Nooruddin, Abdul Razak, the appellant represented by Nooruddin as the guardian and the two sisters Qamarunnisa Begum and Badiunnisa Begum. The defendant was Abdul .tlai.

The facts recited in the decree are these. Syed Shah Nooruddin a pious person of Hyderabad had his Xhankah situated at Nampalli. The Dargah of the said pious man was also situated .in the same locality.

After Syed Shah Nooruddin's death hi> son-ia-law, Abdur Rahim became the Sajjada of the Khankah and the Dargah Shariff. The Sajjada had control over all the expenses of the Dargah and Khankah and the entire property attached to the Dargah and Khankah remained in possession of the Sajjadanasheen and all the expenses of the Dargah and Khankah were met from the income. After the death of Abdur Rahim, Abdul Hai beame the Sajjadanasheen and was having control over the Dargah and Khankah. Abdur Rahim left three adult sons and onb minor son and also two adult daughters.

Apart from the property attached to the Dargah and Khankah Abdur Rahim' left personal Mati:ooka properties. There might have been a dispute betwn the parties rtgarding the partition of these properties.

But the parties settled the dispute by mutual consent and by agreement referred the matter to arbitration for the settlement of the dispute. 'The arbitrators made an award. The decree recited that the properties marked with the letter 'F' in the pla, n annexed to the award were Khankah and Dargah Shariff properties in th'e possession of the defendant Abdul Hai for meeting the expenses of the Khankah and no one has any right or claim over the property 'at present' or 'in future'.

The decree concluded by stating tllat the Dargah and Khankah properties were not !iabk to partition and' none of the plaintiffs "shall have any right or claim regarding ihe same'

The appellant impeached the award and the decree upon the award inter alia o.n the grounds that the award was void by reason of lack of lawful 1guardian on behalf of tlie appellant to protect and represent the rights and interests of the minor in the arbitra- tion proceedings and in the prodeedings resulting in the decree 'Upon the award. The appellant also claimed that the award and

the decree should be avoided becuse the properties marked Exhibits B-1 to B-10 were not Dargah and Khankah properties. in fact and were treated in the award and the deer~ to be Dargah

and Khank; ah on the wrongful representation of Abdul Hai. The appellant in the year 1938 discovered for the first time tHo true and correct facts that the same were not Khankah and Dargah properties and therefore claimed the same as divisible upon partition amongst the heirs of Abdul Rahim.

The trial Court held that the award and the decree thereon were obtained by fraud and the decree was to be set aside. The reasoning given by the trial Court was that it was established on lhe evidence that Abdul Hai was in full possession and enjoyment of the whol.e of the property of Abdul Rahim. including tire property marked as Exhibits B-1 to B-10. In t)le letter dated 13- August, 1938 Exhibit P-8 Abdul Hai denied that the property wa~ waqf property belonging to the Dargah and asserteq that it was; owned and possessed by him and relinquished by his relatives.

Tht letter was held by the trial Court to indicate that Abdul Hai

new that the property was the property of his father which he inherited along with his brothers and sisters and i, n spite of such

knowledge and belief he caused it to be represnted before the :1rbitrators that the property belongeP. to the Dargah and that the ; ame was in his possession as Sajjaaanasheen.

The trial Court further held that the appellant came to know the real state of affairs from the letter of Abdul Hai dated 13 August, 1938 and therefore the suit was not barred by limitation. The trial Court therefore passed a decree for cancellatiO!ll of the decree passed upon lhe award and passed a preliminary decree for partition of the Matrooka properties including the properties marked as.

Exhibits B-1 to B-10 in the award.

In the High Court four questions were considered; First, whether apart from the appellant any other party was a minor at the time of the arbitration agreement and whether there was a dispuie which could be referred to arbitration.

Secnd, whether there was proof that at the time of the arbitration agreement and the award Abdul Hai made a fraudulant and false representation :o his brothers and sisters and made them believe that the pror"rties belonging to the Sajjadanasheen were the properties of Dargah and Khankah which were not partible and by repreSentation and fraud prevented the partition of those properties. Third. whether the appellant had knowledge that Abdul Hai had clairrled the properties as the ancestral properties of the Sajjadanasheen earlier than the time when the appellant said he had knowlec!ge and whether the suit was barred by limitation. Fourth, what would be the effect of the filing of the written slatement by the defendant

No. 6 in thll year 1958 and the omission of defendant No. 7 to file any written statement to obtain partition of the properties in the event of the decree and the award being set aside.

TlJ/:l High Court held that the appellant was a minor but the other parties were not minors.

The Hi~ Court held that the reference to the arbitration and the award thereon were void. The High Court held that !he decree of the Darul Khaza Court upon the award was not a nullity and the present suit should have been filed within three years of the appellant obtaining majority. _The High Court also held that the decree of _the Darul Khaza Cou.rt was not obtained by fraud. The High Court held that Abdul Hai asserted in the year 1927 that the Dargah and the Khankah properties were his personal properties _and from that date Abdul Hai asserted his title adverse to the appellant a.nd t.1ie other plaiQtiffs and the appellant and the other plaintiffs knew in 1927 of the adverse claim of Abdul Hai. Therefore, the suit was barred by limitation.

The minority of th~ appellant is a fact found both by the trial Court and the High Court. It is an admitted fact that the appellant's guardian was his brother Nooruddin at the time of the arbitration proceeding• aiid the time of the decree on the award.

The brother is not a lawful guardian under thie Mohammedan Law. The legal guardians are the father, the executor appointed by the father's will, the father's father and the executor appointed by the will of the father's father.

No other relation is entitled to theguardianship of the property of a minor as of right. Neither, the mother nor the brother is a lawful guardian tliough the father or the paternal grand father of the minor may appoint the mother, brother or any other person as executor or executrix. In default of legal guardians a duty of appointing guardian for the protection and preservation of th'e minor's property is of t!i-e court on proper application. It was held by this Court in Mohd. Amin & Ors. v.

Vakil Ahmed & Ors.(1 ) relying on the dictum in Imambdndi v, Mutsaddi(•) that where disputes arose relating to succesion to the estate of a deceased Mohammedan between his three sons, one of whom was a minor, and other relations, and a deed Qf settlement embodying an agreement in regard to the distribution of the properties belonging to the estate was executed by and betv.leen the parties, the eldest son acting as guardian for and on behalf of the minor son the deed was not binding on the minor son as his brother was not his legal guardian; 'a; nd the deed was void not only qua 1he minor, but with regard to all the parties including those who were sui juris. It is clear on the authority of this decision that_ the arbitration agrelement and the a:-vard and the decree

(I) [1952]S.C.R, l!33.

(2) 45 I.A. 73

are all void in the present case by reason of lack of legal guardian of the appellant.

There is intrinsic evidence in the award that the patriles effected a settlement.

Counsel on behalf of the respondent relied on a copy of an application in the Court of the Darul Khaza in the procegs for passing the decree upon the award in support of the contention that tl!e court appointed Nooruddin as the guardian of the apl lant. It is stated in the application that the defendant No. 3 ( ~1c) meaning thereby plaintiff No. 3 the present appellan! is a mmor and Nooruddin is the real brother and the appellant 1s under the guardianship of Nociruddin. The applicati?n was for permiion to file the suit. There is no order for appomtment of a guardian.

Furtl:ler, the Court in appointing the guardian of property .of a minor is guided by circumstances for. the welfre of th~ mmor.

There is no justification to hold that N9oruddin was either the legal guardian or a guardian appointed by the Court.

Tht decree which was passed on the award appears on an exaniination of the pleadings and the decree itself that tl!e parties proceeded to have the decree on the basis of the award without any contest as and by way of mutual settlement. It will, appear from the decree that it was admitted by the parties that Abdul Hai was in possession of the Dargah and Khankah and that Abdul Hai alone was the Sajjadanasheen of the Khankah. The relinquishment of property by Nooruddin on behalf of the minor is not binding on the minor.

There was no legal sanction behild such compromise in the arbitration and in the proceedings resulting in a decree upon tlie award. There was no legal guardian.

Tht rights and interests of the minor were also not protected particularly when there was conflict of interest between th'e minor and Abdul Hai. The arbitration agreement, the award and the decree of the Darul Khaza Court on the award are therefore void.

The High Court held that the appellant's suit was barred by limitation by reason of knowledge of the appellant that Abdul Hai was in adverse possession since the year 1927 or 1928. In regard to the properties which the appellant claimed in the suit as liable to partition, it is established that all parties proceeded on the basis that Exhibits B-1 to B-10 in the award were not Matrooka properties but Dargah and Khankah properties. If, in fact, they are not Dargah and Khankah properties but Matrooka properties, these should be available to co-owners for partition unless there are legal impediments.

The estate of a dedeased Mohamedan uevolves on his heirs at the moment of his death.

The heirs succeed to the estate as tenants in common in specific shares. Where the heirs continue to hold the estate as tenants in common without

dividing it and on of them subsequently brings a suit for recovery A of the share the pj:riod of !imitation for the suit does not run against him from the date of the death of the deceased but from the date of express ouster or deniaf of title and Article 144 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act, 1908 would be the relevant Article.

Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that there were two impediments to the appellant's claim for partition of the pro' perties. One was that the decree paSsed by the Court of Darul Khaza upon the award was not obtained by fraud and could not be set aside by reason of limitation. The other was that the appellant came to know in the year 1927 that Abdul Hai adversely chiiined properties as his own and therefore the appellant's claim was barred by limitation. The High Court held that the appellant was aware of the attachment of the personal and the Dargah and Khankah properties by the Government of the Nizam in the year 192 7 as also ire lease in the same year of the properties attached. The High Co;, rt' had that when parties had knowledge of the attachment of the properties it could not be postulated that they would have no knowledge of the contentions of Abdul Hai as to release of the Dargah and Khankah properties on the ground that those were not Dargah and Khankah but personal properties of Abdul Hai. Knowledge of release of properties would not amount to ouster of the appellant from the property or of abandonment of rights.

The evidence of the appellant was that in 1350 .i:<asli corres• ponding to the year 1941 the appellant came to know that a letter had been written by Abdul Hai to the Ecclesiastical Department

of the Government of the Nizam in the year 1938 to the effect that the properties shown as Dargah and Khankah in the award and the ®cree were not Dargah and Khankar properties.

The appellant also came fo know from the same letter that sll the proparties including those stated to be Dargah and Khankah properties in the award were attaclled by the Government of Nizan1 in the year 1927 .and after enquiry by the Government of the Nizam all the properties were released in the year 1927.

The appellant further came to know from that letter that Abdul Hai claimed the properties as his own. 'Thereupon the appellant demanded from Abdul Hai partition of the property as Matrooka.

Abdul Hai; asked .the appellant to consult lawyer.

On the evidence it would be utterly wrong to speculate that the appellant knew of the conti!ntions advanced in 1927 by Abdul Hai for the release of the properties by stating that they were not Dargah and .Khankah properties. There was no suggestion at the

time of the examination of the appellant that he was aware in

1927 of the contentions of Abdul Hai.

The High Court relied on Exhibit A-38 a letter dalled 19 October, 1927 writteµ by the appellant to Abdul Hai to impute knowledge of the attachment and release of the properties.

The appellant was never _confronted with tl!at letter. lt was never suggested to the appellant 1ilat the letter could be construed as attributi; ng to the appellant the knowledge of any adverse claim made by Abdul Hai with regard to the properties.

In that letti:r the appellant stated that he was indebted to the elder brother Abdul Hai for his kindness.

The appellant also stated that the expenditure incurred in connection with the litigation would be divided into four parts and the amount incurred on behalf of the appellant could be recovered from his account.

This letter dated 1'9 October, 1927 does not at all have the effect of establishing that the appellant had knowledge of any adverse claim of the appellant. The appellant was never shown the letter to explain what litigation he referred to.

No inference can be drawn against the appellant without giving him an opportunity to have his say in that matter_ It is unfortunate that Abdul Hai died dring the pendency of the suit and before the trial.

Not only his oral evidence but also the correspondence that Abdul Hai had with the Government of the Nizam in the year 1927 did not find way into the record of the suit.

It would be totally misreading the appellant's Jettier of the year 192 7 as impressiri_g the appellant with the knowledge of ouster by Abdul Hai of the appellant from the properties forming the subject matter of the suit.

There are two letter of great importance.

One is dated 13 August, 1938 and marked Exhibit P-8 written by Abdu\Hai to the Director of Endov.(ment, Government of Hyderabad and the other is dated 7 September, 1938 written by the Ecclcsiatical Department of the Government of Hyderabad to the Secretary of the Endowments, Ecclesiastical Department of the Government of Hyderabad. Thie letter of Abdul Hai was written in answer to an application made about that time to the Government of the Nizam by one Sheikh Abdur Rahim a tenant against whom Abdul Hai had filed a suit for recovery of rent.

Abdur Rahim made an allegation that the propertiles in respect of which Abdur Hai filed a suit were Dargah and Khankah properties.

The complaint of Abdur Rahim was however dismissed and the matter was not allowed to be reopened on thle strength of the orders of the Government recited by Abdul Hai in his letter.

In answer Abdul Hai recorded these facts.

The Nizam in the month of April, 1927 appointed the Secretary of the Ecclesiastical Department and the Commissioner of Police to enquire and report as to which of the properties were attached to the Dargah and which were personal private properties. Another Commission was appointed by the Nizam to enquire int\) the proper use of the endowed properties. The Ecclesiastical Department by Letter dated 28 December, 1927 held that only the villages Debser and Sangvi were found to be under the Dargah. All properties of the parties which had been attached by the Nizam were released by letter dated 3 January, 1928 excepting the two villages. Abdul. Hai by letter dated 16 January, 1928 to the Government of the Nizam stated that the properties marked Exhibits B-1 to B-10 in the award and the decree of the Court of Darul Khaza did not belong to the Dargah and Khankah.

Abdul Hai further pointed out that the Nizam by a firman dated 11 November, 1927 had issued orders saying that according to the opinion of the Council the Government's supervision should ble lifted from the 'maash' referring thereby to the properties which had been attached by the Nizam and the same should be given over into the possession of Abdul Hai.

The other letter dated 5 January, 1939 from the Government of the Nizam stated that only two villages were held to be Dargah and the Government of the Nizam had made thorough enquiries and held that there was no other Dargah and Xhankah properties and the question could not be re-opened.

It is established in evidence that the properties which were described as Dargah and Kha:nkah properties before the arbitrators and the decrele of the Darul Khaza Court are not Dargah and Khankah properties.

Abdul Hai obtained an adjudication and an order of the Government of the Nizam in the year 1927 that only two villages of Debser and Sangvi belonged to the Dargah and the rest were not Dargah and Khankah properties. The appellant knew that there was litigation about the year 1927 about th.<: properties. It is not in evidence as to what that litigation was or which properties were concerned therewith because the letter was not shown to the appellant. Even if it be assumed that all p_arties treated the properties marked Exhibits B-1 to B-10 as Dargah properties upto the year 1927 and thereafter there was an adjudication on the representation of Abdul Hai that the properties were not Dargah and Khankah the parties would. be entitloo to the same.

The only way in which the parties could lose their rights to the property would be on the finding that there was adverse possession or ouster.

The decree of the Darul Khaza Court will not be an obstacle to the claim of the appellant for partition of the properties, because the properties are admittedly not Dargah and Khankah properties but Matrooka properties. The arbitration proceedings were void by reason of lack of legal guardian of the appellant to enter into

a compromise. The decree of the Darul Khaza Court is also invalid and not binding on the appellant for the same reason. If all parties proceeded upon a basis that these were Dargah and Khankah properties and that basis is wiped out by the adjudication by the Government of the Nizam the parties are restored to their position as heirs to the Matrooka property. The award

and the decree by reason of evidence of facts discovered since the judgement and the decree of the Darul Khaza Court cannot lie allowed to stand because the effect of the' discovery of the facts is to make it "reasonably probable that the action will succeed". In Birth v. Birch(') the Court of Appeal held that a judgment will be set aside on the ground of fraud if evidence of facts discovered since the judgment raise a reasonable probability of the success of the action. The principle can be stated in the words of Westbury, .L.C. in Rolfe v. Gregory(') "when the remedy is given on the ground of fraud, it is governed by this important principle, that the right of the party defrauded is not affected by lapse of time, or generally speaking by anything done or omitted to be done so long as he remains, without any fault of his own, in ignorance of the fraud that has been committed". This decision was referred to by thlo Calcutta High Court in Biman Chandra) Datta v. Promotha Nath Ghose(') where the dictum o{ Westbury; L.C. was restated by holding that where a plaintiff had been kept from knowledge, by the defendant, of the circumstances constitut ing the fraud, the plaintiff could rely upon section 18 of the Limitation Act to escape from the bar of limitation. In the present case, it is apparent that until the year 1927 the appellant and thevother parties were clearly kept out of the knowledge of the true character of the properties. Even after 1927 it cannot be said on the evidence on record that the appellant had any knowledge of the true character of the properties or ouster or adwrse possession of Abdul Hai. The reasons are that Abdul Hai never alleged against the appellant and the other parties openly that he was enjoying the properties to the total exclusion of the appellant and the other brothers. Possession by one co-owner is not by itself adverse to other co-owners. On the cantrary. possession by one co-owner is presumed to be the possession of all tile co-owners unless it is established that the possession of the co-owner is in denial of title of co-owners and the possession is in hostility to co-owners by exclusion of them. In the present case there is no evidence to support this conclusion.

Ouster is an unequivocal act of assertion of title. There has to be open denial of title to the parties who are entitled to it by excluding and ousting them.

(I) IQO~ Pr<>batc Division 1)1 Cl [IS6~] DcG. J.& S. 576

(3) I.LR. ~Q Cal. s%

Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides that when a ; A person h; aving a right to institute a suit has by means of fraud ' bqen kept from the knowledge of such. {ight or of the title on which it is founded, the time limited for instituting a suit against the person guilty of the fraud shall be computed from the time whlen the . fraud first became known to the person affected !hereby. In Rahimboy v. Turner( 1) Lord Hobhouse said "When B a man has committed a fraud and has got property thereby it is for him to show that the person injured by his fraud and suing to recover the property has had clear and definite knowledge of thO!; e facts which constitute the fraud, at a time which is too remote to allow him to bring the suit". Therefore if the plaintiff desires to invoke the aid of section 18 of the Limitation Act he must• establish that there has been fraud and that by means. of such fraud he has been kept from the knowledge. of his right to sue or of the title wliereon it is founded.

In the present case, he have with reasonable diligence discovered it. There was active properties were Matrooka and not Dargah and Khankah. When Abdul Hai got the properties released by reason of the decision of the Government of the Nii.am in the year 1927 the properties became divisible among the appellant and his brothers and sisters.

The existence of the right of the appellant was kept concealed by Abdul Hai. The appellant was not aware of the right nor could he have with reasonable diligence discovered it. There was active concealment by Abdul Hai of the fact that the properties were not Dargah and Khenkah having full knowledge of the fact.

It was only in 1941 ,(1350 Fasli) that the appellant came to know of the Matrooka character of the properties.

It was then that the appellant also came to know that Abdul Hai had kiept the charac• ter of properties concealed from the parties and entirely misstated and misrepresented the character of the properties by misleading the parties and obtaining by consent an award and a decre.e thereon without any contest.

The cause of action for partition of properties is said to be a "perpetualiy recurring: one" See Monsharam Chakravarty & Ors.

v. Ganesh Chandra Chakravartv & Ors. ( 2 ). In Mohammedan Law the doctrine of partial partition is not applicable because the heirs G are tenants-in-common and the heirs of the deceased Muslim succeed to the definite fraction of .every part of his estate. The shares of heirs under Mohamedan Law are definite and known before actual partition.

Therefore on partition of properties blelonging to a deceased Muslim there is division bv metes and bounds in accordance with the specific share of each heir bleing already H deterinined by the law.·

(!) n T.A. I

(2) 17 C.W.N.521

 .. ·.

Jn the present case the suit is for partition of properties which were by consent of parties treated as Dargah and Khankah but which _were later discovered to be Matrooka properties in_ fact and therefore the declaration in the award and the decree on the award that those were Dargah and Khankah prorties cannot stand and the entire !_)artition is to be re-opened by reason of fraud in the earlier proceedings.

In the present case, the overwhelming evidence is that because of the representation of Abdul Hai that he was the Sajjadanasheen and the properties marked Exhibits B-1 to B-10 were Dargah and Khankah properties, that all the parties treated the properties as Dargah and Khankah before the arbitrators and in the decreie upon the award.

The very fact that there was never any contest indicates that the compromise and settlement between the parties was on the basis that the properties wre Dargah and Khankah. It was absolutely within the knowledge of Abdul Hai as to what the true character of the properties was.

The other parties did not have any opportunity of knowing the same. Abdul Hai knew the real character, concealed the true character and suggested a different character and thereby mislead all the parties.

Again, when Abdul Hai approached the Government of the Nizam and got the properties released by asserting that they were not Dargah and Khankah properties in the year 1927.

Abdul Hai did not inforn1 the same to any of the parties. The unmistakable intention of Abdul Hai all along was to enjoy the properties by stating these to .be Dargah and Khankah. When the parties came to kno_w the real character of the properties even then Abdul Hai was not willing to have partition. On these facts it is established that the fraud committed by Abdul Hai relates "to matters which prima facie would be a reason for setting the judgment aside".

That is the statement of law in Halsbury's Laws of Engfand, Third Edition, Volume 22, paragraph 1669 at page 790.

For these reasons we accept the appeal and set aside the judg- _ ment of the High Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court.

The appellant will be entitled to costs of this Court. The parties will pay and bear their own costs in the High Court.

G.C Appeal allowed.

SYED SHAH GHULAM GHOUSE MOHIUDDIN AND ORS

SYED SHAH AHMED MOHIUDDIN KAMISUL QUADRI (DEAD) BY L. Rs. AND OTHERS

G. K. MITTER

A. N. RAY, JJ.

Limitation Act, 1908

ss. 18 and 144

s. 144

Limitation Act

s. 18

Shah Abdul Rahim

Hyderabad

Abdul Hai Shah Abdur Rahim

Abdur Rahim

Nooruddin

Abdul Hai

August 1, 1908

August 13, 1908

Nizam's Government

24th Julv 1941

Darulkhaza Court

Nooruduin

Darul Khaza Court

Limitation Act 1908

Government of the Nizam

s. 18

Limitation Act

S 576

R. V. Pillai

N. Nettar

C. K. Daphtary

Rameshwar Nath

Swaranjit Sodhi

V. A. Seyid Muhammad

S. P. Nayar

Ray

Shah Abdul Rahim

Ghulam Nooruddin

Abdul Razak

Ghulam Ghousie Mohiuddin

Kamarunnissa Begum

Badiunnissa Begum

Syed Shah Abdul Rahim

1 August, 1908

13 August, 1908

Darul Khaza Court, Hyderabad

High Court of Hyderabad

Abdul Hai

Andhra Pradesh Hjgh Court

Abdul Rahim

Qamarunnissa Begum

Badiunnisa Begum

Qamarunnisa Begum

Abdul .tlai

Syed Shah Nooruddin

Nampalli

Khankah

Khankah Abdur Rahim

Abdul Hai

Sajjaaanasheen

13 August, 1938

Dargah

Sajjadanasheen

Darul Khaza

Nociruddin

Mohamedan

Article 144

Schedule I to the Limitation Act, 1908

Abdul Hai

1'9 October, 1927

Sheikh Abdur Rahim

Abdur Hai

Nizam

28 December, 1927

Debser

Sangvi

3 January, 1928

Abdul. Hai

16 January, 1928

11 November, 1927

5 January, 1939

Westbury

Calcutta High Court

section 18

Limitation Act

S. 576

Section 18

Limitation Act, 1908

section 18

Limitation Act

Matrooka

Government of the Nii.am

Khenkah