PATEL BHUDER MAVJl ETC. v.

JAT MAMDAH KALAH (DECEASED) THROUGH L. Rs.

JAT SAHEB KHAN MAMDAn ETC.

February 13, 1969

[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J. AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]

Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Act Mortgage with possessionr- Morlgagor applying for adjustment..:_Land declared Khalsa under the Land Reforms Act-Effect of-Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, (Sau, 25 ol 1951)-Land declared Khalsa-Rights of Mortgagor whether extinguished.

The Respondent-Girasdars in the State of. Saurashtra mortgaged their lands with possession with the appellants, who paid the land revenue and other dues.

By the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act (25 of 1951), the rights of the Girasdars were extinguished, and the tenants of Girasdara became occupants di land held by them. The Land Reforms Act provided for the Mamlatdar to allot land to a Girasdar for personal cultivation .. The special Mamlatdar declared the lands in dispute to be Khalsa and full assessment had to be taken, and that there was no need to grant any occupancy rights. The Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1954 was enacted scaling down the debts and for providing for restoration of their property to the debtors. Thereupon the respondents applied for adjustment of their debt to the Court having jurisdictioo under the Debtors Relie't Act. appellants relied on the order of the Special Mamlatdar declaring the land• as Khalsa and contended that the lands having been declared as JChalro, the respondents had lost their rights therein.

HELD : The rights of the respoodents-Girasdars in this case were not extinguished under the Land Reforms .Act and it was open to the court exercising jurisdiction under the Debtors Relief Act to scale down the debt and provide the restoration of the land iit possession of the mortgagees to the mortgagors on taking fresh account between the parties and directing payments by one party to the other. .

The Saurashtra Land Reforms Act aimed at regulating the relationship O'f persons in pos.itioo of Landholders and their tenants, and to enable the tenants to become the real owners of the soil under direct tenancy from the State. It wa, not meant to extinguish or affect the rights of Landholders as mortgagors unless the persons in occupation had become tenants either by contract or by operation -0f law.

No adjudication Of the rights of the debton and creditors inter se was G done.

All that the Special Mamlatdar decided and had iuriSdicti<>n to decide under the Land Reforms Act was whether the respondents could be given occupancy certificates or allotted any land Gharkhed and the Special Mamlatdar merely ordered that the lands being Khalsa full assessment had to be taken in respect of them and there was no need to grant occupancy rights. In order to get such occupancy rights the appellants bad to show that they had become tenants which they could not be under H the provisions of s. 6 of the Land Reforms Act. The fact that they had all along paid the revenue and other dues to the State, if any, would .not clothe them with tenancy rights. That apart, it has not been shown

that the respondents were awarded any compensation ill respect of the

Khalsa lands given in mortgage to the appellants. The occupancy certifl.. cates if any, given by the Special Mamlatdar to the appellants could nol unde; the provisions of the Land Reforms Act extingui•h the title of tho respondents. [695 H; 696 HJ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 123 and 124 of 1966.

Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated April 28, 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Applications Nos. 88 and 93 of 1961.

P. B. Patwari, K. L. Hathi, S. K. Bagga and Sureshta Bagga, for the appellants. c P. M. Rawal and P. C. Bhartari, for the respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. These are two appeals by , special leave from judgments of the Gujarat High Court dated April 28, 1965 in Civil Revision Applications No. 88 and 93 of 1961. As the questions involved in both the applications were the same, the High Court delivered the main judgment in Civil Revision Application No. 88/1961 and referred to the same in its judgment in Civil Revision Application No. 93 of 1961. The two applications in the High Court arose out of certain proceedings under the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Aet.

The applicants before the High Court and the appellants before this Court were E mortgagees in possession of certain lands belonging to the debtors who are now represented by the respondents. The main question before the High Court was and before us is, whether the debtors had Io.st all their interest in the lands mortgaged by reason of the operatmn of the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, XXV of 1951 and

as such were not competent to make an application under the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1954. Hereinafter the two Acts will be referred to as the Land Reforms Act the Debtors Relief Act.

It is not necessary to deal separately with the facts in the two appeals as the course of proceedings in both cases were similar giving rise to common questions of law.

We .therefore propose to take note of the facts in Civil Revision Application No. 88 of 1961. The creditors, appellants before us, were in possesion of the properties-the subject matter of litigation, under two mortgage deeds of Samvat years 1997 and 1999. The first mortgage was for Rs. 991 and the second for Rs. 1. 011 The mortgagees were with possession and the mortgagee have been appropriating the income of the usufruct thereof for the last

50. years. There is nothing to show whether they were under a liibnity under the documents of mortgage to pay the revenue and other dues to the State but there is no dispute that they havo

been doing so for many years past.

The lands were situate in Bajana State with its own peculiar land tenure system known as the Girasdari system.

The Land Reforms Act which came into force on July 23, 1951 purported to effect important and far-reaching changes in the said system. The preamble to the Act shows that its object was "the improvement of land revenue administration and for

ultimately putting an end to the Girasdari system" and the regulation of the relationship between the Girasdars and their tenants, to enable the latter to become occupants of the !and held by them and to provide for the payment of compensation to the Girasdars for the extinguishment of their rights.

It will be noted at once that the Act aimed at regulating the relationship of persons in the position of landholders and their tenants and to enable the tenants to become the real owners of the soil under direct tenancy from the State. It was not meant to extinguish or affect the rights of the landholders as mortgagors unless the persons in occupation had become tenants either by contract or by operation of law.

The Act came into force in the whole Of Saurashtra area of the State of Gujarat. Under s. 2 ( 15) 'Girasdar' meant any

ta!ukdar, bhagdar, bhayat, cadet or. mu!-girasia, etc.

Under s. 2 ( 13) 'estate' meant all land of whatever description held by a Girasdar including uncultivable waste whether used for the purpose of agriculture or not and 'Gharkhed' meant any land reserved by or allotted to a Girasdar before the 20th May 1950 or for being cultivated personally and in his personal cultivation.

A tenant under s. 2(30) meant an agriculturist who held land on lease from a Girasdar or a person claiming through him and included a person who was deemed to be a tenant under the provisions of the Act. Under s. 3 the provisions of the Act were

to have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any, other law for the time being in forte. Section 4 provided that "all land of whatever description held by Girasdar is and shall continue to be liable to the payment of land revenue to the State of Gujarat." Section .5 classified Girasdars according to the measure of their holding and under cl. ( c) thereof a Girasdar was to belong to class C if the total area of agricultural land comprised in his estate did not exceed Act. 120-00. Section 6(1) of the Act laid down that any persOl!l who was lawfuUv cultivating any , Jand belonging to a Girasdar was to be deemed for the purposes of the Act to be the t.enant if be was not a member of the Girasdar's family or a servant on wages pavable in cash or in kind etc. or a mortgagee in poS$ession.

The Explanation to the sub-section however shows that a person who was otherwise deemed to be a tenant was not to cease tp be such only on the

MAVJI V. MAMOAJI (Miller, J.) 693

ground that he was a mortgagee in possession. Under s. 19 it was open to any Girasdar to apply to the Mamlatdar for the allotment to him of land for personal cultivation within a certain fixed time. Such application had to be made in a specified form giving the prescribed particulars.

The applicant had to sh?w inter alia, the area and location of the land in respect of which B the allotment was prayed for, the right under which he claimed

the land and full particulars of his estate as also the area of khalsa land, if any, in his possessibn. Under s. 20 of the Act it was for the Mamlatdar to issue notice to the tenant or t.enants concerned on receipt of an application under s. 19 and make an enquiry in the prescribed manner after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. After such inquiry the Mamlatdar was required to pass an order making an allotment to the Girasc

dar of such land as may be specified in the order and this was to be followed by the issue of an occupancy certificate to a Girasdar in respect of his Gharkhed and the land, if any, allotted to him under the section. Under sub-s. ( 4) no Girasdar was to obtain possession of any land held by a tenant except in accordance with the order under the section. Section 24 laid down the total area of the holding which a C class Girasdar could be allotted for personal cultivation.

Sub-s. (2) of the section provided that a C class Girasdar could not be allotted any khalsa land if it was held by a tenant. Chapter V containing sections 31 to 41 provided for acquisition of occupancy rights by tenants and s. 31 laid down the consequences which were to issue in the wake of grant of occupancy certificates. A tenant who was J!Ianted such a certificate was to be free of all relations and obligations as tenant to the Girasdar. The Girasdar in his tum was to be entitled to receive and be paid compensation as provided in the Act. Under s. 36 the riimt. title and interest of the Girasdar in respect of an occupancy holding were to be deemed to have been extinguished on the payment bv the Government of the last im; talment of compensation. The functions of a Mamlatdar are laid down in s. 46 of the Act. It was for him to decide inter Q/ia what land should be allotted to a Girasdar for person~ cultivation and to make such allotment, to decide whether a nerson was or was not tenant, to determine whether a tenancv shall be terminated under s. 12 and many other matters. Under s. 51 an appeal lay to the Collector against any order of the Mamlatclar.

The above analysis of the relevant provisions of the Land Reforms Act amply demonstrates the manner in which a change was to be brought about in the relationship between the Girasda1 and is tenants and the ri2hts which thev were respectively tc acomre under ihe orders of the Soecial Mamlatdar. The said Officer had no jurisdiction to terminate any rights under mort !!age.

694 SUPRiMI! COURT REPORTS

[1969] 3 S.C.R.

The full text of the order of the Mamlatdar on the application of the Girasdars (the respondents to the appeal) is not before us.

The copy of the order on the respondents' application marked Ex. 8/1 bearing date 16th January 1954 was handed over to us.

It appears therefrom Lhat the Girasdar was allowed to keep as Gharkhed certain lands by paying six times the assessment in the treasury but with regard to S._Nos. 684 and 685 (the lands given to the mortgagees) the same were held by the Mamlatdar to be khalsa and full assessment thereof was ordered to be taken. The Mamlatdar .further noted that there was no need to grant any occupancy rights.

On May 2, 1955 the respondents applied for adjustment of their debt to the Civil Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Debtors Relief Act.

The creditors relied on the order of the Special Mamlatdar declaring the lands as Khalia as fortified by the decision of the Bhayati court of Bajana State. It was contended that the lands having been declared khalsa the debtors had lost their righB therein. Reliance was also placed on Forms 7 and 8 by counsel for the appellants to show that his clients had acquired proprietary rights in the said khalsa lands.

According to the Civil Judg~ the judgment of the Bhayati court had merely decided that the Bai!Ula State had no title or interest in the land in question and that the Jats Mul-Girasdars were independent proprietors thereof.

The Judge however remarked that it was not for the Special Mamlatdar to decide any question as to title and he had merely ordered recovery of full assessment from the persons in actual oossession and this in no way vested any title in the creditors. In the result the Civil Judge directed the restoration of the lands to the debtors subject to certain limitations and conditions.

The creditors went up in appeal to the Assistant Judge, Surendranagar. There it was contended on their behalf that the mortgages had been extinP, Uished by the title of the paramount power and on the date of the application under the Debtors Relief Act there was no subsisting mortgage between them . and the

reoondents. Reliance was !'laced on the dedsion of the Soedal Mamlatdar declaring the land to be khalsa land as extinguishing the mortgages by forfeiture of the land to the State. The Assistant Judge dealt with the question at some length and came to the conclusion that the mortgages had not been extinl!'Uished and not being tenants within the meanin!! of s. 6 the creditors could not have got an occupancv certificat~- in resoect of the lands in their possession. He further stressed on the decision of the Special Mamlatdar to show that only the liability for the full assessment of the lands was indicated without anv disturbance to the rights inter se between the mortgagor and the mortgagee.~.

Dealing with the question of the advances made and the amounts

still due to the creditors, it was ordered that the debtors should pay Rs. 1,698/- in twelve yearly instalments and the award was directed to be modified accordingly.

The matter was then taken up by way of Civil Revision to the High Court of Gujarat. The High Court arrived at the following conclusions :-

(a) The decision of the Bhavati court merely declared that the State was entitled to recover taxes of various kinds from the lands in possession of tenants or mortgagees.

There was no decision that the lands in possession of the mortgagees were confiscated to the State.

(b) The Soecial Mamlat<lar reiected the application of the -debtors and directe<l the lands in possession of the different creditors to be treated as Government lands as according to him the decision of the Bhayati court amounted to a forfeiture of th~ lands by the Bajana State.

(c) It was not necessry to test the correctness of the decision of the Sll-~~; nl Mam1atdar as in view of the provisions in the Debtors Relief Act which was an Act subsequent to the Land Reforms Act the provisions of the latter Act were to prevail.

In the result the High Court affirmed the order of the Assistant Judge in appeal directing possession to be handed over to the debtors.

Before us great stress was laid on the decision of the Special Mamlatdar and it was argi.Jed that sub_iect to anv appeal from his order his decision was binding on the parties and not havin~ v; one up in appeal from the order of the Spe6al Mamlatdar the debtors could not be allowed to agitate their rights to the land ignoring the said order. We have not before us the full text of the order of the Special Mamlatdar relied on by th" anoellants nor are we satisfied from copies of form 7 orescribed under Rule 81 of the Rules oromul_gated under the Land Reforms Act that there was any adjudication of the rights of the dehton; and the crediton: inter se. In our view all that the Special Mamlatdar decided and had jurisdiction to decide under the Act wa~, whether the debtors could be given occupancy certificates or allotted anv land Gharkhed and the Snecial Mamlatdar merely ordered that the lands being kha/sa full assesment had to be taken in respect of them and there was no need to grant occupancv rights. In order to get such occupancy rights the creditors had to show that they had

become tenants which obviously they could not be under the provisions of s. 6 of the land Reforms Act. The fact that they had all along paid the revenue and other dues to the State, if any, would not clothe them with the right of the tenants. Under s. 76(c) of the Transfer of Property Act a mortgagee in possession must, in the absence of a contract to the contrary out of the income of the property, pay the Government revenue, all other charges of a public nature and all rent accruing due in respect thereof durine: such possession. We do not know whether there was a contract to the contrary and whether the mortgagors had covenanted to pay the rent and the revenue.

But even if they could not meet the revenue and other State dues out of the income and paid the same out of their own pockets in order to save the security, the mortgagees were only entitled under s. 72(b) of the Transfer of Property Act to add the amount to the mortgage money. They could not by paying such rent or revenue acquire a title in derogation of the rights of the mortgagors and the payments, if any, are to be taken into account when the mortgagors seek to redeem the property.

That apart, it has not been shown to us that the debtors were awarded any compensation in respect of the khalsa lands given in' mortgage to the appellants. The occupancy certificate;, if any, given by the Special Mamlatdar to the appellants cannot under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act extinguish the title of the mortgagors. Whether the mortgagors as C class Girasdars can be allowed to retain land in excess of the limits specified in the Act and whether as a result of the restoration of the lands to them by the award such limit will be exceeded in this case, are not questions for us to consider.

The right of the mortgae:ors not bein[t extinguished under any provision of law to which our attention was drawn. no fault can be found with the award as finally modified by the judgment of the Assistant Jud!!:e and effect must be given thereto.

In our view, it is not

necesarv to consider the noint canvassed at length before the High Court and dealt with in th~ iudwnent of the said court as to whether the provi<ions of the Debtors Relief Act over-ride thn<e in th"' Land Reforms Act.

The object of the two Acts are <liff Prnnt. The ol:>iect of the Land Reforms Act. as already noted. is the imnrovement of the land revenue administration and nuttin<" an end to the Clirasdari svstem and irrantinJ?: of occupancy

riht< to the Girasd"rs and /or their tenants, whereas the Debtors Relief Act g-ovems the rights of the debtors and creditors inter se inter alia bv scaling down the debets and oroviding for restoration of their nronertv to debtors. In our view. the ri2hts of the debtors in th; s case wP-re not extimn1ished under the Land Reforms Act and it was oPen to the court exercising jurisdiction under the Debtors Relief Act to scale down the debt and provide for resto

MAVJl v. MAMDAJI (Mitter, /,) 697

A ratian Qf tho laad in p!llSOl4lon of tho mortgageos to tho mortgagor& on taking fresh acoou11ts n the parties and directing payments by one party to the other as has been done in this case.

Tho appoala thertforo fail and are dismisled with coets. a Y.P.

App1q/ dismissed.

PATEL BHUDER MAVJl ETC

JAT MAMDAJI KALAJI (DECEASED) THROUGH L. Rs. JAT SAHEB KHAN MAMDAJI ETC

February 13, 1969

M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.

G. K. MITTER, JJ.

Girasdara

s. 6

Gujarat High Court

P. B. Patwari

K. L. Hathi

S. K. Bagga

Sureshta Bagga

P. M. Rawal

P. C. Bhartari

Mitter

Bajana State

July 23, 1951

Saurashtra

Gujarat

s. 2

s. 2

20th May 1950

s. 2(30)

s. 3

Section 4

Girasdar

State of Gujarat

Section 6(1)

MAVJI V. MAMOAJI

s. 19

s. 20

s. 19

Section 24

sections 31 to 41

s. 31

s. 36

s. 46

s. 12

s. 51

May 2, 1955

Bhayati court of Bajana State

Surendranagar

s. 6

High Court of Gujarat

Bhavati court

Bajana State

s. 6

s. 76(c)

Transfer of Property Act

s. 72(b)

Transfer of Property Act

Land Reforms Act


MALINI AYYAPPA NAICKER (NOW DEAD) THROUGH A

L.R. ETC. ETC.

SETH MANGHRAJ UDHA VDAS FIRM BY MANAGING

PARTNER

CHATHURBHUJ

CHBABILDAS

(DEAD) THEREAFl'ER BY LRS. &: ORS. a February 13, 1969

[S. M. SIKRI, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HBGDB, JJ.]

 Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, •· 7S(l), first proviso-Power of High Couri to sr4isfy itself that an appeal wa.r decided by tht Distrkt CollTt "'according to iaw"-Scope of.

Tho petitioning creditor in an insolvency proceeding sought annullment of two mortgages, one for Rs. 15,000/. in favour of the appellant in C.A. 84S and another for Rs: 10,000/. in favour the appellant in C.A. 846.

The mortgages weno date(! November 4, 1950 and were registered on November 6, 1950. Tho InsOlvency Court held that the mortgages were not supported by consideration and were led with a view to screen ing some of the properties of the insolvents from their creditor.i. It therefore, annulled the mortgages under section S3 of tho Provincial InsOlvency Act. The District Judge, in appeal, reversed the findings of the trial court but the High Court, acting under the fir.it proviso of section 75(1) of the Act, set aside the judgment of the District Judge and restored that of the Insolvency Court.

In an appeal to this Court by special leave, it was contended on behalf of the appellants (i) that the High Court while acting under the first proviso of section 75(1) to satisfy itself "that an order made in any appeal decided by the District Court was according to law" had no power to disturb the findings of fact reached by the appellate court; the jurisdiction of tho High Court is a very limited one and not more than that conferred on it by su""ection 100(1) C.P.C.; and (ii) that the conclusions of the High Court were unsustainable on the evidence on record.

HELD: (i) The legislature did not confer on the High Court. under the first proviso to s. 75 (I) of the Act an appellate power nor did it confer on it a jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence on record. While exercising that power the High Court is by and lar~ bound by the findings of fact reached by the District Court If the legtslature intended to confer power on it to xamine both questions of law and fact it would have conveyed its intention by appropriate words as has been done under various other statutes. A wrong decision on facts by a competent court is also a decision according to law. [701 DJ

A decision being "contrary to law" as provided in s. 100(1) (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the same thing as a decision being not "according to law" as prescribed in the first proviso of s. 7S(D of the Act The latter expression is wider in ambit than the former. It is neither desirable not possible to give an exhaustive definition of the expression "according to law". The power given to the Hi$b Court . under the first proviso to s. 75(1) of the Act is similar to that given to it under •· 2S of the Provincial Small Cau•e• Court• Act. [701 Fl

BtU .l Co. Ltd. v. Waman H<mra;, (1938) 40, Bom. L.R. 125; Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, [1962] 1, supp. S.C.R. 399;

MALIN! AYYAPPA v. MANGHltAJ (Hegde, J.) 699

Official Receiver, Kanpur and Anr. v. Abdul Shakur [1965] I S.C.R. 254; referred to and explained.

(ii) On the evidence, the findings of the District Court on. the payment of consideration were correct findings o'f fact and the High Court could not have interferred with the same. However, one payment in respect of the mortgage in C.A. 845 was not proved and the mortgage was therefore only valid to the extent of Rs. 10,500/-.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 845 and 846 of 1963.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 17, 1958 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 981 and 982 of 1956.

S. V. Gupte and R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants (in both the appeals).

Naunit Lal, for the respondents Nos. 1 (c) and 17 (in C.A.

No. 845 of 1963) ajlld respondents Nos. l (c) and 16 (in C.A.

No. 846 of 1963).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hegde, J. These appeals arise from an insolvency proceeding wherein one Ponnayya Konar and his sons were adjudicated as insolvents. In the said proceeding the petitioning creditor sought to get annulled two mortgages one for Rs. 15,000 (Exh. A-1) executed by the insolvents in favour of Ayyappa Naicker, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 845 of 1963 and the other for Rs. 10,000 (Exh. A-2), the subject matter of Civil Appeal No. 846 of 1963, in favour of one Srinivasa Naicker, the fatherin-law of the aforementioned Ayyappa Naicker.

The said Srinivasa Naicker is dead and the appeal is being prosecuted by his legal representatives.

Both those mortgages are dated November 4, 1950 and they were registered on November 6,

1950. The Insolvency Court held that those mortgages were not supported by consideration and that they were executed with a view to screen some of the properties of the insolvents from their creditors.

It accordingly annulled those mortgages under s. 53 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In appeal the learned District Judge reversed the findings of the trial court. He came t? the nclusion that those '!lortgages

were fully supported by cons1derat10n and that they were genuine transactions.

The High Court acting under the I st proviso to s. 75 (I) of the Act reversed the judgment of the learned District Judge and restored that. of the Inso_lency Court. These appeals have been. brought agamst the decmon of the High Court after obtaining special leave from this Court.

The learned Counel for the appellants challenged the decision of the Hip Court primarily on two &t'OUDds.

Accordinir; to him

700 SUP!UlME COURT REl'OR'fS

[1969] 3 S.C.R.

the High Court whi~ acting under the 1st proviso to s. 75(1) of A the Act had no power to disturb the findings of fact reached by the appellate 'court.

Next he contended that the conclusions of the High Court are unsustainable on the evidence on record. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondents supported the decision of the High Court.

The two principal questions that arise for decision in these B appeals are ( 1) was the High Court within its jurisdiction in interfering with the findings of the learned District Judge that the impug11ed transactions are bona fide transactions and that they were supported by consideration and ( 2) are the conclusions reached by the High Court correct on the facts and circumstances of the case ? It would be convenient to take up first, the question c as to the scope of the powers of the High Court under the 1st proviso to s. 75(1) of the Act. That section reads :

"The debtor, any creditor, the receiver or any other person aggrieved by a decision cQllle to or an order made in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction by a Court subordinate to a District Court may appeal to o the District Court, and the order of the District Court upon such appeal shall be final : Provided that the High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made in any appeal decided by the District Court was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as E it thinks fit : Provided further, that any such person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court on appeal from a decision of a subordinate Court under secuon 4 ma~ appeal to the High Court on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section ( 1) of section 100 of the Code of Civil F , Procedure, 1908."

According to Shri S. V. Gupte, learned Counsel for the appellants the jurisdiction of a High Court under the 1st proviso to s. 75 ( 1) is a very limited one, the same being not more than that conferred on it by sub-s. (1) of s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention he invited our attention G to the scheme of s. 75 (1) of the Act. He urged that sub-s. ( 1) of s. 7 5 prescribes that the decision of the District Court in appeal is final and the finality conferred on the decision of the District Court is subject to a very limited scrutiny by the High Court. We were further told that. the power conferred on the High Court under the 1st proviso to s. 75 (1) is only a revisionM power, H which power in its very nature is narrower in compass than an appellate power.

According to him the power conferred under the !st proviso to s. 75(1) of the Act is co-extensive with that

MALINI AYYAPPA v. MANGHRAJ (Hegde, J.) 701

given to the High Court under s. 100( 1) (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

On the other hand Mr. Naunit Lal, learned Counsel for the respondent urged that the High Court under the 1st proviso to s. 75(1) of the Act has an extensive power .and that power is very much wider than the power conferred on 1t under~· 100(1)

(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure; the power of the High Coun under the 1st proviso to s. 75 (1) of the Act to call for the case to satisfy itself that the order made by the District Court was according to law and pass such other order in respect thereto as it thinks fit includes within itself the right to examine whether the District Court had taken into consideration all the material evi dence and whether it had properly assessed that evidence.

We are of the opinion that the extreme contentions advanced on either side cannot be accepted. Quite clearly the legislature did .not confer on the High Court under the 1st proviso to s. 75 ( 1 J of the Act an appellate power nor did it confer on it a jurisdictior. to reappreciate the evidence on record.

While exercising that power the High Court is by and large bound by the findings of fact reached by the District Court. If the legislature intended to confer power on it to re-examine both questions of Jaw and fact it would have conveyed its intention by appropriate words as has been done under various other statutes. A wrong decision on facts by a competent court is also a decision according to law.

For these reasons we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Naunit Lal that the power conferred under the 1st proviso to s. 75 ( 1) of the Act enables it to de novo examine the findings of fact reached by the District Court.

A decision being "contrary to law" as provided in s. 100 (I)

(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the same thing as a decision being not "according to law" as prescribed in the 1st proviso. of s. 75(1) of the Act. The latter expression is wider

1~ ambit than e forme~._ It is neither desirable nor possible to give;_ an exhaustive efimtion of e expression "according to law . The power given to the High Court under the 1st proviso to . s. 75(1) of the Act js similar to that given to 1t der s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act.

Explaimng th7 scope of the latter provision Beaumont, C.1. (as he then was) m Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj(') observed:

"The object of s. 25 is to enable the High Court to see tha~ !here has ?een no miscarriage of justice, that the dccISJon was given according to law. Tiie section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may

(t) [1938]40Bom.L.R. 12S.

LIOSup.169-IO

interfere in revision, as does s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and 1 certainly do not propose to attempt any exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders.

Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court' would not have arrived at."

The said statement of the law was accepted as correct by this Court in Hari Sha11kar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury(').

We think the sanre applies squarely to the 1st proviso to s. 75 (1) of the Act.

In support of his contention Mr. Gupte placed considerable reliance on the decision of this Court in Official Receiver, Kanpur and Anr. v. Abdul Shakur and Ors.(") wherein this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under the 1st proviso to s. 75 ( 1) of the Act is incompetent to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court and further the question whether a statutory presumption was rebutted by the rest of the evidence on record was also a question of fact which again was not open to be reviewed by the High Court.

Shah, J. who spoke for the Court observed thus at p. 259.

"The District Court inferred from the facts found that the statutory presumption under s. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had been weakened and the burden which lay upon the insolvent was discharged and it was. not open to the High Court exercising jurisdiction under s. 75(1} proviso 1, nor even under proviso 2 of the Provincial Insolvency Act to set aside the judgment of the District Court, for it is well settled that the question whether a statutory presumptiqn is rebutted by the rest of the evidence is a question of fact."

It may be remembered that Shah, J. was also a party to the decision in Hari Shankar's case('). We see no conflict between

(!) [1962] I Supp. S.C.R. 933.

(2) [1965] I S.C.R. 254.

the two decisions.

The former decision enumerates some of the circumstances under which the High Court can interfere while considering whether the decision under review was made accordincr to law.

All that is laid down in Abdul Shakur's case(') is that me High Court is not competent to disturb a finding of fact reached by the District Court even if in reaching that find

ing it was required to take into consideration a statutory presumption.

We shall now proceed to examine the facts of this case bearing in mind the principles set out above.

We shall first set out the undisputed facts.

The respondent Ponnayya Konar was a well to do person.

He had one rice mill at Kivalur and another at Sirkali. He also had landed pro perties in 'Sirkali and Tuticorin. He was having money dealings with the family of Sreenivasa Naicker from about the year 1925 Under the original of Exh. B-1, a registered deed of Othi dated 28th September, 1925, he had borrowed a sum of Rs. 30,000 from Rangappa Naicker, the father of Srinivasa Naicker. On

October 5, 1930 the said deed was renewed by the execution of a simple mortgage deed by Ponnayya Konar and his sons in favour of Rangappa Naicker.

Under the registered mortgage deed dated 13th January, 1942 (Exh. B-4 is its copy), the insolvents had borrowed from Ayyappa Naicker Rs. 20,000

out of which he discharged some of the debts due to Rangappa Naicker.

Ayyappa Naicker was himself a rich man.

Under the partition deed entered into in his family on October 30, 1936 (Exh. B-3) he got a cash of Rs. 52,000 and lands measuring

250 acres.

The debt due to Ayyappa Naicker under the deed dated 13th January 1942 was discharged by payment of Rs. 5,000 and interest on 3rd April, 1948 and Rs. 15 000 and interest on the 28th March, 1949, as can be seen frm Exhs.

B-5 and B-6.

The case of the mortgagees is that when Exh. A-1 and A-2 were executed they were unaware of the fact that the insolvents had got into financial difficulties by then. The learned District Judge has accepted this plea and the learned Judge of the High Court has not come to a contrary conclusion.

There was no relationship between the insolvents and the !llortgagees.

In .fact they belong to different communities. The

msolvnts are. Hindus and the mortagees are Christians. They

a!so lve at different places. The msolvents were residing at

Srrk~1 and th<: mortgagees at Tuticorin, a place which is at a considerable distance from Sirkali.

According to the mortgagees the circumstances under which Exh. A-1 and A-2 came to be executed are as follows :-

In about the beginning of 1950 Ponnayya Konar approached Srinivasa Naicker for a loan of Rs. 30,000. Srinivasa Naicker told him that he and his son-in-law Ayyappa Naicker together would lend him a sum of Rs. 25,000 on the mortgage of his properties at Tuticorin.

But as they did not have the entire sum of Rs. 25,000 in their hands at that time, a sum of Rs. 10,000 was paid to Ponnayya Konar on April 28, 1950 and a promissory note was taken for that amount. (Exh. A-11). In the beginning of September, 1950 Ponnayya Konar sent his son Arulappan with the letter (Exh. B-7) to get some more money.

Accordingly another sum of Rs. 5,000 was paid on September 8, 1950 and the pronote (Exh. A-12) was taken from Arulappan.

They agreed to pay the balance amount promised to be advanced at the time of the execution of the mortgage deeds. The mortgage deeds were got written up and executed on 4th November

1950. Therein it was recited that they were executed for cash consideration. It was thought that the mortgagees would be able to pay the balance amount before the registtation of the documents on November 6, 1950. But by that time they were not able to get together the entire amount that remained to be paid.

On the date of the registration Ayyappa Naicker paid to the mortgagors only a sum of Rs. 4,500 another sum of Rs.

SOO was adjusted towards the interest due on the sum of Rs. 15,000 previously advanced in. April and September.

The remaining sum of Rs. 5,000 was paid in two instalments, a sum of Rs. 1700 through Amirthan, the 3rd son of Ponnayya Konar on January 7, 1951 and the remaining sum of Rs. 33,00 again through Amirthan on February 10, 1951.

In the insolvency proceedings on the application of the petitioning creditor, a commissioner to search the house of the insolvents and seize their books of account and other relevant records was appointed.

After search the Commissioner seized from the house of the insolvents several account books (ledgers as well as day books) as well as A-11 and A-12 whiFh were found punched and defaced.

Exhs. A-11, A-12 as well as several of the entries in the ledger and day books were marked by consent in the proceedings from which these appeals have arisen.

Hence their genuineness is not open to question.

It is most unlikely that those documents were got up by the insolvents and kept in their house, depending on the off chance of a court commission, er searching their house and seizing them, so that they may serve as corroborating evidence in support of the impugned mortgages. If Exh. A-11 and A-12 as well as the entries in the account hooks were intended to support the clnim under Exhs. A-I und A-2, the most natural course would have been to draw up the mortgage deeds in such a way as to

take assistance from them.

Jn that case the mortgage deeds would not have recited that they were executed for cash consideration. Further Exhs. A-11 and A-12 would have been left in the possession of the mortgagees. We are convinced that. the version put forward by the mortgagees is substantially true. The original agreement between the parties was to take mortgagees of the Tuticorin properties for cash consideration.

The intermediate steps taken were necessitated by the fact that mortgagees were not able to Ret together in one lump the required am'ount.

The promissory notes Exhs. Al I and A-12 were taken as stop gap arrangements.

The recitals in the mortgage deeds accord with the original agreement between the parties.

That was likely to be the reason why the promissory notes Exh. A-11 and A-12 were returned to the parties. The entries in the account books of the insolvents reflect the transactions as they took place.

If they were bogus entries made to support Exhs. A-1 and A-2,

a receipt of Rs. 25,000 in cash on 4th November 1950 would have been shown therein. The learned District Judge correctly thought that the account entries in question had a great deal of intrinsic value. On the other hand the insolvency court and the High Court unnecessarily allowed themselves to be influenced by the apparent contradiction appearing between the recitals in Exhs.

Al and A-2 and those in Exhs. A-11, A-12 and the account

entri, s.

One other circumstance which had weighed with the High Court in holding that Exhs. A-1 and A-2 do not represent genuine transactions is that in their pleadings the mortgagees have struck to their case that cash consideration passed under Exh. A-1 and A-2 and this the Court thought was a deliberately false plea. The learned District Judge had carefully considered this circumstance

bt was of opin.ion that the same was of no consequence. We tmk that the High Court had attached undue importance to that

c1rcustance. The issue before the parties at the time of the

pleadms wa~ whether the mortgages in question were supported by cons1derahon or not and not the manner in which that considerati?n was paid.

In their plea the mortgagees were merely adhenng !O te. t.nor of the mortgage deeds.

From the facts stated earh.er, 1t 1s clear that the mortgagees at all stages proceeded on th.e basis that Exhs. A-1 and A:.2 were executed for cash consideration, the other steps taken by them being merely incidental.

The last and y far the most important circumstances that appears to have mftuenced the High Court was the failure of the mortgagees to pr<>?uce their account books.

This circumstance was careully considered by the District Judge. He held that the adverse mference that could be drawn from that circumstance was rcbuht!ed by the other evidence available in the case It was Ppen to 1111 to do so. His finding on this point is also a finding

of fact and by no means a wholly unreasonable finding. The High Court could not have interfered with the same.

From the above discussion it follows that generally speaking -we shall come to the details of consideration presently-the findings of the District Court as regards the payment of consideration under Exh. A-1 and A-2 are findings of facts and they were not open to review by the High Court.

This takes us to the various items of consideration said to have passed under Exhs. A-1 and A-2 and the proof thereof. The District Court has held that the entire consideration mentioned in those documents has passed.

We havs now to see whether its finding in respect of the various items of consideration is . su11- C ported by legal evidence. The challenge to the payment of cons1- '• deration under Exhs. A-1 and A-2 made by the pet.itioning creditor includes a challenge to the passing of the various items of consideration said to have passed. Ordinarily the burden of proving that a document impe'ached under s. 53 of the Act is not supported by consideration is on the party who challenges its validity. That is so because the party who stands by the document can take D advantage of the admission made by the insolvent in the document in question.

But in this case the mortgagees themselves do not st\tnd by the recitals in the documents as regards the manner in which consideration was paid. Therefore it is for them to prove the passing of consideration.

Hence we have to see how far they have succeeded in proving the same.

We shall first take up Exh. A-2, the mortgage deed executed in favour of Srinivasa Naicker. It is said that the consideration payable under that mortgage was paid in the following-manner :

Rs. 5,000 under promissory note Exh. A-11;

Rs. 1,700 paid in cash on 7-1-1951 and

Rs. 3,300 also paid in cash on 10-2-1951; The receipt of the aforementioned sums is entered in the day book and ledger of the insolvents.

The relevant entries amount to an admission on the part of the insolvents of having received the amounts mentioned therein.

We have earlier considered the authenticity of those accouQt books.

The evidence of the mortgagees as regards the payment of consideration is strongly corroborated by the entries in the insolvents' account books. It was open to the learned District Judge to rely on them. Hence his finding as regards the validity of the mortgage under Exh. A-2 must be held fo be final.

So far as the consideration for Exh. A-1 is concerned it is said to have been made up of-

(i) a sum of Rs. 10,000 advanced under Exh. A-11;

(ii) Rs. 500 the inteest due under. Exh. A-11 and A-12; and

(iii) Rs. 4,500 paid on 6-11-1950.

The receipts of the various sums mentioned above excepting the sum of Rs. 4,500 said to have been paid on 6th November

1950, are entered in the day book and the ledger of the insolvents.

Hence to that extent the finding of the learned District Judge is unassailable.

So far as the payment of Rs. 4,500 said to have been made on November 6, 1950 is concerned no corresponding entry in the day book or the ledger had been proved.

This important circumstance was not noticed by the learned District Judge.

He proceeded on the basis that the account entries support the payment of that item as well. The evidence of Ayyappa Naicker as regards that payment is necessarily interested. The only other evidence on that point is that of P.W. 2, the Registrar who registered Exhs. A-1 and A-2. He is a relation of the insolvents. He did not endorse that payment in Exh. A-1, though he knew that he was required to do so under the rules.

We are also surprised how he could have rememliered that fact after several years.

Had the learned District Judge's attention been drawn to the fact that there is no documentary evidence. in proof of the payment ofthat item it is highly doubtful whether he would have hold in favour of the mortgagee as regards the payment of that item. After going through the evidence bearing on the point we are not satisfied that the payment of that amount is satisfactorily proved.

In the result Civil Appeal No. 846 of 1963 is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the District Court restored. Civil Appeal No. 845 is allowed i, n part i.e. the mortgage Exh. A-1 is neld to be valid to the extent of Rs. 10,500 and interest thereon. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties. to bear their own costs in all the courts.

R.K.P.S.

C.A. 845/63 al/owed in part.

C.A. 845/63 allowed in part:

MALINI AYYAPA NAICKER (NOW DEAD) THROUGH L.R. ETC. ETC

SETH MANGHRAJ UDHAVDAS FIRM BY MANAGING PARTNER CHATHURBHUJ CHHABILDAS (DEAD) THEREAFTER BY L.RS. & ORS

S. M. SIKRI

R. S. BACHAWAT

Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920

Provincial InsOlvency Act

section 75(1)

section 75(1)

C.P.C

s. 75

s. 100(1)

the Code of Civil Procedure

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

S. V. Gupte

R. Thiagarajan

Naunit Lal

Hegde

Ponnayya Konar

Ayyappa Naicker

Srinivasa Naicker

November 4, 1950

November 6,

1950

s. 53

s. 75

s. 75(1)

s. 75(1)

section 100

S. V. Gupte

s. 75

s. 100

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 75

s. 7

s. 75

s. 75(1)

s. 100( 1)

the Code of Civil Procedure

Naunit Lal

s. 75(1)

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 75

s. 75

s. 75

s. 100

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 75(1)

s. 75(1)

s. 25

Beaumont

s. 25

s. 115

the Code of Civil Procedure

s. 75

Gupte

s. 75

Shah

s. 118

Negotiable Instruments Act

Hari Shankar

Abdul Shakur

Ponnayya Konar

Kivalur

Sirkali

Tuticorin

Sreenivasa Naicker

Rangappa Naicker

October 5, 1930

October 30, 1936

3rd April, 1948

28th March, 1949

April 28, 1950

Arulappan

September 8, 1950

4th November

1950

November 6, 1950

Amirthan

January 7, 1951

February 10, 1951

4th November 1950

s. 53

6th November

1950

Ayyappa Naicker


70Q

COMMISSIONER OF INCOMETAX, KERALA v.

MIS. MANICK SONS

February 14, 1969 ). C. SH, l\H, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.j

Income-tax Act, 1922, s. 33-Tribunal's Jowers-Tribunal cannot amalgamate income of two assessment years an divide It equally betwe•n them-Cannot take undertaking from a:rsessee fo file fresh return for earlier year and direct Jncotneuu Officer to make assessment accordingly-Cannot make <rllowance for 'Intangible additions' without giving reasons.

For the asse.sment year 1952-53 the Income-tax Officer added a certain ntnount to the assessec's returned incotnc. as income from undis closed sources.

For the 05'C>.sment year 1953-54 a still larger amount was added on account of unexplained cash credits. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal when considering the appeal for 1953-54 took the view that since the income assessed in 1952-53 was much less than in earlier years some of the undisclosed income of that year must have gone into the cash credits disclosed in 1953-54, It therefore calculated the income for both the assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54 together and after making some allowance for 'intangible additions' in each year, determined the amalgamated income for the two years at Rs. 1,00,000 as a round figure.

On this basis the assessment for 1953-54 was reduced to Rs, 50,000 from the higher figure determined by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In respect of the year 1952-53 an undertaking was taken from the assessee to file a fresh voluntary return for Rs. 50,000 in place of the much lower inoome originally assessed.

At the instance of the department a reference was made to the High Court, and 'failing there, the department appealed to this Court.

HELD : The appeal must be allowed.

Under s. 33(4) of the Income.tax Act, 1922, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal may after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pa" such orders thereon as it thinks fit.

The power confer' red by that sub-section is wide, but it is still a judicial power which must be exercised in respect of matters that arise in the appeal and according to law.

The Tribunal in deciding an appeal before it must deal with questions of law and fact which arise out of the order <if assessment made by the Income-tax Officer and the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

It cannot assume powers which are inconsistent with the c:xprc'>r;; pro\i1; ion'i of the Act 0r its schen1e. r1 I:'.!. RFl

In the present case the Tribunal was entitled to enquire whether the source of cash credits was explained : if it held that they represented capital or income of earlier years it could exclude them from inc()me liable to be taxed in the year to which the appeal related.

But the Tribunal had no .power to find on amalgamation o'f income an average of more years than one, and to divide it for the purpose of asse:1sment between the two years 1952-53 and 1953-54-equally, [712 G: 714 DJ

In \vorking out the amalgamated income for the two assessment years in question the Tribunal could not without giving any reasons, and without supporting evidence, make allowanc~ as it did (or "intangible. add!.. lions", [714 GJ ·

C.l.T. V. MANIC!':: SONS (Shah, J.) 709

The Tribunal hearing an appeal may give directions •for reopening assessment of the year to which the appeal relates : it cannot give any directions to reassess in case of a period not covered by that year. There was no sanction in law to enforce the undertaking given by the respondent when urging his appeal in respect of the year 1953-54, to make a voluntary return for the year 1952-53; and even if the respondent carried out that undertaking the assessment of 1952-53 could not be reopened otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the Act. The undertaking must therefore be ignored.

The implied direction given by the Tribunal to the Income-tax Officer to re-assess the income for year 1952·53 was without jurisdiction. [712 D-E; 714 A]

The questions raised on behalf of the revenue clearly flowed from the contentions raised before the Tribunal and enquiry into those questions was not barred. [712 J)..E; 714 A]

Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. Ne/liappan, 66 I.T.R. 722, distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2459 of 1966.

Appeal by special Jeave from the judgment and order dated August 2, 1965 of the Kerala High Court in Income-tax Referred Case No. 20 of 1964.

Sukumar Mitra and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant.

S. Swaminathan and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Shah, J. For the assessment year 1952-53 respondents M/s.

Manick & Sons were assessed to tax in the status of a registered firm and their income was computed at Rs. 15,33.1 inclusive of Rs. 15,000 being undisclosed income. For the assessment year 1953-54 the respondents returned Rs. 40,887 as their income from business. The Income-tax Officer discovered an aggregate amount of Rs. 74,692 as "cash credits" which, in his view, were not satisfactorily explained by the respondents. The Income-tax Officer accordingly brought to tax a total inc.ome of Rs. 1,31,179 being Rs. 56,487 as income from business and Rs. 74,692 as income from "other sources" and assessed the respondents as an unregistered firm.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner in appeal reduced the income of the respon3ents from business to Rs. 38,420 and income from "other sources" to Rs. 46,620. In second appeal the Tribunal reduced the income from business to Rs. 28,820 and confirmed the finding that the source of the cash credits aggregating to Rs. 46,620 had remained unexplained. But the Tribunal observed that "there were certain special features in the case which needed proper consideration in determining the final assessment." The Tribunal then aggregated the income for

the assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54 fur the two years, which he rounded off at Rs. 1,00,000 and apportioned in equal shares in the two years. For the assessment year 1952-53, the Tribunal recorded that the respondents had given an undertaking to file a voluntary return for assessment on the basis of total income of Rs. 50,000.

At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, four questions were referred to the High Court of Kerala :

"( 1) Whether it was not beyond the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to reopen the concluded assessment for assessment year 1952-53 and to direct that the income should be revised in that year at Rs. 50,000 as against Rs. 15,331 already fixed?

(2) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the Tribunal was justified in directing that any portion of the cash credits be assessed to income-tax in any year other. than the assessment year 1953-54? ( 3) Whether on the facts -and circumstances of the case and evidence on record, the Tribunal was. justified in finding that a portion of the cash credits were covered by the intangible additions made in 1952-53 and 1953- 54 assessment ? ( 4) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, the Tribunal was justified in directing that the income under the head 'business' for the assessment year 1953-54 be reduced to Rs. 50,000 ?"

The High Court declined to answer questions (I) & (2) and answered questions (3) & (4) in the affirmative.

The Commissioner appeals with special leave.

Tile judgment of the Tribunal is not a reasoned decision on the questions arising before it : it is cryptic and in parts obscure, and gives no grounds for its conclusion.

The judgment again !ends contenance to a method of assessment which the Indian Income-tax Officer aggregated to Rs. 74692 which amount was the Tribunal observed that the cash credits discovered by the Income-tax Officer aggregated to. Rs. 7 4692 which amount was reduced by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to Rs. 50,620.

(It is common ground that the correct figure should be Rs. 46,620.) The Tribunal then observed that on the evidence on record "these residuary items must remain unexplained." But the Tribunal thought that because in the assessment year 1952-53 the total income of Rs. 15,331 was compartively small compared to the

C.I.T. v. MANICK SONS (Shah, J.) 711

income of the earlier years "some of that year's profits must have come into the profits of the next year". The Tribunal then set out a consolidated statement of account for two years :

"!. Trade profits assessed for assessment Rs. year 1952-53 15,331

2. Trade profits on the basis of books and without the estimates and additions impugned in this appeal (Rs. 56,487 less Rs. 45,600) . . 40,887

3. Trading deficiency :

(a) Palluruthy branch 1,000

(b) Pavaratty branch 5,000

4. Unexplained cash Credits 50,620 Less set off- Intangible addition for 1952-53 Rs. 15,000

Intangible addition for 1953-54 as above.

6,000

D Rs. 6,000 21,000 29,620

Assessable for both the year 91,838"

and observed : ''The assessee has undertaken to file a voluntary return for assessment year 1952-53 on the basis of a total income of Rs. 50,000.

In these circumstances, the total business income of the assessee for the year under appeal is reduced to Rs. 50,000 only."

The unexplained cash credits found by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner an<l accepted by the Tribunal were Rs. 46,620.

The total income of the two years on the basis adopted by the Tribunal was therefore Rs. 87,838. But the income of the two years was rounded off at Rs. 1,00,000 and divided equally between the two years. For making up a consolidated statement of account the Tribunal gave no reasons nor did it give any reasons "for debiting the intangible additions" of Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 6,000 against the cash credits. Counsel for. t)le respondents suggested that the Tribunal was presumably of the view that Rs. 15,000 brought to tax as business income in the assessment in 1952-53 must have been entered in the books of account of the next year and that Rs. 6,000 called "trading deficiency" in the two branches was entered as cash credit.

The appeal before the. Tribunal raised a simple question-· whether the cash credits aggregating to Rs. 46,620 or any part thereof were liable to be taxed as income of the respondents in

the year 1953-54. For that purpose the Tribuna! had to .consider whether the respondents furnished any explanation leadm~ to a justifiable inference that the amount or a part thereof hd not represent income of the respondents. In the view of. the !ribunal the cash credits had remained unexplained. But the 'Tnbunal still reduced the cash credits by Rs. 21,000, and then proceeded to amalgamate the income for the two years and to divide it equally. For reducing the cash credits by Rs. 21,000 no reasons have been given, and amalgamati~ of the income for the two years and apportionment is without authority of law.

An assessment which has become final may be reopened in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal or in revision by the Commissioner, or under an order of rectification of mistake, or pursuant to a notice of reassessment. The Tribunal hearing an appeal may give directions for reopening assessment of the year to which the appeal relates : it cannot give any directions to reassess in case of a period not covered by that year. There is no sanction in law to enforce the undertaking given by the respondent when urging his appeal in respect of the year 1953-54, to make a voluntary return for the year 1952-53; and even if the respondents carried out that undertaking the assessment of 1952-53 could not be reopened otherwise than in the manner prescribed by law.

The undertaking must therefore be ignored. Under s. 33(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the Income-tax Appellate• Tribunal may, after giving both parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders there on as it thinks fit.

The power conrerred by that sub-section is wide, but it is still a judicial power which must. be exercised in respect of matters that arise in the appeal and according to law The Tribunal in deciding an appeal before it must deal with questions of law and fact which arise out of the order of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer and-tlfe order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It cannot assume powers which are inconsistent with' the express provisions of the Act or its scheme.

The Tribunal was entitled to enquire whether the source of the cash credits was explained: if it held that they represented capital or income of earlier years, it could exclude them from income

liale to be taxed in the year to which the appeal related. But the Tnbunal had no power to find on amalgamation of income an average of more years than one, or to give credit for wjrnt is called intangible additions. without explaining why credit w~ given.

There is no warrant for the claim made by. counsel for. the respondents that the order passed by the Tribunal was by consent. The Tribunal has not stated so, and if the order was made

l>y consent of the departmental authorities and the respondents,

H '

c.1.T. v. MAN!CK SONS (Shah, J.) 713

the objection should have been prominently raised when the Commissioner asked for. a reference to the High Court.

Counsel urged that the final order passed by the Tribunal operates to the prejudice of the respondents, and the Commissioner is not aggrieved by that order. Counsel said that even though the Tribunal has found that the total income for the two years in question was approximately Rs. 91,838 (wlllch if a correctioo account had been made would have been Rs. 87,838), the Triblljlllll has directed assessment of Rs. 50,000 in the year 1952-53 and another Rs. 50,000 in the year 1953-54. But this is only a superficial way of looking at the. matter. In the assessment year 1952- 5 3 the respondents were assessed ill the status of a registered firm and the income of the firm had to be distributed amqngst the partners, and the shares of the partners could be assessed to tax in their hands. The rate of tax on this income unless the partners have large individual income, would be comparatively low. In the year 1953-54 the respondents were an unregistered firm and the total income of the unregistered firm was liable to be taxed._

It was also cointended that the arguments raised before this Court were never set up either before the TnbunaJ or before the High Court and should not be permitted to be raised. The question raised clearly flow from the contentions raised before the Tribunal and contemplate an enquiry into matters urged by counsel by the Commissioper.

The decision of this Court Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. Nelliappan(') on which reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents has little bearing in this case.

In S. Neiliappan's case(') it was held that the conclusion whether a cash credit in the books of account of an assessee is properly explained is one on a question of fact on which no reference can be made to the High Court under s. 66 of the Indian Incometax Act. The Court in that case did not lay down that it is open to .the Tribunal to make a consolidated assessment of tax in respect of the assessment of income for the two years and then divide the income in equal shares.

Turning then to the questions : counsel for the respondents conceded _that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to direct the Income-tax Ofi!.cer to re-open the assessment tor the year 19.52- 53.

He submitted however that the Tribunal did not give any such directiCl!DS : it merely recorded an undertaking given by the respondents that they_ will voluntarily submit a return for Rs. 50,000 for the year 1952-53. But the context in which the statement recording the undertaking occurs !a p'•.r>:; raph 7 of the

(1) 66 I.T.R. 722.

judgment of the Tribuna.l and the direction given in paragraph 8 A leave no room for doubt that the Tribunal did give -a direction to the Income-tax Officer to re-assess the' income for the year 1952-53.

On the answer to the first question no further enquiry need be made on the second question.

The Tribunal has given no reasons in support of the view that the "intangibfe additions" of Rs. 21,000 covered a part of the B cash credits. Our attention has also not been invited to any evidence which establishes a connection between the. cash credits for Rs. 21,000 -and the additions of Rs. 15,000 made in tbe assessment for 1952-53 aaid Rs. 6,000 added in 1953-54.

The fourth question contemplates an inquiry whether tlie Tribunal was justified in directing that tbe income under the head C "business" for the assessment year 1953-54 be reduced to Rs. 50,000. The question is somewhat misleading. The direction o.f the Tribunal was that the total income of the respondents be reduced to Rs. 50,000 for the year 1953-54, the business income being Rs. 28,820 and the balance being income from other sources. For reasons already set out the Tribunal had no juris- D diction to proceed to combine the income for the two years 1952- 53 and 1953-54 and to divide it for the purpose of assessmt between the two years equally.

The Tribuna! had to assess the income for the year in question.

The appeal is allowed, and the answers to the questions re- E corded by the High Court are discharged.

The answers to the questions will be as follows : Q. ( 1 )-Tribunal had no jurisdiction.

Q. (2 )-Tribunal had no jurisdiction.

Q. ( 3 )-in the negative.

Q. ( 4 )-in the negative.

F There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

G.C.

Appeal allowed.

70Q

COMMISSIONER OF INCOMETAX, KERALA

MIS. MANICK SONS

V. RAMASWAMI

A. N. GROVER, JJ

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 33

s. 33(4)

Shah

Sukumar Mitra

B. D. Sharma

S. Swaminathan

R. Gopalakrishnan

Manick

High Court of Kerala

Palluruthy

Pavaratty

s. 33(4)

Income-tax Act, 1922

Income-tax Appellate• Tribunal

TnbunaJ

S. Neiliappan

s. 66


V. D. M, R. M. M. R. M. MUTHIAH CHETIIAR

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS February 14, 1969

(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]

Indian Income-tax Act (11 of 1922), ss. 34 and 16(3)-Assessee's return of income as individual not showing that other members of his' firm were his minor sons-Income of minors separately assessed-S. 34(1) and s. 34(l)(b), applicability of income of a minor son whether can be added under s. 16(3 )-Income of assessee after having been separately assessed.

The assessee and his minor sons separately held shares in a resident firm. For assessment years 1952-53 to 1954-55, the assessee filed returns as an individual and therein stated under the head business income that the profit should be ascertained from the Income-tax Officer assessing the firm.

The names of the partners were stated, but it was not stated in the return that some of the parties were his minor sons.

The minors, through their mother as guardian, also filed returns for these assessment years, and they were atisessed to tax. The assessee was also assessed as an individual, in respect of his share in the income of the firm and other sources, but the assessment order did not include the share of the minors from the firm.

The Income-tax Officer issued notices Of reassessment to the assessee under s. 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 for the years 1952-53 and 1953-54 and under s. 34(1)(b) for the year 1954-55.

The Income-tax Officer took the view that the .assessee had not disclosed the fact that his sons were minors and the income of the sons which mould have been included under s. 16(3)(a)(ii) had escaped assessment n the assessee's hands and accordingly he brought that income to tax. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed this order. The Appellate Tribunal, in appeal held that for the first two years s. 34(l)(a) applied, that in respect of the third year there was no change of opinion but the assessment was made on information received within the meaning Of s. 34(1 )(b) and that the income of the minors could be assessed in the hands of the assessee notwithstanding the separate assessments already made on the minors. On reference, the High Court answered the ques tions against the assessee.

In appeal, this Court,

HELD: Section 16(3) of the Act imposed an obligation upon the Income-tax Offit, er to compute the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment by including the items of income set out in els. (a)(i) to (iv) and (b), but thereby no obligation was imposed upon the tax-payer to disclose the income liable to be included in his assessment under s: 16( 3). For failing or omitting to disclose that income proceedings for reassessment could not be commenced under " 34(1)(a).

Section 22( 5) required the assessee to furnish particulars of the names of the shares of the partners but imposed no obligation to mention or set out the income of the nature mentioned in s. 16( 3). In . the relevant years there was no head in the form of return prescribed under the rules under which income liable to be assessed to tax under s. 16(3)(a) & (b) could be disclosed. These assessments under s. 34(1)(a) for the years 1952-53 .and 1953-54 could not, therefore be upheld. [721 A]

(ii) 'The income of a minor can be included in the hands of an assessee under s. 16(3) of the Act, notwithstanding that an assessment has been made on the minor represented by his guardian. [718 G-H]

?16 SUP.LUlME COURT REPORTS

[1969] 3 S.C.R.

(iii) In respect of the assessment years 1954-55, there was n~ bas!s .for the argument that the Income-tax Officer had only changed his oplD!on.

The order of re-assessment was made well within four years 'from the date of the last day of that assessment year. The notice wasJ therefore, com petently issued by the Income-tax Officer. [721 F] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Civil Appeals Nos. 1457 to 1459 of 1958.

Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 21, 1964 of. the Madras High Court in T.C. No. 75 of 1962 (Reference No. 50 of 1962).

M. C. Chagla and T. A. Ramachandran, for the appellant (in all the appeals).

S. K. Aiyar aail B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.

Ramanathan Chettiar his son Muthiah Chettiar

ailed hereinafter for the sake of brevity, Muthiah-and Ramanathan, Annamalai and Alagappan, sons of Muthiah, constituted a Hindu undivided family. The family owned a 3 /5th share ijll M.R.M.S. Firm, Seramban in Malaya.

The firm was assessed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in the status of a firm resident within the taxable territories. On September 16, 1950, Muthiah separated from the family taking his I/5th share in the M.R.M.S. Firm.

On April 13, 195_1 the status of the family became completely disrupted and the three sons of Muthiah took in equal shares the remaining 2/5th share--the grandfather Rarnanathan taking no share in the M.RM.S: Firm.

For the assessment year 1952-53 Muthiah submitted a return of his income as an individual and stated under the head business income "Kidly ascertain his ( assessee's) share of profit and remittances from the Income-tax officer, Second Additional Circle -I, Karaikudi, in F. 6098-m/1952-53". In Part III of the return

M uthiah supplied the following informatio~ about his partners :

Name and address of the firm Name of each partner including

assessee Messrs. R.RM.S. Firm . .

1. Assessee (Muthiah Chettiar) Seramban, F.M.S.

2. VD. M.RM. M.RM. M.

Ramanathan Chettiar (minor).

3. VD.M. RM. M. RM. M.

Alagappan Chettiar (minor).

4. VD.M.RM.M.RM.M.

Annamalai Chettiar (minor)

5. C.P.R.

6. M.S.S,

7. Charity

Shjlre

60/303

40/303

40/303

40/303 60/303 60/303

3/303

For the assessment year 1953-54 in column 3 in section B of the retunn Muthiah stated: "Kindly ascertain the remittances from the Income-tax Officer, Fifth Additional, Karaikudi in F. 6098-m", and at p. 3 of the retum in column 3 ol. Section F it was stated :

"Assessee has 60/303 share in Messrs. :MRMS Joint Se ram ban, (Malaya). Kindly ascertain share of profit or loss from the Income-tax Officer, Fifth Additional.

Karaikudi in F. 6098." In Part ill of the retum he set out the names of the partners as

were mentioned in the return for 1952-53. Against the names of Ramanathan Chettiar, A!agappan Chettiar and Annamalai Chettiar it was not disclOsed that they were minors.

For the assessment year 1954-55 at the foot of page 1 of the return Muthiah stated :

''The assessee has a remittance of Rs. 6,188-12-0 from R.R.M.S. Firm,· Seramban.

His share of income may be taken from the firm's file.",

and in Part IIl the names of seven partners as mentioned in 1952 53 return were set-out-Ramanathan, A!agapp'an, Annamalai wer not shewn as minors.

Ramanathan, A!agappan and Aannamalai-the three minor sons of Muthiah represented by their mother allid guardian alw filed returns of their respective income for the years 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55 and disclosed therein their shares in the profit from the 2/5th share in the M.RM.S. Firm.

For the assessment years 1952-53, 1953-54 and 1954-55 the Income-tax officer completed the assessments separately on the firm.

F on Muthiah as an individual on the three minors represented by their mother and guardian. Muthiah was assessed in respect of his share in the income of the firm and from other sources.

In his returns Muthiah had not disclosed the share received by his minor sons and the Income-tax Officer did not making the assessments include shares of the minors from the firm under G s. 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

The Income-tax Officer issued notices of reassessment to Muthiah under s. 34(1) (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 for the years 1952-53 and 1953-54 and under s. 34(1) (b) for the year 1954-55. Muthiah filed returns under protest declaring the same income as originally assessed. In the view of the Income-tax Officer Muthiah had not furnished in Part IIl clause ( c) ol. the return full facts regarding B the other narties and in column 2 he had merely disclosed that Ramanathan, Alagappain and Annamalai were minors : that "information was not full in the sense that he had not stated that LIOSup./69-11

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[!969] 3 S.C.R,

they were minors sons" of Muthiah. Accordingly the Income-tax A Officer held that the income of the sons of Muth1ah which should have been included .under s. 16(3)(a)(ii) of the linlcome-tax Act had escaped assessment in Muthiah's hands and he brought that income to tax.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the order made by the Income-tax Officer. In appeal to the TribunaJ it was contended by Muthiah that he had fully and truly disclosed all the particulars he was required to disclose in the returns of his income for the three years in question, and "s. 34(a)(a) had no application to the assessment years 1952-53 and 1953-54 and for 1954-55 the re-opening was based o.nly on a change of opinion".

Muthiah also conteiOOed that s. 40 of the Income-tax Act was mandatory and since the Income-tax Officer had made separate assessments on the minors represented by their mother, no further assessment under s. 16 ( 3) could be made, the twr sections being mutually exclusive.

The Tribunal obsc; rved that for the first two years s. 34 ( l) (a) applied, that in respect of the year 1954-55 there was no cha.ngc of opinion but the assessment was made on information received within the meaning of s. 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act and that sc; parate assessment of the minors did :not stop the Incometax Officer from assessing the income received by the minor sons in the hands of Muthiah.

The Appellate Tribunal accordingly confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

At the instance of Muthiah the following questions were referred to the High Court of Madras :

'(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the re-assessment made on the assessee under s. 34 of the Act is valid in Jaw for 1952-53 to 1954-55?

(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the inclusion of the share income of the minor in the hands of the assessee by invoking the provisions of s. 16 ( 3) of the Act is valid in law notwithstanding that an assessment is made on the minor represented by his guardian ?"

The answer to the second question must, in view of the recent judgment of this Court in C. R. Nagappa v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore('), be in the affirmative.

In considering the first question it is necessarv to refer. to H certain provisions of the Income-fax Act, 1922.' By section 3

(t) [1969] I S.C.R. 979.

the total income of the previous yea( of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and l<>cal authority, and of every firm and other association of rsons or the partners of the firm or the members of the associat10n individually was charged to tax for that year i.n accordance with, and subject to the provisions of the act at any rate or rates prescribed by the Finance Act. "Total income" was defined ins. 2(15) as meaning "total amount of income, profits and gains referred to in sub-s. ( 1 ) f section 4 computed in the manner laid down in this Act." Secuon 4 ( I ) set out the method of computation of total income : it enacted :

• ( I ) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any previous year of any person includes all income, profits and gains from whatever source derived which- ( a) are received or are deemed to be received in the taxable territories in such year by or on behalf of such persoin, or

(b) if such person is resident in the taxable

territories during such year,-

( j) accrue or arise or are deemed to

accrue or arise to him in the taxable territories durinl! such year, or

Section 22 by sub-s. ( 1) required the Income-tax. Officer to give notice by publication in the press in the prescribed niiµiner, requiring every person whose total income during the previ<>us year exceeds the maximum exempt from tax, to fumish a retbrn in the prescribed form setting forth his total income. Sub-section

( 2) authorised the Income-tax Officer to serve a notice upon a person whose income in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer exceeded the minimum free from tax. SectiQ!l 23 dealt with the assessment. It conferred power upon the Income-tax Officer. to assess the total income of the assessee and to deternrine the sum payable by him on the basis of 11uch return, submitted by him.

Rule 19 .framed under s. 59 of the Income-ta.Ji; Act, 1922, required the assessee to make a return in the form prescribed thereunder, and io Form A applicable to an individual or a Hindu undivided family or an llSSOCiation of persons there was no clause which requited disclosure of income o, f a, ny person other than the income of the assessee, which was liable to be included in his total income. The Act and the Rules accordingly imoosed no obligation upon the assessee to disclose to the Income-tax Officer in his return information relating to income of any other person by law taxable in his hands.

720 SUPltliME COUllT ltEPOltTS [1969] 3 S.C.lt.

But s. 16 sub-s. ( 3) provided that in computing the total income of any indiVidual for the purpose of assessment there shall be included the classes of income mentioned in els. (a) and (b).

Sub-section ( 3 )(a)( ii) in-so-tar as it is material, provided :

"In computing the total income of any individual fOr the purpose of assessment, there shall be ipicluded--

(a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly- ( i)

(ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of which such individual 'is a partner;" The assessee was bound to disclose under s. 22(5) the names and addresses of his par1; ners, i.f any, engaged in business, profession or vocation together with the location and style of the principal place and branches thereof and the extent of the shares of all such partners. in the profits of the business, profession or vocatioo and any branches thereof, but the assessee was not required in m~ a return to disclose that any income was received by his wife or minor child admitted to the benefits of partnership of a firm of which he was a partner.

Counsel for the Commissioner contended that in the forms of returns prescribed in the "Notes of Guidance" for drawing up the return were printed, and thereby the assessee was informed that he had to disclose the income received b3 his wife and minor children from a firm of which the assessee was a partner. Counsel has however not placed before the Court the forms of return ill vogue in the relevant year of assessment.

In the Income Tax Manual published under the authority of the Central Government in 1945 under cl. ( 3) printed at p. 185 the assessee is advised to include the returtll under the appropriate head certain classes of income which are liable to be included in the assessment of an individual under s. 16, and income liable to be taxed under ss. 41 D, 44E and 44F. This instruction was repeated in the Manual Parts II aiOO III at pp. 344 and 345 in the 10th Edition published in 1950.

But in the 11th Edition of the Manual published i, n 1954 no such instructions were printed.

About the date on which the instructions were deleted Counsel for the Commissioner was unable to give any information.

Assuming that there were instructions printed in the Forms of return in the relevant years, in the absence of any head under which the income of the wife or minor child of a partner whose wife or a minor child was a partner in the same firm, could be shown, by not showing that income the tax-payer cannot be deem ed to have failed or omitted to disclose fully and truly all material

fact& necessary for his assessment Section 16 ( 3) imposes an obligation upon the Income-tax Officer to compute the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment by including the items of income set out in els. (a) (i) to (iv) and (b), but thereby no obligation is imposed upon the tax-payer to . disclose the income liable to be included in his assessment under s. 16 ( 3).

For faili.ng or omitting to disclose that income pr~ for reassessment cannot therefore be commenced under s. 34(1)(a).

Section 22 ( 5 ) required the assessee to furnish particulars of the names and shares of his partners, but imposes no obligation to mention or set out the income of the nature mentioned in s. 16 ( 3) , In the relevant years there was no head in the form under which income liable to be assessed to tax under s. 16(3)(a) and (b) could be disclosed.

We are in the circumstances unable to agree with the High Court that s. 34 imposed an obligatic, n upon the assessee to disclose all income includible in his assessment by reason of s. 16 ( 3 )(a)( ii) . Section 34 (1 )(a) sets out the conditions in which the power may be exercised : it did not give rue to an obligation to disclose information which enabled the ncome-tax Oflicer to exercise the power under s. 16(3)(a)(ii), nor had the use of the expression "necessary for his assessment" in s. 34(l)(a) that effect.

The High Court. did not consider the question whether in the year 1954-55 the notice under s. 34(l)(b) was properly issued against Muthiah. The Trib11naI in their judgment observed :

"There is no basis for the argument that the Incometax Oflicer had only changed his opinion and re-opened the assessment."

F We agree with that view.

The order of re-assessment was made well within four years from the date of the last day of the year of assessment 1954-55.

The notice was therefore competeintly issued by the Income-tax Oflicer.

The order passed by the High Court, in so far as it relates to the years 1952-53 and 1953-54 is set aside and the answer in the G negative is recorded. For the year 1954-55 the answer recorded b} the High Court is confirmed. There will be no order as to costs throughout.

Y.P.

Appeal partly allowed.

V. D. M. R. M. M. R. M. MUTHIAH CHETTIAR

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS

February 14, 1969

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

A. N. GROVER, JJ.

Indian Income-tax Act

ss. 34 and 16(3)

S. 34(1)

s. 34(l)(b)

s. 16(3 )

s. 34(1)(a)

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 34(1)(b)

s. 16(3)(a)(ii)

s. 34(l)(a)

s. 34(1 )(b)

Section 16(3)

Section 22( 5)

s. 16( 3)

s. 16(3)(a)

s. 34(1)(a)

s. 16(3)

Madras High Court

M. C. Chagla

T. A. Ramachandran

S. K. Aiyar aail B. D. Sharma

Shah

Ramanathan Chettiar

Annamalai

Alagappan

Malaya

September 16, 1950

Muthiah

April 13, 195_1

Rarnanathan

Muthiah

uthiah

Assessee (Muthiah Chettiar) Seramban

S.

2

VD. M.RM. M.RM. M.

Ramanathan Chettiar

VD.M. RM. M. RM. M.

Alagappan Chettiar

Annamalai Chettiar

C.P.R.

M.S.S

Charity

Shjlre

Ramanathan Chettiar

A!agappan Chettiar

Annamalai Chettiar

Ramanathan

A!agapp'an

Annamalai

A!agappan

Aannamalai

s. 16(3)(a)(ii)

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 34(1)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 34(1)

Ramanathan

Alagappain

s. 16(3)(a)(ii)

TribunaJ

s. 34(a)(a)

s. 40

Income-tax Act

s. 16

s. 34

s. 34(1)(b)

Income-tax Act

High Court of Madras

s. 34

s. 16

Income-fax Act, 1922

section 3

section 4

Section 22

s. 59

s. 16

s. 22(5)

Central Government

s. 16

ss. 41

Section 16

s. 16

s. 34(1)(a)

Section 22

s. 16

s. 16(3)(a)

s. 34

s. 16

Section 34

s. 16(3)(a)(ii)

s. 34(l)(a)

s. 34(l)(b)