MODI SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS CO. LTD.

A v.

INCOME-TAX

OFFICER,

SPECIAL

INVESTIGATION

CIRCLE (B), MEERUT

February 10, 1969

[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J

Income Tax A.ct, 1922, s. 34(l)(a)-Notlce in respect of incom• escaping assessment--Condition.r precedent to issue of.

The appellant Company, which was incorporated in 1946, purchased ·· and installed machinery from time to time valued at Rs. 75 lacs.

In C respect of its assessment to income tax for certain years, it was allowed 'initial depreciation' on new machinery installed in the relevant previous years and was also allowed 'normal depreciation'. at appropriate rates. In the assessment year 1956-57 the aggregate of all depreciation allowances including 'initial depreciation' exceeded the original cost of machinery but in respect of that year as well as for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59, the Income Tax Officer failed to deduct 'initial depreciation' and the company was allowed 'normal depreciation' in excess of the D ainount permissible under proviso (c.) to s. 10(2) (vi) of the Income Tax Act, 1922.

On November 20, 1964, the Income Tax Officer issued notices of rea,...sment for the three yean under section 148 of the Income Tax Act,

1961. The Company filed returns under protest and thereafter challenged the notices of re-assessment by a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was common llrOUDd that excessive depreciation Was in fact allowed to the Company and that certain income escaped asses!lment, but it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the mcome did not escape assessment "by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment of that year".

A Single Judge of the High Court held that while the Company committed no error in failing to take into a<i:ount the 'initial depreciation' while entering the Written down value in its return, it was not open to the Company to set out only those facts which exaggerated its claim.

He therefore rejected the petition.

In dismissing a Letters Patent appeal, the High Court took the view that there was apparently "a mistake and error on the side of the Company as well a• the Income Tax Officer" and that the Income Tax Officer could reasonably come to the conclusion that it was due to the omission and failure on the part of the assessee in clisclosing fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment that the error was committed by the Income Tax Officer as a resu1t of which some income had escaped assessment.

On an appeal.

HELD : The judgment of the High Court must be set aside and the case remanded.

Although the High Court held that the Income Tax Officer had decided that certain income had escaped assessment, it did not consider H whether the income escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on the part of the Company to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment, within the meaning of section 34 of the 1922 Act. [596 Fl

• c

Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v, Income Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta and Anr., 41 I.T.R. 191; referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 890 tO 892 of 1968.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 24, 196.7 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 476 to 478 of 1965.

S. T. Desai, H. K. Puri and B. N. Kirpa/, for the appellant (in all the appeals) .

Sukumar Mitra, S. C. Manchanda, R. H. Dhebar, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent (in all the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Mis Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.- hereinafter called 'the Company'-was incorporated in 1946.

From time to time the Company purchased and installed machinery of the value of Rs. 75 lakhs for its factory. In proceedings for assessment of income-tax, the Company was allowed, in computing its income from business for the assessment years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53 "i, nitial depreciation" aggregating to Rs. 15,91,511/- in respect of new machinery installed in the relevant previous years. The Company was also . allowed "normal

depreciation" at the appropriate rates. In the assessment year 1956-57 the aggregate of all depreciation allowances including "initial depreciation" exceeded the original cost of the machinery, but the Income-tax Officer on the written down value of the machinery computed at Rs. 16,48,053/- allowed Rs. 2,59,236/- as normal depreciation. Jn so computing the normal depreciation the Income-tax Officer apparently Jost sight of clause ( c) of the proviso to s. 10(2) (vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Depreciation allowance was also allowed in the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 as a percentage on the appropriate written down value in those years.

The Income-tax Officer on November 20, 1964, issued notices of re-assessment for the three years under s. 148 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961, which had replaced the Act of 1922. The Company filed under protest fresh returns and objected to the issue of the notices of re-assessment.

The Company also moved petitions in the High Court of Allahabad for writs quashing the three notices, contending ime: alia, that the notices issued more than four years after the expiry of the years of assessment were barred. At the hearina of the petitions counsel for the Company conceded that under proso

(c) to s. 10(2)(vi) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in the form in which it stood in the assessment year 1956-57 and thereafter, excessive depreciation was in fact allowed to the Company.

It was also common ground that by virtue of cl. ( c) to Explanation 1 of s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, income having been made the subject matter of excessive relief under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. But it was urged that the income had not escaped assessment "by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment of that year", for-( 1) the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the forms of returns prescribed under the rules did not require the assessee to disclose that initial depreciation had been allowed in the earlier years; and (2) that in any event the Incometax Officer knew that initial depreciation had been allowed to the Company in the years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53.

R. S. Pathak, J ., who heard the petitions held that the. Company committed no error in failing to take into account the initial depreciation while entering the written down value in column (2) of Part V of the return. But the learned Judge held that it was incumbent upon the Company to inform the Income-tax Officer of all material facts necessary to make out its claim to depreciation and it was not open to the Company to set out only those facts which exaggerated its claim : the Company was bound to disclose all material facts which went to show what the true amount of the allowance to which it was entitled. The learned Judge accordingly rejected the petitions. The order passed by Pathak, J., was confinned in appeal under the Letters Patent.

By cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of s. 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, as amended by Act 8 of 1946, in computing the profits or gains of business, profession or vocation carried on by him, an assessee was entitled to allowances not only of normal depreciation but also initial depreciation at the rates set out in els. (a), (b) & (c) in respect of buildings which had been newly erected, or the machinery or plant being new had been installed after the 31st day of March, 1945. It was, however, expressly enacted that the initial depreciation was not deductible in determining the written down value for the purpose of cl. (vi).

Allowance for initial depreciation was therefore not to be taken into account in determining the written down value for determining the normal depreciation. But on that account proviso (c) to s. 10(2)(vi) was not modified.

The written down value of the machinery of the Company in the yea.- 1956-57 was Rs. 16,48,053, but for the application of

cl. (c) of the proviso to s. 10(2)(vi) the initial depreciation allowed in the years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53 had to be taken into account.

The Income-tax Officer inadvertently failed to take into account the initial depreciation, and the Company was .allowed normal depreciation in the year 1956-57 in excess of the amount permissible under proviso (c) to s. 10(2) (vi). The

Income-tax Officer later sought to rectify the error and to bring to tax the income which had escaped tax.

Before R. S. Pathak, J., it was contended that the definition of "written down value" ins. 10(5)(b) applies wherever the expression is used ins. 10(2) and on that account the Company in seting out the written down value in column (2) of Part. V of the return was obliged to take into account all the depreciation actually allowed to it including the initial depreciation and as the Company computed 'the written down value only . by deducting the normal depreciation and not the initial depreciation, it failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. This argument was not accepted by the learned Judge. But he was still of the opinion that the Act imposed upon the Company a duty to disclose all material facts which went to show the true amount of the allowances to which it was entitled, and the Company by failing to disclose that initial depreciation had been allowed in three earlier years, the Company had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment, and on that accounts. 147(1) (a) was attracted and the notice was properly issued.

In app.eal, the High Court observed that the "only question for consideration" was whether the Income-tax Officer was justified in issuing a notice under s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

After stating that there was apparently "a mistake and error on the side of the Company as well as the Incoine-tax Officer'', the Court observed that the Income-tax Officer could reasonably come to the conclusion that it was due to the omission and failure on the part of the assessee in disclosing fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment that the error was committed by the Income-tax Officer as a result of which some income had escaped assessment. The High Court then observed :

"It is difficult to hold that the Income-tax Officer while issuing the notices under section 148 of the new Act could not reasonably hold the view that prima facie the assessee was responsible for the escape in the assessment.",

and held that the notices were not liable to be quashed.

Section 34(1 )(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, provided :

"(l) If-

( a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failur~ on the part of an assessee to make a retuqi of his income under section 22 for any year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year,

income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment for that year, or have been under-·

assessed, or assessed at too low a rate, or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act, or excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed, or

he may . proceed to assess or re-assess such income, profits or gains or re-compute the Joss or depreciation allowance; and the provisions of this Act shall. so far as may b.~, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section : " Section 34 confers jurisdiction upon the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice in respect of the assessment beyond the period of four years, but within a period of eight years, from the end of the relevant year, if two conditions exist ( 1) that the Income-tax -Officer has reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax had been under-assessed; and (2) that he has also reason to believe that such "under-assessment" had occurred by reason of either (i) omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a return of his income under s. 22, or Iii) omission or failure on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. These conditions are cumulative and precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction to issue a notice of re-assessment : Calcutta Discount Co.

Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta and Anr.(')

In deciding the appeal, the High Court held that the Incometax Officer did in fact decide that the income had escaped assessment, but the High Court did not consider whether the income escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on the part of the Company to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.

The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the case is remanded for determination of the question whether by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the Company to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for a5'essment of the Company for the three years in question. any income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax have escaped assessment or the Company has been given excessive depreciation allowance in computing its income.

Costs of these appeals will be costs in the High Court. One hearing fee.

R.K.P.S.

Appeal allowed and case remanded.

{I) 41 l.T.R. 191.

MODI SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS CO. LTD

February 10, 1969

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

A. N. GROVER, JJ

s. 34(l)(a)

s. 10(2)

Income Tax Act, 1922

November 20, 1964

section 148

Income Tax Act

Art. 226

section 34

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Allahabad High Court

S. T. Desai

H. K. Puri

B. N. Kirpa/

Sukumar Mitra

S. C. Manchanda

R. H. Dhebar

R. N. Sachthey

B. D. Sharma

Shah

s. 10(2)

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 148

Indian Income-tax Act, 1961

High Court of Allahabad

s. 10(2)(vi)

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 147

Income-tax Act, 1961

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

R. S. Pathak

Pathak

s. 10

Income-tax Act, 1922

31st day of March, 1945

s. 10(2)(vi)

s. 10(2)(vi)

s. 10(2)

s. 148

Income-tax Act, 1961

section 148

Section 34(1 )(a)

Income-tax Act, 1922

section 22

Section 34

s. 22


SHEIKH ABDUL REHMAN

JAGAT RAM ARYAN

February 11, 1969

[S. M. SIKRI, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.]

Jammu and Kashmir Constitution, 1957, s. 51(a)-Signed oalh form filed before authorised officer-No oath or affirmation made before the officer nor oath for1n signed before hini-If section con1plied with.

Section 5 l(a) of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution provides that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the State Legislature unless Ile 1nakes and subscribes an oath or affirmation in the prescribed for"' before the person outhorised in that behalf. The Election Commission nc:ified the Returning Officer and the Assistant Returning Officer as the authorised officers.

Where a candidate did not sign the oath form before the Assi; tant Returning Officer, nor make oath or affirmation in his presence, but presented to the Assistant Returning Officer the candidate's nomination paper along with the oath form filled up and signed before presentation,

HELD: There was no sufficient compliance with s. 51 (a) and therefore, the candidate was not qualified to be choseri to fill the seat in the Legislature under the section, and his nomination paper \vas liabl~ to be rejected by the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny under s. 47(2)

(a) of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 [601 E-F, H; 602 ABl

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1527 of 1968.

Appeal under s. 123 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representa tion of the People Act,. 1957 from the Judgment and order dated F April 29, 1968 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in ElectiOn Petition No. 33 of 1967.

R. N. Bhalgotra and S. S. Khanduja, for the appellant.

R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh and S. Chakravarti, for the respondent.

G The Judgment of th.~ Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. This appeal is directed against a ju?gent. o~ a Single Judge of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir dtsm1ssmg an election petition for setting aside th~ election of the respondent Jagat Ram Aryan to the legislative assembly of the State of Jamm~ & Kashmir from the Bhaderwah schedulefl caste assembly consl!- 'H tuency. !

The last date for filing the nomination papers was January 20,

1967. The date of scrutiny of nomination papers was January 23,

1967. The date of poll was February 21, 1967. The date of counting and dc; claration of result was March l, 1967. Several candidates filed their nomination papers from this constituency.

The candidates were : {I) Jagat Ram Aryan, (2) Faquir Chand,

(3) Narain Dass, (4) Nikka Ram, (5) Bhagat Ram, (6) Om Parkash and (7) Swami Raj. The first five filed their nomination papers on January 23, 1967 before the Assistant Returning Officer, Kahan Singh, a Tehsildar of Bhaderwah. On scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning Officer Abdul Gani accepted as valid the nomination papers of J agat Ram and Faquir Chand and rejected the nominations papers of the remaining candidates for various reasons.

At the poll the contest was between Jagat Ram, the congress candidate and Faquit" Chand, the National Conference candidate.

Respondent Jagat Ram having secured larger number of votes was declared elected.

The appellant, a voter in the constituency, filed the ckction petition for setting aside the respondent's election on the ground that the nomination papers of Narain Dass, Nikka Ram and Bhagat Ram were improperly rejected.

The High Court found that the nomination paper of Bhagat Ram was properly rejected and this finding is no longer challenged.

The nomination paper of Nikka Ram was rejected on three grounds : ( 1 ) he did not make and subscribe the oath or affinnation as required by's. 51(a) of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution; (2) he was not a member of a scheduled caste and (3) his E father"s name was not correctly shown in the electoral rolls. The nomination paper of Narain Dass was rejected on two grounds : ( 1 ) he did not make and subscribe the oath or affirmation as required bys. 51 (a) and (2) he was not a member pf a scheduled caste. The High Court found that both Narain Dass and Nikka Ram were members of the scheduled caste "Megh". It also held that the error in the electoral roll with regard to the name of F Nikka Ram's father was not a ground for rejecting his nomination paper having regard to s. 44 ( 4) of the J. & K. Representation of the People Act, 1957.

The High Court also rejected the addi tional contention that Narain Dass had not made a deposit of Rs. 125 in conformity with s. 45 (2) of the Act. All these findings are no longer challenged.

G The only point now in issue is whether Narain Dass and Nikka Ram made and subscribed the oath or affirmation as required by s. 51 (a) of the J. & K. Constitution. Section 51 (a) provides :

"A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a sent in the Legislature unless he-

( a) is a permanent resident of the State, and makes and subscribes before some person authorised in that belialf by the Election Commission of India an oath or

.,...

affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the Fifth Schedule."

The Returning Officer and the Assistant Returning Officer were authorised in this behalf by the Election Commission of India bv notification No. 3/ 4 J & K/65 as the persons before whom the oath or affirmation could be made and subscribed. The prescribed form of oath or affirmation to be made by a candidate of the State legislature is :-

"I, A.B., having been nominated as a candidate to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly, (or legislative Council) do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm that I will bear true faith and allegience to the Constitution of the State as by law established and that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India."

Section 44 of the J. & K. Representation of the People Act,. 1957 provides for presentation of nomination papers and prescribes certain requirements for a valid nomination.

Section 45 provides for deposits. Section 46 deals with notice of nominations and the time and place for their scrutiny. Section 47 (2)(a)- reads :- ;.The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination, and may, either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the following grounds;

(a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the candidate either is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of tile provisions of sections 51 and 69 of the Constitution and Part VI of this Act; .... "

Form 2A of the J. & K. Representation of the People (Conduct of election and election petition) Rules, 1957 prescribes the form of nomination paper for election to the legislative assembly.

It is common case that along with their nomination papers both Narain Dass and Nikka Ram filed oath forms signed by them.

The appellant's case is that at the time of the presentation of their nomination papers both Narain Dass and Nikka Ram made oaths and signed the oath forms in the presence of the Assistant Returning Officer. In support of this case, the appellant examined Narain Dass. Nikka Ram. Abdul Qayum and Abdul Rehman.

The respondent's case ; s that Narain Dass and Nikka Ram did not make or subscribe any oath or affirmation before the Assistant Returning Officer, that the oath forms had been filled up and signed before they were presented to him and were not signed in his

presence.

In support of his case the respondent examined Kahan A Singh, the Assistant Returning Officer, and Abdul Gani, the Returning Officer.

The High Court accepted the respondent's case.

It should be remembered that the requirement of making and subscnbing an oath or affirmation was inserted in s. 51 (a) of the J. & K. Constitution by the Co, nstitution Sixth Amendment Act,

1965. There is ground for believing that Narain Dass and Nikka Ram were not aware of this provision and for this reason they omitted to make or subscribe any oath or affirmation before the Assistant Returning Officer.

Our attention was drawn to Instruction No. 7 ( 7) in Chapter U at p. 19 of the Handbook for Returning Officers, issued by the Election Commission, India, for General Elections, 1967. The aforesaid instruction was as follows :-

"The oath or affirmation has first to be made and then signed by the candidate before the authorized officer. It should be borne in mind that mere signing on the paper on which the form of oath is written out is not sufficient. The candidate must make the oath before the authorised officer.

Accordingly he will ask the candidate to read aloud the oath or affirmation in English or the regional language and then to sign and date the paper on which the oath or affirmation is written.

In the case of illiterate persons who want to contest elections, and who cannot properly make and subscribe the oath or affirmation the authorised officer, should read out the prescribed oath and ask the candidate to repe;; t the same and thereafter take his thumb impression on the form on which the oath is printed or cyclostyled in token of his having subscribed the oath. The authorised officer should endorse on this paper that the oath or affirmation has been made and subscribed before the candidate on that day.

He will immediatelv furnish to the candidate a certified copy thereof keeping a copy for your record. The candidate will produce this copy as evidence before you at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers.

This copy will be given to the candidate forthwith without his applying for it. nor any fee be charged for it."

.Kahan Singh the Assistant Returning Officer was not conversant with these instructions.

He did not ask either Narain Dass or Nikka Ram to read the oath or to sign the oath form in his presence. But the breach of these instructions does not entitle them to say that they had made and subscribed the oath before the Assistant Returning Officer when in fact they did not make or -subscribe the oath before him.

It is admitted by the appellant that the oath forms filed by Narain Dass and Nikka Ram did not bear any endorsement of the Assistant Returning Officer stating that the oath or affirma tion had been made and subscribed before him nor was any certificate of such endorsement furnished to them.

The absence of the endorsement on the oath forms tend to suggest that no oath or affirmation was made and subscribed by them before the Assistant Returning Officer.

Neither Narain Dass nor Nikka Ram could produce before the Returning Officer Abdul Gani any evidence of their making and subscribing the oath or affirmation. Abdul Gani gave them an opportunity to produce affidavits in proof of this fact but they did not file any affidavit or any other evidence before him.

The appellant examined witnesses to prove that attempts w.ere made to file such affidavits, but the High Court rightly rejected the testimony of these witnesses. The materials on the record corroborate the testimony of Kahan Singh, the Assistant Returning Officer that Narain Dass and Nikka Ram did not sign the oath forms in his presence and did not make the oath or affirmation before him. Narain Dass and Nikka Ram were Jana Sangh candidates. Abdul Qayum and Abdul Rehman were their party men. All of them were interested witnesses. Having regard to all the materials on the record it is impossible to prefer their testimony to that of Kahan Singh.

In agreement with the High Court we hold that neither Narain Dass and Nikka Ram signed the oath forms before the Assistant Returning Officer nor did they make the oath or affirmation before him.

On January 23, 1967 both Narain Dass and Nikka Ram filed with the Assistant Returning Officer signed and filled up oath forms along with their nomination papers. In our opinion, this was not sufficient compliance with the requirement of s. 51(a).

In Pashupati Nath v. Harihar Prasad(') this Court held tllat the nomination paper was liable to be rejected under s. 36(2)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 corresponding to s. 4712)1a) of the J. & K. Representation of the People Act 1957 if the qualification required by Art. 173(a) of the Constitu: tio.n corresponding to s. 51(a) of the J. & K. Constitution did not

e~1st on the date of scrutiny of nominations. In that case no signed oath form was attach~ to the nomination paper or filed before the date. fixed fr srunny ... In 'the present case signed oath forms alon? with nommat1on papers were filed with the Assistant Returnmg Officer on January 23, 1967 before the date fixed for scrutiny. But this fact mak.es no difference. They neither made nor subscribed the oath or affirmation before the Assistant Returnig Officer a~ re9uired bys. 51 (a). On the date fixed for the scrutmy of nomma!Ions they were not qualified to be chosen to

(I I [1968] 2 S.C.R. 812, A.1.R. 1968 S.C. 1064.

'11--

fill the seat in the legislature under s. 5l(a) of the J. & K. Consti A tution and their nomination papers were liable to be rejected under s. 47(2)(a) of the J. & K. Representation of the People Act, 1957.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

V.P.S.

Appeal dismissed.

SHEIKH ABDUL REHMAN

JAGAT RAM ARYAN

February 11, 1969

S. M. SIKRI

R. S. BACHAWAT

K. S. HEGDE, JJ.

s. 51(a)

Section 5

Election Commission

s. 51

s. 47(2)

s. 123

R. N. Bhalgotra

S. S. Khanduja

R. K. Garg

S. C. Agarwal

D. P. Singh

S. Chakravarti

Bachawat

Jagat Ram Aryan

Jagat Ram Aryan

Faquir Chand

Narain Dass

Nikka Ram

Bhagat Ram

Om Parkash

Swami Raj

Kahan Singh

Bhaderwah

Abdul Gani

J agat Ram

Jagat Ram

Faquit" Chand

Jagat Ram

s. 51(a)

F Nikka Ram

s. 44

Representation of the People Act, 1957

s. 45

s. 51

Section 51

Election Commission of India

Fifth Schedule

India

Section 44

Representation of the People Act

Section 45

Section 46

Section 47

sections 51 and 69

Abdul Qayum

Abdul Rehman

Kahan A Singh

s. 51

Sixth Amendment Act

Election Commission, India

.Kahan Singh

Kahan Singh

Abdul Qayum

Abdul Rehman

January 23, 1967

s. 51(a)

s. 36(2)(a)

Representation of the People Act, 1951

s. 4712

Representation of the People Act 1957

Art. 173(a)

s. 51(a)

[1968] 2 S.C.R. 812

s. 5

s. 47(2)(a)

Representation of the People Act, 1957