ABDUL KARIM AND OTHERS

STATE OF WEST BENGAL

January 31, 1969

[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.)

Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950 Ss. 3(2), 8, 9, 10 &o 11(1)-Com. titution of India, Art. 22 (5)-I/ State Government under an obligation to consider representation of detenu before forwarding to Advisory Board.

The petitioners were detained by orders of detention under s. 3 (2) of tho Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950. After the grounds of detention were communicated to them, they made representations to the State Government agaiust their detention. These were considered by the Advisory Board which reported under section 10 of the Act that there was sufficient cause for detention in each case and the State confirmed the detention& under s. 11 (1) di the Acl By petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioners challenged the legality of their detention on the ground that the representations made hy them against their orders of detention were not considered by the respondent Government, but were merely forwarded hy it to the Advisory Board.

It was contended on behalf of the. State Government that there was no obligation on it to consider the representations since an Advisory Board had been constituted under Section 8 of the Act to consider the cases of. the detenus and had reported that there was sufficient cause for their detention; and that there was no express language in Article 22 (5) of the Coll8titution requiring the State Government to consider the representations o'i the detenus.

An alternative contention was that the State Government might be obliged to consider the representat, ion of a detenu only in a case • where the detention was for a period o! less than three months ar in a case contemplated by Article 22 (7).

HELD: The orders of detention against the petitioners were illegal and ultra vires.

It is necessarily implicit in the language of Art.. 22 (5) that the State Government to whom the representation is made should praperly consider the representation as expeditiously as possible. The constitution of an Advisory Board under Section 8 of the Act does not relieve the Stale Government from the leal obligation .to consider the representation of the detenu as soon as it ts received by it, and to take appropriate action thereon including revocation di the order which it was empowered to do under section 13 of the Act. [ 486 Hl It is manifest that the right under Art. 22 (5) to make a representation has been guaranteed independent o! the duration of the period o! detention and irrespective of the existence or non-existence of an Advisory Board. The constitution of an Advisory. Board for the purpose di reporting whether a person should or should not be detained for a period of more than three months is a very different thing from a right i>f consideration by the State Government whether a person should be detained even for a single day. Even if a reference has to be made to the Advisory Board under section 9 of the Act, the appropriate Government is, under a legal obligation, to consider the representation of the detenu before ruch a reference is made.

[488 DJ

All the procedural requirements of Article 22 a:re mandatory in character and even if one of the procedural requirements is not complied with the order of detention would be rendered illegal. [489 Al '

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 327 of 1968.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus.

R. K. Garg, for the petitioneni.

Debabrata Mukherjee, P. K. Chakravarti and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.

'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. In this case the petitioners have obtained a rule g upon the respondent, viz., the State of West Bengal, to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued under Art. 3 2 of the Comtitution directing their release from detention under orders passed under s. 3 ( 2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) (hereinafter called the Act). Cause has been shown by Mr. Debabrata Mukherjee and other coun$eJ on behalf of the respondent to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given.

At the conclusion of the hearing of this petition on 15th January, 1969, we directed the release of these petitioners and said that the reasons would be furnished later. We shall now proceed to state those reasons.

As regards petitioner No. 2 Sk. Abdul Karim, the order of detention was made on 17th February, 1968 by tl\.e District Ma, gistrate of Hooghly and reads as follows :

"No. 230..C Dated 17-2-1968 Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as Sk. Abdul Karim, son of late Sk. Nasiruddin of Mathurdangi, Police-station Chanditala District Hooghly, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any ma!llller prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the eo!Oll).unity, it is necessary so to do, I therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 ( 2) of the Preventive Detention Act; 19 50 make this order directing that the said Sk. Abdul Karim be detained.

Given under my hand and seal of office.

Sd/ - Illegible . . 17-2-68 District Magistrate, Hoogb!y".

On the same date the foilowing grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu :

"I. You are being detained in pursuance of a detention order made under sub-section ( 2) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), on the following groUlllds :

2. That on 2-2-68 at 19.05 hours you were arrested while carrying 60 kgs. of rice without authority from Dankuni Bazar towards Dankuni Rly. Station with a view to despatch the same by train into the statutory rationing areas of Calcutta and Howrah. {a) That on 9-2-68 at 14.00 hrs. you were found to detrain at Dankuni Rly. Station with a bag containing one maund of rice from Burdwan-Howrah local train.

(b) That on 10-2-68 at 13.55 hrs. you with 2/'3other smugglers were found to carry rice 20 kgs. e.ach, by train from Dankuni Rly. Station towards Sealdah and you all detrained at Baranagore off side platform with unauthorised stocks of rice.

(c) That on 11-2-68 at 08.45 hrs, you with other smugglers were found cg 15 kgs. of rice each by train towards Howrah from Danlruni Rly. Station.

3. You are hereby informed that you may make a representation to the State Government, as early as possible, on receipt of the detention order and that such representation should be addressed to the Asstt. Secy. to the Govt. of West Bfl!lgal, Home Deptt. Special Section, Writers' Buildings, Calcutta, and forwarded through the Superintendent of the Jail in which you are detained.

4. You are also informed that under section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), the Advisory Board shall hear you in person and if you desile to be so heard by the Advisory Board, you should mtimate such desire in your representation to the State Government.

Sd/- Illegible 17-2-68 District Magistrate, Hooghly".

On 21st February, 1968, Sk. Abdul Karim made a representation to the State Government against the order of detention.

On 22nd April, 1968, the Advisory Board made a report under a section 10 of the Act stating that there was sufficient cause for detention of Sk. Abdul Karim.

On 24th July, 1968, the Governor of West.Bengal confirmed the detention order under section 11(1) of the Act. /

Section 3 of the Act provides :

"3. (1) The Central Government or the State Government may- ( a) If satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-

(i) the defence of India, the relatlons of India with foreign powers or the security of India, or

(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or

(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or

(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Forejgners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.

( 4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Govem!-

ment shall, as soon as may be, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grqunds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government having bearing on the necessity for the order".

Sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section empower the District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police in a Presidency Town to exercise the power conferred by and make the order contemplated in sub-section ( 1), but with the qualification that any order made thereunder must be reported forthwith to the Government of the State to which the officer in question is subordinate with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion hav.e a bearing on the necessity for the order.

Sub-section ( 3) further pfl'" vides that no such order made after the commencement of the

Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government.

Section 7 of the Act reads :

"7. ( 1 ) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall,

. '\

as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of. making a representation against the order to the appropriate Governmem:t.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose".

Section 8 provides for constitution of one or more Advisory Boards for the purposes of this Act. Sectfop 9 states :

"In every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within thirty days from the date of detention under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 8 the grounds on which the order has beein made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer, also the report by such officer, under sub-section (3) of section 3".

Section 11 cts :

I • "11. (I ) In any case where the AdVJSOry Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and CO(!ltinue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. ( 2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the dettion of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith".

Section llA states :

"11 A. ( 1) The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention.

( 2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection ( 1) every detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall unless a shorter period is specified in the order, continue to remain in force untll the 1st day of April, 1953, or until the expiration of twelve months

from the date of dete.ntion, whichever period of detention expires later.

(3) The provisions of sub-section

(2) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 3 of the Preventive Detention ( Ameaidment) Act, 1952 (XXXIV of 1952), but nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the appropriate Governmtl!lt to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time."

Section 13 provides for revocation of a detention order and reads as follows :-

" 13. ( 1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897) a detention order may at any time be revoked or modified- ( a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in the sub-section ( 2) of section 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate or by the Central Government; and (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government or by the Central Government.

(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar . the making of a fresh detentio.ri order under section 3 against the same person in any case where fresh facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the Central Government or a State Government or an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should be made".

The Preventive Detention Act (Act No. 4 of 1950) was enacted by Parliament by virtue of the power conferred on it by Art. 22 clause (7) of the Constitution read with entries 9 of List I and 3 of List III of the Seventh Schedule. Article 22 ( 4), ( 5), ( 6) and ( 7) provides as follows :

"22.

( 4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless--

(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who

are, or have been, or are qualified to be e.ppointed as H Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for sl'ch detention :

Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or

(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of law made by Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). ( 5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made wd shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.

(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose. ( 7) Parliament may by law prescribe-

(a) the circumstances er which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinioin of the Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause 4);

(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law for preventive detention; and ( c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) ol clause ( 4) ".

It was argued by Mr. Garg that the representations of the petitioners were not considered by the respondent Government of West Bengal; but were merely forwarded by the respondent to the Advisory Board without any consideratiQII.

It was contended G that the detention of the petitioners was bad in Jaw, because there was a failure on the part of the Government to consider the representations submitted by the petitioners before forwarding them to the Advisory Board. In the first counter-affidavit of the respondent it was asserted by Mr. Monoranjan Dey that "there was no requirement of law which compelled the consideration by the State Government ol the deteirlu's representation before being forwarded to the Advisory Board for consideration".

In the second counter. affidavit Mr. Monoranjan Dey said that "for securing n unprejudiced and impartial consideration of the represqntatton of the

petitioner by an independent Statutory Authority, the State Government refrained at that stage from expressing its views on the .representations to the Advisory Board". The counter-lffi.davits of the respqn.dent are somewhat vague and the allegation of the petitioner has not been categorically denied.

Mr. Debabrata Mulilierjee, however, said in the course of argwnent that the case may be decided on the footing that the representations were not considered by the State Government before sending them to the. Advisory Board.

It was cqntended on behalf oi the respondent that there was no obligation on the State Government to consider the representations since the Advisory Board had been constituted under

section 8 of the Act to consider the case of the de~'us and to report to the State Govelllll1lent whether there was sufficient cause for their .detention.

The question involved in this case depends upon the construction of Art. 22 ( 5) of the Constitution which has already been reproduced.

Though the Constitution has recognised the necessity of law~ as to prevfl!ltive detention, it has also provided certain safeguards to mitigate their harshness by placing fetters on the legislative power conferred on this topic.

Article 22 lays down the pennissible limits of legislation empowering preventive detention. Article 22 prescribes the minimum procedure that must be included in any law permitting prevf1!ltive detention and if such requirements are not observed the detention iniringes the fundamental right of the detenu guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.

The said requirements are : ( 1 ) that !!10 law can provide for detention for a period of more than three months unless the sufficiency for the cause of the detention is investigated by an Advisory Board within the said period of three months; (2) that the State law cannot authorise detention beyond the maximum period prescribed by Parliament under the powers given to it in Art. 22 clause (7); (3) that Parliament also cannot make a law authorising detention for a period beyond three months without the intervention of an Advisory Board unless the law conforms to the conditions laid down in clause ( 7) of Art. 22; ( 4) provision has also been made to enable Parliament to prescribe the procedure to be followed by Advisory Boards. Apart from these enabling and disabling provisions certain procedural rights have been expressly safeguarded by clause ( 5) of Art. 22. A person detained under a law of preventive detention has a right to obtain information as to the grounds of detention and has also the right to make a represeintation protesting against an order of preventive detention. Article 22 ( 5) does not expressly say to whom the representatlon is to be made and how the detainmg authority is to deal with the representation.

But it is necessarily implicit in the language ofArt. 22(5) that the State Government to whom the representation is made should properly consider the representation as expeditiously as

possible. The constitution of an Advisory Board under section 8 of the Act does not relieve the State Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu as soon as it is received by it. On behalf of the respondent it was said that there was no express Iainguage in Art. 22 ( 5) requiring the State

Government to consider the representation of the detenu. But it is a necessary implication of the language of Art. 22 ( 5) that the State Government should consider the representation made by the detenu as soon as it is made, apply its mind to it and, if necessary, take appropriate action. In our opinion, the constitutional right

!make a representation guaranteed by Art. 22(5) must be taken to include by necessary implication the constitutional right to a

proper consideration of the representation by the authority to whom it is made. The right of representation under Art. 22 ( 5) is a valuable constitutional right and is not a mere formality. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of the respondent that the State Government is not under a legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu or that the representation must be kept in cold storage in the archives of the Secretariat till the time or occasion for sending it to the Advisory Board is reached. If the viewpoint contended for by the respondent is correct, the constitutional right under Art. 22 ( 5) would be rendered iJlusory. Take for instance a case of detention of a person on account of mistaken identity. If the order cf detention has been made against A and a different person B is arrested and detained by the police authorities because of similarity of names or some such cause, it cannot be reasonably said that the State Government should wait for the report of the Advisory Board before releasing the wrong person from detention. It is obvious that apart from the procedure of reference to the Aclvisory Board, the State Government has ample power under ectiOn 13 of the Act to reyoke nny ordr of detention at any time. If the right of representation in such a case is to be real and not illusory, there is a legal obligation imposed upon the State Government to consider the representation and to take appropriate action thereon. Otherwise the right of representation conferred by Art. 22 ( 5) of the Constitution would be rendered nugatory. The argument of Mr. Debabrata Mukherjee as regards the construction of Art. 22 ( 5) cannot a.!so

be correct for another reason. Under Art. 22 clause ( 4) of the Constitution, it is open to Parliament to make a law providing for preventive detention for a period of Jess than three months without the cause of detention being investigated by an Advisory Board. It is clear that the right of representation conferred by clause ( 5) of Art. 22 does not depend upon the duration of period nf detention. Even if the period of detention is less than three months, the detenu has a constitutional right of representation.

It is also important to notice that under Art. 22(7) Parliament may by law prescribe the circumstances under which and the class

488 SUPllEME COURT llEPORTS

[1969] 3 S.C.R.

or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board. It cannot possibly be argued that if Parliament makes a law contemplated by Art. 22(7) of the Constitution, the detaining authority is under no legal obligation to consider the representation made by the detenu under Art. 22(5).

Faced with this difficulty counsel on behalf of the respondent conceded that in a case where the detention is for a period of Jess than three months or in a case CQllltemplated Qy Art. 22(7), the State Government will be legally obliged to consider the representation of the detenu. But it was suggested that in a case where a reference has to be made to the Advisory Board it was not necessary for the State Government to consider the

represation. We are unable to accept this argument as correct.

There is no such dichotomy in the scheme of Art. 22 ( 5) of the Constitution and there is no reason why it must be interpreted in a different manner for the two classes of detenus. It is manifest that the right under Art. 22 ( 5) to make a representatiOl!l has been guaranteed independent of the duration of the period of detention and irrespective of the existence or non-existence of an Advisory Board. The constitution of an Advisory Board for the purpose of reporting whether a person should or should not be detained for a period of more than three j!}flnths is a very different thing from a right of consideration by ilie State Government whether a person should be detained even for a sjngle day.

The obligation of the detaining authority to consider the representation is different from the obligation of the Advisory Board to consider the representation later on at the time of hearing the referooce.

It follows, therefore, that even if reference is to be made to the Advisory Board under section 9 of the Act, the appropriate Government is under legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu before such a reference is made.

In the present case, Sk. Abdul Karim has alleged that his representation was not considered by the State Government before it was forwarded to the Advisory Board. This allegation is not controverted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the responc!Qnt. What is at stake in this case is the issue of personal freedom which is one of the basic principles of a democratic State.

A predominant position and role is given in our Constituti9n to human personality and human freedom as the ultimate source of all moral and spiritual values. Preventive detntion is a serious invasion of personal liberty, and, therefore, the Constitution has provided procedural safeguards against the improper exercise of the power of preventive detention.

Al! the procedural requirements of Article 22 are in our opinion maindatory in character and

A even if one of the procedural requirement is not complied with, the order of detention would be rendered illegal.

Accordingly, the order of detention dated 17-2-1968 made a11ainst petitioner No. 2, Sk. Abdul Karim aod the subsequent order of the Gover

nor of West Bengal dated 24th April, 1968 confirming the order Of detention must be held to be illegal and u/Jra vires and peti B tioner No. 2 Sk, Abdul Karim was entitled to be released.

In the case of petitioners Nos. 5, Nirmal Chandra Jana, No. 6 SL Ibrahim and No. 8 Nur Mohd. the order of detentioo sullers . from the same legal defect as the order of detention in the case of petitioner No. 2, Sk. Abdul Karim.

For the reasons already stated we hold that the order of detention and the order of cone firmation under section 11 of the Act in the case of petitioners Nos. 5, 6 8 were also illegal and ultra vi res and the petitioners were consequently entitled to be released

R.K.P.S.

Petition allowed.

ABDUL KARIM AND OTHERS

STATE OF WEST BENGAL

January 31, 1969

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

A. N. GROVER, JJ.

Preventive Detention Act

Ss. 3(2), 8, 9, 10

Art. 22

s. 3

Preventive Detention Act

section 10

s. 11

Article 32

Section 8

Article 22

Article 22

Section 8

section 13

Art. 22

section 9

Article 22

Art. 32

Constitution of India

R. K. Garg

Debabrata Mukherjee

P. K. Chakravarti

G. S. Chatterjee

Ramaswami

State of West Bengal

Art. 3

s. 3

Preventive Detention Act, 1950

Debabrata Mukherjee

Sk. Abdul Karim

17th February, 1968

Hooghly

section 3

Abdul Karim

section 3

Preventive Detention Act, 1950

Calcutta

Howrah

Burdwan-Howrah

Sealdah

section 10

Preventive Detention Act, 1950

21st February, 1968

22nd April, 1968

section 10

24th July, 1968

West.Bengal

section 11(1)

Section 3

Central Government

India

Forejgners Act, 1946

Central Government

Section 7

Section 8

section 8

section 3

Section 11

section 11

section 11

section 3

Section 13

section 21

General Clauses Act, 1897

section 3

section 3

Parliament

Art. 22

Seventh Schedule

Article 22

clause 4

Garg

Government of West Bengal

Monoranjan Dey

Debabrata Mulilierjee

section 8

Art. 22

Article 22

Article 22

Articles 21 and 22

Art. 22

Art. 22

Art. 22

Article 22

section 8

Art. 22

Art. 22

Art. 22(5)

Art. 22

Art. 22

Art. 22

Art. 22

Art. 22

Art. 22

Art. 22(7)

Art. 22(7)

Art. 22(5)

Art. 22(7)

Art. 22

Art. 22

section 9

Abdul Karim

Article 22

Abdul Karim

Nirmal Chandra Jana

SL Ibrahim

Nur Mohd

section 11


GANESH PRASAD DIXIT

ll.

COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, MADHYA PRADESH

February 3, 1969

[J. C. SH;\11, V. R.AMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]

Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax A.ct (2 of 1959), ss. 2(d) 7, 18(5) and Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, r. 33-Notice for best judgment assessment-Time given to show cause less than 15 day~ No prejudice to tax-payer-I/ proceedings liable to be set aside-Purchasu of building material-Material not resold but used in construction-- Building contractor if dealer-Purchase price of building maJerial ii liable to purchase-tax.

The appellants were a firm of building contractors and were registered as dealers under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax, 1959. They were purchasing building materials, which were taxable under the Act, and were using them in the course of their business. The Sales-tax Olli cer served notices upon. them under s. 18(5) calling upon them to show cause why best judgment assessment should not be made. The appellants did not offer any explanation for their failure to submit returns of their turnover, and the Salestax Officer assessed their turnover in respect of sales as nil and assessed them to purchase-tax under s. 7 in respect of goods purchased by them for use in their construction business. Rule 33 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules; 1959, provides tbat a notice of assessment under s. 18(5) shall not give, ordinarily, less than 15 days

from the date of the service to show cause, but, the notices in the present case did not give the appellants a clear period of 15 days to show cause.

On the questions : (I) Whether the notices were invalid, and therefore, the assessment, on the basis of those notices was bad in law; (2) Whether the appellants were dealers; and (3) Whether the impositioo elf purchase-tax under s. 7 was in order,

HELD: (1) The terms of r. 33 are not mandatory. Therefore, unlcos prejudice has resulted to the tax-payer the pr<reedings are not liable to be set aside. In the instant case it was not tht case of the appellants that because of the insufficiency of time they We'• unable to submit their Cl planation. Hence, the notice and assessmeu. could not be held to be invalid. [492 B-F; 493 BJ

~ Ml s. Kajorfrnal Kalyanmal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. 3 I.T.C: 451 and lamna Dhar Potdar v. C.l.T., Punjab, 3 I.T.R. 112, distin guished.

(2) Whether in a particular set of circumstances a person may be said to be a dealer carrying on business in a commodity must depend upon the facts of that case and no general test may be applied for determining the

question. Merely because the turnover of the appellants in respect of sales was nil they did not cease to be dealers. A person, to be a dealer within the meaning of the Act, need not both purchase and sell goods because, a person who carries on the business of buying is, by the definition of the term in s. 2(d), a dealer. [4<13 H; 496 Fl

State of A..P. v. H. Abdul Bakshi, 15 S.T.C. 644 (S.C.) followed.

LM.S. Sadak Thamby & Co. v. State of Madras,

14 S.T.C. 753, approved.

(3) By using. the expre!'sion 'either consumers such goods in the manufacture of the goods for sale or otherwi.se' in s. 7, tho Legislature intended that consumption of goods renders the price paid for their purchase taxable, if th~ goods are used in the manufacture of the goods for sale or if the gootb are consurned otherwise. Therefore, under s. 7, purchase..

tax is payable, where no sales-tax is payable under s. 6 on the sale price of the goods, by a dealer who buys taxable goods in the course of his business, and, (a) either consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale; or (b) consumes such goods otherwise; or (c) di!- poses of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in tho State; or ( d) despatches them to a place outside tho State except as direct result of sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.

In the present case the assessees were registered as dealers, they had purchased taxable material in the course elf their business and bad consumed the materials otherwise than in the manufacture of goods for sale and for a profit motive. Therefore, the purchase price paid by tho appellant. was .taxable.

[495 E--0; 496 A-BJ

V. K. S. V. Sangh v. State of Maharashtra, 22 S.T.C. 116, not applicable.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 940 and 941 of 1966.

Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated August 31, 1965 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Civil Cases Nos. 321 and 331 of 1964.

M. C. Chagla, B. L. Neema, Anja/i K. Varma and J. B.

Dadachanji, for the appellant (in both the appeals).

I. N. Shroff, for the respondent (in both the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Shalt, J. In respect of assessment to sales-tax for two accounting periods April 1, 1961 to June 30, 1961 and July 1, 1961 to September 30, 1961, the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, referred the following questions to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for opinion :

" ( 1 ) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the notice in Form XVI that was served on the applicant was invalid and therefore the assessment of the applicant on the basis of that notice was bad in law ?

( 2) Whet)ler in the facts and circumstances of the case the applicant was a dealer during the assessment period under the Act and tho imposition of purchase tax on him under 7 of the Act was in order ?"

The High Court answered the first question in the negative, and the second in the affirmative. These appeals are preferred with special leave granted by this Court. • The appellants are a firm of building contractors and are registered as dealers under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 2 of 1959.

The appellants purchased building materials in the two account periods and used the materials in the course of their business.

The Sales Tax Officer, Jabalpur Circle, served notices under s. 18 ( 5) of the Act calling upon the appellants to show cause why "best judgment" assessments should not be made, and by order dated November 30, 1961, he assessed the appellants to tax in respect of goods purchased by the appellants for use in their construction business and imposed a penalty of Rs. 200/- in each case. Appeals against the orders imposing tax and penalty were dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and the Board of Revenue.

Rule 33 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, provides that a notice of assessment under s. 18 ( 5) shall be in Form XVI, and ordinarily it shall give not less than 1 ~

days from the date of the service to the assessee to show rause why he "should not be assessed or re-assessed to tax and/or to pay penalty".

The notices served upon the appellants did not give them a clear period of 15 days to show cause. But we are unable to hold on that account that the notices and the assescSments were invalid.

We agree with the High Court that the rule is not intended to be "either invariable or rigid", and "unless prejudice has resulted to the tax-payer the proceedings are not liable to be set aside". It is not even suggested that because of the insufficiency of time the appellants were unable to submit their explanation for failure to make their returns of turnover.

Two cases on which reliance was placed by counsel for the appellants in support of the plea that the notices were invalid have, in our judgment, no bearing. In Messrs.

Kajorimal Kalyanmal v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P., (1) it was held that. a notice under s. 22(2) of the Income-tax Act. 1922, giving the assessee 20 days for filing the return was "entirely illegal".

In Jamna Dhar Potdar and Co. Lyallpur v.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab(') it was held, following the judgment in Ka; orima/ Kalyanmal's case(') that a notice which does not give to a tax-payer under s. 22(2} of the Income-tax Act, 1922, clear notice for furnishing a return, of thirty days from the date of service is illegal. But these cases were decided under s. 22 ( 2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, before it wa~ amended by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act 7 of 1939.

Under the section as it then stood, it was enacted that the

(I} 3 l.T.C. 451.

(2) 3 I.T.R. ll2.

Income-tax Officer shall serve a notice upon any person whose total income is in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer of such an amount as to render that person liable to pay income-tax.

The section was held to be mandatory. But the terms of r. 33 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules are plainly not mandatory. The answer given by the High Court on the first question must be accepted.

To appreciate the scope of the enquiry under the second question, the relevant provisions of the Act may be summarised.

By s. 2 ( d) of the Act, insofar as it is relevant, the expression "dealer" is defined as meaning, amongst others, "any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods, directly or otherwise''. By s. 4(2) every dealer is liable to tax in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected in Madhya Pradesh with effect from the date on which his turnover calculated during a period of twelve months immediately preceding such date first exceeds the limits specified in sub-s. ( 5). Section 6 provides that the tax payable by a dealer under the Act shall be levied on his taxable turnover relating to the goods specified in Sch. II.

Section 7 provides : "Every dealer who in the course of his business purchases any taxable goods, in circumstances in which no tax under section 6 is payable on the sale price of such goods and either consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise or disposes Of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State or despatches them to a place outside the State except as a direct result of sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of such goods at the same rate at which it would have been leviable on the sale price of such goods under section 6 :

Provided " Counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants were not "dealers" within the meaning of the Act because they did not carry on the business of buying goods, and that in any event, the goods pll!chased by them for use in their construction business were not liable to tax under s. 7.

The appellants are registered dealers under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (Act 2 of 1959). It is H true that in respect of the periods their tl}mover in respect of sales was assessed as "nil".

But on that account they did not cease to be registered dealers within the meaning of the Act. A person to be a dealer within the meaning of the Act need not 8 Sup. CJ.69-13

both purchase and sell goods: a person who carries on the business of buying is by the express definition of the' tetm in s. 2(d) a "dealer". This Court held in The Stgte of Aruihra Pradesh v. H.

Abdul Bakshi and Bros.(') that it is not predicted'OOJa dealer that he must carry on the business of buying and selling the same goods. A person who buys goods for consumption in the process of manufacture of articles to be sold by him is a dealer within the meaning of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act 14 of

1950. In H. Abdul Bakshi arli!l Bros's case(') the assessees sold skins, after tanning hides and skins purchased by them. In the process of tanning, they had to use tanning bark purchased by them.

This Court held that the turnover arising out of the tanning bark purchased by the assessees for consumption in the process of tanning was liableflto tax on the footing that the assessees were carrying on the busifill!is of buying goods, even though the goods beught were consum\!l:l'in the process of tanning. In dealing with the question whether an activity of purchase of goods required for consumption in a manufacturing process may be regarded as a business, the Court observed (at p. 647) :

"A person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods. The expression 'business' though extensively used is a word of indefinite import. In taxing statutes it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a person, nonnally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit motive, and not for sport or pleasure. But to. be a dealer a person need not follow the activity of buying, selling and supplying the same commodity.

Mere buying for personal consumption, i.e. without a profit motive, will not make a person dealer within the meaning of the Act, but a person who consumes a commodity bought by him in the course of his trade, or use in manufacturing another .commodity for sale, would be regarded as a dealer. The Legislature has not made

sale of the very article bought by a person a condition for treating him as a dealer; the definition merely requires that the buying of the commodity mentioned in rule 5 (2) must be in the course of business, i.e. must be for sale or use with a view to make profit out of the integrated activity of buying and disposal.

The commodity may itself be converted into another

(I) 15 S.T.C. 641.

saleable commodity, or it may be used as an ingredient or in aid of a manufacturing process leading to the production of such saleable commodity."

This Court agreed with the view expressed in L. M. S. Sadak Thamby & Co. v. The State of Madras(') in which a similar question was decided by the High Court of Madras. In that case the assessee had purchased tanning bark and had consumed it in tanning raw hides. The Madras High Court held that the buying of goods was in the course of business since it was associated with the business of tanning of hides carried on with a profit-making motive. These decisions support the contention of the State that price paid for goods bought for consumption in manufacturing an article for sale is exigible to purchase-tax even if the goods purchased are either destroyed or transformed into another species of goods.

Counsel for the appeHants urged that in the cases of H.

Abdul Bakshi a11d Bros.(') and L. M. S. Sadak Tham by & Compa11y(1) the assessees were carrying on the business of selling goods manufactured by them and for the purpose of manufacturing those goods certain other goods were purchased and consumed in the process of manufacture, but here the goods are not consumed in producing another commodity for sale, and on that account the two cases are distinguishable. The answer to that argument must be sought in the terms of s. 7. The phraseology used in that section is somewhat involved, but the meaning of the section is fairly plain. Where no sales tax is payable under s. 6 on the sale price of the goods, purchase-tax is payable by a dealer who buys taxable goods in the course of his business, and ( 1) either consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale, or (2) consumes such goods otherwise; or (3) disposes of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State; or ( 4) despatches them to a place outside the State except as a direct result of sale or purchase in the course of inter -

State trade or commerce. The assessees are registered as dealers and they have purchased building materials in the course of their business: the building materials are taxable under the Act, and the appellants have consumed the materials otherwise than in the manufacture of goods for sale and for a profit-motive. On the plain words of s. 7 the purchase price is taxable.

Mr. Chagla for the appellants urged that the expression "or otherwise" is intended to denote a conjunctive introducing a specific alternative to the words for sale immediately preceding. The clause in which it occurs means, says Mr. Chagla, that bv s. 7 the price paid for buying goods. consumed in the manufacture of other goods, intended to be sold or otherwise disposed of,

(I) 14 S.T.C. 753.

(2) 15 S.T.C.644.

alone is taxable. We do not think that that is a reasonable interpretation of the expression "either consumes such gooCls in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise". lt is intended by the Legislature . lhat consumption of goods renders the price paid for their purchase taxable, if the goods are used in the manufacture of other goods for sale or if the goods are consumed otherwise.

The decision in Versova Kali Sahakari Vahatuk Sangh Ltd. v.

The State of Maharashtra(') on which reliance was placed by Mr. Chagla has, in our judgment, no application. In that case a society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, carried on the business of transporting fish belonging to its members from fishing centres to the markets and vice versa. For preserving fish in the course of transport, the society used to purchase ice, and the members, whose fish was transported, were charged for the quantity of ice required in respect of their baskets of fish.

The difference between the price paid by the society for ice pu.rchased and the charge made by the society for ice supplied was brought to tax by the Sales Tax Officer under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The High Court of Bombay held that the society was not supplying ice with the intention of carrying on business in: ice, and on that account the society was not a "dealer" within the definition of that term in s. 2 (11 ) of the Act in regard to the supply of ice by it to its members. In that case the taxing authority did not seek to impose purchase-tax : he sought to bring to tax the difference between the price paid by the society for purchasing ice and the charges which it made from its members for supplying ice, and the High Court held that in supplying ice the society was not carrying on business in ice, and on that account was not a "dealer". Whether in a particular set of circumstances a person may be said to be carrying on business in a commodity must depend upon the facts of that case and no general test may be applied for determining that question.

The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.

One hearing fee.

V.P.S.

Appeals dismissed.

(I) 22 S.T.C. 116,

GANESH PRASAD DIXIT

February 3, 1969

A. N. GROVER, JJ.

ss. 2(d)

s. 18(5)

s. 7

s. 18(5)

s. 7

s. 2(d)

s. 7

s. 7

s. 6

August 31, 1965

Madhya Pradesh High Court

M. C. Chagla

B. L. Neema

K. Varma

J. B.

Dadachanji

I. N. Shroff

Shalt

High Court of Madhya Pradesh

s. 18

November 30, 1961

s. 18

s. 22(2)

Income-tax Act

Kalyanmal

Income-tax Act

Income-tax Act, 1922

s. 2

s. 4(2)

Madhya Pradesh

Section 6

Section 7

section 6

section 6

s. 7

s. 2(d)

H. Abdul Bakshi

High Court of Madras

Madras High Court

H.

Abdul Bakshi

L. M. S. Sadak Tham

s. 7

s. 6

s. 7

Chagla

s. 7

High Court of Bombay

s. 2


A RAGHUNA'rH & ORS.

KEDAR NAIB February 3, 1969 B

[1. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]

Tran!Jfer of Property Act, 1882, ss. 4 and 54-Jndian Registration Act, 1908, " 49 as amended by Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act. 1929, s. lection 4 of T .P. Act whether makes s. 49 of Registration Act applicable to documents compulsorily registrable under s. 54 of T.P. Act-Unregistered sale-deed whether admissible in evidence.

Construction of documents-Mortgage or sale.

Practice-High Court in appeal whether can give further relief than given to plaintiff by trial court when plaintiff did nor file appeal against decree of trial court.

D took a loan of Rs. 1700/ - from M, father of the defendants.

On 27th July 1922, D along with his grandmother executed a possessory mortgage deed (Ex.4) in respect of a house for the amount of the aforesaid loan in favour of M. On 23rd February 1953, D's heir sold the said house to the plaintiffs who filed a suit for redemption of the house and for accounts.

The defendants who were sons of M resisted the suit on the ground that Ex .. 4 was not a deed of mortgage though apparently so.

According to them when read with Ex. 26 which was executed in October

1922 it was an outright sale. The !rial court decreed the plaintiff's suit for redemption on payment of an amount fixed by it.

The first Appellate Court allowed the defendants' appeal. The High Court when finally disposing of the second appeal set aside the judgment elf the lower appellate court and restored the judgment of the trial court. The High Court further remanded the case to the lower appellate court with the direction that "the defendants be asked to render accounts before they claim any pay

meat from the plaintiff at the time of the redemption of the mortgage".

In appeals before this Court the contentions on behal'f of the defendantsappellanls were : ( i) That Ex. 4 was really a sale deed and not a mortgage deed and it should be read with Ex. 26; (ii) Thats. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act did not make s. 49 of the Registration Act applicable to documents compulsorily registrable by the provisions of s. 54 paragraph 2 of the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore Ex. 26 though unregistered was not inadmissible in evidence; (iii) That in any case since the respon dents (olaintiffs) had not filed any appeal against the decree of the trial court, the High Court should not have granted them further relief as it did by giving a direction that the defendants should be asked to render accOU11ts before they claimed payment from the plaintiff at the time elf the redemption of the mortgage.

HELD : (i) The terms of Ex. 4 clearly showed that it was a mortgage deed and not a sale deed.

(ii) Ex. 4 could not be read with Ex. 26 because the latter was required to be registered under s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the absenee of such registration this document could not be received in evidence of any transaction affecting the property in view elf s. 29 of the Registration Act. [500 B--501 EJ The contention that s. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act did not make s. 49 of the Registration Act applicable to transactions under s. 54 paragraph 2 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be accepted.

Any A doubt in this respect was removed by s. 10 of the Transfer of Property

1 Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929 which introduced the words '"by ""Y provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882" in s. 49 of the Registration Act. This amendment made it clear that the documents in the supplemental list i.e. the documents of which registration is necessary under tl'c Transfer of Property Act but not under the Registration Act fall within the scope of section 49 of the Registration Act, and if. not registered are not admissible in evidence of any transaction aifectlng any B immovable property comprised therein and do not affect any such immov able property. (503 F-504 BJ

Sohan Lal & Ors. v . . "v/o/wn Lal & Ors., I.LR. 50 All. 986 and Rama Sahu v. Gowro Ratho, I.LR. [1921] 44 Mad. 55. referred to.

(iii) The appellants were right in contending that when the plaintifi had not filed an appeal against the decree of the trial court the High Court C was not legally justified in giving further relief to the plaintiff than that granted by the trial court.

Accordingly the portion of the decree of the High Court remanding the case to the IO\ver appellate court with a direction that the dofendants should be asked to tender accounts, was liable to be set "'ide. [504 D-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 457 and 458 of 1966.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment aind order date\I April 27, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeals Nos. 4940 and 3660 of 1961.

S. P. Si11ha and Shaukat Hussain, for the appellants (in both the appeals).

J. P Goyal and G. Nabi Untoo, for the respondent (in both the appeals).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.

In the suit which is the subject matter of these appeals the plaintiff alleged that one Dwarka Prasad took a loan of Rs. 1700 from Madho Ram, father of the defendants, and that on 27th July, 1922, Dwarka Prasad along with one Mst. Kunta. his maternal grand mother, executed a possessory mortgage deed of the disputed house for Rs. 1700 in favour of Madho Ram.

The tenns of the mortgage deed were that the mortgagor was to pay interest of Rs. 12, 12/- per month out of which the rent amounting to Rs. 6/- which was the agreed usufruct of the house in suit was to be adjusted and the mortgagor was to pay Rs. 6/12/- per month in cash towards the balance of the interest. The parties agreed that the mortgage would be redeemable within twenty years after paying the principal amount and that portion of interest which was not discharged by the usufruct and other amounts. When Dwarka Prasad wiis unable to pay the amount of Rs. 6/12/- per month, he delivered possession of the house to Madho Ram who let out the house on a monthly

rent of Rs. 25. The mortgagors Dwarka Prasad and Mst. Kunta died leaving Mst. Radha Bai as Dwarka Prasad's heir.

Radha Bai sold the house in dispute to the plaintiff on 2nd February, 1953 and executed a sale deed. The plaintiff, therefore, became entitled to redeem the mortgage and asked the defendants to render accounts.

The defendants contested the suit on the ground that Madho Ram was not the mortgagor nor were the defendants mortgagees.

It was alleged that in the locality where the house was situated, there was a custom of paying Haqe-chaharum and to avoid that payment, the original deed dated 27th July, 1922 was drafted and executed in the form of a mortgage though it was actually an out-right sale. According to the defendants, the house was actually sold to Madho Ram and was not mortgaged. The defendants also pleaded that if the deed dated 27th July, 1922 was held to be a mortgage, the mortgagees were entitled to get the payment of Rs. 6442/8/- as interest, Rs. 2315 as costs of repairs etc.

The trial court held that the deed dated 27th July, 1922 was a mortgage deed, that Dwarka Prasad did not sell the house to Madho Ram and that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the mortgage on payment of Rs. 1709/14/..

The trial court.accordingly decreed the plaintiff's suit for redemption on payment of Rs. 1709/14/-. Against the judgment of the trial court the defendants preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Varanasi, who allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

The plaintiff took the matter in second appeal to the High Court which framed an issue and remanded the case back to the lower appellate court for a fresh decision.

The issue framed by the High Court was "Have the defendants become the owners of the property in dispute by adverse possession ?" The High Court also directed the lower appellate court to decide the question oi admissibility of Exts. A-25 and A-26. After remand the lower appellate court held that the deed dated 27th July, 1922 was a mortgage deed

and not a sale-deed, and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the mortgage. The lower appellate court further held that the defendants had failed to prove that they had acquired title by

adverse possession.

The lower appellate court made the following order:-

'The appeal is allowed with half costs in this way that the suit is decreed for the redemption of the mortgage in question if the. plaintiff pays within six months Rs. 1700 as principal, Rs. 9.87 N.P. Prajawat paid before this suit and any Prajawat paid by the defendants during the pendency of this suit till the plaintiff deposits the entire sum due under this decree and the interest at the rate of Rs. 6/12/- per month from 27-7-19?.2 till the plaintiff deposits the entire sum due

under this decree. The costs of the trial court are made easy.

Let the preliminary decree under Order 34, R. 7, C.P.C. be modified accordingly".

Against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court both the plaintiff and the defendants filed appeals before the High Court. The plaintiff prayed that the decree of the lower appellate court should be set aside and the decree of the trial court should be restored. The defendants, on the other hand, prayed that the decree of the lower courts should be set aside and the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed with costs.

By its judgment dated 27th April, 1964 the High Court dismissed the secoind appeal preferred by the defendants but allowed the plaintiff's appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and restored the judgment of the trial court.

The High Court further remanded the case to the lower appellate court with the direction that "the

defendants be asked to render accounts before they claim any payment from the plaintiff at the time of redempti® of the mortgage". The present appeals are brought by special leave against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 27th April, 1964 in second Appeals Nos. 4940 and 3660 of 196!.

In support of these appeals it was contended by Mr. Sinha that the deed Ex. 4 dated 27th July, 1922 was a sale deed and not a mortgage deed. It was pointed out that there was a subsequent deed of sale dated 8th Ock!ber, 1922 Ex. A-26 which is named 'Titimma Bainama'.

The contention was that the document Ex. 4 dated 27th July, 1922 rr.ust be construed along with Ex. A.26 which forms part of the same transactio!l and so construed the transaction was not a usufructary mortgage but was an outright sale. We are unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant. Ex. A.26 dated 8th October, 1922 is not a registered document, and is hence not admissible in evidence to prove the nature of the transaction covered by the registered mortgage deed Ex. 4 dated 27th July, 1922. If Ex. 4 is taken by itself, there is no doubt that the transaction is one of mortgage.

The document Ex. 4 recites that in consideration of moaey advanced the executants "mortgage the said house 'Bhog Bh!\Q.dak' bearing No. 64/71 situate Mohalla Gola Dina Nath.'' Clause 2 provides a period of twenty years for redemption of the mortgage.

Clause 6 of the document stipulates that the cost of refJairs will be borne by the mortgagors. Clause 1 states :

"That the said sum of Rupees Seventeen hundred half of which is Rupees Eight hundred and fifty will carry interest at the rate of twelve annas per cent monthly. The sum of Rupees six wiH be deducted towards rent monthly from the interest which will accrue.

The possession of the house has been delivered to the

RAGHUNATH v. KEDAll NATH (Ramaswami, J.)

50 I

A said mortgage Mahajan (money lender). The mortgagors will pay the balance of Rupees six annas twelve month by month to the said mortgagee after deducting the rent of Rupees six after giving the possession of the said house and shop".

8 Clause 4 provides :

"That we will go on paying the said Mahajan the sum of Rupees six twelve annas the balance of the interest monthly. If the whole or part of the interest remains unpaid we will pay at the time of redemption. ll this amount of interest is not paid the said house c shall not be redeemed".

The reading of these terms clearly shows that Ex. 4 was a mortgage deed and not a sale deed. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that in order to avoid the payment of Haqe-ehaharum, the original deed dated 27th July, 1922 was drafted and executed in the form of a mortgage but it was actually meant to be an out- D right sale.

Tn support of this argument reference was made to Ex. A.26 dated 8th October, 1922. As we have already said Ex.

A.26 was required to be registered under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the absence of such registration this document cannot be received in evideince of any transaction affecting the property in view of s. 49 of the Registration Act. It was, i, however, urged on behalf of the appellants that the effect of section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act was not to make section 49 of the Registration Act applicable to documents which are compulsorily registrable by the provisions of s. 54, paragraph 2 of the Transfer of Property Act.

In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the full bench of the f Allahabad High Court in Sohan Lal & Ors. v.

Mohan Lal &: Ors.( 1 }

Section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act states :

"The chapters and sections of this Act which relate to contracts shall be taken as part of the Indian Registratio, n Act, 1872.

And sections 54, paragraphs 2 and 3, 59, 107 and 123 shall be read as supplemental to the Indian Registration Act, 1908".

Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act reads :

" "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.

(I) I.LR. 50 All. 986.

Such transfer, iC1 the case of tangible immoveaoJe property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.

In the case of tangible immoveable property, of a value less than Qlle hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property".

Section 1 7 of the Registration Act states :

"1 7. (1 ) The following documents shall be registered if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864 or the Indian Registration Act, 1866 or the lindian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely :

(a) instrument of gift of immoveable property;

(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extiinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of

one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property;

(c) non-testamentary iristruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and

( d) leases of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent;

( e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a Court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or ope- . rates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, wheiher vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immoveable property".

Section 49 of the Registration Act prior to its. amendment in 1929 read:

"No document required by section 17 to be registered shall-

(a) affect any immoveable property comprised therein, or

(b) confer any power to adopt, or ( c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered".

By section 10 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, section 49 was amended as follows:-

"No document required by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered shall- ( a) affect any immoveable property comprised

there~, or

(b) confer any power to adopt, 01 ( c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power unless it has been registered.

Provided that an unregistered document affecting immoveable property a'1d required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received. as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registered instrument".

The inclusion of tbe words "by any provision of the 'l;'ransfer of Property Act, 1882" by the Amending Act, 1929 settled the doubt entertained as to whether the documents of which the registration was compulsory under the Transfer of Property Act, but not under section 17 of the Registration Act were affected by section 49 of the Registration Act.

Section 4 o.f the Transfer of Property Act enacts that "sections 54, paragraphs 2 and 3, 59, 107

and 123 shall be read as supplemental to the India, n Registration Act, 1908". It was previously supposed that the effect of this section was merely to add to the list of documents of which the registration was compulsory and not to include them in section t 7 so as to bring them within the scope of section 49.

This was the view taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in

Sohan Lal' s case('). The same view was expressed in a Madras Case Rama Sahu v. Gowro Ratho(') and by MacLeod C.J. in a Bombay case Dawal v. Dharma('). We are however absolved (I) l.L.R. SO All. 986. i2) I.L.R. [1921] 44 Mad. 55.

(3) l.L.R. [1918] 41Born.550.

in the present case from examining the correctness of these dec1- , ions.

For these decisions have been superseded by subsequent legislation i.e. by the enactment of Act 21 of 1922 which by inserting in section 49 of the Registration Act the words "or

by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882" has.made it clear that the documents in the supplemental list i.e. the documents of which registration is llCCCSSary under the Transfer of Property Act but not under the Registration Act fall within the scope of section 49 of the Registration Act and if not registered are not admissible as evidence of any transaction affecting a.ny immoveable property comprised therein, and do not affect any such immovable property. We are accordingly of the opinion that Ex. A.26 being umegistered is not -admissible in evidence. In our opinion, Mr. Sinha is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.

Mr. Sinha contended that in any event the High Court should not have remainded the case to the lower appellate court with a direction that the defendants should be asked to render accounts before they claim any payment from the plaintiff at the time of redemptiqn of the mortgage. It was pointed out that the plaintiff did not file an appeal against the decree of the trial court and in the absence of such an appeal the High Court was not legally justified in giving further relief to the plaintiff than that granted by the trial court. In our opinion, there is justification for this argument. We accordi, ngly set aside that portion of the decree of the High Court remanding the case to the lower appellate court with a direction that the defendants should be asked to render accounts. Otherwise we Sflirm the decree of the High Court allowing the plaintiffs appeal with costs and setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restoring judgmanit and decree of the trial court dated 31st October, 1956.

Subject to this modification we dismiss these appeals. There F will be no order as to costs in this Court.

G.C.

Appeals dismissed.

j_ ,

February 3, 1969

1. C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

A. N. GROVER, JJ.

Jfer of Property Act, 1882

ss. 4 and 54

Jndian Registration Act, 1908

s. 49

Registration Act

s. 54

27th July 1922

23rd February 1953

Transfer of Property Act

s. 49

Registration Act

s. 54

Transfer of Property Act

s. 54

Transfer of Property Act

s. 29

Registration Act

s. 4

Transfer of Property Act

s. 49

Registration Act

s. 54

Transfer of Property Act

s. 10

Supplementary Act, 1929

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

s. 49

Registration Act

section 49

Registration Act

Allahabad High Court

S. P. Si11

Shaukat Hussain

J. P Goyal

G. Nabi Untoo

Ramaswami

Dwarka Prasad

Madho Ram

27th July, 1922

Kunta

Radha Bai

2nd February, 1953

District Judge, Varanasi

C.P.C

27th April, 1964

Sinha

Titimma Bainama

8th October, 1922

Clause 2

Clause 6

Clause 1

Clause 4

section 54

Transfer of Property Act

s. 49

Registration Act

section 4

Transfer of Property Act

section 49

Registration Act

s. 54

Transfer of Property Act

Section 4

Transfer of Property Act

sections 54

Indian Registration Act, 1908

Section 54

Transfer of Property Act

Section 1

Registration Act

Indian Registration Act, 1866

Registration Act, 1871

Indian Registration Act, 1877

Section 49

Registration Act

section 17

section 10

Supplementary Act, 1929

section 49

section 17

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

section 53A

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Property Act, 1882

Amending Act, 1929

Transfer of Property Act

section 17

Registration Act

section 49

Registration Act

Section 4

Transfer of Property Act

sections 54

Registration Act, 1908

section 49

Sohan Lal

Madras

MacLeod

section 49

Registration Act

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

section 49

Registration Act

31st October, 1956


STATE OF RAJASTHAN v.

MAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LTD.

Februiuy 4, 1969

(J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.)

Sales Tax--Contract for providing and fixing goods in building-Whether sale of goods or for rendering service.

The respondent, a fabricator of steel windows, submitted a tender for 'providing and fixing' window leaves in a building. The window leaves were to be fabricated according to the specifications in the contract and were to be fixed within six months from the date of acceptance to the building with rnwl plugs in cut stone work. The rate quoted by the respondent was based on the current price of mild steel billets and the price was to be revised in the light elf cost revision of the controlled price of steel.

The tender was accepted and the respondent carried out the contract. The Sales Tax Officer levied sales tax on the amount received under the contract holding that the contract was for sale of goods and to promote its sale the respondent undertook to fix the windows without demanding any charge for that service. But in appeal the Deputy Commissioner &.cise & Taxation held that two contracts resulted : one for providing windows and the other for fixing them in the building, and that the price of goods supplied, but not the charge for service was taxable. The Board of Revenue confirmed the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner observing that the contract wa~ not a contract of service. On reference, the High Court held that it was a building contract and amount received was not taxabJe.

In appeal, this Court,

HElD : It was a contract for rendering service and the amount received by the respondent was not taxable.

Whether a particular contract is for sale of goods or is a contract for service depends upon the main object of the parties gathered from the terms of the contract, the circumstances of the transaction, and the custom elf the trade, and no universal rule applicable to all transactions can be evolved. [509 Al

In this case, the primary undertaking of the respondent was not merely to supply the windows but to 'ftx' the windows. This service waa not rendered under a separate contract, nor was shown to be rendered customarily or normally as incidental to the sale by the person who supplied window leaves. The fixing of the windows in the manner stipulated required special technical skill. If the windows were not properly 'fixed' the contract would not be complete, and the respondent could not claim the amount agreed to be paid to it. It was only upon the 'fixing' of the window-leaves and when the window-leaves had become a part of the building construction that property in the goods passed under the terms of the contract.

[512 E--GJ

The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. 9 S.T.C. 353; The Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Guntur Tobaccos Ltd., 16 S.T.C. 240 (S.C.); Patnaik and Company v. State of Orissa, 16 S.T.C. 364 (S.C.); Mckenzies Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra, 16 S.T.C. 518

(S.C.); Commissioner of Sales-tax, Maharashtra State, Bombay v.

Arun

Electrics, 16 S.T.C. 385; Arun Electrics, Bo1nbay v. Commissioner of Sales A Tux, Maharashtra State, 17 S.T.C. 576; The State of Madras v. Richardson & Cruddas Ltd., 21 S.T.C. 245; Love v. Norman Wright (B11ilders) Ltd., {1944] I K.B. 484, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISillCTION: Civil Appeal No. 812 ()f

I 966.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated B May 13, 1965 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Ref. No.

I 8 of 1963.

M. C, Chagla and K. Baldev Mehta, for the appellants.

Sanpat P. Mehta, 0. P. Malhotra, J. B. Dadachanji and 0. C.

Mathur, for the respondent.

The Jmtgment of the Court was delivered by

Shah, J.

The respondent carries on the business of fabricating "steel doors, windows, sashes and other goods".

On April 20, 1957, the resp<mdent -submitted in pursuance o! an invitation by the Executive Engineer, Ajmer Central Division, its tender for providing and fixing "S.H. Windows 'W' Type", "S.H. Windows 'WI' Type", "T.H. Windows" and "Composite Windows" of certain sizes "in accordance with the specifications, designs, drawing and instructions". The tender was accepted and the respondent carried out the contract.

The Sales Tax Officer 'B' Circle, Jaipur City included in the taxable turnover of the respoodent Rs. 23,480/- received under the contract. He held that the contract with the Executive Engineer was one of sale of goods and the respondent had with a view to promote sales of goods manufactured by it "voluntarily offered to fit" the goods and had made no separate charge for that service.

The Deputy CommissiOltl.er Excise & Taxation in appeal held that from the acceptance of the tender, two contracts resulted . one for providing doors and windows and another for "fixing" those doors and windows in a specified building, and that the price of the goods supplied, but not the charge for service, was taxable. He accordingly remanded the case with a direction to assess tax on the price for sale of materials <>nly.

The Board of Revenue exercising revisional p<Jwer confirmed the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner observing that the contract undertaken by the respondent was not contract of service.

The following question was referred by the Board of Revenue to the High Court of Rajasthan :

"Whether on the proper interpretation of the contract between the applicant and the Executive Engineer, C.P.W.D., Ajmer, regarding the providing amd fixing of the steel windows to the Accountant General's

Office, Jaipur, and looking to the terms of the transaction of the type undertaken by the applicant the Board were justified in holding that the contract was divisible between two parts representing the sale of the windows and the Jabour charges in fixing the same and thus partly liable to sales-tax ?"

The High Court held that the _contract between the respondent and the Executive Engineer was a "building contract" and the amount received by the respondent was not taxable.

The relevant terms of the tender which was accepted by the Exeoutive Engineer were :

C "Item Rate-tender for Works

I/We hereby tender for the execution for the President of India of the work specified in the under-written memorandum within the time specified in such memorandum at the rates specified therein, and in accordance in all respects with the specifications, designs, drawing, D and instructions in writing referred to in Rule 1 hereof and in Class II of the conditions of contract and with such materials as are provided for by and in all other respects in accordance with such conditions so far as applicable." This recital was followed by a memorandum setting out the E "general description" of the building in respect of which the window-leaves were to be supplied, the estimated cost of the contract and the description and the ammber of items of w0rk offered to be done. The items of work offered to be done were "providing and 6xing" four different types of windows.

The relevant conditions were--

I' "l. The wark shall be executed as per the specifications attached.

2. The work is to be completed in 6 mQllths from the date of award of works. 3.

4. The windows are to be fitted with raw! plugs m cut stoneworks.

5. Work will be executed either by plain glass or

und glass as may be decided by the Engineer in Charge.

Note:- 1.

2. We are offering windows which will be glazed with plain glass only.

If at a later date it is

508 SUPREME COURT ltEPOllTS

(1969] 3 S.C.R.

desired to have windows glazed with ground glass, A the difference in cost of glass will have to be paid

3. 4.

by you.

5. The quotation is based on the current prices ot mild steel billets fixed by the Government. Should there be any change in the cqntrolled price of billets supplied to us, proportionate revision in the cost of rolled sections used in the fabrication will be made i, n the quotation.

6. Sales Tax or any other tax is applicable will be extra.

7. Work will be completed in 6 months from the date of order."

These were followed by specifications relating to the steel to be used in the fabrication, glazing, fittings and finish of the windows.

The respondent offered to execute and complete the "work"

mtioned in the written memorandum according to the specifications and conditions.

In the view of the High Court the contract was for work, in the execution of which some movabre property vassed : it was not a contract for sale of windows and for rendenng service in connection with the fixing of those windows.

Counsel for the State of Rajasthan contends that the respeadent carried on the business of fabricating and selling wind&w

and door leaves and sashes etc. and entered into a contract for "sale of windows", and to promote sale of its manufactured goods, undertook to fix the windows without demanding any charge for that service, and the High Court was in error in holding that the contract was one of service in the execution of which property

in the materials supplied by the respondent passed. Counsel urged that the terms of the tender were not decisive and the Court was entitled to ascertain the true effect of .the cootract as disclosed by the nature of the work, and the "invoice" for payment made out by the respondent.

Counsel submitted that it is usual for manufacturers or dealers in specialized articles to arrange to "fix and "service" the articles sold by them and on that account the contract does not acquire the character of a contract of_ service. He gave instances of sale of motor-tyres, luggage carriers, air-conditioning ooits, refrigerators and contended that in undertaking to instal or fix these units or articles the sellers do not enter into a works contract merely because they undertake to instal or for the articles sold so as to make them fit for immediate service.

But whether a particular contract is one for sale of goodi; or is

RAJASTHAN V. MAN !NDST. CQRi'. (Shoh, J.) 509

a contract for service d!Jpends 'upon the main object of the parties gathered from the terms of the co, ntract, the circumstances of t11:e transaction, and custom of the trade, and no universal rule applicable to all transacllons may be evolved.

As observed in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 34 Art. 3 at p. 6 : .. A contract of sale of goods must be distinguished trom a contract for work and labour.

A CQ!ltract of sale is a contract whose main object is the transfer of the property in, and the delivery of the possession of, a chattel as a chattel to the buyer.

Where the main object of work undertaken by the payee of the price !s not the transfer of a chattel qua chattel, the contract 1s one for work and labour.

The test is whether or not the work and labour bestowed and in anything that can properly become the subject of sale; "neither the ownership of the materials, nor the value of the skill and labour as compared with the value of the materials is conclusive, although such matters may be taken into consideration in determining, in the circumstances of a particular case, whether the contract is in substance one for work and labour or one for the sale of a chattel."

What did the respondent agree to do whf<n it offered its tender?

Did the respondent agree to sell the window-leaves as described in the tender or did it, as part of a works contract, agree to "fix" windows of certain specifications in the building intended to be used for the offices of the Accountant-General ? On a c01IJSideration of all the circumstances, we are of the view that the object of the respondent was to enter into a works contract. That clearly appears from the terms of the tender and its acceptance.

The windows were to be fabricated according to the specifications with glass-plain or ground as decided by the Engineer in Charge, and were to be "fixed" within six months from the date of its acceptance "to the building with raw! plugs in cut stone-work." The rate quoted by the respondent was based on the current price of mild steel billets, and the price was to be revised in the light of cost revision of the controlled price of steel supplied to the respondent.

The contract undertaken by the respondent was to prepare the window-leaves according to the specifications and to fix them to the buildin~. There were not two contracts--0ne c.f sale and another o( service. "Fixing" the wi1ndows to the building was H also not incidental or subsidiary to the sale, but was an essential term of the contract. The window-leaves did not pass to the Union of India umder the terms of the contact as window-leaves.

Only on the fixing of the windows as stipulated, the contract 8Sup. CT/69-1~'

could be fully executed. and the property in the windows passed on the completion of the work and not before.

It was said by this Court iJO The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd.(') that in a building contract which is one, entire and indivisible, there is no sale of goods.

In the case of a building contract the property in materials used does not pass to the other party to the cO!lltract as movable property. In the absence of an agreement to the cQJitrary, the materials in the construction of a building become the property of the other party to the contract only on the theory of accretion.

In The Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Guntur Tobaccos Ltd.(2 ) this Court pointed out (at p. 255):

"A contract for work in the execution of which goods are used •may take one of three forms. The con

tract may be for work to be done for remuneration and for supply of materials used in the execution of the works for a price; it may be a contract for work in which the use of materials is accessory or inddental to the execution of the work; or it may be a contract for work and use or supply of materials though not accessory to the execution of the contract is voluntary or gratuitdus.

In the last class there is no sale because though property passes it does no~ pass for a price. Whether a contract is of the first or the second class must depend upon the circumstances; if it is of the first, it is a composite contract for work and sale of goods; where it is of the second category, it is a contract for execution of work not involving sale of goods."

. The contract in questiO!ll in this case is of the second variety.

Counsel relied upon Patnaik and Company v.

State of Orissa(') and Mckenzies Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra.(') But in both these cases the Court held on a consideration of the

teims of the contract and the circumst11111Ces that the assessees had agreed to and did supply "motor-bus bodies" and the contract being one for sale of chattels, !hey were liable to pay sales-tax.

Our attention was also invited to Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State, Bombay v. Arun Electrics.(') In that case a firm of electrical contractors undertook the job of n5talling electrical fittings in the houses of their customers, which involved the supply and fixing of goods, such as wire, brass clips, wall brackets and tube lights with accessories.

The assessees charged

. (1) 9 S.T.C. 353.

(3) 16 S.T.C. 364 (S.C.).

(5) 16 S.T.C. 385.

(2) l6S.T.C. 240(S.C.) .

(4) 16 S.T.C. 518 (S.C,),

their customers consolidated rates for the materials consumed and labour involved, in carrying out the contracts.

The Sales Tax Officer charged to tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the value of materials supplied in carrying out the contracts. It was held by the High Court of Bombay that the transaction of the assessees with their customers was not a pure works contract, but a combination of two distinct and separutecontracts, one for the supply or the sale of goods for consideration, and the other for the supply of work and labour, and only that part of the contract, which consisted of supply of goods for consideration, was liable to tax under the Sales Tax Act. That case was brought in appeal to this Court at the instance of the assessees. This Court in Arun Electrics, Bombay v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra State(') discharged the answer recorded by the High Court, holding that the conclusion recorded by the Deputy Commissioner and the Tribunal were based on no evidence, and the High Court could not record, on the facts found, an answer to the question referred. The Deputy Commissioner had proceeded only upon the terms of the invoice in which a charge was made for supplying and "fixing" the materials and providing light points complete with 1 /8 CTS wire, brass clips, tapes and alJ approved accessories. The conclusion of the departmental authorities was not based on any intention of the parties as disclosed by the evidence, but plainly on the terms of the bill which was , ambiguous.

In The State of Madras v. Richardson & Cruddas Ltd.(') the assessees without a formal contract agreed to supply fabricate and erect steel structures for a sugar factory. The assessees completed the contract. A bill was submitted by the assessees for charges for fabrication, supply and erection of steel structures at certain rates. The High Court of Madras on a consideration of the evidence held that there was a stipulation for a consolidated lumpsum payment of Rs. 1,160/- per ton for fabricating, supplying and erecting at site all steel work etc; there was no stipulation for passing of property in the goods to the factory before actual compktion of the erection work; there the contract did not contemplate dissecting the value of the goods supplied and the value of work and labour bestowed i, n the execution of the work; and the predominant idea underlying the contract was the bestowing of special skill and labour by the experienced engineers and mechanics of the assessees.

This Court agreed with the High Court and held that the contract was a works contract and not a contract for sale.

Our attention was invited to a judgment of the Court of Appeal in Love v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd.(8 ) In that case the

(!) 17 S.T.C. 576.

(2) 21 S.T.C. 245.

(3) [1944] 1K.B.484.

SU'.PltEME COU'!i.T 1lBl'OR TS fr%9] 3 S.C.R.

respondents co_ntracted -with the ·ecretary of 'State tor War to do ll. the work and supply the l'llaterial mentioned iin the Schedliles to the contract, including the supply of black-out curtains, curtain rails and battens and their erection at a number of police stations.

It was held by the court of Appeal that tlle respondents were liable to pay purchase-tax. kel:iance was placed upon the observations made by Goddard, L.J. at p. 482 : 'B "If one orders another to •make and fix curtains at his house the contract is one of sale though .work and labour are involved in the making and fixing, nor does it matter that ultimately the property was to pass to the War Office under the head contract. As between the plaintiff and the defendants the former passed C the property in the goods to the defendants who passed it on to the War Office."

We do not think that these observations furnish a universal test that whenever there is a contract to "fix" certain articles made by a manufacturer the contract must be deemed one for sale and not of service. The test in each case is whether the object of -the D party sought to be taxed is that the chattel as chattel passes to the other party and the services rendered in connection with the installation are under a separate contract or are incidental to the execution of the contract of sale.

In the present case, the specificatio;!l!l of the windows were set '£ out in the contract. The primary undertaking of the respondent was not merely to supply the windows but to "fix" the windows.

The service is not rendered under a separate contract nor is the service sho\Wl to be rendered oustomarily or normally as incidental to the sale by the person who supplies window leaves. The ''fix.

in~" of windows in the manner stipulated required spedal technical skill. If the windows were not properly "fixed", the contract would not be complete, and the respondeint could not claim the amolljllt agreed to be paid to it. We agree with the High Court that it was only upon the "fixing" of the window-leaves and when the window"leaves had become a part of the building construction that the property in the goods passed under the terms of the contract.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Y.P.

Appeal dismissed.

STATE OF RAJASTHAN

MAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LTD

C. SHAH

V. RAMASWAMI

A. N. GROVER, JJ.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISillCTION

M. C, Chagla

K. Baldev Mehta

Sanpat P. Mehta

P. Malhotra

B. Dadachanji

C.

Mathur

Shah

Jaipur City

High Court of Rajasthan

Ajmer

Jaipur

State of Rajasthan

England

Art. 3

High Court of Bombay

High Court of Madras

SU'

Goddard