57'2

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1953]

195a

GAYA ELECTRIC SUPPT1Y CO., LTD.

Feb. 8.

V. •

THE STATE OF BIHAR.

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS, and GHULAM

HASAN JJ.]

Indian Arbitration Act (X of 1940), s. 34-Contract containing arbitration clause-Rescissio1~ of contract and suit by one party- Application for stay of rnit-Scope of arbitration clause-Construction of cla"se.

If the arbitration agreement is broad and comprehensive and embraceEI' any dispute between the parties in respect of the agreement, or in respect of any provision in the agreement, or in respect of anything arising out of it, and one of the parties seeks to avoid the contract, the dispute is referable to arbitration if the avoidance of the contract arises out of the terms of the contract itself.

Where, however, the party seeks to avoid the contract for reasons dehors it, the arbitration clause cannot be resorted to as it goes along with other terms of the contract. In other words, a party cannot rely on a term of the contract to repudiate it and still say the arbitration clause should not apply.

Where, however, an arbitration clause is not so comprehen sive and is not drafted in the broad language namely "in respectt of" any agreement, or "in reSpect of something arising out of it", that proposition does not hold good.

The arbitration clause is a written submission agreed to by the parties in a contract and like every written submission to arbitration must be considered according to its language and in the light of the circumstances in which it is made.

Disputes which arose between the State of Bihar and an Electric Supply Company whose licence bad been revoked by the

State were settled by an agreement which provided that the State should make an advance payment of Rs. 5 lakbs to the company, '<nd the company should hand over the undertaking to the State.

The undertaking was to be valued within 3 months and if any money was'found due to the company as per the Government valuation over 5 lakbs it will be paid to the company and if the valuation \Vas less than 5 lakhs the company would refund the excess received by it.

The agreement contained an arbitration clause which ran as follows: '' In the case of any difference or dispute between the parties over the valuation as arrived at by the Government and that arrived at by the company any such difference or dispute including the claim for additional compensation of 20% shall be referred to arbitration." The company instituted a suit against the State alleging that the State had failed to make its

' '

• •

valuation and to make payment of the excess within the time 1953 fixed and as time was of the essence of the contract, it had rescinded the agreement, and praying for a declaration that the Gaya Electric undertaking belonged to it, for damages and appointment Qf a Supply Co., Ltd. receiver. The State applied under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act v. for stay of the suit:.

The State of Held, that the scope of the arbitration clause was very Bihar. narrow; it conferred jurisdiction on the arbitrator only on the question of valuation of the undertaking pure and simple .

Questions relating to the breach of contract or its rescission were outside the scope of the clause and the suit could not be stayed under s. 34.

Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. ([1942] A.O. 356) referred to.

Harinagar 811, gar 111.ills Ltd. v. Skoda (India) Ltd. (A.LR. 1948 Cal. 230) 'and Governor-General in Council v. Associated Livestock Farrn, Ltd. ([1937] 41 O.W.N. 563) distinguished.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 175 of 1951.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Order and Decree dated the 30th March, 1-051, of the High

Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami and Rai JJ.) in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 19 of 1951 arising out of the Order dated the 18th December, 1950, of the Court of the Additional Sub-Judge Second at Gaya in Title Suit No. 47 of 1950.

N. 0. Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant.

M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (R. J. Um- \ rigar with them) for the respondent.

1953.

February 3: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MAHAJAN J.-This appeal by special leave arises out of an application made by the State of Bihar against the Gaya Electric Supply Co. Ltd. under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for stay of proceedings in a suit .filed by the company on 28th September, 1950. The facts relevant. to this enquiry are these.

~ A licence for the supply of electric energy in the Gaya Electric town of Gaya was obtained by one Khandelwal in the Supply Go., Ltd.year 1928 under the Indian Electricity A.ct, 1910. v.

Wtth the required sanction of the Government the The State of licence was transfocred to the company in 1932.

. B•har. a notification dated 23rd June, 1949, the licence was

Mahajan J. revoked by the Government with effect from 9th July,

1949. 'l'hereupon the company filed a suit against the State for a declaration that the revocation of the licence was arbitrary, mala fide and ultra vires. During the pendency of the suit negotiations started between the company and the State for a settlement of the dispute and ultimately on 28th October, 1949, a deed of agreement was arrived at between them. The effect of the . agreement and the correspondence referred to therein was substantially as follows:- .(a) That the company would withdraw the suit No. 58 of 1949 unconditionally on 25th October, 1949.

(b) 'rhat within three days of the withdrawal of the suit the State of Bihar would make an advance payment of rupees five lakhs to the company, and simultaneously the company would formally hand over the possession of the undertaking to an authorized officer of the Government.

(c) That both parties will make their respective valuations with"in three months of taking over the undertaking and any balance of money found due to the company as per Government valuation will be paid to the company and in case of over-payment, the excess paid to the company on account of the "on account payment" of rupees five lakhs will be refunded to the Government.

(d) That in the case of a, ny difference or dispute between the parties over the payment of the balance which may be found due after valuation such dispute shall .be submitted to the sole arbitration of a single arbitrator who should be a high government officer of the provincial government of rank equal to or higher than a Divisional Commissioner and his award shall be binding and final on both parties.

' .. . \.

The arhitration clause is c6ntained in a letter dated 1953 13th October, 1949, and was substantially accepted by the company in its letter dated 17t_h <?ctober_, 19j9. s:;:~ ~

1 :t~d.

As set out by the State Government rn 1ts application v. under section 34, it runs as follows :- The State of "In the case of any differsnce or dispute between Bihar. the parties over the valuation as arrived at by the Government and that arrived at by the company,· such difference or dispute, including the claim for additional compensation of 20 % shall be referred to arbitration ... " In pursuance of the agreement the respondent took over the undertaking on 28th October, 1949, and also made a payment of rupees five lakhs to the company.

On the 19th January, 1950, the company sent a statement of valuation of the assets amounting to Rs. 22,06,072 to the Chief Electrical Engineer, Bihar. The Chief Electrical Engineer characterized the valuation of 22 lakhs by the company as fantastic and stated that according to a rough valuation the amount would be approximately five lakhs and that the final valuation would be settled after the company had furnished a detailed history of the plants and machineries.

The company declined to give any further details and stated that time was of the essence of the contract and it would be extended from 28th January, to 15th February, 1950. On 6th April, 1950, the Chief Electrical Engineer intimated that the valuation amounted to Rs. 5,56,221. No reply to this letter was received and the State Government intimated to the company that as difference and dis pute had arisen relating to valuation, Mr. M. S. Rao, I.C.S., was being appointed as sole arbitrator to decide the dispute.

On 28th September, 1950, the company instituted the suit, the subject-matter of the application for sbay, after necessary notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the plaint it was alleged lihat as the State Government had failed and neglected to make its valuation or to make payment to the

Mahaja" J,

1953 company by the 15th 'March, 1950, it committed a

G E ' t . breach of the agreement and by reason of this breach aya eo rto .

Supply co., Ltd. th" company bad rescmded the agreement and bad v. forfeited the sum of five lakbs paid as advance by the The Stat• of State. 'l'be comp:my prayed inter alia for the reliefs

Bihar. of declaration that the electrical undertaking be-. longed to them, for damages, for appointment of Mahajan J, receiver and for injunction.

On the 9th October, 1950, the State Government filed the present application under section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act. It was stated therein that the company had with a dishonest and mala fide motive and with a view to avoid the decision of the matter in dispute in arbitration instituted the suit on incorrect and false allegations, that the arbitration agreement was still subsisting and valid and binding on the parties and could not be taken as having been rescinded as alleged by the company, that the cause of action as alleged in the plaint being non-compliance with the agreement the suit arose out of and related to the agreement and was covered by the arbitration clause and that the State Government was ready and willing to have the dispute setled by arbitration.

The company denied the allegations of mala fides and pleaded that the arbitration clause was no longer in existence and that even assuming it to be in existence, the suit was in no way connected with .the same and it was contended that the suit should not be stayed. 'l'he subordinate judge held that the suit was not in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, and that the court had no jurisdiction to stay the proceedings. In the result the stay application was dismissed. Against this order the State Government appealed to the High Court.

The High Court held that the dispute in the suit was one which arose out of or was in respect of the agreement and that the question in the suit was directly within the scope of the :ubitration clause. By an order of this Court dated 22nd May, 1951, the company wa, s granted special leave under article 136(1) of the Constitution. .

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Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act runs 1958 thus:- • Gaya Electric "Where a.ny party to an arbitration ....... commen- Supply co., Ltd. ces any legal proceedings against any other party•to v. the agreement ..... . in respect of any matter agreed to be The State 0!

Bihar. referred, any party to such legal proceedings may, ...... apply to the judicial authority before whic, h the pro- Mahajan. 'J, ceedings are pending to stay the proceedings, and if satisfied that there is no sufficient rason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement and that the applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, such authority may make an order staying the proceed- . " mgs.

From the language of the section it is quite clear that the legal proceeding which is sought to be stayed must be in respect of a matter which the parties have agreed to refer and which comes within the ambit of the arbitration agreement.

Where, however, a suit is commenced as to a matter which lies outside tbe submission, the court is bound to refuse a stay. In the words of Viscount Simon L. 0. in Heyman v.

Darwins Ltd. (1). the answer to the question whether a dispute falls within an arbitration clause in a contract must depend on (a) what is the dispute, and (b) what disputes the arbitration clause covers. If the arbitration agreement is broad and comprehensive and embraces any dispute between the parties "in respect of" the agreement, or in respect of any provision in the agreement, or in respect of anything arising out of it, and one of the parties seeks to avoid the contract, the dispute is referable to arbitration if the avoidance of the contract arises out of the terms of the contract itself.

Where, however, the party seeks to avoid the contract for reasons dehors it, the arbitration clause cannot be resorted to as it goes along with other terms of the contract. In other' words, a party cannot rely on a term of the con, tra9t

1968 to repudiate it and still say the arbitration clause

Gaya Electric should not apply. If he relies upon a contract, he SupplyOo., Ltd.must rely on it for all purposes.

Where, however v. an' arbitration clause is not so comprehensive and i~ The State of not drafted in the broad language which was used ih

Bihar. the House of Lords case, namely, "in respect of" any

fahajan J. agreement, or "in respect of something arising out of it", that proposition does not hold good .. The arbitration cla, use is a written submission agreed to by the parties in a contract and like every 1written submission to arbitration must be considered according to its language and in the light of tho circumstances in which it is made.

Now as regards the first question, viz., what is the present dispute about, the answer is to be gathered from paragraphs 14 to 17 of the .plaint. It is averred therein that the Government of Bihar committed breach of the agreement and failed to make any valuation of the unde'rtaking or pay the balance of the compensation money, that time being of the essence of the contract, the defendant failed and neglected to complete the valuation within the time originally fixed or the extended time, and that by reason of the breach of contract the plaintiff rescinded the agreement and forfeited the sum of rupees five lakhs and that it is entitled to compensation for the wrongful deprivation of the use of its property.

No claim has been made in the plaint for the valuation of the undertaking or for the payment of any compensation for the undertaking; on the other hand, the claim in the suit is founded on the rescission of the agreement containing the arbitration clause and on a breach of that agreement.

These are matters which may well be said to arise out of the agreement and if the arbitration clause was broadly worded and stated that all disputes arising out of the agreement would be referred to arbitration, it could then probably have been said that the scope of the suit was within the ambit of the arbitration clause, but the clause here is differently worded.

The clause here is that if any difference or dispute

rises between the parties over the payment of the •

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balance which may be found due after valuation such 1953 dispnte shall be submitted to the sole arbitration of _a Gaya Electric single arbitrator.

The scbeme of the agreement is supply co., Ltd. that the Government was to make a valuation as laid v. down in the Indian Electricity Act . within •three The State of months of taking over the _undertaking and any Bihar. balance of money found due to the company as per Mahajan J.

Government valuation was to be paid by the Government, and in case of over-payment, the excess paid to the com2any on account of the "on account payment" of rupees five lakhs mentioned in paragraph 1 had to be refunded to Government. In the case of any . difference between the parties over the valuation as arrived at by the Government and that arrived at by the company, such difference or dispute, including the claim for i.dditional compensation of twenty per cent. had to be referred to arbitration.

The scope of this arbitration clause is a very narrc, w one. It only confers jurisdiction on the arbitrator on the question of valuation of the undertaking pure and simple and does not say tbat all disputes arising out of the agreement or in respect of it will be decided by arbitration.

Questions relating to the breach of contract or its rescission are outside the reach of this clause.

The arbitrator has not been conferred the power by this clause to pronounce on the issue whether the plaintiff was justified in claiming that time was of the essence of the contract and whether the State Government committed a breach of the contract by not making a valuation within the time specified.

This clause is therefore no answer to the company's querry "Show me that I have agreed to refer the subject-matter of the suit to an arbitrator.'' Besides this clause in the agreement there is nothing else which can deprive the court of its jurisdiction to decide the plaintiff's suit as brought.

Ramaswami J., with whom Rai J. concurred, held that upon a perusal of the terms of the contract and of the correspondence it was obvious thH.t no stipulation was made tha.t the compensation money

J95B should be paid within the period of three months, and that on the contrary, the intention of the parties Gaya Electric h t h G Id .

S P. z 0 Ltd was t a t e overnment wou pay compensat10n up y o., .J • v. monGy only a, fter the award had been made by the The Stateof arbitrator.

Now this is the very point which would Bihar. be in issue in the snit itself, and the learned Judge was in error in considering and deciding this point in Mahajan J. this enquiry under section 84.

The validity of the plaintiff's contentionin the suit cannot be gone into by that court exernising jurisdiction under this section as its function is a very limited one.

The only point in such cases to be decided is whether the claim which is brought-whether it is good, bad or indifferent-comes within the submission to arbitration. H maybe that there are grounds upon which the defendant would be able to satisfy the proper tr, bunal that the plaintiff's claim'was frivolous and vexatious, but those considerations, as pointed out by Banks L. J. in Monro v. Bognar Urban Council ('), are material only if the question to be considered is whether the case made was a frivolous and vexatious one and ought to have had no weight at all upon the question of what the plaintiff's claim in fact was and one can only find out what his claim is by looking at the-plaint.

The learned Judges in the High Court seem to have thought that the arbitration clause here had been drafted broadly and that all "disputes arising out of or in respect of the agreements were referable to arbitration. 'l'heir reliance on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.

v. Skoda India Ltd. (9) in support of the decision indicates the error.

In that case the arbitration clause wa, s drafted in a comprehensive language and stated that a dispute arising out of the agreement had to be referred to arbitration.

Their reference to the case of Governor-General in Council v. Associated Livestock Farm Ltd. (') also shows that they were under the same erroneous impression. In this ca.se tb e arbitration clause was in these terms:-

(1)

(1915] 3 K.B, 167.

(3) A.I.R. 1948 Cal. •Jo,

(2) (1937) 41 C.W.N. 563.

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S.C.R.

SUPREME ootJ:R•r REPORTS 58i

"Any dispute or difference arising out of the con- 1953 tract shall be referred to the arbitration of the officer G El t . sanctioning the con tract whose decision shall be final su::l~ 00~" ~d. and binding." •

v. ' It is obvious that these decisions could have no The State of relevance to the arbitration clause as drawn up in the Bihar. present case. If the nature of the claim is as we Mahajo.n J. have indicated above, it seems plain that it does not come within the scope of the submission.

In our judgment, therefore, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was right and the Judges of the High Court were in error in reversing it.

In the result the only course open to us is to allow the appeal with costs and to say that the plaintiff's claim is not within the scope of the submission and that the petition under section 34 was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge.

Agent for the appellants : Agent for the respondent :

Appeal allowed.

Raj inder Narain.

P. K. Chatterji.

RIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH.

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 3-Proceedings before Sub-Divisional Magistrate-Application by respondents to District Magistrate containing allegations against trying Magistrate and the bona fides of the pending proceedings-Transmission of application to Sub-Divisional Magistrate for report-Whether amounts to contempt of Court-Question of prejudice .

. The jurisdiction in contempt of court is not to be invoked unless tbere is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice.

The purport of the court's action is a practical purpose and the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety.

During the pendency of pioceedings against A and B under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, in the court of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, A and B made an application to the District Magistrate alleging that the proceedings were not bona fide and

Feb. 5.

GAYA ELECTRIC SUPPT1Y CO., LTD

THE STATE OF BIHAR

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

DAS

HASAN JJ.

Indian Arbitration Act

s. 34

State of Bihar

Gaya Electric undertaking

s. 34

State of Held

s. 34

Harinagar 811

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

High

Court of Judicature at Patna

Ramaswami

Rai

N. 0. Chatterjee

Rameshwar Nath

. Setalvad

Mahabir Prasad

R. J. Um- \ rigar

MAHAJAN

Gaya Electric Supply Co. Ltd.

section 34

28th September, 1950

Gaya

Khandelwal

23rd June, 1949

9th July,

1949

28th October, 1949

25th October, 1949

section 34

Bihar

19th January, 1950

28th January, to 15th February, 1950

6th April, 1950

M. S. Rao

section 80

the Code of Civil Procedure

15th 'March, 1950

Mahajan J

9th October, 1950

section 34

22nd May, 1951

article 136(1)

Section 34

Gaya Electric

Gaya Electric

Government of Bihar

Electricity Act

Mahajan

section 84

Banks

Calcutta High Court

Mahajo.n

section 34

Raj inder Narain

P. K. Chatterji

RIZWAN-UL-HASAN

STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH

Contempt of Courts Act

s. 3

s. 145

Criminal Procedure Code


. •

S.C.R.

SUPREME ootJ:R•r REPORTS 58i

"Any dispute or difference arising out of the con- 1953 tract shall be referred to the arbitration of the officer G El t . sanctioning the con tract whose decision shall be final su::l~ 00~" ~d. and binding." •

v. ' It is obvious that these decisions could have no The State of relevance to the arbitration clause as drawn up in the Bihar. present case. If the nature of the claim is as we Mahajo.n J. have indicated above, it seems plain that it does not come within the scope of the submission.

In our judgment, therefore, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was right and the Judges of the High Court were in error in reversing it.

In the result the only course open to us is to allow the appeal with costs and to say that the plaintiff's claim is not within the scope of the submission and that the petition under section 34 was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge.

Agent for the appellants : Agent for the respondent :

Appeal allowed.

Raj inder Narain.

P. K. Chatterji.

RIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH.

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and DAs JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act (XII of 1926), s. 3-Proceedings before Sub-Divisional Magistrate-Application by respondents to District Magistrate containing allegations against trying Magistrate and the bona fides of the pending proceedings-Transmission of application to Sub-Divisional Magistrate for report-Whether amounts to contempt of Court-Question of prejudice .

. The jurisdiction in contempt of court is not to be invoked unless tbere is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice.

The purport of the court's action is a practical purpose and the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety.

During the pendency of pioceedings against A and B under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, in the court of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, A and B made an application to the District Magistrate alleging that the proceedings were not bona fide and

Feb. 5.

1953 containing statements in the nature of a countercharge. The 2nd appellant who was then officiating as the District l\fagistrate sent Ril!!wan-ulthis application to the Sub-Divisional l\iagistrate for report and Hasan on reeeiving a report from him' that A and B should be asked to and Anothl!r file a formal complaint before him, advised them to do so.

A v. brother of A sent a similar petition to the District l\Iagistrate

Th~ State of containing also allegations against the trying "Th-fagistrate.

The Uttar P1adesh. 1st appellant, who was the District Magistrate, forwarded them to the Sub-Divisional l\1agistrate for report, itnd on receiving his 'report passed an order that he saw' no reason to withdraw the file from the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The High Court of Allahabad held that as the applications contained allegations which might interfere with the course of tbe trial of the proceedings under s. 145, in transmitting the applications the appellants had acted without due circumspection and thought though they had no intention to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the appellants were therefore guilty of contempt of court: Held, (i) that in transmitting the applications received by them to the Sub-Divisional l\fagistrate and calling for a report the appellants were not in any way iiiterfering with the course of justice but were only doing their duty as superior officers.;

(ii) it was not possible to hold that any prejudice had.been caused by the two applications being sent by the appellants to the Sub-Divisional l\iagistrate or that any action was necessary to protect the Sub-Divisional I\iagistrate who was hearing the case and the appellants were not guilty of any contempt of court.

Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson([l931] I.L.R.58 Cal. 884) referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JurusDIOTION: Criminal Appeal No. 79of1952. Appeal by special leave from a Judgment and Order dated 16th April, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Dayal and Desai JJ.) in Criminal MiscellaneousNo.17 of 1950.

K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. B. Asthana, with him) for the appellants.

N. G. Sen for the respondent.

1953.

February 5.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 16th April, 195 l, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 17 of 1950.

The two appellants are members of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service.

In Marcb, 1950, appellant No. I (Rizwan-ul-Hasan) was posted as District Magistrate, Jalaun, and appellant No. 2, Mohammad Munawar, was posted as rJ.

Magistrate in the same district, having officiated as .District Magistrate for some time in the early part of March, 1950.

On 2nd March, 1950, one Phundi Singh commenced proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun on the allegation that Kedarnath and Matadin were about to cut his standing crop by force and that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace.

The magistrate issued notices to the parties complained against and ordered -attachment of the standing crop.

On 4th March, 1950, one Shriram, brother of Kedarnath, filed a counter application before the court making certain allegations against one 'rhakur Pratap Singb, said to be the real person behind the proceedings commenced by Phundi Singh. Kedarnath and Matadin, the respondents in Phundi Singh's

application, also filed an application similar to that of Shriram before the District Magistrate on the same date. This application was accompanied by a recommendatory letter written to the District Magistrate by Lalla Ram Dwivedi, Secretary, District Congress Committee. It was received by the second appellant who was then officiating as District Magistrate and was sent by him to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, in whose court Phundi Singh's application was pending, for report.

The Sub-Divisional Magistrate returned it with the remark that a proper comp la.int should be made in his court in the ordinary way on the allegations made in the application.

Thereupon the second appellant returned the application to Kedarnath and Matadin and advised them to move the Sub-Di vision al Magistrate ill a formal and proper manner.

On the application of Phundi Singh made before the High Court of Allahabad under section 3 of the

Rizwan-ul- Hasan and Another v.

The State of Uttar Pradesh.

MahajanJ.

5s4 SUPREME cob:RT REPORTS [1953)

1953 Contempt of Courts Act, the second appellant was

Rizwan-ulheld guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magis- Hasan trate on the following reasoning :-

and Another ' " Shri Mohammad M unawar opposite party No. 5

7, h 8 ~· t 1 forwarded application given by the opposite parties utt:r p;.~; sh. Nos. 2 and 3 together with introductory letter-to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalann. We do not think Mahajan J. that he had any intention to influence the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with respect to his action in the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.

But intention is not of importance so far as the question of commission of contempt is concerned. He certainly acted without due circumspection and thought.

It must have been clear to him that the application contained expression which affected the due c.onsiderations of the points in dispute in the proceeding under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. He says in his affidavit and we can accept it that he sent this application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate just for taking action for the protection of opposite parties No. 2 and No. 3 and their crop about which an allegation was made that sollle action was to be taken by the other party the night following.

He should in the circumstances either pass an order for the police himself which he could have very well done, or he could have just conveyed a gist of the complaint necessitating protection of life and property immediately.

His conduct in transmitting the allegations made by the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 to the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, in whose court the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was pending, did amount to the commission of contempt of that court."

As regards the first appellant, the facts are that on 22nd March an application was received by post in the office of the District Magistrate signed by Shriram containing allegations against the trying Magistrate.

On 25th March, 1950, this application was sent by the appellant for report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with the following endorsement:-

...

"S.D,0. Please look into these allegations and let 1953 me have a reporG." On 4th April, 1950, the Sub- Riewan-ul Divisional Magistrate submitted a report and the first Haean appellant having been satisfied that the allegation~ and Another were baseless passed the following order:- v. . d The State of " I do not see any reason to with raw the case Uttar Pradesh. from your file." ' • On the application of Phundi Singh mentioned Mahajan J. above made before the High Court of Allaha, bad under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act this appellant a.long with others was also held guilty of contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's Court,

on the following reasoning :-

"Similarly transmission of the application sent by Shriram on the '25th' March to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, J alaun, amounted to commission of contempt of court by opposite party No. 6.

The mere fact that he had to take action in view of the allegations against the magistrate in that application would not affect this question.

The application contained, afil already stated, expressions showing that Phundi Singh was a history sheeter and that the case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was fictitious and was instituted at the instance of Pratap Singh.

He should not have transmitted the entire application. He could have necessary extracts which related to the allegations against the magistrate sent to the court concerned in the circumstances when the applicants introduced matter irrelevant for transfer application. It may also be mentioned here that the application could be treated as a transfer application . though no such request was made in that application.

J;'he application was neither properly presented nor was it accompanied by an affidavit nor was it stamped.

The a.pplicant wanted some action for the protection of his crop from bad characters." Having found both the appellants guilty of contempt of court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun, the High Court took no action a.gainst them because they happened to commit contempt of court rather due to their ca.relessness a.nd la.ck of vigilance

than with any 'deliberate ii; i.tention to commit it. It was observed that officers who have to transmit com- Rizwan-ul-

Hasan munications to conrts of justice should be vigilant

and Another <tnd careful to see that nothing is transmitted which can have any effect, even remotely on, the merits of The St, te of a case.

Uttar Pfadesh.

In our judgment, the proceedings for contempt of Mahajan J. court against the two appellants on the facts stated are misconceived and have to be quashed.

Both the appellants were superior officers of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate at the time when they sent the applications of Kedarnath and Matadin for report.

They were under a duty to supervise his work. It is difficult to see how by transmitting the applications received by them to him, an~ asking him for his views they were in any way interfering with the course of justice and were committing contempt of his court.· Their action cannot be characteriioed as having a tendency to interfere with the course of justice.

The applications were transmitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the usual and normal course of the official practice and we 'cannot subscribe to the view of the High Court that only extracts of these applications should.have been sent to him for his views and not the applications as such as they contained material which had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice.

The second appellant, when he was officiating a.s

Disrict .Magistrate, received the application of Kedarnath and Matadin with a letter of recommendation from the Secretary of the Congress Committee.

This application was in the nature of a counter complaint, and the appellant acted propedy in sending it to the magistrate who was seised of the original application. He was under no duty to censor it and to cut it into pieces and then forward the relevant parts only to the magistrate.

The recommendatory letter was an annexure to the application and it had to go with it. The conduct of the Secretary of the

Congress Committee in writing a recommendatory letter a.l/911t the fa.cts of the ca.se to the District

I Magistrate was undoubtedly a coclmunication for 1953 the purpose of influencing his decision and was Rizwan-ulrightly reprobated by the High Court. Such a, course Hasan is calcula, ted, if tolerated, to divert the course of and Another justice and ought more frequently than it is, to be v. treated as what it really is, namely, a high contempt The State of of court. 'rhe Congress Secretary has been rightly Uttar Pradesh. held guilty of contempt and punished. He has not Mahajan J. come to this Court and we are no longer concerned with him.

But we are unable t, o find how the conduct of the appellant in sending the application which, as we have already stated, was in the nature of counter charge to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate who was seiJ; ed of the original complaint in any way amounted to contempt of court.

There are three different sorts of contempts known to law in such matters.

One kind of contempt i" scandalizing the court itself. There may likewioe be a contempt of the court in abusing parties who are concerned in ca.uses in that court. There may also be a contempt of court in prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is heard. The act of the appellant could not fall in either of these three categories.

So far as the first appellant is concerned, under the provisions of section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, .he had authority to withdraw the case under section 145 of the Code pending in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

On the application of 22nd March made by Kedarnath and Matadin containing allegations against the Sub-Divisional Magistrate he was entitled to use his powers under that section if the allegations contained therein were substantiated. It is usual to send such applications to the court concerned for its remarks and that is precisely what he did, and as soon as the :remarks we1re received and he was satisfied that the allegations we:re baseless, he declined to withdraw the case. We have not been able to see how such an action on the part of the District Magistrate, done in the normal and usual course of the discharge of his duties as sueh magistrate, could be held to interfere with the 76

SUPREME OOURT RE.PORTS [1953]

1959 course of adnilnistration of justice or to create pre-

Rizwan-uljudice of any kind against the complainant in the Hasan proceedings under section 145 of the Code of and Another Criminal Procedure. '!.'here is nothing in section 528

v. of the Criminal Procedure Code which disables a The State 01 magistrate from taking action unless he is set in Uttar Praesh. motion by the petition of one of the parties and

Mahajan J. nothing in the Code prevents any person from bringing facts to the notice of the District Magistrate which might suggest to that magistrate that it was advisable to see whether the magistrate should remain in charge of a particular case.

In our judgment, therefore, the High Court was in erro1 in thinking that the two appellants acted without due circumspection and thought and were guilty of contempt of the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

We are further of the opinion that it was not possible to hold on those facts that any prejudice arose in the case by these two applications being sent by the appellants to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or that any action was necessary for the protection of the tribunal which was engaged in hearing the case nuder section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.

As observed by Rankin C.J. in Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson('), the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the court's action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety.

The result is that we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court against the two appellants and acquit them of the charge under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act.

Appeal allowed.

Agent for the appellant: S. Subramanian.

Agent for the respondent: 0. P. Lal.

(1} (1931) 58 Cal, 884 at 895.

'.I

section 34

Raj inder Narain

P. K. Chatterji

RIZWAN-UL-HASAN AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF UT'rAR PRADESH

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

DAs JJ.

Contempt of Courts Act

s. 3

s. 145

Criminal Procedure Code

Uttar P1adesh

High Court of Allahabad

s. 145

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Dayal

Desai

K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar

K. B. Asthana

N. G. Sen

MAHAJAN

I (Rizwan-ul-Hasan

Mohammad Munawar

2nd March, 1950

Phundi Singh

section 145

Code of Criminal Procedure

Sub-Divisional Magistrate of J alaun

Kedarnath

Matadin

4th March, 1950

Shriram

rhakur Pratap Singb

Lalla Ram Dwivedi

District Congress Committee

Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun

section 3

Contempt of Courts Act

Mahajan

section 145

Criminal Procedure Code

section 145

Criminal Procedure Code

Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Jalaun

section 145

Criminal Procedure Code

25th March, 1950

4th April, 1950

Sub- Riewan-ul Divisional Magistrate

Uttar Pradesh

Phundi Singh

High Court of Allaha

section 3

Contempt of Courts Act

section 145

Criminal Procedure Code

Pratap Singh

Uttar Pfadesh

section 528

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 145

section 145

section 528

section 145

Criminal Procedure Code

Rankin

section 3

Contempt of Courts Act

S. Subramanian

P. Lal