195::

J anuar, Y .10.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]

KESHAV MILLS LTD.'

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY

[Mmm CHAND MAHA.JAN, S. R. DA~, VrnAN BosE and

BHAGWATI JJ.)

Indian Income-ta.•r Act (XI o/1922), ss. 4 (1) (a) and (c), 18-

J\-ron-resident-Accoznts in 11icrcantile systern-Sale of goods in British Inrli<t throuah agents-Assessability of profits derived front wch sale-Provision of law apvlicable to such cases-Inc01ne-tax outhori.ties, whether bound to compute incorne according to mercantile .•11stein-Avvlicablit?1 of s.13 to non-1esidents.

A non-resident company manufactured textile goods at Poutside British India and sold the goods ex-mills. A firm, R & Co., guaranteed the sale-price of goods sold ex-mills by the company to purchasers at Ahmedabad within British India.

As the company maintained its accounts according to the mercantile system, the company debited R & Co., with the price of goods sold and credited the sales account with the amount of \be bills. R & Co., collected the amounts of the bills from the purchasers on behalf of the company and c1edited the snms realised in the company's

"°count with banks at Ahmedabad and also disbursed them to creditors of the company in British India. These payments were credited by the company to R & Co. During tbe relevant accounting year the company thus received Rs. 12,68,480.

The company also received Rs. 4,40,878 from sales to purchasers in British India. The amount of the sales bills for which hundis were drawn on \lie purchasers in favour of banks were debited by the company to the accounts of the respective merchants and credited to the

ales account and the sums roceivec1 by the ba.nks fro1n the purchasers against delivery of tho rail, vay receipts \Vere credited by the company to the accounts of the respective purchasers. In either case there \Vas no change in the relationship of vendor and purchaser bet\veen the company and the purchasers by reason of the entries made in the company's hooks.

The question as reframed by the High Conrt was whether these two sums were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessees to merchants in British India and whether they were received in British India and could be included in the assessable income of tho company in British India: Held, per llfelw Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das and Bhagwati J J., (Vivian Bose J. dissenting) that tbe two amounts in question were sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the company to merchants in British India; that they were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it w!ien the entries were µiacje in the books of account at P but \iad

196J merely accrued ot arisen to it there; that they were first received by R & Co. and by the banks through whom the railway receipts were negotiated on behalf of the company in British India; <tnd Kesliav Mills that they were therefore liable to t<tx under s. 4(1) (a) of the Lt4, Indian Income.tax Act as having been t•eceived in 13ritish India on v. its behalf.

Oonunissioner of Though it is true that in the case of residents, if the assessee employs the mercantile system regularly it is obligatory on the income-tax authorities to compute the income according to that system, it is doubtful whether that position would be available to a non-resident who maintains his books of account outside British India according to the mercantile system.

Section 13 would only he relevant where the total profits of the assessee have to be computed and in that event the assessee would he entitled to claim that they should be computed according to the system of accounts maintained by him ; it would not be relevant v.'hen stray iten1s of income are sought to he assessed in the taxable territories as received in the taxable territories by a non-resident.

Bvse J.-In the case of accounts kept in the mercantile system, the profit or loss at the end of the accounting year is based not on a difference between \Vhat \Vas actually received and what was actually paid out, but on the difference between the right to receive and the liability to pay. 'I1he taxation in such cases is not on income, profits or gains which \Vere received but on profits which "accrued or arose" to the assessee in the accounting yea.r.

This view excludes s. 4(1) (a) and this means that a resident is taxed in such cases under s. 4(l)(b) and a non-resident under s. 4(1) (c).

Applying s. 4(1) (c) to the present case, in the case of the Rs. 4 lakbs odd the profits accrued or arose in British India where the right to take delivery of the goods accrued and where the price was actually paid, but what is really taxable under s. 4 (1) (c) is not the Rs. 4 lakhs odd, but the figures entered in the accounting year as the p\"ice of the various transactions which the Rs. 4 lakhs represented. Similarly, in the case of Rs. 12 lakhs odd, it is the figure entered in the books in the accounting year relating to the transactions which is taxable.

By the Fnll Conrt.-The expression "deewed to be received" in s. 4 (1) (a) means deemed by the provisions of the Act to be received.

Subramaniyan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax (2 I.T.C. 365), Ahmed Din Alladitta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, P1mjab (2 I.T.R. 369), Kanwal Naya" Hamir Singh v. Commissioner of Jn. come-ta.r, Ajmer-iYierwara (6 I.T.R. 675), Commissioner of Tncomc tax v. Singari Bai (13 I.T.R. 224) distinguished.

B. ill. Kamdar, In re (1946 I.T.R .. 14), Pondicherry Railway Co.

v. Commissioner of Incometax (58 I.A. 239) and Commissioner of

Jncom.e.eax,

Botnbay.

Keshav Mills Ltd;

Income-tax v. Mathias (66 I.A. 23), Comrnissioner1Jf Income-tax v.

Kameswar Singh (1933 I.T.R. 94), Commissionei of Income-tax v.

Chu11ilal Mehta (1938 I.T.R. 521) referred to.

CtVIL

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Commissioner rNo. 151 of 1951.

Income-tax, Appeal from a Judgment and Order dated 14/15th Bornbay.

September, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J.) in Income-tax Reference No. 2 of 1949.

R. J. Kolah and N. A. Palkiwalla for the appellant.

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (P.A.

Mehta, with him) for the respondent.

1953. January 30. The judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan J., Das J. and Bhagwati .J. was delivered by Bhagwati J. Bose J. delivered a separate judgment.

BHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon a reference by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 66 ( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, whereby the High Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal that two amounts of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 were the sale proceeds of goods sold by the appellant to merchants in British India, were received in British India and were liable to income-tax in British India.

The appellant is a company registered in the Baroda State, as it then was, prior to its merger with India. It manufactmes textile goods in Petlad in the Baroda State and after the goods are manufactured they are sold by the company ex-mills. The company employs Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. as guaranteed brokers. That firm guarantees the sale price of goods sold by the company ex-mills to the purchasers from Ahmedabad and receives commission as consideration for the guarantee and the work which it does for the company. The company is a non-resident and its accounts are maintained according to the mercantile system.

195.J In the assessment year 1942-43 (the previous year being the calendar year 1941) the total sales of the d b h d Ke8hav Mills goo s y t e company amounte to Rs. 29,68,808. In making the assessment on the company for that assess-

L~~· . ment year the following three amounts were considered Commissioner of for the purpose of determining the company's liability Income-wx, to British Indian tax.

Bombay.

(a) Sale proceeds recovered through Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co.

(b) Sale proceeds through British Indian banks and shroffs re ceived by means of drafts or hundies drawn by the company (Railway receipts handed over to British Indian merchants by the banks on payment).

Rs. 12,68,480

Rs. 4,40,878

( c) Sale proceeds received by cheques on British Indian banks and hundies on British Indian shroffs and merchants, and collected by the banks and shroffs Rs. 6,71,735

Total Rs. 23,81,093

As regards item(a)the company debited the account of the firm of Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. with Rs. 13,41,744 which represented sales made by the company to merchants ofAhmedabad whose payments were guaranteed by that firm, and credited the sales account with the amount of the bills. }fossrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. collected the amounts of the bills from the merchants at Ahmedabad and credited the sums recovered in the company's accounts with banks and/ or shroffs at Ahmedabad and also made disbursements under instructions of the company to the creditors of the company in British India. All these payments were credited by the company to the account of Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. and during the relevant accounting year the company thus

Bhagwati J.

19!iJ received Rs. 12,68,480 agai115t the total debits of Rs. 13,41,744.

Keshav Mills Ltd.

As regards item (b) the eompany received Rs . . v: 4,40,878 by drawing hundies or drafts for the amounts Oointni8Bioner of of its sales bills (including the forwarding charges and

Income.tax h f 't fj th n t h ) Bombay. ' t e cost o trans1 _rom e m1 premises o t e station on the merchants m favour of recognised banks and

Bhaywati J. shroffs in British India, by sending the same to those banks or shroffs with the railway receipts duly endorsed in favour of the merchants and by instructing the banks or shroffs to recover the amounts including the costs of transmitting the same to them. The amounts of these sales bills were debited by the company to the accounts of the respective merchants and credited to the sales a.ecount and the sums recovered by the banks or shroffs from the merchants in British India against the delivery of the relative railway receipts were on receipt of the same by the company credited to the accounts of the respective merchants in their books of account.

As regards item (c), the company received Bs. 6,71,735 from the merchants by cheques and hundies drawn on banks and shroffs in British India in favour of the company.

These cheques and hundies were negotiated by the company in Petlad and sent back for credit to its accounts with those banks and shroffs. The said cheques and hundies were cashed in British India and the sale proceeds remitted by the banks and shroffs to the company. The amounts of the sales bills were debited to the accounts of the merchants in the books of the coml)any when the goods were invoiced to the merchants and these accounts were credited with the moneys thus received by the company from the merchants.

'l'he Income-tax Officer brought to tax the profits derived by the company represented by the said three items in the assessment year on the basis that the sale proceeds having been received in British India the profits were received in British India. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal held that profits

J •

from items (a) and ( c) were exempt from British Indian 19,;3 tax while thos!l represented by item (b) were rightly Kesha• Mills taxed. The Department filed an appeal to the Appel- Ltd. late Tribunal against the decision of the Appellate v.

Assistant Commissioner in regard to items (a) and (c) Commissioner of and the company filed an appeal in respect of item (b ).

Incmne-tax, The Appellate Tribunal held in regard to item (a) that Bombay. the merchants in British India were not absolved either in law or in-fact from their responsibility to pay to the company its dues by virtue of the debit entries in the accom1t of Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. and in regard to item (b) that the payment of the amounts dne was a condition precedent to the delivery of goods by the banks in British India on behalf of the company. The Tribunal therefore held that profits arising from items (a) and (b) were rightly subjected to tax.

As regards item (c) the Tribunal held that Rs. 6,71,735 "were received by the assessee company directly from the merchants in British India by chequesandhundies drawn on banks and shroffs in British India in favour of the company but were negotiated in Petlad and sent for credit to the company's account. The amounts were received at Petlad and once they were received there, they could not be held to have been received again in British India ".

The Department asked the Tribunal to refer to the High Court the question of law arising on item ( c) and the company asked the Tribunal to refer to the High Court the question of law arising on items (a) and (b) and the Tribunal therefore referred the following question of law to the High Court:--

" Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sums of Rs. 12,68,480, Rs. 4,40,878 and Rs. 6,71,735, or any of them, which, represents receipts by the assessee company of its sale proceeds in British India, include any portion of its income in British India ? "

The High Court held that Rs. 12,68,480 were received in British India and included the profits and gains of the business of the assessee company. It held t, hat Rs. 4,40,878 also were received in British India

Bhagwati J.

1os.1 and the company was liable in respect of that amount.

K<BhavMills In regard to the item of Rs. 6,71,735, the High Court

found that the facts stated by,· the Tribunal were not Ltd. v. sufficient to enable it to reach a decision and therefore

Oommissione1 of directed that the Tribunal should submit a suppleb1em11e-1ax, mentary statement of case setting out the several B 01•1bay. aspects set out in the judgment. 'l'he High Court

Bhagwati .J. reframed the question in regard to the two items of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 in the manner following:-

(1) whether the sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessee to merchants in British India or were debts due by the said merchants?

(2) Whether if they were sale proceeds, they were received in British India ? and answered them by stating that they were sale proceeds and they were received in British India.

There was also a third question which was comprised in the reference and that question was framed as under:- Whether the profits of the assessee's business are included in the sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 ?

This question was also answered by stating that they were included in these two sums. The company obtained leave from the High Court to appeal against the decision in regard to the two sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 and hence this appeal.

It is common ground that the company is a nonresident and its accounts have been regularly kept according to the mercantile system. Its balance sheets were also prepared on that basis. The company was assessed to tax in British India on the basis that these two sums of money were received in British India by or on behalf of the company. In regard to the item of Rs. 12,68,480, even though the amounts of the sales bills were in the first instance debited by the company in its books to the account of Messrs. Ja, gmohandas Ramanlal & Co, the sale proceeds in accordance with

J •

S.C.R. i'lUPREllfE COl'RT REPORTS 957

the terms of the sales hills were pitid by the respective 1953 merchants to -Yiessrs. J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co. in Keshav Mills British India and were either credited bv Messrs.

Ltd . • Tagmohandas Ramanlal & Co. in the compny's acv .. counts with banks or shroffs in British India or were Oommisswner of

l. b d b h . d . h h . .

Incom,,-taz, c JS urse y t em m accor ance wit t e mstruct10ns Bombay. of the company in British India. In regard to the item of Rs. 4,10,878 even though the amounts of the Bhagv•ati J. sales bills were debited in the first instance by the company to the accounts of the respective merchants in the books of account at Petlad the relative railway receipts were sent by the company to banks or shroffs in British India together with drafts or hundies in connection with the same with instructions that deliverv of the railway receipts should he given to the respective merchants against payment and the amounts of the s<tles bills were thus paid by the respective merclrnn ts to the banks or shroffs in British India and were tmtrnmitted under the instructions of the company by the banks and shroffs in British India to the company at Petlad. Prima facie therefore the amounts of the sales bills in both the citses whether they were paid to )fo,:irn .. fagmohandas Ranmnlal & Co. or to the banks or Rhroffs through \1hom the railway receipts were negotiated were paid by the mercha1its in British India and were received by Messrs .. Tagrnohandas Ramanlal & Co. and the banks or shroffs on behalf of the company in British Indin.

The receipt of these itmounts thus fe!l within section 4 (1) (a) of the Act and the - profits or gains of this business thus were received in British India by or on behitlf of the company.

The company however sought exemption from liability to tax on the grounds (a) that the accounts of the company were kept on the mercantile or book profit basis under which the accrual of profit as shown in the account was the criterion of taxability and section 4(1)

(a) had no application at all; (h) that it was obligatory on the authorities under section 13 of the Act to accept that systPm of maintaining accounts except under the proviso to that section and that the method of computation there was made the very basis of 124

958 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS [1953]

19.13 chargeability and section 10 read with section 13 operated to save these amounts from chargeability and Keshan Mills d ' d

(c) that the amounts having been treate as receive Ltd. v... when credit entries were made in the books of account,

OommiBaioner ~I and chargeability having crystallised on the date when

Income-tax, the income accrued or was treated as received, there 8 1:!.nbay. was no further scope for a charge when the amounts were su bsequentl.Y actually received and the subse- Bhagwati J, quent handling of the amounts by the company and the receipt thereof in British Indir1 were of no consequence.

The mercantile system of accounting or what is otherwise known as the double entry system is opposed to the cr1sh system of book keeping under which fl record is kept of actual cash receipts and actual cash payments, entries being made only when money is

actlrnlly collected or disbursed. That system brings into credit what is due, immediately it becomes legally due and before it is actually received and it brings into debit expenditure the amount for which a legal liability has been incurred before it is actually disbursed. The profits or gains of the business which 'are thus credited are not realised but having been earned are treated as received though in fact there is nothing more than an accrual or arising of the profits at that stitge.

They are book profits.

Receipt being not the sole test of chargeability and profits and gains that have accrued or arisen or are deemed to have accrued or arisen being also liable to be charged for income-tax, the assessability of these profits which are thus credited in the books of account arises not because they are received but because they have accrued or arisen.

Mr. Kolah appearing for the company drew our attention to the following cases:~ Subramaniyan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax('), Ahmed Din Allad-itta v. Commissioner. of In come-tax, Punjab('), Kanical Nayan Hnmir Singh v.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Ajmei<Merwara(') and

(r) (1927) i l.T, C. 365.

(2) (1934] 2 l, T.R. 369,

(3) (1938] 6 I.T.R. 675.

.... .

s.c.R.

SUPRE~IE UOU1-t1' REPORTS 959

Cornmissioner of 1 ncome-tax v. Shrimati Singari 1963 Bai(').

Keshav Mills The assessees there were all residents in British India Ltd. and maintained their books of account according to v. the mercantile system. Except in the case of Commis- Commi••ioner of sioner of Income-tax v. Singari Bai(') where the assess- Income-tax, ment was in respect of the total ineome or profits, Bombay. stray items of income treated as received in British Bhagwati J.

India were sought to be charged for tax and they were all assessed for tax not on the basis of actual receipts in British India but on the basis of their having accrued or arisen in British India. The cases were decided with reference to the law as it stood before the amendment in 1939 which under seution4(1) rendered liable to tax all income, profits or gains from whatever source derived, accruing or arising or received in British India or deemed under the provisions of the Act to accrue, arise or to be reciYed in British India.

The question that arose for the determination of the courts was whether under the mercantile system, profits which were credited in the books could be taxed even though they had in fact not been received and the conclusion reached by the courts was that these profits credited in the books of account were earned and could be charged as having accrued or arisen within British India even though they were in fact not received. In none of these cases were the courts concerned with a non-resident claiming to have received profits or gains outside British India under the mercantile system of accounting and claiming exemption from liability to tax under section 4 (1) (a) in respect of profits actually received in British India.

It follows from the above that the mercantile system of accounting treats profits or gains as arising or accruing at the date of the transaction notwithstanding the fact that they are not received or deemed to be received and umler that system, book -profits are assessed as liable to tax. lf an assessee therefore regularly adopts the mercantile system of accounting he would be liable to tax on the profits thus credited by

(1) [1945) 13 I.f, R. 224.

960 SUPREME COURT Rjf>ORTS ll953]

1953 him in his books of account subject to all deductions for bad debts as provided in section 10' (2) (xi). Sec- Keshav M ill8 tion 4 (1) (a) has nothing to do with this basis of tax- Ltd. l j v. ation. Section 13 which is an integra part oft te com-

Oommissioner ofputation of the total income of the assessee and is

Income-ta.•, compulsory on the income-tax authorities as well when Bombay. computing the total income (vide section 2 (15) ) does

Bhagwati J. not lay down ri, ny exemption from liability. It only sets up a mode of computation of the income which is liable to assessment and imposes upon the income-tax authorities an obligation to accept the mode of accounting regularly adopted by the assessee except in the cases where the proviso to that section comes into operation. The profits earned and credited in the books of account being thus taken tts the basis of computation, the system of accounting postulates the existence of debts in so far as moneys remain due and payable by the parties to whom they have been debited and when it is realised that these debts are not recoverable the assessee gets a deduction fdr the bad debts under section 10 (2) (xi).

This however does not mean that the transaction ltS it has been recorded in the books of account under the mercantile system of accounting or the double entry system is metamorphosed or the relationship between the parties assumes a different character. What was in its inception a transaction of sale and purchase is not converted into another transaction as between creditor and debtor.

The relationship as between vendor and purchaser still subsists and there dues not come into existence a new relationship as between creditor and debtor with all its necessary consequences. The transaction as it has been recorded in the books of account has got to be worked out to its fullest extent. _;\forely because the goods have been supplied and the price thereof has been debited to the purchaser the rights and obligations of the vendor and purchaser inter se arc not in any manner affected. The vendor is bound tu fulfil all his obligations under the contract and continues to be liable for all the consequences of his default including rejection of his goods by the purchaser or a claim for d1images

s.c.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORirs 96i

1953 for breach of wal'l'anty by him. The purchaser is

equallv entitlec'l to reJ ect the 0aoods or to claim the .J Keshav M il'1s damages as on breach of warranty by the vendor and Ltd. all these rights and obligations have got to be worked v. out in spite of the fact that the entries are made in Oonunis•ion" of the books of account by the vendor in ;1ccordance with Incorne-tax, the mercantile system of accounting adopted by him.

Bombay.

The vendor could not say tha.t he is under no further Bhagwati J. obligation to the purchaser and that the purchaser must pay the price of the goods debitPd to him as a debt arising out of the book entry.

The count in any action filed by the vendor against the purchaser would be a count for the price of goods sold <ind delivered and would not be a count on an assumpsit for recovery of a debt due by the debtor to him.

It is clear that under these circumstances there is no receipt of the moneys !Lt all, either actual or constructive, in cash or in kind, by actual payment or by adjustment or settlement of accounts. There is also no scope for the <irgurnent, that even though these sums ma v not be said to be either actuallv or constructively reeived they should be "deemed to be received". The expression "deemed to be received" only meam; deemed by the provisions of the Act to be received. The phrase statutory receipt might be conveniently employed to cover income which is "deemed to be received'', and instances of such statutorv receipts are to be found in the provisions of the Ac:t,"e.g., section 18 (4), seetion 58 (E), section 58 (J) (3), section 7(2), section 16(1) (c) and sections 19 (2) (vii) and

HJ(2). (See the observations of Beaumont ('.J. in Commissioner of lncorne-ta; c, Bombay v. New India Assw1- ance Co. Ltd.(1 ).

An amount cannot be "deemed to be received" merely by the volition or sweet will of an indiYidual. In all the cases which we have mentioned above the profits earned which >rnre credited in the books of account according lo the mercantile system of accounting were at best "treated as having been received" which is neither "received" nor "deemed to be received" and therefore not within the purview of section.4(1) (a).

(1) [1938] 6 I.T.R. 603 at p. 614.

962 SUPRE.VIE COUR'i; nEPORTS [1953]

1953 If then profits which have Leen thus credited cannot be said to be received nor deemed to have been receiv- KP, shav A!ifls ed when the entries were made in the books of account, Ltd.

v. the contention urged before us by Mr. Kolah that

Goin1ni . .aioner of there could not be a second receipt of the amount in

Income-la.>:, British lndia does not survive. [t is true that the llombay. words used in section 4(1) (a) rnlate to the first receipt after the accrual of the income. Once it is received bv BhugwatiJ. " the party entitled to it, in respect of any subsequent dealing with the said amount it cannot be said to be "received" as income on that occasion. [Per Kania J, in B. ; JI. Kamdar (1)J.

The "receipt" of income refers to the first occasion when the recipient gets the money under his own control. Once an amount is received as income, any remittance or transmission of the amount to another place does not result in "receipt", within the meaning of this clause, at the other place. 'l'his was definitely established by the Privy Council in Pond-icherry Rail1cay Co. v. Commis8-ioner of lncome- 'J'ax (') :i, ml in Commissioner of Income-tax v. J.Vlathias (3). If, therefore, the income, profits or gains have been once received by the assessee even though outside British India they do not become chargeable by reason of the moneys having been brought in British India, because what is chargeable is the first receipt of the moneys and not a subsequent dealing by the assessee with the said amount.

In that event they are brought by the assessee as his own moneys which he has already received and had control over and they cease to enjoy the character of income, profits or gains.

This ratio however does not apply to the facts of the present case before us.

The moneys were neither received by the company nor could be deemed to have been received by it when the entries were made in the books of account at Petlad. They had merely accrued or arisen to it and so far as the receipt thereof is concerned they were first received in British India when \hey were received by Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal

(r) [r946] r4 l.T.R. 14 at p. 39,

(z) [1931] 58 l.A. z39.

(3) [1939] 66 I.A. z~.

, , .

1953 & Co. or by the various banks or shroffs in British India through 'whom the railway receipts were negoti- - Keshav i.ll1'll8 ated. The first receipt of the moneys was therefore Ltd. when they were paid as such by the merchants to v.

Messrs. J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co. or to the various GommiBBioner of banks or shroffs as above.

W'hatever paid by the Incometox, merchants to these several parties were the sale pro- Bombay. ceeds of the goods which had been sold and delivered BhaguatiJ. by the company to them and they were received within the meaning of section 4 (1) (a) of the Act by these several parties on behalf of tho company in British India at the time when these payments were made by the merchants to them.

Mr. Kolah pressed into service the argument based on section 13 of the Act that the mercantilo svstem of accounting regularly adopted by the assessec \vas obliga.tory on the income-tax authorities for computation of his income. l'Vhile agreeing generally with that submission in case of residents, we doubt whether that position would be available to a non-resident, who maintains his books of account outside British India according to the mercantile system. The section would only be relevant where the total profits of the assessee have to be computed, in which event he would be entitled to claim that they should be computed according to the syHtem of accounts maintained hy him. But the section would hardly be relevant where stra.y items of income are caught iu taxable territories as received in taxable territories by a non-resident. The entries in the present ease were put in merely to prove that the sale proceeds were received outside British India where the entries were made. That contention however could not be sustained, as section 4 (1) (a) is concerned with cases of actual receipt and not with cases of paper receipts.

Having regard to the observations. made above we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was right in holding that the two sums of Rs. 12,68,480 and Rs. 4,40,878 wBre the sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the appellant to merchants in British India, that they were received by Messrs,

964- SUPREME COt'RT REPORTS [1953]

1953 J agmohanclas Itamanlal & Co. and by the banks and

Ke&hav Mills shroffa through whom the railway receipts were nego

L tiatecl, on behalf of the appellant in British lnclia, that td. v. they were liable to tax under section4(1) (a) of the Gommi . ., ioner of Act as having been received in British India on its be

Income-tax, half, that there is nothing either in the facts and circum-

Bombay. stances of 1ohe ease or in law why they should be exflhagwatiJ. empted from such liability, that the a.nswers given to the questions which were ultimately considered by the High Comt were correct, and the appellant was rightly held liable for the tax on these two amounts subject to all just deductions and allowances.

The appeal therefol'e fails and must stand dismissed with costs.

Bo.SE, J.-I respectfully disagree.

Section 3 of the Indian Incomet8x Act provides that the "total income" is to be charged in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

We have therefore to see what "total income" means.

"Total income" is defined in section 2(15). It means (not" inclmles" but means) the total amount of income, profits and gains "referred to in sub-section (I) of section 4 computed in the manner laid down in this Act." Then-fore, the computation of all income referred to in section 4( 1) has to be "in the manner laid down in the Act ".

Section 4 (apart from the provisos and explanations) is divided into three clauses, (a), (b) and (c).

Clause

(b) deals with residents and (c) with non-resident5. As

(a) is general, it is legitimate to infer that it refers to both. Therefore, the words "received" and "deemed to be received " must be constrned in tho same sense in both cases except of course where it is otherwise provided in the Act, for sub-section (1) is made subject to the provisions of the Act.

'N' ow the words "deemed to be received" can be exduded from consideration at once because I agree that they are confined, and are intended to he confined to what I may call the deeming sections in the Act., that is to say, to cases where the deeming must be clone

' . '

under the express provisions of the Act. That leaves 1953 us with the wdrd "received" (I am of courne only deal- Keshav Mills ing with section 4(1) (a) which deals with "receipts" Ltd. and not with section 4( 1) ( c) which refers to "accruals" v. and "arisals" and to that which is deemed to "accrue" Commissioner of or ''arise").

Now this, in my opinion, is to be contrasted with the words "accrue" and "arise" which are used in clauses (b) and (c).

Though there may be overlapping in some cases, I do not think the three are intended to mean the same thing. The Privy Council thought in Commissioner of Income-ta.r v. 1Jiathia8( 1) that there is some variation in meaning between them and in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chun-ilal B. Mehta(') they drew attention to the antithesis between "accruing and arising in" and "received in'', though they also said in the earlier case that there is not a complete disjunction between them and that they are not three mutually exclusive qualifications (page 56); that is, that there may be some overlapping in cert:i, in cases.

Next, we turn to section 6 which divides the various sources of income under various heads for the purposes of computation and chargeability and states that each head shall be "chargeable" "in the manner hereinafter :i, ppearing". It is to be observed that the word "shall" has been user! and not" may" thereby implying that there is no option in the matter.

So far as business is concerned, the he:i, d is No. (iv) "Profits and gains of business etc."'

That carries us on to sections 10 and 13 which P.rescribe the method of computation. Here again, the language is imperative and in the case of a business the method of computation has to be in accordance with the method of auuounting regularly employed by the assessee: s00 Commissioner of Income-tax v.

Kameshwar Singh(·).

Now in the present case, the method of accounting was the mercantile system. The essential difference

(r) [1939] 7 J.T.R. 48 at 56.

(3) [1933] I I.T.R. 94 at IOO and IOI,

(2) [1938] 6 I.T.R. 521 at 527. 125

Income-tax,

Bonibay.

SUPREME COCRT REPORTS [1953]

19!i3 between this and the cash basis system is that in the latter actual receipts and disbursements'are taken into J(e.<; hav Mi'.ll8 account. In the former, sums which are due to the Ltd. v. business are entered on the credit side immediately Commissioner oJthey are legally due and before they are actually

Income-tax, received and expenditures are entered the moment a Bombay. legal liability to pay arises and before the actual clis-

Bose J. bursements.

The profit or loss at the encl of the accounting year is therefore based, not on a difference between hat was actually received and what was actually paid out, but on the difference between the right to receive and the liability to pay. I find it impossible in such a case to say that the taxation is on income, or profits and gains which were "received".

It can only be on profits which ''accrued" or "arose" to the assessee in the accounting year: see the Privy Council in Feroz Shah v. Commissioner of Income-tax(').

That, in my opinion, excludes section 4(1) (a) ttnd that in turn means that in such a case a resident is taxed under section 4(1) (b) and r1 non-resident under section 4( 1) ( c ) .

.N'ow, this to my mind is of vital importance. The primary object of the Income-tax Act is to tax and not merely to ascertain rm income. The computation of the income is subsidiary and is only for the purposes of ascertaining the quantum of the tax : see Goimnissioner of Income-tax v. Karne8hwar Singh('). Therefore, if the legislature chooses to lay down different methods of computation and say that the taxation shall be on the amount so computed, it is essential that these methods be adhered to. In some cases this may be to the advantage of the assessee and in others it may operate to his disadvantage. But that is immaterial.

The importance lies in this. All that can be taxed in a given year are the profits and gains which are received or which arise or accrue in the " previous

year", and if the Act directs that the profits are to bfil computed in a given case on "accruals" or "arisnls" and not on actual receipts it is essential that that b@

(1) [1933) l I.T.H. 219 at 224 and 225.

(2) [1933] l l.T.R. 94 at IOO.

' ••

j ••

S.C.R.

SUPRE~IE COlJRT RE1)0RTS 967

done ; and it follows from that that the tax in such a 1953 case can only be on the accruals or arisals and not on Kesha11 Mills the actual receipts, for clearly you cannot tax on that

LU. which you are forbidden to compute in a case where v. the tax can only be levied on \\httt is computable Gommiseioner ~I under the Act.

Income-ta.•.

It is important to draw the distinction for this rea- Bambav. son. The rate of tax varies from year to year, there- Bo•e J. fore if the book profits which are dirPcted to be taxed in a given year are, say, Rs. 10,000 and the actual receipts only Rs. 100, it makes a lot of difference which figure is taken; nor does it even itself out in the long run, for if the rate of taxation inereases in th(' following year and the state of the \rnsiness is just the reverse, namely that the book profits ?, re only Rs. 100 whereas the actual receipts arising from the previous year's transiwtions are Its. 10,000, it will make a

considern hie difference to the asses see in the aggregate of tax payable over the years, whether he pays on the basis of book profits or actual receipts in the two years.

I am not able to draw tt di:; tinction between a resident and a non-resident in thrso matters. I can find no ground for holding that in the case of a resident the mercantile system must he adopted for computing the profits if that is the system of accounting regularly employed but that that need not be done in the case of a non-resident. If the assessee had been a resident company, the taxation would, in my opinion, have been under section 4(1) (b) on profits and gains which had accrued or arisen and not under section 4

(1) (a) on profits which had been received. The same principle must, in my opinion, be applied in the case of a non-resident and therefo1e section 4 ( 1) ( c) is attracted, provided the profits and gains ha Ye actually accrued or arisen in the taxable ten-itorics or they can, because of section 42, he deemed to haYc accrued or arisen there. If section 4 (I) ( c) is not attracted, then the tax cannot be levied.

Now, applying section 4 (I) (c), the question is where do the profits and gains arise or accrue in a casP

968 SUPREME cotrRT REPORTS [1953]

1953 like the present ? This is not free from. difficulty and Keshav Mills various views have been, and can be, taken. But as Ltd. these expressions have not been defined and as they v. are not words of art, I think they should be construed

CommiSBioner 0! in their ordinary meaning which businessmen would

Incom•tax, ordinarily and easily understand in a business transac-

Bombay. tion. When goods are solcl it is to my mind evident

80., .J. that the profit or the loss on any particular transaction arises out of the sale, for until there is a sale there can be no profit.

The profit may 1{ot be wholly attributable to the sale but that is <tnother

matter.

It is to my mind unquestionable that they arise, in part, at any rate, out of th0 sale.

Therefore, ifthe goods are sold in the taxable territories, then, to my mind, the profits, or a portion of them, arise there. As the Privy Council pointed out in Commissioner of J ncome-la.J; v. Chimil1il 13. 1VI ehta(' ), in determining where the profits arise the place of the formation of the contract is not the sole criterion, other matters, as for example acts done under the contract are also material.

I am not here attempting to go behind the clecision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the place of sale is not necessarily the place of the receipt of the profits. I am construing the word "arise " and not "receive".

That brings me to the next question, where were the goods in the present case sold? That is a mixed question of fact and law and must vary in each case and must, in my opinion, be answered in a commonsense way and not necessarily in the artificial manner laid down by the Sale of Goods Act to determine where and when the property passes. What are the facts here ? In the case of the Rs. 4 lakhs odd, the control over the corpus of thP goods was retained by the assessee right up to the moment the price was paid; and the price was paid not outside British India but to his nominees in this country, namely, to the assessee's banlrn in .British India. These banks retained the documents of title and had the right to refuse

(!) [1938] 6 J.T.R. SZI at 533

). •

S.C.R.

SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS 969

delivery until , the money was actually handed over.

195J Therefore, the right to get iiossession of the baoods and Keshav M?°lls to take deliverv accrued or arose in British Indit1 • Ltd, where the money was actually paid, and that to my v. mind must be taken to be the place where the profits Commissioner of accrued and arose for income-tax purposes, not be- Income.tax, cause the money was received there, for we are not Bombay. concemed with actm1l receipts, but because the right s • ., J. which accrued at the date of the transaction was to receive the money in British India and hand over the goods there on the receipt of the money.

As I haye said, the substance of the transaction must be viewed and that cannot be made to depend upon the method of book-keeping. Even if there are no books the profits on such a transaction would accrue in the place where the money is to be paid and the goods are to be handed oveT.

I eannot see how that can alter by reason of the method of accounting employed. Accordingly, I agree that the method of accounting >1dopted by the assessee cannot affect the substance of the transactions between the parties or affect their nature. The rights and liabilities of the parties inter se cannot be made to depend on the way in which one of them chooses to keep its books. But that is not the case when we come to the question of taxation for income-tax purposes.

There the method of accounting is vital. But even there the substance of the transaction must be viewed, for the substance cannot alter by a mere method of accounting. It is evident that if the assessee had been n>sident in British India and these transactions had

ueen omitted from the books, the sums which ought to have been entered would be taxable as items which had escaped assessment even if there had been no actual receipts in that or in any following year.

Therefore, it is not the entry in the books which attracts the taxation but the profits on the transaction itself, and when the mercantile system is used the profits arise when the right to receive them accrues and not when t.hc entry is made. 1f tho sys-tern is properly employed the e11try is made as soon as the

riht to receive the price arises and so for all practical

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]

1953 purposes that is the date ordinarily referred to, lmt a man cannot manipulate the amount' of his tax by Ke8hav Mill~· h h l choosing to enter or not to enter items w ic oug it to

L~. be entered on a particular date, as and when he

'Oo1nmissloner of}Jleases.

lnemne-lax,

Bo-mhay.

Bose J,

Now, the Rs. 4 lakhs odd represent actual receipts but that is not what is taxable when the computation is based on the mercantile system. What should be taxed, or rather taken into account for the purposes of taxation, are the figures entered in the accounting year as the sale price of the various transactions which the Rs. 4 lakhs represent. The profits which ttrise out of these transactions do not, on my view, escape tax because the profits accrue or arise in the taxable territories.

But the figure on which the tax is to be computed is not the 4 lakhs odd which represent the actual receipts but another figure which unfortunately we have not been given. I am of course assuming that the figures were duly entered in the books at the proper time in accordance with the mercantile system of accounting. If they were not, then the Income-tax authorities have power to tax income which, for one reason or another, has escaped assessment.

Turning to the Rs. 12 lakhs.

We know that the figure entered in the books relating to these transactions was Iis. 13,41,744. I am not clear whether that was entered in the accounting year with which we are concerned, though I gathered that that was the case.

The actual receipts, which followed later, amounted to only Rs. 12,68,480. In my opinion, if anything is computable for the purposes of tax, it is the former figure (assuming all the entries arc in the accounting year) and not the latter. But in order to determine whether the profits on these transactions :ire taxable at all, we must examine the transactions.

In these cases the sales were to merchants reident in Ahmedabad. But according to the assessee's affidavit,

" In respect of buyers from Ahmedabad, the applicant Mills have no account of such buyers.

The

price is debited to the account of the said Jagmohandas 195t Raml:11 and company and credited to the sales Keshav Mill• account in the books of the applicant:" Lid. and later, Jagmohandas v. "discharges its debts by making payments to the Commissioner of applicants from time to time towards the balance 1n;, ome-1""'• in their said account in the books of the applicant omhay.

Mills. The said amounts arc paid by the said firm by Bose J. paying the same to the credit of the applicant Mills with British Indian banks or shroffs."

Now, it is evident from this that Jagmohandas & Company do not merely guarantee payment by tho Ahmedabad buyers but actually make the payments, or the equivalent of payments, to the assessee company. So little do the buyers matter that their transactions are not even reflected in the accounts.

All we have is Jagmohandas. It does not, in my opinion,' matter whether the actual buyers remained primarily and legally responsible to the assessee or not.

The fact remains that in practice Jagrnohandas & Company actually met the obligations of the buyers and discharged their liabilities to the assessee. It is equally clear that Jagmohandas & Company must have recouped themselves in some way from the buyers.

The question is how. If tho whole of the transactions occurred outside British India and the buyers or their agents went to Petlad and received the goods there and pa.id Jagmohandas & Company outside British India, thf'n I am clear that the profits and gains did not accrue or arise in British India, simply because the goods were ultimately brought there. But if Jagmohancbs & Company or their agents were paid in British 1ndia, the profits and gains, in my opinion, arose there in the same way as in the 4 lakhs c>Lse. If Jagmohandas & Company were the actual agents of the assessee as were the banks in the other case, and the payments were made in the taxable territories, then the accrual and arising was direct. If, however, they were not the agents in the strict sense of the term, then I am of opinion that section 42 would be attracted because at the very least there would be a "business connection",

1953 provided of course the payments were made in the taxable territories.

Keshav Mills Ltd.

Now, here again, I am looking to what was actually v. done in order to determine what the rights were, for Commi,, ioner of it is evident that what was done was done in pursuance

Incomctax, of some agreement, express or implied, between the Bombay. h h 1 d h h parties w ic . agreement regu ate t eir rig ts, and Bose J, those rights in turn determine the place where the profits accrued or arose, or must, because of section 42, be deemed to have accrued or arisen.

In my view, the question referred by the Incometax Appellate Tribunal in its statement of the case does not reflect the trnc position because it concentrates on the actual receipts. If the cash basis system of accounting was germane here, then I would agree that the Rs. 4,40,878 was part of the assessee's income in British India, and so also in the other case, provided the payments were made in British India.

But it is misleading to enquire what wou 1d have happened in circumstances which are not material in this case because of the mercantile system of accounting which was employed.

As regards the High Court. The learned Judges reframed the question and answered it without sending the case back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for a further statement of the case.

That was not Htrictly proper.

Hut, in my opinion, the reframed questions suffer from the same defect.

In my opinion, the case should be sent back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for a reframing of the questions along the lines I hnYe indicated and for a further statement of the case.

Appeal di8missed.

Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.

Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.

KESHAV MILLS LTD

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY

VrnAN BosE

BHAGWATI JJ.

ss. 4

British India

Ahmedabad

India

llfelw Chand Mahajan

S. R. Das

Bhagwati

Vivian Bose

tnd Kesliav Mills

s. 4(1)

Section 13

Bvse

s. 4(1)

s. 4(l)(b)

s. 4(1)

s. 4(1)

s. 4

s. 4

Chagla C.J.

Tendolkar

R. J. Kolah

N. A. Palkiwalla

C. K. Daphtary

P.A.

Mehta

Mehr Chand Mahajan

Das

Bhagwati J. Bose

High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Section 66

Indian Income-tax Act, 1922

Baroda State

Petlad

Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co.

ofAhmedabad

Keshav Mills Ltd.

Bhaywati

Keshav Mills British India

Petlad. Prima

fagmohandas Ranmnlal & Co.

Tagrnohandas Ramanlal & Co.

British Indin

section 4

section 4(1)

section 13

section 10

section 13

Keshan Mills

Kolah

Keshav Mills

Bombay

section 4

section 10

Section 13

section 2

section 10

section 18

section 58

section 7(2)

section 16(1)

sections 19

Beaumont

section 4(1)

Kania

. Kamdar

Jagmohandas Ramanlal

J agmohandas Ramanlal & Co.

section 4

section 13

section 4

Section 3

section 2(15)

section 4

section 4( 1)

Section 4

section 4(1)

section 4( 1)

section 6

sections 10 and 13

Bose

section 4(1)

section 4(1)

section 4( 1)

Income-tax Act

section 4(1)

section 4

section 4

section 42

section 4

section 4

Keshav Mills

Supreme Court

Sale of Goods Act

Keshav Mill•

Jagmohandas & Company

Jagmohandas

Jagrnohandas & Company

Jagmohancbs & Company

section 42

section 42

Incometax Appellate Tribunal

Income-tax Appellate Tribunal

Rajinder Narain

G. H. Rajadhyaksha


' ,; .

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 973 .

MAGGA AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and S. R. DAS JJ.]

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), ss. 284, 285, 539-Assessois-Trial with three assessors-Absence of one assessor during trial-Substitution of new person-Legality of trial-Re-appearance of absent assessor-Continuing trial with four assessors- Va, lidity of trial.

Section 285 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits a trial commenced with the aid of three assessors to be continued and completed with the aid of less than three if during the course of the trial any assessor is prevented by sufficient cause from attending. It does not, however, authorise the substitution of an assessor for an absent one nor an addition to the number of assessors during the course of the trial.

A, B and 0 were summoned to sit as assessors for a murder trial and as C did not appear, D who was i11 tl1e list of assessors and who was present in court though not su111moned, was asked to sit as an assessor, and the trial commenced \\'ith three assessors A, B and D.

A absented himself during the course of the trial and the judge asked E to sit in place of A and proceeded with the trial for some days with B, D and E. Later on A appeared and the trial continued till the end with the four assessors A, B, D and E: Held, (i) that the mere fact that D who had not been summoned was allowed to sit as an assessor when the trial commenced did not vitiate the trial as it was a mere irregularity and did not cause any failure of justice; King Emperor v. Ramsidh Rai (39 Cr. L.J. 725) approved.

Balak Singh v. Emperor (A.LR. 1918 Pat. 420) explained.

(ii) though sub-sectiou (1) of s. 285 imposes a duty on \be judge to find ont whether there was sufficient cause for the absence of an assessor and to consider \.Vbether it is not possible to enforce his attendance, it should be presumed that he has done so when be proceeds with the trial in his absence and a mere omission to record reasons for proceeding with the trial without the absent assessor would not by itself vitiate the trial ; {iii) a sessions judge, however, has no jurisdiction to substitute another person for any assessor \Vho absents himself rlnring the trial or to reinstate the absent assessor \Vhen be re-appears and continue the trial with four asses3ors \vhen the trial commenced with three assessors, an(\ the trial in question was there~ lore illegal.

Feb.16.

nnd Another

'J'he Sfa.fe of

Rajnsthnn.

S-CPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [1053]

King Emperor v. Tirwnal Reddi (I.L.R. 24 Mad. 523) distin guished.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Ap. peal No. 103of1952. Appeal under article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 27th October, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Rajasthan at Jodhpur (Wanchoo C.J. and Bapna .T.) in D.B. Criminal Murder Reference No. 2 of .1952, arising out of the .Judgment and Order dated the lst July, 1952, of the Court of the Sessions Judge, Pali, in Criminal Original Case No. 2 of 1951.

H. J. Urnrigar for the appellants.

Porus A. 111 ehta for the respondent.

1953. February 16.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal under article 1:34(1) ( c) of the Constitution of India, by Magga and Bhagga, who have been convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for the triple murders of Ganesh, Gheesa and Hardas.

The case relates to an incident which took place on the night between the 3rd and 4th April, 1951. Gheesa and Ganesh, deceased, Ratna, Govind, another Ganesh who is a witness in the case, and Hardas had gone to "Imaratia " a well in village Gadwara on that night to keep watch over the crops there. Gheesa slept in one shed near the well, while Hardas slept in another shed some distance away, and Ratna slept in a third shed near the entrance gate. Ganesh, deceased, Ganesh (P., V.), and Govind slept on the threshing floor further away from the well. Some time after midnight Ratna woke up on hearing the cries of Gheesa. It is alleged that he then saw the two accused beating Gheesa, accused Magga having in his hand a farsi and accused Bhagga having a katari and an axe. Hardas, who woke up on hearing the cries, rushed to the aid of Gheesa and thereupon the two accused.. Magga and Bhagga, fell upon him and attacked him with farsi and axe. Ratna,

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s.c.R.

SUPREME COlHtT REPORTS 975

ran away and hid himself near the well. On an alarm being raised, one Krishna who was working on a nearby well came and witnessed the attack on Hardas. The accused, after finishing Gheesa and Hardas went to the threshing floor where Ganesh, deceased, was sleeping.

There Magga asked Bhagga to hit Ganesh with the axe and Bhagga immediately hit Ganesh with the axe and he fell down. Thereafter Magga hit Ganesh two or three times with the farsi on the legs and Bhagga cut the neck of Ganesh with the katari. Govind (P.W.) entreated on behalf of Ganesh but he was threatened and was told that if he did not keep quiet he would also be killed. Without injuring Govind and Ganesh (P.Ws.) the accused then left the place.

Information of the incident was carried to the village by Ratna and a report of it was made to the police at 11-30 a.rn. on 4th April, 1951. In the report it was stated that " Bhagga and Magga are standing at their house with swords and are saying that they would kill more persons. Village people are surrounding them outside the house''. The sub-inspector of police, when he arrived at the village, found the house of the accused surrounded by the village people. The door of the house was dosed from inside and the accused were standing on the chabutra inside. Magga had a farsi in his hand and Bhagga had an unsheathed sword.

The sub-inspector got the door opened, arrested the accused, and took possession of the farsi and the sword. He also recovered the axe and a katari which were bloodstained. The clothes of the accused were also taken possession of after the arrest and they appeared to have bloodstai1rn on them.

The acuused pleaded not guilty. They admitted their partnership in cultivation at "Imaratia " well with the deceased but denied that any quarr<!l took place between them and tbe otber partners about the cutting of the crop. They also denied that the~· had gone to the well armed with various weapons aml had committed the murder ofGheesa, Hardas and Ganesh.

The sessions judge on the evidence led by the prosecution fo!t satisfied that the prosecution case was

Magga and Another v.

TheStaU of Rajasthan.

Mahajan J.

Muggrt

luul, Another v. 'l.'lw State of

Rajasthan.

Mahajan J.

976 SUPREME COURi' kEPOR'.i's [1953]

proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It ; was held that the murder was brutal and advantage had been taken of the persons who were sleeping to kill them. In the result the appellants were convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to death.

The sentence of death passed on them by the sessions judge was confirmed by the High Court after examining the evidence afresh. In the High Court a contention was raised that the whole trial was vitiated inasmuch as it had not been conducted in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. This contention was negatived on the ground that the irregularities committed in the course of the trial were such as were cured by the provisions of section 537, Criminal Procedure Code. As the objection raised concerned the validity of the trial the case was certified as a fit one for appeal to this Court.

The facts which concern the validity of the trial, shortly stated, are these : The trial began on 22nd March, 1952. Three assessors had been summoned for that date. Of these two were present while the third did not come. Thereupon one person who was present in the court premises and whose name was in the list of assessors but who had not been summoned in the manner prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure was chosen as an assessor. The trial then began with the three assessors so chosen, viz., Jethmal, Balkrishna and Asharam. On the 6th June, 1952, Jethmal, one of the assessors absented himself and for some reason, which is not clear from the record, one Chimniram was asked to sit in place of Jethmal as an assessor with the result that on the 6th June, 1952, there were three assessors, viz., Balkrishna and Asharam, who had been sitting from the beginning of the trial, and Chimniram who was introduced for the first time that day. On the 23rd .June also Chimniram, Balkrishna and Asharam sat as assessors. On 27th June, however, Jethmal re-appeared and was allowed to sit and since that date four assessors sat throughout, viz., Jethmal, Chimniram, Balkrishna and Asharam. Eventually all these four assessors gave their opinion on the first

' ...

) .. '

July, 1952, wqen the trial came to an end. It was contended that the trial was bad as it took place in defiance of the provisions of sections 284 and 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that such an illegality could not qe cured by the provisions of section 537 of the Code.

In order to judge of the validity of this objection it is necessary to set out the provisions of the Code relevant to this matter. Section 284 provides that, "When the trial is to be held with the aid of assessors, not less than three and, if possible, four shall be chosen from the persons summoned to act as such". The section as it originally stood required that " two or more shall be chosen as the Judge thinks fit", so that there had to be a minimum of two assessors. In the year 1923, that provision was amended so as to make a minimum of three assessors an essential requisite for a trial to be held with the aid of assessors. A trial commenced with less than three assessors is not authorised by the provisions of this section as it now stands. Therefore, unless a case comes within the provisions of the next following section 285, a trial held in defiance of the provisions of section 284 would not be legal. Section 285, however, has no application to cases where a trial is commenced with less than three assessors. [Vide Balak Singh v. Emperar (1); Sipattar Singh

v. King-Emperor(')]. Section 285 provides:- . "( 1) If in the course of a trial with the aid of assessors, at any time before the finding, any assessor is from any sufficient cause, prevented from attending throughout the trial, or absents himself, and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, the trial shall proceed with the aid of the other assessor or assessors.

(2) If all the assessors are prevented from attending or absent themselves, the proceedings shall be stayed and a new trial shall be held with the aid of fresh assessors."

In cases contemplated by this section a trial commenced with the aid of three assessors can be

(1) A.I.I{. 191.S Fat. 420.

(2) A.I.IL 19,2 All. qo.

Magga und Another v. 'l.'he State of Rajasthan.

Mahajan J.

1liagga and Arwthe-r

The State of flajasthan.

J.liahaja.n .J.

978 SUPREME coURii REPORTS [1953j

continued and finished with the aid of.less than three assessors. This section, howeve-r, does neither authorize the substitution of an assessor for an absent assessor, nor does it authorise an addition of rt11 assessor to the number of assessors during the c:ourse of the trial.

The effect of the provisions of sections 284 and 285 is that a trial cannot be va, lidly commenced with less than three assessors chosen in the manner prescribed by the Code, but once validly commenced it can be continued in certain cases to a finish if some, though not all, of the persons originally appointed, attend throughout the trial. lf all of them do not attend, then a fresh trial has to be held. An addition in the number of the assessors or a change or substitution in their personnel during the course of the trial is not warranted by the Code; on the other hand, it is implicitly prohibited.

The procedure prescribed by section 285(1) is not of a permissive nature. It has to be followed if the conditiorn; prescribed are fulfilled, and like section 285(2) it is nf a mandatory character. No scope is loft in these provisions for the exercise of the discretion of the judge for wpplementing these provisiorn and for holding a trial in a manner different from the one prescribed aml for conducting it witfi the aid of some assessors originally appointed, itml also with the aid of some others recruited during the trial.

Section 309 provides that when a trial is concluded, the court may sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence and shall then require each of the assessors to state his opinion orally and shall record such opinions. Sub-clause (2) of this section enacts that the judge shall then give judgment, but in doing so shall not be bound to conform to the opinions of the assessors.

Sections 326 and 327 enact the method and manner of summoning assessors and jurors. Section 537 provides as follows:-

''Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Chapter XX VII or on appeal or revision Oil account-

.. '

) ,.

(a) of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, sutiunonH, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proeeediugs before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this ('ode, or ...

( c) of the omission to revise any list of jurors or assessors in accordance with section 324, or

(cl) of any misdirection in any charge to a jury, uJ1less such error, omission, irregularity or misclirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice."

The first objection that was taken in the High Court to the validity of the trial was that Asharam who had not been summoned as an assessor could not be appointed as such and hence it should be held that the trial commenced with a minimum of two assessors in defiance of the provisions of section 284.

What happened was this: On the date fixed for the trial there was a deficiency in the number of persons who had been summoned and who appeared to act as assessors, the court then sent for Asharam whose name was in the list of assessors and ordered him to sit as an assessor. The High Court took the view, and we think rightly, tha.t the circumstance that the formality of issuing a summons was not gone through was a mere irregularity which was curable under section 537 of the Code, as there was no failure of justice caused on account of that irregularity and that the trial on that account could not be held to be bad. This view is in accord with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in King-Emperor v. Rainsidh Rai(') with which we agree.

We are constrained, however, to observe that the High Court did not fully appreciate the decision of the Patna High Court in Balak Singh v. Jtm.peror('), when it said that that decision held a trial bad where a person was ehosen as an assessor who had uut been summoned. In that case during the examination of the Jirst witness only one qualified assessor was present in court and capable of acting as such, the judge ordered another pernon who happened to be present in court hut was not in the official list of assessors to act as an

(r) 39 Crl. L.J. 725. (2) A.I.R. r9r8 Pat. 420,

19.!3

Magga and Another

v, 'PM State of

Raja, sth.nn,

Mahajan J.

.2llagga and Another v.

The State of

Raja8than.

A-lahaja, n J.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953]

assessor, and it was held that as the tri:i, l commenced with only one assessor and not with two duly qualified assessors the trial was abortive and contrary to law.

No exception could therefore be taken to the rule stated in this decision.

The second objection against the validity of the trial taken before the High Court was founded on section 285.

It was contended that when one of the assessors appointed absented himself the court was bound, under section 285, to ascertain before proceeding further with the trial whether the absence of the assessor was due to sufficient cause and whether it was practicable to enforce his attendance and that the judge in this case failed to observe this condition which alone entitled him to continue the trial with the remaining assessors and that the defect was fatal to the validity of the trial. The High Court held that though there was non-compliance with the provisions of section 285 in the case, this irregularity was cured by section 537 as it had not in fact caused failure of justice. We agree with the High Court in this conclusion. It is no doubt true that the section enjoins on the judge a duty to find whether there is a sufficient cause for the non-attendance of an assessor and whether it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, and ordinarily the proceedings must represent on their face whether this duty has been performed, but we think that such an omission on his part does not necessarily vitiate the trial.

We are further of the opinion that when a judge proceeds with a trial in the absence of one or two of the assessors with the aid of the remaining assessor or assessors, it may be presumed that he has done so because he was satisfied that it was not practicable to enforce the attendance of the absent assessor or assessors and that there was sufficient cause for his or their non-attendance.

If, however, there is evidence to a contrary effect, the matter may be different. Failure to record an order indicating the reasons for proceeding with the trial with the aid of the remaining assessors can at best be an irregularity or an omission which must be held to

' . '

' _, .

be such as to come within the reach of section 537 unless it has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. It could not be seriously argued that such an omission can lead to such a result.

Finally the learned counsel contended, also relying on section 285, that the sessions judge had no jurisdiction or power to substitute an assessor or to reinstate the absent assessor, or to add to the number of assessors.

When the point was raised before the High Court, it fully realized that there was no provision in law which permitted such substitution of an absent assessor by another assessor or the subsequent reinstatement of an absent assessor as had been done in this case.

It, however, felt that the irregularity was of the same nature as non-compliance with the provisions of section 285, and as such was cured by section 537 of the Code. In regard to the addition of an assessor during the trial it said :-

"We have not been able to find any reported case where an assessor harl been added in the middle of the trial as has been done by the learned judge. That is perhaps due to the fact that no judge ever did Buch an obviously silly thing, but considering that the trial, in any case, continued with the aid of two assessors who were there throughout, there was, in our opinion, substantial compliance with the mode of trial provided in the Code and the irregularity committed by the addition of Chimniram in June, 1952, is curable under section 537 as it did not occasion any failure of justice.

The sessions judge was still the court of competent jurisdi0tion to try the case and all that he did was to add unnecessarilv one more assessor to advise him when he had no businss to do so. We can ignore his presence altogether and as the irregularity has not caused failure of justice, the trial will not be vitiated".

In our judgment, the High Court was in error in this view.

The sessions judge during the progress of the trial not only made a change in the personnel of the assessors originally appointed and also added to their number, ln1t )le actually took the opinions 127

Ma, ga and Another

The State of Rajasthan,

Ma, hajan J.

Magga and Another

The State of

Rajasthan..

}, f aha;"an J.

of all the four assessors as required by the provisions of section 309 of the Code, and acted in accordance with those opinions in convicting the two appellants. It is plain that a unanimous verdict of four assessors is bound to weigh much more with a judge than the opinion of two persons. \Ve have not been able to understand how the High Court could ignore the presence of assessors altogether who had given their opinions and which opinions had been accepted by the judge. The opinion of an assessor is exercised in the judicial function imposed upon him by law, and the judge is bound to take it into consideration and he cannot dispense with it.

The judge considered this trial as if he had commenced it with the aid of four assessors, and taking into consideration their opinion, he convicted the appellants.

It is difficult to assess the value which the judge gave to the opinions of the assessors at the time of arriving at his finding and the High Court was in error in thinking that it did no harm and caused no prejudice. We ca1mot subscribe to the view of the High Court that the trial should be taken as having been conducted with the aid of the two assessors as sanctioned bv section 285, Criminal Procedure Code.

That is not what actually happened. It is difficult to convert a trial held partly with the aid of three assessors and partly with the r1id of fom assessors into one held with the aid of two assessors only. At no stage was the trial held with the aid of two assessors only.

The third substituted assessor attended a part of the trial and the added fourth assessor also attended a part of it. None of these two were present throughout. Thus the trial when it concluded was a different trial from the one which was commenced under the provisions of section 284, Criminal Procedure Code.

To a situation like this we think section .537 cannot be called in aid.

Such a trial is not known to the Code and it seems implicitly prohibited by the provisions of sections 284 and 285.

What happened in this case cannot be described as a mere error, omission or irregularity in the course of the trial. It is much more serious. H

' ...

s.c.R.

SUPHEME UOUR'i' REPOR, TS 983

amounts to holding a trial in violation of the provisions of the Uode and goes to the root of the matter and the illegality is of a <·.haracter that it vitiates the whole proceedings.

As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor('), disobedience to an express provision as to a mode of trial cannot be regarded as a mere irregularity.

In Abdu.Z Rahman v. King-Emperor{'), the distinction between cases which fall within the rule of section 537 and those which are outside it was pointed out by Lord Phillimore. There it was said that tlw distinction between Subramania, Iyer'8 ca .. e (1) and that case in which there was an irregularity in <>omplying with the provisions of section 360 of tht' Cmk lnlS fairly obvious.

In Subramania lyer's case (1) the pnwedure adopted was one which the Code positiYely prohibits and it . was possible that it might have worked actual injustice to the accused but that the error in not reading the statements of witnesses to them was of a different character, and such an omission was not fatal.

In Pululcurti Kotayya v. 1\. ing-Emperor(") their Lordships again examined this qm'stion. That wtts a cas¥ where there had been a breach of th0 provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, and it was held that in the peculiar eircumstances of that case it had not prejudiced the accused and the ca, se therefor" fell under section 537 and that the trial was vaJid notwithstanding the breach of section 162.

Sir John Beaumont in delivering the decision of the Board made the following observations which bring out the distinction between the two sets of cases : --

"There are, no doubt, authorities in India which lend some support to !\!fr. Pritt's contention, and reference may be made to 7'irlcha v. Nanak('), il1

which the court expressed th':' view that sedion 537, Criminal Procedure Code, applied only to errors of procedure arising out of mere inadvertence, and not to cases of disregard of, or disobedience to, mo, ndatory provisions of the Code, and to In re Jlarlura 11111tlw

(1) (1901) z8 I.A. z57.

(2) (1927) 54 I.A. 96.

(3) (1947) 74 I.A. 65,

(4) (19n) !.LR. 49 All. 475

Magga (tttd Another

The State of Rajasthan.

Mahajan , J,

Magga and Another

The. State of

Ra.ja$lhan.

}Jaha}an J,

Vannian(' ), in which the view was expressed that any failure to examine tbe accused under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, was fatal to the validity of the trial, and could not be cured under section 537.

In their Lordships' opinion, this argument is based on too narrow a view of the operation of section 537.

When a trial is conducted in a mrmner different from that prescribed by the Gode [as in Subramania Iyer's case(')], the trial is bad, and no question of curing an ii-regularity arises: but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of snCJl conduct, the irregularity can be cured under section 537, and none the less so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always he the case, a breach of one or more of the very com prehensi vc provisions of the Code.

The distinction drawn in many of the cases in India between an illegality find an irregularity is one of degree rather than of kind. This view finds support in the decision of their Lordships' Boflrd in Abdul Rahman v. ]( ing-Emperor( 3 ), where failure to comply with section 3GO, Criminal Procedure Code, was held to be cured by sections 535 and 5Bi. The present case falls under section 537, and their Lordships hold the trial valid notwithstanding the breach of section 162."

In our judgment, the trial conducted in the present case was conducted in fl nrnnner different from that prescribed by the Code and is bad and no question here flrises of curing flny irregularity. The Code does not authorize a trial commenced with the flid of three named assessors to be conducted and completed with the aid of four assessors. The substitution of one assessor by another and an addition to the number of assessors appointed at the commencement of the trial is not sfluctioned by section 285, Criminal Procedure Code, nor is it authorized by section 284. On the other hand, the language of section 285( 1) read with the provisions of section 285(2) implicitly bans the holding of such a tria.I. It is uot possible to say with any degree

(1) (1922) I.LR. 45 l\lad. 820. (%) (1901) is I.A. ~7

(3) (1927) 54 I.A. 96.

of certainty to what extent the opinion of the outgoing and the incoming assessors who did not attend the whole of the trial influenced the decision in the case ;

but as such a trial is unknown to law, it has to be presumed that it was illegal.

Mr. Mehta for the State Govemment contended thttt under section 309(2) the opinion of assessors is not binding on the sessions judge and their presence or absence does not affect the constitution of the court and that as at this trial at least two of the assessors originally appointed sat throughout the trial it should be held that the trial was substantially a trial conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The learned counsel did not go to the length of urging that a trial without the aid of any assessorn whatever was a good trial under the Code. Such a contention, if raised, would have to be negatived in view of the clear

provisions of section 284 and of sub-section (2) of section 285.

The appointment of at least three assessors is essential for the validity of a trial of this character at its commencement, and once validly commenced, in certain events, it can be validly concluded if at least one of them remains present throughout, while others drop out ; but a trial conducted in the manner in which it was done in this case is wholly outside the contemplation of the Code and it is not possible to hold that it was concluded according to the provisions of the Code. The provision in the Code that the opinion of the assessor is not binding on the sessions judge cannot lend support to the contention that the sessions

jndgr is entitled to ignore their very existence.

As already pointed out, though he may not be bound to accept their opinions, he is certainly bound to take them into consideration. The weight to be attached to such opinions may well vary with the number of assessors.

:\:Ir. Mehta to support his contention placed reliimce on tho majority decision of the Madras High Court in King-Emperor v. Tirumul Reddi (1).

In that case the trial continued for about seven weeks.

During that

(l) (l901) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 523.

Magga n.ndAnotMr

The State of

Rajasthf1n.

MahajanJ.

illagga and Another v.

The State of

.Rajasthan.

Mahjan .J.

986 SUPREME COlTRT REPORTS [1953]

period one of the assessors was permitted tci absent himself during two whole days, and five half days respectively, at first, so that he might visit his mother on her death-bed, and subsequently, to perform the daily obsequies rendered necessary by her decease.

He then resumed his seat as an asessor and continued so to act until the termination of the trial. all the depositions recorded in his aJ1sence having ben read by him on his return.

At the conclusion of the trial the sessions judge invited the opinion of each assessor, and recorded it. The opinion of each was that all the accused were guilty and the judge concurring in that opinion, convicted the accused.

On appeal it was contended that the judge had acted contrary to law in allowing the assessor who had been absent to resume his seat as an assessor and in inviting and taking into consideration his opinion in deciding the case. It was held by the majority of the court that the finding and the sentence appealed aga.inst had been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 537 of the Code and that the defect in the trial did not affect its validity and was cured by that section as the irregularity

0 had not in fact occasioned a failure of justice. llfr. Justice Davies

took a different view. This decision was clearly given on the peculiar fact8 and circum8tances of that case and is no authority in support of the view contended for by Mr. Mehta.

For the reasons given above we are constrained to hold that the trial of the appellants conducted in the manner above stated was bad and the <tppellants have to he retried in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code.

In the result we allow this appeal, quash the conviction and sentence passed on the appellants, and direct their retri!tl by the sessions judge in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code.

Appeal allowed Retrial ordered.

Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.

MAGGA AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

S. R. DAS JJ.

Criminal Procedure Code

ss. 284, 285, 539

Section 285

s. 285

article 134(l)(c)

Constitution of India

Wanchoo C.J.

Bapna .T.)

H. J. Urnrigar

MAHAJAN

article 1

Constitution of India

Magga

Bhagga

section 302

Indian Penal Code

Ganesh

Gheesa

Hardas

3rd and 4th April, 1951

Gheesa

Ratna

Govind

Gadwara

Ratna

Krishna

Govind

4th April, 1951

Bhagga

Imaratia

ofGheesa

Mahajan

section 302

Indian Penal Code

section 537

Criminal Procedure Code

22nd March, 1952

Code of Criminal Procedure

Jethmal

Balkrishna

Asharam

6th June, 1952

Chimniram

Jethmal

Chimniram

Asharam

sections 284 and 285

Code of Criminal Procedure

section 537

Section 284

section 285

section 284

Section 285

Section 285

State of flajasthan

sections 284 and 285

section 285(1)

section 285(2)

Section 309

Sections 326 and 327

Section 537

section 324

section 284

section 537

Calcutta High Court

Patna High Court

Magga

State of

Raja8than

section 285

section 285

section 285

section 537

section 537

section 285

section 285

section 537

section 537

State of Rajasthan

State of

Rajasthan

section 309

section 285

Criminal Procedure Code

section 284

Criminal Procedure Code

sections 284 and 285

section 537

Phillimore

Subramania

section 360

Subramania lyer

section 162

Criminal Procedure Code

section 537

section 162

John Beaumont

India

Criminal Procedure Code

State of Rajasthan

State of

Ra.ja$lhan.

}Jaha}an J

section 342

Criminal Procedure Code

section 537

section 537

Subramania Iyer

section 537

section 3G

Criminal Procedure Code

sections 535 and 5B

section 537

section 162

section 285

Criminal Procedure Code

section 284

section 285( 1)

section 285(2)

Mehta

section 309(2)

section 284

section 285

Madras High Court

section 537

Davies

G. H. Rajadhyaksha