S.~.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURAL

INCOME-TAX, BENGAL V.

SRI KESHAB CHANDRA MANDAL

[SAIYID FAZL ALI,

PATANJALI SASTRI,

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA

and DAS JJ.]

Bdngal Agriciiltiiral Income-tax Act, (IV of 1944), ss. 24, 57- Riiles u.nder the Act, r. 11, Forni No. 5-Ret11rn of illiterate assessee -Declaration signed by pen of son of a.ssessee-Va.Z-.-dity of ret11rn- Signature by Agent-Permissibility-"· Qui facit per alium far.it

per se, " applicability of.

The Rules. framed under the Bengal Agricultural Incometax Act, 1944, provided that the declaration in a return of income !; ad to be signed "in the case of an individual, by the individual himself." A return of au illiterate assessee, Keshab Chandra l\fandal, was signed in the vernacular as follows : " Sri Keshab Chftndrn l\Iandal Ba Sri J ugal Chandra Manda!," the latter being the son of the asseosee.

The Appellate Tribunal referred to the High Court the question "whether in the circumstances of the case, the dech1l'ation

in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return." The Higa Court answered the question in the atlinnativo.

On appeal :

Held, per F.AZL ALI, PATANJALI SAS'.l'HI, IIIGKHEHJEA and DAS JJ. ('.\1.AHAJAN J. dissenting)-that the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, and the Rules framed thereunder contained provisions indicating an intention to exclude the common law rule qui facit per alium facit per se in the matter of affixing signature to the return of income made by an assessee who was an individual, and, as it was abundantly clear on the records that there was no physical contact between the assessee and the signature appoating on the return, the return was not properly signed and was not a valid return.

MAHAJAN J.-As the question referrnd was whether the return " signed by the illiterate assessee with the pen of his son " was valid, it must be assumed that there was such contact, and as there was nothing whatso.ever on the record to establish that the assessee did not touch the pen or the hand of the son when the signature \'Ill.to 11ffmid, ttle High Court was right in answering the question in the affirmative.

Judgment of the Calcutta High Court revrrsed.

May 9

1950 APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at

'Commissioner Fort William: (Civil Appeal No. LXXXVUI of 1949.)

-of Agricultural This was an appeal from the judgment and order Incom, tax of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta dated 16th

i<cs,, b •Chandra :; epteRmbfer, 1948, d(G. N, hDaHs '.lnhdCR. P. Moodkerjee .i.J.)

Mandal m a e erence ma e to t e 1g ourt un er section 63 (1) of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, by the Appellate Tribunal of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal. The facts are set out in the judgment.

K. P. Khaitan (B. Sen, with him) for the appellant.

The respondent was not represented.

1950. May 9.

The following judgments were delivered :-

.DasJ.

DAS ].-There is no serious dispute as to the facts leading up to this appeal. They are shortly as follows: In response to a notice issued under section 24 (2) of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, the assessee, who is the respondent before us, submitted a return showing his total agricultural ins; ome for the assessment year 1944-45 to be Rs. 335.

This return is dated the 3rd April, 1945, and just below the declaration appears the following writing in vernacular :

"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal." On the 18th April, 1945, the Agricultural Incometax Officer noted on the order sheet that the case would be taken up at Bankura Dak Bungalow on 6th May, 1945, and directed the office to inform the party to appear with all settlement records, vouchers etc.

On the 6th May, 1945, the assesseefiledapetition before the Agricultµral Income-tax Officer who had gone to Bankura stating inter alia that he had been advised that the return which he had submitted before under the advice of a Headmaster of a school was not a proper return, that there were many mistakes in the return and many things had been omitted and that, therefore, it .was absolutely necessary for him to submit a fresh return and praying for fifteen days' time for doing so and

....

also for a form of return.

This petition was signed in 1950 vernacular as follows : - commissioner "Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal x of Agricultural , Income-tax Ba: Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal' . v.

Below that was the signature of his pleader H. Keshab Chandra Nandi. \Vith this petition was attached a Vakalat- Mandal nama signed in vernacular in the manner following :

"Sri Keshab C]landra Mandal x Ba : Sri J ugal Chandra Manda! of Bal ya. J.L It will be noticed that in both the signatures, against the name of Sri Keshab Chandra Manda} there was a cross mark. The vakalatnama contained the following entry:-

•:I hereby appoint on my behalf Srijukta Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi, Pleader, to do all works in connection with this case and as I do not know to read and write I put in x mark in the presence of the undermentioned persons as a token thereof."

B:is son Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal attested the cross mark in the vakalatnama.

On receipt of this petition the Agricultu'ral Incometax Officer allowed time for one day and fixed the case for the 7th May, 1945, at 10 a.m. The assessee was directed to submit a fresh return and to produce account books and other necessary papers. It was also stated in the order sheet that if the assessee failed to comply with the order, assessment would be made under section 25 (5) of the Act.

On the 7th May, 1945, the assessee did not appear personally. His son Jugal Chandra Manda! appeared with pleader Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi. The son, Jugal Chandra Mandal, had not brought any letter of authority from the assessee. A return was submitted which was signed in vernacular as follows :- .

"Sri Keshab Chandra Mandal Ba: Sri Jugal Chandra Mandal." .

It will be noticed that in this last signature there was no cross mark.

DasJ.

Kuhdb Chandra

Mandal

V..s J.

The Agricultural Income-tax Officer stated in his assessment order as follows :-

"A fresh return is submitted to-day. A remarkable difference is noticeable between the two returns.

Fi:rstTeturn shows total agricultural income of Rs. 335 whereas the revised or the fresh one shows an income of Rs. 1,077-12.'...6. This is really strange. The first one appears to have been signed by the assessee him- self but the second one has been signed by Jugal his son for the assessee. Under the circumstances, I can put no reliance on any of these returns. I do not make any assessment based on these returns." .

The Agricultural Income-tax Officer thereafter immediately proceeded with the assessment and assessed Rs. 4,968-12-1 as the assessable income.

The assessee preferred an appeal from this order to the Assistant Commissioner, Agricultural Incometax, Bengal.

The Assistant Commissioner by his order dated the 14th August, 1945, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the assessment under section 35 (4) (a) (i).

The assessee thereupon preferred a further appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on the 9th December, 1947, accepted the appeal on the ground, amongst others, that the return filed on the 7th May, 1945, was a proper return and should have been treated as such.

The Commissioner of Income-tax thereupon appli• ed under section 63 ( 1) of the Act for a reference of certain questions of law to the High Court. The Appellate Tribunal by its order dated the 22nd April, 1948, referred the following question of law to the High Court :-

"Whether in the circumstances of this case, the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return."

The reference came up before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court (G. N. Das J, and R. P. Mooe kerjee J .) who, for rea?ons stated in their judgment

dated the 16th September, 1948, answered the question in the affirmative. The Commissioner thereupon applied to the High Court for a certificate under section 64 (2) of the Act which having been granted the appeal has now come up before us for final disposal. In this appeal we are only called upon to judge whether the. answer given by the High Court to the question of law formulated by the Appellate Tribunal is well-founded.

It is abundantly clear on the records that there was no physical contact between the asscssee and the signature appearing on the return as filed on the 7th :i\Iay, 1945, and the fact is referred to by the words "in the circumstances of this case" at the beginning of the question.

Indeed the whole of the proceedings have proceeded on this footing.

I desire to make it clear that in this appeal we are not concerned with the propriety of the Income-tax Officer in proceeding to assessment without giving the assessee a further opportunity to put his mark onthe return.

The High Court quoted the following <; ibservations of Blackburn J. in The Queen v. The justices of Kent (1 ):

"No doubt at common law, where a person authorises another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person . authorising it; nevertheless, there may be cases in which a statute may require personal signature."

Then, after stating that the Courts ought not to restrict the common law rule qui Jacit per alfrtm Jacit per se, unless the statute makes a personal signature indispensable, and referring to certain decided cases, enunciated the proposition that when the word sign" or "signature" is used by itself and unless there be a clear indication requiring the personal signature by the hand of the person concerned, the provision would be satisfied by a person signing by the hand of an agent.

Applying this test the High Court 'came to the conclusion that there was not only not anything in the Act or the rules requiring the personal signature of the individual assessee

(1) (18!6) L.R. 8 Q.B. 305 at p. 307.

Co111111.iss/011-cr of A.ricu!tural

b1Lo:ncfax ,, .

jfn11dal

Das.f.

Co1111nissio11:!r

f Agriculftt1'al

lnco1n:!-fa:c

Keshab Chantl1'a

lUandat

DasJ.

but that insistence on such a requirement would create an anomaly, in that while an assessee who is an individual will have to sign personally, the persons authorised to sign for the other categories of assessees, namely, a Hindu undivided family, a company, the Ruler of an Indian State, a firm or any other association will not be compellable to sign personally. The High Court took the view that to avoid such a patent anomaly which woul.d inevitably result if the interpretation proposed by the department were to be accepted, the Court should follow the common law rule mentioned above.

In the result, the High Court answered the point of law referred to them in the affirmative.

The learned Standing Counsel to the Government of Bengal (Mr. K. P. Khaitan) in the course of a fair ' and lucid argument contended before us that the Court should give effect to the plain meaning of the words of the statute and the rules which have statutory force whatever might be the consequences and that on a plain reading of the Act and the rules there could be no doubt that the legislature intended the return of an individual assessee to be signed by himself, i.e., personally.

Learned counsel referred us to a number of decisions, both Indian and English, where personal signature had been held indispensable.

There is no doubt that the true rule as laid down in judicial decisions and indeed, as recognised by the High Court in the case before us, is that unless a particular statute expressly or by necessary implication or intendment excludes the common law rule, the latter must prevail. It is, therefore, necessary in this case to examine the Act and the rules to ascertain whether there is any indication therein that the intention of the legislature is to exclude the common law rule.

Turning first to the Act, it will be found that by section 2 (14) the word "received" used with reference to the receipt of agricultural income by a person has been defined to include receipt. by an agent or servant on behalf of a principal or master respectively.

If the legislature intended that a signature by an agent would be permissible it could easily Lave defined the

word "sign" so as to include the signature by an 1950 agent. Section 25 (2) of the Act requires that if the Commissio1tci Agricultural Income-tax Officer is not satisfied without of Agri<tt!ltural requiring the presence of the person who made the 1nco111c-tax return or the production of evidence that a return v. made under section 24 is correct and complete, he Keshal> C(handra

h 11 h t . · h" Mane/al s a serve on sue person a no ice reqmrmg 1m, on a date to be therein specified, either to attend at Das.f. the Agricultural Income-tax Officer's office or to produce or to cause to be there produced any evidence on which such person may rely in support of the return. This section expressly permits production of evidence by an agent.

Section 41 gives to the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, the Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal for the purposes of Chapter V, and to the Commissioner for the purposes of section 37, the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of certain specified matters only namely, enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation, compelling production of documents and ir; suing commissions for the examination of witnesses, and the proceedings before those officers are to be deemed to be " judicial proceedings" within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code.

Again, section 60 of the Act permits a notice or requisition under the Act to be served as if it were a summons issued by a Court

under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and specifies the person on whom such service may be effected.

There is nothing in the Act making the provisions of the Code relating to the signing or verification of pleadings applica-ble to the returns to be filed by any assessee. If the Legislature intended that the return might be signed by the assessee or by his authorised agent 1'.nere could have been no difficulty in inserting a section in the Act adopting the provisions of the Code relating to the signing and verification of pleadings as if the return was a pleading in a suit. Sections 35 and 58 expressly permit an assessee to attend before the Assistant Commissioner and the AppeUate Tribunal or

Co1n11iiss!cncr cf Agricu!tural

lnconw-tax

K cshab Chandra

Mandal

Das].

any Agricultural Income-tax authority in connection with any . proceeding under the Act, otherwise than when required .under section 41 to attend personally for examination, to attend by a person authorised by him in writing in this. behalf, being a relative of, or a person regularly employed by, the assessee, or a lawyer or accountant or agricultural income-tax practitioner.

It should be noted that even under this section any and every agent cannot represent the assessee but only certain specified kinds of agents can do so.

To summarise, the omission of a d;; finition of the word " sign" as including a signature by an agent, the permission under section 25 for production of evidence by an agent and under sections 35 and 58 for attendance by an agent and the omission of any provision in the Act applying the P' ovisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the signing and verification of pleadings to the signing and verification of the return while expressly a:lopting the provisions of that Code relating to-the attendance and examination of witnesses, production of documents and issuing of commission for examination and for service of notices under sections 41 and 60 respectively, cannot be regarded as wholly without significance. The matter, however, does not rest there.

Section 24 of the Act requires the Agricultural Income-tax Officer to call for a return in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner.

Rule 11 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Rules, 1944, framed under section 57 of the Act prescribes that the return required under section 24 must be in Form 5 and shall be verified in the manner indicated therein.

There is a footnote in Form 5 to the following effect:

" The declaration shall be signed- ( a) in the case of an individual by the individual himself ;

(b) in the case of a Hindu undivided family by the Manager or Karta ;

(c) in the case of a company or the Ruler of an Indian State by the principal officer ;

(d) in the case of a firm by a partner;

(e) in the case of any other association by a member of the association.

There is also a note that the signatory should satisfy himself that the return is correct and complete in every respect before signing the verification, and the alternatives which are not required should be scored out. It will be interesting to compare the requirements of rule 11 and Form 5 with those of other rules dealing. with appeals and other proceedings. Section 34 allows an appeal from the Agricultural Income-Tax Officer to the Assistant Commissioner. Sub-section (3) of that section requires that the appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner. Likewise section 36 provides for a further appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (4) of that section also requires that such an appeal must be in the prescribed form .and be verified in the prescribed manner. l{ule 13 prescribes the forms of appeals under section 34 and rule 14 prescribes the forms of appeals under section 63 of the Act.

Rule 15 is as follows:- " The forms of appeal prescribed by rules 13 and 14 and the forms of verification appended thereto shall be signed-

(a) in the case of an individual, by the individual himself ;

(b) in the case of a Hindu undivided family, by the Manager or Karta thereof ;

(c) in the case of a company, by the principal officer of the company ;

(d) in the case of a firm, by a partner of the firm; ( e) in the case of a Ruler of an Iru::lia1i State, by the principal officer of the State; and

(f) in the case of any other association of individuals, by a member of the association, .and such forms of appeal shall be also signed by the authorised representative, if any, of the appellant."

Rule 17 deals with applications for refund of tax.

Sub-rule (2) requires every such application to be signed by the claimant and his authorised representa.tive, if any, and allows such application to be presented by the applicant either in person or through

Conuuissz'un.cr of Agricultur,:J

Inco111lJ-ta:1::

v. lfrsliab Chandra

;<, fandal

Das J.

Conunissioncr of Agricultural

I nco11ic-ta x ., Keshab Chandra

Mand al

DasJ.

such authorised representative. Rule 22 requires that where an application or memorandum of appeal is signed by an authorised representative, the latter must annex to it the writing constituting his authority and his acceptance of it. Under rule 25 an appeal to the Tribunal has to be presented in person or by an authorised representative and under rule 28 every such appeal has to be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant and his authorised representative, if any, and verified by the appellant.

Each of the forms, from Form 7 to Form 20, contains. separate spaces for the signatures of the appellant or the applicant or the claimant as the case may be and the authorised representative, if any. Form 23 which is notice of hearing of appeal under section 36 requires the attendance of the appellant or respondenteitherinperson or by an authorised representative. Rule 47 provides that, subject to certain special provisions, the provisions contained in Part II of the rules relating to the presentation, notices and hearing of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal shall apply to the presentation, notices and hearing of a section 63 reference application as if it were an appeal. Rule 53 empowers the Tribunal, if it considers it necessary, to hear the applicant or his authorised representative. A perusal of the several rules referred to above will show that while rules 15, 17 (2), 28 and the forms thereunder require the appeal or application to be sigi:ted by the appellant or applicant or claimant as well as by his authorised representative, if any, rule 11 and Form 5 require only the signature of the assessee in the manner therein prescribed for different categories of assessees. Again rules 17 (2), 25 and 47 permit presentation of applications and appeals by the authorised representative of the assessee wh.ereas there is no sucli provision for the presentation by an authorised agent of a return under rule 11 which could easily be inserted in the rules if the Legislature so intended. That wherever the assessee or the appellant or the applicant is required to sign he must sign personally, is also borne out by note (1) at the foot of Form 20 which is for refund of tax under section 48 (2). It runs as follows :

''In the case of a person not resident in British India, 1950 the above declaration shall be sworn(a) before a Justice Comtnissioner -0£ the Peace, a Notary Public, a Commissioner of Oaths, of Agricult,.rat if the applicant resides in any part of His Majesty's Income-tax Dominions outside British India, (b) before a Magisv. trate or other official of the State or a Political Officer, Keshab c1ia .. <1ra if he resides in a State in India, and ( c) before a British Mandal Consul, if he resides elsewhere." DasJ.

This does not mean that only the claimant for refund under section 48 (2) who resides outside India must sign his application personally and other assessees Or appellants or applicants or claimants need not sign their return or appeal or application personally. All that it means is that such a claimant for refund under section 48 (2) must have his signature authenticated by certain public officers by swearing the declaration in their presence. This clearly indicates that personal signature of the assessee, the appellant or' applicant is necessary in all cases wherever his signature is required and authentication of such signature is required only in the case of a claimant for refund of tax under section 48 (2). There are yet other reasons why personal signature of an assessee, appellant, applicant or claimant is necessary. It has been seen that under the Act and/or the rules several acts can be done by or through the authorised representative, namely, production of doc1:Jments, presentation of appeal or application and attendance in proceedings before the authorities. The expression "authorised representative" is defined in rule 2 (a). It will be noticed that in each case the authorised representative has to be duly authorised in writing.

Under rule 22 the authorised representative has to file the writing constituting his authority and his acceptance of it. If it were intended that the •signature by an agent on a return or a memorandum of appeal or other application will suffice as the signa- , ture of the assessee or the appellant or the applicant or the claimant, there would certainly have been some rule for constitution of such agency in writing and for the filing of the writing constituting such agency and the agent's acceptance of it. If an agent for mere__ pre~ sentation of an appeal is expressly required by the

Cou1111is . ., ion _'r of A._f}ric11ltural

/t".:0111.·-f:ax

Aushab Clurndra

Manda/

DasJ.

rules to be duly authorised in writing and such writing has to be filed on record I cannot think that the Act or the rules contemplate or permit the employment of an agent to sign an important document, namely a return or an appeal or application without any written authority and that such agent may sign without producing any such written authority. And yet that would be the result, for there is no provision in that behalf in the Act or in the rules. On a consideration of the provisions of the Act and of the rules and the forms and for reasons stated above there appears to be many clear indications of an intention on the part of the Legislature to insist on the personal signature of the assessee, appellant or applicant whenever his signatu:e is required by the Act or the rules and the common law rule qui facit per alium f acit per se is excluded by necessary implication or intendment of the Act and the rules.

The Appellate Tribunal and the High Court have referred to certain difficulties in arriving at this conclusion which may now be considered.

It is pointed out that to insist on the personal signature of ail individual assessee will result in the anomaly that persons authorised to sign for the assessees of other categories will be free to get the returns signed by their own agents. This argument really begs the question. For reasons stated above none of the persons designated in the footnote to Form 5 are authorised to employ an agent to sign for him and therefore no anomaly can arise. If anything, the use of the word "himself"

with reference to an individual makes the position clearer so far as such individual is concerned. There is an argument based on hardship or inconvenience.

Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute or the rules.

Further, there is no hardship or inconvenience.

In the case of an illiterate person, he can put his mark which, by the Bengal General Clauses Act, is included in the definition of" sign." If claim Form 20 for re- fund of tax under section 48 ( 2) can be sent to a claimant abroad for his signature before certain public

officer for authentication, there can be no hardship or inconvenience in sending to him abroad the return in Form 5 for his signature without the necessity of any authentication thereof. It is said that such a construction will prevent a leper who, by reason of the loss of his fingers, cannot even put his mark. Such cases will indeed be rare and in anv event it will be for the Legislature to rectify thiS.defect. Not to insist on personal signature on returns or appeals or applications will Jet in signature by agent not duly authorised in writing and without production of such writing. In that case the provisions for penalty for filing false returns may quite conceivably be difficult of application. The omission of a definition of the expression "sign" so as to include the signature of an agent, the presence of the provisions permitting only certain specified acts, other than signing, to be done by or through an authorised agent are significant and indicate that the intention of the Legislature is not to permit signature by an agent so as to exclude the common law rule referred to above.

Turning now to the judicial decisions cited before us it will be found that Courts have insisted on personal signature even when there were not so many clear indications in the statutes under consideration in those cases as there are in the statute and the rules before us. Thus in Monls v. ]ackson( 1 ), which was a case under section I (3) of the Municipal Elections Act (38 nd ~9 Vic., c. 40) which required delivery of the nommahon paper " by the candidate himself or his proposer or seconder to the Town Clerk" it was held

tht this requirement was not satisfied by the delivery of it by an agent. In The Qiteen v. JY!ansel jones(2), it

as held tha! a person charged with any corrupt or

illegal practice at a municipal election who was entitled, under section 38 of the Corrupt and Illegal

P.ractice,~ Prevention. Act, 1883, to be "hear.d by h1mse.lf. was not entitled to be .heard by his counsel or sohc1tor.

In In re Prince Blucher( 3 ), the English Court of Appeal held that a proposal of composition

(1) (1876) L.R. 1 C.P.D. 683

(2) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 29

(3) L.R. (1931) 2 Ch. 70

Co11uuissio11er of Agricultural

Inconwtax

J{cshab Chandra

Mand al

Das].

1950 signed by the solicitors of a debtor, who was, by reason of his serious illness, unable to sign it, did not c; omply Cmnmissloner -0/ Agdc•dtural with the requirements of section 16 (1) of the Bank-

1,, comc-ta.< ruptcy Act, 1914, which required "a proposal in

v. writing signed by him." The Court of Appeal applied Keshab Chandra the principles of the decision in Hyde v. Johnson( i) and Mandal in In re Whitley Partners Ltd.( 2 ).

In Luckman Buksh

;;~-;:,.

Roy v. Runjeet Ram Panday("), a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that an acknowledgment by a Mooktear was not sufficient for the purposes of section 1 (5) of the Limitation Act (XIV of 1859) which required an acknowledgment signed by the mortgagee. Rankin C. J. held in japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd. v. Jajodia Cotton Nlills, Ltd.(•) that a demand Jetter signed by the solicitors of the petitioning creditor was not a notice under section 163 of the Indian Companies Act which as it then stood required a demand" under his hand." A similar view was taken by the Rangoon High Court in Ji, fanjeebhai Khataw & Co. v. Jamal Brothers & Co. Ltd.(•) and M.A. Kureshi v. Argus Footwear, Ltd. ( 6 )._ See also Wilsonv. Wallani( 7 ).

InC.T.A.C.T.Nachiappa Chettyar v. Secretary of State for India(•), it was held that the registration of a firm on an application signed by the agent of the partners was ultra vires inasmuch as the rules framed under section 59 of the Income-tax Act required an application signed by at least one of the partners. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v.

Subba Rao (9 ), it was held that by reason of the word

" personally" occurring in rule 6 of the Income-tax Rules framed under section 59 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, a duly authorised agent of a partner was precluded from signing on behalf of the partner an application under section 26-A of the Act for registration of the firm.

In all-these cases the common law rule was not applied, evidently because the particular statutes were held to indicate that the intention was to exclude that rule. This intention was gathered from the use of the

(1) {1836J 2 Bing. (N.C.) 776

(2) (1886) L.R. 32 Ch. D. 337

(3) (1873) 20W.R. 375 (') (1926) I.L.R. 5' Cal._341i

(5) I.L.R. 5 Rang. '83

(6) I.L.R. 9 Rang. 323 (7l (1~80) L.R. 5 Ex. D. 155

(8) (193~ I.L.R. 11 Rang. 380

(9) I.L.R. (19'7) Mad.167

word "himself" or "by him" or "under his hand" 1950 -0r "personally." It is needless to say that such an f Commissionet' intention may _als_o be gathered from the nature o the of Agricultural

particular statute or inferred from the different provi- Income-tax sions of the statute and the rules framed -thereunder. v.

As already stated, there are many indications in the Keshab Chandt'a Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944, and the Mat rules made thereunder evidencing an intention to Das J. exclude the common law rule in the matter of the -signature of the assessee, appellant or applicant on the return, appeal or application.

The High Court referred to the case of In the matter of Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. & U.P. (1 ) and sought to find support for its views from the circumstance that the Court in that case rejected the return not on the ground that it was bad because it was signed by an agent but on the ground that the power of attorney did not authorise the agent to sign

it. It is quite clear that the Court in that case found it easier to decide the case on the latter ground than to enter upon a discussion of the first ground. It is impossible to read that case as an authority for the proposition that the signature of an agent was permissible at all. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High ..Court in Deo Narain Rai v. Kukur Bind(~) referred to in the High Court judgment before us does not appear to milit_ate against the views expressed , above. On a construction of section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act it was held that there was nothing in the Act to exclude the application of the common law rule.

The 011ly provision of that Act on which reliance was placed in establishing such exclusion was section 123.

Stanley C. J. pointed out that the language of the last mentioned section was elliptical and was not accurate draughtsmanship and, therefore, it could not be relied upon in construing section 59. The judgment Qf Banerjee J. also makes it clear that he found,

nothing in th.e Act to exclude signature -by an agent and that the words '' on behalf of" in section 123 were surplusage. -It is quite true that when sigiiature by an agent is permissible, the writing ofthe name Qf

(1) A.IR. (1935) Oudh. 305

(2) (1902) I.L.R. 24 AIL 319.

1950 the principal by the agent is regarded as the signature of the principal himself. But this result only follows Co11l1nissio1ic•r of Agricultural when it is permissible for the agent to sign the name

Income-tax of the principal. If on a construction of a statute v. signature by an agent is not found permissible then Kcshab Chandra the writing of the name of the principal by the agent

Ma1tdal however clearly he may have been authorised by th~

Das 1_ principal cannot possibly be regarded as the signature of the principal for the purposes of that statute. If a statute requires personal signature of a person, which includes a mark, the signature or the mark must be that of the man himself. There must be physical contact between that person and the signature or the mark put on the document.

Fa>l Ali/.

The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be accepted and the question referred to the High Court must be answered in the negative. There will be no order for costs against the assessee and the appellant Commissioner must bear his own costs throughout.

Patanjali Sastri J.

FAZL Au J.-I agree.

PATANJALI SASTRI J.-I agree.

MUKHERJEA J.-I agree.

Mukherjea J,

Mahajan/.

MAHAJAN J.-The question of law referred to the High Court and answered by it in the affirmative is in these terms :-" Whether in the circumstances of this case, the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen of his son should be treated as properly signed and a valid return." The Hi;; h Court was not called upon to answer the question whether an income-tax return could be validly signed by an agent in the name of the principal ; on the other -hand, the question as framed assumes that the return was signed by the illiterate assessee but that the pen affixing the signature was that of his son. The physical act of putting the mark was made by the pen or possibly by the hand of the son who was not the agent appointed by the father and was not otherwise authorised by him to sign for him.

No evidence was led and there is nothing whatsoever on the record to establish that this illiterate assessee did not touch the pen or the hand of the son when the signature was affixed on the return. No precise definition of the word " signature" is given in the Indian Income-tax Act or in any other law. In the General Clauses Act there is no exhaustive definition of the word. It merely says what the word "signature" shall include. It includes the affixing of a mark. In India it is a well known practice that when the executant of a document is illiterate he simply touches the pen wherewith someone else signs his name for him. Reference in this connection may be made to page 972, para. 1659, of Gour on The Law of Transfer. The signature niade in these circumstances is personal signature of the executant. It is his autograph. No question of agency arises in such a situation. This is what seems to have happened here as one can guess from the frame of the question.

Be that as it may, without any enquiry into the circumstances in which the pen of the son affixed the signature of the assessee on the return it could not be assumed that the son acted as the agent of the father and signed his name in that capacity.

In my opinion the discussion of the question whether an agent can sign a return for an assessee was outside the scope of the question which the High Court was called upon to answer. The answer given in my view was a correct one.

After considerable thought I am disinclined to reverse the decision of the High Court by placing an interpretation on the question which it does not bear.

In an ex parte hearing we had not the advantage of hearing any arguments in support of the view taken by the High Court as the respondent did not appear.

It is unnecessary to express any opinion on the question whether an agent can sign for the principal a form of return under the Indian Income-tax Act as that enquiry is outside the scope of the question referred to the High Court as already pointed out.

In the absence of any material to the contrary I am satisfied that the assessee signed the return

Co111nr.isslo11c,·· of Agrirnlturaf

lncottw-tax

Kcs/iab Clumdr<&

Mandal

Mahajan].

Cmn11iissioner -of Agricultural

loco1nc-tax

Kesl1ab Chandra

1lla11dal

}lfnhajan J.

personally. If the Income-tax Officer felt that the assessee had not touched the pen or the hand of the person who put the signature on the return he should have called upon the assessee to appear before him and ascertain from him the circumstances in which the son's pen was used for the signature. In In the matter of Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P. & U.P.('), it was observed that it is the duty of the Income-tax Officer before he accepts a return signed by an agent to satisfy himself about the authority of the agent to do so.

In my opinion, it is equally the duty of an Income-tax Officer before he rejects a return of an illiterate assessee or a person such as a leper, to satisfy himself that there was no physical contact of the person with the mark or the signature put on the form.

I agree with my brother Das that there should be physical contact between the person and the signature or the mark put on the document, but I am afraid I cannot agree with him that in this case that has not happened. The question to a certain extent assumes the contact of the assessee with the pen of his son when it states . that the illiterate assessee's signature was put with the pen of the son.

Be that as it may, that circumstance has not been eliminate<! in the case and that being so, the question cannot be answered in the manner proposed by my learned brother. I am further of the opinion that the ncome tax Officers should not while administering the law create unnecessary problems for the Courts.

In the present case if there was any doubt in the mind of the Income-tax Officer, he should have ca, lled upon the illiterate assessee to put his mark in his presence on the return and he should not have acted hastily in assessing him under t_he penal provisions of the Act.

Ignorant and illiterate people who are not well versed with the law of income-tax should be dealt with more sympathetically than was done here. They should not be penalised in the manner that the present assessee was penalised. In the result I would dismiss this appeal.

Appeal allowed.

Agent for appellant: P. K. Bose.

(1) A.I.R. 1930 Oudh. 305.

SRI KESHAB CHANDRA MANDAL

SAIYID FAZL ALI

PATANJALI SASTRI

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

MUKHERJEA

DAS JJ.

Bdngal Agriciiltiiral Income-tax Act

ss. 24, 57

Bengal Agricultural Incometax Act, 1944

Keshab Chftndrn l\Iandal Ba Sri

ugal Chandra Manda

MAHAJAN

Calcutta High Court

May 9

1950

P. Moodkerjee

section 63

K. P. Khaitan

B. Sen

.DasJ.

DAS

section 24

3rd April, 1945

Keshab Chandra Mandal

18th April, 1945

Bankura Dak Bungalow

6th May, 1945

Bankura

Keshab Chandra Mandal

Jugal Chandra Mandal

H. Keshab Chandra Nandi

Keshab C]landra Mandal

J ugal Chandra Manda

Keshab Chandra Manda

Srijukta Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi

Jugal Chandra Mandal

7th May, 1945

section 25

Jugal Chandra Manda

Babu Hangsa Gopal Nandi

DasJ.

Kuhdb Chandra

Agricultural Income-tax Officer

Jugal

14th August, 1945

section 35

9th December, 1947

section 63

22nd April, 1948

G. N. Das

R. P. Mooe

16th September, 1948

section 64

Blackburn

Government of Bengal

K. P. Khaitan

section 2

Section 25

section 24

Section 41

section 37

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

sections 193 and 228

section 196

Indian Penal Code

section 60

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Sections 35 and 58

section 41

section 25

sections 35 and 58

the Code of Civil Procedure

sections 41 and 60

Section 24

section 57

section 24

Section 34

section 36

section 34

section 63

lfrsliab Chandra

section 36

section 63

section 48

Keshab

India

section 48

section 48

section 48

Aushab Clurndra

ion 'r of A.f}ric11ltural

/t".:0111.·-f:ax

Aushab Clurndra

Manda/

DasJ.

rules to be duly authorised in writing and such writing has to be filed on record I cannot think that the Act or the rules contemplate or permit the employment of an agent to sign an important document, namely a return or an appeal or application without any written authority and that such agent may sign without producing any such written authority.

General Clauses Act

section 48

section 38

section 16

Keshab Chandra

Luckman Buksh

section 1

Limitation Act

Rankin

section 163

Companies Act

Rangoon High Court

Ji

section 59

Income-tax Act

section 59

Income-tax Act, 1922

section 26

Allahabad High ..Court

section 59

Transfer of Property Act

section 123

Stanley

section 59

Qf Banerjee

section 123

Patanjali Sastri

Patanjali Sastri J.

FAZL Au J.-I agree.

MUKHERJEA

Mukherjea

Income-tax Act

General Clauses Act

Income-tax Act

lfnhajan

Das

P. K. Bose


S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 453

PRITAM SINGH

THE STATE

[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS, JJ.]

Constitution of India, Art. 136 (1)-Special leave to appeal- Granting of leave-Guiding principles-Final hearing-Nature of.

The Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal under Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and

grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.

The view that once an appeal has been admitted by special leave, the entire case is at large and the appellant is free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court is wrong. Only those points can be urged at the final hearinl( of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for.

Ibrahim v. Rex ([1914] A. C. 615) referred to.

APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at East Punjab : Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950.

This was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for the Province of East Punjab at Simla (Falshaw and Soni JJ.) dated the 23rd November, 1949, in Criminal Appeal No. 367 of 1949 upholding the conviction of the appellant on a charge of murder and confirming a sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge .of Ferozepore. ]ai Gopal Sethi (H.]. Umrigar, with him) for the appellan.t.

Basant Kishan Khanna, Advocate-General of East Punjab (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent.

1950. May 5. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of

May S

Fazl AliJ.

Prit111n Si11gh

T'111 State

. Fazl A?i J.

murder of one Buta Singh and confirming the sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The prosecution case, which has been found to be substantially true by both the trial judge and the High Court may be shortly stated as follows .

On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra Chamar, who had been brought into the village by Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago.

Buta Singh, on learning of this incident, spoke to Pritam Singh, but finding that his attitude was uncompromising, he advised Kakarra to go to the police station to report the matter.

On the next day, while Kakarra was going to the police station, Mal Singh, the first prosecution witness m the case, brought him back telling him that Pritam Singh had apologized and the matter shoulc1 ncit be pursued.

On the 30th December, at about 5 p.m., just when Buta Singh came out of his house, Pritam Singh came up with a double barrelled 12-bore gun an.d shot him in the abdomen, and Buta Singh died a short time thereafter.

Shortly after the occurrence, Punjab Singh and Na! Singh, who had both witnessed the occurrence, went to the police station at Abohar, which is at a distance of 13 miles from the place of occurrence, and lodged th~ first information report regarding the murder. In this report, Punjab Singh reported the facts as already stated, but he also added that Pritam Singh was drunk when he fired the gun and his younger brother, Hakim Singh, who was also drunk was standing at a short distance from him and shouting "Kill, don't care." None of the other witnesses however supported Punjab Singh as to the part attributed by him to Hakim Singh or as to the drunken condition of the appellant or Hakim Singh, and the police after due investigation of the case sent up a charge sheet against the appellant only. The appellant was thereafter put on his trial before the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the prosecution witnesses, of whom five were eye-witnesses, viz., Punjab Singh, his brother Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal

Singh), and Mst. Phoolan, mother of the deceased, came t<t-the conclusion, in agreement with 4 assessors who were present at the trial, that the version given by the prosecution witnsses was substantially true. In support of his conclusion, he referred to the following facts among others:- (1) that the first information report had been lodged at the police station without any delay, (2) that the names of at least 4 of the alleged eye-witnesses were mentioned in the report, and (3) that no sufficient reason had been shown as to why the prosecution witnesses should have conspired - to falsely implicate the accused in a murder case, if he had been innocent. The High Court on appeal agreed with the Sessions Judge, and the learned Judge who delivered the judgment of the High Court observed as follows in , the concluding part of his judgment :-"I have given the case every consideration and I have come to the conclusion that the learned Sessions Judge was right in holding that the case against the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt."

The appellant thereafter obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, and Mr. Sethi, the learned counsel appearing for him, has in support of the appeal, addressed to us very elaborate arguments to show that the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is 'not correct. He has argued that the alleged eye-witnesses were intimately connected with each other and with the deceased, that they and the accused belonged to two mutually hostile factions, that these witnesses had made discrepant statements as to the respective places from where they claimed to have seen the occurrence, some of them making discrepant statements about their own position before the police officer who drew up. the plan of the scene of occurrence and before the trial

Court and also making discrepant statements about the position of the other witnesses, and that they should not be held to be tru.thful witnes5es inasmuch as they had denied certain previous statements made by them either before the police or before the Committing Magistrate. Mr. Sethi also put forward the theory, which has been discredited by both the Courts below on grounds which prima Jacie do not appear to be

Pritam Singh

The State

Fllzl AJiJ.

Pritam Singh

~- The State

F .. lAUJ.

unreasonable, that the occurrence must have taken place late at night, that there were probably no eye-witnesses to identify the real assailant and that the appellant had been falsely implicated on account of enmity.

The obvious reply to all these arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that this Court is not an ordinary Court of criminal appeal and will not, generally speaking, allow facts to be reopened, especially when two Courts agree in their conclusions in regard to them and when the conclusions of fact which are challenged are dependent on the credibility of witnesses who have been believed by the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing them and hearing their evidence. In the present case, the story for the prosecution, which is neither incredible nor improbable, is supported by no less than 5 witnesses including the mother of the deceased, and their evidence, in spite of its infirmities, has impressed 4 assessors and the two Courts below, who, in appraising its reliability, have given due weight to certain broad features of the case which, according to . them, negative the theory of conspiracy or concoction. In thes{! circumstances, it would be opposed to all principle~ and precedents if we were to constitute ourselves into a third Court of fact and, after re-weighing the evidence, come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by the trial Judge and the High Court.

In arguing the appeal, Mr. Sethi proceeded on the assumption that once _an appeal had been admitted by special leave, the entire case was at large and the appellant was free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which couid be raised in the High Conrt or the trial Court.

This assumption is, in our opinion, entirely unwarranted. The misconception involved in the argument is not a new one and had to be dispelled by the Privy Council in England in Ibrahim v. Rex(') in these words:-" ....... . the Board has repeatedly treated applications for leave to appeal and the hearing of criminal appeals

(!) [19U] A.C. 615.

1950 as being upon the same footing: Riel's Case; Ex-parte Deeming. The Board cannot give leave to appeal • Pritam Si1rgh where the grounds suggested could not sustam the appeal itself; and, conversely, it cannot allow an appeal on grounds that would not have sufficed for the grant of permission to bring it."

The rule laid down by the Privy Council is based on sound principle, and, in our opinion, only those points can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for, and it would be illogical to adopt different standards at two different stages of the same case.

It seems also necessary to make a few general observations relating to the powers of this Court to

gra1, t special leave to appeal in criminal cases.

The relevant articles of the Constitution dealing with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are articles 132 to 136. Article 132 applies both to civil and criminal cases and under it an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree ...... or final order ofa High Court, whether in a civil, criminal or , other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Article 133 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in civil matters only, and it has been drafted on the lines of sections 109 and 1 IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

Article 134 constitutes the Supreme Court as a Court of criminal appeal_ in a limited class of cases only, and clearly implies that no appeal lies to it as a matter of course or right except in cases specified therein. Article 135 merely provides that the ;; upreme Court shall have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to wl.Jich the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do not apply, if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matterwere exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under any existing law. The last article, with which we are concerned is article 136 and it runs thus :-

" 136. {l) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,

The State

Fazl Ali J.

Prifa11t Singh

grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India, v.

Tile State

Faz! Ali J.

(2) .................. " The points to be noted in regard to this article are firstly, that it is very general and is not confined merely to criminal cases, as is evident from the words "appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order" which occur therein and which obviously cover a wide range of matters; secondly, that the words used in this article are "in any cause or matter," while those used in articles 132 to 134 are "civil, criminal or other proceeding," and thirdly, that while in articles 132 to 134 reference is made to appeals from the High Courts, under this article, an appeal will lie from any court or tribunal in the terr1tory of India.

On a careful examination of article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested , under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article.

By virtue of this article, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal c8ses, in income-tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is that Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to exist.

The Privy Council have ttied to lay down from time to time certain principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court in Kapildeo v. The King.

It is sufficient for our purpose to say that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since the reasons, coru; titutional and administrative, which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases

a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave.

Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Since the present case does not in our opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere w.ith the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Agent for the appellant: S. P. Varma.

Agent for the respondent: P, A. Mehta.

THE BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI

EMPLOYEES OF THE BHARAT BANK LTD.,

DELHI

and

THE BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION,

DELHI

UNION OF INDIA: INTERVENER.

(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,

PATANJALI SASTR, I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, and M UKHERJEA J J.]

Conititution of In&ia, A.rt. 136-Siiprc~ Court-Appellate Jurisdiction-Award of Industri~ Tribw1al-Whether appealablel950

Pritam Singh

V; The Stal<J

Fa:t .UiJ.

May 26.

453

PRITAM SINGH

THE STATE

SAIYID FAZL ALI

PATANJALI SASTRI

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

MUKHERJEA

DAS, JJ.

Constitution of India

Art. 136

Supreme Court

Art. 136

High Court of Judicature at East Punjab

Basant Kishan Khanna

S. M. Sikri

Pritam Singh

High Court of Punjab at Simla

Fazl AliJ.

State

Fazl A?i

Buta Singh

28th December, 1948

Pritam Singh

Punni

Kakarra Chamar

Kakarra

Mal Singh

Punjab Singh

Na! Singh

Abohar

Hakim Singh

Sessions Judge of Ferozepore

Punjab Singh

Mitta Singh

Nikka Singh

Mal

Singh

Phoolan

Sethi

Fllzl AJiJ.

England

Riel

articles 132 to 136

Article 132

Article 133

sections 109 and 1

IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Article 134

Article 135

article 133

article 134

article 136

Fazl Ali

Faz! Ali

articles 132 to 134

articles 132 to 134

India

article 136

S. P. Varma

P, A. Mehta

BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI

BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION

liARILAL KANIA

PATANJALI SASTR

M UKHERJEA

Pritam Singh