March 14.

SUPREME COURT REpORTS (1950]

MESSRS. KHIMJI POONJA AND COMPANY

SHRI BALDEV DAS C. PARIKH

(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID F AZL ALI,

PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and S. R. DAS JJ.] Bombay Cotton Contracts Act (IV of 1982). s. 8(1)-East India Cotlt!n Association Bye-laws, Nos. 61-A, 66-A, BO, 82-Cottcn Oontract-Oontract note stating minimum amount of depo!ii DI Rs. 26 and not in prescribed form-Validit11-Arbitration and award undr arbitration clause, whether void.

Section 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, provided that contracts entered into after the date of the commencement of the Act which are not in accordance with the bye-laws of any recognised cotton association shall be void. Bye-law 80 of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., which was a recognised cotton association within the meaning of the Act provided that contracts between members acting a.s commission agents on the one band and their constituents on the other shall be subject to the byelaws and that a contract note in the form given in the Appendix to the bye-laws shall be rendered in respect of every . contract. Bye-law 51-A originally required a deposit at a rate not less than Rs. 25 per bale and the contract note accordingly contained a clause to that effect.

During the war this bye-law was a.mended by reducing the minimum amount of deposit to Rs. 12·8 per bale and introducing a new byelaw (byelaw 65-A) which, ini'3r alia., gave certain options to the last buyer, and by a Notification of the Government the form of tbe contract note was also amended by altering the minimum deposit to Rs. 19-8 and adding two new clauses to comply with the bye-law 65-A.

A contract note rendered after these amendments to the byelaws and the form of contract note,' contained a rubber stamp impression in which the minimum amount of deposit was stated as Rs. 25, and did not contain the two new clauses that were introduced by the Government Notification : Held, that the contract note rendered was not in accor<la, nce with the bye-laws and in the prescribed form as the clause relating to the minimum amount of deposit was inconsistent with the provisions of bye-law 51-A as amended, and the two new clauses had been omitted, even though the con-. tra.ct note recited that it was made in accordance with the byelaws, and it was accordingly void and a valid award could not be made under the arbitration clause contained in the note. [PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI J. preferred to rest his deciion solely on the ground of the omission to include in the contract in question the two clauses newly added in the prescribed form in order to give effect to byelaw 65A.]

Judgment of the Bombay High Court affirmed.

APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bom- 1900 bay. Civil Appeal No. XXVI of 1949. Messrs. Khimji This was an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Poonja &- Co • . Bombay High Court (Stone C.J. and Coyajee J.) dated v. 20th March, 1947, in Appeal No. 42 of 1946, reversing a Shri Balde.., Das

• d t f Ch l J d' . . l' t' d C. Parikh.

JU gmen o ag a . 1sm1ssmg an app 1ca 10n ma e by the respondent under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, praying inter alia that the arbitration agreement containe<j in certain contract notes sent by the appellants to the respondent be declared invalid and void and for setting aside an award made by arbitrators appointed under the said contract note.

M. G. Setalvad, (Rameshwar Nath with him), for the appellants.

G. K. Daphtary, ( B. Sen and K. T. Desai with him), for the respondent.

1950. March 14.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

DAS J.-This appeal arises out of an application Das J. made by the Respondent under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, praying inter alia that the arbitration agreement contained in certain contract notes including contract note No. 17996 sent by the Appellants to the Respondent be declared to be invalid, void and unenforceable and be set aside and that a purported award made by the arbitrators appointed in terms of the said contract notes be set aside. That application came to be made in the following circumstances : The Appellants were and are members of the East India Cotton Association Ltd. The Respondent, however, was not and is not a member of that Association.

In April, 1945, the Respondent employed the Appellants as his agents to effect forward contracts for the sale and/or purchase of cotton according to the rules, regulations and bye-laws of that Association. Between the 9th April, 1945, and the 10th August, 1945, the Appellants as such agents put through various contracts for sale and/or purchase of cotton for July, 1945, and September, 1945, deliveries and sent to the Respondent

• 19llO contract notes in respect of each of such contracts.

All the said contract notes were in printed forms, a M;"'"s: K:i; J• specimen copy whereof is set out at pages 12 to 15 of

"""':. o. the Paper Book. On the 10th August, 194?, the pursh,; &ldev Das chase of 900 bales of cotton at Rs. 432 per candy for

c. Parikh.

September 1945 delivery remained outstanding. According to the Respondent, on the 11th August, 1945, Das J. the Respondent instructed the Appellants to close the said outstanding purchase by selling 900 bales for September 1945 delivery at a rate not less than Rs. 426 per candy, which is said to be the prevailing market rate on that date. As the Respondent did not receive any contract note from the Appellants in respect of the closing transaction of900 bales, the Respondent on the 18th August, 1945, put on record his aforesaid instructions and asked the Appellants to send the contract note.

The Appellants, however, deny that any instruction was given by the Respondent on the 11th August, 1945, for closing the outstanding contract.

They deny the receipt of the Respondent's letter of that date. According to the Appellants the 21st August, 1945, was a clearing date and on that clearing a sum of Rs. 18,900 became due and payable by the Respondent to the Appellants and that instead of paying up his dues the Respondent concocted the false story of having given instructions to the Appellants to close the outstanding purchase. The Appellants by their letter of the 22nd August, 1945, repudiated the allegations in the Respondent's last mentioned letter and called upon the Respondent to pay up Rs. 18,900 and gave notice to him that if he failed to pay up the amount by noon of the 23rd August, 1945, the Appellants would be compelled to square up the outstanding contract at their discretion on account and at the risk of the Respondent. The Respondent on the 24th August, 1945, denied having fabricated any false story and repudiated liability for Rs.18,900 and returned the Appellants' bill. On the 27th August, 1945, the Appellants closed the outstanding contract for purchase of 900 bales by selling the same at Rs. 356 per candy for September, 1945, delivery and along with their letter dated the 27th August, 1945, sent contract note No. 17996. The

Respondent by his letter dated the 28th August, 1945, reiterated the story of previous instruction for closing

lllllO

Messrs. KMmji the contract, denied having given any instruction to Poonja 6ca. the Appellants to close the contract on the 27th August, v. 1945 and returned the contract note No. 17996. On Shri Balde" Das ' . the 28th August, 1945, the Appellants wrote to the

c. Par.ltlt.

Respondent claiming Rs. 34,313 and expressing the desire to refer the disputes to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in the contract notes. Both parties appointed their respective arbitrators. The arbitrators entered upon the reference and eventually fixed the 24th October, 1945, for a meeting of the arbitrators. The Respondent alleges that he received the notice of meeting only on 22nd October, 1945, and could not attend the meeting on the 24th October, 1945, as he had to appear before the Income Tax Officer on the same day. Accordingly, the Respondent sent his agent to attend the arbitration meeting and to obtain an adjournment. The arbitrators, however, rejected the application for adjournment and made an ex parte award on the same day for Rs. 34,313 and interest and cc;:; ts.

Being aggrieved by the award the Respondent on the 10th November, 1945, filed 1'n appeal to the Board of the Association. The Respondent's allegation is that pending the said appeal he discovered that the contract notes rendered by the Appellants from time to time including the contract note No. 17996 were not in accordance with the prescribed official form of contract notes of the Association and he was advised that in the premises the contracts were void under the pro-: visions of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act (IV of

1932) and that, that being so, there was no arbitration agreement between the parties under which there could be any reference to arbitration on which any award could be made.

The Respondent thereupon amended his memorandum of appeal to the Board pointiug out the invalidity of the contracts and at the same time made a substantive application to the High Court under the Indian Arbitration Act for the reliefs already summarised above.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it is necessary to refer to the relevant

Das},

19~

Meurs. Khimji

Poonja &- Co.

Shi Baldev Das C. Parikh.

Das J.

, '

provisions of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, and the bye-laws of the said Association.

Section (8) (i) of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, runs as follows :-

"Save as hereinafter provided in this Act any contract (whether either party thereto is a member of a recognised cotton association or not) which is entered into after the date on which this Act comes into operation and which is not in accordance with the byelaws of any recognised cotton association shall be

void."

There is no dispute that the East India Cotton Association is one of the recognised cotton associations for the purposes of the said Act. Bye-laws 80 and 82 of that Association are in the terms following :-

"80. Delivery Contracts between members shall be made on the Official from giv, en in the Appendix.

Hedge Contracts between members may be verbal or in writing and when in. writing shall be in one or other of the forms given in the Appendix. Whether verbal or written all contracts shall be subject to the bye-laws, provided that in the case of Delivery Contracts Bye- Jaws 149 to 163 inclusive shall not apply.

82. Contracts between members acting as commission agents on the one hand and their constituents on the other shall be made subject to the bye-laws and a contract note in the form given in the Appendix (pages 92; 93, 94 and 95) shall be rendered in respect of every such contract. Bye-laws 130 to 166 (inclusive) shall not apply to these con tracts."

Bye-law 51-A originally required a deposit at a rate not less than Rs. 25 per bale and accordingly the contract note submitted by the agent to the constituent used to contain the following clause at the end of the clause relating to payment of margin:-

"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at arate not less than Rs. 25 per bale shall, when demanded, be made by you tome/us in Bombay."

During the war bye-law 51-A was amended by reducing the minimum amount of deposit from Rs. 25 per

l9IKI bale to Rs. 12-8-0 per bale and accordingly the Government of Bombay by a Notification made on the i9th Sepb 1945 ' f h r db h Messrs. Khimji tem er, , m exermse o t e powers con1erre y t e P . Ii- Co Bombay Options in Cotton Prohibition Act, 1939 (Act

00 "':. • XXV of 1939) provided that the contract note should Shri Baldcv Das also be amended so that the clause last quoted above

c. Parikh. should read as follows:-:-

" In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying in.terest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale shall, when demanded, be made by you to me/us in Bombay."

In order to enforce war-time controls another amend ment of the bye-laws was made whereby a new bye-law was added as bye-law 65-A. In view of this last mentioned amendment and in order to bring the contract note between the agent and the constituent into line with this new bye-law the Government of Bombay by the same Notification dated the 19th September 1944 directed the i11clusion of the two following clauses in the contract note, namely :

"If this contract is a co, ntract for sale, then if between us and other members of the East India Cotton Association we become, under the bye-laws, the first seller of the cotton so sold and if the last buyer exercises the right given by bye-law 65-A, you will then be bound by the provisions of that bye-law as between you and us.

If this contract is a contract of purchase, and if between us and other members of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., we become the last buyers unless we shall have received express instructions from you in writing to the contrary, before the commencement of the delivery period if the contract is entered into before the commencement of the delivery period, or with the order if the contract is entered into during the permitted days of trading in the delivery period, we shall be at liberty at our option and without any further reference to you to exercise the right given to the last buyer under bye law 65-A, and if we so exercise the right you will be bound by the provisions of that bye-law as between you and us."

Das).

70 SUPREME GOUR r REPORTS [1950]

After all these amendments the contract note to be rendered by art agent to the constituent had to be in Musrs. Khimji the form, a specimen copy whereof is set out at pages Poonja 6- Co, •. 17 and 18 of the Paper Book. The contracts between

Shri Baldev Das the Appellants and the Respondent were made after the

c. Parikh. aforesaid contract note form came into vogue.

The

Das J. official Contract Note form to be used after the aforesaid amendments opens with the following clause:-

" I/we have this day sold/bought for you in Bombay subject to the following conditions and to the Bye-laws of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., in force from time to time and subject also to my /our usual charges and terms of business as Commission Agents."

Then are inserted particulars of the description, quantity, price etc., of the cotton which is the subjec_tmatter of the contract.. Then follows the clause for payment of margin, the last sentence of which provides for payment of deposit payable under bye-law 51-A as amended, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale. At the end of the form are to be found the two new clauses required to qe incorporated in every Contract Note by the Government Notification already referred-to.

The Contract Notes actually rendered by the Appellants to the Respondent, however, were in forms, a specimen copy whereof is set out at pages 12-15 of the Paper Book. A comparison of the two forms of the contract notes will reveal the following differences:-

(1) In the contract note rendered by the Appellants to the Respondent the last sentence providing for deposit at the end of the margin clause is missing. There is, however, a rubber stamp impression on the top of the back of the contract to the following effect:-

"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 25 pe: bale shall, when demanded, he made by you to me/us m Bombay."

Evidently, this rubber stamp provision is a reproduction of the sentence that used to be found at the end of the margin clause before bye-law 51-A was

amended and the clause itself was amended by the Government Notification of 1944.

(2) The two new clauses required to be ineerted in the contract referred to above have also been omitted.

Messrs. Khimji The contention of.the respondent was that the con- P()()nja & co. tract notes actually issued were not in accordance with v. the bye-laws of the Association and were accordingly Shri Balde_v Das void under Section 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts

c. Parikh.

Act, 1932, and that, that being so, the arbit.ration agree- Das J. ment incorporated in the contract note was also void and there could be no reference to arbitration and there could be no award as purported to have been made by the arbitrators on a reference under the void contracts.

The matter was dealt with by Mr. Justice Chagla who overruled the contentions of the Respondent and dismissed the application on 2nd July 1946.

The learned Judge pointed out that whereas bye-law 80 required that delivery contracts must be made on the official from and that the hedge contracts, when made in writing, must be made in the form given in the Appendix, clause 82 did not require that the eon.tracts between members acting as commission agents on the one hand and their constituents on the other must be in writing or in particular form.

According to the learned Judge bye-law 82 required two things, namely:-

(i) that the contracts referred to therein should be made subject to the bye-laws, and

(ii) that a contract note in the prescribed torm should be re'ndered in respect of every such contract.

The learned Judge was of the opinion that section 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932, only avoided the contracts in case of contravention of the first requirement, namely, if the contracts were not made subject to the bye-laws, but had no concern with the contravention of the second requirement, namely, if the contract notes were not in the prescribed form. The learned Judge appears to have made a distinction between a contract and a contract note.which wail a mere evidence of the contract. According to him, even if the contract note was not in the prescried form, that fact did not affect the pre-existing contract which had only to be made subject to the bye-laws but need not have

Alcssrs. J{hiniji

Poonja {:; Co. v.

Shri Baldev Das C. Parikli.

/)as}.

SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1950]

been made in writing at all. Accordingly, the learned Judge dismissed the a pplica ti on.

Being aggrieved by that deeision, the Re&pondent went up on appeal which was heard by Stone C.J. and Coyajee J. who accepted the appeal, set aside the dismissal of the Respondent's petition and gave the declaration prayed for and set aside the award. The Appellants have no~ come up on appeal before us after having obtained the necessary certificate from the Bombay High Court.

We find ourselves in agreement with the decision of the appellate Court. Ordinarily, when a contract between the parties i8 reduced to writing, the writing becomes the repository of the contract and that writing only can be looked at to ascertain what the contract between the parties is, and if that writing is not in accordance with the bye-laws, the contract itself must be void. We do not, however, feel pressed to emphasize this aspect of the matter, for, assuming tha.t there was a pre-existing oral contract between the parties dehors the written contract note, .as held by Chagla J. we have yet to see whether the so-called pre-existing oral contract was iri accordance with the bye-laws, for if it were not, then it would be hit by section 8of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932.

There is no suggestion that the terms of the so-called pre-existing oral contract were in any way different from the terms subsequently recorded in the contract notes actually issued.

In the first place we find that the last sentence in the margin clause, in order to be in accordance with the bye-laws, should have been as follows:-

"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, namely, at a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale shall, when demanded, be made by you to me/us in Bombay."

Instead of that sentence, we have the rubber stamp impression reading as follows:-

"In addition to the above, the deposit (not carrying interest) payable under bye-law 51-A, na.mely, at a

rate not less than Rs. 25 per bale shall, when demand- 1950 ed, be made by you to us in Bombay." Messrs. Khitnji The respondent contends that this term is not in Poonja & eo. accordance with the bye-laws of the Association. The v.

Appellants on the other hand contend that there is no Shri Bald•." Das discrepancy, because a provision for a rate not less

c. Parikh. than Rs. 25 per bale does not contravene or is not in- Das 1. consistent with the provision for a rate not less than Rs. 12! per bale. In other words, any rate above the rate of Rs. 12! may be stipulated in accordance with the terms of business to which the contract was subject, for it did not contravene the requirement that the rate should not be less than Rs. 12!. It is true that the opening clause of the contract note makes the contract subject to the Appellants' usual charges and terms of business, but the contract is at the same time subject to the bye-laws of the Association. In order to reconcile the two, such terms of business as are not inconsistent with the bye-laws can only be permitted to prevail. The rubber stamp provision clearly imposes on the respondent as the constituent the liability to deposit a higher amount as the minimum amount to be deposited and is to that extent not in accordance with bye-law 51-A. Apart from this consideration there is another serious objection to the rubber stamp provision. The language of that rubber stamp provision clearly indicates that it purports to summarise and set out what is payable under bye-law 51-A.

In fact, as already stated above, bye-law51-A had been amended and what is payable under the amended bye-law is not at a rate not less than Rs. 25 but at a rate not less than Rs. 12!. Therefore, the rubber stamp provision wrongly summarises and sets out the provisions of bye-law 51-A and consequently is not in accord.ance with that bye-law.

The contention of the Respondent has been and is that by reason of the omission of the two clauses at the end of the contract note actually issued by the Appellants it was not in accordance with the bye-laws. The learned Attorney-General appearing for the Appellants contends that the contract was expressly made subject

19!50 to the bye-laws and, therefore, the provisions of he new bye-law 65-A were by reference incorporated in Messrs. Khimji Poo .. ja & co. the contract. This contention, we are satisfied, is v. unsound. Bye-law 65-A in terms regulates the rela- Sh•i Balde• Das tionsbip between members and incorporation thereof in

c. Pa•ikh. a contract between a member agent and an outsider

Das J. constituent will make no sense and on a plain reding will be meaningless. Further, under bye-law 65-A the last buyer has certain options. The outstanding contract being one for purchase of 900 bales, the Appellants, if they became the last buyers, could, under that bye-law, exercise any of those options at their own discretion. In the second of the two clauses which have been omitted from the contract note this option has been made subject to express instructions of the constituent to the contrary, for it provides that the Appellants as agents would be free to exercise their option-

" unless I/We shall have received express instructions from you in writing to the contrary before the commencement of the delivery period if the contract is entered into before the commencement of the delivery period or with the order if the contract is entered into during the permitted days of trading in the delivery period."

By reason of the omission of the two clauses, this right of the respondent as constituent is not made a term of the contract between the parties. It follows, therefore, that the so-called pre-existing oral contract is not in accordance with the bye-laws on this ground also.

For reasons stated above, this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

PATANJALI SASTRI J.-I agree that this appeal should be dismissed with costs, but I would prefer to rest my decision solely on the ground of the omission to include in the contract in question the two clauses newly added in the prescribed form in order to give effect to bye-law 65-A.

Appeal dismissed.

Agent for the appellants: Rajinder Narain.

Agent for the respondent: M. S. K. Sastri.

SUPREME COURT REpORTS (1950]

KHIMJI POONJA AND COMPANY

BALDEV DAS C. PARIKH

SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.

SAIYID F AZL ALI

PATANJALI SASTRI

Bombay Cotton Contracts Act

s. 8(1)

Section 8

Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932

East India Cotton Association, Ltd.

PATAN.JALI 8ABTRI

Bombay High Court

High Court of Judicature at Bom- 1900

Khimji

Poonja &- Co • . Bombay High Court

Coyajee

Balde

Indian Arbitration Act, 1940

M. G. Setalvad

Rameshwar Nath

G. K. Daphtary

B. Sen

K. T. Desai

DAS

East India Cotton Association Ltd.

9th April, 1945

10th August, 1945

10th August, 194

11th August, 1945

18th August, 1945

21st August, 1945

22nd August, 1945

23rd August, 1945

24th August, 1945

27th August, 1945

Balde" Das

24th October, 1945

22nd October, 1945

10th November, 1945

Das

Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932

Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932

Bombay

Government of Bombay

19th September 1944

Baldev Das

Section 8

Chagla

2nd July 1946

clause 82

section 8

Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932

Baldev Das C. Parikli

Stone

section 8

Bombay Cotton Contracts Act, 1932

Khitnji

Khimji Poo

Rajinder Narain

M. S. K. Sastri


-··

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 741

I, therefore, agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that this appeal should be allowed and the judgments and orders of the Courts below should be set aside and the petition should stand dismissed. I also agree to the order for costs made by my Lord the Chief Justice.

Appeal allowed.

Agent for the appellant: Ranjit Singh Narula.

Agent for the respondents Nos. 1 (a) and 1 (b) : Rajinder Narain.

lIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]

CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS

NANDLAL

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and R. s. NAIK JJ.J

Co-operative Cr<dit Societies Act, 1340 ]!'., (Hyderabwi), s. 42 --Award-Remission by Registrar to Civil Court for execution-

Poicers of Registrar-Instal1nent decree-Defa'U, lt-Exer:tltion pro ceedinas for whole amount in Civil Oourt-P(, wer of Registrat to a.ccept instalment and direct Civil Oottrt to stop proceedings.

Section 42 of the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1340 F., {Hyderabad) provided as follows: "If an award g:ven by the Registrar or by a person nominatecl by him, or by a comruittee of arbitrators is not acted upon, then tbe Registrar can Jave it enforced-(a) through a civil court on a certificate issud by him.

The civil court will treat the award in the satne way as itB own decree; l_b) through a Revenue Court or officer by issuing a certi- ':ficate to that court or officer."

Held, that under the section the Registrar was not in the same position as a court passing t.he decree unUer the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of execution of the decree and be does not possess all the powers of an executing court.

Where a dispute arose bet, veen a m<:mber of a society and the society and an arbitrator appointed under the Act passed a decree for payruent of a certain sum in six monthly instaln1ents with a condition that if default was made in the payment of any inRtaln1ent the who!e amount will become due, and under the provisions of s. 42 the decree was sent for execution to the Civil Court au a. certificate of Registrar :

Province of

Bonibay

K. S. Advani and Others,

Das J,

Oc~. 12.

1950 Held, that after a default bad been made in the payment of the first instalment and the whole decree de.bt had become duo Oo-ope1 alive and execution had been taken out for recovery of tht:l \vhole Soc1et11 of Debts amount, the Rei;(istrar had no pJwer to accept the amount of first

v. instalment and direct the executing co1.1rt to stop further pro- Nandlo, f, ceed.inga, and the executing court wa.s entitled to ignoro the Registrar's order and ta proceed with the execution.

APPEAL under article 37 4( 4) of the Cons ti tu tion from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Hyderabad dated 24th Aban 1356 F., in Civil Appeal No. 374/4 of 1356 F.

Devi Pershad, for the appellant.

Appa Rao and Sada Shiva Rao, for the respondent.

1950. October 12.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

"ahajan J.

MAHAJAN ].-This appeal arises out of execution proceedings of a decree passed by an arbitrator under the Co.operative Credit Societies Act.

The appeal was presented to the Judicial Committee of the State and is now before us under article 374 (4) of the Constitution.

Raja Nandlal was a member of the decree-holder society and was also its debtor. A dispute arose between him and the society and under the rules governing such societies the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator on the 19th Meher 1352 F., passed a decree against him in the sum of Rs. 8,100 payable' in equal six monthly instalments with six per cent. interest, the first instalment being payable at the end of Azur 1353 F. On the 2nd Dai 1353 F., under the provisions of section 42, clause ( d), of the Co-operative Societies Act the decree was sent for execution to the civil court on a certificate issued under the signature of one Moulvi Mohammed Hasan, Madadgar Nazim.

The amount recoverable was stated as Rs. 8, 100 principal and Rs. 666·9-0 interest.

On the same day the decree-holder presented an application for execution of the decree to the Civil Court, Balda, claiming recovery of Rs. 10,339 14-9. It was alleged that as default had been committed in the payment of

. '

the first instalment due in the month of Azur 1353 F., 1950 the wh<J!e decretal amount had become recoverable.

It was prayed that the property detailed in the appli- 8 °t7v:. cation be attached.

On 3rd Dai 1353 F., i.e., a day oc" Y; 'L after the presentation of the application for execution, Nandlal. the judgment debtor deposited a sum of Rs .. 1,000 towards the first instalment in the Office of the Regis- Mahajan J. trar of Co-operative Societies and expressed his willingness to deposit any further amount that may be due towards that instalment. The Nazim's office stated in reply that as he had committed default in the payment of the first instalment the whole decree had become due and the amount of Rs. 1.000 could not be accepted. Subsequently, however, on the 5th Dai 1353 F., a letter was issued by one Mohammed Aihsan, Assistant Madadgar Nazim, to the Civil Court, Balda, saying that Rs. 1,034 had been deposited in the Office of the Nizamat Co operative Credit Societies and therefore the proceedings in execution should be stayed or adjourned. On receipt of the Jetter in the civil court, the decree-holder raised an objection that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to stay execution of the decree as he was not an executing court. This objection was overruled by the court and it was held that under the provisions of section 42 of the Co-operative Credit

Societies Act the Registrar retained the power of staying execution of the award decree even after the issue of a certificate by him. In the result the execution proceedings were stayed. Against this order an appeal was taken to the Sadar Adalat. The Sadar

Adalat allowed the appeal partially and held that to the extent of the payment made the decree could not be executed but it could be executed with respect to future instalments as and when they would fall due.

It further found that the default clause in the decree must be taken to have been condoned by the deposit •of the first instalment in the office of the Registrar.

The decree-holder preferred a second appeal to the High Court but without any material success.

The High Court held that there had been a default in the payment of the first instalment

1950 and the decree-holder had thus a right to . execute the whole decree and that neither the Registrar 00operatw•b nor the executing court could deprive the decree-holder Sooioly of De ts f h h J f th" fi d · t k th v. o t at ng t. n spite o 1s n mg 1t oo e Nandt•t. view that the Registrar still retained jurisdiction to adjourn execution proceedings.

The contention of the Mahajan J. judgment-debtor that the certificate was bad as having been issued by a l\Iadadgar Nazim was negatived. It was held that the Madadgar N azim had delegated powers in this respect and that the defect, if any, stood cured by a fresh certificate signed by the N azim himself. The result was that with these findings the decision of the executing court adjourning the execution proceedings was maintained.

The first point for consideration in this appeal is as regards the jurisdiction of the Registrar functioning under the Co-operative Credit Societies Act in respect to execution of decrees.

The decision of this question depends on the interpretation to be placed on the language employed in section 42, clause (d), of the Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1340 F., as amended.

This section is in these terms :-

"If an award given bithe Registrar or by a person nominated by him, or by a committee ofarbitrators is not acted upon, then the Registrar can have it enforced- ( a) through a civil court on a certificate issued by him.

The civil court will treat the award in the same way as its own decree;

(b) through a Revenue Court or officer by issuing a certificate to that court or officer."

The language employed in this section does not place the Registrar on the same pedestal as a court passing the decree under the Civil Procedure Code.

Under the Code a civil court passing a deceee is also the court executing the decree. It has a dual capa. city, (1) of the court passing the decree, and (2) of the executing court. The Registrar, it appears, has the first capacity of a civil court but he has not been placed in the matter of execution in the same capacity as a civil court passing a decree.

The only '

.jurisdiction conferred on the Registrar is that he can t95o issue a certificate and on that certificate he can sencl 1 a decree either to the civil court or to a revenue officer.

Co-operative . . .fi h Society of Debts It may be that after 1ssumg a certi cate e may be v. entitled to cancel the certificate or issue another, or he Nandlat. may by withdrawing the certificate withdraw execution from a civil court and send it to a revenue court :llahaian J. and vice versa.

On the plain words of the section it cannot be held that the Registrar has been constituted an executing court or that any powers in the matter of the execution of the a ward decree have been conferred1 upon him. The question that arises for consideration is whether in view of this construction of the section it was open to the H.egistrar to intervene during execution proceedings that were pending in a civil court on the basis of the certificate granted by him. In order to determine this point it is necessary to see precisely what the Registrar actually did in this case. After a default had been made in the payment of the first instalment and the whole decree debt had become due and execution had been taken out for recovery of the amount, the Registrar accepted the amount of the first instalment and asked the executing court to stop further proceedings.

The act of the Registrar in accepting the first instalment was a clear trespass on the duties of the executing court. It is only in the executing court where payment towards satisfaction of the decree, the execution of which had been taken out, could be made, unless the court passing the decree has also the jurisdiction to execute it. As already indicated, this jurisdiction is not possessed by the Registrar. That being so, in our opinion, the requisition of the Registrar to the executing court to stop execution proceedings and his act in accepting the first instalment were in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on him and the executing court was entitled to ignore it. Moreover, the' Registrar could not alter or amend the decree passed by the Arbitrator at this stage.

All .the courts below have interpreted the section to mean that the Registrar as thl! couripassing tlie

I%o decree has the same power as the court executing it.

0 t.

We are unable to agree in this view in view of the o-opera ive ] . .

Sooieiy of Debts clear anguage employed m the section.

The analogy

v. of decisions given in respect of civil courts is not avail- N•nilal. able in interpreting this Act.

Under the Civil Procedure Code the parent court, i.e., the court passil!akaja.'i J. I d · d" mg tie ecree, always retams 1uns 1ct10n to execute the decree even if it has been transferred to one or more courts for the purpose of execution. Primarily it is the function of the court passing the decree to execute it but when it is found that it is not possible for it to effectively execute it provision has been made in the Code authorising it to send it to other courts for the purpose of execution; but none of these provisions in any way affect the jurisdiction of the court passing the decree to execute it whenever it thinks fit to do so and the order transferring execution to other courts does not take away its jurisdiction in the matter. The position however in the case of the Registrar is entirely different.

He himself has been given no jurisdiction to execute his own decree.

The only power conferred on him is to get it realized through a civil court or a revenue court and the only authority conferred on him is to issue a certificate for that purpose.

The High Court in this case has, in our opinion, given a decision contradictory to its own findings.

It has been held that the first appellate court was in error in the view that the default clause in the decree stood condoned by the payment of the first instalment . by the judgment-debtor in the office of the Registrar and it has been positively found that once a default has been made the Registrar had no jurisdiction to condone it and that the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree for the full decretal amount with interest.

Having reached this conclusion the High Court still maintained the decision of the two courts below adjourning the execution proceedings.

The logical result of the High Court's decision is that the certificate stands and the execution application has been properly made and the decree-holder is entitled to the relief claimed but in spite of it it has been held

. ,

that the Registrar can stay the proceedings. It seems 1950 to us that the act of the Registrar in asking the civil . t t t . d' d' b f .

Co-opB'atwe cour to s ay execu 10n procee ings pen mg e ore it Soci•tY of n, bts is a clear encroachment on the powers of the executing v. court and is in excess of his statutory powers and Nandlal • should have been ignored by the courts.

As a fresh certificate was issued by the Nazim in Mahajan J. order to cure a defect that might be said to exist in the original certificate because of its having been sent by the Madadgar N azim, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of the learned counsel that there was no proper certificate in this case and the proceedings in execution therefore were without jurisdiction.

The result therefore is that this appeal is allowed, the decisions of all the three courts below are set aside and the executing court is directed to proceed with the execution of the decree from the stage at which it was interfered with by the letter received from the office of the Registrar. In the circumstances of this case we will make no order as to costs of the proceedings throughout.

Appeal allowed.

[IN THE SUPREME CouRTOF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]

KAPOJ\E CHAND

KADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and

KHALIL UZZAMAN J J.J

Muhammadan Law-Dower-Widow in possession of husband's estate in lieu of dower-Whether entitltd to priority over crediiors-

Nature of widow's lien for dower.

A Muhammadan widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the other bairn or otherwise is not entitled to priority as against his other un~

J9b0

Oct l'l.

, ,. , secured creditors. There is nothing inherent in the very nature \)\ (\.\)~~~ Vl'n\c\1 en\it\es it to priority.

Ranjit Singh Narula

Rajinder Narain

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]

CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY OF DEBTS

NANDLAL

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

R. s. NAIK JJ

Societies Act, 1340

s. 42

Section 42

Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1340

Uer the Civil Procedure Code

s. 42

K. S. Advani

article 37

High Court of Hyderabad

Devi Pershad

Appa Rao

Sada Shiva Rao

ahajan J.

MAHAJAN

Credit Societies Act

article 374

Raja Nandlal

19th Meher 1352 F.

2nd Dai 1353 F.

section 42

Moulvi Mohammed Hasan

Madadgar Nazim

Civil Court, Balda

3rd Dai 1353 F.

5th Dai 1353 F.

Mohammed Aihsan

section 42

Sadar Adalat

Mahajan

Madadgar N azim

section 42

Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1340

llahaian

SUPREME CouRTOF INDIA

R. S. NAIK

KHALIL UZZAMAN

Muhammadan Law


. ,

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 747

that the Registrar can stay the proceedings. It seems 1950 to us that the act of the Registrar in asking the civil . t t t . d' d' b f .

Co-opB'atwe cour to s ay execu 10n procee ings pen mg e ore it Soci•tY of n, bts is a clear encroachment on the powers of the executing v. court and is in excess of his statutory powers and Nandlal • should have been ignored by the courts.

As a fresh certificate was issued by the Nazim in Mahajan J. order to cure a defect that might be said to exist in the original certificate because of its having been sent by the Madadgar N azim, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of the learned counsel that there was no proper certificate in this case and the proceedings in execution therefore were without jurisdiction.

The result therefore is that this appeal is allowed, the decisions of all the three courts below are set aside and the executing court is directed to proceed with the execution of the decree from the stage at which it was interfered with by the letter received from the office of the Registrar. In the circumstances of this case we will make no order as to costs of the proceedings throughout.

Appeal allowed.

[IN THE SUPREME CouRTOF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]

KAPOJ\E CHAND

KADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and

KHALIL UZZAMAN J J.J

Muhammadan Law-Dower-Widow in possession of husband's estate in lieu of dower-Whether entitltd to priority over crediiors-

Nature of widow's lien for dower.

A Muhammadan widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the other bairn or otherwise is not entitled to priority as against his other un~

J9b0

Oct l'l.

, ,. , secured creditors. There is nothing inherent in the very nature \)\ (\.\)~~~ Vl'n\c\1 en\it\es it to priority.

1950 Ameer Ammal v.

Sankaranarayan~ Chetty (LL.R. 25 Mad. 658), Meer Melter Ally v . . mt. Amanee (11 W. R. 212), Mania Kapore Chand Bili v. Was-i Ahrnod (LI .... R 41 A_ll. fJ58), Hami1a Btbi v. Zubaid(;, v.

Bibi (A.LR 1916 P.O. 46), Im:iaz Be9"m v. Abdul Karim Khw Kadar Unnisa (A.LR. 1930 All. 881) referred to.

Begum di Others.

Kulwm Bibi v. Sliiam S.inder La.l (A.LR. 1936 Ail. 600), Mst. Ghafooran v. Ram Chandra Dos ( .\.I.R. 1934 All. 168), Mohamed 'l'wabuddin v. Yasin Begum :_17 D.L.R. 224) diRapproved.

Maina Bibi v. Chaudh>i Vakil Ahmad (52 I.A. 145) explained.

APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad under article 374 (4) of the Constitution of India: Civil Appeal No. 189 of 1950.

Abdul Wahid Owasi, for the appellant.

Ahmed Saeed Khan, for respondent No. 1.

1950. October 12.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

Khat; lunaman J.

KHALILUZZAMAN ].-This appeal arises out of execution proceedings. The appellant, Kapurchand, had a money decree, amongst others, against one Mir Hamid Ali Khan, husband of the respondent Mst. Kaderunnissa.

In execution of the decree the house in dispute belonging to the deceased judgment-debtor was attached.

To the attachment the widow of the deceased raised an objection on the ground that she was in possession of it in lieu of her outstanding <lower and could not Le dispossessed till her claim was satisfied. The objection was allowed by the executing court and it was ordered that the house be sold subject to the respondent's. claim, the decree-holder being entitled to the surplus, if any, out of the sale proceeds.

There was not much possibility of the house fetching more in the execution sale than the amount due on account of dower. The court took the view that the widow's claim for dower had priority over the debts due to other unsecured creditors and her position was analogous to that of a secured creditor. The decreeholder made an application in revision to the High Court but without any success.

He then preferred an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the State and it is now before us under article 374 (4) of the Constitution. ••

The sole point for determination in the appeal is 1950 whether a widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the Kapore Cha"d v. other heirs or otherwise is entitled to priority as against Kadar unnisa his other unsecured creditors. It is conceded that the Bequm" Others. husband died leaving the house in dispute and leaving . - outstanding a number of debts including the one due Khatilu., aman J. to the decree-holder. The house was not charged or mortgaged by him either in favour of his wife or in favour of any of the creditors. If the husband had created any charge in favour of his wife in lieu of her claim for dower, then it cannot be doubted that she would have priority over the unsecured creditors. No specific Quranic text or any other original authority on Muslim law has been cited in support of the contention that a widow's claim for dower stands on a higher footing than the claim of any creditor in respect of an unsecured debt. Reference was made to a text in Sur-ai.Nissa which enjoins a husband to pay the claim of his wife and it also says that widows and minors should be given favourable treatment. This text does not give an absolute protection to the claim of the widow as against other claims. On the other hand, a Muslim is enjoined to observe his engagements and to • keep his contracts faithfully and to discharge his liabilities in an honest manner. No distinction is made between an injunction relating to the payment of dower on the one hand and the payment of the other debts on the other. The learned advocate for the appellant contends that a widow's claim for outstanding dower even when she is in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her claim with the consent of other heirs of the deceased stands on no better footing than that of unsecured creditors, though in their absence she is entitled to be paid in full before te • estate is distributed among the heirs. He drew our attention to certain passages from the ho! y Quran and from . writings of other jurists on this subject. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, argued that a widow has a lien on her husband's estate for her outstanding dower and when she has entered "into

1900 possession of his house after his death she cannot be dispossessed till her claim is satisfied either by the Kapo•'. .. Cha"d heirs or by the unsecured creditors.

He placed Kad"' un""" reliance on a decision of the Hyderabad High Court Begum Ji Others. and also of some other High Courts in India.

A careful examination of the various authorities on Kha!iluuama" J. the subject shows that the proposition of law on this subject has been correctly enunciated in Tyabji's Muhammadan Law (1940 Edn.) in these terms: (1) A widow by• her lien does not.have any priority over other creditors ; (2) Mehr as a debt has priority over other heirs' claim to have the estate distributed among themselves.

These two considerations are not affected by the fact of her being in or out of possession of the estate. It seems clear that unless the husband by his own act has placed the widow in a better position than his other creditors, her claim for dower is in the nature of an unsecured debt and she has no priority of any kind against the other unsecured creditors of her husband. The Quranic text in Surai-Nissa, Ruku 4, enjoins the payment of dower in preference to bequests and. inheritance but it is silent on the question of priority of dower debt in relation to other creditors.

In Mubsoot Sarkhasi, Vol. 29, Kitabulfaiaiz, page 137, it is pointed out that payment of debts, has priority over bequests and wills.

In the administration of the estate of a deceased Muslim the rule laid down by early text writers and Fatwas, such as Fatwa-e- Alamgiri, is that in the first instance the funeral expenses of the deceased should be paid out of the estate and that having been done, the estate should be divided between the legatees and the heirs after payment of the debts due from him.

No priority has been indicated in respect of a dower debt of a widow over other • unsecured creditors even if she has taken possession of her husband's estate after his death.

It was said that the nature of the widow's claim for dower is such that it amounts to a lien on the husband's estate.

The claim for lien is based on the assumption that the dower debt is consideration for the marriage ; i.nd is not merely a voluntary debt incurred due to the

' ,\ , '

respect to the wife. According to Hamilton's Hedaya rn50 (1870 Edn., page 44), the leading text book on Hanafi d d.

Kapore Chand law, if a person specifies a ower of ten or more 1ams v. and should afterwards consummate his marriage, or be Kadar Unni•• removed by death, his wife in either case can claim Begum .t othe ... the whole of the dower specified, because by consum- -- mation her claim for dower becomes absolute. The Khaliluszaman J. dower debt becomes her property and it devolves on her heirs and has to be paid out of the estate of the husband. It has been described as a debt upon the husband to be paid out of his estate. The dower of a Muslim woman is a settlement in her favour made prior to the marriage contract and is similar to the donatio propter nuptias of the Romans but is of such an obligatory nature that if it is not mentioned before or at the time of the marriage, it is presumed to exist to the extent of a proper dower amount. Among the Hebrews the dower settled on a wife was for her use after the termination of marriage and among the Jews marriages without similar consideration were invalid.

As pointed out by Mr. Ameer Ali in his book on Muhammadan Law, the custom originated in ancient times with the payments made by husbands to their wives as a means for their support and as a protection against the arbitrary exercise of the power of divorce.

The Muslim concept of dower has no reference to the price that under some systems of law was paid to the father of the bride when she was given in marriage.

On the other hand, it is considered a debt with consideration (for the submission of her person by the wife).

The result of the above discussion is that dower is purely in the nature of a marriage settlement and is for consideration. It is a claim arising out of contract by the husband and as such has preference to be- . q nests and inheritance, but on no principle of .Muhammadan Law it can have priority over other contractual debts. In our view, therefore, a dower debt cannot be given any priority over other debts on any equitable consideration or on the ground that there is something inherent in its very nature which entitles it to priority.

1950 It is now convenient to examine the decided cases on this subject. In Ameer Ammal v. Sankara- Ka.pore Chand

v. narayanan Chetty (1) a Bench of the Madras High

Kadar Unni•a Court held that a claim for unpaid dower constitutes a Begum & Others. debt payable pari passu with the demands of other -- creditors and is not a preferential charge on the KhaliluuamanJ.estate.

InMaina Bibi v. Chaudh1i Vakil Ahmad(') it was held that where the widow is not in the position of a secured creditor and is otherwise in possession of the husband's estate with the consent of the heirs, she is entitled to retain possession of it until her dower debt is satisfied. Their Lordships observed that it was not necessary to say whether the right of the widow in possession is a lien in the strict sense of the term. Whatever the right may be called, it appears to be founded on the power of a widow as a creditor for her dower to hold the property of her husband of which she has lawfully, and without force or fraud, obtained possession until her debt is satisfied. This decision does not place the widow on a higher footing than any other creditor.

As against the heirs all creditors are to be paid in priority before the estate can be distributed.

In Meer Meher Ally v. Mst.

A.manee (') it was held that the lien of the widow over the property in her possession is not a lien in the ordinary legal sense of the term and that a claim for dower is in the same position as that of any other ordinary creditor and ranks pari passu with them and like other debts ha5 to be paid before the heirs are entitled to take anything.

In M aina Bibi v. W asi Ahmad(') it was held that she has no right of possession against the creditors, not being a secured creditor herself.

At page 547 the following observations occur:-

"she cannot set up any such right of possession against creditors claiming to have the debts owing to them from the husband satisfied out of the estate.

She is not a secured creditor ; her claim for her dower

(!1 I.L.B. 25 M•d. 658.

121 52 LA. 145.

13) 11 w .R. 212.

141 I.L.R. 41 All. 5~.8.

. '

debt ranks equally with the claims of other creditors t95o of her husband."

Kapore Chand In Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi (') it was observed "' that dower ranks as a debt and the wife is entitled Kada• unni•• along with the other creditors to have it satisfied on B'gum .t Oth•ro . the death of the husband out of his estate.

Her right, . -- however, is no greater than that of any other un- Khal.ZuzMman J. secured creditor.

Qua the heirs she has a creditor's lien.

In Imtiaz Begum v. Abdul Karim Khan(') the same view was expressed. In para. 295 Mr. Mulla in his book on Muhammadan Law has adopted the view that dower ranks as a debt and that the widow is entitled along with other creditors to have it satisfied out of the estate and that her right is not greater than that of any other creditor. The learned counsel 'for the respondent relied on the decision in Kulsum Bibi

v. Shiam Sunder Lal ('), in which it was held that a widow in possession of her husband's estate is entitled as against the other heirs of her husband ;:and as against the -creditors to retain possession until her dower is satisfied.

The same view had been taken earlier in Mst. Ghafooran v. Ram Chandra Das(') by a single Judge.

It was said that her possession could not be disturbed till her dower debt was satisfied.

In MohamedTurabuddin v. Yasin Begum(') a Bench of the Hyderabad High Court held that the claim of a widow for dower was in1the nature of a secured debt. There was no other creditor in that case which arose between the heirs and the widow.

However, in W ahidunnissa Begum v. Yasin Begum (') it was pointed out that the claim of the widow for dower does not create any interest or charge on the property and that the position of a widow is not only that of a creditor where her dower remains unpaid but also of an heir.

The result of the authorities is that excepting the two Allahabad decisions mentioned above and a decision of the Hyderabad High Court. the consensus

/Jl A.LR. 1916 P.O. 46.

(2) A.I.R. 1930 All. 881. \3/ A.I, R, 1936 All. 600.

14) A.I.R. 1934 All. 168.

(5) 17 D.L, R. 224.

(6/ 32 D.L.R. 421.

\950 of authority is against the proposition that a widow as an unsecured creditor has any priority over the

K•P 0 " Chand other unsecured creditors of her husband. In our v.

K".d"' u""'"' opinion, the above mentioned two Allahabad decisions

B•um .t Oth"' do not lay down the law correctly on this point and the rule has been correctly laid down in Ameer

Kha.l•lus.oman "· Ammal v. Sankaranarayanan Chetty ( 1).

There is nothing repugnant or inequitable according to the principles of Muhammadan Law in the estate of a deceased Muslim being rateably distributed between the unsecured creditors.

For the reasons given above we hold that the objection raised by the widow had no substance in it and the executing court should have directed the property to be sold and the sale proceeds distributed rateably amongst the decreeholders and the widow.

In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of the two courts below and direct the executing court to proceed with the execution in accordance with the observations made herein.

In the circumstances we will make no order as to costs of these proceedings.

Appeal allowed.

1 9~0 f!N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]

Oct. JR.

NARHARI AND OTHERS

SHANKAR AND OTHERS.

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and

KHALILUZZAMAN JJ.J

Res iudicata-Severai a.ppeals arising out of sam' suit-Appeal disposed of by same judgment-Separate decrees drawn "p-Appeal from, orie decree only-Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5-Extension of time-Sufficient cause-Conflict of decisions .

..4. instituted a. suit for possession of two-thirrls share in an estate against B and 0 who cloimed a one-third share each in it.

The suit was decreed by the trial court. B ant! 0 preferred (I) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 658.

Madadgar N azim

KADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS

R. S. NAIK

Kapore Chand

High Court of Hyderabad

article 374

Constitution of India

Abdul Wahid Owasi

Ahmed Saeed Khan

Kapurchand

Mir Hamid Ali Khan

article 374

Kadar

Bequm

Khatilu

Hyderabad High Court

Begum Ji Others

India

Kha!iluuama

Tyabji

Fatwa-e- Alamgiri

Hamilton

Ameer Ali

Madras High

Kadar Unni•a

Kapore Chand

ZuzMman

Mulla

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD)

NARHARI

SHANKAR

KHALILUZZAMAN

s. 5


SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1950]

\950 of authority is against the proposition that a widow as an unsecured creditor has any priority over the

K•P 0 " Chand other unsecured creditors of her husband. In our v.

K".d"' u""'"' opinion, the above mentioned two Allahabad decisions

B•um .t Oth"' do not lay down the law correctly on this point and the rule has been correctly laid down in Ameer

Kha.l•lus.oman "· Ammal v. Sankaranarayanan Chetty ( 1).

There is nothing repugnant or inequitable according to the principles of Muhammadan Law in the estate of a deceased Muslim being rateably distributed between the unsecured creditors.

For the reasons given above we hold that the objection raised by the widow had no substance in it and the executing court should have directed the property to be sold and the sale proceeds distributed rateably amongst the decreeholders and the widow.

In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of the two courts below and direct the executing court to proceed with the execution in accordance with the observations made herein.

In the circumstances we will make no order as to costs of these proceedings.

Appeal allowed.

1 9~0 f!N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]

Oct. JR.

NARHARI AND OTHERS

SHANKAR AND OTHERS.

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, R. S. NAIK and

KHALILUZZAMAN JJ.J

Res iudicata-Severai a.ppeals arising out of sam' suit-Appeal disposed of by same judgment-Separate decrees drawn "p-Appeal from, orie decree only-Maintainability-Res judicata-Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5-Extension of time-Sufficient cause-Conflict of decisions .

..4. instituted a. suit for possession of two-thirrls share in an estate against B and 0 who cloimed a one-third share each in it.

The suit was decreed by the trial court. B ant! 0 preferred (I) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 658.

• "

separate appeals.

These appeals were heard togethe.r and 1900 disposed of by the same judgment but sepa.rate decrees were prepared; A preferred an appeal from one of these decrees in Narhari a.nd time paying the full court fee anl later on, after the period of Othm limitation had expired, preferred an appeal from the other decree v. also. paying a court fee of Re. 1 only.

The High Conrt held that Shankar and A shoula have filed Repante appeals within the period of limita- Others. 1.i on and that, inasn_1uch as one of the appeals was time-barred,

che first appeal was barred by res judicata.

Held, that, as there was only one suit and the appeals hon been disposed of by the same judgment, it was not necessary to file two separate appeals and the fact that one of the appeals waH time-barred did not affect the maintainability of the other appeal and the question of res judica.ta did not a.t all arise in the case.

Held further, that in the circumstances the High Court,, .. , wrong in not giving to the appellant the benefit of s. 5 of the Limitation Act as there was a conflict of rulings on the subject.

Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli (A.I.R. 1927 Lob. 289) applied- Appa v. Kach"i B<ryyan Kutty (A.J.R. 1932 lliad. 689) referred to.

APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court of Hyderabad under article 374 (4) of Constitution: Appeals Nos. 22 and 23 of 1950.

Ghulam Ahmad Khan, for the appellants.

The respondents were not represented.

1950. October 13.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

NAIK J.-The suit out of which these appeals arise Na.; k J. was one for possession of two-thirds of the land covered by survey No. 214 and formesne profits. The plaintiffs claim possession on the ground that survey No. 214 was an inam land and according to the family custom, belonged to them exclusively as members of the senior line as against the defendants who were of the junior lines. There are two sets of defendants: Nos. I to 4 belong to one branch of the family and Nos. 5 to 8 to another.

Each set claim that they are in possession of orie-third of the land and maintain that they are entitled to it as their share of the family property. They deny the custom of exclusive possession by the senior branch, alleged by the plaintiffs. The trial court decreed the suit. From this decree, two separate appeals were taken by the two sets of the defendants to the Sadar -

&.\\a\at, G\l\barga, each daimin~ one-third portion of

Narhari tuid

Others

S h€lnkar a11d

OthtffS

Naik J.

the land and each paid the court fee to the extent of their share. The first appellate court, i.e., the Sadar Adalat, allowed both the appeals and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit by one judgment dated 30th Bahman 1338 F. and ordered a copy of the judgment to be placed on the file of the other connected appeal. On the basis of this judgment, two decrees were prepared by the first appellate court. The plaintiffs preferred two appeals to the High Court. The first was filed on 23rd Aban 1345 F. and with it was attached the decree passed in the appeal of defendants Nos. 1 to 4. Later, on 17th Azur 1346 F. another appeal was filed and with it the decree passed in the appeal of defendants Nos. 5 to 8 was attached.

This latter appeal was twenty-nine days beyond the period of limitation for appeals. It was filed on one-rupee stamp paper and a note was made therein that the full court fee had been paid in the appeal filed earlier, which has been registered as Appeal No. 331 of 1346 F. At the hearing of the appeals, a preliminary objection was raised by the defendants that as the other appeal. i.e., No. 332 of 1346 F. was filed beyond the period of limitation, it cannot be maintained and that when the other appeal is thus dismis, sed, the principle of res judicata would apply to the first appeal, i.e., No. 331 of 1346 and it should also fail. The High Court held that the plaintiffs should have filed two separate appeals within the period of limitation and as the other appeal was admittedly time-barred, the first appeal also failed by the application of the principle of res judicata. The High Court dismissed both the appeals. Against this judgment of the High Court two appeals were preferred to the Judicial Committee of the State and they are now before us under article 374(4) of the Constitution.

The High Court in its judgment relied on the decision given in jethmal v. Ranglal(1). That was a case of a money suit where the plaintiff's claim was partially decreed and from this judgment both the parties had appealed, the plaintiff to the extent of the suit dismissed and the defendant to the extent of the

ll} ~~. D. L. R. 322.

suit decreed.

The first appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's suit in toto, thus allowing the defendant's appeal and dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, and two separate decrees were made. The plaintiff appealed from one decree only, which was passed against him and it was held that the principle of res judicata applied.

Notwithstanding, this ruling of the Judicial Committee of the State, the High Court, in several cases, i.e., Nandlal v. Mohiuddin Ali Khan('), Nizamuddin

v. Chatur Bhuj('), Gayajee Pant v. Habibuddin('), and Jagannath v. Sonajee(') has held that when the suit is one and two appeals arise out of the same suit, it is not necessary to file two separate appeals.

In the judgment of the High Court, though reference is given to some of these decisions, it is merely mentioned that the appellant relies on these decisions.

The learned Judges perhaps thought that in the presence of the Hyderabad Judicial Committee decision in ]ethmal v. Ranglal(') they need not comment on these decisions at all.

There is also a later decision of the Judicial Committee of the State in Bansilal v.

Mohanlal('), where the well known and exhaustive authority of the Lahore High Court in Mst. Lachmi v.

M st. Bhuli (') was followed. In the Lahore case, there were two cross suits about the same subject-matter, filed simultaneously between the same parties, whereas in the present case, there was only one suit and one judgment was given by the trial court and even in the first appeal to the Sadar Adalat, there was only one judgment, in spite of there being two appeals by the two sets of defendants.

The plaintiffs in their appeal to the High Court have impleaded all the defendants as respondents and their prayer covers both the appeals and they have paid consolidated court-fee for the whole suit. It is now well settled that where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not be two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up.

(1) 22 D.L.R, 400.

(31 28 D.L.R. 1094.

15) 17 D.L.R. S22.

(2) 23 D.L.R. 457.

14) 29 D.L R 108.

(61 33 D.L.R. 601.

(7) A.I.R, 1927 L•h. '89, 97

Narhari and

Others

Shankar and

Othrs.

NaikJ.

Narhari and

Of hers v.

Shankar and

Oth!ra.

Nafk J.

As has been observed by Tek Chand J. in his learned judgment in Mst. Lachmi v. Mst. Bhuli(') mentioned above, the determining factor is not the decree but the matter in controversy. As he puts it later in his judgment, the estoppel is not created by the decree but it can only be created by the judgment. The question of res judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits, it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit, the question of res judicata does not arise at all and in the present case, both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment, and the matter decided concerns the entire suit.

As such, there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata.

The same judgment cannot remain effective just because it was appealed against with a different number or a copy of it was attached to a different appeal. The two decrees in substance are one. Besides, the High Court was wrong in not giving to the appellants the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act because there was conflict of decisions regarding this question not only in the High Court of the State but also among the different High Courts in India.

The learned counsel for the appellants cited in support of his arguments the decision given in Appa v.

Kachai Bayyan Kutti(2), which is on all fours with the present case.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that these appeals should be allowed and the case remanded to the High Court for decision on the merits of the case.

Costs of these appeals will abide the result of the case.

Appeals allowed.

(ll A.I.I\. 19'7 Loh. 289. (21 A.l.R. l 932 (\fad. 689.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD)

NARHARI AND OTHERS

SHANKAR AND OTHERS

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

R. S. NAIK

s. 5

Narhari

Shankar

A shoula

s. 5

Limitation Act

High Court of Hyderabad

article 374

Ghulam Ahmad Khan

NAIK

Naik

23rd Aban 1345 F.

17th Azur 1346 F.

article 374(4)

Lahore High Court

Lahore

Sadar Adalat

Narhari

Shankar

Shankar

Tek Chand

section 5

Limitation Act

India


S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 759

CHI NT AMAN RAO

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

RAM KRISHNA

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

[SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,

MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.J

Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act (LXIV of 1948), ss. 8, 4-Law prohibiting bidi manufacture during agriwltural season-Validity -Restriction of fundamental right to carry on trade or business- Reasonableness of restrictions-Test of reasonableness-Jurisdiction of court to consider whether restrictions are reasonable-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g), 19(6).

The Central ProvinceB and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of BidiB (Agricultural Purposes) Act, LXIV of 1948, a law which was in force at the commencement of the Constitution of India, provided that

11 the Deputy Commissioner may by notifica.tiou fix a. period to be an agricultural season v.rith respect to such villages

as may be specified therein" and lhat "the Deputy CommiBsioner may by general order which Bhall extend to such villageB as he may specify, prohibit the manufacture of bidiB during the agricultural season.'' The Act provided further that

11 no person reBiding in a village Bpecified in Buch order Bhall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any perBon for the manufacture of bidis." An order waB issued by the Deputy CommiBBioner under the proviBions of the Act forbidding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis during a particular season. A manufacturer of bidiB and an employee in a bidi factory residing in one of the Baid villageB applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus alleging that since the Act prohibited the petitionerB from exercising their fundamental right to carry on their trade or businesB which was guaranteed to them by cl. (1) (g) of Art. 19 of the ConBtitution, the Act waa void : Held, (i) that the object of the Btatute, namely, to provide meaBures for the Bupply of adequate labour for agricultural purpoBeB in bidi manufacturing areaB of the Province could well have been achieved by legislation reBtraining the employment of agricultural labour in the manufacture of bidiB dnring the agricul tural seaBon without prohibiting altogether the manufacture of bidis.

As the provisions of the Act had no reaBonable relation

Nov.S.

1!1:50 to the object in view, the Act was not a law imposing "reasonable restrictions" within the meaning of cl. (6) of Art. 19 and was Ohintamat1. Rao therefore void.

(ii) The law even to the extent that it could be said t~ The State of authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agricultural Madhya labour cannot be held to be valid because the language employed Pradesh. was wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affect ing the right, and so long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly void.

The phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public.

The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates.

Legislntion which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a. proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in Art. 19 (!) (g.! and the social control permitted by cl. (6) of Art. 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.

Held also, that the determination by the Legislature of what constitutes a. reasonable restriction is not final and conclusive.

The Supreme Court has power to consider v.i'bether the restrictions imposed by the Legislature are reasonable within the meaning of Art. 19, cl. \6) '1nd to declare the law void if in its opinion the restrictions are not reasonable.

ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 78 and 79 of 1950.

Application under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of mandamus.

G. N. Joshi, for the petitioners.

S. M. Sikri, for the respondent.

1950. November 8. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

MahajanJ.

MAHAJAN ].-These two applications for enforcement of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India have been made by a proprietor and an employee respectively of a bidi manufacturing concern of District Sagar (State of Madhya Pradesh). It is contended that the law in force in the State authorizing it to prohibit the manufacture of bid is in certain villages including the one

wherein the applicants reside is inconsistent with the 1950 provisions of Part III of the Constitution and is conse- -- entl o d Ohintaman Rao qu y V I . v, The Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Th• St•t• of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, Madhya LXIV of 1948, was passed on 19th October 1948 and PradBSh. was the law in force in the State at the commencement Mahaja.n.J. of the Constitution. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are in these terms:-

" 3. The Deputy Commissioner may by notification fix a period to be an agricultural sason with respect to such villages as may be specified therein.

4. (1) The Deputy Commissioner may, by general order which shall extend to such villages as he may specify, prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season.

(2) No person residing in a village specified in such order shall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any person for the manufacture of bidis."

On the 13th June 1950 au order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar under the provisions of the Act for bidding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis.

On the 19th June 1950 these two petitions were presented to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order as it prejudicially affected the petitioners' right of freedom of occupation and business. During the pendency of the petitions the season mentioned in the order of the 13th June ran out.

A fresh order for the ensuing agricultural season·· 8th October to 18th November 1950-was issued on 29th September 1950 in the same terms.

This order was also challenged in a supplementary petition.

Article 19 (1) (g) runs as follows:- "All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business."

1950 The article guarantees freedom of occupation and - business. The freedom guaranteed herein is, however, Ohintaman Rao subject to the limitations imposed by clause (6) of

Th• ;·;.1, of article 19. That clause is in these terms:-

Madhya " Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall Pradesh. affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law .1:lakajan J. imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business."

The point for consideration in these applications is whether the Central Provinces and Berar Act LXIV of 1948 comes within the ambit of this saving clause or is in excess of its provisions. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned Act does not impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right in the interests of the general public but totally negatives it. In order to judge the validity of this contention it is necessary to examine the impugned Act and some of its provisions. In the preamble to the Act, it is stated that it has been enacted to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas. Sections 3 and 4 cited above empower the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season. The contravention of any of these provisions is made punishable by section 7 of the Act, the penalty being imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. It was enacted to help in the grow more food campaign and for the purpose of bringing under the plough considerable areas of fallow land.

The question for decision is whether the statute under the guise of protecting public interests arbitrarily

interferes with private business and imposes unreason- I95o able and unnecessarily restrictive regulations upon 0 . - f 1 · h d h h hintamanRao law u occupation ; m ot er wor s, whet er t e total v. prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture The Stat• of of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a Madhya reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights men- Pradesh. tioned in article 19 (1) lg) of the Constitution. Unless it is shown that there is a reasonable relation of the Mahajan J. provisions of the Act to the purpose in view, the right of freedom of occupation and business cannot be curtailed by it.

The phrase "reasonable restriction " connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word " reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.

Clause (6) in the concluding paragraph particularizes certain instances of the nature of the restrictions that were in the mind of the constitution-makers and which have the quality of reasonableness.

They afford a guide to the interpretation of the clause and illustrate the extent and nature of the restrictions which according to the statute could be imposed on the freedom guaranteed in clause (g).

The statute in substance and effect suspends altogether the right mentioned in article 19 (I) (g) during the agricultural seasons and such suspension may lead to such dislocation of the industry as to prove its ultimate ruin.

The object of the statute is to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural pur. poses in bidi manufacturing areas of the Province and it could well be achieved by legislation restraining the employment of agricultural labour in the manufacture

1950 of bidis during the agricultural season.

Even in point - of time a restriction may well have been reasonable if Chintomon Rao t d 1 f th h f k th v. 1t amoun e to a regu at10n o e ours o wor m e Th• stat• of business. Such legislation though it would limit the

Madh11a field for recruiting persons for the manufacture of bidis

P•adosh and regulate the hours of the working of the industry, would not have amounted to a complete stoppage of the Mohainn J. business of manufacture and might well have been within the ambit of clause (6).

The effect of the provisions of the Act, however, has no reasonable relation to the object in view but is so drastic in scope that it goes much in excess of that object.

Not only are the provisions of the statute in excess of the requirements of the case but the language employed prohibits a manufacturer of bidis from employing any person in his business, no matter wherever that person may be residing.

In other words, a manufacturer of bidis residing in this area cannot import labour from neighbouring places in the d1strict or province or from outside the province.

Such a prohibition on the face of it is of an arbitrary nature inasmuch as it has no relation whatsoever to the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and as such cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right.

Further the statute seeks to prohibit all persons residing in the notified villages during the agricultural season from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis. It cannot be denied that there would be a number of infirm and disabled persons, a number of children, old women and petty shop keepers residing in these villages who are incapable of being used for agricultural labour.

All such persons are prohibited by law from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis; and are thus being deprived of earning their livelihood.

It is a matter of common knowledge that there are certain classes of persons residing in every village who do not engage in agricultural operations. They and their womenfolk and children in their leisure hours supplement their income by engaging themselves in bidi business.

There seems no reason for prohibiting them from carrying on this occupation.

The statute as

it stands, not only compels those who can be engaged 1950 in agricultural work from not taking to other avoca- 0 -- t. b t 1 h'b't h h hintaman Rao ions, u it a so pro 1 1 s persons w o ave no connecv. tion or relation to agricultural operations from engaging The State of in the business of bidi making and thus earning their Madhya livelihood. These provisions of the statute, in our Prad .. h. opinion, cannot be said to amount to reasonable restrictions on the right of the applicants and that being so, Mahajan J. the statute is not in conformity with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The law even to the extent that it could be said to authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agricultural Jabour cannot be held valid because the language employed is wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly void.

Mr. Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh contends that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was the proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute, that that legislature alone knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone could say what kind of legislation could effectively achieve the end in view and would help in the grow more food campaign and would help for bringing in fallow land under the plough and that this Court sitting at this great distance could not judge by its own yardstick of reason whether the restrictions imposed in the circumstances of the case were reasonable or not.

This argument runs counter to the clear provisions of the Constitution. The determination by the legislature of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final or conclusive ; it is subject to the supervision by this Court.

In the matter of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court watches and guards the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and in exercising its functions it has the power to set aside an Act of the Legislature if it is in violation of the freedoms guaran. teed by the Constitution, We are therefore of opinion

9ij

SUI'REM:E COURT RE.PORTS (1950]

that the impugned statute does not stand the test of reasonableness and is therefore void.

Chi.'IJ-tama:n Rao

The result therefore is that the orders issued by the Tiu State of Depl, lty Commissioner on 13th June 1950 and 26th

Mndhya September 1950 are void, inoperative and ineffective.

Prad•.••· We therefore direct the respondents not to enforce the

M, ah.ajan J.

Nov. li.

provisions contained in section 4 of the Act agan.st the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. The pet1ttone>s

will have their costs of these proceedings in the two petitions.

Agent for the petitioners Rajinder Narain.

Petitions allowed.

m Nos. 78 and 79:

Agent for the respondent m

P.A. lv/hta.

RAM GOPAL

II.

Nos. 78 and 79:

NAND LAL AND OTHERS

[SAIYID FAZL Au, MUKHERJEA and CHANDRA-

SEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]

Hindu Law-Gift to female owner-Construction-Gift for maintenance-Estate conveyed, whether absolute or limited-Use of

the word 'Malik', effect of. ·

In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered but tbat is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed.

To convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of a.lienaticn need be given ; it is enough if words of such amplit11de are used as would convey full rights of ownership.

The term 'Malik' when used in a will or other document as descriptive of the position which a. devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of lull proprietary rights, including a. full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such f11ll 11roprietory rights were not intended to

be conferred,

RAO

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

SHRI HARILAL KANIA, C.J.

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

MUKHERJEA

DAS

CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ

Central Provinces and Berar Regulation

ss. 8, 4

Constitution of India

Art. 19(1)(g), 19(6)

Constitution of India

Buch

Art. 32

Art. 19

S.

1

Art. 19

Art. 19

Art. 19

Supreme Court

Art. 19

article 32

Constitution of India

G. N. Joshi

S. M. Sikri

MahajanJ.

MAHAJAN

article 19

Constitution of India

Madhya Pradesh

19th October 1948

Sections 3 and 4

Deputy Commissioner

13th June 1950

Sagar

article 32

8th October to 18th November 1950

29th September 1950

Article 19

Ohintaman Rao

article 19

lakajan

Berar Act LXIV of 1948

Sections 3 and 4

section 7

article 19

Mahajan

article 19

article 19

article 19

Chintomon Rao

Mohainn J. business

Sikri

Government of Madhya Pradesh

legislature of Madhya Pradesh

section 4

Rajinder Narain

RAM GOPAL

NAND LAL

SAIYID FAZL Au

CHANDRA-

SEKHARA AIYAR