May26.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ROMESH THAPPAR

I/.

THE STATE OF MADRAS [SHR1 HAR1LAL KANIA C. J., SA1Y1D FAZL Au,

PATANJALI ~ASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.]

[1950}

Constitution of India, Art. 19, els. {I) (a) and (2), 32-Application under Art. 32-Preliminary ob1ection-Fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression-Law imposing restrictions for securing public order and maintenance of public safety-Validity-- Seuerability of Act-Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act tXXXIll of 1949), s. 9 ( 1-A)-Validity.

Held, by the Full Court (i) (overruling o preliminary objections) -TJnder the Constitution the Supreme Court is constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, con sistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking prota:tion against infringement of such right$,. although such applications are made to the Court in the first instance without resort to a High Court having concurrent juris-diction in the matter.

Urguhar v. Brown (205 U. S. 179.) and Hooney v. Kolohan (294 U. S. 103) distinguished.

(ii) Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propogation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation.

Ex parte /ackson (96 U. S. 727) and Lovell v. City of Griffin (303 U. S. 444) referred to.

Held per

KANIA

C. J.,

PATANJAL.I SAsTRJ,

MEHR CttAND

MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs IJ.-(FAzL Au J. dissenting):

(i) Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a law restricting freedom of speech and expressiofi is directed solely against the undermining of the: st:curity of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of the Art. 19 of the Constitution, although the restrictions \vhich it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. Section 9 0-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXXlll of 1949, which authorises impositions of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under cl. (2) and is therefore void and unconstitutional; (ii) Where a la\\' purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in langauge wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative actiOft. affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so I far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is1 not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled o~

it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Section 9 (1-A) is therefore wholly unconstitutional and void.

Per FAZL Au J.-Rcstrictions which s. 9 (1-A) authorised arc within the provisions of cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution and s. 9 (1-A) is not therefore uncoqstitutional or void. (1)

Brij BhuJhan and Another v. The State (1950) S.C.R. 60) referred to. . .

ORIGINAL Ju&Is01c110N: Petition No. XVI of 1950.

Application under article 32 of the Constitution for a. writ of prohibition and certiorari.

The facts are set out in the judgment.

C. R. Pattabhi Ra1nan, for the petitioner.

K. Rajah Ayyar, Advocate-Gene; al of Madras, (Ganapathi Ayyar, with him) fQr the opposite party.

1950. May 26. The Judgment of Kania C. J., Mehr Chand ~1ahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ. Was delivered by Patanjali Sastri, J. Fazl Ali. J. delivered a separate judgment.

PATANJALI SASTRI J.-The petitioner is the printer, publisher and editor of a recently started weekly journal in English called Cross. Roads printed and published in Bombay.

The Government of Madras, the respondents herein, in exercise of their powers under section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) purported to issue an order No. MS. 1333 dated 1st March, 1950, whereby they imposed a ban upon the entry and circulation of the journal in that State. The order was published in the Fort St.

George Gazette and the notification ran as follows :-

"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXlII of 1949) His Excellency the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of securring the public safety and the maintenance of puolic order, it is necessary so to do, hereby prohibits, with effect on and from the, date of publication of this order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross

Roads an English weekly published at Bombay."

The petitioner cl; iims that the said order contravenes the fundamental right of the petitioner to freedom of . (1) Sec the .headnote to Brij Bhus.%an v. The Stale of Delhi, p. 60~ Infra. 6-5 S. C. India 1N.Dl 58

Ramesh Thappar.

The Stat• a} Madras.

Patanjali

Sast1iJ.

R..., sh 1'happar

T "- Slau of

Madras.

Palanjali Sastri].

speech and expression conferred on him by article 19 ( 1) (a) of the Constitution and he challenges the validity of section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act as being void undr article 13 ( 1) of the Constitution by reason of its being inconsistent with his fundamental right aforesaid.

The Advocate-General of Madras appearmg on behalf of the respondents raised a prelimmary objection, not indeed to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application under article 32, but to the petitioner resorting to this Court directly for such relief in the first instance. He contended that, as a matter of orderly procedure, the petitioner should first resort to the High Court at Madras which under article 226 of the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He cited criminal revision petitions under section 435 ot the Criminal Procedure Code, applications for bail and applications for transfer under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code as instances where, concurrent jurisdiction having been given in certain matters to the High Court and the Court of a lower grade, a rule of practice has been established that a party should proceed first to the latter Court for relief before resorting to the High Court. He referred to Emperor v.

Bishes11Jar Prasad Sinha( 1 ) where such a rule of practice was enforced in a criminal revision case, and called our attention also to certain American decisions Urquhart v.

Brown(') and Hooney v.

Kolohan( ') as showing that the Supreme Court of the United States ordinarily required that whatever judicial remedies remained open to the applicant in Federal . ancl State Courts should be exhausted before the remedy in the Supreme Court-be it habeas corpus or certiorariwould be allowed.

We are of opinion that neither the instances mentioned by the learned Advocate-General nor the American decisions referred to by him are really analogous to the remedy afforded by article 32 of the Indian Constitution. That article does not merely confer power on this Court, as article 226 does on the

(') I. L, R. 56 All. l58. i'j 20s u. 5. 179.

(') 294 U.S. W

High Courts, to issue certain writs for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose, as part of its general jurisdiction.

In that case it would have been more appropriately placed among articles 131 to 139 which define that jurisdiction. Article 32 provides a "guaranteed" remedy for the enforcement of those rights, and this remedial right is itself made a fundamental right by being included in Part UL This Court is thus constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection

again.t infringements of such rights. No similar provision is to be found in the Constitution of the United States and we do not consider that the American decisions are in point.

Turning now to the merits, there can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that . freedom is ensurt:d / by the freedom of circulation. "Liberty of circulation is as esscn tia I to that freedom as the liberty of publication.

Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value". Ex parte fackso11(1 ). Sec also Lovell v. City of Griffin( 2). It is therefore perfectly clear that the order of the Government of Madras would be a Yiolation of the petitioner's fundamental right under article 19(1) (a), unless section 9 (I-A) of the impugned Act under which it was made is saved by the reservations mentioned in clause (2) of article 19 w!iich (omitting immaterial words regarding laws relating to libel, slander, etc., with which we are not concemed in this case) saves the operation of any "existing law in so far as it relates to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State." The question accordingly arises whether the impugned Act, in so far as it purpo:-ts by section 9(1-A) to authorise the Provincial Government "for the purpose of ''ecming the public safety or tlie maintenance of public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into

( 1) 96 u, s. 727.

(') 303 U.S. 444.

Romesh T happar v.

The Stale of Madras.

Patanjali Sastri, J.

Ronush T happar v.

Tiu State of

Madras.

Patanjali Sastri, J.

or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of documents" is a "law relating. to any matter which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the State."

. The impugned Act was passed by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon it by section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act, which comprises among other matters, "public order." Now "public order" is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among titc members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the government which they have established.

Although section 9 (1-A) refers to "securing the public

safety" and "the maintenance of public order" as distinct purposes, it must be taken that "public safety" is used as a part of the wider concept of public order, for, if public safety were intended to signify any matte1 distinct from and outside the content of the expression "public order," it would not have been competent for the Madras Legislature to enact the provision so far as it relates to public safety. This indeed was not disputed on behalf of the respondents.

But it was urged that the expression "public safety" in the impugned Act, which is a statute relating to law and order, means the security of the Province, and, therefore, "the security of the State" within the meaning of article 19 (2) as "the State" has been defined in article 12 as including, among other things, the Government and the Legislature of each of the erstwhile Provinces.

Much reliance was placed in support of this view on Rex v. Wormwood Scrubbs Prison(') where it was held that the phrase "for securing the public. safety and the defence of the realm" in section I of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, was not limited to securing the cuntry against a foreign foe but included also protection against internal disorder such as a rebellion. The decision is not of much assistance to the respondents as the context in

(') L.R. [1920] 2 K.B. 305.

which the words "public safety" occurred in that Act showed unmistakably that the security of the State was the aim in view. Our attention has not been drawn to any definition of the expression "public safety," nor does it appear that the words have acquired an.y technical signification as words of art.

"Public safety" ordinarily means security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as securing , public safety . . The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the context. In the classification of offences in the Indian Penal Code, for instance, Chapter XIV enumerates the "offences affecting the public health, safety, convenience, decency, and morals" and it includes rash driving or riding on a public way (section 279) and rash navigation of a vessel (section 280), among others, as offences against public safety, while Chapter VI lists waging war against the Queen (section 121), sedition (section 124-A) etc. as "offences against the State", because they are calculated to undermine or affect the security of the State, and Chapter. VIII defines "offences against the public tranquillity" which include unlawful assembly (section 141) rioting (section 146), prmoting enmity between classes (section 153-A), affray (section 159) etc. Although in the context of a statute relating to law and order "securing public safety" may not include the securing of public health, it may well mean securing the public against rash driving on a public way and the like, and not necessarily the security of the State.

It was said that an enactment which provided for drastic remedies like preventive detention and ban on newspapers must be taken to relate to matters affecting the security of the State rather than trivial offences like rash driving or an affray.

But whatever ends the impugned Act. may have been intended to subserve, and whatever aims its framers may have had in view, its application and scope cannot, in the absence of limiting words in the statute itself, be restricted to those aggravated forms of prejudicial activity which are calculated to

Romnh T hap/HJ

The S1aJe of Madras.

PaJanjali Sastri, J.

Ro""'h Thappar

The Stall of

Madras.

Patanjali Sastri, J.

endanger the security of the State. Nor is there any guarantee that those authorised to exercise the powers under the Act will in using them discriminate between those who act prejudicially to the security of the State and those who do not.

The Government of India Act, 1935, nowhere used the expression "security of the State" though it made provision under section 57 for dealing with crimes of violence intended to overthrow the Government.

While the administration of law and order including the maintenance of public order was placed in charge of a Minister elected by the people, the Governor was entrusted with the responsibility of combating the operations of persons who "endangered the peace or tranquillity of the Province" by committing or attempting "to commit "crimes of violence intended to overthrow the Government."' Similarly, article 352 of the Constitution empowers the President to make a.

Proclamation of Emergency when he is satisfied that the "security of India or any part of the territory thereof is thratene<l by war or bv external aggression or by internal disturbance." These provisions recognise that disturbance of public peace or tranquillity may assume such grave proportions as to threaten the security of the State.

As Stephen in his Criminal Law of England ( 1 ) observes : "Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly defined boundaries. All of them have in common one feature, namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least bv the show and threat of it." Though all these offences thus involve disturbances of public tranqua.

lity and are in theory offences against public order, the difference between them being only a difference of degree, yet for the purpose of grading the punishment to be inflicted in respect of them they may be classified into different minor categories as has been done by (')Vol. TT, p. 242.

the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the Constitutiop., in formulating the varying criteria for permissible legislation imposing restrictions on the fundamental rights enumerated in article 19 (1), has placed in a distinct category those offences against public order which aim at undermining the security of the State or overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole justification for legislative abridgement of. freedom of speech and expression, that is to say, nothing lcrs than endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the right of peaceable assembly "sub-clause (b )" and the right of association "sub-clause ( c)" may be restricted under clauses ( 3) and ( 4) of article 19 in the interests of "public order", which in those clauses includes the security of the State.

The differentiation is also noticeable in Entry 3 of List Ill (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule, which refers to the "security of a State" and "maintenartce . of public order". as. distinct subjects of legislation.

Th~ Constittio~ thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance, treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in kind.

It is also worthy of note that the word "sedition" which occurred in article ,13 (2) of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the article was finally passed as article 19 (2).

In this connection it may be recalled that the Federal Court had, in defining sedition in Niharendtt Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor( 1), held that "the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency'', but the Privy Council overruled that

(1) [1912] F.C.R. 38.

llomesh ThaptmT

The Stale oj

Madras.

Patlllijali Sastri, ].

Tlw S<a1< ef

Matku.

P°'flllia/i Sanri, ].

decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak's case( 1 ) to the effect that "the offence consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small"-· King Emperor v.

Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao (').

Deletion of the word "sedition" from the draft article 13 (2), therefore, shows that criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground . for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State.

It is also significant that the corresponding Irish formula of "undermining the public order or the authority of the State" [article 40 (6) (i) of the Constitution of Eire, 1937] did not apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian Constitution. Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is pos, ible. A freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse.

But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected, with Madison who was "the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution," that "it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits": [Quoted in Near v. Mi1111esotta (')].

We are therefore of opinion that unless a law restricting freedom of speech '11<1 expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of article 19, although the

( 1) 22 Botn. 112.

(z) L.R. 74 I. . .\. $9.

') 282 U.S. 607. 717-8

restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been conceived generally in the interests of public order. It follows that section 9 (1-A) which authorises imposition of restrictions for the wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause (2), and is therefore void and unconstitutional.

It was, however, argued that section 9 (1-A) could not he considered wholly void, as, under article 13(1 ), an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right is void only to the extent of the inconsistency and no more. In so far as the securing of the public safety or the maintenance of public order would include the security of the State, the impugned provision, as applied to the latter purpose, was covered by clause (2) of article 19 and must, it was said, be held to he valid. We are unable to accede to this contention. 'Vhere a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the lirpits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting_ such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as if may be applied within the constitutional limits, a:s it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.

In other words, clause (2) of article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved, an enactment, which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise, cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to any extent.

The application is therefore allowed and the order of the respondents prohibiting the entry and circulatton of the petitioner's journal in the State of Madras is hereby quashed.

FAZL Au J.-For the reasons given by me in B1'ij Bhushan and Another v. The State( t ), which practically

( 1) [19:0] S.C.R. 601.

Romesh T happat

The Slate of Madras.

Patanjali Sastri, ].

Fal Ali ].

Ronush Thappar

Ti.. Sia/I of

Madras.

Fad Ali,].

involves the same question as is involved in this case,.

I hold that the reliefs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted. In this view, I would dismiss this . petition, but I should like to add a few observations to supplement what I have said in the other case.

It appears to me that in the ultimate analysis the real question to be decided in this case is whether

"disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province" and ailecting "public safety" will be a matter which undermines the security of the

State or not.

I have borrowed the words quoted within inverted commas from the preamble of the Act which shows its scope and necessity and the question raised before us attacking the validity of the Act must be formulated in the manner I have suggested.

If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, as

I think it must be, then the impugned law which prohibits entry into the State of Madras of "any document or class of documents" for securing public safety and maintenance ofpublic order ,, hould satisfy the requirements laid down in article 19 (2) of the Constitution. From the trend of the arguments addressed to us, it would appear that if a document is seditious, its entry could be validly prohibited, because sedition is a matter which undermines the security of the State ; but if, on the other hand, the document is calculated to disturb public tranquillity and affect public safety, its entry cannot be prohibited, because public disorder and disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State. Speaking for myself, I cannot understand this argument.

In Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State( 1), I have quoted good authority to show that sedition owes its gravity to its tendency to create disorders and an authority on criminal law like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an offence against public tranquillity. If so, how could sedition be a matter which would undermine the security of the State and public disorders and disturbance of public safety will not be such a matter? It was argued that a small riot or a affray will not

(1) [19;0) S.C.R. 605.

) -!

undermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer :- ( 1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There arc degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also ahd an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, frotn the layman's point of view, be -a matter which undermines the securitv of the State, but that would not affect the law whih aims at checking sedition.

It was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another.

We are here concerned with the latter aspect only.

I shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the subject in the connected cse.

Petition allotved.

Agent for the petitioner :-K. /. Kale.

Agent for the opposite party :-P. A. Mehta.

BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER

ti.

THE STATE OF DELHI. [SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,

PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India. A1t. 19. els. (I )(a) and (2)-Fundamental right of freedom of speech and expreuion-Law imposing pre-censorship on newspapers for securing public safety and preventing public disorder-Validity-Matter disturbing public safety or causing public disorder, whether "undermines the secutity of, or tends to overthrow, the State"-Scope of Art. 19. cl. (2)-East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, sec. 7 (I) (c)-Validity.

Section 7 (I) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that "the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing adGresscd to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a

Romtsh T hap/HJ•

The Stau qf

Madras.

Faz.I Ali,].

1950 May 26.

ROMESH THAPPAR

THE STATE OF MADRAS

SHR1 HAR1LAL KANIA

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

MuKHERJEA

DAs JJ.

Constitution of India

Art. 19

Art. 32

s. 9

Supreme Court

S. 179

S. 103

S. 727

S. 444

Art. 19

Section 9

Section 9

s. 9

art. 19

s. 9

article 32

C. R. Pattabhi Ra1nan

K. Rajah Ayyar

Ganapathi Ayyar

Kania

Mehr Chand

Mukherjea

Das

Patanjali Sastri

Fazl Ali

PATANJALI SASTRI

Government of Madras

section 9(1-A)

1st March, 1950

section 9

Madras

Bombay

Ramesh Thappar

Palanjali Sastri

article 19

section 9

article 13

article 32

High Court at Madras

article 226

section 435

section 24

Supreme Court of the United States

article 32

article 226

articles 131 to 139

Article 32

United States

Government of Madras

article 19(1)

section 9

article 19

section 9(1-A)

s. 727

S. 444

section 100

Government of India Act, 1935

section 9

Madras Legislature

article 19

article 12

Indian Penal Code

section 279

section 280

section 121

section 124

section 141

section 146

section 153

section 159

PaJanjali Sastri

Government of India Act, 1935

section 57

article 352

India

Stephen

England

Indian Penal Code

article 19

article 19

Seventh Schedule

article 19

[1912] F.C.R. 38

llomesh ThaptmT

Tilak

article 13

article 40

Madison

article 19

S. 607

section 9

section 9

article 13(1 )

article 19

article 19

FAZL Au

Romesh T

article 19

James Stephen

-P. A. Mehta

BRIT BHUSHAN

STATE OF DELHI

HARILAL KANIA

SAIYID FAZL Au

MuxHERJEA

Constitution of India

Art. 19

East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949

sec. 7

Section 7

East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949

Delhi


) -!

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 605

undermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer :- ( 1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There arc degrees of gravity in the offence of sedition also ahd an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one insignificant individual may not also, frotn the layman's point of view, be -a matter which undermines the securitv of the State, but that would not affect the law whih aims at checking sedition.

It was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another.

We are here concerned with the latter aspect only.

I shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the subject in the connected cse.

Petition allotved.

Agent for the petitioner :-K. /. Kale.

Agent for the opposite party :-P. A. Mehta.

BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER

ti.

THE STATE OF DELHI. [SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL Au,

PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuxHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India. A1t. 19. els. (I )(a) and (2)-Fundamental right of freedom of speech and expreuion-Law imposing pre-censorship on newspapers for securing public safety and preventing public disorder-Validity-Matter disturbing public safety or causing public disorder, whether "undermines the secutity of, or tends to overthrow, the State"-Scope of Art. 19. cl. (2)-East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, sec. 7 (I) (c)-Validity.

Section 7 (I) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that "the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing adGresscd to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a

Romtsh T hap/HJ•

The Stau qf

Madras.

Faz.I Ali,].

1950 May 26.

Brij Bhus""' &I

A'1t1lhtr

T Ju S1au ef

n.lhi.

particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for crutiny." Held per KANIA

C. J.,

PATANJALI S1i.sTRI,

MEHR

CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHERJEA and DAs

JJ.-(FAZL ALI J. dissenting) that inasumch as s. 7 ( l) ( c) authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution for the pur- pose of preventing activities prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order, it was not a law relating to "a matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the Stace'' within the meaning of the saving provisions contained in

cl. (2) of art. 19 and was therefore µnconstitutional and void.

[Romesh Thappm v. The State 1950 S.C.R. 594] followed.

Per FAZL ALI J.-The expression "public safety"_ has, as a result of a long course of legislative practice acquired a wellrccognised meaning and may be taken to denote safety, or security of the State; and, though the expression "public order" is wide enough to cover small disturbances of the peace which do not jeopardise the security of the State yet, prominence given in the Act to public safety, the fact that the Act is a piece of special legislation providing for special measures and the aim and scope of the Act in general, show that preservation of public safety is the dominant purpose of the Act~ and .. public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as "public tranquillity".

Public J disorders which disturb the public ranquillity do undermine the security of the State and as s. 7 ( 1) ( c) of the impugned Act is aimed at preventing such disorders it is difficult to hold that it falls outside the ambit of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.

Held by the Full Court.-The imposition of pre<ensorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential "part of the right to freedom 0:£ speech and expression declared by art. 19 (1) (a). Blackstone's Commentaries referred .to.

ORIGINAL JuR1SDICTioN : PETITION No. XXIX of 1950.

Application under article 32 of the.

Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari and prohibition. The facts are stated in the judgment.

N. C. Chatterjee ( B. Banerji, with him) for the petitioner.

 M.

Setaluad, Attorney-Geneal for India, (S. M.

Sikri, with him) for the respondent.

1950. May 26. The judgment of Kania C. J ., Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das

JJ. was delivered by Patanjali Sastri J.

FAZL Au J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment.

PATANJALI SAsTR1 J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition to the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, with a view to examine the legality of and quash the order made by him in regard to an English weekly of Delhi called the Organizer of which the first applicant is the printer and publisher, and the second is the editor. On 2nd March, 1950, the respondent, in exercise of powers conferred on him by section 7 ( 1) ( c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which has been extendtd to the Delhi Province and is hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, issued the following order : "Whereas the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, is satisfied that -Organizer, an English weekly of Delhi, has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action as is hereinafter mentioned is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order.

Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, - i949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K. R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till fyrther orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, viz., Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of America to the Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintendent of Press

Branch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. on working days."

The only point argued before us relates to the constitutional validity of section 7 (1) ( c) of the impugned Act which, as appears from its preamble, was passed "to provide special measures to ensure . public safety

19j0

Brij B/Uu1- Ill

AltOllttr

Tlw Slau of

D1/hi.

PolaNjali &slri, J.

llr{i Bhushan &

Anollur.

The State of

Delhi.

Palanjali S, utri, .7

608 SUPREMl<: COURT REPORTS [1950]

and maintenance of public order." Section 7 ( 1) ( c) under which the aforesaid order purports to have been made reads (so far as material here) as follows :-

'The Provincial Government or any authority authorised by 1t 111 this behalf if satisfied tht such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing addressed to a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny."

The petitioners claim that this provision infringes the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression conferred upon them by article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution inasmuch as it authorises the imposition of a restriction on the publication of the journal which is not justified under clause (2) of that article.

There can be little doubt that the imposition of precensorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of-the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by article 19(1) (a). As pointed out by Blackstone in his Commentaries "the liberty of the press consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undonbted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public ; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press(').

The only question therefore is whether section 7 (l)(c) which anthorises the imposition of such a restriction falls within the reservation o[ caluse (2) of article 19.

As this question turns on comit!erations which are essentiallv the .<ame as those on which our decision in Petition No. XVI of 1950(') wJ' based, our judgment in that case concludes the present case also.

Accordingly, for the reasons in\licated in that judgment, we allow this petition and hereby quash the impugned order of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, dated the 2nd March, 1950.

(1) Blackstone's Comn:.cntaries, Vol. IV~ pp. 151, 152. (') Romtsh Thappar v. The State of Madras, supra p. 594.

1950 FAUL Au J.-Tlie question raised in the , case relates to the validity of section 7(1) (c) of the East Punjab

Public Safety Act, 1949 (as extended to the Province of Delhi); which . runs as follows:-

Brij Bliusltan &

.dllllllrlr

"The Proyincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may, by order 'tn

writing addressed to a printer, publisher or editor- • •

(c) require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny ;"

It should be noted that the provisio11s of sub-clause ( c) are not in gen!=ral terms but are confined to a "particular subject or . class of subjects," and that having regard to the context in which these words are used, they must be connected with "public . safety or the maintenance of public order." ·

The petitioners, on whose behalf this provision is assailed, are respectively the printer (and publisher) , and ditor of ·. an English weekly . of Delhi called Orgamzer, and they pray for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition .. to the Chief Conimissioner, .

Delhi, with . a view "to examine . and review the" lelity" of and "restrain the operation" . of . and "quash" the' ·

order made by him on the 2nd March, 1950, under ·. the .

impugned section, directing · them ~to . · submit . • for scrutiny, in duplicate, before . publication, till : further orders, all communal matter and news and · . views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or SUp-' . plied by the news agencJ.es .... " The order in question

recites, among other things that the Chief Comn:iis-;

sioner is satisfied that the Organizer has been publishing highly • objectionable . matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action to which refer(\ .ce has been made is necssary for the purpose of ' preventing or combating activities

TIM Stat. 'If

IM!ri.

Fazl JfliJ.

T h4 Sra/6 of

D1lhi.

/ia<I illi, ].

prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that notwithstanding these recitals the order complained against is liable to be quashed, because it amounts to an infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 ( l) (a) of the Constitution. Articles 19 ( l) (a) and (2), -which are to be read together, runs as follows :-

"19. (1) All citizens shall have the right- ( a) to freedom of speech and expression ;

" " "

(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any Law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of

Cout or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State."

It is contended that section 7 ( l) ( c) of the Act, under which the impugned order has been made, cannot be saved by clause (2) of article 19 of the Constitution, because it does not relate to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. Thus the main ground of attack is that the impugned law is an infringement of a fundamental right and is not saved by the so-called saving clause to which reference has been made.

There can be no doubt that to impose pre-censorship on a journal, such as has been ordered by the Chief Commissioner in this case, is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is included in the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, and the only question which we have therefore to decide is whether clause (2) of article 19 stands in the way of the petitioners.

The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, of which section 7 is a part, was passed by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon 1t by section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is

read with Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act, which includes among other matters "public order." This . expression in the general sense may be construed to have reference to the maintenance of what is generally known as law and order in the Province, and this is confirmed by the words which follow it in Entry 1 of List II and which have been put within brackets, viz., "but not including the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power." It is clear that anything which affects public . tranquillity within the State or the Province will also affect public order and the State Legislature is therefore competent . to frame laws on matters relating to public tranquillity and public order. It was not disputed that under the Government of India Act, 1935 (under which the impugned Act was passed) . it was the responsibility of each Province to deal with all . internal disorders whatever their magnitude may be and to preserve public tranquillity and order within the Province.

At this stage, it will be convenient to consider the meaning of another expression "public safety" which is used throughout the impugned Act and which is also chosen by its framers for its title.

This expression, though it has been variously used in different contexts (see the Indian Penal Code, .Ch. XIV), has not acquired a well-recognized meaning in relation to an Act like the impugned Act, as a result of a long course of legislative practice, and may be taken to denote safety or security of the State. In this sense, it was used in the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, as well as the Defence of India Act, and this is how it was judicially interpreted in Rex v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison (1 ). T4e headnote of this case runs as follows :-

"By section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, power was given to His Majesty in Council 'during the continuance of the present war to issue regulations ...... for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm' :-

(1)[1 !)l!o) 2 K. B. 305. 7-s s. c. India (N.D.)/58

Brjj Bhushan &

Another

The State of Delhi.

Fa-i:l Ali J.

Brjj Bhushan (JI

Another

The Slate of

Delhi

foci Ali].

Held, that the regulations thereby authorized were not limited to regulations for the protection of the country against foreign enemies, but included regulations designed for the prevention of internal disorder and rebellion."

Thus 'public order' and 'public safety' are allied matters, but, in order to appreciate how they stand in relation to each other, it seems best to direct our attention to the opposite concepts which we may, for convenience of reference, respectively label as 'public disorder' and 'public unsafety'. 1f 'public safety' is, as we have seen, equivalent to 'security of the State', what I have designated as public unsafety may be regarded as equivalent to 'insecurity of the State'.

When we approach the matter in this way, we find that while 'public disorder' is wide enough to cover a small riot or an affray and other cases where peace is disturbed. by, or affects, a small group of persons, 'public unsafety' (or insecurity of the State), will usually be connected with serious internal disorders and such disturbances of public tranquillity as jeopardize the security of the State.

In order to understand the scope of the Act, it will be necessary to note that in the Act "maintenance of public order" always occurs in juxtaposition with "public safety", and the Act itself is called ''The East Punjab Public Safety Act." The prominence thus given to 'public safety' strongly suggests that the Act was intended to deal with serious cases of public disorder which affect public safety or the security of the State, or cases in which, owning to some kind of emergency or a grave situation having arisen, even public disorders of comp?ratively small dimensions may have far-reaching effects on the , security of the State. It is to be noted that the Act purports to provide "special measures to ensure public safety and maintenance of public order." The words "special measures" are rather important, because they show that the Act was not intended for ordinary cases or ordinary situations. The ordinary cases are provided for by the Penal Code and other existing laws, and

with these the Act which purports to be of a temporary Act is not apparently concerned. It is concerned with special measures which would presumably be required for special cases or special situations.

Once this important fact is grasped and the Act is viewed in the proper perspective, much of the confusion which has been created in the course of the arguments will disappear. The line of argument advanced on behalf of the pc;_titioners is that since the Act has been passed in exercise ' of the power granted by the expression "public order," used in the Government of India Act, which .is a general term of wide import, and since it purports to provide for the maintenance of public order, its provisions are intended or are liable to be used for all cases of breaches of public order, be they small or insignificant breaches or those of a grave or serious nature. This is, in my opinion, approaching the case from a wrong angle. The Act is a piece of special legislation providing for special measures and the central idea dominating it is public safety and maintenance of public order in a situation requiring special measures.

It was argued that "public safety" and "maintenance of public order" are used in the Act disjunctively and they are separated by the word "or" and not "and," and therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of the Act providing for ordinary as well as serious cases of disturbance of public order and tranquillity. This, as I have already indicated, is a somewhat narrow and tf'chnical approach to the question. In construing the Act, we must try to get at its aim and purpose, and before the Act is declared to be invalid, we must see whether it is capable of being so construed as to bear a reasonable meaning consistent with its validity.

We therefore cannot ignore the fact that preservation of public safety is the dominant purpose of the Act and that it is a special Act providing for special measures and therefore it should not be confused with an Act which is applicable to ordinary situations and to any and every trivial case of breach of public order.

Brij B/iusfian Cl>

Anolhn

T fie State of

Delhi.

Fiu:l Ali J.

hrjj B/slulian 6f .....,,.,,

Tiu S1au of

INlhi.

Faz.I Ali].

In my opinion, the word "or" is us¢d here not so much to separate two wholly different c'Oncepts as to show that they are closely allied concepts and can be used almost interchangeably in the context. I think that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as public tranquillity and the words "public safety" and "public order" may be read as equivalent to "security of the State" and "public tranquillity."

I will now advert once more to clause (2) of article 19 and state what I consider to be the reason for inserting in it the words "matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State." It is well recognized in all systems of law that the right to freedom of speech and expression or freedom of the press means that any person may write or say what he pleases so long as he does not infringe the law relating to libel or slander or to blasphemous, obscene or seditious words or writings : (see Halsb\lfy' s Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Vol. II, page 391).1 This is practically what has been said in clause (2) of article 19, with this difference only that instead of using the words "law relating to sedition," the framers of the Constitution have used the words mentioned above.

It is interesting to note that sedition was mentioned in the original draft of the Constitution, but subsequently that word was dropped and the words which I have quoted were inserted. I think it is not difficult to discover the reason for this change and I shall briefly state in my own words what I consider it to be.

, The latest pronouncement by the highest Indian tribunal as to the law of sedition is to be found in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v.

The King(') which has been quoted again and again and in which Gwyer C. J. laid down that public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or likehood of public disorder, is the gist of the offence of sedition and "the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or

(1) [194•] •. c. ll, 38.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS. 61~

must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency." For this. view, the learned Chief Justice relied on certain observations of Fitzgerald J. in R. v. Sullivan(1)1, and he also added that he was content to adopt "the words 6£ tliat learned Judge which are to be found in every book dealing with' this branch of the criminal

law." There is no doubt that what Gwyer C. J. has stated in that case repre8ents the view of a number of Judges and authors and was also the view of Sir James Stephen in regard to whom Cave J. in his charge to the jury in a case relating to the law of sedition [R. v.

· Burns (1 ) said :-

"The law upon the question of what is seditious and what is not is to be found stated very clearly in a book by Stephen J. who has undoubtedly a greater kaowledge of criminal law than any other Judge who sits . upon the Bench, and what he has said upon the . $Ubject of sedition was submitted to the other Judges, who sometime back were engaged with him in drafting a criminal code, and upon their report the Commissioners say . that his statement of law appears to them to be stated accurately as it exi5"s at present."

The decision. of Gwyer C. J. held the field for several years until the Privy Council, dealing with a case under the Defence of India Rules, expressed the view in King Emperor v.

Sadhashiv Narayan Bhalerao (8 ) that the test laid down by thG learned Chief Justice . was not applicable in India where the offence under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code should be construed with reference to the words used in that section. They also added :-

''The word 'sedition' does not occur either in section 124A or in the Rule ; it is only found as a marginal note to section 124A, and Is not an operative part of the section, but merely provides the name by which the crime defined in the section will be known.

(1) [1868]'11 Cox. C.C. 44. (') [1886] 16. Cox. 355. (•) 74 I.A. 89.

Ul50

Brij Bhushan 6f

AllDl/ur ·

TlllS1ai. of

Dllhi.

Fa.ti Ali].

Brij Bhushan &

Anothlr

TJr. Stau qf

Delhi.

Fa:/ Ali]·

There can be no justification for restricting the contents of the section by the marginal note. In England there is no statutory definition of sedition ; its meaning and content have been laid down in many decisions, some of which are referred to by the Chief Justice, but these decisions are not relevant when you have a statutory definition of that which is termed sedition as we have in the present case.

Their Lordships are unable to find anything in the language of either section 124A or the Rule which could suggest that 'the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that this is their intention or tendency.' "

The framers .of the Constitution must have therefore found themselves face to face with the dilemma as to whether the word "sedition" should be used in article 19 (2) and if it was to be used in what sense it was to be used. On the one hand, they must have had before their mind the very widely accepted view supported by numerous authorities that sedition was essentially an offence agai11.st public tranquillity and was connected in some way or other with public disorder ; and, on the other hand, there was the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee that sedition as defined in the Indian Penal Code did not necessarily imply any intention or tendency to incite disorder.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that they decided not to use the word "sedition" in clause (2) but used the more general. words which cover sedition and everything else which makes sedition such a serious offence.

That sedition does undermine the security of the State is a matter which cannot admit of much doubt. That it undermines the security of the State usually through the medium of public disorder is also a matter on which eminent Judges and jurists are agreed.

Therefore it is difficult to hold that public disorder or disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State.

S.C.R.

SUJ?REME COURT REPORTS 617

It will not be out of place to quote here the following passage from Stephen's Criminal Law of England (Vol. If, pp. 242 and 243) :-

"It often happens, however, that the public peace is disturbed by offences which without tending to the subversion of the existing political constitution practically subvert the authority of the Government over a greater or less local area for a longer or shorter time.

The Bristol riots in 1832 and the Gordon riots in 1780 are instances of this kind.

No definite line. can be drawn between insurrections of this sort, ordinary riots, and unlawful assemblies. The difference between a meeting stormy enough to cause well-founded fear of a breach of the peace, and a civil war the result of which may determine the course of a nation's history for centuries, is a difference of degree. Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other, and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly defirute boundaries.

All of them haye in common one feature, namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least by the show and threat of it.

Another class of offences against public tranquillity are those in which no actual force is either employed or displayed, but in which steps are taken tending to cause it.

These are the formation of secret societies, seditious conspiracies, libels or words spoken.

Under these tcrnal public arranged.''

two heads all offences against the intranquillity of the State may be

This passage brings out two matters with remarkable clarity. It shows firstly that sedition is essentially an offence against public tranquillity and secondly that broadly speaking there are two classes of offences agaihst public tranquillity : (a) those accompanied by violence including disorders which

Brij BhushfJJI &

Anoth.r

The State of Delhi.

Fazl Ali J.

.Brij B.- l'I .,,..,,,,,

TA1St.u of

DI/Iii.

FatJ .Ali J.

affect tranquillity of a considerable number of persons or an extensive local area, and (b) those not accompaI).icd by violence but tending to cause it, such as seditious utterances, seditious conspiracies, etc.

Both these classes of offences are such as will undermine. the security of the State or tend to overthrow it if left unchecked, and, as I have tried to point out, there is a good deal of authoritative opinion in favour of the view that the gravity ascribed to sedition is due to the fact that it tends to seriously affect the tranquillity and security of .the tate. In principle, en, .it would not have been logical to Icfer to sedioon m clause (2) of article . 19 and omit matters .which are no less grave and which have equal potentiality for undermining the security of the State.

It appears that the framers of the Constitution preferred to adopt the logical course and have used the more general and basic words which are apt to cover sedition as well as other matters which are as detrimental to the security of the State as sedition.

If the Act is to be viewed as I have suggested, it is difficult to hold that section 7 ( 1) ( c) falls outside the ambit of article 19 ( 2). That clause clearlystates that nothing in clause ( 1) (a} shall affect the operation of any existing law relating to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. I have tried to show that public disorders and disturbance of public tranquillity do undermine the security of the State . and if the Act is a law aimed at preventing such disorders, it fulfils the requirement of the Constitution. It is needless to add that the word "State" has been defined in article 12 of the Constitution to include "the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of Jndia."

I find that section 20 of the impugned Act provides that the Provincial Government may by notification

declare that the whole or any part of the Province as may be specified in the notifiGation is a dangerously disturbed area. This provision has some bearing on the aim and object of the Act, and we cannot overlook it when considering its scope. It may be incidentally mentioned that we have been informed that, under this section, Delhi Province has been notified to be a "dangerously disturbed area."

It must be recognized that freedom of speech and expression is 'one of the most valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen bv the Constitution and should be jealously guarded by the Courts.

It must also be recognised that free political discussion is essential for the proper functioning of a democratic government, aad the tendency af modern jurists is to deprecate censorship though they all agree that "liberty of the press" is not to be confused with its "licentiousness." But the Constitution itself has prescribed . certain limits for the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression and this Court is only called upon to sec whether a particular case comes within those limits.

In my opinion, the law which is impugned is fully saved by article 19 (2) and if it cannot he successfully assailed it is not possible to grant the remedy which the petitioners arc seeking here.

As has been stated already, the order which is impugned in this case recites that the weekly Organizer has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat of public law and order" and that the action which it is proposed to take against the petitioners "is necessary for the. purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to public safety or . the maintenance of public order." These facts arc supported by an affidavit sworn by the Home .

Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who also states among other things that the order in question was passed by the Chief Commissioner in consultation with the C-cntral Press Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by the AU-India Newspaper Editors' Conference and is . composed of 8---5 S. C. India (N.D.J/58

Brij BJ111shtJ11 f.! btit,,,.

TllA Stnttef

D1/hi.

T t.. SlotL ef

Dll/O.

Ttll!l ,(Ji J.

reprcsentati ves of some of the lc;.ding papen such as The Hind•stao Times, Stausmtm, etc.

In my tipinion, there can be no doubt that the Chief Commissioner has purported to act in this case within the sphere within which he is pemiitted to act under the Jaw, and it is beyond the power of this Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners.

In these circumstances, I would dismiss the petitioners' application.

Petition allowed.

Agent for the petitioners : Ganpat RJli.

Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta.

QIPN-S1-5 S. C. Indi• (N. D.)/58.-27-2-59-500.

-K. /. Kale

-P. A. Mehta

BRIT BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF DELHI

SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J.

PATANJALI SASTRI

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN

DAs JJ

Constitution of India

Art. 19

East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949

sec. 7

Section 7

East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949

Delhi

Brij Bhus

MEHR

CHAND MAHAJAN

MuKHERJEA

DAs

s. 7

art. 19

art. 19

FAZL ALI

s. 7

Art. 19(2)

art. 19

Blackstone

article 32

Constitution of India

N. C. Chatterjee

B. Banerji

M.

Setaluad

S. M.

Sikri

Kania C.

Patanjali Sastri

Mehr Chand Mahajan

Mukherjea

Das

FAZL Au

PATANJALI SAsTR1

article 32

2nd March, 1950

section 7

East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949

section 7(1)(c)

Shankar Prasad

Brij Bhushan

K. R. Halkani

Pakistan

Press Trust of India

United Press of India

United Press of America

section 7

PolaNjali

Bhushan

State of

Delhi

Section 7

article 19(1)

article 19(1)

section 7

article 19

section 7(1)

Public Safety Act, 1949

Brij Bliusltan

Proyincial Government

Fazl JfliJ.

article 19

Articles 19

section 7

article 19

article 19

article 19

East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949

section 7

section 100

Government of India Act, 1935

Indian Penal Code

section 1

Brjj Bhushan

State of Delhi

Brjj Bhushan

Penal Code

article 19

England

article 19

Gwyer

Fitzgerald

James Stephen

Cave

Stephen

India

section 124A

Indian Penal Code

section 124A

section 124A

section 124A

article 19

Indian Penal Code

Bristol

Fazl Ali

FatJ .Ali

section 7

article 19

article 12

Parliament of India

Government of Jndia

section 20

article 19

C-cntral Press Advisory Committee

AU-India Newspaper Editors' Conference

Ganpat RJli

P. A. Mehta