[ { "candidate_id": "cand-sk-2023-parl-simecka-todova-audio", "title": "Synthetic Simecka and Todova vote-rigging audio", "country": "Slovakia", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2023 parliamentary election", "election_date": "2023-09-30", "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding", "manipulation_class": "voice_clone|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour", "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "unknown", "reach_status": "measured", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Canonical moratorium-timing case in which cloned private speech and leak framing constrained correction.", "main_caveat": "Amplifiers are known but the creator and state sponsor are not; SMER's victory is not evidence that the audio changed votes.", "source_urls": "https://cedmohub.eu/how-ai-generated-content-influenced-parliamentary-elections-in-slovakia-the-slovak-police-will-investigate-the-recording-for-a-third-time/|https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/beyond-the-deepfake-hype-ai-democracy-and-the-slovak-case/|https://vsquare.org/slovak-election-targeted-by-pro-kremlin-deepfake-hoax/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/6/b/563625_0.pdf", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-fr-2017-pres-macronleaks", "title": "MacronLeaks hack-and-leak and automated amplification", "country": "France", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2017 presidential election", "election_date": "2017-05-07", "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding", "manipulation_class": "selective_leaking|spoofed_media|bot_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour", "ai_role": "material_amplification", "generative_ai_status": "not_applicable", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "mixed", "reach_status": "measured", "behavioural_effect_status": "not_detected", "electoral_effect_status": "not_detected", "comparative_value": "High-evidence pre-generative-AI case of authentic stolen material, forgery, bot salience and blackout timing.", "main_caveat": "France's later GRU attribution is stronger at the cyber-campaign level than attribution of every forged item and amplifier; no individual causal vote estimate exists.", "source_urls": "https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/presse-et-ressources/decouvrir-et-informer/actualites/russie-attribution-de-cyberattaques-contre-la-france-au-service-de-renseignement-militaire-russe|https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The_Macron_Leaks_Operation-A_Post-Mortem.pdf|https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.00086|https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/french-warned-not-to-publish-emmanuel-macron-leaks", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-fr-2024-eu-lepen-nieces", "title": "Fake Le Pen family personas using face swaps and stolen influencer videos", "country": "France", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2024 European Parliament election", "election_date": "2024-06-09", "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding", "manipulation_class": "synthetic_video|synthetic_image|candidate_impersonation|paid_influence", "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "unknown", "reach_status": "measured", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Distinctive parasocial and false-kinship mechanism using synthetic personas rather than issue persuasion alone.", "main_caveat": "The operator is unknown, party involvement was denied and follower/view figures do not establish voter persuasion.", "source_urls": "https://www.euractiv.com/news/viral-deepfake-videos-of-le-pen-family-reminder-that-content-moderation-is-still-not-up-to-par-ahead-of-eu-elections/|https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2024/04/30/europeennes-quand-l-intelligence-artificielle-se-mele-a-la-campagne_6230817_823448.html|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections|https://incidentdatabase.ai/cite/737/", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-fr-2024-leg-macron-bonus-copycop", "title": "CopyCop fake Macron voting-bonus site and LLM content laundering", "country": "France", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2024 snap legislative election", "election_date": "2024-06-30", "research_status": "promote_with_reach_caveat", "manipulation_class": "spoofed_media|synthetic_text|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|candidate_impersonation", "ai_role": "supporting_tool", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "credibly_reported", "reach_status": "unknown", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Combines cloned institutional interface, fabricated inducement and exposed LLM prompts rewriting journalism at scale.", "main_caveat": "The corpus measures production, not audience; Russia-link is a strong research inference rather than final state attribution.", "source_urls": "https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/04/operation-targets-french-snap-elections-using-ai-generated-content/|https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/russian-disinformation-networks-ramp-up-attacks-on-european-elections.php|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-uk-2024-ge-x-botlike-network", "title": "High-volume bot-like X accounts amplifying Reform and pro-Kremlin themes", "country": "United Kingdom", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2024 general election", "election_date": "2024-07-04", "research_status": "promote_with_platform_corroboration", "manipulation_class": "bot_amplification|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour", "ai_role": "material_amplification", "generative_ai_status": "not_established", "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed", "attribution_status": "unknown", "reach_status": "estimated", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Useful account-level flooding case with explicit separation between estimated impressions, aligned exposure and electoral effect.", "main_caveat": "Bot-like is a behavioral classification, not X-confirmed automation; 150 million displays are non-unique modeled impressions and no party link was shown.", "source_urls": "https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/investigation-reveals-content-posted-by-bot-like-accounts-on-x-has-been-seen-150-million-times-ahead-of-the-uk-elections/|https://www.itv.com/news/2024-07-01/bot-like-x-accounts-having-oversized-influence-on-general-election-study|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-uk-2024-ge-nigeria-facebook-network", "title": "Nigeria-administered Facebook network using AI anti-immigration images", "country": "United Kingdom", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2024 general election", "election_date": "2024-07-04", "research_status": "promote_with_reach_caveat", "manipulation_class": "coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|synthetic_image|microtargeting|paid_influence", "ai_role": "mixed", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "platform_attributed", "reach_status": "qualitative", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Clear foreign-admin location and demographic-targeting case with strong counterevidence that gross follower counts represented UK reach.", "main_caveat": "Most followers were outside the UK and likely fake engagement; pro-Kremlin content does not establish Russian control and no Reform involvement was shown.", "source_urls": "https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-29/uk-election-pro-russian-facebook-pages-coordinating/104038246|https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-01/meta-shuts-down-pro-russian-facebook-pages-in-uk-elections/104045286|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-de-2025-bund-storm1516-rfbi", "title": "Storm-1516 and R-FBI synthetic witness and fake-news-site smears", "country": "Germany", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2025 Bundestag election", "election_date": "2025-02-23", "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding", "manipulation_class": "spoofed_media|synthetic_video|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification", "ai_role": "mixed", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "officially_attributed", "reach_status": "measured", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Strong official-attribution comparison combining synthetic witnesses, fake media infrastructure and domestic laundering.", "main_caveat": "German attribution is strong at Storm-1516 campaign level, while exact responsibility for every R-FBI asset and domestic amplifier must stay scoped; no effect was measured.", "source_urls": "https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/schwerpunkte/EN/disinformation/article-disinformation-hybrid-threat.html|https://alliance4europe.eu/storm-1516-german-elections|https://correctiv.org/en/fact-checking-en/2025/01/24/disinformation-operation-russian-meddling-in-german-election-campaign-exposed/|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-linked-ai-websites-aim-dupe-german-voters-study-finds-2025-01-23/", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-hu-2026-parl-proorban-tiktok-cio", "title": "Pro-Orban TikTok covert influence operation using generative-AI videos", "country": "Hungary", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2026 parliamentary election", "election_date": "2026-04-12", "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding", "manipulation_class": "synthetic_video|synthetic_image|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|candidate_impersonation", "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "platform_attributed", "reach_status": "measured", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Platform-confirmed CIO with synthetic anchors, experts, celebrities and approximately ten million views in a 2026 European election.", "main_caveat": "TikTok confirmed covert coordination but did not publicly identify the sponsor; the opposition landslide does not quantify or disprove attitudinal effects.", "source_urls": "https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/influence-campaign-uses-ai-tiktok-videos-to-boost-hungarys-viktor-orban|https://therecord.media/tiktok-removes-covert-networks-hungary-vote|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungarians-vote-landmark-election-closely-watched-by-eu-russia-us-2026-04-11/", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-sk-2024-pres-korcok-stb-hoax", "title": "Fabricated StB documents and fake-account amplification against Korcok", "country": "Slovakia", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2024 presidential election", "election_date": "2024-04-06", "research_status": "reserve_needs_platform_source", "manipulation_class": "spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|recommender_amplification", "ai_role": "material_amplification", "generative_ai_status": "not_established", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "credibly_reported", "reach_status": "measured", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Document-forgery and false-consensus comparison outside generative media.", "main_caveat": "Needs a platform or election-authority source and method review for fake-account classification; no foreign-state direction or vote effect established.", "source_urls": "https://vsquare.org/slovakia-election-ivan-korcok-peter-pellegrini-fake-accounts-facebook-hoax/", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-fr-2024-leg-zelenska-bugatti", "title": "Synthetic Bugatti dealership witness and fake Zelenska invoice", "country": "France", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2024 snap legislative election", "election_date": "2024-07-07", "research_status": "reserve_election_targeting_unproven", "manipulation_class": "synthetic_video|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour", "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "probable", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "credibly_reported", "reach_status": "measured", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "High-reach synthetic witness and fake-document operation with search-engine capture between election rounds.", "main_caveat": "Direct French-election targeting is unproven and much of the eighteen-million-view reach may have been international; keep outside the core tier.", "source_urls": "https://www.wired.com/story/ai-generated-russian-disinformation-zelensky-bugatti/|https://www.wral.com/archive/21508090/|https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/no-evidence-ukraines-first-lady-bought-bugatti-sportscar-paris-2024-07-13/", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-de-2025-bund-fake-ballots", "title": "Fabricated Leipzig and Hamburg ballot-suppression evidence", "country": "Germany", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2025 Bundestag election", "election_date": "2025-02-23", "research_status": "reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution", "manipulation_class": "spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|election_denial", "ai_role": "supporting_tool", "generative_ai_status": "not_established", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "alleged", "reach_status": "unknown", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Artifact-level example of staged physical evidence pre-loading a ballot-fraud interpretation.", "main_caveat": "Reach was limited or unreported and artifact-specific command attribution was not adjudicated; add platform metrics before promotion.", "source_urls": "https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundestagswahl/desinformation-russland-briefwahl-100.html|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-warns-russian-disinformation-targeting-election-2025-02-21/", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" }, { "candidate_id": "cand-hu-2026-parl-fidesz-execution-ad", "title": "Fidesz generative-AI execution-scene campaign advertisement", "country": "Hungary", "region": "Europe", "election_name": "2026 parliamentary election", "election_date": "2026-04-12", "research_status": "boundary_official_campaign_content", "manipulation_class": "synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack", "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "attribution_status": "admitted", "reach_status": "unknown", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "comparative_value": "Admitted official-campaign use of synthetic atrocity imagery as a fear-based prediction of an opponent victory.", "main_caveat": "Reach, spend and ad-level effect are unresolved; broader survey belief in a war narrative cannot be attributed to this video.", "source_urls": "https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-opposition-condemns-fidesz-election-video-with-fictitious-execution-scene-2026-02-19/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf", "last_checked": "2026-08-11" } ]