[
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-usa-2016-ira-social-influence",
    "title": "Internet Research Agency social influence operation",
    "country": "United States",
    "region": "North America",
    "election_name": "2016 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2016-11-08",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|recommender_amplification|mobilisation",
    "ai_role": "material_amplification",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_applicable",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "officially_attributed",
    "reach_status": "platform_reported",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "High-evidence pre-generative-AI example of covert identity, targeting, ranking, and mobilisation.",
    "main_caveat": "Platform reach figures cover different denominators and time windows; official investigations did not causally estimate votes or turnout changed.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2019/10/08/press-senate-intel-committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia-e2-80-99s-use-social-media/|https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline=",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-usa-2016-cambridge-analytica",
    "title": "Cambridge Analytica voter profiling and deceptive Facebook data collection",
    "country": "United States",
    "region": "North America",
    "election_name": "2016 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2016-11-08",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "data_harvesting|profiling|microtargeting",
    "ai_role": "supporting_tool",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_applicable",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "adjudicated",
    "reach_status": "measured_as_data_subjects",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Direct predecessor for agency transfer through opaque inference, profiling, and personalised message selection.",
    "main_caveat": "FTC findings establish collection and profiling, not that psychographic targeting outperformed ordinary targeting or changed the election.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_opinionpublic.pdf|https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-issues-opinion-order-against-cambridge-analytica-deceiving-consumers-about-collection-facebook",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-usa-2020-iran-proud-boys-emails",
    "title": "Iran-attributed Proud Boys voter-threat emails",
    "country": "United States",
    "region": "North America",
    "election_name": "2020 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2020-11-03",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "voter_intimidation|identity_spoofing|stolen_voter_data|fabricated_video",
    "ai_role": "supporting_tool",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_established",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "officially_attributed",
    "reach_status": "measured_for_records|qualitative_for_delivery",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Shows agency transfer through personalised threats and false domestic provenance without requiring generative AI.",
    "main_caveat": "State attribution is stronger than unadjudicated charges against named individuals; no public-opinion or election effect was assessed.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed|https://archive.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-usa-2024-russia-doppelganger",
    "title": "Russia-attributed Doppelganger cloned-media and targeted influence operation",
    "country": "United States",
    "region": "North America",
    "election_name": "2024 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2024-11-05",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|microtargeting",
    "ai_role": "supporting_tool",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed_for_some_assets",
    "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "officially_attributed",
    "reach_status": "partial_content_level",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Strong source-laundering comparison: copied news design, fake identity media, tailored distribution, and AI-assisted assets.",
    "main_caveat": "The seizure affidavit contains allegations; individual content views are not operation-wide unique reach.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-covert-russian-government-sponsored-foreign-malign-influence|https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/18/doppelganger-us-election/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-usa-2024-iran-hack-and-leak",
    "title": "Iran-attributed Trump campaign hack-and-leak operation",
    "country": "United States",
    "region": "North America",
    "election_name": "2024 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2024-11-05",
    "research_status": "reserve_election_adjacent",
    "manipulation_class": "campaign_intrusion|selective_leaking|media_laundering",
    "ai_role": "none_established",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_applicable",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "officially_attributed",
    "reach_status": "low_qualitative",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "not_detected_in_named_recipients",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Agency transfer over selection, timing, framing, and attempted amplification of private campaign material.",
    "main_caveat": "Major nonresponse and nonpublication are counterevidence to a successful leak-amplification claim.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-irgc-cyber-actors-indicted-hack-and-leak-operation-designed-influence-2024-us|https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-on-iranian-election-influence-efforts",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-bra-2018-whatsapp-mass-messaging",
    "title": "Brazil 2018 WhatsApp mass-messaging ecosystem",
    "country": "Brazil",
    "region": "South America",
    "election_name": "2018 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2018-10-28",
    "research_status": "promote_with_adjudication_caveat",
    "manipulation_class": "bulk_messaging|list_brokerage|closed_group_amplification|alleged_opaque_finance",
    "ai_role": "material_amplification",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_applicable",
    "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "mixed",
    "reach_status": "alleged|unknown",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Closed-channel provenance and mass delivery can make centrally shaped messages appear interpersonal and organic.",
    "main_caveat": "TSE rejected the cases because content, reach, repercussion, candidate link, financing, and gravity were not adequately proved.",
    "source_urls": "https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha-contra-o-pt-pelo-whatsapp.shtml|https://sjur-servicos.tse.jus.br/sjur-servicos/rest/download/pdf/2673321",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-bra-2022-ambassadors-meeting",
    "title": "Bolsonaro ambassadors meeting attacking Brazil's voting system",
    "country": "Brazil",
    "region": "South America",
    "election_name": "2022 general election",
    "election_date": "2022-10-30",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "state_authority_appropriation|broadcast_amplification|election_denial",
    "ai_role": "material_amplification",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_applicable",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "adjudicated",
    "reach_status": "qualitative|institutionally_asserted",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "institutionally_asserted",
    "comparative_value": "Adjudicated use of office, diplomatic staging, broadcast media, and social redistribution to confer official-seeming authority.",
    "main_caveat": "A judicial finding of grave abuse is not a causal estimate of votes, turnout, or result changed.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2023/Junho/por-maioria-de-votos-tse-declara-bolsonaro-inelegivel-por-8-anos|https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Outubro/fato-ou-boato-justica-eleitoral-desmentiu-as-principais-fake-news-sobre-o-processo-eleitoral-em-2022",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-bra-2022-election-denial-network",
    "title": "Brazil 2022 cross-platform election-denial messaging network",
    "country": "Brazil",
    "region": "South America",
    "election_name": "2022 general election and post-election mobilisation",
    "election_date": "2022-10-30",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "cross_platform_coordination|closed_group_amplification|election_denial|mobilisation",
    "ai_role": "material_amplification",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_material",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed_in_sampled_traces",
    "attribution_status": "mixed",
    "reach_status": "measured_as_content_volume",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "indicated_correlational",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Rare case with content-volume traces and a survey association between political WhatsApp-group membership and misinformation belief.",
    "main_caveat": "Content volume is not people reached; survey authors did not claim causation; the entire network lacked a single established command actor.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/research/library/global-elections-casebook/brazil-case-study/|https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/explaining-beliefs-in-electoral-misinformation-in-the-2022-brazilian-election-the-role-of-ideology-political-trust-social-media-and-messaging-apps/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-mex-2024-genai-cluster",
    "title": "Mexico 2024 fact-checked generative-AI election-content cluster",
    "country": "Mexico",
    "region": "North America",
    "election_name": "2024 general election",
    "election_date": "2024-06-02",
    "research_status": "boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first",
    "manipulation_class": "voice_clone|lip_sync|synthetic_endorsement|candidate_impersonation|scam",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed_for_documented_examples",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed_for_examples",
    "attribution_status": "mostly_unknown",
    "reach_status": "unknown",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Useful aggregate map of first-person speech, false endorsement, appearance distortion, and scams.",
    "main_caveat": "The source corpus is 101 fact-check posts, not necessarily 101 unique incidents or an electorate-wide prevalence estimate.",
    "source_urls": "https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CME-Generative-AI-Misinformation-in-the-2024-Mexican-Elections.pdf|https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/html/artificial-intelligence-and-information-integrity-latin-american",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-col-2022-coordinated-facebook-pages",
    "title": "Colombia 2022 coordinated negative-ad Facebook pages",
    "country": "Colombia",
    "region": "South America",
    "election_name": "2022 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2022-06-19",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "coordinated_pages|paid_influence|sponsor_opacity|negative_ads",
    "ai_role": "material_amplification",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_established",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "ultimate_funder_unknown",
    "reach_status": "spend_and_item_count_only",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Clean source-opacity case with coordinated page design and auditable ad spend.",
    "main_caveat": "Ad spend and 538 paid items are not unique reach or persuasion, and investigators could not establish the ultimate operator or funder.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.elclip.org/campana-sucia-en-facebook-colombia-elecciones-desinformacion/|https://cartercentee50c07c05.blob.core.windows.net/blobcartercentee50c07c05/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/colombia-expert-mission-report-2022-english.pdf",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-arg-2023-campaign-genai",
    "title": "Argentina 2023 official-campaign generative-AI arms race",
    "country": "Argentina",
    "region": "South America",
    "election_name": "2023 presidential runoff",
    "election_date": "2023-11-19",
    "research_status": "boundary_comparison",
    "manipulation_class": "synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack|satire",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "admitted|credibly_reported",
    "reach_status": "measured_for_one_item",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Boundary case separating transparent stylised campaign AI from more deceptive synthetic embodiment.",
    "main_caveat": "Much content was labelled or visibly fabricated and contemporary assessments found relatively minor information-space impact.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.context.news/ai/how-ai-shaped-mileis-path-to-argentina-presidency|https://knightcolumbia.org/content/dont-panic-yet-assessing-the-evidence-and-discourse-around-generative-ai-and-elections",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-arg-2025-false-withdrawal-deepfakes",
    "title": "Argentina 2025 Buenos Aires City false-withdrawal and endorsement deepfakes",
    "country": "Argentina",
    "region": "South America",
    "election_name": "2025 Buenos Aires City legislative election",
    "election_date": "2025-05-18",
    "research_status": "reserve_needs_second_source",
    "manipulation_class": "synthetic_video|voice_clone|false_withdrawal|false_endorsement|last_minute_release",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "unknown",
    "reach_status": "unknown",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "High-priority control-shift hypothesis: synthetic first-person withdrawal and endorsement at a moment with limited rebuttal time; agency change remains unmeasured.",
    "main_caveat": "Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here.",
    "source_urls": "https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/videos-falsos-de-macri-y-lospennato-en-x-que-paso-en-la-realidad-con-lo-que-ordeno-la-justicia/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-ind-2024-bollywood-deepfakes",
    "title": "India 2024 unauthorised Bollywood celebrity endorsement deepfakes",
    "country": "India",
    "region": "South Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 general election",
    "election_date": "2024-06-01",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "voice_clone|video_impersonation|false_endorsement|political_amplification",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed_for_focal_assets",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "creator_unknown|amplifier_identified",
    "reach_status": "measured_as_platform_views",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "High-salience harmful impersonation case with content-level reach and a clean distinction between an unknown creator and an identifiable political amplifier.",
    "main_caveat": "More than 500,000 views establish exposure, not belief or persuasion; amplification by a Congress spokesperson does not prove party commissioning, and post-election work found no deepfake doomsday.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.reuters.com/world/india/deepfakes-bollywood-stars-spark-worries-ai-meddling-india-election-2024-04-22/|https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf|https://restofworld.org/2024/exporter-india-deepfake-trolls/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-ind-2024-authorised-ai-calls",
    "title": "India 2024 candidate-authorised AI voice calls and personalised outreach",
    "country": "India",
    "region": "South Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 general election",
    "election_date": "2024-06-01",
    "research_status": "boundary_comparison",
    "manipulation_class": "voice_clone|personalisation|direct_calls|multilingual_outreach",
    "ai_role": "core_generation|delivery_personalisation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "campaign_and_vendor_identified",
    "reach_status": "large_vendor_reported_delivery_volume",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "anecdotal_only",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Essential boundary case showing that campaign authorisation and scalable access can coexist with weak recipient disclosure and concentrated personalisation capacity.",
    "main_caveat": "The reported 50 million-plus calls and 25 million personalised calls are unaudited vendor figures, may overlap, and do not establish listening, persuasion, turnout, or vote effects.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-twn-2024-storm1376-gou-audio",
    "title": "Taiwan 2024 Storm-1376 false Terry Gou endorsement operation",
    "country": "Taiwan",
    "region": "East Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 presidential and legislative elections",
    "election_date": "2024-01-13",
    "research_status": "promote_with_attribution_caveat",
    "manipulation_class": "voice_clone|synthetic_anchor|coordinated_influence_operation|false_endorsement",
    "ai_role": "core_generation|supporting_tool",
    "generative_ai_status": "likely_for_focal_audio|confirmed_for_actor_assets",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "platform_vendor_attributed",
    "reach_status": "low_qualitative_for_focal_audio",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Strong coordinated-operation case combining a false candidate endorsement, reusable synthetic formats, and a named foreign-attributed network.",
    "main_caveat": "Microsoft's CCP linkage is a threat-intelligence attribution rather than an adjudicated state-command finding; YouTube removed the focal audio before significant reach and no vote effect is established.",
    "source_urls": "https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2024/04/04/china-ai-influence-elections-mtac-cybersecurity/|https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/threat-landscape/east-asia-threat-actors-employ-unique-methods|https://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/268943/ai_disinformation_attacks_taiwan.pdf|https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/en_tfc_286/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-pak-2024-pti-authorised-clones",
    "title": "Pakistan 2024 PTI-authorised synthetic Imran Khan campaign speeches",
    "country": "Pakistan",
    "region": "South Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 general election",
    "election_date": "2024-02-08",
    "research_status": "boundary_comparison",
    "manipulation_class": "voice_clone|talking_image|candidate_access_substitution|labelled_synthetic_media",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "party_admitted|candidate_authorised",
    "reach_status": "measured_for_focal_stream",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Clean authorised-use comparison in which synthetic speech restored a jailed leader's campaign presence and was publicly labelled as AI-generated.",
    "main_caveat": "More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/|https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-campaign-speech-from-prison|https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-pak-2024-fake-boycott-clones",
    "title": "Pakistan 2024 fake PTI election-boycott voice clones",
    "country": "Pakistan",
    "region": "South Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 general election",
    "election_date": "2024-02-08",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_withdrawal|participation_suppression",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed_for_documented_examples",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "unknown",
    "reach_status": "unknown",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Direct participation-agency case in which fabricated first-person messages falsely instructed supporters that PTI figures were boycotting the election.",
    "main_caveat": "Fact-checks establish the fabrication, but the operator, commissioning chain, unique reach, belief, participation response, and electoral effect are unknown.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/imran-khan-pti-pakistan-election-withdrawal-fact-check-24318|https://www.voanews.com/a/7481049.html|https://www.sochfactcheck.com/yasmin-rashids-video-announcing-ptis-boycott-of-2024-elections-is-ai-generated/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-idn-2024-official-synthetic-campaigning",
    "title": "Indonesia 2024 official synthetic campaigning and Suharto resurrection",
    "country": "Indonesia",
    "region": "Southeast Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 presidential and legislative elections",
    "election_date": "2024-02-14",
    "research_status": "boundary_comparison",
    "manipulation_class": "deepfake_resurrection|synthetic_image|campaign_branding|chatbot",
    "ai_role": "core_generation|campaign_personalisation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "official_campaign_and_party_identified",
    "reach_status": "mixed_content_level_and_overbroad_hashtag_metrics",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Major authorised-use comparison combining a synthetic deceased leader, AI image rebranding, volunteer distribution, and campaign chatbots.",
    "main_caveat": "The 4.7 million Suharto-view figure is provisional secondary reporting, while 19 billion #Prabowo TikTok views cover all hashtag content rather than AI assets; neither measures persuasion or vote causation.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/ai-disinformation-deepfakes-indonesia-elections-4091296|https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/asia/suharto-deepfake-ai-scam-indonesia-election-hnk-intl/index.html|https://www.reuters.com/technology/generative-ai-faces-major-test-indonesia-holds-largest-election-since-boom-2024-02-08/|https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/indonesia-polls-ai-resurrects-long-dead-dictator-sparks-ethical-concerns/articleshow/107625469.cms",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-bgd-2024-progovernment-ai-disinformation",
    "title": "Bangladesh 2024 pro-government AI pseudo-news and opposition deepfakes",
    "country": "Bangladesh",
    "region": "South Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 parliamentary election",
    "election_date": "2024-01-07",
    "research_status": "promote_with_attribution_caveat",
    "manipulation_class": "synthetic_anchor|voice_clone|pseudo_news|opposition_attack",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed_for_documented_examples",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "aligned_promoters_identified|sponsorship_unknown",
    "reach_status": "unknown",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Low-cost pseudo-news case showing how stock avatars and opposition impersonation can reinforce a dominant political media ecosystem.",
    "main_caveat": "Pro-government promotion does not prove Awami League or government commissioning; focal reach and voter effects are unknown, and the opposition boycott and noncompetitive environment preclude election-result inference.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.ft.com/content/bd1bc5b4-f540-48f8-9cda-75c19e5ac69c|https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/elections/news/ai-disinformation-disrupting-bangladeshs-election-report-3494641|https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/deep-fakes-and-disinformation-in-bangladesh/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-kor-2024-deepfake-enforcement-set",
    "title": "South Korea 2024 election deepfake enforcement set",
    "country": "South Korea",
    "region": "East Asia",
    "election_name": "2024 National Assembly election",
    "election_date": "2024-04-10",
    "research_status": "boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first",
    "manipulation_class": "aggregate_deepfake_enforcement|synthetic_image|synthetic_video",
    "ai_role": "core_generation_for_counted_items",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed_at_aggregate_level",
    "occurrence_status": "officially_reported_aggregate",
    "attribution_status": "multiple_or_unknown",
    "reach_status": "unknown",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Institutional-response case for a broad pre-election ban and active NEC monitoring, useful for separating item detection from harm and enforcement outcomes.",
    "main_caveat": "The 129 detected items are not 129 unique operations, do not establish deception or views, and should be disaggregated before promotion to incident-level cases.",
    "source_urls": "https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240219003100320|https://verfassungsblog.de/fake-news-content-moderation-singapoer-south-korea-election/|https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/ai-and-elections-lessons-from-south-korea/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-zaf-2024-trump-mk-deepfake",
    "title": "South Africa 2024 false Trump endorsement of MK",
    "country": "South Africa",
    "region": "Southern Africa",
    "election_name": "2024 general election",
    "election_date": "2024-05-29",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "celebrity_impersonation|voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_endorsement|political_amplification",
    "ai_role": "core_generation",
    "generative_ai_status": "confirmed_for_focal_asset",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "creator_unknown|amplifier_identified",
    "reach_status": "unknown_for_focal_asset",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Clear false-endorsement case with a prominent party-linked amplifier and strong negative-case evidence about the limited overall role of GenAI.",
    "main_caveat": "The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall.",
    "source_urls": "https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election|https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south|https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-2024-elections/|https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-nga-2023-atiku-spliced-audio",
    "title": "Nigeria 2023 spliced Atiku election-rigging audio",
    "country": "Nigeria",
    "region": "West Africa",
    "election_name": "2023 presidential election",
    "election_date": "2023-02-25",
    "research_status": "boundary_synthetic_non_genai",
    "manipulation_class": "audio_splicing|false_rigging_narrative|cross_platform_spread",
    "ai_role": "not_required_for_focal_asset|material_distribution",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_established|likely_conventional_edit",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
    "attribution_status": "unknown",
    "reach_status": "partial_platform_metrics|persistent_after_debunk",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "expert_observation_only",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Important synthetic-media boundary case showing how a false first-person rigging narrative can persist through voting without neural generation.",
    "main_caveat": "Splice analysis supports conventional compositing, not generative voice synthesis; thousands of listens and platform persistence do not establish belief, turnout, votes, or the responsible actor.",
    "source_urls": "https://cddfactcheck.org/fact-check-audio-of-atiku-okowa-tambuwal-planning-with-inec-to-rig-elections-is-doctored/|https://www.thecable.ng/fact-check-viral-audio-of-atiku-tambuwal-and-okowa-plotting-to-rig-election-is-doctored/|https://www.cddwestafrica.org/uploads/reports/file/Understanding-the-2023-Nigerian-Presidential-and-National-Assembly-Elections_EACReport.pdf|https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/qa-hannah-ajakaiye/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-gha-2024-llm-bot-network",
    "title": "Ghana 2024 likely LLM-assisted pro-NPP account network",
    "country": "Ghana",
    "region": "West Africa",
    "election_name": "2024 general election",
    "election_date": "2024-12-07",
    "research_status": "promote_with_detection_caveat",
    "manipulation_class": "llm_generated_text|coordinated_accounts|hashtag_amplification|inauthentic_engagement",
    "ai_role": "core_content_generation|material_amplification",
    "generative_ai_status": "likely_by_detector_and_behavioural_signals",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed_as_research_sample",
    "attribution_status": "operator_unknown|beneficiary_inferred",
    "reach_status": "network_internal_engagement_dominant",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Useful post-deepfake comparison in which likely LLM text, coordinated schedules, repeated hashtags, and mutual engagement manufactured an appearance of partisan consensus.",
    "main_caveat": "AI-text detection and coordination indicators do not prove ChatGPT use, automation, common control, NPP sponsorship, external reach, or electoral effect; most measured engagement was internal.",
    "source_urls": "https://restofworld.org/2024/ghana-election-ai-bots-x-twitter/|https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/ghana-becomes-the-latest-nation-targeted",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  },
  {
    "candidate_id": "cand-ken-2022-platform-amplification",
    "title": "Kenya 2022 recommender amplification, bots, and influence-for-hire",
    "country": "Kenya",
    "region": "East Africa",
    "election_name": "2022 general election",
    "election_date": "2022-08-09",
    "research_status": "promote_after_claim_coding",
    "manipulation_class": "recommender_amplification|bots|paid_influence|manipulated_media|hate_speech",
    "ai_role": "material_amplification",
    "generative_ai_status": "not_material|conventional_manipulation",
    "occurrence_status": "confirmed_in_sampled_traces",
    "attribution_status": "mostly_domestic|mixed_sponsors",
    "reach_status": "measured_for_selected_content",
    "behavioural_effect_status": "discourse_effect_asserted|individual_effect_unknown",
    "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
    "comparative_value": "Strong non-generative comparison showing joint agency transfer through paid influence, bot coordination, manipulated media, and opaque recommendation at million-view scale.",
    "main_caveat": "The purposive sample's four million views are not electorate-wide prevalence or unique users; recommender lift lacks internal logs, and no causal study links the ecosystem to votes or the result.",
    "source_urls": "https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/new-research-disinformation-on-tiktok-gaslights-political-tensions-ahead-of-kenyas-2022-elections/|https://www.wired.com/story/kenya-tiktok-election-disinformation-hate-speech/|https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-beware-the-dangers-that-digital-influence-poses-for-elections|https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/fellow-research-platforms-failed-to-curb-misinformation-after-kenyan-election/",
    "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
  }
]