pathway_id,case_id,agency_dimension,hypothesized_control_shift_from,hypothesized_control_shift_to,mechanism,opacity,personalization,contestability,duration,hypothesized_power_recipient,potential_harm_pathway,observed_outcome,capability_status,control_mechanism_status,attempted_transfer_status,agency_change_status,agency_preservation_status,maximum_conclusion,falsification_condition,comparator,observed_evidence,researcher_inference,assessment_label,source_claim_ids,reviewer_note
ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,Romanian voters' attention and electoral choice,campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems,"opaque promotion, coordinated accounts, and recommender amplification",network sponsorship and ranking logic partly opaque,low_or_unknown,low_during_campaign_high_after_institutional_response,campaign_period_with_institutional_aftereffects,campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems,"unequal agenda-setting, impaired informed choice, and institutional trust shock",Opaque coordinated promotion and an institutional annulment are observed as separate facts; individual behaviour and a causal electoral effect are not.,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If the coordination, sponsorship, or distribution-control evidence fails independent verification, the control-mechanism hypothesis is not supported; an agency-change conclusion also requires measured individual outcomes.","Comparable exposed and unexposed voters, or opaque and transparently attributed campaign content, with pre-specified attention, belief, and choice-autonomy outcomes.","Official and investigative records describe opaque promotion, coordinated accounts, platform distribution, and the court's annulment decision.",The coded mechanism could shift agenda-setting control toward operators and rankers; the dataset does not infer that this changed a person's agency or caused annulment.,observed_mechanism,clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-006|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013|clm-ro-020,"Generative AI was not established as material. The court decision is an institutional outcome, not evidence of a voter-level agency change or causal vote effect."
ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,Romanian users and authentic local speakers,unidentified network operator,"synthetic personas, apparently hijacked accounts, and coordinated cross-platform amplification",operator and provenance opaque,low_or_unknown,medium_after_takedown,months,unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems,manufactured local consensus and controlled agenda cues,"A coordinated network, content, and non-unique platform activity are observed; belief, choice, turnout, and election effects are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If the accounts are shown to be independent, authentically local, or not centrally coordinated, the control-mechanism hypothesis is not supported; reach metrics alone cannot establish agency change.","Users exposed to coordinated synthetic-persona content versus matched users exposed to authentic, independently produced local content, with provenance comprehension and decision outcomes measured.","Researchers documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, content, and aggregated platform activity.",The network could control apparent local identity and salience; no operator-level intent to displace agency and no user-level agency change are directly observed.,observed_mechanism,clm-ro-014|clm-ro-015|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017|clm-ro-018|clm-ro-021,Pro-Russia narratives do not establish Russian-state command. The repeat election and the 2024 annulment are analytically separate from this network record.
ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,preference_participation_and_trust,Moldovan voters,Shor-linked and Russia-linked influence and finance networks,"payments, coordinated tasking, bots, spoofed media, and synthetic content","sponsor, finance, and message provenance partly opaque",low_or_unknown,medium_after_enforcement,multi_election,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,covert inducement and manufactured social proof could impair independent deliberation,"Payment and influence infrastructure, an inducement attempt, and some payment acceptance are documented; how recipients voted and the electoral effect are unknown.",observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,"If payments were not conditioned, tasked, or linked to electoral conduct, the attempted-transfer coding fails; accepted payment alone cannot establish changed preference or vote.","Credibly identified recipients and comparable non-recipients under a design addressing selection, with task compliance, belief, turnout, and vote outcomes measured separately.","Official, observer, platform, and reporting records document coordinated influence infrastructure and allegations/evidence of electoral inducement; AI is one component.","The covert inducement and impersonation mechanisms constitute an observed attempt to influence decision control, but recipient agency change and votes changed are not observed.",observed_attempt_with_unmeasured_agency,clm-md-003|clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009|clm-md-010|clm-md-011|clm-md-020,"The removed 138,000 mixed accounts-and-transactions aggregate is not a valid reach observation. Administrative advantage and media imbalance remain competing explanations and separate harms."
ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,Moldovan social-media users and authentic local speakers,InfoLeaders curators and linked political networks,central scripts locally adapted by paid participants and reciprocal amplification,coordination and payment opaque to audiences,low_or_unknown,medium_after_disruption,months,network curators and financiers,paid coordination can masquerade as peer speech and control apparent local salience,"Paid tasking, coordinated accounts, content, and engagement are observed; persuasion, turnout, votes, and seats are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If tasking, payment, or reciprocal amplification is not reproducible at account level, the control-mechanism coding fails; engagement totals cannot establish an agency outcome.","Matched users or content streams exposed to centrally tasked paid personas versus authentic independent speakers, with provenance recognition and decision outcomes measured.","A documented paid InfoLeaders sample used central tasking, local personas, and reciprocal engagement; platform totals are non-unique.",The mechanism could shift control over apparent peer signals toward curators; no individual agency change or electoral effect is observed.,observed_mechanism,clm-md-012|clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018|clm-md-019|clm-md-021,Components with different attribution and measurement scopes must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total.
ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,New Hampshire Democratic primary recipients,Steve Kramer and the telecom delivery chain,"cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed caller ID",high apparent-authorship deception,medium,high_after_enforcement,short_campaign_burst,political operator and telecom distribution chain,fabricated authoritative instruction could displace an informed participation decision,"The impersonated demobilising instruction, operator, call attempts, and completed calls are observed; listening, belief, action, and turnout effect are not.",observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,"If the audio was not synthetic, the instruction was not demobilising, or the attributed operator did not select and distribute it, attempted-transfer coding fails; delivery counts alone do not establish agency change.","Recipients versus matched non-recipients, or completed versus failed delivery under a credible design, measuring listening, belief, action, and turnout without treating calls as unique voters.",An admitted operator created an AI-cloned Biden voice telling recipients not to vote in the primary; FCC records document the delivery chain and call counts.,The impersonated participation instruction is an observed attempt to displace decision control; no recipient-level agency change is observed.,observed_attempt_with_unmeasured_agency,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-009|clm-nh-010|clm-nh-012,"Criminal acquittal, FCC findings, and civil default are distinct. None supplies evidence of belief, action, turnout, or votes changed."
ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,future_information_and_platform_governance,not_applicable,not_applicable,prospective monitoring of synthetic media and provider outputs,prospective,not_assessed,not_assessed,future_election,not_applicable,prospective risk only,"Election rules, provider obligations, and institutional preparations are observed; no incident or agency outcome is coded.",not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,Not applicable unless a discrete incident is promoted with claim-level evidence and an explicit unit of analysis.,No incident comparator; future promoted records require an incident-specific comparator.,"TSE rules, compliance obligations, partnerships, and monitoring arrangements.",,not_applicable,clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-006|clm-br-007|clm-br-009,Preparedness file; excluded from incident counts and from agency conclusions.
ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,political_representation_and_audience_interpretation,Jair Bolsonaro as represented person and voters evaluating the endorsement,campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation,disclosed synthetic political surrogate,AI generation disclosed; authorisation unresolved,low,medium_after_disclosure_and_legal_challenge,single_event_with_reuse_risk,campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation,unauthorised synthetic representation could appropriate political voice; disclosure may preserve audience verification,"The avatar, message, and AI disclosure are observed; authorisation, audience interpretation, belief, and electoral effects are unresolved.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,"If authorisation is established and audiences reliably understand the disclosed surrogate as campaign-authored representation, the appropriation hypothesis weakens; agency change still requires measured audience outcomes.","Authorised versus unauthorised and prominently disclosed versus undisclosed synthetic surrogates, measuring attribution accuracy, perceived endorsement, and decision autonomy.","A disclosed synthetic Bolsonaro avatar delivered an endorsement at a campaign launch; legal claims and a defence were filed, but final merits resolution and authorisation were not identified.","The producer controlled the synthetic representation, but whether that displaced or preserved anyone's agency is an untested boundary hypothesis.",boundary_case,clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-014|clm-br-017|clm-br-019|clm-br-020,"Transparent disclosure is material counterevidence. Disclosure alone does not prove agency preservation, and production control alone does not prove agency transfer."
ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,future_information_and_election_trust,not_applicable,not_applicable,"prospective monitoring of campaign, foreign, platform, telecom, and AI-provider mechanisms",prospective and fragmented governance,not_assessed,not_assessed,future_election,not_applicable,prospective risk only,"Election timing, fragmented law, and prior-cycle risk assessments are observed; no new 2026 operation or agency outcome is coded.",not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,Not applicable unless a discrete 2026 incident is promoted with claim-level evidence and an explicit unit of analysis.,No incident comparator; future promoted records require an incident-specific comparator.,"Scheduled election context, enacted state laws, federal governance gaps, and prior-cycle assessments.",,not_applicable,clm-us26-001|clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-007,Preparedness file; excluded from incident counts and from agency conclusions.
ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,represented candidates and voters interpreting campaign evidence,campaign sponsors producing synthetic first-person performances,synthetic candidate simulations with variable disclosure and quotation fidelity,disclosure varies and can be low-salience,low,medium,campaign_cycle,campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations,"synthetic performance can make the sponsor control apparent speech, timing, image, and affect","Multiple attributed synthetic assets are observed; comparable exposure, attribution error, belief, and election effects are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If the synthetic elements are obvious, accurately attributed, faithful to genuine quotations, and do not alter audience attribution or interpretation, the stronger control-shift hypothesis weakens; content production alone cannot establish agency change.","Authentic footage versus labelled and unlabelled synthetic performances, stratified by quotation fidelity, with attribution accuracy and decision outcomes measured.",Named campaign sponsors released synthetic candidate performances; disclosure and fidelity varied across assets.,"Sponsors controlled simulated voice, face, timing, and affect, but whether this displaced voter or candidate agency is untested.",observed_mechanism,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-010|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-012|clm-us26-013|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016,"Some assets use genuine quotations, labels, or obvious satire. Content-level distinctions are required before any stronger inference."
ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,Connie Chan as represented person and users asking questions,Scott Wiener for Congress and its provider stack,disclosed campaign-controlled first-person opponent simulation with policy-permitted query-log review,"AI and parody disclosed; system prompt, retrieval, actual log use, and guardrails opaque",high,high_after_removal,four_day_deployment_plus_90_day_retention_policy,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,sponsor control over opponent simulation and query data could shape representation and agenda,"Deployment, model family, question count, privacy-policy terms, disclosure, and removal are observed; actual retention, unique users, interpretation, and electoral effects are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,"If users reliably understand the tool as sponsor-authored parody, outputs are traceably grounded, logs are not used beyond disclosed purposes, and no decision-relevant difference appears against an ordinary attack ad, the stronger control-shift hypothesis weakens.","Disclosed parody chatbot versus ordinary campaign attack material and versus an undisclosed first-person simulation, measuring attribution, source verification, perceived candidate position, and decision autonomy.","The campaign commissioned and disclosed a Claude-powered parody, controlled its presentation, permitted limited log review in policy, reported question volume, and removed the tool after criticism.","The system could shift representational and evidentiary control toward the sponsor, but explicit parody and absent user-outcome evidence make this a boundary hypothesis.",boundary_case,clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-006|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-009|clm-usca11-010|clm-usca11-011,Explicit parody and disclosure are essential counterevidence. Neither question count nor campaign control demonstrates a change in user agency.