candidate_id,title,country,region,election_name,election_date,research_status,manipulation_class,ai_role,generative_ai_status,occurrence_status,attribution_status,reach_status,behavioural_effect_status,electoral_effect_status,comparative_value,main_caveat,source_urls,last_checked
cand-usa-2016-ira-social-influence,Internet Research Agency social influence operation,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,promote_after_claim_coding,coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|recommender_amplification|mobilisation,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,officially_attributed,platform_reported,unknown,unknown,"High-evidence pre-generative-AI example of covert identity, targeting, ranking, and mobilisation.",Platform reach figures cover different denominators and time windows; official investigations did not causally estimate votes or turnout changed.,https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2019/10/08/press-senate-intel-committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia-e2-80-99s-use-social-media/|https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline=,2026-08-11
cand-usa-2016-cambridge-analytica,Cambridge Analytica voter profiling and deceptive Facebook data collection,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,promote_after_claim_coding,data_harvesting|profiling|microtargeting,supporting_tool,not_applicable,confirmed,adjudicated,measured_as_data_subjects,unknown,unknown,"Direct predecessor for agency transfer through opaque inference, profiling, and personalised message selection.","FTC findings establish collection and profiling, not that psychographic targeting outperformed ordinary targeting or changed the election.",https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_opinionpublic.pdf|https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-issues-opinion-order-against-cambridge-analytica-deceiving-consumers-about-collection-facebook,2026-08-11
cand-usa-2020-iran-proud-boys-emails,Iran-attributed Proud Boys voter-threat emails,United States,North America,2020 presidential election,2020-11-03,promote_after_claim_coding,voter_intimidation|identity_spoofing|stolen_voter_data|fabricated_video,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,officially_attributed,measured_for_records|qualitative_for_delivery,unknown,unknown,Shows agency transfer through personalised threats and false domestic provenance without requiring generative AI.,State attribution is stronger than unadjudicated charges against named individuals; no public-opinion or election effect was assessed.,https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed|https://archive.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf,2026-08-11
cand-usa-2024-russia-doppelganger,Russia-attributed Doppelganger cloned-media and targeted influence operation,United States,North America,2024 presidential election,2024-11-05,promote_after_claim_coding,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|microtargeting,supporting_tool,confirmed_for_some_assets,partly_confirmed,officially_attributed,partial_content_level,unknown,unknown,"Strong source-laundering comparison: copied news design, fake identity media, tailored distribution, and AI-assisted assets.",The seizure affidavit contains allegations; individual content views are not operation-wide unique reach.,https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-covert-russian-government-sponsored-foreign-malign-influence|https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/18/doppelganger-us-election/,2026-08-11
cand-usa-2024-iran-hack-and-leak,Iran-attributed Trump campaign hack-and-leak operation,United States,North America,2024 presidential election,2024-11-05,reserve_election_adjacent,campaign_intrusion|selective_leaking|media_laundering,none_established,not_applicable,confirmed,officially_attributed,low_qualitative,not_detected_in_named_recipients,unknown,"Agency transfer over selection, timing, framing, and attempted amplification of private campaign material.",Major nonresponse and nonpublication are counterevidence to a successful leak-amplification claim.,https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-irgc-cyber-actors-indicted-hack-and-leak-operation-designed-influence-2024-us|https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-on-iranian-election-influence-efforts,2026-08-11
cand-bra-2018-whatsapp-mass-messaging,Brazil 2018 WhatsApp mass-messaging ecosystem,Brazil,South America,2018 presidential election,2018-10-28,promote_with_adjudication_caveat,bulk_messaging|list_brokerage|closed_group_amplification|alleged_opaque_finance,material_amplification,not_applicable,partly_confirmed,mixed,alleged|unknown,unknown,unknown,Closed-channel provenance and mass delivery can make centrally shaped messages appear interpersonal and organic.,"TSE rejected the cases because content, reach, repercussion, candidate link, financing, and gravity were not adequately proved.",https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha-contra-o-pt-pelo-whatsapp.shtml|https://sjur-servicos.tse.jus.br/sjur-servicos/rest/download/pdf/2673321,2026-08-11
cand-bra-2022-ambassadors-meeting,Bolsonaro ambassadors meeting attacking Brazil's voting system,Brazil,South America,2022 general election,2022-10-30,promote_after_claim_coding,state_authority_appropriation|broadcast_amplification|election_denial,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,adjudicated,qualitative|institutionally_asserted,unknown,institutionally_asserted,"Adjudicated use of office, diplomatic staging, broadcast media, and social redistribution to confer official-seeming authority.","A judicial finding of grave abuse is not a causal estimate of votes, turnout, or result changed.",https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2023/Junho/por-maioria-de-votos-tse-declara-bolsonaro-inelegivel-por-8-anos|https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Outubro/fato-ou-boato-justica-eleitoral-desmentiu-as-principais-fake-news-sobre-o-processo-eleitoral-em-2022,2026-08-11
cand-bra-2022-election-denial-network,Brazil 2022 cross-platform election-denial messaging network,Brazil,South America,2022 general election and post-election mobilisation,2022-10-30,promote_after_claim_coding,cross_platform_coordination|closed_group_amplification|election_denial|mobilisation,material_amplification,not_material,confirmed_in_sampled_traces,mixed,measured_as_content_volume,indicated_correlational,unknown,Rare case with content-volume traces and a survey association between political WhatsApp-group membership and misinformation belief.,Content volume is not people reached; survey authors did not claim causation; the entire network lacked a single established command actor.,https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/research/library/global-elections-casebook/brazil-case-study/|https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/explaining-beliefs-in-electoral-misinformation-in-the-2022-brazilian-election-the-role-of-ideology-political-trust-social-media-and-messaging-apps/,2026-08-11
cand-mex-2024-genai-cluster,Mexico 2024 fact-checked generative-AI election-content cluster,Mexico,North America,2024 general election,2024-06-02,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,voice_clone|lip_sync|synthetic_endorsement|candidate_impersonation|scam,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed_for_examples,mostly_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Useful aggregate map of first-person speech, false endorsement, appearance distortion, and scams.","The source corpus is 101 fact-check posts, not necessarily 101 unique incidents or an electorate-wide prevalence estimate.",https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CME-Generative-AI-Misinformation-in-the-2024-Mexican-Elections.pdf|https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/html/artificial-intelligence-and-information-integrity-latin-american,2026-08-11
cand-col-2022-coordinated-facebook-pages,Colombia 2022 coordinated negative-ad Facebook pages,Colombia,South America,2022 presidential election,2022-06-19,promote_after_claim_coding,coordinated_pages|paid_influence|sponsor_opacity|negative_ads,material_amplification,not_established,confirmed,ultimate_funder_unknown,spend_and_item_count_only,unknown,unknown,Clean source-opacity case with coordinated page design and auditable ad spend.,"Ad spend and 538 paid items are not unique reach or persuasion, and investigators could not establish the ultimate operator or funder.",https://www.elclip.org/campana-sucia-en-facebook-colombia-elecciones-desinformacion/|https://cartercentee50c07c05.blob.core.windows.net/blobcartercentee50c07c05/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/colombia-expert-mission-report-2022-english.pdf,2026-08-11
cand-arg-2023-campaign-genai,Argentina 2023 official-campaign generative-AI arms race,Argentina,South America,2023 presidential runoff,2023-11-19,boundary_comparison,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack|satire,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,admitted|credibly_reported,measured_for_one_item,unknown,unknown,Boundary case separating transparent stylised campaign AI from more deceptive synthetic embodiment.,Much content was labelled or visibly fabricated and contemporary assessments found relatively minor information-space impact.,https://www.context.news/ai/how-ai-shaped-mileis-path-to-argentina-presidency|https://knightcolumbia.org/content/dont-panic-yet-assessing-the-evidence-and-discourse-around-generative-ai-and-elections,2026-08-11
cand-arg-2025-false-withdrawal-deepfakes,Argentina 2025 Buenos Aires City false-withdrawal and endorsement deepfakes,Argentina,South America,2025 Buenos Aires City legislative election,2025-05-18,reserve_needs_second_source,synthetic_video|voice_clone|false_withdrawal|false_endorsement|last_minute_release,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,High-priority control-shift hypothesis: synthetic first-person withdrawal and endorsement at a moment with limited rebuttal time; agency change remains unmeasured.,Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here.,https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/videos-falsos-de-macri-y-lospennato-en-x-que-paso-en-la-realidad-con-lo-que-ordeno-la-justicia/,2026-08-11
cand-ind-2024-bollywood-deepfakes,India 2024 unauthorised Bollywood celebrity endorsement deepfakes,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|video_impersonation|false_endorsement|political_amplification,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_assets,confirmed,creator_unknown|amplifier_identified,measured_as_platform_views,unknown,unknown,High-salience harmful impersonation case with content-level reach and a clean distinction between an unknown creator and an identifiable political amplifier.,"More than 500,000 views establish exposure, not belief or persuasion; amplification by a Congress spokesperson does not prove party commissioning, and post-election work found no deepfake doomsday.",https://www.reuters.com/world/india/deepfakes-bollywood-stars-spark-worries-ai-meddling-india-election-2024-04-22/|https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf|https://restofworld.org/2024/exporter-india-deepfake-trolls/,2026-08-11
cand-ind-2024-authorised-ai-calls,India 2024 candidate-authorised AI voice calls and personalised outreach,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,boundary_comparison,voice_clone|personalisation|direct_calls|multilingual_outreach,core_generation|delivery_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,campaign_and_vendor_identified,large_vendor_reported_delivery_volume,anecdotal_only,unknown,Essential boundary case showing that campaign authorisation and scalable access can coexist with weak recipient disclosure and concentrated personalisation capacity.,"The reported 50 million-plus calls and 25 million personalised calls are unaudited vendor figures, may overlap, and do not establish listening, persuasion, turnout, or vote effects.",https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf,2026-08-11
cand-twn-2024-storm1376-gou-audio,Taiwan 2024 Storm-1376 false Terry Gou endorsement operation,Taiwan,East Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-01-13,promote_with_attribution_caveat,voice_clone|synthetic_anchor|coordinated_influence_operation|false_endorsement,core_generation|supporting_tool,likely_for_focal_audio|confirmed_for_actor_assets,confirmed,platform_vendor_attributed,low_qualitative_for_focal_audio,unknown,unknown,"Strong coordinated-operation case combining a false candidate endorsement, reusable synthetic formats, and a named foreign-attributed network.",Microsoft's CCP linkage is a threat-intelligence attribution rather than an adjudicated state-command finding; YouTube removed the focal audio before significant reach and no vote effect is established.,https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2024/04/04/china-ai-influence-elections-mtac-cybersecurity/|https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/threat-landscape/east-asia-threat-actors-employ-unique-methods|https://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/268943/ai_disinformation_attacks_taiwan.pdf|https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/en_tfc_286/,2026-08-11
cand-pak-2024-pti-authorised-clones,Pakistan 2024 PTI-authorised synthetic Imran Khan campaign speeches,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,boundary_comparison,voice_clone|talking_image|candidate_access_substitution|labelled_synthetic_media,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,party_admitted|candidate_authorised,measured_for_focal_stream,unknown,unknown,Clean authorised-use comparison in which synthetic speech restored a jailed leader's campaign presence and was publicly labelled as AI-generated.,"More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches.",https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/|https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-campaign-speech-from-prison|https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037,2026-08-11
cand-pak-2024-fake-boycott-clones,Pakistan 2024 fake PTI election-boycott voice clones,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_withdrawal|participation_suppression,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Direct participation-agency case in which fabricated first-person messages falsely instructed supporters that PTI figures were boycotting the election.,"Fact-checks establish the fabrication, but the operator, commissioning chain, unique reach, belief, participation response, and electoral effect are unknown.",https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/imran-khan-pti-pakistan-election-withdrawal-fact-check-24318|https://www.voanews.com/a/7481049.html|https://www.sochfactcheck.com/yasmin-rashids-video-announcing-ptis-boycott-of-2024-elections-is-ai-generated/,2026-08-11
cand-idn-2024-official-synthetic-campaigning,Indonesia 2024 official synthetic campaigning and Suharto resurrection,Indonesia,Southeast Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-02-14,boundary_comparison,deepfake_resurrection|synthetic_image|campaign_branding|chatbot,core_generation|campaign_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,official_campaign_and_party_identified,mixed_content_level_and_overbroad_hashtag_metrics,unknown,unknown,"Major authorised-use comparison combining a synthetic deceased leader, AI image rebranding, volunteer distribution, and campaign chatbots.","The 4.7 million Suharto-view figure is provisional secondary reporting, while 19 billion #Prabowo TikTok views cover all hashtag content rather than AI assets; neither measures persuasion or vote causation.",https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/ai-disinformation-deepfakes-indonesia-elections-4091296|https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/asia/suharto-deepfake-ai-scam-indonesia-election-hnk-intl/index.html|https://www.reuters.com/technology/generative-ai-faces-major-test-indonesia-holds-largest-election-since-boom-2024-02-08/|https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/indonesia-polls-ai-resurrects-long-dead-dictator-sparks-ethical-concerns/articleshow/107625469.cms,2026-08-11
cand-bgd-2024-progovernment-ai-disinformation,Bangladesh 2024 pro-government AI pseudo-news and opposition deepfakes,Bangladesh,South Asia,2024 parliamentary election,2024-01-07,promote_with_attribution_caveat,synthetic_anchor|voice_clone|pseudo_news|opposition_attack,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,aligned_promoters_identified|sponsorship_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Low-cost pseudo-news case showing how stock avatars and opposition impersonation can reinforce a dominant political media ecosystem.,"Pro-government promotion does not prove Awami League or government commissioning; focal reach and voter effects are unknown, and the opposition boycott and noncompetitive environment preclude election-result inference.",https://www.ft.com/content/bd1bc5b4-f540-48f8-9cda-75c19e5ac69c|https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/elections/news/ai-disinformation-disrupting-bangladeshs-election-report-3494641|https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/deep-fakes-and-disinformation-in-bangladesh/,2026-08-11
cand-kor-2024-deepfake-enforcement-set,South Korea 2024 election deepfake enforcement set,South Korea,East Asia,2024 National Assembly election,2024-04-10,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,aggregate_deepfake_enforcement|synthetic_image|synthetic_video,core_generation_for_counted_items,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,officially_reported_aggregate,multiple_or_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Institutional-response case for a broad pre-election ban and active NEC monitoring, useful for separating item detection from harm and enforcement outcomes.","The 129 detected items are not 129 unique operations, do not establish deception or views, and should be disaggregated before promotion to incident-level cases.",https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240219003100320|https://verfassungsblog.de/fake-news-content-moderation-singapoer-south-korea-election/|https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/ai-and-elections-lessons-from-south-korea/,2026-08-11
cand-zaf-2024-trump-mk-deepfake,South Africa 2024 false Trump endorsement of MK,South Africa,Southern Africa,2024 general election,2024-05-29,promote_after_claim_coding,celebrity_impersonation|voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_endorsement|political_amplification,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_asset,confirmed,creator_unknown|amplifier_identified,unknown_for_focal_asset,unknown,unknown,Clear false-endorsement case with a prominent party-linked amplifier and strong negative-case evidence about the limited overall role of GenAI.,"The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall.",https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election|https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south|https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-2024-elections/|https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf,2026-08-11
cand-nga-2023-atiku-spliced-audio,Nigeria 2023 spliced Atiku election-rigging audio,Nigeria,West Africa,2023 presidential election,2023-02-25,boundary_synthetic_non_genai,audio_splicing|false_rigging_narrative|cross_platform_spread,not_required_for_focal_asset|material_distribution,not_established|likely_conventional_edit,confirmed,unknown,partial_platform_metrics|persistent_after_debunk,expert_observation_only,unknown,Important synthetic-media boundary case showing how a false first-person rigging narrative can persist through voting without neural generation.,"Splice analysis supports conventional compositing, not generative voice synthesis; thousands of listens and platform persistence do not establish belief, turnout, votes, or the responsible actor.",https://cddfactcheck.org/fact-check-audio-of-atiku-okowa-tambuwal-planning-with-inec-to-rig-elections-is-doctored/|https://www.thecable.ng/fact-check-viral-audio-of-atiku-tambuwal-and-okowa-plotting-to-rig-election-is-doctored/|https://www.cddwestafrica.org/uploads/reports/file/Understanding-the-2023-Nigerian-Presidential-and-National-Assembly-Elections_EACReport.pdf|https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/qa-hannah-ajakaiye/,2026-08-11
cand-gha-2024-llm-bot-network,Ghana 2024 likely LLM-assisted pro-NPP account network,Ghana,West Africa,2024 general election,2024-12-07,promote_with_detection_caveat,llm_generated_text|coordinated_accounts|hashtag_amplification|inauthentic_engagement,core_content_generation|material_amplification,likely_by_detector_and_behavioural_signals,confirmed_as_research_sample,operator_unknown|beneficiary_inferred,network_internal_engagement_dominant,unknown,unknown,"Useful post-deepfake comparison in which likely LLM text, coordinated schedules, repeated hashtags, and mutual engagement manufactured an appearance of partisan consensus.","AI-text detection and coordination indicators do not prove ChatGPT use, automation, common control, NPP sponsorship, external reach, or electoral effect; most measured engagement was internal.",https://restofworld.org/2024/ghana-election-ai-bots-x-twitter/|https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/ghana-becomes-the-latest-nation-targeted,2026-08-11
cand-ken-2022-platform-amplification,"Kenya 2022 recommender amplification, bots, and influence-for-hire",Kenya,East Africa,2022 general election,2022-08-09,promote_after_claim_coding,recommender_amplification|bots|paid_influence|manipulated_media|hate_speech,material_amplification,not_material|conventional_manipulation,confirmed_in_sampled_traces,mostly_domestic|mixed_sponsors,measured_for_selected_content,discourse_effect_asserted|individual_effect_unknown,unknown,"Strong non-generative comparison showing joint agency transfer through paid influence, bot coordination, manipulated media, and opaque recommendation at million-view scale.","The purposive sample's four million views are not electorate-wide prevalence or unique users; recommender lift lacks internal logs, and no causal study links the ecosystem to votes or the result.",https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/new-research-disinformation-on-tiktok-gaslights-political-tensions-ahead-of-kenyas-2022-elections/|https://www.wired.com/story/kenya-tiktok-election-disinformation-hate-speech/|https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-beware-the-dangers-that-digital-influence-poses-for-elections|https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/fellow-research-platforms-failed-to-curb-misinformation-after-kenyan-election/,2026-08-11
cand-sk-2023-parl-simecka-todova-audio,Synthetic Simecka and Todova vote-rigging audio,Slovakia,Europe,2023 parliamentary election,2023-09-30,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,measured,unknown,unknown,Canonical moratorium-timing case in which cloned private speech and leak framing constrained correction.,Amplifiers are known but the creator and state sponsor are not; SMER's victory is not evidence that the audio changed votes.,https://cedmohub.eu/how-ai-generated-content-influenced-parliamentary-elections-in-slovakia-the-slovak-police-will-investigate-the-recording-for-a-third-time/|https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/beyond-the-deepfake-hype-ai-democracy-and-the-slovak-case/|https://vsquare.org/slovak-election-targeted-by-pro-kremlin-deepfake-hoax/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/6/b/563625_0.pdf,2026-08-11
cand-fr-2017-pres-macronleaks,MacronLeaks hack-and-leak and automated amplification,France,Europe,2017 presidential election,2017-05-07,promote_after_claim_coding,selective_leaking|spoofed_media|bot_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,mixed,measured,not_detected,not_detected,"High-evidence pre-generative-AI case of authentic stolen material, forgery, bot salience and blackout timing.",France's later GRU attribution is stronger at the cyber-campaign level than attribution of every forged item and amplifier; no individual causal vote estimate exists.,https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/presse-et-ressources/decouvrir-et-informer/actualites/russie-attribution-de-cyberattaques-contre-la-france-au-service-de-renseignement-militaire-russe|https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The_Macron_Leaks_Operation-A_Post-Mortem.pdf|https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.00086|https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/french-warned-not-to-publish-emmanuel-macron-leaks,2026-08-11
cand-fr-2024-eu-lepen-nieces,Fake Le Pen family personas using face swaps and stolen influencer videos,France,Europe,2024 European Parliament election,2024-06-09,promote_after_claim_coding,synthetic_video|synthetic_image|candidate_impersonation|paid_influence,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,measured,unknown,unknown,Distinctive parasocial and false-kinship mechanism using synthetic personas rather than issue persuasion alone.,"The operator is unknown, party involvement was denied and follower/view figures do not establish voter persuasion.",https://www.euractiv.com/news/viral-deepfake-videos-of-le-pen-family-reminder-that-content-moderation-is-still-not-up-to-par-ahead-of-eu-elections/|https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2024/04/30/europeennes-quand-l-intelligence-artificielle-se-mele-a-la-campagne_6230817_823448.html|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections|https://incidentdatabase.ai/cite/737/,2026-08-11
cand-fr-2024-leg-macron-bonus-copycop,CopyCop fake Macron voting-bonus site and LLM content laundering,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-06-30,promote_with_reach_caveat,spoofed_media|synthetic_text|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|candidate_impersonation,supporting_tool,confirmed,confirmed,credibly_reported,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Combines cloned institutional interface, fabricated inducement and exposed LLM prompts rewriting journalism at scale.","The corpus measures production, not audience; Russia-link is a strong research inference rather than final state attribution.",https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/04/operation-targets-french-snap-elections-using-ai-generated-content/|https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/russian-disinformation-networks-ramp-up-attacks-on-european-elections.php|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections,2026-08-11
cand-uk-2024-ge-x-botlike-network,High-volume bot-like X accounts amplifying Reform and pro-Kremlin themes,United Kingdom,Europe,2024 general election,2024-07-04,promote_with_platform_corroboration,bot_amplification|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,material_amplification,not_established,partly_confirmed,unknown,estimated,unknown,unknown,"Useful account-level flooding case with explicit separation between estimated impressions, aligned exposure and electoral effect.","Bot-like is a behavioral classification, not X-confirmed automation; 150 million displays are non-unique modeled impressions and no party link was shown.",https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/investigation-reveals-content-posted-by-bot-like-accounts-on-x-has-been-seen-150-million-times-ahead-of-the-uk-elections/|https://www.itv.com/news/2024-07-01/bot-like-x-accounts-having-oversized-influence-on-general-election-study|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections,2026-08-11
cand-uk-2024-ge-nigeria-facebook-network,Nigeria-administered Facebook network using AI anti-immigration images,United Kingdom,Europe,2024 general election,2024-07-04,promote_with_reach_caveat,coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|synthetic_image|microtargeting|paid_influence,mixed,confirmed,confirmed,platform_attributed,qualitative,unknown,unknown,Clear foreign-admin location and demographic-targeting case with strong counterevidence that gross follower counts represented UK reach.,Most followers were outside the UK and likely fake engagement; pro-Kremlin content does not establish Russian control and no Reform involvement was shown.,https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-29/uk-election-pro-russian-facebook-pages-coordinating/104038246|https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-01/meta-shuts-down-pro-russian-facebook-pages-in-uk-elections/104045286|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections,2026-08-11
cand-de-2025-bund-storm1516-rfbi,Storm-1516 and R-FBI synthetic witness and fake-news-site smears,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,promote_after_claim_coding,spoofed_media|synthetic_video|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification,mixed,confirmed,confirmed,officially_attributed,measured,unknown,unknown,"Strong official-attribution comparison combining synthetic witnesses, fake media infrastructure and domestic laundering.","German attribution is strong at Storm-1516 campaign level, while exact responsibility for every R-FBI asset and domestic amplifier must stay scoped; no effect was measured.",https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/schwerpunkte/EN/disinformation/article-disinformation-hybrid-threat.html|https://alliance4europe.eu/storm-1516-german-elections|https://correctiv.org/en/fact-checking-en/2025/01/24/disinformation-operation-russian-meddling-in-german-election-campaign-exposed/|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-linked-ai-websites-aim-dupe-german-voters-study-finds-2025-01-23/,2026-08-11
cand-hu-2026-parl-proorban-tiktok-cio,Pro-Orban TikTok covert influence operation using generative-AI videos,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,promote_after_claim_coding,synthetic_video|synthetic_image|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|candidate_impersonation,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,platform_attributed,measured,unknown,unknown,"Platform-confirmed CIO with synthetic anchors, experts, celebrities and approximately ten million views in a 2026 European election.",TikTok confirmed covert coordination but did not publicly identify the sponsor; the opposition landslide does not quantify or disprove attitudinal effects.,https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/influence-campaign-uses-ai-tiktok-videos-to-boost-hungarys-viktor-orban|https://therecord.media/tiktok-removes-covert-networks-hungary-vote|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungarians-vote-landmark-election-closely-watched-by-eu-russia-us-2026-04-11/,2026-08-11
cand-sk-2024-pres-korcok-stb-hoax,Fabricated StB documents and fake-account amplification against Korcok,Slovakia,Europe,2024 presidential election,2024-04-06,reserve_needs_platform_source,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|recommender_amplification,material_amplification,not_established,confirmed,credibly_reported,measured,unknown,unknown,Document-forgery and false-consensus comparison outside generative media.,Needs a platform or election-authority source and method review for fake-account classification; no foreign-state direction or vote effect established.,https://vsquare.org/slovakia-election-ivan-korcok-peter-pellegrini-fake-accounts-facebook-hoax/,2026-08-11
cand-fr-2024-leg-zelenska-bugatti,Synthetic Bugatti dealership witness and fake Zelenska invoice,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-07-07,reserve_election_targeting_unproven,synthetic_video|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,core_generation,probable,confirmed,credibly_reported,measured,unknown,unknown,High-reach synthetic witness and fake-document operation with search-engine capture between election rounds.,Direct French-election targeting is unproven and much of the eighteen-million-view reach may have been international; keep outside the core tier.,https://www.wired.com/story/ai-generated-russian-disinformation-zelensky-bugatti/|https://www.wral.com/archive/21508090/|https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/no-evidence-ukraines-first-lady-bought-bugatti-sportscar-paris-2024-07-13/,2026-08-11
cand-de-2025-bund-fake-ballots,Fabricated Leipzig and Hamburg ballot-suppression evidence,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|election_denial,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,alleged,unknown,unknown,unknown,Artifact-level example of staged physical evidence pre-loading a ballot-fraud interpretation.,Reach was limited or unreported and artifact-specific command attribution was not adjudicated; add platform metrics before promotion.,https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundestagswahl/desinformation-russland-briefwahl-100.html|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-warns-russian-disinformation-targeting-election-2025-02-21/,2026-08-11
cand-hu-2026-parl-fidesz-execution-ad,Fidesz generative-AI execution-scene campaign advertisement,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,boundary_official_campaign_content,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,admitted,unknown,unknown,unknown,Admitted official-campaign use of synthetic atrocity imagery as a fear-based prediction of an opponent victory.,"Reach, spend and ad-level effect are unresolved; broader survey belief in a war narrative cannot be attributed to this video.",https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-opposition-condemns-fidesz-election-video-with-fictitious-execution-scene-2026-02-19/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf,2026-08-11
cand-col-2026-pres-ai-media-family,Colombia 2026 presidential election AI-media family,Colombia,South America,2026 Colombian presidential election,2026-05-31,disaggregate_before_claim_coding,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|synthetic_audio|fake_poll|fraud_narrative|bot_amplification,mixed_generation_and_amplification,established_at_observer_aggregate,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,mixed_or_unknown_by_artifact,unknown_by_artifact,unknown,unknown,"Completed 2026 Latin American election with official-observer evidence across image, video, audio, bots, ads and messaging; disaggregate before inclusion.","Aggregate observer reporting cannot establish a common operator, denominator, reach, or effect for each asset.",https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2026_EOM_Colombia_Presidential_Elections_Second_Report_ENG.pdf|https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-05-18/ai-generated-videos-flood-colombias-presidential-campaign-with-electoral-fantasies.html,2026-08-12
cand-nld-2025-ge-chatbot-voting-advice,Netherlands 2025 chatbot voting-advice audit,Netherlands,Europe,2025 Dutch general election,2025-10-29,model_evaluation_not_incident,voting_advice|model_bias|interactive_recommendation,information_intermediary,confirmed,confirmed_evaluation,regulator_measured,laboratory_outputs_only,unknown,unknown,Official multi-model audit of political recommendations; direct test of delegated choice and model-specific intermediary power.,"Evaluation outputs are not population exposure, real voter use, persuasion, or electoral effects.",https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/documents/ran-special-ai-chatbots-as-voting-aid|https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/current/ap-warns-chatbots-give-biased-voting-advice,2026-08-12
cand-can-2025-fed-deepfake-prevalence,Canada 2025 deepfake prevalence and low-harm exposure sample,Canada,North America,2025 Canadian federal election,2025-04-28,observational_null_comparator,observational_platform_sample|deepfake_detection|low_harm_share,measurement_and_observed_content,detector_classified_in_sample,confirmed_research_sample,not_applicable_aggregate,sampled_platform_metrics,unknown,not_detected_in_study_scope,"Provides an explicit platform-post denominator and low harmful-view share, reducing selection on highly reported incidents.","Preprint, detector error, platform sampling and view denominators limit prevalence generalisation; null is study-scoped.",https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.13915|https://mediatechdemocracy.com/en/publications/federal-election_2025/,2026-08-12
cand-jpn-2024-tokyo-anno-ai-avatar,Tokyo 2024 authorised Takahiro Anno AI avatar,Japan,East Asia,2024 Tokyo gubernatorial election,2024-07-07,positive_boundary_comparator,authorised_avatar|manifesto_qa|youtube_and_phone,candidate_access_substitution,confirmed,confirmed,candidate_authorised,campaign_reported_interactions,unknown,unknown,Authorised and transparent interactive representation can preserve or expand candidate access without opponent impersonation.,Campaign-reported response counts and vote totals do not identify votes caused by the avatar.,https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/the-apocalypse-that-wasnt-ai-was-everywhere-in-2024s-elections-but-deepfakes-and-misinformation-were-only-part-of-the-picture/|https://broadlisteningbook.com/en/04_01_takahiro_anno_initiatives.html,2026-08-12
cand-aus-2025-fed-pravda-chatbot-poisoning,Australia 2025 Pravda network and chatbot knowledge poisoning,Australia,Oceania,2025 Australian federal election,2025-05-03,promote_after_claim_coding_with_attribution_caveat,automated_web_publishing|knowledge_poisoning|chatbot_repetition,content_scale_and_information_intermediary,confirmed_for_audit_outputs,confirmed_network_and_audit,credibly_reported_not_adjudicated,audit_response_rate_not_population_reach,unknown,unknown,First Oceania lead focused on upstream manipulation of assistant knowledge rather than only feed content.,"A chatbot-audit response rate is not voter exposure; intent and state attribution are investigative, not adjudicated.",https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-05-03/pro-russian-push-to-poison-ai-chatbots-in-australia/105239644|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/deepfake-scams-poisoned-chatbots|https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/electoral-advertising/ai-and-elections.htm,2026-08-12
cand-gbr-nir-2022-cara-hunter-sexual-deepfake,Northern Ireland 2022 Cara Hunter sexualised synthetic-video attack,United Kingdom,Europe,2022 Northern Ireland Assembly election,2022-05-05,promote_with_technical_provenance_caveat,sexualised_synthetic_video|gendered_abuse|closed_channel_distribution,alleged_or_probable_content_generation,not_forensically_public,victim_and_parliamentary_record_confirmed,unknown,unknown_closed_channel,candidate_harm_reported,unknown,"Adds gendered political violence, candidate-supply harm and WhatsApp distribution absent from the included corpus.","Origin, exact generation method, unique reach and vote effect remain unknown; do not redistribute the media.",https://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/officialreport/report.aspx?docID=422083&eveDate=2025%2F01%2F14|https://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/officialreport/report.aspx?docID=467176&eveDate=2026%2F01%2F26|https://www.theguardian.com/society/ng-interactive/2025/dec/01/it-was-extremely-pornographic-cara-hunter-on-the-deepfake-video-that-nearly-ended-her-political-career,2026-08-12
cand-ecu-2025-pres-ai-disinformation-cluster,Ecuador 2025 AI-assisted viral disinformation cluster,Ecuador,South America,2025 Ecuadorian presidential election runoff,2025-04-13,reserve_disaggregate_observer_sample,synthetic_media|fake_news|false_endorsement|viral_content_sample,content_generation_in_sample,observer_reported_sample,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,mixed_or_unknown_by_artifact,viral_sample_not_population_reach,unknown,unknown,"Official-observer denominator of 247 viral items, with reported false-content and AI shares; useful after artifact disaggregation.",Aggregate sample cannot identify a common actor or causal effect; sampling frame and item coding must be preserved.,https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2025_MOE_Ecuador_Segunda_Vuelta_Preliminar_ENG.pdf,2026-08-12
cand-usa-2024-grok-ballot-deadline-error,Grok ballot-deadline misinformation and state correction request,United States,North America,2024 United States general election,2024-11-05,promote_as_deployed_model_failure_after_claim_coding,deployed_model_failure|false_election_information|institutional_feedback|product_mitigation,interactive_election_information_intermediary,confirmed_deployed_closed_model,confirmed,provider_and_interface_identified_intent_not_established,official_recirculation_claim_not_unique_exposure,unknown,unknown,Real closed-model election-information failure followed by multi-state feedback and a product-level redirect to authoritative information; useful without presuming malicious intent.,"The official statement that screenshots reached millions is not a deduplicated user or voter-exposure measure; exact Grok version, prompt distribution and behavioural effects are unknown.",https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/6077/080524-secretaries-letter-to-x.pdf|https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/five-us-states-push-musk-fix-ai-chatbot-over-election-misinformation-2024-08-05/|https://www.theverge.com/2024/8/28/24230325/x-grok-chatbot-election-misinformation-warnings-vote,2026-08-12
cand-usa-2024-storm2035-openai-low-engagement,Storm-2035 use of ChatGPT with low observed audience engagement,United States,North America,2024 United States general election,2024-11-05,promote_as_provider_telemetry_negative_case_after_claim_coding,ai_assisted_influence_content|covert_websites|social_comments|provider_disruption|low_engagement,supporting_content_generation,provider_confirmed_use,confirmed_by_provider_telemetry,platform_threat_intelligence_not_state_adjudication,provider_category_low_observed_engagement,unknown,unknown,Known hosted-model provenance plus provider disruption and explicit low-audience evidence; counters an assumption that generation automatically produces influence.,Provider telemetry is interested primary evidence and cannot observe every off-platform exposure; the candidate needs independent corroboration before core promotion.,https://openai.com/index/disrupting-a-covert-iranian-influence-operation/,2026-08-12
cand-bra-2024-municipal-ai-observatory,Brazil 2024 municipal-election GenAI observatory sample,Brazil,South America,2024 Brazilian municipal elections,2024-10-06,promote_as_observational_null_and_boundary_sample,observational_election_sample|transparent_campaign_uses|synthetic_media|gendered_abuse|regulatory_context,mixed_generation_and_monitoring_context,confirmed_in_bounded_observations,confirmed_within_search_scope,mixed_by_artifact,generally_low_repercussion_within_observatory_scope_not_prevalence,not_measured,not_measured,"Records an active search that found punctual, generally low-repercussion uses rather than the expected massive wave, while preserving harmful exceptions and regulatory enforcement.",Civil-society monitoring is not a census and cannot support the claim that AI had no impact; artifact-level coding is required for specific harms.,https://www.dataprivacybr.org/en/documentos/ai-in-the-2024-brazilian-elections/|https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2024/resolucao-no-23-732-de-27-de-fevereiro-de-2024,2026-08-12
cand-sgp-2025-ge-ai-video-sample,Singapore 2025 election AI-video sample and no-breach review outcome,Singapore,Southeast Asia,2025 Singapore general election,2025-05-03,promote_as_observational_sample_after_item_coding,observational_platform_sample|ai_video|candidate_likeness|disclosure|regulatory_review,content_generation_in_sample,confirmed_for_sampled_items,confirmed_within_keyword_monitoring_window,mostly_account_level_or_unknown,platform_play_counts_not_unique_exposure,unknown,unknown,"Separates AI-content volume, candidate likeness, disclosure and an official finding that reviewed items did not breach the new election rule.","Do not call all 73 videos deepfakes or violations: 11 visually manipulated prospective candidates, only four were clearly labelled, and the official review found no breach in the reviewed set.",https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/ge2025-deepfakes-ai-generated-tiktok-politicians-disinformation-5078011|https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/new-legal-measures-uphold-integrity-online-advertising-elections/|https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/threat-assessment-of-coordinated-deepfake-or-synthetic-media-campaigns-that-target-singapore-given-advances-in-genai/,2026-08-12