Upload audited relational data tables
Browse files- data/audit.json +22 -0
- data/candidates.csv +37 -0
- data/case_sources.csv +64 -0
- data/cases.csv +10 -0
- data/claims.csv +86 -0
- data/events.csv +32 -0
- data/schema.json +124 -0
- data/sources.csv +58 -0
- data/stats.json +26 -0
- data/watchlist.csv +13 -0
data/audit.json
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{
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"cutoff": "2026-08-11",
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"counts": {
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"cases": 9,
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"claims": 85,
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"sources": 57,
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"events": 31,
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"case_sources": 63,
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"watchlist": 12,
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"candidates": 36
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},
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"errors": [],
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"warnings": [
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"Claim requires live or additional review: clm-br-013 -> needs_update",
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"Claim requires live or additional review: clm-br-014 -> needs_update",
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"Claim requires live or additional review: clm-br-017 -> needs_update",
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"Claim requires live or additional review: clm-br-019 -> needs_update",
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"Claim requires live or additional review: clm-br-020 -> needs_update",
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"Claim requires live or additional review: clm-us26-012 -> needs_update",
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"Claim requires live or additional review: clm-us26-015 -> needs_update"
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]
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}
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data/candidates.csv
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candidate_id,title,country,region,election_name,election_date,research_status,manipulation_class,ai_role,generative_ai_status,occurrence_status,attribution_status,reach_status,behavioural_effect_status,electoral_effect_status,comparative_value,main_caveat,source_urls,last_checked
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cand-usa-2016-ira-social-influence,Internet Research Agency social influence operation,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,promote_after_claim_coding,coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|recommender_amplification|mobilisation,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,officially_attributed,platform_reported,unknown,unknown,"High-evidence pre-generative-AI example of covert identity, targeting, ranking, and mobilisation.",Platform reach figures cover different denominators and time windows; official investigations did not causally estimate votes or turnout changed.,https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2019/10/08/press-senate-intel-committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia-e2-80-99s-use-social-media/|https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline=,2026-08-11
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cand-usa-2016-cambridge-analytica,Cambridge Analytica voter profiling and deceptive Facebook data collection,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,promote_after_claim_coding,data_harvesting|profiling|microtargeting,supporting_tool,not_applicable,confirmed,adjudicated,measured_as_data_subjects,unknown,unknown,"Direct predecessor for agency transfer through opaque inference, profiling, and personalised message selection.","FTC findings establish collection and profiling, not that psychographic targeting outperformed ordinary targeting or changed the election.",https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/d09389_comm_final_opinionpublic.pdf|https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-issues-opinion-order-against-cambridge-analytica-deceiving-consumers-about-collection-facebook,2026-08-11
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cand-usa-2020-iran-proud-boys-emails,Iran-attributed Proud Boys voter-threat emails,United States,North America,2020 presidential election,2020-11-03,promote_after_claim_coding,voter_intimidation|identity_spoofing|stolen_voter_data|fabricated_video,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,officially_attributed,measured_for_records|qualitative_for_delivery,unknown,unknown,Shows agency transfer through personalised threats and false domestic provenance without requiring generative AI.,State attribution is stronger than unadjudicated charges against named individuals; no public-opinion or election effect was assessed.,https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed|https://archive.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf,2026-08-11
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cand-usa-2024-russia-doppelganger,Russia-attributed Doppelganger cloned-media and targeted influence operation,United States,North America,2024 presidential election,2024-11-05,promote_after_claim_coding,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|microtargeting,supporting_tool,confirmed_for_some_assets,partly_confirmed,officially_attributed,partial_content_level,unknown,unknown,"Strong source-laundering comparison: copied news design, fake identity media, tailored distribution, and AI-assisted assets.",The seizure affidavit contains allegations; individual content views are not operation-wide unique reach.,https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-covert-russian-government-sponsored-foreign-malign-influence|https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/18/doppelganger-us-election/,2026-08-11
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cand-usa-2024-iran-hack-and-leak,Iran-attributed Trump campaign hack-and-leak operation,United States,North America,2024 presidential election,2024-11-05,reserve_election_adjacent,campaign_intrusion|selective_leaking|media_laundering,none_established,not_applicable,confirmed,officially_attributed,low_qualitative,not_detected_in_named_recipients,unknown,"Agency transfer over selection, timing, framing, and attempted amplification of private campaign material.",Major nonresponse and nonpublication are counterevidence to a successful leak-amplification claim.,https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/three-irgc-cyber-actors-indicted-hack-and-leak-operation-designed-influence-2024-us|https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-on-iranian-election-influence-efforts,2026-08-11
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cand-bra-2018-whatsapp-mass-messaging,Brazil 2018 WhatsApp mass-messaging ecosystem,Brazil,South America,2018 presidential election,2018-10-28,promote_with_adjudication_caveat,bulk_messaging|list_brokerage|closed_group_amplification|alleged_opaque_finance,material_amplification,not_applicable,partly_confirmed,mixed,alleged|unknown,unknown,unknown,Closed-channel provenance and mass delivery can make centrally shaped messages appear interpersonal and organic.,"TSE rejected the cases because content, reach, repercussion, candidate link, financing, and gravity were not adequately proved.",https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha-contra-o-pt-pelo-whatsapp.shtml|https://sjur-servicos.tse.jus.br/sjur-servicos/rest/download/pdf/2673321,2026-08-11
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cand-bra-2022-ambassadors-meeting,Bolsonaro ambassadors meeting attacking Brazil's voting system,Brazil,South America,2022 general election,2022-10-30,promote_after_claim_coding,state_authority_appropriation|broadcast_amplification|election_denial,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,adjudicated,qualitative|institutionally_asserted,unknown,institutionally_asserted,"Adjudicated use of office, diplomatic staging, broadcast media, and social redistribution to confer official-seeming authority.","A judicial finding of grave abuse is not a causal estimate of votes, turnout, or result changed.",https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2023/Junho/por-maioria-de-votos-tse-declara-bolsonaro-inelegivel-por-8-anos|https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Outubro/fato-ou-boato-justica-eleitoral-desmentiu-as-principais-fake-news-sobre-o-processo-eleitoral-em-2022,2026-08-11
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cand-bra-2022-election-denial-network,Brazil 2022 cross-platform election-denial messaging network,Brazil,South America,2022 general election and post-election mobilisation,2022-10-30,promote_after_claim_coding,cross_platform_coordination|closed_group_amplification|election_denial|mobilisation,material_amplification,not_material,confirmed_in_sampled_traces,mixed,measured_as_content_volume,indicated_correlational,unknown,Rare case with content-volume traces and a survey association between political WhatsApp-group membership and misinformation belief.,Content volume is not people reached; survey authors did not claim causation; the entire network lacked a single established command actor.,https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/research/library/global-elections-casebook/brazil-case-study/|https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/explaining-beliefs-in-electoral-misinformation-in-the-2022-brazilian-election-the-role-of-ideology-political-trust-social-media-and-messaging-apps/,2026-08-11
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cand-mex-2024-genai-cluster,Mexico 2024 fact-checked generative-AI election-content cluster,Mexico,North America,2024 general election,2024-06-02,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,voice_clone|lip_sync|synthetic_endorsement|candidate_impersonation|scam,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed_for_examples,mostly_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Useful aggregate map of first-person speech, false endorsement, appearance distortion, and scams.","The source corpus is 101 fact-check posts, not necessarily 101 unique incidents or an electorate-wide prevalence estimate.",https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CME-Generative-AI-Misinformation-in-the-2024-Mexican-Elections.pdf|https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/html/artificial-intelligence-and-information-integrity-latin-american,2026-08-11
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cand-col-2022-coordinated-facebook-pages,Colombia 2022 coordinated negative-ad Facebook pages,Colombia,South America,2022 presidential election,2022-06-19,promote_after_claim_coding,coordinated_pages|paid_influence|sponsor_opacity|negative_ads,material_amplification,not_established,confirmed,ultimate_funder_unknown,spend_and_item_count_only,unknown,unknown,Clean source-opacity case with coordinated page design and auditable ad spend.,"Ad spend and 538 paid items are not unique reach or persuasion, and investigators could not establish the ultimate operator or funder.",https://www.elclip.org/campana-sucia-en-facebook-colombia-elecciones-desinformacion/|https://cartercentee50c07c05.blob.core.windows.net/blobcartercentee50c07c05/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/colombia-expert-mission-report-2022-english.pdf,2026-08-11
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cand-arg-2023-campaign-genai,Argentina 2023 official-campaign generative-AI arms race,Argentina,South America,2023 presidential runoff,2023-11-19,boundary_comparison,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack|satire,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,admitted|credibly_reported,measured_for_one_item,unknown,unknown,Boundary case separating transparent stylised campaign AI from more deceptive synthetic embodiment.,Much content was labelled or visibly fabricated and contemporary assessments found relatively minor information-space impact.,https://www.context.news/ai/how-ai-shaped-mileis-path-to-argentina-presidency|https://knightcolumbia.org/content/dont-panic-yet-assessing-the-evidence-and-discourse-around-generative-ai-and-elections,2026-08-11
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cand-arg-2025-false-withdrawal-deepfakes,Argentina 2025 Buenos Aires City false-withdrawal and endorsement deepfakes,Argentina,South America,2025 Buenos Aires City legislative election,2025-05-18,reserve_needs_second_source,synthetic_video|voice_clone|false_withdrawal|false_endorsement|last_minute_release,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Direct agency-transfer case: synthetic first-person withdrawal and endorsement at a moment with limited rebuttal time.,Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here.,https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/videos-falsos-de-macri-y-lospennato-en-x-que-paso-en-la-realidad-con-lo-que-ordeno-la-justicia/,2026-08-11
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cand-ind-2024-bollywood-deepfakes,India 2024 unauthorised Bollywood celebrity endorsement deepfakes,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|video_impersonation|false_endorsement|political_amplification,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_assets,confirmed,creator_unknown|amplifier_identified,measured_as_platform_views,unknown,unknown,High-salience harmful impersonation case with content-level reach and a clean distinction between an unknown creator and an identifiable political amplifier.,"More than 500,000 views establish exposure, not belief or persuasion; amplification by a Congress spokesperson does not prove party commissioning, and post-election work found no deepfake doomsday.",https://www.reuters.com/world/india/deepfakes-bollywood-stars-spark-worries-ai-meddling-india-election-2024-04-22/|https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf|https://restofworld.org/2024/exporter-india-deepfake-trolls/,2026-08-11
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cand-ind-2024-authorised-ai-calls,India 2024 candidate-authorised AI voice calls and personalised outreach,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,boundary_comparison,voice_clone|personalisation|direct_calls|multilingual_outreach,core_generation|delivery_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,campaign_and_vendor_identified,large_vendor_reported_delivery_volume,anecdotal_only,unknown,Essential boundary case showing that campaign authorisation and scalable access can coexist with weak recipient disclosure and concentrated personalisation capacity.,"The reported 50 million-plus calls and 25 million personalised calls are unaudited vendor figures, may overlap, and do not establish listening, persuasion, turnout, or vote effects.",https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf,2026-08-11
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cand-twn-2024-storm1376-gou-audio,Taiwan 2024 Storm-1376 false Terry Gou endorsement operation,Taiwan,East Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-01-13,promote_with_attribution_caveat,voice_clone|synthetic_anchor|coordinated_influence_operation|false_endorsement,core_generation|supporting_tool,likely_for_focal_audio|confirmed_for_actor_assets,confirmed,platform_vendor_attributed,low_qualitative_for_focal_audio,unknown,unknown,"Strong coordinated-operation case combining a false candidate endorsement, reusable synthetic formats, and a named foreign-attributed network.",Microsoft's CCP linkage is a threat-intelligence attribution rather than an adjudicated state-command finding; YouTube removed the focal audio before significant reach and no vote effect is established.,https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2024/04/04/china-ai-influence-elections-mtac-cybersecurity/|https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/threat-landscape/east-asia-threat-actors-employ-unique-methods|https://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/268943/ai_disinformation_attacks_taiwan.pdf|https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/en_tfc_286/,2026-08-11
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cand-pak-2024-pti-authorised-clones,Pakistan 2024 PTI-authorised synthetic Imran Khan campaign speeches,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,boundary_comparison,voice_clone|talking_image|candidate_access_substitution|labelled_synthetic_media,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,party_admitted|candidate_authorised,measured_for_focal_stream,unknown,unknown,Clean authorised-use comparison in which synthetic speech restored a jailed leader's campaign presence and was publicly labelled as AI-generated.,"More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches.",https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/|https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-speech-from-prison/|https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037,2026-08-11
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cand-pak-2024-fake-boycott-clones,Pakistan 2024 fake PTI election-boycott voice clones,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_withdrawal|participation_suppression,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Direct participation-agency case in which fabricated first-person messages falsely instructed supporters that PTI figures were boycotting the election.,"Fact-checks establish the fabrication, but the operator, commissioning chain, unique reach, belief, participation response, and electoral effect are unknown.",https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/imran-khan-pti-pakistan-election-withdrawal-fact-check-24318|https://www.voanews.com/a/7481049.html|https://www.sochfactcheck.com/yasmin-rashids-video-announcing-ptis-boycott-of-2024-elections-is-ai-generated/,2026-08-11
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cand-idn-2024-official-synthetic-campaigning,Indonesia 2024 official synthetic campaigning and Suharto resurrection,Indonesia,Southeast Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-02-14,boundary_comparison,deepfake_resurrection|synthetic_image|campaign_branding|chatbot,core_generation|campaign_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,official_campaign_and_party_identified,mixed_content_level_and_overbroad_hashtag_metrics,unknown,unknown,"Major authorised-use comparison combining a synthetic deceased leader, AI image rebranding, volunteer distribution, and campaign chatbots.","The 4.7 million Suharto-view figure is provisional secondary reporting, while 19 billion #Prabowo TikTok views cover all hashtag content rather than AI assets; neither measures persuasion or vote causation.",https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/ai-disinformation-deepfakes-indonesia-elections-4091296|https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/asia/suharto-deepfake-ai-scam-indonesia-election-hnk-intl/index.html|https://www.reuters.com/technology/generative-ai-faces-major-test-indonesia-holds-largest-election-since-boom-2024-02-08/|https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/indonesia-polls-ai-resurrects-long-dead-dictator-sparks-ethical-concerns/articleshow/107625469.cms,2026-08-11
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cand-bgd-2024-progovernment-ai-disinformation,Bangladesh 2024 pro-government AI pseudo-news and opposition deepfakes,Bangladesh,South Asia,2024 parliamentary election,2024-01-07,promote_with_attribution_caveat,synthetic_anchor|voice_clone|pseudo_news|opposition_attack,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,aligned_promoters_identified|sponsorship_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Low-cost pseudo-news case showing how stock avatars and opposition impersonation can reinforce a dominant political media ecosystem.,"Pro-government promotion does not prove Awami League or government commissioning; focal reach and voter effects are unknown, and the opposition boycott and noncompetitive environment preclude election-result inference.",https://www.ft.com/content/bd1bc5b4-f540-48f8-9cda-75c19e5ac69c|https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/elections/news/ai-disinformation-disrupting-bangladeshs-election-report-3494641|https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/deep-fakes-and-disinformation-in-bangladesh/,2026-08-11
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cand-kor-2024-deepfake-enforcement-set,South Korea 2024 election deepfake enforcement set,South Korea,East Asia,2024 National Assembly election,2024-04-10,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,aggregate_deepfake_enforcement|synthetic_image|synthetic_video,core_generation_for_counted_items,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,officially_reported_aggregate,multiple_or_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Institutional-response case for a broad pre-election ban and active NEC monitoring, useful for separating item detection from harm and enforcement outcomes.","The 129 detected items are not 129 unique operations, do not establish deception or views, and should be disaggregated before promotion to incident-level cases.",https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240219003100320|https://verfassungsblog.de/fake-news-content-moderation-singapoer-south-korea-election/|https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/ai-and-elections-lessons-from-south-korea/,2026-08-11
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cand-zaf-2024-trump-mk-deepfake,South Africa 2024 false Trump endorsement of MK,South Africa,Southern Africa,2024 general election,2024-05-29,promote_after_claim_coding,celebrity_impersonation|voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_endorsement|political_amplification,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_asset,confirmed,creator_unknown|amplifier_identified,unknown_for_focal_asset,unknown,unknown,Clear false-endorsement case with a prominent party-linked amplifier and strong negative-case evidence about the limited overall role of GenAI.,"The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall.",https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election|https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south|https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-elections/|https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf,2026-08-11
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cand-nga-2023-atiku-spliced-audio,Nigeria 2023 spliced Atiku election-rigging audio,Nigeria,West Africa,2023 presidential election,2023-02-25,boundary_synthetic_non_genai,audio_splicing|false_rigging_narrative|cross_platform_spread,not_required_for_focal_asset|material_distribution,not_established|likely_conventional_edit,confirmed,unknown,partial_platform_metrics|persistent_after_debunk,expert_observation_only,unknown,Important synthetic-media boundary case showing how a false first-person rigging narrative can persist through voting without neural generation.,"Splice analysis supports conventional compositing, not generative voice synthesis; thousands of listens and platform persistence do not establish belief, turnout, votes, or the responsible actor.",https://cddfactcheck.org/fact-check-audio-of-atiku-okowa-tambuwal-planning-with-inec-to-rig-elections-is-doctored/|https://www.thecable.ng/fact-check-viral-audio-of-atiku-tambuwal-and-okowa-plotting-to-rig-election-is-doctored/|https://www.cddwestafrica.org/uploads/reports/file/Understanding-the-2023-Nigerian-Presidential-and-National-Assembly-Elections_EACReport.pdf|https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/qa-hannah-ajakaiye/,2026-08-11
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cand-gha-2024-llm-bot-network,Ghana 2024 likely LLM-assisted pro-NPP account network,Ghana,West Africa,2024 general election,2024-12-07,promote_with_detection_caveat,llm_generated_text|coordinated_accounts|hashtag_amplification|inauthentic_engagement,core_content_generation|material_amplification,likely_by_detector_and_behavioural_signals,confirmed_as_research_sample,operator_unknown|beneficiary_inferred,network_internal_engagement_dominant,unknown,unknown,"Useful post-deepfake comparison in which likely LLM text, coordinated schedules, repeated hashtags, and mutual engagement manufactured an appearance of partisan consensus.","AI-text detection and coordination indicators do not prove ChatGPT use, automation, common control, NPP sponsorship, external reach, or electoral effect; most measured engagement was internal.",https://restofworld.org/2024/ghana-election-ai-bots-x-twitter/|https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/ghana-becomes-the-latest-nation-targeted,2026-08-11
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| 25 |
+
cand-ken-2022-platform-amplification,"Kenya 2022 recommender amplification, bots, and influence-for-hire",Kenya,East Africa,2022 general election,2022-08-09,promote_after_claim_coding,recommender_amplification|bots|paid_influence|manipulated_media|hate_speech,material_amplification,not_material|conventional_manipulation,confirmed_in_sampled_traces,mostly_domestic|mixed_sponsors,measured_for_selected_content,discourse_effect_asserted|individual_effect_unknown,unknown,"Strong non-generative comparison showing joint agency transfer through paid influence, bot coordination, manipulated media, and opaque recommendation at million-view scale.","The purposive sample's four million views are not electorate-wide prevalence or unique users; recommender lift lacks internal logs, and no causal study links the ecosystem to votes or the result.",https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/new-research-disinformation-on-tiktok-gaslights-political-tensions-ahead-of-kenyas-2022-elections/|https://www.wired.com/story/kenya-tiktok-election-disinformation-hate-speech/|https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-beware-the-dangers-that-digital-influence-poses-for-elections|https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/fellow-research-platforms-failed-to-curb-misinformation-after-kenyan-election/,2026-08-11
|
| 26 |
+
cand-sk-2023-parl-simecka-todova-audio,Synthetic Simecka and Todova vote-rigging audio,Slovakia,Europe,2023 parliamentary election,2023-09-30,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,measured,unknown,unknown,Canonical moratorium-timing case in which cloned private speech and leak framing constrained correction.,Amplifiers are known but the creator and state sponsor are not; SMER's victory is not evidence that the audio changed votes.,https://cedmohub.eu/how-ai-generated-content-influenced-parliamentary-elections-in-slovakia-the-slovak-police-will-investigate-the-recording-for-a-third-time/|https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/beyond-the-deepfake-hype-ai-democracy-and-the-slovak-case/|https://vsquare.org/slovak-election-targeted-by-pro-kremlin-deepfake-hoax/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/6/b/563625_0.pdf,2026-08-11
|
| 27 |
+
cand-fr-2017-pres-macronleaks,MacronLeaks hack-and-leak and automated amplification,France,Europe,2017 presidential election,2017-05-07,promote_after_claim_coding,selective_leaking|spoofed_media|bot_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,mixed,measured,not_detected,not_detected,"High-evidence pre-generative-AI case of authentic stolen material, forgery, bot salience and blackout timing.",France's later GRU attribution is stronger at the cyber-campaign level than attribution of every forged item and amplifier; no individual causal vote estimate exists.,https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/presse-et-ressources/decouvrir-et-informer/actualites/russie-attribution-de-cyberattaques-contre-la-france-au-service-de-renseignement-militaire-russe|https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/The_Macron_Leaks_Operation-A_Post-Mortem.pdf|https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.00086|https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/french-warned-not-to-publish-emmanuel-macron-leaks,2026-08-11
|
| 28 |
+
cand-fr-2024-eu-lepen-nieces,Fake Le Pen family personas using face swaps and stolen influencer videos,France,Europe,2024 European Parliament election,2024-06-09,promote_after_claim_coding,synthetic_video|synthetic_image|candidate_impersonation|paid_influence,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,measured,unknown,unknown,Distinctive parasocial and false-kinship mechanism using synthetic personas rather than issue persuasion alone.,"The operator is unknown, party involvement was denied and follower/view figures do not establish voter persuasion.",https://www.euractiv.com/news/viral-deepfake-videos-of-le-pen-family-reminder-that-content-moderation-is-still-not-up-to-par-ahead-of-eu-elections/|https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2024/04/30/europeennes-quand-l-intelligence-artificielle-se-mele-a-la-campagne_6230817_823448.html|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections|https://incidentdatabase.ai/cite/737/,2026-08-11
|
| 29 |
+
cand-fr-2024-leg-macron-bonus-copycop,CopyCop fake Macron voting-bonus site and LLM content laundering,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-06-30,promote_with_reach_caveat,spoofed_media|synthetic_text|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|candidate_impersonation,supporting_tool,confirmed,confirmed,credibly_reported,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Combines cloned institutional interface, fabricated inducement and exposed LLM prompts rewriting journalism at scale.","The corpus measures production, not audience; Russia-link is a strong research inference rather than final state attribution.",https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/04/operation-targets-french-snap-elections-using-ai-generated-content/|https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/russian-disinformation-networks-ramp-up-attacks-on-european-elections.php|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections,2026-08-11
|
| 30 |
+
cand-uk-2024-ge-x-botlike-network,High-volume bot-like X accounts amplifying Reform and pro-Kremlin themes,United Kingdom,Europe,2024 general election,2024-07-04,promote_with_platform_corroboration,bot_amplification|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,material_amplification,not_established,partly_confirmed,unknown,estimated,unknown,unknown,"Useful account-level flooding case with explicit separation between estimated impressions, aligned exposure and electoral effect.","Bot-like is a behavioral classification, not X-confirmed automation; 150 million displays are non-unique modeled impressions and no party link was shown.",https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/digital-threats/investigation-reveals-content-posted-by-bot-like-accounts-on-x-has-been-seen-150-million-times-ahead-of-the-uk-elections/|https://www.itv.com/news/2024-07-01/bot-like-x-accounts-having-oversized-influence-on-general-election-study|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections,2026-08-11
|
| 31 |
+
cand-uk-2024-ge-nigeria-facebook-network,Nigeria-administered Facebook network using AI anti-immigration images,United Kingdom,Europe,2024 general election,2024-07-04,promote_with_reach_caveat,coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|synthetic_image|microtargeting|paid_influence,mixed,confirmed,confirmed,platform_attributed,qualitative,unknown,unknown,Clear foreign-admin location and demographic-targeting case with strong counterevidence that gross follower counts represented UK reach.,Most followers were outside the UK and likely fake engagement; pro-Kremlin content does not establish Russian control and no Reform involvement was shown.,https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-29/uk-election-pro-russian-facebook-pages-coordinating/104038246|https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-01/meta-shuts-down-pro-russian-facebook-pages-in-uk-elections/104045286|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections,2026-08-11
|
| 32 |
+
cand-de-2025-bund-storm1516-rfbi,Storm-1516 and R-FBI synthetic witness and fake-news-site smears,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,promote_after_claim_coding,spoofed_media|synthetic_video|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification,mixed,confirmed,confirmed,officially_attributed,measured,unknown,unknown,"Strong official-attribution comparison combining synthetic witnesses, fake media infrastructure and domestic laundering.","German attribution is strong at Storm-1516 campaign level, while exact responsibility for every R-FBI asset and domestic amplifier must stay scoped; no effect was measured.",https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/schwerpunkte/EN/disinformation/article-disinformation-hybrid-threat.html|https://alliance4europe.eu/storm-1516-german-elections|https://correctiv.org/en/fact-checking-en/2025/01/24/disinformation-operation-russian-meddling-in-german-election-campaign-exposed/|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-linked-ai-websites-aim-dupe-german-voters-study-finds-2025-01-23/,2026-08-11
|
| 33 |
+
cand-hu-2026-parl-proorban-tiktok-cio,Pro-Orban TikTok covert influence operation using generative-AI videos,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,promote_after_claim_coding,synthetic_video|synthetic_image|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|candidate_impersonation,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,platform_attributed,measured,unknown,unknown,"Platform-confirmed CIO with synthetic anchors, experts, celebrities and approximately ten million views in a 2026 European election.",TikTok confirmed covert coordination but did not publicly identify the sponsor; the opposition landslide does not quantify or disprove attitudinal effects.,https://www.newsguardtech.com/special-reports/influence-campaign-uses-ai-tiktok-videos-to-boost-hungarys-viktor-orban|https://therecord.media/tiktok-removes-covert-networks-hungary-vote|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungarians-vote-landmark-election-closely-watched-by-eu-russia-us-2026-04-11/,2026-08-11
|
| 34 |
+
cand-sk-2024-pres-korcok-stb-hoax,Fabricated StB documents and fake-account amplification against Korcok,Slovakia,Europe,2024 presidential election,2024-04-06,reserve_needs_platform_source,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|recommender_amplification,material_amplification,not_established,confirmed,credibly_reported,measured,unknown,unknown,Document-forgery and false-consensus comparison outside generative media.,Needs a platform or election-authority source and method review for fake-account classification; no foreign-state direction or vote effect established.,https://vsquare.org/slovakia-election-ivan-korcok-peter-pellegrini-fake-accounts-facebook-hoax/,2026-08-11
|
| 35 |
+
cand-fr-2024-leg-zelenska-bugatti,Synthetic Bugatti dealership witness and fake Zelenska invoice,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-07-07,reserve_election_targeting_unproven,synthetic_video|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,core_generation,probable,confirmed,credibly_reported,measured,unknown,unknown,High-reach synthetic witness and fake-document operation with search-engine capture between election rounds.,Direct French-election targeting is unproven and much of the eighteen-million-view reach may have been international; keep outside the core tier.,https://www.wired.com/story/ai-generated-russian-disinformation-zelensky-bugatti/|https://www.wral.com/archive/21508090/|https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/no-evidence-ukraines-first-lady-bought-bugatti-sportscar-paris-2024-07-13/,2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
+
cand-de-2025-bund-fake-ballots,Fabricated Leipzig and Hamburg ballot-suppression evidence,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|election_denial,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,alleged,unknown,unknown,unknown,Artifact-level example of staged physical evidence pre-loading a ballot-fraud interpretation.,Reach was limited or unreported and artifact-specific command attribution was not adjudicated; add platform metrics before promotion.,https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundestagswahl/desinformation-russland-briefwahl-100.html|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-warns-russian-disinformation-targeting-election-2025-02-21/,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
+
cand-hu-2026-parl-fidesz-execution-ad,Fidesz generative-AI execution-scene campaign advertisement,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,boundary_official_campaign_content,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,admitted,unknown,unknown,unknown,Admitted official-campaign use of synthetic atrocity imagery as a fear-based prediction of an opponent victory.,"Reach, spend and ad-level effect are unresolved; broader survey belief in a war narrative cannot be attributed to this video.",https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-opposition-condemns-fidesz-election-video-with-fictitious-execution-scene-2026-02-19/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf,2026-08-11
|
data/case_sources.csv
ADDED
|
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|
| 1 |
+
case_id,source_id,source_role,supports_claim_types,notes
|
| 2 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-ccr-20241206,primary_record,institutional_outcome,
|
| 3 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,primary_record,mechanism|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome,
|
| 4 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,primary_record,mechanism|ai_role|attribution|response,"Proceeding open, no final infringement finding."
|
| 5 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-venice-202503,methodology,attribution|electoral_effect|legal_status|counterevidence,
|
| 6 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,context,reach|response,Platform self-report.
|
| 7 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-ifes-202412,corroboration,mechanism|ai_role|electoral_effect,
|
| 8 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,primary_record,occurrence|reach|attribution,"Authoritative record of the intelligence assessment, not a final adjudication."
|
| 9 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,counterevidence,attribution|counterevidence,PNL-funded brief is distinct from other network components; intent to support Georgescu is not established.
|
| 10 |
+
ro-2025-presidential-repeat,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,primary_record,occurrence|institutional_outcome|electoral_effect,
|
| 11 |
+
ro-2025-presidential-repeat,src-ro-venice-202503,methodology,electoral_effect|legal_status,
|
| 12 |
+
ro-2025-presidential-repeat,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,corroboration,occurrence|reach|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect,Public-data network study; gross platform metrics are not unique voter reach.
|
| 13 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|counterevidence,
|
| 14 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome|counterevidence,
|
| 15 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,corroboration,mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect,Reports police allegation and denials.
|
| 16 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401,primary_record,ai_role|mechanism,
|
| 17 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,context,mechanism|reach,Platform self-report.
|
| 18 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,src-md-eeas-activity-2025,primary_record,attribution|response,
|
| 19 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,context,ai_role|reach,Linked later election; avoid back-projection.
|
| 20 |
+
md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect,
|
| 21 |
+
md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,corroboration,occurrence|reach|mechanism|attribution|electoral_effect,Network study linked to undercover reporting; output metrics are not unique voters.
|
| 22 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,primary_record,legal_status,
|
| 23 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|attribution,"Notice, not final forfeiture."
|
| 24 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,primary_record,reach|mechanism,
|
| 25 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|legal_status,Charges are allegations.
|
| 26 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,primary_record,mechanism|institutional_outcome,
|
| 27 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,primary_record,occurrence|attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome,
|
| 28 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,counterevidence,attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|legal_status|counterevidence,Essential acquittal record.
|
| 29 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,primary_record,legal_status|response,
|
| 30 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,primary_record,occurrence,
|
| 31 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,context,legal_status,
|
| 32 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-platforms-202607,ongoing_monitoring,response,
|
| 33 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-compliance-202607,ongoing_monitoring,response,
|
| 34 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,ongoing_monitoring,response,
|
| 35 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-council-20260807,ongoing_monitoring,response,
|
| 36 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,ongoing_monitoring,response,
|
| 37 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-aio-202411,counterevidence,counterevidence,Prior-cycle evidence.
|
| 38 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,corroboration,occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|legal_status|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Time-sensitive ongoing legal dispute.
|
| 39 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,primary_record,legal_status|counterevidence,
|
| 40 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-fec-dates-2026,primary_record,occurrence,
|
| 41 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,methodology,ai_role|mechanism,Prior-cycle assessment.
|
| 42 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-odni-update-20241021,context,attribution|mechanism,Prior-cycle evidence.
|
| 43 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024,primary_record,legal_status,
|
| 44 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,context,legal_status|counterevidence,"Narrow federal telecom rule, not a broad political-messaging standard."
|
| 45 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-ncsl-20260623,ongoing_monitoring,legal_status,
|
| 46 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,ongoing_monitoring,occurrence|mechanism|legal_status,
|
| 47 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,counterevidence,counterevidence,Platform assessment reported by Reuters.
|
| 48 |
+
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,corroboration,occurrence|mechanism|reach|behavioural_effect|counterevidence|agency_transfer,
|
| 49 |
+
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-ncsl-20260623,context,legal_status,
|
| 50 |
+
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-global-pdid-2024,methodology,,Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim.
|
| 51 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-global-row-tracker-20240416,methodology,,Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim.
|
| 52 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,primary_record,occurrence|attribution|reach|legal_status|institutional_outcome|agency_transfer,Final FCC order.
|
| 53 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,primary_record,reach|mechanism|institutional_outcome|agency_transfer,Consent decree; not criminal adjudication.
|
| 54 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,counterevidence,legal_status|counterevidence,All 22 state counts acquitted.
|
| 55 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,corroboration,institutional_outcome,Secondary case index and outcome summary linking filings.
|
| 56 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,corroboration,institutional_outcome,"Default, not contested merits trial."
|
| 57 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,primary_record,legal_status|counterevidence,Operative consolidated arts. 9-B and 9-C.
|
| 58 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,primary_record,legal_status|occurrence,"Filing proves allegations were made, not violation."
|
| 59 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,corroboration,attribution|agency_transfer|counterevidence,Reports authorisation denial.
|
| 60 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,counterevidence,legal_status|counterevidence,Defence position.
|
| 61 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,ongoing_monitoring,legal_status|institutional_outcome,Scheduled meeting is not a merits outcome.
|
| 62 |
+
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|attribution|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Primary actor artifact and transcript.
|
| 63 |
+
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,ongoing_monitoring,reach,Dynamic one-platform metric.
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us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,corroboration,mechanism|ai_role|agency_transfer,Expert context.
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data/cases.csv
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case_id,case_family_id,title,country,iso3,region,election_name,election_type,election_date_start,election_date_end,case_status,as_of_date,anchor_case,summary,actor_controlling_system,actor_type,actor_attribution_status,target_population,influence_vector,platforms,mechanism_class,ai_role,generative_ai_status,affected_state,agency_transfer_path,power_concentrated_in,democratic_harm,occurrence_status,reach_status,reach_estimate,reach_unit,behavioural_effect_status,electoral_effect_status,institutional_outcome,response,inclusion_tier,overall_confidence,counterevidence,open_questions,last_verified
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ro-2024-presidential-annulment,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,ROU,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,presidential,2024-11-24,2024-11-24,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election after the first round amid officially documented concerns about campaign irregularities, opaque coordinated promotion, platform recommender risks, cyber activity, and foreign interference. Generative AI is not established as a material driver.",mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,campaign_network|platform|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Romanian voters,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",TikTok|Telegram|Facebook|web,recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|institutional_response,material_amplification,not_established,attention|belief|trust|electoral choice,opaque campaign and amplification capabilities → network operators and platform ranking → voters' attention and informational environment → agenda-setting and choice architecture shift away from voters → influence power concentrates in campaign operators and platforms,campaign network operators and platform ranking systems,"unequal campaign conditions, opacity, impaired informed choice, institutional loss of confidence, annulment of the election",partly_confirmed,platform_reported,,,unknown,institutionally_asserted,The Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process on 6 December 2024.,Court annulment; declassification; European Commission DSA proceedings; platform removals; repeat election.,A,0.91,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
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| 3 |
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ro-2025-presidential-repeat,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,ROU,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,presidential,2025-05-04,2025-05-18,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"The repeat election is coded as the institutional aftermath of the annulment and as a distinct cross-platform influence file. DFRLab documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic Romanian personas, generative-AI assets, and a pivot from support for Călin Georgescu to George Simion. The operation's sponsor and any voter effect remain unknown.",unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,unknown_network|platform|institution,unknown,Romanian voters,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",TikTok|Facebook|Telegram|web,institutional_response|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,mixed,confirmed,trust|participation|belief,post-annulment uncertainty and platform-mediated campaigning → institutions and information intermediaries → voters' trust and opportunity to choose → exceptional institutional control over the electoral timetable,electoral institutions and large platforms,"persistent distrust, polarisation, and uncertainty around electoral legitimacy",confirmed,measured,16000000,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the studied network,unknown,unknown,A repeat presidential election was held in May 2025.,"Expanded observation, platform engagement, partial deplatforming, and election-integrity safeguards.",A,0.91,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
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md-2024-presidential-referendum,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,presidential|referendum,2024-10-20,2024-11-03,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"A high-evidence hybrid-interference file combining alleged illicit foreign finance and vote buying with disinformation, spoofed media, coordinated accounts, bots, and some AI-generated content. AI is one layer of the operation, not a demonstrated causal explanation for the narrow referendum result.",Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor|platform,officially_attributed,"Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora","payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|spoofed_media|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"finance plus scalable persuasion and impersonation → network sponsors and operators → voters' information, incentives, and preferences → autonomous deliberation and choice displaced by covert influence → power concentrates in sponsors and intermediaries",foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"distorted campaign conditions, covert inducement, impaired informed choice, institutional distrust",partly_confirmed,estimated,138000+,"authority-reported accounts and transactions across linked investigations; not recipients, people, or voter reach",indicated,unknown,The referendum passed and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff; investigations and platform takedowns continued.,Police and prosecutorial investigations; account and channel removals; campaign-finance enforcement; international observation and public attribution.,A,0.93,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
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md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,parliamentary,2025-09-28,2025-09-28,retrospective,2026-08-11,false,"Linked follow-on evidence shows persistence and adaptation of the 2024 influence infrastructure. A documented paid InfoLeaders network combined inauthentic local personas, Telegram tasking, reciprocal engagement and AI-assisted message adaptation; separate records described synthetic/staged media and context-adaptive bots. Components must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total.",foreign-funded political and influence networks,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Moldovan voters,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference,persistent covert influence infrastructure → network sponsors and operators → voters' information environment and incentives → agenda and deliberation shaped outside transparent competition,foreign-funded influence networks,unequal campaign conditions and impaired informed choice,partly_confirmed,measured,55367950,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the InfoLeaders sample,unknown,unknown,Election completed under an intensified enforcement and information-integrity response.,"Network disruption, financial investigations, platform actions, public warnings, and election observation.",A,0.9,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
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us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,USA,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,presidential_primary,2024-01-23,2024-01-23,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"An AI-cloned voice impersonating President Joe Biden was distributed by spoofed robocalls shortly before the New Hampshire primary and told recipients not to vote in that contest. The operator admitted creating the call, the FCC imposed civil penalties, and a state jury later acquitted him of all criminal charges.",Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,political_consultant|telecom_provider,admitted,New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",telephone network,voice_clone|telecom_robocall|voter_suppression,core_generation,confirmed,belief|participation,cheap voice impersonation plus mass calling → political operator and telecom chain → voters' beliefs about an authoritative instruction → participation decision displaced by fabricated presidential voice → power concentrates in the impersonator and distributor,political operator and telecom distribution chain,"impersonation of authority, attempted demobilisation signal, and reduced trust in authentic communications",confirmed,measured,9581,call attempts initiated; 3978 completed calls carried by Lingo according to FCC records,unknown,unknown,FCC $6 million forfeiture; Lingo $1 million consent decree and compliance plan; state criminal acquittal; later federal civil default judgment and injunction; legal clarification that AI-generated voices fall within TCPA artificial-voice restrictions.,"State investigation and charges; FCC declaratory ruling, enforcement, and provider settlement.",A,0.98,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.","How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
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br-2026-election-preparedness,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,presidential|legislative|gubernatorial,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,"A prospective monitoring file grounded in enacted TSE rules, platform-compliance obligations, institutional partnerships, and observed 2026 incidents. It does not predict electoral harm.","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors",mixed,unknown,Brazilian voters,"synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",major social platforms|generative AI systems|messaging apps|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|recommender_amplification|bot_amplification|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"generative and ranking capabilities → campaigns, providers, and covert operators → voters' information and choice architecture → possible displacement of deliberation or authentic representation → potential power concentration in campaigns and platforms","campaigns, AI providers, and large platforms, constrained by election authorities","prospective: deception, impersonation, discriminatory political violence, suppression, and loss of confidence",partly_confirmed,unknown,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; first round scheduled for 4 October 2026 and runoff for 25 October 2026.,"Mandatory AI disclosure, time-limited ban on new candidate/public-figure synthetic media, provider duties, complaint channels, compliance plans, expert partnerships, and monitoring council.",A,0.95,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
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br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,presidential,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,A disclosed AI avatar of former president Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the launch of his son Flávio's presidential campaign. Federação Brasil da Esperança challenged it in TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; the defence argued that disclosure and the absence of deceptive editing made it lawful. The TSE had not finally resolved the dispute as of the cutoff.,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,campaign,credibly_reported,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,campaign event|social video|news media,synthetic_video|voice_clone,core_generation,confirmed,preference|perceived endorsement|trust,synthetic embodiment of a restricted political figure → campaign producer → voters' perception of endorsement and presence → representation mediated by a controllable avatar → power concentrates in the producer deciding what the avatar says,campaign producer controlling the synthetic persona,contested: possible circumvention of legal restrictions and manipulation through synthetic political presence,confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 pending on the merits at the dataset cutoff; an internal TSE meeting was scheduled for 13 August 2026.,Court petitions and public legal scrutiny under TSE synthetic-content rules.,A,0.91,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
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us-2026-midterms-preparedness,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm election,legislative|state|local,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,"An ongoing monitoring file for a federal election governed by a state-law patchwork, narrow federal campaign-law tools, existing telecom rules, voluntary platform policies, and documented campaign use of synthetic media.","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers",mixed,mixed,United States voters,"synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",television|social platforms|telephone network|generative AI systems|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|telecom_robocall|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"cheap synthetic production and private distribution rules → campaigns, platforms, providers, and covert actors → voters' information environment → authentic representation and deliberation become harder to verify → power concentrates in producers and intermediaries","campaign committees, platforms, and infrastructure providers","prospective and observed: fabricated candidate speech, disclosure ambiguity, suppression attempts, and erosion of epistemic trust",partly_confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; general election scheduled for 3 November 2026.,State disclosure and prohibition laws; FCC artificial-voice enforcement; election-security guidance; platform policies; fact-checking and campaign responses.,A,0.94,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
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us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,legislative|state,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,"By March 2026, campaigns and national committees had deployed realistic AI-generated ads depicting opponents saying or doing things they had not recorded, sometimes with small or low-salience disclosures. The 11 March NRSC Talarico ad converted genuine old posts into a synthetic performance and added reaction lines not present in those posts. The case is observed and attributed, but its behavioural or electoral effect is unknown.",National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,campaign|political_committee,admitted,voters in contested federal and state races,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,social video|digital advertising|web,synthetic_video|paid_influence,core_generation,confirmed,belief|candidate evaluation|trust,realistic candidate simulation → campaign committees → voters' perception of an opponent's speech or conduct → evidentiary cues become campaign-controlled → representational power concentrates in the content producer,campaigns producing and distributing synthetic representations,"possible misattribution of speech, confusion, normalisation of fabricated evidence, and erosion of trust",confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending.,"Candidate objections, voluntary or state-required disclosures, media verification, and calls for clearer rules.",A,0.93,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
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data/claims.csv
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claim_id,case_id,claim_type,claim_text,evidence_label,confidence,source_ids,counter_source_ids,notes,review_status,verified_at
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clm-ro-001,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,institutional_outcome,"On 6 December 2024, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process.",established_evidence,0.99,src-ro-ccr-20241206|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,,The institutional act is certain even where its factual and legal justification is debated.,verified,2026-08-11
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| 3 |
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clm-ro-002,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,mechanism,The official record described opaque and coordinated online promotion that created unequal campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.9,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Established as a feature of the official and independent record; specific sponsors and all network components remain unresolved.,verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-003,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,response,"The European Commission opened formal DSA proceedings against TikTok concerning election-risk management, recommender systems, political advertising, and coordinated inauthentic manipulation.",established_evidence,0.99,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,,Opening proceedings is not a final infringement finding.,verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-004,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,ai_role,Generative AI has not been established as a material driver of the Romanian annulment case.,strong_inference,0.88,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-ifes-202412,,"The central digital mechanism is amplification, coordination, and opaque promotion rather than confirmed synthetic media.",verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-005,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok reported large-scale prevention of fake engagement and removal of election-related networks, but these platform metrics do not measure voter exposure to the specific campaign.",established_evidence,0.84,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,,"Platform self-report; preserve distinction between prevented actions, removed accounts, impressions, and people reached.",verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-006,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,electoral_effect,No source in the reviewed record provides a credible causal estimate of votes changed by the coordinated digital campaign.,established_evidence,0.92,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Absence claim limited to reviewed evidence; update if individual-level or quasi-experimental research appears.,verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-007,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,attribution,A simple claim that Russia alone directed the entire campaign is stronger than the presently coded public evidence supports.,strong_inference,0.82,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"Code official allegations, technical indicators, domestic financing, and final attribution separately.",verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-008,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,legal_status,"The Venice Commission treated annulment as an exceptional measure requiring clear legal conditions, reliable evidence, procedural safeguards, and proportionality.",established_evidence,0.95,src-ro-venice-202503,,"Normative legal standard, not a factual finding about every Romanian allegation.",verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-009,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,Romania held a repeat presidential election on 4 and 18 May 2025.,established_evidence,0.99,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,,verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-010,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,The repeat-election outcome cannot be used as a causal measure of what the annulled 2024 result would have been absent manipulation.,strong_inference,0.94,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|src-ro-venice-202503,,"The electorate, candidates, campaign, information environment, and institutional context changed.",verified,2026-08-11
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| 12 |
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clm-ro-011,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,occurrence,"A declassified SRI report described an initial network of about 25,000 TikTok accounts activated intensely in the final two weeks before the first round, including 797 accounts created in 2016 that had remained largely inactive until 11 November 2024.",established_evidence,0.97,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,Established as an intelligence-service report. The account count is not independently audited unique reach and does not establish the operator or voter effect.,verified,2026-08-11
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| 13 |
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clm-ro-012,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok's separately disclosed Turkey-based network and the SRI-reported 25,000-account network have different scopes and cannot be summed as one operation or one audience estimate.",established_evidence,0.94,src-ro-tiktok-integrity|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,"This is a source-scope correction, not an assertion that the networks were unrelated in every respect.",verified,2026-08-11
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| 14 |
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clm-ro-013,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,counterevidence,"Snoop reported that PNL financed the #EchilibrușiVerticalitate influencer campaign, while the contracted firm said its original brief had been altered, diverted, or cloned in Georgescu's favour.",established_evidence,0.9,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"The reporting is counterevidence to a one-actor account of all amplification. It does not establish that PNL intended to support Georgescu, nor does it disprove separate foreign-linked activity.",verified,2026-08-11
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clm-ro-014,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,"DFRLab identified at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok accounts active from December 2024 through 6 June 2025 that first supported Călin Georgescu and later George Simion while attacking Moldova, France, and the EU.",established_evidence,0.95,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,Established as a transparent public-data research finding; platform access thresholds may leave additional accounts unobserved.,verified,2026-08-11
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| 16 |
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clm-ro-015,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,reach,"The studied network produced 8,514 posts and accumulated at least 16 million views and 681,000 likes across the three platforms.",established_evidence,0.93,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"These are non-unique platform metrics, not authenticated Romanian voters, belief, or persuasion.",verified,2026-08-11
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| 17 |
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clm-ro-016,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ai_role,"The network used generative-AI profile images and descriptions, synthetic Romanian personas, and DreamFace or D-ID-style avatars alongside hijacked accounts and conventional stock footage.",established_evidence,0.91,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"AI was one component of a broader cross-platform coordination system, not a complete explanation for its reach.",verified,2026-08-11
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| 18 |
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clm-ro-017,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,attribution,The network's operator and sponsor remain publicly unidentified; pro-Russia narratives and coordinated behaviour do not by themselves establish Russian-state command.,open_question,0.97,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"Confidence refers to the appropriately unresolved wording, not confidence that no attribution will ever be possible.",verified,2026-08-11
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| 19 |
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clm-ro-018,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence estimates whether the cross-platform network changed belief, turnout, candidate preference, or the repeat-election result.",open_question,0.98,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,Views and likes do not identify a causal effect; the result being upheld does not negate occurrence of the network.,verified,2026-08-11
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| 20 |
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clm-md-001,md-2024-presidential-referendum,occurrence,Moldova held the first presidential round and EU constitutional referendum on 20 October 2024 and the presidential runoff on 3 November 2024.,established_evidence,0.99,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,,verified,2026-08-11
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| 21 |
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clm-md-002,md-2024-presidential-referendum,institutional_outcome,The EU constitutional amendment was approved by a narrow final majority and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff.,established_evidence,0.99,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The dataset does not infer that interference explains the margin.,verified,2026-08-11
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| 22 |
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clm-md-003,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,International observers documented active disinformation and serious concerns about illicit foreign interference affecting campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.96,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,"Observation finding about campaign environment, not a quantified electoral effect.",verified,2026-08-11
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| 23 |
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clm-md-004,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Moldovan police alleged that the Shor-linked network transferred tens of millions of dollars to influence voters.,established_evidence,0.97,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,,Established as a police allegation reported by Reuters; underlying transfers and intent require their own evidentiary assessment.,verified,2026-08-11
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| 24 |
+
clm-md-005,md-2024-presidential-referendum,attribution,"Authorities and international institutions attributed major components of the operation to Russia-linked and Shor-linked actors, while Russia and Shor denied wrongdoing.",established_evidence,0.9,src-md-odihr-final-20250314|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-eeas-activity-2025,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Wording preserves attribution as an official assessment and the denials as counterposition.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 25 |
+
clm-md-006,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ai_role,"AI-generated impersonation and synthetic content appeared in Moldova's information environment, but the wider interference operation relied heavily on non-AI mechanisms.",established_evidence,0.91,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Avoids treating illicit finance, bots, and coordinated networks as synonymous with generative AI.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 26 |
+
clm-md-007,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Meta reported removing a coordinated inauthentic network targeting Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.,established_evidence,0.95,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Platform self-report; independent replication is limited and gross follower counts largely reflected non-Moldovan or fake engagement.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 27 |
+
clm-md-008,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"The ODIHR-cited figure of more than 138,000 accounts and transactions across linked investigations is an enforcement indicator, not a count of recipients, exposed people, persuaded voters, or unique accounts.",established_evidence,0.91,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The denominator combines accounts and transactions and may contain repeated entities; do not convert it into people or voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 28 |
+
clm-md-009,md-2024-presidential-referendum,behavioural_effect,"Documented payment systems provide evidence of attempted and in some cases accepted inducement, but do not establish how each recipient voted.",strong_inference,0.9,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Acceptance of a payment is not identical to compliance with an instruction.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 29 |
+
clm-md-010,md-2024-presidential-referendum,electoral_effect,No reviewed source provides a credible causal estimate of how many referendum or presidential votes were changed by the influence operation.,established_evidence,0.93,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The narrow margin increases importance but does not supply causal identification.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 30 |
+
clm-md-011,md-2024-presidential-referendum,counterevidence,"Observers also found incumbent advantage, insufficient safeguards against misuse of administrative resources, and media imbalances.",established_evidence,0.96,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Prevents the foreign-interference frame from obscuring domestic electoral-integrity problems.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 31 |
+
clm-md-012,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"The 2025 parliamentary-election observation record described inauthentic account networks, troll farms, automated bots, AI videos, disinformation, and foreign-funded vote-buying infrastructure.",established_evidence,0.96,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,Evidence concerns a linked later election and is not silently back-projected into every 2024 event.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 32 |
+
clm-md-013,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,The persistence of a network across elections does not establish that AI-generated content or bots determined the 2025 outcome.,strong_inference,0.94,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 33 |
+
clm-md-014,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"Meta reported about 4,200 Facebook Page followers and 335,000 Instagram followers for the removed Moldova-focused network, but said the vast majority were outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; it assessed that the operation had not built an authentic audience before disruption.",established_evidence,0.97,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Established as platform telemetry and assessment. Gross followers must not be reported as Moldovan voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 34 |
+
clm-md-015,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,occurrence,"DFRLab analysed 253 inauthentic accounts in a paid InfoLeaders network linked through undercover reporting to Telegram-based recruitment, training, task assignment, and mutual amplification.",established_evidence,0.95,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The platform sample and the wider number of recruited people are different denominators.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 35 |
+
clm-md-016,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,reach,"The 253-account InfoLeaders sample produced 28,708 posts, 55,367,950 views, 2,207,894 likes, 295,608 shares, and 239,016 comments across TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram.",established_evidence,0.93,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"Platform totals are non-unique, can include repeat or inauthentic engagement, and do not measure belief or votes.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
+
clm-md-017,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"Curators required local-looking participants to personalise centrally supplied messages while retaining assigned hashtags and to amplify one another, making paid coordination appear to be spontaneous peer speech.",established_evidence,0.92,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"AI-assisted rephrasing was an enabling layer within a paid human and bot-coordinated system, not the sole mechanism.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
+
clm-md-018,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,attribution,"The InfoLeaders network had strong operational links to Shor-affiliated or Moscow-linked structures, but the public record does not independently establish direct Kremlin command of every account or asset.",strong_inference,0.88,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Beneficiary, operational affiliate, funder, state-aligned ecosystem, and direct command are kept separate.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 38 |
+
clm-md-019,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence provides a causal estimate of belief, turnout, votes, seats, or the 2025 result attributable to the InfoLeaders network, synthetic media, or automated accounts.",open_question,0.98,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"The election result and institutional validation do not erase documented interference, but neither identifies a numeric effect.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 39 |
+
clm-nh-001,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,occurrence,An AI-generated voice impersonating President Joe Biden was used in robocalls before the New Hampshire presidential primary.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 40 |
+
clm-nh-002,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,The call told recipients to save their vote for November rather than participate in the primary.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,,The content has a demobilising instruction; criminal intent and legal guilt are separate questions.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 41 |
+
clm-nh-003,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,attribution,Steve Kramer admitted commissioning the AI-generated robocall.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,Admission to creation does not equal conviction on the state charges.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 42 |
+
clm-nh-004,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,reach,"Voice Broadcasting initiated 9,581 call attempts, and Lingo records showed 3,978 completed calls bearing A-level attestations.",established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,"Calls are not equivalent to unique people reached, completed calls, or listeners.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 43 |
+
clm-nh-005,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,Caller-ID spoofing and inaccurate attestation in the telecom chain increased the call's apparent authenticity and deliverability.,established_evidence,0.97,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523|src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,,"Shows that the case is an infrastructure chain, not merely a generated audio file.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 44 |
+
clm-nh-006,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,The FCC ruled that AI-generated voices fall within the TCPA's restriction on artificial or prerecorded voices.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 45 |
+
clm-nh-007,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"The FCC issued a $6 million forfeiture against Kramer, while Lingo agreed separately to a $1 million civil penalty and compliance plan.",established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,Separate creator and provider actions.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 46 |
+
clm-nh-008,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,A New Hampshire jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges in June 2025.,established_evidence,0.98,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,,The acquittal must appear wherever the charging decision is discussed.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 47 |
+
clm-nh-009,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,behavioural_effect,No reviewed evidence measures how many recipients believed or acted on the robocall.,established_evidence,0.95,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,"Update if survey, turnout linkage, or experimental evidence specific to recipients becomes available.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 48 |
+
clm-nh-010,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,electoral_effect,No credible causal estimate links the robocall to primary turnout or vote totals.,established_evidence,0.96,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 49 |
+
clm-nh-011,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"In November 2025, a federal court entered default judgment against Kramer, awarded individual monetary relief, and permanently enjoined similar voter-coercion schemes.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,,"The judgment followed nonappearance and must be described as a default, not a contested merits trial.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 50 |
+
clm-nh-012,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,agency_transfer,"The cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed trusted in-state number transferred control over apparent authorship and relevance of a participation instruction to the operator.",strong_inference,0.9,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,The mechanism is strongly supported; its effect on any individual recipient is unmeasured.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 51 |
+
clm-br-001,br-2026-election-preparedness,occurrence,"Brazil's 2026 general election first round is scheduled for 4 October, with a possible runoff on 25 October.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,,"Prospective date, not an observed election result.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 52 |
+
clm-br-002,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"TSE rules require explicit, prominent, accessible disclosure of synthetic multimedia used in electoral advertising and identification of the technology used.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,,Resolution 23.755 amends the standing electoral-advertising rule.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 53 |
+
clm-br-003,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"Brazil prohibits publication or republication of new synthetic content using a candidate's or public figure's image, voice, or manifestation from 72 hours before until 24 hours after voting ends, even if labelled.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,Time-window prohibition is distinct from the general disclosure requirement.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 54 |
+
clm-br-004,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"AI application providers may not rank, recommend, suggest, prioritise, endorse, or disfavor candidates, campaigns, parties, federations, or coalitions in automated responses.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,"A direct regulation of AI-system outputs, not only political advertising.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 55 |
+
clm-br-005,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,Platforms offering political-content boosting must provide a field for advertisers to declare AI use.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 56 |
+
clm-br-006,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"Internet application providers must prepare measurable election-compliance plans, and the TSE set 16 August 2026 as the submission deadline.",established_evidence,0.98,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-compliance-202607,,Future QA should archive submitted plans and assess measurable implementation.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 57 |
+
clm-br-007,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"By 11 August 2026, the TSE had announced platform partnerships, an AGU agreement, an information-integrity and AI monitoring council, and a voice-deepfake cooperation agreement with ElevenLabs.",established_evidence,0.98,src-br-tse-platforms-202607|src-br-tse-agu-20260803|src-br-tse-council-20260807|src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,,Institutional capacity indicators; effectiveness not yet established.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 58 |
+
clm-br-008,br-2026-election-preparedness,counterevidence,"Empirical research on Brazil's 2024 municipal elections found isolated AI misuse and broad campaign experimentation, but not the predicted wave of high-impact generative-AI manipulation.",established_evidence,0.88,src-br-aio-202411,,"A prior-cycle base rate, not a forecast for 2026.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 59 |
+
clm-br-009,br-2026-election-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before voting, and observed incidents must not be converted into predictions.",open_question,0.99,,,Dataset guardrail rather than an empirical outcome claim.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 60 |
+
clm-br-010,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,occurrence,A synthetic image-and-voice avatar of Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the 25 July 2026 launch of Flávio Bolsonaro's presidential campaign.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 61 |
+
clm-br-011,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,mechanism,The avatar explicitly disclosed that its image and voice were generated with AI and then delivered a political endorsement message.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,A labelled synthetic political persona; not a covert deepfake in the narrow sense.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 62 |
+
clm-br-012,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Opposing parties challenged the avatar in court, while Flávio Bolsonaro's lawyers argued that disclosure and the absence of mixed real footage made it lawful.",established_evidence,0.97,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Established that the competing claims were made; neither claim is treated as finally adjudicated.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 63 |
+
clm-br-013,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"As of 11 August 2026, the TSE had not finally resolved whether the avatar violated the electoral AI rules.",established_evidence,0.93,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Time-sensitive negative status; requires re-verification.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 64 |
+
clm-br-014,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,behavioural_effect,"No reviewed evidence measures whether the avatar changed voter beliefs, candidate preference, or turnout intention.",established_evidence,0.94,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"Update if campaign experiments, polling, or platform exposure data become available.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 65 |
+
clm-br-015,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,Federação Brasil da Esperança filed TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 on 26 July 2026 alleging premature propaganda and unlawful synthetic-media use.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,,The filing and allegations are established; the alleged violations are not.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 66 |
+
clm-br-016,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Art. 9-B requires disclosure, Art. 9-B §3 bars certain simulated interlocution with a candidate or real person, and Art. 9-C §1 bars synthetic audio or video used to favor or harm a candidacy even when authorised.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,,"The legal text is established; application to this disclosed, one-way convention avatar remains unresolved.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 67 |
+
clm-br-017,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The avatar's up-front AI disclosure supports compliance with the labelling duty but does not by itself resolve the separate simulated-interlocution or pro-candidacy synthetic-media prohibitions.,strong_inference,0.93,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,The defence argues that disclosure and lack of deception remove it from the deepfake prohibition; no merits court had accepted or rejected that reading by the cutoff.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 68 |
+
clm-br-018,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The 72-hour pre-election and 24-hour post-election blackout in Art. 9-B §3-A did not apply by timing to the 25 July convention.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Other provisions may still apply; retain the blackout rule for prospective monitoring only.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 69 |
+
clm-br-019,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,attribution,Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers denied that he authorised or knew of the avatar's production; his personal authorisation therefore remains unknown rather than disproved.,established_evidence,0.95,src-br-ft-avatar-202607|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"A denial establishes the defence position, not the underlying absence of authorisation.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 70 |
+
clm-br-020,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,agency_transfer,"The disclosed avatar operated as a synthetic political surrogate, letting the beneficiary campaign deploy Jair Bolsonaro's recognisable persona and endorsement without his physical or verified public participation.",strong_inference,0.91,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-ft-avatar-202607,,Whether this legally circumvented a specific restriction depends partly on authorisation and future rulings.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 71 |
+
clm-us26-001,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,occurrence,The 2026 United States general election is scheduled for 3 November 2026.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fec-dates-2026,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 72 |
+
clm-us26-002,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,"As of 23 June 2026, 31 states had enacted laws regulating deepfakes in political messaging, with materially different prohibition and disclosure models.",established_evidence,0.98,src-us-ncsl-20260623,,"Enactment, effective date, scope, and litigation status should be tracked separately.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 73 |
+
clm-us26-003,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,The United States lacks a broad federal rule uniformly governing AI-generated political messages across the 2026 election.,established_evidence,0.95,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024|src-us-ncsl-20260623|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,"Narrow federal rules remain relevant, especially telecom law and fraudulent misrepresentation.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 74 |
+
clm-us26-004,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,ai_role,CISA assessed generative AI as more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new risk categories.,established_evidence,0.98,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,,Prior-cycle risk assessment used as a conceptual baseline.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 75 |
+
clm-us26-005,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,attribution,"Prior U.S. intelligence assessments establish that foreign actors used synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle, supporting a monitored 2026 risk but not proving a new 2026 operation.",established_evidence,0.94,src-us-odni-update-20241021,,Strict temporal separation between prior evidence and current incidents.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 76 |
+
clm-us26-006,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,counterevidence,A platform assessment of the 2024 global cycle reported that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on Meta services.,established_evidence,0.82,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,,Interested-party assessment reported by Reuters; not generalisable to every platform or 2026.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 77 |
+
clm-us26-007,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before the election, and prior-cycle incident counts do not supply a forecast.",open_question,0.99,,,Dataset guardrail.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 78 |
+
clm-us26-008,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,occurrence,"On 11 March 2026, the National Republican Senatorial Committee released an AI-generated video depicting James Talarico reciting text from prior social-media posts.",established_evidence,0.99,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,The source quotes the committee defending the ad.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 79 |
+
clm-us26-009,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"The Talarico ad carried an AI-generated disclosure in small, easy-to-miss text.",established_evidence,0.98,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,Disclosure existence and disclosure salience are distinct variables.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 80 |
+
clm-us26-010,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"Public reporting identified at least three recent national-Republican synthetic ads by March 2026, but did not provide comparable impression or targeting data.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Content count is not audience reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 81 |
+
clm-us26-011,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Additional 2026 election ads fabricated audiovisual speech or conduct by Jon Ossoff, John Cornyn, and Ken Paxton, with varying levels of obviousness and disclosure.",established_evidence,0.96,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Record separate items in a later content-level expansion rather than treating them as identical.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 82 |
+
clm-us26-012,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,behavioural_effect,"The reviewed reporting does not measure whether any named 2026 synthetic ad changed candidate evaluations, turnout intention, or vote choice.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,General deepfake experiments cannot substitute for item-specific field effects.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 83 |
+
clm-us26-013,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,counterevidence,"Some 2026 campaign-generated videos reproduce genuine prior words, are labelled, or use obvious satire, complicating a binary real-versus-deceptive classification.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,"Motivates content-level coding for quotation fidelity, disclosure, realism, authorisation, and context.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 84 |
+
clm-us26-014,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Much of the Talarico attack used genuine older posts, but the synthetic first-person performance added reaction lines and affect not contained in those quoted posts.",established_evidence,0.97,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Do not describe every spoken proposition as fabricated; separate authentic underlying text from invented performance and asides.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 85 |
+
clm-us26-015,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"A platform snapshot on 11 August 2026 displayed roughly 3,700 YouTube views for the NRSC upload, while cross-platform impressions and unique exposure remained unavailable.",established_evidence,0.88,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,,"Dynamic, non-unique, one-platform metric; must be rechecked and never combined with earned-media readership as unique exposure.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 86 |
+
clm-us26-016,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,agency_transfer,"By making an opponent appear to speak and react on camera, the sponsor controlled not only message selection but the target's simulated voice, face, timing, and affect.",strong_inference,0.94,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,The genuine underlying posts constrain how much substantive policy content was invented.,verified,2026-08-11
|
data/events.csv
ADDED
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+
event_id,case_id,event_date,event_type,description,claim_ids,source_ids,event_status
|
| 2 |
+
evt-nh-20240121,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,2024-01-21,distribution,AI-cloned Biden robocalls distributed before the primary.,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-003|clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,observed
|
| 3 |
+
evt-nh-20240208,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,2024-02-08,regulatory_ruling,FCC clarifies that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA.,clm-nh-006,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,observed
|
| 4 |
+
evt-nh-20240523,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,2024-05-23,enforcement,FCC proposes penalties and New Hampshire announces criminal charges.,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,observed
|
| 5 |
+
evt-nh-20240821,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,2024-08-21,settlement,FCC settles with Lingo Telecom.,clm-nh-005|clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,observed
|
| 6 |
+
evt-nh-20240926,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,2024-09-26,enforcement,FCC issues a $6 million forfeiture.,clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,observed
|
| 7 |
+
evt-md-20241011,md-2024-presidential-referendum,2024-10-11,platform_takedown,Meta disclosed and removed a Moldova-focused coordinated inauthentic network before the election.,clm-md-007|clm-md-014,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,observed
|
| 8 |
+
evt-md-20241020,md-2024-presidential-referendum,2024-10-20,election_and_referendum,First presidential round and EU constitutional referendum.,clm-md-001|clm-md-003,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,observed
|
| 9 |
+
evt-md-20241024,md-2024-presidential-referendum,2024-10-24,law_enforcement_statement,Police publicly describe alleged Shor-linked payment flows.,clm-md-004|clm-md-009,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,observed
|
| 10 |
+
evt-md-20241103,md-2024-presidential-referendum,2024-11-03,election_round,Presidential runoff.,clm-md-001|clm-md-002,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,observed
|
| 11 |
+
evt-ro-20241124,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,2024-11-24,election_round,First round of the Romanian presidential election.,,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,observed
|
| 12 |
+
evt-ro-20241204,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,2024-12-04,declassification,Romania published declassified intelligence assessments concerning the online campaign and electoral-security environment.,clm-ro-002|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-011|clm-ro-012,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,observed
|
| 13 |
+
evt-ro-20241206,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,2024-12-06,court_decision,Constitutional Court annuls the entire presidential electoral process.,clm-ro-001,src-ro-ccr-20241206|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,observed
|
| 14 |
+
evt-ro-20241217,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,2024-12-17,regulatory_action,European Commission opens DSA proceedings against TikTok over election risks.,clm-ro-003,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,observed
|
| 15 |
+
evt-ro-20250504,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,2025-05-04,election_round,First round of the repeat presidential election.,clm-ro-009,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,observed
|
| 16 |
+
evt-ro-20250518,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,2025-05-18,election_round,Second round of the repeat presidential election.,clm-ro-009|clm-ro-010,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,observed
|
| 17 |
+
evt-nh-20250613,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,2025-06-13,criminal_verdict,New Hampshire jury acquits Kramer of all state charges.,clm-nh-008,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,observed
|
| 18 |
+
evt-ro-20250826,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,2025-08-26,technical_investigation,DFRLab published its cross-platform account-network investigation covering the repeat-election period.,clm-ro-014|clm-ro-015|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017|clm-ro-018,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,observed
|
| 19 |
+
evt-md-20250924,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,2025-09-24,technical_investigation,DFRLab published its InfoLeaders network analysis four days before voting.,clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018|clm-md-019,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,observed
|
| 20 |
+
evt-md-20250928,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,2025-09-28,election,Moldovan parliamentary election.,clm-md-012|clm-md-013,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,observed
|
| 21 |
+
evt-nh-20251121,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,2025-11-21,civil_default_judgment,"Federal civil case results in default judgment, monetary relief, and a permanent injunction.",clm-nh-011,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,observed
|
| 22 |
+
evt-br-20260302,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-03-02,regulation,TSE adopts Resolution 23.755 for the 2026 campaign.,clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005|clm-br-006,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,observed
|
| 23 |
+
evt-us-20260311,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,2026-03-11,verified_campaign_content,NRSC releases the synthetic James Talarico campaign ad and transcript.,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,observed
|
| 24 |
+
evt-us-20260328,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,2026-03-28,verified_campaign_content,"Reuters documents multiple campaign-produced synthetic ads, including the Talarico video.",clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-010|clm-us26-011,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,observed
|
| 25 |
+
evt-br-20260725,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-07-25,synthetic_campaign_content,Disclosed Jair Bolsonaro AI avatar appears at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch.,clm-br-010|clm-br-011,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,observed
|
| 26 |
+
evt-br-20260726,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-07-26,legal_challenge,Opposing parties challenge the avatar in electoral court.,clm-br-012|clm-br-013,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,contested
|
| 27 |
+
evt-br-20260803,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-03,institutional_agreement,TSE and AGU announce AI good-practices agreement.,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,observed
|
| 28 |
+
evt-br-20260807,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-07,institutional_response,TSE creates council to monitor disinformation and AI use.,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-council-20260807,observed
|
| 29 |
+
evt-br-20260813,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-08-13,scheduled_internal_meeting,Scheduled internal TSE meeting concerning the AI-avatar dispute; not completed at the dataset cutoff.,clm-br-013,src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,prospective
|
| 30 |
+
evt-br-20260816,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-16,compliance_deadline,Deadline for platform election-compliance plans.,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-compliance-202607,prospective
|
| 31 |
+
evt-br-20261004,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-10-04,election_round,Scheduled first round.,clm-br-001|clm-br-009,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,prospective
|
| 32 |
+
evt-us-20261103,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,2026-11-03,election,Scheduled U.S. midterm general election.,clm-us26-001|clm-us26-007,src-us-fec-dates-2026,prospective
|
data/schema.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
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|
| 1 |
+
{
|
| 2 |
+
"cases": [
|
| 3 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 4 |
+
"case_family_id",
|
| 5 |
+
"title",
|
| 6 |
+
"country",
|
| 7 |
+
"iso3",
|
| 8 |
+
"region",
|
| 9 |
+
"election_name",
|
| 10 |
+
"election_type",
|
| 11 |
+
"election_date_start",
|
| 12 |
+
"election_date_end",
|
| 13 |
+
"case_status",
|
| 14 |
+
"as_of_date",
|
| 15 |
+
"anchor_case",
|
| 16 |
+
"summary",
|
| 17 |
+
"actor_controlling_system",
|
| 18 |
+
"actor_type",
|
| 19 |
+
"actor_attribution_status",
|
| 20 |
+
"target_population",
|
| 21 |
+
"influence_vector",
|
| 22 |
+
"platforms",
|
| 23 |
+
"mechanism_class",
|
| 24 |
+
"ai_role",
|
| 25 |
+
"generative_ai_status",
|
| 26 |
+
"affected_state",
|
| 27 |
+
"agency_transfer_path",
|
| 28 |
+
"power_concentrated_in",
|
| 29 |
+
"democratic_harm",
|
| 30 |
+
"occurrence_status",
|
| 31 |
+
"reach_status",
|
| 32 |
+
"reach_estimate",
|
| 33 |
+
"reach_unit",
|
| 34 |
+
"behavioural_effect_status",
|
| 35 |
+
"electoral_effect_status",
|
| 36 |
+
"institutional_outcome",
|
| 37 |
+
"response",
|
| 38 |
+
"inclusion_tier",
|
| 39 |
+
"overall_confidence",
|
| 40 |
+
"counterevidence",
|
| 41 |
+
"open_questions",
|
| 42 |
+
"last_verified"
|
| 43 |
+
],
|
| 44 |
+
"claims": [
|
| 45 |
+
"claim_id",
|
| 46 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 47 |
+
"claim_type",
|
| 48 |
+
"claim_text",
|
| 49 |
+
"evidence_label",
|
| 50 |
+
"confidence",
|
| 51 |
+
"source_ids",
|
| 52 |
+
"counter_source_ids",
|
| 53 |
+
"notes",
|
| 54 |
+
"review_status",
|
| 55 |
+
"verified_at"
|
| 56 |
+
],
|
| 57 |
+
"sources": [
|
| 58 |
+
"source_id",
|
| 59 |
+
"title",
|
| 60 |
+
"publisher",
|
| 61 |
+
"author",
|
| 62 |
+
"publication_date",
|
| 63 |
+
"url",
|
| 64 |
+
"source_type",
|
| 65 |
+
"primary_secondary",
|
| 66 |
+
"jurisdiction",
|
| 67 |
+
"language",
|
| 68 |
+
"source_quality",
|
| 69 |
+
"retrieved_at",
|
| 70 |
+
"notes"
|
| 71 |
+
],
|
| 72 |
+
"events": [
|
| 73 |
+
"event_id",
|
| 74 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 75 |
+
"event_date",
|
| 76 |
+
"event_type",
|
| 77 |
+
"description",
|
| 78 |
+
"claim_ids",
|
| 79 |
+
"source_ids",
|
| 80 |
+
"event_status"
|
| 81 |
+
],
|
| 82 |
+
"case_sources": [
|
| 83 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 84 |
+
"source_id",
|
| 85 |
+
"source_role",
|
| 86 |
+
"supports_claim_types",
|
| 87 |
+
"notes"
|
| 88 |
+
],
|
| 89 |
+
"watchlist": [
|
| 90 |
+
"watch_id",
|
| 91 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 92 |
+
"jurisdiction",
|
| 93 |
+
"election_date",
|
| 94 |
+
"monitoring_window",
|
| 95 |
+
"signal_category",
|
| 96 |
+
"observable_indicator",
|
| 97 |
+
"defensive_data_source",
|
| 98 |
+
"assessment_rule",
|
| 99 |
+
"status",
|
| 100 |
+
"last_checked",
|
| 101 |
+
"notes"
|
| 102 |
+
],
|
| 103 |
+
"candidates": [
|
| 104 |
+
"candidate_id",
|
| 105 |
+
"title",
|
| 106 |
+
"country",
|
| 107 |
+
"region",
|
| 108 |
+
"election_name",
|
| 109 |
+
"election_date",
|
| 110 |
+
"research_status",
|
| 111 |
+
"manipulation_class",
|
| 112 |
+
"ai_role",
|
| 113 |
+
"generative_ai_status",
|
| 114 |
+
"occurrence_status",
|
| 115 |
+
"attribution_status",
|
| 116 |
+
"reach_status",
|
| 117 |
+
"behavioural_effect_status",
|
| 118 |
+
"electoral_effect_status",
|
| 119 |
+
"comparative_value",
|
| 120 |
+
"main_caveat",
|
| 121 |
+
"source_urls",
|
| 122 |
+
"last_checked"
|
| 123 |
+
]
|
| 124 |
+
}
|
data/sources.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
|
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|
|
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|
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|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
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|
|
|
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|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
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|
|
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|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
| 1 |
+
source_id,title,publisher,author,publication_date,url,source_type,primary_secondary,jurisdiction,language,source_quality,retrieved_at,notes
|
| 2 |
+
src-ro-ccr-20241206,"Press Release, 6 December 2024",Constitutional Court of Romania,,2024-12-06,https://www.ccr.ro/en/press-release-6-dec/,court_release,primary,Romania,en,A,2026-08-11,Authoritative record of annulment; does not by itself resolve every underlying factual or causal claim.
|
| 3 |
+
src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,Summary of cases delivered by the Constitutional Court of Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,,2025-04-01,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/SUMMARY-OF-THE-CASES-DELIVERED.pdf,court_summary,primary,Romania,en,A,2026-08-11,Includes the court's summary of Decision No. 32 of 6 December 2024.
|
| 4 |
+
src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,Commission opens formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks under the Digital Services Act,European Commission,,2024-12-17,https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-opens-formal-proceedings-against-tiktok-election-risks-under-digital-services-act,regulatory_release,primary,European Union,en,A,2026-08-11,Opening of proceedings is not a final finding of infringement.
|
| 5 |
+
src-ro-venice-202503,Urgent report on the cancellation of election results by constitutional courts,European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),,2025-03-17,https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282025%29003-e,legal_analysis,primary,Council of Europe,en,A,2026-08-11,Standards-oriented analysis of annulment in the digital-technology context.
|
| 6 |
+
src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,"Romania, Presidential Election, 4 and 18 May 2025: Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2025-10-28,https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/f/3/600295_0.pdf,election_observation,primary,Romania,en,A,2026-08-11,ODIHR final observation report published 28 October 2025.
|
| 7 |
+
src-ro-tiktok-integrity,Continuing to protect the integrity of TikTok during Romanian elections,TikTok,,2024-12-06,https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/continuing-to-protect-the-integrity-of-tiktok-during-romanian-elections,platform_transparency,primary,Romania,en,C,2026-08-11,Interested-party self-report published 6 December 2024 and updated 7 January 2025; metrics retain the platform's own denominators.
|
| 8 |
+
src-ro-ifes-202412,Romanian 2024 Election Annulment: Addressing Emerging Threats to Electoral Integrity,International Foundation for Electoral Systems,,2024-12-18,https://www.ifes.org/publications/romanian-2024-election-annulment-addressing-emerging-threats-electoral-integrity,civil_society_analysis,secondary,Romania,en,B,2026-08-11,Independent institutional analysis.
|
| 9 |
+
src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,Declassified SRI report submitted to the Supreme Council of National Defence,"Romanian Intelligence Service, published by the Presidency of Romania",,2024-12-04,https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20SRI%20I.pdf,declassified_intelligence_report,primary,Romania,ro,A,2026-08-11,"Authoritative evidence of what SRI reported. It is not a final adjudication of the operator, sponsor, reach, or electoral effect."
|
| 10 |
+
src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,ANAF found that PNL paid for a campaign that heavily promoted Călin Georgescu on TikTok,Snoop.ro,Mirela Neag|Cătălin Tolontan|Iulia Roșu|Răzvan Luțac,2024-12-20,https://snoop.ro/anaf-a-descoperit-ca-pnl-a-platit-o-campanie-care-l-a-promovat-masiv-pe-calin-georgescu-pe-tiktok/,investigative_reporting,secondary,Romania,ro,B,2026-08-11,The PNL funding finding rests partly on a confidential ANAF source and vendor correspondence. Kensington said its brief had been altered or hijacked; this record must not be used to infer PNL intent to support Georgescu.
|
| 11 |
+
src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,Cross-platform campaign accuses Moldova's Sandu of meddling in Romanian elections,Digital Forensic Research Lab,Valentin Châtelet,2025-08-26,https://dfrlab.org/2025/08/26/cross-platform-campaign-accuses-moldovas-sandu-of-meddling-in-romanian-elections/,technical_investigation,secondary,Romania|Moldova,en,B,2026-08-11,Public-data network investigation. View and engagement totals are non-unique platform metrics; pro-Russia orientation does not establish Russian-state command.
|
| 12 |
+
src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,Moldova presidential election and constitutional referendum: Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions,OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2024-10-21,https://cdn.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/9/d/578815_0.pdf,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,2026-08-11,Preliminary observation statement.
|
| 13 |
+
src-md-odihr-final-20250314,"Moldova: Presidential Election and Constitutional Referendum, 20 October and 3 November 2024 — Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2025-03-14,https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/587451,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,2026-08-11,Final observation report and recommendations.
|
| 14 |
+
src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Moldova police say businessman Shor channelled $39 million to pay off voters,Reuters,,2024-10-24,https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-police-say-businessman-shor-channelled-24-million-pay-off-voters-2024-10-24/,news_reporting,secondary,Moldova,en,B,2026-08-11,Reports a police allegation; dollar figure in headline and URL should be preserved as published.
|
| 15 |
+
src-md-eeas-fimi-202401,2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats,European External Action Service,,2024-01-23,https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EEAS-2nd-Report%20on%20FIMI%20Threats-January-2024_0.pdf,government_threat_report,primary,European Union,en,A,2026-08-11,Documents an AI-generated video impersonating Maia Sandu in the broader Moldova information environment.
|
| 16 |
+
src-md-meta-threat-reporting,Taking Action Against Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior in Moldova,Meta,,2024-10-11,https://about.fb.com/news/2024/10/taking-action-against-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-in-moldova/,platform_transparency,primary,Moldova,en,C,2026-08-11,Platform self-report. Gross follower figures were largely outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; Meta said it disrupted the operation before it built an authentic audience.
|
| 17 |
+
src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,"Moldova, Parliamentary Elections, 28 September 2025: Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2026-02-18,https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/662251,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,2026-08-11,Canonical ODIHR landing page verifies publication on 18 February 2026 and links the English report. The provider's PDF filename embeds 18.02.2025 despite the 2026 publication date.
|
| 18 |
+
src-md-eeas-activity-2025,2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference,European External Action Service,,2025-01-01,https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025/documents/2024%20Report%20on%20EEAS%20Activities%20to%20Counter%20FIMI.pdf,government_activity_report,primary,European Union,en,A,2026-08-11,Cross-case institutional response and Moldova context.
|
| 19 |
+
src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,Paid to post: Russia-linked digital army seeks to undermine Moldovan election,Digital Forensic Research Lab,Valentin Châtelet|Victoria Olari,2025-09-24,https://dfrlab.org/2025/09/24/paid-to-post-russia-linked-digital-army-seeks-to-undermine-moldovan-election/,technical_investigation,secondary,Moldova,en,B,2026-08-11,"Network analysis grounded in 253 accounts and linked undercover reporting. Metrics measure platform output and engagement, not unique voters; ties to Moscow-linked structures do not prove direct Kremlin command."
|
| 20 |
+
src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,FCC Makes AI-Generated Voices in Robocalls Illegal,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-02-08,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-makes-ai-generated-voices-robocalls-illegal,regulatory_ruling,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Declaratory ruling that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA.
|
| 21 |
+
src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,FCC Proposes $6 Million Fine for Deepfake Robocalls Around New Hampshire Primary,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-6-million-fine-deepfake-robocalls-around-nh-primary,enforcement_notice,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Notice of apparent liability, not yet the final forfeiture order."
|
| 22 |
+
src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture: Lingo Telecom,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-60A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Primary source for call counts, attestation, and originating-provider allegations."
|
| 23 |
+
src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,Steven Kramer Charged with Voter Suppression over AI-Generated President Biden Robocalls,New Hampshire Department of Justice,,2024-05-23,https://www.doj.nh.gov/news-and-media/steven-kramer-charged-voter-suppression-over-ai-generated-president-biden-robocalls,law_enforcement_release,primary,New Hampshire,en,A,2026-08-11,"Authoritative record of charges; charges are allegations, not proof of guilt."
|
| 24 |
+
src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,FCC Settles Spoofed AI-Generated Robocalls Case,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-settles-spoofed-ai-generated-robocalls-case,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Settlement with originating provider; not an adjudication of every allegation.
|
| 25 |
+
src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,FCC Issues $6 Million Fine for Illegal Robocalls that Used Deepfake Generative AI,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-issues-6m-fine-nh-robocalls,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Final FCC forfeiture action.
|
| 26 |
+
src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,Political operative behind fake Biden robocalls in N.H. primary found not guilty,New Hampshire Public Radio,,2025-06-13,https://www.nhpr.org/nh-news/2025-06-13/political-operative-fake-biden-robocalls-nh-primary-found-not-guilty,news_reporting,secondary,New Hampshire,en,B,2026-08-11,Reports acquittal on all state criminal charges and distinguishes civil enforcement.
|
| 27 |
+
src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,"Resolução nº 23.755, de 2 de março de 2026",Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-02,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-755-de-2-de-marco-de-2026,electoral_regulation,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,"Core legal source for 2026 synthetic-content, AI-provider, platform, and compliance duties."
|
| 28 |
+
src-br-tse-calendar-202603,Eleições 2026: confira as principais datas do calendário eleitoral,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-06,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Marco/eleicoes-2026-confira-as-principais-datas-do-calendario-eleitoral,election_calendar,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE election-calendar publication dated 6 March 2026.
|
| 29 |
+
src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,Por Dentro das Eleições: conheça as regras sobre uso de IA na campanha eleitoral de 2026,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-04-10,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Abril/por-dentro-das-eleicoes-conheca-as-regras-sobre-uso-de-ia-na-campanha-eleitoral-de-2026,official_explainer,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE explainer published 10 April 2026.
|
| 30 |
+
src-br-tse-platforms-202607,Eleições 2026: TSE e plataformas digitais firmam parcerias para ampliar combate à desinformação,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-07-16,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Julho/eleicoes-2026-tse-e-plataformas-digitais-firmam-parcerias-para-ampliar-combate-a-desinformacao,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE institutional release published 16 July 2026.
|
| 31 |
+
src-br-tse-compliance-202607,Plataformas têm até 16 de agosto para apresentar planos de conformidade eleitoral nas campanhas pela internet,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-07-28,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Julho/plataformas-tem-ate-16-de-agosto-para-apresentar-planos-de-conformidade-eleitoral-nas-campanhas-pela-internet,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE compliance-plan notice published 28 July 2026.
|
| 32 |
+
src-br-tse-agu-20260803,TSE e AGU firmam acordo de boas práticas sobre IA nas Eleições 2026,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-03,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/tse-e-agu-firmam-acordo-de-boas-praticas-sobre-ia-nas-eleicoes-2026,institutional_agreement,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Observed preparedness action.
|
| 33 |
+
src-br-tse-council-20260807,TSE cria conselho para acompanhar desinformação e uso de inteligência artificial,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-07,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/tse-cria-conselho-para-acompanhar-desinformacao-e-uso-de-inteligencia-artificial,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Observed preparedness action.
|
| 34 |
+
src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,Eleições 2026: TSE fecha acordo com ElevenLabs contra deepfakes de voz,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-06,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/eleicoes-2026-tse-fecha-acordo-com-elevenlabs-contra-deepfakes-de-voz,institutional_agreement,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE cooperation announcement published 6 August 2026.
|
| 35 |
+
src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Brazil's Bolsonaro is barred from this year's election. Can his AI avatar campaign instead?,Reuters,,2026-07-28,https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/brazils-bolsonaro-is-barred-this-years-election-can-his-ai-avatar-campaign-2026-07-28/,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,en,B,2026-08-11,"Documents the avatar, disclosure, competing legal arguments, and unresolved court status."
|
| 36 |
+
src-br-aio-202411,AI in the 2024 Brazilian Elections,AI Observatory and Data Privacy Brasil,,2024-11-01,https://www.dataprivacybr.org/en/documentos/ai-in-the-2024-brazilian-elections/,civil_society_research,secondary,Brazil,en,B,2026-08-11,Empirical counterweight: fewer high-impact AI incidents than widely feared in 2024 municipal elections.
|
| 37 |
+
src-us-fec-dates-2026,2026 Congressional Primary Dates and Candidate Filing Deadlines for Ballot Access,Federal Election Commission,,2026-05-18,https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2026pdates.pdf,election_calendar,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Official election-date PDF states that its information is current as of 18 May 2026.
|
| 38 |
+
src-us-cisa-genai-202401,Risk in Focus: Generative AI and the 2024 Election Cycle,Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,,2024-01-01,https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-focus-generative-ai-and-2024-election-cycle,government_risk_assessment,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Concludes generative AI is more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new ones.
|
| 39 |
+
src-us-odni-update-20241021,"Election Security Update, 21 October 2024",Office of the Director of National Intelligence,,2024-10-21,https://www.odni.gov/files/FMIC/documents/ODNI-Election-Security-Update-20241021.pdf,intelligence_assessment,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Prior-cycle evidence for foreign influence and synthetic content; used as preparedness context, not a 2026 incident."
|
| 40 |
+
src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024,Commission approves notification of disposition and interpretive rule on artificial intelligence in campaign ads,Federal Election Commission,,2024-09-19,https://www.fec.gov/updates/commission-approves-notification-of-disposition-interpretive-rule-on-artificial-intelligence-in-campaign-ads/,regulatory_notice,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Technology-neutral interpretation of a narrow fraudulent-misrepresentation provision; not a broad federal deepfake rule.
|
| 41 |
+
src-us-ncsl-20260623,Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Elections and Campaigns,National Conference of State Legislatures,,2026-06-23,https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns,legislative_tracker,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"As of update, 31 states had enacted political-deepfake laws; approaches differ."
|
| 42 |
+
src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,AI deepfakes blur reality in 2026 US midterm campaigns,Reuters,Joseph Ax|Helen Coster,2026-03-28,https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/ai-deepfakes-blur-reality-2026-us-midterm-campaigns-2026-03-28/,news_reporting,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"Documents attributed campaign use, disclosure salience, and multiple observed 2026 synthetic ads; does not measure electoral effect."
|
| 43 |
+
src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,Forfeiture Order: Steve S. Kramer,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-104A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Final primary record for attribution, call campaign, caller-ID findings, and the $6 million forfeiture."
|
| 44 |
+
src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,Order and Consent Decree: Lingo Telecom,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-790A1.txt,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Primary consent-decree text for 3,978 completed calls, $1 million civil penalty, and compliance plan."
|
| 45 |
+
src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,Political consultant acquitted over AI-generated Biden robocalls,Associated Press,,2025-06-13,https://apnews.com/article/ai-robocalls-new-hampshire-biden-kramer-e87ef8848a2a6515202535a6e800da07,news_reporting,secondary,New Hampshire,en,B,2026-08-11,Independent report of acquittal on all 22 state charges and actor account.
|
| 46 |
+
src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,League of Women Voters of New Hampshire v. Kramer,League of Women Voters,,2025-11-21,https://www.lwv.org/legal-center/league-women-voters-new-hampshire-v-kramer,civil_case_index,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"Case index and outcome summary linking filings; default judgment must be described as default, not a contested trial."
|
| 47 |
+
src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,Federal court enters default judgment over AI Biden robocall,Associated Press,,2025-11-25,https://apnews.com/article/ai-robocalls-biden-new-hampshire-7bb71c5ab962760995469c3b6f787a86,news_reporting,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"Reports the 21 November default judgment, $22,500 total damages, and nationwide injunction."
|
| 48 |
+
src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,"Resolução nº 23.610, de 18 de dezembro de 2019 — consolidated text",Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2019-12-18,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2019/resolucao-no-23-610-de-18-de-dezembro-de-2019,electoral_regulation,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,"Consolidated operative text, including arts. 9-B and 9-C as amended."
|
| 49 |
+
src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,Representação eleitoral concerning the Jair Bolsonaro AI avatar at the PL convention,Federação Brasil da Esperança,,2026-07-26,https://static.congressoemfoco.com.br/2026/07/27/attachment/2026/07/27/cd5726_tse_fe_brasil_ia_jair_convencao_pl_26_jul__2026.pdf,court_filing,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Primary record of filing and allegations in RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; not proof of violation.
|
| 50 |
+
src-br-ft-avatar-202607,Jair Bolsonaro faces legal challenge over AI avatar,Financial Times,,2026-07-28,https://www.ft.com/content/e18c380f-c25d-4e91-8135-d9c2424ab720,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,en,B,2026-08-11,Independent report of legal challenge and counsel's denial of Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation.
|
| 51 |
+
src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,Flávio diz ao TSE que vídeo de IA com Bolsonaro é legal e não engana o eleitorado,Folha de S.Paulo,,2026-07-28,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2026/07/flavio-diz-ao-tse-que-video-de-ia-com-bolsonaro-e-legal-e-nao-engana-o-eleitorado.shtml,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,pt,B,2026-08-11,Reports the defence position; does not establish that the legal reading is correct.
|
| 52 |
+
src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,Kassio marca reunião com ministros do TSE para definir IA de Bolsonaro,Poder360,,2026-08-11,https://www.poder360.com.br/poder-justica/kassio-marca-reuniao-com-ministros-do-tse-para-definir-ia-de-bolsonaro/,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,pt,B,2026-08-11,Time-sensitive status report; a scheduled meeting is not an adjudication.
|
| 53 |
+
src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,New ad: James Talarico reads his most memorable tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee,,2026-03-11,https://www.nrsc.org/press-releases/new-ad-james-talarico-reads-his-most-memorable-tweets-2026-03-11/,actor_release,primary,United States,en,C,2026-08-11,"Primary actor record and transcript; A for what the NRSC published, C for evaluative claims."
|
| 54 |
+
src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,James Talarico Reads His Most Memorable Tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee / YouTube,,2026-03-11,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIDhhVah4xE,primary_artifact,primary,United States,en,C,2026-08-11,Dynamic platform metric; one-platform views are not unique or total exposure.
|
| 55 |
+
src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,Hany Farid delves into newly released deepfakes of James Talarico,UC Berkeley School of Information,,2026-04-28,https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/news/presscoverage/2026/hany-farid-delves-newly-released-deepfakes-james-talarico,expert_analysis,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,Expert analysis page published 28 April 2026; supports forensic and disclosure context rather than reach or electoral effect.
|
| 56 |
+
src-global-pdid-2024,Introducing the Political Deepfakes Incidents Database,Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,Christina P. Walker|Daniel S. Schiff|Kaylyn Jackson Schiff,2024-03-24,https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30349/32389,peer_reviewed_methodology,secondary,Global,en,A,2026-08-11,Comparative methodology and field map; this dataset adds claim-level causal and agency-transfer coding.
|
| 57 |
+
src-global-row-tracker-20240416,How we're tracking AI incidents around global elections,Rest of World,Victoria Turk,2024-04-16,https://restofworld.org/2024/tracking-global-election-ai/,journalistic_methodology,secondary,Global,en,B,2026-08-11,"Used for methodological comparison and leads, not copied as a source dataset."
|
| 58 |
+
src-global-meta-muted-20241203,Meta says generative AI had muted impact on global elections in 2024,Reuters,,2024-12-03,https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/meta-says-gen-ai-had-muted-impact-global-elections-this-year-2024-12-03/,news_reporting,secondary,Global,en,B,2026-08-11,Reports Meta's interested-party assessment that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on its platforms.
|
data/stats.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
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| 1 |
+
{
|
| 2 |
+
"cases": 9,
|
| 3 |
+
"claims": 85,
|
| 4 |
+
"sources": 57,
|
| 5 |
+
"events": 31,
|
| 6 |
+
"case_sources": 63,
|
| 7 |
+
"watchlist": 12,
|
| 8 |
+
"candidates": 36,
|
| 9 |
+
"_integrity": {
|
| 10 |
+
"input_sha256": {
|
| 11 |
+
"research/seed.json": "6f45bc2c1d20b91903fd8aacab1b14deb37382e1736835e8da1cb58fa4abc79a",
|
| 12 |
+
"research/candidates.json": "6586ccee4ac720620995e7287e4976c9fca3303595b3cb8875727fbd0a4c9df8",
|
| 13 |
+
"research/europe_candidates.json": "1cd6f4b4ff119316ff885623151b085c919f5a8984e082d4ff482eea84005f0c"
|
| 14 |
+
},
|
| 15 |
+
"file_sha256": {
|
| 16 |
+
"cases.csv": "dbc7f65cf832c84f0d07370d0f059ec15e2f42c684a53c2dc7a005a7cd36b5a2",
|
| 17 |
+
"claims.csv": "c0e028101cb7f0ebbd71ba570a34ad43e04e369687a1a86ad3647921060f2ba7",
|
| 18 |
+
"sources.csv": "eace098474e3af1fbaef079e29ca689a0baeb1df821727cd6e4780810792b3fb",
|
| 19 |
+
"events.csv": "bc1135c5765adf9e7e9ac1e8c103d2d5191bcd5e6ac2c4747c4f7614f3260f4f",
|
| 20 |
+
"case_sources.csv": "1aceb7a025916bf114f98823a18ece7bfd4d65ddfe3fcd245794f6c617d3cd0b",
|
| 21 |
+
"watchlist.csv": "de372b4065912da610674421f41dc4fc04f5cc164ff7351ead2512b7e52f7d1a",
|
| 22 |
+
"candidates.csv": "df3ee78d546dfab1ec5b5f5ce9e16b2a19de34b1be2a6b35ac9b71d9921d2450",
|
| 23 |
+
"schema.json": "3d8221ebe129d3e6274bd6bedb796a5550c01c338710603b5c1886acdc6392bf"
|
| 24 |
+
}
|
| 25 |
+
}
|
| 26 |
+
}
|
data/watchlist.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|
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|
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|
| 1 |
+
watch_id,case_id,jurisdiction,election_date,monitoring_window,signal_category,observable_indicator,defensive_data_source,assessment_rule,status,last_checked,notes
|
| 2 |
+
watch-br-001,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,2026-08-16/2026-10-25,platform_compliance,"Submission and publication of provider compliance plans with measurable criteria, deadlines, and expected results.",TSE compliance-plan registry and provider transparency pages,"Record submitted, late, missing, or inaccessible; do not infer effectiveness from submission alone.",prospective_monitoring,2026-08-11,Deadline 16 August 2026.
|
| 3 |
+
watch-br-002,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,2026-08-16/2026-10-25,synthetic_media,"Verified candidate or public-figure synthetic audio, video, or image, with disclosure visibility and provenance status.","TSE decisions, campaign repositories, platform ad libraries, and independent verification","One content item per record; distinguish labelled, unlabelled, authorised, unauthorised, satirical, and deceptive.",active,2026-08-11,Active because the observed 25 July avatar activated the synthetic-media indicator; the intensive formal window begins 16 August. Do not redistribute harmful media.
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| 4 |
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watch-br-003,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,2026-10-01/2026-10-05,72_hour_rule,Publication or republication of new candidate or public-figure synthetic media during the statutory blackout window.,TSE cases and platform timestamped transparency data,Record allegation and adjudication separately; preserve publication and republication timestamps.,prospective_monitoring,2026-08-11,First-round window; add runoff window if applicable.
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| 5 |
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watch-br-004,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,2026-08-16/2026-10-25,ai_provider_outputs,"Documented automated recommendation, preference, or candidate prioritisation by an AI provider.","Reproducible audits, TSE complaints, provider notices, and court records","Require preserved prompts, timestamps, locale, model/version if public, replication status, and legal disposition.",prospective_monitoring,2026-08-11,Defensive audit only; no evasion testing.
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| 6 |
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watch-br-005,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,2026-08-16/2026-10-25,gendered_abuse,"Verified synthetic sexual content or AI-enabled political violence targeting candidates, especially women.","TSE decisions, victim or campaign complaints, and trusted civil-society monitoring",Store metadata only; apply heightened privacy and non-redistribution safeguards.,prospective_monitoring,2026-08-11,
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| 7 |
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watch-br-006,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,2026-08-16/2026-10-25,response_latency,"Elapsed time from verified complaint to label, removal, judicial order, restoration, or public correction.",TSE docket timestamps and platform transparency reports,Report medians only when denominator and start/end definitions are stable.,prospective_monitoring,2026-08-11,
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| 8 |
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watch-us-001,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,2026-01-01/2026-11-30,state_law,"Enacted, effective, enjoined, amended, or invalidated state political-synthetic-media rules.","State codes, court dockets, attorneys general, and NCSL","Track enactment, effective date, scope, remedy, and litigation status separately.",active,2026-08-11,Patchwork counts are date-sensitive.
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| 9 |
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watch-us-002,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,United States,2026-11-03,2026-01-01/2026-11-03,campaign_synthetic_media,"Campaign- or committee-produced synthetic candidate media, including sponsor, quotation fidelity, realism, authorisation, satire, and disclosure salience.","Official campaign channels, ad libraries, FEC filings, and independent verification",One content item per record; do not code a campaign's whole output from a single item.,active,2026-08-11,
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| 10 |
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watch-us-003,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,2026-09-01/2026-11-10,voter_suppression,"Verified synthetic or automated messages providing false voting instructions, impersonating election officials, or discouraging participation.","State election offices, FCC, FBI/CISA notices, court records, and trusted fact-checkers","Separate content, operator, distribution infrastructure, reach, and behavioural effect.",prospective_monitoring,2026-08-11,
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| 11 |
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watch-us-004,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,2026-01-01/2026-11-30,foreign_influence,Officially attributed or technically substantiated foreign influence operation using synthetic content or automation.,"ODNI, FBI, CISA, platform threat reports, and transparent technical investigations","Code official attribution, platform attribution, and independent technical attribution separately.",prospective_monitoring,2026-08-11,
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| 12 |
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watch-us-005,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,2026-01-01/2026-11-30,telecom,"FCC enforcement, provider traceback, or state action involving AI-generated election robocalls or texts.","FCC orders, Industry Traceback Group records where public, state attorneys general, and court dockets","Record call attempts, completed calls, unique recipients, and listeners as different denominators.",active,2026-08-11,
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| 13 |
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watch-us-006,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,2026-01-01/2026-11-30,platform_policy,"Changes in labelling, ad acceptance, fact-checking, provenance, or coordinated-behaviour enforcement relevant to political synthetic media.","Platform policy archives, transparency reports, and ad libraries","Distinguish written policy, observed enforcement, and measured effect.",active,2026-08-11,
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