Publish audited dataset v0.3.0 data tables
Browse filesCanonical v0.3.0 CSV tables, schema, row counts and audit outputs.
- data/analytic_record_claims.csv +217 -0
- data/audit-v03.json +76 -0
- data/audit.json +69 -19
- data/candidates.csv +11 -0
- data/case_actors.csv +15 -0
- data/case_catalog.csv +65 -0
- data/case_elections.csv +16 -0
- data/case_sources.csv +4 -0
- data/cases.csv +11 -10
- data/claim_evidence.csv +163 -0
- data/claims.csv +97 -86
- data/content_items.csv +5 -0
- data/coverage_summary.csv +8 -0
- data/datapackage.json +2107 -0
- data/election_sources.csv +34 -0
- data/events.csv +2 -0
- data/model_evaluations.csv +8 -0
- data/observations.csv +19 -0
- data/official_data_sources.csv +31 -19
- data/official_election_metrics.csv +59 -0
- data/official_elections.csv +10 -10
- data/official_results.csv +69 -24
- data/official_turnout.csv +10 -10
- data/pathways.csv +11 -0
- data/research_view.csv +11 -0
- data/sampling_frame.csv +8 -0
- data/schema.json +238 -0
- data/sources.csv +71 -58
- data/stats.json +52 -20
- data/technology_uses.csv +10 -0
data/analytic_record_claims.csv
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| 1 |
+
record_claim_id,record_type,record_id,case_id,claim_id,relation
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| 2 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro24-networks-clm-ro-002,case_actor,act-ro24-networks,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-002,supports_coding
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| 3 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro24-networks-clm-ro-007,case_actor,act-ro24-networks,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-007,supports_coding
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| 4 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro24-networks-clm-ro-013,case_actor,act-ro24-networks,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-013,supports_coding
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| 5 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro24-tiktok-clm-ro-003,case_actor,act-ro24-tiktok,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-003,supports_coding
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| 6 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro24-tiktok-clm-ro-005,case_actor,act-ro24-tiktok,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-005,supports_coding
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| 7 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro24-tiktok-clm-ro-012,case_actor,act-ro24-tiktok,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-012,supports_coding
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| 8 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro25-operator-clm-ro-014,case_actor,act-ro25-operator,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-014,supports_coding
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| 9 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro25-operator-clm-ro-016,case_actor,act-ro25-operator,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-016,supports_coding
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| 10 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-ro25-operator-clm-ro-017,case_actor,act-ro25-operator,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-017,supports_coding
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| 11 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md24-shor-clm-md-004,case_actor,act-md24-shor,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-004,supports_coding
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| 12 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md24-shor-clm-md-005,case_actor,act-md24-shor,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-005,supports_coding
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| 13 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md24-shor-clm-md-009,case_actor,act-md24-shor,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-009,supports_coding
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| 14 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md24-meta-clm-md-007,case_actor,act-md24-meta,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-007,supports_coding
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| 15 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md24-meta-clm-md-014,case_actor,act-md24-meta,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-014,supports_coding
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| 16 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md25-infoleaders-clm-md-015,case_actor,act-md25-infoleaders,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-015,supports_coding
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| 17 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md25-infoleaders-clm-md-016,case_actor,act-md25-infoleaders,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-016,supports_coding
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| 18 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md25-infoleaders-clm-md-017,case_actor,act-md25-infoleaders,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-017,supports_coding
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| 19 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-md25-infoleaders-clm-md-018,case_actor,act-md25-infoleaders,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-018,supports_coding
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| 20 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-nh-kramer-clm-nh-001,case_actor,act-nh-kramer,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-001,supports_coding
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| 21 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-nh-kramer-clm-nh-002,case_actor,act-nh-kramer,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-002,supports_coding
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| 22 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-nh-kramer-clm-nh-003,case_actor,act-nh-kramer,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-003,supports_coding
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| 23 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-nh-kramer-clm-nh-012,case_actor,act-nh-kramer,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-012,supports_coding
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| 24 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-nh-telecom-clm-nh-004,case_actor,act-nh-telecom,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-004,supports_coding
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| 25 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-nh-telecom-clm-nh-005,case_actor,act-nh-telecom,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-005,supports_coding
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| 26 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-nh-telecom-clm-nh-007,case_actor,act-nh-telecom,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-007,supports_coding
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| 27 |
+
record-claim-case_actor-act-br-prep-tse-clm-br-002,case_actor,act-br-prep-tse,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-002,supports_coding
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| 28 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-prep-tse-clm-br-003,case_actor,act-br-prep-tse,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-003,supports_coding
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| 29 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-prep-tse-clm-br-004,case_actor,act-br-prep-tse,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-004,supports_coding
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| 30 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-prep-tse-clm-br-005,case_actor,act-br-prep-tse,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-005,supports_coding
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| 31 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-prep-tse-clm-br-006,case_actor,act-br-prep-tse,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-006,supports_coding
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| 32 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-prep-tse-clm-br-007,case_actor,act-br-prep-tse,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-007,supports_coding
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| 33 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-avatar-campaign-clm-br-010,case_actor,act-br-avatar-campaign,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-010,supports_coding
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| 34 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-avatar-campaign-clm-br-011,case_actor,act-br-avatar-campaign,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-011,supports_coding
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| 35 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-br-avatar-campaign-clm-br-020,case_actor,act-br-avatar-campaign,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-020,supports_coding
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| 36 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-us26-nrsc-clm-us26-008,case_actor,act-us26-nrsc,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-008,supports_coding
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| 37 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-us26-nrsc-clm-us26-009,case_actor,act-us26-nrsc,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-009,supports_coding
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| 38 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-us26-nrsc-clm-us26-014,case_actor,act-us26-nrsc,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-014,supports_coding
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| 39 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-us26-nrsc-clm-us26-016,case_actor,act-us26-nrsc,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-016,supports_coding
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| 40 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-wiener-clm-usca11-001,case_actor,act-usca11-wiener,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-001,supports_coding
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| 41 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-wiener-clm-usca11-002,case_actor,act-usca11-wiener,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-002,supports_coding
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| 42 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-wiener-clm-usca11-004,case_actor,act-usca11-wiener,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-004,supports_coding
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| 43 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-wiener-clm-usca11-007,case_actor,act-usca11-wiener,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-007,supports_coding
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| 44 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-wiener-clm-usca11-011,case_actor,act-usca11-wiener,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-011,supports_coding
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| 45 |
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record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-anthropic-clm-usca11-003,case_actor,act-usca11-anthropic,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-003,supports_coding
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| 46 |
+
record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-chan-clm-usca11-004,case_actor,act-usca11-chan,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-004,supports_coding
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| 47 |
+
record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-chan-clm-usca11-005,case_actor,act-usca11-chan,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-005,supports_coding
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| 48 |
+
record-claim-case_actor-act-usca11-chan-clm-usca11-011,case_actor,act-usca11-chan,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-011,supports_coding
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| 49 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-ro24-ranking-clm-ro-002,technology_use,tech-ro24-ranking,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-002,supports_coding
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| 50 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-ro24-ranking-clm-ro-003,technology_use,tech-ro24-ranking,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-003,supports_coding
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| 51 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-ro24-ranking-clm-ro-005,technology_use,tech-ro24-ranking,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-005,supports_coding
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| 52 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-ro25-avatars-clm-ro-016,technology_use,tech-ro25-avatars,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-016,supports_coding
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| 53 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-md24-genai-clm-md-006,technology_use,tech-md24-genai,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-006,supports_coding
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| 54 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-md25-mixed-clm-md-012,technology_use,tech-md25-mixed,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-012,supports_coding
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| 55 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-md25-mixed-clm-md-015,technology_use,tech-md25-mixed,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-015,supports_coding
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| 56 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-md25-mixed-clm-md-017,technology_use,tech-md25-mixed,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-017,supports_coding
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| 57 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-nh-voice-clm-nh-001,technology_use,tech-nh-voice,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-001,supports_coding
|
| 58 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-nh-voice-clm-nh-003,technology_use,tech-nh-voice,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-003,supports_coding
|
| 59 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-br-avatar-clm-br-010,technology_use,tech-br-avatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-010,supports_coding
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| 60 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-br-avatar-clm-br-011,technology_use,tech-br-avatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-011,supports_coding
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| 61 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-us26-ads-clm-us26-008,technology_use,tech-us26-ads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-008,supports_coding
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| 62 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-us26-ads-clm-us26-011,technology_use,tech-us26-ads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-011,supports_coding
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| 63 |
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record-claim-technology_use-tech-us26-ads-clm-us26-014,technology_use,tech-us26-ads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-014,supports_coding
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| 64 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-usca11-claude-clm-usca11-003,technology_use,tech-usca11-claude,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-003,supports_coding
|
| 65 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-usca11-claude-clm-usca11-004,technology_use,tech-usca11-claude,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-004,supports_coding
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| 66 |
+
record-claim-technology_use-tech-usca11-stack-clm-usca11-007,technology_use,tech-usca11-stack,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-007,supports_coding
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| 67 |
+
record-claim-content_item-item-nh-biden-call-clm-nh-001,content_item,item-nh-biden-call,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-001,supports_coding
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| 68 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-nh-biden-call-clm-nh-002,content_item,item-nh-biden-call,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-002,supports_coding
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| 69 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-nh-biden-call-clm-nh-005,content_item,item-nh-biden-call,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-005,supports_coding
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| 70 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-br-bolsonaro-avatar-clm-br-010,content_item,item-br-bolsonaro-avatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-010,supports_coding
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| 71 |
+
record-claim-content_item-item-br-bolsonaro-avatar-clm-br-011,content_item,item-br-bolsonaro-avatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-011,supports_coding
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| 72 |
+
record-claim-content_item-item-br-bolsonaro-avatar-clm-br-019,content_item,item-br-bolsonaro-avatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-019,supports_coding
|
| 73 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-us26-talarico-clm-us26-008,content_item,item-us26-talarico,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-008,supports_coding
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| 74 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-us26-talarico-clm-us26-009,content_item,item-us26-talarico,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-009,supports_coding
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| 75 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-us26-talarico-clm-us26-014,content_item,item-us26-talarico,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-014,supports_coding
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| 76 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-us26-talarico-clm-us26-015,content_item,item-us26-talarico,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-015,supports_coding
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| 77 |
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record-claim-content_item-item-usca11-chatbot-clm-usca11-001,content_item,item-usca11-chatbot,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-001,supports_coding
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| 78 |
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| 198 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-us-20260328-clm-us26-010,event,evt-us-20260328,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-010,supports_coding
|
| 199 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-us-20260328-clm-us26-011,event,evt-us-20260328,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,clm-us26-011,supports_coding
|
| 200 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260725-clm-br-010,event,evt-br-20260725,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-010,supports_coding
|
| 201 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260725-clm-br-011,event,evt-br-20260725,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-011,supports_coding
|
| 202 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260726-clm-br-012,event,evt-br-20260726,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-012,supports_coding
|
| 203 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260726-clm-br-013,event,evt-br-20260726,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-013,supports_coding
|
| 204 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260803-clm-br-007,event,evt-br-20260803,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-007,supports_coding
|
| 205 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-usca11-20260803-clm-usca11-001,event,evt-usca11-20260803,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-001,supports_coding
|
| 206 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-usca11-20260803-clm-usca11-002,event,evt-usca11-20260803,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-002,supports_coding
|
| 207 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-usca11-20260803-clm-usca11-003,event,evt-usca11-20260803,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-003,supports_coding
|
| 208 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-usca11-20260803-clm-usca11-004,event,evt-usca11-20260803,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-004,supports_coding
|
| 209 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-usca11-20260803-clm-usca11-005,event,evt-usca11-20260803,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-005,supports_coding
|
| 210 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260807-clm-br-007,event,evt-br-20260807,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-007,supports_coding
|
| 211 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-usca11-20260807-clm-usca11-008,event,evt-usca11-20260807,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,clm-usca11-008,supports_coding
|
| 212 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260813-clm-br-013,event,evt-br-20260813,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,clm-br-013,supports_coding
|
| 213 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20260816-clm-br-006,event,evt-br-20260816,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-006,supports_coding
|
| 214 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20261004-clm-br-001,event,evt-br-20261004,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-001,supports_coding
|
| 215 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-br-20261004-clm-br-009,event,evt-br-20261004,br-2026-election-preparedness,clm-br-009,supports_coding
|
| 216 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-us-20261103-clm-us26-001,event,evt-us-20261103,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,clm-us26-001,supports_coding
|
| 217 |
+
record-claim-event-evt-us-20261103-clm-us26-007,event,evt-us-20261103,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,clm-us26-007,supports_coding
|
data/audit-v03.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
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|
| 1 |
+
{
|
| 2 |
+
"auditor": "agency-transfer-election-cases-v0.3.0/audit-v03",
|
| 3 |
+
"cutoff": "2026-08-12",
|
| 4 |
+
"status": "pass",
|
| 5 |
+
"summary": {
|
| 6 |
+
"error_count": 0,
|
| 7 |
+
"warning_count": 6,
|
| 8 |
+
"table_row_counts": {
|
| 9 |
+
"cases": 10,
|
| 10 |
+
"claims": 96,
|
| 11 |
+
"sources": 70,
|
| 12 |
+
"candidates": 47,
|
| 13 |
+
"case_catalog": 64,
|
| 14 |
+
"case_actors": 14,
|
| 15 |
+
"technology_uses": 9,
|
| 16 |
+
"content_items": 4,
|
| 17 |
+
"pathways": 10,
|
| 18 |
+
"observations": 18,
|
| 19 |
+
"model_evaluations": 7,
|
| 20 |
+
"claim_evidence": 162,
|
| 21 |
+
"case_elections": 15,
|
| 22 |
+
"sampling_frame": 7,
|
| 23 |
+
"coverage_summary": 7,
|
| 24 |
+
"research_view": 10,
|
| 25 |
+
"official_data_sources": 30,
|
| 26 |
+
"official_elections": 11,
|
| 27 |
+
"official_turnout": 9,
|
| 28 |
+
"official_results": 68
|
| 29 |
+
}
|
| 30 |
+
},
|
| 31 |
+
"errors": [],
|
| 32 |
+
"warnings": [
|
| 33 |
+
{
|
| 34 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 35 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 36 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 37 |
+
"row_id": "frame-africa",
|
| 38 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 39 |
+
},
|
| 40 |
+
{
|
| 41 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 42 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 43 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 44 |
+
"row_id": "frame-asia",
|
| 45 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 46 |
+
},
|
| 47 |
+
{
|
| 48 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 49 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 50 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 51 |
+
"row_id": "frame-cross-national",
|
| 52 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 53 |
+
},
|
| 54 |
+
{
|
| 55 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 56 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 57 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 58 |
+
"row_id": "frame-europe",
|
| 59 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 60 |
+
},
|
| 61 |
+
{
|
| 62 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 63 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 64 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 65 |
+
"row_id": "frame-north-america",
|
| 66 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 67 |
+
},
|
| 68 |
+
{
|
| 69 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 70 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 71 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 72 |
+
"row_id": "frame-oceania",
|
| 73 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 74 |
+
}
|
| 75 |
+
]
|
| 76 |
+
}
|
data/audit.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,26 +1,76 @@
|
|
| 1 |
{
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
"cutoff": "2026-08-12",
|
| 3 |
-
"
|
| 4 |
-
|
| 5 |
-
"
|
| 6 |
-
"
|
| 7 |
-
"
|
| 8 |
-
|
| 9 |
-
|
| 10 |
-
|
| 11 |
-
|
| 12 |
-
|
| 13 |
-
|
| 14 |
-
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
},
|
| 16 |
"errors": [],
|
| 17 |
"warnings": [
|
| 18 |
-
|
| 19 |
-
|
| 20 |
-
|
| 21 |
-
|
| 22 |
-
|
| 23 |
-
|
| 24 |
-
|
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|
|
|
|
|
| 25 |
]
|
| 26 |
}
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
{
|
| 2 |
+
"auditor": "agency-transfer-election-cases-v0.3.0/audit-v03",
|
| 3 |
"cutoff": "2026-08-12",
|
| 4 |
+
"status": "pass",
|
| 5 |
+
"summary": {
|
| 6 |
+
"error_count": 0,
|
| 7 |
+
"warning_count": 6,
|
| 8 |
+
"table_row_counts": {
|
| 9 |
+
"cases": 10,
|
| 10 |
+
"claims": 96,
|
| 11 |
+
"sources": 70,
|
| 12 |
+
"candidates": 47,
|
| 13 |
+
"case_catalog": 64,
|
| 14 |
+
"case_actors": 14,
|
| 15 |
+
"technology_uses": 9,
|
| 16 |
+
"content_items": 4,
|
| 17 |
+
"pathways": 10,
|
| 18 |
+
"observations": 18,
|
| 19 |
+
"model_evaluations": 7,
|
| 20 |
+
"claim_evidence": 162,
|
| 21 |
+
"case_elections": 15,
|
| 22 |
+
"sampling_frame": 7,
|
| 23 |
+
"coverage_summary": 7,
|
| 24 |
+
"research_view": 10,
|
| 25 |
+
"official_data_sources": 30,
|
| 26 |
+
"official_elections": 11,
|
| 27 |
+
"official_turnout": 9,
|
| 28 |
+
"official_results": 68
|
| 29 |
+
}
|
| 30 |
},
|
| 31 |
"errors": [],
|
| 32 |
"warnings": [
|
| 33 |
+
{
|
| 34 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 35 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 36 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 37 |
+
"row_id": "frame-africa",
|
| 38 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 39 |
+
},
|
| 40 |
+
{
|
| 41 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 42 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 43 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 44 |
+
"row_id": "frame-asia",
|
| 45 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 46 |
+
},
|
| 47 |
+
{
|
| 48 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 49 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 50 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 51 |
+
"row_id": "frame-cross-national",
|
| 52 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 53 |
+
},
|
| 54 |
+
{
|
| 55 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 56 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 57 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 58 |
+
"row_id": "frame-europe",
|
| 59 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 60 |
+
},
|
| 61 |
+
{
|
| 62 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 63 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 64 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 65 |
+
"row_id": "frame-north-america",
|
| 66 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 67 |
+
},
|
| 68 |
+
{
|
| 69 |
+
"test": "T08_SAMPLING_FRAME",
|
| 70 |
+
"code": "NEGATIVE_SEARCH_NOT_RECORDED",
|
| 71 |
+
"table": "sampling_frame",
|
| 72 |
+
"row_id": "frame-oceania",
|
| 73 |
+
"message": "No negative/null search was recorded for this frame; prevalence inference is unsafe"
|
| 74 |
+
}
|
| 75 |
]
|
| 76 |
}
|
data/candidates.csv
CHANGED
|
@@ -35,3 +35,14 @@ cand-sk-2024-pres-korcok-stb-hoax,Fabricated StB documents and fake-account ampl
|
|
| 35 |
cand-fr-2024-leg-zelenska-bugatti,Synthetic Bugatti dealership witness and fake Zelenska invoice,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-07-07,reserve_election_targeting_unproven,synthetic_video|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,core_generation,probable,confirmed,credibly_reported,measured,unknown,unknown,High-reach synthetic witness and fake-document operation with search-engine capture between election rounds.,Direct French-election targeting is unproven and much of the eighteen-million-view reach may have been international; keep outside the core tier.,https://www.wired.com/story/ai-generated-russian-disinformation-zelensky-bugatti/|https://www.wral.com/archive/21508090/|https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/no-evidence-ukraines-first-lady-bought-bugatti-sportscar-paris-2024-07-13/,2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
cand-de-2025-bund-fake-ballots,Fabricated Leipzig and Hamburg ballot-suppression evidence,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|election_denial,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,alleged,unknown,unknown,unknown,Artifact-level example of staged physical evidence pre-loading a ballot-fraud interpretation.,Reach was limited or unreported and artifact-specific command attribution was not adjudicated; add platform metrics before promotion.,https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundestagswahl/desinformation-russland-briefwahl-100.html|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-warns-russian-disinformation-targeting-election-2025-02-21/,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
cand-hu-2026-parl-fidesz-execution-ad,Fidesz generative-AI execution-scene campaign advertisement,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,boundary_official_campaign_content,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,admitted,unknown,unknown,unknown,Admitted official-campaign use of synthetic atrocity imagery as a fear-based prediction of an opponent victory.,"Reach, spend and ad-level effect are unresolved; broader survey belief in a war narrative cannot be attributed to this video.",https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-opposition-condemns-fidesz-election-video-with-fictitious-execution-scene-2026-02-19/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf,2026-08-11
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 35 |
cand-fr-2024-leg-zelenska-bugatti,Synthetic Bugatti dealership witness and fake Zelenska invoice,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-07-07,reserve_election_targeting_unproven,synthetic_video|spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,core_generation,probable,confirmed,credibly_reported,measured,unknown,unknown,High-reach synthetic witness and fake-document operation with search-engine capture between election rounds.,Direct French-election targeting is unproven and much of the eighteen-million-view reach may have been international; keep outside the core tier.,https://www.wired.com/story/ai-generated-russian-disinformation-zelensky-bugatti/|https://www.wral.com/archive/21508090/|https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/no-evidence-ukraines-first-lady-bought-bugatti-sportscar-paris-2024-07-13/,2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
cand-de-2025-bund-fake-ballots,Fabricated Leipzig and Hamburg ballot-suppression evidence,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution,spoofed_media|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|election_denial,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,alleged,unknown,unknown,unknown,Artifact-level example of staged physical evidence pre-loading a ballot-fraud interpretation.,Reach was limited or unreported and artifact-specific command attribution was not adjudicated; add platform metrics before promotion.,https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundestagswahl/desinformation-russland-briefwahl-100.html|https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-warns-russian-disinformation-targeting-election-2025-02-21/,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
cand-hu-2026-parl-fidesz-execution-ad,Fidesz generative-AI execution-scene campaign advertisement,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,boundary_official_campaign_content,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,admitted,unknown,unknown,unknown,Admitted official-campaign use of synthetic atrocity imagery as a fear-based prediction of an opponent victory.,"Reach, spend and ad-level effect are unresolved; broader survey belief in a war narrative cannot be attributed to this video.",https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-opposition-condemns-fidesz-election-video-with-fictitious-execution-scene-2026-02-19/|https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2026/04/HUN%20Parliamentary%20Elections%202026%20PS_13.04.2026.pdf,2026-08-11
|
| 38 |
+
cand-col-2026-pres-ai-media-family,Colombia 2026 presidential election AI-media family,Colombia,South America,2026 Colombian presidential election,2026-05-31,disaggregate_before_claim_coding,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|synthetic_audio|fake_poll|fraud_narrative|bot_amplification,mixed_generation_and_amplification,established_at_observer_aggregate,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,mixed_or_unknown_by_artifact,unknown_by_artifact,unknown,unknown,"Completed 2026 Latin American election with official-observer evidence across image, video, audio, bots, ads and messaging; disaggregate before inclusion.","Aggregate observer reporting cannot establish a common operator, denominator, reach, or effect for each asset.",https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2026_EOM_Colombia_Presidential_Elections_Second_Report_ENG.pdf|https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-05-18/ai-generated-videos-flood-colombias-presidential-campaign-with-electoral-fantasies.html,2026-08-12
|
| 39 |
+
cand-nld-2025-ge-chatbot-voting-advice,Netherlands 2025 chatbot voting-advice audit,Netherlands,Europe,2025 Dutch general election,2025-10-29,model_evaluation_not_incident,voting_advice|model_bias|interactive_recommendation,information_intermediary,confirmed,confirmed_evaluation,regulator_measured,laboratory_outputs_only,unknown,unknown,Official multi-model audit of political recommendations; direct test of delegated choice and model-specific intermediary power.,"Evaluation outputs are not population exposure, real voter use, persuasion, or electoral effects.",https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/documents/ran-special-ai-chatbots-as-voting-aid|https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/current/ap-warns-chatbots-give-biased-voting-advice,2026-08-12
|
| 40 |
+
cand-can-2025-fed-deepfake-prevalence,Canada 2025 deepfake prevalence and low-harm exposure sample,Canada,North America,2025 Canadian federal election,2025-04-28,observational_null_comparator,observational_platform_sample|deepfake_detection|low_harm_share,measurement_and_observed_content,detector_classified_in_sample,confirmed_research_sample,not_applicable_aggregate,sampled_platform_metrics,unknown,not_detected_in_study_scope,"Provides an explicit platform-post denominator and low harmful-view share, reducing selection on highly reported incidents.","Preprint, detector error, platform sampling and view denominators limit prevalence generalisation; null is study-scoped.",https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.13915|https://mediatechdemocracy.com/en/publications/federal-election_2025/,2026-08-12
|
| 41 |
+
cand-jpn-2024-tokyo-anno-ai-avatar,Tokyo 2024 authorised Takahiro Anno AI avatar,Japan,East Asia,2024 Tokyo gubernatorial election,2024-07-07,positive_boundary_comparator,authorised_avatar|manifesto_qa|youtube_and_phone,candidate_access_substitution,confirmed,confirmed,candidate_authorised,campaign_reported_interactions,unknown,unknown,Authorised and transparent interactive representation can preserve or expand candidate access without opponent impersonation.,Campaign-reported response counts and vote totals do not identify votes caused by the avatar.,https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/the-apocalypse-that-wasnt-ai-was-everywhere-in-2024s-elections-but-deepfakes-and-misinformation-were-only-part-of-the-picture/|https://broadlisteningbook.com/en/04_01_takahiro_anno_initiatives.html,2026-08-12
|
| 42 |
+
cand-aus-2025-fed-pravda-chatbot-poisoning,Australia 2025 Pravda network and chatbot knowledge poisoning,Australia,Oceania,2025 Australian federal election,2025-05-03,promote_after_claim_coding_with_attribution_caveat,automated_web_publishing|knowledge_poisoning|chatbot_repetition,content_scale_and_information_intermediary,confirmed_for_audit_outputs,confirmed_network_and_audit,credibly_reported_not_adjudicated,audit_response_rate_not_population_reach,unknown,unknown,First Oceania lead focused on upstream manipulation of assistant knowledge rather than only feed content.,"A chatbot-audit response rate is not voter exposure; intent and state attribution are investigative, not adjudicated.",https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-05-03/pro-russian-push-to-poison-ai-chatbots-in-australia/105239644|https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/deepfake-scams-poisoned-chatbots|https://www.aec.gov.au/elections/electoral-advertising/ai-and-elections.htm,2026-08-12
|
| 43 |
+
cand-gbr-nir-2022-cara-hunter-sexual-deepfake,Northern Ireland 2022 Cara Hunter sexualised synthetic-video attack,United Kingdom,Europe,2022 Northern Ireland Assembly election,2022-05-05,promote_with_technical_provenance_caveat,sexualised_synthetic_video|gendered_abuse|closed_channel_distribution,alleged_or_probable_content_generation,not_forensically_public,victim_and_parliamentary_record_confirmed,unknown,unknown_closed_channel,candidate_harm_reported,unknown,"Adds gendered political violence, candidate-supply harm and WhatsApp distribution absent from the included corpus.","Origin, exact generation method, unique reach and vote effect remain unknown; do not redistribute the media.",https://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/officialreport/report.aspx?docID=422083&eveDate=2025%2F01%2F14|https://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/officialreport/report.aspx?docID=467176&eveDate=2026%2F01%2F26|https://www.theguardian.com/society/ng-interactive/2025/dec/01/it-was-extremely-pornographic-cara-hunter-on-the-deepfake-video-that-nearly-ended-her-political-career,2026-08-12
|
| 44 |
+
cand-ecu-2025-pres-ai-disinformation-cluster,Ecuador 2025 AI-assisted viral disinformation cluster,Ecuador,South America,2025 Ecuadorian presidential election runoff,2025-04-13,reserve_disaggregate_observer_sample,synthetic_media|fake_news|false_endorsement|viral_content_sample,content_generation_in_sample,observer_reported_sample,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,mixed_or_unknown_by_artifact,viral_sample_not_population_reach,unknown,unknown,"Official-observer denominator of 247 viral items, with reported false-content and AI shares; useful after artifact disaggregation.",Aggregate sample cannot identify a common actor or causal effect; sampling frame and item coding must be preserved.,https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2025_MOE_Ecuador_Segunda_Vuelta_Preliminar_ENG.pdf,2026-08-12
|
| 45 |
+
cand-usa-2024-grok-ballot-deadline-error,Grok ballot-deadline misinformation and state correction request,United States,North America,2024 United States general election,2024-11-05,promote_as_deployed_model_failure_after_claim_coding,deployed_model_failure|false_election_information|institutional_feedback|product_mitigation,interactive_election_information_intermediary,confirmed_deployed_closed_model,confirmed,provider_and_interface_identified_intent_not_established,official_recirculation_claim_not_unique_exposure,unknown,unknown,Real closed-model election-information failure followed by multi-state feedback and a product-level redirect to authoritative information; useful without presuming malicious intent.,"The official statement that screenshots reached millions is not a deduplicated user or voter-exposure measure; exact Grok version, prompt distribution and behavioural effects are unknown.",https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/6077/080524-secretaries-letter-to-x.pdf|https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/five-us-states-push-musk-fix-ai-chatbot-over-election-misinformation-2024-08-05/|https://www.theverge.com/2024/8/28/24230325/x-grok-chatbot-election-misinformation-warnings-vote,2026-08-12
|
| 46 |
+
cand-usa-2024-storm2035-openai-low-engagement,Storm-2035 use of ChatGPT with low observed audience engagement,United States,North America,2024 United States general election,2024-11-05,promote_as_provider_telemetry_negative_case_after_claim_coding,ai_assisted_influence_content|covert_websites|social_comments|provider_disruption|low_engagement,supporting_content_generation,provider_confirmed_use,confirmed_by_provider_telemetry,platform_threat_intelligence_not_state_adjudication,provider_category_low_observed_engagement,unknown,unknown,Known hosted-model provenance plus provider disruption and explicit low-audience evidence; counters an assumption that generation automatically produces influence.,Provider telemetry is interested primary evidence and cannot observe every off-platform exposure; the candidate needs independent corroboration before core promotion.,https://openai.com/index/disrupting-a-covert-iranian-influence-operation/,2026-08-12
|
| 47 |
+
cand-bra-2024-municipal-ai-observatory,Brazil 2024 municipal-election GenAI observatory sample,Brazil,South America,2024 Brazilian municipal elections,2024-10-06,promote_as_observational_null_and_boundary_sample,observational_election_sample|transparent_campaign_uses|synthetic_media|gendered_abuse|regulatory_context,mixed_generation_and_monitoring_context,confirmed_in_bounded_observations,confirmed_within_search_scope,mixed_by_artifact,generally_low_repercussion_within_observatory_scope_not_prevalence,not_measured,not_measured,"Records an active search that found punctual, generally low-repercussion uses rather than the expected massive wave, while preserving harmful exceptions and regulatory enforcement.",Civil-society monitoring is not a census and cannot support the claim that AI had no impact; artifact-level coding is required for specific harms.,https://www.dataprivacybr.org/en/documentos/ai-in-the-2024-brazilian-elections/|https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2024/resolucao-no-23-732-de-27-de-fevereiro-de-2024,2026-08-12
|
| 48 |
+
cand-sgp-2025-ge-ai-video-sample,Singapore 2025 election AI-video sample and no-breach review outcome,Singapore,Southeast Asia,2025 Singapore general election,2025-05-03,promote_as_observational_sample_after_item_coding,observational_platform_sample|ai_video|candidate_likeness|disclosure|regulatory_review,content_generation_in_sample,confirmed_for_sampled_items,confirmed_within_keyword_monitoring_window,mostly_account_level_or_unknown,platform_play_counts_not_unique_exposure,unknown,unknown,"Separates AI-content volume, candidate likeness, disclosure and an official finding that reviewed items did not breach the new election rule.","Do not call all 73 videos deepfakes or violations: 11 visually manipulated prospective candidates, only four were clearly labelled, and the official review found no breach in the reviewed set.",https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/ge2025-deepfakes-ai-generated-tiktok-politicians-disinformation-5078011|https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/new-legal-measures-uphold-integrity-online-advertising-elections/|https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/threat-assessment-of-coordinated-deepfake-or-synthetic-media-campaigns-that-target-singapore-given-advances-in-genai/,2026-08-12
|
data/case_actors.csv
ADDED
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| 1 |
+
case_actor_id,case_id,actor_name,actor_role,actor_type,attribution_status,control_dimension,source_claim_ids,notes
|
| 2 |
+
act-ro24-networks,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,Campaign and influence-network operators,operator,campaign_network,mixed,campaign coordination and promotion,clm-ro-002|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013,Sponsor and command relationships vary by component.
|
| 3 |
+
act-ro24-tiktok,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,TikTok,platform_and_ranker,platform,admitted,"ranking, reach, moderation, transparency",clm-ro-003|clm-ro-005|clm-ro-012,Platform metrics and network definitions must not be merged.
|
| 4 |
+
act-ro25-operator,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Unidentified cross-platform network operator,operator,unknown_network,unknown,"synthetic personas, account coordination, narrative selection",clm-ro-014|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017,Public evidence does not establish sponsor or state command.
|
| 5 |
+
act-md24-shor,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Ilan Shor-linked political network,sponsor_and_operator,political_network,officially_attributed,"finance, recruitment, narrative and distribution",clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009,Underlying components have different attribution strength.
|
| 6 |
+
act-md24-meta,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Meta,platform_and_responder,platform,admitted,distribution and network disruption,clm-md-007|clm-md-014,Meta follower counts include suspected fake and largely non-Moldovan engagement.
|
| 7 |
+
act-md25-infoleaders,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,InfoLeaders curators and paid account network,operator,influence_network,credibly_reported,"message assignment, personalisation and mutual amplification",clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018,Direct Kremlin command of every component is not established.
|
| 8 |
+
act-nh-kramer,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,Steve Kramer,commissioner_and_operator,political_consultant,admitted,"content commission, targeting and call operation",clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-003|clm-nh-012,Acquitted of state criminal charges; separate federal civil and FCC outcomes remain.
|
| 9 |
+
act-nh-telecom,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,Voice Broadcasting and Lingo Telecom,delivery_infrastructure,telecom_provider,adjudicated,"call initiation, attestation and delivery",clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-007,Different providers controlled different parts of the chain.
|
| 10 |
+
act-br-prep-tse,br-2026-election-preparedness,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,regulator_and_responder,election_authority,adjudicated,"rules, monitoring and enforcement",clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005|clm-br-006|clm-br-007,"Preparedness actor, not manipulator."
|
| 11 |
+
act-br-avatar-campaign,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer,deployer_and_beneficiary,campaign,credibly_reported,synthetic persona and campaign distribution,clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-020,Exact producer and Jair Bolsonaro authorisation remain unresolved.
|
| 12 |
+
act-us26-nrsc,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,National Republican Senatorial Committee,sponsor_and_deployer,political_committee,admitted,synthetic opponent performance and distribution,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016,Other ads in the aggregate case have different sponsors.
|
| 13 |
+
act-usca11-wiener,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,Scott Wiener for Congress,commissioner_deployer_and_data_controller,campaign,admitted,"deployment, configurable framing, interface, promotion and policy-permitted log access",clm-usca11-001|clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-011,"Technical constructor, exact prompt, retrieval sources, guardrails and actual retention/use of logs were not publicly established."
|
| 14 |
+
act-usca11-anthropic,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,Anthropic,model_provider,ai_provider,credibly_reported,base-model capability,clm-usca11-003,"No evidence Anthropic designed, approved, financed, or operated this campaign deployment."
|
| 15 |
+
act-usca11-chan,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,Connie Chan,represented_target,candidate,established,first-person identity and political record simulated,clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-011,The site disclosed that it was not affiliated with or endorsed by Chan.
|
data/case_catalog.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
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|
| 1 |
+
catalog_id,record_layer,record_type,title,country,region,election_name,election_date,case_status,manipulation_assessment,ai_role,generative_ai_status,evidence_maturity,incident_count_eligible,research_status,source_count_or_links,main_caveat,last_checked
|
| 2 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,claim_coded_core,election_wide_case,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,2024-11-24,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,material_amplification,not_established,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,8,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",2026-08-11
|
| 3 |
+
ro-2025-presidential-repeat,claim_coded_core,observed_network,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,2025-05-04,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,3,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",2026-08-11
|
| 4 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,claim_coded_core,election_wide_case,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,2024-10-20,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,7,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,2026-08-11
|
| 5 |
+
md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,claim_coded_core,observed_network,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,2025-09-28,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,2,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,2026-08-11
|
| 6 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,2024-01-23,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,12,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.",2026-08-11
|
| 7 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,claim_coded_core,preparedness_file,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,2026-10-04,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,false,included_claim_coded,9,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,2026-08-11
|
| 8 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,2026-10-04,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,7,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,2026-08-11
|
| 9 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,claim_coded_core,preparedness_file,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,North America,2026 United States midterm election,2026-11-03,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,false,included_claim_coded,9,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,2026-08-11
|
| 10 |
+
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,claim_coded_core,observed_campaign_set,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,2026-11-03,ongoing,mixed_documented_manipulation,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,6,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",2026-08-11
|
| 11 |
+
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,North America,2026 California 11th congressional district general election,2026-11-03,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,4,"The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened.",2026-08-12
|
| 12 |
+
cand-usa-2016-ira-social-influence,screening_register,candidate_lead,Internet Research Agency social influence operation,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,Platform reach figures cover different denominators and time windows; official investigations did not causally estimate votes or turnout changed.,2026-08-11
|
| 13 |
+
cand-usa-2016-cambridge-analytica,screening_register,candidate_lead,Cambridge Analytica voter profiling and deceptive Facebook data collection,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_tool,not_applicable,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,"FTC findings establish collection and profiling, not that psychographic targeting outperformed ordinary targeting or changed the election.",2026-08-11
|
| 14 |
+
cand-usa-2020-iran-proud-boys-emails,screening_register,candidate_lead,Iran-attributed Proud Boys voter-threat emails,United States,North America,2020 presidential election,2020-11-03,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,State attribution is stronger than unadjudicated charges against named individuals; no public-opinion or election effect was assessed.,2026-08-11
|
| 15 |
+
cand-usa-2024-russia-doppelganger,screening_register,candidate_lead,Russia-attributed Doppelganger cloned-media and targeted influence operation,United States,North America,2024 presidential election,2024-11-05,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_tool,confirmed_for_some_assets,partly_confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,The seizure affidavit contains allegations; individual content views are not operation-wide unique reach.,2026-08-11
|
| 16 |
+
cand-usa-2024-iran-hack-and-leak,screening_register,candidate_lead,Iran-attributed Trump campaign hack-and-leak operation,United States,North America,2024 presidential election,2024-11-05,reserve_election_adjacent,not_yet_claim_coded,none_established,not_applicable,confirmed,false,reserve_election_adjacent,2,Major nonresponse and nonpublication are counterevidence to a successful leak-amplification claim.,2026-08-11
|
| 17 |
+
cand-bra-2018-whatsapp-mass-messaging,screening_register,candidate_lead,Brazil 2018 WhatsApp mass-messaging ecosystem,Brazil,South America,2018 presidential election,2018-10-28,promote_with_adjudication_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_applicable,partly_confirmed,false,promote_with_adjudication_caveat,2,"TSE rejected the cases because content, reach, repercussion, candidate link, financing, and gravity were not adequately proved.",2026-08-11
|
| 18 |
+
cand-bra-2022-ambassadors-meeting,screening_register,candidate_lead,Bolsonaro ambassadors meeting attacking Brazil's voting system,Brazil,South America,2022 general election,2022-10-30,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,"A judicial finding of grave abuse is not a causal estimate of votes, turnout, or result changed.",2026-08-11
|
| 19 |
+
cand-bra-2022-election-denial-network,screening_register,candidate_lead,Brazil 2022 cross-platform election-denial messaging network,Brazil,South America,2022 general election and post-election mobilisation,2022-10-30,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_material,confirmed_in_sampled_traces,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,Content volume is not people reached; survey authors did not claim causation; the entire network lacked a single established command actor.,2026-08-11
|
| 20 |
+
cand-mex-2024-genai-cluster,screening_register,candidate_lead,Mexico 2024 fact-checked generative-AI election-content cluster,Mexico,North America,2024 general election,2024-06-02,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed_for_examples,false,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,2,"The source corpus is 101 fact-check posts, not necessarily 101 unique incidents or an electorate-wide prevalence estimate.",2026-08-11
|
| 21 |
+
cand-col-2022-coordinated-facebook-pages,screening_register,candidate_lead,Colombia 2022 coordinated negative-ad Facebook pages,Colombia,South America,2022 presidential election,2022-06-19,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_established,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,"Ad spend and 538 paid items are not unique reach or persuasion, and investigators could not establish the ultimate operator or funder.",2026-08-11
|
| 22 |
+
cand-arg-2023-campaign-genai,screening_register,candidate_lead,Argentina 2023 official-campaign generative-AI arms race,Argentina,South America,2023 presidential runoff,2023-11-19,boundary_comparison,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,false,boundary_comparison,2,Much content was labelled or visibly fabricated and contemporary assessments found relatively minor information-space impact.,2026-08-11
|
| 23 |
+
cand-arg-2025-false-withdrawal-deepfakes,screening_register,candidate_lead,Argentina 2025 Buenos Aires City false-withdrawal and endorsement deepfakes,Argentina,South America,2025 Buenos Aires City legislative election,2025-05-18,reserve_needs_second_source,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,false,reserve_needs_second_source,1,Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here.,2026-08-11
|
| 24 |
+
cand-ind-2024-bollywood-deepfakes,screening_register,candidate_lead,India 2024 unauthorised Bollywood celebrity endorsement deepfakes,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_assets,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,4,"More than 500,000 views establish exposure, not belief or persuasion; amplification by a Congress spokesperson does not prove party commissioning, and post-election work found no deepfake doomsday.",2026-08-11
|
| 25 |
+
cand-ind-2024-authorised-ai-calls,screening_register,candidate_lead,India 2024 candidate-authorised AI voice calls and personalised outreach,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,boundary_comparison,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation|delivery_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,false,boundary_comparison,2,"The reported 50 million-plus calls and 25 million personalised calls are unaudited vendor figures, may overlap, and do not establish listening, persuasion, turnout, or vote effects.",2026-08-11
|
| 26 |
+
cand-twn-2024-storm1376-gou-audio,screening_register,candidate_lead,Taiwan 2024 Storm-1376 false Terry Gou endorsement operation,Taiwan,East Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-01-13,promote_with_attribution_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation|supporting_tool,likely_for_focal_audio|confirmed_for_actor_assets,confirmed,false,promote_with_attribution_caveat,4,Microsoft's CCP linkage is a threat-intelligence attribution rather than an adjudicated state-command finding; YouTube removed the focal audio before significant reach and no vote effect is established.,2026-08-11
|
| 27 |
+
cand-pak-2024-pti-authorised-clones,screening_register,candidate_lead,Pakistan 2024 PTI-authorised synthetic Imran Khan campaign speeches,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,boundary_comparison,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,false,boundary_comparison,5,"More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches.",2026-08-11
|
| 28 |
+
cand-pak-2024-fake-boycott-clones,screening_register,candidate_lead,Pakistan 2024 fake PTI election-boycott voice clones,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,3,"Fact-checks establish the fabrication, but the operator, commissioning chain, unique reach, belief, participation response, and electoral effect are unknown.",2026-08-11
|
| 29 |
+
cand-idn-2024-official-synthetic-campaigning,screening_register,candidate_lead,Indonesia 2024 official synthetic campaigning and Suharto resurrection,Indonesia,Southeast Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-02-14,boundary_comparison,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation|campaign_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,false,boundary_comparison,4,"The 4.7 million Suharto-view figure is provisional secondary reporting, while 19 billion #Prabowo TikTok views cover all hashtag content rather than AI assets; neither measures persuasion or vote causation.",2026-08-11
|
| 30 |
+
cand-bgd-2024-progovernment-ai-disinformation,screening_register,candidate_lead,Bangladesh 2024 pro-government AI pseudo-news and opposition deepfakes,Bangladesh,South Asia,2024 parliamentary election,2024-01-07,promote_with_attribution_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,false,promote_with_attribution_caveat,3,"Pro-government promotion does not prove Awami League or government commissioning; focal reach and voter effects are unknown, and the opposition boycott and noncompetitive environment preclude election-result inference.",2026-08-11
|
| 31 |
+
cand-kor-2024-deepfake-enforcement-set,screening_register,candidate_lead,South Korea 2024 election deepfake enforcement set,South Korea,East Asia,2024 National Assembly election,2024-04-10,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation_for_counted_items,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,officially_reported_aggregate,false,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,3,"The 129 detected items are not 129 unique operations, do not establish deception or views, and should be disaggregated before promotion to incident-level cases.",2026-08-11
|
| 32 |
+
cand-zaf-2024-trump-mk-deepfake,screening_register,candidate_lead,South Africa 2024 false Trump endorsement of MK,South Africa,Southern Africa,2024 general election,2024-05-29,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_asset,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,5,"The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall.",2026-08-11
|
| 33 |
+
cand-nga-2023-atiku-spliced-audio,screening_register,candidate_lead,Nigeria 2023 spliced Atiku election-rigging audio,Nigeria,West Africa,2023 presidential election,2023-02-25,boundary_synthetic_non_genai,not_yet_claim_coded,not_required_for_focal_asset|material_distribution,not_established|likely_conventional_edit,confirmed,false,boundary_synthetic_non_genai,4,"Splice analysis supports conventional compositing, not generative voice synthesis; thousands of listens and platform persistence do not establish belief, turnout, votes, or the responsible actor.",2026-08-11
|
| 34 |
+
cand-gha-2024-llm-bot-network,screening_register,candidate_lead,Ghana 2024 likely LLM-assisted pro-NPP account network,Ghana,West Africa,2024 general election,2024-12-07,promote_with_detection_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,core_content_generation|material_amplification,likely_by_detector_and_behavioural_signals,confirmed_as_research_sample,false,promote_with_detection_caveat,2,"AI-text detection and coordination indicators do not prove ChatGPT use, automation, common control, NPP sponsorship, external reach, or electoral effect; most measured engagement was internal.",2026-08-11
|
| 35 |
+
cand-ken-2022-platform-amplification,screening_register,candidate_lead,"Kenya 2022 recommender amplification, bots, and influence-for-hire",Kenya,East Africa,2022 general election,2022-08-09,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_material|conventional_manipulation,confirmed_in_sampled_traces,false,promote_after_claim_coding,4,"The purposive sample's four million views are not electorate-wide prevalence or unique users; recommender lift lacks internal logs, and no causal study links the ecosystem to votes or the result.",2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
+
cand-sk-2023-parl-simecka-todova-audio,screening_register,candidate_lead,Synthetic Simecka and Todova vote-rigging audio,Slovakia,Europe,2023 parliamentary election,2023-09-30,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,4,Amplifiers are known but the creator and state sponsor are not; SMER's victory is not evidence that the audio changed votes.,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
+
cand-fr-2017-pres-macronleaks,screening_register,candidate_lead,MacronLeaks hack-and-leak and automated amplification,France,Europe,2017 presidential election,2017-05-07,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,4,France's later GRU attribution is stronger at the cyber-campaign level than attribution of every forged item and amplifier; no individual causal vote estimate exists.,2026-08-11
|
| 38 |
+
cand-fr-2024-eu-lepen-nieces,screening_register,candidate_lead,Fake Le Pen family personas using face swaps and stolen influencer videos,France,Europe,2024 European Parliament election,2024-06-09,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,4,"The operator is unknown, party involvement was denied and follower/view figures do not establish voter persuasion.",2026-08-11
|
| 39 |
+
cand-fr-2024-leg-macron-bonus-copycop,screening_register,candidate_lead,CopyCop fake Macron voting-bonus site and LLM content laundering,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-06-30,promote_with_reach_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_tool,confirmed,confirmed,false,promote_with_reach_caveat,3,"The corpus measures production, not audience; Russia-link is a strong research inference rather than final state attribution.",2026-08-11
|
| 40 |
+
cand-uk-2024-ge-x-botlike-network,screening_register,candidate_lead,High-volume bot-like X accounts amplifying Reform and pro-Kremlin themes,United Kingdom,Europe,2024 general election,2024-07-04,promote_with_platform_corroboration,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_established,partly_confirmed,false,promote_with_platform_corroboration,3,"Bot-like is a behavioral classification, not X-confirmed automation; 150 million displays are non-unique modeled impressions and no party link was shown.",2026-08-11
|
| 41 |
+
cand-uk-2024-ge-nigeria-facebook-network,screening_register,candidate_lead,Nigeria-administered Facebook network using AI anti-immigration images,United Kingdom,Europe,2024 general election,2024-07-04,promote_with_reach_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,mixed,confirmed,confirmed,false,promote_with_reach_caveat,3,Most followers were outside the UK and likely fake engagement; pro-Kremlin content does not establish Russian control and no Reform involvement was shown.,2026-08-11
|
| 42 |
+
cand-de-2025-bund-storm1516-rfbi,screening_register,candidate_lead,Storm-1516 and R-FBI synthetic witness and fake-news-site smears,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,mixed,confirmed,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,4,"German attribution is strong at Storm-1516 campaign level, while exact responsibility for every R-FBI asset and domestic amplifier must stay scoped; no effect was measured.",2026-08-11
|
| 43 |
+
cand-hu-2026-parl-proorban-tiktok-cio,screening_register,candidate_lead,Pro-Orban TikTok covert influence operation using generative-AI videos,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,promote_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,4,TikTok confirmed covert coordination but did not publicly identify the sponsor; the opposition landslide does not quantify or disprove attitudinal effects.,2026-08-11
|
| 44 |
+
cand-sk-2024-pres-korcok-stb-hoax,screening_register,candidate_lead,Fabricated StB documents and fake-account amplification against Korcok,Slovakia,Europe,2024 presidential election,2024-04-06,reserve_needs_platform_source,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_established,confirmed,false,reserve_needs_platform_source,1,Needs a platform or election-authority source and method review for fake-account classification; no foreign-state direction or vote effect established.,2026-08-11
|
| 45 |
+
cand-fr-2024-leg-zelenska-bugatti,screening_register,candidate_lead,Synthetic Bugatti dealership witness and fake Zelenska invoice,France,Europe,2024 snap legislative election,2024-07-07,reserve_election_targeting_unproven,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,probable,confirmed,false,reserve_election_targeting_unproven,3,Direct French-election targeting is unproven and much of the eighteen-million-view reach may have been international; keep outside the core tier.,2026-08-11
|
| 46 |
+
cand-de-2025-bund-fake-ballots,screening_register,candidate_lead,Fabricated Leipzig and Hamburg ballot-suppression evidence,Germany,Europe,2025 Bundestag election,2025-02-23,reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,false,reserve_needs_reach_and_attribution,2,Reach was limited or unreported and artifact-specific command attribution was not adjudicated; add platform metrics before promotion.,2026-08-11
|
| 47 |
+
cand-hu-2026-parl-fidesz-execution-ad,screening_register,candidate_lead,Fidesz generative-AI execution-scene campaign advertisement,Hungary,Europe,2026 parliamentary election,2026-04-12,boundary_official_campaign_content,not_yet_claim_coded,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,false,boundary_official_campaign_content,2,"Reach, spend and ad-level effect are unresolved; broader survey belief in a war narrative cannot be attributed to this video.",2026-08-11
|
| 48 |
+
cand-col-2026-pres-ai-media-family,screening_register,candidate_lead,Colombia 2026 presidential election AI-media family,Colombia,South America,2026 Colombian presidential election,2026-05-31,disaggregate_before_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,mixed_generation_and_amplification,established_at_observer_aggregate,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,false,disaggregate_before_claim_coding,2,"Aggregate observer reporting cannot establish a common operator, denominator, reach, or effect for each asset.",2026-08-12
|
| 49 |
+
cand-nld-2025-ge-chatbot-voting-advice,screening_register,candidate_lead,Netherlands 2025 chatbot voting-advice audit,Netherlands,Europe,2025 Dutch general election,2025-10-29,model_evaluation_not_incident,not_yet_claim_coded,information_intermediary,confirmed,confirmed_evaluation,false,model_evaluation_not_incident,2,"Evaluation outputs are not population exposure, real voter use, persuasion, or electoral effects.",2026-08-12
|
| 50 |
+
cand-can-2025-fed-deepfake-prevalence,screening_register,candidate_lead,Canada 2025 deepfake prevalence and low-harm exposure sample,Canada,North America,2025 Canadian federal election,2025-04-28,observational_null_comparator,not_yet_claim_coded,measurement_and_observed_content,detector_classified_in_sample,confirmed_research_sample,false,observational_null_comparator,2,"Preprint, detector error, platform sampling and view denominators limit prevalence generalisation; null is study-scoped.",2026-08-12
|
| 51 |
+
cand-jpn-2024-tokyo-anno-ai-avatar,screening_register,candidate_lead,Tokyo 2024 authorised Takahiro Anno AI avatar,Japan,East Asia,2024 Tokyo gubernatorial election,2024-07-07,positive_boundary_comparator,not_yet_claim_coded,candidate_access_substitution,confirmed,confirmed,false,positive_boundary_comparator,2,Campaign-reported response counts and vote totals do not identify votes caused by the avatar.,2026-08-12
|
| 52 |
+
cand-aus-2025-fed-pravda-chatbot-poisoning,screening_register,candidate_lead,Australia 2025 Pravda network and chatbot knowledge poisoning,Australia,Oceania,2025 Australian federal election,2025-05-03,promote_after_claim_coding_with_attribution_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,content_scale_and_information_intermediary,confirmed_for_audit_outputs,confirmed_network_and_audit,false,promote_after_claim_coding_with_attribution_caveat,3,"A chatbot-audit response rate is not voter exposure; intent and state attribution are investigative, not adjudicated.",2026-08-12
|
| 53 |
+
cand-gbr-nir-2022-cara-hunter-sexual-deepfake,screening_register,candidate_lead,Northern Ireland 2022 Cara Hunter sexualised synthetic-video attack,United Kingdom,Europe,2022 Northern Ireland Assembly election,2022-05-05,promote_with_technical_provenance_caveat,not_yet_claim_coded,alleged_or_probable_content_generation,not_forensically_public,victim_and_parliamentary_record_confirmed,false,promote_with_technical_provenance_caveat,3,"Origin, exact generation method, unique reach and vote effect remain unknown; do not redistribute the media.",2026-08-12
|
| 54 |
+
cand-ecu-2025-pres-ai-disinformation-cluster,screening_register,candidate_lead,Ecuador 2025 AI-assisted viral disinformation cluster,Ecuador,South America,2025 Ecuadorian presidential election runoff,2025-04-13,reserve_disaggregate_observer_sample,not_yet_claim_coded,content_generation_in_sample,observer_reported_sample,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,false,reserve_disaggregate_observer_sample,1,Aggregate sample cannot identify a common actor or causal effect; sampling frame and item coding must be preserved.,2026-08-12
|
| 55 |
+
cand-usa-2024-grok-ballot-deadline-error,screening_register,candidate_lead,Grok ballot-deadline misinformation and state correction request,United States,North America,2024 United States general election,2024-11-05,promote_as_deployed_model_failure_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,interactive_election_information_intermediary,confirmed_deployed_closed_model,confirmed,false,promote_as_deployed_model_failure_after_claim_coding,3,"The official statement that screenshots reached millions is not a deduplicated user or voter-exposure measure; exact Grok version, prompt distribution and behavioural effects are unknown.",2026-08-12
|
| 56 |
+
cand-usa-2024-storm2035-openai-low-engagement,screening_register,candidate_lead,Storm-2035 use of ChatGPT with low observed audience engagement,United States,North America,2024 United States general election,2024-11-05,promote_as_provider_telemetry_negative_case_after_claim_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_content_generation,provider_confirmed_use,confirmed_by_provider_telemetry,false,promote_as_provider_telemetry_negative_case_after_claim_coding,1,Provider telemetry is interested primary evidence and cannot observe every off-platform exposure; the candidate needs independent corroboration before core promotion.,2026-08-12
|
| 57 |
+
cand-bra-2024-municipal-ai-observatory,screening_register,candidate_lead,Brazil 2024 municipal-election GenAI observatory sample,Brazil,South America,2024 Brazilian municipal elections,2024-10-06,promote_as_observational_null_and_boundary_sample,not_yet_claim_coded,mixed_generation_and_monitoring_context,confirmed_in_bounded_observations,confirmed_within_search_scope,false,promote_as_observational_null_and_boundary_sample,2,Civil-society monitoring is not a census and cannot support the claim that AI had no impact; artifact-level coding is required for specific harms.,2026-08-12
|
| 58 |
+
cand-sgp-2025-ge-ai-video-sample,screening_register,candidate_lead,Singapore 2025 election AI-video sample and no-breach review outcome,Singapore,Southeast Asia,2025 Singapore general election,2025-05-03,promote_as_observational_sample_after_item_coding,not_yet_claim_coded,content_generation_in_sample,confirmed_for_sampled_items,confirmed_within_keyword_monitoring_window,false,promote_as_observational_sample_after_item_coding,3,"Do not call all 73 videos deepfakes or violations: 11 visually manipulated prospective candidates, only four were clearly labelled, and the official review found no breach in the reviewed set.",2026-08-12
|
| 59 |
+
eval-us-aidp-english-2024,empirical_model_study,model_evaluation_or_experiment,AI Democracy Projects English election-query pilot,United States,North America,2024 U.S. election information,January 2024,completed_study,not_an_incident,tested_system_capability,confirmed_tested_system,study_design_specific,false,included_empirical_study,1,"Point-in-time domain safety test; not representative of users, all questions, consumer interfaces, future performance, or election effects.",2026-08-12
|
| 60 |
+
eval-us-aidp-spanish-2024,empirical_model_study,model_evaluation_or_experiment,AI Democracy Projects bilingual Arizona election-query evaluation,United States,North America,Arizona voter information,2024,completed_study,not_an_incident,tested_system_capability,confirmed_tested_system,study_design_specific,false,included_empirical_study,1,API responses may differ from consumer chatbots; one state and selected questions; no user or electoral-effect measurement.,2026-08-12
|
| 61 |
+
eval-hu-voting-advice-2026,empirical_model_study,model_evaluation_or_experiment,Hungary 2026 general-purpose AI voting-advice evaluation,Hungary,Europe,2026 Hungarian parliamentary election,23-24 March 2026,completed_study,not_an_incident,tested_system_capability,confirmed_tested_system,study_design_specific,false,included_empirical_study,1,Structured audit during a live campaign; not a sample of real users and not evidence that outputs affected the decisive result.,2026-08-12
|
| 62 |
+
eval-us-brennan-2026,empirical_model_study,model_evaluation_or_experiment,Brennan Center election-disinformation capability and safeguard evaluation,United States,North America,2026 U.S. midterm election-disinformation scenarios,February-August 2026,completed_study,not_an_incident,tested_system_capability,confirmed_tested_system,study_design_specific,false,included_empirical_study,1,"Capability and safeguard evidence under researcher tests; not deployment prevalence, audience exposure, or electoral effect. Harmful prompts are intentionally withheld.",2026-08-12
|
| 63 |
+
eval-global-voter-dialogue-rct-2025,empirical_model_study,model_evaluation_or_experiment,Persuading voters using human-artificial intelligence dialogues,United States|Canada|Poland,Cross-national,"2024 U.S., 2025 Canadian and 2025 Polish national elections",2024-2025 election periods,completed_study,not_an_incident,tested_system_capability,confirmed_tested_system,study_design_specific,false,included_empirical_study,1,"Causal for the experimental conversations and measured self-reports; not observed campaign deployment, actual ballots, aggregate election outcomes, durable effects, or covert manipulation.",2026-08-12
|
| 64 |
+
eval-uk-chatbot-voting-advice-rct-2025,empirical_model_study,model_evaluation_or_experiment,Chatbot Voting Advice Applications inform but seldom sway young unaligned voters,United Kingdom,Europe,experimental voting-advice context,2025,completed_study,not_an_incident,tested_system_capability,confirmed_tested_system,study_design_specific,false,included_empirical_study,1,Causal within the experimental samples and interfaces; not a population prevalence estimate or proof that conversational political AI never persuades.,2026-08-12
|
| 65 |
+
eval-eu-mistral-voting-assistant-2024,empirical_model_study,model_evaluation_or_experiment,Mistral and Mixtral as European Parliament voting assistants,European Union,Europe,2024 European Parliament election,2024,completed_study,not_an_incident,tested_system_capability,confirmed_tested_system,study_design_specific,false,included_empirical_study,1,"Point-in-time model audit; not public deployment, user behavior or election effect.",2026-08-12
|
data/case_elections.csv
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case_election_id,case_id,election_id,relation
|
| 2 |
+
case-election-ro-2024-presidential-annulment-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 3 |
+
case-election-ro-2025-presidential-repeat-elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 4 |
+
case-election-ro-2025-presidential-repeat-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 5 |
+
case-election-md-2024-presidential-referendum-elec-md-pres-2024-r1,md-2024-presidential-referendum,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 6 |
+
case-election-md-2024-presidential-referendum-elec-md-referendum-2024,md-2024-presidential-referendum,elec-md-referendum-2024,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 7 |
+
case-election-md-2024-presidential-referendum-elec-md-pres-2024-r2,md-2024-presidential-referendum,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 8 |
+
case-election-md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network-elec-md-parl-2025,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,elec-md-parl-2025,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 9 |
+
case-election-us-nh-2024-biden-robocall-elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,primary_or_institutional_context
|
| 10 |
+
case-election-br-2026-election-preparedness-elec-br-general-2026-r1,br-2026-election-preparedness,elec-br-general-2026-r1,future_or_campaign_context
|
| 11 |
+
case-election-br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar-elec-br-general-2026-r1,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,elec-br-general-2026-r1,future_or_campaign_context
|
| 12 |
+
case-election-br-2026-election-preparedness-elec-br-general-2026-r2,br-2026-election-preparedness,elec-br-general-2026-r2,future_or_campaign_context
|
| 13 |
+
case-election-br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar-elec-br-general-2026-r2,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,elec-br-general-2026-r2,future_or_campaign_context
|
| 14 |
+
case-election-us-2026-midterms-preparedness-elec-us-midterms-2026,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,elec-us-midterms-2026,future_or_campaign_context
|
| 15 |
+
case-election-us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads-elec-us-midterms-2026,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,elec-us-midterms-2026,future_or_campaign_context
|
| 16 |
+
case-election-us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot-elec-us-midterms-2026,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,elec-us-midterms-2026,future_or_campaign_context
|
data/case_sources.csv
CHANGED
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@@ -62,3 +62,7 @@ br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,ongoing_moni
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us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|attribution|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Primary actor artifact and transcript.
|
| 63 |
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,ongoing_monitoring,reach,Dynamic one-platform metric.
|
| 64 |
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,corroboration,mechanism|ai_role|agency_transfer,Expert context.
|
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|
|
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| 62 |
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|attribution|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Primary actor artifact and transcript.
|
| 63 |
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,ongoing_monitoring,reach,Dynamic one-platform metric.
|
| 64 |
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,corroboration,mechanism|ai_role|agency_transfer,Expert context.
|
| 65 |
+
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,corroboration,occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Reporting includes direct interface and privacy-policy observation.
|
| 66 |
+
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,corroboration,occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Direct campaign statements and interface testing.
|
| 67 |
+
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,corroboration,occurrence|reach|response|behavioural_effect,Supports exact campaign-reported interaction count and withdrawal.
|
| 68 |
+
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,corroboration,occurrence|ai_role|mechanism|reach|response|behavioural_effect|agency_transfer,Independent synthesis and expert context.
|
data/cases.csv
CHANGED
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@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
|
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| 1 |
-
case_id,case_family_id,title,country,iso3,region,election_name,election_type,election_date_start,election_date_end,case_status,as_of_date,anchor_case,summary,actor_controlling_system,actor_type,actor_attribution_status,target_population,influence_vector,platforms,mechanism_class,ai_role,generative_ai_status,affected_state,agency_transfer_path,power_concentrated_in,democratic_harm,occurrence_status,reach_status,reach_estimate,reach_unit,behavioural_effect_status,electoral_effect_status,institutional_outcome,response,inclusion_tier,overall_confidence,counterevidence,open_questions,last_verified
|
| 2 |
-
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,ROU,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,presidential,2024-11-24,2024-11-24,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election after the first round amid officially documented concerns about campaign irregularities, opaque coordinated promotion, platform recommender risks, cyber activity, and foreign interference. Generative AI is not established as a material driver.",mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,campaign_network|platform|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Romanian voters,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",TikTok|Telegram|Facebook|web,recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|institutional_response,material_amplification,not_established,attention|belief|trust|electoral choice,opaque campaign and amplification capabilities → network operators and platform ranking → voters' attention and informational environment → agenda-setting and choice architecture shift away from voters → influence power concentrates in campaign operators and platforms,campaign network operators and platform ranking systems,"unequal campaign conditions, opacity, impaired informed choice, institutional loss of confidence, annulment of the election",partly_confirmed,platform_reported,,,unknown,institutionally_asserted,The Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process on 6 December 2024.,Court annulment; declassification; European Commission DSA proceedings; platform removals; repeat election.,A,0.91,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
|
| 3 |
-
ro-2025-presidential-repeat,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,ROU,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,presidential,2025-05-04,2025-05-18,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"The repeat election is coded as the institutional aftermath of the annulment and as a distinct cross-platform influence file. DFRLab documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic Romanian personas, generative-AI assets, and a pivot from support for Călin Georgescu to George Simion. The operation's sponsor and any voter effect remain unknown.",unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,unknown_network|platform|institution,unknown,Romanian voters,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",TikTok|Facebook|Telegram|web,institutional_response|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,mixed,confirmed,trust|participation|belief,post-annulment uncertainty and platform-mediated campaigning → institutions and information intermediaries → voters' trust and opportunity to choose → exceptional institutional control over the electoral timetable,electoral institutions and large platforms,"persistent distrust, polarisation, and uncertainty around electoral legitimacy",confirmed,measured,16000000,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the studied network,unknown,unknown,A repeat presidential election was held in May 2025.,"Expanded observation, platform engagement, partial deplatforming, and election-integrity safeguards.",A,0.91,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
|
| 4 |
-
md-2024-presidential-referendum,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,presidential|referendum,2024-10-20,2024-11-03,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"A high-evidence hybrid-interference file combining alleged illicit foreign finance and vote buying with disinformation, spoofed media, coordinated accounts, bots, and some AI-generated content. AI is one layer of the operation, not a demonstrated causal explanation for the narrow referendum result.",Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor|platform,officially_attributed,"Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora","payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|spoofed_media|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"finance plus scalable persuasion and impersonation → network sponsors and operators → voters' information, incentives, and preferences → autonomous deliberation and choice displaced by covert influence → power concentrates in sponsors and intermediaries",foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"distorted campaign conditions, covert inducement, impaired informed choice, institutional distrust",partly_confirmed,estimated,138000+,"authority-reported accounts and transactions across linked investigations; not recipients, people, or voter reach",indicated,unknown,The referendum passed and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff; investigations and platform takedowns continued.,Police and prosecutorial investigations; account and channel removals; campaign-finance enforcement; international observation and public attribution.,A,0.93,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
|
| 5 |
-
md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,parliamentary,2025-09-28,2025-09-28,retrospective,2026-08-11,false,"Linked follow-on evidence shows persistence and adaptation of the 2024 influence infrastructure. A documented paid InfoLeaders network combined inauthentic local personas, Telegram tasking, reciprocal engagement and AI-assisted message adaptation; separate records described synthetic/staged media and context-adaptive bots. Components must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total.",foreign-funded political and influence networks,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Moldovan voters,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference,persistent covert influence infrastructure → network sponsors and operators → voters' information environment and incentives → agenda and deliberation shaped outside transparent competition,foreign-funded influence networks,unequal campaign conditions and impaired informed choice,partly_confirmed,measured,55367950,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the InfoLeaders sample,unknown,unknown,Election completed under an intensified enforcement and information-integrity response.,"Network disruption, financial investigations, platform actions, public warnings, and election observation.",A,0.9,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
|
| 6 |
-
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,USA,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,presidential_primary,2024-01-23,2024-01-23,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,"An AI-cloned voice impersonating President Joe Biden was distributed by spoofed robocalls shortly before the New Hampshire primary and told recipients not to vote in that contest. The operator admitted creating the call, the FCC imposed civil penalties, and a state jury later acquitted him of all criminal charges.",Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,political_consultant|telecom_provider,admitted,New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",telephone network,voice_clone|telecom_robocall|voter_suppression,core_generation,confirmed,belief|participation,cheap voice impersonation plus mass calling → political operator and telecom chain → voters' beliefs about an authoritative instruction → participation decision displaced by fabricated presidential voice → power concentrates in the impersonator and distributor,political operator and telecom distribution chain,"impersonation of authority, attempted demobilisation signal, and reduced trust in authentic communications",confirmed,measured,9581,call attempts initiated; 3978 completed calls carried by Lingo according to FCC records,unknown,unknown,FCC $6 million forfeiture; Lingo $1 million consent decree and compliance plan; state criminal acquittal; later federal civil default judgment and injunction; legal clarification that AI-generated voices fall within TCPA artificial-voice restrictions.,"State investigation and charges; FCC declaratory ruling, enforcement, and provider settlement.",A,0.98,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.","How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
|
| 7 |
-
br-2026-election-preparedness,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,presidential|legislative|gubernatorial,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,"A prospective monitoring file grounded in enacted TSE rules, platform-compliance obligations, institutional partnerships, and observed 2026 incidents. It does not predict electoral harm.","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors",mixed,unknown,Brazilian voters,"synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",major social platforms|generative AI systems|messaging apps|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|recommender_amplification|bot_amplification|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"generative and ranking capabilities → campaigns, providers, and covert operators → voters' information and choice architecture → possible displacement of deliberation or authentic representation → potential power concentration in campaigns and platforms","campaigns, AI providers, and large platforms, constrained by election authorities","prospective: deception, impersonation, discriminatory political violence, suppression, and loss of confidence",partly_confirmed,unknown,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; first round scheduled for 4 October 2026 and runoff for 25 October 2026.,"Mandatory AI disclosure, time-limited ban on new candidate/public-figure synthetic media, provider duties, complaint channels, compliance plans, expert partnerships, and monitoring council.",A,0.95,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
|
| 8 |
-
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,presidential,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,A disclosed AI avatar of former president Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the launch of his son Flávio's presidential campaign. Federação Brasil da Esperança challenged it in TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; the defence argued that disclosure and the absence of deceptive editing made it lawful. The TSE had not finally resolved the dispute as of the cutoff.,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,campaign,credibly_reported,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,campaign event|social video|news media,synthetic_video|voice_clone,core_generation,confirmed,preference|perceived endorsement|trust,synthetic embodiment of a restricted political figure → campaign producer → voters' perception of endorsement and presence → representation mediated by a controllable avatar → power concentrates in the producer deciding what the avatar says,campaign producer controlling the synthetic persona,contested: possible circumvention of legal restrictions and manipulation through synthetic political presence,confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 pending on the merits at the dataset cutoff; an internal TSE meeting was scheduled for 13 August 2026.,Court petitions and public legal scrutiny under TSE synthetic-content rules.,A,0.91,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
|
| 9 |
-
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm election,legislative|state|local,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,"An ongoing monitoring file for a federal election governed by a state-law patchwork, narrow federal campaign-law tools, existing telecom rules, voluntary platform policies, and documented campaign use of synthetic media.","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers",mixed,mixed,United States voters,"synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",television|social platforms|telephone network|generative AI systems|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|telecom_robocall|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"cheap synthetic production and private distribution rules → campaigns, platforms, providers, and covert actors → voters' information environment → authentic representation and deliberation become harder to verify → power concentrates in producers and intermediaries","campaign committees, platforms, and infrastructure providers","prospective and observed: fabricated candidate speech, disclosure ambiguity, suppression attempts, and erosion of epistemic trust",partly_confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; general election scheduled for 3 November 2026.,State disclosure and prohibition laws; FCC artificial-voice enforcement; election-security guidance; platform policies; fact-checking and campaign responses.,A,0.94,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
|
| 10 |
-
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,legislative|state,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,"By March 2026, campaigns and national committees had deployed realistic AI-generated ads depicting opponents saying or doing things they had not recorded, sometimes with small or low-salience disclosures. The 11 March NRSC Talarico ad converted genuine old posts into a synthetic performance and added reaction lines not present in those posts. The case is observed and attributed, but its behavioural or electoral effect is unknown.",National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,campaign|political_committee,admitted,voters in contested federal and state races,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,social video|digital advertising|web,synthetic_video|paid_influence,core_generation,confirmed,belief|candidate evaluation|trust,realistic candidate simulation → campaign committees → voters' perception of an opponent's speech or conduct → evidentiary cues become campaign-controlled → representational power concentrates in the content producer,campaigns producing and distributing synthetic representations,"possible misattribution of speech, confusion, normalisation of fabricated evidence, and erosion of trust",confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending.,"Candidate objections, voluntary or state-required disclosures, media verification, and calls for clearer rules.",A,0.93,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
case_id,case_family_id,title,country,iso3,region,election_name,election_type,election_date_start,election_date_end,case_status,as_of_date,anchor_case,record_type,manipulation_assessment,summary,actor_controlling_system,actor_type,actor_attribution_status,target_population,influence_vector,platforms,mechanism_class,ai_role,generative_ai_status,affected_state,agency_transfer_path,power_concentrated_in,democratic_harm,occurrence_status,reach_status,reach_estimate,reach_unit,behavioural_effect_status,electoral_effect_status,institutional_outcome,response,inclusion_tier,overall_confidence,counterevidence,open_questions,last_verified
|
| 2 |
+
ro-2024-presidential-annulment,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,ROU,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,presidential,2024-11-24,2024-11-24,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,election_wide_case,mixed_documented_manipulation,"Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election after the first round amid officially documented concerns about campaign irregularities, opaque coordinated promotion, platform recommender risks, cyber activity, and foreign interference. Generative AI is not established as a material driver.",mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,campaign_network|platform|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Romanian voters,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",TikTok|Telegram|Facebook|web,recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|institutional_response,material_amplification,not_established,attention|belief|trust|electoral choice,opaque campaign and amplification capabilities → network operators and platform ranking → voters' attention and informational environment → agenda-setting and choice architecture shift away from voters → influence power concentrates in campaign operators and platforms,campaign network operators and platform ranking systems,"unequal campaign conditions, opacity, impaired informed choice, institutional loss of confidence, annulment of the election",partly_confirmed,platform_reported,,,unknown,institutionally_asserted,The Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process on 6 December 2024.,Court annulment; declassification; European Commission DSA proceedings; platform removals; repeat election.,A,0.91,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
|
| 3 |
+
ro-2025-presidential-repeat,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,ROU,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,presidential,2025-05-04,2025-05-18,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,observed_network,manipulation_confirmed,"The repeat election is coded as the institutional aftermath of the annulment and as a distinct cross-platform influence file. DFRLab documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic Romanian personas, generative-AI assets, and a pivot from support for Călin Georgescu to George Simion. The operation's sponsor and any voter effect remain unknown.",unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,unknown_network|platform|institution,unknown,Romanian voters,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",TikTok|Facebook|Telegram|web,institutional_response|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,mixed,confirmed,trust|participation|belief,post-annulment uncertainty and platform-mediated campaigning → institutions and information intermediaries → voters' trust and opportunity to choose → exceptional institutional control over the electoral timetable,electoral institutions and large platforms,"persistent distrust, polarisation, and uncertainty around electoral legitimacy",confirmed,measured,16000000,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the studied network,unknown,unknown,A repeat presidential election was held in May 2025.,"Expanded observation, platform engagement, partial deplatforming, and election-integrity safeguards.",A,0.91,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
|
| 4 |
+
md-2024-presidential-referendum,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,presidential|referendum,2024-10-20,2024-11-03,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,election_wide_case,mixed_documented_manipulation,"A high-evidence hybrid-interference file combining alleged illicit foreign finance and vote buying with disinformation, spoofed media, coordinated accounts, bots, and some AI-generated content. AI is one layer of the operation, not a demonstrated causal explanation for the narrow referendum result.",Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor|platform,officially_attributed,"Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora","payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|spoofed_media|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"finance plus scalable persuasion and impersonation → network sponsors and operators → voters' information, incentives, and preferences → autonomous deliberation and choice displaced by covert influence → power concentrates in sponsors and intermediaries",foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"distorted campaign conditions, covert inducement, impaired informed choice, institutional distrust",partly_confirmed,estimated,138000+,"authority-reported accounts and transactions across linked investigations; not recipients, people, or voter reach",indicated,unknown,The referendum passed and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff; investigations and platform takedowns continued.,Police and prosecutorial investigations; account and channel removals; campaign-finance enforcement; international observation and public attribution.,A,0.93,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
|
| 5 |
+
md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,parliamentary,2025-09-28,2025-09-28,retrospective,2026-08-11,false,observed_network,manipulation_confirmed,"Linked follow-on evidence shows persistence and adaptation of the 2024 influence infrastructure. A documented paid InfoLeaders network combined inauthentic local personas, Telegram tasking, reciprocal engagement and AI-assisted message adaptation; separate records described synthetic/staged media and context-adaptive bots. Components must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total.",foreign-funded political and influence networks,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Moldovan voters,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference,persistent covert influence infrastructure → network sponsors and operators → voters' information environment and incentives → agenda and deliberation shaped outside transparent competition,foreign-funded influence networks,unequal campaign conditions and impaired informed choice,partly_confirmed,measured,55367950,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the InfoLeaders sample,unknown,unknown,Election completed under an intensified enforcement and information-integrity response.,"Network disruption, financial investigations, platform actions, public warnings, and election observation.",A,0.9,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
|
| 6 |
+
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,USA,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,presidential_primary,2024-01-23,2024-01-23,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,observed_incident,manipulation_confirmed,"An AI-cloned voice impersonating President Joe Biden was distributed by spoofed robocalls shortly before the New Hampshire primary and told recipients not to vote in that contest. The operator admitted creating the call, the FCC imposed civil penalties, and a state jury later acquitted him of all criminal charges.",Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,political_consultant|telecom_provider,admitted,New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",telephone network,voice_clone|telecom_robocall|voter_suppression,core_generation,confirmed,belief|participation,cheap voice impersonation plus mass calling → political operator and telecom chain → voters' beliefs about an authoritative instruction → participation decision displaced by fabricated presidential voice → power concentrates in the impersonator and distributor,political operator and telecom distribution chain,"impersonation of authority, attempted demobilisation signal, and reduced trust in authentic communications",confirmed,measured,9581,call attempts initiated; 3978 completed calls carried by Lingo according to FCC records,unknown,unknown,FCC $6 million forfeiture; Lingo $1 million consent decree and compliance plan; state criminal acquittal; later federal civil default judgment and injunction; legal clarification that AI-generated voices fall within TCPA artificial-voice restrictions.,"State investigation and charges; FCC declaratory ruling, enforcement, and provider settlement.",A,0.98,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.","How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
|
| 7 |
+
br-2026-election-preparedness,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,presidential|legislative|gubernatorial,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,preparedness_file,preparedness_not_incident,"A prospective monitoring file grounded in enacted TSE rules, platform-compliance obligations, institutional partnerships, and observed 2026 incidents. It does not predict electoral harm.","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors",mixed,unknown,Brazilian voters,"synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",major social platforms|generative AI systems|messaging apps|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|recommender_amplification|bot_amplification|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"generative and ranking capabilities → campaigns, providers, and covert operators → voters' information and choice architecture → possible displacement of deliberation or authentic representation → potential power concentration in campaigns and platforms","campaigns, AI providers, and large platforms, constrained by election authorities","prospective: deception, impersonation, discriminatory political violence, suppression, and loss of confidence",partly_confirmed,unknown,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; first round scheduled for 4 October 2026 and runoff for 25 October 2026.,"Mandatory AI disclosure, time-limited ban on new candidate/public-figure synthetic media, provider duties, complaint channels, compliance plans, expert partnerships, and monitoring council.",A,0.95,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
|
| 8 |
+
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,presidential,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,observed_incident,transparent_contested_use,A disclosed AI avatar of former president Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the launch of his son Flávio's presidential campaign. Federação Brasil da Esperança challenged it in TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; the defence argued that disclosure and the absence of deceptive editing made it lawful. The TSE had not finally resolved the dispute as of the cutoff.,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,campaign,credibly_reported,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,campaign event|social video|news media,synthetic_video|voice_clone,core_generation,confirmed,preference|perceived endorsement|trust,synthetic embodiment of a restricted political figure → campaign producer → voters' perception of endorsement and presence → representation mediated by a controllable avatar → power concentrates in the producer deciding what the avatar says,campaign producer controlling the synthetic persona,contested: possible circumvention of legal restrictions and manipulation through synthetic political presence,confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 pending on the merits at the dataset cutoff; an internal TSE meeting was scheduled for 13 August 2026.,Court petitions and public legal scrutiny under TSE synthetic-content rules.,A,0.91,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
|
| 9 |
+
us-2026-midterms-preparedness,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm election,legislative|state|local,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,preparedness_file,preparedness_not_incident,"An ongoing monitoring file for a federal election governed by a state-law patchwork, narrow federal campaign-law tools, existing telecom rules, voluntary platform policies, and documented campaign use of synthetic media.","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers",mixed,mixed,United States voters,"synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",television|social platforms|telephone network|generative AI systems|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|telecom_robocall|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"cheap synthetic production and private distribution rules → campaigns, platforms, providers, and covert actors → voters' information environment → authentic representation and deliberation become harder to verify → power concentrates in producers and intermediaries","campaign committees, platforms, and infrastructure providers","prospective and observed: fabricated candidate speech, disclosure ambiguity, suppression attempts, and erosion of epistemic trust",partly_confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; general election scheduled for 3 November 2026.,State disclosure and prohibition laws; FCC artificial-voice enforcement; election-security guidance; platform policies; fact-checking and campaign responses.,A,0.94,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
|
| 10 |
+
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,legislative|state,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,observed_campaign_set,mixed_documented_manipulation,"By March 2026, campaigns and national committees had deployed realistic AI-generated ads depicting opponents saying or doing things they had not recorded, sometimes with small or low-salience disclosures. The 11 March NRSC Talarico ad converted genuine old posts into a synthetic performance and added reaction lines not present in those posts. The case is observed and attributed, but its behavioural or electoral effect is unknown.",National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,campaign|political_committee,admitted,voters in contested federal and state races,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,social video|digital advertising|web,synthetic_video|paid_influence,core_generation,confirmed,belief|candidate evaluation|trust,realistic candidate simulation → campaign committees → voters' perception of an opponent's speech or conduct → evidentiary cues become campaign-controlled → representational power concentrates in the content producer,campaigns producing and distributing synthetic representations,"possible misattribution of speech, confusion, normalisation of fabricated evidence, and erosion of trust",confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending.,"Candidate objections, voluntary or state-required disclosures, media verification, and calls for clearer rules.",A,0.93,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
|
| 11 |
+
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,us-midterms-2026,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,USA,North America,2026 California 11th congressional district general election,legislative,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-12,false,observed_incident,transparent_contested_use,"Scott Wiener for Congress deployed a disclosed, Claude-powered interactive parody that answered in opponent Connie Chan's first person, framed her record through campaign-selected themes, and was removed after four days of backlash. Its privacy policy permitted conversation retention for up to 90 days. The tool was transparent political satire, not a covert deepfake; population reach and electoral effects are unknown.",Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified,campaign|unidentified_vendor,admitted,California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person,"interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media",web|physical_billboards|Claude,synthetic_text|interactive_impersonation|campaign_attack|data_capture,core_generation,confirmed,candidate evaluation|agenda-setting|perceived representation|trust|query privacy,"campaign-controlled deployment and configurable framing → closed-model dynamic generation → users question a synthetic opponent → the campaign selects how Chan appears to answer and its policy permits staff review of query logs → representational and evidentiary control shifts from the candidate and voter verification to the campaign and its infrastructure providers; exact prompt, retrieval sources and guardrails remain unknown","campaign deployer controlling deployment, interface, framing and permitted access to logs; secondarily the model and infrastructure providers",observed appropriation of an opponent's first-person voice and controversy over racialised and gendered outputs; hypothesised misrepresentation and normalisation of synthetic opponents; electoral effect unknown,confirmed,campaign_reported_nonunique_questions,5058,submitted_questions_in_first_27_hours,unknown,unknown,No adjudication or regulatory outcome was identified by the cutoff.,"The campaign removed the chatbot on 7 August 2026, said it would remove two billboards, acknowledged that the experiment missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",A,0.94,"The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened.","Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",2026-08-12
|
data/claim_evidence.csv
ADDED
|
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| 1 |
+
claim_evidence_id,claim_id,source_id,relation,evidence_scope,directness,locator,extracted_at
|
| 2 |
+
ce-clm-ro-001-src-ro-ccr-20241206-supports,clm-ro-001,src-ro-ccr-20241206,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 3 |
+
ce-clm-ro-001-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-001,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 4 |
+
ce-clm-ro-002-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-002,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 5 |
+
ce-clm-ro-002-src-ro-ifes-202412-supports,clm-ro-002,src-ro-ifes-202412,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 6 |
+
ce-clm-ro-003-src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217-supports,clm-ro-003,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,supports,institutional_action,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 7 |
+
ce-clm-ro-004-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-004,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 8 |
+
ce-clm-ro-004-src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217-supports,clm-ro-004,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 9 |
+
ce-clm-ro-004-src-ro-ifes-202412-supports,clm-ro-004,src-ro-ifes-202412,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 10 |
+
ce-clm-ro-005-src-ro-tiktok-integrity-supports,clm-ro-005,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 11 |
+
ce-clm-ro-006-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-006,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 12 |
+
ce-clm-ro-006-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-006,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 13 |
+
ce-clm-ro-006-src-ro-ifes-202412-supports,clm-ro-006,src-ro-ifes-202412,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 14 |
+
ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 15 |
+
ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 16 |
+
ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 17 |
+
ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 18 |
+
ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 19 |
+
ce-clm-ro-008-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-008,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 20 |
+
ce-clm-ro-009-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-supports,clm-ro-009,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 21 |
+
ce-clm-ro-010-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-supports,clm-ro-010,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 22 |
+
ce-clm-ro-010-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-010,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 23 |
+
ce-clm-ro-011-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-011,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 24 |
+
ce-clm-ro-012-src-ro-tiktok-integrity-supports,clm-ro-012,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 25 |
+
ce-clm-ro-012-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-012,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 26 |
+
ce-clm-ro-013-src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220-supports,clm-ro-013,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 27 |
+
ce-clm-ro-014-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-014,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 28 |
+
ce-clm-ro-015-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-015,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 29 |
+
ce-clm-ro-016-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-016,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 30 |
+
ce-clm-ro-017-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-017,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 31 |
+
ce-clm-ro-018-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-018,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 32 |
+
ce-clm-ro-018-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-supports,clm-ro-018,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 33 |
+
ce-clm-md-001-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-001,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 34 |
+
ce-clm-md-002-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-002,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 35 |
+
ce-clm-md-003-src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021-supports,clm-md-003,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
+
ce-clm-md-003-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-003,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
+
ce-clm-md-004-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-004,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 38 |
+
ce-clm-md-005-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 39 |
+
ce-clm-md-005-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 40 |
+
ce-clm-md-005-src-md-eeas-activity-2025-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-eeas-activity-2025,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 41 |
+
ce-clm-md-005-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-counterevidence,clm-md-005,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,counterevidence,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 42 |
+
ce-clm-md-006-src-md-eeas-fimi-202401-supports,clm-md-006,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 43 |
+
ce-clm-md-006-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-006,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 44 |
+
ce-clm-md-007-src-md-meta-threat-reporting-supports,clm-md-007,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 45 |
+
ce-clm-md-008-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-008,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 46 |
+
ce-clm-md-009-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-009,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 47 |
+
ce-clm-md-009-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-009,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 48 |
+
ce-clm-md-010-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-010,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 49 |
+
ce-clm-md-011-src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021-supports,clm-md-011,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 50 |
+
ce-clm-md-011-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-011,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 51 |
+
ce-clm-md-012-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-012,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 52 |
+
ce-clm-md-013-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-013,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 53 |
+
ce-clm-md-014-src-md-meta-threat-reporting-supports,clm-md-014,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 54 |
+
ce-clm-md-015-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-015,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 55 |
+
ce-clm-md-015-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-015,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 56 |
+
ce-clm-md-016-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-016,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 57 |
+
ce-clm-md-017-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-017,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 58 |
+
ce-clm-md-018-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-018,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 59 |
+
ce-clm-md-018-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-018,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 60 |
+
ce-clm-md-019-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-019,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 61 |
+
ce-clm-md-019-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-019,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 62 |
+
ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 63 |
+
ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 64 |
+
ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 65 |
+
ce-clm-nh-002-src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523-supports,clm-nh-002,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 66 |
+
ce-clm-nh-002-src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523-supports,clm-nh-002,src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 67 |
+
ce-clm-nh-003-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-003,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 68 |
+
ce-clm-nh-003-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-003,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 69 |
+
ce-clm-nh-004-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-004,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 70 |
+
ce-clm-nh-004-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-004,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 71 |
+
ce-clm-nh-005-src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523-supports,clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 72 |
+
ce-clm-nh-005-src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821-supports,clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 73 |
+
ce-clm-nh-006-src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208-supports,clm-nh-006,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 74 |
+
ce-clm-nh-007-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 75 |
+
ce-clm-nh-007-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 76 |
+
ce-clm-nh-008-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-008,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 77 |
+
ce-clm-nh-008-src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-008,src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 78 |
+
ce-clm-nh-009-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-009,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 79 |
+
ce-clm-nh-009-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-009,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 80 |
+
ce-clm-nh-010-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-010,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 81 |
+
ce-clm-nh-010-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-010,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 82 |
+
ce-clm-nh-011-src-us-lwv-kramer-civil-supports,clm-nh-011,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 83 |
+
ce-clm-nh-011-src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511-supports,clm-nh-011,src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 84 |
+
ce-clm-nh-012-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-012,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 85 |
+
ce-clm-nh-012-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-012,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 86 |
+
ce-clm-br-001-src-br-tse-calendar-202603-supports,clm-br-001,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 87 |
+
ce-clm-br-002-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-002,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 88 |
+
ce-clm-br-002-src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604-supports,clm-br-002,src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 89 |
+
ce-clm-br-003-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-003,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 90 |
+
ce-clm-br-004-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-004,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 91 |
+
ce-clm-br-005-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-005,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 92 |
+
ce-clm-br-006-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 93 |
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ce-clm-br-006-src-br-tse-compliance-202607-supports,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-compliance-202607,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 94 |
+
ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-platforms-202607-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-platforms-202607,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 95 |
+
ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-agu-20260803-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 96 |
+
ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-council-20260807-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-council-20260807,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 97 |
+
ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 98 |
+
ce-clm-br-008-src-br-aio-202411-supports,clm-br-008,src-br-aio-202411,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 99 |
+
ce-clm-br-010-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-010,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 100 |
+
ce-clm-br-011-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-011,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 101 |
+
ce-clm-br-012-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-012,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 102 |
+
ce-clm-br-012-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-counterevidence,clm-br-012,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,counterevidence,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 103 |
+
ce-clm-br-013-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-013,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 104 |
+
ce-clm-br-014-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-014,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 105 |
+
ce-clm-br-015-src-br-avatar-petition-20260726-supports,clm-br-015,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 106 |
+
ce-clm-br-016-src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated-supports,clm-br-016,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 107 |
+
ce-clm-br-017-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-017,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 108 |
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ce-clm-br-017-src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated-supports,clm-br-017,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 109 |
+
ce-clm-br-017-src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607-counterevidence,clm-br-017,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,counterevidence,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 110 |
+
ce-clm-br-018-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-018,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 111 |
+
ce-clm-br-018-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-018,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 112 |
+
ce-clm-br-019-src-br-ft-avatar-202607-supports,clm-br-019,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 113 |
+
ce-clm-br-019-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-019,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 114 |
+
ce-clm-br-020-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-020,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 115 |
+
ce-clm-br-020-src-br-ft-avatar-202607-supports,clm-br-020,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 116 |
+
ce-clm-us26-001-src-us-fec-dates-2026-supports,clm-us26-001,src-us-fec-dates-2026,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 117 |
+
ce-clm-us26-002-src-us-ncsl-20260623-supports,clm-us26-002,src-us-ncsl-20260623,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 118 |
+
ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 119 |
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ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-ncsl-20260623-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-ncsl-20260623,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 120 |
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ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 121 |
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ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208-counterevidence,clm-us26-003,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,counterevidence,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
|
| 122 |
+
ce-clm-us26-004-src-us-cisa-genai-202401-supports,clm-us26-004,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 123 |
+
ce-clm-us26-005-src-us-odni-update-20241021-supports,clm-us26-005,src-us-odni-update-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 124 |
+
ce-clm-us26-006-src-global-meta-muted-20241203-supports,clm-us26-006,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 125 |
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ce-clm-us26-008-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-008,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 126 |
+
ce-clm-us26-008-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-008,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 127 |
+
ce-clm-us26-009-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-009,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 128 |
+
ce-clm-us26-009-src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026-supports,clm-us26-009,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 129 |
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ce-clm-us26-010-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-010,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 130 |
+
ce-clm-us26-011-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-011,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 131 |
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ce-clm-us26-012-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-012,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 132 |
+
ce-clm-us26-013-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-013,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 133 |
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ce-clm-us26-014-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-014,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 134 |
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ce-clm-us26-014-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-014,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 135 |
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ce-clm-us26-015-src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube-supports,clm-us26-015,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 136 |
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ce-clm-us26-016-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-016,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
|
| 137 |
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ce-clm-us26-016-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-016,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 138 |
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ce-clm-us26-016-src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026-supports,clm-us26-016,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
|
| 139 |
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ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
|
| 140 |
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ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
|
| 141 |
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ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
|
| 142 |
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ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
|
| 143 |
+
ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-005-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-005,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-005-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-005,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-006-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-006,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-006-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-006,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-007-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-007,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-008-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-008,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,institutional_action,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-008-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-008,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,institutional_action,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-009-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-009,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-009-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-009,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-009-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-009,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-011-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-011,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-011-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-011,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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ce-clm-usca11-011-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-011,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
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data/claims.csv
CHANGED
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@@ -1,86 +1,97 @@
|
|
| 1 |
-
claim_id,case_id,claim_type,claim_text,evidence_label,confidence,source_ids,counter_source_ids,notes,review_status,verified_at
|
| 2 |
-
clm-ro-001,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,institutional_outcome,"On 6 December 2024, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process.",established_evidence,0.99,src-ro-ccr-20241206|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,,The institutional act is certain even where its factual and legal justification is debated.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 3 |
-
clm-ro-002,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,mechanism,The official record described opaque and coordinated online promotion that created unequal campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.9,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Established as a feature of the official and independent record; specific sponsors and all network components remain unresolved.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 4 |
-
clm-ro-003,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,response,"The European Commission opened formal DSA proceedings against TikTok concerning election-risk management, recommender systems, political advertising, and coordinated inauthentic manipulation.",established_evidence,0.99,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,,Opening proceedings is not a final infringement finding.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 5 |
-
clm-ro-004,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,ai_role,Generative AI has not been established as a material driver of the Romanian annulment case.,strong_inference,0.88,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-ifes-202412,,"The central digital mechanism is amplification, coordination, and opaque promotion rather than confirmed synthetic media.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 6 |
-
clm-ro-005,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok reported large-scale prevention of fake engagement and removal of election-related networks, but these platform metrics do not measure voter exposure to the specific campaign.",established_evidence,0.84,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,,"Platform self-report; preserve distinction between prevented actions, removed accounts, impressions, and people reached.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 7 |
-
clm-ro-006,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,electoral_effect,No source in the reviewed record provides a credible causal estimate of votes changed by the coordinated digital campaign.,established_evidence,0.92,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Absence claim limited to reviewed evidence; update if individual-level or quasi-experimental research appears.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 8 |
-
clm-ro-007,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,attribution,A simple claim that Russia alone directed the entire campaign is stronger than the presently coded public evidence supports.,strong_inference,0.82,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"Code official allegations, technical indicators, domestic financing, and final attribution separately.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 9 |
-
clm-ro-008,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,legal_status,"The Venice Commission treated annulment as an exceptional measure requiring clear legal conditions, reliable evidence, procedural safeguards, and proportionality.",established_evidence,0.95,src-ro-venice-202503,,"Normative legal standard, not a factual finding about every Romanian allegation.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 10 |
-
clm-ro-009,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,Romania held a repeat presidential election on 4 and 18 May 2025.,established_evidence,0.99,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 11 |
-
clm-ro-010,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,The repeat-election outcome cannot be used as a causal measure of what the annulled 2024 result would have been absent manipulation.,strong_inference,0.94,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|src-ro-venice-202503,,"The electorate, candidates, campaign, information environment, and institutional context changed.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 12 |
-
clm-ro-011,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,occurrence,"A declassified SRI report described an initial network of about 25,000 TikTok accounts activated intensely in the final two weeks before the first round, including 797 accounts created in 2016 that had remained largely inactive until 11 November 2024.",established_evidence,0.97,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,Established as an intelligence-service report. The account count is not independently audited unique reach and does not establish the operator or voter effect.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 13 |
-
clm-ro-012,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok's separately disclosed Turkey-based network and the SRI-reported 25,000-account network have different scopes and cannot be summed as one operation or one audience estimate.",established_evidence,0.94,src-ro-tiktok-integrity|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,"This is a source-scope correction, not an assertion that the networks were unrelated in every respect.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 14 |
-
clm-ro-013,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,counterevidence,"Snoop reported that PNL financed the #EchilibrușiVerticalitate influencer campaign, while the contracted firm said its original brief had been altered, diverted, or cloned in Georgescu's favour.",established_evidence,0.9,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"The reporting is counterevidence to a one-actor account of all amplification. It does not establish that PNL intended to support Georgescu, nor does it disprove separate foreign-linked activity.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 15 |
-
clm-ro-014,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,"DFRLab identified at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok accounts active from December 2024 through 6 June 2025 that first supported Călin Georgescu and later George Simion while attacking Moldova, France, and the EU.",established_evidence,0.95,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,Established as a transparent public-data research finding; platform access thresholds may leave additional accounts unobserved.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 16 |
-
clm-ro-015,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,reach,"The studied network produced 8,514 posts and accumulated at least 16 million views and 681,000 likes across the three platforms.",established_evidence,0.93,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"These are non-unique platform metrics, not authenticated Romanian voters, belief, or persuasion.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 17 |
-
clm-ro-016,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ai_role,"The network used generative-AI profile images and descriptions, synthetic Romanian personas, and DreamFace or D-ID-style avatars alongside hijacked accounts and conventional stock footage.",established_evidence,0.91,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"AI was one component of a broader cross-platform coordination system, not a complete explanation for its reach.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 18 |
-
clm-ro-017,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,attribution,The network's operator and sponsor remain publicly unidentified; pro-Russia narratives and coordinated behaviour do not by themselves establish Russian-state command.,open_question,0.97,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"Confidence refers to the appropriately unresolved wording, not confidence that no attribution will ever be possible.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 19 |
-
clm-ro-018,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence estimates whether the cross-platform network changed belief, turnout, candidate preference, or the repeat-election result.",open_question,0.98,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,Views and likes do not identify a causal effect; the result being upheld does not negate occurrence of the network.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 20 |
-
clm-md-001,md-2024-presidential-referendum,occurrence,Moldova held the first presidential round and EU constitutional referendum on 20 October 2024 and the presidential runoff on 3 November 2024.,established_evidence,0.99,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 21 |
-
clm-md-002,md-2024-presidential-referendum,institutional_outcome,The EU constitutional amendment was approved by a narrow final majority and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff.,established_evidence,0.99,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The dataset does not infer that interference explains the margin.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 22 |
-
clm-md-003,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,International observers documented active disinformation and serious concerns about illicit foreign interference affecting campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.96,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,"Observation finding about campaign environment, not a quantified electoral effect.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 23 |
-
clm-md-004,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Moldovan police alleged that the Shor-linked network transferred tens of millions of dollars to influence voters.,established_evidence,0.97,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,,Established as a police allegation reported by Reuters; underlying transfers and intent require their own evidentiary assessment.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 24 |
-
clm-md-005,md-2024-presidential-referendum,attribution,"Authorities and international institutions attributed major components of the operation to Russia-linked and Shor-linked actors, while Russia and Shor denied wrongdoing.",established_evidence,0.9,src-md-odihr-final-20250314|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-eeas-activity-2025,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Wording preserves attribution as an official assessment and the denials as counterposition.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 25 |
-
clm-md-006,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ai_role,"AI-generated impersonation and synthetic content appeared in Moldova's information environment, but the wider interference operation relied heavily on non-AI mechanisms.",established_evidence,0.91,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Avoids treating illicit finance, bots, and coordinated networks as synonymous with generative AI.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 26 |
-
clm-md-007,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Meta reported removing a coordinated inauthentic network targeting Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.,established_evidence,0.95,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Platform self-report; independent replication is limited and gross follower counts largely reflected non-Moldovan or fake engagement.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 27 |
-
clm-md-008,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"The ODIHR-cited figure of more than 138,000 accounts and transactions across linked investigations is an enforcement indicator, not a count of recipients, exposed people, persuaded voters, or unique accounts.",established_evidence,0.91,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The denominator combines accounts and transactions and may contain repeated entities; do not convert it into people or voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 28 |
-
clm-md-009,md-2024-presidential-referendum,behavioural_effect,"Documented payment systems provide evidence of attempted and in some cases accepted inducement, but do not establish how each recipient voted.",strong_inference,0.9,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Acceptance of a payment is not identical to compliance with an instruction.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 29 |
-
clm-md-010,md-2024-presidential-referendum,electoral_effect,No reviewed source provides a credible causal estimate of how many referendum or presidential votes were changed by the influence operation.,established_evidence,0.93,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The narrow margin increases importance but does not supply causal identification.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 30 |
-
clm-md-011,md-2024-presidential-referendum,counterevidence,"Observers also found incumbent advantage, insufficient safeguards against misuse of administrative resources, and media imbalances.",established_evidence,0.96,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Prevents the foreign-interference frame from obscuring domestic electoral-integrity problems.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 31 |
-
clm-md-012,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"The 2025 parliamentary-election observation record described inauthentic account networks, troll farms, automated bots, AI videos, disinformation, and foreign-funded vote-buying infrastructure.",established_evidence,0.96,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,Evidence concerns a linked later election and is not silently back-projected into every 2024 event.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 32 |
-
clm-md-013,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,The persistence of a network across elections does not establish that AI-generated content or bots determined the 2025 outcome.,strong_inference,0.94,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 33 |
-
clm-md-014,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"Meta reported about 4,200 Facebook Page followers and 335,000 Instagram followers for the removed Moldova-focused network, but said the vast majority were outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; it assessed that the operation had not built an authentic audience before disruption.",established_evidence,0.97,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Established as platform telemetry and assessment. Gross followers must not be reported as Moldovan voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 34 |
-
clm-md-015,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,occurrence,"DFRLab analysed 253 inauthentic accounts in a paid InfoLeaders network linked through undercover reporting to Telegram-based recruitment, training, task assignment, and mutual amplification.",established_evidence,0.95,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The platform sample and the wider number of recruited people are different denominators.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 35 |
-
clm-md-016,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,reach,"The 253-account InfoLeaders sample produced 28,708 posts, 55,367,950 views, 2,207,894 likes, 295,608 shares, and 239,016 comments across TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram.",established_evidence,0.93,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"Platform totals are non-unique, can include repeat or inauthentic engagement, and do not measure belief or votes.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
-
clm-md-017,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"Curators required local-looking participants to personalise centrally supplied messages while retaining assigned hashtags and to amplify one another, making paid coordination appear to be spontaneous peer speech.",established_evidence,0.92,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"AI-assisted rephrasing was an enabling layer within a paid human and bot-coordinated system, not the sole mechanism.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
-
clm-md-018,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,attribution,"The InfoLeaders network had strong operational links to Shor-affiliated or Moscow-linked structures, but the public record does not independently establish direct Kremlin command of every account or asset.",strong_inference,0.88,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Beneficiary, operational affiliate, funder, state-aligned ecosystem, and direct command are kept separate.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 38 |
-
clm-md-019,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence provides a causal estimate of belief, turnout, votes, seats, or the 2025 result attributable to the InfoLeaders network, synthetic media, or automated accounts.",open_question,0.98,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"The election result and institutional validation do not erase documented interference, but neither identifies a numeric effect.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 39 |
-
clm-nh-001,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,occurrence,An AI-generated voice impersonating President Joe Biden was used in robocalls before the New Hampshire presidential primary.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 40 |
-
clm-nh-002,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,The call told recipients to save their vote for November rather than participate in the primary.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,,The content has a demobilising instruction; criminal intent and legal guilt are separate questions.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 41 |
-
clm-nh-003,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,attribution,Steve Kramer admitted commissioning the AI-generated robocall.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,Admission to creation does not equal conviction on the state charges.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 42 |
-
clm-nh-004,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,reach,"Voice Broadcasting initiated 9,581 call attempts, and Lingo records showed 3,978 completed calls bearing A-level attestations.",established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,"Calls are not equivalent to unique people reached, completed calls, or listeners.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 43 |
-
clm-nh-005,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,Caller-ID spoofing and inaccurate attestation in the telecom chain increased the call's apparent authenticity and deliverability.,established_evidence,0.97,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523|src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,,"Shows that the case is an infrastructure chain, not merely a generated audio file.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 44 |
-
clm-nh-006,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,The FCC ruled that AI-generated voices fall within the TCPA's restriction on artificial or prerecorded voices.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 45 |
-
clm-nh-007,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"The FCC issued a $6 million forfeiture against Kramer, while Lingo agreed separately to a $1 million civil penalty and compliance plan.",established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,Separate creator and provider actions.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 46 |
-
clm-nh-008,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,A New Hampshire jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges in June 2025.,established_evidence,0.98,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,,The acquittal must appear wherever the charging decision is discussed.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 47 |
-
clm-nh-009,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,behavioural_effect,No reviewed evidence measures how many recipients believed or acted on the robocall.,established_evidence,0.95,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,"Update if survey, turnout linkage, or experimental evidence specific to recipients becomes available.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 48 |
-
clm-nh-010,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,electoral_effect,No credible causal estimate links the robocall to primary turnout or vote totals.,established_evidence,0.96,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 49 |
-
clm-nh-011,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"In November 2025, a federal court entered default judgment against Kramer, awarded individual monetary relief, and permanently enjoined similar voter-coercion schemes.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,,"The judgment followed nonappearance and must be described as a default, not a contested merits trial.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 50 |
-
clm-nh-012,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,agency_transfer,"The cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed trusted in-state number transferred control over apparent authorship and relevance of a participation instruction to the operator.",strong_inference,0.9,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,The mechanism is strongly supported; its effect on any individual recipient is unmeasured.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 51 |
-
clm-br-001,br-2026-election-preparedness,occurrence,"Brazil's 2026 general election first round is scheduled for 4 October, with a possible runoff on 25 October.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,,"Prospective date, not an observed election result.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 52 |
-
clm-br-002,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"TSE rules require explicit, prominent, accessible disclosure of synthetic multimedia used in electoral advertising and identification of the technology used.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,,Resolution 23.755 amends the standing electoral-advertising rule.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 53 |
-
clm-br-003,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"Brazil prohibits publication or republication of new synthetic content using a candidate's or public figure's image, voice, or manifestation from 72 hours before until 24 hours after voting ends, even if labelled.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,Time-window prohibition is distinct from the general disclosure requirement.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 54 |
-
clm-br-004,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"AI application providers may not rank, recommend, suggest, prioritise, endorse, or disfavor candidates, campaigns, parties, federations, or coalitions in automated responses.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,"A direct regulation of AI-system outputs, not only political advertising.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 55 |
-
clm-br-005,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,Platforms offering political-content boosting must provide a field for advertisers to declare AI use.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 56 |
-
clm-br-006,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"Internet application providers must prepare measurable election-compliance plans, and the TSE set 16 August 2026 as the submission deadline.",established_evidence,0.98,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-compliance-202607,,Future QA should archive submitted plans and assess measurable implementation.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 57 |
-
clm-br-007,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"By 11 August 2026, the TSE had announced platform partnerships, an AGU agreement, an information-integrity and AI monitoring council, and a voice-deepfake cooperation agreement with ElevenLabs.",established_evidence,0.98,src-br-tse-platforms-202607|src-br-tse-agu-20260803|src-br-tse-council-20260807|src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,,Institutional capacity indicators; effectiveness not yet established.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 58 |
-
clm-br-008,br-2026-election-preparedness,counterevidence,"Empirical research on Brazil's 2024 municipal elections found isolated AI misuse and broad campaign experimentation, but not the predicted wave of high-impact generative-AI manipulation.",established_evidence,0.88,src-br-aio-202411,,"A prior-cycle base rate, not a forecast for 2026.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 59 |
-
clm-br-009,br-2026-election-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before voting, and observed incidents must not be converted into predictions.",open_question,0.99,,,Dataset guardrail rather than an empirical outcome claim.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 60 |
-
clm-br-010,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,occurrence,A synthetic image-and-voice avatar of Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the 25 July 2026 launch of Flávio Bolsonaro's presidential campaign.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 61 |
-
clm-br-011,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,mechanism,The avatar explicitly disclosed that its image and voice were generated with AI and then delivered a political endorsement message.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,A labelled synthetic political persona; not a covert deepfake in the narrow sense.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 62 |
-
clm-br-012,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Opposing parties challenged the avatar in court, while Flávio Bolsonaro's lawyers argued that disclosure and the absence of mixed real footage made it lawful.",established_evidence,0.97,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Established that the competing claims were made; neither claim is treated as finally adjudicated.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 63 |
-
clm-br-013,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"As of 11 August 2026, the TSE had not finally resolved whether the avatar violated the electoral AI rules.",established_evidence,0.93,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Time-sensitive negative status; requires re-verification.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 64 |
-
clm-br-014,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,behavioural_effect,"No reviewed evidence measures whether the avatar changed voter beliefs, candidate preference, or turnout intention.",established_evidence,0.94,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"Update if campaign experiments, polling, or platform exposure data become available.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 65 |
-
clm-br-015,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,Federação Brasil da Esperança filed TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 on 26 July 2026 alleging premature propaganda and unlawful synthetic-media use.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,,The filing and allegations are established; the alleged violations are not.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 66 |
-
clm-br-016,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Art. 9-B requires disclosure, Art. 9-B §3 bars certain simulated interlocution with a candidate or real person, and Art. 9-C §1 bars synthetic audio or video used to favor or harm a candidacy even when authorised.",established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,,"The legal text is established; application to this disclosed, one-way convention avatar remains unresolved.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 67 |
-
clm-br-017,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The avatar's up-front AI disclosure supports compliance with the labelling duty but does not by itself resolve the separate simulated-interlocution or pro-candidacy synthetic-media prohibitions.,strong_inference,0.93,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,The defence argues that disclosure and lack of deception remove it from the deepfake prohibition; no merits court had accepted or rejected that reading by the cutoff.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 68 |
-
clm-br-018,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The 72-hour pre-election and 24-hour post-election blackout in Art. 9-B §3-A did not apply by timing to the 25 July convention.,established_evidence,0.99,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Other provisions may still apply; retain the blackout rule for prospective monitoring only.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 69 |
-
clm-br-019,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,attribution,Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers denied that he authorised or knew of the avatar's production; his personal authorisation therefore remains unknown rather than disproved.,established_evidence,0.95,src-br-ft-avatar-202607|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"A denial establishes the defence position, not the underlying absence of authorisation.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 70 |
-
clm-br-020,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,agency_transfer,"The disclosed avatar operated as a synthetic political surrogate, letting the beneficiary campaign deploy Jair Bolsonaro's recognisable persona and endorsement without his physical or verified public participation.",strong_inference,0.91,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-ft-avatar-202607,,Whether this legally circumvented a specific restriction depends partly on authorisation and future rulings.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 71 |
-
clm-us26-001,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,occurrence,The 2026 United States general election is scheduled for 3 November 2026.,established_evidence,0.99,src-us-fec-dates-2026,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 72 |
-
clm-us26-002,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,"As of 23 June 2026, 31 states had enacted laws regulating deepfakes in political messaging, with materially different prohibition and disclosure models.",established_evidence,0.98,src-us-ncsl-20260623,,"Enactment, effective date, scope, and litigation status should be tracked separately.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 73 |
-
clm-us26-003,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,The United States lacks a broad federal rule uniformly governing AI-generated political messages across the 2026 election.,established_evidence,0.95,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024|src-us-ncsl-20260623|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,"Narrow federal rules remain relevant, especially telecom law and fraudulent misrepresentation.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 74 |
-
clm-us26-004,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,ai_role,CISA assessed generative AI as more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new risk categories.,established_evidence,0.98,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,,Prior-cycle risk assessment used as a conceptual baseline.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 75 |
-
clm-us26-005,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,attribution,"Prior U.S. intelligence assessments establish that foreign actors used synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle, supporting a monitored 2026 risk but not proving a new 2026 operation.",established_evidence,0.94,src-us-odni-update-20241021,,Strict temporal separation between prior evidence and current incidents.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 76 |
-
clm-us26-006,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,counterevidence,A platform assessment of the 2024 global cycle reported that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on Meta services.,established_evidence,0.82,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,,Interested-party assessment reported by Reuters; not generalisable to every platform or 2026.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 77 |
-
clm-us26-007,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before the election, and prior-cycle incident counts do not supply a forecast.",open_question,0.99,,,Dataset guardrail.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 78 |
-
clm-us26-008,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,occurrence,"On 11 March 2026, the National Republican Senatorial Committee released an AI-generated video depicting James Talarico reciting text from prior social-media posts.",established_evidence,0.99,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,The source quotes the committee defending the ad.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 79 |
-
clm-us26-009,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"The Talarico ad carried an AI-generated disclosure in small, easy-to-miss text.",established_evidence,0.98,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,Disclosure existence and disclosure salience are distinct variables.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 80 |
-
clm-us26-010,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"Public reporting identified at least three recent national-Republican synthetic ads by March 2026, but did not provide comparable impression or targeting data.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Content count is not audience reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 81 |
-
clm-us26-011,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Additional 2026 election ads fabricated audiovisual speech or conduct by Jon Ossoff, John Cornyn, and Ken Paxton, with varying levels of obviousness and disclosure.",established_evidence,0.96,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Record separate items in a later content-level expansion rather than treating them as identical.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 82 |
-
clm-us26-012,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,behavioural_effect,"The reviewed reporting does not measure whether any named 2026 synthetic ad changed candidate evaluations, turnout intention, or vote choice.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,General deepfake experiments cannot substitute for item-specific field effects.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 83 |
-
clm-us26-013,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,counterevidence,"Some 2026 campaign-generated videos reproduce genuine prior words, are labelled, or use obvious satire, complicating a binary real-versus-deceptive classification.",established_evidence,0.95,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,"Motivates content-level coding for quotation fidelity, disclosure, realism, authorisation, and context.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 84 |
-
clm-us26-014,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Much of the Talarico attack used genuine older posts, but the synthetic first-person performance added reaction lines and affect not contained in those quoted posts.",established_evidence,0.97,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Do not describe every spoken proposition as fabricated; separate authentic underlying text from invented performance and asides.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 85 |
-
clm-us26-015,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"A platform snapshot on 11 August 2026 displayed roughly 3,700 YouTube views for the NRSC upload, while cross-platform impressions and unique exposure remained unavailable.",established_evidence,0.88,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,,"Dynamic, non-unique, one-platform metric; must be rechecked and never combined with earned-media readership as unique exposure.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 86 |
-
clm-us26-016,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,agency_transfer,"By making an opponent appear to speak and react on camera, the sponsor controlled not only message selection but the target's simulated voice, face, timing, and affect.",strong_inference,0.94,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,The genuine underlying posts constrain how much substantive policy content was invented.,verified,2026-08-11
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| 1 |
+
claim_id,case_id,claim_type,claim_text,evidence_label,confidence,coder_confidence_in_label,claim_status,evidence_strength,source_ids,counter_source_ids,notes,review_status,verified_at
|
| 2 |
+
clm-ro-001,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,institutional_outcome,"On 6 December 2024, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-ro-ccr-20241206|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,,The institutional act is certain even where its factual and legal justification is debated.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 3 |
+
clm-ro-002,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,mechanism,The official record described opaque and coordinated online promotion that created unequal campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.9,0.9,supported,high,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Established as a feature of the official and independent record; specific sponsors and all network components remain unresolved.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 4 |
+
clm-ro-003,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,response,"The European Commission opened formal DSA proceedings against TikTok concerning election-risk management, recommender systems, political advertising, and coordinated inauthentic manipulation.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,,Opening proceedings is not a final infringement finding.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 5 |
+
clm-ro-004,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,ai_role,Generative AI has not been established as a material driver of the Romanian annulment case.,strong_inference,0.88,0.88,partly_supported,moderate,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-ifes-202412,,"The central digital mechanism is amplification, coordination, and opaque promotion rather than confirmed synthetic media.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 6 |
+
clm-ro-005,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok reported large-scale prevention of fake engagement and removal of election-related networks, but these platform metrics do not measure voter exposure to the specific campaign.",established_evidence,0.84,0.84,supported,moderate,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,,"Platform self-report; preserve distinction between prevented actions, removed accounts, impressions, and people reached.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 7 |
+
clm-ro-006,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,electoral_effect,No source in the reviewed record provides a credible causal estimate of votes changed by the coordinated digital campaign.,established_evidence,0.92,0.92,supported,high,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Absence claim limited to reviewed evidence; update if individual-level or quasi-experimental research appears.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 8 |
+
clm-ro-007,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,attribution,A simple claim that Russia alone directed the entire campaign is stronger than the presently coded public evidence supports.,strong_inference,0.82,0.82,partly_supported,moderate,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"Code official allegations, technical indicators, domestic financing, and final attribution separately.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 9 |
+
clm-ro-008,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,legal_status,"The Venice Commission treated annulment as an exceptional measure requiring clear legal conditions, reliable evidence, procedural safeguards, and proportionality.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-ro-venice-202503,,"Normative legal standard, not a factual finding about every Romanian allegation.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 10 |
+
clm-ro-009,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,Romania held a repeat presidential election on 4 and 18 May 2025.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 11 |
+
clm-ro-010,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,The repeat-election outcome cannot be used as a causal measure of what the annulled 2024 result would have been absent manipulation.,strong_inference,0.94,0.94,partly_supported,moderate,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|src-ro-venice-202503,,"The electorate, candidates, campaign, information environment, and institutional context changed.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 12 |
+
clm-ro-011,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,occurrence,"A declassified SRI report described an initial network of about 25,000 TikTok accounts activated intensely in the final two weeks before the first round, including 797 accounts created in 2016 that had remained largely inactive until 11 November 2024.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,Established as an intelligence-service report. The account count is not independently audited unique reach and does not establish the operator or voter effect.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 13 |
+
clm-ro-012,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok's separately disclosed Turkey-based network and the SRI-reported 25,000-account network have different scopes and cannot be summed as one operation or one audience estimate.",established_evidence,0.94,0.94,supported,high,src-ro-tiktok-integrity|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,"This is a source-scope correction, not an assertion that the networks were unrelated in every respect.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 14 |
+
clm-ro-013,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,counterevidence,"Snoop reported that PNL financed the #EchilibrușiVerticalitate influencer campaign, while the contracted firm said its original brief had been altered, diverted, or cloned in Georgescu's favour.",established_evidence,0.9,0.9,supported,high,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"The reporting is counterevidence to a one-actor account of all amplification. It does not establish that PNL intended to support Georgescu, nor does it disprove separate foreign-linked activity.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 15 |
+
clm-ro-014,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,"DFRLab identified at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok accounts active from December 2024 through 6 June 2025 that first supported Călin Georgescu and later George Simion while attacking Moldova, France, and the EU.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,Established as a transparent public-data research finding; platform access thresholds may leave additional accounts unobserved.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 16 |
+
clm-ro-015,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,reach,"The studied network produced 8,514 posts and accumulated at least 16 million views and 681,000 likes across the three platforms.",established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"These are non-unique platform metrics, not authenticated Romanian voters, belief, or persuasion.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 17 |
+
clm-ro-016,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ai_role,"The network used generative-AI profile images and descriptions, synthetic Romanian personas, and DreamFace or D-ID-style avatars alongside hijacked accounts and conventional stock footage.",established_evidence,0.91,0.91,supported,high,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"AI was one component of a broader cross-platform coordination system, not a complete explanation for its reach.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 18 |
+
clm-ro-017,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,attribution,The network's operator and sponsor remain publicly unidentified; pro-Russia narratives and coordinated behaviour do not by themselves establish Russian-state command.,open_question,0.97,0.97,unresolved,none,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"Confidence refers to the appropriately unresolved wording, not confidence that no attribution will ever be possible.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 19 |
+
clm-ro-018,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence estimates whether the cross-platform network changed belief, turnout, candidate preference, or the repeat-election result.",open_question,0.98,0.98,unresolved,none,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,Views and likes do not identify a causal effect; the result being upheld does not negate occurrence of the network.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 20 |
+
clm-md-001,md-2024-presidential-referendum,occurrence,Moldova held the first presidential round and EU constitutional referendum on 20 October 2024 and the presidential runoff on 3 November 2024.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 21 |
+
clm-md-002,md-2024-presidential-referendum,institutional_outcome,The EU constitutional amendment was approved by a narrow final majority and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The dataset does not infer that interference explains the margin.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 22 |
+
clm-md-003,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,International observers documented active disinformation and serious concerns about illicit foreign interference affecting campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,"Observation finding about campaign environment, not a quantified electoral effect.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 23 |
+
clm-md-004,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Moldovan police alleged that the Shor-linked network transferred tens of millions of dollars to influence voters.,established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,,Established as a police allegation reported by Reuters; underlying transfers and intent require their own evidentiary assessment.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 24 |
+
clm-md-005,md-2024-presidential-referendum,attribution,"Authorities and international institutions attributed major components of the operation to Russia-linked and Shor-linked actors, while Russia and Shor denied wrongdoing.",established_evidence,0.9,0.9,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-eeas-activity-2025,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Wording preserves attribution as an official assessment and the denials as counterposition.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 25 |
+
clm-md-006,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ai_role,"AI-generated impersonation and synthetic content appeared in Moldova's information environment, but the wider interference operation relied heavily on non-AI mechanisms.",established_evidence,0.91,0.91,supported,high,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Avoids treating illicit finance, bots, and coordinated networks as synonymous with generative AI.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 26 |
+
clm-md-007,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Meta reported removing a coordinated inauthentic network targeting Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Platform self-report; independent replication is limited and gross follower counts largely reflected non-Moldovan or fake engagement.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 27 |
+
clm-md-008,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"The ODIHR-cited figure of more than 138,000 accounts and transactions across linked investigations is an enforcement indicator, not a count of recipients, exposed people, persuaded voters, or unique accounts.",established_evidence,0.91,0.91,supported,high,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The denominator combines accounts and transactions and may contain repeated entities; do not convert it into people or voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 28 |
+
clm-md-009,md-2024-presidential-referendum,behavioural_effect,"Documented payment systems provide evidence of attempted and in some cases accepted inducement, but do not establish how each recipient voted.",strong_inference,0.9,0.9,partly_supported,moderate,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Acceptance of a payment is not identical to compliance with an instruction.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 29 |
+
clm-md-010,md-2024-presidential-referendum,electoral_effect,No reviewed source provides a credible causal estimate of how many referendum or presidential votes were changed by the influence operation.,established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The narrow margin increases importance but does not supply causal identification.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 30 |
+
clm-md-011,md-2024-presidential-referendum,counterevidence,"Observers also found incumbent advantage, insufficient safeguards against misuse of administrative resources, and media imbalances.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Prevents the foreign-interference frame from obscuring domestic electoral-integrity problems.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 31 |
+
clm-md-012,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"The 2025 parliamentary-election observation record described inauthentic account networks, troll farms, automated bots, AI videos, disinformation, and foreign-funded vote-buying infrastructure.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,Evidence concerns a linked later election and is not silently back-projected into every 2024 event.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 32 |
+
clm-md-013,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,The persistence of a network across elections does not establish that AI-generated content or bots determined the 2025 outcome.,strong_inference,0.94,0.94,partly_supported,moderate,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 33 |
+
clm-md-014,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"Meta reported about 4,200 Facebook Page followers and 335,000 Instagram followers for the removed Moldova-focused network, but said the vast majority were outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; it assessed that the operation had not built an authentic audience before disruption.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Established as platform telemetry and assessment. Gross followers must not be reported as Moldovan voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 34 |
+
clm-md-015,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,occurrence,"DFRLab analysed 253 inauthentic accounts in a paid InfoLeaders network linked through undercover reporting to Telegram-based recruitment, training, task assignment, and mutual amplification.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The platform sample and the wider number of recruited people are different denominators.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 35 |
+
clm-md-016,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,reach,"The 253-account InfoLeaders sample produced 28,708 posts, 55,367,950 views, 2,207,894 likes, 295,608 shares, and 239,016 comments across TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram.",established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"Platform totals are non-unique, can include repeat or inauthentic engagement, and do not measure belief or votes.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 36 |
+
clm-md-017,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"Curators required local-looking participants to personalise centrally supplied messages while retaining assigned hashtags and to amplify one another, making paid coordination appear to be spontaneous peer speech.",established_evidence,0.92,0.92,supported,high,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"AI-assisted rephrasing was an enabling layer within a paid human and bot-coordinated system, not the sole mechanism.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 37 |
+
clm-md-018,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,attribution,"The InfoLeaders network had strong operational links to Shor-affiliated or Moscow-linked structures, but the public record does not independently establish direct Kremlin command of every account or asset.",strong_inference,0.88,0.88,partly_supported,moderate,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Beneficiary, operational affiliate, funder, state-aligned ecosystem, and direct command are kept separate.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 38 |
+
clm-md-019,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence provides a causal estimate of belief, turnout, votes, seats, or the 2025 result attributable to the InfoLeaders network, synthetic media, or automated accounts.",open_question,0.98,0.98,unresolved,none,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"The election result and institutional validation do not erase documented interference, but neither identifies a numeric effect.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 39 |
+
clm-nh-001,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,occurrence,An AI-generated voice impersonating President Joe Biden was used in robocalls before the New Hampshire presidential primary.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 40 |
+
clm-nh-002,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,The call told recipients to save their vote for November rather than participate in the primary.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,,The content has a demobilising instruction; criminal intent and legal guilt are separate questions.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 41 |
+
clm-nh-003,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,attribution,Steve Kramer admitted commissioning the AI-generated robocall.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,Admission to creation does not equal conviction on the state charges.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 42 |
+
clm-nh-004,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,reach,"Voice Broadcasting initiated 9,581 call attempts, and Lingo records showed 3,978 completed calls bearing A-level attestations.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,"Calls are not equivalent to unique people reached, completed calls, or listeners.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 43 |
+
clm-nh-005,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,Caller-ID spoofing and inaccurate attestation in the telecom chain increased the call's apparent authenticity and deliverability.,established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523|src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,,"Shows that the case is an infrastructure chain, not merely a generated audio file.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 44 |
+
clm-nh-006,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,The FCC ruled that AI-generated voices fall within the TCPA's restriction on artificial or prerecorded voices.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 45 |
+
clm-nh-007,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"The FCC issued a $6 million forfeiture against Kramer, while Lingo agreed separately to a $1 million civil penalty and compliance plan.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,Separate creator and provider actions.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 46 |
+
clm-nh-008,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,A New Hampshire jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges in June 2025.,established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,,The acquittal must appear wherever the charging decision is discussed.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 47 |
+
clm-nh-009,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,behavioural_effect,No reviewed evidence measures how many recipients believed or acted on the robocall.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,"Update if survey, turnout linkage, or experimental evidence specific to recipients becomes available.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 48 |
+
clm-nh-010,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,electoral_effect,No credible causal estimate links the robocall to primary turnout or vote totals.,established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 49 |
+
clm-nh-011,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"In November 2025, a federal court entered default judgment against Kramer, awarded individual monetary relief, and permanently enjoined similar voter-coercion schemes.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,,"The judgment followed nonappearance and must be described as a default, not a contested merits trial.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 50 |
+
clm-nh-012,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,agency_transfer,"The cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed trusted in-state number transferred control over apparent authorship and relevance of a participation instruction to the operator.",strong_inference,0.9,0.9,partly_supported,moderate,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,The mechanism is strongly supported; its effect on any individual recipient is unmeasured.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 51 |
+
clm-br-001,br-2026-election-preparedness,occurrence,"Brazil's 2026 general election first round is scheduled for 4 October, with a possible runoff on 25 October.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,,"Prospective date, not an observed election result.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 52 |
+
clm-br-002,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"TSE rules require explicit, prominent, accessible disclosure of synthetic multimedia used in electoral advertising and identification of the technology used.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,,Resolution 23.755 amends the standing electoral-advertising rule.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 53 |
+
clm-br-003,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"Brazil prohibits publication or republication of new synthetic content using a candidate's or public figure's image, voice, or manifestation from 72 hours before until 24 hours after voting ends, even if labelled.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,Time-window prohibition is distinct from the general disclosure requirement.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 54 |
+
clm-br-004,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"AI application providers may not rank, recommend, suggest, prioritise, endorse, or disfavor candidates, campaigns, parties, federations, or coalitions in automated responses.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,"A direct regulation of AI-system outputs, not only political advertising.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 55 |
+
clm-br-005,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,Platforms offering political-content boosting must provide a field for advertisers to declare AI use.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 56 |
+
clm-br-006,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"Internet application providers must prepare measurable election-compliance plans, and the TSE set 16 August 2026 as the submission deadline.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-compliance-202607,,Future QA should archive submitted plans and assess measurable implementation.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 57 |
+
clm-br-007,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"By 11 August 2026, the TSE had announced platform partnerships, an AGU agreement, an information-integrity and AI monitoring council, and a voice-deepfake cooperation agreement with ElevenLabs.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-br-tse-platforms-202607|src-br-tse-agu-20260803|src-br-tse-council-20260807|src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,,Institutional capacity indicators; effectiveness not yet established.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 58 |
+
clm-br-008,br-2026-election-preparedness,counterevidence,"Empirical research on Brazil's 2024 municipal elections found isolated AI misuse and broad campaign experimentation, but not the predicted wave of high-impact generative-AI manipulation.",established_evidence,0.88,0.88,supported,moderate,src-br-aio-202411,,"A prior-cycle base rate, not a forecast for 2026.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 59 |
+
clm-br-009,br-2026-election-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before voting, and observed incidents must not be converted into predictions.",open_question,0.99,0.99,unresolved,none,,,Dataset guardrail rather than an empirical outcome claim.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 60 |
+
clm-br-010,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,occurrence,A synthetic image-and-voice avatar of Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the 25 July 2026 launch of Flávio Bolsonaro's presidential campaign.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 61 |
+
clm-br-011,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,mechanism,The avatar explicitly disclosed that its image and voice were generated with AI and then delivered a political endorsement message.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,A labelled synthetic political persona; not a covert deepfake in the narrow sense.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 62 |
+
clm-br-012,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Opposing parties challenged the avatar in court, while Flávio Bolsonaro's lawyers argued that disclosure and the absence of mixed real footage made it lawful.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Established that the competing claims were made; neither claim is treated as finally adjudicated.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 63 |
+
clm-br-013,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"As of 11 August 2026, the TSE had not finally resolved whether the avatar violated the electoral AI rules.",established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Time-sensitive negative status; requires re-verification.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 64 |
+
clm-br-014,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,behavioural_effect,"No reviewed evidence measures whether the avatar changed voter beliefs, candidate preference, or turnout intention.",established_evidence,0.94,0.94,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"Update if campaign experiments, polling, or platform exposure data become available.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 65 |
+
clm-br-015,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,Federação Brasil da Esperança filed TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 on 26 July 2026 alleging premature propaganda and unlawful synthetic-media use.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,,The filing and allegations are established; the alleged violations are not.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 66 |
+
clm-br-016,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Art. 9-B requires disclosure, Art. 9-B §3 bars certain simulated interlocution with a candidate or real person, and Art. 9-C §1 bars synthetic audio or video used to favor or harm a candidacy even when authorised.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,,"The legal text is established; application to this disclosed, one-way convention avatar remains unresolved.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 67 |
+
clm-br-017,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The avatar's up-front AI disclosure supports compliance with the labelling duty but does not by itself resolve the separate simulated-interlocution or pro-candidacy synthetic-media prohibitions.,strong_inference,0.93,0.93,partly_supported,moderate,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,The defence argues that disclosure and lack of deception remove it from the deepfake prohibition; no merits court had accepted or rejected that reading by the cutoff.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 68 |
+
clm-br-018,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The 72-hour pre-election and 24-hour post-election blackout in Art. 9-B §3-A did not apply by timing to the 25 July convention.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Other provisions may still apply; retain the blackout rule for prospective monitoring only.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 69 |
+
clm-br-019,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,attribution,Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers denied that he authorised or knew of the avatar's production; his personal authorisation therefore remains unknown rather than disproved.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-br-ft-avatar-202607|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"A denial establishes the defence position, not the underlying absence of authorisation.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 70 |
+
clm-br-020,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,agency_transfer,"The disclosed avatar operated as a synthetic political surrogate, letting the beneficiary campaign deploy Jair Bolsonaro's recognisable persona and endorsement without his physical or verified public participation.",strong_inference,0.91,0.91,partly_supported,moderate,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-ft-avatar-202607,,Whether this legally circumvented a specific restriction depends partly on authorisation and future rulings.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 71 |
+
clm-us26-001,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,occurrence,The 2026 United States general election is scheduled for 3 November 2026.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fec-dates-2026,,,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 72 |
+
clm-us26-002,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,"As of 23 June 2026, 31 states had enacted laws regulating deepfakes in political messaging, with materially different prohibition and disclosure models.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-ncsl-20260623,,"Enactment, effective date, scope, and litigation status should be tracked separately.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 73 |
+
clm-us26-003,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,The United States lacks a broad federal rule uniformly governing AI-generated political messages across the 2026 election.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024|src-us-ncsl-20260623|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,"Narrow federal rules remain relevant, especially telecom law and fraudulent misrepresentation.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 74 |
+
clm-us26-004,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,ai_role,CISA assessed generative AI as more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new risk categories.,established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,,Prior-cycle risk assessment used as a conceptual baseline.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 75 |
+
clm-us26-005,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,attribution,"Prior U.S. intelligence assessments establish that foreign actors used synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle, supporting a monitored 2026 risk but not proving a new 2026 operation.",established_evidence,0.94,0.94,supported,high,src-us-odni-update-20241021,,Strict temporal separation between prior evidence and current incidents.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 76 |
+
clm-us26-006,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,counterevidence,A platform assessment of the 2024 global cycle reported that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on Meta services.,established_evidence,0.82,0.82,supported,moderate,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,,Interested-party assessment reported by Reuters; not generalisable to every platform or 2026.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 77 |
+
clm-us26-007,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before the election, and prior-cycle incident counts do not supply a forecast.",open_question,0.99,0.99,unresolved,none,,,Dataset guardrail.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 78 |
+
clm-us26-008,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,occurrence,"On 11 March 2026, the National Republican Senatorial Committee released an AI-generated video depicting James Talarico reciting text from prior social-media posts.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,The source quotes the committee defending the ad.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 79 |
+
clm-us26-009,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"The Talarico ad carried an AI-generated disclosure in small, easy-to-miss text.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,Disclosure existence and disclosure salience are distinct variables.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 80 |
+
clm-us26-010,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"Public reporting identified at least three recent national-Republican synthetic ads by March 2026, but did not provide comparable impression or targeting data.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Content count is not audience reach.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 81 |
+
clm-us26-011,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Additional 2026 election ads fabricated audiovisual speech or conduct by Jon Ossoff, John Cornyn, and Ken Paxton, with varying levels of obviousness and disclosure.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Record separate items in a later content-level expansion rather than treating them as identical.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 82 |
+
clm-us26-012,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,behavioural_effect,"The reviewed reporting does not measure whether any named 2026 synthetic ad changed candidate evaluations, turnout intention, or vote choice.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,General deepfake experiments cannot substitute for item-specific field effects.,needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 83 |
+
clm-us26-013,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,counterevidence,"Some 2026 campaign-generated videos reproduce genuine prior words, are labelled, or use obvious satire, complicating a binary real-versus-deceptive classification.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,"Motivates content-level coding for quotation fidelity, disclosure, realism, authorisation, and context.",verified,2026-08-11
|
| 84 |
+
clm-us26-014,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Much of the Talarico attack used genuine older posts, but the synthetic first-person performance added reaction lines and affect not contained in those quoted posts.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Do not describe every spoken proposition as fabricated; separate authentic underlying text from invented performance and asides.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 85 |
+
clm-us26-015,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"A platform snapshot on 11 August 2026 displayed roughly 3,700 YouTube views for the NRSC upload, while cross-platform impressions and unique exposure remained unavailable.",established_evidence,0.88,0.88,supported,moderate,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,,"Dynamic, non-unique, one-platform metric; must be rechecked and never combined with earned-media readership as unique exposure.",needs_update,2026-08-11
|
| 86 |
+
clm-us26-016,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,agency_transfer,"By making an opponent appear to speak and react on camera, the sponsor controlled not only message selection but the target's simulated voice, face, timing, and affect.",strong_inference,0.94,0.94,partly_supported,moderate,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,The genuine underlying posts constrain how much substantive policy content was invented.,verified,2026-08-11
|
| 87 |
+
clm-usca11-001,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,occurrence,Scott Wiener for Congress launched the ConnieChan.ai interactive attack-ad chatbot on 3 August 2026 and removed it on 7 August after public criticism.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"SFGATE described a Monday launch; Mission Local gives 3 August. Some later summaries use 4 August, the first reporting date.",verified,2026-08-12
|
| 88 |
+
clm-usca11-002,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,attribution,"The Wiener campaign admitted commissioning, paying for, promoting, and controlling the chatbot; the technical builder was not publicly identified.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,,"Anthropic supplied a model but is not attributed as campaign designer, approver, or operator.",verified,2026-08-12
|
| 89 |
+
clm-usca11-003,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ai_role,"The campaign said the chatbot used Anthropic's Claude model family to generate interactive responses; the exact version, deployment route, prompt, retrieval system, and guardrails remain unknown.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Product family is known; technical configuration is not.,verified,2026-08-12
|
| 90 |
+
clm-usca11-004,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,mechanism,The system answered in Connie Chan's first person and dynamically redirected questions toward campaign-selected portrayals of her record.,established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Interactive opponent simulation differs from a static synthetic ad because user questions affect the generated response.,verified,2026-08-12
|
| 91 |
+
clm-usca11-005,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,counterevidence,"The site visibly framed itself as AI and parody, said it was not affiliated with or endorsed by Chan, and disclosed that it was paid for by the Wiener campaign.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,,"Transparent parody weakens a covert-deception theory but does not remove questions about synthetic first-person representation, bias, or data control.",verified,2026-08-12
|
| 92 |
+
clm-usca11-006,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,reach,"The campaign reported that the chatbot received 5,058 submitted questions during its first 27 hours.",established_as_campaign_report,0.78,0.78,supported_as_attributed_measurement,moderate,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"Campaign-reported measure. It is not unique users, conversations, voters, district residents, impressions, beliefs, or votes; repeated or adversarial prompts may inflate it.",verified,2026-08-12
|
| 93 |
+
clm-usca11-007,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,mechanism,"The privacy policy said conversations could be retained for 90 days and reviewed by a small number of authorised staff to fix bugs, understand queries, and improve campaign content.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,,"The data warning was in the privacy policy, not prominently repeated in the main chat interface according to the reporting.",verified,2026-08-12
|
| 94 |
+
clm-usca11-008,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,response,"On 7 August the campaign removed the chatbot, announced removal of the two billboards, said the experiment had missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"Campaign self-termination is a response, not an institutional or legal finding.",verified,2026-08-12
|
| 95 |
+
clm-usca11-009,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,behavioural_effect,"No reviewed evidence measures whether interaction with the chatbot changed candidate evaluation, trust, issue salience, turnout intention, or vote choice.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,This is an evidence-availability claim scoped to the reviewed public record.,verified,2026-08-12
|
| 96 |
+
clm-usca11-010,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,electoral_effect,"The election had not occurred by the cutoff, and no electoral effect can be inferred from question counts, press attention, criticism, or campaign withdrawal.",open_question,0.99,0.99,unresolved,none,,,Prospective guardrail.,verified,2026-08-12
|
| 97 |
+
clm-usca11-011,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,agency_transfer,"The campaign-controlled prompt, sources, guardrails, interface, and logs let the sponsor decide how an opponent appeared to answer user questions, shifting representational and evidentiary control from the candidate and voter verification toward the campaign and its provider stack.",strong_inference,0.93,0.93,partly_supported,moderate,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Analytical synthesis. Disclosure and parody are mitigating conditions; behavioural and electoral effects remain unknown.,verified,2026-08-12
|
data/content_items.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
| 1 |
+
content_item_id,case_id,title,media_type,represented_person,communication_goal,representation_mode,ai_disclosure,authorization_status,disclosure_salience,presentation_mode,source_claim_ids,notes
|
| 2 |
+
item-nh-biden-call,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,AI-cloned Biden robocall,audio,Joe Biden,voter_participation_instruction,false_authentic_voice,no,unauthorised_or_not_affiliated,not_disclosed_in_call,deceptive_impersonation,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-005,"The call combined voice clone, targeted list, spoofed caller ID and telecom delivery."
|
| 3 |
+
item-br-bolsonaro-avatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Jair Bolsonaro campaign-launch avatar,audiovisual_avatar,Jair Bolsonaro,political_endorsement,synthetic_surrogate,yes,unknown,explicit,transparent_synthetic_endorsement,clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-019,Disclosure is established; authorisation and legal status remained unresolved at the cutoff.
|
| 4 |
+
item-us26-talarico,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,NRSC James Talarico synthetic performance,video,James Talarico,candidate_attack,fabricated_first_person_performance_using_real_posts,yes_small_text,unauthorised_or_not_affiliated,low_salience,mixed_quotation_and_fabrication,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-015,"Quoted posts were genuine; reaction lines, affect and first-person performance were synthetic."
|
| 5 |
+
item-usca11-chatbot,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ConnieChan.ai interactive parody,interactive_text_chatbot,Connie Chan,candidate_attack_and_issue_framing,first_person_dynamic_opponent_simulation,yes,not_affiliated_or_endorsed,explicit_site_and_footer,transparent_satirical_simulation,clm-usca11-001|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-007,User prompts dynamically affected outputs; private campaign configuration and logs were not available for audit.
|
data/coverage_summary.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|
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|
| 1 |
+
region,included_case_count,candidate_count,model_evaluation_count,coverage_note
|
| 2 |
+
Europe,4,14,3,Strongest current core coverage; still purposive and concentrated in Romania/Moldova.
|
| 3 |
+
North America,4,9,3,"One adjudicated 2024 robocall, two 2026 campaign records, and several model audits; no prevalence frame."
|
| 4 |
+
South America,2,9,0,Brazil core is mainly preparedness/current use; completed Colombia/Ecuador leads remain to be disaggregated.
|
| 5 |
+
Asia,0,10,0,Screening leads exist but no claim-coded core case yet.
|
| 6 |
+
Africa,0,4,0,Screening leads exist but no claim-coded core case yet.
|
| 7 |
+
Oceania,0,1,0,One knowledge-poisoning lead; no claim-coded core case yet.
|
| 8 |
+
Cross-national,0,0,1,Empirical studies span jurisdictions; not incident counts.
|
data/datapackage.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,2107 @@
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|
|
| 1 |
+
{
|
| 2 |
+
"profile": "tabular-data-package",
|
| 3 |
+
"name": "agency-transfer-election-cases",
|
| 4 |
+
"title": "AI, Elections and Agency Transfer Evidence Index",
|
| 5 |
+
"version": "0.3.0",
|
| 6 |
+
"description": "Purposive, claim-level research corpus with normalized pathways, observations, empirical model studies, screening records and official electoral context. Not a global prevalence sample.",
|
| 7 |
+
"licenses": [
|
| 8 |
+
{
|
| 9 |
+
"name": "CC-BY-4.0",
|
| 10 |
+
"path": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
|
| 11 |
+
}
|
| 12 |
+
],
|
| 13 |
+
"resources": [
|
| 14 |
+
{
|
| 15 |
+
"name": "cases",
|
| 16 |
+
"path": "cases.csv",
|
| 17 |
+
"profile": "tabular-data-resource",
|
| 18 |
+
"format": "csv",
|
| 19 |
+
"mediatype": "text/csv",
|
| 20 |
+
"schema": {
|
| 21 |
+
"fields": [
|
| 22 |
+
{
|
| 23 |
+
"name": "case_id",
|
| 24 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 25 |
+
},
|
| 26 |
+
{
|
| 27 |
+
"name": "case_family_id",
|
| 28 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 29 |
+
},
|
| 30 |
+
{
|
| 31 |
+
"name": "title",
|
| 32 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 33 |
+
},
|
| 34 |
+
{
|
| 35 |
+
"name": "country",
|
| 36 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 37 |
+
},
|
| 38 |
+
{
|
| 39 |
+
"name": "iso3",
|
| 40 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 41 |
+
},
|
| 42 |
+
{
|
| 43 |
+
"name": "region",
|
| 44 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 45 |
+
},
|
| 46 |
+
{
|
| 47 |
+
"name": "election_name",
|
| 48 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 49 |
+
},
|
| 50 |
+
{
|
| 51 |
+
"name": "election_type",
|
| 52 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 53 |
+
},
|
| 54 |
+
{
|
| 55 |
+
"name": "election_date_start",
|
| 56 |
+
"type": "date"
|
| 57 |
+
},
|
| 58 |
+
{
|
| 59 |
+
"name": "election_date_end",
|
| 60 |
+
"type": "date"
|
| 61 |
+
},
|
| 62 |
+
{
|
| 63 |
+
"name": "case_status",
|
| 64 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 65 |
+
},
|
| 66 |
+
{
|
| 67 |
+
"name": "as_of_date",
|
| 68 |
+
"type": "date"
|
| 69 |
+
},
|
| 70 |
+
{
|
| 71 |
+
"name": "anchor_case",
|
| 72 |
+
"type": "boolean",
|
| 73 |
+
"trueValues": [
|
| 74 |
+
"true"
|
| 75 |
+
],
|
| 76 |
+
"falseValues": [
|
| 77 |
+
"false"
|
| 78 |
+
]
|
| 79 |
+
},
|
| 80 |
+
{
|
| 81 |
+
"name": "record_type",
|
| 82 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 83 |
+
},
|
| 84 |
+
{
|
| 85 |
+
"name": "manipulation_assessment",
|
| 86 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 87 |
+
},
|
| 88 |
+
{
|
| 89 |
+
"name": "summary",
|
| 90 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 91 |
+
},
|
| 92 |
+
{
|
| 93 |
+
"name": "actor_controlling_system",
|
| 94 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 95 |
+
},
|
| 96 |
+
{
|
| 97 |
+
"name": "actor_type",
|
| 98 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 99 |
+
},
|
| 100 |
+
{
|
| 101 |
+
"name": "actor_attribution_status",
|
| 102 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 103 |
+
},
|
| 104 |
+
{
|
| 105 |
+
"name": "target_population",
|
| 106 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 107 |
+
},
|
| 108 |
+
{
|
| 109 |
+
"name": "influence_vector",
|
| 110 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 111 |
+
},
|
| 112 |
+
{
|
| 113 |
+
"name": "platforms",
|
| 114 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 115 |
+
},
|
| 116 |
+
{
|
| 117 |
+
"name": "mechanism_class",
|
| 118 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 119 |
+
},
|
| 120 |
+
{
|
| 121 |
+
"name": "ai_role",
|
| 122 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 123 |
+
},
|
| 124 |
+
{
|
| 125 |
+
"name": "generative_ai_status",
|
| 126 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 127 |
+
},
|
| 128 |
+
{
|
| 129 |
+
"name": "affected_state",
|
| 130 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 131 |
+
},
|
| 132 |
+
{
|
| 133 |
+
"name": "agency_transfer_path",
|
| 134 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 135 |
+
},
|
| 136 |
+
{
|
| 137 |
+
"name": "power_concentrated_in",
|
| 138 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 139 |
+
},
|
| 140 |
+
{
|
| 141 |
+
"name": "democratic_harm",
|
| 142 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 143 |
+
},
|
| 144 |
+
{
|
| 145 |
+
"name": "occurrence_status",
|
| 146 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 147 |
+
},
|
| 148 |
+
{
|
| 149 |
+
"name": "reach_status",
|
| 150 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 151 |
+
},
|
| 152 |
+
{
|
| 153 |
+
"name": "reach_estimate",
|
| 154 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 155 |
+
},
|
| 156 |
+
{
|
| 157 |
+
"name": "reach_unit",
|
| 158 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 159 |
+
},
|
| 160 |
+
{
|
| 161 |
+
"name": "behavioural_effect_status",
|
| 162 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 163 |
+
},
|
| 164 |
+
{
|
| 165 |
+
"name": "electoral_effect_status",
|
| 166 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 167 |
+
},
|
| 168 |
+
{
|
| 169 |
+
"name": "institutional_outcome",
|
| 170 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 171 |
+
},
|
| 172 |
+
{
|
| 173 |
+
"name": "response",
|
| 174 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 175 |
+
},
|
| 176 |
+
{
|
| 177 |
+
"name": "inclusion_tier",
|
| 178 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 179 |
+
},
|
| 180 |
+
{
|
| 181 |
+
"name": "overall_confidence",
|
| 182 |
+
"type": "number"
|
| 183 |
+
},
|
| 184 |
+
{
|
| 185 |
+
"name": "counterevidence",
|
| 186 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 187 |
+
},
|
| 188 |
+
{
|
| 189 |
+
"name": "open_questions",
|
| 190 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 191 |
+
},
|
| 192 |
+
{
|
| 193 |
+
"name": "last_verified",
|
| 194 |
+
"type": "date"
|
| 195 |
+
}
|
| 196 |
+
],
|
| 197 |
+
"primaryKey": "case_id"
|
| 198 |
+
}
|
| 199 |
+
},
|
| 200 |
+
{
|
| 201 |
+
"name": "claims",
|
| 202 |
+
"path": "claims.csv",
|
| 203 |
+
"profile": "tabular-data-resource",
|
| 204 |
+
"format": "csv",
|
| 205 |
+
"mediatype": "text/csv",
|
| 206 |
+
"schema": {
|
| 207 |
+
"fields": [
|
| 208 |
+
{
|
| 209 |
+
"name": "claim_id",
|
| 210 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 211 |
+
},
|
| 212 |
+
{
|
| 213 |
+
"name": "case_id",
|
| 214 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 215 |
+
},
|
| 216 |
+
{
|
| 217 |
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|
| 218 |
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|
| 219 |
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|
| 220 |
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|
| 221 |
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|
| 222 |
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|
| 223 |
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| 224 |
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|
| 225 |
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|
| 226 |
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|
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|
| 228 |
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|
| 229 |
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|
| 230 |
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|
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|
| 232 |
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|
| 233 |
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|
| 234 |
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| 236 |
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|
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|
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|
| 239 |
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|
| 240 |
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|
| 241 |
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|
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|
| 243 |
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|
| 244 |
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|
| 245 |
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|
| 246 |
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|
| 247 |
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|
| 248 |
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|
| 249 |
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|
| 250 |
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|
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|
| 252 |
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|
| 253 |
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|
| 254 |
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| 255 |
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| 256 |
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|
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|
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|
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| 260 |
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|
| 261 |
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|
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| 688 |
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"name": "official_turnout",
|
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{
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| 707 |
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| 711 |
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| 723 |
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| 755 |
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| 759 |
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| 762 |
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{
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| 763 |
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"name": "election_date",
|
| 1132 |
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"type": "date"
|
| 1133 |
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|
| 1134 |
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|
| 1135 |
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|
| 1136 |
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|
| 1137 |
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|
| 1138 |
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{
|
| 1139 |
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|
| 1140 |
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|
| 1141 |
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|
| 1142 |
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{
|
| 1143 |
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|
| 1144 |
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"type": "string"
|
| 1145 |
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|
| 1146 |
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{
|
| 1147 |
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|
| 1148 |
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|
| 1149 |
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|
| 1150 |
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{
|
| 1151 |
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|
| 1152 |
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|
| 1153 |
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|
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{
|
| 1155 |
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|
| 1156 |
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|
| 1157 |
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|
| 1158 |
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{
|
| 1159 |
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|
| 1160 |
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|
| 1161 |
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|
| 1162 |
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{
|
| 1163 |
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|
| 1164 |
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|
| 1165 |
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|
| 1166 |
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|
| 1167 |
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|
| 1168 |
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|
| 1169 |
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|
| 1170 |
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|
| 1171 |
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|
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|
| 1173 |
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|
| 1174 |
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{
|
| 1175 |
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|
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|
| 1177 |
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|
| 1178 |
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|
| 1179 |
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|
| 1180 |
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|
| 1181 |
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|
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|
| 1183 |
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|
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|
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|
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|
| 1187 |
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|
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|
| 1191 |
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|
| 1195 |
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|
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|
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|
| 1199 |
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|
| 1200 |
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|
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| 1202 |
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|
| 1203 |
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|
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|
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|
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|
| 1226 |
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|
| 1262 |
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|
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| 1282 |
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| 1286 |
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| 1296 |
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| 1332 |
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{
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{
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{
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{
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|
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|
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|
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|
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{
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| 1490 |
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{
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| 1498 |
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| 1500 |
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|
| 1531 |
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{
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| 1567 |
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|
| 1570 |
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{
|
| 1571 |
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{
|
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| 1579 |
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|
| 1580 |
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|
| 1581 |
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|
| 1582 |
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|
| 1583 |
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|
| 1584 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1585 |
+
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|
| 1586 |
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|
| 1587 |
+
"name": "reviewer_note",
|
| 1588 |
+
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|
| 1589 |
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|
| 1590 |
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|
| 1591 |
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|
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|
| 1597 |
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|
| 1598 |
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|
| 1599 |
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|
| 1600 |
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|
| 1601 |
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|
| 1602 |
+
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|
| 1603 |
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|
| 1604 |
+
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|
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|
| 1606 |
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|
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| 1608 |
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| 1610 |
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| 1611 |
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| 1612 |
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|
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|
| 1614 |
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|
| 1615 |
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|
| 1616 |
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|
| 1617 |
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|
| 1618 |
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|
| 1619 |
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|
| 1620 |
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|
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|
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| 1624 |
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|
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|
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|
| 1628 |
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|
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|
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|
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|
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| 1668 |
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|
| 1670 |
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|
| 1672 |
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|
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|
| 1674 |
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|
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|
| 1676 |
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|
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|
| 1678 |
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| 1679 |
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|
| 1680 |
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|
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|
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|
| 1690 |
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|
| 1692 |
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|
| 1706 |
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|
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|
| 1713 |
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| 1714 |
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| 1715 |
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|
| 1716 |
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|
| 1717 |
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|
| 1718 |
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|
| 1720 |
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| 1725 |
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| 1727 |
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| 1728 |
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|
| 1729 |
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|
| 1730 |
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|
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|
| 1732 |
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|
| 1733 |
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| 1738 |
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| 1739 |
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|
| 1740 |
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| 1741 |
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|
| 1742 |
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| 1743 |
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|
| 1744 |
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| 1745 |
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| 1746 |
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| 1747 |
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|
| 1748 |
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|
| 1750 |
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|
| 1751 |
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|
| 1752 |
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|
| 1753 |
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|
| 1754 |
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|
| 1755 |
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|
| 1756 |
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|
| 1757 |
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{
|
| 1758 |
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|
| 1759 |
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|
| 1760 |
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|
| 1761 |
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{
|
| 1762 |
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|
| 1763 |
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|
| 1764 |
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|
| 1765 |
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{
|
| 1766 |
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|
| 1767 |
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|
| 1768 |
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|
| 1769 |
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|
| 1770 |
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|
| 1771 |
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|
| 1772 |
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|
| 1773 |
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{
|
| 1774 |
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|
| 1775 |
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|
| 1776 |
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|
| 1777 |
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{
|
| 1778 |
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|
| 1779 |
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|
| 1780 |
+
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|
| 1781 |
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{
|
| 1782 |
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|
| 1783 |
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|
| 1784 |
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|
| 1785 |
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{
|
| 1786 |
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|
| 1787 |
+
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|
| 1788 |
+
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|
| 1789 |
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{
|
| 1790 |
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|
| 1791 |
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|
| 1792 |
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|
| 1793 |
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{
|
| 1794 |
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|
| 1795 |
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|
| 1796 |
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|
| 1797 |
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{
|
| 1798 |
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|
| 1799 |
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|
| 1800 |
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|
| 1801 |
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{
|
| 1802 |
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|
| 1803 |
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|
| 1804 |
+
},
|
| 1805 |
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{
|
| 1806 |
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"name": "notes",
|
| 1807 |
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|
| 1808 |
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|
| 1809 |
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|
| 1810 |
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|
| 1811 |
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|
| 1812 |
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|
| 1813 |
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{
|
| 1814 |
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|
| 1815 |
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|
| 1816 |
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|
| 1817 |
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|
| 1818 |
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|
| 1819 |
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|
| 1820 |
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|
| 1821 |
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|
| 1822 |
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|
| 1823 |
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|
| 1824 |
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|
| 1825 |
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{
|
| 1826 |
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|
| 1827 |
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|
| 1828 |
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|
| 1829 |
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{
|
| 1830 |
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|
| 1831 |
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|
| 1832 |
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|
| 1833 |
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|
| 1834 |
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| 1835 |
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|
| 1836 |
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|
| 1837 |
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{
|
| 1838 |
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|
| 1839 |
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|
| 1840 |
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|
| 1841 |
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|
| 1842 |
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|
| 1843 |
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|
| 1844 |
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|
| 1845 |
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{
|
| 1846 |
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|
| 1847 |
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|
| 1848 |
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|
| 1849 |
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{
|
| 1850 |
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|
| 1851 |
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|
| 1852 |
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|
| 1853 |
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|
| 1854 |
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|
| 1856 |
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{
|
| 1857 |
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|
| 1858 |
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|
| 1859 |
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|
| 1860 |
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|
| 1861 |
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|
| 1862 |
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|
| 1863 |
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{
|
| 1864 |
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"fields": "source_id",
|
| 1865 |
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|
| 1866 |
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"resource": "sources",
|
| 1867 |
+
"fields": "source_id"
|
| 1868 |
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|
| 1869 |
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|
| 1870 |
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|
| 1871 |
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|
| 1872 |
+
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|
| 1873 |
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{
|
| 1874 |
+
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|
| 1875 |
+
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|
| 1876 |
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|
| 1877 |
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|
| 1878 |
+
"mediatype": "text/csv",
|
| 1879 |
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|
| 1880 |
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"fields": [
|
| 1881 |
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{
|
| 1882 |
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"name": "record_claim_id",
|
| 1883 |
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|
| 1884 |
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},
|
| 1885 |
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{
|
| 1886 |
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"name": "record_type",
|
| 1887 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1888 |
+
},
|
| 1889 |
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{
|
| 1890 |
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"name": "record_id",
|
| 1891 |
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|
| 1892 |
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|
| 1893 |
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{
|
| 1894 |
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"name": "case_id",
|
| 1895 |
+
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|
| 1896 |
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},
|
| 1897 |
+
{
|
| 1898 |
+
"name": "claim_id",
|
| 1899 |
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|
| 1900 |
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|
| 1901 |
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{
|
| 1902 |
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|
| 1903 |
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|
| 1904 |
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|
| 1905 |
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|
| 1906 |
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|
| 1907 |
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{
|
| 1909 |
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| 1910 |
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| 1911 |
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"resource": "cases",
|
| 1912 |
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|
| 1913 |
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|
| 1914 |
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|
| 1915 |
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{
|
| 1916 |
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"fields": "claim_id",
|
| 1917 |
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|
| 1918 |
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"resource": "claims",
|
| 1919 |
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"fields": "claim_id"
|
| 1920 |
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|
| 1921 |
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|
| 1922 |
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|
| 1923 |
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|
| 1924 |
+
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|
| 1925 |
+
{
|
| 1926 |
+
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|
| 1927 |
+
"path": "case_elections.csv",
|
| 1928 |
+
"profile": "tabular-data-resource",
|
| 1929 |
+
"format": "csv",
|
| 1930 |
+
"mediatype": "text/csv",
|
| 1931 |
+
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|
| 1932 |
+
"fields": [
|
| 1933 |
+
{
|
| 1934 |
+
"name": "case_election_id",
|
| 1935 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1936 |
+
},
|
| 1937 |
+
{
|
| 1938 |
+
"name": "case_id",
|
| 1939 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1940 |
+
},
|
| 1941 |
+
{
|
| 1942 |
+
"name": "election_id",
|
| 1943 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1944 |
+
},
|
| 1945 |
+
{
|
| 1946 |
+
"name": "relation",
|
| 1947 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1948 |
+
}
|
| 1949 |
+
],
|
| 1950 |
+
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|
| 1951 |
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|
| 1952 |
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{
|
| 1953 |
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|
| 1954 |
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|
| 1955 |
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"resource": "cases",
|
| 1956 |
+
"fields": "case_id"
|
| 1957 |
+
}
|
| 1958 |
+
},
|
| 1959 |
+
{
|
| 1960 |
+
"fields": "election_id",
|
| 1961 |
+
"reference": {
|
| 1962 |
+
"resource": "official_elections",
|
| 1963 |
+
"fields": "election_id"
|
| 1964 |
+
}
|
| 1965 |
+
}
|
| 1966 |
+
]
|
| 1967 |
+
}
|
| 1968 |
+
},
|
| 1969 |
+
{
|
| 1970 |
+
"name": "election_sources",
|
| 1971 |
+
"path": "election_sources.csv",
|
| 1972 |
+
"profile": "tabular-data-resource",
|
| 1973 |
+
"format": "csv",
|
| 1974 |
+
"mediatype": "text/csv",
|
| 1975 |
+
"schema": {
|
| 1976 |
+
"fields": [
|
| 1977 |
+
{
|
| 1978 |
+
"name": "election_source_id",
|
| 1979 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1980 |
+
},
|
| 1981 |
+
{
|
| 1982 |
+
"name": "election_id",
|
| 1983 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1984 |
+
},
|
| 1985 |
+
{
|
| 1986 |
+
"name": "official_source_id",
|
| 1987 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1988 |
+
},
|
| 1989 |
+
{
|
| 1990 |
+
"name": "source_role",
|
| 1991 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 1992 |
+
}
|
| 1993 |
+
],
|
| 1994 |
+
"primaryKey": "election_source_id",
|
| 1995 |
+
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|
| 1996 |
+
{
|
| 1997 |
+
"fields": "election_id",
|
| 1998 |
+
"reference": {
|
| 1999 |
+
"resource": "official_elections",
|
| 2000 |
+
"fields": "election_id"
|
| 2001 |
+
}
|
| 2002 |
+
},
|
| 2003 |
+
{
|
| 2004 |
+
"fields": "official_source_id",
|
| 2005 |
+
"reference": {
|
| 2006 |
+
"resource": "official_data_sources",
|
| 2007 |
+
"fields": "official_source_id"
|
| 2008 |
+
}
|
| 2009 |
+
}
|
| 2010 |
+
]
|
| 2011 |
+
}
|
| 2012 |
+
},
|
| 2013 |
+
{
|
| 2014 |
+
"name": "sampling_frame",
|
| 2015 |
+
"path": "sampling_frame.csv",
|
| 2016 |
+
"profile": "tabular-data-resource",
|
| 2017 |
+
"format": "csv",
|
| 2018 |
+
"mediatype": "text/csv",
|
| 2019 |
+
"schema": {
|
| 2020 |
+
"fields": [
|
| 2021 |
+
{
|
| 2022 |
+
"name": "frame_id",
|
| 2023 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2024 |
+
},
|
| 2025 |
+
{
|
| 2026 |
+
"name": "region",
|
| 2027 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2028 |
+
},
|
| 2029 |
+
{
|
| 2030 |
+
"name": "selection_basis",
|
| 2031 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2032 |
+
},
|
| 2033 |
+
{
|
| 2034 |
+
"name": "search_status",
|
| 2035 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2036 |
+
},
|
| 2037 |
+
{
|
| 2038 |
+
"name": "search_languages",
|
| 2039 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2040 |
+
},
|
| 2041 |
+
{
|
| 2042 |
+
"name": "source_channels",
|
| 2043 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2044 |
+
},
|
| 2045 |
+
{
|
| 2046 |
+
"name": "included_case_count",
|
| 2047 |
+
"type": "integer"
|
| 2048 |
+
},
|
| 2049 |
+
{
|
| 2050 |
+
"name": "candidate_count",
|
| 2051 |
+
"type": "integer"
|
| 2052 |
+
},
|
| 2053 |
+
{
|
| 2054 |
+
"name": "negative_search_recorded",
|
| 2055 |
+
"type": "boolean",
|
| 2056 |
+
"trueValues": [
|
| 2057 |
+
"true"
|
| 2058 |
+
],
|
| 2059 |
+
"falseValues": [
|
| 2060 |
+
"false"
|
| 2061 |
+
]
|
| 2062 |
+
},
|
| 2063 |
+
{
|
| 2064 |
+
"name": "known_gap",
|
| 2065 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2066 |
+
},
|
| 2067 |
+
{
|
| 2068 |
+
"name": "last_searched",
|
| 2069 |
+
"type": "date"
|
| 2070 |
+
}
|
| 2071 |
+
],
|
| 2072 |
+
"primaryKey": "frame_id"
|
| 2073 |
+
}
|
| 2074 |
+
},
|
| 2075 |
+
{
|
| 2076 |
+
"name": "coverage_summary",
|
| 2077 |
+
"path": "coverage_summary.csv",
|
| 2078 |
+
"profile": "tabular-data-resource",
|
| 2079 |
+
"format": "csv",
|
| 2080 |
+
"mediatype": "text/csv",
|
| 2081 |
+
"schema": {
|
| 2082 |
+
"fields": [
|
| 2083 |
+
{
|
| 2084 |
+
"name": "region",
|
| 2085 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2086 |
+
},
|
| 2087 |
+
{
|
| 2088 |
+
"name": "included_case_count",
|
| 2089 |
+
"type": "integer"
|
| 2090 |
+
},
|
| 2091 |
+
{
|
| 2092 |
+
"name": "candidate_count",
|
| 2093 |
+
"type": "integer"
|
| 2094 |
+
},
|
| 2095 |
+
{
|
| 2096 |
+
"name": "model_evaluation_count",
|
| 2097 |
+
"type": "integer"
|
| 2098 |
+
},
|
| 2099 |
+
{
|
| 2100 |
+
"name": "coverage_note",
|
| 2101 |
+
"type": "string"
|
| 2102 |
+
}
|
| 2103 |
+
]
|
| 2104 |
+
}
|
| 2105 |
+
}
|
| 2106 |
+
]
|
| 2107 |
+
}
|
data/election_sources.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
election_source_id,election_id,official_source_id,source_role
|
| 2 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1-off-ro-2024-aep-final,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,off-ro-2024-aep-final,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 3 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1-off-ro-2024-ccr-annulment,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,off-ro-2024-ccr-annulment,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 4 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1-off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 5 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2025-r1-off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 6 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2025-r1-off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 7 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2-off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 8 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2-off-ro-2025-ccr-h43,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,off-ro-2025-ccr-h43,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 9 |
+
election-source-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2-off-ro-2025-ccr-h44,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,off-ro-2025-ccr-h44,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 10 |
+
election-source-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 11 |
+
election-source-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 12 |
+
election-source-elec-md-referendum-2024-off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx,elec-md-referendum-2024,off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 13 |
+
election-source-elec-md-referendum-2024-off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,elec-md-referendum-2024,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 14 |
+
election-source-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 15 |
+
election-source-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 16 |
+
election-source-elec-md-parl-2025-off-md-2025-parliament-xlsx,elec-md-parl-2025,off-md-2025-parliament-xlsx,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 17 |
+
election-source-elec-md-parl-2025-off-md-2025-cec-h4149,elec-md-parl-2025,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 18 |
+
election-source-elec-md-parl-2025-off-md-2025-cec-h4151,elec-md-parl-2025,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 19 |
+
election-source-elec-md-parl-2025-off-md-2025-cc-h12,elec-md-parl-2025,off-md-2025-cc-h12,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 20 |
+
election-source-elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024-off-nh-2024-ballots,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,off-nh-2024-ballots,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 21 |
+
election-source-elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024-off-nh-2024-dem-results,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,off-nh-2024-dem-results,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 22 |
+
election-source-elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024-off-nh-2024-checklist,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,off-nh-2024-checklist,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 23 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r1-off-br-2026-calendar,elec-br-general-2026-r1,off-br-2026-calendar,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 24 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r1-off-br-2026-electorate,elec-br-general-2026-r1,off-br-2026-electorate,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 25 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r1-off-br-2026-candidates,elec-br-general-2026-r1,off-br-2026-candidates,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 26 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r1-off-br-2026-results-monitor,elec-br-general-2026-r1,off-br-2026-results-monitor,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 27 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r1-off-br-2026-contests,elec-br-general-2026-r1,off-br-2026-contests,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 28 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r2-off-br-2026-calendar,elec-br-general-2026-r2,off-br-2026-calendar,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 29 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r2-off-br-2026-results-monitor,elec-br-general-2026-r2,off-br-2026-results-monitor,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 30 |
+
election-source-elec-br-general-2026-r2-off-br-2026-contests,elec-br-general-2026-r2,off-br-2026-contests,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 31 |
+
election-source-elec-us-midterms-2026-off-us-2026-fec-dates,elec-us-midterms-2026,off-us-2026-fec-dates,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 32 |
+
election-source-elec-us-midterms-2026-off-us-2026-fec-candidates,elec-us-midterms-2026,off-us-2026-fec-candidates,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 33 |
+
election-source-elec-us-midterms-2026-off-us-2024-eavs-benchmark,elec-us-midterms-2026,off-us-2024-eavs-benchmark,supports_election_context_or_status
|
| 34 |
+
election-source-elec-us-midterms-2026-off-us-congress-election-law,elec-us-midterms-2026,off-us-congress-election-law,supports_election_context_or_status
|
data/events.csv
CHANGED
|
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ evt-us-20260328,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,2026-03-28,verified_campaign_conte
|
|
| 25 |
evt-br-20260725,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-07-25,synthetic_campaign_content,Disclosed Jair Bolsonaro AI avatar appears at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch.,clm-br-010|clm-br-011,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,observed
|
| 26 |
evt-br-20260726,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-07-26,legal_challenge,Opposing parties challenge the avatar in electoral court.,clm-br-012|clm-br-013,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,contested
|
| 27 |
evt-br-20260803,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-03,institutional_agreement,TSE and AGU announce AI good-practices agreement.,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,observed
|
|
|
|
| 28 |
evt-br-20260807,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-07,institutional_response,TSE creates council to monitor disinformation and AI use.,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-council-20260807,observed
|
|
|
|
| 29 |
evt-br-20260813,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-08-13,scheduled_internal_meeting,Scheduled internal TSE meeting concerning the AI-avatar dispute; not completed at the dataset cutoff.,clm-br-013,src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,prospective
|
| 30 |
evt-br-20260816,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-16,compliance_deadline,Deadline for platform election-compliance plans.,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-compliance-202607,prospective
|
| 31 |
evt-br-20261004,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-10-04,election_round,Scheduled first round.,clm-br-001|clm-br-009,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,prospective
|
|
|
|
| 25 |
evt-br-20260725,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-07-25,synthetic_campaign_content,Disclosed Jair Bolsonaro AI avatar appears at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch.,clm-br-010|clm-br-011,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,observed
|
| 26 |
evt-br-20260726,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-07-26,legal_challenge,Opposing parties challenge the avatar in electoral court.,clm-br-012|clm-br-013,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,contested
|
| 27 |
evt-br-20260803,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-03,institutional_agreement,TSE and AGU announce AI good-practices agreement.,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,observed
|
| 28 |
+
evt-usca11-20260803,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,2026-08-03,interactive_campaign_deployment,Scott Wiener for Congress launches the disclosed ConnieChan.ai interactive parody chatbot and promotes it through two billboards.,clm-usca11-001|clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,observed
|
| 29 |
evt-br-20260807,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-07,institutional_response,TSE creates council to monitor disinformation and AI use.,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-council-20260807,observed
|
| 30 |
+
evt-usca11-20260807,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,2026-08-07,campaign_withdrawal_and_apology,"The campaign removes the chatbot, announces removal of billboards, and apologises after backlash.",clm-usca11-008,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,observed
|
| 31 |
evt-br-20260813,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,2026-08-13,scheduled_internal_meeting,Scheduled internal TSE meeting concerning the AI-avatar dispute; not completed at the dataset cutoff.,clm-br-013,src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,prospective
|
| 32 |
evt-br-20260816,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-08-16,compliance_deadline,Deadline for platform election-compliance plans.,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-compliance-202607,prospective
|
| 33 |
evt-br-20261004,br-2026-election-preparedness,2026-10-04,election_round,Scheduled first round.,clm-br-001|clm-br-009,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,prospective
|
data/model_evaluations.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
evaluation_id,title,country,evaluation_window,election_or_context,systems_tested,versions_known,interface,languages,sample_unit,sample_size,design,primary_metrics,headline_results,causal_scope,source_id,data_availability,notes
|
| 2 |
+
eval-us-aidp-english-2024,AI Democracy Projects English election-query pilot,United States,January 2024,2024 U.S. election information,GPT-4-0613|Claude-2 (2023-06-01)|Llama-2-70b-chat-hf|Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1|Gemini Pro Preview (2023-12-13),versions_reported,provider APIs and hosted APIs,en,model_response,130,expert-coded voter-like queries,accuracy|completeness|bias|harm,Half of responses were rated inaccurate; GPT-4 performed better on accuracy but had comparable incompleteness.,"Point-in-time domain safety test; not representative of users, all questions, consumer interfaces, future performance, or election effects.",src-us-proof-aidp-20240227,public_query_response_ratings,"More than 40 election officials and experts participated; exact row count follows the released study data, while the article emphasises rates."
|
| 3 |
+
eval-us-aidp-spanish-2024,AI Democracy Projects bilingual Arizona election-query evaluation,United States,2024,Arizona voter information,Claude 3 Opus|Gemini 1.5 Pro|GPT-4|Llama 3|Mixtral 8x7B v0.1,versions_reported_to_family_or_release,APIs,en|es,model_response,250,25 questions × 2 languages × 5 models,accuracy|completeness|language_disparity,52% of Spanish responses and 43% of English responses contained inaccurate information in the reported comparison; 250 responses were dual fact-checked.,API responses may differ from consumer chatbots; one state and selected questions; no user or electoral-effect measurement.,src-us-proof-spanish-20241030,public_prompts_and_ratings,The article also reports a 48% combined response inaccuracy in prose and a rounded 45% in its summary box; retain source wording and inspect released data for analysis.
|
| 4 |
+
eval-hu-voting-advice-2026,Hungary 2026 general-purpose AI voting-advice evaluation,Hungary,23-24 March 2026,2026 Hungarian parliamentary election,ChatGPT Free|Gemini Free,exact_underlying_versions_unknown,consumer web interfaces,hu,model_output,200,5 party profiles × 10 repetitions × 2 systems × 2 prompt conditions,correct_party_match|consistency|non_running_party_mentions|guidance_despite_disclaimer,Both systems produced unstable and inaccurate political matching; ChatGPT mentioned Tisza in only 8% of voting-advice responses and both systems frequently mentioned parties not running.,Structured audit during a live campaign; not a sample of real users and not evidence that outputs affected the decisive result.,src-hu-liberties-voting-advice-20260721,archived_outputs_described,Important closed-model intermediary case with repeated identical prompts and explicit negative electoral-effect finding.
|
| 5 |
+
eval-us-brennan-2026,Brennan Center election-disinformation capability and safeguard evaluation,United States,February-August 2026,2026 U.S. midterm election-disinformation scenarios,ChatGPT|Gemini|Grok|Claude|Perplexity|DeepSeek|Meta AI|Runway Gen-4|Flux.2,multiple_versions_some_unknown,consumer products,en|es,prompt_or_media_test,14,"multistage chatbot, generation, safeguard-consistency and 14-image detection tests",conspiracy_rebuttal|generation_acceptance|version_consistency|synthetic_media_detection,"Chatbots generally rebutted established conspiracies, yet all tested generation tools produced deceptive election scenes; ChatGPT, Grok, Claude and Perplexity correctly identified four or fewer of 14 synthetic images, and version-level accept/refuse behaviour was inconsistent.","Capability and safeguard evidence under researcher tests; not deployment prevalence, audience exposure, or electoral effect. Harmful prompts are intentionally withheld.",src-us-brennan-eval-20260811,methodology_available_prompts_restricted_for_safety,"The sample_size field records the explicit image-detection set, not every prompt across the multistage study; consult the methodology for each denominator."
|
| 6 |
+
eval-global-voter-dialogue-rct-2025,Persuading voters using human-artificial intelligence dialogues,United States|Canada|Poland,2024-2025 election periods,"2024 U.S., 2025 Canadian and 2025 Polish national elections",purpose-built partisan conversational agents,study_configuration_reported,experimental chat interface,en|fr|pl,participant,6105,"preregistered randomized experiments during real elections; 2,457 U.S., 1,530 Canadian and 2,118 Polish participants",attitude_and_vote_intention_change|categorical_vote_choice|factuality,"Disclosed AI dialogues changed reported preferences and intentions in assigned directions, with larger shifts in the Canadian and Polish studies; some factual errors were observed.","Causal for the experimental conversations and measured self-reports; not observed campaign deployment, actual ballots, aggregate election outcomes, durable effects, or covert manipulation.",src-global-nature-voter-dialogue-20251204,paper_and_osf_materials_available,This is the strongest causal capability bridge in the package and must remain separate from incident prevalence and real-world electoral-effect claims.
|
| 7 |
+
eval-uk-chatbot-voting-advice-rct-2025,Chatbot Voting Advice Applications inform but seldom sway young unaligned voters,United Kingdom,2025,experimental voting-advice context,retrieval-augmented voting-advice chatbots,study_configuration_reported,experimental chat interface,en,experiment,3,three randomized experiments grounded in official political documents; participant N must be taken from the paper's study-specific flow,political_knowledge|candidate_evaluation|vote_preference,The chatbots improved political knowledge more consistently than downstream candidate evaluations or vote preferences.,Causal within the experimental samples and interfaces; not a population prevalence estimate or proof that conversational political AI never persuades.,src-global-pnas-chatbot-voting-advice-20251208,paper_materials_reported,"sample_size=3 denotes experiments, not participants. Paired with the Nature study to prevent overgeneralizing a single persuasive-chatbot result."
|
| 8 |
+
eval-eu-mistral-voting-assistant-2024,Mistral and Mixtral as European Parliament voting assistants,European Union,2024,2024 European Parliament election,Mistral Instruct-v0.2|Mixtral Instruct-v0.1,open_weight_exact_chat_versions_reported,research evaluation with and without curated retrieval,en,party_question_pair,810,"30 questions × 27 parties, evaluated in four contextual settings",answer_accuracy|group_disparity|retrieval_gain,"Mixtral averaged about 82% accuracy, with substantial group-level variation (roughly 50-95%); expert-curated context improved performance by about nine percentage points.","Point-in-time model audit; not public deployment, user behavior or election effect.",src-eu-emnlp-voting-assistant-202411,paper_and_code_links_available,sample_size is the 810 party-question pairs before repeated contextual settings. Provides an open-weight comparator; no manipulatory election deployment is inferred from benchmark performance.
|
data/observations.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
observation_id,case_id,pathway_id,claim_id,metric_family,metric_name,value_low,value_best,value_high,value_operator,unit,denominator,unique_entity_status,platform,geographic_scope,measurement_window,measurement_method,causal_status,source_id,as_of_date,limitations
|
| 2 |
+
q-ro24-accounts,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,ata-ro24,clm-ro-011,production_or_engagement,accounts,,25000,,about,accounts,network_size,unknown,TikTok,Romania,final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round,officially_reported,descriptive_only,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,2026-08-11,"Account count is not exposure, unique people, persuasion, or votes."
|
| 3 |
+
q-ro25-accounts,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ata-ro25,clm-ro-014,production_or_engagement,accounts,215,215,,at_least,accounts,analysed_network_sample,not_applicable,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Romania,2024-12_to_2025-06-06,researcher_measured,descriptive_only,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,2026-08-11,Coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts in the studied set.
|
| 4 |
+
q-ro25-posts,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ata-ro25,clm-ro-015,production_or_engagement,posts,,8514,,exact_in_sample,posts,content_volume,not_applicable,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Romania,2024-12_to_2025-06-06,researcher_measured,descriptive_only,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,2026-08-11,Posts are not users or exposures.
|
| 5 |
+
q-ro25-views,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ata-ro25,clm-ro-015,exposure_or_distribution,views,16000000,16000000,,at_least,views,platform_view_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Romania,2024-12_to_2025-06-06,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,2026-08-11,Cross-platform views are not unique people and should not be summed with likes.
|
| 6 |
+
q-ro25-likes,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ata-ro25,clm-ro-015,descriptive_context,likes,681000,681000,,at_least,likes,engagement_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Romania,2024-12_to_2025-06-06,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,2026-08-11,Likes are not exposure or persuasion.
|
| 7 |
+
q-md24-fb-followers,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ata-md24,clm-md-014,descriptive_context,followers,,4200,,about,followers,page_followers,unknown,Facebook,Moldova,at_takedown_2024-10-11,platform_reported,descriptive_only,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,2026-08-11,Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement.
|
| 8 |
+
q-md24-ig-followers,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ata-md24,clm-md-014,descriptive_context,followers,,335000,,about,followers,account_followers,unknown,Instagram,Moldova,at_takedown_2024-10-11,platform_reported,descriptive_only,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,2026-08-11,Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement.
|
| 9 |
+
q-md25-accounts,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-015,production_or_engagement,accounts,,253,,exact_in_sample,accounts,analysed_network_sample,not_applicable,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_measured,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,"Sample, not the full operation."
|
| 10 |
+
q-md25-posts,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-016,production_or_engagement,posts,,28708,,exact_in_sample,posts,content_volume,not_applicable,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_measured,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,"Content count, not audience."
|
| 11 |
+
q-md25-views,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-016,exposure_or_distribution,views,,55367950,,exact_in_sample,views,platform_view_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,Cross-platform view events are non-unique and non-causal.
|
| 12 |
+
q-md25-likes,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-016,descriptive_context,likes,,2207894,,exact_in_sample,likes,engagement_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,Engagement is not belief or vote change.
|
| 13 |
+
q-md25-shares,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-016,descriptive_context,shares,,295608,,exact_in_sample,shares,engagement_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,Engagement is not belief or vote change.
|
| 14 |
+
q-md25-comments,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-016,descriptive_context,comments,,239016,,exact_in_sample,comments,engagement_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,Engagement is not belief or vote change.
|
| 15 |
+
q-nh-attempts,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,ata-nh,clm-nh-004,production_or_engagement,call_attempts,9581,9581,9581,exact,call_attempts,delivery_attempts,unknown,telecom,United States,campaign_window,provider_records_in_enforcement,descriptive_only,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,2026-08-11,"Attempts are not completed calls, listeners, unique recipients or voters."
|
| 16 |
+
q-nh-completed,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,ata-nh,clm-nh-004,production_or_engagement,completed_calls,3978,3978,3978,exact,completed_calls,completed_call_records,unknown,telecom,United States,campaign_window,provider_records_in_enforcement,descriptive_only,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,2026-08-11,Completed calls are not necessarily unique listeners or persuaded voters.
|
| 17 |
+
q-us26-talarico-youtube,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,ata-usads,clm-us26-015,exposure_or_distribution,views,,3700,,approximately,views,platform_view_events,unknown,YouTube,United States,snapshot_2026-08-11,platform_snapshot,descriptive_only,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,2026-08-11,"Dynamic, non-unique view counter; excludes other platforms and paid impressions."
|
| 18 |
+
q-usca11-questions,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ata-usca11,clm-usca11-006,production_or_engagement,submitted_questions,5058,5058,5058,exact_campaign_report,submitted_questions,interaction_events,unknown,ConnieChan.ai,United States,first_27_hours,campaign_reported,descriptive_only,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,2026-08-12,"Not users, conversations, district voters, impressions, accepted answers, or outcomes; repeated and adversarial prompts possible."
|
| 19 |
+
q-usca11-billboards,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ata-usca11,clm-usca11-001,descriptive_context,billboards,2,2,2,exact_campaign_report,billboards,promotional_placements,not_applicable,physical,United States,August_2026,campaign_reported,descriptive_only,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,2026-08-12,No impression estimate is available.
|
data/official_data_sources.csv
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,19 +1,31 @@
|
|
| 1 |
-
official_source_id,case_family_id,jurisdiction,electoral_institution,title,url,dataset_role,data_status,format,geographic_granularity,access_method,update_frequency,license_or_terms,retrieved_at,notes
|
| 2 |
-
off-ro-2024-aep-final,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,2024 presidential first-round FINAL national protocol and structured results,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale24112024/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,turnout_and_results,final,JSON with linked PDF and CSV files,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,Use FINAL aggregate fields a-f and candidate totals. Precinct CSV excludes postal votes; first-round JSON field g is inconsistent and must not be ingested blindly.
|
| 3 |
-
off-ro-2024-ccr-annulment,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,Decision 32 of 6 December 2024
|
| 4 |
-
off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,2025 repeat presidential first-round FINAL national protocol and structured results,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale04052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,turnout_and_results,final,JSON with linked PDF and CSV files,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,Use FINAL national protocol rather than the live-presence counter. Precinct CSV excludes postal votes.
|
| 5 |
-
off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,2025 repeat presidential second-round FINAL national protocol and structured results,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale18052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,turnout_and_results,final,JSON with linked PDF and CSV files,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,"The precinct CSV omits 3,142 postal votes included in the FINAL national aggregate."
|
| 6 |
-
off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2024 presidential election first round",https://a.cec.md/upload/6858ff67671b8/113995/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,Workbook interleaves aggregation levels; use the national summary row or keys that explicitly identify station rows.
|
| 7 |
-
off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2024 constitutional referendum",https://a.cec.md/upload/67aee6476d633/111800/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,Result shares use valid referendum ballots.
|
| 8 |
-
off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2024 presidential election second round",https://a.cec.md/upload/68590e5edd817/113998/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,Use election plus circumscription plus precinct as the station key in 2024 files.
|
| 9 |
-
off-md-2025-parliament-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2025 parliamentary election",https://a.cec.md/upload/68e657b72b3ec/115495/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad; postal voting,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,Postal rows are marked VpC-. Preserve them in granular ETL and avoid summing aggregate plus station rows.
|
| 10 |
-
off-nh-2024-ballots,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,"New Hampshire, United States",New Hampshire Secretary of State,2024 presidential primary ballots cast,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-ballots-cast_0.xls,participation,final,XLS,state; county; town or city ward; party; ballot mode,direct download,finalized election record,No clear open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,"Democratic ballots: 116,927 regular plus 8,884 absentee."
|
| 11 |
-
off-nh-2024-dem-results,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,"New Hampshire, United States",New Hampshire Secretary of State,2024 Democratic presidential primary official election results,https://www.sos.nh.gov/2024-democratic-presidential-primary-election-results,results,final,HTML landing page with XLSX workbooks,state; county; town or city ward; printed and write-in candidates,landing page and direct downloads,finalized election record,No clear open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,Biden's final write-in total comes from the write-in summary; preliminary and printed-candidate workbooks must not be mixed.
|
| 12 |
-
off-nh-2024-checklist,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,"New Hampshire, United States",New Hampshire Secretary of State,2024 presidential primary names on checklist,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-names-on-checklist_5.xls,electorate_context,final,XLS,state; county; town or city ward; party affiliation,direct download,finalized election record,No clear open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,2026-08-12,"All-party checklist total is 901,008, but it is not a valid denominator for Democratic-primary turnout."
|
| 13 |
-
off-br-2026-calendar,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,Resolução TSE 23.760/2026 — 2026 electoral calendar,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-760-de-2-de-marco-de-2026,calendar,scheduled,HTML legal record,national,web page,legal amendments as issued,Official legal record; no separate reuse license asserted,2026-08-12,First round 4 October 2026; possible second round 25 October 2026.
|
| 14 |
-
off-br-2026-electorate,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral / AGEL,Eleitorado 2026,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/eleitorado-2026,electorate_snapshot,pre_election,CKAN package; ZIP containing Latin-1 semicolon CSV,national; state; municipality; electoral zone; demographic aggregate,CKAN metadata and direct ZIP,periodic pre-election updates; source generation timestamp controls,CKAN declares cc-by without a version; attribute TSE/AGEL and preserve source metadata,2026-08-12,"Audited eligible electorate 158,745,463. Public release is aggregate and excludes exact polling-place contact and coordinate fields."
|
| 15 |
-
off-br-2026-candidates,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral / AGEL,Candidatos 2026,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/candidatos-2026,candidate_snapshot,pre_election,CKAN package; ZIP containing Latin-1 semicolon CSV,candidate; contest; state,CKAN metadata and direct ZIP,frequent pre-election snapshots,CKAN declares cc-by without a version; attribute TSE/AGEL and preserve source metadata,2026-08-12,"Candidate records are provisional and not equivalent to ballot qualification. Whitelist public campaign fields; never republish CPF, voter-title, date-of-birth, email, or address fields."
|
| 16 |
-
off-br-2026-results-monitor,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral / AGEL,Official CKAN query for Resultados 2026,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/api/3/action/package_search?q=resultados%202026,future_result_monitor,not_yet_available,CKAN API JSON,not yet available,API query,recheck through totalization and certification,No 2026 result package existed at cutoff,2026-08-12,The official query returned zero datasets at the cutoff. No speculative result URL or result row is created.
|
| 17 |
-
off-us-2026-fec-dates,us-midterms-2026,United States,Federal Election Commission,2026 congressional primary dates and candidate filing deadlines for ballot access,https://www.fec.gov/documents/5910/2026pdates.pdf,calendar,scheduled,PDF,state,direct download,as state dates change,United States federal government source,2026-08-12,"FEC administers campaign finance, not state election administration or certification; dates were explicitly subject to change."
|
| 18 |
-
off-us-2026-fec-candidates,us-midterms-2026,United States,Federal Election Commission,2026 candidate master file,https://www.fec.gov/files/bulk-downloads/2026/cn26.zip,candidate_registration_snapshot,pre_election,ZIP containing delimited text,federal candidate; state; district,direct bulk download,periodic bulk snapshot,United States federal government source; statutory-use and privacy constraints still apply,2026-08-12,FEC registration status is not ballot qualification. Do not republish candidate addresses.
|
| 19 |
-
off-us-2024-eavs-benchmark,us-midterms-2026,United States,United States Election Assistance Commission,2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey public-release data,https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/2024_EAVS_for_Public_Release_nolabel_V2_csv.zip,retrospective_contextual_benchmark,final,ZIP containing CSV,state and local election jurisdiction,direct download,biennial survey release,United States federal government source,2026-08-12,"Retrospective 2024 benchmark only, not a live 2026 voter file. Missing-value and casewise-denominator rules must be followed."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
| 1 |
+
official_source_id,case_family_id,jurisdiction,electoral_institution,title,url,dataset_role,data_status,format,geographic_granularity,access_method,update_frequency,license_or_terms,landing_url,download_url,published_or_updated_at,retrieved_at,content_sha256,content_bytes,source_schema_version,snapshot_cutoff,notes
|
| 2 |
+
off-ro-2024-aep-final,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,2024 presidential first-round FINAL national protocol and structured results,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale24112024/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,turnout_and_results,final,JSON with linked PDF and CSV files,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale24112024/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale24112024/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Use FINAL aggregate fields a-f and candidate totals. Precinct CSV excludes postal votes; first-round JSON field g is inconsistent and must not be ingested blindly.
|
| 3 |
+
off-ro-2024-ccr-annulment,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,Decision 32 of 6 December 2024 voiding the entire presidential electoral process,https://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocumentAfis/292099,legal_status,final,PDF,national,direct download,final decision,Official judicial record; no reuse license asserted,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Hotarare_32_2024.pdf,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Hotarare_32_2024.pdf,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Establishes annulled legal status; it does not erase the observed count or supply a causal estimate of votes changed.
|
| 4 |
+
off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,2025 repeat presidential first-round FINAL national protocol and structured results,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale04052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,turnout_and_results,final,JSON with linked PDF and CSV files,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale04052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale04052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Use FINAL national protocol rather than the live-presence counter. Precinct CSV excludes postal votes.
|
| 5 |
+
off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,2025 repeat presidential second-round FINAL national protocol and structured results,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale18052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,turnout_and_results,final,JSON with linked PDF and CSV files,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale18052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,https://prezenta.roaep.ro/prezidentiale18052025/data/json/sicpv/pv/pv.json,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"The precinct CSV omits 3,142 postal votes included in the FINAL national aggregate."
|
| 6 |
+
off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2024 presidential election first round",https://a.cec.md/upload/6858ff67671b8/113995/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://a.cec.md/upload/6858ff67671b8/113995/attached_files,https://a.cec.md/upload/6858ff67671b8/113995/attached_files,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Workbook interleaves aggregation levels; use the national summary row or keys that explicitly identify station rows.
|
| 7 |
+
off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2024 constitutional referendum",https://a.cec.md/upload/67aee6476d633/111800/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://a.cec.md/upload/67aee6476d633/111800/attached_files,https://a.cec.md/upload/67aee6476d633/111800/attached_files,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Result shares use valid referendum ballots.
|
| 8 |
+
off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2024 presidential election second round",https://a.cec.md/upload/68590e5edd817/113998/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://a.cec.md/upload/68590e5edd817/113998/attached_files,https://a.cec.md/upload/68590e5edd817/113998/attached_files,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Use election plus circumscription plus precinct as the station key in 2024 files.
|
| 9 |
+
off-md-2025-parliament-xlsx,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,"Official results, 2025 parliamentary election",https://a.cec.md/upload/68e657b72b3ec/115495/attached_files,turnout_and_results,final,XLSX,national; circumscription; polling station; abroad; postal voting,direct download,finalized election record,No explicit open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://a.cec.md/upload/68e657b72b3ec/115495/attached_files,https://a.cec.md/upload/68e657b72b3ec/115495/attached_files,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Postal rows are marked VpC-. Preserve them in granular ETL and avoid summing aggregate plus station rows.
|
| 10 |
+
off-nh-2024-ballots,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,"New Hampshire, United States",New Hampshire Secretary of State,2024 presidential primary ballots cast,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-ballots-cast_0.xls,participation,final,XLS,state; county; town or city ward; party; ballot mode,direct download,finalized election record,No clear open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-ballots-cast_0.xls,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-ballots-cast_0.xls,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"Democratic ballots: 116,927 regular plus 8,884 absentee."
|
| 11 |
+
off-nh-2024-dem-results,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,"New Hampshire, United States",New Hampshire Secretary of State,2024 Democratic presidential primary official election results,https://www.sos.nh.gov/2024-democratic-presidential-primary-election-results,results,final,HTML landing page with XLSX workbooks,state; county; town or city ward; printed and write-in candidates,landing page and direct downloads,finalized election record,No clear open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://www.sos.nh.gov/2024-democratic-presidential-primary-election-results,https://www.sos.nh.gov/2024-democratic-presidential-primary-election-results,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Biden's final write-in total comes from the write-in summary; preliminary and printed-candidate workbooks must not be mixed.
|
| 12 |
+
off-nh-2024-checklist,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,"New Hampshire, United States",New Hampshire Secretary of State,2024 presidential primary names on checklist,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-names-on-checklist_5.xls,electorate_context,final,XLS,state; county; town or city ward; party affiliation,direct download,finalized election record,No clear open-data license identified; normalized factual values and links only,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-names-on-checklist_5.xls,https://www.sos.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt561/files/inline-documents/sonh/2024-pp-names-on-checklist_5.xls,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"All-party checklist total is 901,008, but it is not a valid denominator for Democratic-primary turnout."
|
| 13 |
+
off-br-2026-calendar,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,Resolução TSE 23.760/2026 — 2026 electoral calendar,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-760-de-2-de-marco-de-2026,calendar,scheduled,HTML legal record,national,web page,legal amendments as issued,Official legal record; no separate reuse license asserted,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-760-de-2-de-marco-de-2026,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,First round 4 October 2026; possible second round 25 October 2026.
|
| 14 |
+
off-br-2026-electorate,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral / AGEL,Eleitorado 2026,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/eleitorado-2026,electorate_snapshot,pre_election,CKAN package; ZIP containing Latin-1 semicolon CSV,national; state; municipality; electoral zone; demographic aggregate,CKAN metadata and direct ZIP,periodic pre-election updates; source generation timestamp controls,CKAN declares cc-by without a version; attribute TSE/AGEL and preserve source metadata,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/eleitorado-2026,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"Audited eligible electorate 158,745,463. Public release is aggregate and excludes exact polling-place contact and coordinate fields."
|
| 15 |
+
off-br-2026-candidates,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral / AGEL,Candidatos 2026,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/candidatos-2026,candidate_snapshot,pre_election,CKAN package; ZIP containing Latin-1 semicolon CSV,candidate; contest; state,CKAN metadata and direct ZIP,frequent pre-election snapshots,CKAN declares cc-by without a version; attribute TSE/AGEL and preserve source metadata,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/dataset/candidatos-2026,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"Candidate records are provisional and not equivalent to ballot qualification. Whitelist public campaign fields; never republish CPF, voter-title, date-of-birth, email, or address fields."
|
| 16 |
+
off-br-2026-results-monitor,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral / AGEL,Official CKAN query for Resultados 2026,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/api/3/action/package_search?q=resultados%202026,future_result_monitor,not_yet_available,CKAN API JSON,not yet available,API query,recheck through totalization and certification,No 2026 result package existed at cutoff,https://dadosabertos.tse.jus.br/api/3/action/package_search?q=resultados%202026,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,The official query returned zero datasets at the cutoff. No speculative result URL or result row is created.
|
| 17 |
+
off-us-2026-fec-dates,us-midterms-2026,United States,Federal Election Commission,2026 congressional primary dates and candidate filing deadlines for ballot access,https://www.fec.gov/documents/5910/2026pdates.pdf,calendar,scheduled,PDF,state,direct download,as state dates change,United States federal government source,https://www.fec.gov/documents/5910/2026pdates.pdf,https://www.fec.gov/documents/5910/2026pdates.pdf,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"FEC administers campaign finance, not state election administration or certification; dates were explicitly subject to change."
|
| 18 |
+
off-us-2026-fec-candidates,us-midterms-2026,United States,Federal Election Commission,2026 candidate master file,https://www.fec.gov/files/bulk-downloads/2026/cn26.zip,candidate_registration_snapshot,pre_election,ZIP containing delimited text,federal candidate; state; district,direct bulk download,periodic bulk snapshot,United States federal government source; statutory-use and privacy constraints still apply,https://www.fec.gov/files/bulk-downloads/2026/cn26.zip,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,FEC registration status is not ballot qualification. Do not republish candidate addresses.
|
| 19 |
+
off-us-2024-eavs-benchmark,us-midterms-2026,United States,United States Election Assistance Commission,2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey public-release data,https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/2024_EAVS_for_Public_Release_nolabel_V2_csv.zip,retrospective_contextual_benchmark,final,ZIP containing CSV,state and local election jurisdiction,direct download,biennial survey release,United States federal government source,https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/2024_EAVS_for_Public_Release_nolabel_V2_csv.zip,https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-02/2024_EAVS_for_Public_Release_nolabel_V2_csv.zip,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"Retrospective 2024 benchmark only, not a live 2026 voter file. Missing-value and casewise-denominator rules must be followed."
|
| 20 |
+
off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,Decision 31 of 2 December 2024 confirming and validating the first-round result,https://legislatie.just.ro/public/DetaliiDocument/291969,legal_validation_and_complete_results,final,HTML legal record,national,landing page,finalized election record,official legal record,https://legislatie.just.ro/public/DetaliiDocument/291969,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,H31 established the valid first-round order before H32 later voided the entire process.
|
| 21 |
+
off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,Decision 39 of 9 May 2025 confirming and validating the repeat first round,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_39_2025.pdf,legal_validation_and_complete_results,final,PDF,national,direct download,finalized election record,official legal record,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_39_2025.pdf,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_39_2025.pdf,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Complete 11-candidate result.
|
| 22 |
+
off-ro-2025-ccr-h43,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,Decision 43 of 22 May 2025 confirming and validating the second round,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_43_2025.pdf,legal_validation,final,PDF,national,direct download,finalized election record,official legal record,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_43_2025.pdf,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_43_2025.pdf,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Second-round confirmation.
|
| 23 |
+
off-ro-2025-ccr-h44,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,Decision 44 of 22 May 2025 validating the election of Nicușor Dan,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_44_2025.pdf,winner_validation,final,PDF,national,direct download,finalized election record,official legal record,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_44_2025.pdf,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hotarare_44_2025.pdf,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Validation of president-elect.
|
| 24 |
+
off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Constitutional Court of Moldova,Decision 24 confirming the 2024 constitutional referendum,https://constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?docid=866&l=ro&tip=hotariri,legal_validation_and_turnout_definition,final,HTML legal record,national,landing page,finalized election record,official legal record,https://constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?docid=866&l=ro&tip=hotariri,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Defines the referendum validity calculation and confirms adoption.
|
| 25 |
+
off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Constitutional Court of Moldova,Decision 25 confirming the 2024 presidential election,https://constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?docid=867&l=ro&tip=hotariri,legal_validation_complete_results_and_turnout_definition,final,HTML legal record,national,landing page,finalized election record,official legal record,https://constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?docid=867&l=ro&tip=hotariri,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Distinguishes protocol fields C and D and confirms both rounds.
|
| 26 |
+
off-md-2025-cec-h4149,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of Moldova,Decision 4149 centralizing the 28 September 2025 parliamentary results,https://a.cec.md/index.php/ro/cu-privire-la-centralizarea-rezultatelor-alegerilor-parlamentare-din-28-septembr-2751_115473.html,turnout_and_complete_results_landing,final,HTML with attachments,national and precinct,landing page,finalized election record,official record,https://a.cec.md/index.php/ro/cu-privire-la-centralizarea-rezultatelor-alegerilor-parlamentare-din-28-septembr-2751_115473.html,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Pairs the opaque workbook download with its decision page.
|
| 27 |
+
off-md-2025-cec-h4151,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Central Electoral Commission of Moldova,Decision 4151 allocating parliamentary mandates,https://a.cec.md/index.php/ro/cu-privire-la-atribuirea-mandatelor-de-deputat-in-parlamentul-republicii-2751_115476.html,seat_allocation,final,HTML with attachments,national,landing page,finalized election record,official record,https://a.cec.md/index.php/ro/cu-privire-la-atribuirea-mandatelor-de-deputat-in-parlamentul-republicii-2751_115476.html,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Official seat allocation.
|
| 28 |
+
off-md-2025-cc-h12,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova,Constitutional Court of Moldova,Decision 12 of 16 October 2025 confirming legality and validating 101 mandates,https://constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?docid=882&l=ro&tip=hotariri,legal_validation_and_mandates,final,HTML legal record,national,landing page,finalized election record,official legal record,https://constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?docid=882&l=ro&tip=hotariri,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Confirms the election and validates 101 mandates.
|
| 29 |
+
off-br-2026-contests,brazil-general-2026,Brazil,Superior Electoral Court,Resolution 23.751/2026 on offices contested and voting rules,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-751-de-26-de-fevereiro-de-2026,contest_definition,current,HTML legal record,national and state,landing page,election cycle,official legal record,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-751-de-26-de-fevereiro-de-2026,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Second round applies only to president and governors when required.
|
| 30 |
+
off-us-congress-election-law,us-midterms-2026,United States,United States Congress,2 U.S.C. sections 1 and 7: congressional election timing,https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&num=0&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title2-section7,contest_timing_context,current,HTML legal code,federal and state/district,landing page,statutory,public law,https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&num=0&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title2-section7,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,"The national date bundles separate House, Senate and special contests administered and certified by states."
|
| 31 |
+
off-nh-2024-primary-law,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,New Hampshire,New Hampshire General Court,RSA 659:73 and RSA 654:34 primary counting and undeclared-voter context,https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/LXIII/659/659-73.htm,denominator_and_counting_context,current,HTML legal code,state,landing page,statutory,public law,https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/LXIII/659/659-73.htm,,,2026-08-12,,,,2026-08-12,Explains why the all-party checklist is not a Democratic-primary turnout denominator.
|
data/official_election_metrics.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
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| 1 |
+
metric_id,election_id,geographic_unit_type,geographic_unit_code,metric_code,value,source_field_code,source_label_original,numerator_metric,denominator_metric,authority_reported_rate,computed_rate,legal_role,data_status,official_source_id,as_of_date,notes
|
| 2 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1-registered-voters,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,registered_voters,18021800,,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,,,,,context_or_denominator,final,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before annulment. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 332 in the signed protocol; values are preserved rather than forced to reconcile.
|
| 3 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1-ballots-cast,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,ballots_cast,9465650,,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,,,,,participation,final,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before annulment. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 332 in the signed protocol; values are preserved rather than forced to reconcile.
|
| 4 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1-valid-votes,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,valid_votes,9242186,,valid contest votes,,,,,result_denominator,final,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,
|
| 5 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2024-r1-turnout-rate,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,turnout_rate,0.525233328524,,turnout rate,turnout_numerator,registered_voters,0.525233328524,0.525233328524,reported_participation_rate,final,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before annulment. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 332 in the signed protocol; values are preserved rather than forced to reconcile.
|
| 6 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r1-registered-voters,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,registered_voters,17996367,,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,,,,,context_or_denominator,final,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Canonical FINAL protocol values; the live-presence dashboard used a different registered-voter snapshot. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 237 in the signed protocol.
|
| 7 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r1-ballots-cast,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,ballots_cast,9571899,,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,,,,,participation,final,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Canonical FINAL protocol values; the live-presence dashboard used a different registered-voter snapshot. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 237 in the signed protocol.
|
| 8 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r1-valid-votes,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,valid_votes,9430274,,valid contest votes,,,,,result_denominator,final,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,
|
| 9 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r1-turnout-rate,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,turnout_rate,0.531879517683,,turnout rate,turnout_numerator,registered_voters,0.531879517683,0.531879517683,reported_participation_rate,final,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Canonical FINAL protocol values; the live-presence dashboard used a different registered-voter snapshot. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 237 in the signed protocol.
|
| 10 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2-registered-voters,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,registered_voters,17996537,,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,,,,,context_or_denominator,final,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,"Final national totals include 3,142 postal votes omitted from the precinct CSV. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 70 in the signed protocol."
|
| 11 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2-ballots-cast,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,ballots_cast,11641999,,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,,,,,participation,final,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,"Final national totals include 3,142 postal votes omitted from the precinct CSV. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 70 in the signed protocol."
|
| 12 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2-valid-votes,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,valid_votes,11507695,,valid contest votes,,,,,result_denominator,final,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,
|
| 13 |
+
metric-elec-ro-pres-2025-r2-turnout-rate,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,turnout_rate,0.646902179014,,turnout rate,turnout_numerator,registered_voters,0.646902179014,0.646902179014,reported_participation_rate,final,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,"Final national totals include 3,142 postal votes omitted from the precinct CSV. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 70 in the signed protocol."
|
| 14 |
+
metric-elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024-ballots-cast,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,ballots_cast,125811,,Democratic regular plus absentee ballots cast,,,,,participation,final,off-nh-2024-ballots,2026-08-12,"116,927 regular plus 8,884 absentee Democratic ballots. The 901,008 all-party checklist total must not be used to construct a Democratic-primary turnout rate. Official contest votes were 123,996, leaving a 1,815 ballot-minus-contest-vote gap that the source does not classify as invalid or undervote."
|
| 15 |
+
metric-elec-br-general-2026-r1-registered-voters,elec-br-general-2026-r1,national,BRA,registered_voters,158745463,,official eligible electorate published by TSE after registration closed,,,,,context_or_denominator,pre_election,off-br-2026-electorate,2026-08-12,Pre-election electorate snapshot only. It is not turnout and no 2026 result existed at the cutoff.
|
| 16 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-a,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,A,2710856,A,electors on basic lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 17 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-b,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,B,312650,B,electors on supplementary lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 18 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-c,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,C,1564758,C,electors who received ballots,,,,,legal_turnout_numerator,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 19 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-d,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,D,1564495,D,electors who participated,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 20 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-e,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,E,263,E,received ballots minus participated,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 21 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-f,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,F,18464,F,invalid ballots,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 22 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-h,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,H,1546031,H,valid votes,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 23 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-a-plus-b,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,A_plus_B,3023506,A+B,post-election protocol denominator,,,,,legal_turnout_denominator,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 24 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-legal-turnout-rate,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,legal_turnout_rate,0.517530972322,,legal turnout rate,C,A+B,0.5175,0.517530972322,legal_validity_rate,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 25 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r1-participation-rate-d,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,participation_rate_D,0.5174439872121968,,D/(A+B),D,A+B,,0.5174439872121968,descriptive_participation_rate,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 26 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-a,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,A,2711615,A,electors on basic lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 27 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-b,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,B,309199,B,electors on supplementary lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 28 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-c,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,C,1532264,C,electors who received ballots,,,,,legal_turnout_numerator,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 29 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-d,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,D,1531392,D,electors who participated,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 30 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-e,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,E,872,E,received ballots minus participated,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 31 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-f,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,F,42518,F,invalid ballots,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 32 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-h,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,H,1488874,H,valid votes,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 33 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-a-plus-b,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,A_plus_B,3020814,A+B,post-election protocol denominator,,,,,legal_turnout_denominator,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 34 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-legal-turnout-rate,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,legal_turnout_rate,0.507235466997,,legal turnout rate,C,A+B,0.5072,0.507235466997,legal_validity_rate,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 35 |
+
metric-elec-md-referendum-2024-participation-rate-d,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,participation_rate_D,0.5069468030802293,,D/(A+B),D,A+B,,0.5069468030802293,descriptive_participation_rate,final,off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 36 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-a,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,A,2709867,A,electors on basic lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 37 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-b,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,B,423820,B,electors on supplementary lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 38 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-c,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,C,1701333,C,electors who received ballots,,,,,legal_turnout_numerator,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 39 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-d,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,D,1701284,D,electors who participated,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 40 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-e,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,E,49,E,received ballots minus participated,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 41 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-f,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,F,20715,F,invalid ballots,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 42 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-h,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,H,1680569,H,valid votes,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 43 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-a-plus-b,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,A_plus_B,3133687,A+B,post-election protocol denominator,,,,,legal_turnout_denominator,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 44 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-legal-turnout-rate,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,legal_turnout_rate,0.542917336671,,legal turnout rate,C,A+B,0.5429,0.542917336671,legal_validity_rate,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 45 |
+
metric-elec-md-pres-2024-r2-participation-rate-d,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,participation_rate_D,0.5429017001378887,,D/(A+B),D,A+B,,0.5429017001378887,descriptive_participation_rate,final,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 46 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-a,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,A,2738735,A,electors on basic lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 47 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-b,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,B,342244,B,electors on supplementary lists,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 48 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-c,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,C,1609715,C,electors who received ballots,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 49 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-d,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,D,1609579,D,electors who participated,,,,,legal_turnout_numerator,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 50 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-e,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,E,136,E,received ballots minus participated,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 51 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-f,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,F,30857,F,invalid ballots,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 52 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-h,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,H,1578722,H,valid votes,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 53 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-i,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,I,3662273,I,printed ballots,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 54 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-j,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,J,2052558,J,unused and cancelled ballots,,,,,protocol_component,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 55 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-a-plus-b,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,A_plus_B,3080979,A+B,post-election protocol denominator,,,,,legal_turnout_denominator,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 56 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-legal-turnout-rate,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,legal_turnout_rate,0.522424528048,,legal turnout rate,D,A+B,0.5224,0.522424528048,legal_validity_rate,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 57 |
+
metric-elec-md-parl-2025-participation-rate-d,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,participation_rate_D,0.5224245280477406,,D/(A+B),D,A+B,0.5224,0.5224245280477406,descriptive_participation_rate,final,off-md-2025-cec-h4149,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 58 |
+
metric-elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024-presidential-contest-votes,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,presidential_contest_votes,123996,,votes counted for the Democratic presidential contest,,,,,contest_total,final,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,"The 1,815 gap from Democratic ballots cast is not classified by the source."
|
| 59 |
+
metric-elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024-ballot-minus-contest-vote-gap,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,ballot_minus_contest_vote_gap,1815,,Democratic ballots cast minus presidential contest votes,,,,,unclassified_gap,final,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,Do not relabel as invalid or undervote without an official classification.
|
data/official_elections.csv
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
|
|
| 1 |
election_id,case_family_id,linked_case_ids,jurisdiction,iso3,election_name,contest_type,round,election_date,election_status,legal_result_status,administering_authority,geographic_scope,official_source_ids,as_of_date,notes
|
| 2 |
-
elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,romania-presidential-2024-2025,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,Romania,ROU,"Romania presidential election, first round (later annulled)",presidential,1,2024-11-24,completed,
|
| 3 |
-
elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,romania-presidential-2024-2025,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania,ROU,"Romania repeat presidential election, first round",presidential,1,2025-05-04,completed,
|
| 4 |
-
elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,romania-presidential-2024-2025,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania,ROU,"Romania repeat presidential election, second round",presidential,2,2025-05-18,completed,
|
| 5 |
-
elec-md-pres-2024-r1,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova,MDA,"Moldova presidential election, first round",presidential,1,2024-10-20,completed,
|
| 6 |
-
elec-md-referendum-2024,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova,MDA,Moldova constitutional referendum,referendum,single,2024-10-20,completed,
|
| 7 |
-
elec-md-pres-2024-r2,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova,MDA,"Moldova presidential election, second round",presidential,2,2024-11-03,completed,
|
| 8 |
-
elec-md-parl-2025,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,Moldova,MDA,Moldova parliamentary election,parliamentary,single,2025-09-28,completed,
|
| 9 |
elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,"New Hampshire, United States",USA,New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,primary,single,2024-01-23,completed,final,New Hampshire Secretary of State,state; county; town or city ward,off-nh-2024-ballots|off-nh-2024-dem-results|off-nh-2024-checklist,2026-08-12,The all-party checklist total is not a valid Democratic-primary turnout denominator because undeclared voters may choose a party ballot and same-day registration or party changes occur.
|
| 10 |
-
elec-br-general-2026-r1,brazil-general-2026,br-2026-election-preparedness|br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil,BRA,
|
| 11 |
-
elec-br-general-2026-r2,brazil-general-2026,br-2026-election-preparedness|br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil,BRA,
|
| 12 |
-
elec-us-midterms-2026,us-midterms-2026,us-2026-midterms-preparedness|us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,United States,USA,United States federal
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
election_id,case_family_id,linked_case_ids,jurisdiction,iso3,election_name,contest_type,round,election_date,election_status,legal_result_status,administering_authority,geographic_scope,official_source_ids,as_of_date,notes
|
| 2 |
+
elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,romania-presidential-2024-2025,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,Romania,ROU,"Romania presidential election, first round (later annulled)",presidential,1,2024-11-24,completed,validated_then_void,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad; postal residual,off-ro-2024-aep-final|off-ro-2024-ccr-annulment|off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"H31 first confirmed and validated the final first-round tally; H32 subsequently voided the entire process. Preserve final tally, validation, and process status separately."
|
| 3 |
+
elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,romania-presidential-2024-2025,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania,ROU,"Romania repeat presidential election, first round",presidential,1,2025-05-04,completed,CCR_confirmed_and_validated_2025-05-09,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad; postal residual,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final|off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,Canonical totals come from the FINAL national protocol rather than the live-presence counter.
|
| 4 |
+
elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,romania-presidential-2024-2025,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania,ROU,"Romania repeat presidential election, second round",presidential,2,2025-05-18,completed,CCR_confirmed_and_president_elected_2025-05-22,Permanent Electoral Authority / Central Electoral Bureau,national; county; locality; precinct; abroad; postal residual,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final|off-ro-2025-ccr-h43|off-ro-2025-ccr-h44,2026-08-12,Canonical totals include postal votes omitted from the precinct CSV export.
|
| 5 |
+
elec-md-pres-2024-r1,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova,MDA,"Moldova presidential election, first round",presidential,1,2024-10-20,completed,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,national; electoral circumscription; polling station; abroad,off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx|off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,"The same workbook contains national, circumscription, separator, and station rows; the dataset uses the official national summary row."
|
| 6 |
+
elec-md-referendum-2024,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova,MDA,Moldova constitutional referendum,referendum,single,2024-10-20,completed,law_adopted_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,national; electoral circumscription; polling station; abroad,off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx|off-md-2024-ref-cc-h24,2026-08-12,Question: Susțineți modificarea Constituției în vederea aderării Republicii Moldova la Uniunea Europeană? Validity threshold: one third; law adopted and confirmed.
|
| 7 |
+
elec-md-pres-2024-r2,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova,MDA,"Moldova presidential election, second round",presidential,2,2024-11-03,completed,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,national; electoral circumscription; polling station; abroad,off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx|off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,The dataset uses the official national summary row.
|
| 8 |
+
elec-md-parl-2025,moldova-elections-2024-2025,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,Moldova,MDA,Moldova parliamentary election,parliamentary,single,2025-09-28,completed,CEC_valid_Constitutional_Court_confirmed_101_mandates,Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova,national; electoral circumscription; polling station; abroad; postal voting,off-md-2025-parliament-xlsx|off-md-2025-cec-h4149|off-md-2025-cec-h4151|off-md-2025-cc-h12,2026-08-12,The official workbook explains that one Tokyo vote for Moldova Mare was invalidated during national centralization.
|
| 9 |
elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,"New Hampshire, United States",USA,New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,primary,single,2024-01-23,completed,final,New Hampshire Secretary of State,state; county; town or city ward,off-nh-2024-ballots|off-nh-2024-dem-results|off-nh-2024-checklist,2026-08-12,The all-party checklist total is not a valid Democratic-primary turnout denominator because undeclared voters may choose a party ballot and same-day registration or party changes occur.
|
| 10 |
+
elec-br-general-2026-r1,brazil-general-2026,br-2026-election-preparedness|br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil,BRA,Brazil 2026 first-round election bundle,election_bundle,1,2026-10-04,scheduled,not_yet_available,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,national; state; municipality; electoral zone,off-br-2026-calendar|off-br-2026-electorate|off-br-2026-candidates|off-br-2026-results-monitor|off-br-2026-contests,2026-08-12,"4 October bundles president, 27 governors, two Senate choices per elector, Chamber of Deputies, state assemblies and the Federal District chamber. Candidate files before the 15 August filing deadline are incomplete snapshots, not ballot qualification."
|
| 11 |
+
elec-br-general-2026-r2,brazil-general-2026,br-2026-election-preparedness|br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil,BRA,Brazil 2026 conditional presidential and gubernatorial runoffs,conditional_executive_runoffs,2,2026-10-25,conditional,not_yet_available,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,national; state; municipality; electoral zone,off-br-2026-calendar|off-br-2026-results-monitor|off-br-2026-contests,2026-08-12,25 October is limited to president and governors requiring a runoff; it is not a second round for legislative contests.
|
| 12 |
+
elec-us-midterms-2026,us-midterms-2026,us-2026-midterms-preparedness|us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads|us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,United States,USA,United States 2026 federal election bundle,election_bundle,varies_by_jurisdiction,2026-11-03,scheduled,not_yet_available,state and local election authorities; no single national certifier,state; congressional district; local election jurisdiction,off-us-2026-fec-dates|off-us-2026-fec-candidates|off-us-2024-eavs-benchmark|off-us-congress-election-law,2026-08-12,"Not one national contest: 435 House districts, Senate Class II and special/delegate contests are administered and certified by states; some jurisdictions can hold later runoffs. FEC files are calendar/finance snapshots, not ballot-access or result certification."
|
data/official_results.csv
CHANGED
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@@ -1,24 +1,69 @@
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| 1 |
-
result_id,election_id,geographic_unit_type,geographic_unit_code,geographic_unit_name,contest_name,candidate_or_option,party_or_affiliation,votes,valid_vote_share,rank,outcome,result_status,coverage_status,official_source_id,as_of_date,notes
|
| 2 |
-
result-ro24-calin-georgescu,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Călin Georgescu,independent,2120401,0.22942635,1,advanced_before_annulment,
|
| 3 |
-
result-ro24-elena-lasconi,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Elena Lasconi,USR,1772500,0.191783632141,2,advanced_before_annulment,
|
| 4 |
-
result-ro24-marcel-ciolacu,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Marcel Ciolacu,PSD,1769760,0.191487165482,3,not_advanced_before_annulment,
|
| 5 |
-
result-ro25r1-george-simion,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,George Simion,AUR,3862761,0.409612806584,1,advanced,
|
| 6 |
-
result-ro25r1-nicusor-dan,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Nicușor Dan,independent,1979767,0.209937378278,2,advanced,
|
| 7 |
-
result-ro25r1-crin-antonescu,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Crin Antonescu,Electoral Alliance Romania Forward,1892930,0.200729056229,3,not_advanced,
|
| 8 |
-
result-ro25r2-nicusor-dan,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Nicușor Dan,independent,6168642,0.536044968171,1,winner,
|
| 9 |
-
result-ro25r2-george-simion,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,George Simion,AUR,5339053,0.463955031829,2,runner_up,
|
| 10 |
-
result-md24r1-maia-sandu,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Maia Sandu,PAS,656852,0.424863408302,1,advanced,
|
| 11 |
-
result-md24r1-alexandr-stoianoglo,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Alexandr Stoianoglo,PSRM
|
| 12 |
-
result-md24r1-renato-usatii,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Renato Usatîi,Our Party,213169,0.137881452571,3,not_advanced,
|
| 13 |
-
result-mdref-yes,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,Moldova,Constitutional referendum,YES,,749719,0.503547647417,1,approved,
|
| 14 |
-
result-mdref-no,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,Moldova,Constitutional referendum,NO,,739155,0.496452352583,2,not_approved,
|
| 15 |
-
result-md24r2-maia-sandu,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Maia Sandu,PAS,930139,0.553466712762,1,winner,
|
| 16 |
-
result-md24r2-alexandr-stoianoglo,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Alexandr Stoianoglo,PSRM-supported independent,750430,0.446533287238,2,runner_up,
|
| 17 |
-
result-mdparl-pas,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,
|
| 18 |
-
result-mdparl-patriotic-bloc,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,
|
| 19 |
-
result-mdparl-alternative-bloc,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,
|
| 20 |
-
result-mdparl-our-party,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,
|
| 21 |
-
result-mdparl-democracy-at-home,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,
|
| 22 |
-
result-nh24-biden-write-in,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,Democratic presidential primary,Joe Biden (write-in),Democratic,79100,0.637923803994,1,winner,final,partial,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,"Biden was a write-in and is absent from the printed-candidate workbook. Share denominator is 123,996 presidential votes, not total Democratic ballots cast."
|
| 23 |
-
result-nh24-dean-phillips,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,Democratic presidential primary,Dean Phillips,Democratic,24377,0.196595051453,2,not_selected,final,partial,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,"Printed candidate. Share denominator is 123,996 presidential votes."
|
| 24 |
-
result-nh24-marianne-williamson,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,Democratic presidential primary,Marianne Williamson,Democratic,5016,0.040452917836,3,not_selected,final,partial,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,"Printed candidate. Share denominator is 123,996 presidential votes."
|
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| 1 |
+
result_id,election_id,geographic_unit_type,geographic_unit_code,geographic_unit_name,contest_name,candidate_or_option,party_or_affiliation,ballot_designating_entity,votes,valid_vote_share,rank,outcome,seats,result_status,coverage_status,official_source_id,as_of_date,notes
|
| 2 |
+
result-ro24-calin-georgescu,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Călin Georgescu,independent,,2120401,0.22942635,1,advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before the entire electoral process was annulled.
|
| 3 |
+
result-ro24-elena-lasconi,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Elena Lasconi,USR,,1772500,0.191783632141,2,advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before the entire electoral process was annulled.
|
| 4 |
+
result-ro24-marcel-ciolacu,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Marcel Ciolacu,PSD,,1769760,0.191487165482,3,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before the entire electoral process was annulled.
|
| 5 |
+
result-ro25r1-george-simion,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,George Simion,AUR,,3862761,0.409612806584,1,advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Top-three extract; consult the official source for all candidates.
|
| 6 |
+
result-ro25r1-nicusor-dan,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Nicușor Dan,independent,,1979767,0.209937378278,2,advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Top-three extract; consult the official source for all candidates.
|
| 7 |
+
result-ro25r1-crin-antonescu,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Crin Antonescu,Electoral Alliance Romania Forward,,1892930,0.200729056229,3,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Top-three extract; consult the official source for all candidates.
|
| 8 |
+
result-ro25r2-nicusor-dan,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Nicușor Dan,independent,,6168642,0.536044968171,1,winner,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,Complete two-candidate second-round result.
|
| 9 |
+
result-ro25r2-george-simion,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,George Simion,AUR,,5339053,0.463955031829,2,runner_up,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,Complete two-candidate second-round result.
|
| 10 |
+
result-md24r1-maia-sandu,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Maia Sandu,,PAS,656852,0.424863408302,1,advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,2026-08-12,Top-three extract; consult the official workbook for all candidates.
|
| 11 |
+
result-md24r1-alexandr-stoianoglo,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Alexandr Stoianoglo,,PSRM,401215,0.259512907568,2,advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,2026-08-12,Top-three extract; consult the official workbook for all candidates.
|
| 12 |
+
result-md24r1-renato-usatii,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Renato Usatîi,Our Party,,213169,0.137881452571,3,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,2026-08-12,Top-three extract; consult the official workbook for all candidates.
|
| 13 |
+
result-mdref-yes,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,Moldova,Constitutional referendum,YES,,,749719,0.503547647417,1,approved,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete,off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx,2026-08-12,Complete referendum result.
|
| 14 |
+
result-mdref-no,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,Moldova,Constitutional referendum,NO,,,739155,0.496452352583,2,not_approved,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete,off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx,2026-08-12,Complete referendum result.
|
| 15 |
+
result-md24r2-maia-sandu,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Maia Sandu,PAS,,930139,0.553466712762,1,winner,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete,off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx,2026-08-12,Complete two-candidate second-round result.
|
| 16 |
+
result-md24r2-alexandr-stoianoglo,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Alexandr Stoianoglo,PSRM-supported independent,,750430,0.446533287238,2,runner_up,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete,off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx,2026-08-12,Complete two-candidate second-round result.
|
| 17 |
+
result-mdparl-pas,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS),PAS,,792557,0.502024422286,1,gained_seats,55,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,Top-five vote extract; consult the official workbook and totalization report for all contestants and seat allocation.
|
| 18 |
+
result-mdparl-patriotic-bloc,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,"Blocul Electoral Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei",electoral bloc,,381984,0.241957735434,2,gained_seats,26,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,Top-five vote extract.
|
| 19 |
+
result-mdparl-alternative-bloc,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Blocul Electoral Alternativa,electoral bloc,,125706,0.079625165165,3,gained_seats,8,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,Top-five vote extract.
|
| 20 |
+
result-mdparl-our-party,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Partidul Nostru,PN,,97852,0.061981780199,4,gained_seats,6,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,Top-five vote extract.
|
| 21 |
+
result-mdparl-democracy-at-home,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Partidul Democrația Acasă,PPDA,,88679,0.056171384196,5,gained_seats,6,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,Top-five vote extract.
|
| 22 |
+
result-nh24-biden-write-in,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,Democratic presidential primary,Joe Biden (write-in),Democratic,,79100,0.637923803994,1,winner,,final,partial,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,"Biden was a write-in and is absent from the printed-candidate workbook. Share denominator is 123,996 presidential votes, not total Democratic ballots cast."
|
| 23 |
+
result-nh24-dean-phillips,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,Democratic presidential primary,Dean Phillips,Democratic,,24377,0.196595051453,2,not_selected,,final,partial,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,"Printed candidate. Share denominator is 123,996 presidential votes."
|
| 24 |
+
result-nh24-marianne-williamson,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,Democratic presidential primary,Marianne Williamson,Democratic,,5016,0.040452917836,3,not_selected,,final,partial,off-nh-2024-dem-results,2026-08-12,"Printed candidate. Share denominator is 123,996 presidential votes."
|
| 25 |
+
result-ro24-simion,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,George-Nicolae Simion,AUR,,1281325,0.13863873763198448,4,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 26 |
+
result-ro24-ciuca,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Nicolae-Ionel Ciucă,PNL,,811952,0.0878528088484694,5,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 27 |
+
result-ro24-geoana,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Mircea-Dan Geoană,independent,,583898,0.06317747770927787,6,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 28 |
+
result-ro24-kelemen,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Hunor Kelemen,UDMR,,416353,0.04504919074340205,7,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 29 |
+
result-ro24-diaconescu,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Cristian Diaconescu,independent,,286842,0.03103616395515087,8,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 30 |
+
result-ro24-terhes,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Cristian-Vasile Terheș,PNCR,,95782,0.010363565502793387,9,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 31 |
+
result-ro24-birchall,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Ana Birchall,independent,,42853,0.004636673618124543,10,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 32 |
+
result-ro24-orban,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Ludovic Orban,Forța Dreptei,,20089,0.002173619963934939,11,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 33 |
+
result-ro24-popescu,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Sebastian-Constantin Popescu,Partidul Noua Românie,,14683,0.0015886934108445773,12,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 34 |
+
result-ro24-bertalan,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Alexandra-Beatrice Bertalan-Păcuraru,Alternativa pentru Demnitate Națională,,14502,0.001569109299466598,13,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 35 |
+
result-ro24-predoiu,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Silviu Predoiu,Partidul Liga Acțiunii Naționale,,11246,0.0012168116936837237,14,not_advanced_before_annulment,,final_tally_validated_then_process_void,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2024-ccr-h31,2026-08-12,"Final tally first validated by H31, then the process was voided by H32."
|
| 36 |
+
result-ro25r1-ponta,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Victor-Viorel Ponta,independent,,1230164,0.13044838357825023,4,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 37 |
+
result-ro25r1-lasconi,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Elena-Valerica Lasconi,USR,,252721,0.02679890319199633,5,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 38 |
+
result-ro25r1-sandru,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Marcela-Lavinia Șandru,PUSL,,60682,0.0064348077266895955,6,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 39 |
+
result-ro25r1-funeriu,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Petru-Daniel Funeriu,independent,,49604,0.0052600804600163266,7,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 40 |
+
result-ro25r1-terhes,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Cristian-Vasile Terheș,PNCR,,36445,0.0038646809201938353,8,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 41 |
+
result-ro25r1-popescu,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Sebastian-Constantin Popescu,Partidul Noua Românie,,25994,0.0027564416474007013,9,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 42 |
+
result-ro25r1-banu,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,John-Ion Banu-Muscel,independent,,22020,0.002335032895120545,10,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 43 |
+
result-ro25r1-predoiu,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,Presidential election,Silviu Predoiu,Partidul Liga Acțiunii Naționale,,17186,0.0018224284893524833,11,not_advanced,,CCR_confirmed_and_validated,complete_national_contest,off-ro-2025-ccr-h39,2026-08-12,
|
| 44 |
+
result-md24r1-vlah,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Irina Vlah,independent,,83193,0.05381069331727501,4,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 45 |
+
result-md24r1-furtuna,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Victoria Furtună,independent,,68778,0.044486818181524175,5,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 46 |
+
result-md24r1-tarlev,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Vasile Tarlev,,Partidul pentru Viitorul Moldovei,49316,0.03189845481752953,6,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 47 |
+
result-md24r1-chicu,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Ion Chicu,,Partidul Dezvoltării și Consolidării Moldovei,31797,0.020566857973740502,7,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 48 |
+
result-md24r1-ticu,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Octavian Țîcu,,Blocul Electoral Împreună,14326,0.009266308372859276,8,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 49 |
+
result-md24r1-nastase,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Andrei Năstase,independent,,9946,0.006433247457521874,9,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 50 |
+
result-md24r1-morari,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Natalia Morari,independent,,9444,0.006108545042111058,10,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 51 |
+
result-md24r1-ulianovschi,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,Presidential election,Tudor Ulianovschi,independent,,7995,0.005171306396831629,11,not_advanced,,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2024-pres-cc-h25,2026-08-12,
|
| 52 |
+
result-mdparl-psde,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Partidul Social Democrat European,,,15060,0.009539361584876881,6,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 53 |
+
result-mdparl-andrei-nastase,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Andrei Năstase,independent,,13420,0.008500546644691086,7,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 54 |
+
result-mdparl-cub,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Coaliția pentru Unitate și Bunăstare,,,13314,0.008433403727825419,8,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 55 |
+
result-mdparl-respect,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Respect Moldova,,,10144,0.0064254504592955565,9,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 56 |
+
result-mdparl-loc,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Liga Orașelor și Comunelor,,,6120,0.0038765533133762625,10,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 57 |
+
result-mdparl-stamate,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Olesea Stamate,independent,,5257,0.003329908622290688,11,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 58 |
+
result-mdparl-impreuna,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Blocul Electoral Împreună,,,5030,0.003186121432399118,12,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 59 |
+
result-mdparl-pnm,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Partidul Național Moldovenesc,,,4813,0.0030486684799477044,13,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 60 |
+
result-mdparl-alde,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,ALDE,,,3576,0.0022651233086002477,14,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 61 |
+
result-mdparl-moldovenii,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Alianța Moldovenii,,,3509,0.0022226839177511937,15,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 62 |
+
result-mdparl-sanduta,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Victoria Sanduța,independent,,2862,0.0018128587553730168,16,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 63 |
+
result-mdparl-ucs,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Uniunea Creștin-Socială,,,1837,0.0011635994177568946,17,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 64 |
+
result-mdparl-aur,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,AUR,,,1604,0.0010160116854012295,18,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 65 |
+
result-mdparl-cretu,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Tatiana Crețu,independent,,1598,0.0010122111429371353,19,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 66 |
+
result-mdparl-liberal,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Partidul Liberal,,,1591,0.0010077771767290251,20,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 67 |
+
result-mdparl-noi,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Noua Opțiune Istorică,,,1412,0.0008943943265502096,21,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 68 |
+
result-mdparl-bun,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Blocul Unirea Națiunii,,,797,0.0005048387239805362,22,no_seats,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,
|
| 69 |
+
result-mdparl-moldova-mare,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,Parliamentary election,Partidul Moldova Mare,,,0,0,,excluded_ballots_invalidated,0,CEC_final_and_Constitutional_Court_confirmed,complete_national_contest,off-md-2025-cec-h4151,2026-08-12,Registered competitor; zero valid votes after ballots were invalidated. One Tokyo vote was reclassified invalid according to the official record.
|
data/official_turnout.csv
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
|
|
| 1 |
-
turnout_id,election_id,geographic_unit_type,geographic_unit_code,geographic_unit_name,data_status,electorate_measure,participation_measure,registered_voters,ballots_cast,valid_votes,invalid_votes,turnout_rate,reporting_units_total,reporting_units_counted,official_source_id,as_of_date,notes
|
| 2 |
-
turnout-ro-2024-r1-national,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,final,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,18021800,9465650,9242186,223132,0.525233328524,,,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before annulment. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 332 in the signed protocol; values are preserved rather than forced to reconcile.
|
| 3 |
-
turnout-ro-2025-r1-national,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,final,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,17996367,9571899,9430274,141388,0.531879517683,,,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Canonical FINAL protocol values; the live-presence dashboard used a different registered-voter snapshot. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 237 in the signed protocol.
|
| 4 |
-
turnout-ro-2025-r2-national,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,Romania,final,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,17996537,11641999,11507695,134234,0.646902179014,,,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,"Final national totals include 3,142 postal votes omitted from the precinct CSV. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 70 in the signed protocol."
|
| 5 |
-
turnout-md-2024-r1-national,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,final,basic-list
|
| 6 |
-
turnout-md-2024-referendum-national,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,Moldova,final,basic-list
|
| 7 |
-
turnout-md-2024-r2-national,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,Moldova,final,basic-list
|
| 8 |
-
turnout-md-2025-parliament-national,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,final,basic-list
|
| 9 |
-
turnout-nh-2024-dem-primary-state,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,final,not supplied because no single official checklist field is a valid Democratic-primary denominator,Democratic regular plus absentee ballots cast,,125811,,,,,,off-nh-2024-ballots,2026-08-12,"116,927 regular plus 8,884 absentee Democratic ballots. The 901,008 all-party checklist total must not be used to construct a Democratic-primary turnout rate."
|
| 10 |
-
electorate-br-2026-audited-national,elec-br-general-2026-r1,national,BRA,Brazil,pre_election,
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
turnout_id,election_id,geographic_unit_type,geographic_unit_code,geographic_unit_name,data_status,electorate_measure,participation_measure,registered_voters,ballots_cast,turnout_numerator,turnout_numerator_measure,authority_reported_turnout_rate,valid_votes,invalid_votes,turnout_rate,reporting_units_total,reporting_units_counted,official_source_id,as_of_date,notes
|
| 2 |
+
turnout-ro-2024-r1-national,elec-ro-pres-2024-r1,national,ROU,Romania,final,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,18021800,9465650,9465650,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,0.525233328524,9242186,223132,0.525233328524,,,off-ro-2024-aep-final,2026-08-12,Final count before annulment. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 332 in the signed protocol; values are preserved rather than forced to reconcile.
|
| 3 |
+
turnout-ro-2025-r1-national,elec-ro-pres-2025-r1,national,ROU,Romania,final,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,17996367,9571899,9571899,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,0.531879517683,9430274,141388,0.531879517683,,,off-ro-2025-r1-aep-final,2026-08-12,Canonical FINAL protocol values; the live-presence dashboard used a different registered-voter snapshot. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 237 in the signed protocol.
|
| 4 |
+
turnout-ro-2025-r2-national,elec-ro-pres-2025-r2,national,ROU,Romania,final,final protocol field a: voters on permanent electoral lists,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,17996537,11641999,11641999,final protocol field b: voters who cast a ballot,0.646902179014,11507695,134234,0.646902179014,,,off-ro-2025-r2-aep-final,2026-08-12,"Final national totals include 3,142 postal votes omitted from the precinct CSV. Ballots cast differ from valid plus invalid by 70 in the signed protocol."
|
| 5 |
+
turnout-md-2024-r1-national,elec-md-pres-2024-r1,national,MDA,Moldova,final,post-election protocol fields A+B: basic-list plus supplementary-list electors; not a conventional fixed ex-ante register,protocol field D: voters who participated,3023506,1564495,1564758,protocol field C: voters receiving ballots,0.5175,1546031,18464,0.517530972322,2219,2219,off-md-2024-pres-r1-xlsx,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1564758; D=1564495; E=C-D=263.
|
| 6 |
+
turnout-md-2024-referendum-national,elec-md-referendum-2024,national,MDA,Moldova,final,post-election protocol fields A+B: basic-list plus supplementary-list electors; not a conventional fixed ex-ante register,protocol field D: voters who participated,3020814,1531392,1532264,protocol field C: voters receiving ballots,0.5072,1488874,42518,0.507235466997,2219,2219,off-md-2024-referendum-xlsx,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-third validity threshold. C=1532264; D=1531392; E=C-D=872.
|
| 7 |
+
turnout-md-2024-r2-national,elec-md-pres-2024-r2,national,MDA,Moldova,final,post-election protocol fields A+B: basic-list plus supplementary-list electors; not a conventional fixed ex-ante register,protocol field D: voters who participated,3133687,1701284,1701333,protocol field C: voters receiving ballots,0.5429,1680569,20715,0.542917336671,2219,2219,off-md-2024-pres-r2-xlsx,2026-08-12,The protocol distinguishes voters receiving ballots (C) from voters participating (D); the Constitutional Court applied C/(A+B) to the one-fifth validity threshold. C=1701333; D=1701284; E=C-D=49.
|
| 8 |
+
turnout-md-2025-parliament-national,elec-md-parl-2025,national,MDA,Moldova,final,post-election protocol fields A+B: basic-list plus supplementary-list electors; not a conventional fixed ex-ante register,protocol field D: voters who participated,3080979,1609579,1609579,protocol field D: voters who participated,0.5224,1578722,30857,0.522424528048,2274,2274,off-md-2025-parliament-xlsx,2026-08-12,CEC declared the election valid on 5 October 2025; the Constitutional Court confirmed legality and 101 mandates on 16 October. For this election the official 52.24% rate uses D/(A+B). C=1609715; D=1609579; E=C-D=136.
|
| 9 |
+
turnout-nh-2024-dem-primary-state,elec-us-nh-dem-primary-2024,state,US-NH,New Hampshire,final,not supplied because no single official checklist field is a valid Democratic-primary denominator,Democratic regular plus absentee ballots cast,,125811,125811,Democratic regular plus absentee ballots cast,,,,,,,off-nh-2024-ballots,2026-08-12,"116,927 regular plus 8,884 absentee Democratic ballots. The 901,008 all-party checklist total must not be used to construct a Democratic-primary turnout rate. Official contest votes were 123,996, leaving a 1,815 ballot-minus-contest-vote gap that the source does not classify as invalid or undervote."
|
| 10 |
+
electorate-br-2026-audited-national,elec-br-general-2026-r1,national,BRA,Brazil,pre_election,official eligible electorate published by TSE after registration closed,not yet available,158745463,,,not yet available,,,,,,,off-br-2026-electorate,2026-08-12,Pre-election electorate snapshot only. It is not turnout and no 2026 result existed at the cutoff.
|
data/pathways.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
pathway_id,case_id,affected_agency,control_shift_from,control_shift_to,mechanism,opacity,personalization,contestability,duration,power_recipient,harm_pathway,observed_outcome,agency_transfer_status,assessment_label,source_claim_ids,reviewer_note
|
| 2 |
+
ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,Romanian voters and election institutions,campaign and influence-network operators plus platform ranking systems,opaque promotion and recommender amplification,network and ranking opacity,low,low,persistent_campaign_period,campaign operators and platform ranking systems,unequal agenda-setting and impaired informed choice; institutional trust shock,annulment and repeat election; individual behavioural effect unknown,partial_chain_observed,strong_inference,clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-006|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013,Generative AI was not established as material; sponsorship and causal vote effect remain unresolved.
|
| 3 |
+
ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,Romanian voters and authentic local speakers,unidentified network operator,"synthetic personas, hijacked accounts and cross-platform amplification",operator and provenance opacity,low,medium,months,unidentified network operator and platforms,manufactured local consensus and controlled agenda cues,network occurrence and reach observed; belief and election effects unknown,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-ro-014|clm-ro-015|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017|clm-ro-018,Do not infer Russian-state command from pro-Russia narratives alone.
|
| 4 |
+
ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,preference_participation_and_trust,Moldovan voters,Shor-linked and Russia-linked influence and finance networks,"payments, coordination, bots, spoofed media and synthetic content",sponsor and finance opacity,low,medium,multi_election,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,covert inducement and manufactured social proof can displace independent deliberation,attempted and accepted inducement documented; how recipients voted and election effect unknown,partial_chain_observed,strong_inference,clm-md-003|clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009|clm-md-010|clm-md-011,Administrative advantage and media imbalance are independent competing explanations and harms.
|
| 5 |
+
ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,Moldovan social-media users,InfoLeaders curators and linked political networks,central scripts locally personalised by paid participants and mutual amplification,coordination and payment opacity,low,medium,months,network curators and financiers,paid coordination masquerades as peer speech and controls apparent local salience,"content and engagement observed; persuasion, turnout, votes and seats unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018|clm-md-019,Engagement totals are non-unique and not causal outcomes.
|
| 6 |
+
ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,Steve Kramer and the telecom delivery chain,"cloned trusted voice, selected call list and spoofed caller ID",high apparent-authorship deception,medium,high_after_enforcement,short_campaign_burst,political operator and telecom chain,operator controlled who appeared to speak and the apparent relevance of a demobilising instruction,"attempt and delivery counts observed; listener belief, action and turnout effect unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-009|clm-nh-010|clm-nh-012,Criminal acquittal does not erase FCC and civil findings; legal outcomes must remain separate.
|
| 7 |
+
ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,future_information_and_platform_governance,Brazilian voters and election authorities,not_applicable_observed_controller,prospective synthetic media and provider outputs,prospective,unknown,unknown,future_election,"potential campaigns, providers and platforms constrained by TSE",monitoring hypothesis only,rules and preparations observed; no case-level agency transfer asserted,not_an_incident,speculative_scenario,clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-006|clm-br-007|clm-br-009,Preparedness file is excluded from incident counts.
|
| 8 |
+
ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,political_presence_and_endorsement,Jair Bolsonaro as represented person and Brazilian voters,campaign deployer,disclosed synthetic surrogate,disclosed synthesis but authorisation unresolved,medium,medium,single_event_with_reuse_risk,campaign producer,campaign can deploy a recognisable political persona without physical or verified participation,"avatar and disclosure observed; authorisation, belief and election effects unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-014|clm-br-017|clm-br-019|clm-br-020,Transparent disclosure mitigates deception; legal status and authorisation remained unresolved.
|
| 9 |
+
ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,future_information_and_election_trust,United States voters and election officials,not_applicable_observed_controller,"prospective campaign, foreign, platform, telecom and AI-provider mechanisms",prospective and fragmented governance,unknown,unknown,future_election,potential campaigns and infrastructure providers,monitoring hypothesis only,governance fragmentation and prior-cycle risks observed; no new operation inferred,not_an_incident,speculative_scenario,clm-us26-001|clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-007,Preparedness file is excluded from incident counts.
|
| 10 |
+
ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,represented candidates and voters,campaigns and political committees,synthetic first-person candidate performances,disclosure varies and can be low-salience,medium,medium,campaign_cycle,campaign sponsors and distributors,"sponsor controls simulated speech, timing, image and affect rather than only message selection","multiple attributed assets observed; comparable reach, belief and election effects unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-010|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-012|clm-us26-013|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016,"Some assets use real quotations, labels or obvious satire; content-item coding is required."
|
| 11 |
+
ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,Connie Chan as represented person and users asking questions,Scott Wiener for Congress and its provider stack,"campaign-controlled first-person dynamic opponent simulation with policy-permitted query-log review; exact prompt, retrieval and guardrails unknown","AI and parody disclosed; system prompt, retrieval sources, actual log use and guardrails opaque",high,high_after_removal,four_day_deployment_plus_90_day_retention_policy,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,sponsor controls how the opponent appears to answer and may learn what users ask under the stated policy,"deployment, model family, question count, privacy policy and removal observed; actual retention, user and electoral effects unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-006|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-009|clm-usca11-010|clm-usca11-011,Strongest current bridge to the thesis because the system is adaptive and interactive; explicit parody is essential counterevidence.
|
data/research_view.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
pathway_id,case_id,case_title,country,election_date,record_type,case_status,manipulation_assessment,generative_ai_status,ai_role,system_or_model,controller,influence_vector,target,affected_agency,agency_transfer_status,power_recipient,reach_summary,behavioural_effect,electoral_effect,evidence_strength,main_uncertainty,last_verified
|
| 2 |
+
ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,2024-11-24,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,not_established,material_amplification,TikTok: recommender and integrity systems,mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",Romanian voters,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,partial_chain_observed,campaign operators and platform ranking systems,"25,000 accounts; officially_reported; unknown; final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round",unknown,institutionally_asserted,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
|
| 3 |
+
ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,2025-05-04,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,unknown: DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles,unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",Romanian voters,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,unidentified network operator and platforms,"215 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06 | 8,514 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
|
| 4 |
+
ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,2024-10-20,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,mixed,unknown: synthetic impersonation tools,Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,"payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video","Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora",preference_participation_and_trust,partial_chain_observed,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"4,200 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11 | 335,000 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11",indicated,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
|
| 5 |
+
ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,2025-09-28,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,"unknown: AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems",foreign-funded political and influence networks,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Moldovan voters,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,network curators and financiers,"253 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window | 28,708 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
|
| 6 |
+
ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,2024-01-23,observed_incident,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,core_generation,ElevenLabs: AI voice-cloning service,Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,political operator and telecom chain,"9,581 call_attempts; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window | 3,978 completed_calls; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
|
| 7 |
+
ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,not identified or not applicable,"campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors","synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",Brazilian voters,future_information_and_platform_governance,not_an_incident,"potential campaigns, providers and platforms constrained by TSE",No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
|
| 8 |
+
ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,2026-10-04,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: synthetic image-and-voice avatar system,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,political_presence_and_endorsement,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,campaign producer,No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
|
| 9 |
+
ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,not identified or not applicable,"campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers","synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",United States voters,future_information_and_election_trust,not_an_incident,potential campaigns and infrastructure providers,No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
|
| 10 |
+
ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,2026-11-03,observed_campaign_set,ongoing,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools,National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,voters in contested federal and state races,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,campaign sponsors and distributors,"3,700 views; platform_snapshot; unknown; snapshot_2026-08-11",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
|
| 11 |
+
ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,2026-11-03,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,Anthropic: Claude | Amazon Web Services|Google: hosting and analytics stack,Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified,"interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media",California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,"5,058 submitted_questions; campaign_reported; unknown; first_27_hours | 2 billboards; campaign_reported; not_applicable; August_2026",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",2026-08-12
|
data/sampling_frame.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
frame_id,region,selection_basis,search_status,search_languages,source_channels,included_case_count,candidate_count,negative_search_recorded,known_gap,last_searched
|
| 2 |
+
frame-europe,Europe,purposive anchor cases plus structured comparative screening; not a census,partial,en|ro|pt|selected_local_sources,official election bodies|courts|platform reports|peer-reviewed studies|fact-checkers|investigative reporting,4,14,false,Strongest current core coverage; still purposive and concentrated in Romania/Moldova.,2026-08-12
|
| 3 |
+
frame-north-america,North America,purposive anchor cases plus structured comparative screening; not a census,partial,primarily_en_with_selected_local_sources,official election bodies|courts|platform reports|peer-reviewed studies|fact-checkers|investigative reporting,4,9,false,"One adjudicated 2024 robocall, two 2026 campaign records, and several model audits; no prevalence frame.",2026-08-12
|
| 4 |
+
frame-south-america,South America,purposive anchor cases plus structured comparative screening; not a census,partial,primarily_en_with_selected_local_sources,official election bodies|courts|platform reports|peer-reviewed studies|fact-checkers|investigative reporting,2,9,true,Brazil core is mainly preparedness/current use; completed Colombia/Ecuador leads remain to be disaggregated.,2026-08-12
|
| 5 |
+
frame-asia,Asia,purposive anchor cases plus structured comparative screening; not a census,partial,primarily_en_with_selected_local_sources,official election bodies|courts|platform reports|peer-reviewed studies|fact-checkers|investigative reporting,0,10,false,Screening leads exist but no claim-coded core case yet.,2026-08-12
|
| 6 |
+
frame-africa,Africa,purposive anchor cases plus structured comparative screening; not a census,partial,primarily_en_with_selected_local_sources,official election bodies|courts|platform reports|peer-reviewed studies|fact-checkers|investigative reporting,0,4,false,Screening leads exist but no claim-coded core case yet.,2026-08-12
|
| 7 |
+
frame-oceania,Oceania,purposive anchor cases plus structured comparative screening; not a census,partial,primarily_en_with_selected_local_sources,official election bodies|courts|platform reports|peer-reviewed studies|fact-checkers|investigative reporting,0,1,false,One knowledge-poisoning lead; no claim-coded core case yet.,2026-08-12
|
| 8 |
+
frame-cross-national,Cross-national,purposive anchor cases plus structured comparative screening; not a census,not_started,primarily_en_with_selected_local_sources,official election bodies|courts|platform reports|peer-reviewed studies|fact-checkers|investigative reporting,0,0,false,Empirical studies span jurisdictions; not incident counts.,2026-08-12
|
data/schema.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
|
|
| 13 |
"case_status",
|
| 14 |
"as_of_date",
|
| 15 |
"anchor_case",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
"summary",
|
| 17 |
"actor_controlling_system",
|
| 18 |
"actor_type",
|
|
@@ -48,6 +50,9 @@
|
|
| 48 |
"claim_text",
|
| 49 |
"evidence_label",
|
| 50 |
"confidence",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 51 |
"source_ids",
|
| 52 |
"counter_source_ids",
|
| 53 |
"notes",
|
|
@@ -66,6 +71,11 @@
|
|
| 66 |
"jurisdiction",
|
| 67 |
"language",
|
| 68 |
"source_quality",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 69 |
"retrieved_at",
|
| 70 |
"notes"
|
| 71 |
],
|
|
@@ -150,6 +160,9 @@
|
|
| 150 |
"participation_measure",
|
| 151 |
"registered_voters",
|
| 152 |
"ballots_cast",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 153 |
"valid_votes",
|
| 154 |
"invalid_votes",
|
| 155 |
"turnout_rate",
|
|
@@ -168,10 +181,12 @@
|
|
| 168 |
"contest_name",
|
| 169 |
"candidate_or_option",
|
| 170 |
"party_or_affiliation",
|
|
|
|
| 171 |
"votes",
|
| 172 |
"valid_vote_share",
|
| 173 |
"rank",
|
| 174 |
"outcome",
|
|
|
|
| 175 |
"result_status",
|
| 176 |
"coverage_status",
|
| 177 |
"official_source_id",
|
|
@@ -192,7 +207,230 @@
|
|
| 192 |
"access_method",
|
| 193 |
"update_frequency",
|
| 194 |
"license_or_terms",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 195 |
"retrieved_at",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 196 |
"notes"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
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|
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|
|
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
| 197 |
]
|
| 198 |
}
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
"case_status",
|
| 14 |
"as_of_date",
|
| 15 |
"anchor_case",
|
| 16 |
+
"record_type",
|
| 17 |
+
"manipulation_assessment",
|
| 18 |
"summary",
|
| 19 |
"actor_controlling_system",
|
| 20 |
"actor_type",
|
|
|
|
| 50 |
"claim_text",
|
| 51 |
"evidence_label",
|
| 52 |
"confidence",
|
| 53 |
+
"coder_confidence_in_label",
|
| 54 |
+
"claim_status",
|
| 55 |
+
"evidence_strength",
|
| 56 |
"source_ids",
|
| 57 |
"counter_source_ids",
|
| 58 |
"notes",
|
|
|
|
| 71 |
"jurisdiction",
|
| 72 |
"language",
|
| 73 |
"source_quality",
|
| 74 |
+
"source_independence",
|
| 75 |
+
"method_transparency",
|
| 76 |
+
"access_status",
|
| 77 |
+
"archive_url",
|
| 78 |
+
"content_hash",
|
| 79 |
"retrieved_at",
|
| 80 |
"notes"
|
| 81 |
],
|
|
|
|
| 160 |
"participation_measure",
|
| 161 |
"registered_voters",
|
| 162 |
"ballots_cast",
|
| 163 |
+
"turnout_numerator",
|
| 164 |
+
"turnout_numerator_measure",
|
| 165 |
+
"authority_reported_turnout_rate",
|
| 166 |
"valid_votes",
|
| 167 |
"invalid_votes",
|
| 168 |
"turnout_rate",
|
|
|
|
| 181 |
"contest_name",
|
| 182 |
"candidate_or_option",
|
| 183 |
"party_or_affiliation",
|
| 184 |
+
"ballot_designating_entity",
|
| 185 |
"votes",
|
| 186 |
"valid_vote_share",
|
| 187 |
"rank",
|
| 188 |
"outcome",
|
| 189 |
+
"seats",
|
| 190 |
"result_status",
|
| 191 |
"coverage_status",
|
| 192 |
"official_source_id",
|
|
|
|
| 207 |
"access_method",
|
| 208 |
"update_frequency",
|
| 209 |
"license_or_terms",
|
| 210 |
+
"landing_url",
|
| 211 |
+
"download_url",
|
| 212 |
+
"published_or_updated_at",
|
| 213 |
"retrieved_at",
|
| 214 |
+
"content_sha256",
|
| 215 |
+
"content_bytes",
|
| 216 |
+
"source_schema_version",
|
| 217 |
+
"snapshot_cutoff",
|
| 218 |
"notes"
|
| 219 |
+
],
|
| 220 |
+
"official_election_metrics": [
|
| 221 |
+
"metric_id",
|
| 222 |
+
"election_id",
|
| 223 |
+
"geographic_unit_type",
|
| 224 |
+
"geographic_unit_code",
|
| 225 |
+
"metric_code",
|
| 226 |
+
"value",
|
| 227 |
+
"source_field_code",
|
| 228 |
+
"source_label_original",
|
| 229 |
+
"numerator_metric",
|
| 230 |
+
"denominator_metric",
|
| 231 |
+
"authority_reported_rate",
|
| 232 |
+
"computed_rate",
|
| 233 |
+
"legal_role",
|
| 234 |
+
"data_status",
|
| 235 |
+
"official_source_id",
|
| 236 |
+
"as_of_date",
|
| 237 |
+
"notes"
|
| 238 |
+
],
|
| 239 |
+
"research_view": [
|
| 240 |
+
"pathway_id",
|
| 241 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 242 |
+
"case_title",
|
| 243 |
+
"country",
|
| 244 |
+
"election_date",
|
| 245 |
+
"record_type",
|
| 246 |
+
"case_status",
|
| 247 |
+
"manipulation_assessment",
|
| 248 |
+
"generative_ai_status",
|
| 249 |
+
"ai_role",
|
| 250 |
+
"system_or_model",
|
| 251 |
+
"controller",
|
| 252 |
+
"influence_vector",
|
| 253 |
+
"target",
|
| 254 |
+
"affected_agency",
|
| 255 |
+
"agency_transfer_status",
|
| 256 |
+
"power_recipient",
|
| 257 |
+
"reach_summary",
|
| 258 |
+
"behavioural_effect",
|
| 259 |
+
"electoral_effect",
|
| 260 |
+
"evidence_strength",
|
| 261 |
+
"main_uncertainty",
|
| 262 |
+
"last_verified"
|
| 263 |
+
],
|
| 264 |
+
"case_catalog": [
|
| 265 |
+
"catalog_id",
|
| 266 |
+
"record_layer",
|
| 267 |
+
"record_type",
|
| 268 |
+
"title",
|
| 269 |
+
"country",
|
| 270 |
+
"region",
|
| 271 |
+
"election_name",
|
| 272 |
+
"election_date",
|
| 273 |
+
"case_status",
|
| 274 |
+
"manipulation_assessment",
|
| 275 |
+
"ai_role",
|
| 276 |
+
"generative_ai_status",
|
| 277 |
+
"evidence_maturity",
|
| 278 |
+
"incident_count_eligible",
|
| 279 |
+
"research_status",
|
| 280 |
+
"source_count_or_links",
|
| 281 |
+
"main_caveat",
|
| 282 |
+
"last_checked"
|
| 283 |
+
],
|
| 284 |
+
"case_actors": [
|
| 285 |
+
"case_actor_id",
|
| 286 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 287 |
+
"actor_name",
|
| 288 |
+
"actor_role",
|
| 289 |
+
"actor_type",
|
| 290 |
+
"attribution_status",
|
| 291 |
+
"control_dimension",
|
| 292 |
+
"source_claim_ids",
|
| 293 |
+
"notes"
|
| 294 |
+
],
|
| 295 |
+
"technology_uses": [
|
| 296 |
+
"tech_use_id",
|
| 297 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 298 |
+
"provider",
|
| 299 |
+
"product_or_model",
|
| 300 |
+
"version",
|
| 301 |
+
"access_type",
|
| 302 |
+
"technology_role",
|
| 303 |
+
"use_status",
|
| 304 |
+
"provenance_status",
|
| 305 |
+
"evidence_label",
|
| 306 |
+
"source_claim_ids",
|
| 307 |
+
"notes"
|
| 308 |
+
],
|
| 309 |
+
"content_items": [
|
| 310 |
+
"content_item_id",
|
| 311 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 312 |
+
"title",
|
| 313 |
+
"media_type",
|
| 314 |
+
"represented_person",
|
| 315 |
+
"communication_goal",
|
| 316 |
+
"representation_mode",
|
| 317 |
+
"ai_disclosure",
|
| 318 |
+
"authorization_status",
|
| 319 |
+
"disclosure_salience",
|
| 320 |
+
"presentation_mode",
|
| 321 |
+
"source_claim_ids",
|
| 322 |
+
"notes"
|
| 323 |
+
],
|
| 324 |
+
"pathways": [
|
| 325 |
+
"pathway_id",
|
| 326 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 327 |
+
"affected_agency",
|
| 328 |
+
"control_shift_from",
|
| 329 |
+
"control_shift_to",
|
| 330 |
+
"mechanism",
|
| 331 |
+
"opacity",
|
| 332 |
+
"personalization",
|
| 333 |
+
"contestability",
|
| 334 |
+
"duration",
|
| 335 |
+
"power_recipient",
|
| 336 |
+
"harm_pathway",
|
| 337 |
+
"observed_outcome",
|
| 338 |
+
"agency_transfer_status",
|
| 339 |
+
"assessment_label",
|
| 340 |
+
"source_claim_ids",
|
| 341 |
+
"reviewer_note"
|
| 342 |
+
],
|
| 343 |
+
"observations": [
|
| 344 |
+
"observation_id",
|
| 345 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 346 |
+
"pathway_id",
|
| 347 |
+
"claim_id",
|
| 348 |
+
"metric_family",
|
| 349 |
+
"metric_name",
|
| 350 |
+
"value_low",
|
| 351 |
+
"value_best",
|
| 352 |
+
"value_high",
|
| 353 |
+
"value_operator",
|
| 354 |
+
"unit",
|
| 355 |
+
"denominator",
|
| 356 |
+
"unique_entity_status",
|
| 357 |
+
"platform",
|
| 358 |
+
"geographic_scope",
|
| 359 |
+
"measurement_window",
|
| 360 |
+
"measurement_method",
|
| 361 |
+
"causal_status",
|
| 362 |
+
"source_id",
|
| 363 |
+
"as_of_date",
|
| 364 |
+
"limitations"
|
| 365 |
+
],
|
| 366 |
+
"model_evaluations": [
|
| 367 |
+
"evaluation_id",
|
| 368 |
+
"title",
|
| 369 |
+
"country",
|
| 370 |
+
"evaluation_window",
|
| 371 |
+
"election_or_context",
|
| 372 |
+
"systems_tested",
|
| 373 |
+
"versions_known",
|
| 374 |
+
"interface",
|
| 375 |
+
"languages",
|
| 376 |
+
"sample_unit",
|
| 377 |
+
"sample_size",
|
| 378 |
+
"design",
|
| 379 |
+
"primary_metrics",
|
| 380 |
+
"headline_results",
|
| 381 |
+
"causal_scope",
|
| 382 |
+
"source_id",
|
| 383 |
+
"data_availability",
|
| 384 |
+
"notes"
|
| 385 |
+
],
|
| 386 |
+
"claim_evidence": [
|
| 387 |
+
"claim_evidence_id",
|
| 388 |
+
"claim_id",
|
| 389 |
+
"source_id",
|
| 390 |
+
"relation",
|
| 391 |
+
"evidence_scope",
|
| 392 |
+
"directness",
|
| 393 |
+
"locator",
|
| 394 |
+
"extracted_at"
|
| 395 |
+
],
|
| 396 |
+
"analytic_record_claims": [
|
| 397 |
+
"record_claim_id",
|
| 398 |
+
"record_type",
|
| 399 |
+
"record_id",
|
| 400 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 401 |
+
"claim_id",
|
| 402 |
+
"relation"
|
| 403 |
+
],
|
| 404 |
+
"case_elections": [
|
| 405 |
+
"case_election_id",
|
| 406 |
+
"case_id",
|
| 407 |
+
"election_id",
|
| 408 |
+
"relation"
|
| 409 |
+
],
|
| 410 |
+
"election_sources": [
|
| 411 |
+
"election_source_id",
|
| 412 |
+
"election_id",
|
| 413 |
+
"official_source_id",
|
| 414 |
+
"source_role"
|
| 415 |
+
],
|
| 416 |
+
"sampling_frame": [
|
| 417 |
+
"frame_id",
|
| 418 |
+
"region",
|
| 419 |
+
"selection_basis",
|
| 420 |
+
"search_status",
|
| 421 |
+
"search_languages",
|
| 422 |
+
"source_channels",
|
| 423 |
+
"included_case_count",
|
| 424 |
+
"candidate_count",
|
| 425 |
+
"negative_search_recorded",
|
| 426 |
+
"known_gap",
|
| 427 |
+
"last_searched"
|
| 428 |
+
],
|
| 429 |
+
"coverage_summary": [
|
| 430 |
+
"region",
|
| 431 |
+
"included_case_count",
|
| 432 |
+
"candidate_count",
|
| 433 |
+
"model_evaluation_count",
|
| 434 |
+
"coverage_note"
|
| 435 |
]
|
| 436 |
}
|
data/sources.csv
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,58 +1,71 @@
|
|
| 1 |
-
source_id,title,publisher,author,publication_date,url,source_type,primary_secondary,jurisdiction,language,source_quality,retrieved_at,notes
|
| 2 |
-
src-ro-ccr-20241206,"Press Release, 6 December 2024",Constitutional Court of Romania,,2024-12-06,https://www.ccr.ro/en/press-release-6-dec/,court_release,primary,Romania,en,A,2026-08-11,Authoritative record of annulment; does not by itself resolve every underlying factual or causal claim.
|
| 3 |
-
src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,Summary of cases delivered by the Constitutional Court of Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,,2025-04-01,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/SUMMARY-OF-THE-CASES-DELIVERED.pdf,court_summary,primary,Romania,en,A,2026-08-11,Includes the court's summary of Decision No. 32 of 6 December 2024.
|
| 4 |
-
src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,Commission opens formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks under the Digital Services Act,European Commission,,2024-12-17,https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-opens-formal-proceedings-against-tiktok-election-risks-under-digital-services-act,regulatory_release,primary,European Union,en,A,2026-08-11,Opening of proceedings is not a final finding of infringement.
|
| 5 |
-
src-ro-venice-202503,Urgent report on the cancellation of election results by constitutional courts,European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),,2025-03-17,https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282025%29003-e,legal_analysis,primary,Council of Europe,en,A,2026-08-11,Standards-oriented analysis of annulment in the digital-technology context.
|
| 6 |
-
src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,"Romania, Presidential Election, 4 and 18 May 2025: Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2025-10-28,https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/f/3/600295_0.pdf,election_observation,primary,Romania,en,A,2026-08-11,ODIHR final observation report published 28 October 2025.
|
| 7 |
-
src-ro-tiktok-integrity,Continuing to protect the integrity of TikTok during Romanian elections,TikTok,,2024-12-06,https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/continuing-to-protect-the-integrity-of-tiktok-during-romanian-elections,platform_transparency,primary,Romania,en,C,2026-08-11,Interested-party self-report published 6 December 2024 and updated 7 January 2025; metrics retain the platform's own denominators.
|
| 8 |
-
src-ro-ifes-202412,Romanian 2024 Election Annulment: Addressing Emerging Threats to Electoral Integrity,International Foundation for Electoral Systems,,2024-12-18,https://www.ifes.org/publications/romanian-2024-election-annulment-addressing-emerging-threats-electoral-integrity,civil_society_analysis,secondary,Romania,en,B,2026-08-11,Independent institutional analysis.
|
| 9 |
-
src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,Declassified SRI report submitted to the Supreme Council of National Defence,"Romanian Intelligence Service, published by the Presidency of Romania",,2024-12-04,https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20SRI%20I.pdf,declassified_intelligence_report,primary,Romania,ro,A,2026-08-11,"Authoritative evidence of what SRI reported. It is not a final adjudication of the operator, sponsor, reach, or electoral effect."
|
| 10 |
-
src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,ANAF found that PNL paid for a campaign that heavily promoted Călin Georgescu on TikTok,Snoop.ro,Mirela Neag|Cătălin Tolontan|Iulia Roșu|Răzvan Luțac,2024-12-20,https://snoop.ro/anaf-a-descoperit-ca-pnl-a-platit-o-campanie-care-l-a-promovat-masiv-pe-calin-georgescu-pe-tiktok/,investigative_reporting,secondary,Romania,ro,B,2026-08-11,The PNL funding finding rests partly on a confidential ANAF source and vendor correspondence. Kensington said its brief had been altered or hijacked; this record must not be used to infer PNL intent to support Georgescu.
|
| 11 |
-
src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,Cross-platform campaign accuses Moldova's Sandu of meddling in Romanian elections,Digital Forensic Research Lab,Valentin Châtelet,2025-08-26,https://dfrlab.org/2025/08/26/cross-platform-campaign-accuses-moldovas-sandu-of-meddling-in-romanian-elections/,technical_investigation,secondary,Romania|Moldova,en,B,2026-08-11,Public-data network investigation. View and engagement totals are non-unique platform metrics; pro-Russia orientation does not establish Russian-state command.
|
| 12 |
-
src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,Moldova presidential election and constitutional referendum: Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions,OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2024-10-21,https://cdn.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/9/d/578815_0.pdf,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,2026-08-11,Preliminary observation statement.
|
| 13 |
-
src-md-odihr-final-20250314,"Moldova: Presidential Election and Constitutional Referendum, 20 October and 3 November 2024 — Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2025-03-14,https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/587451,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,2026-08-11,Final observation report and recommendations.
|
| 14 |
-
src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Moldova police say businessman Shor channelled $39 million to pay off voters,Reuters,,2024-10-24,https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-police-say-businessman-shor-channelled-24-million-pay-off-voters-2024-10-24/,news_reporting,secondary,Moldova,en,B,2026-08-11,Reports a police allegation; dollar figure in headline and URL should be preserved as published.
|
| 15 |
-
src-md-eeas-fimi-202401,2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats,European External Action Service,,2024-01-23,https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EEAS-2nd-Report%20on%20FIMI%20Threats-January-2024_0.pdf,government_threat_report,primary,European Union,en,A,2026-08-11,Documents an AI-generated video impersonating Maia Sandu in the broader Moldova information environment.
|
| 16 |
-
src-md-meta-threat-reporting,Taking Action Against Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior in Moldova,Meta,,2024-10-11,https://about.fb.com/news/2024/10/taking-action-against-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-in-moldova/,platform_transparency,primary,Moldova,en,C,2026-08-11,Platform self-report. Gross follower figures were largely outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; Meta said it disrupted the operation before it built an authentic audience.
|
| 17 |
-
src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,"Moldova, Parliamentary Elections, 28 September 2025: Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2026-02-18,https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/662251,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,2026-08-11,Canonical ODIHR landing page verifies publication on 18 February 2026 and links the English report. The provider's PDF filename embeds 18.02.2025 despite the 2026 publication date.
|
| 18 |
-
src-md-eeas-activity-2025,2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference,European External Action Service,,2025-01-01,https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025/documents/2024%20Report%20on%20EEAS%20Activities%20to%20Counter%20FIMI.pdf,government_activity_report,primary,European Union,en,A,2026-08-11,Cross-case institutional response and Moldova context.
|
| 19 |
-
src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,Paid to post: Russia-linked digital army seeks to undermine Moldovan election,Digital Forensic Research Lab,Valentin Châtelet|Victoria Olari,2025-09-24,https://dfrlab.org/2025/09/24/paid-to-post-russia-linked-digital-army-seeks-to-undermine-moldovan-election/,technical_investigation,secondary,Moldova,en,B,2026-08-11,"Network analysis grounded in 253 accounts and linked undercover reporting. Metrics measure platform output and engagement, not unique voters; ties to Moscow-linked structures do not prove direct Kremlin command."
|
| 20 |
-
src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,FCC Makes AI-Generated Voices in Robocalls Illegal,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-02-08,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-makes-ai-generated-voices-robocalls-illegal,regulatory_ruling,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Declaratory ruling that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA.
|
| 21 |
-
src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,FCC Proposes $6 Million Fine for Deepfake Robocalls Around New Hampshire Primary,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-6-million-fine-deepfake-robocalls-around-nh-primary,enforcement_notice,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Notice of apparent liability, not yet the final forfeiture order."
|
| 22 |
-
src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture: Lingo Telecom,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-60A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Primary source for call counts, attestation, and originating-provider allegations."
|
| 23 |
-
src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,Steven Kramer Charged with Voter Suppression over AI-Generated President Biden Robocalls,New Hampshire Department of Justice,,2024-05-23,https://www.doj.nh.gov/news-and-media/steven-kramer-charged-voter-suppression-over-ai-generated-president-biden-robocalls,law_enforcement_release,primary,New Hampshire,en,A,2026-08-11,"Authoritative record of charges; charges are allegations, not proof of guilt."
|
| 24 |
-
src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,FCC Settles Spoofed AI-Generated Robocalls Case,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-settles-spoofed-ai-generated-robocalls-case,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Settlement with originating provider; not an adjudication of every allegation.
|
| 25 |
-
src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,FCC Issues $6 Million Fine for Illegal Robocalls that Used Deepfake Generative AI,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-issues-6m-fine-nh-robocalls,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Final FCC forfeiture action.
|
| 26 |
-
src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,Political operative behind fake Biden robocalls in N.H. primary found not guilty,New Hampshire Public Radio,,2025-06-13,https://www.nhpr.org/nh-news/2025-06-13/political-operative-fake-biden-robocalls-nh-primary-found-not-guilty,news_reporting,secondary,New Hampshire,en,B,2026-08-11,Reports acquittal on all state criminal charges and distinguishes civil enforcement.
|
| 27 |
-
src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,"Resolução nº 23.755, de 2 de março de 2026",Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-02,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-755-de-2-de-marco-de-2026,electoral_regulation,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,"Core legal source for 2026 synthetic-content, AI-provider, platform, and compliance duties."
|
| 28 |
-
src-br-tse-calendar-202603,Eleições 2026: confira as principais datas do calendário eleitoral,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-06,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Marco/eleicoes-2026-confira-as-principais-datas-do-calendario-eleitoral,election_calendar,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE election-calendar publication dated 6 March 2026.
|
| 29 |
-
src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,Por Dentro das Eleições: conheça as regras sobre uso de IA na campanha eleitoral de 2026,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-04-10,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Abril/por-dentro-das-eleicoes-conheca-as-regras-sobre-uso-de-ia-na-campanha-eleitoral-de-2026,official_explainer,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE explainer published 10 April 2026.
|
| 30 |
-
src-br-tse-platforms-202607,Eleições 2026: TSE e plataformas digitais firmam parcerias para ampliar combate à desinformação,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-07-16,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Julho/eleicoes-2026-tse-e-plataformas-digitais-firmam-parcerias-para-ampliar-combate-a-desinformacao,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE institutional release published 16 July 2026.
|
| 31 |
-
src-br-tse-compliance-202607,Plataformas têm até 16 de agosto para apresentar planos de conformidade eleitoral nas campanhas pela internet,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-07-28,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Julho/plataformas-tem-ate-16-de-agosto-para-apresentar-planos-de-conformidade-eleitoral-nas-campanhas-pela-internet,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE compliance-plan notice published 28 July 2026.
|
| 32 |
-
src-br-tse-agu-20260803,TSE e AGU firmam acordo de boas práticas sobre IA nas Eleições 2026,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-03,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/tse-e-agu-firmam-acordo-de-boas-praticas-sobre-ia-nas-eleicoes-2026,institutional_agreement,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Observed preparedness action.
|
| 33 |
-
src-br-tse-council-20260807,TSE cria conselho para acompanhar desinformação e uso de inteligência artificial,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-07,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/tse-cria-conselho-para-acompanhar-desinformacao-e-uso-de-inteligencia-artificial,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Observed preparedness action.
|
| 34 |
-
src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,Eleições 2026: TSE fecha acordo com ElevenLabs contra deepfakes de voz,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-06,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/eleicoes-2026-tse-fecha-acordo-com-elevenlabs-contra-deepfakes-de-voz,institutional_agreement,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Official TSE cooperation announcement published 6 August 2026.
|
| 35 |
-
src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Brazil's Bolsonaro is barred from this year's election. Can his AI avatar campaign instead?,Reuters,,2026-07-28,https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/brazils-bolsonaro-is-barred-this-years-election-can-his-ai-avatar-campaign-2026-07-28/,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,en,B,2026-08-11,"Documents the avatar, disclosure, competing legal arguments, and unresolved court status."
|
| 36 |
-
src-br-aio-202411,AI in the 2024 Brazilian Elections,AI Observatory and Data Privacy Brasil,,2024-11-01,https://www.dataprivacybr.org/en/documentos/ai-in-the-2024-brazilian-elections/,civil_society_research,secondary,Brazil,en,B,2026-08-11,Empirical counterweight: fewer high-impact AI incidents than widely feared in 2024 municipal elections.
|
| 37 |
-
src-us-fec-dates-2026,2026 Congressional Primary Dates and Candidate Filing Deadlines for Ballot Access,Federal Election Commission,,2026-05-18,https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2026pdates.pdf,election_calendar,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Official election-date PDF states that its information is current as of 18 May 2026.
|
| 38 |
-
src-us-cisa-genai-202401,Risk in Focus: Generative AI and the 2024 Election Cycle,Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,,2024-01-01,https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-focus-generative-ai-and-2024-election-cycle,government_risk_assessment,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Concludes generative AI is more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new ones.
|
| 39 |
-
src-us-odni-update-20241021,"Election Security Update, 21 October 2024",Office of the Director of National Intelligence,,2024-10-21,https://www.odni.gov/files/FMIC/documents/ODNI-Election-Security-Update-20241021.pdf,intelligence_assessment,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Prior-cycle evidence for foreign influence and synthetic content; used as preparedness context, not a 2026 incident."
|
| 40 |
-
src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024,Commission approves notification of disposition and interpretive rule on artificial intelligence in campaign ads,Federal Election Commission,,2024-09-19,https://www.fec.gov/updates/commission-approves-notification-of-disposition-interpretive-rule-on-artificial-intelligence-in-campaign-ads/,regulatory_notice,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,Technology-neutral interpretation of a narrow fraudulent-misrepresentation provision; not a broad federal deepfake rule.
|
| 41 |
-
src-us-ncsl-20260623,Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Elections and Campaigns,National Conference of State Legislatures,,2026-06-23,https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns,legislative_tracker,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"As of update, 31 states had enacted political-deepfake laws; approaches differ."
|
| 42 |
-
src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,AI deepfakes blur reality in 2026 US midterm campaigns,Reuters,Joseph Ax|Helen Coster,2026-03-28,https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/ai-deepfakes-blur-reality-2026-us-midterm-campaigns-2026-03-28/,news_reporting,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"Documents attributed campaign use, disclosure salience, and multiple observed 2026 synthetic ads; does not measure electoral effect."
|
| 43 |
-
src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,Forfeiture Order: Steve S. Kramer,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-104A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Final primary record for attribution, call campaign, caller-ID findings, and the $6 million forfeiture."
|
| 44 |
-
src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,Order and Consent Decree: Lingo Telecom,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-790A1.txt,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,2026-08-11,"Primary consent-decree text for 3,978 completed calls, $1 million civil penalty, and compliance plan."
|
| 45 |
-
src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,Political consultant acquitted over AI-generated Biden robocalls,Associated Press,,2025-06-13,https://apnews.com/article/ai-robocalls-new-hampshire-biden-kramer-e87ef8848a2a6515202535a6e800da07,news_reporting,secondary,New Hampshire,en,B,2026-08-11,Independent report of acquittal on all 22 state charges and actor account.
|
| 46 |
-
src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,League of Women Voters of New Hampshire v. Kramer,League of Women Voters,,2025-11-21,https://www.lwv.org/legal-center/league-women-voters-new-hampshire-v-kramer,civil_case_index,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"Case index and outcome summary linking filings; default judgment must be described as default, not a contested trial."
|
| 47 |
-
src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,Federal court enters default judgment over AI Biden robocall,Associated Press,,2025-11-25,https://apnews.com/article/ai-robocalls-biden-new-hampshire-7bb71c5ab962760995469c3b6f787a86,news_reporting,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,"Reports the 21 November default judgment, $22,500 total damages, and nationwide injunction."
|
| 48 |
-
src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,"Resolução nº 23.610, de 18 de dezembro de 2019 — consolidated text",Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2019-12-18,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2019/resolucao-no-23-610-de-18-de-dezembro-de-2019,electoral_regulation,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,"Consolidated operative text, including arts. 9-B and 9-C as amended."
|
| 49 |
-
src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,Representação eleitoral concerning the Jair Bolsonaro AI avatar at the PL convention,Federação Brasil da Esperança,,2026-07-26,https://static.congressoemfoco.com.br/2026/07/27/attachment/2026/07/27/cd5726_tse_fe_brasil_ia_jair_convencao_pl_26_jul__2026.pdf,court_filing,primary,Brazil,pt,A,2026-08-11,Primary record of filing and allegations in RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; not proof of violation.
|
| 50 |
-
src-br-ft-avatar-202607,Jair Bolsonaro faces legal challenge over AI avatar,Financial Times,,2026-07-28,https://www.ft.com/content/e18c380f-c25d-4e91-8135-d9c2424ab720,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,en,B,2026-08-11,Independent report of legal challenge and counsel's denial of Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation.
|
| 51 |
-
src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,Flávio diz ao TSE que vídeo de IA com Bolsonaro é legal e não engana o eleitorado,Folha de S.Paulo,,2026-07-28,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2026/07/flavio-diz-ao-tse-que-video-de-ia-com-bolsonaro-e-legal-e-nao-engana-o-eleitorado.shtml,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,pt,B,2026-08-11,Reports the defence position; does not establish that the legal reading is correct.
|
| 52 |
-
src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,Kassio marca reunião com ministros do TSE para definir IA de Bolsonaro,Poder360,,2026-08-11,https://www.poder360.com.br/poder-justica/kassio-marca-reuniao-com-ministros-do-tse-para-definir-ia-de-bolsonaro/,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,pt,B,2026-08-11,Time-sensitive status report; a scheduled meeting is not an adjudication.
|
| 53 |
-
src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,New ad: James Talarico reads his most memorable tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee,,2026-03-11,https://www.nrsc.org/press-releases/new-ad-james-talarico-reads-his-most-memorable-tweets-2026-03-11/,actor_release,primary,United States,en,C,2026-08-11,"Primary actor record and transcript; A for what the NRSC published, C for evaluative claims."
|
| 54 |
-
src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,James Talarico Reads His Most Memorable Tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee / YouTube,,2026-03-11,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIDhhVah4xE,primary_artifact,primary,United States,en,C,2026-08-11,Dynamic platform metric; one-platform views are not unique or total exposure.
|
| 55 |
-
src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,Hany Farid delves into newly released deepfakes of James Talarico,UC Berkeley School of Information,,2026-04-28,https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/news/presscoverage/2026/hany-farid-delves-newly-released-deepfakes-james-talarico,expert_analysis,secondary,United States,en,B,2026-08-11,Expert analysis page published 28 April 2026; supports forensic and disclosure context rather than reach or electoral effect.
|
| 56 |
-
src-global-pdid-2024,Introducing the Political Deepfakes Incidents Database,Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,Christina P. Walker|Daniel S. Schiff|Kaylyn Jackson Schiff,2024-03-24,https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30349/32389,peer_reviewed_methodology,secondary,Global,en,A,2026-08-11,Comparative methodology and field map; this dataset adds claim-level causal and agency-transfer coding.
|
| 57 |
-
src-global-row-tracker-20240416,How we're tracking AI incidents around global elections,Rest of World,Victoria Turk,2024-04-16,https://restofworld.org/2024/tracking-global-election-ai/,journalistic_methodology,secondary,Global,en,B,2026-08-11,"Used for methodological comparison and leads, not copied as a source dataset."
|
| 58 |
-
src-global-meta-muted-20241203,Meta says generative AI had muted impact on global elections in 2024,Reuters,,2024-12-03,https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/meta-says-gen-ai-had-muted-impact-global-elections-this-year-2024-12-03/,news_reporting,secondary,Global,en,B,2026-08-11,Reports Meta's interested-party assessment that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on its platforms.
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+
source_id,title,publisher,author,publication_date,url,source_type,primary_secondary,jurisdiction,language,source_quality,source_independence,method_transparency,access_status,archive_url,content_hash,retrieved_at,notes
|
| 2 |
+
src-ro-ccr-20241206,"Press Release, 6 December 2024",Constitutional Court of Romania,,2024-12-06,https://www.ccr.ro/en/press-release-6-dec/,court_release,primary,Romania,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Authoritative record of annulment; does not by itself resolve every underlying factual or causal claim.
|
| 3 |
+
src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,Summary of cases delivered by the Constitutional Court of Romania,Constitutional Court of Romania,,2025-04-01,https://www.ccr.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/SUMMARY-OF-THE-CASES-DELIVERED.pdf,court_summary,primary,Romania,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Includes the court's summary of Decision No. 32 of 6 December 2024.
|
| 4 |
+
src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,Commission opens formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks under the Digital Services Act,European Commission,,2024-12-17,https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-opens-formal-proceedings-against-tiktok-election-risks-under-digital-services-act,regulatory_release,primary,European Union,en,A,independent_or_official,not_applicable_official_record,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Opening of proceedings is not a final finding of infringement.
|
| 5 |
+
src-ro-venice-202503,Urgent report on the cancellation of election results by constitutional courts,European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),,2025-03-17,https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282025%29003-e,legal_analysis,primary,Council of Europe,en,A,independent_or_official,not_applicable_official_record,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Standards-oriented analysis of annulment in the digital-technology context.
|
| 6 |
+
src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,"Romania, Presidential Election, 4 and 18 May 2025: Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2025-10-28,https://odihr.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/f/3/600295_0.pdf,election_observation,primary,Romania,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,ODIHR final observation report published 28 October 2025.
|
| 7 |
+
src-ro-tiktok-integrity,Continuing to protect the integrity of TikTok during Romanian elections,TikTok,,2024-12-06,https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/continuing-to-protect-the-integrity-of-tiktok-during-romanian-elections,platform_transparency,primary,Romania,en,C,interested_or_mixed,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Interested-party self-report published 6 December 2024 and updated 7 January 2025; metrics retain the platform's own denominators.
|
| 8 |
+
src-ro-ifes-202412,Romanian 2024 Election Annulment: Addressing Emerging Threats to Electoral Integrity,International Foundation for Electoral Systems,,2024-12-18,https://www.ifes.org/publications/romanian-2024-election-annulment-addressing-emerging-threats-electoral-integrity,civil_society_analysis,secondary,Romania,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Independent institutional analysis.
|
| 9 |
+
src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,Declassified SRI report submitted to the Supreme Council of National Defence,"Romanian Intelligence Service, published by the Presidency of Romania",,2024-12-04,https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20SRI%20I.pdf,declassified_intelligence_report,primary,Romania,ro,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Authoritative evidence of what SRI reported. It is not a final adjudication of the operator, sponsor, reach, or electoral effect."
|
| 10 |
+
src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,ANAF found that PNL paid for a campaign that heavily promoted Călin Georgescu on TikTok,Snoop.ro,Mirela Neag|Cătălin Tolontan|Iulia Roșu|Răzvan Luțac,2024-12-20,https://snoop.ro/anaf-a-descoperit-ca-pnl-a-platit-o-campanie-care-l-a-promovat-masiv-pe-calin-georgescu-pe-tiktok/,investigative_reporting,secondary,Romania,ro,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,The PNL funding finding rests partly on a confidential ANAF source and vendor correspondence. Kensington said its brief had been altered or hijacked; this record must not be used to infer PNL intent to support Georgescu.
|
| 11 |
+
src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,Cross-platform campaign accuses Moldova's Sandu of meddling in Romanian elections,Digital Forensic Research Lab,Valentin Châtelet,2025-08-26,https://dfrlab.org/2025/08/26/cross-platform-campaign-accuses-moldovas-sandu-of-meddling-in-romanian-elections/,technical_investigation,secondary,Romania|Moldova,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Public-data network investigation. View and engagement totals are non-unique platform metrics; pro-Russia orientation does not establish Russian-state command.
|
| 12 |
+
src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,Moldova presidential election and constitutional referendum: Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions,OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2024-10-21,https://cdn.osce.org/sites/default/files/f/documents/9/d/578815_0.pdf,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Preliminary observation statement.
|
| 13 |
+
src-md-odihr-final-20250314,"Moldova: Presidential Election and Constitutional Referendum, 20 October and 3 November 2024 — Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2025-03-14,https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/587451,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Final observation report and recommendations.
|
| 14 |
+
src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Moldova police say businessman Shor channelled $39 million to pay off voters,Reuters,,2024-10-24,https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-police-say-businessman-shor-channelled-24-million-pay-off-voters-2024-10-24/,news_reporting,secondary,Moldova,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Reports a police allegation; dollar figure in headline and URL should be preserved as published.
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| 15 |
+
src-md-eeas-fimi-202401,2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats,European External Action Service,,2024-01-23,https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EEAS-2nd-Report%20on%20FIMI%20Threats-January-2024_0.pdf,government_threat_report,primary,European Union,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Documents an AI-generated video impersonating Maia Sandu in the broader Moldova information environment.
|
| 16 |
+
src-md-meta-threat-reporting,Taking Action Against Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior in Moldova,Meta,,2024-10-11,https://about.fb.com/news/2024/10/taking-action-against-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-in-moldova/,platform_transparency,primary,Moldova,en,C,interested_or_mixed,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Platform self-report. Gross follower figures were largely outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; Meta said it disrupted the operation before it built an authentic audience.
|
| 17 |
+
src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,"Moldova, Parliamentary Elections, 28 September 2025: Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2026-02-18,https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/662251,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Canonical ODIHR landing page verifies publication on 18 February 2026 and links the English report. The provider's PDF filename embeds 18.02.2025 despite the 2026 publication date.
|
| 18 |
+
src-md-eeas-activity-2025,2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference,European External Action Service,,2025-01-01,https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025/documents/2024%20Report%20on%20EEAS%20Activities%20to%20Counter%20FIMI.pdf,government_activity_report,primary,European Union,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Cross-case institutional response and Moldova context.
|
| 19 |
+
src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,Paid to post: Russia-linked digital army seeks to undermine Moldovan election,Digital Forensic Research Lab,Valentin Châtelet|Victoria Olari,2025-09-24,https://dfrlab.org/2025/09/24/paid-to-post-russia-linked-digital-army-seeks-to-undermine-moldovan-election/,technical_investigation,secondary,Moldova,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Network analysis grounded in 253 accounts and linked undercover reporting. Metrics measure platform output and engagement, not unique voters; ties to Moscow-linked structures do not prove direct Kremlin command."
|
| 20 |
+
src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,FCC Makes AI-Generated Voices in Robocalls Illegal,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-02-08,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-makes-ai-generated-voices-robocalls-illegal,regulatory_ruling,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,not_applicable_official_record,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Declaratory ruling that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA.
|
| 21 |
+
src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,FCC Proposes $6 Million Fine for Deepfake Robocalls Around New Hampshire Primary,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-6-million-fine-deepfake-robocalls-around-nh-primary,enforcement_notice,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Notice of apparent liability, not yet the final forfeiture order."
|
| 22 |
+
src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture: Lingo Telecom,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-60A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Primary source for call counts, attestation, and originating-provider allegations."
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| 23 |
+
src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,Steven Kramer Charged with Voter Suppression over AI-Generated President Biden Robocalls,New Hampshire Department of Justice,,2024-05-23,https://www.doj.nh.gov/news-and-media/steven-kramer-charged-voter-suppression-over-ai-generated-president-biden-robocalls,law_enforcement_release,primary,New Hampshire,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Authoritative record of charges; charges are allegations, not proof of guilt."
|
| 24 |
+
src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,FCC Settles Spoofed AI-Generated Robocalls Case,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-settles-spoofed-ai-generated-robocalls-case,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Settlement with originating provider; not an adjudication of every allegation.
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| 25 |
+
src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,FCC Issues $6 Million Fine for Illegal Robocalls that Used Deepfake Generative AI,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-issues-6m-fine-nh-robocalls,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Final FCC forfeiture action.
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| 26 |
+
src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,Political operative behind fake Biden robocalls in N.H. primary found not guilty,New Hampshire Public Radio,,2025-06-13,https://www.nhpr.org/nh-news/2025-06-13/political-operative-fake-biden-robocalls-nh-primary-found-not-guilty,news_reporting,secondary,New Hampshire,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Reports acquittal on all state criminal charges and distinguishes civil enforcement.
|
| 27 |
+
src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,"Resolução nº 23.755, de 2 de março de 2026",Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-02,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-755-de-2-de-marco-de-2026,electoral_regulation,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Core legal source for 2026 synthetic-content, AI-provider, platform, and compliance duties."
|
| 28 |
+
src-br-tse-calendar-202603,Eleições 2026: confira as principais datas do calendário eleitoral,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-06,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Marco/eleicoes-2026-confira-as-principais-datas-do-calendario-eleitoral,election_calendar,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Official TSE election-calendar publication dated 6 March 2026.
|
| 29 |
+
src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,Por Dentro das Eleições: conheça as regras sobre uso de IA na campanha eleitoral de 2026,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-04-10,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Abril/por-dentro-das-eleicoes-conheca-as-regras-sobre-uso-de-ia-na-campanha-eleitoral-de-2026,official_explainer,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,not_applicable_official_record,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Official TSE explainer published 10 April 2026.
|
| 30 |
+
src-br-tse-platforms-202607,Eleições 2026: TSE e plataformas digitais firmam parcerias para ampliar combate à desinformação,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-07-16,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Julho/eleicoes-2026-tse-e-plataformas-digitais-firmam-parcerias-para-ampliar-combate-a-desinformacao,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Official TSE institutional release published 16 July 2026.
|
| 31 |
+
src-br-tse-compliance-202607,Plataformas têm até 16 de agosto para apresentar planos de conformidade eleitoral nas campanhas pela internet,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-07-28,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Julho/plataformas-tem-ate-16-de-agosto-para-apresentar-planos-de-conformidade-eleitoral-nas-campanhas-pela-internet,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Official TSE compliance-plan notice published 28 July 2026.
|
| 32 |
+
src-br-tse-agu-20260803,TSE e AGU firmam acordo de boas práticas sobre IA nas Eleições 2026,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-03,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/tse-e-agu-firmam-acordo-de-boas-praticas-sobre-ia-nas-eleicoes-2026,institutional_agreement,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Observed preparedness action.
|
| 33 |
+
src-br-tse-council-20260807,TSE cria conselho para acompanhar desinformação e uso de inteligência artificial,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-07,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/tse-cria-conselho-para-acompanhar-desinformacao-e-uso-de-inteligencia-artificial,institutional_release,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Observed preparedness action.
|
| 34 |
+
src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,Eleições 2026: TSE fecha acordo com ElevenLabs contra deepfakes de voz,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-08-06,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Agosto/eleicoes-2026-tse-fecha-acordo-com-elevenlabs-contra-deepfakes-de-voz,institutional_agreement,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Official TSE cooperation announcement published 6 August 2026.
|
| 35 |
+
src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Brazil's Bolsonaro is barred from this year's election. Can his AI avatar campaign instead?,Reuters,,2026-07-28,https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/brazils-bolsonaro-is-barred-this-years-election-can-his-ai-avatar-campaign-2026-07-28/,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Documents the avatar, disclosure, competing legal arguments, and unresolved court status."
|
| 36 |
+
src-br-aio-202411,AI in the 2024 Brazilian Elections,AI Observatory and Data Privacy Brasil,,2024-11-01,https://www.dataprivacybr.org/en/documentos/ai-in-the-2024-brazilian-elections/,civil_society_research,secondary,Brazil,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Empirical counterweight: fewer high-impact AI incidents than widely feared in 2024 municipal elections.
|
| 37 |
+
src-us-fec-dates-2026,2026 Congressional Primary Dates and Candidate Filing Deadlines for Ballot Access,Federal Election Commission,,2026-05-18,https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2026pdates.pdf,election_calendar,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Official election-date PDF states that its information is current as of 18 May 2026.
|
| 38 |
+
src-us-cisa-genai-202401,Risk in Focus: Generative AI and the 2024 Election Cycle,Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,,2024-01-01,https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-focus-generative-ai-and-2024-election-cycle,government_risk_assessment,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Concludes generative AI is more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new ones.
|
| 39 |
+
src-us-odni-update-20241021,"Election Security Update, 21 October 2024",Office of the Director of National Intelligence,,2024-10-21,https://www.odni.gov/files/FMIC/documents/ODNI-Election-Security-Update-20241021.pdf,intelligence_assessment,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Prior-cycle evidence for foreign influence and synthetic content; used as preparedness context, not a 2026 incident."
|
| 40 |
+
src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024,Commission approves notification of disposition and interpretive rule on artificial intelligence in campaign ads,Federal Election Commission,,2024-09-19,https://www.fec.gov/updates/commission-approves-notification-of-disposition-interpretive-rule-on-artificial-intelligence-in-campaign-ads/,regulatory_notice,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,not_applicable_official_record,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Technology-neutral interpretation of a narrow fraudulent-misrepresentation provision; not a broad federal deepfake rule.
|
| 41 |
+
src-us-ncsl-20260623,Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Elections and Campaigns,National Conference of State Legislatures,,2026-06-23,https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns,legislative_tracker,secondary,United States,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"As of update, 31 states had enacted political-deepfake laws; approaches differ."
|
| 42 |
+
src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,AI deepfakes blur reality in 2026 US midterm campaigns,Reuters,Joseph Ax|Helen Coster,2026-03-28,https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/ai-deepfakes-blur-reality-2026-us-midterm-campaigns-2026-03-28/,news_reporting,secondary,United States,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Documents attributed campaign use, disclosure salience, and multiple observed 2026 synthetic ads; does not measure electoral effect."
|
| 43 |
+
src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,Forfeiture Order: Steve S. Kramer,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-104A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Final primary record for attribution, call campaign, caller-ID findings, and the $6 million forfeiture."
|
| 44 |
+
src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,Order and Consent Decree: Lingo Telecom,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-790A1.txt,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Primary consent-decree text for 3,978 completed calls, $1 million civil penalty, and compliance plan."
|
| 45 |
+
src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,Political consultant acquitted over AI-generated Biden robocalls,Associated Press,,2025-06-13,https://apnews.com/article/ai-robocalls-new-hampshire-biden-kramer-e87ef8848a2a6515202535a6e800da07,news_reporting,secondary,New Hampshire,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Independent report of acquittal on all 22 state charges and actor account.
|
| 46 |
+
src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,League of Women Voters of New Hampshire v. Kramer,League of Women Voters,,2025-11-21,https://www.lwv.org/legal-center/league-women-voters-new-hampshire-v-kramer,civil_case_index,secondary,United States,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Case index and outcome summary linking filings; default judgment must be described as default, not a contested trial."
|
| 47 |
+
src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,Federal court enters default judgment over AI Biden robocall,Associated Press,,2025-11-25,https://apnews.com/article/ai-robocalls-biden-new-hampshire-7bb71c5ab962760995469c3b6f787a86,news_reporting,secondary,United States,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Reports the 21 November default judgment, $22,500 total damages, and nationwide injunction."
|
| 48 |
+
src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,"Resolução nº 23.610, de 18 de dezembro de 2019 — consolidated text",Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2019-12-18,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2019/resolucao-no-23-610-de-18-de-dezembro-de-2019,electoral_regulation,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Consolidated operative text, including arts. 9-B and 9-C as amended."
|
| 49 |
+
src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,Representação eleitoral concerning the Jair Bolsonaro AI avatar at the PL convention,Federação Brasil da Esperança,,2026-07-26,https://static.congressoemfoco.com.br/2026/07/27/attachment/2026/07/27/cd5726_tse_fe_brasil_ia_jair_convencao_pl_26_jul__2026.pdf,court_filing,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Primary record of filing and allegations in RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; not proof of violation.
|
| 50 |
+
src-br-ft-avatar-202607,Jair Bolsonaro faces legal challenge over AI avatar,Financial Times,,2026-07-28,https://www.ft.com/content/e18c380f-c25d-4e91-8135-d9c2424ab720,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Independent report of legal challenge and counsel's denial of Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation.
|
| 51 |
+
src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,Flávio diz ao TSE que vídeo de IA com Bolsonaro é legal e não engana o eleitorado,Folha de S.Paulo,,2026-07-28,https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2026/07/flavio-diz-ao-tse-que-video-de-ia-com-bolsonaro-e-legal-e-nao-engana-o-eleitorado.shtml,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,pt,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Reports the defence position; does not establish that the legal reading is correct.
|
| 52 |
+
src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,Kassio marca reunião com ministros do TSE para definir IA de Bolsonaro,Poder360,,2026-08-11,https://www.poder360.com.br/poder-justica/kassio-marca-reuniao-com-ministros-do-tse-para-definir-ia-de-bolsonaro/,news_reporting,secondary,Brazil,pt,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Time-sensitive status report; a scheduled meeting is not an adjudication.
|
| 53 |
+
src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,New ad: James Talarico reads his most memorable tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee,,2026-03-11,https://www.nrsc.org/press-releases/new-ad-james-talarico-reads-his-most-memorable-tweets-2026-03-11/,actor_release,primary,United States,en,C,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Primary actor record and transcript; A for what the NRSC published, C for evaluative claims."
|
| 54 |
+
src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,James Talarico Reads His Most Memorable Tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee / YouTube,,2026-03-11,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIDhhVah4xE,primary_artifact,primary,United States,en,C,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Dynamic platform metric; one-platform views are not unique or total exposure.
|
| 55 |
+
src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,Hany Farid delves into newly released deepfakes of James Talarico,UC Berkeley School of Information,,2026-04-28,https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/news/presscoverage/2026/hany-farid-delves-newly-released-deepfakes-james-talarico,expert_analysis,secondary,United States,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Expert analysis page published 28 April 2026; supports forensic and disclosure context rather than reach or electoral effect.
|
| 56 |
+
src-global-pdid-2024,Introducing the Political Deepfakes Incidents Database,Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,Christina P. Walker|Daniel S. Schiff|Kaylyn Jackson Schiff,2024-03-24,https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30349/32389,peer_reviewed_methodology,secondary,Global,en,A,independent_secondary,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Comparative methodology and field map; this dataset adds claim-level causal and agency-transfer coding.
|
| 57 |
+
src-global-row-tracker-20240416,How we're tracking AI incidents around global elections,Rest of World,Victoria Turk,2024-04-16,https://restofworld.org/2024/tracking-global-election-ai/,journalistic_methodology,secondary,Global,en,B,independent_secondary,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Used for methodological comparison and leads, not copied as a source dataset."
|
| 58 |
+
src-global-meta-muted-20241203,Meta says generative AI had muted impact on global elections in 2024,Reuters,,2024-12-03,https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/meta-says-gen-ai-had-muted-impact-global-elections-this-year-2024-12-03/,news_reporting,secondary,Global,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Reports Meta's interested-party assessment that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on its platforms.
|
| 59 |
+
src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,A parody Connie Chan chatbot is Scott Wiener's newest tactic,Gazetteer SF,Eddie Kim,2026-08-04,https://sf.gazetteer.co/a-parody-connie-chan-chatbot-is-scott-wieners-newest-tactic,news_reporting_with_direct_observation,secondary,"California, United States",en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Directly inspected the interface and privacy policy; documents Anthropic, AWS, Google Analytics, 90-day conversation retention and authorised staff review. Does not identify the exact model version or deployment route."
|
| 60 |
+
src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,"Wiener, backed by Anthropic PAC, uses Claude to skewer his SF rival",SFGATE,Anabel Sosa,2026-08-04,https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/scott-wiener-anthropic-billboard-22372638.php,news_reporting_with_campaign_statements,secondary,"California, United States",en,B,interested_or_mixed,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Supports launch timing, Claude use, campaign control, direct interface observations, and two billboards reported at $20,000. Anthropic did not thereby direct or approve the campaign use."
|
| 61 |
+
src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,Scott Wiener pulls the plug on his Connie Chan AI chatbot,Mission Local,Kelly Waldron,2026-08-07,https://missionlocal.org/2026/08/sf-scott-wiener-connie-chan-ai-chatbot/,local_news_reporting,secondary,"California, United States",en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Supports 3 August launch, 7 August removal, campaign apology, and campaign-reported 5,058 questions during the first 27 hours. Questions are not users, voters, or unique people."
|
| 62 |
+
src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,"Scott Wiener's AI chatbot controversy, explained",Axios San Francisco,Nadia Lopez,2026-08-11,https://www.axios.com/local/san-francisco/2026/08/11/sf-scott-wiener-connie-chan-pelosi-ai-chatbot,news_reporting,secondary,"California, United States",en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Independent synthesis of the Claude-powered opponent simulation, interaction count, criticism, and campaign withdrawal."
|
| 63 |
+
src-global-cetas-20240919,AI-Enabled Influence Operations: Threat Analysis of the 2024 UK and European Elections,"Centre for Emerging Technology and Security, Alan Turing Institute",Sam Stockwell,2024-09-19,https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/ai-enabled-influence-operations-threat-analysis-2024-uk-and-european-elections,research_report,secondary,United Kingdom and European Union,en,A,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Comparative incident research and counterevidence: confirmed viral cases were fewer than forecast and no evidence of result effects was found, while trust, harassment, ethical and information-environment harms remained material."
|
| 64 |
+
src-global-knight-20250707,Don't Panic (Yet): Assessing the Evidence and Discourse Around Generative AI and Elections,Knight First Amendment Institute,Felix M. Simon and Sacha Altay,2025-07-07,https://knightcolumbia.org/content/dont-panic-yet-assessing-the-evidence-and-discourse-around-generative-ai-and-elections,scholarly_synthesis,secondary,Global,en,A,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Evidence-led counterweight to technological determinism; stresses limited observed electoral effect, difficult mass persuasion, structural context and the need to include transparent, benign, and negative cases."
|
| 65 |
+
src-us-proof-aidp-20240227,How We Tested Leading AI Models' Performance on Election Queries,Proof News and AI Democracy Projects,"Rina Palta, Julia Angwin, and Alondra Nelson",2024-02-27,https://www.proofnews.org/how-we-tested-leading-ai-models-performance-on-election-queries/,model_evaluation_methodology,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,Point-in-time API evaluation of five specified versions. Expert-coded and publicly documented; not a representative user sample and not predictive of future or consumer-interface performance.
|
| 66 |
+
src-us-proof-spanish-20241030,AI Models Falter Answering Election Questions in Spanish,"Proof News, AI Democracy Projects, and Factchequeado","Emily Elena Dugdale, Rina Palta, and Rafael Olavarría",2024-10-30,https://www.proofnews.org/ai-models-falter-answering-election-questions-in-spanish/,model_evaluation,primary,"Arizona, United States",en|es,A,independent_or_official,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Twenty-five queries in two languages across five specified models, 250 responses, with at least two fact-checkers per response. API responses may differ from consumer chatbots."
|
| 67 |
+
src-hu-liberties-voting-advice-20260721,Should AI Tell You Who to Vote For? Testing Political Advice in General-Purpose AI Systems During the 2026 Hungarian Election Campaign,Civil Liberties Union for Europe and Hungarian Civil Liberties Union,,2026-07-21,https://dq4n3btxmr8c9.cloudfront.net/files/uz6rz9/LIBERTIES_AI_and_ELECTIONS_2026_04_2007_FINAL.pdf,model_evaluation,primary,Hungary,en|hu,A,independent_or_official,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Two free consumer systems, five party-aligned profiles, ten repetitions, and two prompt conditions produced 200 outputs. Exact underlying model versions were not visible."
|
| 68 |
+
src-us-brennan-eval-20260811,Does AI Fight or Fuel Election Disinformation?,Brennan Center for Justice,"Abdiaziz Ahmed, Alex Brunet, Owen Doyle, David Evan Harris, Mark Krass, Lawrence Norden, and Marcelo Agudo",2026-08-11,https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/does-ai-fight-or-fuel-election-disinformation,model_evaluation,primary,United States,en|es,A,independent_or_official,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Tests conducted February-August 2026 across chatbot rebuttal, deceptive-media generation and synthetic-image identification. Harmful prompts are intentionally not disclosed. Laboratory capability evidence is not evidence of election deployment or effects."
|
| 69 |
+
src-global-nature-voter-dialogue-20251204,Persuading voters using human-artificial intelligence dialogues,Nature,Lin et al.,2025-12-04,https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-09771-9,peer_reviewed_randomized_experiment,primary,United States|Canada|Poland,en|fr|pl,A,independent_or_official,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Preregistered randomized experiments during three real elections. Measures reported preferences and intentions under disclosed experimental interaction; it does not observe campaign deployment, ballots cast, or election-result effects."
|
| 70 |
+
src-global-pnas-chatbot-voting-advice-20251208,Chatbot Voting Advice Applications inform but seldom sway young unaligned voters,Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,Hackenburg et al.,2025-12-08,https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2515516122,peer_reviewed_randomized_experiment,primary,United Kingdom,en,A,independent_or_official,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,Three experiments using retrieval-augmented voting-advice chatbots grounded in official documents. Knowledge gains were clearer than downstream preference effects; results do not imply all political chatbots are non-persuasive.
|
| 71 |
+
src-eu-emnlp-voting-assistant-202411,Large Language Models as Voting Assistants: A Case Study on the European Parliament Elections,Association for Computational Linguistics (EMNLP 2024),Francesco J. D. Baccini and colleagues,2024-11-01,https://aclanthology.org/2024.emnlp-main.312/,peer_reviewed_model_evaluation,primary,European Union,en,A,independent_or_official,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Controlled evaluation of Mistral and Mixtral as voting-advice assistants, including group-level variation and curated retrieval. It is a model audit, not evidence of public election deployment."
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
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|
| 13 |
"_integrity": {
|
| 14 |
"input_sha256": {
|
| 15 |
"research/seed.json": "6f45bc2c1d20b91903fd8aacab1b14deb37382e1736835e8da1cb58fa4abc79a",
|
| 16 |
"research/candidates.json": "6586ccee4ac720620995e7287e4976c9fca3303595b3cb8875727fbd0a4c9df8",
|
| 17 |
"research/europe_candidates.json": "1cd6f4b4ff119316ff885623151b085c919f5a8984e082d4ff482eea84005f0c",
|
| 18 |
-
"research/official_electoral_data.json": "270e6513a122652d4083c06709e3e4242b8cf2f14b63d6d901c81c8029726007"
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
},
|
| 20 |
"file_sha256": {
|
| 21 |
-
"cases.csv": "
|
| 22 |
-
"claims.csv": "
|
| 23 |
-
"sources.csv": "
|
| 24 |
-
"events.csv": "
|
| 25 |
-
"case_sources.csv": "
|
| 26 |
"watchlist.csv": "de372b4065912da610674421f41dc4fc04f5cc164ff7351ead2512b7e52f7d1a",
|
| 27 |
-
"candidates.csv": "
|
| 28 |
-
"official_elections.csv": "
|
| 29 |
-
"official_turnout.csv": "
|
| 30 |
-
"official_results.csv": "
|
| 31 |
-
"official_data_sources.csv": "
|
| 32 |
-
"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 33 |
}
|
| 34 |
}
|
| 35 |
}
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
{
|
| 2 |
+
"cases": 10,
|
| 3 |
+
"claims": 96,
|
| 4 |
+
"sources": 70,
|
| 5 |
+
"events": 33,
|
| 6 |
+
"case_sources": 67,
|
| 7 |
"watchlist": 12,
|
| 8 |
+
"candidates": 47,
|
| 9 |
"official_elections": 11,
|
| 10 |
"official_turnout": 9,
|
| 11 |
+
"official_results": 68,
|
| 12 |
+
"official_data_sources": 30,
|
| 13 |
+
"official_election_metrics": 58,
|
| 14 |
+
"research_view": 10,
|
| 15 |
+
"case_catalog": 64,
|
| 16 |
+
"case_actors": 14,
|
| 17 |
+
"technology_uses": 9,
|
| 18 |
+
"content_items": 4,
|
| 19 |
+
"pathways": 10,
|
| 20 |
+
"observations": 18,
|
| 21 |
+
"model_evaluations": 7,
|
| 22 |
+
"claim_evidence": 162,
|
| 23 |
+
"analytic_record_claims": 216,
|
| 24 |
+
"case_elections": 15,
|
| 25 |
+
"election_sources": 33,
|
| 26 |
+
"sampling_frame": 7,
|
| 27 |
+
"coverage_summary": 7,
|
| 28 |
"_integrity": {
|
| 29 |
"input_sha256": {
|
| 30 |
"research/seed.json": "6f45bc2c1d20b91903fd8aacab1b14deb37382e1736835e8da1cb58fa4abc79a",
|
| 31 |
"research/candidates.json": "6586ccee4ac720620995e7287e4976c9fca3303595b3cb8875727fbd0a4c9df8",
|
| 32 |
"research/europe_candidates.json": "1cd6f4b4ff119316ff885623151b085c919f5a8984e082d4ff482eea84005f0c",
|
| 33 |
+
"research/official_electoral_data.json": "270e6513a122652d4083c06709e3e4242b8cf2f14b63d6d901c81c8029726007",
|
| 34 |
+
"research/v0.3_extensions.json": "a6559f8f83897ab304a3acbdc0577a02bd31cbca51b9ba967ad74e958ac0a829"
|
| 35 |
},
|
| 36 |
"file_sha256": {
|
| 37 |
+
"cases.csv": "5f8b16b1c802919d6e409bfa18916e3ef01550f653302a90f7fa1c19345d041f",
|
| 38 |
+
"claims.csv": "f84b6fab66396425e7b44b3185416d016efe087980bd0b97a0b7c5019e337a71",
|
| 39 |
+
"sources.csv": "087060a13c36aa4c8adad9738ed3c4fe0c067eb391074e0a2ffbdeadf7128d6b",
|
| 40 |
+
"events.csv": "46f957f4d8fa06a59d2a9463d3d593b916186bb9dd2cbfd8513430ecc52f27ce",
|
| 41 |
+
"case_sources.csv": "d55ea412ee830b31a737b259bd7c9671f831c1bc6608286cef0e556fab60779f",
|
| 42 |
"watchlist.csv": "de372b4065912da610674421f41dc4fc04f5cc164ff7351ead2512b7e52f7d1a",
|
| 43 |
+
"candidates.csv": "308f5755bdff6da1daea1caca11e2ad8e54f8716b09ac383f2726cb6e60e6ed8",
|
| 44 |
+
"official_elections.csv": "9f36f29cf372068d6ef80b1e5338e8e242b8ceb0b785c455bf9de76818250c4d",
|
| 45 |
+
"official_turnout.csv": "5233c98be0e5e8435bc7313b26578381feec3ae9020aab8b52d244a3874a164b",
|
| 46 |
+
"official_results.csv": "9c4638c6bcd54d805888876fbdd711c172d114052ef2d5412608840b3cdb6702",
|
| 47 |
+
"official_data_sources.csv": "0b531d6431b49a1c8f2fa27f3c0965b4bcf94afadf4463d0289134ab5123e35e",
|
| 48 |
+
"official_election_metrics.csv": "6c5bb956acb6a8d51a335fac5df1aa21b1db1c46e32e4533410ee8b47dcefc4c",
|
| 49 |
+
"research_view.csv": "2a121a58327dadcfa7c857ee886bd75d24afee6af37283cdd3e588d2caf3decd",
|
| 50 |
+
"case_catalog.csv": "f2c5c3e080dbde1867d7afc7f6a2764bd045f9e6639141d72fff0075a45788d8",
|
| 51 |
+
"case_actors.csv": "8cb713d057ea14b764e0aa10c8ffdc5253b103974f0b47ba3fd6571a0bbbd00a",
|
| 52 |
+
"technology_uses.csv": "6bafcac0e741c91ccf79b2d2fe27d19aa68ba6abe558105259d9610a288f560c",
|
| 53 |
+
"content_items.csv": "b0a414c43ff8ac2eb2028c5167c6fa4289f48d1ab853aa32e0d0559821c12548",
|
| 54 |
+
"pathways.csv": "eddfed2c0c38f381ad05297f9a436a7a9133a30a63a094ee738aa3ddb9b75e97",
|
| 55 |
+
"observations.csv": "3ff70ba36925904b88d04a8765e5c8cec42853e80adef113ec0366bcd41f5c8e",
|
| 56 |
+
"model_evaluations.csv": "531719c36c01aacea0d2e89a50540042b4e55859ca653920af5585810b2a4b6b",
|
| 57 |
+
"claim_evidence.csv": "24546a83455d0f573ad1466d711fe750ef2d24f094c0b132ab643e13f792c7d8",
|
| 58 |
+
"analytic_record_claims.csv": "8d9517a61301a047e4a6da97540688914e3c5153cdc45c51ac57680ca10b2d7e",
|
| 59 |
+
"case_elections.csv": "f393a0bb79918c7b159aef1e0ede3eb647fa1eb42ed81ca88c2a6a0545e590ea",
|
| 60 |
+
"election_sources.csv": "d97d6df3de5c9d1da65988ab2fa96d0f13500b5158095dfafa7ebf995771198f",
|
| 61 |
+
"sampling_frame.csv": "cfa4899235107203c0d28134974b6da240fd4fef39a5a0643fd52a2742a462b7",
|
| 62 |
+
"coverage_summary.csv": "9c4df5b4346855c370e65f5d3feeef4c51ff9d055e44bbfd0c530cc4091e419c",
|
| 63 |
+
"schema.json": "7f1b2af699bac1897663d21174c0cab997f387fa0e61f1980d81c84c65bf7052",
|
| 64 |
+
"datapackage.json": "65b64d602bb5ead236825fc8aeb41090f01b48fd29ae91aba34864377f684843"
|
| 65 |
}
|
| 66 |
}
|
| 67 |
}
|
data/technology_uses.csv
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
tech_use_id,case_id,provider,product_or_model,version,access_type,technology_role,use_status,provenance_status,evidence_label,source_claim_ids,notes
|
| 2 |
+
tech-ro24-ranking,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,TikTok,recommender and integrity systems,,proprietary_platform,ranking_and_amplification,confirmed,platform_and_official_records,established_evidence,clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-005,Generative AI was not established as a material driver.
|
| 3 |
+
tech-ro25-avatars,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,unknown,DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles,unknown,mixed_unknown,content_generation_and_persona_creation,confirmed,technical_investigation,established_evidence,clm-ro-016,Stylistic attribution is not product-level forensic proof.
|
| 4 |
+
tech-md24-genai,md-2024-presidential-referendum,unknown,synthetic impersonation tools,unknown,unknown,supporting_content_generation,confirmed,observer_and_investigation_records,established_evidence,clm-md-006,AI was one layer within a predominantly non-AI hybrid operation.
|
| 5 |
+
tech-md25-mixed,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,unknown,"AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems",unknown,mixed_unknown,generation_and_amplification,confirmed,observer_and_technical_investigation,established_evidence,clm-md-012|clm-md-015|clm-md-017,Exact models and automation stack are unknown.
|
| 6 |
+
tech-nh-voice,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,ElevenLabs,AI voice-cloning service,unknown,hosted_proprietary,voice_generation,confirmed,creator_reporting,established_evidence,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-003,Provider identification is supported by creator reporting; the FCC orders establish artificial voice but do not name every tool in the production chain.
|
| 7 |
+
tech-br-avatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,unknown,synthetic image-and-voice avatar system,unknown,unknown,avatar_generation,confirmed,content_and_reporting,established_evidence,clm-br-010|clm-br-011,The public record does not identify the model or provider.
|
| 8 |
+
tech-us26-ads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,unknown,campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools,unknown,unknown,synthetic_video_generation,confirmed,campaign_artifact_and_reporting,established_evidence,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-014,Do not infer a frontier-model provider from output appearance.
|
| 9 |
+
tech-usca11-claude,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,Anthropic,Claude,unknown,closed_hosted_product,interactive_text_generation,confirmed,campaign_statement_and_direct_observation,established_evidence,clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004,"Exact model, API or consumer route, system prompt, retrieval, context and safety settings were not disclosed."
|
| 10 |
+
tech-usca11-stack,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,Amazon Web Services|Google,hosting and analytics stack,unknown,commercial_infrastructure,hosting_analytics_and_data_capture,reported,privacy_policy,established_evidence,clm-usca11-007,Infrastructure listing does not establish which service saw which fields.
|