Question:
You are given the full text of a scientific research paper.

    Summarize the **research methods** used in the study in a way that is informative for policy audiences. Your response should:
    - Describe the overall study design, data sources, tools, and models used
    - Avoid unnecessary technical details or equations
    - Use accessible but precise language

    Write a short paragraph suitable for the “Scientific Research Study Methods” section of a policy brief.

    Scientific Research Paper:
    Articles
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01268-3
1Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA. 2Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal, Montréal,
Québec, Canada. 3Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. 4Institute of Political Science and
Oeschger Center for Climate Change Research, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland. ✉e-mail: mildenberger@ucsb.edu
I
n recent years, over 3,500 US economists, including 27 Nobel prize
winners1, and 1,600 European economists2 have signed public
statements advocating carbon taxation. As a policy tool, carbon
taxes offer theoretical cost effectiveness, price stability and adminis-
trative simplicity. However, these potential economic advantages can
come with a steep political price. Carbon taxes have been rejected
in referenda and elections3–7, been reversed after political back-
lash8,9, been opposed by a substantial proportion of the public10–12
and generated political controversy whenever debated across
advanced democracies9,11,13–16. Scholars have identified diverse bar-
riers to public acceptance of carbon taxes, including perceptions
that the policy will not reduce emissions, that it is too costly, that it is
regressive and that it might undermine economic prosperity10,11,17–20.
In response to this opposition, interest has grown in deploying
carbon tax revenues to boost public support. Carbon tax revenues
can be directed towards environmental spending4,6,7,17,21–30 or can be
paired with tax cuts, although this latter approach may be less effec-
tive than green spending at reducing public opposition23,24,28,30,31 or
only effective for some voters22,32,33. However, earmarking through
either spending or tax cuts may lack high visibility6,34, and voters
may distrust that governments will deliver or maintain these
benefits23,33,35,36. Instead, it has been suggested that highly visible
lump-sum rebates or ‘dividends’ could be more effective in winning
public support and reinforcing that support over time as beneficia-
ries become accustomed to regular dividends37. The hypothetical
potential of climate rebates to increase public carbon pricing support
has been shown in the United States4,17,20,21,29, Canada38, Norway35,
Switzerland39, the United Kingdom4,30, Australia4, Germany17,
Turkey27, France40 and India4. These studies offer strong reasons
to expect that bundling carbon taxes with lump-sum rebates could
increase public acceptance.
However, other studies offer more sobering assessment. Surveys
measuring public support for hypothetical policies may overestimate
voters’ support when confronted with real-world costs. For example,
polling overestimated voter support for failed carbon tax refe
renda in Washington state5 and Switzerland39. Voters’ perceptions
of rebate costs and benefits may also be shaped by competing par-
tisan and interest-group narratives5,40,41. More broadly, voters are
often unaware they receive even high-profile government benefits42.
In light of these competing perspectives, the political impact of
climate rebates requires testing in the context of real-world policies,
as they are implemented. Two such policies currently exist, in
Canada and Switzerland. In Canada, the federal government
imposed a carbon tax and rebate scheme for households as part
of its national strategy for pricing carbon in 2019, which currently
applies in four of the country’s ten provinces (covering over half of
the Canadian population). The tax was initially set at 20 Canadian
dollars (Can$20) per tonne, rising to Can$50 per tonne by 2022.
In December 2020, the government announced a revised schedule
increasing to Can$170 per tonne by 2030. The associated rebate,
called the Climate Action Incentive Payment, is based on the number
of adults and children in each household, with a 10% increase
for rural households. It is delivered through an income tax credit
to one adult per household. All tax revenues are returned to the
province of origin. Because provincial emissions per capita vary
widely, rebate sizes also vary by province. For example, the average
dividend in Saskatchewan is almost double that in Ontario. The
policy is highly progressive, with 80% of households receiving
more in dividends than they pay in carbon taxes43. Supplementary
Section 1 details Canadian federal and provincial carbon pricing.
By contrast, Switzerland established its climate rebate pro-
gramme in 2008 as part of an escalating carbon tax that reached 96
Swiss francs (CHF96) per tonne by 2018. In Switzerland, roughly
two-thirds of revenue is redistributed to businesses and the pub-
lic. Public rebates are given on a per capita basis, with every person
(including children) receiving an equal amount. Citizens receive
their rebates as a discount on their health insurance premiums,
with annual notifications about this monthly benefit through health
insurance forms. In a June 2021 referendum, Swiss voters narrowly
rejected a climate law that would have increased the carbon tax level
and associated rebate amounts. Supplementary Section 2 details the
Swiss policy context.
Limited impacts of carbon tax rebate programmes
on public support for carbon pricing
Matto Mildenberger   1 ✉, Erick Lachapelle   2, Kathryn Harrison3 and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen   4
Revenue recycling through lump-sum dividends may help mitigate public opposition to carbon taxes, yet evidence from real-world
policies is lacking. Here we use survey data from Canada and Switzerland, the only countries with climate rebate programmes,
to show low public awareness and substantial underestimation of climate rebate amounts in both countries. Information was
obtained using a five-wave panel survey that tracked public attitudes before, during and after implementation of Canada’s 2019
carbon tax and dividend policy and a large-scale survey of Swiss residents. Experimental provision of individualized information
about true rebate amounts had modest impacts on public support in Switzerland but potentially deleterious effects on support
in Canada, especially among Conservative voters. In both countries, we find that perceptions of climate rebates are structured
less by informed assessments of economic interest than by partisan identities. These results suggest limited effects of existing
rebate programmes, to date, in reshaping the politics of carbon taxation.
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We evaluate the effect of real-world dividends on public sup-
port for carbon taxes in both countries. In Canada, we report an
original five-wave panel survey of Canadians from February 2019 to
May 2020. Our sample included residents from five provinces, two
subject to the federal carbon tax (Saskatchewan and Ontario), one
with provincial emissions trading (Quebec) and two with provin-
cial carbon taxes (British Columbia and Alberta). Alberta repealed
its provincial tax midway through our study, prompting introduc-
tion of a federal-tax and rebate scheme in 2020. We surveyed the
same respondents after the federal carbon tax was announced but
before it was implemented (February 2019), soon after implementa-
tion (April 2019), after residents of federal-tax provinces received
their rebates (July 2019), after a federal election in which carbon
pricing was a prominent issue (November 2019) and one year after
policy implementation (May 2020). In wave 4, we embedded a sur-
vey experiment exposing respondents to individualized informa-
tion about their actual rebates. In Switzerland, we fielded a survey
of 1,050 Swiss residents in December 2019, which also included an
embedded survey experiment where respondents were exposed to
information on their actual policy rebates. We provide full details
on Canadian and Swiss surveys in Methods.
We begin with data from our longitudinal Canadian survey,
visualizing public support for carbon pricing by province over time
(Fig. 1). Canadian carbon tax support remained relatively stable
across our panel. In the rebate province of Ontario, public support
by wave 5 was within two percentage points of wave 1. However,
between waves 1 and 4, carbon pricing support did increase in the
rebate province of Saskatchewan, before declining through wave 5
for a net gain of five percentage points to 32%. The final wave fol-
lowed the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, although COVID inci-
dence in rebate provinces was still low; for example, in Saskatchewan,
there had been a total of only 176 cases and 2 COVID-related
deaths in advance of wave 5 (ref. 44). Federal COVID-related financial
assistance was already available to respondents by this time. Trends
in carbon pricing opposition are similar (Extended Data Fig. 1 and
Supplementary Section 4). We also conduct exploratory statistical
analysis comparing trends in rebate versus non-rebate provinces
(Supplementary Section 5).
These provincial averages mask strong partisan differences in
carbon pricing support (Fig. 2). Policy support was concentrated
among Liberal Party of Canada supporters (the party that imple-
mented the policy) versus Conservative Party of Canada support-
ers (the opposition party that strongly opposed it) and remained
stable through time. Conservative opposition persisted in both
federal-tax (rebate) and provincial pricing (non-rebate) provinces.
By wave 5, 75% and 81% of Liberal Party supporters in Ontario and
Saskatchewan, respectively, supported carbon pricing, compared
with 32% and 13% of Conservative Party supporters in these same
provinces. Partisan splits across rebate and non-rebate provinces
show similar trends (Extended Data Fig. 2 and Supplementary
Section 6). These partisan differences persist even after condition-
ing on respondents’ individual cost exposure (Extended Data Fig. 3
and Supplementary Section 7).
For rebate policies to offer political benefits to incumbent gov-
ernments, the public must perceive those benefits42,45. We test public
knowledge about existing rebate programmes in both Canada and
Switzerland. We first test Canadian respondents’ specific knowl-
edge about their rebates. In wave 3, immediately after residents of
Ontario and Saskatchewan received their rebates, we asked respon-
dents whether they had received a climate-related benefit as part of
their federal income tax returns (Supplementary Section 8). Many
Canadians did not know, including 17% in rebate provinces and
between 33% and 36% in non-rebate provinces. In Ontario, only
0
25
50
75
Public support for carbon pricing (%)
Wave 1
(February)
Wave 2
(April)
Wave 3
(July)
Wave
Wave 4
(November)
Wave 5
(May)
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Ontario
Québec
Fig. 1 | Support for carbon pricing by province across waves. The dotted
line indicates when the federal carbon tax policy came into effect. The
solid line indicates the approximate period during which households
received their climate rebates. The dashed line indicates the timing of a
federal election in which the carbon tax was highly salient. Respondents
in Saskatchewan and Ontario received climate rebates. Data from
respondents who completed all five waves (n = 899). Error bars depict
95% confidence intervals. Supplementary Section 3 reproduces this figure
for the first four waves only (n = 1,190), finding identical trends across this
expanded sample.
0
25
Public support for carbon pricing (%)
50
75
100
Wave 1
(February)
Wave 2
(April)
Wave 3
(July)
Wave
Wave 4
(November)
Wave 5
(May)
Liberal (Québec and British Columbia)
Liberal (Saskatchewan and Ontario)
Conservative (Québec and British Columbia)
Conservative (Saskatchewan and Ontario)
Fig. 2 | Support for carbon pricing among Liberal Party and Conservative
Party voters by rebate versus non-rebate province. The dotted line
indicates when the policy came into effect. The solid line indicates the
approximate period during which households received their climate
rebates. The dashed line indicates the timing of a federal election in
which the carbon tax was highly salient. Voters are classified according
to their wave 1 (pre-policy implementation) party preferences. Albertan
respondents are excluded because Alberta switched from being a
non-rebate province to being a rebate province between waves 1 and 5.
Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals.
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55% of residents correctly believed they had received a rebate, while
Saskatchewan residents were more aware (75%). By contrast, about
11% and 13% of individuals in the non-rebate provinces of Alberta
and British Columbia incorrectly reported rebate receipt.
We then asked respondents to estimate the size of any rebate
they believed their household had received (Table 1). We compare
perceived amounts to the true average rebate for our survey respon-
dents (see Methods for details). Residents in non-rebate provinces
nonetheless estimated a positive average rebate amount, a misper-
ception that continued after the fall 2019 election (Supplementary
Section 9). In rebate provinces, our survey averages reflect a 40%
underestimation in Saskatchewan and 32% underestimation in
Ontario of true rebate amounts. Limiting our analysis to respon-
dents who correctly believed they had received a rebate, the
Ontario average estimate was CDN$198 (standard error (s.e.) $13),
only a 9% underestimation, and the Saskatchewan average esti-
mate was CDN$315 (s.e. $13), a 29% underestimation. Still, only
24% of Ontario respondents and 19% of Saskatchewan respon-
dents estimated a rebate amount falling within CDN$100 of their
true rebate (Extended Data Fig. 4 and Supplementary Section 10).
These misperceptions are associated with party preference. In both
provinces, respondents who consistently indicated they would vote
for the anti-carbon tax Conservative Party systematically estimated
lower rebate amounts (Supplementary Section 10). We also find
persistent confusion among respondents as to whether the pro-
vincial or federal government is responsible for carbon pricing in
their province, with some learning across the panel (Supplementary
Section 11).
We conduct a similar analysis in Switzerland. Consistent with
previous surveys7,46, we find limited knowledge of the Swiss rebate
Table 1 | Average estimated and true rebate sizes for sample, by
province
Province
Average perceived
rebate (CDN$)
True average
rebate (CDN$)
Received federal rebate
Saskatchewan
268 (13)
444
Ontario
149 (11)
217
Did not receive federal
rebate
British Columbia
63 (9)
0
Alberta
83 (9)
0
Québec
54 (10)
0
Standard errors in parentheses. See Methods for details on calculating true average rebate.
1.00
a
b
c
d
0.75
0.50
Fraction of survey respondents
0.25
0
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0
Yes
Cantonal
tax
None
Less than
CHF3
CHF
3–10
CHF
10–15
Do not
know
National
tax
Health
bill
Pension
contribution
Electricity
bills
Do not
know
No
Response
Response
Response
Response
Do not know
Public
rebates
Renewable
energy
Gov.
spending
Do not know
1.00
0.75
0.50
Fraction of survey respondents
0.25
0
1.00
0.75
0.50
Fraction of survey respondents
Fraction of survey respondents
0.25
0
Fig. 3 | Knowledge about the Swiss scheme among December 2019 survey respondents. a–d, Responses to survey questions: belief that Switzerland has
a carbon tax on fossil fuels (a), belief regarding what most carbon tax revenue is directed towards (b), belief regarding what tax revenue is redistributed to
reduce (c), perceived monthly rebate size (d). Correct choices are highlighted in green.
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policy. Although the policy has been in place for over ten years, only
12% of respondents knew tax revenues were redistributed to the
public, and 85% did not know they received a health bill discount
associated with the country’s carbon tax (Fig. 3). Every Swiss
resident receives CHF5.35 per month (in 2019) as their rebate, but
only 13% of respondents knew (or correctly guessed) the monthly
rebate was between CHF3 and CHF10.
Low public awareness of rebates in Canada and Switzerland may
stem from the indirect mechanisms through which governments
in both countries redistribute their climate dividends. Using two
survey experiments, we assess whether increasing rebate aware-
ness through individualized rebate information increases support
for existing and future carbon taxes. Here, low existing public
knowledge allows us to randomize information about government
benefits that respondents already receive, providing a second-best
approximation for experimental manipulation of rebate receipt
itself. However, our experiments ultimately identify the effect of
information about rebates on public support, not the direct effect of
rebates themselves. These experiments also focus on testing infor-
mation about policy benefits, rather than policy costs.
In Canada, half of wave 4 survey respondents from Ontario and
Saskatchewan (n = 605) were randomly assigned a custom mock-up
of their own tax return with their true climate dividend promi-
nently displayed (Supplementary Section 12 describes treatment;
Methods describes calculation details; Supplementary Section 13
shows experimental balance.) Receiving treatment led respondents
to increase perceptions of their household’s rebate size, suggesting
at least partial updating in the treatment group (Supplementary
Section 14). However, treatment did not change carbon pricing sup-
port (Fig. 4a: Difference-in-Means (DIM) = –0.0342, s.e. = 0.106,
P = 0.747). Instead, information about their true benefit decreased
respondents’ belief that the rebates were sufficient to cover their tax
exposure (Fig. 4b: DIM = –0.136, s.e. = 0.0662, P = 0.0398). As such,
Canadians who learned the true value of their rebates were signifi-
cantly more likely to perceive themselves as net losers even though
most Canadians are net beneficiaries. This shift was concentrated
among Conservative Party of Canada supporters (DIM = –0.213,
s.e. = 0.102, P = 0.0391).
In our December 2019 Switzerland survey, half of respondents
were randomly assigned an encouragement treatment to leave
their computers mid-survey and retrieve their health insurance
forms; respondents were then asked to report the size of their
benefit. All treated respondents were then shown a sample health
form with benefit size highlighted (Supplementary Section 15
provides example), irrespective of whether they reported having
found their personal form (Supplementary Section 16 shows
experimental balance). Unlike in Canada, we find personal rebate
information increased support for the current scheme on a
four-point scale by around one-fifth of a standard deviation
(DIM = 0.18885, s.e. = 0.06155, P < 0.01; Fig. 5a). These results hold
on both the right and left sides of the political spectrum but not
for centre-party supporters. However, treatment had no effect on
support for either small (equivalent to CHF0.03 per litre increase
in heating oil costs; DIM = 0.06213, s.e. = 0.09744, P = 0.524) or
large (equivalent to CHF0.15 per litre increase in heating oil costs;
DIM = 0.11182, s.e. = 0.09396, P = 0.235) increases in the Swiss
carbon tax rate.
Beyond low visibility, we also consider alternative reasons for
the weak effects of rebates on public opinion. In Canada, carbon
pricing preferences might have remained relatively stable despite
rebates because the political benefits of revenue recycling came with
policy announcement (before our wave 1), not during implemen-
tation (our panel period). Two pieces of evidence suggest this as
unlikely. First, we find little baseline knowledge about the rebate
in wave 1, which we would expect if anticipation of future rebates
had already increased support (Supplementary Section 11). Second,
the announcement of a federal rebate policy for Alberta occurred
between waves 2 and 3, after a newly elected provincial government
repealed the provincial tax, which did not provide universal rebates.
This prompted the federal government to step in to announce it
would impose a tax and rebate policy over the objection of the pro-
vincial government (as in Saskatchewan and Ontario.) However,
we find no announcement effect in Alberta, where carbon pricing
support trends roughly in parallel with other provinces after policy
announcement (Fig. 1).
4
a
b
3
2
Group
All
Conservative
Liberal
NDP
Support for existing policy (4-point scale)
Belief receive more than pay (scale from –1 to 1)
1
1.0
0.5
0
–0.5
–1.0
Control
Treatment
Treatment status
Control
Treatment
Treatment status
Group
All
Conservative
Liberal
NDP
Fig. 4 | The effect of rebate information on carbon pricing support in
Canada. a,b, Exposure to individualized information about a respondent’s
true climate rebate amount in Canada did not shape carbon pricing support
(a) but instead generated a backlash by making respondents believe they
paid more in tax than they received as their rebate (b). Full sample is in
black, with subgroups defined by wave 4 party preference. Error bars depict
95% confidence intervals. NDP, New Democratic Party.
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Another possibility is that policy preferences remain condi
tioned primarily by partisanship. We find that Conservative
Party supporters are more likely than Liberal Party supporters to
acknowledge having seen negative ads about carbon pricing and
to report that these ads made them less supportive of this policy
(Supplementary Section 18). Similarly, respondents who report
having voted for the Conservative Party in the Fall 2019 election
were more likely to underestimate their rebates, even when exposed
to information about their true rebate amount in our survey
experiment (Supplementary Section 19). More broadly, in the two
federal-tax provinces, supporters of the Liberal Party of Canada
were three to eight times more likely to support the carbon tax
than were Conservative Party supporters. Similarly, in Switzerland,
left-leaning voters were 48% more likely to support rebates relative
to right-leaning voters. In short, partisanship does structure both
carbon tax preferences and patterns of rebate responsiveness.
Finally, our Canadian results might be a function of survey design
effects. However, we find no such effects using independent samples
of provincial respondents across the survey’s first four waves
(Supplementary Section 20). Accordingly, response consistency in
panel surveys is unlikely to account for weak rebate effects47.
Overall, our results speak to growing interest in recycling carbon
tax revenues in the form of lump-sum rebates to mitigate persistent
public opposition to carbon taxes. We explore existing policies, as
implemented, in Canada and Switzerland using a new longitudinal
opinion panel as well as two survey experiments. We find only
limited evidence that these existing policies have reshaped the
politics of carbon pricing to date. Members of the public in both
countries remain ill-informed about the rebates they are already
receiving and systematically underestimate their size. These low
levels of awareness may stem from rebates delivered via a credit
against a (tax or insurance) bill rather than a more-visible check in
the mail and, in the case of Canada, a highly politicized communi-
cation environment. Still, experimental provision about individual
rebate size only modestly increased support for the current policy in
Switzerland and did not increase support for even a small tax increase.
In Canada, information about rebate size did not increase policy
support, but instead led Conservative Party respondents to believe
the policy imposed net costs on their household.
These findings imply that one-time information does not sub-
stantially affect policy support. While results from non-climate
domains may not extrapolate to carbon taxation19, previous studies
suggest learning over time built public support for conges-
tion taxes48–50 and solid-waste charges51. Yet public ignorance of
dividends has persisted for more than a decade in Switzerland,
and our Canadian panel covered a period in which the carbon tax
was highly salient by virtue of the policy’s implementation, court
challenges, federal–provincial conflict and partisan debate during
a federal election, a most likely case for public learning about the
rebate scheme.
a
b
c
4
3
2
1
3
4
2
Support for existing policy (4-point scale)
Support for small carbon tax increase
(4-point scale)
4
3
2
1
Support for large carbon tax increase
(4-point scale)
1
Control
Treatment
Treatment status
Control
Treatment
Treatment status
Control
Treatment
Treatment status
Group
All
Right
Centre
Left
Group
All
Right
Centre
Left
Group
All
Right
Centre
Left
Fig. 5 | The effect of rebate information on carbon pricing support in Switzerland. a–c, Exposure to individualized information about a respondent’s
true climate rebate amount in Switzerland increased support for the existing policy (a) but not support for either small (b) or large (c) future carbon tax
increases. Full sample in black, with subgroups based on ideological position of preferred political party (Supplementary Section 17 provides classification
details). Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals.
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Altogether, results from these studies paint a more complex
picture of the benefits of lump-sum carbon tax rebates than did
previous surveys and laboratory experiments using hypothetical
policies. While the climate-dividend policies in Switzerland and
Canada diverge from policy ideals, trading off public transparency
for administrative efficiency, we note that these are the only two
extant examples of carbon tax and dividend globally. Both were
implemented in the context of partisan and interest-group debates,
including widespread dissemination of selective or misleading
information. As always, both policy design and attitudinal change
may still occur. The government of Canada has announced that
future rebates, which will steadily increase in value, will be delivered
to households directly. However, in Switzerland, voters rejected
an increase in the country’s carbon tax rate, alongside increased
rebates, in June 2021 when faced with intense politicization of
policy costs by opponents. The evolution and impact of new rebate
designs, increasing tax rates and benefit sizes, and potential shifts in
partisan positions remain for future research.
Online content
Any methods, additional references, Nature Research report-
ing summaries, source data, extended data, supplementary infor-
mation, acknowledgements, peer review information; details of
author contributions and competing interests; and statements of
data and code availability are available at https://doi.org/10.1038/
s41558-021-01268-3.
Received: 29 October 2020; Accepted: 15 December 2021;
Published online: 24 January 2022
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Methods
Our paper draws from four new data sources. First, we report a new survey
dataset, the Canadian Climate Opinion Panel (CCOP). Second, we report a survey
experiment embedded in the fourth wave of the CCOP. Third, we report a large-n
survey of Swiss residents conducted in December 2019. Fourth, we report a survey
experiment embedded in this Swiss survey. We discuss each dataset and the
methods used to analyse it, in turn.
CCOP. The CCOP was a custom five-wave public opinion panel survey
administered online to a sample drawn from the Leger 360 platform. This platform
is a web-based pool of over 400,000 Canadians, 60% of which were recruited
randomly via random-digit dialling. From this pool, an initial sample of 3,313
panellists was generated for five Canadian provinces: Alberta (n = 663), British
Columbia (n = 661), Ontario (n = 660), Québec (n = 661) and Saskatchewan
(n = 668). These provinces were selected to ensure representation of provinces
subject to the federal carbon tax and dividend as well as provinces exempt from the
federal carbon tax because of provincial policies deemed equivalent to the federal
carbon price. Respondents were remunerated by Leger at a rate of CDN$1 to
CDN$3 per wave depending on survey length.
Panellists were invited to participate in the study and answered the first
questionnaire between 21 February and 5 March 2019. During this wave, we
obtained 3,313 completes and a combined American Association of Public Opinion
Research (AAPOR) RR3 response rate of 18%. AAPOR RR3 rates incorporate
an estimate of eligibility among respondents of unknown eligibility into the
response-rate denominator, offering a conservative response-rate estimate52.
Panellists were subsequently recontacted between 10 and 28 April 2019, after the
federal carbon tax policy came into effect on 1 April. During this second wave,
responses were received from 2,189 returning panellists from Alberta (n = 437),
British Columbia (n = 434), Ontario (n = 440), Québec (n = 439) and Saskatchewan
(n = 439). An additional 252 respondents (50 from each province except
Saskatchewan, where 52 completed) were added to this wave as a check against
panel experience, resulting in a total sample of 2,441. The combined AAPOR RR3
response rate for this portion of the fieldwork was 50%. A third invitation went
out to panellists between 27 June and 19 July 2019, after the majority (over 96%)
had completed their income tax returns and thus would have received their rebate
if eligible. In this wave, we secured completes from 1,509 panellists from Alberta
(n = 303), British Columbia (n = 301), Ontario (n = 301), Québec (n = 300) and
Saskatchewan (n = 304). Another 251 respondents (50 from each province except
Quebec, where 51 completed) were added as a check against panel experience, for
a total of 1,760 completes. The AAPOR RR3 response rate for this third wave was
49%. We then secured 1,440 completes in the fourth wave following the October
2019 federal election, of which 1,190 were returning panellists. The remaining 250
over sample were equally distributed across the five provinces. The fieldwork for
this portion of the study was conducted between 22 November and 16 December
2019. The AAPOR RR3 response rate for this portion of the fieldwork was 56%.
Finally, a total of 899 panellists completed a fifth wave of our survey administered
between 13 and 28 May 2020. This included 200 from British Columbia, 176 from
Alberta, 161 from Saskatchewan, 193 from Ontario and 169 from Québec. The
AAPOR RR3 response rate for returning panellists in wave 5 was 76%. Our overall
sample was broadly representative of population characteristics of each province,
including age, gender, education and income (Supplementary Section 21). The
survey received a human subjects review from the Université de Montréal’s Comité
d’éthique de la recherche en arts et humanités (certificate CERAH-2019-016-D).
All survey respondents provided informed consent before beginning the survey.
We find no evidence of systematic attrition of respondents in our later waves on
the basis of observed demographic characteristics (Supplementary Section 22).
A concern in any public opinion panel is that respondents are repeatedly
exposed to a topic, shaping their beliefs and opinions as a function of
panel participation. Panel design effects of this sort can compromise the
representativeness of a panel over time. In the context of the present study,
panel design effects are of even greater potential concern. Climate dividends, as
implemented by the Canadian federal government, are integrated into a complex
federal income tax system, which would tend to dampen respondents’ awareness
and understanding of the policy. Further, contentious political debates have created
a confusing messaging environment for Canadians about the structure, value and
presence of carbon pricing policies in various provinces. If panel respondents,
by virtue of their participation in our study, became more informed about and
engaged with climate dividends, then preference shifts within the panel could be a
misleading indicator of the dividend’s effects on the general public’s preferences. To
measure potential design effects, we collected a random sample of new respondents
during waves 2, 3 and 4 (n = 252 in wave 2, n = 251 in wave 3 and n = 250 in wave
4). These respondents were randomly sampled across the five survey provinces
in equal proportion, equivalent to our sampling procedure in the broader panel
survey (Supplementary Section 20).
Canada survey experiment. Before deploying wave 4, we estimated the objective
rebate received by each survey respondent from Ontario and Saskatchewan, using
their province of residence, reported marital status (including common law),
number of children residing with them as reported in wave 3 and whether their
residence is rural (for example, outside a census metropolitan area (CMA)) and
thus eligible for an additional rebate. These factors completely determine dividend
levels within the current Canadian policy, which we calculated using Revenue
Canada income tax worksheets. Note that dividend levels are not a function of
income in Canada. For CMA measurements, we determine the respondent’s
place of residence using the Postal Code Conversion File provided by Statistics
Canada, which gives us a range of geographic identifying variables (such as
residence in a CMA and electoral district) for each of the self-reported postal codes
collected in our survey. We summarize the rebate calculation process for 2019 in
Supplementary Section 23. As part of an embedded survey experiment in wave 4,
we randomly assigned half the respondents to receive a filled-out tax form that
showed them their own household rebate amount (Supplementary Section 12).
Details about question wording in our survey instrument are presented in
Supplementary Section 24. All respondents were given the option of responding in
either English (n = 752) or French (n = 147).
Swiss public opinion survey. We fielded an online survey of 1,050 Swiss residents,
quota sampled on age, gender and language, in December 2019. The survey was
provided in German and French but not Italian, which is the official language in
the canton of Ticino as well as some municipalities in Graubünden. Nevertheless,
the survey covers respondents from all Swiss cantons. Overall, the sample quite
closely matches the Swiss population; however, as typical for such surveys, the
groups of the lower educated (secondary education I) as well as the oldest age
groups are somewhat underrepresented (Supplementary Section 26). A copy
of the Swiss survey instrument is also provided in Supplementary Section 26.
The survey received a human subjects review from the University of California
Santa Barbara’s Office of Research Human Subjects Committee (protocol number
21-19-0801). All survey respondents provided informed consent before beginning
the survey.
Swiss survey experiment. As part of this December 2019 Swiss survey, half of
respondents were randomly assigned to an encouragement treatment, where we
asked respondents to pause their survey and retrieve their most recent health
insurance form. Respondents were then asked to let us know what the size of
their rebate benefit was. Because all Swiss residents receive the same amount, we
then displayed a sample document (in their language of survey response) to all
respondents in the treated group, whether they reported finding their bill or not
(Supplementary Section 15 for example). We then measured respondent support
for the existing Swiss policy and their potential support for either a small (from
CHF0.25 to CHF0.28 per l heating oil) or large (to CHF0.40 per l heating oil) tax
increase (respondents were randomly asked for their preferences on either of these
two cost settings). A summary of all variables used as well as descriptive statistics
for the Swiss data can be found in Supplementary Section 27.
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the
Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All supporting data are available through a Harvard Dataverse replication archive
at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3WBCH9.
Code availability
All supporting code is available through a Harvard Dataverse replication archive at
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3WBCH9.
References
	52.	Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for
Surveys (AAPOR, 2015).
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by grants (initials of grant principal investigators in
parentheses) from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
Partnership Granthad (M.M., E.L. and K.H.), theSmart Prosperity Institute at the
University of Ottawa (M.M., E.L. and K.H.), the Economics and Environmental Policy
Research Network of Canada (M.M., E.L. and K.H.) and the Centre for International
Governance Innovation (#5597, K.H.), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (#435-2017-1388, E.L.), the Institute for Social, Economic and
Behavioral Research at UC Santa Barbara (M.M.) and the Hellman Fellows Fund (M.M.).
We thank participants at the UC Santa Barbara Environmental Politics Workshop, Swiss
Political Science Association annual meeting, Environmental Politics and Governance
conference, L. Fesenfeld, P. Bergquist, C. Fischer, P. Quirk, G. de Roche and C. Hazlett
for comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
Author contributions
M.M., E.L. and K.H. designed, collected and analysed the Canadian data presented
here. M.M. and I.S.-S. designed, collected and analysed the Swiss data presented here.
All authors contributed to the writing of the paper.
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Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Additional information
Extended data is available for this paper at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01268-3.
Supplementary information The online version contains supplementary material
available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01268-3.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Matto Mildenberger.
Peer review information Nature Climate Change thanks Thomas Bernauer, Nicholas Rivers
and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work.
Reprints and permissions information is available at www.nature.com/reprints.
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Extended Data Fig. 1 | Opposition to carbon pricing by province across waves. Wave 1 was conducted in February 2019 and wave 5 in April 2020. The
dotted line indicates when the federal carbon tax policy came into effect. The solid line indicates the approximate period during which households received
their climate rebates. The dashed line indicates the timing of a federal election in which climate policy, including the carbon tax, was highly salient.
Respondents in Saskatchewan and Ontario received a federal climate rebate associated with Canada’s 2019 carbon tax. Other respondents were subject
to provincial carbon pricing policies that had few, if any rebate, components. Error bars give 95% confidence intervals.
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Extended Data Fig. 2 | Support for carbon pricing among Liberal and Conservative voters, by rebate vs. non-rebate province. The dotted line indicates
when the policy came into effect. The solid line indicates the approximate period during which households received their climate rebates. The dashed line
indicates the timing of a federal election in which climate policy, including the carbon tax, was highly salient. Voters are classified according to their wave
1 (pre-policy implementation) party preferences. Since Alberta only became subject to the federal tax, and thus eligible for the federal dividend, between
wave 4 and 5 (and Albertan respondents had not received a rebate as of wave 5), we bundle Albertan data with the non-rebate provinces. Error bars give
95% confidence intervals.
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Extended Data Fig. 3 | Support for carbon pricing among Liberal and Conservative voters, by cost exposure. Cost exposure measured by whether
respondents report driving alone to work, or whether they report a different means of getting to work (transit, walk, cycle, carpool, work/study from home).
Individuals who chose the survey option ‘This question doesn’t apply to me’ when asked how they get to work are excluded from the figure. The dotted line
indicates when the policy came into effect. The solid line indicates the approximate period during which households received their climate rebates. The
dashed line indicates the timing of a federal election in which climate policy, including the carbon tax, was highly salient. Voters are sorted according to
their wave 1 (pre-policy implementation) party preferences and self-reported means of getting to work. Error bars give 95% confidence intervals.
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Extended Data Fig. 4 | Distribution of perceived household rebate sizes for Canadian panel. Responses from respondents who remained in the panel as
of wave 3 and resided in the rebate provinces of Ontario and Saskatchewan. The correct answer for each set of respondents is highlighted in green.
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    Scientific Research Study Methods:

Answer: Our analysis draws on public opinion surveys in the only two countries to have adopted carbon taxes with widespread rebates. In Switzerland, we surveyed 1,050 adults nationwide in 2019, half of whom were randomly selected to receive information on how the rebate works as well as on the value of their carbon tax rebates. In Canada, carbon pricing varies across provinces. We surveyed a cohort of residents (n = 890) in five provinces over five waves between 2019 and 2020, before, during and after implementation of Canada’s tax and rebate programme. In the two provinces where rebates were implemented, half of the respondents were randomly provided accurate information about their tax dividends. Comparing rebate perceptions and carbon tax support between those who received accurate information and those who did not allowed us to assess the impact of rebate information on public support for carbon pricing.