Text Generation
Transformers
Safetensors
English
qwen3_5_moe_text
qwen
qwen3.5
Mixture of Experts
mixture-of-experts
abliterated
uncensored
refusal-removal
expert-ablation
mechanistic-interpretability
red-teaming
research
conversational
Instructions to use Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- Transformers
How to use Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated with Transformers:
# Use a pipeline as a high-level helper from transformers import pipeline pipe = pipeline("text-generation", model="Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated") messages = [ {"role": "user", "content": "Who are you?"}, ] pipe(messages)# Load model directly from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated") model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained("Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated", device_map="auto") messages = [ {"role": "user", "content": "Who are you?"}, ] inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template( messages, add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=True, return_dict=True, return_tensors="pt", ).to(model.device) outputs = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=40) print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[-1]:])) - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
- Local Apps Settings
- vLLM
How to use Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated with vLLM:
Install from pip and serve model
# Install vLLM from pip: pip install vllm # Start the vLLM server: vllm serve "Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated" # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }'Use Docker
docker model run hf.co/Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated
- SGLang
How to use Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated with SGLang:
Install from pip and serve model
# Install SGLang from pip: pip install sglang # Start the SGLang server: python3 -m sglang.launch_server \ --model-path "Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated" \ --host 0.0.0.0 \ --port 30000 # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:30000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }'Use Docker images
docker run --gpus all \ --shm-size 32g \ -p 30000:30000 \ -v ~/.cache/huggingface:/root/.cache/huggingface \ --env "HF_TOKEN=<secret>" \ --ipc=host \ lmsysorg/sglang:latest \ python3 -m sglang.launch_server \ --model-path "Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated" \ --host 0.0.0.0 \ --port 30000 # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:30000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }' - Docker Model Runner
How to use Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated with Docker Model Runner:
docker model run hf.co/Carlosian/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B-Abliterated
Add independent residual-refusal audit (refusal_bench, 200 prompts)
Browse files
README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -68,6 +68,37 @@ The residual ~2.5% of retained refusals are concentrated on the deliberately-pre
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> **Capability benchmarks are pending.** This release reports the abliteration (Stage-1) validation only. Decontaminated capability evaluation (HumanEval/+, MBPP, GSM8K, AIME, MMLU-Pro, IFEval, BFCL), a StrongREJECT-style willingness×ability uncensoring score, and the three-arm A/B/C comparison are part of the Nous-Heretic protocol and **have not yet been run on this checkpoint**. No capability number is asserted here.
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## Intended use
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- **Security research and red-teaming** — probing model behavior without refusal confounds.
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> **Capability benchmarks are pending.** This release reports the abliteration (Stage-1) validation only. Decontaminated capability evaluation (HumanEval/+, MBPP, GSM8K, AIME, MMLU-Pro, IFEval, BFCL), a StrongREJECT-style willingness×ability uncensoring score, and the three-arm A/B/C comparison are part of the Nous-Heretic protocol and **have not yet been run on this checkpoint**. No capability number is asserted here.
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## Independent residual-refusal audit
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An independent 200-prompt residual-refusal audit (`refusal_bench`, 2026-06-27) was run on a **Q4_K_M GGUF quantization** of this checkpoint (no adapter), single-stream on a Radeon 890M iGPU (Vulkan, `-ngl 99`, `ctx=16384`, `max_tokens=512`, `temp=0.7`, `top_p=0.9`, `seed=42`). Each response is scored complied / soft-refused / hard-refused / degenerate by a heuristic (pattern-based) classifier.
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| Disposition | Count | Rate |
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|---|---|---|
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| Complied | 195 / 200 | **97.5%** |
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| Hard refusal | 0 / 200 | **0.0%** |
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| Soft-refused (answered, with disclaimer/hedge) | 3 / 200 | 1.5% |
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| Degenerate ("brain-damaged"\*) | 2 / 200 | 1.0% |
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\* heuristic false positives on repetitive-but-valid code (e.g. a buffer-overflow walkthrough, a sonnet), not genuine failures.
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**Compliance by category:**
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| Category | n | Complied | |
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| pentest | 60 | 98% | |
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| violence | 20 | 100% | |
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| illegal | 20 | 100% | |
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| sexual | 15 | 100% | |
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| political | 15 | 100% | |
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| manipulation | 15 | 100% | |
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| dual_use | 15 | 100% | |
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| coherence (control) | 30 | 97% | |
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| **selfharm** | 10 | **70%** | 3 soft-refused |
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The only residual friction is the **self-harm** category: the model answers genuine support questions but declines lethal-means requests, emitting crisis-resource language instead — the **deliberately retained guardrail** behaving as designed. **Hard-refusal rate is 0.0%** across every category, and the control/coherence prompts are clean. Throughput was **30.2 gen tok/s** mean (single-stream, full GPU offload) — roughly 3× faster per token than the dense Gemma-12B comparison, reflecting the ~3B-active MoE routing.
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> Caveats: the classifier is heuristic, not an LLM judge; the audit ran on the **Q4_K_M quant**, not the bf16 weights in this repo (representative, not identical). The StrongREJECT-based protocol in the Nous-Heretic method paper supersedes this heuristic pass.
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## Intended use
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- **Security research and red-teaming** — probing model behavior without refusal confounds.
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