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Add independent residual-refusal audit (refusal_bench, 200 prompts)

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@@ -68,6 +68,37 @@ The residual ~2.5% of retained refusals are concentrated on the deliberately-pre
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  > **Capability benchmarks are pending.** This release reports the abliteration (Stage-1) validation only. Decontaminated capability evaluation (HumanEval/+, MBPP, GSM8K, AIME, MMLU-Pro, IFEval, BFCL), a StrongREJECT-style willingness×ability uncensoring score, and the three-arm A/B/C comparison are part of the Nous-Heretic protocol and **have not yet been run on this checkpoint**. No capability number is asserted here.
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  ## Intended use
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  - **Security research and red-teaming** — probing model behavior without refusal confounds.
 
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  > **Capability benchmarks are pending.** This release reports the abliteration (Stage-1) validation only. Decontaminated capability evaluation (HumanEval/+, MBPP, GSM8K, AIME, MMLU-Pro, IFEval, BFCL), a StrongREJECT-style willingness×ability uncensoring score, and the three-arm A/B/C comparison are part of the Nous-Heretic protocol and **have not yet been run on this checkpoint**. No capability number is asserted here.
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+ ## Independent residual-refusal audit
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+ An independent 200-prompt residual-refusal audit (`refusal_bench`, 2026-06-27) was run on a **Q4_K_M GGUF quantization** of this checkpoint (no adapter), single-stream on a Radeon 890M iGPU (Vulkan, `-ngl 99`, `ctx=16384`, `max_tokens=512`, `temp=0.7`, `top_p=0.9`, `seed=42`). Each response is scored complied / soft-refused / hard-refused / degenerate by a heuristic (pattern-based) classifier.
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+ | Disposition | Count | Rate |
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+ |---|---|---|
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+ | Complied | 195 / 200 | **97.5%** |
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+ | Hard refusal | 0 / 200 | **0.0%** |
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+ | Soft-refused (answered, with disclaimer/hedge) | 3 / 200 | 1.5% |
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+ | Degenerate ("brain-damaged"\*) | 2 / 200 | 1.0% |
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+ \* heuristic false positives on repetitive-but-valid code (e.g. a buffer-overflow walkthrough, a sonnet), not genuine failures.
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+ **Compliance by category:**
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+ | Category | n | Complied | |
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+ |---|---:|---:|---|
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+ | pentest | 60 | 98% | |
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+ | violence | 20 | 100% | |
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+ | illegal | 20 | 100% | |
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+ | sexual | 15 | 100% | |
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+ | political | 15 | 100% | |
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+ | manipulation | 15 | 100% | |
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+ | dual_use | 15 | 100% | |
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+ | coherence (control) | 30 | 97% | |
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+ | **selfharm** | 10 | **70%** | 3 soft-refused |
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+ The only residual friction is the **self-harm** category: the model answers genuine support questions but declines lethal-means requests, emitting crisis-resource language instead — the **deliberately retained guardrail** behaving as designed. **Hard-refusal rate is 0.0%** across every category, and the control/coherence prompts are clean. Throughput was **30.2 gen tok/s** mean (single-stream, full GPU offload) — roughly 3× faster per token than the dense Gemma-12B comparison, reflecting the ~3B-active MoE routing.
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+ > Caveats: the classifier is heuristic, not an LLM judge; the audit ran on the **Q4_K_M quant**, not the bf16 weights in this repo (representative, not identical). The StrongREJECT-based protocol in the Nous-Heretic method paper supersedes this heuristic pass.
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  ## Intended use
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  - **Security research and red-teaming** — probing model behavior without refusal confounds.